MEDIA WAR COVERAGE AND PENTAGON POLICY

Policy Analysis Exercise
submitted to

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Freedom of the press is one of the most visible and vaunted guarantees provided by the United States Constitution. When the requirements of national security conflict with that right, observers and participants on all sides of the issue face difficult choices on competing priorities.

This conflict is characterized by a general lack of clear answers and guidance. In 1987, the directive establishing the Wartime Information Security Program (WISP) was cancelled, leaving the US armed services with no central guidance for press censorship. Each of the services has established guidelines based on the WISP program; however, no centralized authority is in place to provide backing or guidance for the individual service rules.

We were asked to examine the historical background of wartime press censorship, the relevant concerns of both defense officials and journalists, and likely future developments that will affect the military's need and ability to control information during combat situations. Our final task was to determine whether the Defense Department should adopt a formal policy for press management, under what circumstances such a policy should take effect, what types of restrictions should be imposed, and how they should be implemented.

Our analysis was based extensively on personal interviews and discussion. (The bibliography lists our survey of background literature.) We spoke with academic experts, and with members of both the media and the military communities.\(^1\) Our research revealed substantial agreement on two major issues. The first point of consensus was that censorship could never again be practiced on a large scale as

\(^1\)We recognize that neither "the media" nor "the military" is a monolithic entity, and the persons we interviewed represent only a sample of opinion; however, for brevity and ease of reference, we use the blanket terms "military" and "media" throughout our discussion.
it was during World War II. Everyone involved with the issue seemed to recognize the imminent futility of any attempt to implement sweeping censorship policies in the future. Given today's communications technology, the defense establishment could at best hope to maintain control over the flow of information from within the immediate combat area.

The second area of broad consensus involved the question of what constitutes a valid reason for material to be censored. Journalists and military authorities shared the belief that troop safety and operational security alone were legitimate concerns of the censorship process. Such controversial subjects as military officials' conduct, the appropriateness of US intervention, and the rationale or opinions of the enemy are issues that are best left to public debate.

While numerous other questions are met with considerably less agreement, the Pentagon has acknowledged the basic importance of the free flow of information in American democracy. Realizing that the exclusion of the press from its invasion of Grenada raised concerns, the Pentagon assembled the Sidle Commission and requested a report on how to approach these questions in the future. The Commission set guidelines for continually maintaining a press pool which could be taken into any combat activity from the onset. Although the press pool has proved less than a perfect solution, it offers promise for reducing the likelihood of a Grenada-like blackout.

While the Sidle Commission guidelines offer important considerations in determining Pentagon press policy, technology, legality, precedent, and political consideration must also be taken into account. Based on our analysis we recommend the following:

I. Enacting a directive or executive order mandating public affairs planning as an integral part of the military operational planning procedure. This order should include the following provisions:

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a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be required to include the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) or someone appointed by him or her during all stages of operational planning for assurance that public affairs concerns are adequately represented throughout the process.

b. That the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) be required to maintain press pools according to priorities outlined in the Siddle Commission report, exercise them periodically, work them into the earliest stages of combat activity when general media access is not feasible, and dissolve them to permit full media coverage of military activity as soon as possible.

II. Establishing a set of ground rules for press personnel in the combat area, to be enforced under the following provisions:

a. That journalists in the combat area be required to obtain accreditation based on affiliation with some official media organization, and that the list of ground rules be provided to all accredited journalists.

b. That restrictions on publishable material pertain only to information which could jeopardize US military operations or endanger US troops.

c. That ground rules be enforced through individual judgment by journalists and through ex post facto review of broadcasts and publications by military officials. If media violate these rules, they should be judged under current regulations.

III. Commitment to further study on future developments that will exert major influence on US Department of Defense press policy, including the following:

a. The coordination of US media policy with that of US allies.

b. The proposed use of high-resolution remote-sensing to gather news.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During World War II, a formal and comprehensive press censorship policy was invoked on a regular and continual basis. Wide-reaching censorship was enforced albeit slightly unequally, on all fronts. The Federal Office of Censorship established the Code of Wartime Practices, providing a specific listing of what could not be mentioned in press reports. The censorship process also involved severe penalties for violations of the code, some of which were considered criminal offenses.

In the early stages of the Korean War, military officials offered the press a new option, an experiment in "voluntary censorship." While the government and the recent experience in World War II provided standard censorship mechanisms and guidance, General MacArthur chose not to invoke these. Journalists were entrusted to use their own good judgment to determine what was fit to report, given the general principle that responsibility and common sense would act as guides to determining what information would endanger the war effort and American troops.

However, this lack of guidance presented a hardship for concerned journalists, who sometimes found it difficult to recognize security violations. A common source of tension between military officials and the most responsible journalists was the definition of a "security threat," a matter in which the military was generally far more likely to

err on the safe side. Given this discrepancy, and the lack of a common set of ground rules, the media were frequently accused of breaching security. By mid-1951, at the request of concerned journalists, among others, the military established a formal review process for all press materials leaving Korea. This was not, however, matched by any broad-scale censorship of communication or by review in Washington.¹

The Vietnam War presented a new challenge to public affairs officials at the Pentagon. Television took the war into America's living rooms, and a great debate ensued about the role the media played in actually determining the outcome of the war. The extensive coverage of the war was countered by no formal censorship procedures. To be allowed into Vietnam, journalists had to be accredited by both the Pentagon and the government of the host country, South Vietnam. The military did issue a set of guidelines for the reporting of combat-related activities, which prohibited the release of information about troop movements, identification of battle units, and other security details. While violation of these ground rules could prompt military authorities to revoke a reporter's credentials, few such incidences arose.

Despite the successful record of journalists adhering to ground rules, their work in Vietnam was subject to intense criticism. The war they covered was ugly. Americans witnessed heavy losses and painful

retreat. Vietnam created deep divides in the American social and political culture, and many have accused the dramatic television coverage of breaking morale and widening the gulf. On the other hand, wars had changed, and this one had little potential ever to become a great patriotic cause. No longer was the enemy as clear and distinct as when Hitler stormed through Europe. Many would argue that during Vietnam, television enabled public debate at home better to embrace the realities of war as it had evolved.

Much bitterness spilled over from the whole Vietnam experience into public perception of both the media and the military. This sentiment also contributed heavily to the traditional tension between the press and the defense establishment. These scars undoubtedly played a significant role in the Pentagon's planning of the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Provisions for press access to the island were entirely disregarded in the planning process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the White House. As a result, journalists were entirely prohibited from Grenada until two days after the invasion.

The primary justification of the JCS for this prohibition was the need for secrecy prior to the invasion. However, the inclusion of a limited press pool would have been a rather minor threat to secrecy relative to the extensive amount of speculation about a possible invasion that had already been sweeping the Caribbean. The need for secrecy provides a serious, but perhaps resolvable, dilemma for the resolution of the press inclusion issue. The First Amendment, coupled with a long tradition of guarantees of press coverage of government
affairs, makes provision for coverage of military actions a necessity in American political culture. While the military's need for secrecy is understandably critical in certain circumstances, recent experimentation in press pooling has proved that with practice and sufficient discipline, the military may well be able to take a small pool into a potential combat area on short notice without leakage. This will be addressed below in our discussion of the Pentagon's recent experimentation in press pooling.

A fury grew out of the Grenada exclusion policy, and the Pentagon felt compelled to react to a serious press relations crisis. In November 1983, General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the JCS, announced the formation of a panel to review the press planning issue. The committee, headed by Winant Sible, a retired major general in the Army, would be known as the Sible Commission. Its members included senior military officials and a number of retired journalists.

The Sible Commission's final report recognized the national importance of media access to the combat zone, intimating that the prohibition from Grenada did not adequately serve the considerable need for independent reporting consistent with the historical guarantee of freedom of the press. The paper outlined a list of Defense Department press provision requirements that the group felt could satisfy the needs of both the press and the Pentagon. Much of the agreement involves the automatic inclusion of a press pool in any planned military operation where this is reasonably possible.
The report outlines the specific details for the selection of pool participants and what facilities and equipment should be provided for them. In addition, the paper calls for the establishment of a set of voluntary ground rules for each military operation, regular meetings between media representatives and Pentagon officials, and programs to facilitate increased understanding between the military and the media.

The directive which gave theatre commanders authority to invoke field press censorship was cancelled in 1987. The cancelled WISP directive had contained provisions for civilian-oriented censorship (including mail and other forms of communication crossing US borders), as well as press censorship in combat zones. Congress had eliminated funding for training of reserve personnel in WISP functions in 1974, and with no new Congressional interest in funding, the directive was cancelled. Individual services retain specific media censorship guidelines; however, without the umbrella of Department-wide policy, these guidelines share no centralized coordination.
CURRENT PRACTICE

CENSORSHIP

Given the vast changes in communication and transportation technology over the past 25 years, the ability of the military to control media coverage has been seriously diminished. During World War II, only a handful of journalists were able to cover most combat areas because of logistical limitations. Of course the profession had not yet expanded to today's proportions either, and journalism's pervasiveness today is unquestionably linked to the incredible technical capacity available. Throughout this technological progression, the media are able to become less and less dependent upon defense officials for access to military operations.

In most cases of combat activity, journalists will have the capacity to get relatively close to the action within hours. Correspondents are spread generously around the globe, and transportation facilities are relatively rapid and inexpensive. Furthermore, any military action by the US can attract journalists from dozens of nations, any one of whom can send news quickly around the world. Given the size of the global media force and the extent of its communication capacity, any attempt at wide-reaching censorship by the military would be futile.

Only in the immediate combat area can military officials realistically maintain sufficient control over the environment to impose
serious limitations on the press. Military officials maintain that they can in fact manage to exercise fairly broad control over the physical combat region itself, and they expect this to be the case in future combat situations. As in Vietnam, journalists can be required to have accreditation to get access to the immediate battle area. In many situations, the press may be required to get permission from the host country as well. This procedure allows defense planners to attach behavioral requirements to access rights. Their options could include setting up ground rules, establishing some sort of experience or training requirements, or requiring journalists to agree to practice specific self-censorship techniques.

As journalists get closer to the center of combat activity, they become increasingly dependent upon military authorities for transportation, communication, and safety. Resources become scarce, communication vital, and transportation complex. Furthermore, when battle is relatively heated, only a limited number of onlookers can be accommodated without subjecting themselves and the mission to undue danger. Thus, in the early stages of a military confrontation or at the center of intense conflict, journalists are necessarily subjected to greater limitations and the need for more intense cooperation with their military escorts.

The press pool is the best-tailored method for providing press access to the combat area under these circumstances. These pools consist of a limited number of pre-designated correspondents who are taken into the combat zone by the military officials involved in that
campaign. Questions and issues surrounding report censorship, communications barriers, and special problems of the media pool are addressed below.

JOURNALISTS IN THE FIELD

A specific set of ground rules that is not overly prohibitive can provide a helpful set of guidelines for journalists to review their own materials for security violations. Such direction can be extremely useful in preventing mishaps, especially in cases where no further censorship is required. Despite the traditional tensions between media and military officials, a sense of immense responsibility for the lives of American troops seems a universal sentiment among journalists. A common theme expressed by defense correspondents is that they too feel a moral obligation to avoid endangering American lives. "We don't want blood on our hands" is a common plea to those who might underestimate their moral integrity.

While most defense officials may recognize the journalist's integrity and commitment to professionalism, they feel that rare exceptions and errors in judgment can prove extremely costly. This may prompt some field commanders or planning officials to desire more stringent measures to control security violations. However, the Pentagon does not have a history of putting heavy requirements on applicants for press credentials, and such attempts would likely be met by serious protests from journalists. Rather, attempts at better
preparing potential pool participants and journalists in general could be a more acceptable means of reducing the threat of dangerous security violations.

Much of the tension between the press and the military is currently exacerbated by an ever increasing sense of distance between military personnel and the journalists covering them. Very few young journalists have any military experience, a significant change from pre-Vietnam days.

In addition, there is an increasing tendency for news organizations to send journalists with little or no experience covering defense affairs into combat coverage and press pools. As the media have become continually more pervasive in American society, the military has responded in part by providing media relations educational programs. The regular exercise of press pools in the last few years has also provided a source of continuing education for both journalists and military personnel about the issues and problems associated with media coverage of military operations.

MEDIA POOLS

The use of media pools to cover US military operations is the most concrete and visible legacy of the Sible Commission report. Media pools allow independent reporting of a military action in the early stages, before the site of operation is opened to the general media. Several
reasons may call for limited media access in these situations—the need for secrecy, scarcity of space to transport large numbers of media correspondents and equipment, and serious time limitations.

Two types of media pools have been established—the national media pool, operating out of Washington, D.C., and a regional media pool, based closer to the proposed military maneuver. In the regional pool, participating news organizations assign reporters to the regional location. The media organization pays all costs for keeping that person at the site, and the reporter must be ready to leave on a pool assignment at a moment’s notice. Under this arrangement, the reporter and any accompanying technical crew are practically "lost" to the news organization for the duration of the pool; because of the requirements for contacting the pool member and the short amount of response time, it is rarely feasible for the reporter to be working on other stories. Networks have hired free-lance camera and technical teams to stay at the pool site for the duration of the pool so as to avoid taking a network crew out of commission, possibly needlessly, for the life of the pool.

The national media pool is comprised of journalists based in Washington. A rotating combination of media organizations is contacted and instructed to assign a representative to the media pool for the next 90-day rotation. If a situation arises where the pool will be activated, the Pentagon media pool liaison will contact the bureau chiefs of the organizations currently serving in the pool. The pool size and alert time are based on the amount of space available and the operation conditions. For example, for the most recent media pool
exercise in Ft. Greely, Alaska, calls to bureau chiefs began at 11:30 p.m. on December 7. The chiefs were instructed to have their assigned correspondents at Andrews Air Force Base by 4:00 a.m. on December 8. This particular pool consisted of eleven media representatives, including two women, and covered winter warfare training exercises.

Pool members are required to be US nationals, and to have valid passports and up-to-date immunizations required for global foreign travel. In addition, pool members are required to bring a sleeping bag, rugged clothing suitable for the current weather in the Washington area, and cash for meals and incidental expenses. The military will provide all transportation, lodging, and additional clothing or gear necessary for the climate in which the operation is taking place. Communications facilities are also provided by the host command.

As previously mentioned, the only media pool to accompany an actual military operation was activated in July 1987, covering the first US Navy escort of reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf. The media pool summoned for this operation consisted of ten members, who were accompanied by Pentagon representatives for the duration of the pool. Reports were submitted to the Pentagon "handlers," who reviewed the copy and then sent it to Washington. Film and video from the CNN crew and the photographers in the pool were taken to Bahrain and then transmitted to Washington.
POOL PROBLEMS

The media pool in the Persian Gulf provided both the military and the media with a "real world" test of the pooling concept. The major problems experienced in this pool serve as specific examples of the broad questions accompanying serious discussion of pooling and censorship. Encryption, necessary for transmission over military communications channels, was time-consuming. Despite clearance from the Pentagon "handlers" in the Gulf, some stories were delayed at the Pentagon, prompting angry reactions from the reporters. The then-spokesperson for the Pentagon claimed that the delay was to insure that future operations mentioned in the material would not be compromised in any way. The reporters suggested that in the future, the Pentagon staff should contact the appropriate bureau chief and agree to release the copies with those selections deleted. A fuller story with the deleted text could be issued at a later time.

One particular incident in the Persian Gulf proved violative of the notion that censorship should be invoked only for material that could jeopardize mission security or troop safety. A few stories mentioned beer drinking by Navy officers, in violation of Navy policy. The officers involved reviewed the copy along with the Pentagon escorts, and protested the inclusion of the beer-drinking references. The passages at issue clearly disclosed nothing about troop location, movement, or future operations, but were a source of serious embarrassment to the officers involved. Pentagon officials admitted that the officers' attempts to interfere with the reports had been
inappropriate, and that similar questions of review would not be an issue in the future.

Considering the question of who should conduct the security review, a conflict exists between the Pentagon escorts and the top officer/theatre commander in terms of responsibility. The theatre commander takes ultimate responsibility for everything that occurs under his or her command; yet he or she may not be as familiar with the workings of the media as one of the official Pentagon escorts. Reporters seem much more comfortable with review by the Pentagon escorts, often because the officers in the operation are too closely involved in the stories themselves to be objective about the security review.

The use of the pool has improved considerably since the first time it was summoned. The initial operation ended up being publicized well in advance, undermining one of the main justifications for using a national press pool. As the process has evolved over time, it has become increasingly routine for both the military plans officers and the media organizations involved.

The major question that arises from this routinization is whether it is enough to guarantee that, a pool will be called up when a serious military action is planned. From the military, the reaction to this question is almost a unanimous yes, but there is dissent among the journalists, many of whom are seriously skeptical. One reporter stated that even if reporters were loaded down with restrictions, he was still
"optimistic" that a press pool would be operated. Most media representatives were reluctant to share his confidence, pointing to the 1987 shelling of Iranian oil platforms at Rashadat as an example of a situation where the press pool should have been utilized, but was simply ignored. While the operation was planned with plenty of time to organize a pool, military officials claim the pooling process simply was not standardized enough for them to work it into their plans. (Ironically, one of the destroyers participating in the shelling, the USS Kidd, had hosted journalists during the Persian Gulf media pool.) Some journalists take this as an indication that defense planners are not ready to welcome the pool into real combat situations. "Their [the military's] need is for us to stay in the States away from them," lamented one correspondent.

Even if the pool is called out, its composition would be uncertain. The Pentagon designates the news organizations to be included in a given quarter from lists provided by the organizations, generally in rotation, but those organizations designate the specific participants. News organizations are then free to assign their usual defense/Pentagon correspondents to the pool. In many cases, however, the regular reporter may be kept in Washington to interpret information and use his or her cultivated sources to get the inside story. In this case, another reporter, perhaps less experienced in defense issues, may participate in the pool. This option raises questions about the quality of coverage—a crucial consideration for both sides.
The pool concept has its value in that it allows for an independent account of the military action that otherwise would not exist. While speed and timeliness are essential to any news story, the main purpose of the pool is not to allow these reporters to beat the clock, but to provide information that would not be available in any other way. The pool is to function as a stop-gap measure until general independent media coverage is possible. To this extent, the pools have proven valuable; however, use of the pools is still at the discretion of the Pentagon, and there is no guarantee that a pool will be called out for every military operation not otherwise accessible to the press.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Modern technology is quickly and significantly changing the way in which the media function. News organizations can cover more of the world, faster, and with fewer people. These changes require the military to adapt to different types of coverage from different types of reporters.

In Vietnam, where television was often seen as an influential factor in the conflict, reporters had the technology to provide photographs from the battle sites after only a short delay for processing. If a similar conflict were to occur today, those same reporters would be able to transmit footage almost simultaneously by using portable satellite dishes to send pictures directly to network studios in New York or Washington.
Other changes in communications technology have affected the way reports are filed from the field. Print reports can be sent by facsimile machines over regular telephone lines or, if classified, can be encoded and sent by satellite. Satellites and fax machines can also transmit photos of usable quality for newspapers.

An even more advanced media usage of technology is a currently proposed joint media satellite. This eye-in-the-sky would be used to provide news organizations with photographs from space to supplement reports. At present, commercial satellite companies interpret photos from the French SPOT and American LANDSAT systems and sell these photos for media use.

The proposed media satellite would entail a group of media organizations collectively funding the satellite and having access to its photography. Such a satellite is only in the proposal stages at present for several reasons—resolution capability of the best commercially available satellite is not good enough for consistent general media usefulness; cost, even in a joint venture, may be prohibitive; and federal regulations pertaining to private satellite ownership may be restrictive, at least by press standards.

These changes pose several challenges. First, the military is losing one of its most crucial advantages in enforcing field press censorship—the ability to control the transmission of reports from the combat zone. Previously, (and still, to a large extent, in a naval environment) the military has provided not only transportation but also
transmission facilities for journalists. This provided an extremely effective means of enforcing security review—by not allowing material to be transmitted until it was reviewed by military personnel. As portable satellite dishes and private communication links become more mobile, more affordable, and more accessible to media organizations, this opportunity for enforced review will become more scarce, and censorship will be more dependent upon cooperation from the journalist.

The use of these private communications links may also have an effect on battlefield security. Portable satellite units may have electronic emissions that can alert the enemy to location of US forces; the enemies could possibly intercept such portable satellite reports and gain intelligence information of great value to them. Private satellite transmission would require more equipment in an already overloaded environment. Finally, military forces would have to consider eliminating or disabling the media satellite, leaving journalists dependent upon local or military communications facilities.
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Precedent for international action in this area is provided by Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 79 defines journalists as civilians fulfilling a professional mission, whether accredited by the armed forces (having the right to accompany the forces without actually being members thereof) or acting in a freelance capacity. The effective difference between the two categories is in the protection afforded them under the Conventions—if captured, journalists accredited by the armed forces would be considered prisoners of war, while freelancers would be considered civilians under the Fourth Convention.

Article 79 also suggests that journalists may obtain an identity card to attest to his or her status. This identity card, as defined in the Article, is not necessarily an accreditation document giving permission for said journalist to accompany the armed forces; it acts primarily as a way for the journalist to prove his or her status as a member of the media. The Article states that the cards should be issued by the government of which the journalist is a national, where the journalist resides, or where his or her news organization is located. Recommended information for an acceptable ID card is listed in Appendix 2.

A working group within NATO is currently addressing issues of coordination of US media policy with that of US allies, along with revising a set of NATO censorship guidelines. This effort includes
establishment of access and support mechanisms necessary to sustain media coverage of a specific area. Members of the working group are identifying media outlets in allied countries which could be used for report transmission during a military operation, as well as locating accommodations, staging areas, and other support facilities for journalists. This effort also includes the identification of potential public affairs officers, most of whom could be called from the various reserve forces of alliance members.
LEGAL PRECEDENT

Considerations of legality require an examination of legal precedent in the areas of national security and First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has long considered sacrosanct the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, applying heightened judicial scrutiny in numerous cases where these rights have been threatened. However, the Court has consistently held that the military warrants special consideration in terms of its power to conduct its operation without outside interference. Even in the particularly sensitive areas of freedom of speech, freedom of religious expression, and gender discrimination, the Court has remained almost completely deferential to military command.

In terms of news gathering rights, the overriding case in numerous disputes has been Zemel v. Rusk, in which the Court upheld an executive ban on travel to Cuba following the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. The ruling contended that while the First Amendment's press provision protects the right to report any information, this does not necessarily guarantee access to information. Justice Warren's majority opinion argued that newsworthiness alone does not guarantee access, citing quarantined disaster areas and the White House as examples of places where necessary bans on free entry may prohibit the flow of information.

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1Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
The Court has affirmed the right to press access to information in one specific setting—the courtroom (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia\(^1\)). However, it is unlikely that this decision would extend to other public fora, and almost certain that it would be overridden by Zemel in military applications.

If the executive has the power to enact a total ban on American access to a foreign country, then the power to make lesser limitations would necessarily be upheld, provided the purpose of the lesser limitation would serve the same ends as the greater limitation (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission\(^2\)). In other words, if the military can place a ban on travel to a combat area as a security precaution, then it could likewise place restrictions or conditions on travel, provided the restraints satisfied the same security need.

Several cases exemplify the Court’s exceptional deference to the US military. In Korematsu v. United States\(^3\), a case now infamous but which remains unchallenged as good law, the Court justified the exercise of racial discrimination in its reluctance to challenge military authority. The Court upheld the power of Congress and the executive to prohibit persons of Japanese ancestry from remaining in San Leandro, California, designated a "Military Area" by the US Army. Parker v. Levy\(^4\) upheld the US military's authority to run a criminal justice system distinctly different from that of civilian society. Rostker v.

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\(^1\) Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
\(^3\) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Goldberg upheld Congressional authority to require only men to register for Selective Service. In Goldman v. Weinberger\(^2\), the Court upheld an Air Force dress provision which effectively forbade an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke while on duty.

Legal precedent clearly indicates almost total deference by the courts to the US military. Exceptions to this rule are few, and have only tangential bearing on military procedure. If the Defense Department's power to exclude the press from combat scenes is virtually unlimited, then the Department must examine what responsibilities that power entails. Because the courts will likely not interfere with military infringements on First Amendment or Equal Protection rights, DoD's primary responsibility to defend these freedoms lies in its mission as an arm of the government.

Since the military is committed to defense, policy-makers must consider what it is that they are defending. Few would argue against the notion that the military's primary function is to defend these very freedoms. It would follow that DoD's legitimacy will remain intact only as long as it refrains from needlessly trampling the values that it is given so much power and freedom to protect. After all, the Defense Department is in essence the last line of defense for these valued Constitutional rights.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS

POLICY GOALS

The Department of Defense could have two conceivable goals in implementing a press policy. There is considerable need for an adequate response to the strained media-military relations evident since Vietnam, and exacerbated by Grenada. To this end, DoD could develop a policy simply as an attempt to mend fences, recover credibility, and boost its public image. These are legitimate and important institutional goals; DoD is a massive public institution which cannot operate effectively without public confidence and support. The Department could embrace public affairs issues through continued discussion, further experimentation with the press in pooling exercises, and upgraded public relations efforts. While the goal is to build public reassurance, however, these measures could represent anything from a genuine commitment to informing the public to a mere facade of concern for public affairs issues.

Alternatively, the Department could seek to institutionalize public affairs concerns as a significant factor in general defense policy and planning. The goal of such a program would be to incorporate the concept of governmental responsibility to the public more routinely into Pentagon practice. Attempts to make DoD policy and practice reflect this freedom of information philosophy would inevitably satisfy the lesser goal of improved public image as well.
The latter goal would satisfy a key ideal of democratic government. While the first goal of building public confidence in the defense establishment is valid in and of itself, a policy that attempted to satisfy the second goal would create such trust on a much more permanent basis. The Grenada mission may have proved a short-term public affairs victory; US armed forces made a quick, clean sweep of a perceived enemy threat, and the American viewer saw no blood and no mess. The long-run effect, however, was to cast a shadow of doubt over what the government hoped to accomplish. The lack of independent coverage could have elicited a nearly indelible distrust from the public, especially if the losses from the combat had been more serious. If a lot of caskets had come home from Grenada, Americans might have felt very threatened by the dark veil of secrecy that surrounded the invasion.

There are indeed short-term costs to adopting a policy of assuring press access to military engagements. The probability of information leaks necessarily increases with the presence of additional people at the site (especially when the additional individuals happen to be journalists). The image of the Pentagon can suffer serious damage when every setback is subject to intense press scrutiny. However, the Defense Department has an important stake in long-term public confidence. Broad public trust and support can provide a deterrence against would-be foreign aggressors. With popular backing, the US military would be perceived by enemies as more likely to react to
aggression, more capable of fighting abroad without having to fight public relations battles at home.

The Defense Department, like other arms of the government, is ultimately responsible to the public. Short-term security violations and public relations damage are relatively small prices to pay for a long-term commitment to freedom of information. Allowing the public to receive as much information as possible enhances the citizens' ability to govern themselves effectively, and fulfills a fundamental obligation of public service in a democracy. There is evidence that DoD is increasing internal media awareness. The formation of the Sidle panel signaled the willingness of the military establishment to consider working media coverage into military planning. The trend also includes the introduction of courses on media-military relations in service education.

Finally, current White House political concerns may be well served by a new and dynamic policy of openness at the Pentagon. President Bush has pledged to make his administration more accessible to the media and seems committed to building a healthier, less antagonistic relationship between the press and the Oval Office. This atmosphere would suggest an opportunity for policy entrepreneurship, on which the Defense Department could capitalize by presenting bold public affairs policy initiatives. The President could in turn seize on the Pentagon initiative as a concrete opportunity for him to turn his pledge into visible policy developments.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CENSORSHIP

Proponents of press limitations point to several major problems that arise due to the lack of a press policy. We have considered these concerns inasmuch as they prove to be legitimate and significant. These include the following:

Military security and the safety of US forces. This is the problem that warrants the most careful attention. In many military operations, secrecy is of the utmost importance, and a scrutinizing press may possess the power to do major damage to the effort by providing the enemy, even inadvertently, with information about troop movements and battle strategy.

Releasing classified information. In this area, a serious question about responsibility arises. One must consider whether leaks are products of press indiscretion or of careless handling of information within the military establishment. It may be unfair to chastise the press for leakage problems on the part of the military, and we cannot attempt to address these issues here.

However, the problem may be one of reporting information that cannot possibly be contained from anyone who is close to the operation. If this is the case, then we have the same security problems discussed above. Censorship guidelines or ground rules which placed restrictions on the dissemination of this information
would serve as well to eliminate the problem of unintentional release of classified information.

Revealing misinformation campaigns conducted by the US government. As good as the intentions of the government may be, our system of governing is too heavily dependent upon a well-informed public to permit widespread public deception. It is impossible to justify censorship of the press based on this concern.

Reporting atrocities committed by American and foreign troops. Such coverage can sway public opinion rather drastically. But again, public policy is ultimately checked by the populace, and it would be impossible for anyone to determine what emotional issues should not be factors in the decision-making process without undermining the system.

Threatening the safety of journalists assigned to the zone. Since reporters are willing to accept the risks involved with entering conflict zones, this issue carries little validity.

Many field commanders nonetheless express grave concern over their assumed responsibility for the lives of reporters who would be taken under the roof of their operations. This concern may be
partially addressed through the involvement of public affairs officials on the mission, who would be charged with providing most arrangements for press correspondents, including safety precautions. Despite the most careful public affairs planning, journalists who wish to be close to the action will inevitably be exposed to considerable risk, and will knowingly make this choice. Like other actors who are committed to playing important roles in American defense activity, they assume the serious consequences associated with that decision.

GENERAL POLICY ALTERNATIVES

In terms of censorship policy in general, we arrived at three broad options:

- No new policy should be established.

  Benefits: Individual services are left to maintain their own guidelines, which may be more appropriate than a blanket order because they will take into consideration the special needs of each service (e.g., the difference between transmission from a ship or on land).

  Problems: There is no guarantee that media/public affairs planning will be considered in any military operations.

- New policy/Executive Order mandating press planning whenever considering any sort of military operation, and the use of pools where general media coverage is not feasible, but not
providing specifics (e.g. make-up of the pools, designated censors).

Benefits: Assures that the press will be present in combat situations, while allowing flexibility for case-by-case decisions about how to operate with the pool.

Problems: Provides no guarantee for reasonably uniform censorship methods or timeliness of press releases.

- New policy/Executive Order spelling out where, when, and how any censorship is to take place.

Benefits: Removes inconsistency and room for bad discretion. All parties involved know what to expect.

Problems: Increased bureaucracy can lead to increased complication, rules that are unenforceable, and further hostility from a press that feels embattled.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our analysis we recommend the following:

I. Enacting a directive or executive order mandating public affairs planning as an integral part of the military operational planning procedure. This order should include the following provisions:

a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be required to include the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) or someone appointed by him or her during all stages of operational planning for assurance that public affairs concerns are adequately represented throughout the process.

Adequate representation of public affairs issues would consist of both consultation with the public affairs annex during the planning process and accompaniment of public affairs officials during the actual execution of any mission. The JCS would be ultimately responsible for this process since they assume direct responsibility for the activities of the US armed forces during wartime. The planning should include the provision of public affairs personnel for assistance to the press, communication facilities for the media, and transportation to and within the theatre of command (as described in Sible Commission recommendations 5-7, see Appendix 1).
By issuing a directive or an executive order, the Pentagon would satisfy the need for institutionalization of public affairs planning. This could provide reassurance that press access is given serious consideration in military planning. Future planning activity would be guaranteed the "expertise of public affairs officers" which the Siddle Commission felt "could have met the interests of both the military and the press, to everyone's benefit."\(^1\) in Grenada.

b. That the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) be required to maintain press pools according to priorities outlined in the Siddle Commission report, exercise them periodically, work them into the earliest possible stages of combat activity when general media access is not feasible, and dissolve them to permit full media coverage of military activity as soon as possible.

While media representatives on the Siddle Commission differed on the selection of which news organizations would participate in the pools, "all agreed that the most important criterion was probably which organizations cover the widest American audience."\(^2\) The Defense Department has since deferred selection to Washington bureau chiefs, who have maintained a rotation which provides pool slots for most of the major national news

\(^1\)Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Siddle Panel) in Statement by the Secretary of Defense, August 23, 1984, p. 4.
\(^2\)Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Siddle Panel) in Statement by the Secretary of Defense, August 23, 1984, p. 10.
national news organizations which provide regular coverage of the Pentagon. Since pool capacity will vary between missions, participants should be selected from those organizations designated for the pool in a particular quarter, according to the rough hierarchy established in the Sible Report commentary (See Appendix 3).

Public Affairs should continue the frequent exercise of the pool, which serves as an important educational source for both media participants and military planners. Through the pool exercise program, participating journalists can gain much of the experience covering military operations that many currently lack. Military planners get a significant opportunity to help reporters grow accustomed to military terminology and customs, and to broaden reporters' understanding of the goals and needs of military planning. Increasing performance quality in practice sessions should lead to increased confidence that the pool can be used efficiently in actual combat.

The pool should only be used during the earliest stages of an operation when the press would otherwise be unable to cover the mission. It should be disbanded in favor of more complete access as soon as combat activity stretches beyond the contingency stages. When the general media are allowed access to the combat area, public affairs representatives should focus their efforts on assistance to the media at large.
II. Establishing a set of ground rules for press personnel in the combat area, to be enforced under the following provisions:

a. That journalists in the combat area be required to obtain accreditation based on affiliation with some official media organization, and that the list of ground rules be provided to all accredited journalists.

To acquire accreditation, journalists would be required to submit general identification information and some proof of affiliation with any legitimate news organization. Approval should be dependent only upon the ability to present such proof as a letter from a news bureau. Applicants would be given the set of ground rules, so that their submission of an application would indicate their awareness of the rules and their consequences.

Accreditation would serve as assurance that ground rules are provided to all press personnel in the combat area. Accredited journalists should receive press identification cards that would provide them universal recognition as official war correspondents under the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

b. That restrictions on publishable material pertain only to information which could jeopardize US military operations or endanger US troops.
The set of guidelines should be similar to the "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information" used to guide journalists in Vietnam (See Appendix 4). An updated set of guidelines has recently been submitted to the ASD(PA) for consideration. These should be general enough to apply to all combat scenarios. (Thus the only problem with the Vietnam guidelines excerpted in Appendix 4 are the specific restrictions on information about the performance of enemy anti-aircraft devices. Such information would have served as valuable intelligence data for the enemy, but might have constituted a security threat only for that particular mission. Updated guidelines should contain some flexibility to allow for similar restrictions for specific operations, but without permitting overly broad interpretation.)

c. That ground rules be enforced through individual judgment by journalists and through ex post facto review of broadcasts and publications by military officials.

Widespread censorship will be impossible to administer on a uniform basis in future combat situations. As in Vietnam, the Defense Department should depend upon independent adherence to the guidelines provided to accredited journalists. Journalists should be subject to removal of accreditation for the violation of ground rules.
While journalists in Vietnam made few violations worthy of punishment, hostile relations grew between the press and the military nonetheless. A greater presence of public affairs personnel might have reduced the hostilities and enhanced understanding between the media and the military. In the future, this goal could also be facilitated through the continual exercise of national press pools, providing reporters valuable experience and understanding of the military.

Ex post facto review would eliminate much of the inconsistency that arises from review prior to publication. Materials will be subject to the discretion of the reporter who will take ultimate responsibility for them, rather than the discretion of various public affairs officers or field commanders. While journalists may occasionally feel unsure about potential security violations, public affairs officers in the field could provide valuable assistance upon request.

III. Commitment to further study on future developments that will exert major influence on US Department of Defense press policy, including the following:

   a. The coordination of US media policy with that of US allies.

Because deterrence is a function of demonstrated political will, and modern media usage is an extremely effective tool for influencing public opinion, attention should be given to
coordination of US media policy with that of US allies. This planning should encompass several elements:

1) an agreed set of definitions for public affairs terms, and agreed goals of the public affairs planning function

2) a set of mechanics for press registration and accreditation

3) establishment of press access/support guidelines

It would be beneficial (although time-consuming) to expand NATO press policy coordination efforts throughout the various contingency planning groups of US allies. The quick, sufficient, and coordinated response of public affairs officers will make a critical difference in how conflict (and therefore public support) is perceived through the media in this age of extensive communications capacity. However, this international coordination can only be accomplished when the US has an institutionalized, department-wide policy.

b. The proposed use of high-resolution remote-sensing to gather news.

Although technical factors and high costs will likely postpone the advent of a joint media satellite, the Department should begin now to assess:
1) The changes in coverage that will be inherent in this new media technology

2) Responses in public affairs/planning to the issue of wartime coverage by satellite

Should DoD act on these recommendations, the effect would be a major step toward healthier media-military relations. The goal of these recommendations is to encourage a more equitable relationship—in a sense, institutionalizing trust. With the required inclusion of public affairs planning, the burden of proof would rest with DoD to offer explanation when media representatives are not included in operations. This would provide an opportunity for the media to move from a largely accusatory stance to their ideal role as watch dogs, eager to question assumptions, but not over-eager to kill.
APPENDIX 1

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SIDDLE COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATION 1:

That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the great majority of cases by implementing the following:

a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.

b. When sending implementing orders to Commanders in Chief in the field, direct CINC\(^2\) planners to include consideration of public information aspects.

c. Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should appropriately come from the Secretary of Defense.

d. Complete the plan, currently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in OJCS\(^3\) to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.

e. Insofar as possible and appropriate, institutionalize these steps in written guidance or policy.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

That, in connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or

\(^1\)From Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Siddle Panel) in Statement by the Secretary of Defense, August 23, 1984, pp. 4-6.

\(^2\)Commander in Chief

\(^3\)Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or the establishment of a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Planning factors should include provision for intra- and inter-theatre transportation support of the media.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

To improve media-military' understanding and cooperation:

a. CJCS\textsuperscript{1} should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program be undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during

\textsuperscript{1}Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
military operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.

b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service schools, to include media participation when possible.

c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through more visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations.

d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is real-time or near real-time news media audiovisual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle set forth at the beginning of this section of the report.
APPENDIX 2

GENEVA CONVENTION RECOMMENDED IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

[The prototype as outlined in Protocol I contains the following information in Arabic, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. In addition the Protocol calls for the use of the native language of the country where the conflict is taking place.]

Name of the country issuing the card

Title: "Identity card for journalists on dangerous professional missions"

Notice: "This identity card is issued to journalists on dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflicts. The holder is entitled to be treated as a civilian under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and their Additional Protocol I. The card must be carried at all times by the bearer. If he is detained, he shall at once hand it to the Detaining Authorities, to assist in his identification.

Name of the competent authority issuing the identification

Photograph of the bearer

Place and date of issuance

Official seal imprint of the issuing authority

Signature of the bearer

Surname and first names of the bearer

Place and date of birth

News organization for which bearer is a correspondent

Specific occupation

Period for which identification is valid

Bearer's height, weight, eye color, hair color, blood type, Rh factor, religion (optional), fingerprints (optional), and special marks of identification

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1From Article 79 of Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
APPENDIX 3

SIDLE COMMISSION COMMENTARY ON POOLING HIERARCHY

a. Wire services. AP and UPI to have priority. A reporter from each and a photographer from either one should be adequate. In a crash situation where inadequate planning time has been available, a reporter from one wire service and a photographer from the other could provide a two-person pool.

b. Television. A two-person TV pool (one correspondent, one film/sound man) can do the job for a brief time although perhaps minimally. All TV representatives agreed that a three-person team is better and can do more. A panel suggestion that a six-person team (one cameraman, one sound man, and one reporter each from ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN) seemed agreeable to the four networks although the load on the two technicians would be difficult to handle. The panel has no suggestion on this except that TV pool representatives must have high priority with two representatives as the minimum and augmentation to depend on space available. This should be a matter of discussion at the meetings suggested in recommendation 8a. The question of radio participation in pools must also be resolved.

c. News magazines. One reporter and one color photographer.

d. Daily newspapers. At least one reporter. The panel agreed with newspaper representatives that, although newspapers do use wire service copy and photos, at least one newspaper pooler is needed for the special aspects of newspaper coverage not provided by the wire services. Criteria suggested for use when deciding which newspaper(s) to include in a pool included: Circulation, whether the newspaper has a news service, does the newspaper specialize in military and foreign affairs, and does it cover the Pentagon regularly. There was some agreement among the media representatives that there are probably not more than 8-10 newspapers which should be considered for pooling under these criteria.

APPENDIX 4

EXCERPTS FROM VIETNAM INFORMATION RELEASE GUIDELINES

The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV.

1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.

2. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.

3. Amounts or ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).

4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved.

5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.

6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.

7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside RVN.

8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.

10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.

11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)

12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.

13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.

14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.

15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CRISIS COORDINATION CENTER

PMKS/1. THIS MSG SUPERSEDES REF A AND DIRECTS AN EMBARGO ON THE MOVEMENT OF MEDIA POOL PRODUCTS TO JIB DHAHRAN.

2. EFFECTIVE AT H-HOUR, ALL MEDIA POOL REPORTS, VIDEOTAPE, PHOTOGRAPHS AND AUDIO TAPE WILL BE HELD AT FORWARD STAGING LOCATIONS TO PROTECT SENSITIVE OPSEC CONCERNS DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN. STAGING LOCATIONS ARE KKM (ARMY), AL JUBAYL (USMC), NAVALCENT DUBAI AND NAVCENT RIYADH (NAVY), OR AT THE ORIGINATING BASE (USAF). SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON HANDLING OF USMC PRODUCTS WILL BE DEVELOPED BY CENTCOM PA AND PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. PAOS MAY CONFIRM TO MEDIA POOL MEMBERS THAT SENSITIVE REPORTS WILL BE EMBARGOED FOR AT LEAST A 48 HOUR PERIOD TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY. NON-SENSITIVE REPORTS, WHICH DO NOT DISCLOSE UNIT LOCATIONS OR PLANS, DEALING WITH NON-TACTICAL, FEATURE RELATED MATERIAL MAY BE RELEASED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS DETERMINED BY THE CCPA CELL AT KKM AND CCPA AT RIYADH. THIS EMBARGO IS NOT -- PAGE 04 RUEKJCS7475.

REPEAT -- NOT INTENDED TO KEEP POOL REPORTERS FROM GATHERING AND PREPARING MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT AND LATER RELEASE. DECLAS OADR MINIMIZE CONSIDERED//
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BRIEFING SCRIPT
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD MEDIA PLAN

SLIDE 1 (MAP OF AOR) The width and breadth of the DESERT SHIELD theater of operations and the myriad possible scenarios for potential combat operations make facilitating coverage for the U.S. and international media on scene a challenging proposition. Already the focus of world attention, the outbreak of conflict in the middle east will result in unprecedented media attention and requests to cover all aspects of ongoing operations. Because of the worldwide impact of hostilities in the region and the proliferation of media outlets, this is likely to evolve into the media event of the century.

SLIDE 2 (MEDIA) Over 400 media representatives are currently in Saudi Arabia and are concentrated in Dhahran. Of this total, approximately 250 are representatives of U.S. media outlets. Because of Saudi government visa policies, this number has stabilized. If a more liberal visa policy was initiated, we could expect that number to double or even triple. Upon commencement of hostilities we can expect that further pressure will be put on the Saudi government to accommodate additional media to cover the story.

SLIDES 3, 4 & 5 (PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSETS) In order to handle the media already in the kingdom as well as those who we expect to
arrive after the commencement of hostilities, the following public affairs assets are currently in place. With the exception of approximately 50 personnel in Riyadh assigned the Central Command Public Affairs Office, the small Joint Information Bureau operation, and the component commanders, the bulk of these assets are in Dhahran and in the field/afloat with operational units. This does not include public affairs assets that will arrive with units deploying as a result of the President’s recent announcement.

SLIDE 6 (POOL COMPOSITION) Because it is not possible to individually facilitate all 250+ media on scene, it is necessary to pool media coverage for combat operations in order to keep the media presence at the front lines at a level that can be handled by existing public affairs assets. This plan calls for two initial pools which would consist of sixteen media personnel: two three-member television crews, one radio correspondent, two wire service correspondents, two wire service photographers, one news magazine correspondent, one news magazine photographer and three newspaper correspondents.

SLIDE 7 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS) This plan envisions a three phase concept of operations. During Phase I, the two 16-member pools will be formed by the Joint Information Bureau Dhahran from media already in theater. In order to protect OPSEC and provide training for media and military personnel, these pools will be randomly activated every two weeks as a minimum. These drills
will give us the opportunity to exercise like we intend to fight, and should help us locate and correct any potential problems before combat operations commence.

Phase II calls for the prepositioning of these pools forward at the first indication that hostilities are imminent. If such intelligence is not available, these pools would be transported forward as soon as possible to join up with front line combatant units upon commencement of hostilities. In keeping with the spirit of the Chairman’s Media Pool message of June 1990, we do not anticipate that these pools will remain as large unwieldy groups. As such we desire itinerary planning that will enable media pool members to disperse throughout the combat area in order to provide balanced coverage of operations. Commands should plan from the onset of the operation to divide the pools into small elements of from 1-3 persons and to disperse those elements throughout the area to facilitate coverage of the entire operation. On an ongoing basis, units in the field are currently hosting groups of unilateral media this size for overnight visits, so in terms of logistical support, this should pose no real additional burden. As soon as deemed possible by the on scene commander, additional pools will be constituted and forward deployed to expand the coverage. These additional pools could be used to fill the gaps in coverage if the conflict is spread over a wide area and the fighting cannot be easily covered by the original two pools. Navy, Air Force and combat support units
located in the rear will also be covered by these secondary pools.

Phase III would begin when hostilities have ended. The pools accompanying units would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although still facilitated through one of the two Joint Information Bureaus.

SLIDE 8 (DEDICATED RESOURCES) Dedicated resources are required to successfully execute this plan. As a minimum, media assigned to cover combatant units in the field require a certain level of support including a keflar helmet, flak vest, web gear with canteen, and chemical suit, mask and decontamination kit. Additionally, the media will require a certain level of instruction and training in the use of this gear.

Dedicated transportation is the key to this plan. Both air and ground transportation support are essential in order to move media pools rapidly forward to the combatant units which they will cover. Transportation remains a critical requirement after the pools are in place to facilitate movement of media pool products such as video and audio tapes and undeveloped film back to the JIB in Dhahran for pooling. This requirement may be able to piggy back upon existing logistic and medevac flights that will be flying regularly once hostilities commence.
Communications support will also be required on a not-to-interfere with operational requirements basis. If commercial facilities are available on scene, media should have access to phone lines/fax machines for filing purposes. If not, military communications systems should be made available on an expedited basis for filing of print media stories. Additionally, in the event of a catastrophic failure of commercial communications systems in the Kingdom, we have to be prepared to assist the media in getting their stories out of the country via military assets.

SLIDE 9 (POOL OPERATIONS)  The filing procedures for the pools have been streamlined to expedite the process. Specific ground rules will be agreed to by pool participants prior to deployment with units. Security at the source will be the policy for video, audio and photographic media pool products. Security review of print products will be conducted in the field by designated personnel, prior to filing. All products will be submitted to JIB Dhahran for pooling with other media on scene, this precludes the need for pool members to regroup periodically in the field to pool materials prior to filing. Additionally, daily operational briefings will be held in Riyadh and be broadcast simultaneously in the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran for media at the rear. This will provide the operational overview necessary to compliment pool reports from the field.
SLIDE 10 (RECOMMENDATIONS) It is critical that we implement a comprehensive combat media coverage plan as soon as possible. Implementation of this plan now sends the message to the media that we are dedicated to assisting them in covering this story, setting the stage for good media relations throughout any potential combat operation. Implementing and exercising this plan now will ensure that we are ready to do our job and facilitate coverage once hostilities commence.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAMS

3 JAN 91

SUBJECT: Replies to your December 14 airlift memorandum

The replies to your memorandum soliciting comments about the possible airlift of additional media into Saudi Arabia are attached and are summarized below:

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<tr>
<th>Tab A</th>
<th>Your Memo's</th>
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| Tab B | **Knight Ridder** -- Clark Hoyt sent two letters, one-day apart. The first said the allocation of two seats was unsatisfactory. He said his 28 newspapers have circulation of 3 - 4 million, and feels that justifies three seats. The second letter urges implementation of Phase III as soon as possible, questions why correspondents will have to be escorted during Phase III, and "trusts" there will not be security review during that phase. He also takes "strong" exception to the ground rules, says categories of "releasable and not releasable" are too easily misunderstood, and feels that security review by commanders is unacceptable. He urges common-sense rules to not report on future operations or security issues during current operations and, although objecting to prior review, suggests that, if it is required, it should occur at a central location. |

| Tab C | **USA Today** -- **USA Today** is not represented on the pool -- Gannett is. Steve Davis sent a letter informing us of his pool contact numbers. He, then called and explained that Gannett does not represent **USA Today** -- they are separate organizations -- and requested to attend the meeting and to have a representative on the pools. NOTE: Gannett represents **USA Today** on the National Media Pool and the contacts for call outs for that pool are from both organizations. |

| Tab D | **Hearst Newspapers** -- Chuck Lewis, a long time pool supporter, doesn't like security review period, but, if required, feels it should be done at the Pentagon. He also doesn't understand why we have escorts during Phase III, feels that the ground rules are too complex, and sent a one-page version. |

| Tab E | **The Washington Post** -- Mike Getler feels the releasable information category should be dropped, the not releasable category is too broad, and that an escort during Phase III is simply a means of controlling everything. |

| Tab F | **The New York Times** -- Howell Raines feels that Phase III contradicts the unilateral coverage concept you discussed at the last meeting and doesn't understand the concept of escorts during that period. He also feels that the ground rules are "unnecessarily specific and gratuitously restrictive," the security review at the source has not been agreed to, and the commander is not the best person to do the review. |

| Tab G | **The Boston Globe** -- Steve Kurkjian is concerned that he will not get equitable consideration, especially if he is listed on the pool roster as a small newspaper. Subsequently, they were listed as a large paper and he has not called for at least a week. |
**Tab H**

*Newsday* -- Gaylord Shaw feels that *Newsday*’s almost constant presence in Saudi Arabia and daily circulation of almost one million merit more that one seat.

**Tab I**

*New York’s Capital Newspapers* -- Harry Rosenfeld requests a seat on the plane.  
*The Virginia Pilot & The Ledger-Star* -- James Rapier requests a seat on the plane.  
*The San Francisco Examiner* -- Larry Kramer requests a seat on the plane.  
*The GAMMA Liaison Network* -- Jennifer Coley requests a seat on the plane.

**Tab J**

*The Voice of America* -- Sid Davis contacted Bob Hall and requested a seat on the plane.  
Bob’s memo about that and his conversation with *USA Today*’s Juan Waite is at this tab.

**Tab K**

*CENTCOM* -- Ron Wildermuth referenced your conversation during your visit and requests that you include six augmentation PAO’s on the flight.  
The Military Airlift Command (MAC) made a similar request to Col. Alex for MAC PAO’s to go on the plane when he was doing the initial research on determining how many people a C141 would hold.

Not at Tab 

*Business Week* requested and will be allowed to attend tomorrow’s meeting.  However, they will be the only organization -- that I know about -- attending the meeting that does not have a slot on the aircraft.

**SUMMARY:**

Have seat(s) but want more: Knight Ridder has 2, wants 3  
*Newsday* has 1, wants more

Do not have any seats and want one or more:  
USA *Today* (Gannett)  
Capital Newspapers  
San Francisco Examiner  
*The Virginia Pilot & The Ledger-Star*  
GAMMA  
VOA  
Business Week

Don’t like/want security review and  
Feel that commanders should not perform it:  
Knight Ridder  
Hearst  
*The New York Times*

Security review, if required, should be done at:  
A central location (Knight Ridder)  
The Pentagon (Hearst)

Does not want security review during Phase III:  
Knight Ridder

Do not want escorts during Phase III and  
Do not like the ground rules:  
Knight Ridder  
Hearst  
*The Washington Post*  
*The New York Times*

Ground Rule Complaints:  
Categories of releasable/not releasable too easily misunderstood (KR)  
Too complex (Hearst)  
Unnecessarily specific and gratuitously restrictive (NYT)  
Releasable category should be dropped (WP)  
Not releasable category is too broad (WP)
MEMORANDUM

December 14, 1990

To: Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps

From: Pete Williams

Re: Plans for pools and flight for auxiliary staff in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield I have met twice, at their initiative, with the bureau chiefs of several news organizations that are regular members of the Pentagon press corps. We discussed complaints from their correspondents in Saudi Arabia and the progress in refining a new plan for pool coverage in the event of hostilities in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. We also discussed a request from news organizations in the Pentagon press corps who cited difficulty in getting visas for staff and who accordingly wanted help in getting additional personnel to the region, should hostilities break out.

After the second meeting, on November 28th, I briefed Secretary Cheney and General Powell on a concept for combat pools, the result of a month of planning and discussions within the Pentagon and with military commanders in the Gulf. After making some suggestions, the Secretary and the Chairman approved the concept. I then briefed a representative of the Saudi government. Our staff has since been preparing the more detailed version of the pool concept that will become part of the overall military plan for the operation. That work has proceeded over the past week, while I was with the Secretary on his trip last week to NATO and Poland. A summary of the concept is attached. I am interested in your comments or questions.

The Secretary and the Chairman also approved the idea of sending a US military C-141 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, if hostilities were to break out, carrying supplemental news media personnel to help cover the story of combat, given that most news organizations have only very small staffs in Saudi Arabia now -- in many cases, only one correspondent. The objective is to help prevent the pool operation from breaking down through a lack of news media representatives necessary to make it work -- the editors, producers, technicians, writers, and pool coordinators who will be essential to successful pool operation.

This flight would be a one-way trip, transporting representatives of US news organizations who regularly cover the Pentagon. Space for cargo will be extremely limited: each passenger would be allowed one small suitcase. Equipment cases should be shipped separately. I solicit your comments on that list as well. The bureau chiefs who first suggested the idea said it was predicated on their inability to get more than one or two visas at a time from the government of Saudi Arabia. Should the visa picture open up, I suggest we readdress the need for the plane.

Thank you for your continued suggestions and comments.
Department of Defense
Contingency Plan for Media Coverage of Hostilities
Operation DESERT SHIELD

The objective of this plan is to ensure news media access to combat areas from the onset of hostilities, or as soon thereafter as possible, in Operation DESERT SHIELD. This is a three-phased plan for exercising and deploying rotating correspondent pools, aligned with front line forces to permit combat coverage.

Each pool would consist of eighteen news media personnel: three newspaper correspondents, two wire service correspondents, two three-member television crews, one radio correspondent, one wire service photographer, one newspaper photographer, one news magazine reporter, one news magazine photographer, one Saudi reporter and one third-country reporter. Membership in the pools would be drawn from news media personnel already in Saudi Arabia.

In Phase I of the plan, which would begin immediately, the first two pools would be formed by the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran and randomly exercised at least once every two weeks to provide training for media participants and U.S. military personnel. These pools will always be exercised simultaneously to ensure that operational security is preserved. During Phase I, the pools would familiarize themselves with troops and equipment, cover activities in the areas to which the pools are sent, and exercise their ability to file news stories from the field.

Phase II would begin by deploying the pools when hostilities are imminent, putting them in place to cover the first stages of combat. If such prepositioning is not possible, the pools would be moved forward from Dhahran as quickly as possible to the immediate area of conflict. As soon as possible, additional pools would be deployed to expand the coverage. The size of these pools will be determined by the availability of transportation and other operational factors. These additional pools could be used to fill the gaps in coverage, if the conflict is spread over a wide area. Air Force, Navy, amphibious, and logistical support units will be covered by additional smaller pools, which will be rotated to ensure continuous coverage.

Security review for all pool material would be performed at the source, where the information was gathered, and transmitted to the Joint Information Bureau at Dhahran, where it would then be available to journalists covering the operation. Ground rules would consist of those currently in effect.

Phase III would begin when open coverage is possible and would provide for unilateral coverage of activities. The pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under U.S. Central Command escort.

13 December 1990
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**TOTAL: 120**

*VOA +1*

*Business Week +1*
Operation Desert Shield
News media ground rules

All interviews with service members will be on the record. Security at the source is the policy. In the event of hostilities, media products will be subject to security review prior to release. Interviews with pilots and aircrew members are authorized upon completion of mission; however, release of information must conform to the ground rules stated below.

All Navy embark stories will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf, Red Sea or North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined Riyadh, Dhahran, or other area by general geographical description, such as "Eastern Saudi Arabia." Stories from other participating countries may be datelined from those countries only after their participation is released by DoD.

You must remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are intended only to facilitate troop movement, ensure safety, and maintain operational security.

You must be physically fit. If, in the opinion of the commander, you are unable to withstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with his forward-deployed forces, you will be medically evacuated out of the area.

You are not authorized to carry a personal weapon.

The following categories of information are releasable:

(1) Arrival of U.S. military units in the Central Command area of responsibility when officially announced. Mode of travel (sea or air), date of departure, and home station.

(2) Approximate friendly force strength figures.

(3) Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures by service.

(4) Confirmed figures of enemy personnel killed in action (KIA) or detained for each action or operation.

(5) Nonsensitive, unclassified information regarding U.S. air, ground, and sea operations, past and present.

(6) Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation will be disclosed using general terms such as "multi-battalion," "naval task force," etc. Specific force or unit identification may be released when it no longer warrants security protection.

(7) Identification and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.

(8) Generic description of origin of air operations, such as "land" or "carrier-based."
(9) Date, time, or location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results.

(10) Types of ordnance expended, in general terms.

(11) Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in theater or operational area.

(12) Type of forces involved (e.g., infantry, armor, Marines, carrier battle group).

(13) Weather and climate conditions.

(14) Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.) after approval of host nation government.

(15) Conventional operation code names.

(16) Names and hometowns of U.S. military units or individuals.

The following categories of information are not releasable:

(1) Number of troops.

(2) Number of aircraft.

(3) Numbers regarding other equipment or critical supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, landing craft, radars, trucks, water, etc.).

(4) Names of military installations or specific geographic locations of U.S. military units in the Central Command area of responsibility, unless specifically released by the Department of Defense.

(5) Information regarding future operations.

(6) Information regarding security precautions at military installations or encampments.

(7) Photography that would show level of security at military installations or encampments, especially aerial and satellite photography.

(8) Photography that would reveal the name or specific location of military units or installations.

(9) Rules of engagement details.

(10) Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods, and results.

(11) Information on operations underway against hostile targets.
(12) Information on special operations units, unique operations methodology or tactics, for example, air operations, angles of attack, and speeds; naval tactical or evasive maneuvers, etc.

(13) Information identifying postponed or cancelled operations.

(14) Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing ships, while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(15) Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(16) Additional guidelines may be necessary to protect tactical security.

Casualty information

(1) Notification of the next of kin is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by an officer of the appropriate service.

(2) There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through news media reports. If casualty photographs show a recognizable face, name tag, items of jewelry or other identifying feature before the casualty's next of kin have been notified, the anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause is out of proportion to the news value of the photograph or video. Although the casualty reporting and notification system works on a priority basis, correspondents are urged to keep this problem in mind when covering action in the field. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the joint information bureaus in Riyadh or Dhahran, the appropriate public affairs office, or the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

- end -
December 17, 1990

The Hon. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs
Pentagon, Room 2E-800
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

Your proposed allocation of seats for the DoD contingency airlift to Saudi Arabia is unsatisfactory to Knight-Ridder.

At our bureau chiefs meeting on Nov. 28, I requested three seats for Knight-Ridder, as others did for their organizations. Five individual newspapers received three seats each. Knight-Ridder, representing 28 newspapers with a combined daily circulation of three million and Sunday circulation of four million, received only two seats.

Knight-Ridder is one of the handful of news organizations that has been represented continuously in Saudi Arabia since the August invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Our commitment to the story is unquestionable. We reach millions of readers from coast to coast in Knight-Ridder cities, and our stories and photographs are carried in client newspapers of our wire service that have a combined circulation approaching 32 million.

I am at a loss to understand why Knight-Ridder would not receive the maximum number of seats allotted any print organization and hereby request that you assign us a third seat on this flight.

