COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THAILAND (U)
Volume IV, Appendixes: The Insurgent Threat and the RTG Countersurgency Effort
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FOREWORD

This study responds to a request made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Institute for Defense Analyses to undertake a study of counterinsurgency in Thailand.1 The main objective of the study is to "provide data and a rationale to affect the recurrent policy decision on ways to counter the insurgency in Thailand while avoiding or minimizing US military involvement." In general, the study request requires an assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the Thai political, economic, social, paramilitary, and military institutions and programs for coping with the insurgency, and a determination of the degree of US support, if any, required to assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in countering the threat.

The specific requirements of the study include:


2. An estimate of the maximum level of insurgency that the Thai military and paramilitary forces might be expected to counter without commitment of US military forces.

3. The capabilities and constraints of the Thai political, economic, and social institutions for countering insurgency.

4. Indications of where parallels and experience from past insurgencies, particularly in Vietnam, could apply to Thailand.

5. Missions and tasks of Thai military and paramilitary forces which, in the light of past experience and Thai non-military factors, could be most effective against insurgency.

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(6) Broad guidance for specifying how Thai military and paramilitary forces could be structured, organized, equipped, and trained to cope with the current and selected levels of increased insurgency growth and activity within Thailand, and if they cannot, to specify the short fall to illuminate the degree to which US military commitment and other US support may be required.

(7) Implications of the above for US support.

On December 27, 1967, the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) noted that "the increased control in the Northeast by the Thai Second Army has been viewed in some quarters with considerable concern as 'further militarization' of the counterinsurgency effort. Behind this concern lies a fear that undue emphasis will be placed on military suppression operations, that the various civil programs will suffer from lack of Army understanding and support, and that police effectiveness will be reduced by Army usurpation of police functions." Accordingly, SACSA asked the study group to make pertinent investigations and to reach conclusions with regard to the appropriate balance between the military and civil aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. This request for additional study was approved by Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Memorandum to SACSA dated January 12, 1968.
Commander in Chief of the Pacific, US Army Pacific, and the US Military Command Thailand. Studies by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, the Research Analysis Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, and other organizations were also consulted. Interviews were conducted with military personnel at CINCPAC and at the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Civilian personnel in the State Department and Agency for International Development in Washington, in the US Embassy in Bangkok, and in the US offices in Udorn, Sakhon Nakhon, and Chiang Mai were also consulted.
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UNCLASSIFIED
PREFACE

The main emphasis of this study is directed toward assessing the counterinsurgent capabilities and limitations of the police, paramilitary, and military organizations of the Royal Thai Government and toward appraising the insurgent threat. Accordingly, only those aspects of Thailand's political, economic, and social characteristics which bear directly on the Royal Thai Government's ability to conduct effective counterinsurgent operations are treated. Since the nature of insurgency in Thailand dictates that offensive military operations be conducted primarily by elements of the Royal Thai Army, the study concentrates on the Army's capabilities and limitations. The study does not purport to be, nor is it, a study in depth of the Thai political system, economy, or society.

Case studies of past insurgencies, including Malaya, Algeria, the Philippines, Cuba, Kenya, Greece, and South Vietnam, were prepared as a basis for assessing the capability of the Royal Thai Government to cope with the insurgency. The lessons learned from these studies were synthesized into general principles of successful counterinsurgency operations and specific principles of military strategy and tactics for combating low-level insurgency. These principles were prepared for the guidance of the study group and were not intended as scientific treatises.

The study is based on extensive examinations of written material on Thailand and on interviews with knowledgeable US officials, both in the United States and in Thailand. No attempt was made to conduct original research. The written material consulted came from a variety of sources including the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Army,
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THE INSURGENT THREAT

1
I

INTRODUCTION

(U) The purpose of this analysis is to provide a basis for understanding the Communist insurgency in Thailand and the threat that the insurgency represents to the Royal Thai Government.

(U) The analysis treats the strategy, techniques, and regional manifestations of the insurgency with emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent political and military apparatus. The study also outlines the background of Communism in Thailand, the development and organization of the Communist Party of Thailand, and the relative roles played by Communist China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in providing political guidance, control, and support to the Thai insurgency. The growth potential of the Communist insurgency in Thailand is discussed separately in this report in Section IV of Volume I.

(U) The analysis is based on data derived from intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the individual military Services. The study also draws on numerous interviews with knowledgeable US officials in Washington, Honolulu, and Thailand.
II

CHRONOLOGY OF INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

(U) 1927 Chinese and Vietnamese Communist refugees enter Thailand following the split between Kuomintang and Communist factions in China. Joining hands with Chinese Communists already in Thailand, they form an International Marxist Study Group. While this Group is predominantly Chinese, it is headed by Ho Chi Minh, Senior Comintern Officer in Southeast Asia. The group is oriented toward Indochina.

(U) 1932 Non-Communist coup overthrows absolute monarchy in Thailand. Communists attempt to exploit coup's liberal objectives by stepping up radical activities.

(U) 1933 Communist activities are restricted by enactment of laws making them punishable by fine and imprisonment. The ban is generally effective, although Communist activity continues underground.

(U) 1936 Communists attempt to gain support among overseas Chinese in Thailand for defense of China following the Japanese invasion.

(U) 1941 Japan occupies Thailand. Communists attempt to recruit new members, appealing to Thai patriotism. Communists make significant headway in Thai labor movement, which is predominantly Chinese.

(6) 1 December 1942 First Party Representatives Assembly (FRA) is held in Bangkok. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is formally established. Chinese and Vietnamese dominate leadership.

(6) 1943 After Comintern is abolished, the CPT becomes a national party with Thai citizenship a prerequisite for membership. Chinese without citizenship join Thai branch of Chinese Communist Party (CCF) or the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT), which was formed ostensibly to thwart Kuomintang activity in Thailand.
1946 Prime Minister Pridi obtains repeal of anti-Communist laws, influenced by his own leftist political orientation and as a measure to gain Soviet support for Thailand's admission to the United Nations.

1947 Communists extend their influence throughout the labor movement, dominate the legally registered Bangkok Labor Union, and establish the General Labor Union of Siam, a national federation of trade unions, which, in 1949, became affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions, a Communist front.

1947 Pridi is overthrown by a conservative coup and exiled. Communist activity in Thailand is subjected to close supervision but not suppression.

1949 Chinese Communist Party of Thailand is ostensibly abolished following Communist victory in China. The Communist Party of Thailand remains the only recognized Communist party in Thailand. (In fact, the CCPT continues as a parallel organization until about 1956, when Peking orders it dissolved.)

February 1952 At the Second Party Representatives Assembly the CPT approves a resolution proclaiming "armed struggle" as the path to socialism in Thailand. In accordance with Maoist doctrine, the Party declares the peasants the main source of strength for a revolutionary army.

1952 Anti-Communist laws are re-enacted. Suppression is vigorous. Virtually all overt activity stops. CPT's clandestine organization is severely disrupted. Surviving leaders go into hiding or flee to China.

1955-1958 Thai Government again adopts a permissive attitude towards CPT. The CPT remains underground but takes advantage of government's leniency to expand its influence in every sphere. The laborers of Bangkok and farmers of the Northeast are targeted.

1958 Marshal Sarit takes over Thai Government and stringently enforces the anti-Communist laws. Repression is severe, but the CPT is better prepared than in 1952. Operations continue at a slower pace.
(U) 1960 The Malayan Emergency ends. The remnants of the Malayan Communist guerrillas gradually retreat to Thailand's southern provinces. The force of 600 to 800 men is composed largely of ethnic Chinese and headed by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Malaya, an ethnic Chinese.

(S) 1961 The CPT officially adopts the strategy of armed revolution at its Third Party Representatives Assembly. The Party plans a transitional phase during which armed units will be formed. It is decided to focus the insurgency on the Northeast, where a partial base has already been laid.

(U) 1962 Thai Government takes severe measures against Communists, executes two leaders. Some CPT leaders want to abandon Bangkok operations and take refuge in the Northeast.

(S) 1963 CPT Politburo members meet in Peking and discuss concept of making the "jungle soldiers" the principal subversive instrument and requiring the urban elements to support rather than lead.

(S) October 1964 CPT Politburo meets in the Northeast and officially adopts the concept discussed in Peking in 1963. This concept had in fact been guiding operations for nearly a year.

(S) 1965 Government forces inflict heavy losses on insurgent cadre. CPT Politburo declares a "new phase" of the revolution in which armed units are instructed to attack government forces, conduct forced propaganda meetings, and perform other acts of insurgency. The CPT unwillingly and prematurely relinquishes its plan for securing a solid base before igniting armed insurgency.
III

THE PARTY ORGANIZATION

(7) The Communist Party of Thailand has about 1,000 members, of whom perhaps 300 are dedicated workers. The CPT has no elected chairman, but Phichit Na Sukothai has been accepted as Honorary Chairman in deference to his age and experience. The Party is organized on the pattern of national Communist parties throughout the world, although it incorporates special features to meet local conditions. (See Figure 1.)

(5) The Party Representatives' Assembly (PRA) is theoretically the highest governing body of the Party, since it is empowered to determine policy, delineate objectives, elect members to the Central Committee, and review actions taken by the Central Committee. In practice, however, power is wielded by the Secretary-General, the Politburo, and the Central Committee on the ground that security conditions preclude "normal" functioning of the Party machinery. For example, the PRA has been convened only twice (in 1952 and 1961) since the Party was founded on December 1, 1942, although Party regulations call for an assembly every five years. Also, delegates to the PRA have been appointed by the Politburo rather than elected by the entire Party membership. Attendance at the infrequent assemblies has varied in accordance with security conditions and decisions
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP: 1000

IN THEORY: TO BE HELD EVERY 5 YEARS
IN PRACTICE: ONLY 3 HAVE BEEN HELD
(1942, 1952, and 1961)

ELECTED BY PRA, THE CC MEMBERS (25)
THEN ELECT CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF CC WHO ARE ALSO

CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF POLITICAL BUREAU, GOVERNING BODY OF
CPI (10 MEMBERS). MEMBERS MEET ANNUALLY

SECTIONS

PROPAGANDA
ORGANIZATION
ECONOMIC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AD HOC

SPECIAL NORTHEASTERN JUNGLE REGION

BRANCHES OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

NORTHEAST
NORTH
SOUTH
CENTRAL

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES

DISTRICT COMMITTEES

VILLAGE COMMITTEES

UNIT COMMITTEES

SUB-UNIT COMMITTEES

CHAIRMEN OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES ARE ALSO POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBERS

PARTY STRUCTURE, BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL, BREAKS DOWN CONSIDERABLY BELOW THE BRANCH LEVEL. FROM THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL ON DOWN, PERSONNEL OF THE COMMITTEES ARE APPOINTED BY CC.

CELLS

3-11 MEMBERS, FORMED IN AREAS WITH OVER 7 PARTY MEMBERS

3-7 MEMBERS, USUALLY IN FACTIONS AND COMMITTEES NOT MENTIONED ABOVE.

CONTROLLED DIRECTLY
BY POLITICAL BUREAU

FIGURE 1 (A), Communist Party of Thailand Organization (U)
of the Central Committee to permit participation of lower level cadre.

The Central Committee has approximately 25 members and alternates, who are elected by the PRA and serve from one Assembly to the next. The Committee selects the Secretary-General of the Party and the members of the Politburo from its own membership. It is supposed to meet once a year but actually meets less frequently.

The Secretary-General supervises the execution of policies and decisions nominally made by the PRA and administers Party affairs in general. He serves as Chairman of the Central Committee as well as Chairman of the Politburo and is the most important official in the Party.

The 10 or 11 members of the Politburo, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, collectively dominate the CPT through their ability to control the election of Central Committee members and to oversee all operations. Formally constituted as the highest administrative organ of the Party, the Politburo manages its affairs through five sections: Propaganda, Organization, Economic, Foreign Affairs, and Ad Hoc.

Four regional branches of the Central Committee were established in 1962 as part of the CPT's preparation for armed revolution. The first was formed in the Northeast with four members; others were subsequently set up in the North, South, and Central regions. Each branch is authorized to act for the entire Central Committee in developing and implementing policy in its region. Since the chairmen of the regional branches are also members of the Politburo, effective control of regional activities also resides in that body.

The national Party leadership employs the regional branches of the Central Committee to tighten control over activities in the field, to compensate for poor local leadership in the provinces, and to enhance security. To provide for additional control of the armed Communist insurgents operating in the Northeast, the Politburo established a Special Northeastern Jungle Region headquarters in 1962. This group operates directly under the supervision of the
Politburo and is responsible for the overall planning, direction, and coordination of all armed subversive operations in that region.

Prior to establishment of the regional branches of the Central Committee in 1962, the CPT was theoretically organized geographically along lines corresponding to the provinces, districts, tambons, and villages of the Royal Thai Government administrative structure. Committees at each level were to be elected by local representatives' assemblies. In practice, however, the geographic boundaries of the local Communist organizations were determined by the number of members available and the requirements of Party activity rather than by Thai administrative boundaries, and the local committee members were appointed by the Central Committee rather than elected by the local assemblies. It is not clear how much of the committee structure remains in place at the provincial and lower levels since the establishment of the branches of the Central Committee at the regional level.

The fundamental elements of Communist Party organization in Thailand are the unit committees or "cells." Composed of three to 11 members, cells are formed in any village, town, factory, or group which contains more than seven Party members. Unit-committee or cell members are appointed by higher authority in the Communist hierarchy, as are the chairmen of the small groups. Subunits of three to seven Party members are often formed to operate directly under unit chairmen. The regional and local organization of the CPT is described more fully in the section of this Appendix which deals with the regional insurgent movements.
IV

INSURGENT STRATEGY, TECHNIQUES, AND TRAINING

A. THE CPT STRATEGY FOR REVOLUTION

(5) The strategy for insurgency in Thailand reflects the dominant role of Communist China in the Communist Party of Thailand. As a consequence, the model for revolution is a Maoist-type, rural-based insurgency calling for the establishment of a political infrastructure, formation of a guerrilla force, and a gradual expansion of political and military control over the population and territory of Thailand, with the eventual goal of bringing down the government. The key element of this strategy, the so-called L-Plan, dictates a linkup of insurgency in the Northeast with that in the North, using the mountain chains as base areas, with external support introduced across the border from Laos.

(8) The tactics employed to implement the insurgent strategy are the classic Communist techniques of persuasion through propaganda, coercion through terror, and armed operations. Techniques of propaganda and coercion are summarized immediately below, followed by a brief description of insurgent training.

B. TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION AND COERCION

1. Propaganda Targets

(9) In accordance with the Maoist strategy of a rural-based insurgency, the principal target of insurgent propaganda is the

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villager, be he ethnic Thai or a member of one of the racial minorities. Some propaganda is directed to a more general audience, including the Buddhist priesthood, the educational community, and labor groups in Bangkok. However, the CPT has apparently decided not to establish the large number of front organizations which have marked Communist operations in South Vietnam. The characteristics of the ethnic Thai villager and his relative lack of susceptibility to Communist propaganda and indoctrination are discussed in Volume II, Part III, "Susceptibility of the Thai Peasant to Communism at Present and in the Immediate Future." A description of the racial-minority targets for Communist propaganda follows.

(U) a. The Racial Minorities in General. While the population of Thailand is remarkably homogeneous, racial minorities, numbering about 4 million and distributed throughout the country in strategic geographical areas, make up about 13 percent of the population. Of these, the Sino-Thais are the largest group, numbering about 3 million. While the Sino-Thais are found in every town and large village, they have concentrated primarily in Bangkok, where they account for about one-third of the population. Another major concentration of Sino-Thais is located near the tin mines and rubber plantations in the South. The Thai-Malays, numbering about one million, are also concentrated in the South, with the majority located in the provinces bordering Malaysia. The Vietnamese minority, though relatively small—numbering between 45,000 and 60,000 depending on the source used, occupies an important area bordering the Mekong in Northeast Thailand. The Phu-Thais, a small, ethnic Thai sub-group numbering about 100,000, are also strategically located in Northeast Thailand. Small minority groups of Cambodians and Soais are found in the southern portion of Northeast Thailand along the Cambodian border.

(U) About 250,000 primitive hill tribesmen inhabit the mountainous border areas of North Thailand and the Burmese-Thai border from north to south. The major groups are the Karen, the Akha, and the Lisu,
whose ethnic ties are with groups in Burma; and the Meo (50,000) and the Yao (12,000) whose ethnic ties are with China. Of these groups, the Yao and Meo occupy the strategic border area in the North between Laos and Thailand. These minority groups differ sharply from one another as well as from the ethnic Thais. Some have grievances against the government; all offer a potential for exploitation by the Communists.

(U) b. Sino-Thai. The Chinese minority is made up of three classes—wealthy and influential businessmen, small businessmen, and laborers. Both the influential and small businessmen are concentrated in the Bangkok area, while the laborers are located chiefly in Bangkok and in the South. In spite of considerable assimilation, some members of the Chinese business community in Bangkok retain fairly strong cultural and nationalistic ties with mainland China. The fact that Peking is the moving force behind the current insurgency and that Sino-Thais hold the key positions of leadership in the Communist Party of Thailand indicates that some of this group have already taken the step toward subversion of the Royal Thai Government. However, as in the Malayan insurgency, the pragmatic Chinese community as a whole is likely to withhold active support unless the government appears to be threatened seriously. In that event, a significant portion of the Chinese community might be expected to support an insurgent movement.

(U) The insurgency potential of the Sino-Thai laborers in the provinces bordering Malaysia is clearer. It is known that they are under the complete control of the Malayan Communist Party (Communist Terrorist Organization). They provide the recruits, food, and money necessary for support of the Party, which is regarded as the best-organized and best-trained subversive movement in Thailand. While the Party's current target is Malaysia, it could probably be changed to Thailand by a Peking directive.

(U) c. Thai-Malay. The Thai-Malay constitute about 80 percent of the population in the four southernmost provinces of Thailand.
bordering Malaysia. Like the Chinese, this group differs radically from the ethnic Thai in almost every cultural aspect. Sporadic attempts by the Thai government to assimilate the Malays through compulsory Thai language training and Buddhist religious teachings led to resistance and some support of a separatist movement during the early 1950's. As a result, the government has been pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward this group, i.e., exhibiting more leniency toward teaching of the Malay language and Muslim religion. Latent differences between the government and the Malays continue to exist, however. Fortunately, the Communist Terrorist Organization in Thailand, which is oriented toward the overthrow of the Malaysian government, does not appear to have gained the support of a significant number of Thai-Malays, due in part to its aims and in part to the Malay antipathy toward the Chinese membership of the Party. Nevertheless, the Thai-Malay have their grievances against the RTC, plus a natural desire to become a part of Malaysia. The Malaysian government has had the good sense not to support the Thai-Malays in a separatist movement. However, clever exploitation of the subversive potential remains a possibility and must be regarded as a weakness in the Thai society.

(U) d. Vietnamese. The Vietnamese minority group, composed of survivors and descendants of Vietnamese refugees who fled to Thailand during the Indochina war, has settled in the Northeast in the provinces bordering the Mekong River. While the government originally welcomed these refugees and gave them land, it became alarmed when the strong orientation of this group toward the Communist regime of North Vietnam became apparent. A repatriation program was initiated in 1959, but it was later suspended at the insistence of North Vietnam because, according to Hanoi, the US bombing of North Vietnam made it impossible to ensure the safety of the refugees. The industry, frugality, and business acumen of the Vietnamese are at least equivalent to those of the Chinese; they have established highly successful retail businesses and have engaged in truck gardening and produce retailing. They have settled in
ethnic pockets comprising entire villages or homogeneous sections of Thai villages, and they have retained strong cultural affiliations and nationalistic ties with North Vietnam.

(U) The Royal Thai Government has officially discouraged assimilation of the Vietnamese. It has established controls to prevent migration of refugees to other parts of Thailand and to inhibit routine movement outside of Vietnamese communities. Restrictions on land ownership have been imposed, and there has been some official discussion of resettling the entire group on a large off-shore island. The official RTG resistance to the group is shared by many Thai villagers who come in contact with the Vietnamese. Their antagonism and dislike are based on more pragmatic considerations, however; they resent the superior business acumen of the Vietnamese, and they believe that the Vietnamese and the Chinese are the mainspring of the insurgency. Many Thai villagers would like to break the Vietnamese and Chinese control of business or drive the "foreigners" out of the country.

(5) There is evidence that the Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam has exploited the loyalties of the Vietnamese to Hanoi as well as the cultural and economic antipathies between the refugees and the Thais. The North Vietnamese enclave in Northeast Thailand appears to be tightly organized on the classic Communist model. When and if Hanoi decides to capitalize on these subversive assets, there is little doubt that the support of the Vietnamese community would be almost total.

(5) The geographical distribution of the Vietnamese in the Northeast would contribute to their subversive potential. They occupy the provinces of the Northeast in the areas on or adjacent to the Mekong River in an arc extending from Nong Khai, opposite Vientiane in Laos, to Ubon province, opposite Pakse. This position could be readily exploited as a transmission belt between Laos and the Northeast for messages, infiltrators, arms, and other supplies required to support an insurgency. While the North Vietnamese in Laos do not control the Mekong River Valley, there is no argument that they could capture the valley in a matter of days, if not hours. In addition, it is unlikely
that the RTG could prevent infiltration across the Mekong. The potential of the Vietnamese in the Northeast in an insurgency is hard to overestimate.

(U) Other Minority Groups. The Phu-Thai, dispersed in communities in Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon, and Roi Et provinces in the Northeast, may have a potential for insurgency. While culturally similar to the Thais, they are characterized by more ambition, drive, and organizational ability than the ethnic Thais in the Northeast. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Phu-Thais consider it necessary to demonstrate their loyalty to the RTG.

(U) Smaller numbers of non-ethnic Thai groups are also located along the borders of Thailand. For example, the Khmer (estimated to number between 160,000 and 400,000) and the Soai, or Kui, are found adjacent to the Cambodian border. Along the Burmese border are located the Mon, estimated between 60,000 and 100,000; the Karen, between 60,000 and 90,000; and the Shan, about 30,000. Although most of these groups have their own languages, other cultural differences are not great. Most of them are Buddhists, to some degree, although they also adhere to various animistic cults. Many have already adopted Thai as a second language, a process speeded up by compulsory education, and Thai is increasingly supplanting their native tongues. There is no reason to believe that any serious grievances exist among these minority groups; their exploitable insurgency potential appears to be low.

(U) The Northern hill tribes, located chiefly in the rugged mountainous border areas, are another matter. They dwell in altitudes from 2,500 to 6,500 feet above sea level. The tribes are not a homogeneous group; there is great diversity in their languages, clothing styles, and religions. The religions are all basically forms of primitive animism—Buddhism has never really penetrated into the hill tribes. The tribesmen subsist on "slash-and-burn" agriculture and grow opium poppies for cash. They raise pigs, chickens, and cattle, and supplement their diet through hunting. Their political organization is
primitive—with headmen or chiefs either elected or appointed. Generally speaking, they are as economically prosperous as the ethnic Thai in the Northeast as long as their (illegal) sale of opium continues.

(U) Both the government and the ethnic Thais tend to look on the hill tribes as barbarians, and the hill tribes reciprocate with suspicion and animosity. However, for years there was little contact with the hill tribes by either the RTG or the lowland Thai dwellers. In the 1950's, the Border Patrol Police, who were assigned the responsibility of policing the 3,000 miles of Thailand's border, including the hill tribe areas, began trying to win the allegiance of the hill tribes through a modest program of development. Village schools were established, vegetable growing was encouraged, and livestock was improved. To compensate for the lack of roads, helicopters were used to insert patrols; helicopter pads were constructed to facilitate this process. On the other hand, the growing of poppies and the slash-and-burn technique of agriculture were discouraged. These efforts to force the hill tribesmen to abandon traditional agricultural practices were resisted. The RTG has also attempted to prevent the tribesmen from acquiring weapons.

(U) Tribal grievances—against the RTG and the Thai people make these minorities an important target for subversion. Of the various groups, the Meo and the Yao appear to be most dangerous, since they occupy the strategic border area in Northern Thailand contiguous to the areas of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao; they are also the most warlike of the hill tribes, along with the Lahu. The fact that Meos in Laos constitute fierce opposition to the Pathet Lao confirms their warlike characteristics and also indicates that they can be marshalled against Communism as well as for it.

2. Propaganda Sources

(X) Apart from what is disseminated by the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) in South Thailand, most insurgent propaganda in Thailand can be traced to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).
Written propaganda is signed by a multiplicity of authors, but explicit references clearly reveal the predominant influence of the CPT.

Unlike written propaganda, verbal recruitment appeals and indoctrination material in the villages emanate primarily from the local farmers' fronts and guerrilla bands. The CPT designation is less frequently used at the village level, but Communist connections and revolutionary goals are not particularly concealed.

3. Written and Oral Propaganda

a. Dissemination. The volume of written propaganda, although small in relation to the Viet Cong output, is nevertheless quite large for the current levels of insurgent operations. Aside from CTO propaganda in the South, the greatest number of Communist documents collected by Thai authorities have come from the areas of intensive insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand. Significant numbers of documents, however, have also been found in the sensitive provinces of West Central and Mid-South Thailand. Relatively little written propaganda material from North Thailand has been found, probably because of both the low literacy rate and the isolation of the area.

Handwritten leaflets distributed at the village level and indoctrination-training texts have frequently been found in security-sensitive areas, supplementing the Communist Party and front propaganda distributed throughout Thailand.

b. Themes and Styles. Written propaganda themes in Thailand are consistent with the ideological positions of Asian Communism as typified by North Vietnam and China. The themes emphasize national revolution, anti-imperialism, and the protracted guerrilla struggle. There appears to be little deliberate concealment of typical ideological positions in written propaganda. The themes often occur even in brief leaflets, but in simplified form because they are aimed at an unsophisticated audience and are designed for tactical purposes.

Tactical emphasis is placed on "political" (anti-RTG and anti-US) themes rather than on economic arguments or commentaries on social conditions. Attacks on current RTG suppression activity
and official misbehavior are particularly frequent. Some of the attacks reveal the existence of real government problems as well as the current tactical concerns of the insurgents. Relatively few attacks are made on specific developmental efforts of the RTG, and the insurgents themselves do not present a detailed program for economic or social improvement. Threats are employed extensively in the literature in conjunction with an appeal to the recipient to "reform" and support the cause.

(?) In content and style, Communist radio propaganda is more like nationally distributed CPT documents than village-level leaflets. It is prepared at similar Communist organizational levels and intended for similar audiences.

(?) c. Verbal Propaganda, Recruitment, and Related Insurgent Activity. Verbal propaganda and recruitment are utilized more than written propaganda in areas of active insurgency. These activities are intertwined with efforts to get persons to support the insurgents tangibly, and they are often undertaken before a serious attempt is made to convince the people of the value of the movement. Recruitment appeals in Northeast Thailand appear to contain more explicit threats, arguments against high taxes, and promises of personal gain than written propaganda. Personal promises, an effective verbal appeal, are made less often in written propaganda, probably because no record is wanted of unfulfilled promises.

(?) Anti-US and anti-RTG arguments are quite common in verbal propaganda, although they appear less frequently than in written materials. Appeals to simple rural virtues and stress on the good behavior, friendship, and local origins of the insurgents are also common.

(?) The thrust of recruitment efforts is not to make the villager a "true believer" but to lead him into involvement with the movement—from which he will find it difficult to extricate himself. In other words, total indoctrination is not the aim of the insurgent recruiter even though ideological themes may be employed.
Recruitment approaches are simple and direct. The main techniques include direct personal approach, contact through family, "cell-chain" techniques (as in chain letters), deception, the building up of a feeling of obligation, and forced involvement.

Indoctrination. Indoctrination material differs considerably from propaganda and recruitment appeals addressed to ordinary villagers. It contains much more explicit information on the organization, strategy, and tactics of the movement. Nevertheless, indoctrination has evidently produced relatively few hard-core cadre members in Northeast Thailand.

The impact of indoctrination may be less in how much the recruit actually believes or understands of what he has been told than in the realization given him of his depth of involvement in a subversive organization. After receiving indoctrination, it is much more difficult for the recruit to recant, whether he is convinced or not.

Insurgent indoctrination on discipline and security reflects the sparsity of hard-core followers. Procedures concentrate on manipulating the fears of unreliable persons so as to reduce the likelihood of their acting in a manner harmful to the movement.

There is a large number of detailed rules governing various aspects of the insurgent movement. As in indoctrination in general, these regulations are presented in a fairly unimaginative manner in which repetition and strong warnings of punishment for disobedience are prominent. Emphasis on discipline and security varies inversely to emphasis on expansion and recruitment.

4. Terror and Armed Propaganda

Terror. The absolute number of incidents involving terror in Thailand is small. Even in the most sensitive districts of the Northeast, most villagers have not been personally hurt by insurgent activities. Although infrequent, these incidents may have a major influence on a village's decision to join or support the insurgents, for they vividly illustrate insurgent capabilities. While
violent acts are targeted fairly specifically against opponents of the insurgent movement, their impact is high because there are seldom significant social or cultural differences between the victims and the ordinary villagers.

b. Armed Propaganda. This technique has been extensively employed in Northeast Thailand. It is a formally developed tactic with roots in the Communist theory of guerrilla warfare and in the experience in Vietnam. Not merely a cover for foraging expeditions, armed propaganda meetings may serve to:

1. demonstrate a lack of government security in an area,
2. demoralize government representatives and agents in the villages,
3. eliminate government informants through threats or violence,
4. make initial contacts which can be followed up by individual propagandists and recruiters,
5. entice villagers into supporting actions (such as selling food) that can be used as leverage in later recruitment efforts,
6. terrorize villagers into noncooperation with authorities, and
7. cultivate insurgent informants.

Considerable planning and organization lie behind the conduct of armed propaganda meetings in Thailand. Insurgent units are specially trained, villages are targeted and surveyed, and manpower is mobilized to conduct such operations.

Although armed propaganda requires more organization and planning than many other insurgent activities, about 25 percent of all reported incidents in one year were of this type. It is one of the primary tactics used to open up new areas to insurgent influence.

C. TRAINING

In the Northeast, three different types of training "programs" can be identified through examination of interrogation reports and other intelligence data. The simplest program is a one-day effort
conducted near the villages. Somewhat more complicated training is conducted at more distant sites, where the recruits stay overnight or perhaps a week or more. "Advanced" training takes place in a semi-permanent camp with recruits segregated into separate units according to their proficiency or amount of involvement in the movement.

One-day instruction does not require a real training facility. The location is chosen for its proximity to the village, security features, and suitability for conducting the minimal training given. Usually no more than 10 persons participate; they may include new recruits, support personnel, or village cadre. Training may be introductory to participation in the local guerrilla unit or it may be more on the line of general psychological conditioning. Instruction often consists of a propaganda speech, discussion of tasks to be completed upon return to the village, and practice in preliminary marksmanship. The latter is normally carried out with dummy weapons. Little, if any, tactical instruction is given.

In the second type of training, a primitive facility is provided. Temporary shelters may be built, and trenches and foxholes are often dug. There are usually about 10 trainees. The curriculum is an elaboration of the first type of training. Simple tactics may be taught, and instructions given in small arms assembly and disassembly. There is little if any actual firing practice. Heavy stress is placed on discipline and security procedures. When this training is completed, the villager may be passed on to a larger group, or he may be returned to his village to perform assigned tasks or to await a call to join the guerrillas. A training experience of this kind implicates the villager deeply in the insurgent movement in addition to providing him with skills the insurgents can draw upon.

The third type of training involves actual insurgent groups (rather than the one or two instructors assigned to conduct the simpler forms of training). Not more than 30 trainees usually participate, however. The training often takes place in a semipermanent facility with huts or tents. The sentinels often occupy foxholes or
other prepared positions. The site is hardly sophisticated, but it is the most developed insurgent facility in many areas. 

(2) "Advanced" training covers the same subjects as the other types but is more intensive. Great emphasis is placed on discipline and security, and use of cover names is normal. The new arrival, who may have come to the camp directly rather than through one of the other training stages, is likely to be given the usual basic instruction on firing positions and weapons assembly. More time, however, is spent on small-unit tactics, including patrolling, setting up ambushes, and defensive maneuvering. In addition, the trainee performs guard duty and may go on food-gathering expeditions as "on-the-job" training.

(2) When the trainee finishes his "class," he may pass from his initial unit to another (there are usually three at the training site). Indoctrination may be quite extensive, including day-long sessions.

(2) Two general characteristics of insurgent training are evident. First, training is limited in scope, whether it consists of the simplest two- or three-hour session or a week or more at a guerrilla campsite. Second, training is "unspecialized." All recruits are taught the same things, with variations only in duration of instruction. Even the insurgent leadership appears to be largely unspecialized. The same person often helps in weapons training, gives propaganda lectures, enforces discipline, and so on.

(2) Even unsophisticated training of the kind outlined above may be unused for long periods of time when the movement stresses recruitment and building support rather than combat. For example, insurgents in the Northeast and in other areas (notably Prachuap Khiri Khan province in West Central Thailand) have demonstrated their ability to lay clever and successful ambushes, but relatively few

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2. By contrast, the CTO in South Thailand have over the years constructed large, permanent camps with a number of comforts. See Stanford Research Institute publications covering this subject.
ambushes have occurred. A June 1967 ambush of two VDC members in Prachuap Khiri Khan involved a ruse to lead the victims to the ambush area, use of a string as a silent signaling device, and the positioning of sharpened bamboo sticks to impale the victims if they dived into the underbrush. A September 1967 ambush in the same area which killed 10 and an earlier ambush in Nakhae district of Nakhon Phanom (killing seven) were similarly professional. In one listing of Northeast incidents for the first 7 months of 1967, however, only five ambushes were reported. The great majority of insurgents have never participated in anything so dramatic.

(7) In short, training is geared to a low level of conflict in which large coordinated operations are not contemplated and in which specialized tasks can be performed by a small leadership core. An effort is made to make the recruit loyal and disciplined; beyond this, only a basic tactical capability is sought. In psychological terms, undergoing the training may make the recruit feel his actions are irreversible; if he gets involved in a fire fight or takes part in an armed propaganda meeting, this feeling is intensified. On the other hand, interrogations of trainees indicate that the training period is largely a bore. In the absence of offensive actions, the trainee may spend weeks or months in the same uncomfortable camp listening to repetitive lectures or performing mundane tasks. The excitement of evading RTG patrols, taking part in forced village meetings, or going on food-gathering missions may be insufficient to break the fundamental monotony. Training thus ties the recruit closer to the movement but also involves hardships and monotony which could ultimately lead to defection.

(7) There is firm evidence that Thai Communists have been trained in Laos, North Vietnam, and China. Training in China, principally for high-level CPT functionaries, began as early as the 1950's. Such training is evidently aimed largely at ideological and strategic indoctrination. Training has been provided for lower level recruits in Laos and North Vietnam. Since 1960, an estimated 1,000 recruits have passed through these training areas and have been returned to
Thailand. In the early 1960's, large numbers of Northeast villagers reportedly received instruction in guerrilla tactics and recruitment techniques near Mahaxai, Laos, and in other Pathet Lao areas. The trainees later served with the Pathet Lao and then returned for operations in Thailand. A few Thais have gone abroad for specialized training in various Communist countries.

(6) Currently, the largest and best-known foreign training effort is that conducted at a CPT training school at North Vietnam. The training at this school is illustrated by the experience of a typical trainee, a man in his early twenties, from the province of Ubon. The young man was originally contacted in his home village in 1965 by a stranger who asked him if he wanted a better life and, if so, what kind. He replied that he would like to be a doctor; the stranger then indicated that it would be possible for him to study abroad. In April 1965 the villager was taken along with two or three others to the town of Nakhon Phanom. There they crossed the Mekong, were met by a group of Pathet Lao soldiers, and were escorted by changing groups of guides to North Vietnam. The journey (by foot) took 18 days.

(6) Upon reaching Vietnam, the villager was taken to a camp near Hanoi, known as the "Hoa Binh School." There he met 130 other Thai trainees, including 18 women. Most came from the Northeast, but some came from Central and South Thailand. He was given six months of political training and two months of military training. The former consisted of basic indoctrination and instruction in propaganda and recruitment techniques, while the latter focused on weapons instruction and small-unit tactics. The villager reported that the camp was about five years old and that large numbers of Thais had been routed through it.

(6) Testimony of other persons trained at the camp indicates that it is regarded as a CPT school, although instruction is largely given by Vietnamese assisted by Thai interpreters. Instruction is oriented toward a low level of insurgency, with stress on propaganda, recruitment, organizational activity, and small-unit tactics. The
school itself appears to give little specialized instruction, but trainees have stated that a few exceptional persons might have been sent on to Peking for this. Some of the female students received nurses' training at military hospitals in Hanoi.

(Official Intelligence on Hoa Binh indicates that its curriculum is primarily a longer version of the training offered in Thailand. It is significant that some of the trainees were recruited directly to go to Vietnam without prior training. The stress is thus apparently on producing low-level insurgents rather than key cadre. It is possible that the current situation does not allow experienced insurgents with leadership potential to leave their units for advanced training.)
V
REGIONAL MOVEMENTS

(U) Communist insurgency currently besets five regions of Thailand: the Northeast, the North, the South, the Mid-South, and the Central area near the Burmese frontier (see Figure 2). The main thrust is now directed at the Northeast, with secondary emphasis on the North.

A. THE NORTHEAST

(U) This section describes the insurgent threat and the tactics employed by the enemy in his attempts to establish a viable infrastructure and gain the active support of the Thai villagers in the Northeast. An evaluation is also made of the insurgents' strengths and weaknesses in that region.

(2) One of the significant indicators of the threat is the number of incidents that occurred in the Northeast during 1967 and 1968. Statistical analysis of these incidents shows that armed encounters peaked in January through March of 1967, coincident with the RTG offensive operations of the 0910 Plan. (See Figure 3.) After the first three months of 1967, operations tended to average about 25 encounters a month, with a sharp drop in December. In January and February 1968, encounters again rose to about 38 a month, but fell off to roughly half that number in March. Similarly, the number of armed propaganda meetings fell to below five after October 1967 and continued at that rate through March of 1968. Assassinations followed the same general pattern, reaching in March 1968 the lowest monthly average number since 1965.

(2) Two diametrically opposed conclusions can be drawn from this quantitative analysis. The first is that RTG measures to arrest the insurgency have borne fruit, resulting in the gradual reduction of
Note:
All insurgent strengths are estimates as of January 1968

FIGURE 2 (2). Regional Insurgent Threat (U)
FIGURE 3 (S). Number of Armed Encounters, Propaganda Meetings, and Assassinations in Northeast Thailand, 1965 to 1968 (U)
insurgent activity and a concomitant weakening of the insurgent structure. The second and opposite conclusion is that insurgent efforts to establish an infrastructure within the villages have met with success, so that assassinations and armed propaganda meetings are no longer required as instruments of coercion. This conclusion might be supported by the fact that in January and February of 1968 armed encounters have again risen to above the 1967 level, suggesting a gain in guerrilla strength and a consequent increase in aggressive action.

(9) The first conclusion is immediately placed in question by the unhappy lessons which the United States derived from reliance on purely statistical indicators in Vietnam. Quite clearly, a solid evaluation must rely on more than just statistical evidence: it must probe more deeply into the structure and fabric of the insurgency on the one hand and that of the Royal Thai Government and its people on the other.

(9) The absence of a "revolutionary situation" among the ethnic Thai population has seriously handicapped the insurgents. At the same time, they have been able--particularly during the early stages of the insurgency--to exploit a major weakness of the RTG, namely the lack of government presence in the Northeast and the inability of the RTG to maintain law and order. The insurgents have capitalized on this weakness through a combination of persuasion and coercion. The campaign of local recruitment has followed the time-honored pattern of first persuading the villager to assist the guerrillas materially and then, once he has become "involved," to convert him ideologically.

(9) The propaganda of persuasion has emphasized such themes as the corruptness of the current Thai government, the US threat to Thailand's sovereignty, and the low standard of living of the villagers, which is attributed to government neglect and corruption. The promise is held out that under Communism everyone will enjoy equal status, dignity, and high incomes. Specific material rewards are dangled: tractors for farmers and training in professions for young men and women.
(8) Coercion is mixed with persuasion. The principal levers are assassinations and armed propaganda meetings, usually staged in conjunction. In a typical situation, a village is surrounded in the late afternoon by armed bands and the villagers are assembled and harangued by the leaders of the invading force. Occasionally the assassination of a villager as a "government informer" reinforces the message.

(9) As demonstrations of effective power, the armed propaganda meetings have made their impact: a recurrent complaint by affected villagers has been that the government has failed to protect them or to provide them with the means of self-protection. Nevertheless, the dictates of successful revolution, particularly on the Maoist model, suggest that coercion alone cannot carry the day. In order for passive support to be transformed into the necessary active involvement, substantial segments of the population must be "converted." And here the Communists have run up against a cultural barrier. Not only is there in Northeast and Central Thailand an absence of an exploitable "revolutionary situation," but Communist ideology and its underlying value structure and modus operandi are in direct conflict with the cultural values of the ethnic Thais. This conflict is described in greater detail in another part of this report.1

(9) The conclusion that the Communist insurgents are not meeting measurable success in converting the populace can be tested in terms of two primary indicators: their progress in establishing a durable organization and their success in raising an effective guerrilla force. Mao's principles of revolutionary warfare hold that, in the absence of a solid "infrastructure," revolutionaries become nothing more than "roving insurgents" bereft of a popular or territorial base. Without an expanding guerrilla force, recruited locally, the revolutionary movement cannot extend its sway progressively over the

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1. See Volume II, Part III, "The Susceptibility of the Thai Peasant to Communism at Present and in the Immediate Future."
populace to the point where it can seriously threaten the existing government. As Mao says:

... The Red Army fights not for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. ... Without these objectives fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.2

(†) Evidence of Communist efforts to establish a village infrastructure in Thailand is available from joint surveys conducted by Thai and US officials in the areas of highest insurgent activity in provinces of the Northeast, and from analyses of defector and prisoner interrogations. The surveys drew on information obtained from village chiefs, schoolteachers, members of the Volunteer Defense Corps and People’s Assistance Teams, and from the files of the police, the Joint Security Centers, the Communist Suppression Operations Command, the relevant provincial and district CPFs, and the Royal Thai Army units operating in the Northeast. The surveys were all made in 1967, the year in which the RTG initiated and conducted the 0910 Plan in the Northeast.

(†) The surveys revealed the cellular type insurgent infrastructure in some tambons and villages of the Northeast. In Kut Bak, one of three tambons in Sakon Nakhon where insurgency is concentrated, 26 cells, most of them composed of three members, were identified in three villages out of a total of 30. The most thoroughly organized village visited in this survey featured 17 cells with a typical Communist organizational hierarchy, including the political chief, who organized liaison and bi-weekly food deliveries to the guerrillas. Another official was charged with recruiting, and a third with intelligence.

(†) Another survey conducted in tambon Nanai, in Nakhon Phanom province, an area of high guerrilla activity, uncovered a total of

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21 three-man cells in six of the 13 villages in the tambon. Similar data applied to another district of the same province. Existence of cellular organization in the southern provinces of the Northeast was also established, but on a smaller scale.

(6) While a Communist infrastructure undeniably exists in some villages in the Northeast, it seems to suffer from significant deficiencies. In the first place, the structure appears to be heavily dependent on kinship ties. In the majority of the cells surveyed, there were links of family or friendship between cell members and members of the guerrilla bands. Kinship among the Phu-Thais, a minority group of Thai subculture, appears to be a salient factor in the infrastructure in Sakon Nakhon, another province of high guerrilla activity. Of the 14 villages which were found to contain cells, seven were completely Phu-Thai, three were partly populated by the latter, and two were composed of Thai-So, another minority group. The difficulty with a kinship-based organization is that, lacking an ideological commitment, members frequently drop out when their relatives are killed, captured, or defect.

(6) The second deficiency revealed in the surveys was the lack of characteristic Communist security and thoroughness in organizing the cells, as demonstrated by the quick breakdown of the structure under pressure. In the village with the highest degree of organization encountered, the survey team identified 30 supporters and rapidly acquired confessions from the cell members. Many interrogees seemed eager to give information and to cooperate with the officials; they informed not only on the organization in their own village, but on others as well. After the questioning by the survey team, about 70 members left the village for district headquarters, voicing fear of Communist reprisals and expressing reluctance to return until a village security unit had been established. Similar results were reported by another survey team.

(6) The apparent unreliability of the infrastructure at the village level has been compounded by a shortage of hard-core leadership, which has prevented the Communists from establishing a
government parallel to that of the Royal Thai Government in the provinces and districts of the Northeast. There is evidence that the CPT was organized in 1962 theoretically along regional, provincial, district, and tambon lines, but that the Party has been unable to find enough personnel to man such an organization. As a consequence, control and direction of insurgent operations relies on an ad hoc organization, and guerrilla commanders must often double as political and military leaders. This lack of an adequate command structure, aggravated by difficulties of communication, is bound to create problems of coordination and to debilitate the insurgency.

Captured documents, for example, have contained references to the CPT's "inadequate understanding" of problems facing the insurgents, and suggest that individual insurgent groups are unaware of where the leadership is coming from. Poverty of central direction is revealed also by a profusion of conflicting nomenclature and ideological terminology. Moreover, coordination among insurgent bands is tenuous.

Other problems beset the movement. Friction between Chinese and Thai members has been continuous since the CPT's founding. Although some effort has been made to appease the Thai members—for example, by appointing Thais to higher committees—the real power at the Party center rests firmly in Chinese hands. The inner circles of the Politburo and the Central Committee are made up predominantly of Chinese who maintain liaison with the Chinese Communist Party and dispose of the Party funds, which emanate primarily from China.

The friction between the Chinese and Thai members is manifested in policy quarrels. Many Thai members still long for a peaceful revolution or do not deem the time ripe for armed revolution. There is evidence that Thai Communists continue to chafe under internal Chinese domination of their Party as well as the external control exercised by Communist China. They believe that the decision to initiate armed revolution reflected primarily a Chinese and North Vietnamese decision to use the CPT as a pawn of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and that Thai national interests are being
sacrificed. Evidence suggests that some Thai Communists, even though they do not take open issue with the Party command, will tend to "sit on their hands"—for example by invoking a variety of excuses not to go to the Northeast. The Party leadership appears impatiently aware of these shortcomings. Thus, a captured Communist document refers to the cadre as "rather addicted to such traditional vices as stealing, smuggling, fighting, narcotics, gambling, and boasting. They are self-seeking and unwilling to make sacrifices." Even more damaging to clandestine movement, the cadre "cannot keep secrets, even when it has been shown that lives are lost as a result."\(^3\)

(8) Some of the Party's problems might be overcome by the emergence of a charismatic leader. A former Thai prime minister, Pridi, who fled to China in 1948 and has since remained in exile there, could have filled this need. However, Pridi has apparently refused—he is reported to be opposed to the Maoist strategy for revolutionary war in Thailand.

(9) Lack of sophistication and effectiveness plagues the guerrilla bands themselves. The overall strength is estimated at 1,500 to 2,000. The individual bands are small, numbering from 20 to 30; they combine occasionally into groups as large as 100 to conduct armed propaganda meetings. Their armament is limited to a variety of small arms ranging from homemade weapons to a few AK-47s. The bands occupy crude camps in the Phu Phan Mountains—a relatively low range in the Northeast which reaches a maximum altitude of 2,000 feet and extends about 150 miles in the shape of a rough crescent. Potentially, this mountain range, which is generally covered by forest, offers a vast sanctuary, but the scarcity of food in the mountains forces the guerrillas to establish small camps near the villages; their supporting infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to provide a system of logistics reaching deep into the

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mountains. Since 1967, when the RTG initiated more vigorous offensive operations, the guerrillas have been forced to move frequently—breaking into 10-man bands which slip into areas not covered by suppressive operations, or retreat into the mountains. Sooner or later they attempt to return to the lowlands to restore contact with their support organization.

Training of recruits for the movement in the Northeast is carried out locally and in camps in North Vietnam and Laos, as described in Section IV. The recruits trained abroad make up the backbone of the political and military apparatus.

In local military training, principal attention is given to weapons familiarization, with some instruction in patrol and ambush tactics. Despite the 1965 decision to shift to the offensive, military operations have been limited chiefly to shows of force through armed propaganda meetings and assassinations. Ambush is seldom employed, and armed encounters tend to be defensive actions against RTG patrols.

The guerrilla logistics are focused almost entirely on food. The main sources of food are relatives of the guerrillas, organized in some cases into rudimentary cells. Food is collected by sending guerrillas into villages under cover of darkness, through delivery by village supporters, or through stealthy purchase in the local market. There is some evidence that food has been shipped out from villages in which local security forces are stationed. However, there is also considerable evidence that food is a major problem preventing the expansion of the guerrilla bands themselves. Defector reports abound with complaints of lack of food, and hunger is universally cited as a cause of defection.

In general, the testimony of defectors seems to bear out the incompatibility of the Thai culture with the rigorous demands of a Communist movement, the lack of any deep-seated and dedicated involvement on the part of the Thais with the insurgent movement, and the failure of the insurgents to create a strong village infrastructure. The element of coercion used in initial recruitment tends to encourage defection, particularly in view of the hardships in the
guerrilla base areas. Complaints about shortages of food; the failure of the Communists to fulfill their promises of education, money, and other recruiting inducements; separation from families; disagreements with the guerrilla tactics; and the rising pressure of government suppression operations are common threads running through interrogation reports.

(7) A US intelligence evaluation gives the following analysis:

The recent sharp rise in insurgent defections probably results from the disillusionment of recruited support elements who are unable or unwilling to bear the hardships of jungle living. Significantly, however, recent defections have also included fully recruited members of armed guerrilla units. These individuals have indicated various motivations for their defections.

Their debriefings indicate in general that both the absence of strong ideological attachment to the insurgent cause and the element of coercion involved in most initial recruitments encourage defection as the hardships of survival in the jungle bear down on the individual insurgent. Additionally, recent defectors spoke of fear of government attack, dissatisfaction with long separation from their families, and disagreement with a projected shift to more violent tactics as reasons for their defection.

(8) To summarize, the Communist insurgency in the Northeast suffers from the following handicaps:

(1) Friction among the top leaders in the Communist Party of Thailand.

(2) Quantitative and qualitative deficiencies among the leadership which inhibit the ability to direct and coordinate insurgent activities effectively.

(3) A weak and unreliable village infrastructure based upon recruitment by intimidation rather than dedication to the goals of the revolution.

(4) A guerrilla force which lacks sufficient strength to take the offensive.

(5) An inadequate logistics support system.

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These deficiencies have prevented the insurgents from establishing political and military control of a geographical area in the Northeast as a base for future expansion.

The contrast between the insurgencies in Thailand and South Vietnam is readily apparent. At the close of the Indochina War in 1954, the Vietnamese Communists had already established a viable, durable, and reliable political and military infrastructure in South Vietnam. This infrastructure controlled extensive base areas, such as Zone D and the Plain of Reeds in the Mekong Delta, and Quantri province on the Coastal Plain—base areas that were denied to the government forces until after the buildup of US military units in 1965. The guerrilla arm was led by veteran military cadre, many of whom were members of the Communist Party and had gained broad experience in military operations against the French. While these forces were initially small, they were able to extend military and political control over ever-expanding areas. This expanded control gave them a larger base for recruitment, for food, and other support. By 1963, the guerrillas were fielding battalion-size and regiment-size units which contested government forces for control. Clearly, the insurgency in Thailand holds few of these assets and prospects.

It appears, then, that the drastic decrease in incidents of insurgency taking place in the Northeast during the past year cannot be attributed to Communist success in building a viable infrastructure. The probable explanation is that the Communists have recognized their own failures and are now reappraising their tactics.

The picture, however, is by no means completely favorable. Even a relatively inefficient and low-level insurgency in the Northeast can continue to put pressure on the Royal Thai Government and tax its political, economic, and military resources. Moreover, the insurgency could intensify in other regions of the country.

5. The growth potential of the insurgency in the Northeast and in other regions of Thailand is discussed in Volume I of this report.
B. THE NORTH

The insurgency in the North is strategically secondary to the main thrust in the Northeast. In February 1967, Thai authorities captured a Sino-Thai who had been trained in Peking and reinfiltrated into Thailand from Laos. The prisoner carried a copy of the so-called "L-Plan," an 8-to-10-year program according to which the Communists aim to seize the mountainous border areas in Chiangrai and Nan provinces, then move downward to the approximate area of Uttaradit, and finally drive eastward to the Mekong along the general axis Udorn-Nakhon Phanom. The basic concept of the L-Plan is to link the northern theater with the northeastern theater, using the mountain chains in Thailand as internal bases and using Laos as an external base for the entire operation.

In the 10-to-15-year time frame, the strategy calls for the insurgency to spread from the general area of Uttaradit southeast into the Phetchabun Mountains, the range which separates Northeast Thailand from the Central Valley of the Chao Phraya River. (There is a cluster of Meo hill tribesmen in these mountains.) If unchallenged, the drive to the south could sever the Northeast from the rest of Thailand and eventually put heavy pressure on the Central Plain and the capital.

The central direction of the insurgency in North Thailand is Chinese, usually exercised through the Communist Party of Thailand. The leaders of the armed bands include not only Sino-Thais but also North Vietnamese, Laojians, and ethnic Thais. The Sino-Thais apparently enjoy an advantage in subverting the Meos, a warlike hill tribe bearing close cultural affinity to the Chinese.

Communist propaganda activity in North Thailand may be traced back a number of years, but overt action began only last year. In May 1967 there were several armed encounters in Chiangrai province. Tribesmen shortly afterward assassinated a police informant in one of the villages. In August 1967, the first armed propaganda meeting was held. Elements of the Border Patrol Police clashed with insurgents in Nan province in October. The Royal Laotian Army subsequently
endeavored to clear the border of Communist insurgents from its side, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Following this, a joint Lao-Thai force unsuccessfully attempted to hammer-anvil Kuomintang (KMT) elements that had been moving into Thailand from Laos in a manner too flagrant for the Thai authorities to condone. This effort seemed to operate as a stimulus to further Communist activity in the North. Shortly afterward, a number of small Border Patrol Police units (consisting of three to 13 men) were ambushed by groups of Communist insurgents (20 to 30 men, mostly Meos). Following these incidents in December, the Royal Thai Army moved into the operational area in force. In the clashes which have occurred since, the RTA claims to have killed at least 200 armed insurgents and to have suffered more than 50 KIA of its own. American officials are skeptical of both figures.

To attain their ends in the North, the Communists vigorously exploit the numerous political, economic, and social grievances of the tribesmen. Foremost among these, as noted in other sections of this report, is the cultural antipathy of Thai officialdom and the lowland Thais in general toward the hill tribe "savages." Other hill tribe grievances include lack of Thai citizenship and the right to own land, and government restrictions on poppy growing, opium trading, slash-and-burn agriculture, and the right to bear arms. The hill tribes hunt for sustenance as well as for sport and have frequently requested firearms to provide for their own defense. The government has either forbidden them to bear arms or has made it extremely difficult for them to procure the required licenses. The Communists, on the other hand, are now furnishing them with modern weapons. These arms are one of the major inducements for the tribes to join the insurgency. Other important attractions include promises of schooling for the children and training in nursing for the women.

Given the grievances of the tribesmen against the Royal Thai Government and their determination to bear arms, it is hardly necessary for the Communists to recruit or conduct political indoctrination along traditional Marxist lines. Once recruits have been secured through various enticements, the Communists furnish them with
rudimentary political and military training and send them back to their own villages to put personal pressure on members of their families to join the movement. A subverted family subsequently works on other families in its clan, and members of subverted clans attempt to undermine the tribe as a whole.

The Communists have reportedly established control over some of the Meo villages in northern Nan province (especially in Pua district) and in nearby parts of Chiangrai province. These villages provide the insurgents with food, recruits, and intelligence. The area in question is highly dissected, heavily forested, and lies along the Laotian border.

The armed insurgent bands number an estimated 150 to 200 individuals, most of whom belong to the highly organized and war-like Meo tribe. Relatively few of the 5,000 Meos within the immediate area of insurgency are believed to support the movement, however. Some members of the Yao tribe belong to the bands, as perhaps do some of the Lahus. The guerrillas frequently operate in bands of 30 men, although the size of the groups varies according to the operation. It does not appear that bands larger than 50 men have been utilized so far.

The hill tribesmen are skilled in scouting and patrolling, marksmanship, and jungle and mountain combat, and thus possess a high potential for guerrilla warfare. They acquire their basic skills in the course of their normal existence, apart from any military training they receive from the Communists.

A few leaders of the insurgency in the North have been trained in Peking. Others have received training in North Vietnam and in Laos. The number of individuals who have been trained abroad is not definitely known (estimates run as high as 300), nor is the rate of training known.

The guerrillas are armed with US carbines and M-1s and with AK-47s. In addition, they have traditional tribal weapons such as flintlocks, crossbows, knives, and a type of bolas. They also have
hand grenades and land mines. Modern arms and ammunition are supplied mostly by Communist agents who cross the Thai-Laoetian border at will.

The insurgents have used the armed propaganda meeting, assassination, and ambush as their principal tactics and techniques. In operations against RFA units, the insurgents' favorite tactic is to seize the high ground dominating the key trails and passes in the area, and to block the advance of the troops through the use of delaying fire, land mines, booby traps, and ambushes. With their intimate knowledge of the terrain, their inurement to the mountain environment, their superior combat intelligence, and their talent for unconventional operations, the hill tribesmen have so far proved more than a match for the Thai military, paramilitary, and police forces.

C. THE SOUTH

Communist activity in the five southern provinces bordering Malaysia is under the control of the Communist Terrorist Organization. The CTO evolved from the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) who crossed the border into Thailand in 1960 after their attempt to overthrow the government of Malaya had been defeated. Leadership of the CTO is still in the hands of the MCP veterans who are Sino-Malays, but Sino-Thai members are beginning to assume some secondary positions in the hierarchy.

The CTO is the most highly organized and efficient Communist movement in Thailand. Unlike the Communist Party of Thailand, the CTO's announced goal is the linkage of the five southern Thai provinces to Malaysia, preparatory to an overthrow of the Malaysian government. Nevertheless, because of its ties with the Chinese Communist Party and its ethnic Chinese leadership, the CTO is responsive to direction from Peking. In the event that the Chinese Communist Party were to order the CTO to shift its attack from the Malaysian government to the RFA, it is likely that the CTO would comply. In addition, the aging CTO leadership will in time be
replaced by Sino-Thais who do not fully share the orientation of the CTO against the Malaysian government.

While there is no evidence to indicate that the CTO and the CPT are coordinating their activities, there are indications that liaison is maintained between the two Communist movements and that the CPT may even act as a channel of communication between the CTO and the CCP.

The CTO political organization is directed by the CTO Secretary General's group, which has political, military, and territorial subdivisions. Its main political support is provided by two front organizations: the Youth League, which derives its membership from the ethnic Chinese, and the Village Union, which is oriented toward the Thai-Muslim community. Control of the ethnic Chinese population is almost absolute, which assures adequate intelligence, manpower, and logistic support for the movement.

The full-time guerrilla forces are estimated at 800 to 1,000 men distributed in three geographic areas in so-called regimental organizations. These guerrillas are backed by about 2,500 part-time guerrillas. The guerrilla forces are based in fairly elaborate camps in the jungle. There are additional camps for recruit training. Weapons are for the most part of World War II vintage. There is evidence that the CTO has a capability for manufacturing some small arms and for reloading ammunition.

Military operations consist mostly of harassing the Malaysian Border Police forces; clashes with Thai forces are avoided insofar as possible. Some observers maintain that the RTG has adopted a "live-and-let-live" attitude toward the CTO, although the Thais effect a measure of coordination with the Malaysian authorities through the General Border Committee, composed of Thai and Malaysian civil and police authorities.

Operations in the South have continued in low key, no doubt reflecting the orientation of the CTO against Malaysia and its desire to avoid provoking more vigorous suppression operations by RTG forces. However, low-level engagements between the CTO insurgents and the joint Malaysian-Thai forces occur from time to time.
In the event that the CTO should reorient its attack and put pressure on the RTG, the sophisticated political and military apparatus of the insurgents could place a significant additional burden on the political stability of the RTG and its financial and manpower resources.

D. THE MID-SOUTH

In contrast to the Chinese-dominated CTO organization in the South, the Communist activity in the Mid-South area centered in the hilly areas of Trang, Pattalung, and Nakhon Si Thammarat provinces, appears to be organized by ethnic Thais, under CPT direction. There is no evidence of cooperation between the CTO and the CPT-led insurgency in the Mid-South.

The organizational structure of the CPT in this area is probably even more handicapped by a shortage of trained cadre than in the Northeast. It also appears that the insurgency in the Mid-South is handicapped by a lack of a dedicated political infrastructure in the villages; support of the movement seems to be based largely on kinship (as in the Northeast) and on fear of Communist reprisals.

There were about 200 armed insurgents in the Mid-South in 1966, according to intelligence estimates. The first three months of 1967 saw nine incidents, of which five resulted from government initiative. While the level of incidents did not rise during the next three months, the RTG nevertheless established a regional CSOC organization (similar to CPM-1 in Northeast Thailand) under a regional Military Circle commander with the regional police chief as deputy. One regiment of the EFA is assigned to the Military Circle.

There have recently been several assassinations and armed propaganda meetings in the Mid-South, but insurgent recruitment activity has decreased significantly, apparently because of suppression operations. Most guerrillas appear to have moved into secure areas in the mountains—sorties into the lowlands are limited mostly to food-gathering forays. Nevertheless, occasional clashes with
government forces continue to occur. The estimate of guerrilla strength remains at about 200.

E. THE WEST CENTRAL REGION

(5) Communist activity in the West Central region is located in four provinces along the Thai-Burmese border and in two provinces to the east of these border provinces. The six provinces are Prachuap Khiri Khan, Phetburi, Ratburi, Kanchanaburi, Nakhon Pathom, and Suphanburi. The insurgency in the area is believed to be directed by two or three members of the CPT Central Committee with about a dozen subordinate leaders coordinating activities in the provinces and districts. In view of the territorial extent of the six provinces, the movement appears to suffer from a serious shortage of trained cadre.

(5) A small but well-organized group of ethnic Thais composed the guerrilla arm, but some Karen tribesmen have also been recruited. The Karens demonstrated their prowess as guerrilla fighters while operating with the British in World War II. Karens are reported to have provided secure bases for the insurgents in the mountainous border area.

(5) Activities of the West Central insurgent group were detected in early 1966, but the first proof of Communist involvement came with the assassination of a government official and a villager in November of that year. The government responded with a sweep through five provinces, achieving negligible results. In August and September 1967, two insurgent ambushes of police patrols produced 21 casualties, including the regional Border Patrol Police chief. The RTG responded immediately by establishing a regional CSOC suppression staff on the model of CPM-1 in the Northeast. Command was assigned to the First Army commander, with the regional Provincial Police chief, a representative from the Ministry of Interior, and the provincial governors serving as advisers. A company of the First Army was assigned to augment local Border Patrol and Provincial Police forces. Additional forces have been alerted for possible reinforcement.
Insurgent operations have continued in low key. The guerrillas have staged a total of three successful ambushes and have figured in several additional clashes with government forces. The US Mission to Thailand estimates the armed insurgent strength in the West Central area at 75.
VI
SUMMARY

The Communist Party of Thailand directs and controls the insurgency in all areas of the country except the Southern provinces near the Malaysian border, where the CPT is overshadowed by the Communist Terrorist Organization. Both the CPT and the CTO are dominated in matters of broad policy by Peking, the CPT through its predominantly Sino-Thai leadership, and the CTO through its predominantly Sino-Malay elite and membership. The CPT, in addition, is influenced by Hanoi. Soviet influence upon the Thai insurgency is negligible.

The roles of Peking and Hanoi in the Thai insurgency are clear. China plays the dominant role through control of the Party leaders. The most promising Thai Communists receive ideological and political training in China. A large part of the financial support for the insurgency is provided by the Chinese. Peking made the decision to launch a "People's War" in Thailand; the objective is to use the Communist Party of Thailand to assist China in attaining long-range political objectives in Southeast Asia. Hanoi, preoccupied with a costly struggle in South Vietnam, plays a subordinate role to Communist China, extending modest assistance to the Thai insurgents through training low-level cadre in camps established in North Vietnam and Laos.

Taking its cue from Peking, the Communist Party of Thailand approved a resolution in 1952 declaring that "armed struggle" was the road to revolution in Thailand. In 1961, the CPT officially adopted the classic Maoist-revolutionary strategy, including the gradual building of an infrastructure in the villages, the formation of armed units, and the establishment of rural base areas from which to expand political control over the country. The Communists estimated that the buildup for decisive action would require about 10 years. By July 1965,
however, Royal Thai Government suppressive operations had caused such morale problems among the insurgents that the CPT Politburo declared a radical change of pace: Communist armed units would immediately begin to attack government forces, assassinate government agents, conduct forced propaganda meetings, and in general initiate the armed rebellion. The main thrust was to be in the Northeast.

A. THE REGIONAL MOVEMENTS

(6) Communist insurgency currently besets four regions of Thailand in addition to the Northeast. These are the North, the South, the Mid-South, and the West Central areas. The Northeast remains the most active, but even there the insurgency is clearly less virulent than in Vietnam.

(6) An estimated 1,500 to 2,000 guerrillas or "jungle soldiers" operate in the forests and mountains of Northeast Thailand. They are organized in bands of 20 to 30 men but frequently combine in groups of 100 to carry out specific operations or to create an illusion of greater strength. The guerrillas are poorly armed and trained, suffer from shortages of food and supplies, and lack motivation. Their military effectiveness is low. Since their security is loose, much is known about their organization and leadership.

(6) The Communists employ blatant promises of tractors, money, and vocational training to attract recruits in the Northeast. A favorite technique is to entice a villager into furnishing food or other assistance, then extort further commitment to the insurgency from him on the basis of his initial involvement. The principal Communist propaganda themes are the "neglect" of the Northeast by the Royal Thai Government, the corruptness of the ruling "Thanom-Prathat clique," and the "neocolonialism" exemplified by the American presence in Thailand. Techniques of persuasion are complemented by techniques of coercion; predominant among the latter is the armed propaganda meeting in which a guerrilla band terrorizes a village to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to demoralize or eliminate government agents, to soften a village for subsequent propagandizing and recruiting, or to serve a number of other purposes.
Although the Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand by any economic indicator, popular discontent with living conditions has never reached the proportions of a truly "revolutionary situation." Furthermore, the Communists have met stiff cultural resistance in their efforts to build a tough, viable infrastructure in the villages. The Communist ideology and way of operating are fundamentally anti-
thetical to the Thai value system, which stresses individuality and enjoyment of life.

There is evidence of a Communist infrastructure in some of the Northeast villages, but the subversive cellular organization appears light and fragile. It suffers from significant deficiencies, including too much reliance on kinship connections (parents drop out when guerrilla sons are captured or defect), a lack of characteristic Communist thoroughness in organization and security (the structure cracks easily under government pressure), and a shortage of hard-core leadership.

The 45,000 to 60,000 Vietnamese refugees in Northeast Thailand are an unplayed card in the Communist hand. Highly organized, disciplined, and responsive to Hanoi, the members of this ethnic minority are settled in villages near key defense installations and along the main lines of communication in the Northeast. They have yet to take an active part in the insurgency.

The mountainous North is the second most active theater in Thailand. The insurgency in this region is controlled by Peking, operating for the most part through the Communist Party of Thailand. According to the captured "L-Plan," the aim of the Northern movement is to consolidate the provinces along the Laotian frontier, then move southward to the general area of Uttaradit, where a linkup is planned with the insurgency in the Northeast. Once the general line Uttaradit-Nakhon Phanom has been secured, the insurgents, using Laos as an external base, will push southward from Uttaradit into the Phetchabun Mountains, the range separating Northeast Thailand from the Central Valley of the Chao Phrya River.
In Nan and Chiangrai provinces, 150 to 200 hill tribesmen under Sino-Thai, North Vietnamese, Laotian, and ethnic Thai leadership are successfully withstanding the trail-bound troops of the Third Thai Army. Most of the insurgents are Meos, a highly organized and warlike people whose tree-slaughtering, poppy-growing, opium-trading proclivities are in head-on collision with the economic policies of the Royal Thai Government. Indiscriminate repressive action by the Royal Thai Armed Forces has helped to solidify the resistance of the Meos. Communist organizers exploit the grievances of the tribesmen, furnish them with much-desired modern weapons, and fan their hatred of the lowland Thais, most of whom regard the mountaineers as savages and intruders.

With their intimate knowledge of the terrain, inurement to the hardships of mountain and jungle warfare, superior combat intelligence, and talent for unconventional operations, the hill tribesmen have so far outguessed the Thai military, paramilitary, and police forces in the North.