I will be out of Washington until Christmas Day. In my absence, I would appreciate it if you would communicate an early decision on this matter to the Washington bureau news editor, Larry Williams, who can be reached at 202-383-6001.

Sincerely,

Clark Hoyt
Bureau Chief
December 18, 1990

The Hon. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs  
Pentagon, Room 2E-800  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I am writing in response to your contingency plan for covering the Persian Gulf War and the "news media ground rules" for Operation Desert Shield. I have sent you a separate letter expressing Knight-Ridder's concerns about the allocation of seats on the C-141.

MEDIA POOLS:

The makeup of the 18-member pools, as we discussed at the Nov. 28 meeting, is satisfactory. I am pleased to see that you plan to supplement Phase-I pools with additional pools and urge you to direct those assembling these supplementary pools, especially if their size is to be restricted, to maintain a fair balance between print and broadcast.

While the proposed pool arrangements are a substantial improvement over the prior setup, our goal should remain open coverage. I would urge you to implement Phase-III as rapidly as possible.

In that connection I am concerned that the plan calls for military escort even under Phase-III open coverage. That appears to contradict the notion of open coverage and places a substantial potential limitation on the free movement of war correspondents if escorts are limited in number or not available when needed. I trust that, under open coverage, escorts would have no role in reviewing press copy.

NEWS MEDIA GROUND RULES:

I take strong exception to the ground rules proposed for Operation Desert Shield.

The proposed rules far overstep the common-sense bounds necessary to protect the security of U.S. military operations. The specific rules about what is "releasable" and "not releasable" are at once so broad and so vague that they are bound to lead to disagreement and misinterpretation even now, in advance of war. On the field, under combat conditions, the potential for misunderstanding and inconsistent interpretation is enormous.
Hon. Pete Williams  
December 18, 1990  
Page 2

mean that military sources should say no more on the record to any reporter than they want to be published or broadcast, no one can argue. If, however, this implies security review of news copy by field commanders, that is an unacceptable step over the bounds.

As we learned by experience during an earlier Pentagon pool operation in the Persian Gulf, military commanders are sometimes tempted to use "security review" to try to prevent the reporting of anything that displeases them, even if totally unrelated to security.

I am sure that you did not intend this, but these proposed rules, taken as a whole, can be read as an unprecedented effort by the military to control what is reported about a war in which hundreds of thousands of American lives are at stake.

I urge you to drop these rules and adopt instead the common-sense guidelines that correspondents will not report about operations that haven't started, and will not report anything on on-going operations that could endanger their security.

I object to any prior review of news copy, but if it is required in Phase-II, which should last only the briefest time, the review should be conducted in a central place, removed from the field, where military officials and editors might consult about written passages, photos or broadcast material in question.

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss this with you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Clark Hoyt  
Bureau Chief
TO: Pete Williams  
FROM: USA TODAY  
RE: Pentagon pools

Mr. Williams:

Would you please update your records regarding whom to contact in the event pools are activated.

For USA TODAY, they should be:

Managing editor Tom McNamara:  
703-276-5492 (work)  
703-823-5309 (home)  
202-362-8671 (second number)

Washington editor Steve Davis  
703-276-3656 (work)  
703-237-7548 (home)

Thank you,

Steve Davis

They also want to attend the 4 Jan. meeting. They say that Gannett doesn't represent them.
Dec. 20, 1990

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

This is a response to your Dec. 14 memo and invitation to comment.

First, I offer my applause for your efforts to anticipate and plan for contingencies in the Persian Gulf. Later problems will be minimized by this program. Equally important, a process will have been established so that later unanticipated problems can be overcome by people working together, in good faith and with clear channels of communication.

Many aspects of your plan are excellent and, therefore, I'm going to limit my comments to areas I think should be changed.

1) I'm sorry to see on-site "'security review'" in your plans. As you know, when the national Pentagon pool was first launched in 1984, no such reviews were contemplated. Correspondents were to comply with the "'Vietnam-era rules,'" which didn't require prior review; if a correspondent violated the rules, the punishment was simple, swift and effective -- the loss of accreditation. Those rules won a very high degree of compliance.

Unfortunately, the practice of prior censorship has become embedded in the Pentagon pool concept in recent years, mainly because all parties quickly recognized that the pool was reliant on military communications.

However, if you're going to have a review, experience with the Pentagon Pool has shown that an on-site commander may not be the best person to perform this duty.

We all recall the episode in the Persian Gulf when the pool was covering the July 1987 reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers; the U.S. Navy commodore in charge of the escort insisted on censoring material that in no way violated news media ground rules but, instead, merely embarrassed him.
Therefore, if the Department of Defense insists on prior review, I urge that it be handled at the Pentagon.

If you stick to on-site review, you should create an appellate process at the Pentagon where disputed material could be examined and the relevant Washington bureau chief consulted. Such a procedure evolved from the 1987 Persian Gulf pools and worked to speed the process.

2) I don't understand the need -- or the practical feasibility -- for Phase III escorts. If unilateral coverage becomes possible, correspondents will need to move about more freely than pool constraints permitted. In Phase III, escorted unilateral coverage is an oxymoron.

Correspondents covering Desert Shield from August to the present have complained about the DOD requirement for escorts, on the one hand, and about the lack of available escorts, on the other hand. That combination quickly shuts down any coverage other than briefing coverage.

3) The ground rules are needlessly complex and you should go back to the one-page rules previously issued for Desert Shield, which are similar to the Vietnam-era rules referred to above. I'm enclosing a copy of the one-page version.

I recommend you adopt the old axiom that, in the United States, everything is permitted except that which is prohibited. With that as a guiding light, the rules then should become a short list of "don'ts," similar to the one-page version. The forbidden information outlined in $1-16 in the non-releasable section is similar to the Vietnam-era rules.

The danger of trying to spell out in detail what can be released is that there will be instances where a particular fact isn't prohibited from being released but it also isn't covered by one of the can-be-released rules. The result: gridlocked copy that doesn't move. Don't tell us what we can do; tell us what we can't do.

Again, thanks for responding to our needs. I look forward to working with you on further refinements.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

A. The following categories of information are not releaseable:

(1) Number of troops
(2) Number of aircraft
(3) Number of other equipment (e.g. artillery, tanks, radars, trucks, water "buffaloes," etc.)
(4) Names of military installations/geographic locations of U.S. military units in Saudi Arabia
(5) Information regarding future operations
(6) Information concerning security precautions at military installations in Saudi Arabia
(7) Names/hometowns of U.S. military personnel being interviewed and names of Saudis being interviewed. Commanders of U.S. units being interviewed are excepted from this provision.
(8) Photography that would show level of security at military installations in Saudi Arabia
(9) Photography that would reveal the name or specific location of military forces or installations.

2. If you are not sure whether an action you will take will violate a ground rule, consult with your escort officer PRIOR TO TAKING THAT ACTION.
The Washington Post
1150 15TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20071
(202) 334-6000

December 18, 1990

The Honorable Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Room 2E800
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete,

Thanks for the document outlining pool plans and charter status report. I think the pool plans represent some progress but am unclear if you want names submitted now for the charter. If so, please let us know.

I wish I could say thanks for your list of ground rules. I suspect that you may have heard similar assessments from some of my colleagues, to the effect that they are wildly excessive and seemingly a prescription for total control and gridlock. Listing categories of information that are releasable is a new one on me. It should be dropped. You can bet that every story written by a correspondent in-country will have a dozen things that aren't on either of your lists and so we will be subject to essentially unlimited censorship by a battalion of public affairs officers with varying degrees on understanding about the press's role in a democracy who will be acting as editors, reading their list, checking it twice and crossing things out because they don't fit clearly in your list of what is releasable.

The rules about what is not releasable also seems far too broad and are open to all sorts of excessive interpretation, in my view, by large numbers of PACs caught in what are certain to be hectic conditions. There were very concise rules in Vietnam which, I believe, were well respected by reporters and would be again in the Gulf. Let's get this honed down to legitimate security guidelines.

Finally, the idea that in Phase III one needs a military escort at all times also goes too far. I see no need for that. It seems simply another means of controlling everything.
We should have one more meeting of the group, it seems to me, on these points. If you are open to this, let me know quickly so it can be set up. Time is short.

Thanks,

[Signature]

Page 2
Mr. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-1400

Dear Pete:

I'd like to add my voice to what I believe should be a chorus of protest about your memorandum of Dec. 14. I find many of your proposals unacceptably restrictive and some seem to be in direct contradiction to our group discussions at the Pentagon.

Your assertion that after pools disband, "all media operate independently, although under U.S. Central Command escort" flies in the face of what I remember as a clear agreement on all sides. That understanding was that everyone was on their own once we went to what you called "unilateral coverage." There was no mention of "escorts."

The long list of "ground rules" is unnecessarily specific and gratuitously restrictive. I remember no discussion about there being any need to go beyond the current understandings under which the pools operate.

Finally, your "security at the source" idea is an innovation to which no one agreed so far as I know, if I am interpreting it correctly. The least qualified person to make any kind of review, in my judgment, may be the commander on the scene.

I hope you will have us back for another meeting. In the meantime, best wishes for a calm and restful holiday.

Sincerely,

Howell Raines
Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary/Spokesman  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C.  

Dec. 17, 1990

Dear Pete:

I write to comment on the proposed pool procedure which your office sent out last week. First, I want to thank you for your diligence in getting this plan designed and approved. If implemented to its fullest, I believe it will help in achieving the objective of providing immediate and comprehensive coverage of hostilities, should they occur, in the Persian Gulf.

However, I remain concerned that The Boston Globe will not receive as equitable treatment as other major newspapers, that have shown a continuing commitment to the story, when it comes to drawing up membership of individual pools. Your proposal does not address this issue and my fears have been provoked by the recent experiences of Colin Nickerson, The Globe correspondent currently in Saudi Arabia, and my conversations in the past week with Pentagon officials here and in Saudi Arabia.

In essence, we have been told that newspapers will be placed on one of two lists. By some accounts, membership on the first list will depend on the size of the newspaper, by other accounts the first list will be comprised of only the eight newspapers who were on the JTB's original pool list. The second list will be comprised of all other American newspapers who are in Saudi Arabia when hostilities begin.

As you know from our previous conversations and letters, The Globe, despite its long-standing commitment to the story in Saudi Arabia, has been treated unfairly under the original pool procedure. Because of the unwillingness of JTB and Pentagon officials to intervene, Nickerson and Globe reporters who preceded him in Saudi Arabia have spent much time in vain trying to prevail on the reporters for the eight newspapers to place The Globe onto the pool. I have been assured by both you and Bob Taylor that the new pool procedure will rectify the situation and The Globe will begin to receive equitable treatment under the new procedure. However, Nickerson has been recently told that when the new pool procedure is finally established, The Globe will be placed on the second list of "all other newspapers" which will reduce our odds of actually making it onto a pool. Also, he understands that only those newspapers on the first list will be given trial runs so that the vital communications systems
In be tested.

Bob Taylor has assured me as late as yesterday that my concerns were
appreciated by you and your office, that The Globe would be treated equitably
under the new pool procedure and specifically that The Globe would placed on
the same list for pool rotation as the other major newspapers, including the
am only hope that is true so that The Globe can fulfill its responsibilities
to its readers.

Thanks again for your assistance.

incerely,

[Signature]
December 18, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I have received and reviewed your December 14, 1990, memorandum concerning Persian Gulf pools and the C-141 flight in the event of hostilities. While I salute you and your staff for the time and effort you have devoted to this project, I feel compelled to appeal for reconsideration of the decision to allocate only one seat on the C-141 to Newsday.

Newsday has made a major commitment to coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis, with at least one reporter present in Saudi Arabia since soon after the deployment of U.S. forces there. I believe our commitment has equalled or exceeded some newspapers on the list that were granted two or three seats on the flight. In addition, Newsday's circulation far exceeds that of several newspapers ahead of us on the list. With the newspaper shake-out in New York, our daily circulation now approaches one million—and on Sundays exceeds that level.

For these reasons, I request that Newsday be allocated at least two seats on the C-141. If you have questions or need more information, please call me or our deputy bureau chief, Mary Leonard, or contact us by fax on (202) 393-7043.

We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Gaylord Shaw

Gaylord Shaw
December 14, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs  
2E-800  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Mr. Williams:

I understand you are making plans for a C-141 to transport news representatives from Washington to Saudi Arabia in the event hostilities break out in the Persian Gulf.

This is to request a seat on that flight for Michael Gormley, our military correspondent who reported from Saudi Arabia last month. Mr. Gormley is an experienced reporter and will be properly equipped for such an assignment.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Harry Rosenfeld

HMR/b
December 5, 1990

Hon. Pete Williams  
Office of Assistant Sect. of Defense for Public Affairs  
Washington D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Williams:

As managing editor of The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star, I am requesting that your office include a member of our reporting staff in any contingency airlift operation that is being planned for reporters covering Desert Shield in the event hostilities break out.

It is my understanding that your office is assembling a plan to take a number of journalists to the Middle East should fighting begin in that region. If so, our newspapers would like to be represented.

As you may know, our newspapers circulate in a region where the military, in particular the Navy, is prominent. It is estimated that 110,000 naval personnel, plus another 10,000 Air Force members from Langley AFB in Hampton and 10,000 from Fort Eustis in Newport News, live in the Hampton Roads area. Already more than 30 Norfolk-based ships and nearly 20,000 Norfolk-based sailors have been deployed to support the Desert Shield operation. In addition, nearly 1,000 Navy medical personnel from Portsmouth Naval Hospital and surrounding clinics, at least two F-15 Air Force squadrons from Langley and several companies of Army transportation troops from Fort Eustis have been deployed.

I would appreciate your assistance in assuring that our military affairs reporter is included in whatever airlift your office plans for the Desert Shield operation.

Sincerely,

James C. Raper Jr.
November 30, 1990

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
2E-800
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I understand you are making plans for a C-141 to transport news representatives from Washington to Saudi Arabia in the event hostilities break out in the Persian Gulf.

This is to request a seat on that flight for Jonathan Broder, our Washington correspondent and Kim Komenich, our photographer. Mr. Broder is a veteran reporter with extensive experience in the Middle East. Mr. Komenich is an experienced overseas photographer who won The Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos.

I will contact your office within a week to confirm the availability of these seats.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Larry Kramer
ATTENTION: CAPTAIN DAVID THOMAS

Dear Captain Thomas:

It was a pleasure speaking to you today. I appreciate your information and attention to my request.

I wish to officially request a photo position on the proposed contingency airlift to Saudi Arabia. I understand this plane is still in the "proposal" stages and that the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs, Mr. Peter Williams, will be reviewing all requests for positions in the beginning of January.

I am faxing two previous letters to Mr. Williams just for background information, and again, let me express my appreciation for your assistance in presenting this information to Mr. Williams and Lieutenant Commander Greg Hartung.

Please feel free to contact if you have any questions or with an update. I can be reached at 212-447-2505.

Sincerely,

Jennifer E. Coley
Executive Vice President

JBC/kk

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

5 February 1991

On 5 February 1991, I received a phone call from Mr. Richard Harwood, the Ombudsman for the Washington Post who said that he was referred to me by Pete Williams office for statistical information on media in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Harwood stated that the information was for a piece he was writing for the Sunday Washington Post concerning media coverage in the Gulf region.

I provided current (from 5 Feb CINCCENT Sitrep) media information plus general information concerning the media in-country, the combat pools, and the pooling procedures. Mr. Harwood was particularly interested in our "censorship" procedures. I pointed out to him that DoD had no Congressional authorization to censor news reports, and had not had such authorization since the expiration of the WISP statute some years ago. I explained the security review process in detail from the field all the way through the ASD(PA) in the event of a contested report. I emphasized that our concern was not to impede reporting, but to protect U.S. lives and the security of our ongoing operations.

I additionally pointed out that I did not believe that members of the media would intentionally print a story revealing details that could endanger U.S. lives, and he agreed, and that the procedure (security review) was to ensure that our concerns about the release of certain types of information were clearly understood by the news media. I also added that of the three contested media pool reports (that I knew of) that had come to Pete Williams for arbitration, that all three had been released as originally written. At the end of the explanation, Mr. Harwood’s comment to me was "that’s not censorship," "there are people here on the news desk that really believe that DoD is censoring the news reports." He finally asked that I fax a copy of the current ground rules/guidelines to him, which I did.

[Signature]

Gregory H. Hartung
LCDR, USN
Plans Officer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

At 1645 on 5 February 1991 a meeting was held at the Pentagon attended by the following personnel:

Pete Williams
Bob Taylor
COL Pete Alexandrakos
LCDR Gregg Hartung
Larry Rubenstein - Reuters
Toby Massey - AP
Vin Alabiso - AP
Guy Cooper - Newsweek
Larry Downey - Newsweek
Michele Stephenson - Time
Dyrc Halstead - Time
Mark Gottfried - U.S. News and World Report

This meeting was requested by Toby Massey to Mr. Taylor to discuss pool photo issues under contention. Photo pool members explained their system at great length. Photo pool photographs were all brought to a central location in Dhahran where the film was developed and made available to a committee of 5 members from both wire services and the three news magazines. This committee decides which photographs will be made available as pool photographs. None of the five organizations is permitted to release material other than pool material. After the initial selection in Dhahran, the film is transferred to New York, where a similar selection process or "second look" takes place. After this second look, the negatives are returned to the photographer who originally took them.

Pool members other than the five who serve as the selection committee all have access to pool material via one of the wire services. They additionally are allowed access to transmission equipment to send additional photos they have shot that are not part of the pooled material on a case by case basis. The members of the committee are not allowed to do this with their own photographer's film.

Photo pool members stated that foreign photographers had access to pool products via either the international services of Reuters and AP or by purchasing the photo from the individual photographer who took the photo. They also noted that U.S. photographers are not permitted access to the French Media Pool products.

Photo Pool members rejected the suggestion that Knight-Ridder KTRN photo service had any subscribers that did not also receive either Reuters or AP photo wire services. They said that Knight-Ridder had been given access to pool products
initially, but that mishandling of negatives and release of non-pooled material had caused them to be excluded.

Photo Pool members agreed to add a newspaper representative to their photo selection committee, but first wanted to meet with the representative organization at the Washington D.C. level to discuss procedures. Larry Rubenstein noted that USA Today had volunteered to serve in this capacity. LCDR Hartung suggested that perhaps ANPA or some other media organization could select the newspaper photo representative.

When the subject of photo agencies was brought up by Mr. Taylor, there was unanimous agreement among the Photo Pool members that these agencies were not news agencies, and that they (photo agencies) would never agree to the rules of the pool for sharing purposes, because there was nothing to be gained financially because under current rules, they could not sell any pool product except that which their photographers shot. There was also agreement that any decision concerning photo agencies would likely affect the DoD National Media Pool in the future.

The meeting closed with both Mr. Williams and Mr. Taylor stating that they would take their (Photo Pool members) recommendations into consideration, and would let them know what they had decided.

[Signature]
Gregg Hartung
LCDR, USN
Plans Officer
## POOL STRUCTURE
8 FEB 91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Have Now</th>
<th>Possible Additions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARCENT</strong></td>
<td>(Have 27, anticipate 56 total)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Chuck Willey</td>
<td>HAVE NOW</td>
<td>POSSIBLE ADDITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII Abn CORPS</td>
<td>101ST AIR ASSLT 1 - Mag Photo,</td>
<td>(Expect 22 more)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Ned Longsworth</td>
<td>3 - TV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82ND ABN 3 - TV, 2 - Wires</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24TH ID</td>
<td>3 - TV, 1 - MAG, 1 - PHOTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20TH ENGR BDE 3 - PENCILS (1-MAG, 2-PAPERS),</td>
<td>3 - TV, 1 - PHOTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18TH CORPS ARTY 3 - TV</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO, 1 - PENCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3RD ACR 1 - TV(HOMETOWNER),</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO, 1 - PENCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18TH AVN BDE</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO, 1 - PENCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CORPS SUPPORT</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO, 1 - PENCIL, 1 - RDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VII CORPS</strong></td>
<td>(Have 14)</td>
<td>(Expect 7 more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Jim Gleisberg</td>
<td>HAVE NOW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1ST AD 3 - TV, 1 - PHOTO, 1 - PAPER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3RD AD 2 - PAPER</td>
<td>3 - TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1ST ID 1 - PHOTO, 1 - PAPER</td>
<td>1 - RADIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1ST CAV 1 - PAPER, 1 - INT.</td>
<td>1 - PHOTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2ND ACR 1 - PAPER</td>
<td>2 - PENCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CORPS REAR 1 - RADIO, 1 - PHOTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARCENT</strong></td>
<td>(Have 21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col John Shorwell</td>
<td>HAVE NOW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1ST MARDIV 6 - TV, 1 - MAG, 1 - PHOTO, 3 - PAPER</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2ND MARDIV 3 - TV, 1 - WIRE, 1 - PHOTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1ST FSSG 1 - RADIO, 1 - INT., 2 - PAPER, 1 - PHOTO</td>
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</tbody>
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QUERY:  
Is CENTCOM planning to double the number of pool slots to cover front-line ground units?  
If so, will reporters be assigned to the 2nd and 3rd Army Divisions and the Marine Amphibious Force?  Will reporters be allowed to fly aboard B-52s and to visit military hospitals?

ANSWER:  
CENTCOM does plan to broaden opportunities for media coverage. It is too soon to know whether or not the number will be doubled and it would be premature to try to predict which specific units these additional slots will be assigned to cover. CENTCOM is continuing to examine the possibility of media members flying aboard B-52 missions, but such flights have not, as yet, been approved. Plans are presently being made for reporters to visit hospitals and other military medical facilities.
The DoD National Media Pool was developed to cover military contingency operations from the earliest stages of troop deployment. It was established in 1985 as a direct result of the October 1983 U.S. military rescue operation in Grenada.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff named retired Major General Winant Sidle to head a panel which examined the relationship of the military and the media as a result of criticism about the lack of media access during the early stages of the Grenada rescue operation. The Sidle Panel was composed of Defense Department representatives and news veterans. The panel's final recommendations were primarily designed to ensure media access to military contingency operations while still maintaining operational security and troop safety.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook several major initiatives to implement the Sidle Panel's recommendations. The DoD National Media Pool is the best known initiative. In addition, we have ensured that public affairs planning is conducted concurrently with operational planning and public affairs plans have been incorporated in published contingency operations plans.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has accredited more than 40 Washington-based media organizations for pool membership. The heads of each have agreed to keep designated staff members on alert for short-notice media pool deployments and to maintain operational security of any pool activations. Pool participants include 28 newspaper organizations, the three national news magazines, the three major wire services, the four major television networks, and seven radio networks.

These organizations serve on a rotational basis, decided among themselves, with the pool membership changing each calendar quarter. While pool composition can be tailored to a given contingency, based largely on transportation availability, the "standard" pool is composed of 12 people as follows: one wire photographer and two reporters; a television correspondent and two-person technical crew; a magazine reporter and a photographer; a radio correspondent; and three newspaper reporters. In addition, two DoD public affairs officers and one Joint Staff public affairs officer serve as pool escorts and are generally joined by a unified/specifed command public affairs escort.

All pool members have agreed to observe basis ground rules. Participants are obligated to equip themselves with lightweight, mobile gear and have become virtually self-supporting in this regard. The Department will provide billeting, food, special clothing and equipment, and transportation to, from and within the theater of operations. Pool members pay for their own billeting and food.
Defense authorities have established procedures for sending print news stories via military communications systems as quickly as possible. Video/audio tapes and photographs are delivered on a priority basis to a secure area where they can be picked up by other news representatives for transport back to Washington. The timely return of tapes and photos is the most difficult aspect of pool deployments, depending on circumstances and geography.

We first tested the media pool in April 1985 to cover a U.S. military exercise in Honduras. We have activated it seven additional times to exercise its members while covering military exercises at various diverse locations. We also have activated the pool for four operational deployments -- one in conjunction with maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, two related to military deployments/operations in Panama and most recently to Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia. There have been a total of 12 DoD National Media Pool deployments.

Each pool deployment is a learning experience for all participants. Although exercise deployments cannot fully simulate combat conditions, they do permit correspondents and their escorts to practice alert assembly, transportation and filing procedures, test communications systems, and generally get a feel for the challenges that will be encountered in a combat situation. Deployments also serve to exercise the visited units' media plans for hosting and integrating the pool into exercise scenarios.

Prepared October 31, 1990
LIST OF DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL PARTICIPANTS

MEDIA POOL #1

Robert Witten
Gene Randall
Kim Willenson
Howell Raines
John Fialka
Lloyd Battle
James Schule
Benjamin Shore Jr.
Barry Thumma
Mathew Quinn

Mutual Radio
CNN
Newsweek
New York Times
Wall Street Journal
CNN
Mobile Video Services
Copley Press Service
AP
UPI

April 85 (5 days)
EX UNIVERSAL TREK
85 Honduras

Total: 10

MEDIA POOL #2

Elliot Brenner
Tim Clary
Peter Maer
Dave Wood
Roy Gutman
Michael Duffy
Gene Randall
Barry Hecht
Ray Defrehen
Steven Komarow
Michael Wines
Dirk Halstead

UPI
UPI
Mutual Radio
Newhouse
Newsday
Time
CNN
CNN
CNN
AP
LA Times
Time

September 85 (1 day) EX DOUBLE
EAGLE 85 Ft
Campbell, KY

Total: 12

MEDIA POOL #3

Frank Aukofer
Douglas Mills
John Mulera
Robert Craig Windham
Fred Francis
Sheldon Fielman
Gary Keifer
Elliot Brenner
Scott Applewhite
William Knoholm
Robert Kittle
Frank Morring

Milwaukee Journal
UPI
NBC
United Stations Radio
NBC
USN&WR
UPI
AP
AP
USN&WR
Scripps Howard

December 85 (2 days)
EX KERNAL USHER 86-1
Pacific Ocean off
San Clemente Island,
California

Total: 12
MEDIA POOL #4

Tim Ahern
Scott Applewhite (2)
Neil Roland
Doug Mills (2)
Christopher Hanson
Dirk Halstead (2)
Liz Colton
Gene Randall (2)
Robert Schrader
Peter Morris
Peter Grier
Vern Guidry

Total: 12

August 86 (2 days)
EX Gallant Eagle 86
USCENTCOM exercise in
Southern CA desert

MEDIA POOL #5

Rita Beamish
Barry Thumma (2)
Eli Michael Meyers
Doug Mills (3)
Christopher Thaxton
Hanson
Karl Inderfurth
William Redding
Jay Patterson
Charles D. Jaco
Robert Kaylor
Molly E. Moore
Richard C. Halloran

Total: 12

February 87 (2 days)
EX TASK FORCE 1
82nd Airborne deployment to Honduras

MEDIA POOL #6

Coleen Combes
Henry (Dave) Rosso
Steve Komarow (2)
Scott Applewhite (3)
John Disney
Eric Engberg
Gabriel Romero
Craig Anderson
Richard Sandza
Steven Brown
Richard Whitmire
Jim O'Shea

Total: 12

May 87 (2 days)
EX Solid Shield 87
USCINCICANT amphibious
assault, Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina
MEDIA POOL #7

Tim Ahern (2) AP (Photographer) July 87 (9 days)
Doug Mills (4) UPI (Photographer) EARNEST WILL 1st
Jon Bascom ABC Radio actual (real-world)
Carl Rochelle CNN (Correspondent) deployment; Persian
Ray DeFrehn (2) CNN (Cameraman) Gulf to observe
Peter Morris (2) CNN (Soundman) Kuwaiti tanker escort
Mike Duffy (2) Time (Reporter)
Dennis Brack Washington Times (Reporter)
James Dorsey Knight-Ridder (Reporter)
Mark Thompson

Total: 10

MEDIA POOL #8

Steve Komarow (3) AP (Reporter) March 88 (2 days)
Douglas Allmond ABC-TV (Cameraman) FTX GOLDEN PHEASANT 88
Karl Inderfurth ABC-TV (Correspondent) EDRE to Honduras.
Philip Mishoe ABC-TV (Soundman)
Durrell Kreisher Copley News Service (Reporter)
Jay Sapir UPI Radio
Joseph Marquette UPI (Photographer)
Frederick Kempe Wall Street Journal (Reporter)
Robert Cohn Newsweek (Reporter)
Colleen Combes (2) Reuters (Photographer)

Total: 10*

*Note: Jeremy Bigwood, contract photographer for Newsweek joined the pool "in progress" in Honduras. Thus, while only 10 deployed via MILAIR from Washington, the pool "grew" to 11 while in Honduras.

MEDIA POOL #9

James Miklaszewski NBC-TV December 88 (4 days)
Sheldon Fielman (2) NBC-TV (Technician) U.S. Army infantry
John Mulera (2) NBC-TV (Technician) external evaluation in
Richard Sandza (2) Newsweek Alaska.
Gary Kieffer Newsweek (Photographer)
Robert Daugherty AP (Photographer)
Thelma LeBrecht AP Radio
Eliot Brenner (3) UPI
Molly Moore (2) Washington Post
John Sawyer St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Guy Jones Fort Worth Star-Telegram

Total: 11
## MEDIA POOL #10

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ron Allen</td>
<td>CBS-TV (Correspondent)</td>
<td>May 89 (1 Day)</td>
<td>NIMROD DANCER Augmentation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabe Romero (2)</td>
<td>CBS-TV (Cameraman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Violette</td>
<td>CBS-TV (Soundman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barry Bagnato</td>
<td>CBS Radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliot Brenner (4)</td>
<td>UPI (Reporter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dennis Cook</td>
<td>AP (Photographer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Adams</td>
<td>Reuters (Reporter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Cary</td>
<td>USN&amp;WR (Reporter)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John Van Beekum</td>
<td>USN&amp;WR (Photographer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thom Shanker</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eli Teiber</td>
<td>New York Post</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Laurence Jolidon</td>
<td>Gannett/USA Today</td>
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Total: 12

## MEDIA POOL #11

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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steve Komarow (4)</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>December 89, OPN</td>
<td>JUST CAUSE - Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Applewhite (4)</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Matthew Mendelsohn</td>
<td>UPI</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Kearns</td>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Timothy Aubry</td>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia Johnson</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Bascom (2)</td>
<td>ABC Radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Francis (2)</td>
<td>NBC-TV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John Mulera (3)</td>
<td>NBC-TV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Edgar Brown</td>
<td>NBC-TV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alan Levin</td>
<td>NBC-TV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Steve Kuhn</td>
<td>NBC-TV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Katherine Lewis</td>
<td>Houston Post</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Merida</td>
<td>Dallas Morning News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clayton</td>
<td>Houston Chronicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Thompson</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 16
MEDIA POOL #12

John King
Scott Applewhite (5)
Martin W. Jeong
James H. Adams
Carl Rochelle
Mike Greene
Bob Torpey
Chris Turner
Frank O'Connor
Alan Levin (2)
Tom Mote
John Ydstie
Jay Peterzell
Dennis Brack
Mike Ross
Peter Copeland
Frank Aukofer (2)

AP
AP
UPI
Reuters
CNN
CNN
CNN
CNN
CNN
CNN
CNN
CNN
NPR
Time
Time
Times Mirror Company
Scripps Howard Newspapers
Milwaukee Journal

August 90, OPN
DESERT SHIELD -
Saudi Arabia

Total: 17

() = Number of pool deployments in which the person has participated.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SECDEF Support for the DoD National Media Pool - ACTION MEMORANDUM

In 1983, the media raised a furor over being excluded from the initial stages of the Grenada rescue mission. As a result, Cap Weinberger formed a panel to examine the situation and to recommend how to improve media coverage of future contingency operations.

The Siddle Panel, as it became known, recommended creation of a pool of reporters to cover secret contingency missions. From this, we, in close cooperation with the media developed the DoD National Media Pool Concept. The pool gives select U.S. news media access to military contingency operations from their onset while maintaining operational security. It is your pool, administered by my department under your order, and has high priority for any support required. The attached paper provides a more detailed discussion of the pool.

The media pool has been exercised several times during both Cap Weinberger's and Frank Carlucci's tenure and was operationally deployed twice; a no-notice, "operational" exercise in Honduras to demonstrate U.S. resolve in Central America and the Navy's first escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf. However, the real indication that the pool concept had come of age and gained acceptance by the military was evident last April 18th when a media pool was on board the JACK WILLIAMS Surface Action Group (SAG) as it sank an Iranian frigate in the Persian Gulf. Frank Carlucci's and Admiral Crowe's decision to place a pool on board the SAG was a clear signal that the pool concept is a necessary part of a military operation.

Although past exercises and deployments have gone very well, it is still necessary to conduct two to four pool exercises per year in order to keep our people and the media proficient, to refine our plans and to test operational security. These deployments also provide valuable training to the visited command which must implement its own contingency plans for media coverage of military operations.
The current media pool concept gives us a very viable mechanism to cover contingency operations, maintain secrecy and still inform the American people of the early hours of military operations; and it is endorsed by the media. I strongly recommend you approve continuation of the DoD National Media Pool and lend your personal support to the concept as needed. It is, in fact, your pool and cannot effectively continue without your approval and support.

[Signature]

Enclosure
As stated
Concur
Nonconcur
See Me
JULLS REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECT (RAP) REPORT

RAP No: 0581, JULLS No: 01860-90177 (00581), Last Update: 11/16/89

1. (U) TITLE: DoD Media Pool.

2. (U) OPR: OASD(PA)/DPL, LCDR Hartung, 223-1075, (202)693-1075.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: AIRLIFT, JCS PUB 15, JDS, MEDIA POOL, PASSENGERS.

4. (U) SOURCES:
   a. 42265-72346 GOLDEN PHEASANT 88 by MAC.

5. OBSERVATION:
   a. Airlift to move DoD National Medial Pool from Washington, DC, to Pope AFB, NC, and onward to Honduras was requested through what was later learned to be a back-channel source, resulting in lack of normal coordination of airlift with the Military Airlift Command and supported CINC.
   b. The DoD National Media Pool and the requirement for its movement were not entered into the Joint Deployment System (JDS).

6. DISCUSSION:
   a. In the JULLS Long Report (JULLS number 42265-72346), HQ MAC stated the media pool was not coordinated with MAC, was not included in the supported CINC's validation requirements, and implied that the airlift was not properly prioritized. MAC stated that this resulted in improperly authorized travel by "bumping" of several passengers (believed to be MAC ALCE personnel) from the first deployment mission.
   b. The Secretary of Defense directed OASD/PA to activate and deploy the pool. OASD/PA made a verbal request for airlift to the JCS MAC Liaison Officer, a procedure followed on six previous occasions without problem.
   c. The DoD National Media Pool is not a requirement appropriate for a CINC to validate. The pool's activation/deployment is directed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, when appropriate, with the concurrence of the White House.
   d. JCS PUB 15 assigns SECDEF-directed airlift missions a priority of 1B(1). For an actual contingency, concurrence for deployment of the DoD National Media Pool may be obtained from the White House which could result in an even higher airlift priority, depending on the specific circumstances.
UNCLASSIFIED

JULLS REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECT (RAP) REPORT

01/08/90

e. Volume I of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) states "CINC's should be prepared to host the DoD Media Pool during the initial stages of operations."

f. DoDD 5122.5, "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)," requires the ASD:PA to coordinate "instructions that have operational implications" (e.g., airlift for the DoDD National Media Pool) with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice the CINC's as recommended by MAC in their JULLS input.

g. No one in OASD:PA directed the "bumping" of passengers from the first deployment mission for FTX Golden Pheasant 88.

7. LESSON LEARNED:

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

a. OASD:PA will work with JS/J-4 to develop a mutually agreed SOP for requesting airlift for all DoD National Media Pool deployments (completed).

b. OASD:PA will work with DJSP:PA to develop a written Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to enter information regarding the deployment of the DoD National Media Pool into the public affairs paragraph of the various JCS orders issued by JCS under JOPS Volume IV. This action will effectively serve to coordinate the deployment with affected commands such as the supported CINC, USTRANSCOM, and MAC. It will also provide the supported CINC information necessary to enter the requirement for the deployment into JDS. SOP is written and approved within OSD. DJSP:PA has it for approval and entry into JOPES.

9. COMMENTS: JCS 220009Z Mar 85, "Logistic Support for DoD Public Affairs Media Pool," states supported commanders are responsible for planning logistic support for the pool out of existing exercise or contingency funds, including inter-theater airlift. Funding appears to remain an issue. OASD:PA will take action to ensure funding for airlift is resolved permanently. Completed. Funding issue permanently resolved.

10. (U) MILESTONES: BASELINE FORECAST ACTUAL

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11. (U) VALIDATE IN EXERCISE: Reschedule.

12. (U) RECOMMENDATION: Retain.

0581-2

UNCLASSIFIED
JULLS REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECT (RAP) REPORT

RAP No: 608, JULLS No: 10558-00208 (00608), Last Update: 01/05/90

1. (U) TITLE: DoD Media Pool Activities.

2. (U) OPR: OASD(PA), CDR THOMAS, 223-1076, (202)693-1076.

3. (U) KEYWORDS:

4. (U) SOURCES:

   a. 03060-36657 ELIGIBLE RECEIVER89-1/09 by OASD (PA).
   b. 03061-73861 ELIGIBLE RECEIVER89-1/79 by OASD (PA).
   c. 03058-18455 ELIGIBLE RECEIVER89-1/80 by OASD (PA).

5. (U) PROBLEM: The JTF would not permit on-scene, post hostilities media pool coverage, provided misleading information to the media pool and lacked guidance on how to host the DoD Media Pool.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The DoD Media Pool is a relatively new concept. With National Command Authority approval, the DoD National Media Pool deploys at DoD expense to report on military operations. The media pool is a DoD effort to improve public understanding and thereby gain greater public acceptance of the government's actions through expanded media access to the operation. The JTF did not understand the National Command Authority's media pool objectives and did not, therefore, see the need to bring the media pool forward as soon as the objective airfield was reasonably safe. During a press conference, members of the media pool were given information that was not factual and had several inconsistencies. This left the JTF with a continuing credibility problem.

   During contingency operations the JTF becomes responsible for hosting the media pool, and achieving the National Command Authority's objectives in deploying the pool. The JTF Commander, working through his public affairs liaison, must maintain control of the media pool's itinerary. For operational security reasons, media pool access to communications is controlled and report contents screened to avoid an inadvertent compromise. However, the goal is for media pool members to file more accurate and timely stories than would be possible without DoD and JTF assistance.

7. (U) SOLUTION: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) issue a DoD directive on national media pool operations. The directive should serve as a single source for CINCs and Task Force commanders on how to host and manage a media pool.

8. (U) STATUS RECOMMENDATION: Retain.

9. (U) COMMENTS: Compiled from three separate JULLS from 608 -1

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IMMEDIATE
0 182305Z MAY 90
EM CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO USCEINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCENT MAC DILL AFB FL/CC/CC/
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INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC/ASD/PA/
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC

SUBJECT: DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

1. THE RECENT DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT TO PANAMA FOR
OPERATION JUST CAUSE WAS ITS FIRST DEPLOYMENT TO COVER AN ACTUAL
COMBAT OPERATION. A DOD ANALYSIS OF THE DEPLOYMENT, WHICH INCLUDED
COMMENTS FROM THE REPORTERS IN THE PANAMA POOL, THE COMMANDS
INVOLVED, AND THE MILITARY ESKORTS, REVEALED SEVERAL AREAS THAT
NEED TO BE IMPROVED IN THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS AND
GOVERNING POLICIES FOR THE POOL.

2. THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WAS DEVELOPED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS IN HANDLING MEDIA ASPECTS OF THE
JUST CAUSE OPERATION. AFTER THAT OPERATION, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONVENE THE SIDEL PANEL TO DETERMINE HOW
BEST TO ACCOMMODATE THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE MEDIA TO REPORT
ON MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE PANEL CONCLUDED THAT MILITARY
OPERATIONS SHOULD HAVE OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
OVERALL FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY, IT SUGGESTED ESTABLISHING A
SMALL POOL OF MEDIA TO COVER AN OPERATION UNTIL OPEN COVERAGE
COULD BE ARRANGED. CONSEQUENTLY, IN 1985, THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE ESTABLISHED THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, CONSISTING OF A
SMALL CONTINGENT OF MEDIA WHICH REMAINS ON ALERT IN WASHINGTON,
D.C., AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT.

3. THE GRENADA AND PANAMA OPERATIONS CLEARLY REVEALED THE MEDIA'S
NEED FOR AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION. DURING THE FIRST 24 HOURS OF
THE GRENADA ACTION, MORE THAN 600 REPORTERS ATTEMPTED TO GAIN
ACCESS TO THE OPERATION. IN PANAMA, MORE THAN 300 REPORTERS
EVENTUALLY ARRIVED ON-SCENE. IN BOTH CASES, THE LARGE NUMBER OF
JOURNALISTS OVERWHELMED THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THEM.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, CONSISTING OF UP TO 16
MEDIA AND 3 ESKORT OFFICERS, IS STRUCTURED TO PROVIDE MEDIA
COVERAGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE COMMAND HAS HAD TIME TO
STAFF THE SITUATION AND ESTABLISH OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE. ONCE
OPEN COVERAGE IS ACHIEVED, THE POOL IS TO BE DISBANDED.

4. ALTHOUGH THE MEDIA WAS DEPLOYED DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE,
IT WAS UNABLE TO COVER MILITARY ACTION UNTIL THE SECOND DAY
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DID NOT PERFORM AS PLANNED. THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) AND THE JOINT STAFF ARE
WORKING TOGETHER TO EVALUATE AND SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE MEDIA
POOL EXPERIENCED DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE. THOSE SOLUTIONS
WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A NEW DOD DIRECTIVE ON THE NATIONAL
MEDIA POOL WHICH WILL BE FORWARD TO ALL COMMANDS AND THE SERVICES
FOR STAFFING IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NEW DIRECTIVE, THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE BASIC GUIDELINE TO BE
USED IN PLANNING FOR ACCOMMODATING A DOD MEDIA POOL DURING BOTH
EXERCISE AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

5. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT MILITARY ACTIONS IN GRENADA AND
PANAMA DEMONSTRATED THAT OTHERWISE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS ARE NOT
TOTAL. SUCH ASPECTS ARE PROPERLY HANDLED. BOTH OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH SUCCESSFUL, PRODUCED SOME UNFAVORABLE
AND OFTEN INCORRECT NEWS STORIES, WHICH DETRACTED FROM THE
OPERATION.

6. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT THE MEDIA ASPECTS OF MILITARY

TMSC 2DF REQUIRED

JCSCISC TUBE IMMEDIATELY TO DJS-P A/TUBE TO NMCC DURING NON-DUTY HOURS
NMCC PASS THIS MESSAGE TO DJS:PA///SECDEF CABLES PASS TO OSD:PA///
JCSCISC DUTY OFFICER: SHIFT MUST PROCESS THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY///
FINAL DISTR ADD FOR JCS PER COL SUMRALL JR/OCJCS/18MAY90/SUPERNAVY
OPERATIONS ARE IMPORTANT, WILL GET NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, AND WARRANT YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION. AS STATED IN THE
JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE, JOPS VOLUME V: PLANNING FOR
THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL IS A REQUIREMENT FOR ALL CONTINGENCY
PLANS. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH PLANNING SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO ALL
PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISES (EXCEPT FOR CPX, NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT/ACCIDENTS, AND COMBINED/JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
EXERCISES/FTX’S). THE COVERAGE AND POOL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
MUST BE PLANNED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OPERATIONAL PLANS AND SHOULD
ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY, INCLUDING DIRECT
COMBAT, MEDICAL, PRISONER-OF-WAR, REFUGEE, EQUIPMENT REPAIR,
REFUELING AND REARMING, CIVIC ACTION, AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEXES SHOULD RECEIVE COMMAND ATTENTION WHEN
FORMULATING AND REVIEWING ALL SUCH PLANS.
THE COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT MOST NATION SENSITIVITIES
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING TO RECEIVE THE NATIONAL MEDIA
POOL. COMMANDERS SHOULD WORK CLOSERLY WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM TO
EFFECT APPROPRIATE NATION COORDINATION.
8. THE NEXT DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL MAY OCCUR AT
ANY TIME TO EITHER AN EXERCISE OR REAL-WORLD CONTINGENCY OPERATION.
AS A MINIMUM THE POOL WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT:
A. DAILY, COMPREHENSIVE, UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL BRIEFINGS
FOR POOL PERSONNEL.
B. ACCESS TO AREAS OF ONGOING COMBAT/EXERCISE OPERATIONS. THE
MEDIA REALIZE AND ACCEPT THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF RISK INVOLVED IN
ACCOMPANYING MILITARY FORCES INTO COMBAT. THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY
IS NOT A REASON FOR EXCLUDING THEM FROM AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS.
ESSENTIALLY, THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO TREAT REPORTERS AS MEMBERS OF
THE UNITS, ALLOWING THEM TO MOVE WITH THE UNITS, WITHOUT RECKLESSLY
EXPOSING THEM TO HOSTILE FIRE, WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THEIR COVERAGE
SHOULD BE FROM POSITIONS OF REASONABLE SAFETY.
C. REASONABLE ACCESS TO KEY COMMAND AND STAFF PERSONNEL.
ALL INFORMATION GIVEN OUT BY THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED
AND ON THE RECORD.
D. AN OFFICER FROM THE SUPPORTED COMMAND IN THE GRADE OF O-5
OR O-6 TO COORDINATE MEDIA POOL REQUIREMENTS. THIS OFFICER WOULD
NORMALLY BE THE COMMAND PEO, AND SHOULD BE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR
WITH MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS. THE ONGOING OPERATION, AND PARTICIPATING
COMMANDS THE OFFICER SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE AND UNRESTRICTED ACCESS
TO THE COMMANDER TO RESOLVE MEDIA POOL PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE.
E. ITINERARY PLANNING THAT WILL ENABLE MEDIA POOL MEMBERS TO
DISPERSE THROUGHOUT THE COMBAT AREA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BALANCED
COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS, AND TO REGROUP PERIODICALLY TO SHARE
INFORMATION WITH FILESTORIES. COMMANDS SHOULD PLAN FROM THE
ONSET OF THE OPERATION TO DIVIDE THE POOL INTO SMALL ELEMENTS OF
FROM 1 - 3 PERSONS, TO DISPERSE THOSE ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE
AREA OF OPERATION TO FACILITATE COVERAGE OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION.
TO PERIODICALLY RETURN THEM TO A CENTRAL LOCATION TO POOL THEIR
MATERIAL, AND THEN TO RETURN THEM TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA SO THAT
THEY MAY CONTINUE COVERING THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. THIS
ET UNCLAS FINAL SECTION OF 02
CYCLE SHOULD BE REPEATED THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. AT A MINIMUM
OF ONCE A DAY.
F. COOPERATION FROM ALL FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION/EXERCISE ON A NOT-TO-INTERFERE BASIS. NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE A LEGITIMATE ROLE TO FULFILL IN A COMBAT AREA. SINCE THE
EARLIEST DAYS OF OUR NATION, THEY HAVE HELPED THE MILITARY SERVICES
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE KEEP THE AMERICAN PUBLIC INFORMED
OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. ARMED SERVICES.
9. SUPPORTED COMMANDERS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING LOGISTICAL
SUPPORT FOR POOL AND ESCORT PERSONNEL OUT OF EXISTING EXERCISE OR
CONTINGENCY FUNDS. THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL MAY CONSIST OF UP TO
16 MEDIA PERSONNEL AND 8 ESCORT OFFICERS (2 DOD & 6 JCS). REQUIRED
SUPPORT MAY INCLUDE, BUT MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO:
A. EXISTING CONTINGENCY/EXERCISE Airlift FROM CONUS TO AREA
OF OPERATIONS OR EXERCISE AND RETURN.
B. THEATER GROUND, SEA, AND AIR TRANSPORTATION TO ALLOW FOR
POOL COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS.
C. MESSING AND BILLETING ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS.
D. ISSUANCE OF ANY GEAR CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO THE
SITUATION (E.G., HELMETS, CANTEENS, FLAK VESTS, ETC.).
E. ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO FILE STORIES ON AN
EXPEDITED BASIS.
F. MEDICAL SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
G. COMMANDS ARE ENCOURAGED TO RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND UNITS.
11. THE DOD MEDIA POOL POINT OF CONTACT IS LCDR GREGG MARTUNG.
USN. AV 223-074. COMM (202) 693-1074. MESSAGE ADDRESS: SECOM
WASHINGTON DC/DASD:PA-DPL/.
BT
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

March 20, 1990

On January 8, 1990, Pete Williams, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, asked Mr. Fred Hoffman to research the facts surrounding the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama in conjunction with Operation JUST CAUSE and to provide his findings and recommendations.

In the report, Mr. Hoffman gives an account of the operation, offers his observations about what happened, and makes 17 recommendations he believes would improve future media pool operations.

Some of the recommendations -- numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 -- will be implemented immediately. Others -- numbers 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, and 17 are agreed to in principle but require some refinement. The remaining recommendations, numbers 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 are under consideration and will require further consideration and coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, and the media pool members.

The Department of Defense is committed to the National Media Pool and will make every effort to use the pool in a way that serves the interests of informing the American people about military activities.

-end-
Southern Command PAOs failed to provide regular operational briefings for the pool to keep it informed of developments all through Panama. There was only one such briefing, more than 24 hours into the pool's four-day deployment.

Malfunctioning fax equipment and understaffing at the Pentagon, plus communications problems at the Southern Command Media Center in Panama, caused serious delays in getting out print pool reports and still photos.

The decision to send a news pool from Washington was highly questionable. The story could have—and, in my opinion, should have—been covered by a pool formed from U.S. news personnel already in Panama.

Such a pool could have been put in place before American forces attacked. It could have had a front-row view of the assault on Noriega's main headquarters, the Commandancia, a short distance down the hill from Southern Command headquarters on Quarry Heights. Some locally-based U.S. news personnel could have been pre-positioned to cover attacks on other key objectives as well.

Colonel Ron Sconyers, then the Southern Command's Public Affairs Officer, suggested to Williams that the story could be covered by a pool drawn from American news personnel already in Panama—personnel with whom he had worked. Sconyers had mustered such a pool many times before on smaller operations without any security breach.

It should be noted here that the Pentagon pool was established to enable U.S. news personnel to report the earliest possible action in a U.S. military operation in a remote area where there was no other American press presence. Panama did not fit that description.

But Williams, following discussions with Cheney, sent the national pool from Washington.

It appears that a key reason for this decision was what Cheney later described in an interview as a "desire to avoid being criticized for not using it" in the Panama situation.

As it turned out, the Pentagon pool landed in Panama about four hours after U.S. troops launched their attacks on key targets.

Even then, whatever helicopter lift Southern Command PAOs could round up was swiftly snatched away for higher priority operational purposes. Ground transportation was deemed too risky because of sniping. Also, the Bridge of the Americas which spans the Panama Canal was closed for hours on the first day of the operation.

The helicopter situation eased after about 36 hours, but the story was rapidly winding down by that time.

From the outset, the newsmen and women in the pool met one frustration after another.

PAOs in Panama unwittingly fed the pool's justified irritation by hauling its members to some "events" that had nothing to do with the fighting they so badly wanted to see and report.

As a result, there were suggestions that the pool was being manipulated to serve the Bush Administration's political and diplomatic interests.
Army Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, who commanded all the combat troops in the
invasion, said he could have received a smaller pool at Ft. Bragg, NC, and taken it with him to
Panama ahead of the paratroop deployment. It could have been briefed, sequestered and
positioned to witness the opening of the attack, said Stiner, who flew to Panama on Monday,

Stiner’s scenario would have required a much earlier callout of the pool. It actually was
mustered the evening of Tuesday, Dec. 19.

In fact, the pool question still was being discussed in the White House Oval Office as late
as Tuesday afternoon and a “go” order wasn’t given by Williams to his staff and the Southern
Command PAO until about 5 pm that day for a 7:30 pm callout start—only 5 1/2 hours
before H-hour.

Major General Will Roosma suggested that, in the future, the Pentagon media pool
members should exercise several times a year with airborne troops in conjunction with periodic
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises. In that way “they become part of the team” and
gain experience, said Roosma, who is Stiner’s deputy in command of the 18th Airborne Corps.

More frequent pool exercises—the pool was called out only once last year prior to the
Panama deployment—might well serve to implant necessary ground rules and prescribed
procedures more deeply in the minds of pool members and their bureau chiefs, particularly
those new to pool duty.

Periodic pool exercises with various elements of the armed forces, especially those with
quick reaction missions, would help accustom line outfits to contact with news people.

There was a breach of OPSEC rules by staff members of Time magazine’s Washington
bureau reached at a Christmas party during the Panama pool callout on the evening of Dec. 19,
only a few hours before the pool was due to take off from Andrews Air Force Base, MD.

This breach resulted from an open discussion at the party about who would go for Time—
an assignment that should have been established by the bureau chief in advance. As Time
bureau chief Stanley Cloud acknowledged: “More people knew than should have known.”

But that secrecy rule violation likely could have been avoided if the Time bureau chief had
been notified at his office during daytime business hours—something made impossible because
of the high level Pentagon decision to delay the callout until after the evening news broadcasts
on TV.

So far as I could determine, the Time violation did not compromise the operation.

-0-

Some of the key problems that eventually burdened the pool had their genesis in
oversight on secrecy and subsequent fumbles at the Pentagon and the Southern Command in
November.

As a consequence, about a month of possible planning time was lost and, when Operation
Just Cause was mounted, there was no public affairs plan.
If the normal planning process had been carried out, it is quite likely that some of the problems which cropped up for the pool during Operation Just Cause would’ve been anticipated. A careful plan would have provided for earmarking helicopters to move the pool, for dedicating aircraft to carry photographic and other pool products to the United States, and for adequate communications facilities to accommodate not only the pool, but the hundreds of other reporters and photographers who flooded into the country.

The Southern Command did have a contingency plan for accommodating the pool, but its provisions were very general. What was needed was a specific plan tailored to the upcoming operation.

As Major General Roosma of the 18th Airborne Corps said, "a public affairs annex to an operational plan must be written in great detail."

"The time to prepare such a plan is not during great crisis, but before hand," Roosma said.

The first discussion of a possible pool to cover the Just Cause Operation came on Sunday, December 17, in a meeting at which President Bush presided in his study. That was the meeting that produced the decision to send American troops into Panama.

Cheney said the Department of Defense pool would be activated to go in with the initial forces, according to White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, who was present. Bush asked whether the pool would come from Washington or would be organized in Panama. The President was told it would come from Washington, Fitzwater said. Bush indicated concern as to whether this could be done while still protecting operational security.

The issue came up again at the White House on Tuesday afternoon, 10 hours or so before the operation was due to start. Vice President Quayle asked if the pool couldn’t be organized in Panama rather than being dispatched from Washington, Fitzwater said, adding:

"No one had a good answer as to why it had to come from Washington."

According to this account, Bush and Quayle remained skeptical that the pool would be able to maintain secrecy.

In the last analysis, Fitzwater said, "the President left it up to him (Cheney)."

Meanwhile on Monday morning, Williams said he was called to Cheney’s office and told that the President had decided to proceed with an operation against Noriega and that a pool would be used to cover it.

"You can’t mention this to anybody," Williams quoted Cheney as telling him.

Williams said he had several conversations with Cheney on Monday and Tuesday.

"There was never any doubt in anyone’s mind that there was going to be a pool," Williams said.
The Pentagon chief made it clear it was basically his decision, but Williams obviously was in full agreement.

"We decided 7:30 pm was a good time to call it out," Williams said.

"I never suggested an earlier callout," he said when asked about this.

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalled the White House discussion about the pool on Tuesday and said "the final judgement was made in the Oval Office and that was that we ought to have a pool."

Did Powell make any recommendations to Cheney or Williams on how and when the pool should be called out? The four-star general said he was "left out of the pattern" in this regard, that he discussed the pool with Cheney "in only the most general terms" and that "I left it up to Pete Williams."

Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, the Joint Staff Director of Operations, said "we didn't play any role" in the framing of the civilian decisions on the pool callout.

Williams said he didn't hear from senior military leaders on the question of the timing of the pool deployment.

Bound by a secrecy rule laid down by Cheney, Williams informed only two members of his staff on Monday, December 18, of the upcoming operation and the likelihood of a news pool being formed to cover it. These two were Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Taylor and Major John Smith, Williams' Military Assistant.

It wasn't until the next morning that Williams brought his own planning staff into the process and several hours after that on Tuesday that Williams began discussions with Southern Command PAO Sconyers about a probable pool.

Therefore, more than 24 hours of immediate planning time was lost.

Taylor was set to work gathering information to refresh Williams' knowledge of pool callup procedures and similar matters. Smith, who had served in the Southern Command, provided information on the public affairs setup down there.

There was some "brainstorming," as Smith described it, but apparently no detailed planning on that Monday.

The only conversation outside the small circle of knowledge in Williams' office came about midday on Monday. It was initiated by mid-level officers from the Joint Staff who wanted to discuss possible airlift arrangements for a media pool deployment. These discussions were inconclusive because options offered from the Joint Staff would have landed the pool in Panama about 12 hours after the attacks opened.

Even after Williams brought in his planning staff to start detailed preparations on Tuesday, debate over whether to use a Panama-based pool or send one from Washington lingered into the afternoon.
big influx of newsmen and women. He was offered additional help early on, but declined at the time.

The upshot was that he found himself spending much of his time and energies in arranging billeting, food and other necessary services for hundreds of news people. To that extent, he was diverted from serving the pool.

Back in Washington, Colonel Alexandrakos, head of OASD(PA)'s Plans division, and some of his staff began the callout as ordered at about 7:30 pm Tuesday. Pool members were supposed to report to Andrews AFB by 9:30 pm for a planned departure at 11 pm.

Immediately, the Plans officers manning the phones ran into difficulties in getting the word to some of the news people on the pool roster.

Some of this difficulty could be attributed to the fact that the callout came during the week before Christmas when there were news staff parties and there were news people on vacation.

The situation wasn't helped by apparent confusion in the callout process at the Pentagon.

Alexandrakos said he was ordered by Deputy Assistant Secretary Taylor in mid-callout to expand the pool by going back to all the wire services and inviting each to send a reporter and a photographer.

Taylor said in an interview Alexandrakos apparently had not understood that there were supposed to be slots on the pool for two representatives of each of the three wire services. That decision was made earlier on Tuesday, Taylor said.

The pool already had been expanded in an unprecedented way when Williams offered NBC the opportunity to bring along on the flight to Panama a satellite uplink dish which, together with its associated equipment, weighed more than a ton.

NBC arranged for that satellite dish and two technicians with an outside company which provides such services.

In effect, this add-on widened the radius of knowledge outside the normal pool. It created the potential for an OPSEC breach by technicians who never had been involved in pool activities and never had been subjected to the discipline of OPSEC ground rules. The satellite uplink, however, did help the NBC correspondent, Fred Francis, in beaming his broadcasts from Panama. There is no evidence that the addition of the technicians led to any security compromise.

As another byproduct of the confusion which surrounded the callout, the primary pooler for one newspaper and his alternate both showed up at Andrews. The alternate, who did not make the trip, then called home. Normally this would be a violation of a ground rule, but an escorting officer gave permission for the call.

Apart from the incident at the Time magazine Christmas party, there was another report of a security breach allegedly involving the pool.
"Once it became clear that things were not going well, it should have been worked through command channels," the JCS Chairman said. "It never became a matter of discussion for me and General Thurman."

When the pool finally did get moving, Alexandrakos and Sconyers kept it in a single unit rather than splitting it to cover more of the story. Alexandrakos said the pool was kept together because of transportation limitations. It was split into two sections on the second day of the operation.

The first time the pool had a chance to get anywhere near any shooting was around 10 am when Sconyers managed to get a helicopter back and the group was flown to Ft. Amador, across the bay from Quarry Heights and the main part of Panama City.