The Communist Terrorist Organization in the South is highly organized and disciplined. It has 800 to 1,000 full-time guerrillas and 2,500 part-time armed insurgents. While-the CTO claims to be oriented against Malaysia and is now largely quiescent, its target and tempo could change in response to direction from Peking. Moreover, the immediate control of the organization will eventually pass from its aging Sino-Malay leaders to Sino-Thais or even ethnic Thais. When this occurs, the CTO's avowed orientation may also shift from Malaysia to Thailand. But, to expand significantly in South Thailand, the CTO must overcome the inherent antipathy of the large Malay-Muslim population to Communism and to the Chinese brand of Communism in particular. The CTO is now making strong efforts to subvert this important minority group.

About 200 guerrillas in the Mid-South provinces of Trang, Patthalung, and Nakhon Si Thammarat occasionally make rice-raids on the lowland settlements, conduct armed propaganda meetings, and clash with government patrols. They are under the direction of the
Communist Party of Thailand, and their leaders, in contrast with those of the CTO in the South, are believed to be ethnic Thais. The village infrastructure in the Mid-South is weak, suffering from a lack of hard-core leadership and from other deficiencies typical of local Communist organizations in the Northeast.

In six West Central provinces near the Burmese border, a well-trained force of approximately 75 guerrillas answering to the CPT has conducted sporadic operations. Insurgency in the West Central region has been largely low keyed, but bands in this area have staged three professional ambushes of government forces. Although the insurgents are mostly ethnic Thais, some Karen tribesmen have also been recruited. The Karens are also reported to have provided secure mountain bases for the guerrillas.

B. WEAKNESSES OF THE INSURGENCY

The Communist insurgency in Thailand is in an early and vulnerable stage of development. The CPT lacks effective top-level leadership, there is exploitable friction between Sino-Thai and ethnic Thai members at all levels, the command structure of the Party appears inadequate for smooth orchestration of the regional efforts, and the movement has been unable to generate widespread popular support. Allowing for significant regional variations in certain respects, there are shortages of hard-core leadership in the field, village infrastructure is brittle or non-existent, and the military effectiveness of the guerrilla bands is low.

The Thai insurgency lacks a political-military leader approaching the caliber of Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, since the CPT is Chinese dominated internally as well as externally, there is no charismatic Thai at the helm to attract widespread popular support.

Friction between Sino-Thai and ethnic Thai members has plagued the CPT since its founding. Current disagreement reflects not only chronic Thai resentment of Chinese control but also a belief on the part of many ethnic Thai Communists that Thai national interests
are being sacrificed on the altar of Chinese foreign policy. Some Thai Communists cling to the dream of a peaceful revolution in Thailand, while others have no quarrel with violence but feel the time is not yet ripe for armed insurgency. The differences between the Sino-Thais and the ethnic Thais represent a major fault line in Thai Communism.

Organizationally, the Thai Communists currently lack the ability to coordinate the various regional movements effectively. An undeveloped command structure and a shortage of professional leaders inhibit their attempts to meld the regional efforts into a unified operation. Even within regions, there is evidence that insurgent bands in widely separated areas frequently fail to work in unison.

The failure of the insurgency to generate large-scale popular support is its most significant weakness. It is the cumulative result of all the other failures of Thai Communism, plus the countermeasures of the Royal Thai Government. In addition, it stems from the fundamental incompatibility of the Thai and Communist value system.

C. STRENGTHS OF THE INSURGENCY

Like an Oriental wrestler, the Communist Party of Thailand directs its armed bands and other weapons against the weaknesses of its opponent. Choosing the time and scene of conflict more often than not, the CPT chops at a political vulnerability of the RTG here, probes an economic soft-spot there, worries a social lesion in a third area, and occasionally tests a military reflex. The relative strengths and weaknesses of the Royal Thai Government in these and related fields are discussed in other parts of this report; they need not be recapitulated here. The point to emphasize in this context is that for a minimum expenditure of effort and resources, the CPT can apply acute pressure to the RTG—pressure which can be relieved only by an inordinate expenditure of resources on the part of the government. A modest Communist investment in insurgency
requires a substantial RTG outlay for economic, police, paramilitary, military, and other counterinsurgency programs. The imbalance is inherent in the arithmetic of insurgent warfare, and the imbalance becomes more, not less, pronounced as the insurgency takes root.¹

¹ The growth potential of the insurgency in Thailand is evaluated in Volume I of this report.

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APPENDIX B
COORDINATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PLANNING AND PROGRAMS
COORDINATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PLANNING AND PROGRAMS

A. INTRODUCTION

(U) This Appendix evaluates the performance of the Royal Thai Government in evolving (a) a concept for counterinsurgency in Thailand, (b) priorities for implementation of the concept, and (c) an organizational structure for coordination of programs supporting the counterinsurgency effort. The organization for coordination will be examined at the national, regional, and provincial levels.

(U) The yardsticks for evaluation are derived from the principles for effective counterinsurgency set forth in Volume III of this study. Two of those principles are specifically addressed:

1. Act promptly and resolutely to prevent or defeat the insurgency. Implicit in this principle is an early recognition and correct diagnosis of the threat.

2. Establish priorities for and coordinate counterinsurgency planning and programs at all levels. Implicit in this principle is sufficient political stability first to evolve an effective concept, then to arrive at appropriate priorities, and finally to coordinate the implementation of the concept through appropriate agencies at all levels.

(U) In tracing the evolution of a concept, a system of priorities, and an organizational framework for coordination, it is important to recognize that this process has taken place in an atmosphere of political strengths and weaknesses which have been decisive in determining the nature of the organization. In short, the process of evolution has occurred within the realities of the Thai political climate. Accordingly, one must avoid the temptation to demand a perfect organizational blueprint for coordination. The RTG political
system has been discussed earlier in this study; therefore only those political constraints which have the most significant impact on the evolution of priorities for counterinsurgency and the coordination structure will be noted here. These constraints include:

(1) The traditional centralization of authority at the Bangkok level and the "vertical" orientation of the RTG ministries and bureaus which administer counterinsurgency programs at the grass roots level.

(2) Rivalry and factionalism between individuals and cliques within the leadership of the Royal Thai Government.

(3) The reluctance of the government to delegate authority to regional and provincial officials, coupled with the reluctance of those officials to report problems and progress except through the vertical channels of ministry communications, weakens the lateral cooperation required for effective coordination. This constraint is reinforced by the hierarchical relationship of inferior to superior—an ingrained cultural characteristic of the ethnic Thais—whereby an inferior is accustomed to acting only within limits prescribed by a higher authority. In short, initiative is not only discouraged by the centralization of authority, but it is antithetical to the Thai culture. Thus, ministries, departments, and bureaus engaged in rural development, education, health, security, and other programs designed to counter the insurgency tend to resist coordination at the regional, provincial, and district levels.

(4) These constraints on coordination do not stop at the city limits of Bangkok. There the necessity of keeping the political system in equilibrium—that is, preventing any individual or clique in the ruling elite from achieving an inordinate share of power—is a compelling force to be reckoned with in any attempt to establish a coordinating agency which, by its very nature, must assume broad powers over the entire RTG administration if it is to be effective. These aspects

2. See Volume II, Part III, "Susceptibility of the Thai Peasant to Communism at Present and in the Immediate Future."
of Thai political life and their impact on the evolution of a concept and organization for counterinsurgency will be considered further in this Appendix as appropriate.

B. EARLY ORGANIZATION FOR COIN--THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMAND

The first organization for coordinating counterinsurgency operations, the National Security Command (NSC), was created in April 1962 in response to evidence of increased Communist penetration and activities in Northeast Thailand and an epidemic of terrorist activities by the Malay Communist Party in South Thailand. The creation of the NSC marked the early recognition by the RTG that the existing governmental structure could not coordinate its counterinsurgency programs and that a special agency would have to be created for that purpose. In the words of Field Marshal Sarit, then prime minister, all government agencies had to "combine their efforts to protect the nation against the Communist conspiracy."3 Significantly, the concept inherent in the creation of the agency stressed the necessity of "preventive measures rather than active measures of suppression."4

The organization of the National Security Command is shown in Figure 1. Members were drawn from the principal ministries and agencies of the government, including the armed forces, and charged with the task of "formulating policies for countering Communist activities by both passive and active operations."5 The National Security Central Command was assisted by a group of government officials involved in intelligence and security operations who advised the Central Command on Communist activities and appropriate countermeasures. Thus the organization of the initial coordinating body

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4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
FIGURE 1 (5). Organization of National Security Command (U)
included representatives of many government ministries and departments involved in the counterinsurgency effort.

The initial practical step in the "prevention" mission was the organization of Mobile Development Units (MDUs) to render "general service to local citizens with a view of strengthening the relation between the RTG and the local population." Each MDU was commanded by an officer of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Membership was drawn from the Ministries of Interior, Public Health, Agriculture, and Education; team leaders and technical specialists were provided by the military. Each unit was divided into mobile teams who visited the villages giving first aid and distributing medical supplies and clothing. More importantly, the mobile teams assisted the villagers in local development activities, including well digging and the repair and occasional building of roads and bridges. In addition, the MDUs were directed to gather intelligence on Communist activities.

The "suppression" role was to be planned, implemented, and coordinated by the NS Central Command Headquarters, although provision was made for delegating this responsibility to the three area commands of the Northeast, North, and South.

In summ, the Royal Thai Government had made an early diagnosis of the incipient insurgency, had recognized the need for a supra organization for coordinated direction and planning, and had derived a broad concept consisting of preventive measures aimed at gaining the support of the people and suppressive operations to arrest the development of the insurgency. Undoubtedly US influence was a significant factor in the Thai response. Nevertheless, the Thai government took the first important steps toward countering the insurgency much earlier than did the British in Malaya or the governments of the Philippines and South Vietnam.

6. Ibid., p. 10.
C. THE SHIFT TO THE COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS COMMAND

(6) The combination of preventive and suppressive measures failed to arrest the expansion of the insurgent effort in the Northeast. In late November 1965, the RTG was forced to reappraise the situation because of an increasing level of terrorist activities in the Northeast, which culminated in a bloody ambush of police officers. This reappraisal led to the conclusion that

the previously existing organization (NSC) alone could not fully provide law, order, and security for the people, since normally civilian personnel are not sufficiently trained to cope with this type of war. Therefore, in order to eliminate these limitations and vulnerabilities, the civilian, police and military authorities responsible for carrying out the suppression operations have been joined together under the coordinating authority and special support structure of CSOC.7

(7) In short, the government's suppression efforts, coordinated by the NSC and executed by paramilitary and police forces, were considered inadequate. As a result, the RTG passed a resolution which established the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) under the direction of General Prephat, the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA). The CSOC was activated by the Prime Minister, General Thanom, on December 14, 1965, and three days later the CSOC headquarters were set up in the Rose Palace in Bangkok.8

(7) One obvious question arises: Why was it necessary to create a new organization to achieve coordination when the NSC already existed. Presumably the NSC could have been reorganized to include the necessary civil, military, and police officials. It is possible to speculate that struggles for power among members of the ruling elite lay behind this decision. The NSC was directly under Prime

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8. Ibid.
Minister Thanom, with the post of Chief of Staff occupied by Air Marshal Dawee, a Thanom protege. Dawee's removal might have been difficult, if not impossible, because of his relationship with the Prime Minister. At the same time, General Praphat, the second strongest individual in the RTG (if not the strongest), had no direct and important representation in the NSC. Similarly, the powerful RTA and the Interior Ministry, both under Praphat, lacked leverage in the NSC. Accordingly, if Praphat was to gain power through increased control of the important task of conducting the counterinsurgency, with its involvement of the key RTG ministries and agencies, a new organization would have to be created. There is some evidence that Praphat was able to gain the support of influential civilians, including those in his own Ministry of the Interior, by agreeing to leave the control of counterinsurgency in the provinces under the civil authorities.

Regardless of the validity of the power-struggle argument, the key role which Praphat occupied under the CSOC could be justified on sound organizational grounds. The principal agencies involved in the suppression operations were the police, paramilitary (including the Volunteer Defense Corps and Village Security Officers), and the military. These forces were under Praphat's control by virtue of his command of the RTA on the one hand, and the police and paramilitary (as a component of the Ministry of the Interior) on the other. In addition, the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) in the Ministry of the Interior was the principal civilian agency involved in prevention and local suppression operations, since it staffed the majority of administration posts in the provinces and districts, and theoretically, at least, had the authority to coordinate all civil programs at those levels. Thus, while the shift from the NSC to the CSOC organization may not have been essential, Praphat's broad authority over the principal agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations ensured more effective coordination. In any case, with the formation of the CSOC structure, the NSC was stripped of most of its power, retaining only the direction of the Mobile Development
Unit program and responsibility for suppression operations in South Thailand adjacent to the Malaysian border, in cooperation with Malaysian authorities.

(9) The organizational structure of the CSOC reflected the RTA's conviction that civil, police, and military authorities should be grouped within a single organization in order to achieve coordinated direction at the top. (See Figure 2.) Examination of the organization indicates that the Royal Thai Army has the preponderance of important posts--General Praphat as commander in chief of the RTA is the CSOC commander; Lt. General Surakit, the chief of staff of the RTA, is the CSOC chief of staff; and Lt. General Saiyud, Personnel Director of the RTA, heads the key Operations and Coordination Directorate. High-level police and civilian representation is provided by Lt. General Charoen of the Provincial Police and Mr. Sanit of the Department of Local Administration. Since the DOLA is the agency of the Ministry of the Interior which administers the provincial and district governments, its representation in the CSOC was critical.

(9) Field agencies subordinate to the CSOC were established with civil, police, and military membership (CPMs), with principal authority vested in the provincial governors. (These CPMs were authorized for seven provinces in the Northeast area.) A special organization, CPM-1 (Civil-Police-Military), was assigned responsibility for coordinating and directing operations in 10 districts of Nakhon Phanom and northern Ubon, the areas of the most intense guerrilla activity in Northeast Thailand. The organization of these CPMs is shown in Figure 3. In June 1965, at the urging of the United States, Joint Security Centers (JSCs) were established for the collection of intelligence in the Northeast and the South. These Centers were placed under the control of the CSOC, and became the CSOC's primary source of intelligence collection and dissemination.

FIGURE 2 (S). Organization Chart of CSOC Headquarters (U)
D. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The concept for countering the insurgency had been enlarged since the prevention-and-suppression formula of the NSC days, reflecting a more sophisticated understanding of the problem. The successful counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, with civilian control of the effort, for example, had been noted by the RTG. Recognizing that the insurgents could not succeed without the support of the villagers, the government embarked on a program of increasing security and developmental projects in the villages in order to win the allegiance of the peasants, thereby denying their support to the guerrillas and preventing the growth of the insurgent movement. Thus a concept of security combined with development emerged. Priority for counterinsurgency operations in 10 districts (with secondary
priority in seven additional provinces) in the Northeast was implicit in the location of CPM-1 and the provincial CPMs.

Planning for implementation of the concept was to be centralized largely in the CSOC in Bangkok, with execution by CPM-1 or the provincial CPMs. The Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC was charged with coordinating the activities of the ministries, departments, and bureaus concerned with administration, development, public relations, education, local security, and other civil matters. The National Police were assigned an equal planning status with both the military and the Civil Affairs Division. Primary responsibility for intelligence rested with the police, and the intelligence division of the CSOC was headed by a police lieutenant general.

Primary responsibility for suppression operations under the CPMs rested chiefly with the police, as it had previously under the NSC organization. Military forces played a subordinate and supporting role, except when operations required units larger than company size, in which case the military assumed command. In addition, military forces were to furnish communications and logistic support. Volunteer Defense Corps personnel, and later a pilot program of Village Security Officers, were to assist in providing village security.

E. ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

Despite the improvements inherent in the CSOC organization for coordination of the insurgency, deficiencies in the organization began to become apparent during the first eight months of its operations. The chief deficiency was the inability of the Civil Affairs Division to coordinate fully the civil programs aimed at countering the insurgency, illustrating the perennial problem of lateral coordination even at the national level. Accordingly, General Premhat, in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister (and presumably with the

10. For detailed discussion of village security programs, see Appendix D, "Police, Village Security, and Paramilitary Programs."
agreement of the principal members of the RTG) ordered the Director General of DOLA, with a staff of representatives from the Ministries of Interior, National Development, Agriculture, and Education, together with some 15 other departments and bureaus involved in counterinsurgency programs, to set up offices in the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC. It was hoped that this reinforcement of the Civil Affairs Division would achieve the necessary lateral coordination.11

At the same time, the authority of CPM-1 over districts in Ubon and Nakhon Phanom provinces proved unworkable. Responsibility for counterinsurgency operations in those districts was returned to the provincial governors. Subsequently, after a brief hiatus as the CSOC Forward headquarters, CPM-1 became the regional field agency responsible for coordinating counterinsurgency operations in the seven Northeast provinces most plagued by the insurgents.

Other improvements in organization evolved during the first eight months. The need for an agency responsible for coordinating the psychological warfare program was recognized, and a beginning in this important field was made with the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Operations Section in the CSOC. The lack of capability for systematic interrogation of prisoners and defectors was identified as another constraint. Accordingly, interrogation centers in the Joint Security Center in the Northeast and in Bangkok under the CSOC, together with a training program for interrogators sponsored by the United States, were established.12

In March 1966, in response to concern over the spread of the insurgency in the South and in the Northeast, special coordinating committees13 were created in those provinces without a CPM

11. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, A-277, October 5, 1966, p. 25. SECRET
12. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, A-17, July 8, 1966, p. 17. SECRET
13. Committees for Combatting and Suppressing Communists (CCSCs).
organization to ensure the harnessing of all government programs in support of efforts to prevent the spread of insurgency and to serve as a basis for the formation of CPMs if this should become necessary.

\( ^{14} \) In August a decision was made to train and assign military officers for assignment to district staffs to assist the district officers in discharging their responsibilities for the development of village security forces.\(^{15} \)

\( ^{15} \) In spite of the evolution of improved coordination of the counterinsurgency effort in Bangkok and, to a lesser degree, in the provinces, insurgent activity in the Northeast increased and at the same time spread to new areas in the Northeast. There was a growing recognition that the large-scale military sweeps involving battalion-scale units were not only expensive in effort and money but, more importantly, were not successful in blunting the insurgency. A reappraisal of the concept was begun and a new concept emerged.\(^{16} \)

F. THE 0910 PLAN

\( ^{16} \) The new concept for military operations was reflected in the abandonment of unproductive sweeps for one of concentration of military forces in selected areas of high guerrilla activity ringed by villages which provided support in the form of recruits and food. The plan to implement this new concept, known as the 0910 Plan, selected 10 such areas in which military, paramilitary, and civil forces would be concentrated to clear the guerrillas and to provide local security, civic action, and short-term development projects for the villagers. Thus the plan was more nearly in concert with the concept of security and development. Under the guidance of the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC, the governors were directed to

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15. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, A-277, October 5, 1966, p. 28. SECRET

16. Ibid., p. 3.
draw up specific plans for both development and security operations in their provinces for support of the 0910 Plan.17

Operation 0910 was launched in mid-January 1967 in 11 target areas in six Northeast provinces. Offensive military operations were successful in accomplishing the mission of separating the guerrillas from their supporters in the target-area villages.18 In the process, about 190 insurgents were killed and a significant number were captured or defected. However, the majority of the insurgents slipped out of the target areas into areas free of offensive military operations.

The task of providing security for the villages in the target areas, although handicapped by a shortage of local security resources, was also accomplished by garrisoning villages with security forces made up of a combination of police, paramilitary, and even military forces.

Local development in the target area villages which was the responsibility of the civil organization of the provinces did not measure up to expectations, indicating a lack of capability on the part of civilian administrators and, perhaps more importantly, the need for additional resources. Environmental improvement activities (road building, medical assistance, and the like) were generally carried on as independent programs in insurgency areas rather than as adjuncts to military operations.

The results of the coordinated effort represented by the 0910 Plan were summed up by the American Embassy in Bangkok in its October 1967 report to the State Department as follows:

The lower level of Communist insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand, set following the peak of March and April this year, continued during the third quarter of 1967. There were only slight variations in numbers of assassinations, forced village propaganda meetings,

17. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, A-589, January 13, 1967, p. 15. SECRET

18. For further description of military operations and the 0910 Plan, see Appendix C, "The Royal Thai Armed Forces."
and harassing actions (though total of encounters between armed insurgent groups and RTG security forces peaked somewhat in August). Insurgents have not taken advantage of reduced RTG mobility during the rainy season to mount a more offensive campaign, probably indicating their capabilities in the Northeast have been reduced by RTG pressure in 09/10 Operation target areas and other circumstances. Reports indicating that Communist bands are suffering logistics and morale problems accumulated during the period. Numbers of defectors increased, as did villagers' reports that insurgent groups are short of food and equipment. The expected shortage of rice throughout the Northeast, increased hardships of living in the forest when the rains finally came in September, and the arrests of key Communist Party figures have probably contributed along with Government operations to insurgent problems. It is also possible the insurgents have been reluctant to provoke a major response to their activities in the Northeast by escalating armed violence, particularly in view of the prospect that martial law might be applied to parts of the region, and the open secret that the RTA was maneuvering for a greater security role in the region. 19

G. THE MILITARY "TAKEOVER" OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT

(56) The Embassy prediction that the RTA was maneuvering for a greater security role proved to be accurate. In late-October, General Dongchem, the Second Army commander of RTA forces in the Northeast, was directed to assume responsibility for CPM-1, the regional organization for coordinating counterinsurgency operations and programs in the Northeast. Accordingly, General Dongchem replaced CPM-1 with a provisional Second Army Forward Headquarters, with staffing drawn from his Second Army Headquarters in Korat.

(35) This dramatic shift of responsibility for coordination at the regional level was a natural concern to the US officials and no doubt some Thai civil officials as well. Did it signify the abandonment of a coordinated civil-military approach— which had been in

the process of steady evolution, for one of "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort? Why was such a dramatic shift considered necessary? Would this militarization of the regional effort be extended to the national effort? What change in direction and responsibility of the CSOC was likely to emerge?

Precise answers to these questions are difficult to pinpoint because of the intricacies of Thai politics with its rivalries among individuals and cliques in the ruling elite. Nevertheless, two principal reasons for the change appear to emerge. First, the government was dissatisfied with the progress of the counterinsurgency effort. While the insurgency in the Northeast appeared to have been blunted and its expansion arrested, it was still far from under control. In addition, the spread of the insurgency to the Mid-South and West Central regions, coupled with evidence of Communist penetration of the Meo hill tribe in the North, no doubt contributed to the uneasiness of key RTG officials. It also was clear that the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC, with ministerial representation from elements of the RTG, had failed to perform effectively, and that this failing was duplicated at the civilian level in the provinces. Finally, it was apparent that the paramilitary and police forces lacked sufficient resources and effectiveness to furnish the required security. The only forces available to fill this gap would have to come from the Army—at least until expansion of police and paramilitary programs caught up with the demand—and this was a long way down the road.

It is probable, however, that the main reason for the shift was the RTA's concern over its loss of influence and direction of the military effort. The CSOC Directorate of Operations under Lt. General Saiyud not only was engaged in coordinating the civilian and military effort but had largely taken over the normal military planning role, thereby cutting out the RTA headquarters in Bangkok and the Second Army in the Northeast. This was unacceptable to the RTA. Undoubtedly the RTA viewed the major expansion of the police and the establishment of Provincial Police Special Action
Forces and Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons as an intrusion into the RTA role. Demands on the officer corps for personnel to man the various counterinsurgency organizations, including the CSOC, was also a factor, particularly in light of the impending deployment of a reinforced regiment to South Vietnam.

In any case, the political leverage of the RTA was sufficient to bring the Army back into a dominant role in military planning. General Prephat either willingly sided with his Army subordinates or gave in to pressure and the Second Army Forward "takeover" of the regional coordination role in the Northeast became an accomplished fact. (The CSOC structure, reflecting the evolutionary changes described above, is shown in Figure 4.)

H. THE FUTURE OF COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The ultimate future of the national structure for coordination is difficult to estimate. Speculation on this issue varies among the official US community. All agree that if the CSOC did not exist, a coordinating agency with similar functions would have to be created, and all tend to agree that the RTG recognizes the necessity of continuing a coordinated civilian-military effort. Nevertheless, the role of the CSOC remains obscure. Some feel that the recent withdrawal of some US financial support may weaken the CSOC position. Others hold that there is a move afoot to reestablish the National Security Command as the policy-making body, with the CSOC retaining the role of implementing established policy. Others feel that the two may merge. Finally, there is some speculation that the CSOC will continue its role of coordination but will be divorced from its role of military operational planning. This last view appears to have validity, for the following reasons:

(1) The CSOC structure for coordination remains intact.

(2) Opposition to the CSOC on the part of the civil ministries is minimal. The Department of Local Administration, the major element in the civil structure of the CSOC, is not viewed as a significant threat to other civil ministries.
1. All provinces in which "charging and investigating Communist activity" (i.e., martial law) is authorized. Includes provinces under First and Second Armies plus provinces in South Thailand (Surat Thani, Trang, Pattalung, Phatani, Yala and Narathiwat). 

2. All provinces in which "charging and investigating Communist activity is not authorized." Includes all provinces not specified in 1 above.

FIGURE 4 (S), Command and Control for Counterinsurgency (U)
(3) General Saizyd, Director of Operations in the CSOC, is reputed to be resilient. More importantly, he enjoys good relations with the RTA hierarchy, including General Dongcherm of Second Army, and the police.

(4) The provincial governors have become accustomed to taking orders through CSOC channels.

(5) Political leverage for reinstating the NSC with its Thanom-Dawee power base appears to be minimal.

(6) There is no evidence to indicate that the RTA seeks an increased role in the counterinsurgency effort.

(65) In any event, the exact form of the organizational structure for coordination of the counterinsurgency effort is not fundamental. Clearly, the RTG recognizes the need for an effective structure and organization for coordination and will take the appropriate political decisions to ensure the retention of coordination machinery.

I. THE IMPACT OF "MILITARIZATION" AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

(95) The substitution of the Second Army Forward Headquarters with its military staff for CPM-1 with its combined civil-military personnel raised grave questions with regard to the future of the coordination of the counterinsurgency effort in the Northeast. On the surface the shift could be interpreted as an abandonment of the concept of a coordinated civil-military approach to counterinsurgency, signaling a military "takeover" emphasizing suppressive operations at the expense of development. The broad powers delegated to General Dongcherm in his charter did little to allay this concern. The General was given authority to

issue instructions to police, civil, and government officials with regard to counterinsurgency operations as specified in the 9th Article of Martial Law, which states that "military have power over civilians in matters pertaining to maintenance of peace; civilians must obey tactical requirements of military officers" and "because military have authority over civilians in areas of effective martial law, all development and security programs conducted as part of the suppression campaign must go through Second Army." However, there was a mitigating note in the statement that "usually military officers should not interfere
with civilian operations, except when open
necessity demands.20

(6) If arbitrarily executed, these powers could have led to a
serious dislocation of a coordinated effort. Civil programs involving
development and security could have easily been thrown into disorder
with the most serious implications.

(8) Initially General Dongchern's behavior may have confirmed
these fears. Summoning the provincial governors and regional police
commanders to his headquarters, he informed them that he was assuming
full responsibility for the entire counterinsurgency effort in the
Northeast. The reaction of the governors was ambivalent. On the one
hand they resented the intrusion of the army into what they considered
was a civil responsibility; on the other hand, there is some evidence
to indicate that they were relieved by the presence of a powerful
individual who could share responsibilities for failures in perfor-
mance. General Dongchern's summary abolishment of the posts of Deputy
Commander of CPM-1, one of which had been occupied by a high-ranking
civil servant and the other by the regional chief of the Provincial
Police, and the substitution of advisory posts further exacerbated
their resentment. The Provincial Police Force reacted by withdrawing
its critical support and cooperation.

(8) Nevertheless, as time passed General Dongchern demonstrated
that he did not intend to interfere with the direction of the civil
effort for security and development. Specifically, the military did
not intervene in the rural development programs of the governors.
Similarly, the responsibilities of the governors for local security
in their provinces were left intact, with the exception of those
areas with a high guerrilla concentration, which were an appropriate
military responsibility. In spite of broad powers to substitute
military courts for civil jurisdiction, this authority was not
exercised, nor were curfews or road patrols instituted. Similarly,

the responsibilities of the police were not altered and the intelligence responsibilities of the Special Branch and Provincial Police were not usurped. In short, civil responsibilities continued as they had in the past.

The understanding and restraint of General Dongcherm in dealing with problems in the Northeast has overcome much of the initial resentment among the civil officials and the civil agencies involved in local security and development. General Dongcherm has established effective working relations with 13 of the 15 provincial governors in the Northeast. The exceptions are Governor Phat of Ubon province and Governor Bodaeng of Sakon Nakhon. Since Governor Phat has apparently implemented the most effective counterinsurgency programs of security and development in the Northeast, largely on his own initiative and with minimal resources, this rift does not appear to have seriously impaired the overall effort. On the other hand, Governor Bodaeng, generally regarded as inefficient and ineffective, is confronted with the most serious insurgent situation in the Northeast. The lack of cooperation with Governor Bodaeng is serious in view of the critical situation in Sakon Nakhon. Fortunately it appears that the RTG has recognized Bodaeng's ineptitude and plans to replace him in the late summer or fall. There are also indications that the Provincial Police is overcoming its resentment toward the Second Army takeover and is gradually becoming more cooperative.

In his military operations, the General has demonstrated a similar understanding of the problems involved in combating the insurgency. Employing his minimal forces to fragment and attrite the guerrilla strength, he has rejected the nonproductive tactics of large sweeps in favor of saturation patrols. Troops have been held under firm discipline, and the Royal Thai Army has improved its image with the villagers.

The precedent set by the establishment of the Second Army Forward headquarters in the Northeast may have significant implications for other regions. In the event that the level of insurgency should intensify, the RTG may establish military coordination
machinery, with similar authority, in the North, West Central, Mid-South and the Thailand/Malaysian border regions. If this situation were to arise, one-third to one-half of the 71 provinces would come under the authority of a military headquarters.

This possibility gives rise to several questions. What trends toward increased military authority are apparent? If these trends should become a reality, does the Army have sufficient high-caliber senior commanders for assignment to regional commands? Finally, assuming that such officers are available, will the RTG have the perception to identify these officers and the political will to assign them to such regional commands?

As to the first question—insurgent activity is on the rise in the North, West Central, and Mid-South; and there is a real possibility that this trend will continue. In the northern region, clashes with Meo guerrillas, some of whom have received training in Laos, have led the RTG to react by building up the military forces there to five battalions under the command of the newly established forward headquarters of the Third Army.

The RTG appears to have abandoned the concept of modest developments among the Meo hill tribes for one of suppression. Against US and Border Patrol Police advice, the RTG has initiated a policy of forced resettlement of Meo hill tribesmen, coupled with severe repressive military measures (including the napalming of at least one Meo village). If the Meo insurgency continues to rise, which it appears likely to do in response to these repressive measures, it would appear likely that authority similar to that of the Second Army Forward will be delegated to the commander of the Third Army, General Aung.

Increased insurgent activity has also occurred in the four border provinces of the West Central region and in three provinces of the Mid-South. This increased tempo of guerrilla activity has resulted in the establishment of a First Army Forward headquarters, under the First Army commander, with advisers assigned from the police and the Ministry of the Interior. In the Mid-South, the military
command, the Fifth Military Circle, has been reorganized along the lines of CPM-1 in the Northeast. In both cases, the increased threat has led the RTG to assign these military commanders increased authority approaching that delegated to the Second Army Forward commander.

(8) While there has been little change in the pattern of insurgent effort in the provinces bordering Malaysia, the situation may deteriorate. The Communist organization in this border region is the strongest in Thailand. While it is currently oriented against the Government of Malaysia, it is under the control of Peking. A change in Peking's policy could turn this formidable apparatus against the RTG, instead of Malaysia; the passage of control of the movement to younger leaders who are concerned primarily with subverting the RTG could have the same effect. Such a shift would probably result in increased responsibilities for the Royal Thai Army. It would appear, then, that there is a definite trend toward militarization of the counterinsurgent effort in the border regions of Thailand.

(9) Assuming that such a trend is borne out by events, and that the military is assigned increased responsibility for the counterinsurgency effort, the question of the availability of qualified commanders arises. Does the RTA have a sufficient number of high-caliber officers with the understanding, sensitivity, and restraint to meet the demanding requirements of such an assignment? In the opinion of knowledgeable US officials, both military and civilian, who have had long experience and close contact with the RTA, the answer to this question is predominantly affirmative. As a specific example, the First Army commander and his deputy are both rated as equals of General Dongcherm.

(9) Given the necessary general officers with suitable qualifications, does the RTG have the perception required to identify these officers and to ensure their assignment? Here one enters the realm of pure speculation. It is probable that the capability exists to identify these officers. But rivalries among individuals, groups, and cliques in the RTA and RTG may place severe constraints and limitations on the freedom of selection based on ability. Judging by the
gradual evolution of effective response by the RTG to the significant demands of the counterinsurgent effort, there appears to be a justification for guarded optimism.
APPENDIX C
ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES
I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide data for an evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to counter the insurgency in Thailand, and to serve as a basis for broad guidance for specifying how Thai military forces, especially the Army, could be structured, organized, equipped, and trained to cope with the insurgency.

The paper focuses primarily on the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and counterinsurgency (CI) operations in Northeast Thailand. The analysis is based mostly upon reports of the American Embassy, Bangkok, and MACTHAI headquarters, general interviews with MACTHAI staff officers, and specific interviews with the US Special Forces officers involved in CI training of RTA units. Intelligence and psychological warfare operations have been excluded from this paper as those subjects are covered elsewhere in the overall paper.

The effectiveness of the Royal Thai Army is gauged on the basis of its ability to defeat the insurgent armed bands in the country. It is generally conceded that the RTA could do little more than fight a short delaying action against any sizable overt aggression by Chinese and/or North Vietnamese military forces.
II
THE ROYAL THAI ARMY

A. BACKGROUND

(1) To be successful, plans to defeat the insurgency in Thailand must give the major role to the Royal Thai Army (RTA). Militarily, it is dominant among the Thai armed forces, having a strength more than double that of all the other Services combined. Politically, the RTA is a powerful force essential to the successful prosecution of any major Thai effort against insurgency. The Army's commander-in-chief, General Praphat, concurrently occupies the other governmental positions of Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Proper attention to the Army's efforts to counter the insurgency pays double dividends: in addition to the uniformed individual's contribution to the stability provided by RTA active-duty units, the individual soldier who has been properly trained and educated becomes a valuable element of anti-Communist forces upon his return to civilian life.

(2) The RTA has made encouraging progress in modernization and expansion since the United States began its program of military assistance to Thailand in 1950. In recent years increased attention has been given to its counterinsurgency capabilities. The modern Thai Army, however, has not "proved" its fighting ability in any major battles. The Thai battalion in Korea during the fighting there participated in limited engagements, and a full assessment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment presently in South Vietnam is not yet available.
B. SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS

1. Northeast Thailand

(6) Prior to late 1965 operations to suppress the insurgency in Thailand were conducted almost entirely by police and paramilitary units. As insurgent activities increased in intensity, especially in the Northeast, and as police elements began to suffer losses, the RTA was called upon to participate in the suppression operations. Although the RTA had not completely ignored preparations for its participation in these operations prior to 1966, it was not adequately prepared for such involvement. Consequently, US Army assistance in the counterinsurgency (CI) training of RTA units was accelerated in 1966, and the RTA issued its first policy directive requiring special CI training as a part of the normal training cycle in September 1967.1

(6) During 1966 several area sweep-type operations, involving up to two infantry battalions for a period of from several days to a few weeks, were carried out. These operations produced little direct contact with the insurgents, who for the most part sought to avoid combat. Communist terrorist (CT) camps were located and destroyed and CT elements at least temporarily were displaced. (See Annex E.)

(6) In 1967 the Thai government implemented a new counterinsurgency plan designed to put pressure on Communist guerrillas in Northeast Thailand. This operation, called the "0910 Plan" (taken from the 1966-67 lunar calendar year 2509/2510), was more commonly known as the "Dry Season Plan." The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) developed the plan at the direction of General Praphat, the CSOC commander.

(6) The basic concept of the 0910 Plan was to: (a) provide security to the villages which surrounded subservive base areas and had been subjected to Communist coercion or influence; (b) isolate

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1. Royal Thai Army Order 153/10, dated September 13, 1967.
the guerrillas within a manageable area by preventing contact with the populace and by inhibiting Communist supporters from communicating with the guerrillas; and (c) ferret out and destroy the insurgents by use of an armed strike force. This mission was dictated by the fact that the insurgents had been using remote mountainous areas as safe havens in which to train and to cache weapons and supplies. Villagers near these safe havens had been coerced by the Communists into providing food, recruits, information, and other support by such techniques as forced propaganda meetings, intimidations and threats, and other acts of terrorism. The Thai government hoped that by concentrating its efforts in a series of coordinated civic action, psychological warfare, and suppression operations, the insurgents would be denied village support.

Counterinsurgency forces included some Border Patrol Police, Provincial Police, and Royal Thai Army units, but most of the personnel were armed villagers—members of the Volunteer Defense Corps and the Village Security Officers. Provincial Police augmented the local forces to form Joint Security Teams (approximately 12 men in each team) in villages near the selected safe havens. In each target area, a platoon-size strike force was positioned close enough to reinforce the Joint Security Teams. Elements of the Border Patrol Police, the Royal Thai Army's 3d, 6th, and 13th Infantry Regiments, and the CSOC Field Headquarters in the Northeast (CPM-1) were deployed as strike forces. In Pla Pak subdistrict, the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, provided village security and also acted as the strike force. The battalion's mission was to organize, train, and equip local volunteers. As the volunteers gained proficiency and confidence, the battalion was to withdraw its units and repeat the training cycle in another group of villages. The plan was to train and equip a self-defense unit in every village of Pla Pak subdistrict in one year.

Under the 0910 Plan, a static security force of police and RTA units would occupy a ring of villages in each of the 11 areas surrounding subversive base areas. In all, 180 of the 15,000 villages
in the Northeast were covered. A platoon-size reaction force was held available in each target area to support the static security forces if required. Meanwhile, Army units conducted intensive patrols in the forests in the vicinity of the selected villages. Field reports indicate that the insurgents withdrew from the area of operations for the most part, avoiding combat whenever possible. Nevertheless, the combination of armed strike forces and static defense forces isolated the insurgents from the target villages, displaced them from their bases, and inflicted moderate losses. By January 1968 all but three infantry companies had been withdrawn from the 0910 area of operations. Elements of police and local security forces were left in place.

6) The general conclusion that can be drawn from the 0910 operation is that the present level of insurgency in Northeast Thailand does not have sufficient strength to challenge seriously the Thai security forces when those forces make a concentrated effort in a local area. However, this isolated success in less than 2 percent of the villages in the Northeast does not mean that the insurgents have been eliminated, nor does it mean that sufficient RTG security forces have been made available to permit broad-scale application of the same technique.

(7) On October 17, 1967, Headquarters, Second Army Forward, assumed responsibility for suppression operations formerly controlled by CFM-1 in Northeast Thailand. (The Army's resources are shown in Figure 1.)

(9) The RTA forces allocated to Second Army counterinsurgency operations in March 1968 participate in three general types of operations:

(1) static population security,
(2) local patrol and reaction in 0910 target areas, and
(3) offensive operations against selected target zones.

(8) Only one company of the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, is involved in providing static population security. Two rifle companies (one each from the 3d Bn, 6th Inf, and the 3d Bn, 13th Inf) are
involved in local patrol and reaction operations. The forces engaged in offensive operations include:

1. 3d Bn, 6th Inf (less 1 company),
2. 3d Bn, 13th Inf (less 1 company),
3. 2 rifle companies each, following 5-week CI training, and
4. airborne rifle company (2 infantry platoons and one mechanized platoon).

In addition to the above forces, 22 Special Forces teams (12 men each) are scattered throughout the Second Army area taking part in all three operations. Of the 11 target areas, six have one rifle platoon that continues to serve as a reaction force for support of police and paramilitary units involved in long-term pacification functions. The men are billeted in public buildings and field camps adjacent to the villages and conduct local patrols and ambush operations in the area.

The primary objective of the offensive operations is to fragment the insurgent forces and keep them on the run. First, target areas are selected on the basis of intelligence information and suspected locations of guerrilla camps. These target areas are initially surrounded by two or more infantry companies operating in an area about 3 kilometers in diameter, and thence compressed by a combination of attack and blocking actions. The infantry units then fan out into patrol and ambush actions over approximately 100 square kilometers seeking to intercept and destroy the insurgent forces. After a few weeks, the unit is redeployed to a new zone of operations—usually leaving behind a minimum patrol force. It is significant to note that the area under intensive patrol and ambush coverage at any one time is only a small portion of the total area of Northeast Thailand and the insurgents can and do elude the patrols and move to other areas.

During the past year it cannot be said that the insurgency has been effectively destroyed nor more than held in check by these operations. The insurgents still do not seek combat with RTG forces and especially avoid contact with Army units.
The area in Northeast Thailand most seriously threatened by the insurgents is centered around the Phu Phan Mountains and the forested areas extending northward toward the Mekong River, and covers roughly 5,000 square miles. The two RTA battalions engaged in strike operations there together can control about 150 square miles during an operation. Hence, the 1,500 to 2,000 insurgents operating in small bands (20 to 50 men) can easily evade RTA units and move to areas not under security-force control.

The US military advisers to Thailand have estimated that 13 infantry battalions would be required to control this primary insurgency area, provide security for the population in the absence of adequate police and paramilitary units, and conduct saturation patrols and offensive operations against the guerrilla bands in the forests. The estimate allocates 9 battalions for the security and patrolling roles and 4 battalions for strike forces. The commanding general of the Second Army Forward has repeatedly requested up to 10 battalions for operations in the Northeast.

Offensive operations in the Northeast have not been conducted in the villages, and those in the forests have, as a matter of policy, been almost free of any use of artillery fire and air-delivered bombs and rockets. This restrained use of firepower, combined with troops well indoctrinated to be considerate of the domestic population, has produced a good military image and has avoided counterproductive reactions among the villagers.

Subsequent to the Second Army Forward takeover of suppression operations from CPM-1, 81 armed clashes with insurgent elements were reported in a five-month period. Only five of these incidents were initiated by the insurgents, apparently to force the RTA units to deploy, thus enabling the insurgents to withdraw. The results of the 81 clashes are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgents killed in action</th>
<th>56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTA killed in action</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents captured</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents surrendered</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above statistics were provided by Thai sources to the US Liaison Officer to the Second Army Forward who in turn notes that the fatality figures are considered quite reliable; however, the captured and surrendered figures include low-order supporters and suspects as well as insurgents, and it is difficult under present conditions to determine a meaningful breakdown of these or other similar statistics provided by the Thais.

The US military observers at the Second Army Forward Headquarters are impressed with the dedication, competence, and zeal of the commander and his staff. They feel the Second Army Forward understands both the need for conducting suppression operations without inflicting undue hardships on the villagers and the overall aspects of the counterinsurgency programs designed to win the support of the people. These observers consider that the Second Army Forward is flexible and seeks to avoid fixed patterns of operations.

Extracts of a message from the American Embassy in Bangkok (number 11046, dated February 29, 1968) appraising the situation in the Northeast are quoted below:

RTG Counterinsurgency Forces

Armed Forces. About 3,045 Royal Thai Army infantry, armored and support personnel are deployed to the Northeast in areas of insurgency. Second Army Forward has the equivalent of slightly more than three battalions at its disposal for combat operations. RTA units are clearly superior to insurgent bands they have engaged, and are probably capable of containing any strictly military threat put up by Northeast Communists. Their performance in reacting quickly to intelligence, patrolling aggressively in insecure areas, and mounting offensive operations against insurgent bands has been spotty, however. A distinct rise in RTA aggressiveness in the Northeast in November was reflected in the level of RTG-initiated incidents, possibly resulting from initial elan as Second Army assumed the functions of CPM-1. (RTG-initiated incidents dropped in December to previous levels, but Army units have continued to operate more vigorously under Second Army Forward direction.)

During 1967 one RTA battalion had responsibility for village security—as opposed to reaction strikes.
or other combat operations—in Pla Pak sub-district of Nakhon Phanom, the only district in which regular forces were so used under the 09/10 Plan. Available reports indicate the battalion performed well both in reducing insurgent incidents to almost nil, and in giving villagers a favorable impression of the soldiers’ behavior.

The RTAF has maintained most of its deployed helicopter fleet in the Northeast to support counterinsurgency programs and operations, and numbers of aircraft deployed and hours flown have slowly increased.

US Special Forces training of RTA units, begun in 1966, has noticeably improved RTA performance. Companies that have been through the training phase in the NE normally engage in five weeks of operations immediately afterward under Second Army Forward. (Their subsequent return to their previous station tends to dissipate some of the effect.)

Thai Counterinsurgency Performance

As indicated by the analysis in reflets, insurgents in Northeast Thailand have not been able to create a base in the villages capable of supporting their jungle soldiers, and at the end of 1967 appeared to have modified their operational approach significantly. While this is due partly to the insurgents’ own weaknesses, and the quality of the material they have to work with, it also owes much to RTG counterinsurgency programs and operations.

The 09/10 Plan has disrupted CT activity and successfully prevented the terrorists from operating in large numbers as is demonstrated by their continuing policy of avoiding confrontation with the RTG military forces whenever they can. They have not successfully assaulted the small ten to 12 man teams of VDC and provincial police that provide security to remote villages.

Military strength in the NE is insufficient. Despite increased Second Army authority for suppression operations, RTG has not made further deployments to NE. (Deployments to Vietnam may affect expansion of forces for internal CI operations.)

2. North Thailand

During the period December 1967 through February 1968, the RTA deployed four infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battery, an engineer company, and a platoon of armored personnel
carriers to conduct operations in the northern provinces of Chiangrai and Nan under the direction of Third Army. Several company and battalion-size sweeps, principally along ridges, were conducted. Forty RTA soldiers were killed and 92 were wounded, against a confirmed seven CT killed in these December-February operations. It is reported that troops often moved along the narrow mountain trails in single file, making themselves vulnerable to ambush and sniper fire. The effectiveness of these lowland RTA troops was limited by a lack of training in mountain and jungle warfare and lack of acclimatization to the mountain environment, insufficient initial helicopter support, a shortage of qualified small-unit leaders, and inadequate logistic support (food and water, particularly). Inability to distinguish between local Meo tribesmen and CTs added to the operating difficulties of the RTG troops, who out of frustration sometimes fired upon a Meo village before knowing if it harbored any CTs. Sniper fire in the vicinity of a village resulted on occasion in the bombing of the entire village.

Action is already underway to correct these deficiencies in the RTA's northern operations. A Special Forces team was dispatched to Chiang Klang to give instruction in disarming booby traps and conducting ambushes and other counterinsurgency techniques. Helicopter support was improved remarkably after the first two months of operations. The acclimatization and experience in the mountains have helped alleviate the environmental problems. Establishment of a proposed CI training center in Nan should further improve the caliber of the military CI effort in the North. General Saiyud recently announced that the RTG had decided to halt its program of resettlement of the mountain tribes in the North and to resume development operations in the tribal-insurgency area. The halting of this heretofore largely counterproductive program appears to be a sound move.

See Annex A to this paper for additional coverage of operations in North Thailand.
3. Evaluation

The Royal Thai Government has come to realize the futility of large-scale sweep operations against an enemy that does not elect to stand and fight. In the Northeast the RTG seems fully alert to the need to control suppressive operations so as to cause the least disruption to the populace and to revolutionary development activities. There is evidence also of an understanding of the value of saturation patrolling, population security, and concerted police-military actions concurrent with strike-force actions designed to keep the insurgents on the run and separated from the people. The tactics employed, however, are hampered by a lack of sufficient forces available to deny the insurgents opportunity to withdraw to uncontested areas. The six rifle companies available as a strike force in the Northeast can apply pressure on only a small segment of the 1,500 to 2,000 insurgents at one time since the CT bands are scattered over an area of approximately 5,000 square miles. Lacking enough police and paramilitary personnel to provide population security, the RTG has had to divert military units to population security roles. Thus, any increase in strike forces would have to be accompanied by an increase in security forces to be effective. Estimates that from 10 to 13 battalions would be required to fragment the insurgents—effectively appear reasonable.

In the North, the RTG seems headed toward military suppression operations that could be counterproductive. The use of napalm against Meo villages, for example, could harden the position of the tribesmen and widen the gap between the government and the hill peoples. Suppressive operations alone are not likely to succeed in the absence of overall CT programs designed to establish a favorable government presence. There are indications that the RTG is taking a new look at the situation and may adopt a more effective program in the North.
C. ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION

1. Army Headquarters

(Figure 2 depicts the RTA administrative command organization and the principal elements of the RTA Headquarters. The Army Council is composed of the Army commander-in-chief (CINC) as chairman, his staff assistants, the Secretary of the Army Staff, Army area commanders, and chiefs of the service branches when appropriate. Since 1953, the General Staff has been organized in a manner similar to that of the US Army. The Thai intelligence director, however, also has responsibility for public information on military matters.

2. Territorial and Tactical Organization

(a) Territorial Organization. Thai Army units have traditionally been tied to geographical areas; these units have been concurrently tactical and territorial. Thailand is divided into four major territorial commands for both tactical and administrative purposes. There are three army areas, each commanded by a lieutenant general, and a separate military circle commanded by a major general. (See Figure 3 for area locations.) These commanders report to the commander-in-chief, RTA.

(b) Each army area is divided into two military circles, which in turn are divided into military districts. Each army area contains one infantry division, and the separate 5th Military Circle contains one regimental combat team. (Figure 4 depicts this organization.)

(c) The army area commander's normal responsibilities include administration and mobilization, as well as control, of tactical troops. The area command headquarters are not staffed to function as a field headquarters in war. Similarly, the division headquarters have in the past functioned primarily as administrative headquarters and were intended to provide a nucleus for a tactical organization of three armies in the event of mobilization.

(d) Tactical Organization. The units of the combat arms are organized generally along the World War II triangular lines of the US Army. The 1st Infantry Division has four infantry regiments; the
FIGURE 2 (S). Royal Thai Army Administrative Command Organization (U)
FIGURE 3 (f). Army Areas of Thailand (U)
3rd Infantry Division, three regiments; and the 4th Infantry Division, two regiments. Each regiment contains three infantry battalions, a headquarters company, a heavy mortar company, a service company, a medical company, and an armored personnel carrier (APC) platoon. The battalion has a full TOE strength of 880, including a headquarters company and three rifle companies. The headquarters company includes, in addition to the battalion headquarters, a heavy weapons platoon and a service platoon. The heavy weapons platoon has three 75mm recoilless rifles, three 81mm mortars, and two heavy machine guns. The rifle company has three rifle platoons, each armed with US caliber .30 (or M-16) rifles, two 2.36 rocket launchers, and one light machine gun. The weapons platoon of the rifle company has three 60mm mortars and three 57mm recoilless rifles.

The organization, by unit designation, of RTA infantry, armor, and artillery is shown in Annex B. The composition of the major units is summarized on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Unit</th>
<th>Regt</th>
<th>Inf Bn</th>
<th>Cav Sq</th>
<th>Engr Bn</th>
<th>FA Bns</th>
<th>Tx Bn</th>
<th>AAA Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Inf Div</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav Div</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th RCT</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Abn Inf Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RTG has expressed a strong desire for a HAWK battalion to be employed in defense of Bangkok. The United States has agreed to deploy one HAWK battery from South Vietnam in 1968 and to man this battery pending completion of training of Thai personnel. It will probably be 1970 before the RTA personnel take over operation of the battery.

3. Disposition

Figure 5 shows the disposition of the principal RTA combat units and headquarters. The Second Army Forward Headquarters is located in the Northeast Sakon Nakhon. Lieutenant General Dongchem, the Second Army commander, moved to the forward location and has taken full responsibility for the conduct of CI operations.
FIGURE 5 (5). Army Dispositions, Thailand, Dec. 1967 (U)

SECRET
Similarly, in response to increased levels of insurgency, both the First and the Third Army deployed a command and control element (forward headquarters) in the fall of 1967. The First Army established its forward element to control operations in West Central Thailand, to the southwest of Bangkok near Khiri Khan, the area in which 10 police were killed in September 1967. The Third Army forward element moved out of Phitsanulok to Chieng Klang in the North to control troops deployed in the tri-border area of Thailand, Laos, and Burma. These deployments of army "forwards" reflect the RTG's concern for the spread of the insurgency and a recognition of the necessity for increased RTA involvement in counterinsurgency operations.

In addition to the troop deployments discussed above, the RTA maintains one infantry company in South Korea. Also, in September 1967 Thailand deployed its Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) to South Vietnam. This 2,000-man force includes one infantry battalion and combat support and service support units, making it in reality a battalion combat team. The RTAVR is to be replaced by a Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (RTAED) of 10,500 men organized into two brigades of three infantry battalions each. The artillery element includes two 105mm battalions and one 155mm battalion. Helicopter support is to be provided by US units in Vietnam.

4. Evaluation

The general organization of the Royal Thai Army and the organization of its tactical units present, per se, no bar to the effective employment of Army units in counterinsurgency operations. The planned conversion of an ineffective cavalry division to an infantry division will improve the RTA's force structure. The proposed HAWK battery will not add directly to the CI capability of the RTA, but the intangible, psychological impact should strengthen the RTG in the eyes of the people.
(8) The existing triangular organization of infantry battalions and rifle companies appears to be suitable for the CI operations in Thailand. These operations in general and the conditions that exist in Thailand place a premium upon riflemen. The addition of a fourth rifle company would be a practical way of increasing rifle strength with minimum increases in overhead strength. In the event that the insurgency spreads in Thailand to the extent that RTA expansion is required to cope with the situation, it would appear desirable to consider adoption of a four-rifle-company battalion organization in preference to the activation of new infantry battalions to achieve the same force equivalent.

(9) The Thais are reluctant to abolish any established organization. Consequently, the formation of the division for duty in Vietnam may have an adverse, long-term impact on the effectiveness of RTA units; i.e., retention of this new division in the force structure could aggravate an already serious manning problem within the RTA.

(9) The organizational structure of the logistical elements of the RTA requires improvement. This subject is discussed separately below.

(9) The present disposition of RTA units will not permit the effective fragmentation and destruction of CI bands in the Northeast insurgency areas. Stationing of maneuver battalions by area is shown below and the number of battalions committed to CI operations on December 31, 1967, is shown in parenthesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Army</th>
<th>2nd Army</th>
<th>3rd Army</th>
<th>5th Mil. Circle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (includes one Abn Bn and one SF Gp)</td>
<td>17 (1/3)</td>
<td>9 (3)</td>
<td>6 (1/3)</td>
<td>4 (1/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (2/3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(7) By March 1968 elements of four battalions were involved in CI operations in the Third Army area in northern Thailand. It should be pointed out that of the 22 units in the First Army area, four are assigned as school troops, and six are designated as King's Guard. This still leaves 12 battalions which, it appears, could be put to better use in the threatened areas. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 5, only 5 of the 11 battalions in the Second Army area are stationed in the threatened Northeast. The deployment of forward elements of the Army headquarters to areas of insurgency activity should improve the effectiveness of RTA units in CI operations.

D. PERSONNEL

1. CONSCRIPT

(U) The Royal Thai Army is composed principally of conscript privates and volunteer commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior are jointly responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Conscription Act, and the RTA administers the draft program for all three Services.

(U) The various RTA military circle headquarters, the provincial recruiting officials, and district conscription boards are jointly responsible for processing all conscripts residing in their respective areas. Each military circle and province maintains records of personnel subject to conscription or reserve call throughout their period of liability for military service.

(U) Service obligation under the Act is normally two years, but the term may be extended during war or an emergency. Individuals who have participated in Territorial Defense Department training, possess special education, or work in one of several qualifying civilian professions may qualify for a reduced active-duty obligation.

(U) Under the Act, each male citizen at the age of 18 must register at the recruiting office of the district which is his home of record. At the age of 21, prospective conscripts return to the induction office to receive their physical examinations, after which
they participate in a lottery drawing, usually held during April, which determines who is to be drafted. Prior to the lottery, however, personnel may volunteer for the draft and choose their unit and location. After processing, draftees are customarily sent to the nearest Army, Navy, or Air Force installation, where they are issued uniforms and assigned to a unit for training or to a recruit training school.

(U) Personnel selected for induction are sent to active duty throughout the year on the following schedule:

- RTA - May and November
- RTN - January, April, July and October
- RTAF - May and November

(U) During their two-year obligated active duty, draftees must remain in a "conscript" status. They are not normally eligible for advanced training or promotion unless they have proven to be outstanding and are well educated. In some cases, personnel may be advanced one rank during their second year of service; however, they still remain in a conscript status. Upon completion of their two-year obligation, draftees may enlist for an unspecified term of service providing vacancies exist. These individuals receive considerably higher pay and are removed from "conscript" status.

(U) Upon release from active military service, conscripts are assigned to a Category I reserve status for a period of 23 years, as follows:

- Class 1 - 7 years
- Class 2 - 10 years
- Class 3 - 6 years

(U) Eligible personnel who are not drafted by age 30 are placed in Category II reserve status for 15 years, as follows:

- Class 2 - 10 years
- Class 3 - 5 years
2. Officer and NCO Procurement

(U) a. Officers. At the end of 10 years of civilian schooling, the prospective RTA officer attends the Armed Forces Preparatory School for two years. The cadet then attends Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy for five years and is commissioned as a second lieutenant upon graduation. Fifty percent of the RTA officer ceiling is normally allocated to officers from the academy. An academy graduate receives special qualification pay in addition to base pay and allowances.

(U) Civilian students who have completed secondary school and outstanding cadets of the Armed Forces Preparatory School may be selected to attend one of several foreign military academies. Upon graduation from the foreign academy, these cadets are commissioned in the RTA and receive qualification pay based on the academy attended.

(U) Students who have received at least a bachelor's degree may be commissioned in the RTA upon completion of a 15-day RTA Territorial Defense Course. Special qualification pay is received based on education.

(U) A five-year program, similar to ROTC, is conducted by the RTA Territorial Defense Department for personnel attending secondary and university level schools. Volunteers for this program advance through five grades, based on examination, and attend a 35-hour orientation course after graduation. Individuals who successfully complete the program are commissioned as acting second lieutenants and are integrated into the RTA on the recommendation of their unit commander as vacancies occur. As is the case with academy and college graduates, special qualification pay is based on education.

(U) Doctors and dentists are commissioned after graduation from medical school. Their initial appointment is to the rank of first lieutenant and, as an additional incentive, they receive special qualification pay.

(U) Opportunities exist within the RTA for highly qualified NCOs to become commissioned officers without attending an OCS-type course. Twenty percent of the RTA officer ceiling is allocated to

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this source, and selection depends upon availability of vacancies within the authorized RTA manning level. In addition to passing a written RTA examination, applicants for this program must have a master sergeant's rank (in grade for at least 4 years), 15 years' RTA experience (only 8 years is required of vocational school graduates), and a year's successful service in an officer billet.

(U) b. Noncommissioned Officers. Civilian personnel who have completed secondary level school (10th grade high school) may volunteer to become an NCO. Volunteers take a written examination to qualify for a particular RTA branch; selections are based on test scores and personnel requirements.

(U) Selected candidates attend a two-year branch NCO school. At the end of the first year, candidates are promoted to corporal or lance corporal on the basis of a comprehensive final examination. Failures are transferred to RTA units to serve out their remaining obligation as privates, and successful graduates devote the second year of training to MOS qualification. The individual achieving first-standing in his NCO class may enter the Armed Forces Preparatory School without taking the competitive examination.

(U) Students who have participated in the RTA Territorial Defense Department five-year training course and have completed vocational or secondary school may voluntarily enlist as NCOs. If accepted, they are assigned rank on the basis of the training course grade successfully completed. For example, those who complete grade 3 are appointed corporals, and those who complete grade 4, sergeants.

(U) Conscripts who reenlist in the RTA upon completion of their two-year service obligation may be selected for promotion to NCO rank upon completion of the NCO school as discussed above.

(U) Civilian personnel who have completed grade 4 of civilian education and who possess special skills of use to the RTA may qualify for direct appointment to the rank of lance corporal. These individuals, however, may not advance beyond the rank of corporal.
3. Manpower Resources and Manning Levels

(8) It was estimated that at the beginning of 1968, there were 8.2 million males in Thailand between the ages of 15 and 49. Of these, about five million were estimated to be fit for military service. Approximately 315,000 males reach the age of 18 each year, and between 20,000 and 30,000 are conscripted annually. The total armed forces authorized strength in December 1967 was about 200,000. Since probably half of this full-strength force would be conscripts (the remainder being volunteer officers, NCOs, and privates), the annual number of two-year draftees required to keep all military units at 100 percent strength would be about 50,000.

(8) At the end of 1967, the RTA had a total authorized strength of 141,756. The manning levels in June and December of 1967 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAP</th>
<th>Non-MAP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>111,285</td>
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<td>139,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>84,216</td>
<td>16,781</td>
<td>100,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
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As of 31 December 1967

<table>
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<th>Non-MAP</th>
<th>RTAVR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>28,241</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>141,756</td>
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<tr>
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<td>85,177</td>
<td>15,336</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>102,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) There is considerable variation in unit strengths within the Army; for example, all regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division are above 80 percent in strength, and the 1st Special Forces Group is above 100 percent of authorized strength even though the overall average for the Army is close to 70 percent.

(8) The strength figures tabulated above do not include the 11,266-man division programmed for South Vietnam. Adding this figure to the authorized strength of 141,756, and comparing the assigned strength of 102,678 to this new total, gives a manning level
of 67 percent. The RTA has announced a manning-level objective of 74 percent of full TOE authorized strength by September 1968. Its longer-range objective is to reach 100 percent of reduced TOE strength (equivalent to 84 percent of full TOE strength) by January 1970.

4. The Individual Soldier

The Thai conscription system produces alert, physically fit military personnel. The prestige of military service is generally high. The Thai enlisted man, usually of rural background, is limited somewhat by lack of education and mechanical training. He has, however, an interest in learning and usually possesses the aptitude for becoming a good soldier. He is patriotic, with a deep sense of loyalty to his king and respect for his superiors, responsive to discipline, and inured to physical hardship. The lowland Thai, however, requires additional physical conditioning to be able to perform effectively in the mountainous areas of North Thailand.

Morale and discipline in the armed forces appear to be good. In general, enlisted men consider military pay, benefits, and allowances better than those received by civilians with a similar degree of training and experience. The conscript private's monthly pay is from 60 to 200 baht; the volunteer private's pay, between 530 and 600 baht per month; and a colonel's pay, about 4,000 baht ($200) per month. The individual soldier is well-fed, wears a smart uniform, and enjoys liberal passes and furloughs.

5. Personnel Constraints

a. Present-for-Duty Strengths. The assigned strengths of the RTA units reveal a serious shortage of personnel. The actual situation in most units is even worse than the figures indicate. The Thai Army is called upon to provide personnel for many tasks which take them away from their units. There are, for example, RTA personnel on missions in Laos, positioned as assistant district officers in the civil administration, performing duty with Mobile Development Units, and helping to man Special Operations Centers. While these tasks are important, the army units nevertheless suffer from the loss
of some of their members. It appears that although the assigned strength of many units is 70 to 75 percent of TOE, the present-for-duty strength is probably not more than 50 to 60 percent of TOE after allowances are made for personnel on leave, sick, absent without leave, and on special duty. It is generally conceded that to send a full-strength company through the counterinsurgency (CI) training conducted by the US Army's 46th Special Forces Company, resources from throughout the battalion are required. In no case to date have two full-strength companies from the same battalion taken the training at the same time.

(6) b. Use of Conscripts. The RTA does not appear to use the two-year conscript to his maximum potential. After his eight weeks of basic training within his battalion, the conscript is often employed in only menial tasks for the remainder of his two-year tour. During his second year of obligated service, the outstanding conscript may be promoted to the rank of private first class. The highest pay even this outstanding conscript can receive is 200 baht per month (20 baht = $1.00). Efforts by US advisers to convince RTA authorities to make better use of the conscript have not been successful.

(6) c. Shortage Of Company Grade and Noncommissioned Officers. The most critical personnel problem in the RTA today is the shortage of company grade and noncommissioned officers. As of December 31, 1967, the reported figures were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>NCOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td>55,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>8,993</td>
<td>39,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>-4,467</td>
<td>-15,993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) It is estimated that only about 60 percent of the approximately 5,000 company grade officers authorized are actually assigned--a shortage of about 2,000. Allowing for the absences of officers for reasons discussed above, this means that on the average only two officers are present for duty in a tactical company that is authorized
six officers. Officers in the US Special Forces confirm that most units undergoing CI training have only two officers per company.

Adequate junior officer and NCO leadership is, of course, essential to the effectiveness of any military organization. Because of the state of training and overall character of the Thai conscript and the nature of small-unit reactions in CI operations, this leadership is extremely critical. The initiative, aggressiveness, and ability to take charge when necessary simply do not exist among the draftees.

The annual gains and losses of officers and NCOs are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs:</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Academy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of NCOs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduates</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Schools</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Losses:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion to Officer</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers from RTA</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirements</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>652</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NET GAIN</strong></td>
<td>348</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RTA has announced plans to reduce the officer and NCO shortages. The program of instruction at the Royal Military Academy will be reduced from five to three years; the next class will be graduated in August 1968 instead of January 1969. Commissioning of 300 master sergeants per year is planned. About 150 university graduates will be commissioned annually for the next three years; they will receive training at the Royal Military Academy for a 15-month period. Each branch NCO school will increase its enrollment from 80 percent to full capacity. In addition, each branch school will begin in April a one-year NCO course, which is expected to
provide about 1,300 NCOs in the next year. The possibility of establishing "crash" schools at each of the branch schools to fill the immediate NCO requirements is being studied by the RTA.

(§) It appears that if all these plans (excluding the "crash" schools) are carried out, a shortage of about 1,000 company grade officers and 10,000 to 12,000 NCOs will still remain at the end of three years.

(§) d. Age of Company Officers. A high percentage of the officers in the line companies have been promoted from NCO status. Since one eligibility requirement for this promotion is 15 years' service, the age of these newly commissioned officers is about 37 years. The platoon leader in his late 30's or early 40's undoubtedly is at a disadvantage in setting the example in physical stamina for his troops. The RTA has announced that the 300 master sergeants to be commissioned annually for the next three years must be under 35 years of age.

(§) e. Formation of New Units. About 60 percent of the Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (RTAED) is being drawn from the active army. Formation of the HAWK battery will be an additional demand for technically competent personnel. Neither of these drawdowns would be especially serious if RTA units were at full strength. In view of the existing personnel picture in the RTA, however, the operational posture of other combat units will be appreciably degraded for at least the next two years by the loss of personnel to these new units.

6. Evaluation

(§) a. Overall Shortages. Personnel shortages, both quantitative and qualitative, comprise the most serious constraint to RTA effectiveness today. The US Army rates a unit whose strength is below 75 percent of that authorized as C-4--not operational. At present RTA strength is less than 70 percent of that authorized. The three regiments of the 3rd Division and both regiments of the 4th Division were above 75 percent of authorized strength in December 1967.
While present-for-duty figures are not available, it is doubtful that even any of these regiments has a present-for-duty strength as high as 75 percent. Additionally, reassignment of personnel to the newly formed division for Vietnam was not reflected in the December strength figures. In general, the manning levels of the logistical units are lower than those of the combat units.

b. Capabilities and Limitations of the RTA Soldier. Doubt has been expressed by some as to whether the individual Thai, because of his Buddhist precepts primarily, will really fight in combat. Based on interviews with many US personnel who have spent considerable time in Thailand and who have had close association with the Thais, this study group believes that the Thai soldier can be trained to be an effective fighter. His religious beliefs do not preclude his becoming a good combat soldier; on the contrary, blessings bestowed on a unit departing for war by the Buddhist officials, including the King, serve to enhance the unit's effectiveness. Preliminary reports from South Vietnam indicate the soldiers of the Thai volunteer regiment have performed well under fire.

A weakness of the Thai soldier is lack of initiative. He follows orders well, but by nature is not inclined to "take charge" when the situation demands. The relatively rigorous schooling requirements to become a noncommissioned officer in the RTA make it difficult to take advantage of the outstanding leader who has little formal schooling.

Most of the Thai privates are from rural areas and have had little or no mechanical experience. Hence, a formidable training problem faces the RTA with the introduction of any sophisticated equipment of modern warfare. Nevertheless, there is evidence to indicate that the soldier can and does absorb technical training rapidly.

c. Shortages of NCOs and Company Grade Officers. Because of the lack of initiative among Thai privates, the junior officer and noncommissioned officer assume critical importance. As outlined earlier in this paper, steps are planned to alleviate the junior
officer and NCO shortage. Because a complete solution to this problem does not appear likely within the next five years under the proposed plans, this constraint will remain serious for some time.

3. Leadership. The commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the RTA up through the battalion commander are generally competent. The selection and schooling process help to produce capable NCOs.