Here is the way that Ken Merida of the Dallas Morning News described what the pool found there:

"Even at Ft. Amador, a military installation shared by the United States and Panama under the Panama Canal Treaties, the action was largely over. U.S. troops had repeatedly shelled the barracks of the Panamanian Defense Forces in the early morning hours when we were still on a military transport plane. All that was left to do was smoke out a few remaining Noriega loyalists, none of whom surrendered in our presence."

While at Ft. Amador, the poolers could see smoke rising from around the battered remains of the Commandancia in Panama City several miles away.

"We were told that because of continued sniper fire on the first day it was too dangerous for us to visit the neighborhood of Chorillo which housed another of Noriega’s headquarters and was still burning from heavy shelling by U.S. troops," Merida said.

"It was also too dangerous, we were told, to take a helicopter tour of Panama City."

This issue of the pool’s safety was a sore one. Some members of the pool felt it was being used as an excuse by escorts to divert the newsmen and women from hot military action.

Lieutenant Colonel Ned Longsworth, who was chief escort for the pool at Ft. Amador, acknowledged that "I may have been a little too protective at Ft. Amador." Longsworth claimed that, otherwise, safety was not invoked to prevent moving the pool to newsworthy sites.

But Kathy Lewis, reporter for the Houston Post, said "we were often told we could NOT go to a certain area because of concern about snipers or other threats to our safety."

As for the rejection of poolers’ requests to be flown over the city, Longsworth said, "I wasn’t going to put a helicopter pilot’s life on the line to fly over the city when there still was fire."

Regardless, Longsworth said, "The pilots advised that they didn’t want to fly over Panama City. They were still catching rounds. This was not for the safety of the pool. The pilots thought it would endanger their ship."
Members of the pool resented what they regarded as special treatment accorded to ABC personality Sam Donaldson, who arrived with an entourage the day after the main attacks.

"When Sam Donaldson arrived, it was like the President had walked into the media center," said one military escort who shared the pool's feeling of resentment.

This officer said Sconyers was "given over basically to supporting Sam Donaldson."

Sconyers and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Donnelly, made it clear they were unhappy at what they hinted was pressure from Washington to give Donaldson favored treatment.

It is self evident that there should never be any special treatment or favoritism for any outside newsmen or women at the expense of the pool.

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"It was a nightmare," said Army Captain Barbara Summers.

"The faxing and refaxing operation was a nightmare," said the Houston Post's Kathy Lewis.

Both were describing their experiences, thousands of miles apart, in trying to get written pool reports from Panama to the Pentagon for distribution.

Summers was part of an undermanned crew at the Pentagon, grappling with a faulty fax machine and torturous telephone communications.

Lewis was a reporter serving with the media pool in Panama, harried by the same problems.

While TV and radio newsmen with the pool transmitted their reports without major difficulty, the newspaper, wire service and magazine reporters and still photographers ran into obstacle after obstacle.

The first obstacle arose Wednesday morning when the initial writing pool report was filed in Panama to the Pentagon. The fax machine in the Plans office was broken. As a result of this malfunction, the machine was cutting copy short at the margins.

Sergeant Rhueben Douthit located a replacement, but then he and other staff members had difficulty reading the incoming material.

The Pentagon staffers then tried to phone the media center at Quarry Heights in Panama to clarify the copy. However, sometimes the calls were misdirected by the Quarry Heights switchboard and sometimes the phones in the media center went unanswered. It took as long as two hours to get a call through.

By this time, bureau chiefs from news organizations represented on the pool were calling the Pentagon demanding to know why they weren't getting the pool reports from the scene.
Cynthia Johnson, Time photographer, told this story:

"Arrangements were supposedly made to send my Wednesday film out on a military aircraft headed for Dover Air Force Base (Delaware) on Thursday. We had a courier in place to transport the film to our lab when it arrived. The plane arrived, but the film wasn't on it. After much phoning back and forth in the middle of the night, my film was discovered in someone's in-box at Howard Air Force Base."

Sconyers should have anticipated a need for dedicated aircraft as a backup in the event that primary transmission means failed.

Instead, the only arrangement made was to try to send pool materials back to the States on planes already scheduled to carry cargo or passengers.

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The problems back at the Pentagon in handling the print pool reports were aggravated by the fact that most of the small staff left behind by Alexandrakos was inexperienced in pool matters.

Although Alexandrakos knew Tuesday morning that the media pool might be sent to Panama, he failed to make sure that each of his staff knew what they were supposed to do when the copy began rolling in from Panama.

To have prepared his staff properly over the long term, Alexandrakos should have assigned specific tasks to each member and exercised the team periodically.

Marine Major Shelley Rogers and Captain Summers improvised. They organized themselves and two enlisted men into teams of two each so there would be around-the-clock coverage. This meant 12-hour shifts.

Rogers had additional responsibilities—she had to work in the Pentagon's Crisis Coordination Center handling messages and other tasks.

So she had to spread herself thin and this added to the burden on the other three.

Sergeant Dowhit was the only member of this small team who had experience with the pool. When he became aware Tuesday evening of what was about to happen, he pulled out a binder containing standard operating procedures developed in the past and gave it to Major Rogers. But it was too close to the event for a simple reading of the SOP to prepare sufficiently anybody who had not previously handled such responsibilities.

Examination of the SOP shows a total lack of any provisions for Pentagon handling of pool products other than print reports.

Apparently there has never been a requirement laid down by the Pentagon that organizations participating in the still photo activities of a pool must share their products with photo agencies outside the pool.

This is a loophole which must be closed. The pool must serve the entire news industry.
7. The ASD(PA) should study a proposal by several of the Panama poolers that future pools deploy in two sections. The first section would be very small and would include only reporters and photographers. The second section, coming later, would bring in supporting gear, such as satellite uplink equipment.

8. The national media pool should never again be herded as a single unwieldy unit. It should be broken up after arriving at the scene of action to cover a wider spectrum of the story and then be reassembled periodically to share the reporting results.

9. The pool should be exercised at least once during each quarterly rotation with airborne and other types of military units most likely to be sent on emergency combat missions.

10. During deployments, there should be regular briefings for pool newsmen and newswomen by senior operations officers so the poolers will have an up-to-date and complete overview of the progress of an operation they are covering.

11. There is an urgent need for restructuring of the organization which has the responsibility for handling pool reports sent to the Pentagon for processing and distribution. The ASD(PA) must assure that there is adequate staffing and enough essential equipment to handle the task. The Director of Plans, so long as he has this responsibility, should clearly assign contingency duties among his staff to ensure timely handling of reports from the pool. Staffers from the Administration Office, Community Relations and other divisions of OASP[PA] should be mobilized to help in such a task as needed.

12. The ASD(PA) should give serious consideration to a suggestion by some of the pool members to create a new pool slot for an editor who would come to the Pentagon during a deployment to lend professional journalism help to the staff officers handling pool reports. Such a pool editor could edit copy, question content where indicated and help expedite distribution of the reports.

13. The pool escorting system needs overhauling as well. There is no logical reason for the Washington-based escorts to be drawn from the top of the OASP[PA] Plans Division. The head of that division should remain in Washington to oversee getting out the pool products.

Pool escorts should be drawn from the most appropriate service, rather than limiting escort duty to officers of the Plans Division. The individual armed service public affairs offices should be required to assign military officers to the pool on a contingency basis. For example, if it's an Army operation, the escorts should be primarily Army officers. In the Panama deployment, the three Washington-based escorts wore Air Force and Navy uniforms in what was an overwhelmingly Army operation.

Escorts should deploy in field uniforms or draw them from field commands soon after arriving. The Panama pool escorts wore uniforms befitting a day behind the desk at the Pentagon and this, I found, had a jarring effect on the Army people with whom they dealt.

14. The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products
Mr. Stanley Cloud
TIME Magazine Washington Bureau
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20036-5334

Dear Stan,

I received your letter of April 6, and appreciated hearing your comments. Although Fred concludes there was no compromise of the operation that can be traced to that specific violation of operational security, I'm sure you understand that the potential for compromise was there. However, I also realize there were some extenuating circumstances that made our pool call out especially difficult for you to control.

A violation of operational security is a serious matter. If a service member is found guilty of a security breach, he or she would suffer serious consequences.

For this reason, when a media organization signs up to participate in the DoD National Media Pool, we go to some lengths to stress to participants the importance of operational security. It is this pledge by the media to abide by certain ground rules which is the very cornerstone of the media pool concept. Our ground rules, which are reviewed at the bureau chief meeting at the beginning of each quarter, state specifically that, "Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool."

Thanks for your candor in discussing the issue with me, Stan. I know that all of you at TIME want to make the pool work, and we appreciate your support.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to call me.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
April 6, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Office of Public Affairs
Room 2-E 800
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

Thanks for sending me a copy of Fred Hoffman's report. I read it with interest, agree with much of it, and look forward to the additional discussions you mentioned.

For the record, however, I feel obliged to point out that Hoffman doesn't have it quite right about TIME's alleged "breach of OPSEC rules." There was no "open discussion at the [Christmas] party about who would go for TIME." Larry Barrett and I discussed the matter with two of the correspondents whom we had long-since designated to be in the pool. For reasons having to do with holiday plans, both asked to be excused. Later, Barrett talked to Dick Thompson, who agreed to go in their place. Since all these discussions took place in a corner of the Kennedy Center restaurant, with only 90 minutes to go before the deadline for arriving at Andrews, they created something of a stir, particularly among the spouses of the affected correspondents. Hence, my remark to Hoffman that "more people knew than should have known."

But, given the circumstances surrounding the callup and the fact that the entire TIME bureau was in a restaurant when it occurred, I insist that, any "breach of OPSEC rules" was not only unintentional but, more important, totally unavoidable.

Sincerely,

Stanley W. Cloud

SWC/jrs
Mr. William I. Greener  
619 Maple Avenue  
Wilmette, Illinois 60091

Dear Bill:

I received your letter of April 4, and would like to thank you for your observations and advice. We are working to improve any future media pool deployments by implementing suggestions made by Fred Hoffman, the Joint Staff, the bureau chiefs and others.

We look forward to seeing you on your next trip to Washington. Until then, I will keep you informed of our efforts to make the media pool more effective and appreciate your interest in this matter.

I might add that when I conveyed your comments to Pete Alexandrakos he said, "Bill who?" I'm sure his memory will improve by the time you come to visit.

Sincerely,

Signed

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
April 4, 1990

Honorable Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
Washington, D.C.  20301-1400

RE: Review of Panama Pool Deployment

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for the report prepared by Fred Hoffman. It was as expected hard hitting and very helpful. I had the opportunity to briefly discuss the report with Fred last Sunday, so the actual report was very welcome.

While you need more advice like a hole in the head, I can't help but remind you that everything in the report boils down to planning, planning, planning. You might tell Pete Alexandrakos that I thought I had taught him better than that. Seriously, please give Col. Alexandrakos my best.

I told Dick Cheney that I am more than willing to help in any way you think would be worthwhile. I will give you a call on my next trip to Washington with the hope that we can have that long delayed visit.

Again, my thanks for keeping me advised. All the best,

Sincerely,

William I. Greener  
619 Maple Ave.  
Wilmette, Il. 60091
Mr. Andrew J. Glass  
Chief of Bureau  
Cox Newspapers  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 10000  
Washington, DC  20006-1894

Dear Andy:

I received your letter of April 4, and would like to thank you for your observations. You certainly make some good points. We are working to improve any future media pool deployments by implementing suggestions made during the course of recent bureau chief meetings and also those made by Fred Hoffman, the Joint Staff, and many individuals, such as yourself.

I can assure you that the Secretary of Defense strongly supports the pool concept and is personally committed to implementing changes necessary to make future pool deployments a total success. We will keep you informed of our progress in this area and hope that you will remain personally involved in our effort to improve the media pool.

Sincerely,

Signed  

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
Mr. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400  

Dear Pete:

Thanks for sending me a copy of Fred Hoffman's report how things went with the Pentagon press pool during the Panama operation. It was also good to hear that you are moving to fix some of the more glaring problems.

Nevertheless, I was disturbed to hear Secretary Cheney tell the newspaper editors today that he would always choose protecting military lives over the "legitimate interests of the press."

In the first place, the press has no "legitimate interests." The American public, however, does. The pool is there to represent the rest of us. The press is there as the eyes and ears of the public. That's our "mission." And, if we are not going to go the way of Rome, Pete, I think it's vital that that mission be accomplished as well.

In the second place, the Secretary need never make such a choice. It should be possible to devise a plan that safeguards operational security and still offers reporters a window. If that means a much smaller pool, so be it: even one good reporter is better than none. If that means sequestering people for a couple of days, so be it. If a reporter gets hurt, that's too bad. It won't be the first time and it goes with the job.

Sincerely,

Andrew J. Glass  
Chief of Bureau
Mr. Robert Hey  
Bureau Manager  
Christian Science Monitor  
910 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Mr. Hey:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

As part of our effort to improve pool operations, we intend to accept that recommendation and amend the current media pool ground rules by adding the bold-faced paragraph in the enclosure to this letter.

It is important to the Department of Defense that the DoD National Media Pool remain non-competitive. The pool represents the entire U.S. news industry, and its main purpose is to inform the American people about military operations.

I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Reg Murphy
President and Publisher
Baltimore Sun
501 North Calvert Street
Baltimore, MD 21278

Dear Mr. Murphy:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Kevin Klose  
Deputy National Editor  
Washington Post  
1150 15th Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20071  

Dear Mr. Klose:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. William Beecher  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Minneapolis Star and Tribune  
1627 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Mr. Beecher:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,  

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Ms. Deborah Orin
Washington Bureau Chief
New York Post
1112 National Press Building
Washington, DC  20045

Dear Ms. Orin:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure: Ground Rules
Mr. Nick Horrock
Washington Bureau Chief
Chicago Tribune
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Nick:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Ronald Cohen  
Executive Editor  
USA Today  
1000 Wilson Boulevard  
16th Floor  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Cohen:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Sam Stanton  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Central Newspapers  
1000 National Press Building  
Washington, DC 20045  

Dear Mr. Stanton:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
15 JUN 1990

Mr. Clark Hoyt
Bureau Chief
Knight-Ridder Newspapers
700 National Press Building
Washington, DC 20045

Dear Clark:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave
Editor-in-Chief
Washington Times
3600 New York Avenue, N.E.
Washington, DC 20002

Dear Mr. de Borchgrave:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Ms. Kathy Lewis  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Houston Post  
1206 National Press Building  
Washington, DC  20045

Dear Kathy:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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It is important to the Department of Defense that the DoD National Media Pool remain non-competitive. The pool represents the entire U.S. news industry, and its main purpose is to inform the American people about military operations.

I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Carl P. Leubsdorf  
Bureau Chief  
Dallas Morning News  
1012 National Press Building  
Washington, DC 20045  

Dear Carl:

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Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Cragg Hines  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Houston Chronicle  
801 18th Street, N.W.  
Suite 603  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Hines:

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Sincerely,

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Douglas Turner  
Washington Bureau Chief  
The Buffalo Evening News  
1141 National Press Building  
Washington, DC  20045

Dear Mr. Turner:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Steven Kurkjian  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Boston Globe  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 3800  
Washington, DC  20006  

Dear Mr. Kurkjian:

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Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Al Hunt  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Wall Street Journal  
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036  

Dear Al:  

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)  

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. George Condon
Managing Editor
Copley News Service
1100 National Press Building
Washington, DC 20045

Dear Mr. Condon:

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Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Howell Raines  
Washington Editor  
New York Times  
1627 Eye Street, N.W.  
7th Floor  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Howell:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Robert Adams  
Washington Bureau Chief  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 550  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Mr. Adams:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Phil Gaily  
Washington Bureau Chief  
St. Petersburg Times  
1414 22ND Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Gaily:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Ms. Barbara Cohen  
Vice President/Bureau Chief  
CBS  
2020 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Barbara:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. David Oziel  
News Director  
UPI Radio  
1400 Eye Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20005  

Dear David:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. David A. Wiessler  
Bureau Chief  
United Press International  
1400 Eye Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20005  

Dear David:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Bruce Russell  
Chief of Bureau  
Reuters  
1333 H Street, N.W.  
Suite 410  
Washington, DC 20005  

Dear Bruce:

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Sincerely,

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. George Watson
Washington Bureau Chief
ABC News
1717 DeSales Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear George:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Bill Headline  
Vice President and Bureau Chief  
CNN  
111 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001  

Dear Bill:

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Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Timothy Russert  
Vice President and Bureau Chief  
NBC  
4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20016

Dear Tim:

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Ms. Robin Sproul
News Director
ABC Radio
1717 DeSales Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Robin:

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Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Brad Kalbfeld  
Deputy Director/Managing Editor  
AP Radio Network  
1825 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006-1253

Dear Mr. Kalbfeld:

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Ms. Evelyn Thomas  
Manager of Radio News  
CBS Radio  
2020 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ms. Thomas:

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Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Craig Warner  
News Manager  
Mutual/NBC Radio  
1755 South Jefferson Davis Highway  
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Warner:

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Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Jeff Rosenberg
Executive Producer
National Public Radio
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Jeff:

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Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Richard Rieman  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Unistar Radio  
2000 North 15th Street  
Suite 200  
Arlington, VA 22201

Dear Dick:

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Larry Liebert
Washington Bureau Chief
San Francisco Chronicle
1085 National Press Building
Washington, DC 20045

Dear Larry:

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Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
Mr. Jonathan P. Wolman  
Bureau Chief  
Associated Press  
2021 K Street, N.W.  
Suite 600  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Jon:

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Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Stanley Cloud  
Bureau Chief  
Time Magazine  
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
8th Floor  
Washington, DC  20036-5334

Dear Stan:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

As part of our effort to improve pool operations, we intend to accept that recommendation and amend the current media pool ground rules by adding the bold-faced paragraph in the enclosure to this letter.

It is important to the Department of Defense that the DoD National Media Pool remain non-competitive. The pool represents the entire U.S. news industry, and its main purpose is to inform the American people about military operations.

I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Evan Thomas  
Bureau Chief  
Newsweek  
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC  20006

Dear Evan:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Carey English  
Chief of Correspondents  
U.S. News and World Report  
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Mr. English:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations--whether print, still photo, TV or radio--to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Jonathan P. Wolman  
Bureau Chief  
Associated Press  
2021 K Street, N.W.  
Suite 600  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Jon:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Robert G. Fichenberg  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Newhouse News Service  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 3900  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Mr. Fichenberg:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Dave Montgomery
Washington Bureau Chief
Capital Cities Communications, Inc./ABC
1717 DeSales Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Dave:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:
Ground Rules
As of June 8, 1990

PROPOSED MEDIA POOL GROUND RULES

You have been selected to participate as a member of the DoD National Media Pool. The ground rules below will protect the security of the operation and the safety of the troops involved, while allowing you the greatest permissible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all U.S. media.

- Prior to your departure, do not tell anyone that the pool has been activated. This is absolutely essential to preserve security in the event of an actual contingency operation.

- You may not file stories or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other information (from videotape, sound bites, photo cutlines, etc.) have been pooled with other pool members. This pooling may take place at a pool member meeting during or immediately following the operation. You will be expected to brief other pool members concerning your experiences. Detailed instructions on filing will be provided by your military escorts at an appropriate time.

- You must remain with the escort officers at all times, until released—and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting and are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety.

- The DoD National Media Pool is a non-competitive pool that represents the entire U.S. news industry. Therefore, all U.S. news media will have equal access to print, still photo, audio and video products resulting from media pool deployments.

- Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool.

- Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these guidelines and your willingness to abide by them.

Additional ground rules developed by the news organizations within the pool are attached.
Mr. Patrick Sloyan  
Washington Correspondent  
Newsday  
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 1250  
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Pat:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations--whether print, still photo, TV or radio--to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Andrew J. Glass  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Cox Newspaper  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 1000  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Andy:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

"The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations--whether print, still photo, TV or radio--to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
26 July 1990

RESPONSES TO GROUND RULE CHANGE PROPOSAL

1. ABC RADIO - Robin Sproul  
   DTD  2 JUL 90
2. NEW YORK TIMES - Howell Raines  
   DTD 27 JUN 90
3. NEWHOUSE NEWSPAPERS - Robert Fichenberg  
   DTD 19 JUN 90
4. KNIGHT RIDDER - Clark Hoyt  
   DTD 20 JUN 90
5. GANNETT NEWSPAPERS - Ron Cohen  
   not dated
6. COX NEWSPAPERS - Andrew Glass  
   DTD 19 JUN 90
7. SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWSPAPERS - Dan Thomasson  
   DTD 19 JUN 90
8. WALL STREET JOURNAL - Albert Hunt  
   DTD 20 JUN 90
9. AP - Jonathan Wolman  
   DTD 19 JUN 90
10. WASHINGTON TIMES - Arnaud de Borchgrave  
    DTD 21 JUN 90
July 2, 1990

The Honorable Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I received your letter regarding the proposed rule changes for the DoD National Media Pool. I don't believe there has been a problem in the past in sharing audio from the radio pool member among all interested parties. However, the word "equal" in the new language could pose some serious technical problems in the future.

If "equal" is construed to mean that any media organization wanting access to radio feeds must receive live audio at the same time and same quality as the radio network pool, problems arise. The radio networks have a Washington-based live audio distribution system in place. It does not have add-on capacity at this time. In the past, the radio networks have provided taped copies of the radio feeds to those requesting them, and we have attempted live feeds to others via AT&T toll in Washington, or by telephone (not "broadcast quality").

In short, I have no problem with the spirit of the new language. I do think, however, that the word "equal" has to be dropped or further defined.

Sincerely,

Robin Vierbuchen Spraul
June 27, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I agree with your decision on the universal sharing of pool information. I would be interested to know if you are encountering resistance in other quarters.

I do not recall hearing any dissent in our most recent meeting at the Pentagon.

On another matter, our executive editor, Max Frankel, raised the question with me recently of whether we should apply for inclusion in the pools as a wire service. The New York Times is one of several large newspapers or chains that maintains its own wire service. Presently, ours has 354 domestic clients and 150 foreign clients, making it one of the largest syndicates. I'd be interested in knowing your initial thoughts on this.

Best regards,

[Signature]

Howell
June 19, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I agree completely with Fred Hoffman's recommendation that the guidelines on pool participation be amended to make equal and unrestricted access to pool products mandatory for participation in the pool.

The very nature and definition of a news pool make it obvious that members of a pool are agents for their peers, including their competition, and anyone who can't live with this well-established concept shouldn't be in the pool.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Fichenberg
Editor and Bureau Chief
June 20, 1990

The Hon. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs  
Department of Defense  
Washington, DC, 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

Thanks for your letter and the proposed change in the ground rules for the Pentagon national media pool.

As you might imagine, I'm delighted with the language in the new paragraph. It is perfect.

KRTN continues to want to participate in the photo pool. Please let me know how we should proceed on that application.

Sincerely,

Clark Hoyt

cc: Charles Borst, Scott Bosley
Mr. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Williams:

I heartily endorse your addition to the National Media Pool ground rules concerning its noncompetitive nature. All news organizations that are interested should share in the work product of the participants. That is precisely what a news pool is and always has been, and I see no grounds for changing that philosophy.

Cordially,

Ron Cohen  
Executive Editor  
Gannett News Service
June 19, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

Thank you for your letter of June 15th and the enclosed proposed ground rules for the future conduct of Defense Department press rules. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in including me on your circulation list.

I regard the new "equal access" clause as a desirable reform and welcome its addition to the rules.

Sincerely,

Andrew J. Glass
Chief of Bureau

AJG:df
June 19, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Public Affairs
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Pete:

I thoroughly agree with Fred Hoffman’s recommendation and support the rule change.

This is no ordinary assignment, and the competitive stance between newspapers and television, for instance, should have no place here.

The important thing is to make sure that the American public is as informed as possible in these grave situations.

Thanks for considering me.

Sincerely,

Dan K. Thomasson
Editor

DRT/rms
June 20, 1990

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Public Affairs
The Pentagon #2E800
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Pete,

I've always believed in the general principles of sharing pool information with all legitimate news media. Accordingly, I applaud you for reasserting that principle.

If I can be of any other assistance please let me know.

Best,

CL
Mr. Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Washington DC 20301-1400

June 19, 1990

Dear Pete:

Regarding yrs of June 15 with new ground rules on sharing pool copy. I like your proposal just fine. If AP ever received a pool report direct from the field, we would immediately FAX it to your office for distribution.

In fact, we did it that way when Komarow called here during the Panama pool.

Regards,
June 21, 1990

The Hon. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Mr. Williams:

Thank you for your letter of June 15.

I appreciate your request for my input regarding ground rule changes. Indeed, your suggestions seem congruous with the parameters of others (notably the White House pool). I foresee no conflicts with the suggestions you have made.

Again, thanks for sharing your thoughts.

Sincerely,

Arnaud de Borchgrave

AB: bp
Mr. Jack Nelson  
Bureau Chief  
Los Angeles Times  
1875 Eye Street, N.W.  
Suite 1100  
Washington, DC 20006  

Dear Jack:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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I am interested in your thoughts on the proposed change to the ground rules, and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Frank Aukofer  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Milwaukee Journal  
940 National Press Building  
Washington, DC 20045  

Dear Mr. Aukofer:

One of the recommendations of Fred Hoffman's report on the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama says that media pool products should be shared with all elements of the news industry. The report recommends:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
Mr. Dan Thomasson  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Scripps Howard  
1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 610  
Washington, DC 20005  

Dear Dan:

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Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure:  
Ground Rules
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD -- PERSIAN GULF

REGIONAL MEDIA POOLS

1. SECDEF AND CJCS HAVE APPROVED A CONCEPT OF REGIONAL
MEDIA POOL COVERAGE OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, GULF
OF OMAN AND NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. THIS COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED

ASD(PA)//ASD(ISA)IA//

LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN,
OASD(PA)/DPL/GHH/10AUG90/31074/
DISC NO. HARTUNG 90-1

Robert W. Taylor
Principal Deputy Assistant
Security

AUG 10 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified by
ASD(PA)
20 May 91
BY EXPERIENCED U.S. NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES LOCATED IN-THEATER.

2. (C) THE FOLLOWING PLANNING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR THE FIRST TWO REGIONAL MEDIA POOL EMBARKS:

A. (C) TWO REGIONAL MEDIA POOLS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. ONE WILL ORIGINATE ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 12, IN DUBAI, UAE, AND WILL TRAVEL VIA COD TO THE USS INDEPENDENCE/RON/RETURN TO DUBAI THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE SECOND MEDIA POOL EMBARK WILL ORIGINATE ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, IN BAHRAIN, TRAVEL VIA HELO TO THE USS ANTIETAM AND RETURN TO BAHRAIN THE SAME DAY.

B. (U) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THE FOLLOWING MEDIA POOL COMPOSITION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THESE REGIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENTS:

DUBAI POOL

2 WIRE SERVICE REPORTERS
1 WIRE SERVICE PHOTOGRAPHER
3 MEMBER TELEVISION CREW
1 RADIO CORRESPONDENT
1 NEWS MAGAZINE REPORTER
1 NEWS MAGAZINE PHOTOGRAPHER
3 NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS
BAHRAIN POOL

1 WIRE SERVICE CORRESPONDENT
1 WIRE SERVICE PHOTOGRAPHER
2 MEMBER TELEVISION CREW
1 RADIO CORRESPONDENT
1 NEWS MAGAZINE CORRESPONDENT
1 NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT

3. (U) NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES FOR EACH POOL WILL BE SELECTED BY USCENTCOM-DESIGNATED FORWARD PAO WITH THE ADVICE OF RESPECTIVE USIS BAHRAIN OR USIS ABU DHABI REPRESENTATIVE. THESE PROPOSED COMPOSITIONS ARE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY; IF CERTAIN MEDIA ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR EMBARK, THOSE POOL SLOTS SHOULD BE OFFERED TO OTHER MEDIA PRESENT IN THE AOR.

4. (U) ALL NMRS SHOULD BE U.S. CITIZENS.

5. (U) POOL PRODUCTS, BOTH PRINT AND BROADCAST, WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL INTERESTED U.S. AND FOREIGN MEDIA ON AN EQUITABLE, NO-FEE BASIS. MEDIA POOL BUREAU CHIEFS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING DISSEMINATION OF PRODUCTS IAW THIS POLICY.
6. (U) DOD AND AMBASSADORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO DISCLOSE DETAILS OF THESE REGIONAL MEDIA POOL PLANS TO HOST NATION OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO ENTER/TRANSIT THE HOST COUNTRY AND FACILITATE PROCESSING.

7. (U) ASSUMPTIONS.

A. (U) PUBLIC WILL BE INFORMED OF DESERT SHIELD OPERATIONS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND SAFETY.

B. (U) GOVERNMENTS OF BAHRAIN AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WILL AUTHORIZE ENTRY-EXIT VISAS OR NON-OBJECTION CERTIFICATES FOR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AS REQUIRED.

8. (U) MEDIA WILL BE SELECTED WITHOUT REGARD TO GENDER, IAW LONGSTANDING DOD POLICY.

9. (U) GROUND RULES. ALL DATEDINES MUST BE: QUOTE- IN THE PERSIAN GULF- UNQUOTE- OR QUOTE- ABOARD THE USS (FILL IN NAME OF SHIP) IN THE PERSIAN GULF- UNQUOTE. THERE CAN BE NO MENTION OF COUNTRY OF EMBARK IN REPORTING- NON-SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES OF U.S. PICKET STATION SHIPS SHOULD BE BRIEFED AND DISCUSSED. DETAILS OF EMPLOYMENT OF SHIPS OR HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED. DUE TO
SECURITY CONCERNS, NAMES OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED OTHER THAN THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SHIP WILL NOT BE RELEASED.

10. (U) FOR USIS BAHRAIN AND USIS ABU DHABI. REQUEST YOU BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON U.S.-MEDIA IN AREA TO ASSIST USCENTCOM-DESIGNATED FWD PAO AND CJTFME IN SELECTING POOL MEMBERS. ALSO REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE WITH ASSEMBLY AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION FOR POOL IF NECESSARY, BEFORE AND AFTER POOL EMBARKS.

11. (U) FILING. FILING FOR THESE POOLS WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDIA UPON COMPLETION OF POOL OPERATIONS.

12. (U) REQUEST THAT CJTFME PROVIDE A DETAILED AFTER ACTION REPORT ON THESE MEDIA POOLS TO USCINCCENT INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// ASD{PA}::DPL-

13. (U) OASD{PA} POINT OF CONTACT IS LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN (202) 693-1074.

DECL OADR
UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD{PA}//
USCINCCECENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA//
INFO CJTFME
AMEMBASSY RIYADH//USIS//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//NEA/USIA//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
OSAF WASHINGTON DC//PA//
USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//PA//
CINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL//PA//
CINCTAC LANGLEY AFB VA//PA//
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA//FCPA//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
COMUSNAVCENT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
CG I MEF

ASD{PA}//ASD{ISA}NEA//

LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN
OASD{PA}: DPL/RD/10 AUG 90/
31074/DISC 90-1
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
AUG 10 1990

NIGHT ACTION NOT REQUIRED
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

Declassified by
ASDC(PA)
20 May 91
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS - DEPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD {U}

A. CJCS WASHINGTON DC 182305Z MAY 90

1. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE APPROVED A DEPLOYMENT OF THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. BECAUSE OF THE INITIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT NEWS MEDIA HAVE EXPERIENCED IN ATTEMPTING TO COVER U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA, THIS DEPLOYMENT WAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN WASHINGTON ON 10 AUGUST 90. PLANNING FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH INDICATED OBJECTIVES.

2. CONCEPT OF OPS. THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WILL DEPLOY FROM ANDREWS AFB, WASHINGTON DC ON 11 OR 12 AUGUST 90. THE POOL WILL CONSIST OF UP TO 15 U.S.-ONLY MEDIA, TWO DOD ESCORT OFFICERS
AND ONE JCS ESCORT OFFICER. THIS GROUP WILL TRAVEL FIRST TO MCDILL AFB TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF USCENTCOM FOR BRIEFINGS/PHOTO OP WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF. UPON COMPLETION, THE POOL WILL TRAVEL VIA DEDICATED MILITARY ARLIFT TO RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA. UPON ARRIVAL IN AOR MEDIA POOL SHOULD BE GREETED BY THE OPERATION COMMANDER IF POSSIBLE AND BRIEFED ON THE OPERATION. AN ITINERARY SHOULD THEN BE EXECUTED THAT WILL ALLOW THE POOL TO COVER U.S. MILITARY FORCES THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

3. [U] GROUND RULES. IN ADDITION TO THE STANDARD DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL GROUND RULES, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GROUND RULES WILL BE ENFORCED:

A. [U] THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE CONSIDERED NOT RELEASEABLE:

1. [U] NUMBER OF TROOPS
2. [U] NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
3. [U] NUMBER OF OTHER EQUIPMENT (TANKS, ARTILLERY, ETC.)
4. [U] NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS/GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA
5. [U] INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS
6. {U} INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA

7. {U} NAMES/HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL BEING INTERVIEWED. COMMANDERS OF UNITS ARE EXCEPTED FROM THIS PROVISION.

8. {U} PHOTOGRAPHY THAT WOULD SHOW LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA

9. {U} PHOTOGRAPHY THAT WOULD REVEAL NAME OR SPECIFIC LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES OR INSTALLATION

4. {U} MEDIA POOL COVERAGE. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, POOL MEMBERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO OBSERVE, PHOTOGRAPH, AND REPORT ON THE SITUATION TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT AS DETAILED IN REF A. POOL REPORTS WILL USE SAUDI ARABIA AS DATELINE, WITHOUT MENTION OF SPECIFIC LOCATIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

5. {U} BRIEFINGS. MEDIA POOL MEMBERS SHOULD RECEIVE, AS A MINIMUM, ONE UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL BRIEFING EACH DAY OF THE DEPLOYMENT TO UPDATE THEM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AS FAR AS OPSEC PERMITS.

6. {U} FILING. WRITTEN POOL REPORTS SHOULD BE FILED AT LEAST TWICE DAILY VIA SATCOM GEAR DIRECTLY TO OASD{PA}. NO ATTEMPT WILL
BE MADE TO CENSOR NEWS COPY. IF A VIOLATION IS NOTED BY THE
DESIGNATED CENTCOM SECURITY REVIEW OFFICER DURING THE PROCESS OF
SECURITY REVIEW OF POOL MATERIAL, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT TO THE
MEDIA POOL MEMBER. IF THE REPORTER Chooses TO CHANGE THE TEXT AS
RECOMMENDED, THE REPORT CAN BE TRANSMITTED AS UNCLASSIFIED. IF THE
REPORTER Chooses NOT TO MAKE A CHANGE, THE DOCUMENT WILL BE
FORWARDED TO OASD(PA) VIA SECURE MEANS FOR REVIEW AND RELEASE.
COURIER FLIGHTS MUST BE ARRANGED ON A TWICE DAILY BASIS TO TRANSPORT
VIDEO/UNDEVELOPED FILM TO A POINT WHERE VIDEO CAN BE UPLINKED AND
VIDEO/ FILM PICK UP CAN BE ARRANGED BY THE BUREAU CHIEFS.
7. {U} SECURITY. POOL MEMBERS WILL BE ESCORTED AT ALL TIMES.
ESCORTS WILL ENSURE PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE/GROUND RULES ARE
FOLLOWED. POOL WILL NOT INTENTIONALLY VISIT ANY SPACE/AREA WHERE
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS DISPLAYED OR BEING DISCUSSED.
8. {U} INTERVIEWS. INTERVIEWS INVOLVING MILITARY PERSONNEL
PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD ARE ENCOURAGED AND WILL
BE ON THE RECORD. MILITARY PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THIS
OPERATION WILL BE BRIEFED THAT ALL PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT
OPERATIONS WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED, LIMITED TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCES
AND IAW ESTABLISHED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

9. {U} POOL MEMBERS SHOULD BE OFFERED MEALS THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE AND ASSIGNED BERTHING/BILLETING APPROPRIATE TO THEIR EQUIVALENT RANK {0-4}, AS AVAILABLE.

10. {U} A COMPLETE LISTING OF MEDIA POOL MEMBERS AND ESCORT PERSONNEL WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPMAG.

11. {U} COUNTRY CLEARANCE. SPEED IN OBTAINING PROPER COUNTRY ENTRANCE/EXIT PROCESSING IS CRITICAL DURING THE MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST USCENTCOM AND SAUDI ARABIA COUNTRY TEAMS COORDINATE IN ADVANCE COUNTRY CLEARANCE/CUSTOMS/SHOT REQUIREMENTS/ENTRY-EXIT VISAS AND ANY OTHER REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE PROMPT PROCESSING. ALL POOL MEMBERS WILL BE TRAVELLING ON OFFICIAL DOD TRAVEL ORDERS AND WITH OFFICIAL ESCORTS.

12. {U} REQUEST USCENTCOM PROVIDE PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT TO OASD{PA} ASAP.

13. {U} THE OASD{PA} POC FOR THIS ACTION IS LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN, AV 223-1074, COMM {202} 693-1074.

DECLAS OADR
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD -- DEPLOYMENT OF DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL [U]

CHUSMTM RIYADH PASS TO CENTCOM PUBLIC AFFAIRS FORWARD

A. SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 112203Z AUG 90.

1. REF A DISCUSSED DEPLOYMENT OF THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. THE DOD

Lcdr Gregg Hartung, USN,
OASD:PA/DPL/GHM/112203Z/31074/ML

DISC NO. HARTUNG 90-1

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

UNCLASSIFIED

Downgraded
by ASD(IA)
20 May 91
NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WAS ACTIVATED IN WASHINGTON, DC, AT 1940
HRS EDT, 11 AUG 90, AND WILL DEPART ANDREWS AFB AT 0800 HRS EDT, 12
AUG 90 ENROUTE MACDILL AFB. AT MACDILL AFB, POOL MEMBERS WILL
RECEIVE BRIEFINGS BY USCINCENT, FILE THEIR STORIES, AND THEN DEPART
VIA DEDICATED AIRCRAFT FOR SAUDI ARABIA. THIS DEPLOYMENT IS DESIGNED
TO ENABLE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO OBSERVE AND REPORT ON THE U.S.
MILITARY UNITS IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.
2. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING COUNTRY CLEARANCES
AND ANY OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMMAND AND THE HOST NATION.
MEDIA POOL MEMBERS WILL ARRIVE IN COUNTRY WITH VISAS PROVIDED TODAY
BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC.
3. {U} THE FOLLOWING 20 PERSONNEL COMPRIZE THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA
POOL {17 MEDIA, 3 ESCORTS}:
READ LINE AS RANK/NAME/SEX/ORGANIZATION/PASSPORT NUMBER/PASSPORT
EXPIRATION DATE/PLACE PASSPORT ISSUED/DOB/POB:
A. CIV/ KING, JOHN M/AP/01435962/22 MAY 00/WASHINGTON DC/30 AUG 63/
MASSACHUSETTS
B. CIV/ APPLEWHITE, SCOTT M/AP/011236699/21 JUL 93/WASHINGTON DC/
29 AUG 51/Texas
C. CIV/JEONG, MARTIN W./M/UPI/051284995/28 JUL 96/SAN FRANCISCO/
12 DEC 96/CALIFORNIA
D. CIV/ADAMS, JIM/M/REUTERS/011186131/10 JUL 93/WASHINGTON DC/
28 AUG 93/CALIFORNIA
E. CIV/ROCHELLE, CARL/M/CNN/012234451/26 MAR 95/WASHINGTON DC/
15 AUG 95/NORTH CAROLINA
F. CIV/GREEN, MIKE/M/CNN/013695005/30 JUN 98/WASHINGTON DC/
1 DEC 98/NORTH CAROLINA
G. CIV/TORPEY, BOB/M/CNN/013897567/2 FEB 99/WASHINGTON DC/
1 SEP 99/UNITED KINGDOM
H. CIV/TURNER, CHRIS/M/CNN/012625864/14 JAN 96/WASHINGTON DC/
14 APR 96/OKLAHOMA
I. CIV/O'CONNOR, FRANK/M/CNN/UK PASSPORT A50296F/17 FEB 97/
LONDON/17 JUN 97/HARARE
J. CIV/LEVIN, AL/M/CNN/013587258/20 MAR 98/WASHINGTON DC/
23 JAN 94/MARYLAND
H. CIV/MOTE, TOM/M/CNN/011542859/27 MAR 94/WASHINGTON DC/
12 JUL 94/DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
I. CIV/YDSTIE, JOHN/M/NPR/013551609/7 FEB 98/WASHINGTON DC/
30 APR 51/MINNESOTA
J. CIV/PETERZELL, JAY/M/TIME/013569528/24 FEB 98/WASHINGTON DC/
31 OCT 52/NEW JERSEY
K. CIV/BRACH, DENNIS/M/TIME/013760875/9 FEB 99/WASHINGTON DC/
14 NOV 39/KANSAS
L. CIV/ROSS, MIKE/M/LA TIMES/Z3021659/7 FEB 94/AMEMBASSY BEIJING/
14 APR 49/NEW YORK
M. CIV/COPELAND, PETER/M/SCRIPPS HOWARD/D970416/WASHINGTON DC/
19 SEP 57/ILLINOIS
N. CIV/AUKOFER, FRANK/M/MILWAUKEE JOURNAL/D11182160/23 MAY 93/
WASHINGTON DC/6 APR 35/WISCONSIN
O. LTC/USA/ICENOGLE, LARRY/M/OASD:PA/SSN ****/DOB 2 FEB 49/
POB ILLINOIS
P. LCDR/USN/BARRON, DAVID/M/JCS/SSN ****/DOB 3 JAN 52/
POB TEXAS
Q. LCDR/USN/HARTUNG, GREGORY/M/OASD:PA/SSN ****/DOB 19 JUN
55/POB TEXAS
4. MR. HABIB A. SHAHEEN, COUNSELOR, EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
WILL ACCOMPANY THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DURING THE DEPLOYMENT
TO SAUDI ARABIA.

5. [U] ADDITIONAL GROUND RULE. IN ADDITION TO THE GROUND RULES STATED IN REF A, ADD THE FOLLOWING TO THE LIST OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED NOT RELEASEABLE: NAMES OF ANY SAUDI ARABIAN CITIZENS (MIL OR CIV) THAT ARE INTERVIEWED/FILMED/OR PHOTOGRAPHED.

6. [U] OASD{PA} POINT OF CONTACT IS LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN (202) 693-1074.

DECL OADR
DoD Press Pool Meeting  
Fort McNair, Wash. D.C.  
Friday, January 19, 1990

Mr. Williams: I appreciate you all coming here on a day when there is a story of some substance going on out in town. (Laughter) I guess that's not the greatest choice of words. This shows you some of the skills I have and how I got my job!

We had originally planned to go as long as you wanted, but I think what we'll do is even though I know there are some people who are still on their way and ordinarily, I suppose we would wait for them, but this is just an indication of the sort of problems you have with a pool. When do we start? But I think we'll try to get it wrapped up here and give you a chance to say, so that some of you who may have to cut away for other events can go without missing the substance of this.

The purpose of this meeting here today is to gather your impressions of what went wrong, your impressions of how the pool worked, what you think was good about it, what you think was bad about it, so that we can fix the problem. I very much appreciate your willingness to make contributions today because indeed, the success of this meeting will depend very much on your willingness to make contributions.

Someone who isn't here today but who is working very hard on this question right now is Fred Hoffman. Many of you know Fred. Fred is a 35 year veteran of the Associated Press, covered the Pentagon since before there was a Pentagon for AP, covered Vietnam, and later under Secretary Weinberger, became a principle Deputy of Public Affairs of the Pentagon for a short time. Any of you who know Fred know that Fred is a very independent person. Fred owes no allegiance to anybody. He has strong feelings about the pool. And we have asked him, although he retired in December, we asked him to come back and make a very thorough, independent review of the pool. He's doing that now. He's in Panama today. He talked to Max Thurman when General Thurman was in town earlier this week. He's down talking to military commanders, field commanders today. He will be making his way up, probably going to Fort Bragg and trying to talk to General Stiner, talk to all of the people who were involved. I realize he's spoken to many of you who were in the pool so far, and he will try to do that before he's finished. He will not try, he will in fact talk to every reporter who was on the pool. But it is not possible for him to talk to all of you who are Bureau Chiefs and who are reporters involved and who care about the pool.

So one of the things that we are doing today is making a transcript of these proceedings, and Fred will get a copy of that as indeed will all of you, and that will help him a great deal. So any comments you make here today will not simply vanish into the ether. They are being recorded. That will be part of the record on the pool.

I realize that to some extent you will want to know what went wrong and why. There will be a natural tendency to sort of want to fix blame, and we will work with you as much as you like on that question, but I think the real goal for us now is to try to find solutions. After all, if this pool is to work, it's to work for you. It's your pool as much as it is the DoD pool. If you don't find it satisfactory, then it has a problem.

So the question is what do you want? How do you want to fix the pool? What are your ideas on how you think it could be made to work better? Or indeed some of you might say at all. There are different viewpoints on this issue, I've discovered.

MORE
But we will be making our own suggestions, obviously. The National Defense
University has an instructor, for example, at this meeting today, who is interested in
learning about the media pool. At the conclusion of this meeting we're going to meet
with another instructor who wants to revise his training plan to enable him to make his
students more aware of these issues. Indeed, his students are future military commanders.
The Joint Operational Planning System which instructs commanders to incorporate media
coverage plans into their combat operations will obviously be something we'll be spending
some time with. The discussion of the pool has indicated that those plans may not be
sufficient. They may have to be reevaluated to ensure that they adequately cover the
mechanics of getting the pool into action and getting pool members back so that they
can file.

Anyway, those are my preliminary comments. There's no question but that the pool
didn't work right in Panama. We got it there, and then from there on it was less than
a thrilling success. We are interested in your comments.

Let me prevail upon you to do this. As shy as you all are, we are making a
transcript, and indeed I would say that the transcript of the proceedings is important.
There are microphones throughout the hall. Those of you in the front row will find
microphones behind you. There's a little black button that you need to press and hold
down while you speak.

I have no great structure in mind for this meeting, but we'll be happy to impose
one if that will help the proceedings. This meeting grows out of, as I said, two
forces, I suppose you could say. One is our own desire to hear from you and see what
you think—not only the people who were on the pool, and there are many reporters here
today who were part of that pool, but also those of you who use the pool, who receive
the pool. You are as much a part of the operation as those who went down there and put
things into that end. So those of you who receive the pool products on the other end
are important to hear from as well. So it's important to get both those sides. But as
I say, part of it is our own desire to hear from you and part of it is the regular
quarterly Bureau Chiefs meeting we had in January with the new rotation, the new
organizations that come in. Several of them at that time suggested we have such a
meeting. So for those two reasons, that's why we're here.

Those are my initial comments, and I'm happy to respond to questions. I'm happy
to hear from you. Perhaps to get things going, I see Fred Francis from NBC News, Steve
Kamarow from AP who were reporters on the pool, perhaps you would be willing to share
some of your observations about how it went. Fred, you're so shy and humble. Why
don't you go first?

Mr. Francis: I think since I wrote that paper, which some of you have seen, I
have since learned, Pete, that the planning for the pool, while you may have been told
on Monday, over the weekend prior to the invasion, during the planning in the Joint
Chiefs, it may have been Friday, it may have been Saturday, and Fred Hoffman can track
this down. What I'm saying I think goes right to the crux of whether the military
wants the media in place. The public affairs man in the Joint Chiefs, Erv Sharp, went
to General Kelley and said, "General Kelley, a lot of activity. Do I need to stick
around, because I'm going on vacation on Monday to visit my parents." General Kelley
said you don't need to stick around.

Mr. Williams: That was what day?
The third problem were briefings. It was very hard to get end of the day information, to get details on things that had taken place where we were not, such as the Marriott incident.

Fourth, I won't bore everyone with the details, but the mechanics of filing have got to be addressed at some point. They were a nightmare.

The issue of security kept coming up, and I went with the assumption that I assumed considerable risk by participating in the pool, and it came as a surprise to me that the word security kept coming up as it wasn't safe for us to do things.

Mr. Williams: Your personal security you mean, not operations?

Ms. Lewis: I'm sorry, my personal security, yes. That it wasn't safe to take us here or safe to take us there. While I know some concern has to be given to that subject, I just assumed I took a risk when I signed up for pool duty.

In terms of constructive things, I think it would have been very helpful to the pool if we had had, perhaps, an editor in Washington representing the pool. It's very hard to keep the hours we were keeping, trying to cover things, and file, and do battle with the bureaucracy. It to me, would have been very helpful if perhaps at some point you would consider assigning an editor to represent the pool at the Pentagon in Washington.

Mr. Williams: I'm not sure I understand what that person would do.

Ms. Lewis: For example, filing the first day was a nightmare. We had terrible problems, the newspaper people, in terms of how to file. The fax machine system was not working at all properly. It was very hard for me to fight that system out of Panama. Had someone been here to represent us, maybe they could have cut through or made the case a little more effectively of the deadlines we were facing. Also, I think maybe someone representing the pool here could have made the case pretty strongly to you that things were not going right on the first day, and maybe more corrective measures could have been enacted on the second day, if someone were representing the interests of the pool from here.

Voice: Can you identify yourself?

Ms. Lewis: Kathy Lewis of the Houston Post. I was a member of the newspaper pool.

I share Steve's belief that if what it takes is breaking into smaller groups, we ought to do it. By the end of the week we were doing it fairly effectively, and I am all for that.

I also think it's important that pool members attend a briefing meeting at the beginning of the quarter when you go on duty. Not just Bureau Chiefs, but the pool member being assigned.

I think those are my basic points. I don't want to go over. I agree with much of what my colleagues have written and said on this already.

Mr. Williams: I will come back to your questions in a second, but there are some other comments out there.
problem is that the press has not earned the trust of the military, and that is essential if we are to literally drop in on a combat commander and ask for his or her cooperation.

In the pools in which I have participated, and I think this may have been the case in Panama, pool members have been unfamiliar with the military and uncertain how to behave in combat, and thus unwilling or unable to take the necessary risks.

What he suggests, in brief, is that all the reporters selected for the pool be required to undergo a brief military-type training, perhaps a day of classroom work and a day of field work, perhaps at a place like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The benefits of this, he says, would one, enable the pool to demand quicker and more immediate access to combat action as it is happening rather than being held back by the commanders until the fighting is over and there's not much to report. Also it would give the combat commanders confidence that the pool is seasoned and professional and can be placed in risky situations, and it would give the pool reporters a new understanding and sympathy for the troops who bear the burden of combat. I will give you the rest of the memo, but that's the sense of it.

Mr. Nelson: Jack Nelson of the LA Times. I wanted to support what Frank Star said. We had a reporter, of course, who tried to get in for several days too, and couldn't give in, and we were given the same reason. But it also seems to me that the problem goes far beyond just the pools. I only know, of course, what I've read about what happened down there, but for one thing, as I understand it, we were barred from even interviewing injured soldiers for four days. There were other restrictions put out. It seems to me that a lot of the reason for lack of cooperation on the part of the military came from the top officers who told lower commanders to tell their troops not to cooperate with the press.

Mr. Williams: For those who are here from the pool, this is the first I've heard of barring from interviewing injured soldiers. Is that correct?

Voices: Yes, or photographing. They wouldn't even let us photograph an injured helicopter.

Mr. Mendelsohn: I'm Mat Mendelsohn from UPI. For the record, we were not allowed to see crippled aircraft which were sitting maybe 150 yards, 200 yards away from us. We were not able to talk to civilian wounded, military wounded. We were not allowed to visit with POW's. This is on the first day. Although we inadvertently stumbled upon a makeshift detainment camp and there was a little mutiny there and we forced our way into the camp. But at that point there was no plan for us to see POW's, wounded, dead, crippled aircraft. These were definite no's. No, you cannot do this. It wasn't we did not ask, it was a definite no. I asked Colonel Sconyers several times about the aircraft, we were at Howard Air Force Base. The aircraft were sitting within eyesight and they were working to repair aircraft. We were not even allowed to see crippled aircraft.

Mr. Williams: What kind of aircraft were they?

Mr. Mendelsohn: They were helicopters. I'm told they were Apaches, I believe. We didn't see them. So it's not a question, it was clearly we were not allowed to see this.

Mr. Raines: I'm Howell Raines, New York Times. Pete, to return to your opening point, I think it's worth noting that I was among those who thought the Department
Mr. Rubenstein: Larry Rubenstein from Reuters.

Two things I want to raise. The first one is I'm hearing two sets of complaints here, and I want to make sure that in Fred's report, and if not in your mind, we separate these things. I think it's integral to separate them. One are the problems we had with the pool, with the call-out, with the implementation of the pool in the first 12-18 hours, and getting them into action, and getting that material back. That is one problem that I think we all agree on needs to be addressed.

The second problem that I think needs to be separated from the DoD pool is the problem of unilateral coverage of an invasion, or for that matter anything else that goes on, and how the Pentagon and the Southern Command or whatever command is involved, responds to that. I think those are separate issues.

Mr. Williams: Tell me what you mean by unilateral coverage.

Mr. Rubenstein: That means the 500 reporters that wanted to drop in on D+24 hours. What do you do with them? Do you let them in or not? The press in the Marriott demanding protection. The whole gamut. Our pool representative has told me the horror stories that I'm sure all the pool members suffered trying to get access to the four telephones in the press center. They had a shot at it initially, and then all of a sudden a tremendous amount of unilateral press descended on the same facilities and they had to invoke all kinds of higher military authority just to get near a phone on the ground. So I think that is a separate issue. I think the Pentagon's response to that, and more importantly, the individual command's response to that, is something that definitely needs to be looked at and how you deal with that.

In Grenada there were no unilateral people on the ground, and people didn't try to fly into that airport within five hours of the invasion because it was still full of potholes and military craters, so the Sibley Commission I'm not sure really explored that issue.

The second point along those lines is, as we discussed in the Bureau Chief's meeting, the third triad of the pool, the Pentagon, the pool members, and the individual commands and their representatives, I'm not sure have been represented well to this point in pool discussions and in pool meetings. I think as we have seen in all the pool exercises and in the actual deployments we've experienced on the tanker export and stuff like that, that invariably the problems that occur, occur with the commands, with the local on-scene colonel, whoever is in charge of the press and who's actually given the responsibility, as Colonel Sconyers was in Panama, of a lot of authority and what the pool did.

Mr. Conan: Neil Conan from NPR. I would just like to point out that perhaps Fred Hoffman would like to go back in history a little bit, other than details, as one who survived a fabulous tour in the Persian Gulf, other than details and differences between the Army restricting your access and the Navy restricting your access, the same problems occurred on the Persian Gulf pool. We were kept out of the action, filing was a nightmare. Everything was very similar. The same kinds of problems that we had in the Persian Gulf are the same kinds of problems that people are reporting from Panama, to some degree even worse in the Persian Gulf. Why were those lessons not learned? Why were there no meetings like this after that?

Mr. Williams: That's interesting, Neil. Yesterday Larry Rubenstein on the radio from ABC Radio, said that he thought the problems were just the opposite. That in the
My question is this. Was there a public affairs annex to the plan of operation for the assault in Panama?

Mr. Williams: My understanding is that there was. Bob Taylor's been looking into that question. Do you know the answer?

Mr. Taylor: The annex that I saw was there and it suggested that the DoD media pool would be used, but it fell short of discussing exactly how it would be employed.

Mr. Williams: The annex was...

Voice: That's your problem right there.

Mr. Hoyt: Clark Hoyt from Knight Ridder. Into this rich stew you're developing here I'd like to throw in one other issue which is the sharing of pool material after it was gathered in Panama.

As you know, we operate with the Chicago Tribune a photo service that was denied pool photos throughout that operation. You and I talked about it at the time. We have since applied to have that photo service be part of the rotation. But it's always been my understanding from the beginning of pools, that all material, that pool members were surrogates for everyone, and that all pool material gathered was to be shared with everyone. Is there something I don't know here that says that principle does not apply to photographs?

Mr. Williams: No, all material is for pool members. I guess that's the distinction that I would make.

Mr. Hoyt: These two news organizations are and were pool members.

Mr. Williams: I don't want to debate with you here, Clark, because I think you raise an interesting point and one we will look into. In explaining why it worked the way it did, clearly member newspapers, KRTN's member newspapers were receiving pool material from the wires, from AP, from UPI, from Reuters, but as to specific photographs exclusively or given, provided for KRTN, for you, and in turn to pass along to your clients, KRTN is not a pool member, and that's the distinction. Obviously individual newspapers are and they received their pool materials. But you raise a good question and we will look at it.

Mr. Clayton: I'm Bill Clayton of the Houston Chronicle. I'd like to elaborate on the access question. I'm not clear whether we should be demanding to be on the front lines in the cross-fire. I personally don't relish that idea. But there's middle ground for access that would be better than what we had. One example is on Quarry Heights, there's a place at which the hot firing could be observed if we had been there early enough to see it, that would satisfy the questions of personal security.

A lot of the access ground could be covered by earlier briefings by somebody knowledgeable. Our first briefing, the whole time we were there, our first briefing was by a diplomat who was not briefed on military matters and wanted to discuss the history of the Panama Canal.

The other thing about transmission, aside from the equipment malfunction at the sending point which took hours to correct, there was a delay that I don't understand, maybe some people here in Washington know, between the time the copy was transmitted successfully and the time it was received by outlets for newspapers.
In many cases, we had filed and only hours later did we know there was this problem. There was no relaying from the Pentagon back to SOUTHCOM so that we would know this was a problem.

I think there's another point to be addressed. The rules, I believe, are sort of stringent, sort of restrictive from the standpoint of newspapers. We have to submit our files to a commander on the scene to be read. As it was, in many cases we were getting back sort of late. We had to get the copy and then send it through a fax, sometimes two or three times, before it got there. I think early on when we realized this was a continuing problem, Kathy had asked one of our escorts can we just call the wires and let them distribute it, or call our news organizations and let them distribute it through the wires, or some way to get around that and make it more expedient for news organizations, and we ran into bureaucratic red tape. Our escort then had to call the Pentagon. He said well, he's waiting to get clearance for that. That is the kind of thing in a timely situation, we need to be able to make these kind of amendments right on the spot. It's just a flexibility question.

Mr. Bagnato: I'm Barry Bagnato from CBS. I want to look at some of these same problems in a non-combat situation. Last spring we were involved in an operation where the first additional troops were flown into Panama. It was a 24 trip, two stops: North Carolina and one in Panama. We discovered in both places that unilateral coverage had already been permitted. There were other reporters on the ground there, which made us unnecessary. In Panama we were given an hour and a half to talk to whomever we could find, and then to deal with the logistics which were three telephones in an office, and to file.

What this underlines is the same problem in both the combat and the non-combat situations we've been finding, that somewhere deep in that mindset is a concern that the wrong story is going to get out, that the press should somehow be an arm for the Pentagon in some ways. I know that mindset must exist. And the point has to be made to commanders in these situations that it doesn't do any good to put the media in a situation where they're not going to be able to do their job, to do our job, because that is only in the end going to make the Pentagon look bad, as it has especially in the case of the last couple of weeks.

Mr. Sloyan: Pat Sloyan with News day. This is a big brother question. You're sitting on what I'm told is dynamite footage of the largest airborne assault since World War II, combat footage. Infrared, electronically enhanced, of the jump itself. I'm also told pretty good stuff at the Comandancia. Some of that was released. You're also sitting on when Noriega comes out of the Vatican Embassy and outlines his deal to Thurman, footage of his surrender at the Vatican. Why are you holding this stuff back?

Mr. Williams: I've not heard of some of this, Pat. The only videotape that I know of that I've seen myself is the videotape of Noriega getting on the C-141 at Howard. I'll look into this other stuff.

Mr. Sloyan: Have you not seen the jump?

Mr. Williams: No.

Mr. Sloyan: Do you know it exists?

Mr. Williams: This is the first I've heard of it, Pat.

Mr. Sloyan: There may even be stuff of Río Hato.
were brought in, and they were eager to go and do whatever they could do, made it very difficult for us. The next day there were the people that were kept from 5:00 in the morning until midnight at the airport and then brought to SOUTHCOM. These people were fighting, screaming mad. I was in the middle of transmitting pictures, and one of them came in and told me they were going to take my phone.