3. There are two distinct groups of junior officers—the graduates of the Royal Military Academy and other colleges, and those commissioned from NCO ranks. Those of the first group are well educated, young, ambitious. Many of the company officers are of the latter group, and while they possess valuable experience they are older than desired for combat duty.

3. Many of the majors and lieutenant colonels have been trained in US schools; they are intelligent, energetic, and competent. Many regimental commanders are colonels who are older, relatively lazy, and not interested in effecting needed changes.

3. At the higher levels, business interests occupy considerable attention of the general officers. In a sense, they are not full-time Army officers, but this is the "Thai way" and will undoubtedly continue. There are, at the same time, excellent leaders among the general officers. General Dongcherm, Commanding General of the 2d Army, has shown initiative, excellent planning ability, and persuasive leadership in executing his counterinsurgency task in the Northeast. The 1st Army Commander and his staff are also considered extremely capable.

3. Staff Ability. There is a traditional reluctance among staff officers throughout the RTA to initiate proposals to their commanders. Much of the energy of the staff officers is expended in complying strictly with the formats, rules, and procedures of plans and orders and not in generating ideas. There are, however, encouraging signs of staff initiative among some of the young field-grade officers who have received training in US schools, and some of the commanders are encouraging this trend. The US adviser to the 2d
Army commander reports that General Dongchern has made a special point of encouraging initiative on the part of his staff.

(8) f. Rating. Overall, the personnel posture of the RTA, both in quantity and quality, is rated marginally adequate for the RTA to perform its share of the task of containing the present insurgency. However, improvements must be made before the armed insurgent bands can be effectively fragmented or destroyed. Manning levels of units must be increased. The shortages of company grade and noncommissioned officers have to be alleviated. Real efforts must be made to instill initiative in the RTA soldier.

E. EQUIPMENT

(8) Suggestions for improvement of the RTA's counterinsurgency potential were informally expressed to members of this study group, during their visit to Thailand in March 1968, by US personnel at headquarters MACTHAI, by US training personnel, and by US observers at Second Army Forward. These suggestions universally centered around RTA force modernization rather than force expansion. Their specific comments concerning force modernization were usually directed toward three categories of equipment: infantry weapons, helicopters for increased mobility and fixed-wing light observation aircraft, and more effective field communications.

(8) Since it began in 1950, the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Thailand has contributed appreciably to the transformation of the RTA from 10 poorly equipped and undermanned regimental combat teams to a relatively modern force of four divisions, a separate regimental combat team (RCT), and a special forces group. In 1950 the RTA was equipped with a mixture of obsolete materiel of foreign origin—not supportable with spare parts or ammunition. Between 1951 and 1956, most of this foreign equipment was replaced by US materiel of the type used in World War II and the Korean War. During this period MAP provided about 60,000 individual weapons and 4,000 general purpose vehicles. After 1959, most of these WW II general purpose vehicles were replaced by vehicles purchased in Japan. Modernization
of RTA equipment continues as an objective of MAP. The status of key "move, shoot, and communicate" equipment is briefly discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

1. Mobility

(5) In FY 68, MAP provided funds for purchase of 17 UH-1 type helicopters so that the first of the four programmed RTA airmobile companies could be activated in FY 68. Plans call for activation of the second and third companies by FY 71 and the fourth company probably by 1972.

(5) The surface transportation capability of the RTA needs improvement. The general purpose fleet consists of off-shore procurement from Japan (86 percent) and WW II vehicles (14 percent). No additions or replacements have been provided since 1962. The Military Assistance Plan for Thailand, FY 68 to FY 73, provides for modernization of the RTA vehicles. For example, a $15 million "add on" for FY 68 provides nearly $3 million for vehicles, 50 percent of which are to be issued to maneuver battalions operating in the North and Northeast against the insurgents. Annex D shows the total number of cargo vehicles on hand or programmed under MAP through FY 68.

(5) During most of 1967, unavailability of tires, tubes, and batteries caused a high vehicle deadline rate in the RTA. These items are manufactured locally and furnished by the RTA. In the last quarter of 1967, US advisers reported receipt of increasing quantities of these items, and it appeared the situation was improving significantly.

(5) The MAP has provided 155 M-113 armored personnel carriers to the Thai Army. These carriers, operated by transportation corps personnel, have been kept in good condition and have added appreciably to the mobility of the RTA infantry elements.

(5) Two light aviation companies are scheduled for activation during FY 68 and FY 69. Observation aircraft and helicopters are being provided by MAP. These companies will assist in solving the existing command and control, observation, and reconnaissance deficiencies of the units deployed in suppression operations.
2. **Weapons**

Some 60,000 individual weapons were provided to the RTA during the early years of US military assistance to Thailand. Modernization of small arms has included the introduction of the M-16 rifle and M-79 grenade launcher. The 4,500 M-16 rifles delivered to the RTA have been allocated to the 3rd Infantry Division (3,300), the Special Forces Group (800), the airborne battalion (375), and schools (25). The lighter, rapid fire M-16 is a much more suitable weapon for the Thai infantry soldier in counterinsurgency operations than is the .30 caliber rifle. Over 800 M-60 machine guns have been programmed through FY 68.

In past years, 183 M-24 tanks were provided to the RTA. These are no longer supportable with spare parts and are being replaced with M-41 tanks. Since 1962, 114 M-41 tanks have been delivered.

Except for one battalion at the Artillery School, the RTA has no medium (155mm) artillery. There are enough 105mm howitzers on hand to equip an artillery battalion (four tubes per battery) for each maneuver regiment.

The four air defense battalions have been equipped with the M-16 half track (.50 caliber machine gun) and M-2A1 40mm guns (towed), which are logistically unsupportable. To date, 18 twin 40mm M-42 guns (SP) and 18 trailer-mounted quad .50 caliber machine guns (M-55) have been provided to equip the 4th Air Defense Artillery Battalion, less one firing battery.

3. **Communications**

A beginning has been made in modernizing RTA radio communications. Up until now, the radio equipment within the infantry battalion has consisted of the following:

- battalion to company: AN/PRC 10 (FM)--range, 3 to 5 miles
- AN/GRC 87 (AM)--range, 10 to 15 miles
- company to platoon: AN/PRC 6 (FM)--range, 1 mile
- platoon to squad: None
The plan to overcome these obvious communication deficiencies includes establishing a platoon command net by providing the PRC-6 to each squad, utilizing the PRC-25 (range 5 miles) for each platoon in the company command net, and using the PRC-25 for each company to operate in the battalion FM command net. The FY 67 MAP included 769 PRC-25 radios. An expedited delivery of 144 sets (enough to equip four RTA battalions in the Northeast) was requested; the remaining 625 PRC-25 sets are expected to be delivered in September 1968.

4. Evaluation

Many maneuver units of the RTA have been rated by NACTHAI as not fully operational because of the lack of mobility. In December 1967, only 63 percent of the wheeled vehicles in the RTA were operational. Significant improvement was expected during the first quarter in 1968, with the reported receipt by units of significant quantities of tires, tubes, and batteries.

The RTA has insufficient helicopters to provide the rapid reaction capability desired in CI operations. The current limited availability of helicopter lift in the Northeast requires that extensive use be made of wheeled transportation when strike forces are shifted to new zones of operations within the large insurgency area. As a result, surprise is lost and the CT gain a headstart in withdrawing from the zone. Since one airmobile company can lift only one rifle company at a time, the present plan to provide four airmobile companies over a period of four years will provide only a gradual increased capability. From an operational point of view, an acceleration of this program is desirable.

The RTA has sufficient numbers of weapons on hand to provide the firepower needed in successful CI operations at the current level of insurgency. Maintenance and in-commission rate of weapons are good. Provision of the M-16 rifle under MAP is highly desirable, but not essential to CI operations; the much more critical factor regarding firepower of individual weapons is the training of the users. The RTA has adequate numbers of mortars and artillery pieces to provide the required indirect fire support in its suppression
operations. The reluctance of the RTA to use ammunition, particularly artillery, to train its personnel is a more serious constraint than weapons availability. The absence of medium artillery in the RTA divisions does not seriously detract from current CI operations.

The lack of effective radio communications within the rifle battalion is a serious impediment to the conduct of CI operations. Provision of the PRC-25 radio with its increased channels and range will improve communications at the company level. Additional requirements for long-range, light-weight radios for use by patrols may become evident as CI operations are initiated over wider areas than currently covered.

F. TRAINING

1. Routine Training

The RTA headquarters annually publishes a comprehensive training directive which outlines the annual cycle of training, beginning with individual training and progressing through annual battalion training tests. The directive emphasizes counterinsurgency subjects and directs that one-third of all training be done at night. However, JUSMAG advisers indicate that the latter is not met to any appreciable extent.

Basic training of conscripts is done at the battalion level, based upon two draft calls annually. This repeated involvement in individual basic training tends to interfere with unit training.

The most common routine training deficiencies cited in MACTHAI quarterly reports are inadequate periods of field training and the lack of uniformly well-conducted marksmanship and qualification firing in the RTA. For the coming year, the RTA budget provides for an increase in annual per diem for routine field training from 12 days to 36 days for combat arms units. Because of weaknesses in RTA routine training, it has been necessary for US Special Forces to include basic subjects, such as land navigation, in special CI training programs.
Noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers through the grade of lieutenant colonel are generally evaluated by US military observers as being well schooled in the classroom fundamentals of land warfare. The conscripts and the regular cadre, with the exception of the overaged, are considered to have an adaptability to military service and an eagerness to learn. It is reported that NCOs and officers alike are insatiable in their quest for US field manuals and related documents, and that the Thai military readily absorb effective training.

2. Special CI Training

From 1960 to 1966 the US Army furnished small units and mobile training teams to Thailand from Special Forces units in Okinawa on an ad hoc basis for the conduct of field exercises and cadre training of limited numbers of RTA officers and NCOs.

In April 1966 a decision was made by the US and Thai governments to establish a company-size USASF unit in Thailand on a permanent change-of-station basis. Company D, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, was reactivated at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, on April 15, 1966, and directed to begin pre-mission training for operations in Thailand.

Company D, was tasked to give advice and assistance in the training of RTA units in CI operations and in the preparation of programs of instruction for all levels of RTA combat units and service schools for CI operations.

The Company has organized a Special Forces training base and headquarters at Camp Pawai, Lop Buri province, and three B Detachment training sites: Detachment 4610 at Nam Pung Dam, Sakon Nakhon province; Detachment 4620 at Pak Chong, Korat province; and Detachment 4630 at Ban Kachong, Trang province.

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3. Company D was redesignated "46th Special Forces Company (Airborne), 1st Special Forces" in April 1967.
During 1966 and 1967, 36 rifle companies completed a five-week training program that emphasized patrolling and insurgency tactics and culminated in five weeks of actual counterinsurgency operations. Similarly in 1967, 34 rifle companies completed a three-week CI course of instruction, and three infantry battalions completed a four-week training program conducted by the US 46th Special Forces Company. By October 1968, all RTA rifle companies are scheduled to have completed one of the CI training programs.

The primary training task assigned to the Company was a five-week counterinsurgency course designed to prepare RTA infantry companies for successful operations against armed insurgents. The five-week program is carried out in three phases, training two infantry companies in the Northeast and one in the South during each cycle. After several cycles of training had been completed, it was decided to give the company cadre two weeks of special CI training prior to the beginning of the main five-week cycle to prepare them for subsequent instruction.

Phase I of the course consists of a one-week period of training at the home station of the infantry company. A combined US-Thai Mobile Training Team visits the unit and conducts training in such basic CI subjects as guerrilla operations, problems of CI operations in Southeast Asia, surveillance and reporting, camouflage, basic psychological warfare operations, civic action, information sources and reporting, and the like. At the same time, inspections are made to ensure that personnel of the Company are properly equipped with serviceable gear and that the unit fires its organic weapons.

At the end of Phase I, the unit and the combined US-RTA training team are moved to the Phase II training site. The two infantry companies in the Northeast are moved to Camp Nong Takoo, Korat province, and the infantry company in the South is moved to Camp Kachong, Trang province.

4. See Annex F to this paper for subjects and type of instruction given in each phase.
Phase II training consists of two weeks of advance individual training and small-unit operations at the squad level. Such subjects as map reading, compass use, jungle firing, ambush and counterambush training, raids, intelligence, reconnaissance, tactics, air operations, and the like are taught.

Upon completion of this course, the companies in the Northeast are moved to their Phase III training site at Camp Nam Pung, adjacent to Nam Pung Dam, Sakon Nakhon province. In South Thailand, the company remains at Camp Kachong, Trang province.

The training during Phase III consists of a series of realistic field problems commencing with the establishment of an operations base and platoon and company-level operations utilizing current counterinsurgency tactics. These exercises are planned and executed by the unit leaders with combined US-RTA Special Forces observers. Combined US-RTA Special Forces personnel also serve as aggressors for the exercises.

After Phase III training, the companies become operational for a five-week period. In the Northeast, they are assigned to Second Army Forward Headquarters at Sakon Nakhon where they perform counterinsurgency missions as required. In South Thailand, the company is assigned operational missions in Phatthalung and Trang provinces under control of the commanding officer, 5th Regimental Combat Team. Operations are often undertaken with other military, police, and VDC personnel.

During this operational phase, the USASF personnel remain at the training site, while the RTASF personnel are attached to the company to act as advisers.

Although US personnel do not receive detailed reports of the activities during the operational phase, fragmentary information indicates that, in general, companies engaged in combat actions performed satisfactorily, and that the training is paying off. The CSOC has reported that the companies graduating from the five-week program perform better on operations than do other units.
The RTA rifle companies that have participated in the five-week CI training program have usually been composite units from the parent battalion. In some cases, most of the riflemen have been recent conscripts with about three months' service. Attention to basic fundamental unit training is required during this program because the personnel have not had experience in unit training at squad and platoon levels. The USASF officers and NCOs engaged in this training unofficially rate the Thai soldier as hardy and receptive to training. They comment that when units fail to achieve desired training results, the cause can most often be attributed to weaknesses in leadership at the company or platoon level where average company commanders and platoon leaders are not uncommon. This comment applied to about one-third of the company and platoon leadership.

3. Evaluation

Inadequate amounts of field training and weaknesses in marksmanship programs are constraints on the effectiveness of the RTA. Possibly of greater significance is the adverse effect upon training of the low manning levels, especially company grade officers and NCOs. Nevertheless, the performance of the RTA in the Northeast suggests that the level of training at least meets minimum standards for CI operations in that area. However, the difficulties encountered by 3rd Army troops in the steep mountains of the North reflect a need for specialized training to improve the effectiveness of the RTA in that area.

The CI training by US Special Forces units appears to be reasonably effective, at least for current operations in the Northeast area. During March 1968, MACVTHAI was studying the extent to which the US Special Forces could also assist in training units for CI operations in the North. As noted earlier, the inadequacies of routine, basic-unit training by the RTA has resulted in the special CI training program being geared accordingly. As a result, less time is available for concentration on high payoff areas in the special training cycle. Past insurgency operations against bands operating in forested areas have shown the importance of battle drills and techniques
to achieve instinctive reactions and rapid delivery of effective fire by small units against guerrilla bands. There is every reason to believe that added emphasis in this area of training of RTA units would be worthwhile.

G. LOGISTICS

The RTA Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, is the staff officer responsible for advising the Chief of Staff, RTA, on logistical matters and for advising the Chiefs of Technical Services, as appropriate. He has no command or control authority except for his own staff and office operation.

The RTA Director of Logistics is the chief assistant to the ACoFS, Logistics. He is also a staff officer with no command or control except over his own directorate and the RTA Logistics College. He does, however, exercise control over RTA supplies and equipment. He is responsible for monitoring the requisitioning and issuing of supplies, approving of the allocation of equipment to units, and recommending approval or disapproval of all disposal actions. The Director is also responsible for approving construction for the RTA and for allocating RTA funds to be used for technical schooling, procurement of supplies, and maintenance and repair of facilities.

The Chiefs of Technical Services are each responsible for the operations of the facilities, installations, and units assigned to their respective departments; for technical supervision of units assigned to the combat divisions; and for the supply and maintenance of equipment for which responsibility is assigned. The Chiefs of Technical Services are under the authority of the Commander in Chief, RTA; their activities are supervised by the Chief of Staff and coordinated by the ACoFS, Logistics, and the Director of Logistics.

The concentration in Bangkok of the RTA storage and depot system causes delays and unresponsiveness in the supply system. Bilateral plans for the activation of Army Support Commands (ASCOMs), with subordinate supply and maintenance organizations which will provide intermediate field support to RTA divisions and task
organizations, were approved by the RTA, Chief of Staff, and initial elements were programmed and funded in the FY 67 MAP. The establishment of such forward logistics elements has been considered basic to an effective RTA peacetime logistics system and essential to any effective combat deployment. The RTA was assisted by MACTHAI in developing the approved plan, and based upon RTA agreement to provide the personnel to support the activation of ASCOM units, MACTHAI developed a six-year program (FY 67-FY 72) for activations which will culminate in ASCOM organizations in the North, Northeast, and South Thailand. Activations for ASCOM Northeast were programmed and funded in the FY 67 MAP. Activations thus far include an ASCOM Headquarters, Ordnance Field Support Company, Quartermaster Direct Support Company, and a Signal Supply and Maintenance Company. Construction bids were offered in February 1968 for a headquarters building, five supply buildings, six maintenance buildings, roads, hardstand, and utilities. Additional activations and construction to fill out the ASCOM Northeast, and its facilities, are phased through 1970. First priority has been given to ASCOM Northeast due to growing RTA operational commitments in that area. Initial activations for ASCOM North and South are planned for the FY 68 MAP.

(2) The major logistics deficiency cited in the MACTHAI reports is the low percentage of serviceable wheeled vehicles. This is primarily due to shortages of RTA-provided consumables, such as tires and batteries, and the failure to re-order parts as they are consumed. At the urging of MACTHAI, the RTA is beginning to implement a periodic maintenance inspection system that should be beneficial.

(2) An appraisal of the RTA logistics situation, prepared by the Logistics Division of the Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand, in February 1968, is quoted below:

Limitations of the Logistics Situation

The logistics situation within the Royal Thai Army is marginally satisfactory. The combat service support structure is capable of providing minimum essential support to the combat forces under existing conditions of deployment, manning, training and
limited counter-insurgency operations. Existing service support units are not capable of adequately supporting further deployment of combat forces nor a significant increase in counter-insurgency operations. There is an urgent requirement to correct this deficiency in force structure and additional logistics units are planned for activation during the Military Assistance Plan Years FY 67-FY 72. Commitment of the RTA to extensive counterinsurgency or other combat operations before additional service support units are activated, equipped and trained would require substantial U.S. or third country logistics augmentation.

... there is an equally urgent requirement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics operations throughout all units of the RTA. Many supply and maintenance positions in combat and combat support units are occupied by personnel requiring additional training or are unfilled. ... Improvement in these two areas--manning and training--can be accomplished most directly through increased interest and active participation of all commanders and their staffs in logistics matters. There is a significant need to improve methodology and techniques whereby the RTA General Staff and higher level commanders can project in a constructive manner their concern for improving supply and maintenance operations.

The marginal capability of the RTA logistics system is being affected by the requirement to provide MOS-trained technicians to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) which will begin deploying to Vietnam in August 1968. These personnel requirements constitute a significant drawdown in critical technical skills from RTA supply and maintenance units beginning in February of 1968 and peaking out in February 1969. The RTAVF and training base requirements will reduce the effectiveness of the RTA logistics system and may affect planned activations of additional logistics units due to personnel shortages in supply and maintenance units. The RTAVF's impact on in-country operations will be offset to some degree in September 1968 due to the return of experienced service support personnel from the RTA Volunteer Regiment now in Vietnam. A significant number of skilled personnel will return from Vietnam in August 1969, resulting in a general overall improvement in the quality and quantity of technical skills in RTA supply and maintenance units.
Essential end items and repair parts in the hands of troops or within the RTA supply system are frequently inadequate for the performance of both the peacetime mission and for the support of initial combat operations. ... The improvement of supply management practices, including the establishment of new procedures and techniques, is vital to the improvement of RTA combat readiness.

Stocks of supplies in-country are estimated at approximately 30 days except for POL and ammunition, based on normal combat ammunition day of supply. Stockage of artillery 105mm and 155mm ammunition approximates 35 days, small arms 90 days and other calibers of ammunition approximates 60 days. Resupply of stocks under normal combat rates would be required within these time frames.

Maintenance of wheel and track vehicles and engineer construction equipment continues to be a major problem area within the RTA. ... Although the problem has many facets, perhaps the most critical is to convey to all operating levels the concern of the RTA Command and Staff and senior commanders for establishing and maintaining unit operational readiness. ... Commanders and their staffs must learn to direct and guide subordinates in establishing goals and standards of performance, in creating a competitive spirit within subordinate units, and in the conduct of command inspections of tactical units and logistics support activities. On-the-job training (OJT) can and should be formalized and closely supervised. ...

The level of manning and training of service support units is generally below the level maintained in the combat units, compounding the deficiency in logistics structure. If RTA planned strength increases materialize and appropriate priority is afforded logistics units, this problem will be alleviated. A problem closely associated with manning levels is the continuing shortage of skilled technicians and equipment operators. Critical MOS shortages must be overcome, primarily by RTA Service School training and by RTA conducted on-the-job training programs. These programs will require RTA budget support. RTA efforts must be supplemented by scheduling MAP supported off-shore training and Mobile Training Teams during the MAP plan years.

Technical service base depots, except the Engineer Depot, are located in the Bangkok area. ... the complete concentration of these facilities in Bangkok
is undesirable, since there is an inadequate intermediate supply and maintenance echelon in forward areas. This contributes to the lengthy, unresponsive supply line during peacetime and would be even less satisfactory should forward combat elements be deployed. Bilateral planning agreement must be reached on a balanced logistics force structure and on provisions for establishing forward supply and maintenance complexes.

The antiquated POL distribution system which utilizes 55 gallon drums as the principal delivery method is severely taxed during peacetime operations and would probably fail completely during combat operations. Storage and distribution facilities and equipment currently planned, and funded in part, should materially reduce this problem. Increased use of commercial bulk haul and up-country storage will also help alleviate this problem.

The RTA generally has the capability of providing required 1st through 3rd echelon maintenance, with a limited 4th echelon capability. There is no 5th echelon maintenance capability within the RTA for the support of MAP furnished material. Limited non-MAP facilities which provide 5th echelon maintenance for non-MAP wheel vehicles and self-propelled barges are in existence. Fifth echelon maintenance of RTA aircraft is accomplished by commercial contract utilizing MAP furnished repair parts. Development of country self-sufficiency to accomplish all repair and IROAN rebuild of MAP equipment has been initiated with the FY 67 MAP and will be expanded during MAP plan years FY 67-FY 72.

Much equipment in the RTA is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Some equipment is 10-20 years old. The vehicle fleet is principally made up of OSPFJ vehicles and some WWII vehicles are still in the system. Twenty million dollars worth of equipment has been identified as no longer supportable through MAP. M-24 tanks and engineer construction equipment are the high dollar items. In recognition of this problem the MAP has planned increased funds for attrition and replacement of such equipment. The RTA must be persuaded to contribute to the solution of this problem, since it is apparent that RTA commanders are reluctant to turn-in over-age and obsolete equipment even after MAP support of the end items is terminated. This reluctance restricts MAP programming of replacement items. In addition, the repair of this obsolete equipment constitutes an
uneconomical drain against RTA's limited manpower and maintenance facilities.

Balanced medical support for the RTA under wartime conditions is severely limited due to the non-availability of ambulance trains, helicopter ambulance companies, and clearing and collecting companies which are required to provide evacuation of personnel from division rear to field and fixed hospitals. A five-year program to improve the medical logistics capability of the RTA has been included in the FY 68-FY 72 MAP requirements document. A project to evaluate the medical logistics of the RTA has been established.

There is a critical country-wide shortage of personnel trained in the various military medical disciplines and technical fields. The RTARF has an unfavorable doctor/population ratio of 1:351 (based on assigned strength in comparison to the U.S. Army ratio of 1:209 (as of 1965). The RTN has 52.3 percent of its authorized physicians, the RTA has 51.0 percent and the RTARF has 42.0 percent. Total medical personnel fill for the RTARF is 58.7 percent of authorized.

The above logistics evaluation prepared by the Logistics Division of the US Military Advisory Group includes considerations of conventional warfare in Thailand as well as considerations of CI operations. Those aspects that most apply to improvement of logistics responsiveness to support CI operations include the establishment of forward depots and the activation of limited numbers of service and support units to improve supply and maintenance within the RTA as shown in Annex C. Although there are weaknesses in the logistics capability of the RTA, it has not been necessary to limit CI operations solely because of logistics capability. The current level of the insurgency allows the RTA to improvise and make use of domestic transportation and local sources of food supplies.
III

THE ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE

The mission of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) is to defend the country from air attack and to provide tactical air support of ground and naval forces, support of counterinsurgency units, and the aerial movement of personnel and equipment. Two C-47s are assigned to the UN Command in Korea, and a 35-man contingent is conducting operational transport missions with the RVNAF in South Vietnam. Current RTAF strength is 21,400 men.

The capabilities and limitations of the RTAF are summed up in the following statement from the Southeast Asia Military Fact Book:

The air force is capable of engaging in tactical air operations including armed reconnaissance, air-to-ground support, and joint ground and amphibious operations. It has a limited capability to support the movement of personnel and equipment and a marginal to nonexistent capability for air defense. It is able to effect and maintain tactical air superiority against air forces in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Communist China and North Vietnam. As a result of an extensive reorganization, which was initiated in August 1967, the RTAF hopes to increase utilization of its aircraft by assigning like equipment together. Delivery of four F-5A jet aircraft has increased the RTAF's close air support and all-weather capability. The RTAF's support for counter-subversive operations has also improved with the acquisition of additional H-34 helicopters. Poor utilization of resources, including personnel, has resulted in low in-commission rates, ineffective channels of command and guidance, improper assignment of personnel, and poor or inappropriate use of training. Logistic system is strained by arrival of new aircraft, deployment of units, and the lengthy supply procedures utilized for requisitions.

The RTAF inventory includes the following numbers and types of aircraft:

Jet fighters: 42
  F-86Fs  27
  F-86Ls  15

Transports: 29
  C-123Bs  8
  C-47s  21

Helicopters: 53
  HH-43Bs  4
  H-34C/Ds props  49

Trainers: 158
  F-5As  4
  F-5Bs  2
  T-33As  9
  T-37Bs jets  7
  T-28Ds  47
  T-6s  69
  CHIPMUNKS prop  20

Miscellaneous: 14
  U-10Bs  11
  C-45s  2
  C-54  1

Total 296

On a routine basis, 10 H-34 helicopters support 2d Army suppression operations in the Northeast. This number of helicopters provides useful high-priority cargo lift and evacuation, and very limited capability for tactical maneuver of strike forces. Subject to the demands of CI operations in the other active areas in Thailand, the RTAF can provide troop lift for the assault echelon of one infantry battalion on a pre-planned mission. Counterinsurgency operations in the mountains of the North have been hampered by lack of an adequate number of helicopters.
IV

THE ROYAL THAI NAVY

The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is responsible for the defense of the seaward approaches to Thailand (Gulf of Siam). This mission involves patrol operations, antiship submarine warfare, mine warfare, and the transport and support of marine or other security forces conducting amphibious operations. In wartime, the Navy would operate in conjunction with SEATO forces. The secondary missions of the Navy include assisting the Army in maintaining internal security and patrolling border areas along the Mekong River. One patrol (PGM) and one amphibious (LST) are presently operating in South Vietnam. The current strength of the RTN is 21,800 men (includes 7,500 Marines, 100 naval air, and 500 WAVES).

The Southeast Asia Military Fact Book gives the following evaluation of the RTN capabilities and limitations:

The navy is capable of performing patrol missions and of providing transportation and support for amphibious operations. It can sealift one reinforced battalion. Antiship submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, although limited by lack of experience in conducting ASW exercises, have improved because of modernization of its large submarine chasers and on-the-job training. Mine warfare forces have a small capability and the naval air has a modest surveillance/antiship submarine capability. The Marine Corps, one of the most effective services in Thailand, is capable of conducting small-scale (approximately battalion-size) landings against light resistance. One of the main weaknesses affecting operation of the navy's logistic system is a dependence on foreign sources to supply petroleum products, ammunition, and spare parts. Three of the six river patrol craft (RPC) have been deployed to patrol the Mekong River.

The navy's ships are generally in a low state of maintenance. The mass of its naval vessels were built during 1936-45 and include standard US and
British World War II designs as well as ships built in Italy, Japan, and elsewhere before World War II. The age of these ships limits the navy's effectiveness. Postwar additions include ships and naval aircraft which are generally of US construction.¹

The RIN's inventory includes the following types and numbers of ships and aircraft:

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyer Escort</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
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¹ Defense Intelligence Agency, joint JCS-DIA publication (January 1968). SECRET NOFORN
**Ships (cont.)**

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| YO      | 2  
| YP      | 1  
| YTL     | 3  
| YW      | 2  
| YPB     | 1  
| YTM     | 1  
| YAG     | 1  
| RPC     | 6  

**Aircraft**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SZF      | 6  
| HU-16D   | 1  

Total 128

(6) Naval headquarters and the main naval base are at Bangkok; the Naval Station is at Ban Sattahip. The Navy is organized into one fleet, consisting of one patrol, one antisubmarine, one mine warfare, and one service squadron. The Marine Corps consists of one brigade (RCT), and one service battalion.

(6) In addition to the Navy's participation in the Mekong River patrol, one battalion of Marines is involved in security operations along the Cambodian border. In view of the relatively high state of readiness of Marine units, an increased participation in CI operations appears feasible.
V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(6) The armed forces of Thailand, especially the Army, have a dominant role in the political control of the country. (The organizational structure of the armed forces is shown in Figure 6.)

(2) The Royal Thai Army, the largest of the Services, has a strength of 100,000 men, and is organized into four divisions and one separate regimental combat team. The Royal Thai Air Force, 21,400 strong, operates with aircraft of US origin, including 42 jet fighters, 29 transports, and 53 H-34 helicopters. The Royal Thai Navy has a strength of 14,000 men. Its inventory is comprised of one destroyer, 35 patrol craft, 17 mine warfare vessels, and 40 amphibious ships and craft. These naval vessels are mostly of the 1936 to 1945 vintage. The Marine Corps has 7,500 men organized into four battalions. The quality of the marine units is considered to be high by US observers.

(2) There has been some slowness on the part of the Royal Thai Government and the Army to accept the fact that Thailand is not immune to insurgency, and hence to make the necessary resources available for effective suppression operations in concert with revolutionary development activities. The 0910 Plan operations and follow-on suppression operations in the Northeast have, in limited geographical areas, established government presence, isolated the selected villages from the insurgents, provided security to the population, and caused a minimum of hardship to the populace. Since sizable areas are available for displacement when they are confronted locally by government forces, the insurgents can and do withdraw from zones of concentrated action by government forces.

(2) Decisive fragmentation of the existing armed bands in the Northeast, concurrent with provisions for population security, could require three to four times the number of government forces currently
FIGURE 6 (G). Royal Thai Armed Forces (U)
being made available for these tasks. Significant increases in the level of external support for the insurgents could generate requirements for force expansion of the RTA and for increased US logistical support. However, the current level of insurgency suggests that force modernization, primarily improved infantry weapons and field radios, and increased mobility to include helicopter lift, is currently required rather than an increase in the number of combat units. To have a major impact on the effectiveness of the RTA in CI operations, however, such force modernization must be coupled with increased field training and personnel actions to overcome shortages of junior officers, NCOs, and skilled and present-for-duty personnel. Limited increases in support units are also required to improve maintenance and other logistical support in the RTA.

〈94〉 The Royal Thai Armed Forces can contain the current Communist-inspired insurgency in the country. Certain actions, however, must be taken before the Thai Army can carry out its tasks in decisively destroying or fragmenting the armed bands operating in Thailand.

〈95〉 The manning levels of combat units and some service support units of the RTA must be raised. No new combat units are required to defeat the present insurgency if existing units are made fully operational. The basic four-division structure set forth in Project 33 appears adequate.

〈96〉 Plans to alleviate the shortage of company grade and non-commissioned officers should be expanded. This shortage is at present a major obstacle to combat effectiveness of RTA units.

〈97〉 A re-stationing program for the RTA should be developed and executed. In addition to temporary increased commitment of units to suppression operations, a permanent stationing of additional forces away from the Bangkok area and in the outer, threatened areas is highly desirable for counterinsurgency operations.

1. See Annex C for a breakdown of Project 33, Royal Thai Armed Forces Structure Plan 1/67.
Current US programs to modernize infantry weapons, improve tactical communications, and increase mobility, particularly through increased helicopter availability, all having a direct bearing upon RTA CI capabilities, should be expedited. The United States should continue its efforts to influence the RTA to provide more resources for field training and improved marksmanship training.

The RTA budget must be increased to support higher manning levels, more field training, the commitment of additional forces to CI operations, and the permanent re-stationing of forces.

The development of a forward depot supply system and activation of essential logistical units as jointly programmed by US/Thai planning staffs, should be implemented to improve the overall responsiveness of the supply system in supporting CI operations.

Finally, activating and sending a division to Vietnam is having an initial adverse impact on the combat effectiveness of RTA units in Thailand. However, the long-term result of combat experience could be favorable.
Annex A
SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS IN NORTH THAILAND
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SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS IN NORTH THAILAND

"Full-scale counter-insurgency operations got under way on on 21 December, 1967, with the initiation of a one company sweep which started moving in a northeasterly direction from Ban Pon along the Nan River to a point near the juncture of the Nan and Pat Rivers (just 10 kilometers south of the Lao-Nan boundary). At this point the company was to flank southward and attack along the Phu Wae-Phu Kha ridge driving the enemy into a one-company anvil force located near Kang Hau. The area near the flanking point proved to contain the greatest concentration of enemy activity. Moving along the narrow mountain trails single file detracted from the logic of this conventional sweep. Approximately 30 CT were spotted near the flanking point on 22 December. They were taken under fire by a reconnaissance platoon, resulting in four CT confirmed kills. From that point the CT were believed to have split into small groups and moved southward. On 5 January, another sweep was conducted along the same ridge line, this time from South to North. Four rifle companies were to patrol and sweep villages moving Northward into a blocking force composed of five Cavalry Platoons situated near the headwaters of the Nan River. These patrol actions succeeded in drawing fire from the CT but also appeared to give the advantage to the Communists. Restricted by the terrain to mountain trails, the RTA patrols did little more than move through a series of ambushes and sniper fire. The patrols, unfamiliar with the indigenous tribal

1. This section is extracted from Major Richard L. Weaver's study, Thailand--Northern Insurgency and the Military Response (U) (Bangkok: Office of Historical Advisor, Military Assistance Command, undated), pp. 40-43; 48-50; 54-55. CONFIDENTIAL
people, were unable to distinguish loyal Meo from CT. Out of frustration, Meo villages were often taken under fire before it had been determined whether they contained any CT or not.

"Early in January, platoon-patrol bases were established throughout the Northern Nan insurgency area. One troop of the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, operated in the vicinity of Ban Hui Kon and Ban Yao Nong Xham along the North border. Three infantry companies from the 4th RCT operated patrol bases in the general vicinity of the QB1050 grid square, the suspected area of heaviest concentration of CT. This region has been identified by local tribal people as the wildest and most heavily jungled area in Nan. A great number of caves there are well known to the Meo, who look upon this area as the ultimate safe haven in the event of disaster.

"The Cavalry troop located on the Northern border near Ban Nam Xham apparently straddled the CT infiltration route from the North. Patrols from this unit were attacked by an estimated force of 30 CT on the 5th, 6th, 16th, 29th, and 30th of January. The attacks consisted of both ambushes and staged attacks on platoon patrol bases. On 22 January a clash near Ban Na Sa resulted in 2 CT dead. Both were identified unmistakably as Vietnamese, suggesting a new scale in the Communist insurgency efforts in Northern Thailand. Near the end of January, activity expanded in the QB1050 sector, which was patrolled by the three infantry companies. A total of three clashes with the CT took place there during the period 22-29 January. The increased activity may have resulted from the RTA's sacking of Ban Hui Sa Lao, a village in this area, during a patrol sweep on 17 January.

"On 2 February three companies from the 2nd Battalion, 4th RCT, conducted the first operation to the west of the Nan River valley, generally along the Chiang Rai-Nan Changwat boundary. The south to north sweep was directed against suspected 100 CT allegedly

* NOTE: (According to the RTG)—American observers are not so sure.

150
occupying trenches and bunkers in that area. The sweep elements failed to make contact with the enemy. However, north of this area near Ban Wang Sau, the 2nd Troop of the 7th Cavalry Squadron was hit hard by an estimated 50 CT and suffered 4 KIA and 5 WIA.

"During the first half of February, units located in the Ban Huai Sa Na-Ca-Ban Pa Xaa area continued to bare (sic) the brunt of the CT attacks. The situation then became unusually quiet in the Nan area during the last half of February.

"On 5 March an estimated force of 50 CT entered the village of Ban Pin in the Northern most portion of the Nan-Lao border area and killed the village chief and his entire family. Two ambushes of RTG units occurred on 29 and 30 March, one in the Khun Huai Pa Daeng mountains North of Chieng Khan and the other in the hard-hit Q81050 area. Both elements reported an estimated force of 20 CT. The reduction in incidents indicated, perhaps, that the initial momentum of open CT action had been stalled. Many knowledgeable observers, however, felt that despite this interim of quiet, the Communists were present in even greater numbers than in December.

"The comparative casualty totals for the Northern insurgency effort during the months of December through February reflect the frustration and difficulties which accompanied RTG operations during this period. Forty RTA soldiers had been killed, and ninety-two wounded, against a confirmed seven CT killed.

"The RTA units suffered a number of distinct disadvantages. First their lack of training in mountain and jungle warfare weakened their confidence and precipitated frequent mistakes. Despite the level of unit conditioning, acclimatization to the mountain environment requires time, and units fresh from the lowlands could not hope to adapt to the difficult terrain and rarified air so quickly. Due to overall U.S. policy considerations, moreover, American advisors were unable to accompany units into the operational area. Advisors with experience in Vietnam under similar conditions might possibly have reduced the number of the major errors committed. During the
first two months, morale of RTA soldiers in the operational areas, moreover, was at a low ebb, a condition due primarily to the non-availability of helicopter support. The RTAF, which in the past has been notoriously reluctant in support of the RTA, failed to enthusiastically respond to the crisis. Early in the operations, H-34s, which had been requested for a full-day's use, arrived just before noon. After a 30-minute lunch, the pilots flew missions for two hours and then departed. There are no RTAF helicopter pilots who are qualified to fly at night, further reducing the flexibility of support. By the end of January, of the five helicopters available for use by the CI forces, three were deadlined for spare parts.

"Most of the units in the field suffered from lack of food and water and suspected that if wounded, their evacuation would be delayed. A number of units were required to send pack teams through dangerous CT areas in order to acquire food from Pua, Tung Chang or Chieng Klang.

"In a number of instances, units refused to respond to orders directing them to patrol certain areas until they were resupplied. Friendly Meo returning from the insurgency areas reported that RTA Platoons remained static in their patrol bases for extended periods of time, playing cards and drinking locally procured rice wine.

"Lack of qualified small-unit leaders in both the BPP and RTA has severely limited the RTG's achievements in the hill areas. Most company commanders and platoon leaders appear to lack discipline and initiative.

"Since RTG operations have expanded in the insurgency area, it is believed by local observers that conditions have further deteriorated. Clumsily conducted operations, and the unprovoked attacks and destruction of property have contributed substantially to this condition.

"It appears that only a limited threat existed in the tribal areas of Nan and Chieng Rai prior to December. Although some estimates have indicated that as many as 300 Meo had been trained by the Communist in Laos and North Vietnam, there had, in fact, been very
little activity. Most of the Meo in Nan had never seen a Communist and were aware of the threat only through the counseling of local BPP. The sacking and razing of villages and general confusion which accompanied the RTG's heavy deployment in the operational area seemed to aggravate the old wounds of the Meo and rapidly expand the numbers of insurgents. In a number of circumstances, it appears that attacks by so-called terrorists were only retaliatory raids by wronged villagers. On 6 December Ban Na Sa, a Meo village in Northern Tung Chang, was visited by a BPP patrol. The patrol became embibed (sic) on rice wine as the evening wore on and raped a number of girls. They also misappropriated and ate their fill of pigs and chickens. As they departed the village the following morning, they were waylaid by the men of the village. The incident was statistically recorded as an attack by Communist terrorists.

(C) "The Ban Meo Mua, a village Northeast of Amphur Pong near the Chiang Rai-Nan boundary, attacks by the RTA and RTAF played directly into the hands of the Communists. After Meo CT from Laos attacked the school in this friendly village on 14 February, the RTAF and RTA blindly responded by destroying the entire village.

(G) "Many of the problems in the Nan Operations stem from the unimaginative conventional approach by RTG forces. In frustration, friendly villages have been bombed and attacked because CT sniper fire was received close by. In effect most of the operations and missions (both RTA and RTAF) have been terrain oriented rather than guerrilla oriented. The 75mm Howitzer battery near Pong has done little more than conduct harassing fire on ridge tops.

* * * * * * * * *

(C) "Use of both the KMT and indigenous hill tribe resources could completely change the tempo of the current operations and effect a sharp reduction in the unwarranted destruction of property and accidental casualties. The knowledge which this force would possess of the terrain and local populace would greatly assist in the systematic identification and elimination of Communist cadre.

(C) "Meanwhile, substantial efforts are being made to improve the counter-insurgency capability of the units operating under Third
Army Forward's control. A special team of Special Forces personnel have been dispatched to Chieng Klang in order to provide instruction on disarming of booby traps, conducting ambushes, and other special counter-insurgency techniques. A plan is presently being considered for the institution of both military and paramilitary troops to be employed in the insurgency area.

(2) "The military response to the insurgency threat in Nan and Chieng Rai has been prompt and enthusiastic. The operations there have represented the focal point of government interest and concern since November. This energetic reaction has demonstrated the Thai recognition of the serious threat that this condition poses to their security. The threat has never been underestimated, and there has been a genuine attempt to provide the necessary support and assistance to counter-insurgency forces operating there.

(3) "The initial Royal Thai Army difficulties in these mountain border operations were principally environmental. Acclimatization and experience have since corrected many of these deficiencies. Coordination and helicopter support problems improved remarkably after the first two stumbling months. The quality of counter-insurgency operations is improving and is expected to be elevated considerably with the institution of the proposed Counter-Insurgency Training Center in Nan. Ultimately the use of XMT and or hill tribe paramilitary personnel may further bolster the effort and permit the release of many of the conventional forces committed there.

(4) "The most critical factor in this area continues to be the residual psychological problem which has plagued the northern community for years. The ability of the Thai Government to successfully promote the understanding and full acceptance of tribal peoples is in the final analysis, the hinge upon which the ultimate success of these operations depend."
Annex B

ROYAL THAI ARMY--ORDER OF BATTLE SUMMARY

RTA GHQ

SF Gp (Abn)
101st FA Bn (155mm)
   (Sch Trps, Arty Sch)
1st Airborne Bn
4th AAA Bn (40mm)

Cav Div (Mech)
1st Cav Regt:
   1st Cav Sqdn
      (Ceremonial Horse)
   3d Cav Sqdn (Mech)
   11th Cav Sqdn (Mech)
      (Sch Trps, Cav Sch)

2d Cav Regt:
   6th Cav Sqdn (Pack)
   7th Cav Sqdn (Pack)
   10th Cav Sqdn (Pack)

21st Inf Regt:
   1st Bn
   2d Bn
   3d Bn

20th FA Bn (75mm)
21st FA Bn (105mm)

First Army Area

1st Inf Div

1st Inf Regt (King's Guard):
   1st Bn
   2d Bn
   3d Bn
   4th Bn (Palace Guard)

2d Inf Regt:
   1st Bn
   2d Bn
   3d Bn

11th Inf Regt (King's Guard):
   1st Bn
   2d Bn
   3d Bn

31st Inf Regt:
   1st Bn
   2d Bn
   3d Bn
   (Sch Trps, Inf Center)

4th Tank Bn (M24, M41)

1st Div Arty:
   1st FA Bn (105mm)
   2d FA Bn (105mm)
   11th FA Bn (105mm)
   31st FA Bn (105mm)
   (Sch Trps, Arty Sch)
   1st AAA Bn (AW)

(continued next page)
Second Army Area

3d Inf Div

3d Inf Regt:
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

6th Inf Regt:
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

13th Inf Regt:
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

8th Tank Bn (M41)

3d Div Arty:
3d FA Bn (105mm)
6th FA Bn (105mm)
13th FA Bn (105mm)
2d AAA Bn (40mm)

Third Army Area

4th Inf Div

4th Inf Regt:
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

7th Inf Regt:
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

9th Tank Bn (M41)

4th Div Arty:
4th FA Bn (105mm)
7th FA Bn (75mm)
3d AAA
(Sch Trps, Arty Sch)

Fifth Military Circle

5th RCT
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
4th Bn
5th FA Bn (75mm)
Annex C

RIN FORCE STRUCTURE, EXISTING AND PROJECTED
## Annex C

**RTA FORCE STRUCTURE, EXISTING AND PROJECTED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>FY 68, MAP</th>
<th>Projected</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Special Forces Gp</td>
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(continued next page)

\(^a\) In being 1 Oct 67. Data from draft MACTHAI J3 Study, Royal Thai Armed Forces Force Structure Plan 1/67, Project 33, 8 Sep 1967.

\(^b\) JSOP FY 70 to 77 Force Level Objectives, Vol. III, Book II, Sec VI.

\(^c\) FY 72; MACTHAI draft J3 Study, op. cit.

\(^d\) Cavalry division reorganized to infantry division FY 67-FY 69; cavalry designation retained.

\(^e\) To be inactivated in FY 68.

\(^f\) Assigned to 1st Inf Division.

\(^g\) Reorganized as battalion.

\(^h\) These units were not mentioned in Project 33.
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Annex D

STATUS OF SELECTED ITEMS, ROYAL THAI ARMY
Annex D
STATUS OF SELECTED ITEMS, ROYAL THAI ARMY

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QTY AUTH FOR RTA</th>
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<td>CARBINE CAL 30 M1 &amp; M2</td>
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<td>MG 7.62 M60</td>
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<td>LAUNCHER M79</td>
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<td>MORTAR 81MM</td>
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<td>MORTAR 60MM</td>
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<td>TRK DUMP 2½T M614</td>
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*This list reflects data on records of MAP Division, Army Advisory Group, as of 15 March 1968. Authorized quantities do not include items for units to be activated.
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<th>ITEM</th>
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Annex E
SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS 1966-1967¹

1st Quarter 1966

(2) "More vigorous patrolling of police and, in increasing numbers, of military units on operational or training missions, resulted in a sharp increase in the number of armed clashes with Communist groups in the northeast. In the last half of 1965 there were about 13 clashes (counting the multiple encounters in the Phu Phan operation at the end of the year as one clash). Geographically these clashes were limited in 1965 to Nakae, That Phanom, Pla Pak, and Muang (capital) districts in Nakhon Phanom, Chanuman in Ubon, and Sawang Daen Din in Sakon Nakhon. During the first quarter of 1966, there were upwards of 25-30 clashes occurring in the same districts plus adjacent districts of Mukdahan and Kham Chai-i (Nakhon Phanom), Annat Chareon and Loeng Nok Tha (Ubon), and Phanna Nikhom (Sakon Nakhon). Nongbua Lamphu district in Western Udon is the only new area somewhat removed from the centers identified in 1965. Most of these clashes involved small police and communist patrols, and casualties on both sides remained fairly light--about 15 terrorists killed; 3 police killed, and 11 wounded.

2nd Quarter 1966

(2) "1. During the quarter RTG security forces mounted the following major security operations:

Operation Bunnam, April 10-May 27, in the Sakon Nakhon-Udon border area, involving PP, BPP Mobile Reserve

Platoon, VDC, major elements of the 1st Bn, 3rd RCT stationed at Sakol Nakhon and one company of the 13th RCT from Udorn. Air support was provided by five RTAF and six USAF helicopters. Forty-four communist suspects were seized, 23 surrendered, and four terrorists were killed in six clashes.

Loeng Nok Tha, April 25. Forces under the control of CPM-1 including one company of the 6th RCT at Ubon, arrested 58 of 66 suspects.

Kalasin (Sahat Sakhan district). A four-day sweep uncovered evidence of communist camps and activity but made no significant contacts.

Thai-Malayan border (Sadoe district). The first combined Thai-Malaysian police operation since reactivation of the border agreement began April 30. the 700-man combined field force was supported by RTAF and Australian helicopters and aircraft. No significant contacts were made, but camps and supplies were located and destroyed.

Nongkhai (Bungkan district). A communist group estimated from 40-100 men was located in the mountains east of Bungkan in late May. A security sweep June 3-7 by 500 police, military and VDC supported by USAF helicopters arrested 135 suspects, of whom five were held for further interrogation. A terrorist camp was discovered and destroyed. Through cooperation with the Lao authorities, Lao units were stationed across the Mekong from RTG forces to prevent the escape of terrorists.

3rd Quarter 1966

(6) "The most noteworthy event in the southern border area was the CT ambush of a Thai-Malaysian patrol on August 7 in the Betong District of Yala, killing 2 Thai and 8 Malaysians and wounding 4 Malaysians and 1 Thai. This was the first significant offensive action by the Communist Terrorists since 1959 and subsequent "Apologies" to RTG officials, claiming that the CT thought the patrol was entirely Malaysian, suggest that the attack does not represent a change in CT policy of avoiding contact with Thai patrols. It is possible, however, that the incident may have been intended to discourage closer Thai cooperation with the Malaysians in joint operations against the CT. The "apologies" will also not preclude
further efforts by the CT at recruitment "taxation" and expansion of their influence and activities in the four Southern provinces.

(5) "The response of Thai agencies, many of them such as the ARD Secretariat, Health Ministry, RTAF, 13th RCT, etc., involved in the counterinsurgency effort, to recent record-breaking floods along the Mekong has been most encouraging and has given a boost to efforts at closer coordination. Air support provided by USAF helicopters had a catalytic effect in stimulating greater Thai effort.

(5) "During the July-September quarter, the following security operations took place:

June 30-September 15, Trang/Phatthalung. This operation, which in the early phases involved up to 1,200 RTA, BFP, and Provincial Police, terminated on September 15, with the withdrawal of the last company of the 5th RCT. Planned at length, but with poor security, it produced a few minor clashes (two terrorists KIA), about 200 arrests, but few other tangible results. RTA Deputy Commander of the operation was reportedly well impressed with the training of the PP Region IX Special Action Force participating. Subsequent to the conclusion of the sweep, Communist terrorists have moved back and taken revenge on villagers who cooperated with RTG forces.

July 17, Nakhon Phanom/Ubon. Mixed CPM-1 forces and elements of two battalions of the 6th RCT launched a sweep in the Phu Phaeng Ma mountains, involving air strikes and mortar fire against an alleged 120 terrorists. About 13 suspects were taken and a few minor clashes occurred (one terrorist KIA) and subsequent intelligence indicated that there were fewer than 60 Communists in the area, most of whom exfiltrated the area the first night of the operation.

August 24-September 2, Sawang Daen Din, Sakhon Province. Run by the provincial CPM, this operation involved units of the 1st Bn, 3rd RCT at Sakon Nakhon, BFP Platoons and VDC. Forces were heli-lifted into the operations area. There were few contacts with terrorists, three camps were located (one quite sizeable) and some suspects were arrested, but overall results were disappointing. Terrorist activity has continued following the termination of the operation.

September 10-12, Loeng Nok Tha District of Ubon. Under the direction of the BFP Area 3 commander, acting for
the governor, this action deployed six BPP Mobile Reserve Platoons, elements of the 6th RCT from Ubon, PP and CID members. Twenty-three suspects were seized, but no contacts were made with insurgent elements suspected of using the mountain areas east of Loang Nok Tha, although two recent camp sites used by 30-50 men were discovered.

September 22-24, Loei Province. This operation was mounted by the Loei provincial CPM supported by forces from CSOC field headquarters (ex-CPM-1) and USAF helicopter lift. There were no contacts with terrorists throughout the three-day operation.

During September, RTA participation in the above operations, plus smaller scale operations of 6th RCT company in Nakae and airborne and Special Forces units attached to CSOC Forward Field Headquarters (Mukdahan), amounted to 35 battalion days of actual field operations.

4th Quarter 1966.

"CI Operations: During the quarter, the following security operations of significance were conducted:

A sweep in Ban Dung district of Udorn September 9 by a BPP NRP and PP appears to have set back the spread of Communist organizational activity in this area.

During early October a company of the 6th RCT from Ubon operated in the Lern Nok Tha area of Northern Ubon against an estimated terrorist band of 20.

CPM-1 forces have continued heavy patrolling and civic action in Sawang Daen Din district in Sakon Nakhon during October.

In Area VII (west-central Thailand near the Burma border) PARU, BPP, PP and CID forces conducted a month-long operation during October to acquire information on Communist organizational and propaganda activity.

A sweep in Nakae, Nakhon Phanom against an estimated 200 terrorists on November 12 resulted in heaviest RTG casualties to date--two KIA, 12 WIA. Terrorist losses were three KIA, two wounded and captured. For the first time RTAF T-28s carried out a napalm strike (approved by General Praphat), with no evident results.

Operation by CPM-1 forces airlifted to Pla Pak district of Nakhon Phanom December 21 by USAF helicopters appears to have been one of better planned and executed sweeps to date. In eight separate clashes, three terrorists reported KIA, six captured, one RTA WIA."

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Annex F
COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING COURSE

PHASE I, 5-WEEK COMPANY CI TRAINING
(1 week)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Operations</td>
<td>2 Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of CI Opsns</td>
<td>1 Lecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Tactics and Techniques</td>
<td>3 Conference&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Employment</td>
<td>4 Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Formations and Battle Drill</td>
<td>8 Conference, Practical Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camouflage Techniques</td>
<td>1 Conference, Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance and Reports</td>
<td>2 Lecture, Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons</td>
<td>8 Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zero Firing</td>
<td>5 Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Introduction to Psychological Operations and Civic Action</td>
<td>4 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander's Time</td>
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<td>Security Measures</td>
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<sup>a</sup>Conducted for selected personnel after duty hours.
### PHASE II, 5-WEEK COMPANY CI TRAINING
(2 weeks)

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<tr>
<td>Moving in Jungle</td>
<td>2 Conference, Demonstration</td>
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<td>Jungle Range and Malayan Range</td>
<td>8 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>17 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>4 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambush and Convoy Counter Ambush</td>
<td>26 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Hygiene Sanitation and Personal Hygiene</td>
<td>4 Conference, Demonstration, Practical Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI Tactics-Search and Seizure</td>
<td>6 Conference, Demonstration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demo/Mines and Booby Traps</td>
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<td>Air Resupply</td>
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<td>Air Mobility</td>
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### PHASE III, 5-WEEK COMPANY CI TRAINING
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<td>Jungle Base</td>
<td>34 Practical Exercise</td>
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<td>Raids</td>
<td>42 Practical Exercise</td>
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<td>Surveillance</td>
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<td>Company Field Training Exercise</td>
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Number 41-67 (U), Pacific Command (3 November 1967). SECRET NOFORN

Number 43-67 (U), Pacific Command (24 November 1967). SECRET NOFORN

Discussions with personnel in Thailand in March 1968 as indicated in following partial listing:

Col. G.W. McIntyre, AC of S, J3, MACTHAI.
Col. J.J. Jackson, AC of S, J2, MACTHAI.
Col. G.P. Elliott, Chief, Army Advisory Group (ARAG), MACTHAI.
Col. R.W. Burley, Chief Ops Div, ARAG.
Maj. D.E. McCartney, Personnel Advisor, ARAG.
Col. H.R. Hurst, Chief, Log Division, ARAG.
LTC J.M. Murphy, MAP Div, ARAG.
LTC D.J. Crittenden, JS Section, MACTHAI.
LTC D. Ellis, MACTHAI In O to 2nd Army Fwd.
LTC J. Mittelstedt, Det II, ARAG.
LTC Bartelt, CO, 46th Special Forces Co.
APPENDIX D

POLICE, VILLAGE SECURITY, AND PARAMILITARY PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION

(U) This paper examines current and projected police, village security, and paramilitary programs in Thailand and evaluates them in terms of their ability to provide long-term rural security in Thailand. The subject has been covered in detail in order to bring together basic information not available in any single source document. Principal focus is on Northeast Thailand\(^1\) where the greatest counterinsurgency effort is underway.

(U) Information for this paper was obtained from reports from the US Embassy and US Military Assistance Command in Thailand, existing studies on the Thai counterinsurgency effort, Agency for International Development (AID) program documents, and extensive interviews with knowledgeable American officials and representatives of study agencies in Washington and Bangkok.

(U) Liberal use has been made of the data and evaluations contained in the ARPA, "Counterinsurgency Systems Manual Northeast Thailand," Phase 2 Report, dated December 15, 1967. This report, prepared by the Research Analysis Corporation's field office in Thailand, reflects extensive, on-the-spot research by a six-man study group.

\(^1\) Northeast Thailand is divided into Police Regions 3 and 4. (See Figure 5.)
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II
THAILAND NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT

A. MISSION

(U) The Thai National Police Department (TNPD) is charged with law enforcement, criminal investigation, and internal protection and security of the country and its people. The police operate under military control in time of war.

(U) The initial approach of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to the insurgency was to assign responsibility to the police for countering acts of armed terrorism and insurgency, in addition to their normal peacetime functions. Although this responsibility has been shifted to the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the police still play a major counterinsurgency role within, or in coordination with, the military-control framework.

B. ORGANIZATION

(U) The TNPD is a major department within the Ministry of the Interior. The Director General of the TNPD, General Prasert Ruchirawongse, exercises administration and control through a deputy director general and two assistant director generals. Figure 1 shows the central organization of the police department, the major elements of which are discussed below.

C. MAJOR ELEMENTS

1. Metropolitan Police

(U) The Metropolitan Police, numbering about 7,200, are responsible for law enforcement in the Bangkok-Thonburi complex. Support from the US Agency for International Development has been used to help
FIGURE 1 (U). Organization of the Department of Police, Ministry of Interior (U)
establish an effective and improving metro communications system and to increase the effectiveness of the overall police force through training for improved administrative and investigative procedures. The Metropolitan Police have no significant role in the current counterinsurgency effort, although they could have, should the insurgency spread to the Bangkok urban area [8, 11].

2. Education Bureau

(U) The Education Bureau [1] operates directly under the Office of the First Assistant Director General and functions as the central training command. The Bureau supervises eight schools, described briefly below.

(U) a. Sampran Cadet Academy. The Academy is the primary source of police officer personnel, supplemented by some volunteer officer transfers from the military services into the police, direct commissions awarded to outstanding senior police NCOs, and select university graduates who volunteer for police service. The Academy maintains an enrollment of about 400 students and graduates 90 to 100 annually. The Academy offers a 4-year course of instruction leading to a commission in the TNPD as a sub-lieutenant.

(U) b. Detective Training School. The Detective Training School, located in Bangkok, graduates two to three classes per year. The school offers a basic course lasting 12 weeks and an advanced course of 16 weeks. The classes combine officer and NCO personnel. Selection, on a countrywide basis, depends on a recommendation for training by commanding officers. About 250 students are graduated annually.

(U) c. NCO School. Located in Bangkok, this school offers a 3-month training course for outstanding noncommissioned officers, who are given a one-grade promotion upon completion. Students are

1. Numbers in brackets refer to source documents listed in the "Bibliography."
assigned to the school upon the recommendation of their commanding officers. This school also graduates about 250 students annually.

(U) d. Police Recruit Schools. There are five Police Recruit Schools currently in operation in Korat, Lampang, Nakhon Pathom, Yala, and Chon Buri. Candidates for these schools must be at least 18 years of age, have a Matayom 6 (equivalent to US 10th grade) education, and be able to pass a physical examination. The recruits are all volunteers; upon completion of their training, lasting 4½ months, they are assigned to police units throughout Thailand and serve a one-year probationary period before acceptance as full-fledged police constables.

To meet the required police-strength increases, the recruit training centers have increased their output from 2,500 (1965) to between 10,000 and 12,000 men per year. These trainees will provide replacements for normal attrition and an expansion of about 8,000 police per year through 1972. The May 1968 strength of the TNPD was about 64,000 (1966 strength about 56,000). By the end of 1972 the planned strength is to be on the order of 100,000 police.

(U) Recruiting has not been a problem. There is a waiting list of volunteers for the TNPD long enough to provide four to five times the authorized recruit input.

3. Provincial Police Division

(U) The Provincial Police (PP), the largest operational division in the TNPD, is responsible for police coverage of all Thailand with the exception of the Bangkok-Thonburi urban complex which is the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police. As shown in Figure 1, the Provincial Police (about 37,000, not including Border Patrol Police) functions under the deputy director of the TNPD. The PP is commanded by a commissioner (Lt. General Chatra) and consists of two subdivisions for central administration and three subdivisions for regional administration, plus the Border Patrol Police (BPP) and Special Action Forces (SAF) as shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 (U). Organization of the Provincial Police (U)
(U) Thailand is divided into nine Provincial Police regions (Figure 3), each of which encompasses from six to nine changwats (provinces). The PP headquarters in each of these regions is outside the Department of Local Administration channels. The province chief of police is responsible to the regional PP commander. He is also responsive to the province governor for many matters, and it is considered imperative that the police chief establish good working relations with the governor and his staff. The governor is a member of the Department of Local Administration which, along with the TNPD, falls within the Ministry of the Interior. If the governor and a province police chief were unable to work together effectively due to personality reasons, it is safe to conclude that the police chief would be removed [1].

(LOU) Provincial Police have traditionally functioned at the changwat and amphur (district) levels. This resulted in a very limited police presence at the tambon (village cluster) and muban (village) levels and slow reaction times in response to calls for police assistance. To increase police protection and establish government presence at the village level, a program to construct and man 1,150 tambon police stations is underway [2]. By June 1968, 342 of the 375 stations in the FY-66 and FY-67 programs had been constructed, with 200 of these authorized for full manning of 20 police each [19]. Four hundred additional stations are planned for FY-69. The current plan is to have 20 police at each tambon station; programmed stations will provide 50 percent coverage of all tambons in the more critical areas, namely all provinces in Regions 3 and 4 (Northeast) plus Nakhon Si Thammarat and Surat Thani provinces in Region 8. The program also provides for 50 additional stations in Region 8 and 50 each for Regions 5, 6, and 9.

The shortage of trained police personnel has limited implementation of the tambon police station program. In August 1967 the BPP police received 1,300 new recruits and were to have transferred an equal number of seasoned BPP personnel for manning tambon police stations. Eight hundred were transferred immediately, and the
FIGURE 3 (U). Provincial Police Regional Areas (U)
remainder by May 1968. Six hundred volunteers from the Metropolitan Police were transferred to the tambon station program the last calendar quarter 1967 which, together with those transferred by the BPP and recent graduates of the recruit schools, have somewhat alleviated the personnel shortages. In the interim, completed tambon police stations have been manned by 2 to 3 police supplemented by Volunteer Defense Corps members (VDC) [13, 14, 19]. (See "Paramilitary Section" below for discussion of the VDC.)

(U) The Provincial Police in Regions 3 and 4 have an established radio network covering tambons, amphurs, changwats, and regional headquarters. The network is complete from amphur through changwat to region to Bangkok. In areas where there are no tambon stations, patrols are sent out from the amphur police station carrying either an FM-5 or FM-1 radio (depending upon distance and terrain) to maintain communications with the amphur station. Those tambons with a permanent tambon police station use their assigned FM-5 radio to maintain communications with village police patrols and with the amphur police station. The FM-5 VHF set, with a maximum range of 25 miles, nets with both the FM-1 radio (maximum range of 3 miles) carried by PP patrols and to the FM-5 assigned to the amphur station. All FM-5 and FM-1 radios within an amphur operate on the same frequency [1]. The messenger on foot or bicycle, however, still represents the main mode of communication between villages and the tambon.

(U) Counterinsurgency training for the Provincial Police is conducted at Chaiya counterinsurgency schools at Chiangmai and Udorn. All PP recruits are now receiving this training. (PP Special Action Forces (SAF) are discussed in the "Paramilitary" Section of this paper.)

4. Border Patrol Police

(U) The Border Patrol Police, responsible for security of Thailand's border areas, although nominally assigned to the Provincial Police, functions as a semi-autonomous force. Its organization and functions are more paramilitary than police, hence the BPP is discussed below in the "Paramilitary" Section.

5. Central Investigation Bureau

(C) a. Special Branch Division. In June 1963 the 7th Division of the Special Branch (SB) was organized to extend police counter-subversive and intelligence collection capabilities to the changwat level. There are now 33 Special Branch offices in operation throughout Thailand [13].

(C) In addition to their own collection efforts the Special Branch units receive intelligence from the PP and BPP which is processed through the Joint Security Center (JSC) structure. Intelligence not processed through the JSCs is transmitted to 7th Division SB headquarters in Bangkok. All SB field offices are in radio contact with Bangkok.

(C) The SB has been active in obtaining information on Communist subversion throughout the country. Relations with PP and BPP have generally been good. The SB units work with the Immigration Division in detecting and investigating illegal and possible subversive persons entering the country. In cooperation with the PP, the Special Branch units assist in preparing arrest lists for counter-insurgency sweeps.

(C) In 1966 Interrogation Centers were established in Bangkok and Udon to assist in processing the large number of persons detained during suppression operations. Interrogations are also conducted by the JSC personnel. A six-week course has been established to train interrogation personnel.

(U) b. Railway Patrol Police Division. The Railway Patrol Police (about 700) is charged with security of all facilities of the state railway system, both rolling stock and fixed installations [1].
Their role has become increasingly important not only because of the deteriorating rural security situation and the ever present threat of railway sabotage and ambush, but also because of the system used to transport substantial amounts of US military supplies and equipment. With US support, out-of-date weaponry is being replaced and the Railway Police communication system, which will tie into the TNPD system, is being improved.

(U) The basic weapon carried by the Railway Police is the .38 caliber pistol. Carbines, M1 rifles, M3 submachine guns, and 12 gauge shotguns are also available.

(U) The Railway Police maintain close relations with customs and immigration personnel, coordinating and exchanging information regarding possible smuggling and illegal-entry activities. Close, cooperative relations are also maintained with Provincial and Border Patrol Police in the areas through which the rail line passes. These police elements are prepared to render assistance to the Railway Police when called upon.

(U) c. Marine Police. This Division (about 1,500 members) was formed in 1954 as a result of the RTO's recognition of the need for an organization similar to the US Coast Guard to secure and patrol the water borders of Thailand.[1] Marine Police are responsible for patrolling territorial waters (including bays and sounds accessible from seaward) and the Mekong River border with Laos to prevent smuggling, illicit entry, subversive activity, and banditry. The Division is also charged with enforcement of the navigation laws, security of the ports of Bangkok and Sattahip, and protection of the fisheries industry. Marine Police are assigned to the 26 patrol bases along Thailand's water borders and to the Division Headquarters at Paknam.

(U) The Marine Police are equipped with about 150 watercraft of all types. The commissioning of 33 shallow-draft patrol craft has provided a year-round capability on the Mekong River for the first time. Fifteen 40-foot patrol craft were recently added for use in the Northeast and other critical areas.
(U) The Marine Police are armed with M1 rifles, carbines, M3 submachine guns, and M14 automatic rifles. Some of their boats are armed with .50 caliber machine guns or 20mm antiaircraft guns.

(U) The Marine Police chain of command runs from subdivision headquarters directly to Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam (17 km south of Bangkok). Requests from PP regional headquarters that might interfere with the Marine Police mission have to be referred for approval to the headquarters at Paknam. The Commanding General, 2d Army Area (Fwd) has authority to direct Marine Police participation in counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Police commander in the Northeast keeps the headquarters at Paknam informed of such operations.

(U) d. Highway Patrol Police (HPP). This Division (present strength of about 368 is to be expanded by 150 per year through 1970) is responsible for police protection and law enforcement on the highways and roads outside the metropolitan areas of Thailand. Its responsibilities include traffic control, accident prevention and investigation, crime prevention and investigation on the highways, highway escort of the Royal family and high-ranking members and guests of the RTG, highway escort of military cargoes and convoys.

(U) The Highway Police are armed with pistols, carbines, shotguns, and submachine guns. Their basic weapon is the pistol, but a shotgun is normally carried in patrol cars.

(U) The chain of command runs from subdivision headquarters to HPP Headquarters in Bangkok. As with the Marine Police, requests from Provincial Police regional headquarters which might interfere with the HPP mission are referred to Bangkok. The 2d Army Area (Fwd) has authority to direct HPP participation in counterinsurgency operations.

6. *Police Air Division*

(U) Prior to 1966 the Border Patrol and Marine Police possessed a limited air capability. The BPP had, as of June 1966, 14 helicopters, seven fixed-wing aircraft, and 21 pilots. The Marine
Police had three helicopters and three float planes, but only one pilot. Standards of performance were poor. Recognizing the need to modernize equipment, reduce the number of types of aircraft on hand, and provide air support for all police activities—particularly the tambon police program, the TNPD agreed to form a Police Air Division (PAD).