We can't lend ground support. If you're going to give the ground support to all these people that are coming in, 250 people or whatever, it needs to be done somewhere else other than where the pool people are. The pool people need to have their facilities, and if the military wants to lend ground support, which for the first three days, some ground support was necessary because there was nothing downtown. Everything was looted, a lot of the stuff was closed, there was no food, the people that had been at the airport had not eaten, had not slept, had not showered. There were a lot of specific problems, but it should not have all come to SOUTHCOM. It was a very big problem for the pool people that were there, and it did hamper what we were trying to do as far as I'm concerned.

Mr. Glass: Andy Glass, Cox Newspapers. One quick anecdote and then a philosophical observation, if I may. Our regional correspondent was in Bogota at the time of the invasion. We chartered an airplane to fly to Panama. While we were over the area, the military air controller said if you don't get out of here in five minutes, we'll shoot you down. So we got out of there. It was quite awhile before our correspondent got in.

But it seems to me that what we're really dealing with is that World War II was the last good war in the sense that the press and the military were on the same side and cooperated. Many of the senior commanders who are now in charge were the same people who were junior commanders in Vietnam, and for better or worse, regard the press as an enemy, and feel that one reason the United States failed in Vietnam was that the press was on the other side.

So until these attitudes change, until there is a philosophical feeling that we are one country and that the people deserve to know what is going on, Pete, many of these things are just going to be bandaid solutions and are not really going to be addressed.

Mr. Bascomb: John Bascomb, ABC Radio. I had the good fortune of being not only on the Persian Gulf pool, the original DoD pool, not the theater pool, but the Panama pool as well. I wanted to point out a couple of similarities and differences.

We were told in Panama frequently when we asked to go close to the action, that it was not safe. However, I felt we were in much greater risk in the Persian Gulf. We were on a body of water filled with mines. In the Persian Gulf they supplied us with flak jackets and helmets which were never even offered to us in Panama. We know the risk and we're willing to take that risk if we're part of the pool. So keeping us away because it's not safe for us, I don't think is a good argument.

In terms of access, in the Persian Gulf we were on the ship with the captain. We had access 24 hours a day in his quarters, on the bridge, immense briefings. We just couldn't file. In Panama, we had no access, of course. And I think something that should be included in future public affairs annexes would be a rigid minimum of two briefings a day from perhaps the G3. I couldn't understand why we were not housed closer to or even in the operations center where we could listen to the briefings that General Thurman must have been getting throughout the day.

MORE
accounts for why it took so long. It just was a complicated call out. It was hard to get everybody rounded up.

There have been some who suggested that rather than continuing to try to fill the slots in the pool, as soon as you get a certain critical mass the pool should leave and you shouldn't wait for people. So if you can't find the radio correspondent or you can't find the news magazine representative or whatever, you start a stop watch and then when that time elapses you say okay, the plane's gone. That suggestion has arisen since the Panama operation. I see several of you nodding yes. Be sure you note all the people who nodded yes so that when they don't go on the pool they will remember that they consented to that. (Laughter) But that's the sort of thing you're up against in terms of the lateness of the arrival.

I guess the primary point, and the one that keeps coming up over and over again is this idea of cultural acceptance, or the idea that somehow the people who are running the military now were the ones who felt abused in Vietnam. I've heard this point made over and over and over again. It was made after the Sidle Commission and it was made in Grenada, and it's been made repeatedly. I will wait for Fred's report. Fred is obviously aware of that criticism. He will look at it. I'm confident that Fred will give us an honest assessment of that.

Having talked to General Kelley, and I think it was important for you to note, Fred, in your initial discussion of the fact that he said it was okay for Erv Sharp to go home, I would just remind everybody that no decision was made to undertake this operation until Sunday. Whether Tom Kelley should have guessed that things might get dicey, that it would be a good idea for Irv Sharp to stay or not, I suppose is a different question. I just don't want anyone to think, nor did I think you meant to imply, that Tom Kelley knew all along there was going to be an operation and he intentionally got Irv Sharp out of the way. I suspect that was not your point, and I think it's important to emphasize that.

I've talked to Thurman, I've talked to Ron Sconyers. I don't have the advantage of what Fred will have and what several of you had of talking to the lieutenant colonels and colonels who made the operation work on the ground. I have found no evidence of the cultural acceptance problem. My own view is that it was a matter of insufficient planning. Now you may well say if the cultural acceptance problem went away, the planning problem would go away as well. That may well be. I intend to look into that.

I guess my point is this. I don't know how to make the military culturally accept reporters. I don't know a way to do that. I do know a way to try to fix the planning process if it turns out that the planning process is the problem. I guess I'm going to concentrate on things where I think the situation can be fixed. But the other point that I would make, is obviously the cultural acceptance thing is a long term question. There are people here from the National Defense University today that are eager to address this. This is something we work on all the time. It's a continuing matter of getting reporters and military people together, and indeed there was a recommendation of the Sidle Commission, as many of you may recall, which Admiral Baker reminded me of the other day, which is we should have more meetings between editors and military people. I think all that is true and all that is good, but at the same time, if it's fundamentally a planning problem, then that's something we fundamentally need to address.

Mr. Francis: First of all, this notion that we have to do something to have the military trust us, is ludicrous. The second notion I think that is ludicrous is that we have to jump out of airplanes or go to the National Training Center and become combat ready. That's ludicrous. It's the planning process.
suspect that boils down to the issue of getting people on planes, on military aircraft, and into the scene of combat. Since you did not mention that in your recap of things that you were going to look at, I just wanted to reiterate that as an issue that's of concern to many of us here.

Mr. Williams: I understand. While it's not technically a pool matter, it is one that we spend a considerable amount of time on. Somebody was, I can't remember who was making the point about World War II was the last time that there were warm and fuzzy feelings between the military and the press. There was also full field censorship. Korea was the last conflict where there was full field censorship. I can't envision a time in which there would be full field censorship again.

The unilateral coverage problem is a very real one. We had, at some point while the Panama operation was still going strong, 600 reporters all trying to jam into Quarry Heights Officers Club. I guess the difference is, between World War II and where it becomes a different matter not only in terms of quantity but quantitatively as well, communications are faster and more complicated. More people are needed to support the news product now than used to be. Although fundamentally I would agree that the principal part, and this is off the pool topic for just a moment, the principal point of the pool, again, is to get reporters, eye witnesses, if you will, to military actions and at some point you get right back down to pencils and notebooks again, and that's what we need to remind ourselves of. But when you get to the unilateral coverage issue, it's a lot of people with a lot of support stuff, and John made this point yesterday when we were on WAMU. In a sense, we had fairly good facilities in Panama, but if we undertake a military operation, and I had better for the sake of diplomatic nicety not mention a specific country, but if we go to Taylorland which is about as lush and comfortable as there is hair on top of Bob's head, we're out literally in the middle of nowhere. Then we're really going to be up against it when suddenly we have an enormous number of people wanting to come in to some makeshift airstrip and that kind of thing. I don't know the answer to that question, but it's certainly something we have to look into.

But to some extent, while the purpose of the pool and the purpose of the unilateral coverage are the same, to allow more and better coverage of military operations, as some have already suggested in terms of demand for telephones and facilities, unilateral coverage is a competing interest, to some extent, with the pool. I suppose your response might be well if the pool had worked better we wouldn't have wanted so much unilateral coverage. That may be true early on, but there are a lot more reporters out there than there were in World War II.

Voice: It seems to me that the purpose of the pool originally, as originally conceived, was a temporary arrangement to last until the unilateral could get there. The purpose was to protect the security of the operation.

Mr. Williams: That's part of it.

Voice: Two days after the invasion had occurred, when the whole world knew that the United States had military operations going on in Panama, there is no excuse for not allowing unilateral coverage.

Mr. Williams: There were at least two charter planes that I know of that came in Thursday. There was an L-1011 that came in Friday with over 250 people on it. There were reporters already in Panama before the operation started. So this is not like Grenada in that sense. It's not like we went to a remote place where there weren't any reporters to start with.
what can we do, and gone to somebody with enough clout here in Washington in addition, you know, I understand the value of a high ranking escort, that's probably very valuable too, but to get back to the command and control center, if the command and control is here in Washington we need better input here in Washington from the moment the pool leaves me.

For instance, I heard on NBC that the pool had been deployed at like 1:06 a.m. on Tuesday. I called our contact at the Pentagon and said are we in second stage notification on pool movement? First her response was what's second stage notification? The second one was she didn't think so and she'd get back to me. An hour and a half later she called back and said yes, we're in second stage notification. I said thank you, the world knew about this three hours ago. So I think we need to enforce that.

The second one about unilateral coverage, I debriefed extensively our photographer who was shot and wounded down there who was with the photographer who was killed by the American troops down there accidentally. One point he made was the fact that the troops on the ground really had no conception of media, and they weren't even, for instance the wounding took place, a group of American tanks and personnel carriers came down the street in front of the Marriott, and there was a group of news people standing together in front of the Marriott, visibly, with cameras and the whole thing, and all of a sudden the second tank in the thing opened fire, supposedly at a sniper, and just was sweeping the entire area with bullets and nailed everybody that was standing in this little crowd. Right afterwards the American medics came up to them and interrogated them as to who they were, and then gave them medical assistance, which he thought was kind of ridiculous. It wouldn't have saved the other guy, he was dead instantly, but in his case it prolonged the thing. Then they medivac'd them to the hospital.

So if you're talking unilateral coverage, that's a risk of unilateral coverage you automatically assume by being there, but I just don't know where you can draw the level with the military about acceptance of that.

Mr. Williams: The purpose of the pool, of course, was number one, to be a way of getting reporters with early arriving troops and maintaining operational security. Several of you are right, it was not envisioned that the pool would last forever. The complications that we had in Panama, and this is not an excuse but it is an observation, were fundamentally that the first troops jumped out of airplanes, and that would not work.

We could have put a pool together from people who were already in Panama, and perhaps in retrospect that's what we should have done. But our feeling was that the people here in the national media pool were best qualified and knew the ground rules and all of that. In fact as some of you know, the Persian Gulf pool was a locally assembled pool.

Voice: Not so.

Mr. Williams: The first one was.

Voice: The first one was a DoD pool, and then they went locally.

Mr. Williams: Okay. But the only other point I'd make is this. I don't have any doubt that we need to do a better job of planning these pools. I don't think anyone can have any doubt about that. On the other hand, I think I have wondered whether if it weren't that Howard Air Force Base were on the other side of the Panama Canal, we probably wouldn't be sitting here today. So we have to bear in mind, this is no excuse, MORE
Mr. Williams: I can understand that, and frankly I'm astonished that I haven't heard more of that today. You're all being very charitable. But I do want to reassure you that we were working on the unilateral coverage problem as well, and some of it wasn't entirely of our making. Some of the Costa Rican authorities wouldn't let planes take off even after we had cleared them. But still, your point remains a sound one.

Mr. Headline: Bill Headline from CNN. To punctuate that point, remembering back to the Sidele hearings, we made the point over and over and over again that pools are basically repugnant and we want unilateral coverage, we want unilateral coverage as quickly as we can make it. As superb a job as Fred Francis did for television, NBC would rather have had Fred covering for NBC and we all would rather have had our own people covering as quickly as possible. That won't change. So I think the point there is that while we need to continue perfecting the pool, and we certainly appreciate your willingness to proceed down that path, at the same time you do have to take a careful look at the next stage in handling unilateral requirements as quickly as you can.

Mr. Williams: That is something that I think is less well thought out on both sides. In a sense, if this operation had been in some bizarre, small, remote, uncivilized in the sense of having landing strips and that kind of thing, country, I think our problems would have been much worse because the problem is this. You say to news organizations or they come to you and say we want to send in more people. We need more people in. I say okay, but remember that I've got no place to put you, I've got no place to house you, I can't feed you, there's no water, there's no phones, I don't know what the hell to do with you once you get there, and people say yes, fine, we'll figure that out. That's our job. You just get us in there.

Once they get there, of course, people start saying could I get a jeep, how about this, and that's just the natural part of things. So I guess what I'm saying is I'm willing to do that, but we all have to understand it's not going to be real smooth.

Mr. Francis: Unilateral means you're on your own.

Mr. Williams: Fred's point is unilateral means you're on your own and of course that's true, but it also means I can't absolve myself, I mean you say you're on your own, but another organization will say say, my guy just got captured, would you please go get him.

Mr. Francis: The point is that until Friday afternoon, Panama was not safe. If you had let the Howard 200 or 300 loose on the streets of Panama you'd have had 20 or 30 hostages. That's the simple fact. I don't know if your people told you that, but it wasn't safe to work. You go to ugly-land somewhere, and it's basically the same problem. We've got to fix the pool to make the pool work in that first 12, 24, 36, 48 hours. Unilateral means you're on your own and NBC will take care of themselves, and the New York Times and the other papers will take care of themselves on a unilateral basis. I think the concept is that it's a competing interest. NBC was still trying to get people in while the pool was working, and that's the way it's going to be in any situation.

Mr. Russett: Tim Russett, NBC. I was the lucky guy who was the network pool chairman for this great event. I think one thing for the Hoffman report, Pete, and to your point about notification, in the very early stages, after the initial notification which we were able to execute pretty well, there really was a major delay in the second phase allowing me to tell the other networks that in fact the Pentagon pool had MORE
Voice: I don't want to overrule my own correspondent here.

Voice: I know you're going to fight for three, and that's fine.

Voice: We wouldn't send a one man crew in a riot on the streets of the United States. I think for safety's sake a guy with a camera needs someone to hold on to his belt.

Voice: We can work that out later. The point is, that your small crew with a still photographer, with a wire reporter, with a radio reporter, and your second echelon, the point is the second echelon handles the filing. The second echelon handles the filing. Everybody wants immediate stuff within an hour, that's just not going to work. You're covering combat.

Mr. Williams: I guess I still would like a little more discussion, and I apologize to the radio reporters. I spent ten years as one, I don't know why I forgot radio. It's a problem we constantly fight. But who is the six person pool?

Voice: In the Persian Gulf the standing pool was a three person TV crew, a wire still photographer, they varied. The people who were on the pool when I went there were both wire service photographers. There was one writer who happened to be either from AP or UPI, they just rotated it; and the radio guy.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time Magazine. Excuse me, I think in the Persian Gulf there was a wire still photographer and a magazine still photographer and they went to different places.

Mr. Williams: Larry says that was only on the initial deployment.

Voice: (John) I just want to second what Fred Francis had to say. I think it can be done with a five person pool, and to allay any concerns about how you get these photos back, the videotape or the audio tape or the written reports, the second echelon goes in. I think the plane we took out of Andrews at 11:20 at night should have carried the second echelon. If we had been notified during the day and flown to Fort Bragg and left with the troops, we would have been on the ground for four or five hours before the uplink arrives, and we would have been able to file by 6:00 a.m. the day of the invasion.

Mr. Williams: On what day? You wouldn't have gotten there until 1:00 in the afternoon.

Voice: No, if we had gone in with the troops. Or if we had gone in during the day. There were planes landing at Howard all during the day on Tuesday before the invasion began. If we could have gone in pre-positioned 12 hours, we would have filed on the invasion as it occurred, and then the support gear could come in on the same plane we left Andrews on, and the first reports could have been out of there in time for the morning shows, the morning drive.

Mr. Williams: There's a radio guy!

Voice: I was just going to emphasize the importance of that quick second echelon to file, even on the standing Persian Gulf pool when we were out in the ship, they would helicopter tape back to the island we weren't ever on. They'd just bounce it around one of the news bureaus until they figured out somebody knew how to feed a radio.
they have nothing to report and they can't get the news out. You can do that initially as long, and the point has been stressed here, as you have that second group coming in. There are still pool people who will take care of the filing, who will also take care of more extended reporting after that. But you've got to get the immediate reports out, and from a place where they will be credible and where they're needed. That's what a smaller pool can do.

Mr. Rosenberg: Jeff Rosenberg, NPR. After the Persian Gulf operation we discussed with the DoD people the filing problems, and they told us that there was a plan afoot to put in MARSAT telephone equipment on at least a significant number of fleet ships, which would certainly take care of all voice. I don't know if you're familiar with the MARSAT system. It's a global telephone system that's absolutely public, and you can access it from almost any spot on the globe. It produces acceptable voice data, faxes, it takes care of all that problem. You may not know, we had terrible trouble getting voice back from the Persian Gulf, the initial stages. Can you report any progress on that?

Mr. Williams: I don't know the answer. Alex or Bob, do you know the answer? I'm sorry that I don't. We'll have to make sure that our next operation is on board ship, obviously.

Mr. Massey: Toby Massey with AP. I'm afraid I have to agree with Mr. Francis totally. I think when you have a small working group, and that's what a pool should really mean, that it's a workable group, that you get them in initially, and if you bring in the backup crew, and as far as who's in there, that's just housekeeping chores. We can decide who's going to be in it, whether there will be a second editor, a second photographer, three more writers, whatever it is. But I think the initial thing, and we made the point over and over again on the pool, is to get them to the scene, make them eye witnesses, and get them out into the field of action. It's easier to do with six or eight people than it is with thirty.

Ms. Johnson: Cynthia Johnson, Time. I just would like to say in terms of magazine still, or in addition to wire still, we have very different requirements for the magazines. We shoot chrome. We very rarely use wire pictures unless we can get a print. That's just the requirements of a magazine. So it's another factor to consider.

Mr. Williams: And I'm aware of the fact that you guys prefer color and other people what black and white, that kind of thing.

Ms. Johnson: It's not a difference between, the wires shoot color. It's that we use chrome. We print our magazine from chrome.

Mr. Williams: Other comments?

Let me thank you all very much. Let me assure you that we intend to follow up on all these ideas. We'll be meeting with our planners. We'll be giving a transcript of this to Fred, and we'll send a transcript to all of you as well. Thanks very much for coming.
SUBJECT: DoD Media Pool Travel Authorization and Orders No. 90-01

TO: Individuals Concerned

The Secretary of Defense authorizes and invites the individuals identified on the attached listing to travel aboard military conveyance, including air, sea and ground transportation, during the period 12-22 Aug 90 for the purpose of gathering information for publication or broadcast. This travel is primarily of official concern to the Department of Defense, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and meets the criteria of DoD Directive 5122.8 for use of military carriers for public affairs purposes.

Travel by military transportation is directed and no fare will be assessed. All other expenses incurred as a result of these orders will be borne by the individuals named. Access to flight deck during non-critical phases of flight is authorized at discretion of the aircraft commander. All safety regulations will be strictly observed. HQ MAC/DOXT has waived portions of AFR 60-16, MACR 55-130, and MACR 55-141 to permit named individuals aboard MAC aircraft during tactical missions.

News media representatives are granted mission essential ground personnel (MEGP) status in accordance with HQ MAC message 0223GOZ Dec 88.

This is a non-revenue mission.

These orders do not constitute authorization for access to classified information or to enter classified military areas. Aircraft commanders must be advised of the contents of these orders.

REQUESTED:

Peter Alexandrakos
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Director for Plans

APPROVED:

Robert W. Taylor
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Attachment:
As stated
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<td>AU&amp;OFFER, Frank</td>
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RIYADH AND DHAHARAN PASS TO USIS IMMEDIATELY

SUBJ: DOC MEDIA POOL TO SAUDI ARABIA

A. CTSCCENT 111815Z AUG 90

B. SECDEF 112203Z AUG 90 classified confidential

C. PHONE CON 10 AUG 90, MR. TAYLOR, DASPPA AND CAPT WILDERMUTH, CENTCOM PA

D. PHONE CON 11 AUG 90, MR. TAYLOR, DASPPA AND CAPT WILDERMUTH, CENTCOM PA

E. SEE A PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR DOC NATIONAL MEDIA POOL IN SAUDI
ARABIA, Doha: Provided here is the pool summary:

1. Colonel Pete Williams met today with the Saudi Arabian Press
   Attache to the United States, Maj. Jared Chamber, who requested
   that the itinerary for the trip start in Tabuk versus Riyadh.
   The substance of the visit is fine; however, the sequence needs to
   be changed. Please revise the itinerary to reflect this change and
   forward to JASD(PS). Also, include in the itinerary time for media
   to file before departing MacDill AFB.

2. Col. Peter D. Belcher, USA, requested assistance in obtaining a dedicated
   aircraft and chemical gear. USAF C-141, tail number 80-0215, has
   been dedicated to transport the pool to Saudi Arabia, but cannot be
   dedicated for the entire mission until the itinerary is revised.
   The chemical gear request was cancelled by Ref. D.

3. Maj. Colon Kircher, USA, has been dispatched from HQ
   Central Command to run the USCENTCOM JIC for the duration of the first media
   pool deployment. Capt. Mike Sheehan, USN, has been dispatched from
   the US Navy Los Angeles Office to assume duties as the chief of
   the JIC upon departure of the pool.

4. (U) JASSD(PS) Plans Office will operate 24 hours per day for
   the duration of the pool deployment. Phone numbers are COMM (202)
   697-1254, 697-1073/74/75 or AV 227-1254, 223-1073/74/75; TELEFAX
   COMM (202) 633-5033 or AV 223-5033.

NNNN

4CN=90224/40284 TOR=54354/00092 TAR=30235/03492 CDN=RAU276

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PAGE 02 OF 02
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UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJ: ANNEX F TO OPORD DESERT SHIELD PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A. USCINCENT 111300 AUG 90 SAR

1. REF A. FROM USCINCENT PROPOSED ANNEX F TO OPORD DESERT SHIELD PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND IS APPROVED WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

A. PARA 2(1) (A). CHANGE TO READ, "ASD( PA) WILL ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, IF ACTIVATED. ASD( PA) WILL COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) TO OBTAIN HOST GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND WILL ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR USCINCENT REGIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOLS ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). DETAILED INFORMATION, SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS AND ITINERARIES FOR EACH POOL DEPLOYMENT WILL BE FORWARDED BY USCINCENT TO CASD( PA) FOR APPROVAL."

B. PARA 2(1) (B). CHANGE TO READ, "RELEASE OF INFORMATION AUTHORITY WILL ULTIMATELY BE DELEGATED BY MESSAGE TO USCINCENT, USCINCENT FWD JIB(S), AND OTHER COMMANDS DESIGNATED BY ASD( PA) AND USCINCENT AS REQUIRED OR UPON ACTIVATION OF JIB(S)."

C. PARA 2(1) (C). CHANGE TO READ, "ASD( PA) WILL ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE ON A CONTINUING BASIS DURING THIS OPERATION."

D. PARA 4(1). LAST SENTENCE. DELETE WORDS, "AND INTERVIEWS."

E. PARA 7(1). CHANGE TO READ, "DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL AND USCINCENT REGIONAL MEDIA POOL MEMBERS WILL BE...."

F. APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F, PARA 1. SENTENCES 3.4 & 5. CHANGE TO READ, "NMHS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION AND ASKED NOT TO RELEASE IT. U.S. MILITARY ACCREDITATION IS ISSUED BASED ON NMHS OBSERVANCE OF THE ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES."

G. APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F, PARA 2(1)(A). SECOND SENTENCE. CHANGE TO READ, "ALL DATES MUST BE "IN THE PERSIAN GULF" OR "ABoard the USS (FILL IN NAME OF SHIP) IN THE PERSIAN GULF." THERE CAN BE NO MENTION OF COUNTRY OF EMBARK IN REPORTING."

2. CASD( PA) POC FOR PLANS IS LTC JERRY R. HARRE, USA, A/V 223-1073.

COMM (202) 693-1073; FOR MEDIA QUERIES, LCDR SATTERFIELD, A/V 227-

***************CALL IMMEDIATE TO WMCC/DDO***************

***************CALL POSTED NUMBER FOR ALL SPECIFIC TRAFFIC***************

DELIVER ONE HARD COPY TO WMCC/DDS

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INFO DJS(1) MIDS(1) WMCC/DDO(1) CEXX-JS(1) SECDEF-41(1) USDP-FIELD(1) GC(1) USDP-SPH(1) USDP-MESA(3) USDP-DASS(4) USDP-CN(1) USDP-CIS(1) USDP-ADMN(1) USDP-PWP(1) USDP-SC-FC(1) USDP-CT(1) USDP-PD(1) USDP-MC(1) USDP-JSA(1) USDP-POISA(1) USDP-N(1) WMC(1) DAT-61(1) DB-10B(3) DB-10B(1) CCG/CCG(2) +USEUCOM AIDES VATHINGEN GE +USDP-CJCS WASHINGTON DC +USDP-CJCS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM +CJCS 18 ABC FT BRAGG NC +SAFE

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122336Z AUG 90
The following pool report was filed by John King of The Associated Press. The Pentagon pool arrived in Saudi Arabia 5:18 p.m. Monday, local time.

At An Air Base in SAUDI ARABIA — Maj. Gen. Don L. Kaufman, chief of the U.S. military training mission to Saudi Arabia and now acting chief of staff for Central Command Forward — the command operations for U.S. troops. Kaufman said planes are landing virtually every 10 minutes or so, carrying in troops and equipment.

On the current military situation, he said "everything is about the same as it's been for about a week or so. This is an historic moment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I think our position grows stronger with each day that goes by." Kaufman said that when asked if there were enough forces there if Iraq attacks.

"The Saudi government has been extremely cooperative." He said he thinks they are surprised by the size of the American commitment. "They are finding that we are not going to allow a handfull of Americans to be in harm's way. The numbers are larger, I think, than the Saudis originally anticipated."

Dozens of military transport planes, vehicles and equipment. U.S. forces and equipment were arriving at several places in the kingdom and moving on to various positions.

--Reporters are being taken-out to visit troops. This information is a from a briefing.

Pool guidelines prohibit saying where are or specific details of equipment, etc. pool stopped enroute to Saudi Arabia at Torrejon Air Force base in Spain for refueling. It's a waystation for troops and equipment bound for the Persian Gulf area. The tarmac lined with rows of C-141 and massive C-5 transport planes and a wing of F16 fighters, some carrying sidewinder missiles.

A huge hangar was filled with cots so the troops can catch a nap. There's a television and round the clock food operation. Volunteers from the local church handing out drinks and bake goods. Among the soldiers some were from 327 Signal Co. in Fort Bragg. The airborne unit troops wore red berets. Support groups from the 18th Air Corp, just come in on a C-5.

A member of this unit said they had not trained in the desert and had not trained extensively for chemical warfare. "We're not really that well trained except in our (military specialty)," a member of the Signal Co. said. The young man anxiously asked a reporter "So- should I think I'm coming back ... I'm pretty scared." Other soldiers at the 82nd Airborne, stopping at the Spain air base said they had received training and were confident they would fare well in event of a chemical attack in the desert.

Kaufman said he was aware of no military incident between the Saudis and Iraqis.

"As far as I know it has been very stable," said Kaufman.
Eds: The following is a pool dispatch reported by Scripps-Howard and filed by John King of The Associated Press.

At An Air Base in Saudi Arabia — Here are some brief comments from troops at an airfield in Saudi Arabia. We are prohibited from saying where interviews took place or from using their names.

The troops were interviewed in the air base hangar, waiting to be transported to their field positions.

A female nurse, 21, with Delaware National Guard, "The guard's done a lot for me, and I want to put something back." She volunteered, is an airman first class from Hagertown, Pa. She's a student in Delaware.

A 27-year-old sergeant from Claymont, Del., in a support unit from Fort Bragg. He came over today on a Federal Express plane. "I called my wife and told her I might be called on, and if I go, just pray we all get out of here safe ... Yes, it's scary, you have to build up the courage and put the fear aside and do what you have to do." He had gas mask on belt. "They are telling us to be ready to stay four to six months."
Pool report written and filed by John King, AP.

A Qatar television newscast available on Saudi television was dominated by coverage of the Iraqi invasion. The footage included lengthy coverage of naval and air activity in the region, including shots of American and British ships. Most of the newscast was in Arabic, but the footage included comments from a British official, in English, who said naval forces would turn commerce away from Iraq if economic sanctions were not fully enforced.

Also shown was an American military officer, not identified in English, who cited Iraq's "propensity" for using chemical weapons. Other footage included shots of a chem-warfare suit and mask, trucks lined up at the Turk-Iraq border and a rally of supporters of Kuwait's ousted emir. The site of the rally was not given in English.

Also shown were comments from Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., discussing the US government's concern for Americans and others being held against their will. And brief footage was shown of the reunion and news conference of the 10-year-old American girl reunited with her parents.

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king

AP-WX-08-13-90 1436EDT<
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AP-WX-08-13-90 1313EDT
SAUDI ARABIA - Three American oil workers in Saudi Arabia said Monday they have found virtually unanimous support among Saudi citizens for the massive deployment of U. S. troops here.

The three, one of whom was heading home to Georgia on a flight Monday night, said they initially feared Iraqi forces would continue south into the Saudi kingdom after conquering Kuwait but now feel reassured that such an attack would be repelled.

The three men work for Aramco, an oil company they said has about 5,000 American workers here. About 90 percent of the dependents of the expatriate workers have departed since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they said, under a voluntary program run by the company.

Heading home Monday night was Joe Daniel of Eastman, Ga., a student at the New Orleans Baptist Seminary who was here for a summer job and scheduled to leave sometime this month.

"I tried to get out earlier, right after the invasion, but there was a waiting list," Daniel said. "I wasn't really afraid but everybody at the (Aramco) camp thought it would be best to go as soon as possible."

Daniel said he called family members the day after the invasion to let them know he was safe.

"We really don't feel any danger," said Daniel, who arrived in Saudi Arabia two months ago.

The men work at an Aramco facility in Abqaiq, more than 200 miles south of the Kuwait-Saudi border, near which Iraqi troops have taken up positions.

They were interviewed in a hotel elsewhere in Saudi Arabia by a Pentagon media representative allowed into the country Monday with a media pool. Guests at the hotel included dozens of Kuwaitis, Britons (Style??), and others who fled Kuwait after Iraq attacked. Ground rules for the operation prohibit disclosure of the exact location.

Mike McMahon, who said he has been in Saudi Arabia working for Aramco "off and on for 10 years" said most Americans learned of the Iraqi invasion from Voice of American and British Broadcasting Corp. broadcasts.

"It makes you uneasy, nervous, but I never had personally any fear for my life," said McMahon, of Phoenix. "I've thought from the beginning that the risk to us was pretty low."

He said another Aramco worker, whom he declined to name, went to the Saudi-Kuwait border shortly after the invasion because he wanted to inquire about family members in Kuwait.

"He wasn't able to get in," McMahon said. "Iraqi soldiers stopped him at the border."
McMahon said the man took vacation time to try to locate his family but the he had not heard from him so did not know whether they still were in Kuwait.

He said Saudis who work at Aramco have been overwhelmingly supportive of the U.S. military buildup here.

"The Saudis I've talked to are very much supportive of the American troops and their presence here," he said. "During the Iran-Iraq war when the U.S. ships were in the Persian Gulf there was a mixed feeling among the Saudis. But this time I feel like most everybody is glad to see them, especially when they first came because of the reports about the Iraqi troops massing at the border. I know I'm certainly glad to see them."

The other Aramco worker asked to be identified only by his first name, Walt, and said he was from Mississippi.

He said the Americans most worried about the prospect of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi territory have left with most of them leaving their cars out at the airport. We still believe there is no real threat here but anytime the military is involved some people get hysterical."

Walt, who said he has worked here for seven years, said family members called him at 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. the day after the Aug. 2 invasion, saying they had heard reports that all Americans in Saudi Arabia were being evacuated.

"I said that was nonsense only to get another call a few hours later with the same question," he said.

Walt said he had come away from his recent conversations with Saudis with the impression "Saddam Hussein has forfeited his credibility among the Arabs here and they are now very much against him and very supportive of the U.S. presence."

An English-language Saudi newscast Monday night showed King Fahd meeting with his Cabinet and the newscaster said the king had offered praise for the nations that have sent military forces to help defend the oil-rich kingdom. And an editorial in Monday's Arab News, an English language daily published in Saudi Arabia, condemned the invasion of Kuwait and called Saddam "a fool, squirming and frothing hysteria in a trench of his own making."

Both Walt and McMahon said they would be leaving Saudi Arabia soon for scheduled vacations but planned to return.

"In some ways I'm sorry to leave at this time," McMahon said. "It's a stressful period for some of our people and I wish I could stay with them and ride it out."
SAUDI ARABIA - Paratroopers with the 22nd Airborne division spread across the Saudi Arabian desert Tuesday with tanks, guns and missiles saying they were ready for anything, including a chemical attack.\[eop\]

"We're trained for it," an Ann Arbor, Mich., Army specialist said of the possibility of chemical warfare. "If it happens, we're ready for it."\[eop\]

The paratroopers were part of the U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia ordered by President Bush to "draw a line in the sand" and help prevent Iraq from invading.\[eop\]

They brought with them Sheridan tanks and TOW anti-tank missiles that would form a defensive line to fight Iraqi forces if they invade.\[eop\]

The soldiers also brought 50-caliber guns and trucks that can fire banks of twelve battle missiles at a time.\[eop\]

Every paratrooper interviewed by a pool of American reporters said he was ready for a chemical attack or anything else that comes.\[eop\]

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and an Italian diplomat has said Saddam was relocating chemical munitions closer to the Saudi border now.\[eop\]

"I'm a little scared but...we're ready," said a paratrooper from Norfolk, Va.\[eop\]

A lieutenant said the paratroopers trained constantly to fight in nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons battles.\[eop\]

"We haven't done it in this heat," he said. But he said the troops regularly train in the humid summer heat of Fort Bragg, N.C.\[eop\]

However, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East, told the pool reporters earlier that the troops have trained in the hot chemical protection suits in western U.S. deserts where temperatures are comparable to those in Saudi Arabia.\[eop\]

The paratroopers, interviewed at an undisclosed staging area, said they were anxious to get closer to the Kuwait border where commanders said Iraqi forces that invaded and occupied Kuwait were building up and digging in defensively.\[eop\]

Some of the soldiers passed the time with sardonic humor.\[eop\]

When a reporter asked one of them the precise purpose of his 50-caliber gun mounted on a truck, he replied: "To stay
The paratroopers also brought communication trucks and an entire repair unit for trucks, tanks and missiles with them. They had M-16 rifles by their sides. "They are soldiers first," an officer said.

The paratroopers also had medics commanded by a second lieutenant who said the medics never get the attention they deserve.

"Everybody gives all the attention to the big toys," he said, referring to the tanks and anti-tank weapons nearby.

The pool reporters were bound by rules prohibiting them from saying where in Saudi Arabia the U.S. units are and how big they are.
FOR THIS AND ALL OTHER POOL REPORTS PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING FA
NUMBER: 202-693-5853 and if busy, 697-3501. Please number this pool
report no. 6 and the newspaper pool no. 7 and fax to the same
number. Reuters is receiving no. 5 and it should be available soon.

fyi, svl reports coming in today because of volume of
interviews. This first set will be followed with later day
demonstrations of weapons and additional interviews.

date line for all is SAUDI ARABIA — we are prohibited from
disclosing exact location.

this report written and filed by John King of AP.

SAUDI ARABIA — For one American soldier, deployment in Saudi
Arabia is a honeymoon of sorts.
The specialist, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., was scheduled to be
married on Aug. 11 but was called for duty in Saudi Arabia a few
days before then.

"My wife, then my fiance, and I got to thinking that I might
not come back so, we decided to go ahead and do it," said the
specialist, among a contingent from the 82nd Airborne set up at a
Saudi air defense camp.

The Saudi desert has the specialist, from Monroeville (sp??),
Ala., thinking about changing his honeymoon plans.

"We were supposed to go to Florida but now maybe we'll go
someplace better," he said. "With this heat, maybe we'll go to
Alaska."

Ground rules for the Pentagon pool operation prohibit disclosure
of the exact location and publication of the names of American
troops deployed here to defend Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi
attack.

The 82nd Airborne troops visited Tuesday are living in tents on
the Saudi complex, surrounded by M551-Sheridan airborne assault
vehicles, a light tank, anti-tank vehicles equipped with Tow
missiles and other weapons, including and multi rocket launch system
designed to fire at enemy radar and assembly positions as well as
light vehicles.

When they arrived their worries were potential battles with
Iraqi troops and possible use of chemical weapons against them.
Now, with Iraqi forces taking up defensive positions and the
bogging American forces digging in as well, the troops here are
more worried about family back home and beating the intense desert
heat.

Temperatures were approaching 100 degrees when the pool visited
the troops at 10 a.m. local time Tuesday and expected to reach 115
degrees or higher by afternoon. The reddish sand of the desert can
be seen for miles; shade is virtually impossible to find.

The most popular spot here is the maintenance garage, which
offers a respite from the sun and — by Saudi standards — a cooling
breeze.

All of the American forces here are told to drink at least six
gallons of water a day to stay hydrated in the searing heat.

These rapid-deployment forces were called into action so quickly
that many said they did not get to say goodbye to family and
friends.

"The last time I saw my wife was 5 a.m. the day I left," said
one staff Sgt. "She wasn't home when I got the call to go. So I
got a quick note off before I left and wrote her from Spain on the
way over."

One of the few complaints from the soldiers that Washington
give approval for a free mail system.

"I didn't have time to get any money," said the staff sgt,
based at Fort Bragg and originally from New York.
A lieutenant interviewed atop a Sheridan said morale has been "outstanding" and that troops are beginning to adjust to the heat. "We're settling in now," he said. "We came in expecting anything from going into a peacetime mission to total war. In Panama we went in knowing it was a combat situation right off the bat."

There is little shade under which to escape the sun and the troops left the states so quickly they could not bring any gear for recreation activities. So now they mostly sit and wait. Those assigned to day shifts say sleeping at night, when temperatures drop into the 80s, isn't so bad. There are rows of tents for those who need to sleep during the day, but they provide little escape from the dry heat.

"We'd rather sit and wait than go and fight but it's frustrating," said the lieutenant.

The staff sergeant had a different perspective.

"If I have to come this far and go through all this trouble I'd rather get out there and fight, take care of business," he said.

Saudi forces brought the American troops sandwiches and fries from Hardees and also have brought breakfasts of bread, fruit and cheeses. Believe it or not, several said they would prefer to eat their Army-issued MREs - meals ready to eat.

"No offense because the Saudis have been great hosts, but things just taste a little different," said one Sgt.

All of the troops have chemical warfare suits with them and gas masks strapped to their hips.

"You hear little rumors about it (the possibility of chemical attacks) from time to time but you just press on," another sgt from Fort Bragg said as he stood next to a huge satellite communications disk. "We've got a lot of duties to keep care of here so you can't worry too much."

Said a sgt from Mt. Airy, N.C.: "You can't worry about the gas or chemicals. You take in the equipment and if you need to use it you do, we're trained and ready."

Gen. Ed Scholes, commander of the forward command forces here, said "our troops are prepared for that and ready for it if it comes. ... You're always concerned about that prospect, but our troops here are trained in that and they have the equipment."

Scholes described the mission as "deterrence, assisting and training the Saudis and if necessary assisting them in the defense of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

Part of the 82nd's current work, he said, was securing an area for the arrival of Marines and equipment.

Scholes and the troops reported few equipment problems associated with the heat.

"There are obvious problems in operating in this environment but we've had nothing unusual," the general said.

Some radio failures have been blamed on the heat.

Army officials said last week that units with tanks and other vehicles would need additional air filters and higher viscosity oil to keep running in the desert environment. As much a problem as the heat is the talcum-like sand of the desert.
National Desk: This is pool report number seven. You must fax a
printout of this immediately to the Pentagon, and then wait for
the Pentagon to release it to everyone before using it. Fax num-
ber at Pentagon is 202-693-6853. To verify that number and make
sure of everything, call 202-693-1074.

Following is a daily newspaper pool report by Frank Aukofer of
The Milwaukee Journal and Peter Copeland of Scripps Howard.

Saudi Arabia—As soldiers have for centuries, the Americans of
the 82nd Airborne here are mostly fighting the heat, boredom and
concern that their loved ones back home are worrying about them.

And, as soldiers have always done, they already are complaining
about the food and the sanitary facilities.

The first couple of days weren’t bad. Their Saudi hosts brought
the troops Hardee’s beef sandwiches and french fries. No kidding.
Nobody among the troops knows where the Saudis found the American
fast food, but there are Hardee’s franchise in this country.

Now the troops have settled in to meals provided by their Saudi
hosts that consist mostly of bread, water, fruit and vegetables.

"Yesterday for lunch, we had green beans, bread and water, and
for breakfast today, we had bread, an apple and water," said a
19-year-old private from Spokane, Wash. "I’d rather eat an MRE
(ready-to-eat field ration) but they said they don’t have enough
in the country yet."

Many of the soldiers at an air defense base the Saudis turned
over to the Americans here in the desert can’t get used to the
fact that the shower and latrine is combined in a single stall—and
they don’t come equipped with toilet paper.

"These people own most of the oil and have most of the money in
the world, and they drive Bimmers and Mercedes," said a 36-year-
old platoon sergeant from Columbia, S.C. "You think they’d come
up with some decent plumbing."

A 23-year-old private from Portsmouth, Ohio, said, "The desert’s
not as bad as I thought. At night it’s like air conditioning," he
said with a grin.

The troops have little to do but sit in the stifling heat, and
try to keep their equipment and vehicles ready to go at a mo-
moment’s notice.

In coming days they will be training with Saudi troops and pre-
paring to defend the area where more U.S. equipment will be un-
loaded.

They also will be training to protect themselves from chemical
weapons, which have been used in the past by Iraqi forces in the
war against Iran.

A 31-year-old sergeant from Sanford, Fla., was the man in
charge of protecting his people from chemicals.

They all carry gas masks strapped to their sides and protective
suits in their packs. They also carry three syringes loaded with antidotes to nerve gas.

"It's just like putting on regular clothes," he said. "It would degrade soldiers' performance, but I've trained in the California desert and didn't die of heat."

Another chemical warfare expert, a 22-year-old from San Francisco, said he had worn one of the suits for eight hours straight in training in the California desert. But that was in 80-degree temperatures, he said.

In addition to all the protective, equipment, the troops have nerve gas detectors to warn them of an attack.

A 23-year-old tank commander from Turtle Lake, Wis., said one of the biggest problems was that the heat had been "frying the radios."

The equipment was not designed specifically for desert fighting, and the tanks and jeeps were painted dark green camouflage instead of the brown desert patterns.

The vehicles did not have big tires for sand and sometimes bogged down off the road.

Tank crews stay 24 hours a day with their Vietnam-era Sheridan light tanks, which can be dropped from airplanes. They sleep on the tanks or on the sand next to the tanks. But during the day, the metal armor on the tanks is too hot to touch, much less sleep on.

Their only activity so far has been writing letters home and keeping the tanks running.

"There's a lot of maintenance," the Turtle Lake tank commander said. "When you depend on a vehicle to keep you alive, you keep after it."

Each person out in the open must drink five to six gallons of water a day to keep from dehydrating in the desert heat, the troops say. They carry canteens and one-liter plastic bottles of water provided by the Saudis.

With the tanks and other vehicles sitting out in the open, the coolest place around is the maintenance garage, where the desert wind blows through one of the few shaded areas around.

Temperatures reach 100 degrees by 10 in the morning, and climb to 120 just past midday. Everyone agrees that the early afternoon is the worst time.

Sleeping at night, the soldiers say, is not too bad because it cools down to the 80s. But the men who work nights and must sleep during the day have had some trouble adapting.

"I miss the smog already," said a 24-year-old TOW anti-tank missile gunner from Buena Park, Calif., near Los Angeles. He had just finished writing a letter to his girlfriend in North Carolina, near Fort Bragg.
An 18-year-old private from Winchester, Ky., said the hardest part for him was worrying about how his family must be worrying about him and the other troops.

Sitting in the shade of a jeep and sharpening a knife, the Kentucky private said he'd like to be able to tell his mom that he's doing all right.

"Tell her not to worry, that I'll be home soon," he said. Tell her to pray for me and tell her I pray every night."

-30-
SAUDI ARABIA - A 26-year-old Saudi sergeant had this advice for his new American allies: "Keep the flaps of your tent open."

"God willing, they will get used to the heat soon," said the stocky sergeant, sweat running down his face into a thick, black beard.

He and his men stood outside a cloth tent, white on the outside and a festive yellow inside. They slept on colorful woven rugs and made strong coffee in silver-colored pots.

About 50 yards away on the Persian Gulf, American soldiers from the 82nd Airborne had their own tent. The soldiers from both sides were guarding a Saudi naval base.

In other parts of the country, the soldiers from the two armies were separated, but here on the coast they began combined operations Tuesday.

"This is the first day and we are getting to know each other," the Saudi sergeant said, speaking through an interpreter.

The American platoon at the site was getting to know both the Saudis and what it was like to live in the desert.

"They could put us up in air-conditioned buildings," said the platoon's medic, a 24-year-old from Hollywood, Fla. "But then if we have to fight people used to this, we're not going to last very long."

The medic said his biggest problem was the gung-ho types in his platoon.

"We've got some pretty hard-charging studs here," he said. "They push pretty hard. But that's their job. They're overeager."

He said that a number of members of the platoon had suffered from the heat, by not drinking enough water and not eating as well as they should.

"I'm like their mother," he said. "It's my job to see that they eat, and if you see a guy with two full canteens, you know he's not drinking."

The medic said he had treated many platoon members with intravenous injections of a nutrient-laden fluid called "ringers lactate." (Check definition). Symptoms of heat exhaustion, he said, are headaches and blurred vision.

The Saudis, used to living in the desert, had the more comfortable looking of the two tents. The Americans simply had their gear strewn on the sand inside.

Between the two tents was an area, half surrounded by buried wooden packing crates, with two 25-foot-long pieces of canvas inside. The Saudis asked the Americans not to step there because that is where they face Mecca and pray five times a day.
The pool visited first with a detachment from the 82nd Airborne that had set up a staging camp at a Saudi air-defense facility temporarily being used as a camp for the U.S. forces.

Their camp was the temporary home for numerous Vietnam-era M551 Sheridan airborne assault vehicles – light, air-droppable tanks.

Also at that site was a multiple rocket launcher. Ground rules for the pool operation prohibit the release of exact numbers of weapons, exact locations of U.S. deployments and the names of most troops here. Only officers with command duties can be quoted by name.

At the naval base, a small detachment from the 82nd took up positions on sand dunes overlooking the water; nearby were Saudi forces already on hand at the naval base.

Naval Cmrd. Christopher J. Elles, who heads a 20-member U.S. Navy training detachment in Saudi Arabia, said approximately 2,000 Americans and 10,000 expatriates total had left the area since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

"A great deal of the civilians have left here," he said, in most cases leaving behind family members who work for area oil operations.

"One bomb in the right place obviously would create a lot of problems," he said when asked about the defenses in place for nearby oil facilities. "That's a personal opinion."

This was the first time the visiting pool had the opportunity to see U.S. troops working in the field with Saudi forces, with the exception of the Canadian jets, the pool has not seen any forces from other nations, although Egyptian and other forces are reported to be on Saudi soil. Local media also reported that Pakistan has pledged to send military help.

"There's a great deal of working relationships that have to be worked out," Elles said of the growing multinational defense force.

Although the deployment of large numbers of American troops on Saudi soil is unprecedented, the U.S. military does maintain some permanent training facilities here, and the commanders of those units are assisting in the discussions with Saudi officials as well as taking on new roles in the American defense force. Several Saudi military installations also were built by Americans, some dating back to World War II; others in the past 20 years.

Elles said as the American presence close to the Kuwait-Saudi borders grows the U.S. troops are under clear instructions to avoid instigating combat.

"We have very specific rules of engagement," he said. "We are not going to shoot first unless it is more than clear that it is an attack." He said Iraqi forces would have to cross clearly into Saudi territory before U.S. forces would consider firing.

The pool was transported into the field aboard Blackhawk helicopters after viewing a demonstration of Apache attack helicopters, a vital component of the anti-tank strategy should Iraq send its formidable armored force across the Kuwait border into the Saudi kingdom.
Lt. Col. Don Vinson, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 82nd Aviation Brigade, said a typical Apache carried eight laser-guided Hellfire missiles, two 19-shot rocket pods and 1200 rounds of 30 mm ammunition. But Vinson said the Apaches also could be fitted with other weapons as well.

He said the Hellfires would "destroy any armor known today."

Asked if there were enough Apaches in Saudi Arabia to destroy a column of Iraqi tanks, Vinson answered with a blunt "absolutely."

En route to the naval base the Blackhawks crossed over a stretch of desert so sun-scorched in most areas the land was cracking. Temperatures were well above 100 degrees my mid-afternoon.

The choppers passed over a number of Saudi oil facilities, including storage tanks and a lengthy pipeline.

Out in that heat was another detachment from the 82nd, exercising in the scorching heat as part of an effort to get them accustomed to the arid desert climate.

All U.S. forces here are being told to drink at least six gallons of water a day. A medic at the naval base said he had treated numerous dehydration cases. And soldiers at the staging camp reported radio failures they blamed on heat.

A Saudi official traveling with the pool said Saudis in both the United States and here had called government offices urging the government to allow American troops in immediately after the invasion.

"We gave them money, supported them and never got in their way and now this," the official said of Iraq. The official, who asked not to be named, said Saudi public opinion appeared to be fully behind the U.S. deployment.

He gave that assessment when asked by a member of a helicopter crew: "What do the Saudi people think of us being here?"
and told him that's exactly why we should be worried."

Another concern is over what will happen if the crisis turns into a long stalemate.

Arab resolve is firm now, in the face of a clear and present danger, but may be more difficult to maintain in the months ahead, especially if the spectacle of one Arab nation slowly being forced to its knees by a U.S.-led blockade ignites the highly flammable, anti-Western passions that still exist in this part of the world.

Such a scenario, while worrisome, is not considered likely at the moment; however.

"There is a feeling that things are happening too fast for a stalemate to develop," one Saudi source said. "More and more, Saddam is acting like a cornered animal."

Cornered perhaps. But it is clear from conversations with them that, when the kill comes, the Saudis are anxious that it will be clean and quick.
A senior Kuwaiti official said Tuesday that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can only be reversed through military action by the United States, Saudi Arabia and other nations.

"I don't see any hope unless there is military action," said Abdul Rahman al Ateeqi, senior advisor to the ousted Emir of Kuwait. "We don't want others to be harmed," said al Ateeqi, but "there is no way but this one."

The Bush administration is sending troops to the area to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia but still hopes that economic sanctions will force Iraq to leave Kuwait.

But Kuwaiti officials expressed a pessimistic view of the unfolding crisis during interviews at a Saudi guest palace, where members of their ousted government have taken refuge.

"A small country like Kuwait cannot wait a long time until these sanctions are effective," said al Ateeqi.

"Especially with a dictator like Saddam. He can hang on a long time."

The officials said the Iraqis are destroying the physical infrastructure of their country. "The people inside are completely isolated," said al Ateeqi. "There is nothing left to them. The longer this continues the worse it becomes."

The Kuwaitis also said they no longer have any hope of a negotiated solution to the crisis. "There is no way of negotiations now," al Ateeqi said. "You cannot negotiate when somebody else's boot is on your neck."

Another senior Kuwaiti official argued that a settlement is impossible in any case because Saddam Hussein's ambitions extend well beyond Kuwait's borders or even Iraq's immediate economic interests.

"No matter how much money you give him," said Kuwaiti finance minister Sheik Ali Khalifa al Sabah, Saddam will direct his economic resources to bringing into reality his vision of Iraqi grandeur. "The guy is a Hitler -- no doubt about that," he said. "He wants not only to 'lead' the Arabs by force, he wants to control the world through oil."

A similar perception by the U.S. led the Bush administration to order the largest deployment of American forces to the Middle East since World War II.

But thus far that deployment is said to be defensive. U.S. officials have stressed the difficulty of an attempt to force Iraq's departure from Kuwait.

Al Ateeqi said, however, that the Kuwaitis fear that a protracted stalemate could weaken both American and Arab resolve to reverse the invasion. "There is a question how long you can keep your forces here... doing nothing," he said.

Despite the unprecedented cooperation that Saudi Arabia's normally insular leaders have extended to
Operation Desert Shield, diplomatic sources in Saudi Arabia also cautioned that the Saudis may not be willing to host a large U.S. military presence indefinitely.

"The Saudis have opened their body to a foreign object. It's like a necessary operation. It's not pleasant, and they want as few tubes sticking out as possible," said one diplomat.

At the same time, he stressed the strategic importance of the area. "If the Eastern Province is taken by Iraq, the rest of the Gulf goes. I think that's why the line in the sand has been drawn where it has," he said.

Kuwait's exiled government has made little secret of its hope that, as Iraq's political options rapidly diminish, it will cross this line and justify a major military retaliation.

The likelihood of that happening increased when Saddam Hussein formally annexed Kuwait, the diplomat said. He added: "Saddam has a real political problem because he's done something he can't give up."

"Pretty soon, both sides will have to fish or cut bait -- and I think the first move will be by Iraq," he said.

The Kuwaiti officials said they are generally satisfied with the Arab reaction to the crisis so far -- with the exception of the response of Jordan's King Hussein. "He is advocating something he has been totally against," said al Ateequi. "He is against occupation on the one hand and for it on the other. He is against torture on the one hand and for it on the other. He is condemning himself."

Finance minister al Sabah added this warning to Arabs who support Saddam: "Any allies who are with him today he will turn against tomorrow. Ours is a case in point. We supported him for eight years to the tune of $11.7 billion. We opened our ports to him -- at considerable danger to ourselves."

The Saudis are now opening their own borders to Kuwait. Some 70,000 have crossed into this country and are being housed and fed at Saudi expense.

Iraqi border guards are generally allowing Kuwaitis to leave, say the sources. Westerners in Kuwait are being turned back by the guards.

In a number of cases, one source said, American women married to Kuwaitis have been able to leave by donning traditional dress. Iraqi soldiers have treated Arab women in Kuwait with respect, the source said.

A century ago, Saudi king Abdul Rahman was driven out of Riyadh by Iraqi-backed rivals and found refuge with the ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak al Sabah. Now the Saudis are returning the favor: Abdul Rahman's grandchildren rule Saudi Arabia today and have given refuge to the grandchildren of Mubarak al Sabah.

ENDIT
this is a pool report and must be faxed to pentagon.
believe this is pool report No. 13.
Wednesday, 15 Aug 90
written and filed by John King, ap.

SAUDI ARABIA - Saudi fighter pilots Wednesday boasted that they could defeat Iraq's air force and said they were finding it easy to work with British and American pilots now flying missions with them along the Kuwait-Saudi border.

And they said they had no qualms about fighting fellow Arabs if Saddam Hussein decided to send his forces into the Saudi kingdom.

"Nobody likes war but if he wants to fight we will fight to the death," one Saudi pilot said Wednesday before the Saudi Air Force staged a demonstration for a visiting pool of American journalists.

The Saudi pilots all speak English and have been trained in the United States, and American and British planes make up the Saudi arsenal. Now, with a multinational defense force forming here, a Saudi squadron commander said Saudi, American and British pilots are flying as a single force under a single command.

"From the first day they arrived here that plan had to be implemented before we leave the ground," the commander said.

A number of U.S. planes were seen parked outside an intricate hangar and maintenance area on one Saudi air base visited by the Defense Department pool.

He said Iraqi planes have been spotted along the Kuwait-Saudi border but that none have crossed clearly into Saudi territory.

"I don't think it wise for them to cross that border," he said. "We will react to that. ... I'm confident that we could inflict heavy damage."

The squadron commander, who said he got his first training in Selma, Ala., and has studied at other U.S. military installations, said "as a military man" he expected the Mideast standoff to be resolved only through combat.

"I am here as an instrument of the hand of the politician, to use if they need me," he said. Should it come to war, he said, "I'm not afraid but I am ready."

A half dozen pilots interviewed before a scrambling of Saudi jets expressed little doubt that they could defeat the Iraqi air force and also do significant harm to Iraqi tanks and other ground forces.

And none said a potential war pitting Arab against Arab had made them reluctant to fight. Ground rules prohibit use of their names.

"We have to put a leash on them," the Saudi commander said when asked how eager his men were to take on the Iraqis. "We have to put a leash on me," he then said with a laugh.

The Saudi pilots said it has been easy for them to join forces with the American and British pilots because of their training in the West.

"We are friends for," one pilot said, "and we spoke about the influx of the outside air arsenal. "We are quite comfortable with the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Air Force.

In addition to F-15s, the Saudi air force now American-made F-5s, AH-64s and F-16s and British-made Hawks, Lightnings and Tornadoes.

Inside one facility at the base was a reminder of the occasional fires in the area.
The Saudi pilots said it has been easy for them to join forces with American and British pilots because of their training in the West.

"What are friends for," one pilot said when asked about the influx of the outside air arsenal. "We are quite comfortable with the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Air Force.

In addition to F-15s, the Saudi air force has American-made F-5s, AWACS and C-130s and British-made Hawks, Lightnings and Tornadoes.

Inside one facility at the base was a reminder of the occasional fights in the U.S. Congress over selling the Saudis newer American air firepower.

A plaque on one wall is inscribed with a 1966 quote from Sen. John Chafee, R-R.I., from a Senate debate on arms sales. "In my opinion, Saudi Arabia is a far better judge of its own defense needs than the members of Congress," Chafee said.

One pilot interviewed said he was first trained in the United States in 1976 at an Air Force Base in San Antonio.

He said the Iraqi air force was "quite strong" but that the Saudis, with the help of the Americans and British pilots, could easily defeat them in an air fight.

Still, he said, "I think we need more planes from the United States, maybe F-16s or F-18s."

Of Saddam Hussein, the pilot said, "He's an unpredictable man, we can't trust him." Said another: "It won't be a war of Arab versus Arab because he (Saddam) is not Muslim anymore." Asked about the possibility of fighting against fellow Arabs, another pilot said: "It's not that; it's a matter of pride. We are a nation that is not willing to start a fight but we will fight to protect the sovereignty of our country and we will win."

Said another pilot: "I'm a soldier. When I go to fight, an enemy is an enemy."

He said the Saudis frequently train for air-to-ground attacks on tanks, which would be a vital component of any defense against Iraqi tank attacks.

Although the pilots said they were ready to fight Iraq, many said they were still in a state of disbelief over the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait.

"If you had asked me if I was ready to fight Iraq three weeks ago I would have thought it was a dream," one fighter pilot said.

At a maintenance facility at one Saudi air base, several Saudi technicians said they believed the Iraqis must be forced out of Kuwait.

"It was a mistake," one warrant officer said of the invasion of Kuwait. "So the mistake should be corrected by a mission of the United Nations or whatever."

------------------ Also:

There was more evidence Wednesday of the burgeoning U.S. buildup here. Transpport planes have been arriving around the clock at one airbase and significant numbers of heavy equipment were visible Wednesday on the tarmac. Also, U.S. military officials said the Marine presence has grown substantially in the past 48 hours.

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Jk
AP-WX-90-15-90 0420EDT
Natl Desk: I hope that you have been getting all of the pool reports from the Pentagon. They should be faxing them all to you; if not, call Pete Williams and request them.

This is Pentagon Pool Report No. 14. Please fax to Pete Williams at the Pentagon-202-693-6853. You can verify at 202-693-1074. Story can be used as soon as it is released by the Pentagon.

This pool report was written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia—The Saudi Arabians served sweet Arabic coffee and screaming warplanes to a visiting American news team Wednesday.

They also gave members of the Pentagon press pool an unprecedented look inside some of their most secret and sophisticated air defenses.

They made pilots, commanders and maintenance crew members available for interviews, gave tours of briefing and operations rooms, and even provided peeks at the private quarters of the crew members.

In return, the American visitors agreed not to identify any of the Saudi military personnel, except for the general in charge, nor reveal any information about defenses, location or military operations.

One maintenance crew in a desert bunker that houses warplanes had equipped their day room with low couches for sipping sweet coffee and tea, and a very American pool table so well worn that some of the felt covering had been repaired with tape.

In their dark green uniforms, the crews don't look much different than American airmen, except that many have beards and mustaches. They all speak English—the international language of aviation, and some have trained in the United States or Great Britain.

As in America, many are young lieutenants and captains in their 20s and 30s, with wives and children back in their home towns.