(U) A Joint US-Thai agreement of June 30, 1966, provided for (a) establishment of a Police Air Division, (b) employment of two US advisers, (c) expansion of police aircraft maintenance contracts, (d) broadening of POL support, and (e) the purchase of utility and light observation helicopters.

(U) On December 13, 1966, the official order establishing the PAD was signed by the Director General of the Police (General Praset). A commander of the PAD and a staff of seven officers were assigned on June 26, 1967. The Commander of the Border Patrol Police, Major General Krachang, was designated as commander of the PAD, apparently because the majority of the air assets were held by the BPP. Included on the PAD staff is the commander of the Marine Police, who possess the few remaining, available police aircraft. Staff members perform their PAD duties in addition to their primary BPP, Marine Police, and other responsibilities.

(U) a. Mission. The PAD provides air support to all elements of the TNPD in order to preserve peace throughout Thailand. Table 1 shows the past personnel and aircraft complements and the tentative long-range plan for the PAD.

(U) The PAD now has 10 Bell 204 utility helicopters, one of which was involved in an accident and requires extensive repair. With the delivery of 11 additional utility helicopters in the near future, there is no budget commitment to buy FY 69 and later programmed aircraft. Hence the complement of utility helicopters for the foreseeable future is about 20. The 1968 figures represent the total currently supported program. However, the RTG is purchasing an additional large STOL (DeHavilland DHC-4) to bring the total
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<td>79</td>
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<td>131</td>
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a. Tentative, long-range plan, not officially approved.
to four. The estimated 1970 complement, without desired additional expansion, will be 60 airplanes, 90 pilots, and 100 mechanics [14].

(2) **Police Requirements.** The Police Air Division was established and supported by AID on the assumption that the TNPD could not secure dependable, quick-reaction support from the RTAF (particularly helicopter). It was felt that vis-a-vis the RTA and RTAF, the police could be in a weak bargaining position for meeting either police operational needs or for maintenance and repair of police aircraft. The US Embassy position has been that any efforts to integrate the helicopter programs in Thailand must insure that essential TNPD requirements are met.

(2) During 1969 the Royal Thai Army and Air Force will each have been provided 25 UH-1H utility helicopters, which will help at least temporarily to reduce the existing requirements-to-capabilities ratio. Delivery of these programmed helicopters is subject to the higher priority requirements which might result from increased losses or higher force levels in Vietnam.

(2) The Border Patrol and Marine Police utilize light observation helicopters (LOH) for border surveillance, liaison command and control, resupply of outlying police posts, servicing of radio nets, convoy monitoring, civil action, and the like. Many of these requirements can be met by LOHs.

(2) A primary role of the police utility helicopters is to provide a quick-reaction capability to lift police Special Action Forces and Mobile Reserve Platoons to support tambon police stations and villages threatened by insurgent forces not large enough to justify military reaction.

(2) **Maintenance.** Maintenance advisory support for the TNPD is provided by contract with Air America. The contract includes advisory service on the procurement and control of the large quantity of supplies and parts necessary to support TNPD aircraft. The contract also provides for maintenance services to the extent that the in-house capability of TNPD is not adequate.
An RTG Utility Helicopter Single Manager Support Program is now being developed:

MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI in cooperation with the American Embassy, Bangkok are working with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) on establishment of this program to support utility helicopters. The stated objective is to assist in the timely establishment of a single depot level maintenance and supply facility designed for the effective and efficient accomplishment of maximum support for helicopters provided the Royal Thai Government with responsibility for management and control vested in the Ministry of Defense (RTG). The Prime Minister has approved this concept of support and is currently developing plans for receipt and utilization of the first UH-1Hs to be received in June of 1968.

This program is to include depot level support for the Thai National Police Department helicopters with their representation being included in the management organization at the MOD. Assistance is being provided by MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, CINCPAC, DA, CSAF and others to facilitate establishment and operation of a sound and workable organization [18].

(U) d. **Air Request Procedures.** Routine requests for PAD aircraft are submitted through the regional police commander to Bangkok PAD Headquarters. Approval for use is obtained from the Director General, TNPD. Emergency requests are submitted via the most expeditious route to the PAD Headquarters in Bangkok. The PAD commander or his deputy has authority to take necessary action to deploy aircraft as available. If the regional Provincial or Border Patrol commander has aircraft assigned, he can authorize their use to fill emergency requests.

D. **POLICE IMAGE**

(צ) The TNPD, particularly the Metropolitan and Provincial Police, has had a long standing reputation for corruption and venality from the highest to the lowest levels. Indications are that this poor reputation may still be justified, but to a lesser degree than previously. Although specific incidents can be cited, it is difficult to validate the frequency of police malpractice and
consequently its total impact on the rural security program. This problem represents a delicate area where the United States must rely upon the Royal Thai Government to exercise control to insure that police malpractice does not work against counterinsurgency efforts or exceed what is normally allowable in the Thai modus vivendi.

(U) A September 1965 RAND study [3], which included an assessment of the police and civil security situation in Thailand, cited three problem areas: relations between the Provincial Police and the local governments, police corruption and its causes, and the internal organization and administration of the TNPD. Recognizing these problems, the United States and Thailand established a Joint Evaluation Committee in June 1965 to develop specific police performance targets and monitor police progress.

(U) The TNPD has attempted to correct low-level malpractice through police training and to improve the police image through a public relations program which emphasizes a "Service to the People" theme. These efforts have included (a) training police in public relations, (b) soap-opera type radio programs extolling the police (broadcast over 23 stations), (c) mobile exhibits showing the role of the police and the need for public support and understanding, and (e) distribution of posters.

(C) The Director General of the TNPD has on occasion summarily relieved police commanders on the slightest inference of malpractice. In 1965, for example, the military commander of the Mobile Development Unit in Region 4 initiated adverse reports about the Provincial Police, primarily because of bad feeling between the regional police commander and the MDU commander. Upon hearing these reports, the Director General of the TNPD removed the regional police commander and two changwat police commanders. (The MDU commander was later relieved for malfeasance.) It appears that strong, exemplary measures were taken in this case to demonstrate the desire of the police leadership to eliminate corrupt police practices [14].

(U) The USOM, "Thailand Village Attitude Survey Reports" published in June 1967, representing a survey of 1,200 villagers in
17 villages, reflect local feelings toward the police. Some respondents were not satisfied with the slow and inefficient work of the police and the necessity to pay for police services. An instance was reported where it was necessary for the complainant to pay the police in order to ensure that the thief would not be released. Other respondents complained that criminals could easily buy their way out of custody and prosecution. Despite these complaints, and the police enforcement of whiskey, forestry, and other laws undesirable in the eyes of the villagers, the majority of the respondents indicated the need for more frequent police visits to the villages.

(U) The USIS Liaison Officer to USOM indicated that the desire for police presence was directly related to the seriousness of the banditry or insurgent threat. Cases were cited of villagers assisting in building the tambon police station, or building one of their own, to expedite establishing a police presence. After completion and manning of tambon stations in high-threat areas, villagers have sometimes voluntarily resettled close to the new police station for better security [14].

(U) Low pay is often cited as the reason for police malpractices. The pay scale for police, including an October 1967 pay raise, is shown in Table 2. Low pay is apparently the common malady of all Thai civil servants.

(U) An effective police presence in the rural areas which is desired and accepted by the villagers is a vital element of the RTG counterinsurgency effort. The United States can provide aid and advice to improve technical and tactical capabilities, but the improvement of the police image among the villagers must be accomplished by the RTG.

E. POLICE ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTHEAST

(2) Maintenance of law and order is the primary mission of the Provincial Police in the Northeast. This mission is largely performed by those police personnel located at permanently established amphur and tambon police stations. In addition, the police participate in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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a. These monthly salaries went into effect October 1, 1967. All figures are in baht; $20 ~ US $1.00.

Counterinsurgency operations directed by the Second Army Forward. The ARPA "Counterinsurgency Systems Manual" describes these operations as follows:

**Patrols**
- Amphur stations dispatch patrols on foot or bicycle.
- Most patrols travel to those tambons which do not contain a tambon police station. The patrol may vary in size from three to five policemen to 20 or more, depending upon the nature of the threat and the size of the area to be patrolled. Normally, the patrols set up a temporary headquarters at the tambon seat and dispatch visiting patrols to the villages within the tambon.
Permanently established tambon police stations send patrols, usually three to five men, to the local villages. In some of the larger villages, police patrols will remain at the village and rotate back to the tambon station every 10 to 15 days. Each tambon station is scheduled to have up to 20 policemen. At present, the strength varies from five to 20 policemen, with an average of about 12 to 13.

Sweep Operations
In the seven security changwats of the Northeast, sweep operations are normally planned by [Second Army Forward,] with PP from the projected operational area included because of their familiarity with the local people and terrain. In the other Northeast changwats the PP, with the governor's approval, may plan and conduct sweeps under the supervision of changwat headquarters, using assets within the changwat and, if necessary, additional resources, such as the SAF platoons, are obtained from the Region.

Response Operations
The PP, by virtue of their dispersed locations, are often the first force to react to a CT incident. If available strength in the area is adequate to handle the situation, the PP will conduct a response operation with local police and paramilitary assets (such as VDC). Otherwise, assistance will be requested through the amphur chief of police to changwat and Region.

Intelligence Collection
The PP through their contacts with the local population are in a good position to collect intelligence. The amount of intelligence actually gathered by police personnel varies between stations and is a direct result of the rapport that has been established between the police and the people under their jurisdiction, and of the local commander's appreciation of the value of intelligence. Most policemen attempt to establish a good relationship with village and tambon chiefs and key personnel such as priests, schoolteachers, farmers, and businessmen. The PP also use agents within their area of responsibility. These agents are paid small sums from station contingency funds. In some instances former policemen, relatives of policemen, or persons with prior military service, will act as police agents or informants without pay. Intelligence collected by the PP is reported through police channels to Region, where a copy is given to the appropriate JSC (Udon or Korat).
The PP are also given intelligence gathered by the Border Patrol Police when they are both located in the same amphur and by crime suppression personnel who may be operating in the area. In amphurs in which military units are operating, intelligence is shared through the amphur CPM or via informal arrangements.

Population and Resources Control
The PP spot-check personnel in their areas of responsibility, both informally and through surprise roadblocks to check identification cards or alien registration cards. Most Thai citizens at age 18 are required to have an identification (ID) card obtained through the amphur office. The ID card contains the following information: photograph, serial number, name, date of birth, address, where issued, date of issue, age at time of issue, and height. These ID cards are good for 6 years, at which time the individual is required to obtain another card with a new photograph. Loss of the card is supposed to be reported immediately to the amphoe police station.

The police roadblocks include investigation of goods moving through their areas as well as people. Carriers, especially those with foodstuffs, are questioned as to the final destination of materials; spot-checks are made to ascertain veracity. In sensitive amphurs some roadblocks are maintained continuously. Illegal items such as unregistered weapons, smuggled goods, and ammunition are seized and the carrier detained for prosecution. The police also ask mill owners and merchants to report unusually large purchases of foodstuffs or other items possibly destined for a CT camp.

Psychological Operations
The PP do not directly engage in psychological operations activities. They do, however, stress throughout their training the need for establishing good relationships with the people under their jurisdiction. This need to develop a greater degree of rapport between the police and the public (and thus gain the increased support of the police by the public) has been recognized by all responsible police command levels. Police personnel often give talks to local groups and schools, participate in charity drives, and maintain exhibits at many local fairs, demonstrating police

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1. The Department of Local Administration Office at the local level; the issuance of ID cards is not a police function.
responsibilities to the people of the Kingdom and stressing the fact that the police are public servants.

F. POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

(U) The ARPA "Counterinsurgency Systems Manual" is based upon extensive, on-the-spot research; its evaluation of Provincial and Marine Police Program effectiveness is quoted below:

Strengths
In the past three years a great deal of emphasis has been placed on improving the capabilities of the PP. Police transportation, weapons, communications, and logistical support have been much improved during this period. More than half of the police have now received counterinsurgency training at the Chaiya centers, as part of a continuing program to upgrade individual proficiency.

Additional vehicles and the current program to modernize police weapons and communications equipment have contributed to the improved morale and effectiveness of the PP.

The activation of the TNPD Aviation Division (which is expected to become completely operational in the near future) will contribute immeasurably to the effectiveness of the PP counter-subversion and counterinsurgency roles. The SAF platoons are based on the concept of air mobility. Improved communications and air support from the Air Division should mean more rapid response to incidents, improved aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and an increase in aerial delivery and emergency evacuation when required.

The construction of tambon police stations introduced permanent police presence at the tambon level and should bring about an increased feeling of security among the villagers in these tambons.

Senior PP officers have recognized the need to develop a greater degree of rapport between the police and the public. This recognition, plus the emphasis throughout police training

2. See "Paramilitary" Section below for a discussion of Special Action Forces (SAF).
being placed on this subject, could result in increased cooperation and support of the PP in Northeast Thailand.

The Marine Police have reportedly made significant improvements in their effectiveness over the past three years, especially in the areas of communications, overall organization, facilities, equipment, and vessel/engine maintenance. USOM support is scheduled to provide the Marine Police in Northeast Thailand and other critical areas with an additional seven 40-foot patrol craft for Mekong River and ocean patrol operations within the next twelve months. 3 These additional patrol craft, equipped with radar and marine ship to shore radios, should further increase the overall effectiveness of River Patrol operations. The recently completed machine shops at Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom should provide adequate maintenance support facilities for these new vessels.

Weaknesses

Communications capabilities from village to tambon or amphoe are still considered inadequate by most observers. Except when visiting patrols are in the village, reports from many villages still must be transmitted in person to tambons or amphoe. This results in time lags of many hours, and in some instances as much as a full day. Many amphoe and tambon radio sets do not remain operational around the clock but only operate to receive scheduled calls.

Police transportation is reportedly still inadequate to meet requirements. The lack of a standard table of equipment has also created difficulties in maintenance, resupply, and parts replacement for police vehicles.

Police base pay and per diem allowances are still low, even after the 1 October 1967 pay increase. Many police NCOs and junior officers are reportedly unable to afford further schooling for their children after completion of the free government primary education (currently 7 years of primary school). Problems of this nature may result in police personnel seeking to supplement their salaries from sources that could damage the overall image and reputation of the police in the Northeast, contrary to TNPD efforts to improve this image.

3. A total of fifteen 40-foot patrol craft have now been provided.
The current system of patrolling (by Marine Police) cannot provide adequate protection against illegal crossings of the Mekong River. In most instances at present, single patrol craft, with a speed of about 15-20 knots (with the current) are required to cover a distance of about 60 miles--30 miles out and 30 miles return trip.

Although the additional 40-foot, radar-equipped craft will improve detection capabilities of the police patrols, the overall police system will still be inadequate. The fact that the Marine Police patrol primarily during daylight hours, with only limited operations after dark due to the absence of proper navigational aids along the river, further increases opportunities for illegal crossings.

A February 29, 1968 US Embassy Thailand message [15] on counterinsurgency developments in the Northeast made the following qualitative comments on the police:

... American assistance in modernizing equipment, supporting manpower increases (especially in the N.E.), and training programs to improve the performance of policemen, is being provided. The police nonetheless still have far to go in improving their ability to provide effective protection in remote areas, and in establishing themselves as a friendly RTG presence. In 1966, the Department began to extend police protection down to the tambon (village cluster) level by constructing stations at the tambon level manned in adequate strength to react promptly to calls for help from villages under communist pressure. To date nearly 250 tambon stations have been built, three fourths in the NE., and initial local reaction has been highly favorable.

Other police organizations contribute to counterinsurgency, notably Special Branch, which executed a well planned round-up of communist party leaders (announced September 1967) that has disrupted insurgent command and financial channels, and led to a much sharper picture of the extent and nature of the communist insurgency. A Police Air Division amalgamating all police air assets has been formed (with considerable U.S. urging), and is being equipped with utility and observation helicopters. (Both police and RTAF helicopters have been struck several times by ground fire, indicating they are being put to use where most urgently needed.)
III
VILLAGE SECURITY PROGRAMS

(U) Traditionally, Thai villagers have had to rely on their own initiative to protect themselves from thieves and bandits. Faced with the absence of any government presence below the amphur level and with only infrequent visits from police or other government officials, village headmen formed local home guard units to maintain some semblance of law and order. Members of the home guard received little or no training and were either poorly armed or without arms.

(U) With the increased insurgent threat, the RTG has had to make some provisions for increasing the capabilities of the village home guard units and for demonstrating its concern for the villager, who has seldom seen a government official. The Tambon Police Station program is gradually extending police presence closer to the villages, and various pilot village-security programs are being tested.

(U) The USOM, Thailand village attitude surveys published in June 1967 indicated the necessity for and the willingness of the villagers to participate in the security of their village. Rather than attempting to establish a police presence in each village, the thrust of the various RTG programs has been toward using volunteers, properly trained, armed, backstopped by police, and posted in their own village.

(U) This section of the Study describes in-being village security units which, in addition to the minimally capable home guard discussed above, are:

1. Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC)
2. Volunteer Protection Teams (VPT)
3. Peoples Assistance Teams (PAT)
A. VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS

(U) The Volunteer Defense Corps [1] is the reserve paramilitary force which operates under Ministry of Interior aegis. The initial response by changwat governors to increased village security problems was to activate members of the VDC to form Joint Security Teams (JSTs) consisting of 2 or 3 police or military cadre and from 9 to 12 VDC members. The teams were designed to act as defense forces, as a part of the 0910 Plan\(^1\), for villages in designated security-sensitive areas. These villages on the fringe of insurgent base areas were the targets of insurgent recruitment, food collection, and propaganda activities. Placement of forces in these villages was designed to cut off the insurgents from villages near their bases while simultaneously using other forces to fragment and destroy the insurgent bands. In addition to members assigned to JSTs, other VDC forces fulfill a village-protection role in the VDC-manned Village Defense or Village Protection Units, separately employed by the governors to provide village security. There are about 3,000 VDC on active duty in the Northeast to provide security for about 310 villages. Operations of the VDC are described in more detail in the "Paramilitary" Section.

B. VOLUNTEER PROTECTION TEAMS

(U) The VPT program [1] was established in mid-1966 under the impetus of Governor Phat of Ubon province. Operating only in Ubon, the VPT works to defend the villages against insurgent attack and to help enforce civil law. Members of the VPT have been designated as assistant village headmen to give them legal authority to arrest and detain suspected insurgents and lawbreakers. The VPT program is funded entirely by the RTG.

\(^1\) See Appendix B for discussion of the 0910 Plan for counter-insurgency operations.
(U) There are about 368 VPT members, grouped into 26 village teams in Ubon. Members of the VPT are recruited from and assigned to their village of residence. They receive 15 days training from an RTA Special Forces unit, including instruction in weapons handling, patrolling by day and night, ambush and retreat, intelligence collection and reporting, jungle survival, first aid, map and compass reading by night, and marking of landing zones for helicopter resupply. The teams are armed with M-1903 rifles and shotguns. Monthly compensation is about 150 baht.

(U) The VPT functions primarily as a static village-defense force. Some insurgent defectors have indicated that their group tried to avoid contact with any village having a Village Protection Team.

C. PEOPLE’S ASSISTANCE TEAMS

(P) The PAT program was initiated in October 1966 (under US sponsorship) as a pilot project to assess the applicability of village-based security and development concepts to Thailand's security-sensitive areas. The PAT philosophy is that "an improved village defense posture plus favorable attitudes on the part of the villagers -- resulting from a government presence which provides both protection and village development, lead together to improved intelligence, which in turn allows for the creation, over time of a permanent viable security environment in the village" [1]. The PAT concept is predicated on the assumption that villagers from the local area, given special training, can best fulfill the village security mission; police and military units, as outsiders, will not be able to do so. Reliance is placed on external support to village teams from police, military, and other patrol and reaction forces.

(P) There is no clearly defined legal status for the PATs. They have no authority to arrest, capture, detain or interrogate. Consequently, the PAT emphasis has been toward development and attitude change rather than the aggressive security aspects of the PAT concept. However, the teams do provide an armed presence in the villages;
there have been no cases of armed propaganda meetings, assassinations, or kidnapping in villages with PATs.

(C) The PAT program operates under the aegis of the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, and it is controlled by the changwat governor. The program is funded entirely by the US Government.

(D) Personnel are recruited from the amphurs, and upon completion of their training are assigned to specific villages in the amphur of recruitment. A nine-weeks training course is conducted at Camp Suan Son near Hua Hin; team leaders receive an additional two weeks of training. Political indoctrination and motivational training is an integral part of the PAT course. Training is also given in paramilitary action for village protection, conducting village improvement and attitude-change projects, and the collection of intelligence and information from the villagers. Team medics (some are women) receive training at the Public Health Hospital in Khon Kaen.

(U) The PAT members are the highest paid of all village security forces, receiving more pay than police or active-duty VDC; e.g., PAT--680 baht per month; VDC--480; police lance corporal--600-630 baht.

(C) About 442 PAT members have been trained; there are currently 33 villages in the Northeast with People's Assistance Teams. Members are armed with M-1 rifles, M-3 submachine guns, M-1 carbines, grenades, and pistols.

D. VILLAGE SECURITY OFFICERS

(U) Almost simultaneously with the launching of the PAT program in October 1966, the Village Security Officers Program was initiated [1]. The program has been operated as a pilot project jointly sponsored by the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and USOM, and is designed to determine the feasibility of training and arming village headmen and selected village members in order to prevent the spread of insurgent activity. The mission of the VSOs is to provide:

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(a) protection to the villagers, (b) intelligence, (c) a government presence at the village level, and (d) assistance to the overall RTG effort.

(U) The VSOs are under the direct administrative control of the DOLA, Ministry of the Interior. The unit is led by the village headman, and all other members are appointed assistant headmen and as such have authority to arrest lawbreakers. Technical advice, training, and commodity support for the VSO was to have been provided by the Provincial Police.

(U) Members are selected by the village or tambon headman or the district officer. All VSO receive three weeks of training; VSO leaders receive an additional week of leadership training. Included in the three-week program are two weeks of paramilitary training and one week of instruction emphasizing Thailand civics and nonsecurity-oriented village support.

(U) The VSOs are paid between 230 and 530 baht per month--50 baht per month plus per diem when away from the village. Budget limitations have prevented having more than 40 percent of the trained VSOs on active assignment at any given time. Pay has not always been timely.

(U) Initially, 1,314 VSO [14] were trained and returned to 192 villages. They were deployed to high insurgent-threat villages rather than to villages not dominated by the insurgents, which was the original plan. The insurgents, however, were able to enter the villages in sufficient strength, round up VSO members, and take over their weapons. As a countermeasure, several VSO units banded together to form sector security organizations of about 25 men each to replace the 5 to 12 man VSO units providing static security for a single village with backup from tambon police, police reaction units, VDC, or the RTA. Even after taking this action, a 19-man VSO unit was forced to surrender its weapons to insurgents who had apparently been informed of the unit's movements by one of the VSO members [14]. There are currently 500 VSOs on active duty in the Northeast assigned to 51 villages.

(U) The VSO program has suffered from several other shortcomings, such as (a) poor personnel screening, which permits infiltration of
VSO units by Communist sympathizers, (b) insufficient men and arms in
each village to cope with the insurgents, (c) inadequate motivation
and technical training, and (d) inadequate compensation.

E. VILLAGE SECURITY FORCE

(Confidential) A joint Thai-US evaluation of the PAT and VSO pilot programs
resulted in a recommendation that the two programs be combined into
a single Village Security Force program [5]. The US Ambassador to
Thailand, through his Special Assistant for Counter Insurgency, has
given the VSF program heavy support. The program was essentially
sold to the RTG during the last four months of 1967.

(Confidential) A confidential memorandum from the Thai Minister of the
Interior to the Prime Minister of Thailand, dated January 9, 1968,
presented the planned implementation of the VSF program. As of mid-
March 1968, the joint Thai-US VSF Program Agreement was being co-
ordinated.

(U) A December 27, 1967, VSF concept paper prepared by the
US Ambassador's Special Assistant for Counter Insurgency stated the
objectives of the VSF program as follows:

The basic objective of the VSF Program, working
in conjunction with the purely military and larger
civil programs is to provide, in the threatened
areas of the Northeast to begin with, adequate local
native security which will block or make dangerous
armed Communist access to the population of the
villages. At the same time as this is accomplished,
a parallel objective is to create village by village
that atmosphere of security and confidence in local
authorities sufficient to make development and im-
provement projects worthwhile or purposeful.

The overall objective is, of course to enlist the
voluntary continuing responsiveness and cooperation
in favor of government authorities. In accomplishing
this objective, the flow of intelligence and
cooperation from the villagers works in favor of the
government and makes the life of the insurgent danger-
ous and uncertain. The basic objectives may be stated
in another way; to cut the insurgent off from access to
the people whom he needs to grow, and to reduce the in-
surgent to the status of a hunted criminal [4].
(U) The VSF program will draw heavily on experience gained in the pilot PAT and VSO programs. Until such time as the VSFs become operational, the existing village security organizations will continue to function.

(U) The VSF members will be assigned and responsible to the village from which they are recruited; only volunteers will be accepted. In each village for which a VSF is planned, the village council will nominate approximately 20 volunteer candidates. Amphur authorities, including the police, will screen the candidates for the 10 best suited for training. An effort will be made to provide a more thorough security check of members than was accomplished in the VSO program.

(U) Candidates will attend a central VSF training center for approximately eight weeks of intensive instruction in light weaponry, small-unit counterinsurgency and village protection tactics, establishment of a low-level intelligence system, Thai "civics" activities, and specific training in related vocational skills.

(U) The VSF units will be temporary; members will have the status of assistant headmen with arrest authority, as authorized for VSOs. Serving in the VSF will be a full-time, compensated job. Members will be armed with carbines, rifles, and submachine guns. Their tactics will be aggressive within and surrounding their village, and not passive prior to terrorist initiatives. As with all village security organizations, the VSF will rely on support from tambon police, police reaction forces, VDC, or the RTA in the event of insurgent activities beyond the scope of their capabilities.

(U) Units will be established in areas which have not been subjected to operations by large insurgent bands, but in which intelligence indicates that subversive organizational efforts are underway ("pink" areas), or in areas which appear likely to be subjected to insurgent pressures ("grey" areas). The size of the unit will vary between 6 and 14 members, depending upon the number of families in the village—50 families, 4; 50 to 100 families, 10; 100 families, 10 to 14.
(LOU) The VSF program has passed the conceptual stage, but it is far from being able to provide the village security envisaged. The 1968 program, already behind schedule, calls for training 2,200 VSF members; the ultimate goal is 20,000 trained VSF members by the end of 1972. Support of the VSF program by the United States has been tentatively set at $4.6 million through FY 1969. Thai programmed funding is equivalent to about $4.4 million [2].

(FOUO) The VSF will function under the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the Ministry of the Interior and will require cooperation from several vertically-oriented Thai ministries and departments. Embassy officials in Thailand are concerned that the traditional rivalry between the DOLA and the TNPD (both in the Ministry of the Interior) will be an obstacle to effective implementation of the VSF program. It is hoped that the program will draw the DOLA and TNPD into closer cooperation on village security. As of May 1968, the TNPD and DOLA had not resolved their differences on the VSF concept, and no action was being taken to implement the program.

(FOUO) The police are generally reluctant to provide resources for support of programs outside their jurisdiction. They exhibit a philosophy of "Better no program than a program which we don't control." The TNPD must be convinced that some expenditure on its part to support the VSF program can enhance the police security role in a way that cannot likely be achieved by direct application of police assets [14].

F. VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

(U) In 1955 the South Vietnamese organized self-defense corps to provide village-level security. These units received only limited US support and as a consequence were ineffective in providing grass roots security. The United States was reluctant to provide aid for the village security forces in South Vietnam for fear such units would be rapidly infiltrated by the Communists and all aid would be lost. At the same time, the United States was providing considerable
support to the Army of Vietnam (ARVN). No appreciable support was provided for village security forces until they were transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Defense Ministry.

There appears to have been a similar reluctance to support village security units in Thailand, resulting in a proliferation of pilot programs to ensure that appropriate screening and training procedures were developed prior to committing US support to a full-scale program. This has cost valuable time and has resulted in the current, rather sophisticated Village Security Force program which, although strongly supported by the US Embassy, is still lacking unqualified support by the US community and the RTG. If the VSF program does not progress as planned, there is danger of repeating mistakes made in Vietnam.

G. EVALUATION OF VILLAGE SECURITY PROGRAMS

There has been a proliferation of village security programs in Thailand, largely as a result of US advice and support. The initial RTG approach was to utilize the easily activated (and deactivated) Village Defense Corps, led by the police and military, as village security units. On the provincial level, Governor Phat of Ubon provided weapons and on-site training to strengthen traditional home guard units in order to secure some of his insurgent threatened villages.

In October 1966 the United States sponsored the formation and training of pilot People's Assistance Teams and Village Security Officers, on an experimental basis. These pilot programs are now being molded into the Village Security Force program, again US sponsored. The VSF program involves full-time, centrally trained, and relatively sophisticated indigenous village security units with a modest development capability. Although the necessity for motivational civics-and-development training cannot be disputed, there is serious question as to whether these requirements should not be secondary to providing an immediate village security force. Adherence to existing VSF goals may result in a very slow development of
village security units and invite further insurgent expansion into the "pink" and "grey" areas. Heavier reliance on building up and supporting the traditional home guard units could have a more immediate impact on improving security for insurgent threatened villages.

To avoid indications of a further US-sponsored proliferation of village security programs, it would hardly be appropriate to repudiate the VSF program at this point in time. However, its goals could and should be modified to provide for more immediate results in the "pink" and "grey" areas. One modification would be the substitution of mobile training teams for amphur-level training, perhaps on the model of Governor Phat's VPT training. This would provide interim village security forces until such time as the total, highly desirable goals of the currently envisaged VSF program can be implemented fully.

The VSO experience in forming sector village security units indicates that it may be neither necessary nor practical to provide a static security unit for each village. A tambon, with an area of about 50 square miles, generally has its villages concentrated along streams and transportation links and in the cultivable areas, rather than dispersed uniformly throughout the tambon. Thus, several villages, collocated within an area of 4 square miles, for example, could be protected by a sector village security unit through patrols and exploitation of mobile defensive tactics.

The concept of forming village security units under the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and outside police channels is considered by many to jeopardize the effectiveness of such units because of the lack of technical support and supervision and the generally noncooperative attitude of the police toward rural security programs not sponsored by the TNPD. However, the potentially greater intelligence gathering capability of indigenous non-police village security units may more than compensate for the lack of cooperative police support. A concerted RTI effort is necessary to ensure closer working relations between the police and DOLA-sponsored security units.
IV
PARAMILITARY

(U) Paramilitary forces in Thailand, all under Ministry of the Interior sponsorship, are the Border Patrol Police (BPP), the Provincial Police Special Action Forces (SAF) and the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC). These paramilitary forces provide a civil (non-military) capability for counterinsurgency at a threat level below that which would warrant RTA commitment and backup as well as reaction support for tambon police stations and village security forces. Paramilitary forces also participate in RTA-directed counterinsurgency operations to fragment and destroy the Communist insurgent bands.

A. BORDER PATROL POLICE

(U) The Border Patrol Police (about 7,600) is the primary security force and representative of the RTG in the border areas. Although nominally under the Provincial Police (the assistant PP commander is the BPP commander), the BPP functions as a semi-autonomous force with headquarters at locations separate from the PP regional headquarters. The BPP comes under military control in time of war to act as a stay-behind force to organize guerrilla bands.

1. Tasks

(U) The BPP are charged with maintaining security along the border areas to a distance of 15 miles into Thailand. This involves some 3,000 miles of border. The BPP have been the only RTG presence in many of the remote border areas and in particular among the hill tribes in the North. Specific tasks of the Border Patrol Police include:

1. Patrolling along the border to prevent infiltration and maintain peace and public safety control
(2) Collecting information for the security of the country
(3) Supporting and rendering assistance to the hill tribe people according to the national plan for remote area development
(4) Carrying out air-rescue operations
(5) Cooperating with local officials against Communism
(6) Cooperating with other police and military forces
(7) Cooperating with local officials to prevent and suppress smuggling, illegal entry, and crime
(8) Cooperating with local officials for special duties and in assisting people in emergencies

2. Organization

(U) The BPP is organized into the following types of platoons (generally, 30-man platoons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Number of Platoons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolteacher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) A company headquarters controls several platoons in a given geographic area. Programmed expansion is for 32 additional line, mobile line, or mobile reserve platoons per year for FY 67 through FY 69 [2]. The associated manpower increases of 1,200 per year should result in a BPP strength of about 10,500 by the end of 1969.

(U) a. Line Platoons. Line platoons are stationed at various locations along the border. Members of a platoon are encouraged to become a part of the community, and most members have families with them. In addition to their BPP activities, platoon members raise rice or vegetables and may carry on a small business. This not only supplements their police salary, but serves as a means of unostentatiously demonstrating new types of vegetables and improved
agricultural methods to their neighbors and of bringing the platoon members into the life and concerns of the village. Most of the enlisted personnel are recruited locally and thus are familiar with the dialects and customs of the area. Officers tend to transfer more frequently than the enlisted men.

(U) Patrolling is a most essential task of the BPP. Each line platoon consists of from 1 to 3 patrols of 2 to 7 men each who cover assigned routes in the platoon area of responsibility usually twice a month. Itineraries are varied from trip to trip, both as to trails traversed and time of arrival. The main functions of the patrols are (a) to establish and maintain the good will of the villagers and key village personnel; (b) to pick up information about the presence and intent of strangers and the activities and possible whereabouts of criminals, malcontents, and Communist suspects; (c) to report to platoon headquarters any incidents requiring action; and (d) to carry out civic action programs. Members also take part in major roundups of smugglers, bandits, or Communist suspects conducted by the Special Branch Units and the Provincial Police.

(U) BPP police functions are limited in that, although they have the power of detention, they must turn suspects over to district officers or the Provincial Police after minimal interrogation. The BPP are responsible for suppression of smuggling and infiltration only in areas where Customs and Immigration officers are not stationed.

(U) Intelligence collection is another important function of the BPP. The patrols penetrate areas and have contacts with strata of society (e.g., hill tribes) not usually reached by other Royal Thai Government representatives; they can also pick up intelligence from other countries.

(U) b. Mobile Line Platoons. Mobile line platoons, not now included in the BPP structure, are to be added under present planning. A mobile platoon would be available to the company headquarters in charge of several line platoons for deployment in support of any unit under the company's command. The BPP hopes to increase its flexibility in this way by adding lower echelon command capability to reinforce
platoons for specific operations, conduct heavy patrolling, and perform other unconventional operations.

\(\text{c. Heavy Weapons Platoons.}\) These platoons provide a fire-support capability for positioning where needed. Weapons include mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other available heavy weaponry not compatible with fast moving counterinsurgency operations.

\(\text{d. Mobile Reserve Platoons.}\) In April 1966 the Mobile Reserve Platoon (MRP) concept was initiated to provide a quick reaction capability. The platoon was organized around light modern weaponry (first units in Thailand to receive AR15 (M-16) rifles and M-79 grenade launchers) transportable by three Bell 204-B (Huey) helicopters allowing full platoons to be deployed to a trouble area as a complete tactical unit. The MRP was designed to provide a tactical police unit which could respond to situations beyond normal police capability. The Provincial Police formed its Special Action Forces at about the same time. The MRPs and SAFs constitute the police quick reaction capability, which is discussed in more detail below.

\(\text{U. Mobile reserve platoons have normally been positioned at the regional BPP headquarters when not on patrol or participating in counterinsurgency operations.}\)

\(\text{e. Development Platoons and Schoolteacher Platoons.}\) These platoons support line platoons in the civic action portion of the BPP mission. The US SEABEE Technical Assistance Teams (STAT) have provided on-site technical training and assistance to Development Platoons.

3. BPP Armament

\(\text{The BPP platoons are armed with M1 and M2 carbines, M1 rifles, and submachine guns, and the MRPs have some M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers. Heavy weapons such as mortars and machine guns formerly carried by a heavy weapons squad in each platoon, are now carried by a heavy weapons platoon which is shifted to areas as needed. This move was to provide the basic platoon with greater mobility. Weapons are stored in platoon armories under guard when not in use. Platoons are equipped with FM-1 and FM-5 radios.}\)
4. **Transportation**

(U) Transportation equipment used by the BPP includes 2½- and 3/4-ton trucks, power wagons, jeeps, bicycles, horses, outboard motorboats, and helicopters.

5. **Supply**

(U) Resupply of BPP platoons, accomplished by surface deliveries supplemented by air, is a problem that would be intensified under active insurgency. Helipads have been built by the BPP at most platoon sites. The lack of adequate helicopter capability necessitates the use of air drops to isolated platoon sites.

6. **Training**

(U) The BPP receive more specialized training than the Provincial Police. They are now able to carry out their own training programs, both in counterinsurgency (CI) and in the skills that enable them to use, maintain, and repair their equipment through third echelon, and can carry out their civic action programs. The US Special Forces Mobile Training Teams assisted in establishing the CI training programs, and US Civil Affairs Mobile Training Teams instructed BPP, as well as PP, in civic affairs. This training is now provided by the BPP.

(U) The BPP has a training center at Phitsanulok for training MRP's and retraining line platoons. In addition, a leadership school is located at Hua Hin to give squad and platoon leaders necessary training for effective leadership.

7. **Parachute Aerial Replacement Unit**

(U) Theoretically under the control of the BPP, but in reality largely autonomous, the 572-man PARU operates small, 10-man "Special Forces" type anti-guerrilla and long-range patrolling units in the North and Northeast [8]. The unit also has a jungle rescue capability. The PARU Headquarters is at Hua Hin. There are about 250 PARU forces stationed at Phitsanulok under RTA control. No US aid is being provided for the PARU [14].
8. Remote Area Security Development Program

(U) The civic action programs of the BPP (now called the Remote Area Security Development Program) started in 1955. The objective of the BPP program is to involve the villager in his own development, and consume his latent zeal with constructive projects which are small enough to be assisted, seen, and appreciated by the hill tribes and the tradition-oriented rice farmers, and easily identifiable as assistance and concern from the RTG. The program includes such projects as:

(1) production and provision of new seeds for garden plots to tide the farmers over from one rice crop to the next
(2) creation of school "systems," with BPP teachers, books, pencils, paper, and conspicuous displays of the Thai flag, RTG symbols, and the like
(3) medical programs by BPP patrols, schoolteachers, hill tribe medical stations, and platoon dispensaries
(4) trading centers and marketing cooperatives for villages formerly dependent upon one or two money lenders and markets
(5) breeding animals for local consumption and cash income
(6) basic water supplies—sanitary well, pump water storage, catch basins
(7) small earthen dams for irrigation and water storage
(8) cleared plowed fields
(9) handicrafts, perhaps treadle sewing machines, needle work, and pottery for local consumption and cash sales

9. Evaluation of BPP

(Confidential) The BPP are the most effective of the police-paramilitary units in Thailand. The April 1966 Research Analysis Corporation study of "Border Patrol Police Capabilities and Potentials for Counterinsurgency (U)," made the following evaluation, which is still appropriate:

Other countries faced with problems of border infiltration and unrest might well consider the establishment of an organization similar to the BPP of Thailand. Experience in Malaya and South Vietnam, for example, has demonstrated that the organization, mission, and attitudes of national police forces play an important role in determining whether or not insurgency escalates from incipient stages. Police customarily concentrate on the suppressive aspects of CI, and it is essential
that they be properly equipped and trained for this type of action. Border areas, however, pose special problems best met by an organization tailored not only to employ force but also to link the outlying districts to the central government by such peaceful means as persuasion and civic action.

It is hoped that the importance of fully utilizing this unique organization for border control is recognized and understood. As the tempo of Communist actions in Southeast Asia quickens, the vulnerability of Thailand's extensive border to infiltration and insurgency is becoming, as recent newspaper reports indicate, an increasing source of concern to the RTG. In the BPP Thailand has a front line of defense. They are well equipped and trained for both preventive and suppressive CI measures, but they are stretched too thin to cope fully even with present conditions. Current efforts to improve equipment and training of the PP will strengthen the country's second line of defense, and planned movements of troops nearer the border would provide reserves in case of emergency. These are essential actions, but neither PP nor Army is as well fitted as the BPP to deal with the threat of insurgency along the borders in its present incipient stage. It would seem a prudent policy to increase RTG support of the BPP sufficiently to enable them to bring their platoons up to strength and to carry on their already-established civic-action programs at a more effective level.4

B. POLICE REACTION FORCES

The May 1965 US Embassy Mission "Police Study" made the following recommendations:

Creation of mobile police reserve forces designed to quickly reinforce local police in village areas where bandit or terrorist acts have become of such scope as to be beyond control of local police should be a priority item for immediate development. These mobile reserves should be of two types:

PP Mobile Reserves: Reserve squads or platoons held at each regional area, whose mission will be to reinforce village police elements and assist them in restoring law and order within the village area. They will remain in the village area and provide

1. BPP strength has since been increased from about 6,200 to 7,600. Further expansion is authorized at the rate of 1,200 per year through 1969. Improved weapons and equipment have also been provided.
presence and protection until the confidence of the villagers in the ability of the police to protect them has been restored.

Police PARU Mobile Units: A highly mobile and well trained paramilitary police group capable of immediate deployment and commitment of units from squad to company strength to those areas where acts of terrorism or insurgency by armed groups have increased to an intensity beyond the capability of the local police and their reserves to effectively suppress. Their action would consist of close and continuous pursuit with the objectives of arrest or destruction of armed hostile elements. Provincial police cannot be committed to such actions as they are likely to be prolonged and beyond their scope of limited paramilitary training.

(U) Probably related to this recommendation was the formation of reaction forces in both the Border Patrol and Provincial Police in 1966. The BPP formed Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP) and the PP formed Special Action Forces (SAF), each discussed below.

1. Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons

(CC) The objectives of the BPP Mobile Reserve Platoon program are to:

1. create at BPP area headquarters a reserve force ready to react rapidly to CT incidents, respond to intelligence reports, or reinforce a friendly unit.
2. provide increased BPP coverage and surveillance of critical border areas.
3. increase the depth and scope of BPP development and civic action programs.
4. provide isolated villagers in border areas with proof of the presence, interest, and strength of the government.

(CC) The BPP was most anxious to develop the MRP capability, and to do so completely reorganized the BPP in a period of six months to permit formation of 13 MRPs by November 1966 within the then existing manpower authorization. Manning for line platoons was reduced to 30 to provide necessary manpower. AID assisted in the rapid development
of the BFP quick-reaction capability. The MRP's were the first units in Thailand to receive the AR-15 (M-16 rifles) and M-79 grenade launchers.

(U) The 30-man MRP is tailored for lift by 3 Bell 204 (Huey) helicopters. The platoon is organized into a six-man headquarters and three eight-man squads. The distribution of weapons within the platoon is as follows:

**Platoon Headquarters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Leader (Lt)</td>
<td>M2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Platoon Leader (MSGT)</td>
<td>AR-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operator (Constable)</td>
<td>ML1 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk/Grenadier (Constable)</td>
<td>M-79 grenade launcher and M-1911 Al pistol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Radio Operator (Constable)</td>
<td>M3 submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic (Constable)</td>
<td>ML1 carbine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MRP Squad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader (NCO)</td>
<td>AR-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Squad Leader (Constable)</td>
<td>AR-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Rifleman (Constable)</td>
<td>AR-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman (3) (Constables)</td>
<td>M2 carbine (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadier (Constable)</td>
<td>M-79 grenade launcher and M-1911 Al pistol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operator (Constable)</td>
<td>M-3 submachine gun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The training of MRPs is conducted at Camp Saretsena, the BFP training camp located east of Phitsanulok. The six-week course, which emphasizes the demonstration technique of instruction, includes instruction and practical work in weapons, small unit tactics, scouting and patrolling, intelligence and public relations, and comprehensive field exercises. In addition to this 362 hours of basic instruction, additional instruction is given to selected MRP members, including use of BFP cameras, radar operator training, refresher training for MRP medics, and specialized intelligence training.

(C) The MRPs operate under the control of the commander of the BFP area to which the platoon is assigned. In areas where the RTA
controls CI operations, the RTA commander has authority to employ MRPAd to supplement his forces.

(\textit{\textbf{\textcircled{C}}}) Mobile Reserve operations have included combat patrols in response to Communist insurgent activity; pre-planned sweeps, as part of joint forces, into insurgent base areas; reconnaissance patrols; security missions; civic action projects; intelligence collection; population identification; and demonstrations of government presence in remote areas. The BPP administrative areas (same as PP regions) annotated with MRP base locations are shown in Figure 4.

(\textit{\textbf{\textcircled{C}}}) In August 1967 an "Analysis of the Mobile Reserve Platoon Program" [?] by the Research Analysis Corporation, concluded that:

The MRPs have been successful in achieving three of the four initial program objectives: increased border coverage, increased development programs, and increased RTG presence in remote areas. The quick response capability, perhaps the primary objective, has not been achieved to any meaningful extent by the MRPs.

The MRPs appear to have been at least as effective as comparable units operating in Thailand during 1966.\textsuperscript{1}

Compared to previous capabilities the presence of the MRPs is an improvement to the assets available to BPP area commanders.

From all indications the MRPs appear to be superior to similar size CT units now in Thailand.

2. Provincial Police Special Action Forces

(\textit{\textbf{\textcircled{C}}}) In June 1966 the Provincial Police formed its first Special Action Force (SAF). Increased insurgent activities in the provinces (and perhaps recommendations of the 1965 US Mission "Police Study") provided the impetus for the formation of these units, which were created to provide each PP regional commander with an elite, highly trained and properly equipped force available for quick-response

\textsuperscript{1} The MRPs had not yet received new weapons, and helicopter lift was in short supply. Because of this, the MRPs were relatively ineffective until late 1967.

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FIGURE 4 (C). Basing of Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP)(U)

CONFIDENTIAL
operations. The program was partially supported by Public Safety Division, USAID.

(2) The Provincial Police undertook to form the SAFs in the midst of conflicting demands for already limited trained police manpower, e.g., the tambon police stations were in the process of being manned. These personnel problems, and the late delivery of US commodity support limited the effectiveness of the SAFs prior to 1968.

(2) The 50-man SAF consists of a 10-man headquarters and four, 10-man squads. The types and distribution of weapons within the platoon are shown in Table 3. The units use FM-1 and FM-5 radios.

(U) The SAFs are trained at Chaiya counterinsurgency centers at Chiangmai and Udon. Personnel receive essentially the same training as MRP members, but with differing emphasis. For example, MRP training emphasizes subjects related to civic action, while SAF training emphasizes crowd control. The MRP school is better staffed than the SAF school.

(U) The SAFs are controlled by the regional Provincial Police commander. As in the case of the MRPs, the SAFs are subject to the call of the RTA commander in those areas under RTA control.

(U) When not on quick-reaction standby or employed in joint CI operations, SAF members carry out normal police assignments. There are 24 SAFs assigned at various locations throughout police regions of Thailand as shown on Figure 5. The projected program provides for 36 SAFs by 1969.

3. **Comparison of SAF with MRP**

(U) The "Analysis of Mobile Reserve Platoon Program," cited above [7], included the following comparison of the two types of police quick-reaction forces:

**Mission and Employment**

Both the SAF Platoons and MRPs are special quick response units created for use in situations which require resources beyond normal police capabilities available to their respective commanders in their assigned geographic areas.

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### Table 3

**WEAPONS DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE SAF PLATOON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Assigned Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon commander</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine and 0.38 cal. revolver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy commander</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine and 0.38 cal. revolver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon sergeant major</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio operator</td>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio operator</td>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster sergeant</td>
<td>M-1 rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runner/Messenger</td>
<td>M-1 rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runner/Messenger</td>
<td>M-1 rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Squads (4; 10 men each):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad leader</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant squad leader</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>M-1/M-2 carbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>M-1 rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>M-1 rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>Shotgun (pump)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad member</td>
<td>Shotgun (pump)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SAF platoons place primary emphasis on the preservation of civil law and order through the suppression of banditry and insurgency. The MRPs place primary emphasis on remote area development, civic action programs, and suppression of insurgency.

Both groups have been employed in suppression operations against CTs and both groups have also engaged in civic action operations—the SAFs to a lesser extent than the MRPs.

4. **Concept of Quick Response**

   The initial concept of police quick-response, formulated in 1967 [11], projected that by the end of 1970 an adequate police reaction force would be available to every village in security-sensitive
FIGURE 5 (C). Provincial Police Special Action Forces Deployment (U)
areas within 40 minutes. The prohibitive force requirements and other delays in implementing the system have since reduced the quick-reaction goal to 2 hours [14]. The August 1967 "Analysis of Mobile Reserve Platoon Program" gave an objective and particularly pertinent discussion of the quick-response capability, quoted in part below:

... For a reaction force to be able to respond to an incident in time to effect contact with insurgents, the following elements are required: (1) Channels for virtually instantaneous reporting of the incident; (2) rapid decision making by command and control centers involved; (3) immediate dispatch of airlift support to the troop loading area; (4) ready availability of troops to board the aircraft; (5) speedy movement to the objective area; and (6) intelligent tactical deployment to effect armed contact. All this must be operable under adverse environmental conditions such as darkness and rain. This series of necessary requirements severely limits the ability of MRPs, or for that matter any other ROC counterinsurgency forces, to respond to a CT incident in time to make contact.

One BPP area commander has suggested that, in order to be effective a response unit must arrive at the scene of the incident no more than 2 or 3 hours after it occurs. Such a figure is dependent upon the actual operational situation, but is offered as a general analytical yardstick. With a 2 to 3 hour response time, according to this commander, the unit can collect current fresh information from the villagers regarding the CT unit, and with good internal communications and transportation, the platoon could locate the insurgents, block their escape routes, and engage them. Arrival of the response element after more than 3 hours have elapsed would generally not suffice to catch the communist unit.

5. Future Role of Police Reaction Forces

Long-range planning provides for the basing of police reaction forces throughout Thailand to supplement normal police capabilities against banditry and low-level subversive activities (see Figures 4 and 5). This is a basically sound approach, and if inspection and retraining procedures are maintained to ensure readiness and effectiveness, these police paramilitary units can be a major influence in preventing growth of a Communist insurgency.
The continuing presence of these units in the rural areas is a necessary element in the effort to provide physical and psychological security for the villagers, thereby denying the support-base necessary for a successful insurgency. The future role of these units should include:

(1) Assisting police and village security units in preventing or countering banditry and low-level insurgency without the necessity of committing Thai military forces, including quick-reaction response in those areas where intelligence has permitted alerting of necessary command and air-lift capabilities.

(2) Participating in joint operations with RTA forces in those areas where the insurgency has reached a level beyond the control capability of the police.

(3) Forming a permanent paramilitary force to remain in its assigned rural areas and continue to supplement the civil security efforts after RTA units have fragmented insurgent bands and moved to higher threat areas.

Encouragement for the RTG to form additional police reaction forces should be based upon the growth in insurgent capability. No US endorsement should be given to the frequent comments on the proliferation of police reaction forces duplicating RTA capabilities. (During the Malaya Insurgency, 1948-1960, 800 Police Special Constabulary units (25 men each) were employed with great effectiveness [10].) Police paramilitary units play a vital role in civil security; their capabilities should be exploited to arrest the insurgency at force levels and with unconventional operations which do not inflict injuries and other hardships on the villagers. The recent developments in North Thailand, where possible RTA over-reaction may have negated several years of BPP civic action effort, indicate that civil security forces might be a more effective long-range counter to the incipient insurgency in the North.

C. VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS

The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) is the paramilitary reserve available for call to active duty in the event of emergency or civil
disaster. In addition to its "national guard" role, the VDC provides a major manpower base for village and tambon armed units.

(C) The VDC organization consists of changwat and amphur companies. To date, most of the activated VDC have been called individually rather than by unit. In FY 67 the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) began to underwrite the amphur VDC company program. The overall, current VDC strength is about 22,000; MAP supported 34 percent of this structure in FY 67, and plans to support 50 percent in FY 68 and 56 percent in FY 69.

(C) Amphur VDC companies, commanded by the district officer, consist of one to three 40-man Platoons at the amphur level and one or two 12-man squads at the tambon level, all assigned to the single amphur company. The companies were formed by the RTG in 1966 to augment police and military forces operating in active insurgency areas, provide population and resources control, interrupt insurgent access to the rural villages, and reassure the rural population of government interest and capability. These VDC units operate primarily as patrol forces.

(C) The CINCPAC "Military Assistance Program" for Thailand, dated August 7, 1967, stated that:

The program of MAP support for selected VDC "new amphur companies" is designed to: (1) encourage RTG to develop a patrolling force adequate to stalemate further insurgent expansion by end FY 69 and (2) to provide only that MAP equipment which will, in conjunction with equipment already in the hands of Thai, assure minimum required patrolling capabilities. The FY 68 program is accordingly an extension and expansion of the austere FY 67 program. MAP will provide, per twelve-man squad, two submachine guns, two shotguns and one radio-transceiver with associated ammunition and spares while RTG will provide eight M1903 rifles (with ammunition), individual equipment and uniforms. In FY 69, the same austere program continues with further expansion. During that year RTG will have exhausted its stocks of M1903 rifles, and MAP will have to provide carbines or equivalents to permit the necessary further expansion. Provision of the submachine guns and shotguns will greatly improve the VDC counterrambush and ambush capabilities and will provide the VDC with weapons comparable to
those in the hands of the insurgents. Radio transceiver, FM-1, or FM-5, will be provided to the VDC "new amnphur company," as no communications are currently available to VDC, and the radios envisioned, series radios, (FM-1 for squad, FM-5 for platoon) are fully compatible with radios already provided by USOM (AID) to police and civil administrative elements. [12]

(C) The current MAP-supported VDC plan includes the following unit-personnel strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 67</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphur platoons (40 men each)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambon squads (12 men each)</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>1,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>12,856</td>
<td>23,184</td>
<td>25,584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The VDC personnel are recruited in the area in which they reside and trained by the Royal Thai Army. Four types of training are given: annual training for changwat VDC companies; basic and refresher courses given by Mobile Training Teams; leadership courses presented to selected VDC unit commanders and leaders; and on-the-job training through participation in RTA unit exercises.

(U) VDC members are paid when on active duty or on authorized travel according to the following schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Baht/Day</th>
<th>Baht/Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon leader</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third class officer</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second class officer</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First class officer</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The VDC units have generally been employed in one of three ways—as elements of village security forces, usually led by police; as elements of strike units; and as security guards. Amphur VDC platoons and tambon squads are employed as a patrolling and backup force for police and village security units. The changwat governors have authority to recruit and activate VDC members within established allocations.
(U) The ARPA "Counterinsurgency Systems Manual Northeast Thailand" gives the following evaluation of the effectiveness of the VDC program:

**Strengths**

1. The VDC's long tradition as a patriotic paramilitary force is a sound basis for the unit to be employed in a CI environment.

2. Utilization of district (Amphoe) officer in the VDC does provide necessary leadership and good judgment in the selection of members.

3. The system of active duty allocations does not permit provincial governors to augment local police forces as required.

4. Familiarity with local areas.

5. Long established contacts with the local population.

**Weaknesses**

1. The VDC's use in the past as an instrument of power and the RTG's fear that it may be so used again will be a limiting factor in RTG consideration of major VDC revision.

2. Utilization of nai amphoe and district education officers as VDC unit leaders is shortsighted in that their personnel will be required in their primary duties in counterinsurgency operations.

3. Little coordination among the agencies responsible for the VDC takes place below the level of the VDC committee (National level).

4. There is no detailed table of organization and equipment for VDC units.

5. Unit organization, stations, and allocation of training time do not adequately reinforce critical area counterinsurgency posture.

6. VDC personnel procedures are not adequate to identify or trace "non-locatees" meaning unnecessarily low present-for-duty strengths for active duty.

7. The basic weapon, Springfield rifle M1903, is too heavy a weapon for combat in close terrain.

8. VDC units require a squad radio capable of netting with district Provincial Police radios, permitting positive control of units and rapid
reporting of intelligence. (The MAP includes providing FM-1 and FM-5 radios.) [1]

(2) The VDC represents a paramilitary capability which can be activated when needed and deactivated as the threat subsides. Some American observers have indicated that the RIG would probably prefer to make more extensive use of the VDC for village security forces rather than utilize the various US promoted VSO, PAT and VSF village security concepts.
RURAL SECURITY IN THE NORTHEAST

(U) The emphasis of the RTO's counterinsurgency effort has been in the Northeast, although some programs have been selectively applied in other threatened areas. This section of the paper is focused on the rural security program in the Northeast in order to provide an approximation of current status and a feeling for the total magnitudes involved.

A. POLICE

(C) The various police branches assigned in the Northeast, and their approximate strengths, are the Provincial Police (9,500), Border Patrol Police (1,850), Marine Police (215), Highway Patrol Police (150) and the Railway Police (100). The total police strength of approximately 11,815 men represents about a 40 percent increase over the estimated mid-1966 police strength in the Northeast.

(U) About 210 of the programmed 592 tambon police stations for the Northeast have been completed and are being manned. The total program provides less than 50 percent coverage of the 1,273 tambons in the Northeast (average tambon population is about 7,000). Each tambon police station is ultimately to be manned by 20 Provincial Police.

(C) This police coverage appears thin in view of the fact that the Northeast hosts about 34 percent of the total population and covers about 32 percent of the land area of Thailand but has less than 20 percent of the available police. In contrast, at the peak of the Malaya counterinsurgency effort, police force manning to cover an area about three-fourths that of Northeast Thailand reached about 75,000 [10].
The countrywide police expansion to a manpower authorization of 100,000 should slowly correct this disparity. The continuing US-RTG study of manpower requirements will undoubtedly provide a sound basis for determining total police requirements in the Northeast and in other areas of the country.

B. VILLAGE SECURITY FORCES

About 560 of the 15,148 villages [2] in the Northeast have an RTG-sponsored village security force of one type or another (see Table 4, pp. 244-5). Many of the other villages have self-organized home guard units formed by the village headman for protection against thieves and minor bandit incursions. These units, however, are poorly trained and armed and have little capability to provide security against well-organized insurgent bands. Nevertheless, they do represent a village-security potential which, if trained and armed, could be exploited by the RTG.

(U) The diverse units providing village security are being integrated into the Village Security Forces Program now being implemented.

C. PARAMILITARY FORCES

The Provincial Police have eight 50-man Special Action Forces in the Northeast, and two more are to be added soon. There are six 30-man BPP Mobile Reserve Platoons in the Northeast. These units are included in the personnel figures given in the "Police" section above.

It is planned that by 1969 there will be 120 (40 man) amphur VDC platoons and 946 (12 man) tambon VDC squads in the Northeast (about 16,000 personnel). The current year program [12] is for 83 platoons and 550 squads (about 9,900 personnel).

D. RURAL SECURITY IN A NORTHEAST PROVINCE AND DISTRICT

(U) To illustrate the magnitude of the rural security problem in the Northeast, the situation in Nakhon Phanom province generally
(which has received special RTG attention) and in the Nakae district in particular is described below, as of the end of 1967.

(C) Nakhon Phanom has a population of 510,000 and a land area of 3,740 square miles. There are ten district police and 22 (of a total of 74 tambons) tambon police stations in the province; the average tambon population is about 7,000. About 79 of Nakhon Phanom's 843 villages are protected by an RTG-sponsored village security organization (VDC or VSO). The description below of a specific district within Nakhon Phanom, Nakae, further demonstrates the thin rural security coverage in the Northeast.

(CY) Amphur Nakae encompasses a portion of the Phu Phan Mountains; it has a land area of about 680 square miles and a population of about 70,000. The disposition of village security units in Nakae, as of September 1967, is shown in Figure 6. About 28 of Nakae's 113 villages are protected by VDCs, VSOs\(^3\) or RTA static security units; five of the 11 tambons in Nakae have a police station [1, 16].

(2) To supplement police and village security units, plans to form VDC amphur platoons and tambon squads were initiated in 1966. These units were to have functioned primarily as a patrolling force. However, as in other areas of the Northeast, it was soon found that rather than being utilized in their planned role, the amphur VDC were called up as individuals to flesh out village security units [1, 12]. It is projected that with US MAP support, there should be two 12-man VDC squads per tambon and three 40-man VDC amphur platoons available in Nakae by the end of 1968.

(C) The civil village security, police, and VDC manpower investment in rural security for Nakae is about 1,000 men. This does not include RTA forces committed to counterinsurgency operations. This investment provides security for only about 25 percent of Nakae's villages.

---

1. No additional VSOs have been trained since September 1967 pending implementation of the VSF program.

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CONFIDENTIAL
Table 4
VILLAGE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Force</th>
<th>Approximate Number in Northeast</th>
<th>Villages Covered</th>
<th>Apaches in Northeast Covered by Program</th>
<th>Men on Village Team</th>
<th>Recruitment Base</th>
<th>Major Activities</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VDC</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>Armed protection</td>
<td>Springfield rifles M1A1; “home” VDC with M-1 rifles and carbines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPT</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Home village</td>
<td>Armed protection</td>
<td>Springfield rifle M1A1; 12-gauge shotguns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5-15</td>
<td>Emergency status</td>
<td>Armed protection</td>
<td>12-gauge shotguns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>Armor protection</td>
<td>N-1 rifles; M-1 carbines; N-1 submachine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSF b</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Home village</td>
<td>Armed protection; N-1 rifles; N-1 carbines; N-1 submachine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Data and format provided by Research Analysis Corporation Field Office, Thailand.
b. Not yet in being; plan being implemented with 1968 goal to train 2,200 VSF members.

17-Nov-64
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Uniforms</th>
<th>Approximate Monthly Pay</th>
<th>Training Length</th>
<th>Training Site</th>
<th>By Whom Given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VDC in JTs and</td>
<td>Fatigues;</td>
<td>450-480</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>At changwat</td>
<td>RTA Mobile Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPUs have radio</td>
<td>boots;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>or amphoe seat</td>
<td>by RTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provided by</td>
<td>rifle belt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDC (PMH-92-20</td>
<td>overcoat;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by RTA Special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or PM-1/31; VPUs</td>
<td>hat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have access to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDC radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or to a CSDC-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provided PMH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH-1 radio</td>
<td>None provided; most members have purchased fatigues</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>Amphoe seats</td>
<td>RTA Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link with tambon and amphoe police stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH-1 radio assigned; link with TH-1 at amphoe level</td>
<td>Regular PTG administrative uniform; may also have fatigues and boots</td>
<td>230-350</td>
<td>3 weeks for all VDF; 1 extra week for leaders.</td>
<td>Chaiyaphum Training Center (Udon) home amphoe</td>
<td>PP and DOLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDF villages provided PM-1 or PM-1 radio by PM; links with tambon police station</td>
<td>Blue denim pants and shirt; canvas boots</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>8 weeks all VDF; 1 extra week for leaders; 2 weeks extra for CAT/PAT</td>
<td>Camp Suang Son Hue Khi Hua</td>
<td>DOD and DOLA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: CAT - Census Apiration Team  
CSDC - Commuicer Suppression Operations Command  
DODA - Department of Local Administration  
JT - Joint Security Team  
PAT - Precies Assistance Team  
PP - Provincial Police  
VDC - Volunteer Defense Corps  
VPP - Volunteer Protection Team  
VPG - Volunteer Protection Unit  
VRS - Village Radio System  
VST - Village Security Force  
VSO - Village Security Officer

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FIGURE 6(C). Rural Security Forces in Amphur Nakae (U)
E. COMPARISON WITH MALAYAN EXPERIENCE

The question of how much police, village security, paramilitary, and military manpower is required to combat existing and possibly increased levels of insurgency may be partially answerable in comparative terms. A comparison of forces in Northeast Thailand, with the peak strength during the Malayan insurgency [10] shows an order of magnitude difference in manpower commitments. A far more serious insurgent threat existed in Malaya than can now be foreseen in Thailand, and any comparison of numbers must be considered in this light. Significant statistics and the estimated commitment to the rural security-counterinsurgency effort in Northeast Thailand (1968) versus Malayan peak commitment (1948-1960) are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NE THAILAND</th>
<th>MALAYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land area</td>
<td>65,600 sq miles</td>
<td>50,600 sq miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed insurgents</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RURAL SECURITY/CI COMMITMENT:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NE THAILAND</th>
<th>MALAYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Security</td>
<td>7,300*</td>
<td>250,000 (home guard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDC (Special Amphur)</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>3,000**</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Total security forces} = \frac{3,000**}{32,000} = \frac{40,000}{365,000}
\]

* Includes 2,200 VSF tentatively programmed for training in CY 1968.
** Temporarily reinforced to 5,200 during May and June 1968 for operations in Amphur Nakae [19].

F. NEED FOR IMPROVED RURAL SECURITY

This examination of rural security forces in the Northeast indicates that a considerably greater manpower investment will probably be necessary to provide for long-term rural security. Although there have been very few recent armed propaganda meetings or overt attacks on the villages, there is evidence to indicate
considerable covert activity may be taking place. This points up the need for an indigenous village security force, whose members can detect such covert activity as well as provide security against small overt attacks. Such units should be formed and available before an insurgent infrastructure can be developed within the village. In other words, overall provisions for rural security in Thailand (including village security units) cannot await development of insurgent threats, but must be pursued on a priority basis throughout the country in order to ensure physical and psychological security for all the people in Thailand.
VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(\$) One of the critical deficiencies which resulted in the rapid expansion of the Viet Cong insurgency in the late 1950's was the failure of the Government of South Vietnam to provide protection for the population. Although the popular grievances and highly developed Communist infrastructure associated with South Vietnam do not appear characteristic of Thailand, the failure of the Royal Thai Government to provide effective rural security could permit growth of the insurgency to far more serious proportions. Recognizing this, the RTG is taking measures to eliminate the current lack of physical and psychological protection for the rural population in the Northeast and other threatened areas of the country.

($) The Thai Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is charged with maintaining law and order, a mission which includes countering subversive activities within the country. However, since the insurgency exceeds the capabilities of MOI civil forces, the RTG has assigned the role of directing counterinsurgency operations in the field to the Royal Thai Army. Operating under martial law, the RTA has conducted operations to fragment and destroy insurgent bands and also to supplement civil rural security programs. There is no question concerning the appropriateness of the Army's mission to destroy the guerrilla bands, nor of the short-term necessity for the Army to assist in providing protection to the villages. However, reliance on the military to provide long-term rural protection would leave security voids which could be exploited by the insurgents if military forces were redeployed to counter heavy insurgent activity in another area or to meet a conventional external threat. It would also degrade the Army's capability for offensive action against the armed bands.

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A permanent police-paramilitary security capability, incorporated in the rural population is required for the long term to help prevent the insurgents from gaining the support of the populace either through political persuasion or terrorism. The forces in Thailand with the potential for providing this internal security capability include the police, village security organizations, and paramilitary forces. Figure 7 shows the major departments of the Ministry of the Interior which support civil security organizations in Thailand and the types of forces under each department.

A. RURAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Initial RTG efforts, patterned after the Malayan counter-insurgency programs, were directed toward expanding and improving the ability of civil forces to provide rural security and keep the insurgency below the threshold of military involvement. To do this the RTG developed programs to:

1. expand and improve the Thai National Police Department (TNPD) and to extend police presence to the tambon level,
2. sponsor development and support of indigenous village security forces, and
3. provide a paramilitary capability for backup support of tambon police stations and village security units and to combat small insurgent bands.

Although the increased insurgent threat has necessitated Royal Thai Army direction of counterinsurgency efforts in the Northeast, the general long-range approach to providing rural security remains essentially unchanged.

In 1966 the RTG began to implement its civil-oriented rural security programs, which included expansion of police manpower, construction of tambon police stations, activation of police tactical

---

1. Village security organizations are often classified as paramilitary forces; they have been treated separately here to focus on the village security problem in essentially the same way as has the RTG.
FIGURE 7 (U). Ministry of Interior Controlled Civil Security Forces (U)
units and the Police Air Division, the initial pilot programs for village security units, and activation of VDC Special Amphur Companies. Training for many of these programs was not completed until late 1966, and their impact on improved rural security not felt until 1967.

The current rural security picture reflects a slowly increasing police presence at the tambon level and the existence of a variety of defense units protecting a small proportion of the security-sensitive villages. The local forces are backed up by police and military tactical units supported by a limited number of helicopters. Police and VDC also participate under RFA direction in active counterinsurgency operations to fragment and destroy the insurgent bands. The present and projected status of the civil programs is described below.

1. Expansion of Police Forces

The Thai National Police Department has been expanded from 56,000 men in 1966 to about 64,000 in May 1968. Planned annual training of 10,000 to 12,000 recruits will offset losses from normal attrition and provide for an increase of 8,000 police per year; 1972 strength is projected to be on the order of 100,000.

The Provincial Police presence is gradually being expanded down to the tambon (village cluster) level. The amphur (district) was formerly the lowest level at which police were stationed. Approximately 210 tambon police stations of the 592 programmed for the Northeast have been completed and are being manned. The total country-wide program is for 1,150 tambon police stations by 1970, which would provide approximately 50 percent coverage of the security-sensitive tambons. (There are 1,273 tambons in the Northeast and 4,926 in all Thailand.)

The TNPD Police Air Division (PAD), with 10 utility and 16 light-observation helicopters and 10 fixed-wing aircraft, provides minimal command, logistic, and reconnaissance support for all branches of the TNPD as well as tactical lift for police-paramilitary forces. The currently supported program includes 11 more utility helicopters.
(BELL 204) to be provided by the United States and two more DeHavilland heavy STOL aircraft to be purchased by the RTG. The estimated 1970 complement will be 60 airplanes, 90 pilots, and 100 mechanics.

The TNFPD has initiated programs to improve the acceptability of the police by the villagers. In spite of these programs, there apparently still exists some justification for the poor reputation of the Metropolitan and Provincial Police. Although the United States can provide technical assistance and commodity support to these efforts, it must rely upon the RTG to ensure that police malpractices do not negate CI efforts.

2. Village Security Organizations

The traditional approach to village security has been for the village headman to form a "home guard" to protect his people from thieves and bandits. These units have generally not been well enough trained or armed to deter or defeat organized insurgent bands. Governor Phat of Ubon, however, has formed effective local units and now has about 26 insurgent-threatened villages secured by Village Protection Teams.

Existing village security units and the approximate number of Northeast villages in which they are located are shown below. The 561 villages covered represent only a small percentage of the approximately 2,000 security-sensitive villages in the Northeast.

| No. of Villages | 
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) | 310 |
| Village Protection Teams (VPT) | 26 |
| Village Security Officers (VSO) | 192 |
| Peoples Assistance Teams (PAT) | 33 |
| Total | 561 |

There has been a proliferation of village security organizations, traceable in large part to US advice and support. The initial RTG approach was to utilize the existing VDC as Joint Security Teams.
in support of CI operations in the Northeast; VDC were also activated to provide security in sensitive villages.

In October 1966, two US-Thai sponsored pilot programs were inaugurated. Peoples Assistance Teams were established in 33 villages and have proved highly successful. The Village Security Officer program has been less successful because of poor personnel screening, inadequate armament, insufficient training, low compensation, and budgetary problems. The experience gained in these pilot programs has led the United States Embassy to propose and the RTG to indicate its willingness to accept a new approach known as the Village Security Force program.

The VSF program will provide centrally trained, relatively sophisticated, indigenous village security units with a modest capability for economic and social development. The VSFs will be employed in their village of recruitment on a full-time basis. The CY 1968 goal is to train 2,200 VSF who will provide protection for about 220 additional villages in the Northeast. The goal for the VSF program is to have 20,000 VSF in about 2,000 villages by the end of 1972. The existing village security units are expected to continue operations in the interim and will eventually be assimilated by the VSF. Projected US support for the VSF is 4.6 million through 1969. RTG investment is planned to be the equivalent of 4.4 million during the same period.

3. Paramilitary Forces

The paramilitary forces of Thailand include the Border Patrol Police, police quick-reaction units, and the Volunteer Defense Corps. The Border Patrol Police (present strength of approximately 7,600 to be expanded to about 10,500 by the end of 1969) is responsible for the security of border areas. By becoming participating members of the border communities, the BPP forces have obtained assistance from the people which partially compensates for their inability to secure the entire border physically.

The BPP has supported the Hill Tribes Remote Area Development program in the North since 1955, in most cases constituting the only
RTG presence in the tribal villages. The BFP units have pursued an active development program in about 50 hill tribe villages and made patrols to numerous more remote communities to demonstrate RTG concern and to collect intelligence. These units have been effective in the North and were well on their way to gaining the allegiance of many of the hill tribesmen. However, recent military operations in the North against insurgent bands have tended to be more harsh and indiscriminate than warranted. In particular the napalming of a Meo village in January 1968 has created considerable ill will and negated many years of BFP effort.

(6) The BFP has also worked with great effectiveness in rural security and counterinsurgency operations in other border areas of Thailand. It is considered the most effective paramilitary force in Thailand and has performed well, within the limitations of manpower and assets, all along the 3,000-mile border of Thailand.

(6) In 1966, the BFP formed Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP), and the Provincial Police (PP) formed Special Action Forces (SAF) as tactical units to support police or village security forces under attack by insurgent bands. Although there have been very few occasions when these units have functioned in their quick-reaction role, they have contributed significantly to the counterinsurgency effort. Plans call for a total of 24 MRPs and 36 SAFs. Present units are distributed throughout Thailand, and their roles, vital to providing long-term rural security in an insurgency atmosphere, are:

(1) To assist police and village security units in preventing and countering banditry and low-level insurgency without the necessity of committing Thai military forces. This includes quick response in those areas where intelligence has permitted alerting of necessary command and airlift capabilities.

(2) To participate in joint operations with RTA forces in those areas where the insurgency has reached a level beyond the capability of police to control.

(3) To be a permanent paramilitary force which remains in its assigned rural areas and continues to supplement the civil security efforts after RTA units have fragmented insurgent bands and moved to higher-threat areas.
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(U) The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) is the paramilitary reserve of Thailand available for call to active duty in the event of emergency or civil disaster. Since the development of the insurgency, the VDC has provided a manpower base for village and tambon armed security units.

(0) There are about 3,700 VDC on active duty in the Northeast as members of village security units, joint strike teams, and base security guards. The US Military Assistance Program has funded through 1969 to provide partial support to special amphur companies consisting of one to three 40-man platoons at the amphur level and one or two 12-man squads at the tambon level. These forces provide an additional patrolling and paramilitary backup capability for police and village security forces. By the end of CY 1968 it is planned to have about 9,900 VDC assigned to the special amphur companies in the Northeast; 16,000 are programmed for the end of CY 1969.

B. CONCLUSIONS

(0) The RTG concept for providing rural security through (a) increased police presence at the tambon level, (b) organization and support of an indigenous village security force, and (c) provisions for civil-controlled police-paramilitary units which can backstop police and village security forces and combat small insurgent bands is basically sound. Since the RTG started with a negligible capability in the remote areas, progress, although impressive in terms of absolute numbers, is less impressive when related to the total magnitude of the problem of extending the RTG presence and providing physical and psychological security to the villages.

(0) The orientation of RTG police programs is appropriate for the long haul and planned expansions should be continued. Current plans should be broadened to include extending police presence to additional tambons beyond the 1,150 now planned. Continuation of the Joint Thai-US on-site study of police-manpower-requirements is recommended.

(U) The performance and requirements of the Police Air Division should be closely monitored and coordinated with RTA and RTAF increased helicopter-lift capabilities. Increased helicopter-lift
capability is needed country-wide to provide the reconnaissance and mobility essential to maintaining rural security in threatened areas, particularly in remote border areas. The provision of additional helicopter mobility capability may at some point be more efficient than marginal increases in police, paramilitary, or military force levels.

Efforts to ensure fair and considerate treatment of the population by the police and thereby improve the police image require continued emphasis by the RTG. Such efforts are necessary to prevent police expansion from becoming counterproductive.

Village Security Force program goals, by their sophistication (requirement for eight weeks training at a central VSF school, employment of VSF on a full-time basis, and the like), are delaying and may cause further delays in providing protection for security-sensitive villages. As an interim measure, consideration should be given to:

1. A concept of active and collective defense of those villages which are concentrated in a small geographic area, utilizing VDC and other local security resources in a random pattern of patrols and ambush.

2. Exploiting the capability of the local villagers for security by the formation of "home-guard"-units under the supervision of the district, with arms and funding provided by the RTG.

The concept of forming village security units under the Department of Local Administration and outside police channels is considered by many to be unsound. The argument is that such units will suffer from lack of technical support and supervision and from a noncooperative attitude on the part of the police toward rural security programs not sponsored by the TNPD. However, the potentially greater intelligence-gathering capability of indigenous non-police village security units may more than compensate for the lack of wholehearted police cooperation and support. A concerted RTG effort is necessary to ensure a closer working relationship between the police and DOLA-sponsored security units.

The BPP are by experience and motivation best adapted for remote area security work with the hill tribes. The RTG should assign
high priority to expansion of the BPP remote area programs and should provide the BPP with the required manpower and assets. Care should also be taken to avoid creating further hill tribe grievances against the RTG.

(2) The PP Special Action Forces and BPP Mobile Reserve Platoons provide an appropriate contribution for long-term security of the rural areas of Thailand in an insurgency atmosphere. They insure a permanent tactical capability in a given geographic area and can function independently under police control or as a part of joint counterinsurgency forces in high-threat areas where military commitment has been necessary. Expansion beyond the programmed 24 MRRPs and 36 SAFs should be based upon an increased insurgent threat.

The immediate goal should be to improve equipment and maintain training and inspection procedures which assure maximum effectiveness from existing forces.

(2) The VDC Special Amphur Company program being supported by the US Military Assistance Program, if implemented and supported as planned, will provide a positive contribution to the improvement of rural security. Development of this potential through improved leadership and better equipment warrants continued RTG and US support.

The RTG ability to activate and deactivate VDC units provides a flexible means of countering variable insurgent threat levels.

(2) Finally, overall provisions for country-wide rural security in Thailand, including the formation of village security units, cannot await development of insurgent threats, but must be pursued on a priority basis throughout the country in order to insure physical and psychological security for all the people in Thailand.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

(U) One of the ways in which the Royal Thai Government has responded to Communist insurgency within its borders has been to take special steps to improve income and living conditions in the affected and threatened areas. These special steps have centered on the rural Northeast, where economic problems are the most acute in Thailand and where insurgency has been most evident.  

(U) The United States Government has assisted the RTG in its counterinsurgency-related campaign to improve environmental conditions, placing the bulk of its support behind the Thai main effort in the rural Northeast. Within this large and geographically ill-favored region, the priorities have been given to road construction, improvement of health, and stimulation of agricultural production.

(U) Although the environmental-improvement programs are predominantly economic and social in content, their paramount purpose is political—to help win or retain the allegiance of the villagers. The programs thus operate on two main levels, addressing formidable problems on the economic and social plane in order to meet insistent challenges on the political plane. Some of the programs, such as roadbuilding, also serve a security purpose, which in turn supports the overall RTG political objective of defeating the insurgency.

(U) Partly because the programs serve multiple purposes, partly because of present limitations in social science methodology, and partly for other reasons, there is a shortage of precise information.

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on the effectiveness of the environmental improvement effort. Only fragmentary studies are available of the direct or indirect effects produced by the effort at the economic and social level (or even of the quantitative technical accomplishments of the various programs). Determining the political impact of the economic and social effects of the program (where known) has frequently proved to be an intractable problem for researchers, as has determining the influence which the programs exert on political attitudes simply through their existence and through their operations in contact with the public.

(U) In the absence of substantial analytical evaluations of the effectiveness of these programs, it is impossible to state categorically the extent to which they accomplish their various purposes and contribute to the overall counterinsurgency effort. Nevertheless, it is possible to make subjective observations concerning the effort, which, taken in the context of the particular insurgency situation in Thailand, should prove useful in forming a general assessment of RTG capability.

B. PURPOSE

(U) The purpose of this study is to describe the general nature and emphasis of the principal environmental improvement programs included in the RTG counterinsurgency effort. Tentative conclusions are also derived regarding the support which these programs lend to the counterinsurgency effort as a whole.

C. SCOPE

(U) The term "environmental improvement" is used in this study to refer to that part of the counterinsurgency effort in which the Royal Thai Government employs special economic and social programs to win or retain the political allegiance of the population. The various "civic action" activities of the Royal Thai Armed Forces meet the
above definition but are excluded from consideration here because they are relatively limited in comparison with the other programs.\(^2\)

(U) The special environmental improvement programs are distinguished from conventional economic and social development programs in at least three ways: first, their primary purpose is political rather than economic or social; second, they are usually designed for short-range rather than long-range impact; and third, as a practical test, they are usually identified as "counterinsurgency" or "security" programs by either the RTG or by the US Government, which assists the RTG activities in this sphere through the Agency for International Development. Conventional economic and social development programs undertaken by the RTG are also relevant to the counterinsurgency effort, but they are discussed in Volume II, Part II, "The Economic Background."

(U) This study is selective rather than comprehensive. It attempts to isolate points of major significance to the overall counterinsurgency effort through a brief examination of the objectives, emphasis, organization, and financial support of the principal environmental improvement programs. Exhaustive analysis of the environmental improvement effort, detailed treatment of individual programs, evaluation of the US advisory effort, and compilation of extensive reference data are explicitly beyond the scope of the project.

(U) The study is ultimately concerned with the political effectiveness of the special programs, but it must be stressed that contemporary social science sheds little light on how to measure the political impact of programs such as these. The tentative conclusions presented in this brief analysis are thus frankly subjective.

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2. Thai military civic action is referred to in Appendix C, "Royal Thai Armed Forces," and is described on pp. 14 and 21 of US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, "Developments in Thailand, 3rd Quarter FY 68," April 19, 1968. SECRET
D. METHOD OF APPROACH

(U) Official documents of the RTG and the US Agency for International Development were analyzed to identify the principal environmental improvement programs, to ascertain the general nature and emphasis of the programs, and to determine the levels of financial support extended to the programs by the RTG and the US Government, respectively.

(U) Research reports prepared by the US Agency for International Development in Thailand and evaluations contained in the general literature on counterinsurgency in Thailand were studied to obtain indications as to the probable impact of the programs.

(U) Numerous interviews bearing on the environmental improvement programs were held with US Government officials in Washington, D.C., in Bangkok, and in the principal areas of active insurgency in Thailand. A brief period of research and travel in the country provided an opportunity for limited first-hand observation of problems and progress in the environmental improvement aspect of the counterinsurgency effort.

(U) General guidelines for consideration of the environmental improvement programs were provided by the "Principles of Counterinsurgency," set forth in Volume III, Section II.
II
NATURE AND EMPHASIS OF THE PROGRAMS

A. GENERAL

(U) The environmental improvement programs considered in this study are those special economic and social development programs which the Royal Thai Government employs to support the counterinsurgency effort in critical rural areas. These programs are now operating chiefly in the Northeast, with priorities assigned to road construction, improvement of health, and stimulation of agricultural production.

(U) The overall nature and emphasis of the programs are described in this section as prelude to a sketch of the principal individual programs in Section III and a general discussion of the programs in Section IV. Readers already familiar with the programs may wish to proceed directly to Section IV.

(U) As noted in the "Introduction," the environmental improvement programs are chiefly distinguishable from the conventional RTG economic and social development programs in that their primary purpose is political rather than economic or social.

(U) The conventional RTG economic and social development programs set forth in the First and Second National Development Plans (1961-1966, 1966-1971) have contributed substantially to the economic growth of the country and to the improvement of public health and education. By increasing the financial and material resources of the nation and by raising incomes and the level of living throughout the country, these programs have fundamentally enhanced the capability of the Royal Thai Government to cope with Communist insurgency. In general, however, the conventional programs have concentrated on the development of Bangkok and the Central Plain, where the rate of return on investment is high. Neither RTG per capita expenditures nor the
benefits of Thailand's expanding economy have flowed as swiftly and
abundantly to the outlying regions as they have to the cities and
villages of the economic heartland. Yet it is in the remote and
impoverished rural areas, and particularly in the Northeast, that the
insurgency has been most serious.

(U) Spurred on by signs of incipient insurgency in the Northeast
and by Communist charges of neglect, the Royal Thai Government or-
ganized its first environmental improvement program (the Mobile Develop-
ment Units) in August 1962, soon after the establishment of the
National Security Command. Additional programs such as Accelerated
Rural Development and Community Development were formed later, with
considerable technical and financial support from the US Agency for
International Development. Some of the programs were administered
through newly created offices and agencies within the Royal Thai
Government; others were administered by the traditional ministries
such as Interior, Public Health, and Education. Collectively, the
programs represented a new departure in regional development and
political action for the RTG.

B. OBJECTIVES

1. Political

(U) The ultimate objective of the environmental improvement
programs is political—to help win or retain the support of the rural
population in the fight against Communist insurgency.

(U) The environmental improvement programs share this objective
with other major elements of the counterinsurgency effort, but at the
present level and extent of insurgency in Thailand, a particularly
heavy burden of responsibility seems to rest on the special economic
and social programs.1

1. In specific localities of high insurgent activity, however, where
protection is the critical issue, the burden falls heaviest on the milit-
tary strike forces and on the police and paramilitary rural security pro-
grams. Public information and psychological operations activities provide
general support to all programs in the endeavor to win or retain the
support of the villagers.
2. Psychological

(U) To win the support of the rural population, it is necessary to change existing popular attitudes toward the RTG where they are unfavorable and to instill favorable attitudes where political indifference is the norm. To retain existing popular support in contested areas, it is necessary to reinforce attitudes that are already favorable to the RTG. The second-level objectives of the environmental improvement programs clearly reflect these requirements for attitude change and reinforcement. Official planning and publicity literature of both the Royal Thai Government and the US Agency for International Development emphasizes that the programs are intended to do such things as demonstrate the interest of the Royal Thai Government in the welfare of the rural population, create a favorable image of the Royal Thai Government, improve relations between the government and the people, counteract Communist charges of government neglect, and immunize the rural population against Communist propaganda.

(U) The assumption underlying these second-level psychological objectives is that the desired attitudinal changes (which in turn will lead to the political objective stated at the beginning of this section) can be produced by programs that are predominantly economic and social in content. It is an assumption that appears to have considerable validity, but it has yet to be "proved" in a scientific sense.

3. Economic and Social

(U) Suspended from this somewhat tenuous link in the hierarchy of objectives, there is a third-level set of purposes which includes removing or mitigating the economic and social causes of discontent in the villages, increasing incomes and raising the level of living, reducing the economic and social disparities between the Central Plain and the outlying regions, strengthening local government, developing the "human potential" in the rural areas through medical care and education, and generally giving the villagers a personal stake in the nation.
4. Technical

(U) Below the third-level economic and social objectives lies a set of technical goals which are predominantly quantitative in nature (e.g., build so many kilometers of local roads, dig so many wells, hold sick-calls in so many villages). Many of these goals are cited in the program descriptions in Section III.

5. Other

(U) Some of the environmental improvement programs also have important ancillary purposes which support the overall national objective of defeating Communist insurgency but do not fit well into the general scheme outlined above. Among these are programs to contribute to rural security, increase the government presence in the insurgency-threatened areas, and assist in the collection of intelligence. In these aims, as in the basic political purpose and the second-level psychological objectives, the environmental improvement programs are intended to assist and to be assisted by the other counterinsurgency programs.

C. EMPHASIS

1. The Northeast

(U) The environmental improvement activity in Thailand is heaviest in the Northeast, the poorest region of the country by every indicator and the scene of the most widespread insurgent activity. In this South Vietnam-size area, containing more than 15,000 villages, the special programs operate mostly in the first three tiers of provinces behind the border. (See Figure 1.) Within these large and sensitive areas, the environmental improvement programs try to focus on the thousands of remote villages which are the actual or potential sites of the insurgency problem.\(^2\)

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2. For further information on the Northeast, see Annex 1 to this study, "Notes on the Magnitude of the Developmental Problem in the Northeast"; Volume II, Part II, "The Economic Background"; and Appendix A, "The Insurgent Threat."
FIGURE 1 (U).  Selected RTG Development Activities (As of 30 Sept 1967)(U)
2. Roadbuilding

(U) The most heavily stressed functional activity in the environmental improvement effort is roadbuilding. Improvement of health and stimulation of agricultural production are next in importance. Within these three priority fields, preference is given to projects that have an immediate, visible, and positive impact on the lives of the villagers.

(U) The emphasis within the top priority field of roadbuilding is on the construction of service tracks—unpaved rural roads scraped out with a bulldozer and slightly graded. These roads have no culverts or drainage and can be used only in the dry season (October–June), but in the Northeast, where lack of transportation poses major obstacles to economic development, spread of government presence, and the mobility of security forces, roads of any kind are widely regarded as the key improvement project.

3. Accelerated Rural Development

(U) Most of the counterinsurgency roadbuilding in Thailand is accomplished through Accelerated Rural Development (ARD), the program stressed most heavily by the Royal Thai Government and assisted most extensively by the US Government. Like the other large counterinsurgency-related programs, Mobile Development Units (MDU) and Community Development (CD), ARD also conducts work in health improvement and agricultural development. Smaller programs, such as Potable Water, tend to concentrate on a single field like health improvement, or a specialized aspect of that field.

(U) Geographically, then, the emphasis of the programs is on the villages of the insurgent-threatened areas of the Northeast. Functionally, the greatest stress is placed on the construction of rural service tracks through the Accelerated Rural Development program, the largest single program in the effort.

D. ORGANIZATION

(U) The environmental improvement programs follow two basic patterns of organization. Accelerated Rural Development and Mobile
Development Units are specially created entities outside the structure of the traditional ministries, while Community Development and the other programs are administered as special programs within the ministries.

(U) It should also be recalled that ARD, MDU, and CD are multi-activity organizations, coordinating several types of projects, while most of the other programs are more specialized in scope.

(U) The present key level in the organization and administration of all the environmental improvement programs, with the possible exception of MDU, is the province.

1. National

(U) At the national level there appears to be no central point of direction and control for the environmental improvement effort short of the Prime Minister, although General Prapth, the Deputy Prime Minister, has responsibility for the major share of the programs through his various positions as Chairman of the Central Committee for Accelerated Rural Development (CARD), Minister of the Interior, and Commander of the Royal Thai Army. Other high officials also provide a degree of coordination by figuring in the direction of more than one program.

(U) The various programs nominally come within the purview of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) for purposes of national integrated planning, but there is little indication that the NEDB exercises strong influence over the special counterinsurgency-related activities at the present time.

(U) The Accelerated Rural Development program receives policy guidance and direction at the national level from the Central Committee for Accelerated Rural Development, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and consisting of high officials from all the ministries involved in rural development. Also at Bangkok, but beneath CARD, is the Committee for Coordination of ARD in the Northeast, which consists of representatives from the various ministries and is charged with high-level planning and supervision of ARD activities in the Northeast. The operating organization for ARD at the national level is the
Accelerated Rural Development Office, which has the status of a department in the Office of the Prime Minister.
(U) The Mobile Development Unit program is directed at national level by the National Security Command, which is in turn responsible to the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense. The National Security Command, headed by Air Marshal Dawee, is composed of high-ranking military and civilian representatives of the various ministries.
(U) Community Development and the other programs, as indicated above, are organized within the framework of the traditional ministries. Their top policy guidance and direction come from the ministers, who are also either personally assigned or represented on the national coordinating groups for ARD and MDU.

2. Regional

(U) At the regional as at the national level, there seems to be no central point of coordination and supervision for the effort at the present time. Military regional commanders have nominal authority to direct civilian programs in support of the counterinsurgency objective, but their powers in this respect are seldom if ever exercised, at least in the Northeast.
(U) The Royal Thai Government, however, with encouragement from USAID, has recently decided to prepare and implement an integrated plan for the development of the Northeast. This regional plan, to be known as the Northeast Economic Development Plan (NEED), envisages a high degree of coordination among the numerous agencies and ministries active in the area and among their local programs. The outlook is for the emergence of a regional operating body to direct and coordinate all developmental activities in the Northeast.\(^3\)

(U) Insofar as the individual programs are concerned, the ARD program now has a Northeast ARD Office at Khonkaen (and may have additional regional headquarters), but the functions of this office do not

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3. See Annex 2 to this study, "Notes on the Northeast Economic Development Plan."

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seem to be clearly defined. As one source noted, "the lines of authority ... to these regional organizations are confused."  

(U) The Mobile Development Unit program appears to have three regional commands at present: South, North, and Northeast. MDUs operate in specific areas within each region.

(U) Each of the programs organized within the traditional ministries appears to be coordinated at the regional level only to the extent that its present ministry coordinates other activities at that level. Except for police and a few other functions (e.g., Highway Department), the Thai civil administrative structure is not highly developed at the regional level.

3. Provincial and Below

(U) At the presently focal provincial level, as nearly as can be ascertained, all the environmental improvement programs except for Mobile Development Units are directly responsible to the governor, although they are also responsible through vertical channels to their regional (if any) and national headquarters. The commander of MDUs in a province is considered a consultant to the governor rather than a subordinate.

(U) Accelerated Rural Development and Community Development have fairly extensive offices at the provincial level (with offshoots to lower levels), and the other programs are staffed by personnel in addition to those required for the normal activities of their ministries.

(U) Where program offices and staffs are assigned at the district level, they are responsible to the district officers in much the same way as provincial representatives are responsible to the governor.

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There has been considerable staff expansion at the district level to meet the fundamental aim of carrying the programs to the villages.

E. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

(U) Estimates vary as to the amount of financial support extended to the environmental improvement programs. This is to be expected, since the effort is not budgeted as a unit, and there are sometimes questions as to precisely which programs or portions of programs should be considered and exactly what costs should be ascribed to them. For general comparative purposes (not for cost accounting or detailed analytical purposes), an estimate was formed in this study on the basis of 11 programs meeting the study's definition of "environmental improvement" and on the basis of RTG and US cost data available in a recent US Government source.6

(FOO0) On the above bases, the estimated combined RTG and US costs for special environmental programs are $41.4 million for FY 1967, $43.9 million for FY 1968, and $67.6 million for FY 1969. Of the estimated $153 million total for the three years, the RTG contribution is approximately twice that of the US contribution. Within the effort, as noted earlier, emphasis is placed on the Accelerated Rural Development program, which operates chiefly in the Northeast, and on the functional areas of road construction, health improvement, and stimulation of agricultural production. (See Table 1 for summary cost estimates and Table 2 for estimated costs of the individual programs over the three-year period.)

(U) US support to the RTG environmental improvement programs has been delivered mostly in the form of technical assistance and commodities. The substantial US aid to the environmental improvement effort (as well as to the country's internal security and defense programs) has enabled Thailand to continue to pursue the long-range goals set forth in the Second National Economic and Social Development

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Plan and to maintain a high rate of economic expansion. This point is discussed in Volume II, Part II, "The Economic Background."

Table 1

SUMMARY ESTIMATED COSTS OF PRINCIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS³ (thousands of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>FY 1967</th>
<th>FY 1968</th>
<th>FY 1969</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTG</td>
<td>21,632</td>
<td>26,779</td>
<td>51,023</td>
<td>99,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>19,733</td>
<td>17,105</td>
<td>16,605</td>
<td>53,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41,365</td>
<td>43,884</td>
<td>67,628</td>
<td>152,877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2

**ESTIMATED COSTS OF PRINCIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS**

(Thousands of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMS</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>RTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Rural Development</td>
<td>9,303</td>
<td>14,441</td>
<td>23,744</td>
<td>10,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Minus Mobile Medical Teams)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Development Units</td>
<td>4,081</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>4,784</td>
<td>4,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>4,136</td>
<td>3,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Democracy(b)</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Area Security</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Medical Teams</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2,720</td>
<td>2,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potable Water</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein Food Development</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Trade Training Units(c)</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Intensive Construction</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Thai Army</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>21,672</td>
<td>19,733</td>
<td>41,405</td>
<td>26,779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                       | RTC    | US     | TOTAL  | RTC    | US     | TOTAL  | RTC    | US     | TOTAL  |
|                       | 99,434 | 53,445 | 152,879|        |        |        |        |        |        |

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b. Developing Democracy receives only a portion of the funds indicated; other local government training is included in the figure.

c. Mobile Trade Training Units receive less money than indicated. The figures given include other rural education activities.
PRINCIPAL PROGRAMS

(U) The principal RTG environmental improvement programs are sketched below to indicate the range and scope of activities embraced in this aspect of the counterinsurgency effort. No attempt is made to provide a complete inventory or exhaustive description of the programs; however, for those who require further details, the "Bibliography" lists several RTG and US sources containing comprehensive reference data on the subject.

(U) Attention is invited first to those programs which are administered by specially created agencies. Programs administered within the traditional ministries of the Royal Thai Government are discussed next. The names, administrative sponsorship, and typical activities of the principal programs are summarized in Table 3. (A brief discussion of the effectiveness of the programs as a whole is presented in Section IV of this study.)

A. PROGRAMS UNDER SPECIAL AGENCIES

1. Accelerated Rural Development

(U) The Accelerated Rural Development program was initiated in 1963 to speed the execution of road construction and village-level projects in critical areas. It now operates in 14 provinces in the Northeast and four in the North. (See Figure 1.)

(U) The most frequently cited purposes of the ARD program are to (a) increase the income of the people, (b) strengthen the bonds between the RTG and the people, and (c) strengthen local government. As in the case of other environmental improvement programs, additional purposes are often ascribed in the official literature. A purpose that is implicit in ARD's roadbuilding mission is to contribute to local security in sensitive areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Typical Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Rural Development</td>
<td>Road construction, water development, medical care, agricultural development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Development Units</td>
<td>Medical care, village projects, road construction, psychological operations, village projects, information gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Leadership training, village projects, commune projects, road construction, school teaching, trade centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Democracy</td>
<td>Medical care, disease prevention, health supervision, Border Patrol Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Area Security Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Medical Teams</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potable Water</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein Food Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Trade Training</td>
<td>Ministry of National Development, Royal Highway Department, Royal Irrigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Intensive Construction</td>
<td>Ministry of National Development, Royal Highway Department, Royal Irrigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Training</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense, Royal Thai Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: PRINCIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
(U) The Accelerated Rural Development Office is the national administrative center for the program. (See Figure 2.) In each province in which ARD is operative, the government plans and implements its activities through the provincial ARD office, headed by an officer (Palad Changwat ARD) who is directly responsible to the governor. (See Figure 3.) Decentralization of ARD at the provincial level provides the governor with the resources to carry out developmental projects based on local needs, subject to policy approval at the national level.

(FOOU) The United States supports the ARD program by furnishing construction equipment, vehicles, assistance in training, and technical advice. The US support represented over half the total ARD expenditures of approximately $27 million in FY 1967, but the Thai proportion is scheduled to be increased in succeeding years.

(U) The major emphasis in the ARD program is on roadbuilding. ARD activities also include development of water facilities, training of construction equipment operators and technicians, support of mobile medical teams, sponsorship of farmers' organizations, and stimulation of agricultural production.

(U) a. Roadbuilding. The current objective of the road construction program (at least in the Northeast) is to build an all-weather road to every district seat and a service track to or within five kilometers of every village in the ARD provinces by 1972. The ARD provincial staffs, assisted by US advisers, select routes for priority construction on the basis of three factors: the density of population in the area, the economic potential of the area (this usually bears a strong correlation with the density of population), and security considerations. Several hundred kilometers of all-weather roads and service tracks have been completed, but no overall estimate in terms of remaining kilometers to be constructed is available. The magnitude of the task is suggested by the fact that there are 133 districts and nearly 16,000 villages in the territory covered by ARD.
FIGURE 2 (U). Administrative Chart of the National ARD Office (U)
FIGURE 3 (U). Organization of ARD in Nakhon Phanom (U)
(U) b. Water Development. The second most important activity in ARD is the development of water control and storage facilities, the lack of which constitutes the most formidable environmental problem in the Northeast. ARD is concerned with planning and building small-scale improvements such as ponds, dams, wells, and irrigation systems for agricultural purposes and general village use. Large-scale water development projects remain the concern of traditional agencies such as the Royal Irrigation Department, in much the same way that major road construction remains the responsibility of the Royal Highway Department.

(U) The current objective in the ARD water program is to prepare a five-year development plan in each province. Actual construction of facilities on a regular basis lies in the future.

(U) c. Training Operators and Technicians. In a third facet of its program, ARD contributes to Thailand's supply of skilled manpower by training equipment operators and technicians. Seven hundred were formally trained in 1967, and 1,500 received additional on-the-job training in the ARD provinces.

(U) d. Mobile Medical Teams. ARD assists the Ministry of Public Health in planning and carrying out a program by which Mobile Medical Teams provide medical services in sensitive rural areas. The US contributes technical assistance, vehicles, radios, and medical supplies.

(U) In 1967 there were 26 Mobile Medical Teams of Thai doctors and nurses (usually from Bangkok) who served a tour of 30 days, and paramedics who were assigned permanently. The plans for 1968 call for the number of teams to be increased to 56. It is hoped that they will be able to visit 4,000 villages as opposed to the 1,500 villages served in 1967.

(U) e. Amphur Farmer Groups. ARD assists farmers to improve their income and leadership skills through the Amphur Farmer Group program. By forming district federations of existing village farmers' clubs (rice, livestock, and the like), ARD helps farmers gain benefits (such as credit from commercial banks to buy fertilizer.
and insecticides) which they could not secure as individuals or as members of the smaller village clubs. Farmers are encouraged to develop a sense of responsibility and initiative as they learn to manage the business operations of the groups. About 18,000 farmers in 14 Northeast provinces reportedly already belong to the new organizations.

(U) f. Agricultural Package Program. ARD is to initiate an Agricultural Package Program in 1968 in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Land Development Department, and the Community Development program. The idea is to make available in one "package" the necessary inputs--credit, supplies, extension services, farmers' organizations, and marketing facilities--to increase agricultural production. The approach has been successful in the United States and in India, and the RTG desires to test its possibilities in Thailand with a pilot project in 56 villages.

2. Mobile Development Units

(U) The first Mobile Development Unit was formed in August 1962, soon after the establishment of the National Security Command. There were 22 Mobile Development Units in March 1968, operating in the Northeast, the northern provinces of Uttaradit, Nan, and Chiangrai, the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, and Satun, and the central provinces of Prachinburi and Kanchanaburi. (See Figure 1 for a somewhat earlier disposition.)

(U) The basic purpose of the MDU program is to gain the loyalty of villagers in remote and sensitive areas by demonstrating the interest of the Royal Thai Government in their welfare. Secondary purposes are to identify requirements for long-range development and to gather intelligence.

(U) The National Security Command, composed of high-ranking military and civilian officials from the various ministries, directs the MDU program at the national level. Regional commands have been established for the North, Northeast, and South. Within each region, MDUs operate in specific areas. The governor of each province
in which there is an MDU acts as consultant to the program, as does the chief administrative officer (nai amphur) in each affected district.

(U) Each Mobile Development Unit—the basic operational element in the program—has about 120 men, organized as shown in Figure 4. The personnel are chiefly technicians from the line ministries, led by military officers. A special MDU Construction Company is also provided to improve or develop roads in MDU areas.

(U) The original MDU concept envisioned a Unit or one of its teams moving quickly into a remote village in a sensitive area and taking immediate action to assist the inhabitants with their most urgent needs (e.g., medical care, potable water supply, agricultural assistance, educational supplies). Self-help projects were to be encouraged. At the same time, the MDU was to conduct psychological operations (e.g., show films, give talks, distribute photographs and literature), appraise the security situation, and attempt to identify long-range developmental projects for future action, which in most cases would presumably be undertaken by some other agency. This effort was to take two or three weeks, at the end of which the MDU would withdraw, except from certain villages which would be designated "model villages." The latter would require about a nine-month effort, which might include the construction of roads, schools, wells, water distribution systems, streets, fences, health stations, meeting halls, and playgrounds, as well as the promotion of agricultural projects. Following this period of development, most of the MDU personnel would withdraw from the "model village," leaving a party of about 10 for another nine months or so to provide for the transfer of the program to nonmilitary local authorities.

(U) In practice, MDUs have tended to move into villages and remain there, concentrating on the "model village" mission almost exclusively. There is no report of a developed "model village" having been turned over to the local authorities.

(U) The Thai budget provided approximately $5 million for the MDU program in FY 1967. The US support was $783,000, mostly in the form of equipment and POL.
1. TOTAL AVERAGE STRENGTH 120
2. AVERAGE STRENGTH 60
3. AVERAGE STRENGTH 3
4. AVERAGE STRENGTH 17


FIGURE 4 (U). Organization of a Typical Mobile Development Unit (U)
B. PROGRAMS UNDER THE MINISTRIES

(U) The environmental improvement programs are described under the ministry which is fundamentally responsible for their execution. Many of the programs require coordination among several ministries and also with one or more of the specially administered programs such as ARD and MDU.

(U) The programs outlined below are the counterinsurgency-related activities which the ministries have developed to produce a more-or-less immediate impact at the village or commune level. They are in addition to the usual developmental activities carried out by the ministries at national, province, and district levels.

1. Ministry of Interior

(U) a. Community Development. The Community Development program is a relatively old counterinsurgency activity sponsored by the Community Development Department of the Ministry of the Interior. It operates in 91 districts in 27 provinces, covering much of the same territory as ARD, plus some additional areas. (See Figure 1.)

(U) The main purpose of the CD program is to strengthen local government by training village leaders to define, analyze, and solve community problems. By acquainting villagers with problem-solving techniques and concepts of economic and social development, it is hoped "to develop the human potential" in the countryside and increase the ability of the rural population to cooperate in improving living conditions. The aim of providing the villagers with a "stake" in the country which they will be eager to defend is often mentioned by US advisers as an objective of CD and related programs.

(U) This program is administered through the normal channels of the Community Development Department of the Ministry of Interior. At the provincial level, the CD office and program are directly responsible to the governor, who is himself an official of the Ministry of Interior. A typical organization at provincial, district, commune, and village levels is depicted in Figure 5.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
CHANGWAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
DEVELOPMENT DEMONSTRATION OFFICER (2ND GRADE)
AMPHUR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
AMPHUR DEVELOPMENT OFFICER (3RD GRADE)
3RD GRADE DEVELOPMENT DEMONSTRATION OFFICER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS (3RD & 4TH GRADE)
TAMBON DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
DEVELOPMENT WORKERS
VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
PROVINCE (CHANGWAT)
DISTRICT (AMPHUR)
COMMUNE (TAMBON)
VILLAGE (MUBAN)
LOCAL PEOPLE


FIGURE 5 (U). Community Development Organization, Nakhon Phanom Province (U)

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(U) The CD program has trained more than 20,000 villagers who have presumably used their knowledge to stimulate and carry out self-help projects in their communities, sometimes with the assistance of ARD, MDU, or one of the other environmental improvement programs. Once a village has prepared a plan for a project, modest funds are provided to help defray the cost.

(U) The projects accomplished under the CD program are quite varied, ranging from the promotion of fish culture in paddy fields to the repair of roads and drilling of wells. The Community Development Department budget in FY 1967 was about $3.5 million; AID contributed an additional $660,000 in equipment, training assistance, and technical advice.

(U) b. Developing Democracy. The Department of Local Administration in the Ministry of the Interior sponsors a program which is basically the same as the Community Development program, except that it focuses on the commune (tambon) rather than the village. The goals are to strengthen local government by training tambon council members in problem-solving techniques and democratic decisionmaking.

(U) The Department of Local Administration is the branch of the Ministry of the Interior which furnishes the officials who serve as the governor's staff at the province level and who direct routine administrative activities and coordinate operations of the functional agencies at the district level. The program thus fits into the normal governmental structure, requiring only an extension of personnel and services to the tambon level.

(U) More than 4,000 tambon council members (local assemblymen and committeemen) received Developing Democracy training in 1967. By the end of that year, a total of about 9,000 rural leaders in 316 tambons had participated in the program. As in the case of the Community Development program, modest funds have been made available to support local self-help projects. The United States has assisted the program with equipment and technical advice.
(U) c. Remote Area Security Development. In addition to its regular police and paramilitary functions, the Border Patrol Police (BPP) carries on a program of environmental improvement among the hill tribes of the North and the isolated villages of other border areas.

(U) Known as Remote Area Security Development, the BPP program is intended to promote internal security (and facilitate defense against foreign incursions) by creating a friendly, cooperative populace in the border areas. The main thrust of the program is in the hill tribe area of the North.

(U) The Remote Area Security Development program is administered within the organizational structure of the Border Patrol Police, which is the primary security force and representative of the Royal Thai Government in the border areas. The BPP functions as a semi-autonomous branch of the Thai National Police Department, although it is nominally a part of the Provincial Police Division. The Thai National Police Department itself is a major department of the Ministry of Interior.¹

(U) The BPP attempts to stimulate rapid improvement in living conditions in key areas through projects such as medical care, well digging, road construction, and establishment and operation of schools. It also provides advice on animal care, promotes the development and sale of handicrafts, and sets up trade centers for marketing local products and for purchasing village necessities on favorable terms. Many BPP members live in the isolated communities they protect and serve; others visit the communities on patrol.

(U) Although the entire program is fairly limited in scope, most of the BPP projects are highly visible (like schools and dispensaries) and involve participation on the part of the rural population. These last characteristics are believed conducive to attracting and securing the allegiance of the local inhabitants, most of whom are noted for their political indifference. Through demonstrations of RTG concern

¹. For further details of Thai police organization, see Appendix D, "Police, Village Security, and Paramilitary Programs in Thailand." CONFIDENTIAL

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for the welfare of the hill tribes and other border peoples, the BPP also hopes to build local immunity against Communist subversion, to elicit information of Communist activities, and to gain active support in the fight against insurgency.

(FOUO) The Royal Thai Government allocated $287,000 to the Remote Area Security Development program in FY 1967, while the United States contributed $1.4 million in technical assistance and commodities. The RTG is to double its support in 1968 to about $600,000 but the United States is to reduce its input to $380,000. Similar RTG and US expenditures are forecast for 1969.

(FOUO) The expected net reductions in support from the 1967 level imply a sharp decrease in the BPP environmental improvement effort in the North and other border areas. Some of this decrease is perhaps explainable by the fact that plans exist for gradual transfer of BPP schools to the appropriate agency in the Ministry of Interior and for gradual transfer of medical care activities to the Ministry of Public Health. How these plans—and the entire BPP program—will be affected by recent intensification of the insurgency in the North is not known.

2. Ministry of Public Health

(U) a. Mobile Medical Teams. The Mobile Medical Teams program of the Ministry of Public Health has already been mentioned under the Accelerated Rural Development program, which supplies planning and logistical support to the activity. (See page 24.) The Mobile Medical Teams furnish basic medical care and preventive services to remote areas not yet provided with permanent health facilities. They might be considered the advance guard of the Ministry of Public Health's long-range effort to improve and expand the health infrastructure in the rural areas.

(U) b. Potable Water. The Ministry of Public Health sponsors a five-year program to build potable water systems (treatment plants, elevated tanks, distribution systems) throughout the insurgent-threatened ARD provinces. The goal is to build 600 systems by 1972,
with at least one in each district in which the ARD program operates. Since more than 90 percent of the people in the rural Northeast reportedly suffer from water-borne intestinal parasites, introduction of potable water systems strikes at a major health problem in that region.

(FOUO) Villages desiring a potable water system must make a token contribution (8 to 15 percent) toward the capital costs and raise funds through village action to pay the continuing operating and maintenance costs. The Royal Thai Government budgeted approximately $896,000 for the program in FY 1968, while AID contributed $616,000 in equipment and technical assistance.

(U) c. Protein Food Development. The Ministry of Public Health initiated a project in 1968 to develop a family of high-protein food supplements from indigenous food sources such as fish and soybeans. Although somewhat long-range and indirect for an environmental improvement program, this project is aimed chiefly at the rural Northeast and the North, scenes of active insurgent movements. In both these areas rice accounts for an estimated 84 percent of the daily caloric intake, and there is a serious protein deficiency in the diet which reduces energy and drive in adults and impairs physical and mental development in children. This is regarded as one of the most important health problems of the countryside.

(FOUO) The Royal Thai Government has budgeted $24,000 for the Protein Food Development project in FY 1968; the Agency for International Development has set aside $70,000.

(U) d. Malaria Eradication. Although the Malaria Eradication program of the Ministry of Public Health was begun in 1951 and was not designed to counter the insurgent movement, it should be mentioned here because it probably has a personal impact on more Thai villagers than any other RTG program. During both 1968 and 1969, it is planned that this program will send spraying or survey teams into every dwelling in 38,000 of Thailand's 42,000 villages, establishing direct contact with 75 percent or more of the total population.
(U) Malaria ranked first as the cause of death and illness in Thailand as recently as 1951. It is now reduced to tenth place but still remains a threat to health and rural development as well as a hazard to the armed forces.

(FOUO) The Royal Thai Government has invested $21 million in the Malaria Eradication program since 1951; the United States has spent $13 million. The World Health Organization has also contributed to the effort. Current annual RTG expenditures are now about $4.2 million, with US assistance standing at a peak of approximately $2.6 million.

3. Ministry of Education--Mobile Trade Training Units

(U) The Ministry of Education has formed a number of Mobile Trade Training units in the Northeast to train village youths in carpentry, electricity, auto mechanics, radio repair, barbering, tailoring, and other skills.

(U) The program is designed to give young villagers in the insurgent-threatened areas wider economic opportunities than they might otherwise enjoy, to reduce the vulnerability of rural youths to Communist appeals, and to enlarge the base of technically trained manpower in the Northeast.

(U) By January 1968, about 14,000 young people had participated in the five-month courses given by the Mobile Trade Training Units. Seven units were in operation, and 11 more were being formed.

(FOUO) The Royal Thai Government budgeted approximately $300,000 for special rural education in FY 1967, and the United States supplied $1.2 million in equipment and technical assistance. It is not clear, however, what share of these amounts supported the particular program described above.


(U) Two new projects are being launched within the Ministry of National Development to provide supplemental employment and income to villagers in the Northeast and thus show them that the Royal Thai Government is interested in their welfare.
(U) The Royal Highway Department is selecting road construction projects within its purview that can be accomplished through labor intensive methods, i.e., the application of manpower rather than machinery. The Royal Irrigation Department is examining its construction program with a similar objective. It is recognized that the projects will not lead expeditiously to the attainment of long-range economic development goals, although they will result in some additional roads and water storage capacity, both critical needs in the Northeast. The two projects are specifically identified as efforts to produce immediate favorable impact in the counterinsurgency context.

(FOUO) The RTG budget for the Labor Intensive Construction program is not yet determined. The United States was prepared to contribute $350,000 in hand tools, rollers, graders, and trucks in FY 1968.

5. Ministry of Defense—Royal Thai Army Agricultural Training

(U) The Royal Thai Army, in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education, is to develop a program in 1968 to provide agricultural training to conscripts during the last few months of their military service. Most RTA conscripts come from rural areas, and 90 percent of them return to their villages at the completion of their service. This program will emphasize the teaching of modern agricultural techniques which the men can apply in their villages to increase production and thus raise their incomes. It is believed that the returning veterans, on the basis of their military experience and their agricultural training, could play a key role in voluntary village security and in the contemplated Village Security Force program.

(FOUO) The Royal Thai Government has budgeted approximately $145,000 for the RTA Agricultural Training program in FY 1968, while AID will contribute $550,000 to develop the curriculum and teaching materials and train the instructors.
IV

DISCUSSION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT EFFORT

(U) This discussion is selective and its judgments are largely subjective, as explained in the Introduction. Within these limitations, the purpose is to arrive at tentative conclusions regarding the support which the RTG environmental improvement programs lend to the counterinsurgency effort as a whole.

A. OBJECTIVES

(U) The ultimate objective of the environmental improvement effort is political—to help win or retain the support of the rural population in the fight against Communist insurgency. The assumption is that the attitudinal changes and reinforcements necessary to accomplish this objective can be effected through the attainment of goals that are predominantly economic and social, such as the raising of farmers' incomes and the improvement of public health. The individual programs and their component projects are intended to work toward these broad-gauge economic and social goals by hitting closer targets in fields like roadbuilding, well digging, agricultural assistance, and medical care.

(U) The philosophy of environmental improvement is sometimes questioned or attacked at the slenderest link in the hierarchy of objectives, which is the assumption referred to above. It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt or prove or disprove that assumption; it is accepted here as having a certain amount of validity. In the context of the Thai counterinsurgency, however, it should be noted that failure to improve the opportunities for higher incomes and better living conditions in contested areas will inevitably be exploited politically by the Communists, whose most persistent
propaganda theme is "Government neglect!" On this ground alone, there appears to exist a political imperative for special economic and social action.

(U) Furthermore, the train of environmental improvement has already been set in motion in the Northeast and other areas, the destination has been announced (at least in general terms), and some of the passengers have had a glimpse of the promised land. If the train stalls or reverses now, it is unlikely that there will be a need for Communist propagandists to foment dissatisfaction. Once the process of development or environmental improvement has been initiated and publicized, as it has in Thailand, it would seem to fulfill its own logic.

(U) The Royal Thai Government, in all practicality, has no reasonable alternative now but to proceed along the general course already begun, striving to attain the current objectives but adjusting emphasis and pace where necessary to meet the requirements of changing situations.

B. EMPHASIS

(U) The geographical emphasis of the environmental improvement effort is now on the villages of the insurgent-threatened areas of the Northeast, as described in Section II. The functional emphasis is on building roads to the villages, with health improvement and stimulation of agricultural production as second and third priorities. Accelerated Rural Development is the most important single program in the effort.

(U) This pattern of emphasis appears sound for a number of reasons, the most important of which are outlined below. Two areas—geographical, one functional—in which the application of more effort would appear likely to increase overall effectiveness are also noted below.

1. Geographical

(U) a. The Northeast. The Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand, it contains a third of the nation's population, it has

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traditionally attracted a smaller proportion of RTG expenditures than any other region, and it is the most beset with insurgency. The major part of the environmental improvement effort should clearly be there.  

(U) Within the Northeast, which covers a third of the national territory, economy dictates that the effort should be concentrated, as it is, on the vulnerable border areas. The political objective of the effort, the population-oriented nature of insurgency warfare, and the tactical lessons of the past affirm the wisdom of trying to focus on the villages in these areas, numerous and widespread as they are.

(U) b. The North. The geographical region where it seems essential to place more stress than presently contemplated is the North, the second poorest region of Thailand and the scene of small but intense uprisings on the part of Communist-infiltrated hill tribesmen in the provinces along the Laotian frontier.

(U) The limited RTG environmental improvement effort in the North, consisting mostly of the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security Development program and some ARD roadbuilding activity, was making excellent progress toward improving relations between the hill tribes and the government until this winter's napalming of Meo villages and forced resettlement of several hundred hill tribesmen canceled out many of the gains made through years of arduous civic action.

(U) Attempts to suppress insurgent activity in the North through large-scale conventional military action have now apparently been abandoned. The best hope for recouping RTG political losses in the area and building a bulwark of friendly tribesmen against further Communist subversion is to intensify and expand the BPP village-oriented development program, an effective counterinsurgency weapon in its own right by all reports and also an ideal complement to the unconventional warfare operations that some observers think are the military answer to the relatively few armed insurgents in the North.

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1. For additional background, see Annex 1 to this study, "Notes on the Magnitude of the Developmental Problem in the Northeast."

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2. Functional

(U) By stressing roadbuilding as the primary function in the effort, RTG and US planners have found the key to many problems. Moreover, in selecting the three priority fields of roadbuilding, health improvement, and stimulation of agricultural development, the RTG has placed its major effort on problems that are recognized as highly significant by Thai villagers. 2

(U) Most villagers would probably place water development ahead of roads on their priority list, but it is difficult to stimulate and assist local improvements in water development until a fairly good road network has been established. Development of water supply and control facilities actually does figure prominently in the environmental improvement effort, but many projects are carried under construction, health, agricultural, and community development programs, and it is difficult to identify them as a separate field of activity. (The arrangement superficially appears to lack coherence, but it must be remembered that the environmental improvement effort is concerned with small village-level projects, not with great dams on the Mekong or even on the Mun or Chi. Major projects requiring a more coordinated approach belong to traditional agencies such as the Royal Irrigation Department.)

(U) Most villagers would probably place stimulation of agricultural production ahead of health improvement on their list, too, but the RTG does carry on a fair amount of agricultural research and extension work as an everyday developmental activity of the Ministry of Agriculture and other agencies. If this were taken into account, the combined environmental improvement effort and traditional emphasis on agriculture would probably exceed the total RTG stress on health improvement in the remote areas.

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2. See the many references to villagers' "wants and needs" in the numerous reports published by the US Agency for International Development in Thailand.
(U) a. **Roadbuilding.** By opening up remote areas, roads have contributed to general economic development, health improvement, political communication, and rural security. In specific areas they have given birth to a small but thriving transportation industry, stimulated the production of cash crops, made it possible for farmers to sell their products in formerly inaccessible towns, enlarged the retail market in the towns, increased employment in the mechanical trades, facilitated the expansion of government medical services, enabled government officials to visit the villages more frequently, and improved the mobility of security forces.  

(U) As noted above, the expansion of roads into the remote areas also makes it possible for the RTG to attack more vigorously the fundamental economic problem of the Northeast, which is a severe shortage of water supply and control facilities. With more and better roads, hydrological survey teams can perform more effectively, earth-moving and drilling equipment can be introduced, irrigation systems can be installed, and village leaders can be reached and encouraged to organize local projects to help their own communities.

(U) b. **Health Improvement.** The RTG emphasis on health improvement appears sound on economic and political as well as humanitarian grounds. Economic activity in the outlying regions has undoubtedly suffered because medical care has been less available than in the Central Plain, debilitating parasitical diseases have been more prevalent, and nutritional problems have been more severe. On the political side, special attempts to provide medical care are widely regarded as an effective means of attracting loyalty and support.

(U) c. **Agricultural Production.** The overwhelming majority of the insurgent-threatened areas earn their living directly or indirectly through farming, and there is no need to point out that improvement of incomes and living conditions in those areas is fundamentally tied

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to increased production and prosperity in agriculture. (The argument for increased stress on basic agricultural development in Thailand is set forth in some detail in Volume II, Part II, "The Economic Background.")

(U) Without necessarily disturbing the relative priorities now assigned to roads, health, and agriculture in the environmental improvement effort, it would appear desirable to give serious consideration to providing additional support to the stimulation of agricultural production. One program which may emerge as a key vehicle for achieving rapid results is the Agricultural Package Program, a pilot effort intended to make credit, seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, pesticides, advice, organizational support, and marketing facilities all available to the farmers of selected villages in a single "package." Programs of this type have been extremely successful in other countries. If the Thai program shows promise, it may be possible to produce rather striking improvements in rural incomes and levels of living by expanding it significantly.

3. Program Emphasis

(U) The largest single program is Accelerated Rural Development, an omnibus effort which operates, coordinates, or provides support to a variety of activities. Its principal functions are roadbuilding, water development, medical care, and assistance to agriculture.

(U) ARD is a specially created program with high-level backing, fairly smooth integration into the traditional governmental structure, and good personnel. The primary emphasis on this program seems well placed, and no reasons for change are seen.

(U) A clear need for more emphasis on the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security Development program was pointed out under "Geographical Emphasis." This program is now scheduled to be de-emphasized, as noted in Section III.
(U) Within the environmental improvement effort itself at the provincial level, the ARD program serves as a mechanism for coordinating a wide variety of activities. The Community Development and Developing Democracy programs are also coordinating as well as operating mechanisms.

(U) In Sakon Nakhon, and perhaps in other provinces, the ARD and CD programs are interwoven in exemplary fashion. Whenever an ARD team makes a survey for a new road, it is accompanied by CD workers who explain to the villagers along the route that a road will be built through their area at a definite time in the future. The CD workers tell village leaders that bulldozers and other roadbuilding equipment will be available to help with village projects, and urge them to start planning what they want done. When the ARD roadbuilding crews arrive on schedule, the village leaders, with CD assistance, are ready with their plans and supplementary labor. With such foresight and preparation, it requires only a minimum diversion of ARD operators and equipment to help build a small dam, scoop out a pond, or do whatever else meets the "wants and needs" of the villagers.

4. **Lower Levels**

(U) At district and lower levels, organizational problems seem to revolve around comparatively light staffing and shortages of qualified technical personnel. Heavier organization will ultimately be required at the district level to get the programs into more villages. It is hoped that the contemplated expansion of the effort over the next two years will further strengthen that echelon in particular.

(U) The following quotation illustrates how formal organization and coordination may be less important than informal arrangements in achieving program goals at local levels:

In practice it is difficult, if not impossible, to segregate and identify which agency implemented and whose funds supported specific projects at the local level. This fact is not, however, as incongruous with the principles of sound management as superficially might seem to be true. This is because the various
developmental programs being instituted in Nakhon Phanom are not intended to operate as disparate projects but are meant to complement one another. Many are closely related to one another, and all are directed at the same target population. In addition, the lower the level of implementation, the greater is the likelihood that the involved officials will be in the habit of dealing with one another in a personal, informal manner.

D. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

(FOUO) The environmental improvement effort will cost about $153 million for the three-year period from FY 1967 through FY 1969, according to the rough estimate developed in this study. (See Table 1.) Of this amount, the RTG will contribute approximately twice what the United States will contribute.

(FOUO) A few comparisons may help to place the cost of the effort in perspective. The RTG share for the three-year period is about 10 percent of the total amount which the RTG plans to spend on all economic and social development, including the special programs, during FY 1967 through FY 1969. The total RTG cost of development, in turn, will be about 32 percent of the total national budget for the period. During the three-year period, the RTG share of the cost of the special programs will be about two-thirds what the country will pay for police protection.

(FOUO) If the total estimated RTG and US cost of $153 million were to be distributed equally among 15,000 villages (roughly the number in the Northeast), each would receive slightly over $10,000, or about $3,375 annually. Each of the 11.5 million inhabitants in the Northeast, if the $153 million were to be distributed equally in that area, would get about $13.30, or $4.43 annually. The total RTG per capita expenditures in the Northeast in 1960, on the eve of the insurgency, were only $4.75 for all purposes. (In 1965, the last


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C. ORGANIZATION

(U) The overall organization of the environmental improvement effort appears adequate for present purposes, although there is undoubtedly room for improvement. It is hoped that present plans for expansion of the effort will particularly strengthen program staffs at the district level.

1. National Level

(U) The environmental improvement effort appears to have no single planning and coordinating agency at the national level. In this respect it is similar to the public information aspect of the counterinsurgency effort, dissimilar to the military aspect.

(U) At the present level of intensity and complexity of the counterinsurgency effort, current national-level arrangements appear adequate for both internal and external coordination of the effort, despite their lack of conformance to Western standards (often observed in the breach, even in the West). In any event, the apparent failure to centralize authority and responsibility at national level reflects traditional Thai wariness regarding new accretions of power and will probably not be rectified on grounds of efficiency alone.  

(U) As noted in Section II, some of the environmental improvement programs are conducted by specially created organizations. Some destabilizing influence on administration at national and other levels might be expected as a result of imperfect accommodation of these special organizations, like Accelerated Rural Development, into the traditional governmental structure. If instability has occurred, however, it does not appear to have affected the counterinsurgency effort significantly.

2. Regional Level

(U) There is no single planning and coordinating agency for the environmental improvement effort at the regional level, although the

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Northeast Economic Development Plan may lead to one for its region. Since the Royal Thai Army has regional commands which double as counterinsurgency commands in the Northeast and the North, and since the Thai police have regional commands, some regional control and coordination of the environmental improvement effort would appear desirable.

3. Provincial Level

(U) Formal arrangements (and informal practices) for planning, directing, and coordinating the environmental improvement programs appear generally adequate at the provincial level, the present dominant level in the effort. As with other provincial activities, much depends on the political backing given the governor in high Bangkok circles and on his personal leadership.

(U) Insofar as coordination with other aspects of the counterinsurgency effort is concerned, environmental improvement programs appear to be closely supported by public information activities at the provincial level, mostly through the good offices of the USAID and USIS advisers. Coordination with the military is generally not close, probably because most of the environmental improvement programs operate on a schedule worked out months ahead of time, while military operations have characteristically short lead times. Security considerations may also inhibit joint planning.

(U) There are times when closer coordination with the military might be desirable, as in the follow-up to strike operations, but military engineer units, if available to combat commanders, might be more suitable to such missions than, for example, ARD roadbuilding teams. In general, at the present level of insurgency and counter-guerrilla activity, the lack of close coordination between the environmental improvement effort and the military effort is not a critical matter.

5. See Annex 2 to this study, "Notes on the Northeast Economic Development Plan."


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year for which figures are readily available, they were $8.00,
compared with $21.00 in the Central Plain.)

(FOUO) These brief comparisons cannot answer the question of
whether Thailand is devoting enough resources to environmental improve-
ment to accomplish its objectives satisfactorily, but they do indi-
cate that the RTG is making allocations in this field which compare
very favorably with its other expenditures and which represent,
especially when the US contribution is taken into considera-
tion, a sizable increase in investment in the border regions.

(FOUO) Regarding the US contribution to the RTG environmental
improvement effort, as defined in this study, it is interesting to
note that both the proportion and the absolute amount of US support
are schedule to decrease over the three-year period, although the
effort as a whole will be substantially increased. This decrease in
US support is believed to indicate that many of the initial require-
ments for expensive construction equipment will soon be met, and that
many of the programs are expected to mature rapidly to a point at
which they can be operated more and more without US advice. The fact
that most US aid to this effort is in the form of technical assistance
and commodities is encouraging in itself.

(U) It has been pointed out previously that US financial assist-
ance of all kinds to Thailand has been a significant factor in
enabling the country to pursue its policy of basic national develop-
ment and attain an enviable rate of economic growth, which is in
itself a prime asset in the counterinsurgency effort.

(U) Two observations were made above on the desirability of
expanding specific environmental improvement programs. A considerable
increase was urged in the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security
Development Program in the North to regain goodwill lost in last
winter's suppression campaign and to counteract Communist subversion
of the hill tribes. It was also suggested that serious considera-

8. Agency for International Development, "AID Program in Thai-
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be given to the possibility of a sharp increase in the Agricultural Package Program (an ARD activity), should the pilot project prove promising. Enlargement of the effort in either or both of the respects mentioned above would raise the overall cost, but it is impossible at this time to forecast the expenditures that might be entailed.

E. THE RESULTS

(U) The results of the environmental improvement effort are hard to define precisely. This is true not only on the political plane, where the ultimate objective lies, but also on the economic and social plane, where the programs principally operate.9

(U) On the economic and social level, there is a dearth of comprehensive analytical evaluation, a shortage of organized data on the technical achievements of the various programs, and a lack of systematic information on the technical requirements against which the known achievements should be measured. The shortage of data and analysis is sometimes explained on the ground that "the programs are really political."

(U) On the political level, the shortage of data and analysis is even more acute. There is little detailed information, for example, on political attitudes in the insurgent-threatened areas at the time the environmental improvement programs were begun. In the absence of a fairly well defined base from which to measure, researchers have found it difficult to determine the influence of the programs on the villagers' attitudes. They have been further handicapped by a lack of specific information on the economic and social impact of the programs, as noted above, and by methodological difficulties inherent in trying to trace the psychological and political effects of activities such as roadbuilding and well digging.

(U) Although the basis for a thorough evaluation does not presently exist, it is possible to find important indications of results in a number of areas pertinent to the objectives of the effort. The following areas have been singled out for attention here:

(a) spread of government presence
(b) improvement of incomes and living conditions
(c) removal or mitigation of discontent.

1. Spread of Government Presence

(U) One of the ways in which the environmental improvement effort is intended to win or retain political support is by creating closer relations between the government and the rural population, and one of the ways in which the programs are supposed to forge closer ties is by spreading the government presence in the countryside. Contact between the RTG and the villagers has traditionally been quite limited, partly because there have not been enough government officials at lower levels.

(U) To what extent have the special programs brought government officials into the outlying provinces? At what level are these officials stationed, and do they have contacts with the villagers? Data are not available with which to answer these questions for all the insurgent-threatened areas of Thailand, but an indication as to the quantitative expansion of the RTG presence can be gained from the experience of Nakbon Phanom province, one of the most heavily threatened in the Northeast. 10

(U) In Nakbon Phanom, introduction of the ARD, MDU, and CD programs added 287 individuals to the normal complement of 569 RTG officials and employees (excluding military, police, and school-teachers). The programs thus increased the number of RTG civil representatives in roughly comparable administrative and service categories by about one-half. Expansion of ministerial staffs to handle

10. Estimates are based on data contained in Philco-Ford, Changwat Handbook, Nakbon Phanom, Volume IV, op.cit. Recent reinforcement of program staffs may not be reflected in the figures.
special programs probably also occurred, but this could not be ascertained.

(U) Of the 287 new personnel in Nakhon Phanom, 72 (54 ARD and 18 CD) were assigned at the provincial level, increasing the staff in the provincial capital from 166 to 238. This augmentation not only nearly provided one new man for every two already there, but also greatly increased the proportion of headquarters officials whose normal duties would call for visiting the villages.

(U) The district level is the most important with respect to contact and work with the villagers. The 215 new personnel at this level joined a force of 403, an increase of over 50 percent. Ninety-nine of the new men were assigned to Community Development, while the remaining 116 were members of a Mobile Development Unit operating in the villages in five of Nakhon Phanom's 10 districts (and not actually assigned to the districts in a technical sense). Almost all of the new personnel may be assumed to have duties that frequently place them in contact with the rural population.

(U) The importance of the 215 additional personnel at district level becomes particularly apparent when it is noted that only about 270 of the original 403 government personnel at that level appear to have duties that would normally bring them into contact with the villagers. In this light, the increment at district level represents nearly an 80 percent improvement in capability to spread the government presence into the countryside.

(U) Even with a total of approximately 485 district-level personnel whose routine duties require village contacts, however, coverage of the estimated 843 villages in Nakhon Phanom remains a difficult problem. The ratio of individual workers to villages does not appear to be too unfavorable (it is better than 1:2), but, unfortunately, the various RRG activities cannot be carried out simply by assigning each worker to one or two villages. Many of the activities require a team effort by groups of about 20 individuals (e.g., MDU), and some of the activities, such as the traditional farm programs, require that a very limited number of government specialists try to make contact with almost every farmer in the province.

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(U) For example, there are only 39 regular agriculture, rice, forestry, and livestock officers at the district level in Nakhon Phanom to work with more than 53,000 farm families (approximately one official per 1,360 families). The situation would be extremely onerous for the officers even if they were to work out a common program, but that is frequently not done. As a result, the 10 agriculture officers in the group of 39 may find that they are attempting by themselves to reach all 53,000 families, a virtually impossible task.

(U) The shortage of officials appears even more acute when it is recognized that heavy administrative duties and lack of transportation limit the time that each official can actually spend in the field. Here it must be emphasized, however, that new roads built by the special programs are making it easier for RTG officials of all types to visit the remote villages.

(U) In summary, if the experience in Nakhon Phanom can be taken as representative of what has happened in other sensitive provinces, the environmental improvement programs have significantly promoted the spread of government presence in the countryside. The total number of government officials has increased by about one-half, and the number of officials whose duties require them to visit the villages has increased by considerably more than one-half. Most of the environmental improvement personnel have been assigned at the district level, and most of them perform work that brings them into contact with the villagers. In spite of increases produced by the programs, however, the government presence in the countryside still remains quite thin.

2. Improvement of Incomes and Living Conditions

(U) A major aim of the special developmental programs is to improve incomes and living conditions in insurgent-threatened areas. It is hoped that gains in the economic and social fields will remove possible grounds for popular discontent and will help win political support for the Royal Thai Government.

(U) Determination of the economic and social impact of the programs is difficult because of the previously mentioned shortage of
basic data and analysis and because factors other than the environmental improvement programs also influence incomes and living conditions. For example, a certain amount of traditional, long-range developmental activity is carried on in the insurgency areas, which has its effect on agricultural production, public health, and education. Near large military bases like Udorn in the Northeast, US servicemen are stimulating the local economy with their purchases, and in some localities private initiative is finding opportunities for growth and profit.

(U) In 1967 the recent trend of slow but perceptible economic growth in the Northeast actually reversed. The reason was severe floods and drought, plus a drop in the world price for kenaf, an important cash crop in the Northeast. Fortuitous occurrences have thus temporarily made a realistic appraisal of the impact of the environmental improvement programs even more difficult.

(U) While the impact of the programs cannot be expressed in terms of national or even regional economy at this time, there are numerous instances of specific gains in local communities, which are, after all, the target of the effort. The catalytic effect of the new roads on agricultural production, marketing, and general economic activity has been mentioned above. Nearly a thousand kilometers of new construction have recently been reported. Vehicles, people, and goods start moving almost as soon as the bulldozers clear a trail. The appearance in remote villages of items like ready-made clothing, medicines, transistor radios, metal roofing, and even motorbikes gives visible evidence of local improvements in cash income through better transportation. In attempting to characterize the results of activities like road construction, which provide basic infrastructure, it must also be remembered that many of the results will not be evident until some time has passed.

(U) Village water supply projects have improved health conditions and agricultural production in many villages. Only fragmentary statistics are available, but Remote Area Security Development workers reported digging 60 wells in 1967, and Mobile Medical Teams accounted for 40. Sixteen water treatment plants, 18 water tanks, and three distribution systems serving 38,000 villagers were built in 1967 under the Potable Water program. New roads should help to speed progress in water development.

(U) Medical and training projects have improved the living conditions and opportunities of many villagers in the threatened areas. The Mobile Medical Teams claim to treat one million people a year, and the RTG is training about 750 paramedical personnel annually for village service.