As two Saudi pilots talked with reporters and a CNN television crew Wednesday, the alarm sounded to scramble their two F-15 jets. Within a matter of seconds, the pilots were in their planes, the bunker doors were open, and the jets were on their way.

Within five minutes, afterburners flashing, they were streaking almost vertically into the sky from halfway down the runway.

It was all part of a pattern of hospitality remarkable for a country that, in ordinary times, has been reluctant to open itself to the western world.

Instead of sleeping on pallets in the desert sand and stifling heat, as many of the American troops here are doing, the news team and its escort of American military officers are staying in
a comfortable hotel.

Much of the transport is in air-conditioned buses, although the news pool members also have had heavy doses of the hardships the American troops here have been experiencing.

An afternoon ride across the blistering desert in an American Blackhawk helicopter, for example, has the feel of sitting inside a noisy blast furnace. The desert heat comes roaring through the open doors with a velocity strong enough to blow eyeglasses off a man's face.

When the sand blows through, as it often does, it stings the skin and swirls into eyes, nose, ears and crevices in the clothing.

At the end of the helicopter trip to a Saudi naval base, the base commander threw his headquarters open to the grimy visitors. They sat in air-conditioned comfort under crystal chandeliers, in white leather chairs arranged around a beige carpet. Gold-framed photographs of King Fahd and other Saudi royalty hung on a wall.

Stewards served the guests sweet tea from silver trays. But when a delay prompted an unscheduled lunch, the pool members ate American military field rations, called MREs, packaged in dark brown plastic bags.

Moments later, they were back in the heat on the airstrip, sand swirling around, swigging warm water from plastic bottles as the pilots waited for a clearance to take off.

Saudi Arabia, at least in this area, is not unlike the Mojave Desert in California, and similar to what Americans have seen countless times in American western movies.

If you ask any American soldier what he or she thinks about Saudi Arabia, the answer is always hot, hot, hot—even from Americans who have lived in places like Florida and Arizona. It only gets comfortable here from shortly before dark to just after daybreak.

The terrain around the air base where the American military and the news team are staying has endless variety—all of it variations on a sandy theme. Some areas are hard-packed and cracked, others have dunes of yellow sand almost as fine as talcum powder.

In other places, the sand is pockmarked and colored in shades of dirty gray. Except for irrigated areas, plant life is almost nonexistent.

On the helicopter trip across the desert, some pool members were surprised to see a golf course, seemingly out in the middle of nowhere.

This golf course, however, had no grass whatsoever. The fairways and the "greens" were just different colored sand, prompting one newsmen to say he'd have to play the entire course with a nine iron or a wedge.

There are patches of green, where water has made the desert
productive, and occasional herds of camels and other animals.

So far, the Pentagon pool members have had no contact with ordinary Saudi Arabians. Their hosts have been Saudi diplomats and military men.

The diplomats dress in the traditional long white gown, called a thobe. They carry or wear a cloak called an abaya. On their heads, they wear either a white or red-and-white cloth, called a shemagh or ghutra. The headdress is held in place by a black wool cord called an igaal.

In such garb, the men look identical, except for the difference in headdress color. The women wear colored long dresses covered by black gowns, called abaya, down to their ankles, and some of them are fully veiled, with their faces covered.

Men and women do not dine or socialize together. They sit separately in the hotel lobby and restaurant.

Saudi Arabia follows strict Islamic codes. Alcohol is forbidden by law in any form; so one of the more popular drinks among American guests is one of the many varieties of alcohol-free beer available here.

There also are many kinds of soft drinks available, including Coke and Pepsi, as well as apple and other fruit juices.

Pork is forbidden, but the hotel serves a variety of other delicious food, buffet style. There are fresh salads, chicken, lamb and beef, vegetable casseroles, soups and a dessert table covered with sweets that are, in the American idiom, to die for.

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Desk: please fax this right away to the Pentagon. You can use it on our wire with my byline, adding whatever you want from the other pool reports or using them as separates.

This is a DOD report written and filed by Peter Copeland. The pool is not allowed to use names of soldiers, American or Saudi, or say where they are.

SAUDI ARABIA — With their commanding officers out of earshot, the young Saudi airmen crowded around, anxious to talk with a visiting American journalist.

"I have an announcement," said one, in good if stiff English.

"Thank you very much for your help.

"We have one mission: to defend Saudi Arabia. Thank you for helping," said the 32-year-old chief warrant officer.

A dozen other airmen crowded around inside the hangar at a Saudi Air Force base. "The Americans are good people," said one, "We know they are good friends."

Pressed if they did not worry about losing control of their country to the growing American military presence or if they weren't concerned about the impact of the invasion of American culture, one said, "It is not the time to look for this."

And while the Saudis were concerned about the impact of American culture, the American soldiers were getting a taste of desert life. One American soldier drove by the hangar with a towel under his jungle cap, covering his shoulders like an Arab headdress.

A 27-year-old Sergeant from Claymont, Del., said he and his men were briefed about Saudi culture and told to respect it. "Some of their customs are kind of weird," he said. "They told us not to use our left hand for anything."

Lt. Col. Jim Frederick of the 18th Airborne Corps, said a chaplain in his unit had given a Christian service for U.S. troops. Saudi law prohibits non-Islamic religious services, but there have been no restrictions placed on U.S. troops.

"After the service three Saudis came up to shake the chaplain's hand," Frederick said. "The chaplain didn't say 'Go with God like he usually does,' but one of the Saudis said, 'Can you give Holy Communion?'

There also is a law against importing pork products, but U.S. field rations have barbecued pork on the menu.

Saudi Arabia is hermetically sealed to protect its culture and Islamic religion from outside influence. Never before have so many Americans, especially 18-year-old soldiers, been allowed inside the kingdom, where women are veiled, segregated and not allowed to talk with strange men.

"You are guests and you have to respect your host," said a bearded, 25-year-old warrant officer. "But a host must also respect his guest.

"As God tells us, you have your religion and we have ours," the warrant officer said.

There are many misconceptions held by both sides, and the Saudi airmen were anxious to dispel the idea that they are closed minded. "Let us take you out to meet the people," one enlisted man said. "You will like them."
A 32-year-old warrant officer said, "The Americans keep saying this is Muslim against Muslim, but if Saddam Hussein really were a Muslim, he would not have taken Kuwait like a thief."

One great difference between the two cultures is the role of women, and while American women were working at the airbase and driving U.S. Army trucks here, Saudi women are not even allowed to drive.

"It is not as if we have never seen women before," said another Saudi airman, a little exasperated with the questions about the role of women. "We have women, too. And we have been to Bahrain and Kuwait. It is not that unusual for us to see women driving," he said.

Asked if women would ever be allowed to serve in the Saudi military, one of the airmen said, "Not as long as there is Islam."
An invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraqi ground forces would provide the first major test of the tank-killing abilities of the Army's new attack helicopter, the AH-64A Apache.

Army Lt. Col. Don Vinson, commander of the 1st battalion of the 82d aviation brigade, now on duty in Saudi Arabia, said that the Apaches assigned to his unit can "absolutely" stop an Iraqi tank column. The helicopters are armed with laser-guided Hellfire anti-tank missiles able to burn through heavy armor. They also carry 30 mm. machine guns and 19-shot rocket pods, able to fire a variety of warheads including high explosives, deadly submunitions, smoke, and flares.

The 82d is permanently stationed in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. Elements of the unit were also deployed during the U.S. invasion of Panama.

The Apache was designed to fight on broken terrain like that in Central Europe, hiding behind the crests of hills and popping up into view only long enough to fire its weapons. Without such protection, the slow-moving helicopters might be vulnerable during daylight hours in the flat Arabian desert. For that reason, says Vinson, if hostilities break out his unit plans to operate under "cloak of darkness." Adds the commander: "I don't fight except at night."

Unlike most Arab armies, the Iraqi armed forces are also capable of fighting at night, according to a Pentagon official.

Also discussing the 82 aviation brigade's anti-tank mission was brigade commander Col. Gene Cole. The two aviation officers explained that the vulnerability of the lethal Apaches will be further reduced by the role of small new OH-58D Kiowa Warrior light observation helicopters. The Kiowas will take forward positions and act as spotters for the Apache gunships, using advanced radar and FLIR (Forward-Looking Infra-Red) sensors to locate enemy tanks. The Kiowas also carry laser sighting
devices used to guide Hellfire missiles fired by the Apaches. The working of the two systems is coordinated by means of encoded radio links.

A forward-observation role can also be played by individual Apaches.

Also new to the 82d brigade are CH-58C helicopters armed with air-to-air Stinger missiles, said Col. Cole.

Lt. Col. Vinson said that the Iraqi army does have ground-to-air weapons to defend their tank columns. According to "The Military Balance" for 1989-90, Iraqi defenses include a variety of Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. But, said Vinson: "taking a look at what their numbers are. I quite frankly do not consider that to be a major factor."

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"Some of us speak a little English. Or we use Arabic, but mostly it's sign language. We talk about whatever comes to mind," the Saudi sergeant said.

"The Americans are good soldiers," he said.

Asked if the Americans also were good people, the Saudi replied, "So far so good, but we are still getting to know them."

The sergeant, married with three children, said his family was worried about him being so close to the border with Kuwait. "It is natural for relatives to be afraid, but it is my job," he said.

The Saudi government worried about its soldiers having contact with the Americans, fearing exposure to American values and customs would weaken the Saudi's strict Islamic code.

The Americans had been briefed by their commanders and told to be extra sensitive not to offend their hosts, whose customs are quite different. Soldiers, for example, were told not to show the soles of their feet because it is regarded as an insult here.

"We worry about drugs and alcohol, and there is none here," said a Saudi military official. "We don't care if you eat with your left hand. If you asked, 'Why do you keep your women locked in the house?' then we might be offended," he said.

An American crewmember of a Blackhawk helicopter pointed to his chest and asked another Saudi official, Adel Al-Jubeir, "What do the Saudi Arabians think about us being here?"

Al-Jubeir replied, "They were calling our government and saying, 'Why don't you let the Americans in? Who gives a damn about Arab opinion?'

"But what do you think about being here?" asked Al-Jubeir, an advisor to the Saudi ambassador to the United States. "I wouldn't want to go half way around the world and die for another country," the Saudi said to the American.

"No one forced me to come here," the young American said. "I was nervous before I came here, but now it feels like an everyday mission."

An American Air Force sergeant chimed in, "Don't worry about Saddam Hussein. We'll smoke his butt."

end
Saudi Arabia—U.S. missile-firing helicopters, tanks and anti-tank missiles were building up Tuesday to fight an Iraq tank invasion if it comes, and Airborne paratroopers said they were ready for anything including a chemical attack.

The Army's new Apache helicopters, equipped with Hellfire anti-armour missiles, are in Saudi Arabia primarily to fight tanks if necessary, the Apache battalion's commander said.

When asked if the helicopters could stop a column of tanks, Lt. Col. Don Vinson replied: "Absolutely."

F-15 fighter planes have been in Saudi Arabia for a week to fight any Iraq air attack and Airborne paratroopers have brought Sheridan tanks and TOW anti-tank missiles to join the helicopters in fighting any tank attack.

In addition, Marines will begin arriving at Saudi port in the next few days, another commander said, presumably to help the paratroopers and other army troops guard and defend all the U.S. weaponry.

The U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia was ordered by President Bush last week to "draw a line in the sand" and help prevent Iraq from invading.

The Airborne paratroopers told a pool of American reporters and photographers they were ready for anything Iraq could launch, including a gas warfare attack.

"We're trained for it," an Ann Arbor, Michigan, paratrooper said of the possibility of a nerve or mustard gas attack. "If it happens, we're ready for it."

Every paratrooper interviewed by the reporters said he was ready for a chemical attack or anything else that Iraq does.

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and an Italian diplomat said Saddam was relocating chemical munitions closer to the Saudi border.

"I'm a little scared, but...we're ready," said a Norfolk, Virginia, army specialist.

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East, said troops have trained in hot chemical weapon protection suits in western U.S. deserts, where temperatures are comparable to those in Saudi Arabia.

The soldiers also brought 50-caliber guns and tractor vehicles that can fire banks of 12 missiles at a time.

Some of the paratroopers said they were getting bored at a staging area where reporters talked to them and were anxious to get the units closer to the Kuwait border where commanders said Iraq forces that invaded and occupied Kuwait were building up and digging in defensively.

Some of the soldiers past the time with sardonic humor.

When a reporter asked one soldier the precise purpose of the 50-caliber gun mounted on a truck, he replied: "to stay alive, sir."

The pool reporters were also told by Kuwaiti officials that they believe the only way to drive Iraq out of Kuwait would be with military action because economic sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations would take too long.

"Let's be honest, a small country like Kuwait cannot wait for a longtime for sanctions to be effective," said Abdul Rahman Ateeqi, a senior advisor to Kuwait's ousted Emir Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah.

"I don't see any hope other than military action," he said.

The American reporters are in Saudi Arabia as a pool organized by the Defense Department to provide pictures, television film and news reports of the U.S. buildup to the news media of the American press.

They are reporting under rules that prohibit them from saying where U.S. units are in Saudi Arabia, how big the forces are or identifying by name any of the soldiers they talk to, other than commanders.
this is a pool report. pls fax to number supplied with last report.

this written and filed by john king, ap.

SAUDI ARABIA - American forces in Saudi Arabia staged an impressive display of force Tuesday as the massive buildup of U.S. and other foreign troops here continued at a brisk pace.

A Pentagon pool allowed into the kingdom visited with American forces at a number of locations, including a Saudi naval base at which U.S. forces were taking up positions side-by-side with Saudi marines.

The base is located near vital Saudi oil terminals. A detachment of troops from the 82nd Airborne was working Tuesday to secure the area for U.S. Marines due to arrive soon.

While at the base, two lengthy convoys of double-decker buses carrying U.S. troops, followed by jeeps and scores of trucks, passed by on a nearby highway to a barracks area of the sprawling base.

The first Marines to hit Saudi soil arrived Monday at a Saudi commercial port and were being transported to field positions, according to U.S. military officials here.

Planes could be heard arriving at the airbase throughout the night, and the tarmacs on Tuesday were lined with huge American C-5, C-141 and C-130 transport planes. Also seen arriving was a British Airways jet.

Lined up at the airport were dozens of Saudi fighter jets and a smaller contingent of Canadian fighters. Bulldozers, front end loaders, armored vehicles and jeeps brought to the airbase aboard the American transports lined the base roads, and pallet after pallet of munitions, gear, food and other supplies were lined up alongside the roads.

An increasingly familiar site at the base are the massive C-5s with their shark-like nose open and pointing toward the sky while equipment is unloaded.
This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia—The Saudi prince says, jokingly, that the main advantage to being a member of the royal family is it gets him a better table in a restaurant.

Contrary to the opulent "Arabian Nights" image many Americans have of Saudi Arabian royalty, Prince Abdullah Bin Faisal Bin Turki said he grew up modestly, in a Saudi "mud house." It is called that because the exterior walls are made of baked mud.

In an informal meeting with American reporters here, Abdullah said that members of the royal family, who now number as many as 3,000 to 4,000, must carve out their own careers in Saudi society.

He said he studied industrial engineering, learned much of his excellent English watching television, and worked his way through the Saudi civil service.

Now he is the secretary-general of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, Saudi Arabia's two major industrial cities. The commission has 4,000 employees, and Abdullah operates like the chief executive officer of a big corporation.

He said the royal family—like any huge family—had all types of people with different abilities and interests. Though the family is not a political party, he said, some of its members follow government careers.

Membership in the royal family is not a prerequisite for government service. However, the three top positions in the monarchy—the king, the crown prince and the second deputy prime minister—are reserved exclusively for the royal family.

The king also serves as prime minister, and the crown prince as deputy prime minister.

The current prime minister is King Fahd, the crown prince now is Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and the second deputy prime minister, who also serves as defense minister, is Prince Sultan.

But other government ministers may or may not be members of the royal family.

"Some fools like me go into public service," Abdullah said, laughing. "Some are very rich, and some are not so. Some succeed and some don't. It's like any other large family in Saudi Arabia."

Being a member of the royal family, he said, has both advantages and disadvantages. He conceded that if a royal family member was qualified for a position, he would get promoted more rapidly.
But Abdullah said there were disadvantages as well. If a royal family member did poorly in a job, he also would be demoted more quickly and perhaps even ostracized within the family.

"If you are bad, you get spotlighted," he said.

Abdullah said family members also had more responsibilities than ordinary Saudi citizens.

"We are supposed to have our homes open to the public," he said. "We cannot refuse to see people. We have to listen to people. We represent the government with the people and the people with the government."

One of the American newsmen listening to Abdullah commented that royal family members didn’t sound all that much different from US congressmen.
The Vietnam veteran general who is the top-ranking U.S. military officer in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf area offered a bit of advice Thursday to younger troops eager for battle with Iraq.

'Senior military officials who experienced Vietnam consider war 'man at his most ludicrous state,' and hope to avoid combat here, Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Horner said.

Horner said today's troops are trained so hard and so prepared for combat that 'I can understand their eagerness.'

But, 'if they stop and think, they realize war is a loser for everyone,' Horner told a visiting pool of American journalists.

Horner is the top commander in the region and the top deputy to Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. Central Command, which controls U.S. forces in Southwest Asia.

Horner said he was working 'very closely' with Saudi military officials but said many command functions remain to be worked out.

At a lengthy question-and-answer session Thursday he repeatedly declined to answer questions about deployments and strategy, often joking with reporters as he brushed aside their questions.

Asked about accounts from Air Force crew chiefs who reported that Iraqi planes had turned in retreat after weapons aboard US F-15 locked on to them, Horner rolled his eyes and smiled before saying: 'I'd like to answer your question but I choose not to.'
Visitors to a small office at the AWACS site are offered cookies sent by Americans who live in a nearby city. "Ahlân Wasahlan," - Arabic for hello and welcome - is written across a small note attached to each bag of cookies. The note goes on to say:

"These cookies come from American homes... so that you will know how much we appreciate your presence."

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One of the concerns that the folks back at the Pentagon had was how the female soldiers assigned to Operation Desert Shield would fare in Saudi Arabia's strict, male-dominated society.

They needn't have worried, said several female crew members assigned to a U.S. AWACS surveillance plane stationed in Saudi Arabia.

"I thought I was going to run into problems with Saudi men," said a 21-year-old female surveillance technician from Michigan. "But I've had no problems so far. All the Saudi men I've met have been extremely polite."

That's not to say that no cultural misunderstandings exist.

The technician said a Saudi businessman became so enamored of another female crew member that "he offered to buy her from the male crewmen she was with for half a million dollars."

"She was a blonde," said the technician, who is a brunette.

But Saudi and American crews are integrated on the AWACS planes, and the Saudi crew members say they have no difficulty working with the young American women. "It's fun working with them," a Saudi captain said. "We enjoy them. They are nice people."

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POOL CORRECTION:

In a pool report filed Tuesday (?), it was erroneously reported that Canadian jets were on the ground at a Saudi air base. US Air Force officials who had said the planes were Canadian on Thursday said they were mistaken, that the planes were British Tornados and belonged to a Royal Air Force squadron that uses the Canadian Maple Leaf - painted on each of planes' tails - as its insignia.

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**TOTAL PAGE: 002**
SAUDI ARABIA -- The panic began shortly after the invasion of Kuwait, when foreigners living here began to see fliers warning about the danger of a poison gas attack.

"We knew something was happening, but there was no news in the paper or on TV, so people imagined the worst," said an English teacher from New Zealand.

"One chap we know was so panicked that he just left the country and left all his things here," said the New Zealander, who has lived in Saudi Arabia for two years.

Many Americans ran out and bought short-wave radios because, as American oil worker Mike McMahon said, "Word passes kind of slow around here."

Now Saudi television is filled with images of U.S. soldiers unloading tanks, armored vehicles and sophisticated helicopters. The fear of an attack from Iraq seems far more remote than in the days following the Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait.

Some Americans here even offered the arriving troops bags of cookies with the note: "So that you will know how much we appreciate your presence."

Many foreigners have left the area near the border of Kuwait, however, some going home and others fleeing south to the capital of Riyadh.

"A great deal of civilians have left here, especially the families of workers," said Navy Cmdr. Christopher Elles, one of the few U.S. military people living here before last week.

"It's been tense but calm," Elles said.

Life for Americans and other Westerners in Saudi Arabia means living in isolated compounds, oases of green lawns, swimming pools and other reminders of home in the desert.

"There is very little mixing. The cultures are just too disparate," said Bill Walker 43, an English teacher from Monterey, Calif.

"I don't have many Saudi friends, but that doesn't mean the Saudis aren't friendly," he said.

"One reason you can't go into peoples' homes is because of the women," Walker said, explaining that women at a party eat and socialize apart from the men under the Saudis' strict interpretation of Islamic law. The same law limits him to teaching only male students.

Another foreigner was more blunt: "It's like a big monastery. You live around here and you become a connoisseur of ankles."

In public, Saudi women wear floor-length black robes and veils below the eyes. Sometimes their entire faces are covered with a thin black guaze.

American women in Saudi Arabia are not required to wear veils, but many wear long black skirts. The U.S. Embassy here advises: "Sleeveless dresses are offensive, as are tight slacks, shorts and skirts above the knee."

Saudi men wear long white robes called "thobes" over white boxer shorts and T-shirts, a wardrobe that makes enormous sense in the hot climate. They wear sandals or dress shoes and white or red-and-white checked headresses.

Despite the furnace-like heat, American men here wear long pants and shirts buttoned to the collar bone. The Embassy advises: "Visible gold necklaces on men offend many Saudis."

There are an estimated four million foreigners living here along with seven million Saudis. U.S. officials say the foreigners include 25,000 Americans.
The foreigners, who live under tight restrictions and need to be sponsored by a Saudi employer, make up 75 percent of the workforce, according to U.S. figures.

The country is developing at an explosive rate, fueled by the combination of Saudi oil, technicians and experts from industrialized countries and service workers from other Arab countries and Asia.

"There are foreigners here who like it very much, who are interested in our culture, and there are those that should have stayed home," said Mohammed Mulla, a senior professor at the King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals in Dhahran.

"We have the wide range of human temperament in our country," he said. "In the end, people are people. That is God's equal-opportunity affirmative action."

Still, foreigners in Saudi Arabia face a range of restrictions that change their lives, such as having to interrupt their activities five times a day while the Moslems pray. Even television programs are interrupted for prayer.

There also is a total ban on alcohol. "You look like you're looking for a pub," Patricia, an Englishwoman living here, said to four American journalists walking on a busy street.

She quickly provided the name and address of two clandestine bars run by foreigners. She also provided the secret password: "Say you're there to see your girlfriend."

Some foreigners brew their own moonshine called "sediki," which means "my friend" in Arabic.

The Americans seem both enchanted and exasperated with Saudi life. Walker, the English teacher, said that when he mentioned he had a woman professor in college, one of his Saudi students asked to transfer to another class.

"He thought I was scum because I had a woman teacher," Walker said. "But the other students laughed and called him a country bumpkin.

"I like life here," Walker said. "You even get used to the weather, and after a while 100 degrees seems cool."
This is a Defense Department Pool, report number 14. It must be faxed to the Pentagon before release. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.

Somewhere in Saudi Arabia—U.S. women troops say they are shocking and sometimes even angering Saudi men in this country where some Saudi women wear veils, walk behind their husbands and are not supposed to drive.

A woman F-15 fighter ground crew chief said Wednesday that Saudi men stop work and stare when she tells crewmen what to do and that Saudi men reacted so strongly when a ground crew woman took off her shirt to work in a t-shirt underneath that an American sergeant told her to put it back on.

But Saudi soldiers say they see the American woman only as professional soldiers. And a Saudi general said any difference in U.S. and Saudi ideas about women could not disrupt any part of the U.S.-Saudi military operations to prevent an Iraq invasion because Saudi men and American women do not work side by side.

When asked if aircraft ammunition loading, for example, could be halted by an American woman sharply criticizing Saudi men's work, Brig. Gen. Turki bin Nasser said that could not happen.

"They're not working that way," Turki, a base commander, told a pool arranged by the U.S. defense department of American reporters and photographers.

"U.S. people are working on their aircraft. We are working on our aircraft. So I can't see that happening."

Beyond the fact that American and Saudi troops do not work side by side, a Saudi aircraft unit commander told reporters Saudi men see the American military women only as professionals.

"We look at them as soldiers doing their jobs," he said. "They are professional soldiers doing their jobs. It is not unusual."

But the women including the woman ground crew chief said their was no question that Saudi men react with dismay and occasional hostility when they see American women doing what once were considered mens' military jobs—repairing airplanes, driving trucks, serving in non-combat jobs with 82nd Airborne paratroopers and in her case, directing ground crew men.

"I don't think they disagree with what we're doing," the Victoria, Virginia sergeant said. "I think they're more like shocked. There's an American woman. She's doing what men are doing."

For example, she said, several Saudi soldiers stopped their work and watched in amazement in the past few days as she directed a male driver where to maneuver his truck so she could attach the fighter plane's tow bar to it so the plane could be pulled into a hangar.

"I saw amazement," she said. "I saw shock."

She said she saw outright Saudi male hostility when another F-15 ground crew woman took her shirt off on a hot
"They got very emotional about that," she said. "They made a lot of physical movements. I think they asked the sergeant to make her put her shirt back on."

She said she did not know for sure, however, whether the Saudis asked or the American sergeant only decided on his own to tell the woman to put her shirt back on because of the Saudis' strong response.

But she said the U.S. military has put no restrictions on military women other than a dress code that says neither men nor women should wear shorts in public and women should not wear clothes that expose any torso skin above the waist.

"A lot of us like to jog, but that's out," she said. "You can't wear shorts."

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East, told the reporters Sunday that he had issued several orders out of respect for Saudi sensibilities but would issue no orders restricting U.S. service women while they are in Saudi Arabia.

He said he had ordered U.S. soldiers not to take any alcohol or pornography to Saudi Arabia, for example, because both are prohibited there. He also has urged both men and women to respect Saudi sensibilities.

But when asked if he also would order any restrictions on women troopers while they are in Saudi Arabia, he replied: "Absolutely not."
Although U.S. analysts believe the Saudi government is extremely stable, in recent years the Kingdom has faced both Iranian-backed terrorism and the threat of insurgency among the Shiite minority in its Eastern Province, according to informed sources in Saudi Arabia.

In the last few years seven or eight Saudi diplomats have been killed in Thailand, Turkey, and other posts abroad. In addition, several Saudi airline offices overseas have been bombed, says a well-placed source. He said it is believed that the attacks were paid for by Iran and carried out by Lebanese Shiites trained by the Syrians. Saudi Arabia has tightly held information about attacks on its facilities and personnel abroad.

Another source said that the threat of Iranian strikes or sabotage within Saudi Arabia had also been rated high for a number of years. The possible targets of such attacks included Aramco and other oil facilities, as well as U.S. diplomats. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, that threat assessment had been downgraded to "medium." The source noted that the Saudis tightly control access to the Kingdom in order to prevent such attacks. He stressed that the danger of terrorist actions is thought to come from abroad and not from the country's Shiite minority.

The likelihood of terrorist attack against the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was also downgraded several months ago, said one source. He noted that this reassessment had been made over bitter objections from some American officials.

Since the early 1980s, U.S. Embassies in the region have employed tight security measures, with senior diplomats often travelling in heavily-armored cars.

The threat of insurgency among Shiites in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province has also been considered significant in recent years, say the sources. In 1980, riots in the city of Qatif were put down hard by Saudi security, resulting in what one source described as "numerous" deaths. Similar rioting in 1985 was suppressed by police with violence but without loss of life.
the sources say.

Since the early 1980s, the Saudi government has made a concerted effort to improve the lot of the Shiites in the Eastern Province. The area is administered by Mohammed bin Faisal, a member of the royal family.
pool report for pentagon, needs to be faxed.

desk: ple combine this and the hospital story to follow into one
pool report, but ple separate the material with a dash and keep
the two datelines, their separate issues, and I presume separate
stories for our wire but for numbering purposes one pool report.

thnx,

jks

PENTAGON PUBLIC AFFAIRS:

we have lost count of pool report numbers because we have no
hard copies, so, from now on we'll go by date and number for our
numbering, making this 16-1, the first for aug. 16.

written and filed by john king, ap

SAUDI ARABIA - Iraqi fighters on several occasions have turned
in retreat after weapons systems aboard American jets have locked
onto the Iraqi targets, several Air Force crew chiefs said Thursday.
"They don't want to play with us," one crew chief told a
reporter with a visiting pool of American journalists.

If I were in a Mirage and an F-15 locked onto me, I'd get out
of there fast too," the chief told an Associated Press reporter.

Col. John McEwan, commander of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing
from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, refused to confirm the
reports and said he had instructed his pilots not to discuss any
encounters with Iraqi jets.

"I'm not going to get into our encounters," he said. But he
did say he considered the U.S. air power here far superior to
Iraq's. "We're not over here to go to war; we're over here to keep
the peace. ... We will not start a war but we will finish one
quickly in the air."

But another officer in the unit and several crew chiefs said
weapons systems aboard U.S. F-15s have locked onto Iraqi jets
several times during flight missions near the Kuwait-Saudi border.

"One of my pilots told me they turn and run as soon as the
radar locks on," one crew chief said. "There's been a little cat
and mouse but when the weapons lock on they're gone," said another.

When asked again later about the encounters reported by crew
chiefs, McEwan said: "All I'll do is remind you our radar can
lock on at a pretty good range. Beyond that you'll have to ask the
Iraqis."

McEwan said the fighter unit felt somewhat vulnerable on the
ground when his unit first arrived last week but now have
coordinated missions with the Saudis and received powerful ground
protection from other U.S. forces, including the massive Patriot
ground to air missile systems.

The reporters visited with the fighter wing Thursday morning at
a Saudi Air base where it has set up camp, using spare Saudi
hangars, maintenance garages and other facilities. Ground rules for
the Pentagon pool operation prohibit the release of the exact
location or the exact number of planes and other weapons systems,
or the publication of the names of non-command officers.

The troops are living in Saudi barracks and schools right now
but a tent city is under construction on the base, as is a portable
hospital that already is treating about 15 cases of heat stress a
day, according to Air Force officials interviewed Thursday morning.

McEwan said the Saudi base facilities are the best he has ever
seen. "The Saudis build everything big and everything right," he
said.
The interviews were conducted between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. local time, when temperatures already were approaching triple digits and the sun was scorching the open base. One Air Force sergeant was taken to the hospital during the pool's visit for a minor case of heat stress. He had been swinging a sledge hammer for several hours helping to set up the tents.

McBroom and his crew chiefs and maintenance personnel said they had very few equipment problems associated with the heat. Most of the planes are being kept outdoors in the heat because electronic systems sometimes have temporary troubles when going from a cool to hot environment, McBroom said.

The Air Force has extensive stocks of missiles for the jets, and crews were seen unloading boxes of 20 mm shells for their onboard guns as well.

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written and filed by john king, ap.

SAUDI ARABIA - The U.S. military is treating about 15 cases of minor heat stress a day and rushing to set up medical facilities for the growing number of American forces here, Air Force officials said Thursday.

The officials spoke at the first U.S. military hospital set up in Saudi Arabia, a series of portable tent structures that look much like those from the M.A.S.H. television series.

Already up and running is a small ward for outpatient care and an overnight ward. A portable, two-bed operating room was under construction and due to be completed by day's end.

An Air Force major running the facility said it was the first American medical center in the kingdom but that the Army was sending in similar equipment and the Air Force likely would send more.
The major, whose name cannot be used because of ground rules for the Pentagon pool operation, said most patients so far have been for minor heat stress, with the treatment prescribed either simply rehydration by drinking water or, in more severe cases, the intravenous injection of nutrient-laden fluids. He said there have not yet been any reported cases of heat stroke, a more serious heat-related ailment. He said 15 a day was a low number considering the size of the U.S. deployment here.

He said the overnight ward had been not needed yet but added, "I'm sure it will be by tonight."

U.S. troops are being told to drink at least six gallons of water a day but even with that, several interviewed over the past few days have said they are finding it impossible to adjust to the Saudi desert heat.

"We'll never get used to it, all we can do is drink and drink and complain a bit," one Air Force captain said Thursday.

"If you asked everybody they'd all say we'd rather go home but we've got a job to do," said an Air Force sergeant.

At the outpatient ward, several patients were receiving treatment for heat stress; one through intravenous fluids.

"This is your fault, colonel," the man said jokingly to his commanding officers, Air Force Col. John McBroom.

Another man under McBroom's command, a 28-year-old sergeant from Sarasota, Fla., said he fell ill after several hours of swinging a sledgehammer while setting up tents in near 100-degree weather.

"I didn't take enough breaks at all," he said.

McBroom visited the tent site and told the men and women to knock off work until nightfall, when temperatures generally drop into the 60s.

"Ninety-five percent of them will go so hard at it, even in this heat, that you have to pull them back," said McBroom, who was like a father with his troops just minutes after showing his fighter-pilot bravado while briefing reporters about U.S. air power in the Saudi kingdom.

Also receiving treatment at the facility was an Army tank gunner with the 82nd Airborne who fractured his finger back home at Fort Bragg but then aggravated the injury here. And in the back of the outpatient ward and Air Force dentist was doing some crown work on an Air Force nurse from New Jersey.

The major said the facility could handle virtually any injury or trauma, including treatment of soldiers affected by chemical weapons.

He said those forces would have to be decontaminated first before being allowed into the hospital for treatment.

"We can treat large numbers of casualties and do so quite successfully," he said.

The major said Hepatitis A and certain parasitic infections were common to Saudi Arabia and that malaria was a concern in some parts of the kingdom.

The major said there was "not much in the way of local hospital support" but said two Navy hospital ships are coming to the region to be available if needed.

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This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia-A tent city for a US Air Force fighter wing took shape here in the desert Thursday in what American commanders said was a deployment bigger than anything in the Vietnam War.

The tent city, complete with air conditioning and a 50-bed field hospital, will house at least 1,100 men and women of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing from Langley Air Force Base, Va. Some of the airmen also are staying in Saudi barracks and two elementary schools vacated by the Saudis to house American troops.

The tent city was being assembled at a vast Saudi Air Base here, where American F-15 fighters are on alert to maintain air superiority over anything the Iraqi air force might throw at Saudi Arabia.

"We have a well-integrated air defense network here," said the wing commander, Col. John McBroom. "I have no qualms that we'll be able to do our mission."

He said that co-operation from his Saudi Arabian hosts had been outstanding. For example, he said the Saudis had cleared out the two elementary schools so his crews would have air conditioned places to sleep and rest.

Earlier, the wing had set up a field kitchen, which served 500 for breakfast Thursday, including soldiers from a Patriot missile battery here.

McBroom and the officer in charge of setting up the tent city, Col. Dave Peesbles, both said they had never seen a deployment of troops and equipment as big, even in Vietnam.

"This is an awesome airlift," McBroom said. "You don't get them any bigger than this."

McBroom's wing is the oldest in the Air Force-dating back to 1917-and the F-15 fighter with his name on it is decorated with the World War I hat-in-the-ring insignia of Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker.

About 40 men and women of McBroom's wing were working and sweating in the desert heat Thursday, assembling air-conditioned tents and the ATH, for air-transportable hospital.

Assembling the tents consisted mainly of drilling holes in the solid rock under the sand and driving in stakes with old-fashioned sledge hammers.

McBroom, who said everybody was a volunteer in a combat situation, was rotating his men and women from their regular jobs into building the tent city and hospital.

- more -
About mid-morning, he decided to call a halt, and issued orders to wrap up the operation for the day. From now on, he said, the men and women would work only at night and early in the morning.

Even in the morning, the heat was so intense that the troops putting up the tents could only work 20 minutes at a stretch before resting and drinking water. They are told to drink a quart of water an hour.

But a 26-old-airman from Sarasota, Fla., who usually issues fuel for aircraft, overdid it and nearly dropped over in the heat because he had not taken enough breaks from swinging his sledge hammer. He wound up in the field hospital, under the care of the unit's nurses.

"I just got kind of nauseous and weak," he said. "But I'll get back at it. That's what we're here for."

Lt. Col. Susan Helm of Goodrich, Mich., the chief nurse, said the biggest problems so far were heat-related. But she said the hospital expected to have to deal with other diseases related to food, water and improper sanitation.

She said everyone in the unit felt good about setting up the hospital because they had just gone through an exercise doing the same thing in May at Langley Air Force Base.

"This is designed to support the wing, and the wing's here," she said. "We like to be around our people."

Maj. Rich Williams, the hospital commander, said he was ready to treat patients if the Iraqis launched a massive chemical warfare attack.

He said any soldiers injured would go to a decontamination unit in the hospital complex, where all the gas would be washed off their bodies, then to the hospital for treatment.

Williams also said the doctors, nurses and other personnel joked a lot about how they resembled the famous "MASH" television series. He said he was the Col. Potter of the group, and others were starting to pick up nicknames as well.

Sitting in a dentist's chair in the hospital was Col. Carolyn Masson of Marlton, N.J., who is in charge of 126 flight nurses and technicians who will provide first aid and prepare patients for air evacuation. She had popped a crown off a tooth and was having it re-cemented.

The hospital had just barely been set up—the operating rooms still had not been assembled—and it was still hot inside because of an initial shortage of freon. But everyone expected to have the whole complex up and running soon.

"Just tell Americans that these people are dedicated and they're working their bums off," McBroom said. "We do believe we can take care of ourselves."

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04:15:17 Thu 08/16/90
This is a Defense Department Pool, report number 16-4. It must be faxed to the Pentagon for release. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.

Incorporates earlier radar lock on quotes.

Somewhere in Saudi Arabia - The commander of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia said Thursday he had some measure of Iraq's ability to launch a chemical weapons attack and was ready to deal with it.

"We're prepared to handle the threat that we face in that regard," Lt. Gen. Charles Horner told a pool of reporters and photographers organized by the Defense Department.

"What we do is look at the numbers, what we know of their capability and then we prepare to respond to it," he said. "As far as I'm concerned, we're prepared."

Earlier, ground crew chiefs said Iraqi planes had fled in the past week when weapons radar on U.S. F-15 fighter planes locked onto them near the Saudi-Iraq border.

Horner said he would not talk about such encounters.

But the ground crew chiefs said that pilots told them Iraqi planes on their own side of the border had turned and fled when weapons radar on U.S. F-15s on the Saudi side of the border locked onto them.

Warning systems tell pilots when another plane's weapon radar has locked onto them, ready to shoot if there is a confrontation between the two planes.

"There has been a little cat and mouse but when the weapons lock on they're (Iraqi planes) gone," the crew chief said.

Col. John McBroom, commander of the first tactical fighter wing, would not confirm the encounters but told the pool reporters: "All I'll do is remind you our radars can lock on at pretty good range."

McBroom told Reuters later that none of the Iraqi planes have strayed across the border into Saudi Arabia.

"They have not come across the border," he said. "They're being careful. Very careful."

The hospital commander at the F-15 base said he was ready if Iraq launched a massive chemical weapons attack.

"Yeah, we could treat large numbers of chemical casualties and do so quite successfully," the commander said.

He said pilots or soldiers injured by nerve or mustard gas, despite the protection suits they would wear in a chemical attack, would go first to a decontamination unit for the chemicals to be washed off their bodies and then would be admitted to the hospital.

When Gen. Horner was asked to confirm the fighter plane weapons radar incidents or any other encounters between U.S. and Iraq forces, he said he would not talk about such matters.

But he did confirm that U.S., Saudi and other forces had not yet reached agreement on a command structure for coordinating the joint military build up to deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia.

However, he said a plan has been in place from the time U.S. forces began arriving last week on how they would cooperate with Saudi forces if Iraq attacked.

"Obviously we don't have the finished product (the command structure) yet," he said "but I can tell you from the first day we were here we said 'What are we going to do if they attack now?' and that's the way we have been structuring it every day."

When asked if he or a Saudi general was in overall command, he said "we work together."
written by Michael Ross of the Los Angeles Times.

SAUDI ARABIA--Nowhere does history seem to repeat itself more quickly than it does in the turbulent Middle East.

Just over three years ago, the skittish sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf watched with a concern that bordered on alarm as American naval forces converged on this part of the world to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers and safeguard the shipping lanes then being menaced by Iran.

The fear then was that the U.S. presence would escalate the Iran-Iraq war, invite Iranian retribution and leave the Arab regimes that rim the southern side of the Gulf even more exposed than before. "We have to live here. You don't," a senior Arab official said at the time. "If you widen the war beyond your ability to control it, we will end up paying the price long after you leave."

Barely a year later, however, those fears had been dispelled. Demonstrating on more than a few occasions that it was not afraid of a fight with Iran, the United States proved its determination to safeguard the flow of oil to the West.

Now, move the clock forward and shift the scene westward a few hundred miles, into the searing sands of the Arabian Desert.

Kuwait, once again, is the hapless victim. The stakes
are similar—oil, although this time a lot more of it. And as U.S. forces—land, sea and air—converge on the region once more, similar fears are gnawing away at the political calculations of the region’s nervous rulers.

The humiliation of having to call in foreigners, not to mention Israel’s closest ally, to settle Arab affairs "represents a dangerous political liability for all of these fragile regimes," a diplomat who spent many years in the region said.

For Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, a monarch who recoils from confrontation and strives for consensus in all dealings with his fellow Arabs, the decision to invite foreign intervention must have been particularly painful.

"Some countries thrive on conflict. We have tremendous dislike for it," a senior Saudi official said.

Nevertheless, there was a crucial difference this time. Whatever the Saudi monarch’s misgivings were, they paled beside the immediate threat that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein posed to the balance of power throughout the region following his army’s invasion of Kuwait Aug. 2.

"The way he runs Iraq, the way he thinks and acts...(Saddam) is a Hitler," said Sheik Ali Khalifa al Sabah, the finance minister of the ousted Kuwaiti government and a member of its ruling family. "He wants not only to ‘lead’ the Arab world by force, he wants to rule the world through oil."

Now, as the largest U.S. expeditionary force ever deployed since the Vietnam War digs into the sands of eastern Arabia, Saudi officials and diplomats interviewed by visiting reporters seem uncertain as to how the crisis

- more -
will unfold.

But on one point there seems to be a firm consensus: Iraq must not be allowed to keep Kuwait.

If the Gulf states once were worried about how they would live with Iran after U.S. forces left, they are now much more concerned about how they will live with Iraq if U.S. forces don't stay.

"Yes, we have certain sensitivities about the American presence here," a Saudi official acknowledged. "But these troops are not here because of us. They are here because of him (Saddam Hussein). He created all of this. We cannot compromise our security. We cannot be sensitive when it comes to a threat like this."


But they are quickly acclimatizing themselves to the American presence in much the same way as the newly arriving troops are becoming used to the blistering desert sun, which routinely sends temperatures soaring past 115F.

"The Americans are our friends," said a Saudi Air Force pilot. "We are here for the same mission--the defense of Saudi Arabia."

Officially, the purpose of the U.S. presence, which grows larger by the day, is to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. But it also serves a less tangible--and in the long term possibly more important--purpose of stiffening Saudi resolve by insulating the kingdom from
Iraqi intimidation.

It is on this point, Saudi officials and diplomats agree, that Hussein may have made his gravest miscalculation.

"Clearly he thought he could intimidate the rest of the Arab world into letting him keep Kuwait," one diplomat said. "What he did not count on was the immediate American and Western response, which then served to embolden the other Arabs."

The Arab response, the diplomat added, was a crucial follow-on. In deciding to send token forces to join the Americans, Egypt, Syria and Morocco have provided a face-saving Arab cover for what is still essentially a foreign force.

What happens next is not clear. Everyone hopes--but without much conviction--that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council will eventually bring Hussein to his knees, if not to his senses.

But sanctions have a poor track record. They often take months to have real effect, by which time the resolve to maintain them is usually wavering.

Hussein also has a trump card in the form of the several thousand foreigners in Kuwait and Iraq who are now hostages in all but name. "How strong will the west's resolve be several months from now, when these Americans, West Europeans and Asian hostages are starving?" wonders an Arab diplomat.

It is hoped that, as Iraqis themselves start to go hungry, Hussein may be overthrown. There have been coup attempts before--and the fact that Hussein has survived
them all underscores the difficulties potential plotters face. Hussein's control over the regime is so tight that "no one can really count on a coup to save the day, at least not in the short run," an Arab expert on Iraqi politics said.

Slowly, the conviction is growing that "the only solution," in the words of a Kuwaiti official, "is a military solution."

Saudi officials say they do not underestimate the difficulties of trying to oust an occupation army of some 150,000 Iraqi troops from Kuwait by force. The military costs of such a move could be politically unacceptable and in the end there might not be much left of tiny Kuwait for its exiled rulers to reclaim.

Instead, the not-so-secret hope of some Saudi officials is that Hussein may yet be pressured into withdrawing--or goaded into making the mistake of his life.

Hussein's startling acceptance on Wednesday of Iran's long-standing conditions for formally ending the Gulf war is viewed here as a dramatic admission of the gravity of his position.

"Iraq got very little out of the Gulf war, which took eight years and cost a million lives," a Saudi official noted. "For Saddam now to surrender what little territory he did gain is a sign of desperation."

The calculation is that, if Hussein gets desperate enough, he may strike out in a way that justifies a major military retaliation.

"We don't want to go to war. We don't want to fire the first shot, but at the same time the status quo is
SAUDI ARABIA - A senior Saudi military official on Wednesday discounted Iraq's ability to hit populated Saudi areas with chemical weapons and said many of the command responsibilities of the burgeoning multinational defense force here remain unresolved.

Brig. Gen. Turki Bin Nasser, a member of the Saudi royal family, said his forces had no qualms about fighting fellow Arabs should Iraqi troops attack the kingdom and said he believed there are enough troops here to thwart any such attack.

"We would not like to see Arabs fighting Arabs but if we have to we will do it," he said. "If anybody wants to come to the kingdom and attack we will fight to defend ourselves."

The general, in a meeting with American journalists at a Saudi air base, said Saudi, American and British pilots were conducting joint missions but that many command responsibilities have yet to be worked out.

"We hope the higher authorities will solve the problems of command and control," Turki said. "We have not solved that yet."

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney is to visit Saudi Arabia later this week, presumably to discuss those issues.

Turki said that in the event of combat with Iraq "there must be a command and control structure" but he said during joint operations conducted in the past several days "we haven't faced any problems yet."

Turki met with a visiting pool of journalists at a Saudi Air base he commands. It was the latest in an unprecedented series of visits of Americans to Saudi defense installations.

Hours before the meeting with Turki, the journalists were allowed into Saudi jet hangars and maintenance facilities that one Saudi military officials said are off limits to many Saudis.

The pool spent most of the day with Saudi military officials but also saw further evidence of the growing American presence here, including the first-ever field deployment of the massive Patriot ground-to-air missile system.

Transport planes continued to arrive around the clock, and heavy artillery and other equipment is arriving to reinforce the lighter forces first deployed here a week ago.

Comments by Turki left the impression that military planners expect foreign troops to remain in Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi forces in Kuwait for some time even if a settlement is negotiated soon.

"It always takes longer to pull troops out than it takes to bring them in," he said.

He would not answer specifically when asked how long Saudi Arabia would want American troops to remain after any negotiated settlement that involved Iraq leaving Kuwait.

He also gave an indirect answer when asked if Saudi Arabia would need outside military help as long as Iraq's Saddam Hussein held power.

"The political situation in this region, it changes every day," he said. "If I told you three weeks ago that Iraq was to invade Kuwait you would have told me I was crazy."

American forces dispatched here have carried with them special suits and masks designed to protect them from Iraq's formidable chemical and gas weapons.

But Turki said he did not believe Iraq had the capacity to accurately launch chemical warheads with its ground missiles and said the Saudi and other air forces here should be able to
"As far as we know he doesn't have means of delivery with ballistic missiles but he has the means if they are carried by aircraft," Turki said of Iraq's chemical threat. "Air to air I have no problem."

Turki declined to offer a personal opinion when asked whether he believed it would take military force to oust Iraq from Kuwait. "I would leave that to the politicians," he said. "We are here to defend the country should anything happen."

He said the Saudi military needed the help from the United States and other nations simply because of Iraq's huge army. "If you face a million-man army you have to have a large enough force to deter it and to fight it if you need to," he said.

He said the Saudi government was not concerned by Saddam Hussein's attempts to rally Arab support by accusing Saudi Arabia of selling out to the West. "We see nothing wrong in defending our country," he said. "Whoever doesn't like it, that's his problem."

He said Iraqi forces still were taking up defensive positions near the Saudi-Kuwait border but said the threat of an attack remained significant. "If it wasn't real we wouldn't have all these forces here. Because of all this force, there is a deterrent to them."

He said the Iraqi invasion was evidence that the Saudis should be allowed to purchase more military equipment from the United States and other Western nations. Turki also said the Saudis were considering an enlargement of their military forces.

Turki, in a playful tone, said Iraqi military officers who fought in the Iran-Iraq war "should take him (Saddam) to court" for offering Wednesday to return captured territory to Iran.

But even if Iran and Iraq settle border disputes he said he doubted Iraq would send troops now along that border south into Kuwait. "I think both of them don't trust each other and I don't think he is going to pull forces out of that area," Turki said.
unacceptable to us," the Saudi official said.

"So our course now," he added, "is to wait. Wait and hope that all the pressure will force Saddam into committing either a good mistake by withdrawing, or a bad one by going forward."

endit
SAUDI ARABIA - Both American troops and their Saudi allies are experiencing some culture shock these days.

The most obvious surprise for the Saudi forces has been the high profile of women in the U.S. military, particularly the Air Force.

And the U.S. forces face the prospect of a lengthy stay in a country where alcohol is illegal, shorts are considered offensive and virtually all activity grinds to a halt five times a day for prayers. Even Saudi soldiers, some of whom are working side by side with Americans, stop for prayers.

For now, as they are briefed on Saudi and Muslim customs and try to get accustomed to the searing heat, Americans troops are not being allowed to make recreation trips into Saudi cities, although some are housed temporarily at local hotels.

The Saudis have been extraordinarily gracious hosts, even as they are occasionally taken aback by the ways of their allies. But both Saudi and American officials say there likely will be at least a few incidents if the U.S. military presence here is a prolonged one, a prospect that appears increasingly likely.

"When you have two cultures that are so different, so fundamentally different, there are bound to be some conflicts," a Saudi government minister said this week. "But we are confident that we can keep them to a minimum."

The culture clash comes at an already stressful period of Saudi history. The oil boom took Arabia out of obscurity and the past two decades have brought an incredible development boom in major oil and urban areas. The Saudis are reaching out to the West for help in development and business, while at the same time fighting to maintain their strict, religious traditions.

"It is a delicate balance, one we are trying to manage and, we think, doing so for the most part successfully," a prominent Saudi
businessman said this week after a dinner he hosted for visiting American journalists.

To help keep the balance, the Saudis have tight restrictions on foreigners; only those with work contracts are allowed into the country and almost all of them live in walled-off compounds.

Suddenly, thousands more Americans are on Saudi soil, most of them young and unfamiliar with Arab and Saudi traditions.

The U.S. military is taking a number of steps designed to keep Saudi-American interaction, military actions excepted, to a minimum. Troops interviewed this week seemed to understand, although they're not always happy about it.

"The guys sure would like a cold one," a female Air Force captain said Thursday in an interview conducted on the sun-drenched tarmac of a Saudi airbase.

"Tell the folks back home to send in the Budweiser plane," an Army tank gunner said earlier in the week.

Some of the misunderstandings are innocent, but, to the Saudis, offensive. Several Saudi military officials were sitting with U.S. troops early in the week when the Americans served field rations for lunch. Two pork dishes were among the choices offered; Muslims do not eat pork.

The greatest cultural adjustment for both sides revolves around the presence of hundreds of U.S. military women here for Operation Desert Shield.

A group of Saudi airmen stood in stunned silence the other day as an American woman working a supply line in the triple-digit heat stripped down to her T-shirt. She was asked to put her uniform shirt back on.

And an Air Force captain assigned to an AWACS plane said she often finds Saudi airmen assigned to the crews staring at her.

"They seem shocked at first, but they're extremely polite and I think they're getting used to it," the North Carolina native said.

"It must be a strange sight for them."

Indeed it must.
reported and written by john king, ap.

xxx it must.

While the co-ed U.S. military forces banter about, Saudi men and women rarely interact in public beyond quiet conversation. And most Saudi women wear ankle-length black robes, covering their heads and usually their faces with black headresses and veils.

Saudis consider it offensive for women to wear pants, particularly shorts or blue jeans, and Saudi women will hiss at women they consider dressed inappropriately. The women in the U.S. military contingent have been advised to wear the robes -- abayas -- when they venture out in public.

"I think it would be too risky to go downtown without it," a 21-year-old (female) Air Force senior airman from Mount Clemens, Mich., said Thursday. "I'm not going to take any chances."

It's unclear when the U.S. forces will be able to wander about in Saudi cities. Officers from each of the services said this week some recreational activities will have to be planned if the stay here drags on much longer, and there is every indication that it will.

"We are guests of the Saudis and we need to be aware of their cultural concerns," said Air Force Col. John McBroom. "We'll brief them (American troops) and tell them what to do and not to do and if they don't do it right we'll send them home. It's that simple."

Americans who work here say it is rare for Saudis to become close friends with Americans but that cordial professional relations are not uncommon. Rarely are Americans invited into Saudi homes, they say, in part because they are not supposed to see Saudi women when they are not wearing abayas and veils.

"There will probably be some panic among both Americans and Saudis when there are clashes of the cultures," said Bill Walker, a 43-year-old from Monterey, Calif., who teaches English at a Saudi university.
"The cultures are just too disparate," he said when asked why American-Saudi friendships are rare.

Yet both Saudis and Americans who have lived here for some time say there are fewer problems than one might expect when two such diverse cultures meet.

Americans have been on Saudi soil since the 1930s, when an expedition drilling for water struck oil, triggering Arabia's interaction with the Western world.

"I think we Saudis always, because of the oil find, have associated Americans with our good fortune," a Saudi government official said over lunch this week. "We are very different, but we have a positive bond."

A Saudi physician offered this explanation for the generally good relations between Saudis and Americans.

"Our cultures are so different that neither side has much of a chance of imposing major changes on the other," he said. "So we accept that and develop relationships without prying into the private affairs of others."

Members of the Saudi elite in essence lead dual lives; most were educated in the West and some own homes in the United States.

"It is many of us, the Saudis who travel to the states and see the crime and drugs, that are trying to keep hold of our conservative traditions," the businessman said.

The physician had this advice for military planners:

"If the Saudis feel overwhelmed there will be tension," he said. "So while some contact is inevitable, it probably would be best kept to a minimum."

AP-WX-06-17-90 0728EDT <
U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia are under strict orders to avoid initiating combat in response to actions by Iraq that fall short of actual combat or an unambiguous invasion of Saudi land or air space, according to American military officials here.

Some analysts have expressed concern that, as Saddam Hussein's options diminish, the Iraqi leader might attempt to "trick" American or Saudi forces into shooting first. Unless there were clear evidence that an attack by Iraq was imminent, such an action could significantly decrease international political support for the military and economic measures that have been put into place against Iraq.

Threatening actions that could tempt a preemptive response by the U.S. might include Iraq's sending warplanes streaking toward — but not across — the Saudi border. Another such action might be Iraq's activating the radars on its long-range surface-to-surface missiles.

The current rules of engagement for American forces have been carefully worked out with the Saudis to guard against either force launching an attack by accident or in response to a feint by Iraq.

Late last week, an Iraqi reconnaissance plane crossed briefly into Saudi airspace, said one senior U.S. officer. Contrary to some press reports, however, the plane was not fired on by Saudi air defenses, the officer said. "The rules of engagement are very explicit" in requiring that Iraqi aggression or intrusions be unambiguous in order to trigger Saudi or U.S. military action, the officer explained. In the case last week it is believed that the plane may have strayed over Saudi territory unintentionally.

"We're very aware of the Vincennes syndrome," said the officer, referring to a 1987 incident in which the U.S. Navy downed an Iranian passenger jet in the Persian Gulf.

Referring to the threat of Iraqi feints involving warplanes or surface-to-surface missiles in Kuwait or southern Iraq, another high-ranking U.S. combat officer said: "We accept that that stuff is there. That means we face a certain amount of danger. But we have to be careful not to keep our finger too tightly on the trigger."
ssl fax to pentagon public affairs office.

unsolicited advice: never, ever agree to trek through a pitch-black desert with the united states army.

(fyi: scott applewhite survived as well and bly filed pool foto of this exercise)

POOL REPORT 18-1

SAUDI ARABIA _ The sergeant is halfway done with digging his first foxhole on his first night in the Arabian desert when word comes to pull back.

He swings his shovel in protest until the reason, transmitted by whisper, makes its way down the line: the platoon is out of position.

"We're too far out in front of the rest of the company," says the sergeant. "They could be firing and killing us."

The shovels are put away, rucksacks quickly packed and the platoon within minutes makes a short retreat, guided to its new site by a dim fluorescent signal flashed by a sister platoon several hundred yards away.

Platoon 22 _ the second platoon of the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade _ digs in again.

A few minutes later, the company commander is explaining to a reporter that the platoon had taken position far enough out front to be hit by friendly mortar and machine gun fire. The captain isn't happy, but shrugs it off.

"He's our newest platoon leader," he said. "It's good to get him out here to practice."

Friday night's exercises were just that _ practice _ on the first night the Saudi government allowed American troops to train long after sundown. More such drills, including some joint exercises with Saudi troops, are planned.

The first night desert training, witnessed by two reporters and a photographer, demonstrated the formidable challenges American forces would face in a desert war in the Middle East. And it provided journalists the first chance to spend extended time with some young men who would help fight that war, a diverse group from throughout America _ some eager to fight, some terrified by the prospect, but all united in the hopes the crisis will be resolved soon, either through combat or diplomacy.

"We're here sweating because our lives may depend on it," one private said as he carried a 50-pound pack through 95-degree evening heat. "But it's really not up to us. Our lives are in the politicians' hands."

The sun was just beginning its descent when the three platoons began the exercise, walking in a V-shaped formation roughly three miles into the seemingly endless Arabian desert. As the sun dropped off the horizon, a herd of camels traipsed by the curious Americans.

The soldiers' packs are extra heavy because of the need to carry more water. During a break, a 20-year-old medic from Newburgh, N.Y., lightens his load by taking a few gulps. The infantrymen he is there to help drop into a circular perimeter, their weapons aimed across the darkening terrain.

"Finding the courage is tough _ it's scary out here," says the medic. "But you've got to swallow that and go out and do it."

Inside his bag are needles with the antidotes to certain chemical weapons; the medic prays they will not be needed.

"We just want to go back to the states and be with our kids," he says.
None of a dozen soldiers interviewed under the sparkling desert sky knows when the trip home will be. Some ask aloud whether they will make it. Most hope diplomacy forces Iraq from Kuwait; a few would rather take on the forces of Saddam Hussein now.

"If it would get us home faster, then let's go kick him out of Kuwait," one private says. "What we have now is hurry up and wait. It's frustrating."

It is so dark that one can move around virtually unnoticed; so quiet you can hear whispers. Much of the talk is idle chatter.

"The sky is just like the sky back home," one soldier says to his sidekick in a two-man foxhole. "But it just isn't the same unless I'm sitting out on my back porch," is the response.

Just a few yards away, another soldier tells a passerby: "My wife is having our baby in five weeks. I wish I could just say hello."

A radio man with the medic begins a sentence saying "If Saddam doesn't pull out of Kuwait..." The medic completes the thought, "...he'll be squished like a grape."

The men are barely in their foxholes when word comes to head back to their transport trucks, a nearly three-mile walk in total darkness.

Those in the back of the line can see the shadows of just the few men ahead. In training, one sergeant says, soldiers have been known to stop, thinking a tree several feet ahead in the darkness is the man they are supposed to follow.

"That cuts you off from the front," he says. "And if you get cut off, you die."

There are no trees in the Saudi desert, but the going is treacherous in the dark because of short, sharp shrubs underfoot and small dunes that turn a walk to a stumble.

During the trek, most of the soldiers say they understand they have to be here, and are ready to fight to defend the Saudi kingdom. These are the troops - airborne paratroopers - who got here first, when they had little firepower to back them up.

"When they called us out, we thought we were going to drop right into a war," the medic says.

Helicopters on night flights pass by in the distance, a reminder much more U.S. firepower is in the region now.

As they wait, the 82nd Airborne forces train about 12 hours a day. They have some complaints - the lack of mail chief among them - but say morale is high and that they complain largely because there is little else to do.

"It's Army tradition," one sergeant says with a laugh. "But we're fine."

A reporter keeps asking what it would be like to fight in the desert. The soldiers keep asking what it's like back home.

"Please tell them we'll be back," a lieutenant says. "We just don't know when."

jk

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** TOTAL PAGE: 001 **
This is a Defense Department pool report 18-2. Please fax to pentagon (693-6853), written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.<eop>

Saudi Arabian foreign minister Saud Faisal said Saturday his country wants a U.N. military boycott to force Iraq out of Kuwait, and then international cooperation to keep Iraq out of Kuwait.<eop>

"They are considering military action in the United Nations," the foreign minister said at a press conference, referring to a military boycott.<eop>

"The United Nations now is in consultation to see whether some action more than the (present U.S.) boycott is required," he said. "We wholeheartedly support that action."<eop>

Saudi officials said the foreign minister was referring to informal discussions in the United Nations in the past week on the world body joining the present U.S. boycott against Iraq. They said a U.N. boycott was the next step beyond the sanctions the U.N. has already imposed against Iraq for invading and annexing Kuwait.<eop>

The U.S. Navy intercepted two Iraqi coastal vessels Friday under new orders to enforce U.S. boycott, U.S. Defense Department officials said. They said the Iraqi ships were empty and so were allowed to proceed.<eop>

Faisal also said international defense cooperation should continue even if the boycott succeed in driving Iraq out of Kuwait.<eop>

"Hopefully the new international order that will come at this period of tremendous change in the international community will be based on international cooperation for legitimate defense and opposition to aggression," he said.<eop>

The Saudi Arabian foreign minister said he saw no way to end the confrontation with Iraq without military action unless Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and restores the leaders it ousted there.<eop>

"Unless these two principles are accepted by Iraq, I do not see any prospect of a diplomatic settlement," he said.<eol>
This is a Defense Department Pool Report 18-3. Please fax to Pentagon (693-6853), written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.<eop>

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - Oil Minister Hisham Nazer said Saturday that Saudi Arabia will act on its own to boost oil production to help make up for lost Iraq and Kuwait exports unless OPEC agrees to an immediate meeting.<eop>

"We do not want to take unilateral action," Nazer said. "But if they refuse to meet, they leave us no alternative."<eop>

Saudi Arabia has called for a special meeting of the 13-member Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to consider steps to take following the August 2 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq which sent oil markets soaring. Iraq is opposed to the meeting.<eop>

The Saudi oil minister asked how soon his country would move to increase production in the absence of an OPEC meeting, replied "immediately."<eop>

"We are beginning to have a market that is literally destabilizing," Nazer said. <eop>

"We do have a crisis," he said. "Refusing simply to meet to discuss the crisis, we think, is illogical."<eop>

Saudi Arabia, the world's leading oil exporter, would support an increase by all OPEC members in order to make up for the shortage, Nazer said.<eop>

He said that OPEC agreement last month for a 22.9 million barrels per day production ceiling and a price of $21 a barrel by December 1 was not being met because of Iraq's invasion. International economic sanctions have been imposed against Iraq, another major exporter.<eop>

Saudi Arabia could not make up the full four million barrels per day shortfall in crude oil exports, Nazer said, only about one million barrels per day.<eop>

Oil production could be increased by Venezuela and the United Arab Emirates by another one to two million barrels per day, Nazer estimated.<eop>

He said that Third World countries were suffering the worst from the higher oil prices which have now hit $26 to $29 a barrel.<eop>

"If OPEC is not going to consider these things, then, of course, they leave it to member countries to defend their own interests and that includes, of course, their decision to make up for the shortages," Nazer said.<eop>

"We will not let the countries of the Third World go down the drain," he said.<eol>
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - There is a growing consensus among Saudi Arabian leaders that military action ultimately is the only thing that will force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

The Saudis have drawn their own line in the sand, saying officially that they will be satisfied with nothing less than the withdrawal of Iraq’s troops, restoration of the pre-invasion Kuwaiti government and international protection to stop Hussein from ever invading a neighbor again.

But they are pessimistic, believing that cannot happen through diplomatic efforts alone, and probably not even as a result of international economic pressure. The United Nations already has imposed economic sanctions that amount to an international embargo on trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

A high-ranking Saudi official, in a background briefing here Saturday, said Saddam’s Iraq would have to suffer military as well as economic blows before it could be forced out of Kuwait.

Referring to the Iraqi occupation forces, the official said:

"We believe for it to be forced to withdraw, it will have to take specific blows to its presence there."

He was one of three Saudi officials who spoke here to members of the Pentagon press pool and other journalists who have recently arrived in the country. Though the Saudis kept the American press out of the country when American troops started arriving here, they allowed the pool in Monday, and in recent days have been granting visas to others, including network crews from ABC, CBS and NBC.

The other Saudi officials who talked with the reporters Saturday were the foreign minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and the minister for petroleum and minerals, Hisham Nazer.

The unidentified Saudi official and other Saudis are not clear about exactly what form the blows against Saddam would have to take. Some suggestions have been the assassination or overthrow of Saddam, the development of an effective resistance within Kuwait or an economic squeeze so tight that Saddam would fire the first shot, bringing military retaliation.

If that happened, American troops would likely be in the thick of it. The Saudi official said that American troops were positioned in the north of Saudi Arabia, "in areas where there is a potential conflict."

The official said there also were Saudi, Syrian and Egyptian troops in those same areas. He would not identify the location.
During the last several days, Saudi Arabian officials and leaders—members of the power structure of the country—have told reporters here repeatedly that only military force would push Saddam out of Kuwait, and that he had to be taught a lesson for the future.

They also privately believe that Saddam's army is not as good as it's been represented to be, saying they think it will start to crumble if tested against the combined forces of the United States and other countries that have sent troops here.

However, the Saudi official who spoke here Saturday said the Iraqi army was formidable and should not be underestimated. Moreover, he and everyone else believes that Saddam is an unpredictable ticking bomb.

Although some Saudi businessmen have winked and said there were profits to be made as Saudi Arabia moves to war footing—air conditioners to be sold and buildings to be built for troops and refugees, among other things—they say the situation overall is an economic disaster.

Mostly, the Saudis would just like to have the whole thing go away, without anybody getting hurt, so they can go back to what they see as their self-appointed role as the moderating force in the Middle East, doling out precious oil to the world in a predictable and economically comfortable way.

"We don't want a cat to be hurt, much less a lot of people," said Prince Abdullah bin Faisal, a member of the royal family.

But the Saudis know that's wishful thinking at this point. They were scared badly by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, and especially his movement of troops toward the Saudi border right after taking over Kuwait. He pulled the divisions back, but the Saudis still have nightmares about his army marching through their country.

The fear grows less each day as the American military buildup here continues. The Saudi official said the US troops here, along with the popular support in the United States for President Bush's decision to send them, had been a tremendous morale booster for Saudi Arabsians.

He also said Saudis were willing to make sacrifices to boot Saddam out of Kuwait, including chemical warfare hits on unprotected Saudi soldiers and civilians.

Moreover, he said that Saudi Arabia would be willing to sacrifice its people held captive in Kuwait and Iran, saying the Saudis did not regard a soldier's life as less precious than a civilian's.

"We are willing to pay any price to end this conflict," he said.

For Americans, the question is what price they will be willing to pay if, as many Saudis believe, the shooting starts.
WITH THE TROOPS

Saudi Arabia -- The young sergeant is lying prone in the sand, the butt of his M-16 rifle tucked against his shoulder. It is late afternoon in the Saudi Arabian desert. The sergeant's squad is manning a defensive line while several officers scout the top of a nearby hill. The officers are selecting sites where the company should dig in with anti-tank weapons that will turn the road below into a deadly shooting gallery if an Iraqi tank column attempts to pass along it.

The company of about 250 soldiers from the 82d Airborne's 2d Infantry Brigade is in its third day of training in the heat of the Arabian peninsula. The men arrived late last week believing they would go into battle immediately. Now it is hard to adjust to the emerging stalemate as American troops pile into the country and the Iraqi army tucks into defensive positions.

The sergeant turns to a reporter sitting beside him. "A lot of my men feel like we're wasting time," he says. "That's the basic consensus: let's get the show on the road or get out of here. You know, we thought the 82 Airborne was coming over to save Kuwait. And here we are -- just sitting."

Increasing the nervousness of the troops is the danger of a terrorist attack on their barracks, where security now is extraordinarily tight. "It's hard to keep your guard up a hundred percent of the time, the sergeant says. "I'd hate to be here as a pawn in a political chess game. Which we are."

The sun is turning red as it approaches the horizon. A cooling breeze begins to blow across the desert, making the harsh terrain suddenly seem soft and welcoming. A hundred yards away, a herd of camels shuffles by, urged on by their Bedouin master. The man gruffly shakes his stick at an American photographer who takes his picture.

As it gets dark, the company reassembles and sets off for its first nighttime march. It heads for the road, about two and a
"We would not attack large groups of Iraqis, but if we saw two or three together, we would shoot them," he added.

In the first week after the invasion, the troops patrolling the capital were "relaxed" and undisciplined, Nasser said.

The soldiers who carried out the initial attack--Iraq's elite Republican Guards--were withdrawn soon after the invasion and replaced by ordinary troops, many of whom had been told by their commanders that they were going to Kuwait to safeguard it from an American invasion, Nasser said.

"They did not expect us to attack them, so they were easy targets. These were also the soldiers who did the terrible things, the ones who raped our women," he said.

"They looted everything," another Kuwaiti said. "They made motorists stop in the street and give them their cars. They even stopped people on the street to take the watches off their wrists."

Another witness said he saw some Iraqi soldiers shoot the plate glass out of the window of a Mercedes Benz dealership and drive off with the cars. "They took all the new American and European cars back to Baghdad," he said.

As the behavior of the occupiers became worse, the resistance grew bolder, Nasser said.

He asked that his group's method of operations and the area in which it fought not be disclosed in detail because his cell was still believed to be active.

However, he said that, on the third day following the invasion, he and his friends chased two Iraqi soldiers into a restaurant, where they shot one and captured the other.

"They tried to hide in a big refrigerator in the back of the restaurant. One resisted and we killed him. The other one surrendered," Nasser said, adding that the resistance was holding "about 150 Iraqis as prisoners" by the time he left Kuwait last week.

Using gasoline bombs made from bottles with dates pressed into the necks to hold the wicks in place, the group also disabled an Iraqi tank one night.

"The Iraqis would stand outside their tanks. We would sneak up and shoot the men outside the tanks, then open the hatch and drop the bomb inside," Nasser said.

He claimed that a number of tanks were disabled in this manner.

The resistance is still largely uncoordinated, "but we are getting more organized and better disciplined every day," Nasser said.

"Many are involved, soldiers who have taken off their uniforms, doctors, women who treat our wounded... everyone contributes in their own way."

Anazy, the football coach who escaped on Thursday, added that most Kuwaitis are still refusing to return to work.

"To work for them means we accept them and this we do not wish to do," he said.

Most of the refugees in Saudi Arabia -- from the wealthy ones who sag morosely in the leather sofas of air conditioned hotel lobbies to the poorer ones sitting on blankets spread over the concrete floors of vacant school buildings--say they haven't given up hope of returning to Kuwait one day.

But even Nasser concedes there is little hope of that happening without outside support. "Now we are counting on the other Arabs, and on Bush and Thatcher, to help us," he said.

"We have discovered our will to resist," said another
SAUDI ARABIA - There are American warplanes flying overhead but there are no hippies, no punks and no anti-war protesters on a major college campus here.
Yet students and professors at the King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals talk of little these days besides the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia. Some people worry about the American soldiers arriving every day, but others say that if the choice is between American tanks and Iraqi tanks, they'd choose American.
"We are Muslims. We don't need Americans to help us. If the Americans come here, they might not leave for 20 years," said Sultan al-Dhaher, a Saudi student from a town near the border with Iraq.
"The Holy Koran says that Christians don't always want to help you; they want to trick you," said Dhaher. "The real reason the Americans are here is not to help us but for oil.
"When we fight, we do not fight for land or air," said Dhaher, an intense 20-year-old with dark eyes and a wispy beard. "We fight for Islam. We are like the mujahadin in Afghanistan who rely not on the force of arms but on the force of God.
"Iraq surprised us, and the American Navy got here fast," Dhaher said. "But now the forces of Egypt and other Arab countries are coming, and the Americans will be able to go."
"They must go," added another student, a 20-year-old from near Dhahran. "If Iraq, only one country, can raise an army of one million men, imagine what all the Islamic countries could do."
The students demanded to know why the United States continues to support Israel, and said the Arab world will be torn if Iraq's Saddam Hussein manages to turn his fight for survival into a fight against Israel.
"All Muslims want to fight Israel," said Dhaher.
As they spoke, a giant C-5 transport plane lumbered noisily overhead, so full of equipment that it seemed to be standing still.
"That's another problem with the Americans," one of the students said, pointing up at the plane. "Noise pollution."
The students insisted they support their king and seemed surprised when asked if there were any campus political organizations.
"Why would we need an organization?" asked a 20-year-old from Medina. "If the king said the Americans should come, of course I agree with him, but it should be temporary."
Another student said simply, "We want to solve our own problems."
The students, among the 5,000 attending one of the most prestigious technical universities in the Middle East, were dressed identically in white robes and headdresses. Only the foreign students, not the Saudis, wore blue jeans. No one had long hair, a Walkman, an earring, shorts or sneakers. At the center of the immaculate campus, with stone buildings that seemed to rise out of the desert, was a large pond with a fountain and ducks, surrounded by thick date palms and bougainvillea (spell). The simple mosque with marble walls had a computer printout showing the five daily prayers.

"Saudi students tend to be more reserved than Americans," said Mohammed Mulla, director of the Academic Development Center, "and they probably are more aware of global issues than Americans. At the freshman and sophomore level, Saudi students are just as sophomoric as American students," Mulla said.

Right now, they are keenly aware of the Iraqi troops that have occupied Kuwait only 200 miles north. Students and faculty were so upset after the Aug. 2 invasion that summer school is ending early.

"The students know and I know that Saddam Hussein could have been here last week," said professor Mulla. "And knowing him, he wouldn’t have had any qualms about killing all of us."

Sipping sweet tea flavored with mint from his garden, Mulla said, "Nothing in my life has affected me more than this, nothing has ever disrupted my life more. Every country wants to be able to defend itself," Mulla said. "But it was the Americans or Saddam Hussein."
There are two elephants loose in the streets of Kuwait City this week: Saddam Hussein's army and a real elephant, released from the zoo by Iraqi troops.

"A friend of mine drove into Kuwait and back today," said Nasir, a Kuwaiti refugee in Saudi Arabia. "He saw an elephant in the streets. The Iraqis raided the zoo and let all the animals out of the cages."

Nasir, a wealthy businessman now being put up by the Saudi government at a luxury hotel, said that Iraqi troops have also looted the central bank, commercial bank, police stations, and gold shops of his country. Soldiers have also stolen luxury cars from Kuwaiti dealerships and driven them back to Iraq, according to reports reaching Nasir by telephone and from Kuwaitis streaming across the border in recent days.

International telephone calls in and out of Kuwait have not been possible since shortly after the Iraqi invasion. However, Nasir and some other Kuwaitis were able for several days after that to communicate with their friends by driving near the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and calling on their car telephones -- a local call from that distance. In the past few days, however, this method of communication has also been cut off -- possibly because of electronic interference from military radars in the area.

Nonetheless, it is still possible for Kuwaitis to drive in and out of the country with relative ease. Nasir said that his younger brother had returned to the country to join the resistance to the Iraqi invasion. Kuwaitis here do not believe the resistance poses a military threat to Saddam but consider it to be important for symbolic reasons.

Nasir and another wealthy Kuwaiti, Farid, said that the Iraqis had also released patients from the hospitals and psychiatric wards. "These guys cannot take care of themselves," said Nasir.

Farid noted that Iraqi families had been moving into abandoned houses in Kuwait. "It is a policy maybe of replacing people," he said. "They want to affect the composition of Kuwait's
inhabitants."

But the exiles said they did not believe that any attempt to install a pro-Iraqi administration in Kuwait -- perhaps as part of a negotiated settlement -- would succeed. "The Kuwaitis will reject any government Saddam will create for them," Farid said.

The pair also confirmed reports from diplomatic sources here that there has been looting by Palestinian residents of Kuwait. Some 300,000 Palestinians live in the country.

They also confirmed diplomats' reports that Kuwaiti women have not been subject to mistreatment by Iraqi troops. There have been many news accounts concerning rape and mistreatment of Filipino and other foreign women.

The spotty nature of communications with Kuwait and Iraq itself has resulted in a lively exchange of rumors. Among the most widely spread in Saudi Arabia at the moment is that Saddam Hussein recently took a second wife -- a younger woman -- and that several days ago he killed his first wife, to whom he has been married for many years.

A similar phenomenon has occurred among U.S. troops, who say they are receiving little information about events in the region. Soldiers at a military base in Saudi Arabia said today, for example, that they had heard rumors that George Bush had given Saddam Hussein a 36-hour deadline to withdraw from Kuwait. Another rumor had Iraqi forces invading Saudi Arabia EARLY This morning. The soldiers said they did not believe either rumor but were starved for news.

- 0 -
This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia—Even Americans familiar with military operations might have trouble grasping the vast scope of the war preparations here.

They range from platoons of soldiers dug into the desert sand to giant container ships unloading tanks, from highway columns of troops in double-decker buses to air crews flying reconnaissance missions high in the sky, watching for Iraqi warplanes.

The American deployment of troops, weapons, equipment and supplies is spread over a vast area of the desert, some of it touching the turquoise waters of the Persian Gulf—or as it is called here, the Arabian Gulf.

It is bigger than anything the United States ever cranked up at one time during the Vietnam War, according to command officers who served in Vietnam.

Under an arrangement with the US Defense Department, members of the press pool covering Operation Desert Shield here have agreed not to disclose information that would compromise security. That includes numbers of troops and even the general location of the buildup. That’s why stories have not carried the datelines of Saudi Arabian cities or military installations.

The pool members also have agreed not to identify the military men and women they interview, except for those with command responsibilities. There is concern that their families might be targets of attacks by terrorists sympathetic to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Though such attacks have been virtually nonexistent in the continental United States, military families live all over the world. Besides, nobody wants to take any chances.

The press pool reporters, photographers and camera crews, with the help of their military escorts and Saudi government officials here, have ranged over a vast area of Saudi Arabia, a country as big as the part of the US east of the Mississippi River.

They have talked with Marines resting in arena-sized warehouses at a sprawling Persian Gulf port, flown off to interview American and Saudi crews of AWACS aerial reconnaissance planes at an air base, roared across the desert in helicopters, trudged through the sand to visit with young Airborne soldiers camped in the open, plugged their ears as Saudi and American pilots scrambled howling F-15 fighters from giant bunkers built into the sand, and watched sweating nurses and doctors erect a fully-equipped field hospital in the unrelenting heat of the desert sun.
Everywhere the American military machine has touched down, there are what appear to the untrained eye to be highly organized operations. There are, however, still infuriating instances when the old military snafu of "hurry up and wait" surfaces.

At one point, for example, the pool missed a chance to see soldiers in a remote forward location because their helicopter pilots could not get a clearance to take off.

Mostly, there is a high degree of discipline. Crews methodically refuel the endless parade of cargo planes—the giant C-5 and smaller C-141—whose takeoffs and landings have become part of the round-the-clock routine.

Marines unpack wrenches from plastic bags, charge batteries and crank up the 750-horsepower, 12-cylinder diesel engines on wicked M-60 tanks. The tanks, scores of them, are lined up on vast concrete parking lots, along with weapons-carrying "humvees"—the modern Jeep.

For the American military men and women here, there are enormous differences in the conditions of combat duty—from the opulent haves to the gritty have-nots.

Here, as one wag put it, the great god is freon-worshipped as the lifeblood of air conditioning, the thing that everyone wants but not everyone can have.

Much depends on the nature of the job. AWACS crews work long hours, but they do their duties in air-conditioned comfort. And some of them live in cool Saudi motels with swimming pools.

Marine guards on ships are billeted in the air-conditioned crews' quarters, while their comrades sleep in the heat and humidity on ground pads laid on concrete.

In the worst conditions of all are the soldiers sprawled out in the desert, with meager or no shade, sleeping on the ground, in tents and around tanks.

The food varies, too. Some Airborne troops were fed Hardees beef sandwiches and french fries in the field for a couple of days, then had their chow degenerate into a diet of bread, water and vegetables or fruit.

Many troops get only plastic-wrapped field rations called MREs, for meals, ready-to-eat.

Asked about the troops' food situation at a news conference, Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the forward commander of the Desert Shield forces here, said it was obvious there would be "different levels of comfort" in different places.

"Certainly the folks that are up there in the desert . . . their level of comfort is going to be somewhat less than some of the people working in the command centers back in here," he said.

"I just had lunch and it was delicious. In fact, it was dangerously delicious for a man my age."
Horner said the troops had their MREs, though he said they sometimes would just as soon have a Hardee's hamburger.

"So they have the government-issue meal and many times they opt to buy their meals, and that's their privilege," he said.

However, very few troops—and certainly none of those out in the desert—have had any opportunity to drop by any Saudi fast-food outlet for a burger and fries.

Still, there appear to be few morale problems, although even the lowest-ranking troops here are acutely aware that it could soon become a problem.

"It will be very difficult if the morale starts going down," a young Marine said. "They want to go home and then we start going real slow. We need some action. I wish we'd go ahead and do it. We need to do something—either leave or get rid of him."

He was referring to Hussein, the enemy.

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10:26:22 Fri 08/17/90
This is Defense Department pool report No. 17-1. Must be faxed to Pentagon, 693-6853, for release. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.

SOMewhere in SAUDI ARABIA — U.S. Marines landed here this week, ready to fight if Iraq invades and capable of invading Kuwait or Iraq if tensions worsened and President Bush gave that order, an admiral said Friday.

"They will be in defensive positions to try to deter, first of all, an attack from the North and should that deterrence fail, obviously, to try to defend as far forward as they can," Rear Adm. Steve Clayey told reporters.

When asked if the Marines also had the capability to invade Kuwait or even Iraq, he said they could if so ordered.

"We certainly have assault capability," he said. "... This is a mechanized capability with tanks, armoured vehicles, light armoured vehicles.

"They have that mobility and they have that firepower to go anywhere they're told to go," he said.

The admiral, a commander of U.S. amphibious naval forces, made the comments to a pool of American reporters and photographers organized by the Defense Department.

President Bush has said the mission of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is only to deter or defend against an Iraqi attack and that there is no plan for them to invade. An international boycott rather than military action is being used to try to force Iraq to get out of Kuwait after invading and annexing that country.

The Marines themselves said they were ready to fight.

"If the Iraqis decide to aggress, it's a suicide mission for themselves," a 23-year-old lance corporal from Long Beach, Calif., said. "They're going to lose.

"We'll take casualties, of course," he said. "But there will be nothing left of the Iraqis."

A Somonauk, Ill., lance corporal said he would rather fight than dig in for weeks or months in defensive positions.

"I'd rather go (fight) and then get the hell out," he said.

A 42-year-old first sergeant from Mobile, Ala., said at least two Marines nearing the end of their service time re-enlisted when they learned their unit was going to Saudi Arabia.

"You train, train, train," he said. "It's not every day you get to do the real thing, so these guys are motivated."

The Marines' landing this week was not anything like the amphibious assaults familiar in World War Two newsreels.

It was the Marines' first use in actual potential combat of the new Rapid Deployment Force concept in which the Marines were flown to Saudi Arabia at the same time ships permanently filled with all their combat equipment arrived to join up with them.

Three 755-foot-long cargo ships arrived with tanks, armoured trucks, TOW antitank missiles, ammunition, food, field kitchens, a field hospital and all the other equipment a Marine expeditionary force of 16,000 men needs. The admiral did not say how many Marines are in Saudi Arabia, however, and the pool of reporters were operating under security rules that prohibit reporting where U.S. units are in Saudi Arabia, how large they are or the names of any military people other than commanders.

"We're making history here today," Admiral Clayey said.

"... It's a rapid buildup in about eight days. It's the first time in history we've done this."
by Michael Ross of the Los Angeles Times and Peter Copland of Scripps

Howard

SAUDI ARABIA -- Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait have imposed a curfew, closed mosques and sealed the border with Saudi Arabia in response to continuing hit-and-run attacks by Kuwaiti resistance cells, according to refugees arriving here. The resistance is still relatively small and uncoordinated, but "it is growing as we become more organized," said a Kuwaiti shopkeeper, who fought with the underground for nearly two weeks before the location of his cell was discovered and surrounded by Iraqi tanks.

The shopkeeper, an army reservist who asked to be identified only as Nasser, his first name, said resistance members were holding more than 150 Iraqi soldiers prisoner.

They were captured, he said, in night-time raids on Iraqi patrols in residential areas of the Kuwaiti capital.

Another refugee, a high school soccer coach who fled on Thursday, said Kuwaitis knew the resistance was continuing because scattered shooting could still be heard throughout the city at night.

Abdullah al Anazy, 37, said the Iraqis on Wednesday also imposed an 8 p.m.-7 a.m. curfew because "young Kuwaitis are shooting at their soldiers in the dark."

No formal curfew had been in effect before Wednesday, Anazy said, adding that it was but one of several security measures the Iraqis have taken this week to deal with the still small but apparently growing underground resistance.

"They also closed the mosques whose ulemas (prayer leaders) were denouncing the Iraqis and speaking out against the invasion," Anazy said.

"It is the young people," he added. "They are the ones who are taking up arms and fighting... but only at night."

Other newly arrived refugees also confirmed reports by Saudi sources that the Iraqis have closed the border to Kuwaitis trying to enter Saudi Arabia. Until a few days ago, the Iraqis were barring foreigners from leaving but were allowing—even encouraging—Kuwaitis to go.

Saudi officials said more than 100,000 Kuwaitis were now in the Kingdom, but that the flow of refugees abruptly slowed to a trickle a few days ago.

Anazy and another refugee who arrived in Saudi Arabia after the border was closed said they escaped by crossing the desert at a remote spot far from the frontier post where they had been turned back by Iraqi soldiers.

The refugees, interviewed at a school, a hotel and other locations where they have been given temporary shelter by the Saudi government, gave similar accounts of the Aug. 2 invasion, which appeared to have taken their tiny country and its unprepared defense forces by complete surprise.

"We never thought they would do this to us," said Nasser El Asmi, a 32-year-old worker with the Kuwait Oil Co. "We thought 'how could they do this to us, a neighbor and fellow Muslim country?' But Saddam Hussein is a bad man. We never had a chance."

Stunned into submission by the overwhelming size of the invasion force, the Kuwaitis offered only scattered resistance for the first day.

"We woke up in the morning and found Iraqis everywhere,"
said Asmi.

Even though Iraqi troops had been massing on their borders, Kuwaiti leaders apparently chose to believe Hussein's assurances, delivered to other Arab governments, that he would not invade Kuwait.

As a result, the Kuwaiti National Guard was not on alert and its main garrison in the capital was nearly deserted on the morning of the invasion because most of its men had been given the Thursday-Friday weekend off, according to one of the defenders who escaped.

"Normally, there are about 2,000 soldiers stationed at the garrison, but there were only about 120 on duty on the morning of the invasion," when the Iraqis surrounded the garrison with tanks, said Cpl. Melfi al Asmi, 34.

"We resisted all day, from seven in the morning until seven at night, but they were firing at us from all sides," he said.

Asmi, who is Nasser al Asmi's cousin, said about half the defenders were killed or wounded before the rest chose to flee.

"There was no officer there to make decisions. The highest-ranking soldier was a sergeant. We did the best we could, but at least we realized we would all be killed if we stayed," he said.

Nasser's garrison apparently held out longer than the defenders at other installations in the city did.

In the first eyewitness account of the storming of the emir's palace in Kuwait, Mansour al Mohanny, 32, said that it fell to a force of "about 70 Iraqi commandos who came over the back wall" at about 12:30 p.m., more than 10 hours after the initial invasion.

"They came over the wall firing rockets and machineguns," Mohanny, a clerk at the palace said.

He said the palace guards killed 15 of the Iraqis before being overwhelmed.

Mohanny, who escaped after the Iraqis entered the palace to hunt down the remaining guards, said that the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, was not at there at the time of the attack. He said he knew how the emir had escaped, but was not at liberty to divulge it.

The Kuwaitis interviewed all said the invasion appeared to have been very well planned. "They bombed the runways so our jet fighters could not take off and they cut the communications right away," leaving National Guard bases throughout the country isolated from one another, Cpl. Asmi said.

"The Iraqis had very good intelligence. They knew where everything was. They even knew where the foreigners lived," added Nasser, the shopkeeper and army reservist.

While the thoroughness of their intelligence suggests that the Iraqis may have been planning the invasion for some time, every Kuwaiti interviewed over the past several days--from senior government officials to ordinary citizens--professed shock and profound disbelief at what had happened.

"I don't know why we were so complacent, so foolish," another refugee, who asked not to be identified, said bitterly. "As Muslims, I guess we never thought our brothers could do such a thing to us."

As the initial shock began to wear off, some Kuwaitis using arms taken from police stations--and from the Iraqi soldiers they later killed--went underground and began ambushing Iraqi patrols at night, Nasser said.
Kuwaiti, "but alone we cannot do it. Alone, against the Iraqis we are like a mosquito stinging an ox."
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said here Sunday that American warships were still shadowing Iraqi tankers they fired warning shots at Saturday, but refused to say whether the navy would sink them if they continued to refuse to stop.

The American warships fired warning shots at one of two tankers sailing out of the Persian Gulf.

"I wouldn't want to speculate," Cheney said when asked if the U.S. warships would sink Iraqi ships if necessary to stop them.

"I wouldn't want to speculate on what happens next," he said when asked what steps the navy might take if the ships refused to stop.

"We obviously are prepared to see to it that the sanctions that the United Nations voted and the action that the legitimate government of Kuwait asked us to take are carried out," Cheney said.

The American warships reportedly have been ordered to use minimum force such as shooting out the rudders to stop the ships if necessary.

Cheney also said there were no plans now to send additional U.S. forces beyond those originally planned for deployment in Saudi Arabia. He said the deployment was on schedule.

The Defense Secretary and U.S. military commanders have refused to give the size of the military effort here, though commanders have said it is bigger than any single deployment in the Vietnam War.

"Should (Iraqi president) Saddam Hussein be foolish enough to launch an attack on Saudi Arabia, we would be able to do a very effective job of making him pay us a bit of a price for that," Cheney said.

"Obviously I'll be more comfortable once we've got more forces in country," he said.

When asked whether U.S. or Saudi generals were in charge of the combined forces, Cheney said the United States was in charge of its own troops and was cooperating with the Saudis. There also are Egyptians, Morocans, and Syrian troops here with others scheduled to arrive from Pakistan.

"The arrangement that's worked out is consistent with our constitutional principles (that U.S. forces are under the command of president Bush and his generals) and it's consistent as well with their (Saudi) requirement for sovereignty," he said.

The Defense Secretary spends several hours touring a Saudi air base here. Under a blazing desert sun, he stopped by an Apache attack helicopter, visited a mobile command headquarters that supervises the airlift operations here, and talked with some of the troops.

For one 23-year-old 82nd airborne private, a member of a weapons loading team for the Apache helicopters, it was deja vu.

"I met him in Panama," the soldier from Western Port, Md., said. "The 82nd is first in for everything."

A capitán in the group from Overland Park, Kan., said, "He told us lots of stuff is coming."

As Cheney walked around, followed by a herd of television crews, reporters and photopherr, four F-15 jet fighter plans roared off the runway, banked sharply and climbed into the sky.
--please relay to fndesk and to pentagon for pool distribution--

By MICHAEL ROSS, Los Angeles Times

SAUDI ARABIA As prospects for a diplomatic solution to the Gulf crisis diminish, a grim consensus is emerging among Saudi officials that war with Iraq may be unavoidable.

This conviction, expressed with growing resolve by Saudi officials over the past week, in turn reflects a now widely shared perception that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is, in the words of one member of the Saudi royal family, "a psychopath" who represents "an intolerable threat to the region so long as he remains in power" in Iraq.

"We do not see any prospect of a diplomatic settlement," Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal said Saturday, contradicting public what other officials have been saying privately for several days.

Publicly, the Saudis continue to insist that Iraq agree to withdraw from Kuwait as a condition for further negotiations. But in private they say they have little expectation that Hussein will do that.

"He's gone too far to turn back now," said one senior official. "His loss of face would be fatal. The magnitude of his misadventure would kill him."

When Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2, Hussein was counting on two things to intimidate his Arab brethren into accepting the new status quo--his 1 million-man army, the largest in the Middle East, and his own emerging appeal as a champion of the frustrated Arab cause.

"He really could have become the new Gamal Abdel Nasser," a Saudi official said, referring to the late and immensely popular Egyptian leader. "It was happening. He was winning the hearts and the minds of the Arabs until he went the wrong way."

Hussein's call for a "holy war" against what is popularly perceived as the domination of pro-Israeli, Western interests in the region did strike a resonant chord in Jordan and the West Bank, where the failure of the intifada has created a mood of bitterness and despair among Palestinians living under Israeli rule.

But his threats backfired elsewhere, one Saudi official said, because he went too far, upping the ante too quickly and too violently to leave room even for appeasement.

"If someone holds a knife to your throat and says 'give me your money,' you do it. But if if you become convinced that he is going to stab you anyway, then you fight for your life," the official said.
"Every time we think we see a solution, this guy [Hussein] shows up and shuts the door to it," a member of the Saudi royal family added. "We have no choice but to stand up to him."

Now, emboldened by the multinational military presence taking shape in the eastern desert, Saudi thinking has shifted from ways of containing Hussein to ways of exorcising him from the Arab body altogether.

That will come about, Saudi officials say, when the Iraqi military becomes so desperate that it either assassimates Hussein or lashes out in a way justifies retaliation by the formidable array of Western and Arab forces now aligned against Iraq.

"The only thing we still need now," a Saudi businessman commented, "is one brave Iraqi soldier."

In the meantime, the transformation that has overtaken this cloistered kingdom in the early hours of its greatest crisis is nothing short of remarkable, diplomats and other Middle East experts say.

Indeed, in just a little over two weeks, the mood here has turned from one of extreme apprehension to one of almost cocky confidence, with young Saudi princes talking avidly about what B-52s could do to Baghdad as their elders entertain dinner guests with the latest Saddam Hussein jokes.

The transformation, if further proof were needed, is even more evident in the Saudi treatment of the media.

Saudi Arabia used to be one of the most difficult countries for Western journalists to visit. But over the past week, the Saudis have literally thrown open their doors to an invasion of reporters from around the globe, giving them unprecedented access to military facilities and senior government officials.

One journalist who has covered this part of the world for a number of years could hardly believe his ears when he overheard a Saudi official asking an American military officer for advice on how to set up a media pool. "The Japanese are in Jeddah today. The Brits have just landed. We are going crazy," the harried official confessed.

In this time of testing, the Saudis have even discovered a sense of humor about themselves—something for which they were not generally known.

"Our ministry of information is still denying that Iraq has invaded Kuwait," one Saudi prince said over dinner the other night, eliciting much laughter from his guests.

"Have you heard? 50,000 more American soldiers arrived today," said another Saudi. "They had to turn around and go home because we wouldn't give them visas." Howls of laughter this time.

Such humor veils, but does not entirely conceal, concerns that the crisis could still take an uncontrollable turn.

The threat that Iraq may use the chemical weapons it possesses is one such concern.

"A friend told me not to worry because the missiles the Iraqis have to deliver chemical weapons are not accurate and land many kilometers from their targets," a Saudi businessman said. "I thought of my home"
or apartments, food and even small stipends by the oil-rich royal family.

"The Saudis are doing everything for us. It is not possible for us to go back now, but here we are welcome," said Melfi Azmi, a 34-year-old Kuwaiti who has been living here for 10 days.
THIS IS PENTAGON POOL 19-7 WRITTEN AND FILED BY PETER COPELAND, SCRIPPS HOWARD. THE PENTAGON WILL ONLY ALLOW THE USE OF THE NAMES OF COMMANDERS, NOT SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. [IT][PAR]

[RO] SAUDI ARABIA - The leaders of the U.S. forces in the desert here cut their military teeth in the jungles of Vietnam, an experience that deeply colored their views of warfare. [IT][PAR]

[RO] They have few doubts about the ability of their troops to fight and win, and their only fear is that politics will control military strategy as it did in Vietnam. [IT][PAR]

[RO] The leaders say their mission in Saudi Arabia is more clear than it was in Vietnam, and just as importantly they feel that this time they have the support of the American people. [IT][PAR]

[RO] Senior commanders and non-commissioned officers in Saudi Arabia said during a week of interviews that their Vietnam experience sobered their views about the ["glory"] of war and taught them the dangers of waging a protracted conflict far from home. [IT][PAR]

[RO] ["A lot of the senior leadership were in Vietnam, and we really do dislike war. We think it is man at his most ludicrous state," said Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the top U.S. commander in Saudi Arabia. [IT][PAR]

[RO] ["The problem we have with young folks is we train them so hard and keep them motivated so well. They are always saying it's like being on a football team and never getting to play a game," said Horner, a fighter pilot who flew 111 combat missions over North Vietnam. [IT][PAR]

[RO] ["I can understand their enthusiasm," Horner said. [PAR]

["If they stop and think, they know war is a loser for everybody." Army Brig. Gen. Ed Scholes of the 18th Airborne Corps said. [PAR]

["In Vietnam congressmen came over and said, 'Why are we here?' Obviously the troops had to wonder, 'Why are we here?'" [IT][PAR]

[RO] ["This time the people in the States are behind the troops. They understand the need is there and the strategy is there," said Scholes, who was commissioned in 1961 and served two tours in Vietnam. [IT][PAR]

[RO] The generals warned, however, that public support could erode with time.

["People remember Vietnam at the end, not at the beginning when there was support," said Air Force Maj. Gen. Don Kaufman of Central Command. [IT][PAR]

[RO] ["War as it should be conducted is even worse than it was in Vietnam," Kaufman said.

["The way you win in a war is destroying everything, move in and then you rebuild it." [IT][PAR]

(MORE)
Here we know where the front line is," Kaufman said.

"It would be a war of firepower, artillery, bombs and tanks."<IT>[PAR]

Kaufman said there are lessons to be learned from Vietnam, but he cautioned:

"I left Vietnam 25 years ago. I was a captain then, and I'm a general now."<IT>[PAR]

"We try to read the history books and the lessons learned, but that was a long time ago," he said.<IT>[PAR]

One lesson from Vietnam that is even more important now in Saudi Arabia is to have respect for the host nation, said Air Force Lt. Col. Allen Pack.<IT>[PAR]

"We have to treat people with all the respect we can," Pack said, especially in Saudi Arabia where customs are so different.

"We weren't courteous enough in Vietnam."<IT>[PAR]

An Air Force senior master sergeant from Sophia, West Virginia, said the deployment here has been more popular than in Vietnam because there has been no shooting.<IT>[PAR]

"In Vietnam we didn't have public support because it was mommas wanting their sons back home," the sergeant said.<IT>[PAR]

"I don't want to get into another Vietnam, a political war. We didn't use B-52s in some places because we couldn't," said the sergeant, who in 1968 was an airman first class in Vietnam.<IT>[PAR]

"Let's either whip 'em or go home," he said.<IT>[PAR]

The chief master sergeant for the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing said military life has improved since he was in and out of Vietnam between 1966 and 1973.<IT>[PAR]

"The idea now is to take care of people and let them do their job," the chief said.

"These guys are living in air-conditioned barracks and eating hot meals."<IT>[PAR]

"Things are 1,000 percent better here than in Vietnam." the chief said.<IT>[PAR]

"People understand why they are here and they want to be here," the chief said.

"They want to protect our economic interests and oil."<IT>[PAR]

An Air Force senior master sergeant from Birmingham, Ala., said:
When you went home after Vietnam, you were treated like a criminal. In the United States and in the world right now people know we're fighting for a cause and their way of life. [IT][PAR]

My attitude is positive, the Alabama sergeant said. Let's do the job and get the hell out of Dodge. [IT][PAR]

/end

(END)
This pool report was reported and written by Frank Augofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Jubail, Saudi Arabia—Saudi Arabia stands to lose $8 billion to $11 billion because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a Saudi official said here Monday.

"It will wipe out almost all of our liquid reserves," the official said.

He said the estimate included the cost of the war preparations here, housing of refugees and lost economic opportunities.

Most of the money, the official said, will be spent in the next two to three months.

The cost estimate came as the Saudi government, demonstrating increasing confidence as American troops take up defensive positions here, took a group of journalists to what would be the biggest war prize on the Persian Gulf—the industrial city of Jubail.

As one example of the invasion's economic blow to Saudi Arabia, the official told the journalists that $10 billion worth of joint venture projects with other countries had to be postponed because of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

He said the projects would have been started between now and 1992 or 1993. Because of the invasion, he said, they will have to be postponed by at least one year.

The $10 billion estimate of postponed projects, the official said, is separate from the actual war costs, which he said included such things as buying ammunition, medicine and other supplies; housing troops and refugees; buying gas masks and other equipment to protect against chemical weapons, and lost business opportunities.

The Saudis are housing an estimated 200,000 refugees, some of them in luxury hotels, the official said. He said about half of them were Kuwaiti citizens and the others were of other nationalities who also fled from occupied Kuwait. Other estimates have placed the number of Kuwaiti refugees here at 120,000 of the 200,000 total.

The official said the estimate of the war preparation costs was his own. He said the Saudi government had not issued its own estimate yet because it was still analyzing and debating the situation at high levels.

Jubail, which is home to about 80,000 people, contains the largest petrochemical manufacturing complex in the world, according to Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki, the secretary general of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu.
Yanbu, on the Red Sea across Saudi Arabia, is this country's second-largest industrial city. Both cities have been literally carved out of the desert, most of it in the last decade.

Jubail also sits on top of the biggest pool of oil in the world.

Abdullah said the government had spent $15 billion developing the two cities in the last 16 years—about $9 billion of that on Jubail—and companies from all over the world, including the US, Europe and Japan, had invested a total of $25 billion.

Saudi officials said there had always been security measures in place to protect Jubail against terrorist attacks and other threats. Security intensified during the war between Iraq and Iran, they said.

But Abdullah said no one ever expected anything like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last Aug. 2.

Saudi and other officials interviewed here said there was a great deal of apprehension and fear shortly after the invasion of Kuwait. But they said confidence was returning as American troops took up positions to defend the city.

"We don't expect this place to be taken out," Abdullah said. He said defenses had been rapidly improving.

In Jubail, the journalists visited the Saudi Petrochemical Co., half of which is owned by a subsidiary of the Shell Oil Co. Company officials said it was the biggest petrochemical manufacturing plant in the Middle East.

The plant, along with all of the others in Jubail, has emergency procedures that could shut the facility down in a matter of seconds, officials said. They said the procedures were for fires or other problems within the plants, but could be used if there were a military threat.

Bruce Holson, a Texan who is Saudi Petrochemical's financial vice-president, said he had sent his wife back to Houston after the invasion of Kuwait.

Now, he said, everyone feels better because the American troops have arrived.

"I think it's a fairly normal situation right now," he said.

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Defense Department spokesman Pete Williams accompanying Cheney aboard the Eisenhower at the beginning of a four-day trip to the region, refused to comment on the situation.

Cheney was informed of the incident during a visit to the USS Scott, a guided missile destroyer that is part of the Eisenhower's battle group in the Red Sea.

Cheney declined comment, but a senior Pentagon official said he had received reports that confirmed such an incident.

While on board the Scott, Cheney was told that the destroyer had just returned from its interdiction duty at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba and had turned back a Cypriot bulk freighter headed for the port.

Commander Tom Corcoran, commanding officer of the Scott, said he had a "very polite conversation" with the master of the Cypriot ship and that the freighter turned around after reporting that it was carrying a cargo of aluminum chromate and other chemicals.

"We didn't want to take the chance," Corcoran told reporters aboard his ship. "If we maneuvered at a safe but fairly close distance and spoke on the radio."

Corcoran said the Cypriot freighter headed for an unknown destination after turning around.

The Eisenhower battle group did not go on a high alert status during the shooting incident in the Gulf of Oman.

Cheney was to remain on the Eisenhower until Sunday morning when he was to travel to northern Saudi Arabia and visit American troops deployed on land there in defense of the desert kingdom's vital oil fields.

He was to travel on to Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf nations before visiting in Jiddah on Monday and stopping in Cairo before arriving back in Washington early Wednesday.

The defense secretary was slated to receive an update on the military status of Operation Desert Shield and observe nighttime flight operations with the aircraft carrier's jet fighters and bombers.
half kilometers away, to practice digging in for an ambush.
The soldiers spread out across the sand. There is no talking
and no light except for little that comes from the stars. The
silhouettes ahead could almost belong to a band of desert nomads.

"They tell us we'll be here about a year," says a Private
First Class nervously as the company moves along. "We're being
told to expect to fight in about 30 days -- as soon as all the guys
are here. By mid-September we should have about a hundred thousand
troops. They're telling us to expect to take Kuwait."

Another soldier joins the private. They have also been
told that, if Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait, the 82nd
will go home without fighting. "I hope that's what he'll do."
says the private. "If we go into Kuwait, I'm going to die."

While they are in this morose mood, the two men explain that
they do not have ammunition in their rifles. Three days ago,
while travelling by bus to the barracks where the 2d Brigade is
now stationed, a staff sergeant in another company fired
a 9 mm pistol round into his helmet, which was on the floor of
the bus at the time. An order was quickly issued requiring troops
to turn in all but an emergency ration of ammunition.

Soon the marching men reach what seems to be their
destination. A pair of soldiers in the company's 2d platoon begin
digging a position from which they would be able to fire their
squad's 5.56 cal. machine gun at approaching Iraqi vehicles.

"You guys should stick around and eat with us," the sergeant
says to two reporters who have accompanied the troops. "Sometimes
you even get lunch and dinner," he grouses cheerfully.

"We didn't today," says the other soldier, who has
somehow gotten the nickname Battle Smurf.

"But we're still soldiers. And we're capable of performing,"
declares the sergeant, stepping up the pace of his digging.

"And perform we must," says the other.

"And perform we shall."

Another soldier appears out of the darkness and tells the
machine-gunners that the 2d platoon has ended up in the wrong
place. It is too close to the road. In fact, it turns out that
the platoon would be in the fire zone if the 82nd were to launch
a mortar attack.

"It's a small price to pay to be one of America's Finest." observes the sergeant.

"That's right." agrees the soldier nicknamed Battle Smurf.
"Of course, they take away all our ammunition -- "
"No bitterness!" says the sergeant.
"Ha. Ha," says the other.
"That's right. Laugh it out."

Eventually the platoon finds its way to safer ground. The company commander explains that the 2d platoon's lieutenant is new. "It's good to get him out here to practice," he says dryly.

The men of the 82d are confident of victory. But their gallows humor shows they are well aware of the seriousness of the confrontation that could lie ahead.

- O -
ABOARD THE USS EISENHOWER IN THE RED SEA - The U.S. Naval fleet in the Persian Gulf went to battle stations Saturday after an American frigate fired six warning shots across the bow of an Iraqi tanker in the Gulf of Oman, Navy officials said.

Officials said the battle group in the Persian Gulf later discontinued its general quarters status.

The Navy official told reporters traveling with Defense Sec. Dick Cheney that the fast frigate USS Reid fired the first shots of a two-day-old interdiction effort ordered by President Bush to halt goods leaving and entering Iran in the Persian Gulf Crisis.

"The Persian Gulf forces have gone to general quarters," said Capt. Morris Foote of the guided missile cruiser USS Ticonderoga, which was located in the Red Sea with the Eisenhower battle groups on the eastern side of the Saudi Arabian peninsula.

Foote said the incident occurred about 4 p.m. Gulf time, 9 a.m. EDT, south of the narrow entrance to the Persian Gulf in the Gulf of Oman.

Foote did not have details but other officers told reporters they believe the Iraqi ship had not stopped when ordered. Foote said warning shots were fired by the Reid's 76 millimenter gun after the frigate's command received permission to do so from Rear Ad. William Fogarty, the commander of the Middle East task force in the Persian Gulf.

"It was not immediately known whether the Iraqi tanker continued on its way or turned around after the altercation but reports reaching the Eisenhower six hours later said the U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf were no longer at battle stations.

"One of our frigates, out in the Gulf of Oman, has fired a warning shot at an Iraqi tanker, in fact, fired six of them," Foote said. "But the naval officer later clarified that statement to say the shots were fired across the bow of the tanker.

Foote said there was apparently no threat from the Iraqi tanker, which like all other commercial vessels should not under international law be armed.

"I don't think that there was any other provocation. I don't think there was anything, in fact, threatening from the Iraqis or from any other source," he said.

"But as a general course, when we start getting into the business of firing shots, you're never sure of the reaction," he said.

On Thursday evening President B. Hussein authorized American warships to use force if necessary to stop commerce headed to and from Iraq and Kuwait, which is occupied by an estimated 160,000 Iraqi troops.

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** TOTAL PAGE.001 **
POOLO REPORT FROM AP, UPI, REUTERS REPORTERS.
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JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA -- American and Iraqi troops have settled in for a standoff in the desert, a stalemate people here believe could favor Iraq.

Iraq will have to endure the deprivation of an international blockade that will keep its oil off the market and will restrict the food supply.

But the Iraqis endured the eight-year war with neighboring Iran without protest, and the world is unlikely to let them starve.

The United States, however, will face political trouble at home and in the Arab world if thousands of U.S. troops are camped for months in the scorching heat of the desert with no end in sight.

"Time is not on our side," said a Saudi official here.

"International resolve will soften before Saddam Hussein.

"Saudi officials interviewed during the past week seemed increasingly pessimistic about a peaceful solution to the crisis.

"We have tried our hardest to find a diplomatic solution," said Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal. "We have failed."

Another senior Saudi official said Saturday that it will probably take a combination of economic and military pressure to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia will not feel safe until the Iraqi leader is out of power, however. "If Saddam Hussein goes, his system will go with him," the Saudi official said.

Despite the stiffening of Saudi rhetoric, the military situation on the ground was surprisingly calm. Both sides were digging in, but the Iraqis were at least 25 miles from the Saudi border under the watchful eye of American intelligence, a Saudi official told reporters Saturday.

There have been occasional sightings of Iraqi troops near the border, the officials said, but they apparently were gathering intelligence on Saudi positions and not looking for a fight.

American and Saudi pilots were flying continuous missions in F-15 fighters directed by AWACS radar planes, and air defense batteries were on alert.

U.S. troops continued to arrive with gear to protect them from a chemical attack, but the threat seemed far less likely than initial reports indicated.

The senior Saudi official said U.S. and Saudi troops have now been joined on the ground by troops from Syria, Morocco and Egypt. More troops were coming from Pakistan and Bangladesh, he said.

Although the exact number of troops in Saudi Arabia was not known, they were outnumbered by Iraq with 170,000 men and 800 or 900 tanks in Kuwait and many more in Iraq, Saudi officials said.

Entire Kuwaiti units escaped the Iraqi invaders and made it to Saudi Arabia, the official said. Most of Kuwait's air force also managed to escape, he said.

They might be able to link up with the Kuwaiti resistance, which has bought Iraqi tanks from their crews and burned them and is setting up a clandestine radio transmitter outside the country, the officials said.

The best hope for the Saudis was that the Iraqi dictator will be overthrown by his own generals. "Saddam Hussein is not a very popular person in Iraq," the official said.

Relief must be soon, however, because the Saudis fear they will be painted as a tool of U.S. designs to control the flow of Middle East oil and as a lackey of America's ally, Israel.

The Saudis would like to defend themselves but can't, and they
end of text

add to do list: memorandum pool report

Page 1
SAUDI ARABIA — The United States is moving significant forces with offensive capabilities into positions from which they could launch forays into occupied Kuwait, according to military officials.

Those forces also have received briefings on the position of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and on contingency plans should the United States decide to send forces across the Saudi-Kuwait border, a prospect that is considered highly unlikely unless the Iraqi forces cross first into Saudi territory, the officials said.

Ground rules for the Pentagon pool operation prohibit disclosure of the exact locations of U.S. forces here or specific details about the size of deployments.

The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity over the past few days, described the troop and equipment movements and planning as routine military procedure.

''I don't see us going into Kuwait but if those orders ever came we would obviously want to be ready,'' one senior U.S. officer in Saudi Arabia said.

Said another official: ''If it came down to that it we would have to move at lightning speed. So obviously you take preliminary steps to bring up the level of readiness, regardless of the current plans.''

The U.S. mission here is universally described as defensive, and the first wave of troops and equipment to reach Saudi soil were those that have trained in anti-tank and other warfare that could be used to thwart an Iraqi incursion into the Saudi kingdom.

But in the past few days much of troops and materiel that have arrived and moved into forward positions have been those considered generally to be designed for offensive missions.

These include the beginning elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, an air-assault assault unit which transports its troops with helicopters, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which includes tanks, heavy artillery and Cobra attack choppers, and other ground and naval forces geared toward offensive missions.
SAUDI ARABIA - A Kuwaiti who has escaped from his country twice since the Iraqi invasion said Monday his countrymen and others living there are as much to blame for looting as the invading forces.

"Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Filipinos, Indians, Iraqis, everybody is looting," said Kamil al Sultan, a Kuwaiti businessman who also owns a home in Santa Barbara, Calif. "They were taking tape recorders, washing machines, air conditioners, gold - anything they can carry, that they can get away with, they took."

Sultan said he first left Kuwait on Aug. 8, immediately after the Iraqi invasion, driving his four-wheel drive vehicle south from Kuwait City, following oil pipelines south and getting across the border into the Saudi desert without major problems.

Sultan said he went back into Kuwait on two days later to get several family members and relatives. They headed for the Saudi border on the 11th and were stopped several times along the way by Iraqi troops, he said.

He the party used food and other booty to bribe their way through some posts and after being told at one stop they would not be allowed to proceed further convinced an Iraqi commander to let them go. Sultan said the commander gave them a note that allowed them to get across the border, but he said he no longer had it because guards at the last station seized it.

Sultan said he and others who escaped have kept in touch with leaders of the small resistance movement in Kuwait by driving to the border and calling them on cellular car phones.

He said Iraqis have moved into vacant homes and taken food and supplies but for the most part have not damaged occupied homes.

He said the Kuwaiti people were awaiting guidance from their ousted government on whether they should seek jobs elsewhere during the Iraqi occupation.

Sultan said he is hoping to start a new business with proceeds of the sale of construction and building materials he had ordered from the United States. The materials were to be shipped to Kuwait but he said he is trying to arrange to have them shipped elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region.

The Air Force is providing its personnel here with the same legal services it provides on bases back home, including help writing wills and documents that grant power of attorney to spouses back in the United States.

An attorney working out of a makeshift office at a Saudi airbase said he has helped numerous airmen draft wills since he put an ad in a base newsletter last week announcing his services were available.

And the attorney, who asked that his name not be used, said dozens of Air Force personnel also have had to grant power of attorney to spouses or relatives back home so that they have the authority to conduct financial transactions.

The attorney said he also had advised commanders in the number of minor disciplinary cases but declined to be specific.

"It hasn't been anything too serious," he said. "I don't force us having too much trouble with the guys over here because there is no alcohol."
Expeditionary brigade are upset because their commander ordered them to sleep on a ship at night, one of the four said Monday.

Martha, a radio technician from Tennessee, said the conditions aboard the ship are probably better than those at a Saudi facility where her male colleagues are sleeping.

But that's not the issue.

"We don't want to be treated any differently from anyone else," she said.

Women are barred from direct combat roles in the military but dozens of women have been sent here in other roles.

The female Marine said her status here is unclear. She said that commanders are considering sending the four women home. A Marine spokesman said service guidelines called for women to be sent wherever their units were deployed. The commander of the unit in question was not immediately available to discuss the woman's account.

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** TOTAL PAGE.001 **
This is a wire service story that must be faxed to the Pentagon 693-6853 for release. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.

Kuwait—There is no build up of Iraq and Saudi military forces at this crosspoint on the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and so no apparent danger of a border clash that could trigger accidental war, at least not here.

Saudi border guards have a single machine gun in view and keep watch through binoculars on what civilians at the border say are Iraqi tanks spaced about a quarter mile apart in a defensive line across the Kuwait side of the border.

Otherwise, there are no military weapons or forces in sight at this border station less than a mile from the gulf.

There is a large Saudi military force miles back and the biggest U.S. military force build-up since the Vietnam war even further from the border.

But if Saudi and Iraq forces are as far apart along the rest of the nearly 150-mile Saudi-Kuwait border as they are here, the risk of accidental war started by some isolated clash appears to be small.

What reporters saw here was in line with a Saudi official statement last week that most Iraqi forces were 25 to 40 miles from the border and Saudi forces were also staying well back from it.

If so, a war would have to be started deliberately. But Iraq President Saddam Hussein has said he has no intention of invading Saudi Arabia and Saudi and U.S. officials say the purpose of the huge military force they are building is only to deter an Iraq invasion or fight invading Iraqi forces if they come.

The reporters went to the border on their own but are members of a pool organized by the Defense Department to share news report with the rest of the American reporters. They are bound by security rules not to report where U.S. units are or how large they are.

At the large modern border crossing station at Khafji there is not only little military activity. There are also few border crossings.

The flow of Kuwaiti refugees has slowed to a trickle choked off by Iraq, according to border officials.

Not a single car came through while a group of American reporters were there. The border officials said fewer than 100 people a day come through now.

Most of them continue south but about 100 Kuwaitis were at the station, clustered around moderate to expensive looking luggage, trying to get passports or decide where they wanted to go now that they were safely out of Kuwait, the border authorities said.

A mile or so away, well-off Kuwaitis who managed to get to Saudi Arabia days earlier were dialing car telephones at a highway rest stop on the green and turquoise gulf, trying to call relatives still in Kuwait.

One man said he had been trying to call his father in Kuwait for a week but with no luck.

He said he and his family drove across the border through the desert last week, eluding Iraqi forces and getting past one group of Iraqi soldiers by giving them water.

“It was very difficult,” he said. “Very dangerous.”

Another man said many people died trying to cross the desert because they did not have enough water.

Some of the Kuwaitis said, as others had earlier, that resistance fighters in Kuwait are using car bombings and night attacks against Iraqi forces.

“The young people are fighting the Iraqis at night with small arms,” one man said. “It’s too bad they don’t have bazookas.”

“We want to do everything we can to get Saddam out of Kuwait,” another man said.
KHAFJI, Saudi Arabia - The police captain served sweet tea to guests in his office overlooking occupied Kuwait.

Far off in the desert a handful of vehicles - people here said they were Iraqi tanks but it was hard to tell - stirred clouds of sand as they patrolled.

A hundred or so refugees from Kuwait huddled in the shade near the parking lot of this border crossing post, eating chunks of lamb and mounds of rice from enormous oval trays.

If Iraqi troops ever invaded Saudi Arabia, they would come through Khafji before meeting American forces, but when reporters visited Monday there was no sign of tension and the only Saudi defense was a single machinegun.

"No, I'm not afraid," said the police captain, offering the guests a seat. A tennis match was on television and his men were unarmed and seemed relaxed.

Less than a mile away, across a vast no-man's land, was the last checkpoint in Kuwait, which has been occupied by Iraq since Aug. 2.

A few Saudi border guards stood in the back of a red pickup truck and stared across the border into Kuwait with binoculars.

Saudi officials said the main Iraqi force had taken defensive positions 70 miles north of here in Kuwait City, and the nearest concentration of armor was a good 25 miles from Saudi Arabia.