(U) The AID program trained 700 equipment operators and technicians in 1967 and gave on-the-job instruction to 1,500 others. Mobile Trade Training Units have trained 14,000 youths in carpentry, electricity, auto mechanics, and other trades. Community Development workers have trained 26,000 leaders in 9,000 villages, and Developing Democracy teachers have trained 9,000 tambon councilmen. Many of the results of these efforts have already been felt in the countryside; others will undoubtedly not be perceived immediately.

(U) In summary, it is difficult to state the economic or social impact of the environmental improvement effort precisely, but in specific areas and villages where the programs have operated, there is little doubt that "on the whole the impact has been both considerable and favorable."\textsuperscript{12}

3. Removal or Mitigation of Discontent

(U) Economic and social conditions which could understandably supply a basis for popular discontent have long existed in the Northeast and other insurgent-threatened regions of Thailand, but nobody

knows for sure how much discontent there actually was on these grounds prior to the outbreak of the insurgency and the advent of the environmental improvement programs, or how much there is now.

(U) On the basis of very limited evidence, however, it would appear that popular perceptibility of unfavorable conditions in the Northeast (e.g., absolute poverty in terms of slender diet and minuscule cash income, relative poverty vis-a-vis the other regions and Bangkok) was quite low before the insurgency began, and acceptability of perceived hardships and disparities was quite high. There was undoubtedly a certain amount of latent dissatisfaction, but there was no widespread, seething discontent that presaged a jacquerie or peasants' revolt.

(U) The Communist propaganda that accompanied the surfacing of the insurgency produced both direct and indirect changes in the situation, although it is difficult to estimate their magnitude. The Communists told the Northeasterners that they were poor—that they were poor in absolute terms and that they were poor in relative terms. The emphasis on relative poverty was necessary to reinforce the unifying theme of Communist propaganda in the Northeast: "Government neglect!" This theme must have initially sounded strange to most farmers, ignorant of the poverty in which they lived, unaware of the fact that RTG per capita expenditures in the Northeast were historically the lowest in the nation, and generally unfamiliar with the notion that the government was responsible for their well-being. Nevertheless, the Communists persisted in the charge, and it is reported that a certain number of villagers ultimately got the message.13 This was the direct effect of the propaganda.

(U) The charge of "Government neglect!" and more alarming indications of overt insurgency induced the Royal Thai Government to proclaim its interest in the welfare of the Northeasterners and to

announce intentions to improve their conditions (tacit admissions of previous disregard, which the Communists did not fail to call to the attention of the villagers). With the completion of plans for the deployment of the Mobile Development Units and other environmental improvement programs came additional RTG announcements. These pointed out that the Government was taking action to improve conditions, but, in the process, they contributed to the public enlightenment on poverty which had been initiated by the Communists. 14 The unintentional fueling of discontent by the government itself was the indirect effect of the Communist propaganda.

(U) As noted above, though, there is no conclusive evidence as to how much popular discontent has been fanned individually or collectively by Communist propaganda and government announcements. The slow growth rate of the insurgency in the Northeast would indicate that discontent has never become virulent. In fact, although government publicity has contributed to dissatisfaction, especially among young people, by confirming the Communist line that village life in the Northeast is backward, it has also persuaded a great many villagers that the government sincerely wishes to assist them and that the future will bring them greater benefits than they have known in the past. 15 There are reports that over-optimistic government publicity and "promises" by visiting officials have sometimes aroused expectations that have not been fulfilled, but the extent of disappointment, cynicism, or discontent produced in this way is not known. 16

(U) Most significantly, in those areas where the environmental improvement programs have actually been operative, the villagers are said to be generally better off than they were before, dissatisfaction has apparently diminished, and the impact in terms of increased

14. Ibid.
political allegiance is said to be favorable. The main difficulty is that the programs are small in comparison with the size of the problem and cannot reach villages as quickly as might be desired.

(U) Like the government announcements that preceded and now accompany the effort, the programs themselves have produced a few negative results. There are reports of dissatisfaction in specific localities on such grounds as careless or inconsiderate performance on the part of program personnel, transfer of government effort from a low-threat village to a high-threat village, and selection of one village over another. Generally, however, the spread of government presence through the programs has not been counterproductive.

(U) In summary, Communist propaganda and government publicity have both contributed to discontent with economic and social conditions in the Northeast, especially among young people, but discontent has not become virulent. In areas where the programs have operated, living conditions have been improved, dissatisfaction has apparently diminished, and the loyalty of villagers to the government has been strengthened. In other areas, villagers are generally confident that the government is interested in their welfare and will improve their lot in the future.

19. Ibid.
(U) The Royal Thai Government employs a variety of special economic and social development programs to support the counterinsurgency effort in critical rural areas. These environmental improvement programs are now operating chiefly in the villages of the Northeast, with priorities assigned to road construction, improvement of health, and stimulation of agricultural production. Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) is the most important single program in the effort.

(U) The prime objective of the environmental improvement effort is political—to help win or retain the support of the rural population in the fight against Communist insurgency. The political objective, relatively short-term outlook, and local orientation of the environmental improvement programs distinguish them from the conventional long-range economic and social development programs of the Royal Thai Government, which also play a part in the counterinsurgency effort.

(U) The question is sometimes raised as to whether a major political goal can be achieved by means of programs that are predominantly economic and social in content. In the Thai context, two special considerations make the programs a political necessity. First, if the RTG fails to take action to improve incomes and living conditions in insurgency areas, the Communists will inevitably continue to exploit the situation to their own political advantage by charging "Government neglect!" Second, the processes of economic development and environmental improvement are already under way in the Northeast, people are generally aware of the programs and their goals, and some of the villagers have experienced beneficial results. If the programs stop or stall now, discontent can be expected even without the intercession of Communist agitators. The Royal Thai Government therefore
has no reasonable alternative but to press on to the current objective, adjusting the emphasis, organization, and pace of the effort where necessary to meet changing situations.

(U) The pattern of emphasis of the environmental improvement effort is basically valid, as pointed out below. Two areas in which the application of additional effort might substantially increase overall effectiveness are also noted.

(FOUO) The present geographical emphasis on the insurgent-threatened villages of the Northeast is sound—that is where the biggest problem now lies. The Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand, it contains a third of the nation's population, it has traditionally attracted a smaller proportion of RTG expenditures than any other region, and it is the most beset with insurgency.

(FOUO) There should be additional stress on the North, however. Much of the goodwill built up by years of arduous civic action among the hill tribes in that region has been lost through the recent suppression campaign. To regain lost goodwill and to counteract further Communist infiltration in the North, the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security Development program should be intensified and expanded, not cut as present plans contemplate.

(U) The functional emphasis on roadbuilding, health improvement, and stimulation of agriculture is sound from a developmental point of view. It also meets the main "wants and needs" of the Thai villagers, as determined in various surveys, although the road network will have to be enlarged before increased attention can be paid to the villagers' chief requirement, more and better water supply and control facilities. (Water development projects are spread among a variety of programs in the Thai system, and it is difficult to identify them as a separate activity.)

(U) The emphasis on Accelerated Rural Development, the largest single program in the effort, also appears well placed. ARD is an omnibus activity concerned with road construction, water development, health improvement, and increased agricultural production. It provides coordination to the overall effort, especially at the
provincial level; has backing in the highest Bangkok circles; and appears to be working effectively. One of the ARD programs, now in the pilot stage, may prove capable of stimulating rather dramatic increases in agricultural production in the Northeast. This is the Agricultural Package Program, modeled on successful experiments in India and the United States. If the program shows promise, it will be desirable to expand it substantially, since improvement of conditions in the Northeast is firmly bound to growth in agriculture.

(U) The organization of the environmental improvement effort is uneven by Western standards, but it has served to get the programs into the field quite rapidly, and it appears adequate at the present level of intensity and complexity of the counterinsurgency effort. The organization undoubtedly reflects skillful accommodation to the realities of Thai politics, in which new accretions of power are regarded warily. The proposed Northeast Economic Development Plan may lead to closer coordination of planning and implementation of activities at the regional level, which would appear desirable. It is hoped that projected increases in the environmental improvement effort will particularly strengthen staffing at the district level in order to get more projects into the villages—the target of the effort.

(FOOU) The pace of the effort is ultimately governed by the level of its financial support. The RTG environmental improvement programs, including US support, will cost an estimated $153 million for the three-year period, FY 1967 through FY 1969. The FY 1969 estimated cost of $67.6 million represents more than a 50 percent increase over the FY 1967 and FY 1968 costs, thus indicating a sharp acceleration of effort in the near future. Since the developmental problems faced by the effort are enormous and the political problems should not be viewed with complacency, the contemplated increase in pace appears prudent.

(FOOU) It should be noted that the RTG is giving the effort considerable financial support. The RTG share of the $153 million three-year cost is equivalent to about 10 percent of the cost of the
total contemplated RTG economic and social development effort, including the special programs, for the period. That effort, in turn, accounts for about 32 percent of the Thai national budget. When the RTG and US contributions are considered together, they represent a sizable increase in investment in formerly neglected border regions like the Northeast. The US assistance to the environmental improvement effort and to other RTG programs has enabled Thailand to pursue its long-range developmental policies and to attain an economic growth rate which is itself an important asset in the fight against Communist insurgency.

(U) Although it is extremely difficult to determine the results of the environmental improvement effort precisely, even on the economic and social level, there is little doubt that the programs have produced a favorable if geographically limited impact on incomes and living conditions. Government programs have meshed well with grass-roots efforts in a number of localities. Unfortunately, the developmental problems facing the Royal Thai Government in the outlying regions and especially in the Northeast are of such magnitude that no imaginable programs could lift those entire regions to the level of the Central Plain in the space of a few years.

(U) Politically, in areas where the programs have operated, what discontent there was appears to have diminished, and the loyalty of the villagers to the Royal Thai Government appears to have been strengthened. In other areas, thanks to the environmental improvement programs, villagers seem generally confident that the government is interested in their welfare and will improve their lot in the future.

(U) An important contribution of the programs has been to draw a significant number of additional government officials into the insurgent-threatened areas, increasing personnel in one province by about 50 percent. Most of the environmental improvement personnel have been assigned at the district level or below, and most of them perform work that brings them into contact with the villagers. In spite of increases produced by the programs, however, the government presence in the countryside remains quite thin.
(U) The new roads built by the programs have also helped spread the government presence by making it possible for all types of RTG officials to visit the villages more frequently. They have also increased the mobility of the police and other security forces.

(U) In conclusion, the RTG environmental improvement effort is politically necessary at this time. Its emphasis is generally sound, although it needs strengthening in the North; its organization is adequate; and its pace reflects a serious commitment of RTG (and US) resources. The effort is making limited but visible headway against formidable obstacles on the economic and social plane. On the political plane, it supports the national counterinsurgency effort by contributing to the spread of government presence, dispelling popular dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions, and demonstrating the intent of the RTG to meet the Communist charge of "Government neglect!"
Annex I
NOTES ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL
PROBLEM IN THE NORTHEAST
Annex 1

NOTES ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEM IN THE NORTHEAST

(U) The physical extent of the Northeast is a prime indicator of the magnitude of the developmental problem in that region. Northeast Thailand covers more than 65,000 square miles, an area larger than the Republic of South Vietnam. It comprises a third of Thailand and contains about a third of the population (approximately 11.3 million people). By any economic measure, it is the poorest region of the country, although even in the Northeast people are not starving or in rags.¹

(U) Alternately flooded and baked by Nature, the Northeast produces the lowest rice yields in Thailand and shows the lowest annual per capita incomes of any region. Over the years the Northeast has attracted the lowest annual per capita RTG expenditures for economic and social development and has thus until recently seen very few agricultural extension agents, doctors and nurses, and other service representatives of the Royal Thai Government, aside from schoolteachers. For many villagers, the chief contact with the RTG has apparently been with the police, and such contacts have frequently been marked by harsh treatment, petty exploitation, or lack of positive results.

(U) All these conditions--regional poverty, relative lack of government services and assistance, and misconduct and inefficiency on the part of the police--found expression in the early 1960's in the Communist charge of "Government neglect!" The accusation may

have initially surprised the Northeasterners, to whom a service philosophy of government was presumably a novelty at that time, but the persistence of the charge and its tacit acknowledgment by the Royal Thai Government, which soon proclaimed its interest in the welfare of the rural Northeasterners and expanded its developmental activities in the region, have since resolved all doubt as to the vitality of the issue. Like most issues articulated by a clever enemy, it puts the opposition, in this case the Royal Thai Government, at a disadvantage.

(U) The major source of the government's disadvantage is that the reasons for the poverty of the Northeast are fundamental and cannot be readily overcome even with the best of intentions. Besides being large, the Northeast is poorly endowed geographically.

(U) The most striking geographical deficiency of the area is a lack of adequate water supply and control, in the northern and eastern provinces, where the insurgents have been most active. Because these provinces have no large rivers and comparatively few large streams for drainage, the heavy rains that come during the period from June to October frequently result in destructive floods. At best they leach the soil of valuable minerals and impose severe limitations on movement and travel. During the rest of the year, when hardly any rain at all falls, the porous Northeast soil loses most of the moisture received during the rainy season, and the sun evaporates much of what the soil retains. Drought is characteristic in the dry season. The extreme shortage of water supply and control facilities in the region is illustrated by the fact that only 3 percent of the cultivated land in the Northeast is under irrigation, as compared with the national average of 16 percent.

(U) Massive improvement in the economy of the Northeast must await the construction of great dams along the Mekong--developments which appear to be 20 to 30 years in the future even under favorable international political conditions. In the meantime, the situation is not hopeless. New local projects such as earthenware dams, small irrigation systems, ponds, and wells can brighten the scene.
considerably and lead to higher agricultural production (as can the provision of fertilizers and other inputs and the encouragement of new crops), but even the construction of modest water development facilities in the thousands of communities which require them urgently is a formidable undertaking.

(U) Along with a shortage of water supply and control facilities and an associated soil deficiency, the Northeast has a major transportation problem. The size of the region, the dispersion of more than 15,000 small villages almost uniformly throughout its vast extent (except for mountainous areas), and the seasonal rains that clog trails and wash out roads, all contribute to the situation. Efforts have been made to solve the problem in recent years, with the result that nine villages out of 10 are now said to be within a day's walk of a road in the dry season, whereas 10 years ago only one village in 10 was that close. Nevertheless, thousands of miles of new and better roads remain a vital necessity for continued economic development of the Northeast and for the swift land movement of government officials, police, and other security forces. Even a minimum construction program to put a road within five kilometers of every village is officially expected to take five years, and could take longer.

(U) The above list of problems in the Northeast is not complete. No mention has been made, for example, of the widespread diseases that debilitating and plague a majority of the villagers. The purpose is not to catalog the deficiencies of the region but simply to point out the magnitude of the problems faced by the environmental improvement effort in the Northeast.
Annex 2
NOTES ON THE NORTHEAST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Annex 2

NOTES ON THE NORTHEAST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

(FOUO) The decision to give special developmental attention to the Northeast directed the efforts of many ministries and agencies toward the region. Better coordination in planning and implementation would probably have made it possible to derive greater benefits from the available resources. With this in mind, the Royal Thai Government, encouraged by USAID, recently decided to formulate an integrated development plan for the region. It will be known as the Northeast Economic Development Plan (NEED).

(FOUO) A Northeast Economic Development Committee has been appointed to oversee preparation of the plan, and this committee in turn has designated a NEED Subcommittee as the working body to formulate the detailed outline of the plan. The Subcommittee is to work in cooperation with the ministries and the special agencies, such as ARD, which have developmental activities in the Northeast. The Subcommittee has formed six working groups, which began meeting in January 1968. There are an overall planning group and five sectoral groups concerned with agriculture, manpower, agribusiness, transportation and water resources. In addition, a special unit has been formed to assure that the plan will be responsive to village needs. US technical assistance will be provided to all of these groups.

(FOUO) It is not clear who will be in charge of directing the implementation of the NEED plan, once it has been drawn up and approved by the RTG. There are indications that a special agency will be established to serve as the coordinating body, but it is not

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known whether such an agency would have authority to direct programs or would merely serve as liaison between the various ministries and agencies.

(POUO) Although the plan is still in the formulative stage, some quantitative goals have already been established. The primary goal is to double the per capita income of the Northeast in five years. To achieve this aim, the intent is to concentrate on establishing a basic economic and social infrastructure. The infrastructure targets to be reached by 1972 include: (a) completion of all-weather roads to every ARD amphur seat, (b) construction of service tracks to or within five kilometers of every ARD village, (c) drilling 6,300 wells, (d) providing seventh grade education to every child, and (e) training more than 4,500 rural health workers.

(POUO) Financial support for NEED will be supplied by the Royal Thai Government and the United States. In FY 1968, the United States is to provide $3 million and the RTG $1 million, while in FY 1969 the United States plans to contribute $6 million and the RTG $2 million. Since the emphasis of the effort is now on planning, most of the US support in FY 1968 and FY 1969 will be in the form of technical assistance.
Annex 3

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APPENDIX F
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

A. INTRODUCTION

(U) The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the RTG in developing an intelligence organization with the capability to:

1. identify the membership of the insurgent infrastructure, and
2. furnish paramilitary and military forces with intelligence which will enable contact with the insurgent forces under conditions favorable to counterinsurgency forces.

(U) These requirements are demanding. Task 1 above entails not only identification of the membership of the infrastructure, but also sufficient information about modus operandi to permit the capture or elimination of the insurgents. The intelligence needed by paramilitary and military forces must yield a similarly detailed picture of insurgent pattern of operations if tactical advantage in contact with insurgent forces is to be achieved consistently.¹

(U) These intelligence requirements cannot be compartmented. Intelligence of the insurgent infrastructure is often useful to paramilitary and military forces; conversely, military intelligence can assist in the detection and elimination of members of the insurgent cadre. It follows, then, that coordination at all levels by all agencies involved in intelligence production is essential.

(U) In order to evaluate the RTG intelligence effort, this paper will trace the evolution of the intelligence capability from the outbreak of the insurgency in 1962 to January 1968. It will

¹ For further discussion, see Volume III, Section III, "Military Strategy and Tactics in Low-Level Counterinsurgency Operations."
describe the operations of the intelligence organization, identify constraints, and evaluate performance.

B. EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (1962-1968)

In 1962, when insurgent activities first surfaced overtly with the assassination of several government officials in Northeast Thailand, the RTG intelligence capability in the area was negligible. The Special Branch of the Police, charged with the detection of internal subversion, had been established on the Scotland Yard model in 1932, but its operating agencies were confined to major population centers. Whatever intelligence functions the Provincial Police exercised were extremely limited; typically, a district with perhaps as many as 800 villages was covered by fewer than 40 police. The Border Patrol Police, responsible for areas extending 15 miles from the border, was similarly handicapped. The intelligence section of the garrisons maintained by the RTA in the Northeast was equally limited.

This lack of an intelligence organization also applied to the Armed Forces headquarters in Bangkok. Quite probably, this lack was the result of deliberate policy on the part of the RTG, sponsored by the awareness that an intelligence organization in the services represented an excellent base for organizing a coup. To ensure control of those small elements of the Royal Thai Armed Forces involved in intelligence, a Joint Intelligence Agency under the Minister of Defense coordinated the intelligence directorates of the Armed Forces. These directorates were minimally staffed and their function was limited to counterintelligence in the Armed Forces—another safeguard against the ambitions of politically-oriented officers.

The Armed Forces Intelligence School, originally established in 1955 to train officers in military intelligence, formed the

2. Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Counterintelligence Estimate—Thailand (U) (March 31, 1966), p. 53. SECRET
framework for assignment of an external and internal intelligence role. In 1958 the school was divided into two components: the Armed Forces Intelligence School (AFIS) proper, which retained responsibility for service intelligence training and in addition was assigned the responsibility for external intelligence collection, and the Armed Forces Security Center, charged with internal security. In 1965 the AFIS was renamed the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center. It appears that the Center has gradually taken on a portion of the counterinsurgent operations role. It is responsive to the Ministry of Defense.3

C. EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

1. *Special Branch*

In June 1963, an important step was taken in the development of an intelligence capability targeted against the insurgent infrastructure; this was the establishment of Division VII in the Special Branch (SB) with responsibilities for extending its operations into the remote areas plagued by insurgency. This most important improvement was largely conceived and supported by US officials. Initially field offices were set up in the North, Northeast, and Southern regions. Since this initial step, the SB has extended its area coverage to some 36 provinces, including all those confronted with varying degrees of insurgency. The SB is now the principal agency for targeting the cadre and infrastructure of the Communist Party of Thailand. It makes extensive use of covert agents, as well as mail interception and phone tapping.4

2. *National Police*

Expansion of the Special Branch has been paralleled by that of the Provincial Police and the Border Patrol Police; both of these agencies are in the process of extending their presence into the

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threatened areas. Ultimately, police posts will be established in each tambon (group of 6 to 10 villages) in those provinces threatened by insurgency. In order to harness this expanding coverage for intelligence purposes, schooling in intelligence has been added to police training curricula to make police intelligence operations more effective.

D. CREATION OF THE JOINT SECURITY CENTERS

The next step in upgrading the intelligence organization for counterinsurgency was the creation of Joint Security Centers (JSC). These agencies grew out of the necessity to centralize all available intelligence under one roof, so that information could be pooled at a regional level, turned into useful intelligence, and disseminated to regional military forces and the provincial CPsMs. Executive responsibility for the centers was assigned to the Special Branch, with membership drawn from the police and the military. The first of these centers was established in Udorn, Northeast Thailand, in June 1965; it was followed by one respectively in Korat and Si Thammarat provinces in the South. Since that period, additional JSCs have been established in the North, West Central and Mid-South areas. The Southern Border region is served by a Combined Intelligence Headquarters with Malaysian and RTG representatives. Another improvement in coordination was taken in the assignment of the JSC to the CSOC chain of command, thus ensuring the flow of intelligence to that coordinating agency.5

E. DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPROVED INTERROGATION CAPABILITY

With the increase of paramilitary and military field operations against the insurgents and the swelling number of prisoners and defectors, serious weaknesses in the interrogation process came to light. Accordingly, in January 1966, the CSOC, the

5. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, Airgram 840, April 8, 1966. SECRET
SB, and General Prehat agreed that an interrogation unit would be established under the SB but affiliated with the CSOC. Two such units were planned, one in the JSC at Udorn in Northeast Thailand and the other in Bangkok. At the same time, it was agreed that additional interrogators would be trained. The Udorn Interrogation Center opened in October 1966, and a temporary center affiliated with the CSOC became operational at about the same time. A few months later the permanent center in Bangkok under the CSOC became operational.  

(6) The necessity for improving the reporting of insurgent incidents led US officials to initiate the design of a suitable system. Stanford Research Institute was selected by ARPA to develop such a system, using the National Statistical Office computer facilities. After approval of the concept by the RTG as a basis for development, field testing of the Village Information System (VIS) was initiated in May 1967. Test operations at the district level by three SRI teams were approved by the CSOC to initiate the reporting system.  

F. THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE  

(8) The current intelligence structure derived from the evaluating process is shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. The principal field agencies include Division VII of the Special Branch, the National Police, with its Provincial and Border Patrol Police components, elements of the civil administration, and the Second Army Forward Headquarters together with assigned units. The main intelligence coordinating agencies are the CPMS at the district and provincial levels, the Joint Security Center, and the Second Army Forward Headquarters. At the national level, the foregoing line agencies are represented, while the coordination function is performed by

6. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, Airgram-17, July 8, 1966. SECRET  
7. American Embassy, Bangkok to Department of State, Airgram-394, October 13, 1967. SECRET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village level: Raw intelligence collection</td>
<td>Village headmen, Village Security Forces (MSG, PAT, etc.), Village agents, Census and Aspiration Teams</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambon level: Raw intelligence collection</td>
<td>Tambon Police</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District level: Collection Minor collection and evaluation for local operations</td>
<td>District Police, District civil officials, Agents, Volunteer Defense Corps patrols</td>
<td>District CPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial level: Limited interrogation Some collection, interpretation and evaluation for provincial level operations</td>
<td>Provincial Police, Special Branch, Agents (including SB), Prisoners and Defectors, Captured documents, VDC patrols, Military units in static defense, Mobile Development Units</td>
<td>Provincial CPM, Special Branch Area Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level: Interrogation for tactical operations Complete intelligence production for dissemination to Second Army Forward and Provincial CPMS</td>
<td>JSC Interrogation, JSC Intelligence production, Second Army Forward, 6 &quot;D&quot; teams assigned to target areas, Military units in field, Prisoners and Defectors, Captured documents</td>
<td>JSC 4-Uniform, JSC 3-Korat (SB, PP, BPP, RTA), JSC Interrogation center G-2 Division-Second Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level: Interrogation for tactical and strategic operations Complete intelligence production to serve as a basis for operations Dissemination laterally to other agencies involved in COIN and downward to field agencies</td>
<td>CSOC/SB interrogation, CSOC/SB production, APSC production</td>
<td>Special Branch-Div. VII, National Police (PP and BPP), CSOC: Intelligence Division, Interrogation Center J-2, Supreme Command, ETA-RTA-RTN, NSC Intelligence staff, Armed Forces Security Center, Joint US/RTG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 1 (S). Intelligence Organization and Flow, Northeast Thailand (U)
the CSOC. Other agencies involved in the intelligence process at this level include the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) and the Joint Intelligence Agency under the Minister of Defense.

(S) Intelligence sources at the grass roots include the village headmen, village security elements composed of the Village Security Officers, members of Political Action Teams (PATs), Census Aspiration Teams making village surveys, agents, Community Development workers, and schoolteachers. Of these sources, only the village headman is common to all villages.

(S) In this connection, the potential for intelligence is one of the principal justifications for the newly developed program for village security, the Village Security Force (VSF). Personnel for this program will be recruited, trained, and returned to their parent village. Because of their village background, they will not only have local knowledge of each family within the village, but more importantly, they will be included in the village gossip, a favorite pastime of the Thai peasant. From these sources, VSF should be in a good position to gain insight into the village membership in the Communist infrastructure and of those who are supporting the jungle soldiers. This brand of intelligence is not available to the external agencies, including the tambon police, because they are "outsiders."

(S) At the tambon level the gradual expansion of the tambon police stations and the police department is extending a police presence to the more critical tambons in the Northeast. These police supply some intelligence derived from interrogation of arrested persons and from patrol activities within the tambon. At the district level, paramilitary forces of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) are an intelligence source in the form of information picked up on patrols as well as occasional interrogation of captured or defecting jungle soldier. Similarly, units of the Second Army Forward also furnish intelligence through interrogation of captured or surrendering jungle soldiers. The six intelligence teams assigned to the Second Army with target-area orientation are an important source of information. Civil administrators engaged in the various government programs in the villages occasionally contribute.
A limited amount of collation and evaluation of information is conducted within the district CPMs to assist in mounting local operations against the jungle soldiers. This process is more effective at the provincial level because of increased intelligence sources and more competent personnel. Some interrogation takes place in the provincial CPMs, together with some collation, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of intelligence as a basis for operations at district and provincial levels.

The regional intelligence organization includes the JSC and the Second Army Forward. The JSC includes members of the Special Branch, the Provincial and Border Patrol Police, and the military. It is charged with collection, collation, interpretation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence to the Second Army Forward, the provincial CPMs, and other intelligence agencies in the region. Theoretically this evaluated intelligence should support military operations by the Second Army Forward and paramilitary operations by the provincial CPMs, as well as furnish individual targets for arrest by the Police or Special Branch. The Special Branch has executive responsibility for the JSC.

The Second Army Forward intelligence organization consists of an undermanned G-2 division of about seven officers, together with six "D" teams of 12 men each, reinforced by interrogation, photo, and lie detector elements. These teams are field intelligence units and accordingly are assigned to specific geographical areas. The operating units of the Second Army Forward also furnish some intelligence through prisoners, defectors, and captured documents.

As previously noted, all field agencies are represented at the national level. The principal coordinating agency is the CSOC with its intelligence division, headed by a police lieutenant general, and its organized interrogation center. The SB conducts its own interrogations within the interrogation center. Coordination between SB and the CSOC interrogation is dependent on a directorate of senior officers who oversee interrogation operations of both the CSOC and the SB. The precise role of the AFSC is obscure.
G. EVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The overall intelligence structure has been functioning for about one year. During this period, Special Branch operations targeted against the infrastructure of the Communist Party of Thailand have produced intelligence leading to the arrest of about 50 cademen. The majority of these arrests, which included members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Thailand, the Central Committee, a labor organizer, and the head of a Communist-controlled front, were made in one coordinated operation during August 1967. Since it is known that the infrastructure of the CPT lacks membership to flesh out its organization, particularly at the district and provincial levels, the loss of these cadre probably constitutes a significant setback. The performance of the Special Branch shows promise and should achieve high effectiveness with the addition of trained personnel and refresher training for those already assigned.

On the other hand, the acquisition of military intelligence so vital to effective counterinsurgency operations has not measured up to requirements. This does not mean that no progress has been made. During the past year a rather extensive order of battle has been amassed. It is known that jungle soldiers operate in small bands of 10 to 20, that they have established bases in the Phu Phan Mountain area and the more heavily forested areas of eight of the 15 provinces in the Northeast region, that they are poorly armed and equipped, and that they tend to avoid combat with government forces. A large number of the leaders have been identified by name, together with considerable background information. A sizable proportion of the estimated 2,000 jungle soldiers have also been identified by name. This is a good start, but the intelligence does not fulfill the requirements of effective military operations. What is needed, and what has not yet been attained, is a kind of detailed information on the basis of which operations can be mounted with a reasonable probability of contact with the insurgents under favorable tactical conditions.
Nevertheless, although intelligence production has not achieved the sophistication required, at least a sound organizational structure has been erected, thanks in good part to technical advice and assistance from US officials. The structure does not appear to suffer from any significant organizational defects. In this connection it is worthwhile to note that the RTG has achieved reforms in its intelligence structure at a faster pace than most governments faced with similar insurgent threats. Even the British in Malaya, enjoying all the advantages of a superb Special Branch and wielding absolute direction of the counterinsurgency, required a period of four years to evolve an intelligence structure and system which was adequate for the task. The experience in the Philippines was similar. It is doubtful that the South Vietnamese have made equivalent progress even now. In short, the structural basis for an effective system of intelligence production against the infrastructure and the jungle soldiers exists in Thailand.

This does not negate the need for improvements in each component of the structure and in the coordination among them. A study of the organization and performance of the intelligence structure made by US officials in Thailand indicates that:

While RTG intelligence resources have shown progress in the past two years, all available intelligence is not now retrievable by RTG counterinsurgency planners and commanders. To enable these officials to make the best possible use of counterinsurgency forces and assets, sources of intelligence need upgrading; better coordination among intelligence producers is required; intelligence processing must be improved and better integrated into planning and command functions; and a streamlined system of prisoners and defector interrogation and of document exploitation is needed. 8

The study concludes that progress in three areas is essential: improvement in intelligence sources including training and retraining, a reevaluation of priorities for intelligence

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acquisition, and the assignment of additional personnel; improved functioning to ensure that intelligence is more adequately indexed, collated, and disseminated so as to reach those involved in planning and implementing counterinsurgency operations in a more suitable form and in a more timely fashion; and, finally, improved procedures for exploitation of interrogation and documents.

The most serious specific constraint bears upon the production of operational intelligence for the Second Army Forward units. The main source for this intelligence is JSC 4, which receives inputs from the provincial CPNs, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, and exploitation of captured documents. However, JSC 4 requires more qualified personnel.

The lack of effective coordination between JSC 4 and Second Army Forward is another serious constraint. Available intelligence is not delivered to the military in timely fashion, and the G-2 division of Second Army Forward cannot take full advantage of such intelligence as is available because of similar qualitative and quantitative deficiencies. The G-2 division is undermanned, staffed as it is with only 7 to 8 officers and a few enlisted; those officers who are assigned are not technically qualified. Two immediate remedies are indicated: first, the exchange of liaison officers between JSC 4 and Second Army Forward to improve coordination and to ensure timely delivery of information and, second, the expansion and upgrading of the G-2 division. A qualified US Army officer with practical experience in the field of intelligence for insurgent operations should be assigned as an adviser to the G-2 division of Second Army Forward.

Another major constraint in intelligence production stems from the failure thus far by the RTG to evolve an effective psychological warfare and defector program. Thus, a major source of operational intelligence which, for example, proved so important to the British in Malaya—namely 'surrendered personnel'—is largely denied to the RTG. Such a program should be evolved at the earliest possible time. It is understood that US officials are strongly supporting it.

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Finally, the RTG, from its highest to lowest officials, including the military, shows an alarming disregard for demanding requirements of counterintelligence—for denying information to the Communist infrastructure and the guerrilla arm. On at least one occasion, General Dongcherm, Second Army Forward Commander, in order to prevent loss of surprise, has found it necessary to mount a military operation without informing the provincial governor. As a consequence, civil follow-up of the military operation could not be planned and much of the effect of the operation was lost. Even the military show a similar disregard for security; there is evidence, for example, that Second Army Forward plans for impending operations tend to be discussed in public places.

H. CONCLUSIONS

The RTG, with major advice and assistance from US officials, has made rapid strides in the field of intelligence. In a relatively short period a sound intelligence organization has been established which should afford the mechanism for adequate coordination. Qualitative and quantitative improvements of its intelligence personnel should make the JSC into an effective funnel of operational intelligence to the provincial CPMs and the Army.

Coordination between the Second Army Forward and the JSC can be improved by exchange of liaison officers to assure that intelligence production by the JSCs meets the requirements of the Second Army Forward and is delivered in a timely fashion.

A substantial upgrading of the Intelligence Division of the Second Army, both in numbers and in technical qualifications of personnel, is required. To facilitate this improvement, a US Army intelligence specialist in insurgency warfare should be assigned to the Second Army Forward as a matter of priority.

A concerted effort should be taken to impress the need for intelligence security on RTG officials and the military. The RTG should take action at the highest level to emphasize this imperative. Finally, a defector program should be planned and implemented at the
earliest in order to take advantage of the potential of such a program for intelligence acquisition.
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THAILAND (U)

Volume I: Summary and Evaluation

June 1968

Franklin T. Echols

Study Report No. 133

Donald M. Witten, Project Leader

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
INTERNATIONAL & SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION

WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
400 ARMY-NAVY DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA.

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SECRET
15 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency in Thailand (U)

(U) The abstract of WSEG Report No. 133, "Counter-insurgency in Thailand," is contained in Section I below. Additional comments on the study are contained in Section II.

I. ABSTRACT


(U) Conducted by: WSEG FOR: JCS

(2) Purpose: To determine what US military commitment to counter the insurgency in Thailand may have to be considered, in view of the effectiveness of an indigenous Thai counterinsurgency.

(2) Summary of Methodology and Discussion: The study bases are extensive examinations of written material on Thailand and interviews with US officials in the US and Thailand, plus extensive examinations of the past insurgencies in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Algeria, also including case study of the insurgencies in Viet Nam, Cuba, Kenya and Greece.

A qualitative analysis of the Thai insurgency considers the internal political, social, and economic factors aiding or damping the insurgency and counterinsurgency potential.

(2) Principal Findings: The study concludes that:

1. The Communist insurgency in the Northeast suffers under the following handicaps:

a. Friction among the top leaders in the Communist Party of Thailand.

b. Quantitative and qualitative deficiencies among the leadership which inhibit the ability to direct and coordinate insurgent activities effectively.

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22 Dec 93 91-FD-2232
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c. A weak and unreliable village infrastructure based upon recruitment by intimidation rather than dedication to the goals of the revolution.

d. A guerilla force which lacks sufficient strength to take the offensive.

e. An inadequate logistics support system.

2. Thailand has the political stability, economic resources, and military capability to defeat the Communist insurgency it now faces. No US commitment of military force will be required provided US economic and military assistance continue at the currently projected levels.

3. If the insurgent movements in Thailand expand it is probable that the Royal Thai Government will still be able to cope with the threat without direct US military involvement. In such a case, however, the Thai would require additional US military and economic assistance in addition to raising their own current force level.

4. If the Chinese and North Vietnamese increase their external support of the insurgent movements in Thailand by a major infusion of external forces, the Royal Thai Government will require the support of US combat units, the extent of such support not now capable of being estimated.

II. COMMENTS

This study is responsive to the requirements contained in the memorandum from the Director, Joint Staff, dated 24 March 1967, as modified by his memorandum, dated 19 January 1968, to conduct a study of counterinsurgency in Thailand.

No attempt was made to conduct original research. The study is based on examinations of written material on Thailand and on interviews with knowledgeable US officials. Written material consulted included documents from the following agencies:

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of State
Agency for International Development
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Interviews were conducted with officials at the following agencies:

- Headquarters Pacific Command
- Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
- Department of State
- Agency for International Development
- United States Embassy, Bangkok
- United States Offices in Udorn, Sakhon Nakhon, and Chiang Mai

(U) It is considered that this study generally meets the task order requirements. The study should be particularly useful in discriminating between the natures of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Thailand.

(Confidential) The study does not analyze in detail selected levels of insurgency above the existing one. Had this been accomplished, a much better assessment of possible future requirements for US support could have been postulated.

K. S. MASTERS
Vice Admiral, USN
Director
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THAILAND (U)

Volume I: Summary and Evaluation

June 1968

This report has been prepared by the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses in response to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Task Order SD-DAHC15 67 C 0012-T-138, dated 3 November 1967.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION
400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202

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DATE CASE #
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FOREWORD

This study responds to a request made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Institute for Defense Analyses to undertake a study of counterinsurgency in Thailand.\(^1\) The main objective of the study is to "provide data and a rationale to affect the recurrent policy decision on ways to counter the insurgency in Thailand while avoiding or minimizing US military involvement." In general, the study request requires an assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the Thai political, economic, social, paramilitary, and military institutions and programs for coping with the insurgency, and a determination of the degree of US support, if any, required to assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in countering the threat.

(2) The specific requirements of the study include:

(1) "A description of the current insurgency and its growth potential.

(2) An estimate of the maximum level of insurgency that the Thai military and paramilitary forces might be expected to counter without commitment of US military forces.

(3) The capabilities and constraints of the Thai political, economic, and social institutions for countering insurgency.

(4) Indications of where parallels and experience from past insurgencies, particularly in Vietnam, could apply to Thailand.

(5) Missions and tasks of Thai military and paramilitary forces which, in the light of past experience and Thai non-military factors, could be most effective against insurgency.

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(6) Broad guidance for specifying how Thai military and paramilitary forces could be structured, organized, equipped, and trained to cope with the current and selected levels of increased insurgency growth and activity within Thailand, and if they cannot, to specify the short fall to illuminate the degree to which US military commitment and other US support may be required.

(7) Implications of the above for US support.

On December 27, 1967, the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) noted that "the increased control in the Northeast by the Thai Second Army has been viewed in some quarters with considerable concern as 'further militarization' of the counterinsurgency effort. Behind this concern lies a fear that undue emphasis will be placed on military suppression operations, that the various civil programs will suffer from lack of Army understanding and support, and that police effectiveness will be reduced by Army usurpation of police functions." Accordingly, SACSA asked the study group to make pertinent investigations and to reach conclusions with regard to the appropriate balance between the military and civil aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. This request for additional study was approved by Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Memorandum to SACSA dated January 12, 1968.
PREFACE

The main emphasis of this study is directed toward assessing the counterinsurgent capabilities and limitations of the police, paramilitary, and military organizations of the Royal Thai Government and toward appraising the insurgent threat. Accordingly, only those aspects of Thailand's political, economic, and social characteristics which bear directly on the Royal Thai Government's ability to conduct effective counterinsurgent operations are treated. Since the nature of insurgency in Thailand dictates that offensive military operations be conducted primarily by elements of the Royal Thai Army, the study concentrates on the Army's capabilities and limitations. The study does not purport to be, nor is it, a study in depth of the Thai political system, economy, or society.

Case studies of past insurgencies, including Malaya, Algeria, the Philippines, Cuba, Kenya, Greece, and South Vietnam, were prepared as a basis for assessing the capability of the Royal Thai Government to cope with the insurgency. The lessons learned from these studies were synthesized into general principles of successful counterinsurgency operations and specific principles of military strategy and tactics for combatting low-level insurgency. These principles were prepared for the guidance of the study group and were not intended as scientific treatises.

The study is based on extensive examinations of written material on Thailand and on interviews with knowledgeable US officials, both in the United States and in Thailand. No attempt was made to conduct original research. The written material consulted came from a variety of sources including the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Army,
Commander in Chief of the Pacific, US Army Pacific, and the US Military Command Thailand. Studies by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, the Research Analysis Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, and other organizations were also consulted. Interviews were conducted with military personnel at CINCPAC and at the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Civilian personnel in the State Department and Agency for International Development in Washington, in the US Embassy in Bangkok, and in the US offices in Udorn, Sakhon Nakhon, and Chiang Mai were also consulted.
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thailand has the political stability, economic resources, social cohesiveness, and military capability to defeat the Communist insurgency which it now faces. It can do this without a commitment of US military force, provided US economic and military assistance is furnished at approximately the levels that have been projected and provided the Royal Thai Government takes immediate steps to improve its effectiveness in the following areas:

1. Destruction of the Communist armed bands in the Northeast through reinforcement of the Second Army Forward and increased emphasis on aggressive small-unit operations.
2. Conciliation of the hill tribes in the North through expanded and intensified civic action.
3. Destruction of the Communist armed bands in the North through unconventional military operations.
4. The effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort in all areas could be enhanced through:
   1. Encouragement, exploitation, and rehabilitation of defectors through a thoroughly integrated national program.
   2. Formation of adequate paramilitary forces to provide rural security pending the fielding of the contemplated Village Security Force.

If the insurgent movements in the North, West Central Border Area, and Mid-South expand, and if the insurgency along the Malaysian border is redirected against Thailand and intensified, it is probable that the Royal Thai Government will still be able to cope with the threat. If these events occur, however, the Thais will have to raise additional military, paramilitary, and police forces, and they will require additional US military and economic assistance to support an expanded counterinsurgency effort.
If the Chinese and North Vietnamese increase their external support of the insurgent movements in Thailand through massive infiltration of men and supplies to the point where the problem changes from a "Mao-type" (essentially locally based) insurgency to, in effect, an invasion, the Royal Thai Government will be unable to defend itself without direct military support from friendly powers. Such an eventuality lies beyond the scope of this analysis, however, and the extent of US support which might be required cannot now be estimated.

(U) The principal findings on the insurgency, the Thai capabilities, and the Thai counterinsurgency effort are summarized below.

A. THE INSURGENCY

(5) The Communist Party of Thailand's attempt to create a revolution in Northeast Thailand is seriously handicapped by the absence of a "revolutionary situation." The ethnic Thai is basically satisfied with his means of livelihood, his ownership of land, his religion, his way of life, and his government. Only in some areas of the Northeast where the Thai villager exists at a bare subsistence level can the Communist organizers find genuine grievances to exploit. Yet, the potential for exploitation exists also among some ethnic minorities, notably the Vietnamese refugee community in the Northeast, the Meo and other hill tribes along the borders with Laos and Burma, and the Chinese and Malays in the Southern Peninsula.

(5) In the early stages of the insurgency, a thin and ineffective government presence in the Northeast and in the border areas enabled the Communists persuasively to charge government neglect and to propagandize and coerce the villagers almost without interference. Armed propaganda meetings and occasional assassinations served to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to demoralize the villagers, and to force them to provide support. Demonstration of effective power is impressive—indeed one of the principal complaints of the villagers is that the government has failed to protect them and has not provided them with the necessary arms to protect themselves. Yet, coercion alone cannot support a successful
insurgency on the Maoist model; there must also be the positive "conversion" of significant segments of the population. Communist efforts to "convert" the ethnic Thai have been obstructed not only by the absence of revolutionary tinder but also by the inherent opposition of Thai cultural values to Communist ideology, underlying values, and modus operandi.

These obstacles seem borne out by the Communist failure to erect a sound and durable infrastructure in the villages, the key to a successful revolution on the Maoist model. A series of joint US-Thai surveys has established the fact that while a Communist infrastructure has been found to exist in some of the villages in the Northeast, it appears to suffer from a number of weaknesses. The structure relies heavily on family ties rather than on ideological dedication or loyalty to the cadre. Security in the village cells seems generally weak and the structure breaks down readily under pressure. There is a shortage of cadre, as evidenced by the Communist inability to staff a "shadow government" in the Northeast. The top leadership of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is weakened by frictions between Thai and ethnic Chinese members.

Finally, the movement lacks a charismatic Thai leader.

The armed guerrilla strength in the Northeast, estimated at 1,500 to 2,000, is not sufficient to overcome government authority in the region. The guerrilla bands share the ineffectiveness of the party structure; they are small, numbering about 20 to 30 men, and lightly armed. Military operations are focused on armed propaganda meetings rather than aggressive attacks against the government suppression forces. The insurgents have been forced by the Royal Thai Government to shift bases frequently. They seem to suffer from an inadequate logistical support system, and there is evidence that the growth of the armed bands is limited by food shortages.

These deficiencies have prevented the insurgents from establishing political-and military control over a sizable geographical area in the Northeast as a base for future expansion. However, even a relatively inefficient insurgency can tax the political, economic, and military resources of the Royal Thai Government.
B. THE GOVERNMENT

(U) A stable and effective government is a prerequisite for a successful counterinsurgency effort since it provides the basic capability to plan, coordinate, lead, and sustain the total effort. The Royal Thai Government generally shows both stability and effectiveness, especially in comparison with other Southeast Asian governments.

(U) A major strength of Thailand is the homogeneity of the ethnic Thai, who constitute the large majority of the population. They generally accept the present government, which, despite its openly authoritarian nature, has been benevolent rather than repressive and has given the country more than nine years of political stability and economic prosperity. Moreover, the present military leaders in Bangkok have committed themselves in principle to the introduction of representative democracy modeled on Western lines, as reflected in a new and soon-to-be promulgated constitution.

(U) There are, however, some potential sources of instability in the Thai body politic. Rivalry among personalities and factions at the highest levels of government injects abiding uncertainty into Thai politics, all the more so because leadership in modern Thailand has usually been transferred via the coup d'etat rather than through orderly political processes. Two countervailing forces against potential instability, however, are the King and the civil service. The King, by virtue of the prestige of the monarchy and his personal popularity, can restrain excesses of policy and factionalism. The Thai civil service is one of the most professional and competently staffed services in Asia, enjoys substantial independence from the power struggles and shifts at the top level of government, and thus constitutes a conveyor belt of continuity and stability.

C. THE ECONOMY

(FOUO) The Thai economy is basically sound and is expanding rapidly. It supports the current level of counterinsurgency expenditures well, thanks in part to US economic and military assistance.
and is capable of sustaining a higher level of effort without serious strain. It is estimated that the Royal Thai Government could increase its projected total expenditures (including counterinsurgency expenditures) for the period FY 1969 through FY 1971 by approximately 5 percent without risking serious inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the Thai economy which require alleviation for counterinsurgency purposes.

(U) Agriculture is the mainspring of the Thai economy. Thailand grows more than enough food to feed its own population, and most Thai farmers own the land they work. Yet, agricultural production is now advancing less rapidly than that of manufacturing and the other industrial sectors, and the rural population is becoming relatively poorer at the same time that it becomes absolutely a little wealthier. The growing disparity in incomes between urban and rural areas could have important implications in the face of an insurgency which derives its strategic impetus from Mao.

(U) Furthermore, the rural areas in the Northeast, North, and South--all featuring some levels of insurgency--are disadvantaged by nature and remoteness from the centers of trade. The poorest region in the country is the Northeast, in which the Communist insurgency is currently the most widespread. A sharp increase in the present emphasis on agricultural production in Thailand--featuring additional incentives and assistance to the farmers to enable them to intensify and diversify their production--can help to improve incomes and living conditions in all the remote regions as well as in the Central Valley.

D. CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION

(U) By the summer of 1962, with the assistance of the United States, the Royal Thai Government had formulated a broad concept of prevention and suppression, had established the National Security Command as a coordinating agency, and had launched the first of its special counterinsurgency programs.
The concept of prevention and suppression evolved in 1962 remains in effect in the Northeast today. Prevention entails winning the support of the villagers by improving their incomes and living conditions and by providing them with security against the insurgents; suppression entails destruction of the guerrilla bands through offensive operations. In the North, suppression has recently been stressed at the expense of prevention, and with counterproductive results among the hill tribes, but there is some evidence that the Royal Thai Government has realized the error of indiscriminate military action and is in the process of reviving its environmental improvement activities among the hill tribes.

The structure for coordinating the counterinsurgency effort has undergone a series of evolutionary changes since 1962. The most significant was the establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) in 1965 at the national level. Concurrently, a regional organization, CPM-1, connoting its civilian-police-military makeup, was established in Northeast Thailand with subordinate CPMS at provincial and district levels. In addition, Communist Suppression Committees were formed in the remaining provinces.

At the national level since 1965, representation of the various government departments concerned with environmental improvement has been increased and an intelligence and interrogation capability have been added. At the same time, however, the military planning role of the CSOC has been diminished as a result of pressures from the Royal Thai Army.

At the regional level, CPM-1 in the Northeast has been superseded by the Second Army Forward Headquarters under General Dongcherm. Provincial and district CPMS have remained organizationally unchanged, but they have been strengthened by the assignment of more and higher caliber personnel.

While organizationally the structure at various levels is sound, qualitative deficiencies remain. At the national level, rivalry and factionalism weaken coordination. This factor may underlie the current uncertainty surrounding the future of the CSOC.
late 1967, there was evidence of dissatisfaction in Bangkok with the broad role assigned to the CSOC and indications that the National Security Command was emerging as the principal policy-making agency for counterinsurgency, with the CSOC assigned to the implementing role. Whatever may be the future of the CSOC, US observers seem agreed that the RTG recognizes the essential need for a coordinating agency such as the CSOC and that such an agency will continue to exist.

At the provincial and district levels, effective coordination is inhibited by the traditional centralization of authority at the national level, by lack of individual initiative derived from cultural factors, and by the "vertical" orientation of the various ministries and departments of the government. The defects at the local level can be overcome in part by dynamic leadership at the provincial level. Such leadership is beginning to emerge. An example is Governor Phat of Ubon province, whose coordination of the counterinsurgent effort is deemed the most effective in the Northeast.

Another potential obstacle to coordination is the "militarization" of the regional command in the Northeast, reflected in the replacement in October 1967 of CPM-1 by a provisional military command drawn from the Second Army Headquarters, designated Second Army Forward, under command of General Dongchern. Despite initial fears, however, General Dongchern has demonstrated considerable restraint and circumspection in the exercise of his broad powers. He has not intervened in civil programs, has not usurped the functions of civil authorities, and has in fact established effective working relationships with the great majority of the provincial governors. This precedent is important in the light of a possible trend to place other regional organizations under military command as evidenced by the recent establishment of the Third Army Forward in the North.

In short, the RTG has evolved an effective concept for counterinsurgency, stressing environmental improvement, village security, and suppression operations. It has developed an effective
organization for coordinating counterinsurgency operations at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels of administration. The assignment of a military commander to head the regional organization in the Northeast has not led to a breakdown of coordination or an undue "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort. Coordination continues to be marred, however, by rivalries in Bangkok and by the characteristic lack of initiative of subordinate Thai officials at the local levels, emphasized by the tradition of centralized decisionmaking and "vertical" loyalty within the various ministries and agencies. Nevertheless, strong leadership is beginning to emerge which may overcome these obstacles.

In the North, however, the concept of heavy-handed suppression operations coupled with forced resettlement of Meo hill tribes, is counterproductive. There is some evidence that the RTG is re-appraising its concept and policies toward the hill tribes.

E. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT

(U) The Royal Thai Government employs a variety of special economic and social development programs to help win or retain the support of the villagers-in-threatened areas. These environmental improvement programs are now operating chiefly in the Northeast, with priorities assigned to road construction, improvement of health, and stimulation of agricultural production. Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) is the most important single program in the effort.

(U) The environmental improvement programs are a political necessity. If the RTG fails to take action to improve incomes and living conditions in insurgency areas, the Communists will inevitably continue to exploit the situation by charging "Government neglect!" Furthermore, economic development and environmental improvement are already under way in the Northeast. If the programs stop or stall now, discontent can be expected even without Communist provocation.

(U) The present geographical emphasis on the insurgent-threatened villages of the Northeast is sound. The Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand, it contains a third of the nation's
population, it has traditionally attracted a smaller proportion of RTG expenditures than any other region, and it is the most beset with insurgency.

(FOOU) More attention needs to be paid to the North, however, where much of the goodwill built up by years of arduous civic action among the hill tribes has been lost through the recent suppression campaign. To regain lost goodwill and counteract further Communist infiltration, the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security Development program in the North should be intensified and expanded, not cut as presently planned.

(U) The functional emphasis on roadbuilding, health improvement, and stimulation of agriculture is sound from a developmental point of view and also meets the main "wants and needs" of the Thai villages as determined in various surveys. The road network will have to be enlarged, however, before increased attention can be paid to the villagers' chief requirement, greater and improved water supply and control facilities.

(U) The organization of the environmental improvement effort is uneven by Western standards, but it has served to get the programs into the field quite rapidly, and it appears adequate at the present level of intensity and complexity of the counterinsurgency effort. It is hoped that planned increases in the effort will feature expanded staffing at the district level so as to get more projects into the villages—the target of the effort.

(FOOU) The Royal Thai Government is giving the effort considerable financial support, allocating sums that compare favorably with its other expenditures and scheduling twice as much support to the effort as the United States for the FY 1967 through FY 1969 period. The effort will be sharply increased in the near future, which appears prudent, since the developmental problems in the insurgency areas are enormous and the political problems should not be viewed with complacency.

(U) When the RTG and US contributions are considered together, they represent a sizable increase in investment in formerly neglected
border regions like the Northeast. US assistance to the environmental improvement effort and to other RTG programs has enabled Thailand to pursue its long-range developmental policies and to attain an economic growth rate which is itself an important asset in the fight against Communist insurgency.

(U) Although it is extremely difficult to determine the results of the environmental improvement effort precisely, even on the economic and social levels, there is little doubt that the programs have produced a favorable, if geographically limited, impact on incomes and living conditions. Politically, in areas where the programs have operated, what discontent there was appears to have diminished, and the loyalty of the villagers to the Royal Thai Government appears to have been strengthened. In other areas, because the effort is under way, villagers seem generally confident that the government is interested in their welfare and will improve their lot in the future.

(U) The programs have had the additional important effect of drawing a significant number of government officials into the insurgent-threatened areas, increasing personnel in one province by about 50 percent. The new roads built by the programs have also helped spread the government presence by making it possible for officials to visit the villages more frequently; they have also increased the mobility of the police and other security forces. Nevertheless, in spite of recent gains, the government presence in the countryside remains quite thin.

F. RURAL SECURITY

(U) The second element of the RTG concept is to provide security for the villagers. History indicates that economy of forces, continuity of local operations, and intelligence considerations generally favor the assignment of this mission to police and paramilitary organizations rather than to the military. The Royal Thai Government decided accordingly to expand its police and paramilitary forces to perform the rural security mission and the associated tasks of village
defense, local patrolling, and immediate reaction. As an interim measure, Army units were to provide local security to villages in areas of active military operations. This decision has proved basically sound.

The initial programs adopted by the Royal Thai Government to implement the mission and tasks of rural security included an expansion of police forces from the district to the tambon (village cluster) level and the callup of the Volunteer Defense Corps, a paramilitary organization. Paramilitary programs for village security subsequently went through a series of overlapping evolutionary stages. In January 1968, the Royal Thai Government indicated an intent to activate a Village Security Force (VSF) along lines conceived by US officials in Bangkok. The program had not been activated by May 1968, however, because of unresolved differences of opinion between the Department of Local Administration and the Thai National Police Department. This disagreement has delayed the extension of protection to insurgent-threatened villages and will probably cause further delays.

The progress of the RTG in achieving village security can be estimated by examining a typical district, Nakae, in a province of the Northeast—where there is a high level of insurgency. About 21 of Nakae's 113 villages are protected by paramilitary security units, while seven are guarded by small Army units. Five of the 11 tambons now have a police post. It is expected that by the end of 1968, two 12-man paramilitary squads will be located in each tambon and three 40-man paramilitary Platoons will be available at the district level to act as local patrol and reaction forces. When these forces are in place, the total security forces in the district will consist of about 1,000 men.

The precise extent of the threat in the Northeast is difficult to measure. The guerrillas have seldom attacked villages directly, but armed propaganda meetings were employed extensively in 1967. However, even these sessions fell off sharply in the fall of 1967 and in the first three months of 1968. In view of the limited

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number of attacks on villages, one could argue that the necessity for village security has not been demonstrated. However, even if evidence of overt pressure is not convincing, and even if the insurgency in the Northeast is considered relatively weak (as this study concludes), prudence dictates that village security be strengthened as a hedge against the possibility of a rising level of insurgency.

Only about 25 percent of the villages in the insurgent-threatened provinces of the Northeast are defended in place, if the Nakae sample is reasonably representative. The remainder of the villages must be protected through a combination of offensive patrol and ambush operations by district and tambon police, paramilitary units, and Army units, at least until the VSF program is complete. Unfortunately, only 220 villages out of some 15,000 in the entire Northeast are slated to receive VSF security units in 1968. The entire VSF program, if implemented according to schedule by 1972, will provide security for only about 2,000 villages in addition to the estimated 550 now having a village security unit of some kind. It would appear, then, that some interim measures should be considered to accelerate the establishment of village security.

Two possible interim solutions would be (a) adopt a concept of dynamic collective defense for those villages which are concentrated in a small geographic area, utilizing paramilitary and other local security resources in a random pattern of night patrols and ambushes and (b) exploit the capability of the local villagers for security by the formation of "home guard" units under the supervision of the district, with arms and funding provided by the Royal Thai Government.

While it is recognized that the "home guard" approach to security was abandoned because of the loss of some weapons to the insurgents and other deficiencies, Governor Phat of Ubon apparently has been successful with it. Perhaps the most important advantage of a home guard program is that it might serve to attract the "footloose youth" of the Northeast and consequently deny them to the guerrilla movement.
The Remote Area Security Development program conducted by the Border Patrol Police (BPP) in the North was well on the way to winning the allegiance of the hill tribes when disrupted by indiscriminate military operations early this year. This combined security and civil action program should be reemphasized as soon as practicable.

G. SUPPRESSION OF THE ARMED BANDS

1. Mission and Tasks

A study of past counterinsurgency operations shows that the mission of regular military forces should be to seize the initiative by offensive operations against the guerrilla forces, rather than to defend population centers and installations. (Police and paramilitary forces should perform static defense.) The tasks to be executed in the offensive mission are the fragmentation and attrition of the guerrilla forces. The Second Army Forward in the Northeast is now conducting its operations in consonance with the above mission and tasks.

Tactical experience shows that the tasks of fragmentation and attrition can be accomplished better through small-unit patrol and ambush operations than through large sweeps and encirclements. The Second Army Forward in the Northeast is employing the bulk of its limited forces in small-unit operations and is superior to the guerrilla bands in tactics, as well as in organization, training, equipment, and logistics. On the other hand, the Third Army Forward in the North has not evolved effective tactics. It is hampered also by lack of combat experience, difficult terrain, inadequate intelligence, and marginal logistic support. Most importantly, it faces a more aggressive adversary, the Meo.

2. Disposition of Forces

The Royal Thai Army has sufficient combat troops in the inventory to deal effectively with the current armed insurgency, but the troops are not deployed to maximum advantage. The six companies
permanently available to Second Army Forward for offensive operations in the Northeast are not adequate for the mission and tasks described above, much less for providing support to currently inadequate village security forces. The US Military Assistance Command, Thailand has estimated that 13 infantry battalions will be required to carry out widespread operations against the 1,500 to 2,000 guerrillas and to back up village security. In the North, Third Army Forward has enough combat troops to suppress the armed insurgency in its area. Its difficulties are not quantitative.

3. Quantitative and Qualitative Deficiencies of the RTA

While the RTA has sufficient infantry battalions in the inventory to meet current requirements, the units suffer from a number of quantitative and qualitative deficiencies. The most serious quantitative deficiency is the shortage of company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. Furthermore, there is an overall personnel shortage of about 50 percent of Table of Organization strength. Current RTA plans for augmentation of officer and enlisted strength will reduce but not eliminate these shortages.

The most important qualitative deficiency is a lack of initiative throughout the rank structure, which can be overcome only through strong leadership at top echelons of command. Leadership at intermediate and lower levels of command cannot compensate for ineffective senior leadership in the Thai system, as it often can in Western armed forces. Fortunately there are strong leaders among the top command echelon. General Dongcherm has demonstrated the type of leadership required to exploit the capabilities of his units. In the opinion of knowledgeable US officials in close contact with the RTA, there are other general officers with equivalent qualities of leadership.

4. Training

Training of the RTA does not measure up to requirements. Basic training lacks competent supervision and is incomplete; rifle marksmanship standards are not adequate for effective counterinsurgency
operations. Field training at all levels is severely restricted by a lack of per diem funds, although this deficiency will be remedied to some extent by increased funding during 1969.

(2) The United States has assigned a Special Forces company to assist the RTA in achieving a high standard of counterinsurgency training. Unfortunately, the impact of counterinsurgency training has been diluted by the low standard of basic training in the RTA. As a consequence, the Special Forces have been unable to concentrate on the high payoff areas of immediate action drills and combat marksmanship. If this training is to succeed, the United States must either insist on a higher standard of basic training prior to counterinsurgency training or concentrate on the high payoff areas without attempting to rectify basic training deficiencies.

5. Intelligence

(2) A sound national intelligence organization has gradually evolved and is now in place in Thailand. The Special Branch of the Police bears primary responsibility for targeting the CPI infrastructure and has achieved some success, highlighted by the arrest of about 50 Party members in August 1967.

(2) However, military intelligence acquisition and dissemination are inadequate. There is a need for timely, detailed intelligence which will enable the RTA to mount operations with reasonable assurance of contact under favorable tactical conditions. All components of the present intelligence structure require upgrading if this end is to be achieved.

(2) The most acute need for more effective production and dissemination of operational intelligence is in the Northeast. A principal source of intelligence for Second Army Forward, JSC 4, suffers from shortages of qualified personnel, and there is a lack of coordination between JSC 4 and Second Army. The G-2 division of the Second Army also suffers from quantitative and qualitative deficiencies. Two immediate steps are indicated: the exchange of liaison officers between JSC 4 and Second Army, and the assignment
of a qualified US Army intelligence specialist as adviser to the G-2 division of the Second Army.

In addition, Second Army Forward has not exploited the intelligence potential of direct observation from low-performance aircraft. An even more significant weakness is the lack of an effective psychological warfare and defector program. Such a program would considerably facilitate achievement of the military mission as well as serve the overall strategy of the counterinsurgency effort. Finally, the RTG and the RTA show a disturbing disregard for the basic requirements of counterintelligence—the need to deny information to the Communist infrastructure and the guerrilla bands.

6. Organization

As in other low-level insurgencies, the basic organization of the infantry battalion has proved adequate for the task. If the insurgency should increase to the point requiring additional forces, a fourth rifle company should be added to the infantry battalion in lieu of the creation of additional infantry battalions.

7. Equipment

The current US Military Assistance Program for modernization of the RTA appears sound. Consideration should be given to accelerating the delivery of helicopters and to providing additional PRC-75 radio equipment to meet the operational requirements of small-unit patrols.

8. Logistics

The logistics of the RTA suffers from a variety of ills including a lack of command interest, shortages of trained supply and maintenance personnel, delays in the supply of replacement parts, and a tendency to hoard supplies and equipment.

The Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand reports that these deficiencies may be severe enough to prevent the RTA from supporting an increased level of troop deployment in the Northeast. It would appear, however, that the relatively low-level logistic
requirements of counterguerrilla operations in that region might be satisfied in part by utilizing commercial transportation and by air-lifting priority items.

H. GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE INSURGENCY

The growth potential of the insurgency in the Northeast and in the Central Plain and among the ethnic Thai in general is low. Intensification of suppression operations in the Northeast, together with a continuation of environmental improvement and village security programs, not only can arrest the insurgency but can critically weaken it. In the Central Plain, the Communists' prospects for creating a strong insurgent movement are even less promising than in Northeast Thailand. Since most of the ethnic Thais reside in the Central Plain, and since the Thai economy depends heavily on the agricultural production of the area, this region is of critical importance to the Royal Thai Government.

The ethnic minorities of Thailand constitute significant potential sources of insurgency. They comprise about 4 million of the 33 million population and all have grievances of varying degrees against the government. Most of them lack the intrinsic cultural barriers to Communist methods and techniques which characterize the ethnic Thai.

The growth potential is high among the hill tribes in the North. It is likely that the Communists will capitalize on the revolutionary situation in this area and the lack of government presence to spread the insurgency to tribes other than the Meeo. Geographical considerations and a narrow population base limit the threat to Thailand as a whole.

The growth potential of the insurgency along the Malaysian frontier is also high. The Communist Terrorist Organization has a viable infrastructure and a trained guerrilla arm. Peking directives could release this potential against the Royal Thai Government. However, considerations of geography and population limit the threat. The insurgency in the Mid-South appears to have a moderate potential for growth.

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The potential in the West Central Border Area is uncertain. However, the proximity of this area to the Central Plain and the possibility of a linkup with a hill tribe insurgency extending southward lend significance to the threat in this region.

Depending on the outcome of the war in South Vietnam and other developments, the North Vietnamese or the Chinese may at some time in the future have a capability to furnish massive external support, including units of regulars or "volunteers," to the Thai insurgents. Were they to render support of that magnitude, however, the scenario would become one of outright invasion, and it would lie beyond the scope of this analysis.

I. CAPABILITY OF THE RTG TO COPE WITH THE POTENTIAL THREAT

Continuing insurgency in the Northeast, coincident with an expansion of the hill tribe insurgency in the North, a redirection of the Communist Terrorist Organization against Thailand rather than Malaysia, and an intensification of the insurgent activities in the Mid-South and the West Central Border Area, would put severe pressures on the Royal Thai Government. The pressures would sharpen even more if the insurgency should spread to the mountainous areas bordering the Central Plain, thus gaining a base for disruptive raids against the population centers and economy of that vital region.

An appraisal of the capability of the Royal Thai Government and its institutions to stand up under such pressures must be speculative at best. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that the RTG could probably muster the men, money, and materials to support the required expansion of police, paramilitary, and military forces to counter the threat. It is also probable that the political stability of the Royal Thai Government would not be threatened by the growth of the insurgencies in the North and South to their full potential. Indeed, there is the possibility that the stability of the government would in fact be enhanced by a greater threat from the ethnic minorities—that in such a circumstance the ethnic Thai would support the government even more actively than at present.

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In the North, expanded police, paramilitary, and military forces could probably confine the insurgency among the hill tribes to the border provinces and could protect the ethnic Thai population centers in the river valleys from raids and sorties. However, if recent operations in the North are any indication, insurgency among the hill tribes is not likely to yield to a purely military situation. According to a recent report, "the most critical factor in this area continues to be the residual psychological problem which has plagued the northern community for years. The ability of the Thai Government to successfully promote the understanding and full acceptance of tribal peoples is, in the final analysis, the hinge upon which the ultimate success of these operations depend."  

In the light of our own national experience with attitudes toward ethnic minorities, such a prescription is more easily stated than implemented. Nevertheless, if the RTG can bring itself to the hard decision of de-emphasizing suppression and adopting a conciliatory policy toward the hill tribes, and if it reinforces its decision with a renewed and intensified program of local development, the serious spread of insurgency may be averted. There is no evidence that the Communist influence is particularly widespread among the Meo; indeed some 10 years of Communist organizational efforts have reaped a fairly meager harvest. The case might even be made that if the RTG were to permit the hill tribes to continue their traditional practices of slash-and-burn agriculture, the growing of poppies, and the use of guns for hunting, the Communists might well find themselves without many openings for exploitation. This prospect might make it worthwhile to consider lifting the restrictions which vex the hill tribes.  

The agency most familiar with the hill tribes and their problems is the Border Patrol Police. An expansion of this paramilitary force would seem to be in order. It might also be desirable

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to encourage the creation of hill tribe paramilitary units recruited locally and trained in unconventional operations by the Border Patrol Police. Such a force could be far more effective against hard-core insurgents than regular military units. A clear need is seen for an unconventional approach to the military aspect of the problem in the North.

(6) Insurgency in the South could be confined to the Peninsula, and Thai military pressure, in concert with Malaysian forces, might be able to defeat the insurgency there militarily.

J. IMPLICATIONS FOR US SUPPORT

(6) An expansion of insurgency in the North and an intensification in the South and West Central area might compel the Royal Thai Government to increase its military, paramilitary, and police forces beyond presently contemplated levels. The degree of force expansion cannot be accurately forecast. However, if it becomes necessary to increase RTG forces, US military and economic assistance should also be increased commensurately to equip new units and to support the nonmilitary programs of an expanded counterinsurgency effort.

(6) If Peking and Hanoi were to increase their external support of the insurgency in Thailand to invasion proportions, the RTG and its armed forces would be incapable of coping with the situation without direct military support from friendly countries. For example, if Hanoi were to infiltrate numerous North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao cadre or organized "volunteer" forces into the Northeast and mobilize the 50,000 highly disciplined North Vietnamese refugees in that region as active insurgents, the threat in the Northeast would take on grave new dimensions. Similarly, the infiltration of sizable forces of Pathet Lao cadre or North Vietnamese volunteers into the northern provinces through Laos could magnify the insurgency in that region to dangerous proportions.

(6) Large-scale intensification of external support to the insurgency on the order referred to above would dramatically change the Thais' problem from one of internal Maoist insurgency to what would
in effect be an invasion. The additional pressures would seriously threaten the stability of the Royal Thai Government and, as noted above, could not be relieved without external military support. The extent of the support which might be required in such an eventuality cannot now be estimated, nor is it within the scope of this analysis to consider the implications of a threat of invasion proportions.
I
THE SETTING FOR INSURGENCY

A. INTERNATIONAL SETTING

(U) The Thais take pride in the literal meaning of their country's name--"Land of the Free"--and the historical reality which the term reflects. Alone of the nations of Southeast Asia, they remained independent in the centuries when the rest of the area was colonized by Western imperial powers. One important consequence is that they are considerably more self-confident and less defensively suspicious about dealing with great powers than are most other Asians. They also consider that they owe their independence less to their own strength than to their skillfulness in gaining acceptance by stronger powers of their usefulness as a buffer state.

(U) Their active alliance with the United States--through SEATO and in support of the Vietnam war--is in some sense a departure from historic Thai policy. In another sense, it is an application of this policy, reflecting Thailand's acute awareness that China and the Vietnamese Communists represent the only serious threat it faces, and that US power represents the only effective support available for containing this threat, now and over the long term.

(U) The role of Thailand in the tides of conflict in Asia has long been overshadowed by the war in Vietnam. The very vicissitudes of the struggle in South Vietnam and the uncertainty of its outcome, however, have tended to shift concern with increasing frequency to neighboring Thailand. One need not accept the "domino theory" to recognize that powerful reverberations from the conflict in South Vietnam are acutely felt in Bangkok, nor to perceive that
political shock waves emanating directly from Peking and Hanoi disturb the domestic tranquility of this Asiatic "Land of the Free." Surrounded by Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, and sharing a brief peninsular border with Malaysia, Thailand suffers as well the centripetal pressures inherent in its geographic position in mainland Southeast Asia.

B. THAILAND AND ITS PEOPLE

(U) Thailand's geography is favorable to an insurgency. Some 3,000 miles of open border invite infiltration. External support to local insurgents could be readily injected into Thailand from Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Malaysia across the Mekong River or over mountain trails (see Figure 1). The investment in resources to create an effective bar to infiltration would be prohibitive; only selected stretches of the Mekong could be effectively patrolled. Suitable guerrilla base areas exist in the extensive forested plains and mountains. Interregional communications by road and rail are adequate to support counterinsurgent operations, but regional communications, particularly in the northern, western, and southern border areas, cannot effectively support counterinsurgent operations. Airlift in these areas is essential.

(U) Thailand has a total land area of nearly 200,000 sq. miles. The nation is divided geographically into four major regions. The extensive Central Plain is watered by the Chao Phraya River, which brings silt to replenish the fields each year. The heavy, dark-clay soil is especially suitable for the production of paddy rice, and approximately 20 percent of the 43 million acres in this region is cultivated, mostly in rice. The North is a mountainous area covered with forests, but dissected by four major river valleys which provide rich farmland on 5.6 percent of its 24 million acres. The Northeast is separated from the Central Plain by a mountain range. It is an eastward-sloping plateau with poor soil and an irregular water supply. Floods and droughts are not uncommon. Cultivated land covers about 20 percent of the 40 million acres
FIGURE 1 (U). Topographical Map of Thailand (U)

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in the Northeast. The South of Thailand contains 17 million acres of which 15 percent is cultivated. A variety of tropical crops is grown in this region in addition to rice.

(U) The variability and instability of the amount and distribution of rainfall are the major climatic hazards for agriculture. The heavy rainfall also leaches the soil of soluble chemicals and accounts for the low fertility of most Thai soils. Despite these conditions, Thailand is a country of lush growth where food has never been a serious problem to the population at large.

(U) The population of Thailand is remarkably homogeneous; 30 million inhabitants, 87 percent of the population, are ethnic Thais. The ethnic Thai is a rice farmer—a highly respected occupation buttressed by tradition and religion.

(U) Ninety percent of the Thai farmers own their own land. In the Central Plain, the Thai farmer is favored by nature and manmade improvements; he customarily grows enough food for his family along with a surplus to exchange for consumer goods. Markets are accessible through a well-developed communication system of rivers, canals, and highways. The Thai farmer in the Northeast, which hosts about one-third of the population, is less favored. While he normally produces enough food for his own needs, except during periods of extensive droughts, any surplus is limited or negligible. In the dry season, sources of drinking water might be as far as a mile away. Access to markets is difficult for some villagers even in the dry season; in the wet season it is impossible.

(U) Four out of five Thais live in a village, where lack of contact with the central government, and in some cases physical isolation, has sponsored an informal but effective grass-roots democracy. The villager customarily elects his own village headman by a show of hands, and he participates in village discussions which lead to an informal consensus on common programs. This tradition of informal, local democracy makes it difficult for outsiders to impose their programs, be they government officials
or Communist organizers. At the same time, participation in village affairs has generally not led the villager to demand a voice in the political process beyond the confines of his own village. His acceptance of the Buddhist principle of status—which holds that temporal position is earned through the acquisition of merit—leads him to accept authority inherent in a superior position, without demanding the right to influence the selection of those in authority. However, he expects that the authority be exercised "correctly"—that is, with due regard and consideration for the inferior. Otherwise he demonstrates considerable ingenuity in avoiding conformity to orders.

(U) The remaining 13 percent of Thailand's population, almost 4 million, is made up of a number of ethnic minorities (see Figure 2 for geographical distribution). Of these, the Chinese constitute the largest group, almost 3 million, with the majority located in Bangkok and a large concentration of the remainder located in the Southern Peninsula, which also hosts about 1 million Malays. A small Vietnamese minority of about 50,000 occupies a strategic area in Northeast Thailand. About 250,000 primitive hill tribesmen live in the rugged mountainous border areas of northern and western Thailand. Significant cultural differences exist among these minorities and between them and the ethnic Thais. Almost all constitute potential subversive threats of varying intensity to the stability of the Royal Thai Government because of their cultural antipathies and, with the exception of the Bangkok Chinese, exploitable economic grievances.

C. THE ECONOMY

(U) The Thai economy has expanded rapidly during the 1960's. The economy is still basically agricultural, but industry and commerce have grown at a faster rate than agriculture.1

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1. See Volume II, Part II, "Economic Background," for a discussion of Thailand's general economy, overall economic development, and economic capability to support the counterinsurgency effort.
FIGURE 2 (U). Thailand, Major Ethnic Groups (U)
Investment and savings rates have increased sharply in the past decade, capital formation has grown appreciably, and the Gross National Product has risen at an average annual rate of 7.5 percent between 1958 and 1967, reaching a level of $4.7 billion. The monetary unit has remained stable, wholesale and consumer price indexes have shown only slight increases, and the advance in growth has been achieved essentially without inflation.

Allowing for a population increase of 3.2 percent annually, the GNP has risen in real terms at slightly above 4 percent a year. Although incomes vary throughout the country, with the people in the Bangkok area receiving much higher incomes than the people in the predominantly rural areas, the rise in per capita GNP from $12 in 1962 to $140 in 1967 is a meaningful indicator of total economic growth.

Agriculture is the dominant sector in the Thai economy. Significantly, the country produces enough rice to feed its own population and to sell a considerable amount abroad. The workers engaged in agriculture in 1966 represented 80 percent of the national labor force. This large element of the population produces a major part of the Gross National Product, but not in direct proportion to its size. In 1966 agriculture provided 32 percent of the GNP.

Agriculture is the most important earner of foreign exchange for the country, providing approximately 80 percent of the total value of exported goods. These export earnings have been a large factor in providing Thailand with foreign exchange to pay for imports needed in the growth of nonagricultural sectors of the economy. In 1967, the Royal Thai Government derived 11 percent of its non-loan revenue directly from agriculture. Indirectly, the amount was much larger.

A large part of Thai industry is based on processing agricultural products, for example, rice milling, cotton and silk textile production, gunnysack manufacturing, tapioca flour milling, lumber milling, liquor distilling, and cigarette manufacturing.
The marketing and distribution system is also largely based on purchasing rice and other farm products, transporting them, and selling manufactured goods to the farming community.

D. POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

1. Central Government

(U) The central government in Bangkok and its administrative structure have remained relatively unchanged since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1932. Technically the government is a constitutional monarchy; in practice it is dominated by the executive branch. The power of the executive branch is concentrated in the hands of a small elite of military and civilians, among whom the military wield the most power.

(U) Its openly authoritarian nature notwithstanding, the present government has provided the country with a relatively stable and successful administration. Periodic coups have not led to a breakdown of government into political chaos. Since 1958, the Royal Thai Government has been dominated by a group of powerful military leaders with broad authoritarian powers. The relative absence of democratic principles notwithstanding, military rule has been benevolent rather than repressive and has brought the country nine years of political stability and economic prosperity. Moreover, although power is concentrated in the hands of a group of military leaders and civilians, this ruling elite is not completely free to do as it pleases. Theoretically, it is not subject to any of the checks and balances which characterize a Western democracy. In practice, however, some constraints on freedom of action exist. The first of these derives from rivalry within the government: the competition among individuals and factions is such that no single group is strong enough to assert full power.

(U) The monarchy also imposes some constraint on the ruling group. King Phumiphon is a respected symbol of national unity, is widely popular in his own right, and thus can and does invoke his
prestige to influence government policies. Perhaps an even more formidable bridle on top-level policy—as well as a conveyor belt of continuity in policy—is the Thai civil service, considered one of the most effective in Southeast Asia. More than simply staffing the government bureaucracy proper, the civil service oversees wide ranges of national life: the railways, communications services, a number of industries and commercial institutions, the national education system, as well as the principal levers of the national economy.

(U) Two factors have contributed to the success of the Thai civil service. The first factor is its overall competence: the service has attracted the most highly educated and motivated members of the society; almost all university students aspire to careers in the civil service. The second factor is its carefully nurtured tradition of political neutrality. Despite frequent shifts of leadership, Thai civil service members have shown loyalty to the top leadership. The various regimes, on their part, have rewarded this loyalty by permitting the civil service rather broad authority within its spheres.

2. Local Government

(U) The populations of Thai villages vary from about 200 to 2,000. Groups of villages (typically from eight to 15) in turn are organized into communes called tambons, which are headed by a leader chosen from among the constituent village headmen. Neither the village nor the tambon headmen are civil servants although they are technically government employees. The lowest level at which an official government presence can be found is at that of the district, the administrative echelon in which three to 14 tambons are grouped. The district officer and his assistants are drawn principally from the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior, although other ministries concerned with such matters as education, health, and the like assign representatives to the district. At the beginning of the insurgency
in 1961, government representation in a typical district covering over 100 villages, about 700 square miles, and a population in excess of 50,000, consisted of only about 15 officials and a police force of about 40 constables. Sparse government representation, combined with inadequate or nonexistent roads and a shortage of transportation, has made contact between the government and villages infrequent. Some remote villages have had no contact with district officials whatsoever.

(U) Districts are grouped under a provincial echelon of administration. (Figure 3 shows the administrative divisions of Thailand.) A typical provincial office in the Northeast might be responsible for 10 districts, with a population of over 400,000 and an area of nearly 4,000 square miles. The provincial staffs have suffered from the same deficiencies as the district: there simply are not enough personnel to supervise the districts adequately. There are qualitative deficiencies as well. Harsh living conditions have led many civil servants to avoid service in the Northeast, and the central administration has tended to assign its less capable officials to this administrative Siberia.

(U) The authoritarian nature of the central government, reinforced by its concern for survival, has led to a concentration of decision-making in Bangkok and to discouragement of initiative at the local level. Initiative tends to be blunted also by the traditional veneration of higher authority, which is deeply rooted in the Thai culture. Nevertheless, its shortcomings notwithstanding, the fact that a civil administration did exist down to the district level was of prime importance when insurgency erupted. Unlike in Vietnam, where an administrative structure had to be created after insurgency broke out, in Thailand the task has been to improve an established system.
FIGURE 3 (U). Thailand, Administrative Divisions, 1965 (U)

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II

THE INSURGENCY

A. NARRATIVE

(U) In 1961, when the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) adopted a resolution to conduct an insurgency in Thailand, the Party did not appear to pose a significant threat. Like most Southeast Asian Communist parties, it was established in the late 1920’s by a few alienated intellectuals of Chinese and Vietnamese heritage, including Ho Chi Minh. When the Japanese overran Thailand, the Communists attempted to exploit the situation by creating front organizations in the labor unions of Bangkok, and staged an unsuccessful bid to capture the nascent resistance movement among the Thais. After Pridi Panomyong became Prime Minister in 1947, anti-Communist laws, enacted during the Japanese occupation, were repealed and the Party made some gains in influence among the Bangkok labor unions. A year later Pridi was overthrown, and the Party organization, although it continued to enjoy "legal" status, came under close government surveillance.

(8) In 1952, the CPT took the first major step toward active subversion in a resolution proclaiming the armed struggle as the path toward socialism and, faithful to Maoist theory, marking the villagers as the base for the revolution. The government immediately responded with repressive legislation outlawing the Party and moved vigorously to disrupt the clandestine organization, bringing Communist activity to a virtual halt. However, beginning in 1954, the return by the government to a more permissive attitude toward the CPT and its activities enabled the clandestine Party to revive its organization and focus its activities among the Bangkok laborers and the villagers of Northeast Thailand. In 1958, the coup which brought Marshal Sanit to power marked a shift once more to a policy
of severe repression, but the Party, now boasting secure clandestine organization, was able to continue its subversive operations, albeit at a slower pace. With the termination of the Malayan Emergency in 1960, the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party, under Peng Chen, fled into Thailand, where they established themselves in the southern provinces bordering Malaya.

1. Developments in the Northeast

The line of armed revolution adopted in 1961 by the CPT embraced the immediate goal of forming an infrastructure and guerrilla units pending the creation of a "revolutionary situation." The target chosen was the Northeast, where a small base for Communist organization already existed and where the lower standard of living, the isolation of the area from the influence of the government, and the lack of security offered possibilities for exploitation. Ease of access for external support through Pathet Lao-controlled territory in Laos also influenced the choice of target area. The Party attempted to achieve its goal by playing on local grievances, particularly alleged government neglect. Thai youths were recruited and sent to Laos and North Vietnam for indoctrination and guerrilla training; the more promising recruits were sent to Communist China. In this early phase, the CPT, controlled by Peking, was the leading actor, supported by the Communist Party of North Vietnam, the so-called Lao Dong Party.¹

In the meantime, the policy of armed revolution in the rural areas was affirmed by the Politburo members of the CPT at a meeting in Peking and later in another meeting in the Northeast. In addition to propaganda and persuasion, a limited measure of terror was also authorized. Yet, the guerrilla units were strictly enjoined from clashes with RTG paramilitary and military forces in order not to jeopardize the priority tasks of building an infrastructure, organizing guerrilla forces, and establishing a secure base.

¹ See Volume IV, Appendix A, "The Insurgent Threat," for further discussion.
base prior to the initiation of offensive guerrilla tactics against
the Royal Thai Government.

(U) In 1963, the government took the first of a series of steps
designed to extend government influence into the Northeast in order
to counter the spread of the insurgency. In time, these steps were
to include improvements in the governmental structure to coordinate
programs at the national and regional levels, the development of
economic programs to counter the Communist claim of government
neglect, the expansion of the provincial and district civil service
to implement the new programs, the improvement of village security
by expansion of police and paramilitary forces, and the commitment
of Royal Thai Army (RTA) units to suppression operations.

(U) The first step in 1963 was a vigorous crackdown on the
Communist infrastructure. Two high-ranking cadres of the CPT were
executed and numerous suspected members were confined. At the same
time that these immediate measures were being taken, the RTG was
quickly recognizing the longer-range problems, particularly the fact
that the normal governmental structure could not muster the kind of
effective coordination of operations required to arrest the
insurgency and that a specialized agency for coordination would have
to be created. The result was the formation of a special coordi-
nation and operational body in April 1962—the National Security
Council—charged with formulating policies for countering Communist
activities by both passive and active operations. Subordinate to
the Council was the National Security Command with regional sub-
commands in the Northeast, North, and South. Local paramilitary
and police forces were assigned to these regional commands. At this
particular stage, suppression missions were conducted by police and
paramilitary forces.

(U) The RTG also recognized the need for preventive measures and
inaugurated special developmental programs in the impoverished
Northeast during the early 1960's. The US AID mission encouraged
the government in this direction and often initiated suggestions and
plans for specific programs.
(U) The initial step in the prevention program was the organization of the Mobile Development Units (MDUs) in August 1962, entrusted with the mission of rendering general service to local citizens with the view of strengthening the relations between the RTG and the population.

(U) In 1964, under the persistent spur of Communist charges that the Northeast was neglected, the Royal Thai Government and the United States recognized the need to place additional emphasis on relatively short-term, high-impact projects such as roadbuilding. The Accelerated Rural Development program (ARD) was established in that year to provide the governors of selected provinces with the capability to plan and construct roads and village-level projects. Eighteen provinces, 14 in the Northeast and four in the North, were initially chosen for ARD attention. Additional civil service personnel were assigned to each province to assist the governor in planning and implementing the ARD program. At the same time, the United States was able to persuade the RTG to allocate ARD funds directly to the provincial governors—unprecedented step in decentralization of Thai authority.

In June 1963, the RTG moved to improve its meager intelligence capabilities in the Northeast. The Special Branch of the Provincial Police, charged with the detection of internal subversion, had been established on the Scotland Yard model in 1932, but its effective scope-of-operations was limited to major population centers. Accordingly, the RTG established Division VII of the Special Branch with field offices in the Northeast, North, and South, with the mission of targeting the infrastructure of the CPT. These field offices were progressively expanded.

Further improvements in the intelligence structure were introduced in June of 1965, when the first of several regional intelligence centers was established in the Northeast on the advice and with the support of US officials. These Joint Security Centers (JSCs) were placed under the management control of the Special Branch, and their membership was drawn from the Provincial and
Border Patrol Police and the military. Later, an additional JSC was established in the Northeast, as well as in the Northern, West Central and Mid-Southern regions. The Thai-Malaysian Intelligence Headquarters sustained responsibility for intelligence coordination in the southern provinces bordering on Malaysia.

(U) In late 1963 Field Marshal Sarit died and was replaced as Prime Minister by General Thanom. Some US officials feared that power struggles and confusion would attend the change in leadership, but the transition was smooth and the government continued to function in an orderly fashion. Prime Minister Thanom generally continued the policies, both domestic and foreign, of his predecessor.

(U) In the meantime, during 1963 and 1964, guerrilla operations continued in low key. The insurgents avoided contact with the police and paramilitary forces while sustaining their efforts to create a revolutionary situation, establish an infrastructure, and recruit guerrilla forces by means of propaganda, coercion, and terror. Assassinations rose from one in 1962 to four in 1963 and to seven in 1964.

(U) The RTG, responding to the heightened insurgent activities, took two additional steps to expand the government presence in the Northeast. One was a program to improve local security in the threatened provinces by increasing the number of police posts at the district and tambon levels. The ultimate goal was to extend the police presence to 1,152 tambons in the provinces threatened by insurgency, and to expand the force from 56,000 to 100,000 by 1972.

(U) The second important step was the reinforcement of the police and paramilitary forces in the field with regular military units of the Royal Thai Army. This bolstering of units in the field brought about an increase in contacts with the guerrillas, who were still anxious to avoid combat.

(U) The increased effectiveness of government suppression operations, combined with the growing presence of US forces in South Vietnam and Thailand, apparently forced the CPT, under Peking direction, to abandon the classic Maoist formula of establishing a
viable infrastructure, mustering a sizable guerrilla force, and consolidating a base prior to shifting to an offensive strategy. In mid-1965, the CPT Politburo declared a new phase of the revolution in which guerrilla units were ordered to attack government forces and to conduct forced propaganda meetings in the villages.

In late November 1965, a new guerrilla offensive, climaxed by the bloody ambush of a police patrol, forced the government to reappraise its policy. This reappraisal led to an important change in the counterinsurgency structure. It was concluded that the National Security Command, with its civilian membership, was not an adequate agency for direction and coordination. Accordingly, the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was organized with General Praphat as its commander. The practical result was that the National Security Command lost most of its power, retaining command only of the Mobile Development Units and responsibility for suppression operations in southern Thailand adjacent to the Malaysian border, in cooperation with Malaysian authorities.

The CSOC was charged with overall direction of the counterinsurgency operations. The civilian, police, and military components of the new authority were assigned co-equal roles in planning, but primary responsibility for the execution of suppression operations was retained by the police. Military forces were given a subordinate and supporting role except when military units exceeded company size, whereupon the military assumed command. The Royal Thai Army service and support elements were also tasked to provide logistic and administrative support for suppression operations.

Field agencies subordinate to the CSOC were created in seven of the 15 provinces of the Northeast where insurgent activity was taking place. These agencies, called CPMs, connoting their civil-police-military membership, were under the direct command of the provincial governors. In addition, CPM-1 was established to act as a field agency for the CSOC in coordinating the allocation of resources and interprovincial operations.
As a result primarily of greater aggressiveness on the part of the suppression forces, armed encounters in the Northeast rose sharply from 15 in 1965 to 216 in 1966. Similarly, assassinations rose from 31 in 1965 to 116 in 1966, and the incidence of forced propaganda meetings in villages, initiated in 1966, reached a total of 143. During that year, low-level insurgency activities spread to the West Central and Mid-Southern areas.

The CSOC was an obvious improvement over previous organizational structures. Nevertheless, the first eight months of 1966 bared some salient deficiencies in the coordination of counterinsurgency operations. A key one was the inability of the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC to coordinate the civil development programs involving various ministries and departments. Accordingly, General Praphat ordered the Director of the Department of Local Administration with a staff of representatives from the Ministries of Interior, National Development, Agriculture, and Education, and other government departments and bureaus involved in counterinsurgency programs to reinforce the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC.

Additional bolstering of the organizational structure and counterinsurgency programs was undertaken during the first eight months of 1966. Thus a Psychological Warfare Section was created in the CSOC in recognition of the need to coordinate activities in this important realm. Similarly, recognition of the value of systematic interrogation of prisoners and defectors prompted a training program for interrogators and the establishment of interrogation centers in the Joint Security Center in the Northeast and in the CSOC.

Events had demonstrated that village security in the threatened areas was inadequate: the traditional local defense units formed in some villages were not providing full protection against the insurgents, and the expansion of the police down to the tambon level was not proceeding rapidly enough. Early in 1966, at CSOC direction, members of the Thailand National Guard, the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), were called to active duty to assist in village security. Later in October 1966, two programs for village defense were adopted
largely as the result of US initiative and support—the Peoples' Assistance Teams (PATs) modeled after the Revolutionary Development Teams in Vietnam and the Village Security Officers (VSOs). Both groups were staffed by local villagers who were given special training; in effect they constituted a home guard. In addition, the police began to form tactical units to provide reaction forces to support tambon and district police and village security units. These consisted of Provincial Police Special Action Forces and Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons. In order to improve the planning for local security, the RTG decided to assign military officers to the district offices in the Northeast.

The tactics of the Royal Thai Army in the Northeast were reappraised in the light of a growing recognition that the battalion-size military sweep operations were expensive and largely ineffective. A new concept for military operations abandoned unproductive sweeps in favor of concentration of military forces in selected areas of high guerrilla activity ringed by villages which provided support in the form of recruits and food. The plan to implement this new concept, known as the 0910 Plan, was launched in mid-January 1967, and targeted 11 areas of high guerrilla activity in six Northeast provinces with the design of concentrating military, police, paramilitary, and civil forces to clear the guerrillas and to provide local security, civic action, and short-term development projects for the villagers. To compensate for the shortage of local security resources in the affected villages, combined forces of police, village security forces, paramilitary elements, and military forces were garrisoned in the villages.

In the summer of 1967, rumors in Bangkok that the Royal Thai Army was maneuvering for a greater role in the counterinsurgency effort seemed borne out by events. In late October, General Dongcherm, the Second Army commander of RTA forces in the Northeast, was directed to take over responsibility for CPM-1, the regional organization responsible for coordination and direction in the Northeast under the CSOC.
The CSOC chain of command to CPM-1 was altered so that CSOC direction of military operations flowed through the RTA and thence to Second Army Forward. This shift concerned US officials as a harbinger of a "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort at the expense of local development. Apparently, however, General Dongcherm understood the need for a coordinated civil-military approach to the problem in the Northeast and did not interfere with civil programs of development and village security.

(U) Coincident with the above events, RTG and US officials undertook an evaluation of experiences with the village security program represented by the Village Security Officers and People's Assistance Teams. This appraisal bared the need for additional screening of personnel; improved training of security forces, not only in security functions, but also in intelligence and community development; modern small arms; and more certain remuneration. In early January 1968, the RTG indicated its intent to implement the Village Security Force program (VSF) with some US financial support. As of June 1968, training of the initial increment has not been executed.

(U) In February 1968, the government took an important step toward legitimization and liberalization of the political structure. After more than eight years of discussion and debate, a new constitution was accepted by the National Assembly and forwarded to the King for approval and promulgation.

(U) Incident reports through March 1968 suggest an increased level of armed encounters. Significantly, in February 1968, clashes initiated by the insurgents exceeded those initiated by the RTA for the first time since May 1967. The incidence of meetings and assassinations was below that of 1967. Increasing Pathet Lao and Viet Minh infiltration was reported from some sources in the field, but was unconfirmed. In general, infiltration of personnel into the Northeast, as well as into other regions, has been in the form of returning Thai trainees and occasional foreign cadres, rather than in the form of substantial numbers of foreign organizers or guerrillas. If a recent US mission estimate of 1,500 active insurgents is accurate, guerrilla
strength in the Northeast has remained roughly the same during the last 15 months.

2. Developments in the North

Evidence of Communist subversion among the Meo hill tribes in the northern provinces of Nan and Chiangrai came to light in December 1966, and was dramatized by two armed clashes between Border Patrol Police and Meo tribesmen in February and September 1967. In December 1967, the RTG, in conjunction with the Lao government, dispatched troops to conduct an operation against Kuomintang (KMT) bands whose activities were becoming untenable. In the engagements that ensued, Royal Thai Army and Border Patrol Police units engaged in about 20 clashes with armed Meo tribesmen, suffering 50 casualties.

The RTG's response to this new threat was immediate and heavy handed. The Third Army was ordered to establish a forward command post in Nan province with the equivalent of about five understrength infantry battalions. Later Royal Thai Air Force elements, including T-28 fighter bombers, helicopters, and observation aircraft, were assigned to support suppression operations including air strikes against several Meo villages. At least one village was attacked with napalm. In addition to suppression operations, the government began a program of resettling Meos into camps in the lowlands—an action that was all the more severe in light of the known aversion of the Meos for living in low altitudes.

The guerrilla forces operating in Nan and Chiangrai provinces, consisting of Meo and some Yao tribesmen, are led by Sino-Thai, Vietnamese, some Laotians, and possibly some ethnic Thais. Some of the leaders have received training in Laos and North Vietnam. Captured documents indicate that the CPT, under the direction of Peking, is the dominant force behind the operations, with Hanoi rendering support. It is estimated that there are 150 to 200 tribesmen operating in relatively small bands of about 30. They are armed with a variety of small arms, including some submachine guns and AK-47 rifles. Their tactics seem to be aimed at avoiding close
contact with government forces, but they are harassing RTG patrols with booby traps and small-arms fire.

Reports of subversive activity in the border areas of West Central Thailand had been noted by the RTG earlier, but the first proof came with the assassination of a government official and a villager in November 1966. The government responded with a sweep through five West Central provinces, with negligible results. In August and September 1967, two successful ambushes of police forces by the insurgents inflicted 21 casualties, including the regional Border Patrol Police chief. In September 1967, the RTG responded by establishing a special CSOC suppression staff on the model of CPM-1 in the Northeast. Command was assigned to the First Army commander, with the regional Provincial Police chief, a representative from the Ministry of Interior, and the provincial governors serving as advisers. A company of the First Army was assigned to augment local Border Patrol and Provincial Police forces. Additional forces have been alerted for possible reinforcement.

Insurgent operations have continued in low key. In all, three successful ambushes have been carried out by the insurgents plus occasional clashes with government forces. The US Mission estimates the insurgent strength in this area at 75.

Intelligence collected on subversive activities in three Mid-South provinces during 1966 resulted in an estimate that the armed insurgents totaled about 200. The first three months of 1967 witnessed nine incidents, of which five were the result of government initiative. While the level of incidents did not rise during the next three months, the RTG nevertheless established a CSOC organization similar
to CPM-1 in Northeast Thailand under a regional Military Circle commander with the regional Police chief as deputy. One regiment of the Royal Thai Army is assigned to the Military Circle.

There have been several forced propaganda meetings and assassinations, but insurgent recruitment activity has decreased significantly in these areas. Most guerrilla leaders appear to have moved into more secure areas in the mountains—sorties into the lowlands seem to be limited to food-gathering activities and some recruitment. Nevertheless, occasional clashes with government forces continue to occur. The estimate of guerrilla strength remains at about 200.

5. Developments in the South

Operations in the South have continued in low key, no doubt reflecting the orientation of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) against Malaysia and the desire to avoid clashes with the RTG forces in order to preclude more vigorous suppression operations. However, low-level engagements between the CTOs and the joint Malaysian-Thai forces continue. The US Mission estimates the operational strength of the CTO at 800.

The command and control organization in the South differs from that employed in other insurgent areas. It was originally established under the National Security Command in 1962, where it remained in spite of the shift to the CSOC organization in December 1965. As now organized, it reflects a joint Malaysian-Thai approach to counterinsurgency in the border area. The General Border Committee is composed of RTG-Malaysian civil and police officials. The operating body is the regional Border Committee which is jointly chaired by the chief police officer of the State of Kedah in Malaysia and the senior Thai police officer of the 9th Region in South Thailand. A regional Border Committee Office, composed of three divisions, including Operations, Intelligence, and Administration, is located in Songla. Thailand is responsible for planning and implementing operations. The equivalent of about two police platoons is available for routine operations supported by police reinforcements.
6. Recapitulation

During the period from the establishment of the National Security Command in 1962 to the approval of the draft constitution in 1968, the RTG has taken a series of steps to counter the insurgent challenge of government neglect of the Northeast. Communications have been opened up through road construction. Nine out of ten villages are within one day's walk of a road, as contrasted with only one out of ten in 1959. The government presence in the Northeast has been expanded from the district into the tambons and villages by increases in civil personnel. Police presence has been extended from the district level to many of the tambons in the provinces threatened by insurgents, while some villages have been provided with full-time security by a combination of police, paramilitary, and military resources. RTA units are operating offensively against the guerrilla bands.

A structure for coordination and implementation of counter-insurgency programs has evolved at the national, regional, and subordinate levels in the form of the CSOC in Bangkok, the Second Army Forward in the Northeast region, and the provincial and district CPMs. An organization for intelligence collection, dissemination, and distribution has come into being with the creation of the Joint Security Centers in all regions.

B. THE THREAT

This section describes the insurgent threat and the tactics employed by the enemy in his attempts to establish a viable infrastructure and gain the active support of the Thai villagers. An evaluation of the insurgents' strengths and weaknesses is also made, focusing on insurgent operations in the Northeast.

One of the significant indicators of the Communist insurgent threat is the number of incidents that occurred in the Northeast during 1967 and 1968. Statistical analysis of these incidents in the Northeast shows that armed encounters peaked in January through March.
of 1967, coincident with the RTG offensive operations of the 0910 Plan. (See Figure 4.) After the first three months of 1967, operations tended to average about 25 encounters a month, with a sharp drop in December. In January and February 1968, encounters again rose to about 38 a month, but fell off to roughly half that number in March. Similarly, the number of armed propaganda meetings fell to below five after October 1967 and continued at that rate through March of 1968. Assassinations followed the same general pattern, reaching in March 1968 the lowest monthly average number since 1965.

Two diametrically opposed conclusions can be drawn from this quantitative analysis. The first is that RTG measures to arrest the insurgency have borne fruit, resulting in the gradual reduction of insurgent activity and an implied weakening of the insurgent structure. The second and opposite conclusion is that the insurgent efforts to establish an infrastructure within the villages have met with success, so that assassinations and armed propaganda meetings are no longer required as instruments of coercion. This conclusion might be supported by the fact that in January and February of 1968 armed encounters have again risen to above the 1967 level, suggesting a gain in guerrilla strength and a consequent increase in aggressive action.

The first conclusion is immediately placed in question by the unhappy lessons which the United States derived from reliance on purely statistical indicators in Vietnam. Quite clearly, a solid evaluation must rely on more than just statistical evidence; it must probe more deeply into the structure and fabric of the insurgency on the one hand and that of the Royal Thai Government and its people on the other.

The absence of a "revolutionary situation" among the ethnic Thai population has seriously handicapped the insurgents. At the same time, they have been able--particularly during the early stages of the insurgency--to exploit a major weakness of the RTG, namely the lack of government presence in the Northeast and the inability of the RTG to maintain law and order. The insurgents have capitalized on this weakness through a combination of persuasion and coercion.
FIGURE 4 (B). Number of Armed Encounters, Propaganda Meetings, and Assassinations in Northeast Thailand, 1965 to 1968 (U)
campaign of local recruitment has followed the time-honored
erm of first persuading the villager to assist the guerrillas
tially and then, once he has become "involved," to convert him
logically.

The propaganda of persuasion has emphasized such themes as
腐ruptness of the current Thai government, the US threat to
land's sovereignty, and the low standard of living of the
ager, which is attributed to government neglect and corruption.
promise is held out that under Communism, everyone will enjoy
al status, dignity, and high incomes. Specific material rewards
dangled: tractors for farmers and training in professions for
ing men and women.

Coercion is mixed with persuasion. The principal levers
assassinations and armed propaganda meetings, usually staged in
unction. In a typical situation, a village is surrounded in the
afternoon by armed bands and the villagers are assembled and
nged by the leaders of the invading force. The intent is to
strate to the villager the impotence of the government, to
lize the village leadership and the villagers, to force the
agers to provide supplies, and by virtue of this compromising
, to become a base for further exploitation. Occasionally, the
ssination of a villager as a "government informer" reinforces
message.

As demonstrations of effective power, the armed propaganda
ings have made their impact: a recurrent complaint by affected
agers has been that the government has failed to protect them
to provide them with the means of self-protection. Nevertheless,
dicates of successful revolution, particularly on the Maoist
, suggest that coercion alone cannot carry the day. In order
 passive support to be transformed into the necessary active
olvimento, substantial segments of the population must be "con-
ted." And here the Communists have run up against a cultural
rier. Not only is there in Northeast and Central Thailand an
ence of an exploitable "revolutionary situation," but Communist
ideology and its underlying value structure and modus operandi are in direct conflict with the cultural values of the ethnic Thais. This conflict is described in greater detail in another part of this report; suffice it here to sketch a comparison of the cultural values of the ethnic Thais and the Communists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Thai</th>
<th>Communist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Extreme individuality.</td>
<td>1. Total discipline and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>responsiveness to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. An emphasis on enjoyment</td>
<td>2. Derogation of pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and gratification from life.</td>
<td>and insistence on a form of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ascetism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>orientation which leads to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>acceptance of a hierarchical</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A limited interest in</td>
<td>4. A stress on material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material satisfaction.</td>
<td>goals.</td>
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</tbody>
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The conclusion that the Communist insurgents are not meeting measurable success in converting the populace can be tested in terms of two primary indicators: their progress in establishing a durable organization and their success in organizing an effective guerrilla force. Mao's principles of revolutionary warfare hold that, in the absence of a solid "infrastructure," revolutionaries become nothing more than "roving insurgents" bereft of a popular or territorial base. Without an expanding guerrilla force, recruited locally, the revolutionary movement cannot extend its sway progressively over the populace to the point where it can seriously threaten the existing government. As Mao says:

... The Red Army fights not for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. ... Without these objectives, fighting

2. See Volume II, Part III, "The Susceptibility of the Thai Peasant to Communism at Present and in the Immediate Future."
loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.

Evidence of the Communist efforts to establish a village infrastructure in Thailand is available from joint surveys conducted by Thai and US officials in the areas of highest insurgent activities in provinces of the Northeast, and from analyses of defector and captured prisoner interrogations. The surveys drew on information obtained from village chiefs, schoolteachers, members of the Volunteer Defense Corps and People's Assistance Teams, and from the files of the police, the Joint Security Centers, the Communist Suppression Operations Command, the relevant provincial and district CPNs, and the Royal Thai Army units operating in the Northeast. The surveys were all made in 1967, the year in which the RTG initiated and conducted the 0910 Plan in the Northeast.

The surveys revealed the cellular type insurgent infrastructure in some tambons and villages of the Northeast. In Kut Bak, one of three tambons in Sakon Nakhon where insurgency is concentrated, 26 cells, most of them composed of three members, were identified in three villages out of a total of 30. The most thoroughly organized village visited in this survey featured 17 cells with a typical Communist organizational hierarchy, including the political chief, who organized liaison and bi-weekly food deliveries to the guerrillas. Another official was charged with recruiting, and a third with intelligence.

Another survey conducted in tambon Nanai, in Nakhon Phanom province, an area of high guerrilla activity, uncovered a total of 21 three-man cells in six of the 13 villages in the tambon. Similar data applied to another district of the same province. Existence of cellular organization in the southern provinces of the Northeast was also established, but on a smaller scale.

While a Communist infrastructure undeniably exists in some villages in the Northeast, it seems to suffer from significant deficiencies. In the first place, the structure appears to be heavily dependent on kinship ties. In the majority of the cells surveyed, there were links of family or friendship between cell members and members of the guerrilla bands. Kinship among the Phu-Thais, a minority group of Thai subculture, appears to be a salient factor in the infrastructure in Sakon Nakhon, another province of high guerrilla activity. Of the 14 villages which were found to contain cells, seven were completely Phu-Thai, three were partly populated by the latter, and two were composed of Thai-So, another minority group. The difficulty with a kinship-based organization is that, lacking an ideological commitment, members frequently drop out when their relatives are killed, captured, or defect.

The second deficiency revealed in the surveys was the lack of characteristic Communist security and thoroughness in organizing the cells, as demonstrated by the quick breakdown of the structure under pressure. In the village with the highest degree of organization encountered, the survey team identified 30 supporters and rapidly acquired confessions from the cell members. Many interrogees seemed eager to give information and to cooperate with the officials; they informed not only on the organization in their own village, but on others as well. After the questioning by the survey team, about 70 members left the village for district headquarters, voicing fear of Communist reprisals and expressing reluctance to return until a village security unit had been established. Similar results were reported by another survey team.

The apparent unreliability of the infrastructure at the village level has been compounded by a shortage of hard-core leadership, which has prevented the Communists from establishing a government parallel to that of the Royal Thai Government in the provinces and districts of the Northeast. There is evidence that the CPT was organized in 1962 theoretically along regional, provincial, district, and tambon lines, but that the Party has been
unable to find enough personnel to man such an organization. As a consequence, control and direction of insurgent operations relies on an ad hoc organization, and guerrilla commanders must often double as political and military leaders. This lack of an adequate command structure, aggravated by difficulties of communication, is bound to create problems of coordination and to debilitate the insurgency.

Captured documents, for example, have contained references to the CPT's "inadequate understanding" of problems facing the insurgents, and suggest that individual insurgent groups are unaware of where the leadership is coming from. Poverty of central direction is revealed also by a profusion of conflicting nomenclature and ideological terminology. Moreover, coordination among insurgent bands is tenuous.

Other problems beset the movement. Friction between Chinese and Thai members has been continuous since the CPT's founding. Although some effort has been made to appease the Thai members—for example, by appointing Thais to higher committees—the real power at the Party center rests firmly in Chinese hands. The inner circles of the Politburo and the Central Committee are made up predominantly of Chinese who maintain liaison with the Chinese Communist Party and dispose of the Party funds, which emanate primarily from China.

The friction between the Chinese and Thai members is manifested in policy quarrels. Many Thai members still long for a peaceful revolution or do not deem the time ripe for armed revolution. There is evidence that Thai Communists continue to chafe under internal Chinese domination of their Party as well as the external control exercised by Communist China. They believe that the decision to initiate armed revolution reflected primarily a Chinese and North Vietnamese decision to use the CPT as a pawn of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and that Thai national interests are being sacrificed. Evidence suggests that some Thai Communists, even though they do not take open issue with the Party...
command, will tend to "sit on their hands"—for example by invoking a variety of excuses not to go to the Northeast. The Party leadership appears impatiently aware of these shortcomings. Thus, a captured Communist document refers to the cadre as "rather addicted to such traditional vices as stealing, smuggling, fighting, narcotics, gambling, and boasting. They are self-seeking and unwilling to make sacrifices." Even more damaging to clandestine movement, the cadre "cannot keep secrets, even when it has been shown that lives are lost as a result."³

(4) Some of the Party's problems might be overcome by the emergence of a charismatic leader. A former Thai prime minister, Pridi, who fled to China in 1948 and has since remained in exile there, could have filled this need. However, Pridi has apparently refused—he is reported to be opposed to the Maoist strategy for revolutionary war in Thailand.

(5) Lack of sophistication and effectiveness plagues the guerrilla bands themselves. These bands are small, numbering from 20 to 30; they combine occasionally into groups as large as 100 to conduct armed propaganda meetings. Their armament is limited to a variety of small arms ranging from homemade weapons to a few AK-47s. These small bands occupy crude camps in the Phu Phan Mountains—a relatively low range in the Northeast which reaches a maximum altitude of 2,000 feet and extends about 150 miles in the shape of a rough crescent. Potentially, this mountain range, which is generally covered by forest, offers a vast sanctuary, but the scarcity of food in the mountains forces the guerrillas to establish small camps near the villages; their supporting infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to provide a system of logistics reaching deep into the mountains. Since 1967, when the RTG initiated more vigorous offensive operations, the guerrillas have been forced to move frequently—breaking into 10-man bands which slip into areas

not covered by suppressive operations, or retreat into the mountains. Sooner or later they attempt to return to the lowlands to restore contact with their support organization.

As early as 1960, political and military training of promising recruits was commenced in Hoa Binh, west of Hanoi, and in camps in Laos. Since that time an estimated 1,000 recruits have passed through these training courses and have been returned to Thailand. Although some members of this group were drawn from the hill tribes and from the West Central and Mid-South areas, the majority apparently came from Northeast Thailand. In large part, these trainees make up the leadership of the political and military apparatus.

Local military training is usually given to the more promising members of the village cells in the mountain and jungle camps. The training is relatively unsophisticated. Principal attention is given to weapons training, with some instruction in patrol and ambush tactics. As has been pointed out, however, the decision in 1965 to shift into the offensive notwithstanding, military operations have been limited chiefly to shows of force through armed propaganda meetings and assassinations. Thus, ambush is seldom employed, and armed encounters tend to be defensive actions against RTG patrols.

The guerrilla logistics are focused almost entirely on food. Their main sources of food are relatives of the guerrillas, organized in some cases into rudimentary cells. Food is collected by sending guerrillas into villages under cover of darkness, through delivery by village supporters, or through stealthy purchase in the local market. There is some evidence that food is shipped out from villages in which local security forces are stationed. However, there is also considerable evidence that food is a major problem preventing the expansion of the guerrilla bands themselves. Defector reports abound with complaints of lack of food, and hunger is universally cited as a cause of defection.

In general, the testimony of defectors seems to bear out the incompatibility of the Thai culture with the rigorous demands of a
Communist movement, the lack of any deep-seated and dedicated involvement on the part of the Thais with the insurgent movement, and the failure of the insurgents to create a strong village infrastructure. The element of coercion used in initial recruitment tends to encourage defection, particularly in view of the hardships in the guerrilla base areas. Complaints about shortages of food; the failure of the Communists to fulfill their promises of education, money, and other recruiting inducements; separation from families; disagreements with the guerrilla tactics; and the rising pressure of government suppression operations are common threads running through interrogation reports.

A US intelligence evaluation gives the following analysis:

The recent sharp rise in insurgent defections probably results from the disillusionment of recruited support elements who are unable or unwilling to bear the hardships of jungle living. Significantly, however, recent defections have also included fully recruited members of armed guerrilla units. These individuals have indicated various motivations for their defections.

Their debriefings indicate in general that both the absence of strong ideological attachment to the insurgent cause and the element of coercion involved in most initial recruitments encourage defection as the hardships of survival in the jungle bear down on the individual insurgent. Additionally, recent defectors spoke of fear of government attack, dissatisfaction with long separation from their families, and disagreement with a projected shift to more violent tactics as reasons for their defection.

To summarize, the Communist insurgency in the Northeast suffers from the following handicaps:

(1) Friction among the top leaders in the Communist Party of Thailand.

(2) Quantitative and qualitative deficiencies among the leadership which inhibit the ability to direct and coordinate insurgent activities effectively.

5. Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Defections, August 1967. SECRET NOFORN.
(3) A weak and unreliable village infrastructure based upon recruitment by intimidation rather than dedication to the goals of the revolution.

(4) A guerrilla force which lacks sufficient strength to take the offensive.

(5) An inadequate logistics support system.

These deficiencies have prevented the insurgents from establishing political and military control of a geographical area in the Northeast as a base for future expansion.

The contrast between the insurgencies in Thailand and South Vietnam is readily apparent. At the close of the Indochina War in 1954, the Vietnamese Communists had already established a viable, durable, and reliable political and military infrastructure in South Vietnam. This infrastructure controlled extensive base areas, such as Zone D and the Plain of Reeds in the Mekong Delta, and Quantri province on the Coastal Plain—base areas that were denied to the government forces until after the buildup of US military units in 1965. The guerrilla arm was led by veteran military cadre, many of whom were members of the Communist Party and had gained broad experience in military operations against the French. While these forces had been initially small, they were able to extend military and political control over ever-expanding areas. This expanded control gave them a larger base for recruitment, for food, and other support. By 1963, the guerrillas were fielding battalion-size and regiment-size units which contested government forces for control. Clearly, the insurgency in Thailand holds few of these assets and prospects.

It appears, then, that the drastic decrease in incidents of insurgency taking place in the Northeast during the past year cannot be attributed to Communist success in building a viable infrastructure. The probable explanation is that the Communists have recognized their own failures and are now reappraising their tactics.

The picture, however, is by no means completely favorable. Even a relatively inefficient and low-level insurgency can continue
put pressure on the Royal Thai Government and tax its political, economic, and military resources. Moreover, the insurgency could spread. Recent indications of insurgency among the Yao (and possibly the Yao) hill tribes are ominous. Some of the other hill tribes, as well as the sizable Muslim Malay minority of over a million and the Chinese located in the Peninsula, bear serious grievances toward the RTG. There is evidence that an effective infrastructure is in existence among the Malay Communists in the Peninsula, and may be building among the hill tribes. The Communists may choose to violate Mao's doctrine and attempt to enlist the Chinese in Bangkok in an urban insurgency. It must be assumed that the leaders in Peking are fully alert to these opportunities and will attempt to capitalize on them. Their success in exploiting them will depend on the strengths and weaknesses of the RTG political, economic, and military institutions. An evaluation of these strengths and weaknesses follows in Section III.
III
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT

(U) This section evaluates the elements of strength and weakness of the Royal Thai Government, its institutions, and its programs for countering the threat. The analysis includes an assessment of the capability of the economy of Thailand to support the counterinsurgency effort; of the stability of the Royal Thai Government with emphasis on its ability to withstand the pressure of the insurgency; of the adequacy of the concepts and organization for counterinsurgency; and of the effectiveness of measures taken through environmental improvement programs to counter the Communist charge of government neglect. Finally, the adequacy of measures taken to provide security for the villager and the effectiveness of the Royal Thai Army in the conduct of suppression operations against the armed guerrilla bands are appraised. The evaluation focuses on counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast.

A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CAPABILITIES TO COPE WITH THE COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. Economic

(U) A sound economy is an obvious prerequisite for successful counterinsurgency operations. It provides the money and materials required by national strategy, it furnishes possible remedies for causes of popular discontent, and it offers the population hope for the future.

(U) Prudent fiscal policies, a good infrastructure, a responsive private sector willing to invest in the country, a strong demand for the country's agricultural exports, and an adequate inflow of capital from foreign sources have all contributed to
Thailand's emerging prosperity. The country is still poor by US standards, with an average annual income of only $140, but per capita income is rising an impressive 4.5 percent a year despite an annual population increase of 3.2 percent.

(U) The Thai economy as a whole is growing at an average annual rate of 7.5 percent, a performance which is outstanding in Southeast Asia and which places the nation in the first rank of less-developed countries throughout the world. Prospects for continued growth are generally bright, although the estimated rate of expansion for the period 1967 to 1971 has recently been revised from an optimistic 8.5 percent to 6 to 7 percent as a result of droughts, floods, and dips in several world commodity prices.

(FOUO) Thailand has recently increased its expenditures for counterinsurgency, but the net diversion of funds from developmental activities will produce only a slight reduction in the expected growth rate of the economy. The United States directly reinforces Thailand's economic capability to support the counterinsurgency by contributing substantial economic and military assistance (the approximate financial equivalent of US aid in FY 1968 amounted to 12 percent of the entire Thai budget for that year). A comprehensive US Embassy to Thailand analysis has concluded that the Royal Thai Government can increase its projected total expenditures (including counterinsurgency expenditures) by approximately 5 percent for the period FY 1968 through FY 1971 without risking serious inflationary pressures.

(U) The Thai economy, therefore, is basically sound and is expanding rapidly. Thanks in part to US economic and military assistance, it supports the current level of counterinsurgency expenditures well and is capable of sustaining a higher level of effort without serious strain. In economic terms, the only effect of the insurgent threat has been a slight reduction in the government's economic development appropriations to pay for increased security expenses, and a diversion of some development funds to border areas where the economic returns are marginal. The
insurgency has so far not reduced the willingness of domestic and foreign investors to place their capital in the Thai economy.

(U) Although the economic outlook is generally favorable, there are sectoral and regional weaknesses in the Thai economy which require strengthening to eliminate grounds for economic discontent and to improve the economic capability to support a prolonged counterinsurgency effort. The major weakness in the Thai economy is in the agricultural sector, where additional incentives and assistance are needed to enable farmers to intensify and diversify their production. Without increased production of marketable crops (rice in particular), the 80 percent of the total population who depend directly on agriculture for their livelihood will not begin to share equitably in the new wealth which is accompanying the economic development of the nation. Agriculture is the mainspring of the Thai economy, still furnishing one-third of the Gross Domestic Product and earning three-fourths of the foreign exchange obtained through export sales, but agricultural production is now advancing less rapidly than that of the manufacturing and other industrial sectors, and the rural population is becoming relatively poorer at the same time that it becomes absolutely a little wealthier. The growing disparity in incomes between urban and rural areas could have sharp implications in the face of an insurgency which draws its strategic impetus from Mao Tse-tung.

(U) Closely linked to the broader weaknesses in the agricultural sector are the economic deficiencies in the outlying regions. Considerably less favored by nature and farther from the center of trade, the rural areas in the Northeast, North, and South suffer accentuations and harsh variations of the adverse conditions found in the Central Valley. The poorest region in the country is the Northeast, where the Communist insurgency is currently the most widespread. Next poorest is the North, where small but intense uprisings have broken out among the hill tribes. The third poorest is of course the South, where the Communists have established a
strong presence. A sharp increase in the present emphasis on agricultural production in Thailand can help to improve income and living conditions in all the remote regions, as well as in the Central Valley.

(U) A shortage of trained manpower pervades all sectors of the Thai economy and will emerge as an increasingly serious constraint on development as the economy simultaneously expands and becomes more complex. Since a major foreseeable limitation on economic development implies a corresponding degradation of the counterinsurgency effort in time, the need for increased investment in secondary and advanced education, vocational schooling, and in-service training is obvious.

(FOUO) The detailed economic analysis presented in Volume II of this study suggests the following conclusions:

(1) The Thai economy is capable of supporting the present level of counterinsurgency effort with only a slight reduction in the expected rate of national economic growth.

(2) The Royal Thai Government could increase its projected total expenditures (including counterinsurgency expenditures) for the period FY 1969 through FY 1971 by approximately 5 percent without risking serious inflationary pressures. (For comparison, Thai expenditures on the Armed Forces currently account for about 15 percent of the national budget.)

2. Political

(U) Successful counterinsurgency operations require a stable and effective government with the capability to plan, coordinate, lead, and sustain the total effort. The Royal Thai Government is generally both stable and effective, especially in comparison with the governments of other Southeast Asian countries. Its strengths--and its weaknesses--stand out clearly when attention is focused on four key areas: (1) groups and institutions, (2) the Royal Thai Government, (3) national policy, and (4) local administration.¹

¹. These four areas are discussed in detail in Volume II, Part I, "Politics and Administration."

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By far the greatest barrier in Thailand to a successful Communist insurgency has been the basic contentment of the ethnic Thai. His economic satisfaction, his sense of well-being derived from his religion and culture, and his general acceptance of established authority do not provide the Communist organizer with many openings to exploit. Only in some areas in the Northeast where the Thai villager lives in a bare subsistence economy are there any genuine grievances to capitalize upon.

On the other hand, the ethnic minorities, including the Chinese, Malays, North Vietnamese, and hill tribes are susceptible in varying degrees to subversive influences and, as such, constitute a potential source of instability. These minorities and their grievances can fuel the insurgency to the point where it could place a much heavier burden on the government. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they could in and of themselves pose a vital threat to the security of the government as long as the great majority of the Thai people continue, as they have in the past, to support their government.

The Thai civil service is another major asset of the Royal Thai Government. Politically neutral, staffed by an educated and highly-motivated elite, and administering a wide range of national programs and services, the civil service has done much to maintain the stability and continuity of the government since 1932.

The stabilizing influence of the civil service notwithstanding, a potential weakness in the Thai political system stems from the absence of regularized procedures for passing of power from one administration to another. Since the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932, changes in government have taken place only through the expedient of the top-level coup, in which power is grasped by one faction in the ruling elite from another. These periodic coups have not resulted in a breakdown of government and political chaos, but the possibility remains.

2. See Volume II, Part III, "The Susceptibility of the Thai Peasant to Communism at Present and in the Immediate Future."
(U) There are encouraging trends which may alleviate or eliminate this potential weakness in the Thai political system. Many influential Thais, most notably the King, have felt the need for broadening the base of representation within the government and regulating the transfer of power. This recognition is mixed, at the same time, with an awareness that a Western-style democracy cannot be introduced overnight in Thailand. The Thais remember past political chaos triggered by experimentations with democracy, such as the period from 1946 to 1951.

(U) The new constitution, in preparation for the past nine years, has been accepted by the military regime, and sent to the King for his signature and promulgation. The constitution provides for a liberalization of the political process and for the regularization of the passage of power. However, it also provides for a strong executive in order to ensure the continuation of stable government. When promulgated and implemented, this instrument should mitigate a potential source of government instability.

(U) The close ties between the Royal Thai Government and the United States are another political feature with important implications for stability. The present alliance with the United States, which represents a sharp departure from previous traditions of flexibility and nonalignment, entails both apparent advantages and drawbacks. American economic and military assistance has certainly contributed to the security and prosperity of the country. At the same time, the identification of the Royal Thai Government with the United States makes its leaders vulnerable to US policy shifts. Specifically, negotiations with North Vietnam over the future of South Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia) have strong implications for US-RTG relations as well as for the future government of Thailand. If a Vietnam settlement should establish North Vietnam-in de facto control of the line of the Mekong, the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, either separately or in concert, could sharply increase pressures on the Royal Thai Government through intensification of insurgency in Thailand, supported by external threats.
In this event the Royal Thai Government might have to choose between two alternatives—to accommodate with China and North Vietnam or to seek direct US intervention in Thailand. The decision of the Royal Thai Government would probably turn on the appraisal of its leaders as to the willingness of the United States to become directly involved through the commitment of military forces, as well as on the extent to which the Royal Thai Government feels its policies and interests to be entwined with those of the United States. At this writing, the Royal Thai Government would have extreme difficulty in gauging confidently the credibility of a massive US commitment to Thailand's abiding defense. On the other hand, the elite now ruling Thailand may deem the country's fortunes so closely linked with the United States that they could not readily sever the ties. In either event—whether the Royal Thai Government chooses to reach an accommodation with the Communists or to resist Communist pressure in the hope that the United States would come to the rescue—the Royal Thai Government would be subjected to stresses and strains that would materially weaken the country's stability and consequently its capability for resistance.

(U) On balance it is concluded that the Royal Thai Government has sufficient stability to plan, coordinate, and implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy. However in the event that the external support of the insurgency provided by Peking and Hanoi should be increased by an order of magnitude, this stability would be severely taxed.

B. CONCEPTS AND ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

(U) Having concluded that, barring drastic external changes, the basic stability so fundamental to a successful counterinsurgency effort exists in Thailand, it remains necessary to examine the performance of the Royal Thai Government in evolving a concept, priorities and programs for implementation of the concept, and the organizational structure for coordination of the counterinsurgency effort.
A successful counterinsurgency demands that many agencies and departments of the government participate in a coordinated effort and that this coordination be carried out effectively at both the national and regional levels. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, the traditional centralization of authority in Thailand at the Bangkok level tends to inhibit initiative and coordination at the local levels of administration in the province and the district. This tendency is reinforced by the deference of inferior to superior, an ingrained cultural characteristic derived from Buddhism. Loath to act on their own authority, regional officials tend to regard themselves strictly as implementers and not innovators.

The traditional centralization of authority is reflected in and strengthened by the vertical orientation of the ministries and departments. Representatives of the various ministries tend to report directly through the ministerial chain of command rather than to the district or provincial chief official, thus stinting the lateral coordination required for effective counterinsurgency operations at the province and district levels where the insurgency must be fought.

Defects in initiative and coordination do not stop at the city limits of Bangkok. Rivalry and factionalism between individuals and cliques in the capital, as noted above, place limits on the arbitrariness of the government, but they also debilitate effective interministerial coordination. The necessity of keeping the political system in equilibrium—that is, preventing any individual or clique from achieving an inordinate share of power—is in itself an obstacle to any attempt to establish a coordinating agency which, in order to be effective, would perforce have to assume broad powers over the entire RTG administration.

With the outbreak of insurgency in the Northeast in 1961, the RTG acted to evolve a concept for counterinsurgency, to draft programs consistent with that concept, and to establish coordinating machinery for execution of the programs. By 1962 a broad concept stressing prevention and suppression had been formulated and a supra
agency, the National Security Command, had been created with the miss-
ion of coordinating prevention and suppression efforts. The object
of the prevention mission was to strengthen relations between the RTG
and the local population by providing general economic and social ser-
vice and local security against the insurgents. The suppression mission
was defined as one of putting pressure on the guerrilla bands by
offensive operations conducted by police and paramilitary forces.

This basic concept of gaining the support of the villager
through environmental improvement and security, at the same time
that offensive military operations are being aimed against the insur-
geants, remains in effect today (with the exception of efforts in
the Northern region, which will be discussed below). As might be
expected, these programs to implement the concept, appraised in
greater detail in the subsequent sections, have undergone a series
of changes. Suffice it to state here that the Royal Thai Government
must be credited with evolving a basically sound concept at a rela-
tively early stage in the insurgency.

The structure for coordination of the counterinsurgency
effort has evolved from the National Security Command in 1962 to the
Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) in 1965. In addition,
the CSOC has undergone a series of organizational and mission changes
since 1965. These changes have been prompted in part by politics
and in part by revealed organizational deficiencies. Specifically,
the dissatisfaction of the Royal Thai Army with the major military
planning role which supposedly had been assured by the CSOC led to
the return of this function to the Army. Deficiencies in the represen-
tation of the various ministries and departments involved in
environmental improvement were partially remedied by upgrading and
broadening representation in the CSOC. An intelligence structure
was also added and an interrogation capability incorporated. The
organizational concept of the CSOC as it appears today seems funda-
mentally sound.3

3. For a detailed description of the evolution of CSOC, see
Volume IV, Appendix B, "Coordination of Counterinsurgency Planning
and Programs."
Nevertheless, the future role of the CSOC is somewhat obscure. In late 1967 there were indications of dissatisfaction with the broad CSOC role, as evidenced by a move to restore the National Security Command as the principal policy-making body for the counterinsurgency. As of March 1968, the views of the US official community on the role of the CSOC varied widely. Some US observers held that the NSC might well recapture the policy-making role; there was also some feeling that the CSOC and the NSC might be merged. Others were of the opinion that the recent withdrawal of some US financial support for the CSOC might tend to reduce its role. Still others predicted that the CSOC would continue its role of direction and coordination of the counterinsurgency effort. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that the RTG clearly recognized the need for continuing a coordinated civil-military approach to the counterinsurgency effort and that a formal coordinating structure such as the CSOC must continue in operation.

The organization for coordination at the Northeast regional level, CPML, also came in for its share of reorganization. In October 1967, General Dongcherm, the Second Army commander in the Northeast region, whose only responsibilities for counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast had been those of furnishing-military units, military staff assistance, and logistic support to CPML, was directed to assume command of the regional counterinsurgency effort. Accordingly, CPML was replaced by a provisional Second Army Headquarters Forward under General Dongcherm's direct command.

As indicated earlier, this dramatic shift of responsibility for direction and coordination of the regional effort was of concern to US officials in Bangkok and Washington. Did it indicate the abandonment of a coordinated civil-military approach for one of "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort?

A precise reason for this shift is difficult to identify in the light of the intricacies of Thai politics. Nevertheless, there are several plausible explanations. In the first place, the RTG was dissatisfied with the counterinsurgency effort. While the insurgency
in the Northeast appeared to have been blunted, it was still far from under control. In addition, the spread of the insurgency to the Mid-South and the West Central regions, coupled with evidence of Communist penetration of the M'eo hill tribe in the North, no doubt contributed to the uneasiness of key government officials.

(8) It was also clear that the Civil Affairs Division of the CSOC, with ministerial representation from elements of the RTG, had failed to perform effectively. This deficiency was duplicated at the civilian level in the provinces. Finally, it was apparent that the paramilitary and police lacked sufficient resources to provide the required security. Until expansion of police and paramilitary programs caught up with the demand—and this was a long way off—the only forces available to fill this gap would have to come from the Army.

(8) Probably the main reason for the shift, however, was the Royal Thai Army’s concern over the loss of influence and direction of the military effort. The CSOC Directorate of Operations, under Lt. General Siyud, not only was coordinating the civilian and military effort, but had largely taken over the normal military planning role, thereby cutting out the RTA headquarters in Bangkok and the Second Army in the Northeast. This was unacceptable to the Army. Undoubtedly the RTA viewed the major expansion of the police and the establishment of Provincial Police Special Action Forces and Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons as intrusions into its domain. Strains placed on the officer corps to man the various counterinsurgency organizations, including the CSOC, were also a factor, particularly in light of the impending deployment of a reinforced battalion to South Vietnam. The necessity for martial law in order to provide a legal basis for the Royal Thai Army to engage in battle within Thailand also was relevant.

(5) In any case, the political leverage of the RTA was sufficient to bring the Army back into a dominant role in military planning. General Praphat, head of the CSOC and the RTA, either willingly sided with his Army subordinates or gave way under pressure, and the

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Second Army "takeover" of the regional coordination role in the Northeast became an accomplished fact.

The powers delegated to General Dongchem in his charter for regional coordination did little to still the apprehensions of US officials of a "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort. The military was given authority to issue instructions to police, civil, and government officials with regard to counterinsurgency operations as specified in the 9th Article of Martial Law, which states that "military have power over civilians in matters pertaining to maintenance of peace; civilians must obey tactical requirements of military officers" and "because military have authority over civilians in areas of effective martial law, all development and security programs conducted as part of the suppression campaign must go through Second Army." However, there was a mitigating note in the statement that "usually military officers should not interfere with civilian operations, except when operational necessity demands." 4

It is clear, then, that the broad powers delegated to the Royal Thai Army, if arbitrarily executed, could have led to a serious dislocation of a coordinated effort. Civil programs addressed development and security and could have easily been thrown into disorder, with serious implications for a successful counterinsurgency effort.

Initially, General Dongchem's actions may have confirmed these fears. Summoning the provincial governors and regional police commanders to his headquarters, he informed them that he was assuming full responsibility for the entire counterinsurgency effort. The reaction of the governors was ambivalent. On the one hand they resented the intrusion of the army into what they deemed a civil responsibility. On the other hand, they evidently were also relieved by the presence of a powerful individual who could share responsibilities for failures.—General Dongchem's summary abolition of

4. See Volume IV, Appendix B, "Coordination of Counterinsurgency Planning and Programs."
the posts of Deputy Commander of CPM-1, one of which had been occupied by a high-ranking civil servant and the other by the regional chief of the Provincial Police, and the substitution of advisory posts exacerbated their resentment. The regional police force reacted by withdrawing its support and cooperation.

Nevertheless, as time passed it became increasingly apparent that the military did not intend to interfere with the direction of the civil effort for security and development. Specifically, they did not intervene in the rural development programs of the governors. Similarly, the responsibilities of the governors for local security in their provinces were left intact, except for areas of high guerrilla concentrations. The broad powers to substitute military courts for civil jurisdiction were not exercised, nor were curfews or road patrols instituted. Similarly, the responsibilities of the police were not altered, and the intelligence responsibilities of the Special Branch and Provincial Police were not usurped. In short, civil responsibilities continued as they had in the past.

The restraint exercised by the military in dealing with problems in the Northeast has overcome much of the initial resentment among the civil officials. General Donchcherm has established effective working relations with 13 of the 15 provincial governors in the Northeast. The exceptions are Governor Phat of Ubon province and Governor Bodaeng of Sakon Nakhon. Since Governor Phat has apparently implemented the most effective counterinsurgency programs of security and development in the Northeast, largely on his own initiative and with minimal resources, this rift is not serious. Nor may the rift with Governor Bodaeng prove damaging, since the latter is scheduled to retire during 1968. There are indications also that the animosity of the police toward the Second Army takeover is waning and is gradually being replaced by a spirit of cooperation.

It appears clear, then, that the "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort in the Northeast has not resulted in undue military domination of the effort or a breakdown of the coordinated approach to the problem. Military operations have made use of the
sparse forces available to fragment and attrite the guerrilla strength, rejecting the nonproductive tactics of large sweeps in favor of saturation patrols. Troops have been held under firm discipline, and the Royal Thai Army has improved its image among the villagers.

The civil-police-military organization (CPM) subordinate to the CSOC chain of command has continued in seven provinces and their subordinate districts in the Northeast without fundamental change. The structure appears sound. The RTG has taken steps to correct deficiencies in the territorial administration by increasing the number of officials assigned and by selecting high-caliber men. Evidence suggests that in sharp contrast to previous years, service in the Northeast is now considered as a "status symbol" by the civil service.

Coordination of the environmental improvement and security programs is slowly improving. The required dynamic leadership is beginning to emerge. An example is Governor Phat of Ubon province in the Northeast, where counterinsurgency programs are considered to be the most effective in the Northeast. Another forceful leader is Mr. Saijit, chief of one of Ubon's districts (and now Deputy Governor of Ubon), who developed a defector program which is credited with making major inroads in the guerrilla strength in northern Ubon.

The RTG concept developed in 1962 for countering the insurgency, consisting of environmental improvement and security of the villagers, appeared to be applicable to the hill tribes of the northern border regions as well as to the ethnic Thai. With the assistance and support of the United States, the RTG in the late 1950's had adopted a policy of modest development and civil action among the tribal groups. The responsibility for implementing this program was assigned to the Border Patrol Police, the only agency of the RTG which had contact with the hill tribes. As was pointed out above, however, in December 1967 when insurgent operations surfaced in the North, the RTG response was immediate and heavy handed. Suppression operations included the napalm of at least one Meo village and the forced resettlement of many Meo villagers. It appears, however,
that the government is now reassessing its approach toward the hill tribes, and there are indications that it will return to a policy of modest development, along with greater restraint in suppression operations.

Thus in sum, therefore, the RTG has developed what appears to be an effective organizational concept for counterinsurgency. The structure for coordinating counterinsurgency operations at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels of administration seems to be sound. The assignment of a military commander to head the regional organization in the Northeast has not led to a "militarization" of the counterinsurgency effort: rather, coordinated civil and military programs have continued. Coordination, however, continues to be handicapped by the characteristic lack of initiative of subordinate Thai officials, the tendency of the RTG to centralize decision-making at the Bangkok level, and by the reluctance of local officials to coordinate their operations in the provinces and districts. Nevertheless, leadership is beginning to emerge which encourages initiative and promises to overcome some of the time-honored barriers to coordination, especially at the crucial local levels.