Thousands of U.S. troops have landed here in the past week to beef up the Saudi forces against an Iraqi attack. So far Iraqi forces have been digging in to positions inside Kuwait and battling sporadic resistance.

"The young people are fighting the Iraqis at night with small arms. It's too bad they don't have bazookas," said Ahmed Abdullah, 28, a secretary from a government ministry in Kuwait.

"I talked to my friend. He says sometimes the electricity and water don't work and he can't find milk for the children," Abdullah said. He and other Kuwaitis had parked near the border to use car phones to call friends and family inside their country. International phone lines were cut by the Iraqi invaders, but the car phones still worked.

Their cars were parked in the white sand along the deep green water of the Persian Gulf. Across the thin highway, a ribbon of asphalt laid across the desert, a boy tended a herd of scruffy camels.

By Monday, the flow of refugees through Khafji into Saudi Arabia had slowed to a trickle, Saudi customs officials said. Only two Western families had crossed in the past two days, they said.

The refugees, called "guests" here, have been treated generously by the Saudis' King Fahd. They were given free hotels
This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Jubail, Saudi Arabia - Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Mubarak is the director general overseeing the construction of this industrial city on the Persian Gulf.

He is a large man with a grandfatherly look, possessed of a dark complexion, gray mustache and features that make him look, except for his Arab dress, like every American's movie stereotype of a Spanish don.

When you talk to him, he speaks perfect English. Ask him where he learned it so well, and he says casually that he attended high school in Philadelphia, junior college in Contra Costa, Calif., and is a graduate of the University of Arizona at Tempe.

Among the Saudi Arabian government and business leaders who have been working with the US military and the American press covering the war buildup here, that is not uncommon.

Ask almost anybody where he went to school and you hear answers like the University of Colorado, Georgetown University and Michigan State, as well as universities in Great Britain. And everyone, it seems, speaks flawless English.

To visitors accustomed to thinking of the Middle East, and particularly Saudi Arabia, as a mysterious country of rich sheikhs and princes lying on silk cushions in Bedouin desert tents, the reality is a source of continuing wonder.

Despite Saudi Arabia's mostly successful attempts to maintain a conservative Muslim society closed to the outside world, there has been a weaving together of its leadership with American and British culture.

Statistical information is hard to come by—the Saudis tend to be casual about that sort of thing—but the rough estimates work out this way:

Of a total of about 15 million people in the country, about 10 million are native Saudi Arabians. About three million are in leadership positions of one sort or another, in civil service, business and industry.

Of the three million, about 300,000 have been educated abroad—about 70%, or 210,000, of them in the United States and the remainder in Great Britain.

In the top levels of society, English is spoken as fluently as Arabic. In fact, everywhere you go—at least in big and middle-sized cities—almost all of the public and commercial signs are in English as well as Arabic. At King Fahd University in Dhahran, all of the classes are taught only in English.
For an American, Saudi Arabia is an easier country to get around in, linguistically, than Mexico.

Admittedly, the journalists here have had contact mostly with the cream of Saudi leadership—the internationalized government, military and business leaders. But these are the people who run things, who are the contacts for the American military here. In many respects, they act almost as informally western as their guests.

For example, when the Saudis took a group of journalists on a bus trip from Dhahran to see the industrial city of Jubail, a man who identified himself as Khalid Faisal worked as the steward, walking up and down the aisle to serve soft drinks and cookies to the passengers.

Asked about himself, he said only that he was between jobs.

When a reporter inquired of others, it turned out that he is a Saudi prince, a member of the royal family and the brother of Prince Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki, the secretary general in charge of the royal commission in charge of developing Jubail and the country's other industrial city, Yanbu.

Asked about his brother, Abdullah said that Khalid had volunteered to help. A reporter commented that having a prince serve the passengers certainly seemed like small-d democracy.

"No," Abdullah replied, "democracy is a right. Good manners is a duty."

But if it is not democracy, there is a degree of egalitarianism, at least in appearance and person-to-person relationships. Lower-ranking bureaucrats and go-fers dress exactly the same as princes and others in high positions—in a long white robe called a thobe, and wearing the headdress called a ghoutra.

The dress itself produces a certain leveling—like the uniforms in a Catholic elementary school in the States. The only variation is the color of the headdress—either white or red-and-white checks—and the choice is a matter of personal taste. So there is no way to tell prince from pauper.

Saudis tell you that many of them would prefer to wear western clothing, which they find more practical. But they say it is frowned upon. If you ask who does the frowning, they say it is the masses of people whose feelings they must consider.

Moreover, the Saudis operate with an easy informality. There has been no obvious fawning, bowing or scraping toward high-ranking officials by the men who take their orders. Seating on buses and airplanes has been first-come, first-served.

That is not to say that the Saudis approve of everything American. This is a strict Muslim country, where alcohol and pork are forbidden by law, where women may not drive cars, where television programs that show too much violence or cleavage are censored, and where everything shuts down five times a day for prayers.
Not all Saudis are strictly religious, and some will tell you that they drink alcohol when they’re out of the country. But they also say they would not, even if they could, vote to legalize it in their country, and they speak wistfully of the erosion of morals and traditions as Saudi Arabia becomes more internationalized.

"Sometimes you do things you would not want your children to do," one Saudi said.

As in America, civil servants are often paid less than what they might make in private industry. Prince Abdullah confides that his father forced him to study industrial engineering in England because the family did not have much money and he wanted to make sure his son had a civil service career.

But he says what he really wanted to do was play professional soccer and then become a chef. Now, he says, he's thinking of retiring from the civil service and going into private industry, where he could make 50% more money.

The Saudis also have an easy sense of humor, and many jokes work as well in Arabic as they do in English. The prince says his employees sometimes say his name as "Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki been around too long."

When the Pentagon pool of journalists arrived here more than a week ago, the first Saudi reporter met was a lieutenant colonel in the Army.

They had barely finished exchanging greetings when the colonel told the reporter a Polish joke.

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SAUDI ARABIA - Troops stationed here before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are complaining that they have not been issued suits designed to protect against chemical weapons.

"All these guys coming in here get gask masks and the suits but we get nothing," an Air Force airman said Monday night. "They are treating us as if we don't count."

A spokesman for military, however, said the shortage was discussed at a command staff briefing Tuesday and that more suits are expected to arrive on transport planes in the next few days.

An Air Force sergeant stationed in Saudi Arabia the past nine months, went as far as calling a news organization in the United States to voice his complaint.

"I was just fed up with the bureaucracy," the sergeant said Monday. "Why should my guys be left naked?"

The sergeant was identified in a U.S. wire service report but Pentagon pool ground rules prohibit the use of his name in pool dispatches from Saudi Arabia.

In brief interviews with a dozen men stationed here as part of a US Military training operations, just one said he had chemical gear.

"I scavenged it up by cutting a deal," the Air Force sergeant said.

The sergeant who called the states to complain said there are about 120 US military personnel stationed at the training mission, with most of them being Air Force personnel. The men conduct training with the Saudi military and also provide security, communications and other logistical support to a small US compound on a Saudi air base.

"I don't have a suit. I don't have a gas mask. I don't have any of it," an Army sergeant said when asked whether he had the protective gear.

Both Saudi and American officials have said they doubted Iraq has the capability to successfully use chemical weapons against the airbase. Iraq's missiles are not considered very accurate at long distances, and the United States has deployed missile-killig Patriot missile systems at strategic areas as a precaution. Also, Air Force officials have predicted US or Saudi fighters could intercept any Iraqi planes that tried to cross into Saudi territory.

Bratton and the other men interviewed said they believed those assertions but still would feel more comfortable with the chemical gear.

"It's as much psychological as anything," said one of the men, an Air Force master sergeant. "We see everybody else with them and hear everything being said about Iraq's gas and chemicals but we get nothing."

The men said they have requested chemical gear several times and were told it was coming in from the United States.

One said he was told gear for the men stationed here full time was aboard a C-130 transport plane that arrived at their airbase Monday. But when he went the plane, the man said he was told the chemical suits and gear already had been offloaded and taken somewhere.

"Somewhere, but not here, not for us," he said.

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Somewhere in Saudi Arabia- Iraqi President Saddam Hussein moved surface-to-surface Scud missiles into occupied Kuwait, increasing the threat of a chemical weapons attack, a Saudi commander said Tuesday.

"We know that he did move missiles to Kuwait," Brig. Gen. Turki Bin Nasser, a Saudi base commander, said at a press conference.

Asked if the missiles increased the threat of a chemical weapons attack, he said, "I think he has the ability and he uses the means of delivering chemical weapons and we are well trained for it."

"You expect anything from this guy," the general said.

He said he believed Iraq began putting the missiles into Kuwait the first week it invaded that country, Aug. 2. Iraq later annexed Kuwait.

Jane's in London reported earlier that Iraq has moved 36 of the Soviet-made Scud missiles into Kuwait but Turki said he did not know how many had been moved to Kuwait.

The missile has a range of 300 miles, enough to hit cities and other villages on Saudi Arabia's East coast.

But Turki said at an earlier press conference that the missiles were so inaccurate they were likely to land in the desert around the Persian Gulf.

He said Tuesday that U.S. and Saudi Forces have defenses ready in place against the Scuds, including U.S. Patriot anti-missiles.

Turki said he believed Saddam was digging in defensively for now but said the Iraqi president could consolidate and then he can turn it into an offensive invasion.

"He's unpredictable," the general said. "You have to be ready for anything he does."

Turki also said Saudi planes lock weapons radar onto Iraqi planes almost every day near the Saudi border and said the Iraqi planes turn away.

"There is always this cat and mouse type thing on the border," he said. "We see them, lock on them and they just turn back and go. They've done it more than once."

He said the Iraq and Saudi planes come within 30 to 40 miles of each other but said the Saudi planes fly no closer than 20 to 30 miles from the border with Iraq and Kuwait.

The general said that Saddam has tanks, SAM anti-aircraft missile sites, radar, armour and other equipment near the Saudi border.

Further, Turki said, "He is massing across the Kuwaiti border a lot of defense stuff."

"I believe he is expecting the Navy to go there or something."
SAUDI ARABIA - Troops stationed here before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are complaining that they have not been issued suits designed to protect against chemical weapons.

"All these guys coming in here get gas masks and the suits but we get nothing," an Air Force airman said Monday night. "They are treating us as if we don't count."

A spokesman for military, however, said the shortage was discussed at a command staff briefing Tuesday and that more suits expected to arrive on transport planes in the next few days.

An Air Force sergeant stationed in Saudi Arabia the past nine months, went as far as calling a news organization in the United States to voice his complaint.

"I was just fed up with the bureaucracy," the sergeant said Monday. "Why should my guys be left naked."

The sergeant was identified in a U.S. wire service report but Pentagon pool ground rules prohibit the use of his name in pool dispatches from Saudi Arabia.

In brief interviews with a dozen men stationed here as part of a US military training operations, just one said he had chemical gear.

"I scrounged it up by cutting a deal," the Air Force sergeant said.

The sergeant who called the states to complain said there are about 120 US military personnel stationed at the training mission, with most of them being Air Force personnel. The men conduct training with the Saudi military and also provide security, communications and other logistical support to a small US compound on a Saudi air base.

"I don't have a suit. I don't have a gas mask. I don't have any of it," an Army sergeant said when asked whether he had the protective gear.

Both Saudi and American officials have said they doubted Iraq has the capability to successfully use chemical weapons against the airbase. Iraq's missiles are not considered very accurate at long distances, and the United States has deployed missile-killing Patriot missile systems at strategic areas as a precaution. Also, Air Force officials have predicted US or Saudi fighters could intercept any Iraqi planes that tried to cross into Saudi territory.

Bratton and the other men interviewed said they believed those assertions but still would feel more comfortable with the chemical gear.

"It's as much psychological as anything," said one of the men, an Air Force master sergeant. "We see everybody else with them and hear everything being said about Iraq's gas and chemicals but we get nothing."

The men said they have requested chemical gear several times and were told it was coming in from the United States.

One said he was told gear for the men stationed here full time was aboard a C-130 transport plane that arrived at their airbase Monday. But when he went the plane, the man said he was told the chemical suits and gear already had been offloaded and taken somewhere.

"Somewhere, but not here, not for us," he said.

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PENTAGON POOL REPORT NO. 21-1 -- FILED BY JAY PETERZELL, TIME MAGAZINE

SAUDI ARABIA -- Four or five days after Iraqi troops
invaded Kuwait, a clandestine radio station transmitted a message
to the Kuwaiti people: a satellite would pass over Kuwait City
that evening at midnight and photograph the city. All Kuwaitis
should go up on their roofs and show their opposition to Saddam
Hussein.

The word spread quickly. By midnight, the whole city
seemed to be up on the tops of buildings shouting "God is Great!"
The Kuwaitis unrolled huge banners bearing resistance slogans in
Arabic and English: "NO TO SADDAM!" and "KWUWAIT FOR US, NOT FOR
THE IRAQIS!" and "WE DIE AND KWUWAIT LIVES!" The slogans were
written in three-foot-high letters that the Kuwaitis were sure
would be large enough to be read from the sky.

"We stayed one hour on the roofs shouting," says Nawal,
one of several Kuwaiti participants in the demonstration who have
since escaped to Saudi Arabia and described the event to a
reporter. Iraqi soldiers, surrounded by thunderous shouts of
"Allah Akbar!" from all over the city, nervously shot bursts of
automatic-weapons fire into the air.

Western diplomats here say they have gotten similar
reports about the demonstration. Says one official: "Something
big happened that night."

Nawal and her husband Hussein, a middle-class Kuwaiti who
worked with the resistance movement during the week after the
invasion, also described Iraq's almost-comical attempts to create
the fiction that Kuwaitis support Iraq's occupation of their
country.
On Sunday, August 5, Iraqi T.V. showed the world what it said were members of Kuwait's new, pro-Iraqi government. As music played in the background, the new Kuwaiti ministers were pictured shaking hands with Saddam Hussein at a meeting the day before in Baghdad. According to a narrator, they were thanking Saddam for coming to Kuwait's assistance.

"We had to laugh, really," says Nawal. "Because we know some of these people."

Her husband Hussein explains that he went to high school with two of the men the Iraqis claimed were now ministers in the new government: Naser al Mandel, the Minister of Education, and Fadel al Wathkeke, the Minister of Information.

Hussein said that both men were actually lieutenants in the Kuwait Navy and had been arrested by Iraq along with other Kuwaiti officers at a Navy base on the day of the invasion.

"When you looked at their faces," he says of the Iraqi footage of his friends, "they looked like someone was holding a machine gun on them... They were not traitors. I know them very well. They never would cheat their country."

This ostensible new government of Kuwait has not been heard from since the Iraqi broadcast. The Iraqis have simply been unable to find any Kuwaitis, even among the political opposition, who are willing to take the reins of power from Saddam Hussein.
Like many Kuwaiti refugees, Hussein and Nawal are surprisingly philosophical about the loss of their country. Kuwaitis often gather here in informal meetings, or Diwaniyya. Many of them tell lighthearted, almost affectionately teasing, stories about the Iraqi invaders.

"You see us like this, joking and laughing," says Hussein. "But you can't see inside my heart. It's breaking, really. At night, we can't believe what's happened to us. Every day I think maybe I should go back."

Describing the aftermath of the invasion, Hussein said that the Kuwaiti army and police had passed out weapons to the public the first day. "Everyone has one or two machine guns. The problem is about the bullets," he says.

In addition to describing occasional acts of violence against Iraqi soldiers, Hussein said he had witnessed what appeared to be an effort to intimidate collaborators.

Iraqi soldiers are widely reported to be poorly supplied, relying on civilians in Kuwait for food and water. One afternoon about few days after the invasion, Hussein saw a truckload of Iraqi soldiers pull up to a house near his own. A couple of the soldiers went inside. A car with two Kuwaitis pulled up. One of the Kuwaitis drew a pistol, shot several soldiers, and the car pulled away.

Also in the first week after the invasion, Hussein says,
the resistance learned that Iraq's intelligence service had compiled a list of names and addresses of Kuwaiti army officers and was rounding them up. Resistance members went around the city taking down street signs and house numbers so that the Iraqis would not be able to find the officers' houses.

The resistance also dealt with more-mundane tasks -- like taking out the garbage. Trash collection in Kuwait City stopped after the invasion, explains Hussein, and resistance members feared that the accumulating refuse would breed disease. They organized a trucking service to collect garbage, carry it into the desert, and burn it.

Many of Iraq's soldiers were less fearsome than they were bedraggled, say Hussein and Nawal. They sometimes saw Iraqis wearing the uniforms of Kuwaiti police or firemen -- not to disguise themselves but because their own uniforms were falling apart. Iraqi army trucks were often seen carrying not just guns but also stolen chairs, sofas, refrigerators, ovens and other appliances. The soldiers stole hundreds of new cars from Kuwaiti dealerships. In one case, says Hussein, Iraqis set fire to thousands of Toyotas, Chevies and GM cars at a huge dealership known as the Al-Ganim Company, in Shwaik.

And yet many Iraqis are treating Kuwaitis with respect, says Hussein. He told a story about five Kuwaiti soldiers he knows who were arrested by the Iraqis and detained in a villa near the Gulf. Every day, a different officer and guard showed up and demanded to know whether the five men were soldiers or civilians. They all said they were civilians. Then why were
they there? the officer asked them. They said they didn't know.

They were provided with food and given a stolen television and a VCR with a single tape to help them pass the time.

After six days, the officer who had come to question that morning said they could leave. How? they asked? they were a long way from town. The officer nodded, went away, and returned with a new Kuwaiti Army car, which he said they could keep. The five astonished soldiers piled in and drove off. They saw Hussein later that day and told him the story.

Incidents like that make the Iraqi invasion seem almost like a ghazza, the traditional Arabian camel-rustling raid in which women were always treated with respect and relatively few people were killed. But the danger in Kuwait is by no means over.

That is one reason why Nawal's mother reacted as she did when Nawal's brother showed up at their hotel room. He had escaped from Kuwait four days earlier but had been unable to link up with his sister and mother until then. They had not known whether he was safe. He said hello to them all and rushed off to the lobby to round up his children.

Nawal's mother sat on the bed crying. Finally she stood up, mumbled something in Arabic to a visitor, touched one hand to her chest, and left the room. Nawal translated: "My heart," her mother had said. "I want to see my son."
THIS IS PENTAGON POOL REPORT WRITTEN AND FILED BY PETER COPELAND, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, AND MICHAEL ROSS, LOS ANGELES TIMES.

Saudi Arabia - When Defense Secretary Dick Cheney came to see U.S. troops here, his Saudi host got the cold shoulder — literally.
Turki bin Nasser, not only a Saudi brigadier general but also a royal prince, greeted Cheney Sunday and took him to see U.S. troops on the sweltering flight line of the base Prince Turki commands.
But in the crush of American reporters trying to get close to Cheney while he spoke to the troops, Turki was jostled aside. At one point, a Cheney bodyguard pushed Turki with a stiff forearm. The general turned and got on his bus.
While both sides called the incident a misunderstanding, there was concern it was a sign of things to come as two very different cultures rub shoulders. Both sides are on their best behavior now — the American GIs are getting "cultural sensitivity" briefings that would make Miss Manners proud — but some worry that the misunderstandings could multiply the longer U.S. troops are here.
"It depends on whether we are here for three months or three years. Up to now, most Americans haven’t seen a Saudi and most Saudis haven’t seen an American," said a Western diplomat.
"Obviously that’s not going to be sustainable if they stay here a long time, especially given the American military’s propensity to replicate Subic Bay wherever it goes," the diplomat said. "This isn’t going to be an easy place to turn into a Bangkok."
Rest and relaxation for the American troops is not a major concern in the first weeks of this massive deployment, but soon soldiers are going to be thirsty in a country that’s dry in more ways than one. And they are going to be looking for company in a place where women are veiled and segregated from men.
"As long as it is Saudi rest and relaxation, that is fine," said a senior Saudi official. "If they want American rest and relaxation, perhaps they will have to look for it somewhere else."
The issue of women soldiers is raised often by both sides because Saudi women are not allowed to show their hair, aces or figures in public or drive cars.
American commanders say they won’t limit the use of women troops, although some women soldiers have been told not to drive in public areas — and not to drive at all unless they are in full uniform with their heads covered.
Saudi airmen work alongside female American radar operators in what U.S. commanders proudly describe as the ‘‘fully integrated’’ flight crews aboard U.S. AWACS. The Saudis, however, do not reciprocate: their AWACS planes are for men only.
While such differences can probably be finessed, Western diplomats say that in the long run, the American presence could become a catalyst for deeply unsettling social changes in Saudi Arabia.
Since the oil boom of the 1970s, Saudi society has been divided between the conservative Islamic majority and the Western-educated, "modernizing" elite. The presence of thousands of Americans could drive a wedge between the two groups, according to diplomats from several Western countries.

"Once this is all over, there will be a battle," said one diplomat. "The modernizers are feeling pretty good now, but the liberals are a very thin veneer on the conservative majority."

Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait united the two groups. Iraq threatened Saudi oil fields - the source of power for the modernizers - and the whole structure of society, including the royal family and religious hierarchy. So far, the conservative religious leaders have backed the American deployment, calling it a necessary measure in the short term.

"My impression is that the Saudis generally think this is a good idea - now," said a Western diplomat here. "Having tens of thousands of Americans here for a long time is going to be a problem," the diplomat said.

"Every member of the royal family has a part of his brain that says I wish there were an easy solution," the diplomat said. "Half of them are worried the Americans won't stay long enough and half are worried they'll stay too long," the diplomat said. "Sometimes the same individual worries about both."

Much depends on how long the U.S. troops are here, and that depends on Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

"The realistic Saudis think it is going to be a long grind. The Americans are digging in; the Iraqis are digging in," the diplomat said. "Maybe with enough pressure something inside Iraq or inside Saddam Hussein's head will give."

"The wishful thought is that the Americans will take out Saddam Hussein," he said."

For now, relations between the Saudis and the Americans are better than ever, and both sides expect long-awaited Congressional approval for more arms sales to Saudi Arabia. As a diplomat here said, "There is a honeymoon going on in American-Saudi relations."

But like in any new marriage, getting to know each other can be rough at times.
Large Saudi Arabia—The food has improved somewhat at a former
Saudi air defense installation in the desert here, but US Army
Airborne troops still are not fond of Saudi Arabian cooking.

And newly-arrived women truck drivers said they been told, to
their disappointment, that they will not be able to do their
jobs. It is against the law for women to drive in Saudi Arabia.

But military commanders said the concerns were unfounded. They
said any women drivers, in uniform, would be allowed to drive
anywhere.

Some of the troops here complained of diarrhea and other in-
testinal problems. Though they worry that food poisoning is the cul-
pit, doctors at the medical facility say the problems have been
caused mostly by the desert heat and the change in environment.

This encampment, in a hot, windy desert area near a Saudi air
base, was the first place members of the Pentagon press pool vis-
ited after they arrived here Aug. 13 to report on the massive US
military buildup following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

At that time, many of the troops were complaining about the
sanitary facilities and the food, provided by Saudi Americans un-
der contract with the US military. They were fed Hardee’s beef
sandwiches the first few days, then the diet went to bread, wa-
ter, beans and fruit.

Since then, the quality of the food has improved somewhat, the
soldiers say, but many still don’t like it because it’s different
from what they’re used to.

"You can get enough to eat. It’s just that some of the guys are
scared to eat some of it," said a 21-year-old Poplarville, Miss.,
private manning a machine gun on the roof of a building.

"After the first couple of days," said a 30-year-old sergeant
from Needles, Calif., "you’ll never say anything bad about MREs
(field rations) again."

At first, the machine gunner said, breakfast consisted of
bread, butter and cheese, "and you couldn’t eat the cheese." In
the last several days, he said, the troops were getting dry cere-
al and hard-cooked eggs.

"There’s a lot of rice," he said. "It’s there just about every
meal except breakfast. There’s not a lot of meat, and there was
no meat for breakfast."

The men sleep in tents, but the women, many of them newly-ar-
Despite the restrictions on coverage, the pool members here—unlike those who covered the Panama invasion—have had wide-ranging access to most of what they wanted to see and report on here. However, there have been occasional denials, such as a request by the pool to visit military units closest to the Kuwait border.

The military public affairs staff, under Navy Capt. Mike Sherman, work out the pool’s requests with unit commanders. Sherman said his operation was autonomous and exercised its own judgment, with nothing ruled off-limits by the Pentagon.

“We’re trying to find as much to cover as we can here,” Sherman said. “We’re trying to balance it so there’s coverage of all the services. We’re also trying to respond to requests from the news organizations.”

For example, as soon as one of the staff officers learned that a Patriot missile battery had been set up, he told the pool members about it. They asked to go and he took them.

Other journalists arriving over the last four days, including the networks, have had to agree to the same restrictions as the pool reporters if they cover military installations and operations. Except for isolated violations, they have mostly done so, and many of them are doing the same stories filed by pool reporters and broadcasters last week.

Included in a package of clippings in the military press center the other day was a page one Chicago Tribune story describing the scene here. There was nothing in it that had not been covered by pool reporters last week. Someone had scribbled across the top, “Better than nothing!”

Events put on by Saudi Arabian government officials and businessmen for the pool reporters and others have not been subjected to restrictions other than the guidelines restricting reporting of military operations.
The pool report was written by Frank A. Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal with John King of the Associated Press.

Eastern Saudi Arabia - A reporter asked the 23-year-old paratrooper if he knew why he was in Saudi Arabia.

"This is an economic war, pure and simple," said the second lieutenant, who said he had been an economics major in college.

"We're here because of oil. Our allies actually need the Saudi oil more than we do, but we're the ones who are going to have to protect it."

Then the young officer launched into a five minute analysis of the world economy, the interdependence of monetary systems, and such things as the effect of fluctuating oil prices on stock markets.

A 24-year-old private, a tank gunner from New York City, stood and listened quietly. When the reporter turned to him, he shrugged and said:

"It would have been a lot simpler if you'd asked me. I would have said 'oil.'"

Among the troops here, that is the response most often heard when they are asked if they know why they might be asked to fight and die against Iraqi troops in the desert.

When the question is asked, the sophistication of the responses appears to mirror what you might find in the general population.

Officers, non-coms, doctors, and soldiers who ordinarily keep up on current events can give quite detailed replies. Teenagers and other young people who pay little attention to such things usually don't have much to say. They rely on talk and rumors from their comrades.

A 19-year-old woman private first class, newly arrived from North Carolina, looked back blankly when a reporter asked her why she was in Saudi Arabia.

"I don't really know," she said. "I just drive a truck."

She is Airborne qualified, has jumped out of airplanes and said she had been on exercises in Central America.

Her partner, a 20-year-old woman truck driver from Texas, said: "I'm not sure what we're defending. It's just to help Saudi Arabia against Iran and Iraq. We're here for their protection as well as ours."

A dispatcher, a 20-year-old Michigan woman said simply, "Saudi Arabia wants our protection."

There is a hunger for news here, however, though most field commanders reportedly have been briefing their troops on the military situation, they have had little news from home or about the
world situation.

A 22-year-old sergeant from Chicago said he was hoping a PX would open so he could buy a short-wave radio to keep up on what was going on.

Some reporters who go out in the field bring stacks of English-language Saudi Arabian newspapers with them to distribute to the troops.

There's also a yearning among families back in the United States for more specific news about what's happening to their sons, daughters, husbands and wives here.

Defense Department restrictions forbid publishing of names of anyone but commanders, both as a protection against terrorism and to prevent harassment of families in the United States.

To get around that, commanders have come up with other communications methods. Col. John McBroom, commander of the 1st Tactical Air Wing, had his photographers take 500 slides of members of his wing deploying here. Then he made a tape describing what was going on.

The slides were shown and the tape played for the troops' families back at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.

Some of the young people here have a knack for reducing the situation to its basics.

"We need the Saudi oil, and now the Saudis need us," said a 22-year-old paratrooper.

Another soldier told John Ydstie of National Public Radio, in a comment that was widely circulated among journalists:

"I'm here to defend my materialistic way of life. I like my lifestyle."
Saudia Arabia - Kuwaitis who fled their nation are forming a liberation army to lead any military effort to force out Iraqi occupation forces, Kuwait's crown prince said today.

"We will be reorganizing, rearming, re-equipping with necessary arms to take part as an advance team in liberating our country," Prince Saad Abdullah al Sabah said. "We Kuwaitis will never submit or surrender to threats or to aggression or to occupation."

Prince Abdullah, the No. 2 official in the ousted Kuwaiti government, met with reporters at a hotel where he and other Kuwaiti officials have set up temporary headquarters.

Abdullah declared that "the Kuwaiti government is alive and well" and implored world leaders to tighten the economic and political sanctions against Iraq.

"We in Kuwait and our brothers in this vital part of the world, are fully convinced that it is quite necessary that we should cooperate together and to fight and to struggle, by all means available to us to free Kuwait," he said.

Abdullah said he was convinced Iraq was planning to launch an attack on Saudi Arabia next in an effort to gain control of its oil and other riches.

"The unjustified and unlawful aggression has shown to all the world the real designs and the real expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime," he said.

Abdullah, flanked by other Kuwaiti officials, said some Kuwaitis who fled have returned to their country to take part in a resistance movement. Others, he said, were preparing to take up arms in case a military assault is made to force the Iraqis out.

"We will fight and fight until we drive out the aggressors from our country," he said. "We will do everything. We are willing to sacrifice everything, not only our money and our funds but also our blood to liberate our country."

The resistance movement, he said, "is growing day by day. It has been escalating and will continue to escalate."

Abdullah said two or three members of the al Sabah royal family had been arrested in Kuwait. Other Kuwaiti officials said the emir was in the hotel but would not meet with reporters.

"He is too formal," said Ali Jaber al Sabah, a member of the royal family who serves as marketing director for the government-owned Kuwait Petroleum Co.

Jaber said the company is making arrangements to purchase about 250,000 barrels of Saudi crude oil on a daily basis so that it can supply its gas stations in Europe. He said he also was negotiating with other Persian Gulf oil producers. The oil operation is being run out of London.

Jaber said Kuwaitis still in their country have reported that two palaces are being used as "concentration camps" for women and children arrested at demonstrations.

"They are beating the hell out of them," he said.

Jaber said recent reports indicate food is getting scarce in Kuwait but that looting was not as common as in the days immediately following the Aug. 2 invasion.

"Unarmed boys are walking the neighborhoods to deter looting," he said.
SAUDI ARABIA - The headline on the mimeographed newsletter declares: "Secretary of Defense Explains Why We Are Here."

To news-hungry American troops, it is just what they have been begging for - news from the states on how their deployment in Saudi Arabia has been received and how long it will last.

But readers come away disappointed. "The situation is very uncertain," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney is quoted as saying. "We don't know how long it will last."

The American military buildup in Saudi Arabia is the biggest story in the United States these days but most troops here know little about the reaction and developments back home.

The troops are being briefed on Iraqi troop movements in occupied Kuwait, and have occasional opportunities to read Saudi newspapers.

But most of the thousands of U.S. troops here have no access to American publications or any television, so they incessantly ask questions of visiting reporters about the situation back home.

"Do the American people want us here?" an Army private asked during a desert exercise this week.

"Is President Bush saying we'll go to war?" asked an Air Force supply officer.

But not all of the questions relate to the military action.

"Are the Mets in first?" was what a newly arrived Marine from New York wanted to know the other day.

Iraq is trying to fill the news void with radio broadcasts suggesting that while Americans are protecting Saudi oil fields the "petrol emirs" are in the United States and have "enjoyed" the company of American women.

"I thought it was pretty funny, actually," said a member of the 82nd Airborne Division who listened to the broadcast earlier this week. "If that's their idea of psychological warfare I don't think we have much to worry about."

The Saudi media also has had its fair share of propaganda the past two weeks.

Local television, which can be seen by some U.S. forces who are staying in hotels or in Saudi barracks, frequently includes lengthy segments showing the arrival and exercises of troops in the kingdom, with no narration but patriotic music booming.

And Saudi papers on a daily basis carry dispatches from a state press agency designed to assure the public that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait will not affect Saudi Arabia's food supplies, economy or security.

But the Saudi papers also have published numerous stories written by wire services concerning the Middle East crisis. Americans who live here say the local press never has been this open before.

There are signs the troops will be getting more access to the news.

For the first week of the U.S. presence here there were few attempts to get newspapers to troops in the field. But in the past few days a daily shipment has been sent to some camps.

"They get passed around and read again and again and again," a spokesman for the 82nd Airborne said. "They guys are hungry for news."

A few issues of Stars & Stripes also have turned up the past few days, and the small newsletter that carried the dispatch about Cheney's remarks is being published at one Saudi airbase where U.S. forces are positioned.

A mail system also is getting off the ground this week.

"That will finally bring us some word on how our families are doing," said a 20-year paratrooper said. He said troops were not told much about their mission even before they left "Because they don't want to upset the families."

A 20-year old Army driver says he was told at a briefing that U.S. troops were on "a peacekeeping mission."

But he said he knew there was a good chance for combat. How?

"They issued live rounds instead of blanks."

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SAUDI ARABIA -- American soldiers holding their own against the
desert sun, the blowing sand and even the threat of poison gas are
beginning to confront a new enemy: boredom.

The one complaint of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia is that
there's nothing to do.

Troops aren't allowed out of military camps, there's no mingling
with the local people, no beer, no discos and almost no entertainment.
"Personally, I'd like to get out of here," said a 21-year-old
Army military policeman from Chicago.

"There's nothing to do except write letters and sleep," said the
MP, who worked four-hour shifts guarding the dusty entrance to the 18th
Airborne Corps headquarters.

"When I became an MP, I thought I'd be driving around housing
projects, waving at kids and being Officer Friendly," he said. "Even
the dumbest rock could do this."

The worst thing for many is not knowing when they can go home.
"I've heard six months, one year. Today I heard Thanksgiving," the
lanky MP said.

The MP, whose helmet read, "Dowhat'salikelike," had more reason than
most to complain about his sudden trip to Saudi Arabia: He was to be
married on Saturday.

Asked how his fiancee reacted to the news that he wasn't going to
make the wedding, he laughed and said, "She was upset."

The MP's next big day is Sept. 2, his 22nd birthday. "I'm going to
drink some water and be standing at this gate, trying to remember to
celebrate it when I do get back," he said.

What could the brass do to make life better?
"A PX. A PX that actually has things," the MP said. "I'd buy a
radio, junk food and Chapstick."

Surely there must be something good about being here?
"It doesn't rain," he replied. "I hate rain."

Commanders say they're aware of the boredom and plan to increase
training and maneuvers as the troops get settled. Just about everyone,
for example, has brushed up on chemical warfare skills.

The military is working to get mail from home delivered, and some
commanders have set up news clips from local English-language papers. Some
fields have all libraries, and others have videos.

But the card game seems to be spades. A few soldiers brought
football and soccer balls, but it's been too hot to play.

Sometimes the spare time leads to creativity. One hangar was
decorated with a spoof on the missing child milk cartons. A water
bottle had a picture of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the message:
"Have you seen this child? If found, shoot between the eyes. Phone
White House for reward."

The level of boredom varies with the job. Crew members of AWACS
radar planes, for example, are too busy to be bored.

"You train forever, but this is real," said a 35-year-old
technical sergeant from New York. "We're changing at the bit."

One reason some soldiers might feel tired after two weeks here is
that they're coming off the high of a rapid deployment into unknown
terrain.

"There were some scared people coming over here, including this
old master sergeant," said an Air Force veteran of Vietnam.

"Now the kids see it's normal, and they start worrying about
stupid things," he said.
SAUDI ARABIA _ American tank-killing AH-64 Apache helicopters are flying missions near the Saudi-Kuwait border, carrying additional air-defense systems installed before the choppers were deployed in Saudi Arabia, Army officers said Friday.

Even more advanced systems designed to detect and defend the choppers against enemy fire are expected to be brought into Saudi Arabia for front-line units, the officers said.

"They were upgraded to match what they've (Iraqi forces) got," said an Apache pilot with the 101st Airborne Division (Air-assault)'s aviation brigade.

Several Apache pilots and co-pilots interviewed Friday said they have been on missions to the border area. One officer said frequent Iraqi troop movements have kept U.S. forces "locked, loaded and ready," even though an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia is not considered imminent.

"They move around so much you can't always be sure right away what they're up to," the officer said. "So you stay ready."

A small group of reporters visited the brigade Friday at its base in the Saudi desert, within range of Iraqi forces just over the border into Kuwait. It was the first time the 101st had allowed reporters into its base camp, which is expanding by the day as more men, equipment and supplies arrive here, and would be used as a staging facility for forward repair and refueling bases in the event of combat.

Ground rules for the Pentagon pool operation prohibit the disclosure of the camp's location. Most details of the Apache defense systems are classified, but they are designed to destroy approaching enemy fire or to confuse guidance systems.

The Apaches, with Hellfire missiles and multiple rocket pods, are the military's main weapon against Iraqi tanks. They are designed for combat in both night and day, and have plans to work in conjunction with Air Force A-10 air-to-ground support.

During a display Friday for the journalists, two Apaches flew north over the Saudi desert, hugging the ground and at times hiding behind sand dunes. The reporters watched from a Blackhawk helicopter.

Col. Tom Garrett, the brigade commander, said the division is receiving constant updates on Iraqi troop and tank movements and could quickly respond to an incursion into Saudi Arabia.

"We've been told we should get a 6- to 8-hour heads up when that start moving around but we can be ready pretty fast if need be," Garrett said.

"We're not worried about it," he said of the Iraqi tank threat. "We are locked and loaded and ready to go."

Several Apache pilots interviewed said the missions up to the Kuwait-Saudi border were to get familiar with flying conditions and the terrain below.

"We can take out 200 tanks easy in about two hours," said Lt. Col. Dick Cody, commander of an Apache battalion. "It's a (tactical) fighters dream out here."

The Apaches are equipped with state of the art radar and other scanning systems, and the weapons use laser and computer-controlled guidance systems.

The Hellfire never has been used in combat but Garrett said it has performed well in training missions. Live-fire training is planned for the Saudi desert in the near future, he said.

The Apaches, because of their anti-tank capabilities, were among the earliest arrivals in Saudi Arabia.

Their engines are being flushed daily because of sand ingestion, but Garrett and several pilots said they had experienced few weather-related problems.

"We've got two enemies out here," Garrett said. "One is the environment. The other is the Iraqis."
DoD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL
REPORT 90-1-65
RELEASED BY OASD(PA) AT 9:15 a.m.
24 AUG 1990

This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia—We are hovering 50 feet over the desert floor, ready to see how our Apache helicopters will obliterate any Iraqi tanks foolish enough to cross the border with Kuwait.

It is eerily cool and quiet, especially considering the fact that we are sitting in a Blackhawk troop-carrying helicopter with all its doors open to the desert heat.

This is a place in the Saudi Arabian desert that looks like something out of "Lawrence of Arabia." There are giant, bright beige sand dunes everywhere, and a palm-fringed oasis off to the right. Earlier, we saw camels.

It is Friday morning, and we are the first American journalists to visit this forward unit of the 101st Airborne Division’s air assault brigade out of Ft. Campbell, Ky., the ones who call themselves "Wings of Destiny."

This is the springboard unit, the soldiers who will go into battle first if shooting starts with the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. They are our tank killers, and they have already flown their wicked machines to the border—an easy trip, they say.

They fly the Apache helicopter, which is the junkyard dog of the Army’s chopper fleet. There is no more vicious helicopter anywhere in the world, and these folks plainly know how to use them.

Aside from the engine roar and the whup-whupping of our chopper’s blades against the dry desert air, the only sounds through the headsets are those of our pilot and the pilots of the two Apaches hovering off in the distance. Against the desert bleakness, they look like tiny dragonflies. But they are anything but harmless.

The lead pilot is Lt. Col. Dick Cody of Montpelier, Vt., 40 years old and as confident as modern technology and training can make a man.

"We can hurt ‘em," he tells us later. "We can hurt ‘em bad. They’ll be toast."

Cody is the commander of the Apache battalion. His choppers are loaded with super-secret computerized equipment to find and destroy enemy tanks, day or night. And the open desert is a particularly good place for their deadly work.

Right now, the Apaches are carrying eight laser-guided Hellfire missiles, along with two pods that hold 19 rockets each and 1,200 rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition for the chain gun.
"We could take out 200 tanks, easy, in about two hours," Cody says of his unit. "In the desert, they can run, but they can't hide. We have systems so if they hunker down in the sand, they're hotter than the sand so we can see them. It's a tac (tactical) pilot's dream out here."

But Cody is not alone in his confidence. The platoon of young men who loaded the Hellfires in the shimmering heat on the air-strip are pumped up, too. They were laughing and joking among themselves as they watched the journalists watch the Apaches take off.

"I think we can kick everybody's ass, sir," a 24-year-old specialist from Chicago says with a grin. "We can go anywhere, fight anybody, and win."

Cody says that during the day, the Apaches can operate out of range of anything the Iraqis can throw at them. At night, they can get in even closer.

Cody loves the Apache, which pilots say is the most maneuverable helicopter in the air. It is fully acrobatic, capable of loops and rolls. It can even fly upside-down.

"I've been flying Cobras (an older attack helicopter) for 12 years," Cody says. "I thought that was the baddest machine I'd ever seen, 'till this one. The Cobra's like a Corvette. The Apache's like a Lamborghini."

Cody talks to our pilot, a 31-year-old captain from Chicago, who maneuvers his Blackhawk around a sand dune and down low so the television cameraman and the photographer can get shots to show the folks back home.

Soon the Apaches are skimming across the desert toward us, growing in size by the second. Just before they reach us, they veer up and away into the hazy blue sky, as they might after they had shot hellfire at an Iraqi tank.

Later, the aviation brigade commander, Col. Tom Garrett of Southern Pines, N.C., tells his visitors some of the usual things—that the 101st is here as a deterrence, and everyone hopes that there will be a diplomatic solution so nobody has to fight.

Garrett says they are here on a real mission and in real danger. But he says his men and women have been getting the helicopters assembled and operational faster than he expected, and are ready to go. Cody says the same thing, but with more grit.

"We're locked and loaded," he says. "We ain't playing around this week."

08:29:18 Fri 08/24/90

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Military intelligence reports do not indicate that Iraq has moved SCUD missiles into Kuwait, according to authoritative American officials in Saudi Arabia.

A well-placed official here said no SCUD launchers or missiles had been stationed in Kuwait. Asked about a claim this week by "Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review" that the Iraqi military had moved up to 36 SCUD launchers and 800 missiles into the occupied country, this source said: "I don't believe it."

The official added that the movement of SCUDs into Kuwait was not decisive in any case. "There are SCUDs all over southern Iraq and they can hit [a military airbase], whether or not they are deployed forward 100 kilometers into Kuwait," he said.

Another knowledgeable American source agreed that no SCUDs have been placed in Kuwait. But this source said that, as a result, the missiles are not now in effective range of certain U.S. military facilities.

Iraq has 36 SCUD-B launchers and has modified the weapon so that the missiles have a maximum range of over 300 miles, according to "The Military Balance" for 1989-90. The missile is known to be inaccurate at that range.

The American source said, however, that the missile is considered highly accurate at a range of about 200 miles. A move of SCUDs into Kuwait would be significant because of the difference in accuracy when fired from different distances, he explained.
DARPA APPLIQUE ARMOR SYSTEM READY IN THREE MONTHS

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has successfully completed a three-month project to take a technology from proof-of-principle concept to fieldable prototype system within three months. The objective of this $2 million effort was to provide 75 prototype kits of Light Applique System Technique armor to the Marine Corps for application to Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) deployed with both Marine and Army forces participating in Operation Desert Storm.

Light Applique System Technique (LAST™) is a unique attachment system for applique armors. Foster-Miller Inc., Waltham, Mass., under contract to DARPA, developed the LAST™ system, which consists of: a hook-and-a-loop attachment system (Velcro USA); armor modules (Lanxide Armor Products, Newark, Delaware, and Coors Ceramics, Golden, Colo.); and a protective cover (Bell AVON, Picayune, Miss.) The key features that make the LAST™ system so attractive include its light weight and ease of installation and repair. The hook-and-loop attachment system itself weighs less than three-tenths of a pound per square foot and is affixed to the vehicle with pressure-sensitive adhesive. Consequently, no modification of the vehicle structure, such as drilling or welding, is required to install it. Prototype LAST™ kits consist of the LAST™ system, ceramic armor tiles, a battle damage repair kit, and a manual with a videotape providing instructions on kit installation.

An extensive list of technical and operational issues were addressed and overcome in the course of this intense three-month effort. The most challenging was the creation of an industrial base that produced over 60,000 ceramic armor tiles in less than 90 days. The armor tiles also had to undergo ballistic validation testing to verify tile performance. The LAST™ system underwent developmental testing, and a LAV equipped with a LAST™ armor kit underwent live fire testing and was tested against chemical agents, all during the 90-day effort.

While the timing of the ground war in the Gulf made it impossible to field prototype LAST™ systems in support of Operation Desert Storm as planned, the Marine Corps has decided to equip Marine units on both the East and West coast with LAST™ kits for continued test and evaluation.
Nonetheless, the an Iraqi missile attack using either conventional or chemical weapons is considered very unlikely by officials here because of the extraordinary deterrent force the United States has assembled in the region.

"What does it mean for Iraq to fire SCUDs at Saudi Arabia in current circumstances?" the first official said. "It means death for Iraq. Because we are in a position, if provoked in that manner, to respond in an absolutely devastating way."

He added that chemical weapons were unlikely to be used offensively by Iraq for the same reason. "The consequences to Iraq of using chemical weapons are unthinkable. It would be suicidal," he said. "And Iraq understands that."
SAUDI ARABIA -- American and Saudi officials in Saudi Arabia say they consider it unlikely that what they describe as their objective of restoring a stable military balance in the Middle East can be achieved so long as the current Iraqi
government remains in power.

This amounts to a conclusion that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and a return to the situation that existed before Iraq invaded its neighbor on August 2 would not by itself resolve the crisis on the Arabian Peninsula or result in the departure of American forces.

"It would depend on the circumstances of the withdrawal," says one U.S. official. He notes that American goals are to restore the independence of Kuwait and to remove the Iraqi military threat to Saudi Arabia. He said that additional measures would have to be taken to achieve this second goal, including additional arms sales to Saudi Arabia and "confidence-building" measures by Iraq that would give the Saudis and Gulf nations enough sense of security "to allow them to ask us to leave."

Since Iraq would still have significant military capabilities even if it withdrew its army from Kuwait, the official said, removing the credibility of the Iraqi military threat will depend largely on political assurances. "The accent has to be on the word credibility. And this regime has no credibility internationally," he added. "It's hard for me to see how the current government could give those assurances at this stage."

The problem of what to do if Saddam Hussein meets international demands and leaves Kuwait could become real sooner
than most people realise. Virtually no U.S. or Saudi official believes Iraq will invade Saudi Arabia at this point. That is quite a change from the initial days of the U.S. deployment. "To be honest, had the Iraqis come across the border at that point it would have been a debacle," says one official. But within a week or so, the tide had turned and any Iraqi attack would have been met with a devastating response.

The combination of international military, diplomatic and economic pressure has begun to tell on Saddam Hussein. Says this official: "You can see that in the series of diplomatic parries he has come forward with. Each one of which, if you read it carefully, I think expresses a small glimmer of appreciation that he's going to have to get out of Kuwait."

U.S. troops are now stationed in Saudi Arabia under the terms of an agreement signed last week by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd. Although details of the agreement are secret, officials say it expresses an understanding that U.S. forces will stay as long as required by the Saudis and their Gulf partners.

"We will stay here as long as our presence is required by the Saudis and their partners. And we leave the instant the Saudis ask us to leave or we reach the judgment unilaterally that our presence is no longer needed," says one official. "It is not open-ended, in the sense that we have absolutely no intention of staying around here. The minute we can get out, we will. And the Saudis have no intention of inviting us to stay permanently. So we're in total agreement."
Now, they keep the suits where they were, close enough so
they could get to and in them in minutes.
Disaster team experts coordinating the chemical attack
preparedness said a surprise chemical attack is unlikely.
They said it would most likely come in aircraft and
missile attacks that would give intelligence units time to
warn all military people to get into their suits.
If the warning was that a chemical attack was possible,
everyone would put on the chemical suits except for the gloves
and hoods and keep working, the expert said.
If the warning was that Iraqi planes had crossed into
Saudi Arabia and a possible chemical attack was imminent, they
would put on the gloves and hoods.
If Iraq did bombard troops with chemical weapons, the
problem in Saudi Arabian heat, of course, would be fighting
and working in the hot suits.
The chemical experts refuse to confirm reports that
military efficiency would be cut in half.
But say that under the worse conditions, troops might
alternately fight for 30 minutes, and then rest, in
decontaminated areas for 30 minutes.
For support units back at the camps, some areas would be
contaminated with chemicals and some would not, a disaster
unit officer said.
He said operations, therefore, would be moved to areas
that chemicals had not hit.
Decontamination areas would also be set aside in camps
where troops and workers coming in from gas-hit areas would
take off their suits and then move onto their camps or mess
halls.
Military hospitals here have separate decontamination
tents where victims of a gas attack would have all trace of
the chemical washed off their bodies before they were moved
into the hospitals for treatment.
"The stackup would be out at decontamination," said Lt.
Col. Rich Williams, Commander of the First Tactical F-15
Fighter Wing hospital.
He said the hospital could successfully treat large
numbers of victims of a gas attack.
But the military people here say they are confident those
victims will not include them.
"Putting these suits on is just like dressing yourself," said a mechanic who works on the Airborne Warning and Control
System (awacs) radar planes that patrol skies watching for an
Iraq air attack.
"I don't see, other than getting caught out too far way
from your equipment, how it can be much of a problem," he
said. "It's pretty basic."

"The American soldier captured are still lost in Vietnam after they had been eaten by worms," the male voice adds in fractured, accented English.

"The sand heaps are moving in the Arabian desert, and they swallow many people and they will swallow you." World War II had Tokyo Rose, Vietnam had Hanoi Hannah, and now Iraq has its own propaganda radio station trying to break the spirits of American soldiers digging into the Saudi Arabian desert.

So far the reaction among U.S. troops to the broadcasts has ranged from curiosity among those who haven't heard them to hysterical laughter among those who have. "In Vietnam they tried to jam Hanoi Hannah for awhile, but then they just let it go because it gave everybody a good chuckle," said a sergeant major with the XVIII Airborne Corps who served in Vietnam.

A pair of 22-year-old soldiers who arrived two days ago at the base camp Dragon Catyb — named for the XVIII Airborne Corps' dragon patch — said they heard about the broadcasts shortly after landing in Saudi Arabia.

"They are trying to mess with our minds. It might get to somebody who just came in the Army," said a specialist from Anaheim, Calif.

It would take an awful lon time in the hot sun for these broadcasts to do much damage, however, and the Radio Baghdad announcer needs to brush up on his English grammar, not to mention his psychology.

"To the Amer-ee-can soldier in Sah-oo-dee Arabia desert. Nothing is more expensive than peace. Don’t be fuel for the war machine. Your children are waiting for you. Your wife is waiting for you. You might have a lover. She also is waiting for you."

"Remember what the petrol emirs are doing with the American girls," the announcer croons in an almost sing-song voice. "Do you want to defend them? ...

"Is it in your interests as a civilized person to defend people who are living in the Middle Ages? ...Don’t die to defend corrupt sheiks." The messages are interspersed with rousing violin music that sounds like the soundtrack to a spaghetti western.

Wednesday's broadcast included a reading of a rambling letter from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to George Bush warning that the United States will lose its status as a superpower if it doesn’t stop picking on Iraq.

Weapons and technology do not a superpower make, the letter says. "The source of power lies in righteousous," Hussein writes.
"You must know that Iraq has the best army in this area and soldiers that do not fear death," the latter says. Hussein claims 500,000 volunteers have come forward to fight the "American, zionist aggression against Iraq," and urges Bush to stop backing the emir of occupied Kuwait, the "Croesus of Kuwait," who "can't put two words together."

At the end of the broadcast, the announcer - variously dubbed by journalists who have heard him as "Baghdad Bruce" and the "'Bozo from Baghdad,'" - says, "Thanks a lot for our attention."

It's not clear how many soldiers have actually heard the broadcast, which come on at irregular intervals during the day over a short-wave frequency. "Most of the soldiers don't have short-waves with them, but those who do are copying some of the stuff down and passing it around for fun," said a Pentagon public affairs officer here. "It's really hysterical." If Radio Baghdad's attempt to demoralize the troops is instead providing them with comic relief, a more successful form of disinformation frightened the civilian population of eastern Arabia. Fliers faxed to embassies, consulates and businesses in Saudi Arabia two weeks ago purported to give people instructions on what to do at the event of an Iraqi chemical weapons attack.

"If you are outside, do nothing. You will die," said one version of the flier, sent in both English and Arabic.

Most of the fliers were anonymous - they had no line of origin on the top. Other faxes claimed to be from the Canadian or the Philippine embassies in Riyadh, but checks with those and other embassies proved that to be false.

"We now think they were part of a disinformation effort," one Western diplomat said, adding that the fliers caused "considerable anxiety among foreigners" during the early days of the crisis.

The flier goes on to say what to do if people see birds falling from trees and their pet dogs and cats "dropping dead" in the street.

The final message of the flier is: "Good luck."
DESK: this is a pool report and must be faxed to the pentagon.

pool report 22-3

reported and written by john king, ap.

DAMMAM, Saudi Arabia - First came several Kuwaiti refugees, expressing their gratitude for the hospitality of the Saudi government.

Next came a man involved in a land dispute, not long after him a man seeking help finding medical treatment. Another man came to offer a poem.

Prince Muhammad bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, the son of King Fahd and governor of Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province, had time for each of them.

Muhammad was holding open court Wednesday in his ornate palace, continuing a tribal tradition of hosting a daily Majlis, complete with a Bedouin royal guard.

In the United States, such access is reserved for the wealthy, high-powered lobbyists and major campaign donors. In Saudi Arabia, where even the king is obliged to host Majlis, anyone is welcome.

Some of those who brought problems or praise to Muhammad on Wednesday wore gold-braided abayas over their ankle-length thobes; others just dingy thobes and tattered sandals. All got a few minutes of the prince's time, and his promise to look into their concerns.

Watching all this was a horde of reporters from the United States, Europe and Japan, who listened intently to discussions of local land disputes before seeking Muhammad’s view on the larger dispute that had brought them there – the Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait.

The Kuwaitis, he said, were welcome in Saudi Arabia and would be housed for free, offered needed medical care and even pocket money if necessary.

"The Kuwaitis are like brothers," he said. "Any number are welcome in this country."

It is Muhammad's province, which makes up 30 percent of Saudi Arabia and borders Kuwait and Iraq, that will bear the brunt of the Kuwaiti influx and also the thousands of American and other troops flooding into the kingdom to defend it and its oil fields.

The Eastern Province also would be the major prize for any invader of Saudi Arabia, for it is home to the richest oil fields in the world, the country’s petrochemical and other industries, and home of a sprawling, ultra-modern Persian Gulf port.

For the closed Saudi society all this must bring shock, but Muhammad said he has heard no complaints at his daily sessions.

He wishes aloud that economic and political sanctions will force Iraq's Saddam Hussein to pull his troops from Kuwait. "Everyone is working hard to see this problem resolved peacefully."
But, if necessary, he says Saudis are ready to die for their country.

"Saudi Arabia will never start war," he said. "We are only defending our country." Of the prospect of war, he said: "You have to prepare. ... There is always a chance of war."

Muhammad said the American and other troops were welcome, but he said he hoped that they, like the Kuwaitis, soon would be able to head home.

"These friendly forces are here for a purpose and when their purpose is finished and there is no reason for them to be here they will go home," Muhammad said.

The opening of the Majlis to the foreign reporters was the latest in a series of events this past week that have given the West an unprecedented and extraordinary look at the Saudi government and society.

The Majlis dates back to the country's nomadic, tribal days and the guidance of the Koran that Muslims confer among themselves to settle disputes and make policy.

By the time Muhammad arrived there were some 100 people waiting in chairs arranged around the huge hall. After he entered, everyone walked past to shake his hand and offer greetings. Then those with problems formed a line, carrying with them a written explanation of their problem.

Muhammad tells the man seeking medical help he will have aides look into the matter. Several men with land disputes, including one who said he faces fines for building a store without government permission, get the same response.

With the crowd of journalists circled around him, Muhammad tells the man offering a poem, "We have no time now."

After the meeting, he would rather talk about the local government and its traditions than the Iraqi forces less than 200 miles to the north and their impact on life in Saudi Arabia.

"We listen to their complaints and we solve them," he says of the extraordinary session. "We try our best to accommodate everyone."

When a reporter asks if Saudi Arabia is likely to move toward a democracy, Muhammad looks around at the local people and says, "This is democracy. ... Saudi Arabia is improving every year. I don't think we need to change except for the better."

A government official accompanying the reporters tried to explain the Saudi system to Americans who have nothing like this back home.

After a while, the official says simply: "Your system is good for you. Our system is good for us."

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The hard problem will arise in about a month, when the U.S. military build-up is complete. If Iraq still occupies Kuwait at that point -- despite the economic blockade and despite diplomatic efforts -- the U.S. and Saudi Arabia will face the decision whether to initiate military action. In that event, the decision will be made by King Fahd in consultation with President Bush, says the U.S. official. "We're not going to do anything unilaterally. If we do anything in that area it will be by agreement with the Saudis," he says.

The official presented this analysis of the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia for the United States:

The importance of the nation stems from three factors, he says.

The first and most obvious is oil, which will both make the U.S. increasingly dependent on the country and give the Saudis increasingly financial clout in the form of petrodollars.

The second and less obvious is its geographic position: virtually any flight from Southern Europe to Asia must pass over Saudi territory. There are 5,000 military overflights and 35-40,000 commercial overflights cleared by Saudi Arabia in a typical year. Together with its usefulness as a communications site, this gives it strategic military significance.

The third is religious and political. Saudi Arabia is caretaker of the two most holy sites of Islam -- a religion with
two billion adherents (many in countries with oil) and the fastest-growing faith in the world, particularly in Africa.

All this amounts to enormous — and growing — influence. "This is not a radical regime. This is a conservative regime that is as devoted as Mohammad was to free enterprise," says the official. In this view, the United States has a long-term strategic interest in encouraging the continued strength of a moderate government in Saudi Arabia.

Two factors have traditionally kept the peace in this region — and both have been upset recently.

One was the historical balance between various nations: Iran and Iraq, Syria and Iraq, and so on. The Iran-Iraq war upset that balance by exhausting Iran.

The other was the cold war, in which client relationships with superpowers constrained regional aggression. But the cold war has ended.

"So now we find ourselves here sustaining the balance on a temporary basis until the real basis can be restored," the official says.

The task now is to re-establish that balance rather than to allow the passions of the current crisis to rage out of control. Concludes the official: "If there is a war with Iraq, Iraq better not be destroyed. Because we're going to need Iraq to balance Iran after the war."
24 AUG 1990

This pool report was written by Michael Ross of the Los Angeles Times.

Saudi Arabia--At a party for expatriate workers the other night, the mood was almost jovial until the news began to spread.

"Have you heard, British Aerospace has issued its employees with gas masks and nerve gas antidotes," said a young Briton, fidgeting nervously with a plastic cup of Pepsi.

"At least that's something," replied the young American next to him. "Nobody's doing that for us. Nobody's doing much of anything for us."

While the world's attention is focused on the plight of Western hostages in Kuwait and Iraq, resentment is starting to build among an even larger group of foreigners who feel that their employers, bowing to official pressure, may not be taking adequate steps to ensure their safety in neighboring Saudi Arabia.

No one is holding them hostage, but concern is growing among the thousands of foreigners who work in the kingdom's Eastern province that they could be trapped here if war breaks out in the Persian Gulf.

"So far it's only the joint venture companies, the ones being run by their foreign partners, that have taken steps to ensure the safety of their employees. The Saudi companies have done nothing for their foreign employees," an American businessman here said.