C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT

(U) The Royal Thai Government invokes a variety of special economic and social development programs to support the counterinsurgency effort in critical rural areas. These environmental improvement programs are now operating chiefly in the villages of the Northeast, with priorities assigned to road construction, improvement of health, and stimulation of agricultural production. Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) is the most important single program in the effort.

5. See Volume IV, Appendix E, "Environmental Improvement," for a description of these programs.
(U) The prime objective of the environmental improvement effort is political—to help win or retain the support of the rural population in the fight against Communist insurgency. The political motivation, relatively short-term outlook, and local orientation of these programs distinguish them from the conventional long-range economic and social development programs of the Royal Thai Government, which also play a part in the counterinsurgency effort.

(U) The question is sometimes raised as to whether a major political goal can be achieved by means of programs that are predominantly economic and social in content. In the Thai context, two special considerations make the programs a political necessity. First, if the government fails to take action to improve incomes and living conditions in insurgency areas, the Communists will inevitably continue to exploit the situation to their own political advantage by charging "Government neglect." Second, the processes of economic development and environmental improvement are already under way in the Northeast, people are generally aware of the programs and their goals, and some of the villagers have experienced beneficial results. If the programs stop or stall now, discontent can be expected even without the intercession of Communist agitators. The Royal Thai Government therefore has no reasonable alternative but to press on toward the current objective, adjusting the emphasis, organization, and pace of the effort where necessary to meet changing situations.

(U) The pattern of emphasis of the environmental improvement effort is basically valid, as pointed out below. Two areas in which the application of additional effort might substantially increase overall effectiveness are also noted.

(U) The present geographical emphasis on the insurgency-threatened villages of the Northeast is sound—as has been pointed out. The Northeast is the poorest region of Thailand, it contains a third of the nation's population, it has traditionally attracted a smaller proportion of RTG expenditures than any other region, and it is the most beset with insurgency.
(FOUO) There should be additional stress on the North, however. Much of the goodwill built up by years of arduous civic action among the hill tribes in that region has been lost through the recent suppression campaign. To regain lost goodwill and to counteract further Communist infiltration in the North, the Border Patrol Police Remote Area Security Development program should be intensified and expanded, not cut as present plans contemplate.

(U) The functional emphasis on roadbuilding, health improvement, and stimulation of agriculture is sound from a developmental point of view. It also meets the main "wants and needs" of the Thai villagers, as determined in various surveys, although the road network will have to be enlarged before increased attention can be paid to the villagers' chief requirement—more and better water supply and control facilities. (Water development projects are spread among a variety of programs in the Thai system, and it is difficult to identify them as a separate activity.)

(U) The emphasis on Accelerated Rural Development, the largest single program in the effort, also appears well placed. The ARD program is an omnibus activity concerned with road construction, water development, health improvement, and increased agricultural production. It provides coordination to the overall effort, especially at the provincial level, has backing in the highest Bangkok circles, and appears to be working effectively. One of the ARD programs, now in the pilot stage, may prove capable of stimulating rather dramatic increases in agricultural production in the Northeast. This is the Agricultural Package Program, modeled on successful experiments in India and the United States. If the program shows promise, it will be desirable to expand it substantially, since improvement of conditions in the Northeast is firmly bound to growth in agriculture.

(U) The organization of the environmental improvement effort is uneven by Western standards, but it has served to get the programs into the field quite rapidly, and it appears adequate at the present level of intensity and complexity of the counterinsurgency effort.
The organization undoubtedly reflects skillful accommodation to the realities of Thai politics, in which new accretions of power are regarded warily. The proposed Northeast Economic Development Plan may lead to closer coordination of planning and implementation of activities at the regional level, which would appear desirable. It is hoped that projected increases in the environmental improvement effort will particularly strengthen staffing at the district level in order to get more projects into the villages—the target of the effort.

(FOXO) The impact of the effort is ultimately governed by the level of its financial support. The RTG environmental improvement programs, including US support, will cost an estimated $153 million for the three-year period, FY 1967 through FY 1969. The FY 1969 estimated cost of $67.6 million represents more than a 50 percent increase over the FY 1967 and FY 1968 costs, thus indicating a sharp acceleration of effort in the near future. Since the developmental problems faced by the effort are enormous and the political problems should not be viewed with complacency, the contemplated increase in pace appears prudent.

(FOXO) It should be noted that the RTG is giving the effort considerable financial support. The RTG share of the $153 million three-year cost is equivalent to about 10 percent of the cost of the total contemplated RTG economic and social development effort, including the special programs, for the period. That effort, in turn, accounts for about 32 percent of the Thai national budget. When the RTG and US contributions are considered together, they represent a sizable increase in investment in formerly neglected border regions like the Northeast. US assistance to the environmental improvement effort and to other RTG programs has enabled Thailand to pursue its long-range developmental policies and to attain an economic growth rate which is itself an important asset in the fight against Communist insurgency.

(U) Although it is extremely difficult to gauge precisely the results of the environmental improvement effort, even on the economic
and social level, there is little doubt that the programs have produced a favorable, if geographically limited, impact on incomes and living conditions. Unfortunately, the developmental problems facing the Royal Thai Government in the outlying regions and especially in the Northeast are of such magnitude that no imaginable programs could lift those entire regions to the level of the Central Plain in the space of a few years. Politically, in areas where the programs have operated, what discontent there was appears to have been diminished, and the loyalty of the villagers to the Royal Thai Government seems to have been strengthened.

D. POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

This section contains an analysis of the missions and tasks of the Thai police and paramilitary forces which in the light of past experience and the Thai environment could be most effective against insurgency. Broad guidance is also developed for structuring, organizing, training, and equipping police and paramilitary forces to cope with the current level of insurgency as well as plausible increases in the threat.

1. Evolution of the RTG Program for Police and Paramilitary Forces

A salient characteristic of insurgencies in general is that they invariably erupt initially in areas remote from government influence and control—areas in which civil administration, including police forces, is minimal or nonexistent. The insurgency in Thailand is no exception.

When insurgency began in Northeast Thailand, the only forces of law and order on the scene were the district police—typically a force of about 40 constables was responsible for a district with 25 to 150 villages, covering an area as large as 700 square miles, and with a population reaching 70,000 or more. Inadequate to protect the villagers from bandits and thieves, these tiny forces were all the more helpless against armed insurgents.

A standard problem facing a government combating insurgency is how to fashion the forces charged with the basic task of village
security. Two broad choices are open: regular military units can be charged with the task, or police and paramilitary units can be created or expanded to carry out the mission. Experience gives the nod to the latter alternative; the comparative advantages lie in economy of force, continuity of operations, and effective intelligence. Economy of force favors the assignment of paramilitary forces because static security can be provided by forces with lower standards of training than those boasted by regular combat forces. Paramilitary forces provide for greater continuity of operations because army units may be shifted in response to the changing demands of the tactical situation, and in any event individual members of the regular forces tend regularly to be transferred through promotion or other occupational demands. This lack of continuity on the part of regular forces inhibits their effectiveness in key local counterinsurgency operations, including intelligence.

(U) The rationale for the composition of reaction forces to reinforce village security units is not as clear. The training of regular military forces fits them for such a mission. Here, too, however, lack of continuity becomes a penalty inasmuch as the patrol missions typically assigned to reaction forces require familiarity with the local area. This fact, along with the desirability of concentrating regular military forces in offensive operations, favors the organization and training of paramilitary forces as backup for village defense units.

(U) The basic counterinsurgency planning of the RTG has followed the above rationale. In 1965, a program was adopted providing for the expansion of a police presence from the district down to the tambon level. The goal was to provide a police post of 20 constables in 1,150 of the 5,000 tambons by 1970. Of this number, 592 tambon police posts were to be established in the 1,273 tambons in the Northeast. The implementation of various programs requires an increase in total strength from 56,000 in 1966 to about 100,000 in 1972.
(U) The next step was the callup of selected members of the Thailand "National Guard," the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), in early 1966. Later in October, two programs for village defense were adopted as the result of US initiative and support—the Peoples' Assistance Teams (PATs) and the Village Security Officers (VSOs). In the same year, reaction units were formed to act as backup forces for the tambon police posts and Border Police patrols. These forces are known as Special Action Forces (SAF) in the Provincial Police and Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP) in the Border Patrol Police. To provide mobility for these reaction forces, the police undertook to bolster their Air Division with increases in their inventory of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

(C) In 1967, the 0910 Plan assigned the task of village security for the 180 villages in the 0910 target areas to composite teams of VDC, police, and elements of the Army; an infantry platoon was deployed to each of the 11 target areas for the reaction role. In late 1967, RTG and US officials analyzed the lessons learned from the VSO and PAT programs. Their conclusion was that additional screening of personnel and improved training were necessary—not only in security but also in the related fields of intelligence and community development. It was also concluded that higher standards of performance in turn required more effective small arms and more regular compensation for services.

(2) In early January 1968, the RTG decided to implement a village security program which had been conceived by US officials in Bangkok and which incorporated the lessons learned from previous village security efforts. The goal of this program was to organize and train 2,000 village security teams of four to 14 men each by 1972, with the intermediate goal of 220 teams during 1968.

(U) The problem of providing security among the hill tribes in the rugged mountainous regions of the North is more difficult than in the ethnic Thai villages in the Lowlands. There are about 1,200 hill tribe villages in the North which, for the most part, can be reached only on foot or by helicopter. In 1955, the government
decided to establish a presence in the area through the newly formed Border Patrol Police. Since that period, the Border Patrol Police have conducted patrols and launched a modest development program designed to win the support or, at least, passivity, of the hill tribes. Communications in the area have been improved by construction of helicopter and light-aircraft landing areas. Experience in this program has given the Border Patrol Police a better understanding of the hill tribes and their problems and generally has made them reasonably effective within the limitations of the available personnel resources.

2. Current Status for Security Programs in the Northeast

The RTG progress in achieving village security can be best illustrated by examining a typical district in a province of the Northeast, Nakae, with a high level of insurgency. Nakae district in Nakhom Phanom province encompasses a part of the Phu Phan Mountains and the foothills and lowlands to the north. It commands an area of about 700 square miles with a population of about 70,000. About 21 of Nakae's 113 villages are protected by VDC or VSO security units, while seven are guarded by small regular army units. Five of the 11 tambons now have a police post. By the end of 1968, two 12-man VDC squads will be located in each tambon to act as a local patrol and reaction force. In addition, three 40-man VDC Platoons will be available at the district level as a patrol and reaction force. There are no Provincial Police Special Action Forces or Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons in the district. Once the tambon VDC and district forces are emplaced, total civil security manpower in the district will be about 1,000. (See Figure 5.)

3. Evaluation of the Village Security Program

The precise nature of the insurgent threat to the villages is difficult to measure.
FIGURE 5 (C). Rural Security Forces in Amphur Nokae (U)

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have seldom engaged in direct attacks on villages. In 1967, armed propaganda meetings in the villages were extensively employed. However, as previously noted, the incidence of these meetings decreased sharply in the fall of 1967 and in the first three months of 1968. In view of the limited number of overt attacks on villages in the Northeast, one could argue that the necessity for village security has not been demonstrated. However, even if evidence of overt insurgency pressure is not significant, and even if the insurgency in the Northeast is considered relatively weak (as this study concludes), prudence dictates that village security be strengthened against the possibility of a rising level of insurgency. Nevertheless, if the Nakae sample is reasonably accurate, it would appear that only 25 percent of the villages are protected. The remainder must be secured by a combination of offensive patrol and ambush operations by tambon and district VDC units, police, and regular army units, at least until such time as the Village Security Force program is complete. Unfortunately, only 220 of the 15,000 villages in the entire Northeast, in addition to the 550 already provided with security, are slated to receive VSF security units in 1968; the entire program, if it goes according to schedule, will provide security for only about 2,000 villages by 1972. Some interim measures, therefore, seem in order.

(1) Two such interim measures suggest themselves. The first of these is a concept of active and collective defense of clusters of villages concentrated in a small geographical area, rather than the static defense of each individual village. In Nakae district--specifically in four of the 14 tambons centered astride the main east-west highway--several village concentrations are candidates for this type of defense. One example shows 10 villages located in a rough rectangle measuring three by four miles. These villages could be given some degree of protection by deploying tambon VDC and police squads in random patterns of night patrols and ambushes.

(2) The second interim measure would be to capitalize on the desire and tradition of the villagers to contribute to their own
defense through a local "home guard." It is true that the "home guard" approach has been largely discarded because of deficiencies, including the loss of some weapons to the insurgents. Nevertheless, there are examples of success—e.g., in the program adopted by Governor Phat of Ubon. Perhaps the key merit of a "home guard" program is its likely attraction to the local "foot-loose youth" and its prospect of thus denying them to the guerrilla movement. A village survey conducted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency during 1967 indicates that these youth

want to join organizations which give them a privilege to bear arms, particularly modern weapons. This feeling is especially strong among those in the late teens' and in the early twenties'. They are among the most excited groups about new developments—village patrol teams, VSO, VDC, etc.—and they tend to be more eager to accept new ideas and urban influence. Because of this strong desire to be a part of larger organizations, young people now can be a dangerous two-edged sword. Failure on the part of the RRO to recruit, train, and organize or stabilize these people to play a more important and more fruitful role for the country, may result in general disillusion with the Government. They may jump into the Communist-oriented Front Organizations and fancy themselves as a force of "national liberation"—again playing a "patriotic role" to "liberate" the country out of "fascism, corruption, and U.S. occupation."7

punishment. The suspicion is widespread among villagers that the police are open to bribes. A more general, and probably more important, complaint of the villagers is that the police do not behave "correctly" toward them, and tend to act in an arbitrary and authoritarian manner.

These complaints are recognized by the Royal Thai Government and attempts are being made to upgrade the police image by improving their performance and attitude toward the villagers. Nevertheless, images change slowly and improvements are also likely to be slow. Therefore, the expansion of the police posts to the tambon level may well carry with it a counterproductive impact.

The second constraint relates to the fact that the village security programs have been organized under the Department of Local Administration rather than under police jurisdiction. As a result, the necessary cooperation between village security units and the police tambon posts may suffer. A concerted effort is necessary to ensure a coordinated working relationship between village security units and the police if the two programs are to achieve their potential.

4. Conclusions

This section has touched briefly on the overall missions and tasks of the Thai police and paramilitary forces and suggested guidelines for their future development. This subject is treated more fully in Volume IV, Appendix D, "Police, Village Security, and Paramilitary Programs." The following conclusions are derived from the previous discussion and Appendix D:

(1) The RTG concept for providing rural security through increased police presence at the tambon level, organization and support of an indigenous village security force, and civil controlled police and village security forces to combat small insurgent bands is in accordance with experience gained in other insurgencies and is considered basically sound.

(2) The orientation of RTG police programs is also appropriate for the long haul and planned expansions should be continued. Current plans should be broadened
to include extending a police presence to additional tambons beyond the 1,150 now planned.

(3) The performance and requirements of the Police Air Division should be closely monitored and coordinated with RTA and RTAF helicopter-lift capabilities. The provision of additional helicopter-mobility capability may at some point be more effective than marginal increases in police, paramilitary, and military force levels.

(4) Efforts to ensure fair and just treatment of the population by the police in order to improve the police image require continued RTG emphasis.

(5) Village Security Force program goals, by their sophistication (requirements for eight weeks training at a central VSF school, employment of VSF on a full-time basis, and the like) are causing and may continue to cause delays in providing protection to security-sensitive villages. As interim measures, consideration should be given to: a concept of active and collective defense of those villages which are concentrated in a small geographic area, utilizing VDC and other local security resources in random patterns of night patrols and ambushes; and exploiting the capability of the local villagers for security by the formation of "home guard" units under the supervision of the district, with arms and funding provided by the Royal Thai Government.

(6) The Border Patrol Police capabilities for remote area development and security should be further exploited, particularly vis-a-vis the hill tribes in the North. The expansion of the Border Patrol Police to fulfill this role warrants consideration.

(7) The Provincial Police Special Action Forces and the Border Patrol Police Mobile Reserve Platoons provide an appropriate contribution for long-haul security of the rural areas of Thailand in an insurgency atmosphere. They ensure a permanent tactical capability in a given geographic area and can function independently under police control or as a part of joint counterinsurgency forces in high threat areas where military commitment has been necessary. Expansion beyond the programmed 24 Mobile Reserve Platoons and 36 Special Action Forces should be based upon an increased insurgent threat. The immediate goal should be to improve equipment and maintain training and inspection procedures which assure maximum effectiveness from existing police-paramilitary forces.

(8) The VDC Special District Company program being supported by the US Military Assistance Program, if implemented and supported as planned, will provide a positive contribution to the improvement of rural security. The RTG ability to activate and deactivate VDC units provides a flexible means of countering variable insurgent threat levels.
(3) Provisions for country-wide rural security in Thailand cannot await development of insurgent threats, but must be pursued on a priority basis throughout the country in order to ensure physical and psychological security for all the people.

E. ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES

(U) This section analyzes the missions and tasks of the Thai military forces which, in light of past experience, could be most effective against insurgency, and develops broad guidance for structuring, organizing, equipping, and training Thai military forces to cope with the current levels of insurgency, as well as selected levels of insurgency growth and activity within Thailand.

(U) The nature of the insurgency in Thailand dictates that the Royal Thai Army perform the principal offensive military role. Accordingly, this analysis concentrates on the Army. The evaluation is based on the lessons learned from a number of insurgencies as set forth in "Military Strategy and Tactics of Low-Level Insurgency," Volume III, Section III.8

1. Mission and Tasks of the Royal Thai Armed Forces

(U) The history of past insurgencies, particularly those in Indochina, illuminates the vital need of arresting the expansion of guerrilla forces from small units into large, conventionally organized and equipped forces of a regular character. Unless such expansion is arrested, the insurgent forces grow ultimately to a size and sophistication which permit them to challenge the government forces. By the same token, experiences in Malaya, the Philippines, Algeria, and South Vietnam show that the primary mission and tasks of the regular armed forces are the seizure of the initiative through offensive operations aimed at fragmentation and attrition of the guerrilla forces.

8. This section also draws on material in Volume IV. See Appendix C, "Royal Thai Armed Forces"; and Appendix F, "Intelligence Capability."
(U) Unfortunately, most insurgencies witness competing demands for military resources which lead to a dissipation of military forces and inhibit offensive operations. This competition evolves from the fact that insurgencies usually begin in areas remote from government influence—areas in which civil administration, including police and local security forces, is minimal or nonexistent. The government then faces the dilemma of whether to employ armed forces in static security to compensate for the lack of police forces or to concentrate them against the guerrillas.

(U) Experience also shows that even after a government decides to concentrate the armed forces in an offensive against the insurgents, operations initially suffer from deficiencies in doctrine, intelligence, training, and equipment. A period of trial and error spanning several years is standard before civil and military plans and programs are meshed in effective coordination, an intelligence system becomes effective, and deficiencies in military tactics, training, and equipment are overcome.

(U) The principal tactical deficiency revealed by the record of past insurgencies is the predilection of the high commands for conventional tactics of large sweeps, flanking maneuvers, and encirclements. Invariably, guerrillas escaped these cumbersome operations by slipping out of the target area before the counterinsurgency forces were in position, or by slipping through the gaps in the lines. Two or three years invariably elapsed before the unproductive results of these tactics dictated a shift. This occurred in Malaya and the Philippines, for example, where large sweeps were ultimately abandoned in favor of small-unit operations by combat patrols.

The evolution of strategy and tactics in Thailand has followed a similar pattern. During 1966, the first year in which battalion-size units were employed in the Northeast against the insurgents, tactical operations consisted of large sweeps involving at least one battalion, supplemented by paramilitary and police forces and at times supported by attack aircraft armed with rockets and napalm. The results of these operations were largely negligible.
The RTA decided to abandon these tactics at an early stage. In 1967 the RTG decided on a more sophisticated tactical approach which was incorporated in the 0910 Plan prepared by the CSOC. The basic concept of the plan was to (a) provide security for selected villages adjacent to guerrilla bases in 11 target areas in 6 Northeast provinces, (b) isolate the guerrillas from the villagers, and (c) fragment and attrite the guerrilla forces by offensive patrol operations.

Forces assigned to the 0910 Plan included Border Patrol Police, Provincial Police, and Royal Thai Army units, supplemented by the Volunteer Defense Corps and the Village Security Officers. Provincial Police augmented these local forces to form Joint Security Teams, with approximately 12 men in each team; the teams were located in villages in the selected target areas.

The tactic employed in the 0910 Plan was the garrisoning of a ring of villages in each of the 11 target areas. In all, 180 villages out of 5,000 were protected in the provinces in the Northeast with high insurgency. A platoon-size reaction force was available in each of the 11 areas to support the static security forces. Meanwhile, Army units conducted intensive patrols in the forests in the vicinity of the selected villages.

The insurgents suffered a significant setback as a result of 0910 operations. Not only did they suffer 190 casualties, or roughly 10 percent of their estimated strength, in addition to yielding a significant number of prisoners, but they were cut off effectively from the 180 villages included in the 0910 Plan. Defectors confirmed that the guerrillas were suffering from food and equipment shortages. Defections rose, while assassinations and armed propaganda meetings fell off. The selectiveness of the operation enabled the bulk of the guerrillas to shift to new areas not covered by the 0910 Plan, where they could proceed to establish new bases of support. Nevertheless, the underlying concept of the 0910 Plan, coupled with effective implementation, was a significant step in countering the insurgency.
In October 1967, Second Army Forward Headquarters, under the command of General Dongchern, replaced CPM-1 as the controlling headquarters for military operations in the Northeast. Forces assigned to General Dongchern were the equivalent of about three battalions of infantry, of three rifle companies each. These forces were employed in three missions as follows:

(1) Village Security—one rifle company,
(2) Patrol and Reaction Forces—two rifle companies (one platoon assigned to six 0910 target areas), and
(3) Offensive Operations—3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry (less one rifle company); 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry (less one rifle company); two rifle companies in the final phase of counter-insurgency training were temporarily assigned for five weeks; one airborne rifle company of two rifle platoons and one mechanized platoon.

The tasks of the six rifle companies assigned to offensive operations were and still remain the fragmentation and attrition of the guerrilla bands. The most common tactic employed is the selection of a zone of operations in which guerrilla bands are known to be operating. This zone, usually about 3,000 meters in diameter, is surrounded by two or more infantry companies. The companies then converge on the guerrilla base areas. After this initial operation, the infantry units break into small units which patrol and conduct ambushes in an area of about 10,000 square meters. These operations continue until contacts with the guerrillas cease, at which time the units are moved to another target area to repeat the process.

In the period from October 1967 through February 1968, 81 armed clashes with the guerrillas were reported. Of these, only five incidents were initiated by the guerrillas, and even these appear to have been for the purpose of covering their withdrawal. The following results were reported:

- Guerrillas killed in action: 56
- RTA killed in action: 2
- Guerrillas captured: 342
- Guerrillas surrendered: 286
(U) The US Army liaison officer with the Second Army Forward has expressed confidence in the reliability of the above casualty figures—although the number of guerrillas captured or having surrendered may be inflated by suspects. Be that as it may, the relative effectiveness of the RTA emerges clearly.

The RTA thus seems to have evolved in the Northeast a fundamentally correct strategy and the tactics to implement it. After less than a year's experimentation with large sweeps, the mission and tasks are now clearly the fragmentation and attrition of the guerrilla bands through offensive operations conducted by small-unit patrols and ambushes.

Not only are the military tactics sound, but General Dongcherm, as has been pointed out above, has clearly recognized the imperative of conducting operations with an eye toward winning the villagers' support. He has continually impressed this need on his commanders. Generally, offensive operations have avoided the use of artillery fire, bombing, strafing, and rocketry. These restraints, combined with circumspect behavior by the troops toward the population, have created a favorable image of the RTA among the villagers in the Northeast.

While sound strategy and tactics have been developed in a relatively short period of time, the implementation of the mission is severely handicapped by a shortage of military forces. As has been described, guerrilla base areas in the Northeast center in the Phu Phan Mountains and the forested areas extending north toward the Mekong in the form of a rough crescent covering about 5,000 square miles. The six rifle companies available for offensive operations can cover an area of about 150 square miles in each operation. The guerrillas, therefore, have ample freedom to clear the area of operations and to return after offensive operations have ceased. Many guerrilla base areas remain untouched.

It follows that additional forces must be assigned to the Second Army Forward. This conclusion is independent of whether the insurgent movement is deemed weak (as this analysis holds) or strong.
In either case, the goal should be to break the back of the insurgent movement before it has an opportunity to expand. This conclusion is enhanced by the fact that the strategy and tactics of the Second Army Forward are fundamentally sound and that additional forces could be effectively deployed without running the risk of alienating the villagers.

The US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, has estimated that 13 battalions of infantry would be sufficient to provide security for the villages and to conduct saturation patrols and other offensive operations against the 1,500 to 2,000 guerrillas. General Dongcherm has requested up to 10 battalions.

In terms of gross numbers of infantry battalions in the RTA, the necessary forces to reinforce General Dongcherm's command are in the inventory. (See Figure 6 for the Army dispositions.) Thirty-five infantry battalions and six cavalry squadrons are available in three and one-third infantry divisions and one cavalry division (see Table 1). The Second Army area alone has six additional infantry battalions which, if assigned to General Dongcherm's operational control, would largely satisfy his estimate of requirements. In addition, the Marine Brigade, with a strength of three infantry battalions, could contribute at least one battalion.

Table 1
DISPOSITION OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS,
ROYAL THAI ARMY, MARCH 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>1st Army</th>
<th>2nd Army</th>
<th>3rd Army</th>
<th>5th Circle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (includes one airborne battalion and one Special Forces Group)</td>
<td>17 (1/3)a</td>
<td>9 (3)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>4 (1/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (2/3)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Figures in brackets indicate the number of battalions assigned to suppression operation.
While enough infantry battalions are available to meet the requirements, the picture is not so bright when one examines the duty strengths of these units. The authorized strength of the Royal Thai Army was 141,756 as of December 1967; the assigned strength was only 102,676, or 72 percent. Other factors reduce the effective strength still further. Thus, officers and men are assigned to special missions, including security officers in the provincial and district CPMs, Mobile Development Units, and Special Operations Companies, but they continue to be carried on the rolls of their parent organization. Consequently, infantry battalions habitually operate at about 50 to 60 percent of Table of Organization strength when personnel on leave, sick, and on special details are taken into consideration. The deployment of a division to South Vietnam will further deplete the personnel strength of the RTA battalions. The plans of the RTA to rectify these quantitative deficiencies do not appear adequate. The objective of 74 percent of full TO and E strength by September 1968 and 84 percent by January 1970 appears to fall short of requirements.

The most critical quantitative deficiency in the RTA is the shortage of company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. As of December 31, 1967, reported strengths were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td>55,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>8,993</td>
<td>39,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>-4,467</td>
<td>-15,993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, almost 50 percent of this shortage falls in the company grades--2,000 or about 40 percent of company grade requirements. When special duty assignments are taken into consideration, a rifle company with an authorized strength of six officers is unlikely to have more than two officers on duty. Plans for alleviating the company-grade officer shortage, even if met, will still leave a deficiency of about 1,000. The shortage of NCOs is similarly serious. The plans to remedy this deficiency will still fall short of required levels by about 10,000 to 12,000--roughly 20 percent. These shortages
become all the more significant in the light of the general need for leadership in the Royal Thai Army.

2. **Training and Leadership**

(U) A study of past insurgencies suggests that, even after an offensive concept is formulated and forces necessary to implement the strategy are assigned to the field commanders, a number of constraints can inhibit implementation. The nature of guerrilla tactics is one of these constraints. In the initial phase of the insurgency, the insurgents generally strive to build up their infrastructure and expand their forces. Toward the end, they seek to avoid combat in order to conserve their resources. Even when they clash with government forces, they usually attempt to disengage unless they perceive a tactical advantage in sustaining contact. During this phase, then, government units soon recognize that the guerrillas threaten them only when cornered—and this can only happen when government forces press their attacks with vigor.

(U) In conventional operations, an offensive spirit can gradually be infused through planning and training. In counterinsurgency operations, by contrast, contact can rarely be planned with confidence. Furthermore, the adverse conditions of terrain and weather associated with counterinsurgency operations tax the physical capabilities of the troops, wear down their resistance, and weaken their resolve and aggressiveness.

(U) In the typical operations of squads, Platoons, and companies during the early stages of insurgent warfare, the influence of battalion and other senior commanders cannot be asserted as effectively as in conventional operations. Instead, the command influence in these operations is limited to company-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The leadership in this group is even more critical than in conventional operations. This group suffers from quantitative and qualitative deficiencies, there is a dearth of company-grade officers to man the units, and those officers who are available lack training.
These typical constraints are operative in Thailand. The shortage of company-grade officers has already been noted. Yet, an even more serious constraint in Thailand is a qualitative one: it relates to the unique Thai cultural pattern which seriously discourages the exercise of initiative by subordinates in the military chain of command.

(U) Nevertheless, these qualitative constraints can be mitigated through realistic training and dynamic leadership. Perhaps the best example of the role of training in instilling aggressive spirit into small units is that of the British in Malaya. The British learned that once contact with the guerrillas had been made, the reaction of the patrols had to be immediate—almost instinctive. To inculcate the hair-trigger response, the British instituted immediate-reaction drills in their Jungle Training Center. These drills were rehearsed until reaction to contact became instantaneous. The British also learned the value of individual marksmanship in small-unit encounters, and their marksmanship training set a standard of achieving a "kill" in two to three seconds. The British system of training then inculcated an instinctive aggressive reaction to guerrilla contact, superb marksmanship, and a high degree of jungle know-how—British and Colonial units became confident that they could beat the CT's at their own game—which they did time and again. The role of training in achieving this goal cannot be overestimated.

Unfortunately, routine training in the RTA is deficient. Field training is not intensive enough, and marksmanship schooling is neither efficient nor uniform. Field training has been stunted by the provision that per diem be paid to units away from their base camps. In 1969 this constraint may be eased by an increase in funding for routine field training from 12 days to 38 days annually.

(U) The United States has assigned a company of Special Forces to assist the RTA in achieving a higher standard of training. During 1966 and 1967, 36 RTA rifle companies completed five weeks' training, followed by an assignment to the Second Army Forward in the Northeast (or the Fifth Military Circle in the Mid-South) for five weeks of
active operations. Unfortunately, the Special Forces instructors have found it difficult to focus training on immediate action drills and marksmanship because of gaps in basic training of the company units undergoing this schooling—most of the riflemen are recent conscripts with only about three months' service. Consequently, the Special Forces have attempted to remedy gaps in basic training rather than specialized training. Some changes therefore seem to be indicated. The US advisers should insist that basic indoctrination and instruction in small-unit tactics be given before assignment to training by the Special Forces. Alternatively, the Special Forces instructors should concentrate on the high-payoff areas of immediate reaction drills and marksmanship on the assumption that basic training will be provided by the Royal Thai Army.

Yet while training can do much to instill in small units an aggressive response to guerrilla contact, it cannot in itself solve the broader problem of the lack of initiative found throughout the RTA chain of command. Before examining the role of dynamic leadership in mitigating this problem, it may be useful to examine the characteristics of the RTA officers and men.

The average Thai soldier is generally described as intelligent, cooperative, and adaptive to military discipline. He learns rapidly and is capable of acquiring technical skills. He tends to be in excellent physical condition, and this factor, combined with his predominantly rural background, prepares him well for the hardships of small-unit patrol operations. He has the capability of becoming a good marksman, although ineffective small-arms training does not exploit this capability. Buddhist teachings do not debilitate his effectiveness. In short, the Thai soldier is potentially a good soldier when he has effective leadership. He has demonstrated his merit in Korea and appears to be performing well in South Vietnam.

The noncommissioned officers are professionals of long service; they have had at least two years of schooling. The task of training falls mainly on their shoulders. Because of officer
shortages, many platoons are commanded by master sergeants who are considered thoroughly competent—but they, too, require leadership.

The company-grade officers are of two types, those appointed from the NCO ranks and those who are military academy or college graduates. Those rising from the ranks are handicapped by age—formerly 15 years of service was a prerequisite for appointment, with the result that most officers in this category were at least in their mid-thirties. Recently the Army has set an age ceiling of 35 years for all officer candidates, but age remains a constraint on their effectiveness in the field. Nevertheless, this group is considered to be reasonably competent and effective.

The academy graduates are rated by the American military advisers as the group with the highest potential in the RTA. They are more responsive to US advisory efforts, are well schooled, and are now acquiring some command experience in counterinsurgency operations.

Field-grade officers are also credited with good potential, particularly those majors who have attended US resident courses. Colonels and special colonels tend to vary sharply in capability; some are well schooled and veterans of service in Korea, others lack professional competence, are over-age, and unimaginative.

The entire command structure of the RTA lacks combat experience and reflects the lack of realistic peacetime training. Since ingrained cultural characteristics inhibit initiative at subordinate levels, leadership must come from the top—it cannot be inserted laterally at subordinate levels of command as in Western-oriented armies.

Fortunately, there is evidence of dynamic leadership and the encouragement of initiative. General Dongchem is a prime example. He has demanded that his staff take action in any situation arising during his absence from his headquarters. He expects his subordinate commanders to make decisions without waiting for orders from Second Army Forward. He has insisted on a pattern of flexible operations against the insurgents, and he appears to have inculcated
a sense of dedication and motivation in his staff and field units. His headquarters has been on a seven-day week schedule—a condition hitherto unheard of in the Royal Thai Army. Some of his offensive units have been continuously in the field since October 1967. He has insisted that his troops not damage their image with the villagers through indiscriminate operations or plundering.

The qualities of leadership shown by General Dongcherm are not unique. Knowledgeable US officers, including the Commanding General of the US Military Assistance Command in Thailand, regard the First Army Commander and his deputy as equally capable. General Saiyud, the Director of Operations at the CSOC, is similarly rated. And there are others. It appears, then, that lack of initiative in the RTA is gradually being overcome by positive leadership.

3. Intelligence

(U) A principal lesson from past insurgencies is that an offensive concept of operations and an aggressive spirit on the part of small units are not in themselves enough for effective counter-insurgency operations. Timely intelligence is essential to provide contact with the guerrillas under favorable tactical conditions.

(U) Targets for intelligence fall into two categories: the military arm of the insurgents and their political infrastructure. These intelligence requirements cannot be compartmented; intelligence regarding infrastructure often yields vital military information, and military intelligence can aid in the detection and elimination of cadre. It follows, then, that effective operations require coordination of all agencies involved in intelligence.

As in many insurgencies, the intelligence structure in Thailand was gradually evolved with experience. The current structure is shown in Table 2 and Figure 7. The principal field agencies include Division VII of the Special Branch, which is targeted against the Communist infrastructure; the National Police; elements of the local civil administration in CPMs at provincial and district levels; and the Second Army Forward, with its assigned units. The principal
### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village level: Raw intelligence collection</td>
<td>Village headman, Village Security Forces (USG, PAT, etc.), Village agents, Census Apportionment Teams</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambon level: Raw intelligence collection</td>
<td>Tambon Police</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District level: Collection</td>
<td>District Police, District civil officials, Agents, Volunteer Defense Corps patrols</td>
<td>District CPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor collection and evaluation for local operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial level: Limited interrogation</td>
<td>Provincial Police, Special Branch, Agents (including SB), Prisoners and Defectors, Captured documents, VDC patrols, Military units in static defense, Mobile Development units</td>
<td>Provincial CPM, Special Branch Area Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some collection, interpretation and evaluation for provincial level operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level:</td>
<td>JSC Interrogation, JSC Intelligence production, Second Army Forward, 6 &quot;U&quot; teams, assigned to target areas, Military units in field, Prisoners and defectors, Captured documents</td>
<td>JSC 4-Udorn, JSC 5-Korat (SB, PP, BPP, RTA), JSC Interrogation center, G-2 Division-Second Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation for tactical operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete intelligence production for dissemination to Second Army Forward and Provincial CPMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level:</td>
<td>CSOC/SB interrogation, CSOC/SB production, ASPC production</td>
<td>Special Branch-Div. VII, National Police (PP and BPP), CSOC: Intelligence Division, Intelligence Center, J-2 Supreme Command, RTR-KTR-RTR, NSE Intelligence staff, Armed Forces Security Center, Joint US/RTG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation for tactical and strategic operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete intelligence production to serve as a basis for operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination laterally to other agencies involved in COIN and downward to field agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Constraints:


Tambon level: Tambon Police expansion incomplete—reporting in a lack of police presence in many villages.

Provincial level: Provincial governors fail to pass prisoners and defectors to JSC for interrogation. Provincial Police not fully cooperative with Second Army.

Regional level: Intelligence production by JSC 4 not yet adequate for military operations. Procedures for coordination between JSC 4 and Second Army not yet effective. G-2 Division has inadequate resources, both numerically and technically.

National level: Limited coordination between SB and CSOC interrogation.

General constraints applying to all levels of the Intelligence structure:

1. The improvement of sources which must be undertaken on a service by service basis, including training and retraining of personnel; redefinition and assignment of priorities to specific areas of source acquisition, and the assignment of some additional personnel to high-priority requirements. (2) Better organization of intelligence resources from the national level down is required to ensure that information received is adequately indexed, filed, collated, and disseminated so as to reach counterinsurgency planners and commanders in timely usable form. (3) Interrogation and document exploitation must be centralized so as to ensure full intelligence value is derived from each prisoner, defector, or document obtained.

SOURCE: U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Improving Intelligence Product, 28 Feb. 1966, SECRET NOFOHN

FIGURE 7 (S). Intelligence Organization and Flow, Northeast Thailand (U)
intelligence coordinating agencies are the CPVs at district and pro-
vincial levels, the Joint Security Centers, and the Second Army
Forward Headquarters. At the national level, the foregoing line
agencies are represented, while the coordination function is per-
formed by the Communist Suppression Operations Command. Other agencies
involved in the intelligence process include the Armed Forces Security
Center (AFSC) and the Joint Intelligence Agency under the Minister of
Defense.

Intelligence sources at the grass roots include the village
headmen, village security elements, Census Aspiration Teams making
village surveys, agents, Community Development workers, and school-
teachers. Of these, only the village headman is common to all
villages.

The potential for intelligence is one of the principal
justifications for the newly developed program for village security,
the Village Security Forces. Personnel for this program will be
recruited, trained, and returned to their parent village. Because of
their village background, they will not only have local knowledge of
each family within the village, but more importantly, they will be
privey to gossip, a favorite pastime of the Thai villager. These
forces should thus be in an excellent position to gain a good intel-
ligence picture of the village membership in the Communist infra-
structure and of those individuals who are supporting the jungle
soldiers. This brand of intelligence is not available to the external
agencies, including the tambon police, who are considered "outsiders."

The gradual expansion of police forces is extending their
presence to the more critical tambons in the Northeast. The police
are a source of some intelligence through interrogation of arrested
persons and patrols. At the district level, paramilitary forces of
the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) provide information picked up on
patrols, or from captured jungle soldiers, as do units of the Second
Army Forward. The six intelligence teams assigned to Second Army
with target area orientation are another important source of informa-
tion. Civil administrators who visit the villages occasionally
contribute some information, too.
The Second Army Forward intelligence organization consists of an undermanned G-2 division of about seven officers, together with six "DM" teams of 12 men each, reinforced by interrogation, photo, and lie detector elements. These field intelligence units are assigned to specific geographical areas. The operating units of the Second Army Forward also relay intelligence derived from prisoners, defectors, and captured documents.

4. Evaluation of the Intelligence Effort

The Thai intelligence system has been in operation for about one year. During this period, Special Branch operations targeted against the infrastructure of the Communist Party of Thailand have produced intelligence leading to the arrest of about 30 cadres, most of whom, including members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Thailand, the Central Committee, a labor organizer, and the head of a Communist-controlled front, were apprehended in one coordinated operation in August 1967. Since it is known that the infrastructure of the CPT lacks membership to flesh out its organization, particularly at the district and provincial levels, the loss of these cadres constitutes a significant setback. It would appear that the Special Branch shows promise. It should improve its performance with the planned accretion of trained personnel, as well as refresher training for those already assigned.

On the other hand, the acquisition of timely military intelligence so vital to effective counterinsurgency operations has not been adequate. This does not mean that progress has not been made. During the past year a rather extensive order of battle has been compiled. A large number of the guerrilla leaders have been identified by name and linked with considerable background information. Areas of operations of some jungle bands have also been pinpointed. This is a good start. However, this intelligence is not sufficient for effective military operations; what is required is detailed and timely information on the basis of which military operations can be mounted with a reasonable chance of contact under favorable tactical conditions. This level of sophistication has not been achieved.
Nevertheless, at least the organizational structure is now in place. In this connection, it is worth noting that RTG reforms of its intelligence structure have been achieved at a faster pace than have those of most governments faced with similar insurgent conditions. Even the British in Malaya, with all the inherent advantages of a superb Special Branch and vested with absolute direction of the counterinsurgency, needed four years to evolve an intelligence structure and system which were adequate to the task. The experience in the Philippines was similar.

Improvements are needed, nevertheless, in each component of the structure and in the coordination among components. A recent study by US officials in Thailand concludes the following:

While RTG intelligence resources have shown progress in the past two years, all available intelligence is not now retrievable by RTG counterinsurgency planners and commanders. To enable these officials to make the best possible use of counterinsurgency forces and assets, sources of intelligence need upgrading; better coordination among intelligence producers is required; intelligence processing must be improved and better integrated into planning and command functions; and a streamlined system of prisoners and defector interrogation and of document exploitation is needed.

The study goes on to recommend three remedial steps: an improvement in intelligence sources including training and retraining; a reevaluation of priorities for intelligence acquisition, and the assignment of additional personnel; improved functioning to ensure that intelligence is more adequately indexed, collated, and disseminated so as to reach those involved in planning and implementing counterinsurgency operations in a more suitable form and in a more timely fashion; and, finally, improved procedures for exploitation of interrogation and documents.

The most serious specific constraint relates to the production of operational intelligence for the Second Army Forward units.

The main source of this intelligence is JSC 4, which derives inputs from the Provincial CPMs, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, and exploitation of captured documents. But JSC 4 is handicapped both qualitatively and quantitatively; it needs more qualified personnel as well as on-job retraining.

Lack of effective coordination between JSC 4 and the Second Army is another serious constraint. Available intelligence is not delivered promptly to the military. Part of the problem is that the G-2 division of Second Army Forward is handicapped in exploiting available intelligence by its own deficiencies; the division is staffed with only eight officers and a few enlisted men, and those officers who are assigned are not technically qualified. Two immediate remedies are indicated: first, an exchange of liaison officers between JSC 4 and the Second Army could improve coordination and ensure timely delivery of information; and, second, the G-2 division should be augmented and upgraded. A qualified US Army officer with practical experience in the field of intelligence for insurgent operations should be assigned as an adviser to the G-2 division of the Second Army as a matter of priority.

Yet another major barrier lies in the operational field; the RTG has not targeted an effective psychological warfare and defector program against the weak infrastructure and the guerrilla arm. Thus, a major source of operational intelligence—surrendered personnel—which proved so important to the British in Malaya, is denied to the RTG. Such a program should be established at the earliest possible time. It is understood that US officials are strongly supporting such a program.

Finally, the RTG, including the military, continue to disregard the demanding requirements of counterintelligence—of denying information to the insurgents. On at least one occasion, for example, the Second Army commander found it necessary to mount a military operation without, for the sake of security, informing the provincial governor.
5. **Organization**

Lessons of past insurgencies indicate that the basic infantry battalion is an adequate structure for counterinsurgency operations. Operations in Thailand confirm this. In the event that the level of insurgency increases so that additional forces are required, consideration should be given to the addition of a fourth rifle company to the infantry battalion as an alternative to the formation of additional infantry battalions.

6. **Equipment**

a. **Infantry Weapons.** While the basic structure of the infantry battalion meets the requirements for counterinsurgency operations, some modifications and additions to the equipment of the infantry are indicated. The current US Military Assistance Program for the modernization of small arms in the infantry units appears to respond to requirements. The replacement of the M-1 rifle by the M-16, together with the provision of the M-79 grenade launcher and the M-60 machine gun, should provide the Thai soldier with adequate weapons.

b. **Communications.** The US Military Assistance Program for modernization of communication equipment is not fully responsive to the requirements of counterinsurgency operations in Thailand. For the most part, these operations consist of small-unit patrols and ambushes conducted by squads, platoons, and companies operating in dispersed formations. Communications modernization appears to reflect the requirements of more conventional operations in which dispersal of units is not a significant factor. Specifically, the modernization program provides FRC-6s in the infantry squads with a range of one mile to operate in the infantry platoon command net, and FRC-25s with a range of five miles to operate in the company and battalion command nets. While the program represents a significant improvement over previous communication capabilities in the infantry battalion, it may be necessary to furnish additional FRC-25s to squads.
operating as independent units. Additional requirements for light-weight equipment with ranges in excess of five miles may be generated by the pattern of counterinsurgency operations, in which case consideration should be given to the provision of this improved equipment from the US inventory, if available.

7c. Mobility. The vital role of the helicopter in counterinsurgency operations has been demonstrated in Malaya, Algeria, and, in particular, South Vietnam. The enhancement of the mobility of ground forces through the employment of helicopters results in a dramatic improvement in offensive capabilities in counterinsurgency operations. Flexibility, surprise, and fire support are improved by an order of magnitude, while the enhanced logistics support capability gives a commander a freedom of action which would be impossible when logistics support is dependent on a surface line of communication.

The Second Army Forward is currently assigned 10 H-34s of the Royal Thai Air Force. This helicopter lift capability is employed primarily in logistic support. The Second Army Forward is forced to utilize motor vehicles for tactical deployment of strike forces to operational areas. As a result, surprise is lost, and the guerrillas are able to evade contact by moving out of the target areas before strike forces are deployed. In operating areas in the North, the lack of roads makes the employment of motor vehicles for tactical and logistics support impractical, yet only eight helicopters are available.

The US Military Assistance Program will furnish 25 UH-1 helicopters to the RTA and 25 to the RTAF during 1968 and 1969, with two additional increments of 25 by 1972. An acceleration of this program appears to be indicated.

7. Logistics

In February 1968, a Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) study concluded that the RTA logistics organization was incapable of supporting its forces in conventional combat. The deficiencies cited in the report included, among others, the lack of
forward depots, quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in maintenance and supply personnel, an unresponsive supply system incapable of furnishing replacement parts in a timely fashion, a tendency to hoard supplies, and a lack of command interest in logistics.

The JUSMAG report also questions the capability of the logistics support organization to sustain additional forces for counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast. While we are not in a position to question this appraisal, it appears that some improvisation might bridge the gap. However, the level of logistics support requirements in the Northeast is relatively low, due to the pattern of operations. Only limited amounts of small arms ammunition and mortar rounds are expended; fuel requirements for motor vehicles appear to be relatively modest; food should be available locally; maintenance and supply should be correspondingly low. It would appear that additional forces in the Northeast might be sustained by exploiting commercial rail and truck capabilities, supplemented by organic motor transport and the modest transport airlift available in the RTAF inventory. Specifically, delivery of resupply to the Northeast from depots in the Bangkok area might make use of rail transport to Udorn and commercial truck from Udorn to base camps in the Northeast. It is understood that the commercial trucking capability in Northeast Thailand is highly developed for support of US air bases in the area. Distribution from base camp to operating areas could be accomplished by a combination of organic motor vehicles and helicopters assigned to support Second Army Forward. The modest airlift capability of the RTAF might also be employed for emergency resupply of spare parts and critical supply items to airfields in the vicinity of base camps.

8. Conclusions

a. Missions and Tasks. A study of counterinsurgency operations shows that the mission of regular military forces should be to seize the initiative by offensive operations against the guerrilla forces, rather than to defend population centers and installations.
(Police and paramilitary forces should perform static defense.) The tasks to be executed in the offensive are (a) the fragmentation of the guerrilla forces into diminishing bands in order to deprive them of the initiative and to reduce their capability for offensive operations against the population and the regular armed forces, and (b) the attrition of the guerrilla forces to reduce their strength to the point where they lose all significant military capability. The Second Army Forward in the Northeast is now conducting its operations in consonance with the above mission and tasks.

Tactical experience shows that these tasks can be accomplished better through small-unit patrol and ambush operations than through large-unit operations such as sweeps and encirclements. The Second Army Forward in the Northeast has evolved effective tactics, employing the bulk of its limited forces in small-unit patrol and ambush operations. The Second Army Forward units in the Northeast are clearly superior to the guerrilla bands in tactics as well as in organization, training, equipment, and logistics. On the other hand, the Third Army Forward in the North has not evolved effective tactics. It is also hampered by lack of combat experience, difficult terrain, and marginal logistic support. Most importantly, it faces a more aggressive adversary, the Meo.

**b. Disposition of Forces.** The Royal Thai Army has sufficient combat troops in the inventory to deal effectively with the present level of armed insurgency, but the troops are not deployed to maximum advantage. The six companies permanently available to Second Army Forward for offensive operations in the Northeast are not enough to accomplish the mission and tasks described above, much less provide needed support to currently inadequate village security forces. The US Military Assistance Command in Thailand has estimated that 13 infantry battalions will be required to carry out widespread offensive operations against the 1,500 to 2,000 jungle soldiers and to back up village security. In the North, Third Army Forward has enough combat troops to suppress
the armed insurgency in its area. Its difficulties are not a function of the numbers of men available.

(c) Quantitative and Qualitative Deficiencies of the RTA. While the RTA has sufficient infantry battalions in the inventory to meet current requirements of the Second Army Forward in the Northeast, these units are handicapped by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies. The most serious quantitative shortcoming is the dearth of company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. Not more than two company-grade officers are available per rifle company, and many platoons are commanded by master sergeants. There is an overall personnel shortage of about 50 percent of Table of Organization strength. The RTA plans for augmentation of officer and enlisted strength will reduce but not eliminate these shortages.

The RTA also suffers from qualitative deficiencies, the most important of which is the lack of initiative which pervades the ranks. This lack of initiative can be overcome only through strong leadership at top echelons of command. Leadership at intermediate and lower levels of command cannot compensate for ineffective senior leadership in the Thai system, as it often can in Western armed forces. Fortunately, there are strong leaders among the top command echelon. General Dongcherm has demonstrated qualities of dynamic leadership and, in the opinion of knowledgeable US officials in close contact with the RTA, other general officers offer equal potential.

(d) Training. Training within the RTA does not measure up to requirements. Basic training is incomplete and lacks competent supervision; rifle marksmanship standards do not measure up to those required for effective counterinsurgency operations. Field training at all levels is severely hampered by the lack of per diem funds, although this deficiency will be alleviated to some extent by increased funding during 1969.

The United States has assigned a Special Forces company to assist the Army in achieving a high standard of counterinsurgency training. Unfortunately, the impact of this training has been
blunted by the low standard of basic training in the Royal Thai Army. As a consequence, the Special Forces have been unable to concentrate on the high payoff areas of immediate reaction drills and combat marksmanship. If this training is to achieve its desired goals, it appears that the United States should insist on a higher standard of basic training prior to counterinsurgency training or should concentrate on the high payoff areas without attempting to rectify basic training deficiencies.

4. Intelligence. A sound national intelligence organization has gradually evolved and is now in place in Thailand. The Special Branch of the Police bears primary responsibility for targeting the CPT infrastructure and has achieved some success, highlighted by the arrest of about 50 Party members in August 1967.

However, military intelligence production and dissemination have not measured up to requirements. There is a need for timely, detailed intelligence which will enable the RTA to mount operations with reasonable assurance of contact under favorable tactical conditions. All components of the present intelligence structure require upgrading if this end is to be achieved.

The most acute need for more effective acquisition and dissemination of operational intelligence is in the Northeast. JSC 4, a principal source of intelligence for Second Army Forward, suffers from shortages of qualified personnel. There is a lack of coordination between JSC 4 and Second Army. The G-2 division of the Second Army also is handicapped by insufficient size and competence. Two immediate remedies are indicated: the exchange of liaison officers between JSC 4 and Second Army, and the assignment of a qualified US Army intelligence specialist as adviser to the G-2 division of the Second Army.

Second Army Forward has not exploited the intelligence potential of direct observation from low-performance aircraft. Another significant weakness is that the RTG has not yet evolved an effective psychological warfare and defector program. The creation of a politically acute and thoroughly integrated program
designed to encourage, exploit, and rehabilitate defectors would materially support the military effort and should be pursued as a matter of high priority. Finally, the RTG and the RTA show a disturbing disregard for the basic requirements of counterintelligence—the need to deny information to the Communist infrastructure and the guerrilla bands.

f. **Organization.** As in other low-level insurgencies, the basic organization of the infantry battalion has proved adequate for the task. If the insurgency should increase to the point requiring additional forces, a fourth rifle company should be added to the infantry battalion in preference to the creation of additional infantry battalions.

g. **Equipment.** The current US Military Assistance Program for modernization of the RTA appears sound. Consideration should be given to accelerating the delivery of helicopters and to providing additional FRC-25 radio equipment to meet the operational requirements of small-unit patrols operating in dispersed formations.

h. **Logistics.** The logistics organization of the RTA suffers from a variety of ills including an inadequate supply system which fails to furnish replacement parts in a timely fashion, shortages of trained supply and maintenance personnel, a lack of command interest, and a tendency to hoard supplies and equipment. The Joint US Military Assistance Group, Thailand reports these deficiencies as being so severe that it is doubtful that the RTA could support an increased level of force deployment in the Northeast. It would appear, however, that the relatively low-level logistic requirements of the current operations might be met in part by improvisations such as utilizing commercial transportation and the airlifting of priority items.
IV
PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE INSURGENCY

(U) This section contains a region-by-region discussion of the
growth potential of the insurgency, followed by general conclusions
on the subject. The capability of the Royal Thai Government to cope
with the potential threat and the implications for US support are
discussed in subsequent sections.

1. The Northeast

The key advantage commanded by the Communist movement in the
Northeast has derived from the relative lack of government presence
in the area. At least initially, the insurgents enjoyed a fairly
free hand in their attempts to persuade and coerce the villagers;
this freedom has been constricted to the extent that the RTG has
for village security and suppression of the armed bands have made
themselves felt. The major weaknesses of the insurgency have been
identified as the absence of a classic revolutionary situation among
the villagers and the intrinsic barriers within the Thai culture to
Communist goals and methods.

Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the insurgency has imposed
considerable pressures on the government's political, economic, and
military institutions and programs. The Royal Thai Government,
despite some deficiencies and constraints, has withstood those pres-
sures and has exhibited the political stability required to plan,
coordinate, lead, and sustain the counterinsurgency effort. The RTG
has developed an effective concept for countering the insurgency in
the Northeast, including environmental improvement to negate the
Communist propaganda of government neglect, an expanding program of
village security to isolate the Communists from the villagers, and
offensive operations to fragment and attrite the armed bands. The economy is capable of supporting the national strategy.

Environmental improvement, village security, and suppression programs have prevented the Communists from establishing a strong infrastructure among the villagers and from organizing a guerrilla force capable of seizing the initiative through offensive operations. As a result, the Communists have been unable to control a sizable, reliable, and durable base area in the Northeast— an essential for successful insurgency on the Maoist model.

As long as the level of external support of the insurgency is not increased by an order of magnitude, the commitment of additional military forces for suppression operations in the Northeast, combined with a continuation of the environmental improvement and village security programs, will result in further fragmentation and attrition of the guerrilla bands and degradation of insurgent strength. Vigorous offensive action not only can check the expansion of the insurgency in the Northeast, but can debilitate the insurgency movement in general and thus reduce the overall threat to Thailand.

The creation and implementation of a thoroughly integrated program to attract, exploit, and rehabilitate defectors from the insurgent ranks would considerably facilitate the process of fragmentation and attrition and should receive a high priority in RTG planning.

2. The Central Plain

The potential of insurgency in the fertile Bangkok Plain and the Chao Phraya River Valley is even lower than in the Northeast. Incomes and living conditions are superior to those in the Northeast, communications are more highly developed, and the government presence is more extensive. As a result, the insurgents lack leverage. These obstacles notwithstanding, the Communists probably will attempt to extend the insurgency to this vital area, if only to put maximum pressure on the Bangkok government. It is doubtful, however, that they will enjoy appreciable success.
3. The North

The rugged mountainous regions of northern and western Thailand are inhabited by about 250,000 hill tribesmen, including the Meo (about 50,000) and the Yao (about 12,000). The majority of the tribes exist by "slash-and-burn" agriculture; quite a few grow opium poppies and hunt with firearms. The Royal Thai Government opposes all these practices: slash-and-burn agriculture because it depletes the soil and causes erosion, poppy growing because Thailand adheres to international narcotics control agreements, and hunting with firearms because the Royal Thai Government fears armed tribesmen. The most significant cleavages between the RTG and the hill tribes, however, are cultural and attitudinal. The Royal Thai Government, reflecting the attitudes of the majority of the ethnic Thai, regards the tribesmen as savages, and the hill tribes reciprocate with suspicion and animosity.

Communist organizers have capitalized on the grievances of the Meo and have made inroads among them. The government has responded with harsh suppression, including forced resettlement. Suppression operations have been ineffective, counterproductive, and costly in manpower and money.

It is likely that Communist organizers will attempt to subvert other hill tribes. There is some evidence that they have already succeeded in penetrating some tribes along the northern and northwestern border with Burma. Given the estrangement of the hill tribes from the RTG and more generally from Thai national life, it is likely that insurgency will spread in time to other tribes in the North.

An insurgency in the North could have access to external support and direction from Vietnam and China through Laos and Burma. However, the potential of the insurgency would be limited by the narrow population base in the North and by geography. The population of the hill tribes is estimated at only 250,000, and the ethnic

Thai in and adjacent to the area are not likely to support a Communist movement in which the mountain "barbarians" play a leading role. The location of the hill tribes gives them access to the population centers in the narrow river valleys of the North and the upper reaches of the Chao Phraya River Valley. However, the main population centers and economic resources of the "heartland" of the Central Plain could be threatened only if the insurgency spread southward through the mountains flanking the Chao Phraya River—a contingency which is possible but not likely.

4. The South

The Malays and the Chinese are the principal ethnic minorities in the South. Their cultures differ radically from that of the ethnic Thais. About one million Thai-Malays reside in the four provinces bordering Malaysia, constituting 80 percent of the local population. Sporadic attempts by the Thai government to assimilate the Malays culturally have created resentments; however, the government recently has pursued a more conciliatory approach, permitting the Thai-Malays to teach their traditional language and religion. Nevertheless, grievances persist.

The Chinese minority in the South is located in two pockets, one bordering the Malaysian border and the other in the central section of the Peninsula. The southern Chinese pocket provides the principal support for the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO). The CTO, composed of the remnants of the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party which fled to Thailand after the failure of the insurgency in Malaya in 1960, is the best organized Communist movement in Thailand. It commands a strong village infrastructure and an effective guerrilla arm composed of Chinese and some Malays. While the announced political objective of the CTO remains the overthrow of the government of Malaysia, the Party is under the direction of F'-ying. On order, its potential for insurgency could be directed against the Royal Thai Government.
6) The Chinese community in the central section of the Peninsula, the so-called Mid-South, apparently is a source of support for the low-level insurgency there, notwithstanding the fact that the leadership of the insurgency is suspected of being ethnic Thai. Suppression operations executed by small Royal Thai Army forces have apparently arrested its growth.

7) Military insurgency in the South would tend to be choked by lack of land access to external support. Malaysian police authorities in the border area would be likely to continue cooperating with the Royal Thai Government even if the CTO were to shift its target from Malaysia to Thailand. Some support for the insurgents could probably be introduced by sea, but Royal Thai Navy and Marine Police patrols could inhibit the flow. The insurgents in this area also face a meager population base for expansion. Since the CTO is completely dominated by the Chinese, the Chinese population in the Peninsula would probably be the principal target of recruiting. The Malays are not likely to be drawn to the movement if the pattern of the recent insurgency in Malaya is any indicator.

8) Finally, most of the South is geographically remote from the "heartland" of Thailand. Given the narrowness of the Peninsula (only about 35 miles wide at one point), military blocking forces could confine the insurgency to the southern portion of the region.

9) Despite these handicaps, there is a potential for insurgency in the South which could put additional pressures on the political, economic, and military institutions and programs of the government.

5. The West Central Border Area

10) The growth potential of the insurgency in the West Central border area is difficult to assess. The leadership of the movement appears to be ethnic Thai. While the insurgency is weak, with only a reported membership of 200, an expansion of the movement could pose a serious threat to the population and economic resources of the nearby Central Plain. There is also the danger of the insurgency linking with a hill tribe insurgent movement, working its way south along the mountainous border with Burma.
6. **External Support**

An evaluation of the growth potential of the insurgency must consider the impact of possible increases in external support of the insurgency from the North Vietnamese, Chinese, or Pathet Lao. A moderate increase in the supply of cadres and arms is within the current capabilities of Thailand's Communist neighbors. Such an increase could stiffen the resistance of the insurgency in the Northeast to RTG programs and aggravate the situation in the North, but it would not enable the insurgents to control those regions, let alone to extend the insurgency to the point of seriously threatening the central government. The situation, however, could change drastically if the outcome of the war in South Vietnam were to leave North Vietnam in de facto control of the line of the Mekong between Thailand and Laos. With secure routes for infiltrating personnel and equipment into Northeast Thailand, the North Vietnamese would be in a position to fuel the insurgency more assiduously and to provide sanctuaries for Thai insurgents. Most importantly, they could then effectively mobilize the North Vietnamese refugee community living in the Northeast, a highly organized body of perhaps 50,000 individuals distributed in villages and towns along most if not all of the main lines of communications in that region, as well as in proximity to key Royal Thai Government (and US) military installations. Infiltration of numerous Communist cadre or organized "volunteer" forces and the active, widespread, externally supported opposition of the North Vietnamese refugees would create for the RTG security problems that it could not effectively solve without support from friendly combat forces.

Depending on the outcome of the war in South Vietnam and other developments then, the North Vietnamese or the Chinese may at some time in the future have a capability to furnish massive external support, including units of regulars or "volunteers," to the Thai insurgents. Were they to render support of that magnitude, however, the scenario would be changed from one of insurgency to one of outright invasion, and it would lie beyond the scope of this analysis.
7. Conclusions

The growth potential of the insurgency in the Northeast and in the Central Plain and among the ethnic Thai in general is low. Intensification of suppression operations in the Northeast, together with a continuation of improvements in living conditions and village security, not only can arrest the insurgency but can critically weaken it. In the Central Plain, the Communists' prospects for creating a strong insurgent movement are even less promising than in Northeast Thailand. Since the bulk of the ethnic Thai population resides in the Central Plain, and since the Thai economy depends heavily on the agricultural production of the area, this region is of critical importance to the Royal Thai Government.

The ethnic minorities of Thailand, unlike the ethnic Thai, constitute significant sources of insurgency. They comprise about 4 million of the 33 million population. All have grievances of varying degrees against the Royal Thai Government and its policies. Most of them lack the intrinsic cultural barriers to Communist methods and techniques which characterize the ethnic Thai.

The growth potential is high among the hill tribes in the North. It is likely that the Communists will capitalize on both the revolutionary situation in this area and the lack of government presence to spread the insurgency to tribes other than the Meo. Geographical considerations and a narrow population base limit the threat to Thailand as a whole.

The growth potential of the insurgency along the Malaysian frontier is high. The CTO has a viable infrastructure and a trained guerrilla arm. Peking directives could release this potential against the Royal Thai Government. However, considerations of geography and population limit the threat. The growth potential of the insurgency in the Mid-South appears to be medium.

The potential in the West Central border area is uncertain. However, the proximity of this area to the Central Plain and the possibility of a linkup with a hill tribe insurgency extending southward lend significance to the threat in this region.
3. CAPABILITY OF THE RTG TO COPE WITH THE POTENTIAL THREAT

Continuing insurgency in the Northeast and North, coincident with an expansion of the hill tribe insurgency in the North, a redirection of the CTO against Thailand rather than Malaysia, and an intensification of the insurgent activities in the Mid-South and the West Central border area, would put severe pressures on the Royal Thai Government. The pressures would sharpen even more if the insurgency should spread to the mountainous areas bordering the Central Plain, thus gaining a base for disruptive raids against the population centers and economy of that vital region.

An appraisal of the capability of the Royal Thai Government and its institutions to stand up under such pressures must be speculative at best. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that the RTG could probably muster the men, money, and materials to support the required expansion of police, paramilitary, and military forces. It has been noted that the Royal Thai Government could probably increase its annual budget by about 5 percent without incurring serious inflation. If the total increase in the budget were devoted to military expansion, active forces could be increased by about one-third across the board. If the increases were confined to the ground forces, an even larger expansion would be economically feasible. The precondition is, however, that the United States would continue to supply military equipment through a military assistance program.

It is also probable that the political stability of the Royal Thai Government would not be threatened by the growth of the insurgencies in the North and South to their full potential. Indeed, there is the possibility that the stability of the government would in fact be enhanced by a greater threat from the ethnic minorities—that in such a circumstance the ethnic Thai would support the government even more actively. Some men now in power might lose their positions if the elite became dissatisfied with the conduct and progress of counterinsurgency efforts. But changes in individual fortunes would not necessarily disturb the basic stability of the government and its overall ability to pursue a vigorous counterinsurgency strategy.

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In the North, expanded police, paramilitary, and military forces could probably confine the insurgency among the hill tribes to the border provinces and could protect the ethnic Thai population centers in the river valleys from raids and sorties. However, if recent operations in the North are any indication, insurgency among the hill tribes is not likely to yield to a purely military solution. In the words of a recent report, "the most critical factor in this area continues to be the residual psychological problem which has plagued the northern community for years. The ability of the Thai Government to successfully promote the understanding and full acceptance of tribal peoples is, in the final analysis, the hinge upon which the ultimate success of these operations depend."^2

In the light of our own national experience with attitudes toward ethnic minorities, such a prescription is more easily stated than implemented. Nevertheless, if the RTG can bring itself to the hard decision of deemphasizing suppression and adopting a conciliatory policy toward the hill tribes, combining this form with the substance of a renewed and intensified program of local development, the serious spread of insurgency may be averted. There is no evidence that the Communist influence is particularly widespread among the Meo; indeed some ten years of Communist organizational efforts have reaped a meager harvest. The case might even be made that if the RTG were to permit the hill tribes to continue their traditional practices of slash-and-burn agriculture, the growing of poppies, and the use of guns for hunting, the Communists might well find themselves without many openings for exploitation. This prospect might well be worth the price of lifting the restrictions which plague the hill tribes.

The agency most familiar with the hill tribes and their problems is the Border Patrol Police. An expansion of this force would seem to be in order. It would also seem highly desirable to encourage the creation of hill tribe paramilitary units recruited

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and trained by the Border Patrol Police. Such a force, thoroughly trained in unconventional tactics, could be far more effective against hard-core insurgents than regular military units.

Insurgency in the South could be confined to the Peninsula, and military pressure, in concert with Malaysian forces, might be able to defeat the insurgency militarily in that region.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR US SUPPORT

The foregoing analyses indicate that the armed forces of Thailand are capable of coping with the current level of insurgency in Thailand without the participation of US military units. However, US military and economic assistance should be provided at approximately projected levels so that the Thais can continue to pursue their policies of economic development and environmental improvement. These policies are themselves key components of the overall counterinsurgency effort.

If the insurgency should spread among the hill tribes in the North, and if there should be an intensification of insurgency in the Southern Peninsula and in the West Central area, the police, paramilitary, and armed forces of Thailand would probably be capable of coping with the contingencies without the help of US military units. Since the mainsprings of insurgency in the North are essentially political, psychological, and economic rather than military, the deployment of US forces to support the Thais in that region might even be counterproductive.

An expansion of insurgency in the North and an intensification in the South and West Central area might compel the Royal Thai Government to increase its military, paramilitary, and police forces beyond presently contemplated levels. The degree of force expansion cannot be accurately forecast. However, if it becomes necessary to increase RTG forces, US military and economic assistance should also be increased commensurately to equip new units and to support the nonmilitary programs of an expanded counterinsurgency effort.

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(8) If Peking and Hanoi were to increase their external support of the insurgency in Thailand to invasion proportions, the RTG and its armed forces would be incapable of coping with the situation without direct military support from friendly countries. For example, if Hanoi were to infiltrate numerous North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao cadre or organized "volunteer" forces into the Northeast and mobilize the 50,000 highly disciplined North Vietnamese refugees in that region as active insurgents, the threat in the Northeast would take on grave new dimensions. Similarly, the infiltration of sizable forces of Pathet Lao cadre or North Vietnamese volunteers into the northern provinces through Laos could magnify the insurgency in that region into dangerous proportions.

(8) Large-scale intensification of external support to the insurgency would put severe pressures on the Royal Thai Government and seriously threaten its stability. It is certain that the RTG would require the support of US military forces to cope with such a contingency. The exact level of US involvement is difficult to predict, depending as this would on a potentially wide range of insurgency escalation.