After an initial wave of panic that followed the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait Aug. 2, the mood among the foreign community has calmed considerably.

"Having American forces here has been like a tranquilizer," said Tom Wright, a contractor from Alberta, Canada. "Just seeing soldiers who look like they know what they're doing is a tonic."

But while the arrival of U.S. forces has allayed fears of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, reports that Iraq has deployed chemical weapons north of the Kuwaiti border--weapons mounted on rockets capable of reaching this far--has everyone "really worried," Wright added.

Saudi officials could provide no exact breakdown for the number of foreigners living in the sprawling Eastern province, which falls southwards from Kuwait, down the western rim of the Persian Gulf, to the ill-defined frontiers with South Yemen and Oman.

But U.S. diplomats said that, before the invasion of Kuwait, there were at least 12,000 Americans here, most of them clustered around the coastal oil towns of Dhahran, Dammam, Ras Tannurah and Jubail, some 150 to 200 miles south of the Kuwaiti border.

About 4,000 dependents were evacuated soon after the invasion, while another 2,000 to 3,000 were vacationing outside Saudi Arabia at the time and never returned. The remainder--who account for roughly half of the original American presence in the Eastern province--are still here, according to U.S. consular officials.

Most of them work for ARAMCO, the now wholly Saudi-owned Arabian American Oil Company which, with 45,000 workers, is the region's largest employer.
ARAMCO spokesmen say the company is operating on a business as usual basis and that all dependents who wanted to leave have been evacuated at company expense.

However, interviews with dozens of Aramco workers over the past few days suggest that the company has gone to extraordinary lengths to pressure many who would otherwise have left into staying.

While some smaller companies are offering bonuses of up to 25% for employees who elect to stay, ARAMCO's management has told its employees the only way they can leave is to quit their jobs on 30 days notice, several sources said.

"They've made it clear that if we quit, we lose everything... all our benefits, severance pay and belongings unless we pay to move our things ourselves," one employee said.

While most foreign firms operating here have also agreed to repatriate non-essential employees, ARAMCO officials have indicated that they make no such distinction between essential and non-essential personnel.

"When someone comes to me and asks 'Am I essential? my response is 'You're getting a paycheck,'" ARAMCO spokesman Sydney Bower said.

If this seems to be an insensitive response to the concerns of ARAMCO employees, other officials say privately that it reflects the company's own acute fears of what will happen if its foreign work force panics and leaves the country.

Although foreigners constitute only about one-quarter of ARAMCO's work force,
many of them are clustered in high-tech and other vital maintenance positions.

"The expat community working for ARAMCO is on the edge and if the scale tips a little further, you could have a real exodus out of here," one company executive said.

"If that happens," he added, "the Saudis would be in real trouble. They have enough trained people of their own to run the oil fields, but after a month or so maintenance would probably shut down."

At a time when the Saudis are planning to increase oil production by 2 million barrels per day to help the West sustain its boycott of Kuwaiti and Iraqi crude, such a development "could spell disaster" for the international effort to isolate Iraq, the official said.

The issue is such a sensitive one that company officials do not talk about it publicly. Indeed, nearly everyone interviewed for this article demanded anonymity for fear of losing his job.

One thing company officials do say is that there is no reason why an employee who breaks his contract should expect to get severance pay and repatriation.

However, employees say that Aramco's failure to make contingency plans for an evacuation, together with its refusal to even consider repatriating less essential staff such as secretaries and company school teachers, has left a residue of bitterness.

"ARAMCO has no evacuation plans. Their position is, 'We're a Saudi company. We're already home and we're not going anywhere,'" an executive from an American company said.
Under Saudi law, foreigners who live in the kingdom must surrender their passports to their employer, who then handles all their subsequent paperwork with customs and immigration.

To travel outside his province of residence, a foreigner must obtain a special letter of authorization through his employer. To leave the country, he must get a special exit visa stamped in his passport.

Most foreign companies got exit-re-entry visas for their foreign staffers a few days after the invasion, said Ted Bevec, an executive with the American Businessmen's Association, a local business group. No one used them, but "just knowing they had the visas and could leave if they wanted to eased a lot of panic," he said.

ARAMCO workers, however, said the company had not done the same for them.

"They told us that, because we would have to break contract and resign in order to go out, the exit visas would take 30 days to get," one employee said.

While it is not clear how many would have actually left--indeed many said they would have stayed--a number of those interviewed said they were angry at not having been given what they considered to be a fair choice.

"The choice they gave us was either to stay or to quit--and still stay here 30 more days," another employee said.

Even so, as many as 600 Aramco employees have resigned since the crisis began and "more resignations are landing in managers' in-trays every day," said another Aramco official.
Most of the resignations came from the ranks of Aramco's Filipino, Pakistani and other Asian employees, whom the Saudis generally hold in lower esteem than the Arab and Western nationals living in their country.

"The Asians, and particularly the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, are the underclass here and they get treated pretty roughly," said one American businessman.

"Most of the Americans figure that if push comes to shove they can scramble aboard a C-5 and get out of here," he added. "But who's going to take care of the guys from Bangladesh? They're the ones who are really scared. They've got nobody to look after them."

One Bangladeshi, who works as a bus boy at a luxury hotel in Dhrahahn, confided as much to a foreign guest the other night.

"We have asked to go but the hotel, they will not give us our passports back," he said.

"It is very bad," he added. "You come and you go, but we...we here are trapped."

endit
This is Defense Department pool report No. 299. Must be faxed to Pentagon, 693-6853, for release. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuter.

ON THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER – The only people crossing through this huge entry station from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia now are Iraqi military defectors, a customs official said Friday.

"I have some of that," he said when asked if Iraqi defectors came across there. But when asked how many, he said "I have no exact number."

Saudi Ambassador Ghazi al-Gosaibi told Reuters in Bahrain Thursday that "tens" of Iraqi soldiers had defected into Saudi Arabia since Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait, some with vehicles and armour.

The Iraqi defectors are the only traffic through this major entry station, the customs official said, because Iraq has completely cut off all traffic from Kuwait through it.

He said Iraqi tanks occasionally come up to the Iraq-occupied Kuwait crossing station two kilometers across a no man's land. But he said there had been no incidents.

There are no major Saudi or Iraqi military forces here -- both keep well back from the border -- and the border official said he was not worried that Iraq might invade.

"No, we're relaxed here," he said through an interpreter. "We don't think there will be anything. We're confident."

Although Iraq has cut off traffic through this official border station, Kuwaitis are still escaping across the desert.

Nearly 20 kilometers away, three cars full of refugees who had left Kuwait City at noon Friday arrived four hours later at a desert border post where camels were grazing nearby.

Saudis in two trucks on a ridge on the border guided them to safety.

A Kuwaiti man who said he had helped a number of people escape Kuwait said Iraqi forces had not shot at the caravan this time. He said the only problem was that one of the four cars they started with broke down and had to be left in the desert, about 15 refugees crowding into the three cars left.

The refugees said they did not know if Iraqi forces had begun surrounding foreign embassies Friday as threatened for defying Iraq's demand that they close down and move to Baghdad.

The refugees said they only knew they did not see westerners on the street in Kuwait City anymore and one said he knew Iraqi forces were taking them away but said he did not know where.

"He says they probably do not treat them nicely," an interpreter said.

Reporters were taken to the two border crossings by Saudi officials under ground rules that their locations on the border not be reported.
This is Pentagon Pool Report No. 25-1. Please fax immediately to Pete Williams at the Pentagon, 202-693-6853. You can use as soon as it is released.

This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

Saudi Arabia-Summerfest to Saudi Arabia.

That’s what happened to Chief Warrant Officer Timothy Zarnowski of Milwaukee.

Zarnowski, 38, is an instructor for pilots of Apache helicopters, the deadliest weapon in the American arsenal here against Iraqi tanks.

The Apache is the most maneuverable helicopter in the world, capable of the same sorts of acrobatic maneuvers as fixed-wing aircraft.

Early this summer, the Army sent Zarnowski, with two Apaches, to Milwaukee for a display at Summerfest. Now he’s at a forward desert base here with the unit that would go into battle first if Iraqi tanks in Kuwait move into Saudi Arabia.

Zarnowski, whose father, Eugene, lives on Milwaukee’s South Side, is part of the 101st Airborne Division’s air assault brigade and, like others in his unit, he’s supremely confident of their ability to stop anything the Iraqis might throw at them.

"We’ll be able to handle them pretty well," he said. "They’ll be sitting ducks for us. They have a few weapons systems that can knock us down, but we’re not worried. We can jam them."

The Apache carries up to 16 Hellfire missiles, one of which can knock out any tank in the world, along with two rocket pods that carry a total of 38 rockets, and a 30-millimeter chain (machine) gun with 1,200 rounds of ammunition.

The chain gun and the rockets are used to force tanks to button up, and the laser-guided Hellfires can be fired from long distances to blow up the tanks.

Zarnowski talked with a reporter who was a member of the first group of journalists to visit the 101st here. Because of a tight schedule, they were only able to talk a few minutes, but Zarnowski’s parting shot was:

"If you see Mayor John, tell him I said Hi," Zarnowski said. "Say hello to (State Rep.) Wally Kunicki, too."

As might be expected in the most massive deployment of forces since the Vietnam War, there are many young Wisconsin men and women here.

Kerrie Pauly, 24, of Sheboygan, who graduated from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, is part of the 18th Airborne Corps.
that has taken over a former Saudi air defense base here.

She's a second lieutenant who leads an advance medical platoon. In a battle, her team of 35, including surgeons, would move to the front lines to administer emergency treatment, then evacuate the wounded.

"We train without the doctors," she said. "When we go in, we have the doctors with us."

Pauly is the only woman on the team here. She said she was among the lucky ones in the unit because she was housed in an air-conditioned building.

Like everyone else, she said the desert heat was the most difficult part of working here. But unlike others, she said she had no real complaints about the food provided by Saudi Arabian contractors. Other troops at this base had said they didn't like the Saudi cooking.

Moreover, Pauly said Saudi Arabia was not the worst place she had been stationed.

"I was on a mission in Peru which was probably worse," she said. "The water was real bad. Here they bring us bottled water. It helps a lot."

Navy Lt. Don Goulet of Oconomowoc, who was born in Appleton, helped make military history here.

Goulet, 30, is the aide and flag lieutenant for Rear Adm. Steve Clarey, the commander of the Navy's Amphibious Group Three out of San Diego, Calif.

Clarey is the commander of a maritime pre-positioning force, a new concept for rapid deployment of equipment and troops that was used for the first time here.

"We've made history here," Clarey told reporters. "This is the first time this rapid deployment force has been used in an actual combat situation."

Under the new system, civilian cargo ships, under lease to the US Navy, are fully loaded at all times and stand by for military emergencies anywhere in the world.

There were three ships in the first group that arrived at an ultra-modern Saudi Arabian port on the Persian Gulf here. They carried tanks, vehicles and other equipment for US Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade out of 29 Palms, Calif., who were airlifted here.

The Marines were "married up" with their equipment from the ships and sent out into the field. The equipment included M60-A1 tanks.

By all accounts, the operation went flawlessly, with the three 755-foot long ships unloaded in a matter of days.
Goulet said he was a lot more concerned about what might happen in Saudi Arabia before he came here.

"Now that I'm here and I see all the support we've got, and what else is on the way, I think we're in good shape," he said.

Goulet's wife, Ann, is back in San Diego. Their first child is due in November.

"This is a great facility," Goulet said of the Saudi Persian Gulf port. "I think we're in an excellent position to handle any threat Iraq dishes out. I don't even feel like I'm in combat."

Goulet asked about the Green Bay Packers and whether they had signed quarterback Don Majkowski yet. The reporter didn't know.

"Well, tell them to sign Majik and quit screwing around," Goulet said. "They're behind the curve already."

-30-
ATTACKING IRAQ, 800:

US Forces Have Iraq Targeted, And A Plan To Destroy It

Eds: To comply with Pentagon coverage ground rules, exact locations of U.S. military installations are not disclosed. Note language 13th graf, bgn: "I came ..."

SAUDI ARABIA - The targets on the map are marked and circled much like those on a similar map seen a week earlier, with one notable exception.

These targets are in Iraq.

To the East, to the right when looking at the map, there still are markings showing deployments of Iraqi forces in occupied Kuwait, some not too far back from the Kuwait-Saudi border; others in a crescent-shaped formation further north near Kuwait City and supply routes back to Iraq.

But over the past week, the emphasis on the maps, and in the briefings to the American troops who get to see them, has shifted more to the targets in Iraq itself.

Now convinced there is enough U.S. firepower on the ground here to thwart any Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, American military planners are mulling how to use the growing might against Iraq should hostilities erupt.

"Right after the invasion of Kuwait, we had to hurry, so it was a come-as-you-are war," a Pentagon source said. "That was more than two weeks ago. Now, for us, it's a do as you please war."

There are numerous political, economic and military decisions that would factor into any decision to make an all-out assault on Iraq. And American officials stress that such an attack would be highly unlikely unless Iraq instigates hostilities. Complicating all planning is Iraq's grasp on some 3,000 American and a total of 10,000 Western hostages.

But it is clear from interviews and reviews of U.S. intelligence and planning over the past week that such a plan is in place and being refined virtually daily, as spy satellites, AWACS tracking planes and other intelligence sources provide the latest on Iraqi military activities.

After spending their first week here reluctant to discuss contingency plans, many officers in the past week, at several command levels, have discussed such plans privately, if for no other reason than to send a signal to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

"We know when they are loading gas into their trucks," an Army colonel said Friday. "We'll be ready if they come, and ready to go after them too."

Vietnam-era generals leading the deployment in Saudi Arabia favor an overwhelming attack on Iraq if fighting erupts, including destruction of key government facilities in Baghdad, Iraqi oil fields and military installations and infrastructure being used to resupply Iraqi forces in Kuwait and near Iraq's border with Saudi Arabia, according to a number of military sources here.

The command post for the Persian Gulf deployment, Operation Desert Shield, has been at the Central Command headquarters in Florida, but a makeshift war room is ready to be opened in Saudi Arabia within days, allowing the command post to be shifted to Saudi Arabia.

"I came out of one briefing the other day hearing B-52s humming in my head," one senior officer said this past week. A field commander privy to some of the contingency plans put it this way: "These guys have decided if we go, we go all out, none of this halfway bull shit."
The options, according to the officials, include bombing runs, use of naval firepower from a battleship and other surface combatants in the Persian Gulf, and even ground forces if necessary to knock out key Iraqi installations and block supply and communications routes.

American aircraft have been flying 24 hours a day on practice missions and to counter Iraqi air patrols. And elements of both the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions have been briefed on possible Iraqi targets. The 82nd consists of paratroopers; the 101st has attack helicopters and can deploy infantry from helicopters as well.

Members of the 82nd have been told their division might be dropped into Iraq or just over its border with Kuwait to cut off supply routes, according to the sources.

Incredible amounts of U.S. military force continue to pour into Saudi Arabia and the waters that surround the Arabian peninsula. For example, the first shipments of huge M-1 tanks are just offshore and once unloaded will immediately move to forward positions in the Saudi desert. They would, from the Army's 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), join Marine M60-A1 tanks already on the ground.

Backing up the tanks are formidable deployments of tank-fighting helicopters, A-10 planes and other heavy weapons stationed in the Saudi desert - some at airstrips not even on most maps. These strips are well within striking distance of Iraqi targets in both Kuwait and Iraq.

A ground war against entrenched Iraqi positions in Kuwait would be bloody and the air attacks necessary to support the ground troops likely would level much of Kuwait. Kuwaiti government officials, now living in effective exile in Saudi Arabia, have implored U.S. officials not to wage such a fight.

Less bloody, and potentially devastating to the power of Saddam Hussein, would be a direct assault on selected Iraqi targets, which if successful would create chaos in the government and choke off the source of needed supplies and reinforcements to the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Air Force jets stationed in Saudi Arabia and on Navy carriers in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea and are within range of Iraqi targets, as are F-111 bombers in Turkey and long-range B-52s from Diego Garcia.

And U.S. officials believe there is enough firepower here to still defend Saudi Arabia from any forward attack by the forces in Kuwait during such an assault on Iraq.

There are concerns that Iraq would launch chemical-carrying Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia if the United States moved against Iraqi targets.

But American and Saudi military officials say the missiles travel slowly and that jets and ground-to-air missile systems should be able to destroy them in flight. Saudi officials this week confirmed reports that Scud launchers had been moved into Kuwait. But an American military intelligence source disputed that, while saying Scuds stationed in southern Iraq still could reach Saudi targets.

From a military standpoint, a destructive attack on Iraq appears the favorite option in the event of hostilities. But such a move likely would have far-reaching implications on already tumultuous regional politics.

Here Saddam to survive such an assault with his power intact, Saudi officials say they likely would need an extended U.S. or United Nations military commitment to deter revenge.

"He is a madman now," a Saudi official said Friday.

"Defeated, he would be deranged."

Some representatives of the Saudi and U.S. government believe an extended, perhaps permanent, American military presence will be needed regardless of the outcome of the crisis.
A Western diplomat in Saudi Arabia cautioned that any assault
that severely damaged Iraq might hurt U.S. interests in the region
even if Saddam lost power.

"The United States put up with shenanigans from Iraq all during
the Iran-Iraq war because of worries about Iran," said the
diplomat, who spoke on the condition he not be identified further.
"Iran is still there, and the whole face of the Middle East is
changing because of the current situation. ... The last thing the
United States needs is another bitter enemy around here."

AP-WX-08-25-90 1038EDT
SAUDI ARABIA — Saudi troops and tanks were dug in and pointed north Saturday in the first line of defense of their desert kingdom. The tanks painted in desert camouflage were buried in the rocky sand with only the turrets showing. Hundreds of trucks, jeeps, water tankers and other vehicles could be seen on the horizon.

You've got to break the shape and cut the shine," said a Saudi helicopter pilot, explaining how the camouflaged tarps were draped over the armored vehicles to hide them.

On Saturday the Saudi government for the first time took foreign journalists to meet Saudi troops near the border with Iraq and only 18 miles from occupied Kuwait. The Saudis were joined there by troops from the Persian Gulf states, Egypt, Morocco and other countries.

These Arab troops would be the first to face an invading Iraqi force. Thousands of U.S. troops were positioned deeper inside Saudi Arabia, a soft-spoken man with wadis for the sand, spoke in a brightly colored tent with red, blue and green Oriental rugs.

I'm glad that you came at this time of day because it is the hottest point and you see what it is like to be a soldier," the major general told his guests.

Life for a Saudi soldier begins at 4:32 a.m. Their workday is interrupted five times for prayer. They kneel and touch their heads to the hot ground among sandbags formed in a V and pointed toward the holy city of Mecca.

If you get really thirsty you can put a rock under your tongue," suggested a Saudi colonel, sitting cross-legged on the floor of his tent.

The desert climate, the colonel said. The scorpions and snakes come out this time of year. The heat was intense, and the sand on the horizon shimmered so that it looked like silver water. The wind whipped up columns of sand until evening when the sun finally set in a red ball.

The Arab forces were joined in the desert by troops from Kuwait, whose country was invaded Aug. 2 by Iraq.

Asked if they were ready to fight, a Kuwaiti soldier grabbed his rifle, waved it in the air and said, "Fight? No problem. No problem."

Moroccan troops did not appear as well equipped as the Saudis. One of their tents was propped up by a shovel, and the floor was covered not with rugs but with cardboard.

The commander of the 2,200 Egyptian troops, Col. Abdulrahman Al-Saeed,
said of his men, "Morale is high because the holy places are here and they are very willing to fight with their Saudi brothers."<PAR>
<FO>Asked if Iraq could be driven from Kuwait without a war, the Egyptian commander said, "I hope so." END
This is Defense Department Pool Report No. 20. Must be faxed to Pentagon, 693-6853. Written and filed by Jim Adams, Reuters.

U.S. officials are downplaying the danger of an Iraq chemical attack or other warfare that would endanger American civilians in Saudi Arabia even if war with Iraq were to break out, Western sources said Sunday.

They said that was why the State Department had not issued a warning for American workers to leave Saudi Arabia despite pressure from workers who say such an official warning would be required for them to leave without losing their jobs.

One of the sources said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is unlikely to launch a chemical attack on Saudi Arabia because Iraq should know that U.S. forces would retaliate by destroying its ability to wage further war.

"Iraqis should know that if they send in one missile, they would lose their war-making capability," he said.

Another of the sources said U.S. and Saudi planes would be able to block Iraqi planes trying to drop chemical bombs in Saudi Arabia and there would be hours of warning time if Iraq tried to load, fuel and fire Soviet-made Scud missile with chemical warheads into Saudi Arabia.

He said U.S. soldiers close to the border could be in danger of an artillery chemical attack but the artillery could not hit civilians in Saudi Arabia cities which are 200 miles or more from the border.

"I think there is a greater danger of being hit by a bus in Khobar (a popular shopping city) than by a chemical weapon," he said.

U.S. officials do not believe an Iraqi land invasion could get as far as the cities where most American civilians live, but if that became a danger U.S. forces would have time to evacuate Americans, the sources said.

The Western sources, speaking on condition they be identified that way, said some American employees in Saudi Arabia have told U.S. officials that they cannot leave their jobs and get them back later unless the State Department issues a strong warning that Americans should leave.

The State Department advisory in effect does not advise U.S. government employees or other Americans to leave but does say their families should consider leaving and that Americans should avoid non-essential travel to Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. officials are willing to help any American get out of the country quickly but are advising them that Saudi companies "have long memories" and probably would not give them their jobs back later, the sources said.

They said the U.S. officials know that a few Americans say they are being held hostage to force them to stay in Saudi Arabia to help maintain oil production and other key jobs.

But the sources said the U.S. officials are not colluding with the Saudi companies to make American workers stay in Saudi Arabia. They said the State Department has not issued a stronger warning for Americans to leave only because they believe no such warning is justified.

U.S. and Saudi officials are consulting on allowing Americans to obtain Saudi exit visas so they could leave immediately if they saw danger rather than having to wait up to -- MORE --
two weeks to obtain exit visas, the sources said.

They said some companies in Saudi Arabia might oppose that step, however, because it would reduce their ability to depend on the Americans showing up for work.

Aramco, a Saudi-owned oil giant, employs about 3,000 of the 12,000 Americans who lived in Saudi Arabia before Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2. The sources said about one-third of the 12,000 American were on vacation at the time of the invasion and about 2,500 family members have left, so about 5,500 American civilians remain in the country.

They work for a number of large Saudi companies in addition to Aramco and for U.S. companies including the McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Co.

In another development Sunday, the general in charge of the U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia said it was the biggest single U.S. military sea and air operation since World War II and was not yet completed.

Maj.-Gen. Gus Pagonis, commander of logistics for U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia said hundreds of plane loads of troops and equipment have arrived so far, an average 50 a day.

"How much more will depend on the amount of force that's been agreed to by the President (President Bush) as well as the king of Saudi Arabia (King Fahd)," he said.

"I can't give you a specific," he said. "I know that our forces are growing rapidly, our combat power is growing rapidly and we're all here now to sustain it for as long as necessary to bring the forces in," the general said.

REUTERS JA BRO
DoD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL
REPORT 90-1-74
RELEASED BY OASD(PA) AT 2:00 p.m.

26 AUG 1990

2. Please fax immediately to Pete Williams at the Pentagon, 202-693-6853. You can use as soon as it is released. This pool report was reported and written by Frank Aukofer of The Milwaukee Journal.

High Above Saudi Arabia--It is 6:30 a.m. after a night of quiet, and suddenly there's a jumble of voices in the headsets.

"It looks valid. Coming south in Kuwait. All I can tell you now is it looks like a high-performance aircraft."

The team aboard the AWACS surveillance plane tightens up, paying close attention to every detail as the Iraqi plane streaks toward the border with Saudi Arabia.

"There's no fighters too close to him," a voice says. "He can bust the border."

But within a matter of seconds, the surveillance officer and his technicians, along with the senior weapons director and his crew, have not only located and tracked the Iraqi plane, but also have positioned an American fighter within striking distance.

"Another one's coming," a voice says. "Fellas, they're up playing games now."

Sitting in front of the situation display console, which looks something like a 17-inch color television screen set vertically, is the mission crew commander, Lt. Col. Laszlo "Skosh" Bakonyi, 48, of Austin, Tex. Born in Hungary, he is a naturalized American citizen.

At this moment on Sunday morning, he is in control of the Boeing 707 AWACS, which is what American and Saudi Arabian forces here use to keep an eye on Iraq and Kuwait.

He watches the screen intently as he orchestrates the defense against possible hostile action.

Bakonyi doesn't have to say much. Every member of the crew is highly trained and familiar with the task at hand. They report to each other constantly over the radio.

As the Iraqi planes approach, one of the surveillance technicians reports that they apparently have penetrated the the Saudi Arabian border. But Bakonyi says it's not certain, and he determines that they don't appear to have any hostile intent.

"They just like to duke the border," he says.

"It appears they're coming down and then turning back north," a voice says in the headset.

"That's awfully gentlemanly of them," another replies.

Soon the Iraqi planes have gone back home to Jharna Airfield in Kuwait, and the AWACS crew goes back to watching and waiting at their screens.

It was an incident, but not an uncommon one. The Iraqis don't fly much, but when they do it's usually this scenario.

The AWACS is a sophisticated, computer-operated surveillance plane, distinguished by the giant radar pod over its fuselage. This is the first time it has been visited by American journalists in a potential combat situation.

The AWACS, or E-3 as its people call it, is the first line of defense for the forces of the United States and other countries that have come here to defend Saudi Arabia against 'Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

This airplane not only can spot any aircraft that pops up in Iraq or Kuwait, it can marshal and control the air defenses against them.

In an all-out war, Bakonyi says, this one AWACS could track the enemy and co-ordinate 200 to 300 American, Saudi and British warplanes on offensive and defensive missions against the Iraqis.
Though it is designed to detect aircraft, the AWACS is so sensitive it can pick up a speeding automobile on a highway five miles below.

"These fighters that are screaming along are easy meat for us," says Staff Sgt. Nick Kropp, 31, of Geneseo, Ill., one of the surveillance technicians.

Even so, seconds count, and the surveillance team works rapidly to track and identify anything they spot.

"We assume the worst and set up as such," Kropp says.

The American AWACS crews are the most experienced troops here in Saudi Arabia. For almost 10 years, until April of 1989, US AWACS planes flew 24 hours a day here in Saudi Arabia, according to Lt. Col. Don Fowler, 46, of Whitesboro, N.Y., another mission control commander.

The Americans work closely with Saudi AWACS planes and crews. On this mission, the American plane replaces a Saudi AWACS in the sky, and there are two Saudis in the US crew.

One is a mission control commander, Lt. Col. Suleiman Musallam, 40, of Bassim. The other is a weapons director, First Lt. Malled Alshahili, 29, of Riyadh, who sits right next to First Lt. Sharon F. Mahan, 26, of Miami, Fla.

On this mission, Mahan is responsible for the CAP, or combat air patrol. These are the fighter planes—Saudi, British and American—that are in the sky to protect the AWACS plane.

In the event of an attack, Mahan and the other weapons directors would send the fighters off to shoot down the enemy. At the same time, the AWACS, which is regarded as a "high value asset," would move out of harm's way if threatened.

The easy way to understand an AWACS plane, Bakonyi says, is to think of it as an airport air traffic control system in the sky—but with one difference.

"Air traffic control keeps airplanes apart," he said. "Our job is to put them together."

The brains of the AWACS is a giant computer, which has roughly the same power as 100 home computers. There are eight generators to run that and the 15 situation display consoles, along with the radar and the other equipment, including communications links with all the US forces here. Each generator could power a small city.

This mission, which runs all night and includes two air-to-air refuelings, gets off to a rocky start when the No. 3 generator baulks. The crew successfully bypasses it, but then the first KC-135 tanker doesn't show up where it's supposed to be.

Another tanker is scrambled and it soon joins the AWACS high in the sky. But for some reason, its autopilot is not working, so the KC-135 pilot and the AWACS pilot, Capt. Bill Shinners, 30, of Milwaukee, must fly by the seat of their pants during the dark and delicate maneuver—the most dangerous thing the AWACS does.

After one false start, Shinners works the AWACS up under the KC-135, which looks like a giant science-fiction insect hovering overhead, and suck in 7,260 gallons of gasoline in nine minutes.

Later, with Capt. Mike Wolf, 36, of Los Angeles, at the controls, the AWACS takes on another 12,900 gallons in 21 minutes to carry it through the end of its mission.

The rest of the sortie is mostly uneventful. But this and the other AWACS planes here—both American and Saudi Arabian—will continue their sentry duty in the sky, with a simple message for the troops here as well as their families back home:

Not to worry.
SAUDI ARABIA - American women soldiers have become pioneers in this desert kingdom, doing things and going places that always had been off limits to women.

The American women hardly feel like pioneers, however, and some present being sent to a country where they are allowed to die in battle but not to wear t-shirts.

"The thing that bothers me is that we are over here to defend their country, but they don't want females because it is an insult to Arab culture," said a young woman who is a lieutenant with the Army's 18th Airborne Corps.

Forty percent of my unit are women, but they are not supposed to drive in the cities or wear t-shirts," she said.

Another woman officer said, "If I were stationed over here permanently, I would do everything I could to conform with their customs, but the American military means women. We've got a job to do, and I'm going to do it."  

Eleven percent of the U.S. armed forces are women. Although they cannot hold combat positions, the modern battlefield has no front line and the women carry gas masks, rifles and sidearms just like the men do.

They have landed in a country where men and women are segregated in public, with separate sections on buses and in restaurants. Saudi women look like ravens, draped in black robes with black veils and even long black gloves, despite temperatures of 130 degrees.

Riding in a bus across a remote air strip, Air Force Capt. Becky Colaw said, "It's pretty good out here because there are no Saudis.

"We can drive trucks and do what we want. We still try to conform with local customs, and we try to keep our shirts on," Colaw said.

The only thing you can't do is wear shorts and t-shirts outside the compound," said Colaw, one of about 150 women who maintain jets, handle supplies and load missiles with the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing from Myrtle Beach, S.C.

Colaw joked that the lack of contact with Saudi women - most soldiers haven't seen a single one and the men probably never will speak to one - will boost the popularity of the women soldiers in the ranks.

"We'll have to shoot the men off after a week," Colaw said. (MORF)
Her commander, Col. Sandy Sharp, said, "We have respected their customs, and we will continue to do so. It is something of a problem for the ladies."

"We keep them in uniform most of the time," Sharp said. "If they are in civilian clothes, they should cover their legs and wear more clothes than the heat might suggest."

"As long as they are in military uniform, they are military members and our hosts understand that," Sharp said.

A Western diplomat here said, "Saudi women are veiled and out of sight, and in the view of some Saudis, Western women ought to be, too, and especially not driving vehicles and going to major government institutions."

"The position of the U.S. military is that you take them as a package," the diplomat said. "They are not going to change the way they do business because of local sensitivities."

In fact, American servicewomen have already broken down barriers that Saudi women and female diplomats had not crossed.

No women can drive here and single women are not even supposed to ride in the front seat with a man, but it is common to see American servicewomen driving on bases.

Women assigned to the U.S. embassy here had not even been inside the Saudi military headquarters for a visit, but now women soldiers are working there.

It's a learning process on both sides, said Air Force Chief Master Sgt. James Chalmers. We explain to our women what the customs are so they know where they stand. The Saudis have questions. They were surprised that the girls are turning wrenches and changing tires just like the men."

In some cases, Saudi men are working alongside American women with no problems.

Saudi and American crews have been flying AWACS radar planes together for eight years, although American women still are not allowed aboard the Saudi planes.

"I wouldn't want to go on a Saudi plane," said one female sergeant. "They sometimes just sit and stare at you." The AWACS crews tell of the time a Saudi businessman offered a female crewmember $500,000 for a female crewmember.

And some walls still have not come down.

Reporters allowed on an AWACS flight saw Saudi men working comfortably on radar screens alongside American women.

After the flight, a Saudi officer invited everyone for lunch at the..."
palatial Saudi officers club. At the gate, U.S. Air Force Capt. Christine Queen stepped out of the car so the rest of the group - all men - could go inside the male-only club. (END)
MEMORANDUM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, FORCES COMMAND

SUBJECT: Navy Exercise Media Pool After Action Report

During a recent Battle Group Evaluation conducted by the Third Fleet in the PACOM AOR, a group of Navy journalists was used to simulate the DoD National Media Pool. The resulting media pool exercise proved beneficial to both the public affairs personnel and operators who would have been dealing with the real pool had it been deployed. I am forwarding a copy of the Third Fleet After Action Report on the exercise for your information and use in planning similar events in your area.

This is an excellent example of a concerted effort to exercise our media pool planning in anticipation of a real-world deployment of the pool. I salute the effort and encourage each of you to plan and execute such exercises in your own respective areas. Please keep me posted of the results, as I continue to monitor efforts to improve our ability to deploy the DoD National Media Pool.

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Attachment:
As stated
Mr. Osama Nugali  
Acting Director, Saudi Arabia Information Office  
Embassy of Saudi Arabia  
601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW  
District of Columbia 20037

Dear Mr. Nugali,

I would like to take this opportunity to convey my appreciation for the excellent relationship that we have enjoyed when working with you and your staff on matters of mutual interest. The spirit of cooperation manifested in our relationship gives me great confidence that the efforts of our two countries will ultimately be successful in achieving our mutual goal.

I am forwarding to you a memorandum which we received from Captain Michael T. Sherman, U.S. Navy, the Chief of the United States Central Command Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran. In this memorandum, he indicates that he was advised by Mr. Shaheen to request your assistance in obtaining visas for eight journalists in the United States and one American journalist now located in London.

I would appreciate any assistance you may be able to provide in obtaining these visas.

Please do not hesitate to let me know if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Public Affairs

Attachment  
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL BUREAU CHIEFS

SUBJECT: DoD National Media Pool

The DoD National Media Pool will be disbanded effective 1700 EDT, 26 August 1990. Members of the pool will be offered transportation back to CONUS via military airlift to occur within 72 hours of termination of the pool. Those who wish to remain in Saudi Arabia may do so if they obtain host nation approval. Those who remain in Saudi Arabia will assume responsibility for arranging and paying for their return transportation to the U.S. via commercial means. All pool members should be informed of this stipulation.

The CNN contract uplink equipment and associated technicians will remain in country under the umbrella of a DoD/CENTCOM pool uplink facility. Those personnel and equipment will remain eligible for DoD return transportation to CONUS once their pool status is terminated by OASD(PA).

The current DoD National Media Pool is the largest, most ambitious pool deployment yet. It has performed well, and those involved are commended for a job well done.

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
DATE: 23 Aug 90

SUBJECT: Media Pool Material Distribution Dispute

1. PROBLEM: Greg Mathison of MAI News Photography Agency has informed us that as many as eight (8) representatives of Photo agencies will be at 23 August DoD press conference to ask Mr. Williams why they can't share in the pool and why Time is being permitted to embargo their photos and reselling them to other magazines.

2. DISCUSSION: Mathison claims the following:

   a. Dennis Brack of Time (member of DoD pool) did not provide his photos free to Newsweek and U.S. News as required by the pool rules, but sold the photos to those magazines for $6000.00. (We have not confirmed this with Newsweek or U.S. News.)

   b. Time magazine is not turning all photos taken by Brack over to the other pool news magazines, but is holding some back and selling those through the Time photo service. This is unfair trade practice vis a vis the photo agencies and supports their argument to be part of the pool.

   c. The photo agencies are going to attend the news brief on Thursday to raise this issue with Mr. Williams.

   d. The photo agencies may decide to join in taking legal measures against the Department of Defense because the DoD is restraining their trade.

   e. Bruce Russell of REUTERS tells us there was a meeting between the news magazines and the photo agencies in New York yesterday to discuss this issue. Apparently nothing was resolved.

   f. In June we sent out letters to pool members to request their comments on a change to pool rules which states that pool products are to be shared with all media, not just those on the pool. So far we have received 10 written responses supporting the change. We have received 3 negative responses (called in from Time, Newsweek and U.S. News) disagreeing with the proposed change.

3. RECOMMENDATION: The following response (coordinated with LCDR Hartung via telephone) is recommended if the question is raised at the press brief:

The Hoffman report recommended that the "ASD(PA) should ... require all pool participant organizations -- whether print, still photo, TV or radio -- to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must
understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requestors should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time honored pool practices."

We are evaluating this recommendation and in June sent a letter to pool members asking for comments about a proposed change to the ground rules in this area. Forty-five letters were sent. As of today we have received 10 written and 3 verbal responses. As yet there is no clear consensus as to the recommendation, we will continue to work on it.

Note: Office of the General Counsel (Kathy Peluso - 7-2714) recommends that if anyone mentions the possibility of a law suit on this issue, the following answer is appropriate:

I will not comment on any potential litigation where the Department of Defense may be a party.

LTC Harke/3-1073
UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

TO DECOM WASHINGTON DC//ASD(PA)//
TO RUCD//SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA-PPC/PC/PA//
RUCAB//TA WASHINGTON DC//SAO/AA-PA//
RUCM//CHIEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCMD//CMAF WASHINGTON DC//SAF/PA//
RUCAC//CINC WASHINGTON DC//PA//
RUCJCS//CINC WASHINGTON DC//PA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM VAIHINGEN GE//CC/CPA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM HONOLULU HI//CC/J032//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM NORFOLK VA//CC/PA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CC/CPA//
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM SCOTT AFB IL//CC/PA//
RUCINOC//USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CC/PA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//CC/CPA//
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM PETERSON AFB CO//CC/PA//
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM PETerson AFB CO//CC/PA//
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CPA//
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/PA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM FORT McPHERSON GA//CC/CPA//
RUCIN//USCENTCOM NORFOLK VA
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM PACIFIC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCINNA//USCENTCOM LONDON UK
RUCINNA//CHUSMN PAKISTAN

UNCLASSIFIED

CHUSMTM PASS TO USCENTCOM FWD PA

SUBJ: DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL

1. THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WILL BE DISBANDED EFFECTIVE 1700 EDT, 25 AUG 1990. MEMBERS OF THE POOL WILL BE OFFERED TRANSPORTATION BACK TO CONUS VIA MILITARY AIRLIFT TO OCCUR WITHIN 72 HOURS OF TERMINATION OF THE POOL. THOSE WHO WISH TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA MAY DO SO IF THEY OBTAIN HOST NATION APPROVAL. THOSE WHO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARRANGING AND PAYING FOR THEIR RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO THE U.S. VIA COMMERCIAL MEANS. ALL POOL MEMBERS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS STIPULATION.

2. THE CNN CONTRACT UPLINK EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED TECHNICIANS WILL REMAIN IN COUNTRY UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF A DOD/CENTCOM POOL UPLINK FACILITY. THOSE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REMAIN ELIGIBLE FOR DOD RETURN TRANSPORTATION TO CONUS ONCE THEIR POOL STATUS IS TERMINATED BY OSD(PA).

3. THE DOD POOL ESCORT OFFICERS (LTC ICENOGLE, LCDR BARRON, AND LCGR HARTUNG) ARE TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND ASSIST CENTCOM PAD IN...

MCN=90236/07534 TOR=6936/00002 TAO=90242/07232 CNSN=PAUAN2

PAGE 91

UNCLASSIFIED  24/2/12 AUG 90

************************************************************
TRANSITIONING TO OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE. THEY SHOULD DEPART SAUDI ARABIA NLT 1 SEP 90.

4. THE CURRENT 200 NATIONAL MEDIA POOL IS THE LARGEST, MOST AMBITIOUS POOL DEPLOYMENT YET. IT HAS PERFORMED WELL, AND THOSE INVOLVED ARE COMMENDED FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

4017

NNNN
SUBJECT: Amendment of DoD Media Pool Travel Authorization and Orders

TO: Individuals Concerned

So much of DoD National Media Pool Travel Authorization and Orders No 90-1, dated 12 Aug pertaining to the individuals listed at Attachment 1 is hereby amended as follows:

AS READS: "during the period 12-26 Aug 90".

IS AMENDED TO READ: "during the period 12 Aug - 1 Sep 90".

REQUESTED: 

[Signature]

for Peter Alexandrakos
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Director for Plans

APPROVED:

[Signature]

Robert W. Taylor
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Frank Aukofer  
Jay Petersell  
Peter Coleland  
Martin Jeong  
Al Levin  

Attachment 1  
Milwaukee Journal  
Time  
Scripps Howard  
UPI  
CNN
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN WILDERMUTH – RIYADH
INFO CAPTAIN SHERMAN – DHAHRAN

30 AUG 90

SUBJECT: Media Pool Composition

In reference to our conversation about media pools earlier today, CJCS message DTG 182305Z MAY 90 provides the most current information about the procedures and requirements for contingency media pools. While it focuses on the DoD National Media Pool, most of the guidance also applies to regional pools.

Although open media coverage has been established in Saudia Arabia, a regional pool may still be needed in order to get media into an operational area should hostilities occur. Therefore, we recommend you develop plans to very quickly establish and deploy a regional pool to cover such contingencies.

Since any pool you create would be from the large media contingent already in theatre, you should be able to tailor your pool to provide excellent area and unit coverage. Based on our experience with DoD pools, we recommend you ensure all types of media organizations (e.g., TV, radio, wires, etc.) are represented in the pool. That pool would then be divided into smaller subpools to be deployed to areas of activity or anticipated activity throughout the theatre. Then, as the situation develops, the subpools would file their stories which, collectively, would provide coverage of the overall operation.

Although in the DoD pool not all types of media are expected to be in each subpool, regional pools are less restrictive and, depending on available transportation, each subpool should contain at a minimum TV, radio, print, and a photograph representation.

Another issue facing you is the large contingent of international media. They too should be factored into the coverage. The exact composition is situational based upon numbers present and transportation available.

I hope this helps. It's a challenge, but a necessary one in order to be ready for all eventualities.

Bob Taylor

Ron,

I thought I'd send you a copy of this again as I understand the 4 man pool concept is still being considered.

Bob
6 September 1990

DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

To provide media coverage of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the DoD National Media Pool was deployed from Washington on August 12, 1990. The pool travelled to MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and was briefed by the CINC about the ongoing operation. The group then travelled via military aircraft to King Abdul Aziz Air Base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to cover the ongoing deployment of U.S. Forces in support of Desert Shield.

The pool covered all aspects of the deployment including the arrival of various Army, Air Force and Marine Corps units; the arrival of equipment and material; and Saudi military participation in the operation. Additionally, pool members covered naval operations in the Persian Gulf, participated in an operational AWACS mission, and spent several nights in the field with forward deployed U.S. troops.

Once a sufficient independent (non-pool) media presence was established in the area to ensure continued coverage of U.S. military activities, the DoD National Media Pool was disbanded at 5 p.m. EST, August 26, 1990. Only two media pool members chose to return, however; the remainder chose to remain in Saudi Arabia to continue coverage of DESERT SHIELD.

Current coverage of ongoing activities is being facilitated by a Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh and a Combined/Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, operated in conjunction with the Saudi Arabian government. The current media presence, including both U.S. and international press, is approximately 400, a number that continues to grow daily. Coverage of ongoing activities is being facilitated through "media opportunities" that are available on a sign-up basis. Individual assistance for special projects is provided to U.S. media only. While there is no censorship of media in Saudi Arabia, ground rules that protect the operational security of our troops are voluntarily adhered to by media on scene.

The DoD National Media Pool for Operation DESERT SHIELD consisted of the following organizations:

Associated Press
United Press International
Reuters
CNN
National Public Radio
Time
Los Angeles Times
Scripps-Howard Newspapers
Milwaukee Journal
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

THROUGH DIRECTOR FOR PLANS 23 OCT 1990

SUBJECT: Anticipated Media Complaint on Chairman’s Visit To Saudi Arabia

I received a telephone call from Commander David Knox (CCPA) in Riyadh at 0900 23 Oct 90 providing a "heads up" on anticipated media complaints regarding "unfair" access given to ABC TV during the Chairman’s visit there. Commander Knox’s report is as follows:

"Upon arrival, the Chairman informed CCPA that he wanted no scheduled media opportunities, but if something were to come up, the PAO could feel free to take whatever media happened to be available in the city along to cover it without pooling the media. The JIB at Dhahran put out a somewhat conflicting notice saying that there would be "no media opportunities at all." ABC TV asked to cover the Chairman’s visit and was told "there are no scheduled opportunities." ABC, however, sent a team in anyhow on the chance that something might come up, even though there were no scheduled opportunities. An opportunity did, in fact, come up and ABC was taken out to cover it. They took a risk and it paid off. They were told their coverage could be considered "unilateral." A tape of that coverage is now on the way back to the states. Meanwhile, Joe Albright of Cox Newspapers also came on the chance that he might get an opportunity and was set up for a 6 a.m. interview with the Chairman. However, he pooled the results of his interview. The result is that all the rest of the media at Dhahran are very angry and plan to make calls to Washington, D.C. to protest what they consider to have been unfair access granted to ABC. Deborah Amos of NPR has stated she will telephone Pete Williams to complain. Also, Mr. Alacastro of NBC plans to complain. Meanwhile, the Albright pool report is in the hands of the rest of the media and the combat camera team got 5 or 10 minutes footage of the General shaking hands and talking with the troops. The question which Captain Wildermuth asked Commander Knox to relay to ASD(FA) is, "Is there any reason CCPA must require ABC to pool their report since the only advantage they had was to take a risk to come up when there was nothing scheduled?"

Why would they pool?

Jerry R. Harke
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army
Plans Officer
August 20, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Williams:

I am asking the Pentagon to include Tribune military writer Jim Michaels in the next press pool being arranged to tour U. S. Military operations in Saudi Arabia or naval operations in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Michaels is already in Dubai, awaiting permission to join naval forces in the gulf or to enter Saudi Arabia. He has been in contact with officials at the U. S. consulate there, who suggested this letter. He is ready to go virtually within minutes of a final approval.

In the interest of geographical balance among the pool reporters, and given the presence of many San Diego-based ships and Marines in the area, I think there would be little question about the validity of letting Michaels join the pool.

I am hoping you will grant this request.

Sincerely,

Carl Larsen
Metro Editor

CL:tbs
Mr. James P. Gannon
The Detroit News
Washington Bureau
1148 National Press Building
Washington, D.C. 20045

Dear Mr. Gannon:

Thank you for your letter of August 23rd, in which you expressed your interest in having The Detroit News represented in the Department of Defense National Media Pool.

As you may already know, the list from which pool representatives are selected is compiled by the American Newspaper Publishers Association. The Detroit News was included on earlier lists, but was deleted by ANPA when it was acquired by Gannett Company, Inc., in March 1986. The Gannett Company has designated as its pool representatives USA Today and the Gannett News Service.

I appreciate your continued interest in the Media Pool. If you have further questions concerning the Pool, please feel free to contact Lieutenant Commander Gregg Hartung, USN, at 202-697-6163.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

CC:
Mr. Robert L. Burke
Senior Vice President
American Newspaper Publishers Association
Box 17407, Dulles Airport
Washington, D.C. 20041
August 23, 1990

Mr. Peter Williams  
Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C. 20301-1400

Dear Mr. Williams:

I was operating under the evidently mistaken impression that The Detroit News was on the list of newspapers for the Pentagon press pool for the Persian Gulf operations. However, a Major Hunt in your office has informed me that The Detroit News is not on the pool list.

I am writing to request that you put The Detroit News on the pool list for possible future selection when pool members are rotated.

The Detroit News is a major metropolitan newspaper with a daily circulation exceeding 500,000, circulating throughout Michigan. In addition, The Detroit News editorial staff provides all of the hard-news coverage for the combined Sunday editions of the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press. That gives us a Sunday circulation of 1.3 million, which is the fourth-largest Sunday newspaper in the United States.

The Detroit News is a Gannett Co. newspaper, and the reports of its correspondents go out over the Gannett News Service to all 81 Gannett daily newspapers across the country. That gives a Detroit News writer a nationwide exposure with potential circulation of several million readers nationally.

Thank you for your attention to this request. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

James P. Gannon  
Bureau Chief
Ms. Maria Wilhelm  
Washington Bureau Chief  
People Magazine  
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036-5334

Dear Ms. Wilhelm:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding People's interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
August 10, 1990

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs
Dept. of Defense
The Pentagon; Room 2E800
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Williams:

This letter is to request that PEOPLE Magazine's correspondent Mike Ryan and photographer Harry Benson be considered as candidates for any media pool covering current military action in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Messrs. Ryan and Benson are already in the Middle East; they are currently in Cairo.

The enclosed article shows you their previous work when the two covered U.S. military action in Panama last December.

Please do not hesitate to call my office at 861-4089 with any question. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Maria Wilhelm
Washington Bureau Chief

enc.
Ms. Sherry Von Ohlsen
Best-Seller, Inc.
20 Woodlawn Road
Sparta, NJ 07871

Dear Ms. Von Ohlsen:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding your interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Signed
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
August 17, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Dept. of Defense
Public Affairs Office
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Williams,

I have been informed that I should contact you in order to be part of any upcoming media pools being sent to Saudi Arabia. THE WORLD & I, a publication of the Washington Times Corporation, has requested that I travel to Saudi Arabia to cover the events for the magazine.

WORLD & I is an international magazine serving an audience of doctors, lawyers and academics, an audience I understand the military is eager to gain support from. I feel it is in the interest of both the magazine and the United States government to find a slot for me in the Pentagon's arrangement of media in the Middle East.

Please inform me on the possibility and on whatever is required for selection. Also, please contact editor Rick Saarce at WORLD & I for any further information/confirmation. Thank you.

Sincerely Yours,

[Signature]

Sherry Von Ohlsen
Mr. Sid Holt  
Managing Editor  
Rolling Stone  
745 Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10151  

Dear Mr. Holt:  

Thank you for your recent letter regarding Rolling Stone’s interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.  

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.  

Sincerely,  

Signed  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
August 13, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
The Pentagon
Room 2E800
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Williams:

Rolling Stone Magazine plans to cover the events in the Persian Gulf, and would therefore like to request that our writer P.J. O'Rourke be part of any media pool opportunities departing for the Persian Gulf area.

It is my understanding that the national pool has already been sent to the area, and that no other pools have been sent yet. We would like to have Mr. O'Rourke in the Middle East as soon as possible, and would appreciate your contacting us when any pool opportunities arise. I can be reached at (212)350-1245.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Sid Holt
Managing Editor

SH/ob
Mr. Carl Larsen  
Metro Editor  
San Diego Tribune  
350 Camino de la Reina  
P.O. Box 191  
San Diego, CA  92112-4106  

Dear Mr. Larsen:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding the San Diego Tribune's interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools, you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,
Signed
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
Ms. Susan Schauer  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Scripps League Newspapers  
1174 National Press Building  
Washington, D.C. 20045

Dear Ms. Schauer:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding Scripps League Newspapers' interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461 or 5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
August 22, 1990

Mr. Dewey Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Public Affairs Office
700 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC 20361-1400

Dear Mr. Williams:

This is a request to place Christopher F. Rosche, Scripps League's Washington-based defense reporter, on the waiting list for the Pentagon pool covering the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Scripps League is a privately owned chain of 30 newspapers in 15 states. With several newspapers in the chain located near military bases, we have a strong interest in the Persian Gulf crisis.

Although Mr. Rosche's primary mission would be covering the military operations of the U.S. military in the Middle East, our news service is also very interested in writing various profiles of the servicemen and women protecting the Persian Gulf area.

We have 10 newspapers in California, one of which is located near Lemoore Naval Air Station where many of the Navy's carrier-based jet fighter pilots are home based. One of our primary focuses would be a series of articles on the men and women aboard the USS Independence, and its F/A-18 fighter squadrons, as they prepare for possible action in the Gulf.

Coverage would be greatly appreciated by many of our readers living on or near military bases like NAS Lemoore.

If you have any questions about our request, please give me or Mr. Rosche a call at 202-783-1866 during business hours.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Susan Schauer
Bureau Chief
Ms. Phyllis Schwartz  
Assistant News Director  
WLS Television, Inc.  
190 North State Street  
Chicago, IL  60601

Dear Ms. Schwartz:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding WLS Television's interest in becoming a part of any media pool covering current military action in the Middle East. Currently, the Department of Defense National Media Pool has been disbanded and coverage in the area is being accomplished on a unilateral basis. There are occasional regional media pools being facilitated by the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia when circumstances will not permit unilateral access.

If you would be interested in further information concerning these regional media pools you can contact the Combined Joint Information Bureau at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Signed

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
August 14, 1990

Mr. Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Public Affairs
Washington DC

This letter officially requests that WLS-TV, Channel 7 Chicago, be a part of the first Defense Department Regional News Pool to the Middle East.

Our interest is reporting on the numerous military personnel from the Chicago area and Illinois, who are involved in the United States deployment and also reporting on the events in the Middle East for an estimate of 100,000 Iraqi Nationalists who reside in Chicago.

All persons listed below are members of the Eyewitness News staff and will be covering this tour.

Chuck Goudie      Reporter
Eugene Stanback  Crew
Joe Kussman      Crew
Dave Fell        Producer

Thank you for your prompt attention and consideration. If you have any question, feel free to call me at 750-7296.

Thank you,

Phyllis Schwartz
Assistant News Director
Ms. Cinny Kennard  
WFAA TV  
Washington Bureau  
444 N. Capitol N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001

Dear Ms. Kennard:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding WFAA TV's interest in becoming a member of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. Since WFAA TV is an ABC-TV affiliate, you already have access to pool material by virtue of ABC's membership in the pool. Video membership on the pool consists of ABC, CBS, CNN and NBC television networks which rotate every three months.

I hope this answers your questions about the DoD National Media Pool. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Signed
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary
Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
Pete Williams
Asst. Sec of Defense
The Office of Public Affairs
The Pentagon
Washington D.C.

Pete,

After speaking with Greg on the phone I learned to put our television stations name on the list of journalists to accompany American Troops to Saudi Arabia or other military operations we must submit a letter to you.

I realize the rotation and that there are certainly news organizations that have been on the list for some time, yet we are requesting that WFAA be added to the list.

For this weekend would you please put my name on the list with Photographer Michael Kornely. Jim Fry is the Bureau Chief in our Washington office and should be contacted for further questions on background that you would need.

Marty Haag is our executive news director and works closely with Burl Osborne who recently chaired the American Newspaper Editors Group. In fact A.H. Belo Corporation owns both WFAA and the Dallas Morning News where Mr Osborne is the editor. I believe the Dallas Morning News and one other Texas Newspaper accompanied troops to Panama by virtue of being in the rotation.

Would you kindly do all thats necessary to put WFAA-T.V. on the rotation list and if we can answer any questions, please feel free to call me.

Thanking you in advance

Cinny Kennard

Cinny Kennard
SUMMARY SHEET

DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENTS

The following are brief summaries of the twelve deployments of the DoD National Media Pool to date:

April 1985 - A 10-member pool deployed to Honduras on an ambitious, five-day exercise to cover UNIVERSAL TREK 85. Although news of the pool leaked before it left Washington and problems were experienced sending one pool product back to the U.S., the pool was still successful in that it was a learning experience for all participants.

September 1985 - More limited in scope, a 12-member pool deployed to Ft. Campbell, KY, for one day to cover DOUBLE EAGLE 85, an air assault brigade field training exercise. Pool products were filed in a satisfactory and timely manner. Secrecy was maintained for this deployment.

December 1985 - More aggressive in scope, a 12-member pool deployed for two days to cover KERNAL USHER 86-1, a Navy and Marine Corps amphibious exercise off the southern California coast. This exercise required more transportation to move pool members to several locations to cover various aspects of the exercise. It also revealed that radio interviews could not be recorded aboard ship due to electrical interference. Pool reports were released 7 1/2 hours earlier than planned when pool members agreed to delete one reference to an upcoming operation.

August 1986 - A 12-member pool deployed for two days to cover a joint fire control exercise, GALLANT EAGLE 86, near Twentynine Palms, CA. This deployment was notable for several reasons: it was the first to include women (two); three pool reports were transmitted to the Pentagon in just over one hour each; and it was a daytime activation/assembly which presented unique OPSEC problems.

February 1987 - A 12-member pool deployed for two days to cover an airborne jump into Honduras. This exercise required extensive coordination; required linking up with and joining the deploying force at Ft. Bragg, NC; and saw the first use of teletypewriter machines to file stories over commercial telephone circuits. The three pool reports were received at the Pentagon in one hour and 10 minutes; 22 minutes; and 32 minutes. This was more ambitious than the first pool deployment and, to the military, was a graduation exercise for the pool concept.
May 1987 - A 12-member pool deployed to Camp Lejeune, NC, for two days to cover an amphibious assault during exercise SOLID SHIELD 87. This was the first pool to file stories to the Pentagon via classified messages for release concurrent with commencement of the "attack." Transportation delays to the assault area due to helicopter problems emphasized the need to plan backup transport for all phases of pool operations. This deployment also marked the first routine use of the pool as called for in a unified or specified command plan for a significant military exercise.

July 1987 - The first "real-world" use of the pool. A 10-member pool deployed for nine days to cover Operation EARNEST WILL, the first U.S. Navy escort of refagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf. This was the first operational deployment of the pool to cover an actual military operation and secrecy was maintained for three days. This pool was able to report the reflagging of tankers and "broke" the story of the Bridgeton hitting a mine in gulf waters while under escort. The pool functioned under "real-world" conditions exactly as designed.

March 1988 - The first short-notice deployment of the pool. The military had approximately six hours to deploy a 10-member pool for two days to cover the U.S. Army's no-notice, emergency deployment readiness exercise to Honduras, GOLDEN PHEASANT 88. This is considered the second operational pool deployment to cover what the media described as "a show of strength ordered by President Reagan to counter what the White House called an invasion by Nicaraguan forces." The standby news magazine photographer for the pool was not activated, but at the magazine's request, their photographer was allowed to join the pool in Honduras. One of the three newspapers on pool standby was not activated and later asked permission for a reporter to join the pool in Honduras at the paper's expense. Permission was granted, but when the reporter arrived in Honduras, she chose not to join the pool. The deployment was otherwise "routine."

December 1988 - An 11-member pool deployed for four days to cover a brigade-level external evaluation conducted by 2nd Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light). This was the first media pool deployment that did not visit a JCS-level exercise or real-world action and was the first deployment to a cold weather environment. Members received cold weather indoctrination training from Northern Warfare Training Center cadre. When asked for comments at the end of the deployment, print media requested more time for one-on-one interviews with soldiers. A significant lesson learned related to the need for clearly defined security review procedures. As a result, the security review policy was reevaluated. Other lessons learned concerned the environmental challenges that a media pool would face when covering military operations in arctic weather.
May 1989 - A 12-member pool accompanied the first aircraft carrying Marine Corps augmentation forces to Panama on 12 May 1989 as part of Operation NIMROD DANCER. The force deployment was publicly announced by President Bush on the afternoon of 11 May and received extensive media coverage both at the departure point of MCAS Cherry Point and at the arrival at Howard AFB, therefore, normal OPSEC procedures were not required. Further, media products were filed directly to news bureaus and not via OASD(PA) as in previous pool deployments. The decision to send the pool was made late afternoon on 11 May. The airlift was confirmed at 0115 on 12 May and call out was completed by 0145; Media were assembled at the Andrews AFB Media Center and processed by 0345. The Media Pool aircraft departed at 0430. The pool deployment served as a good exercise of DoD National Media Pool procedures.

December 1989 - A 16-member pool deployed to cover Operation JUST CAUSE in the first deployment of the DoD National Media Pool to a ground combat operation. The call-out for the pool began at 1930 on 19 December and experienced problems in locating pool personnel due to the holiday season. The operation began at 0100 on 20 December with the media pool arriving at Howard AFB at 0500 on that same date. Numerous delays were experienced by the pool in the first 36 hours of the deployment, mostly attributed to transportation difficulties. The pool was the first to transport and use a satellite ground station for direct television feeds. Operation JUST CAUSE represented the greatest challenge for the pool thus far. Pool members voiced frustration that they were not permitted to witness the early stages of the operation and other live combat action and complained that they did not have access to adequate transportation or communication facilities. The media concerns expressed at the conclusion of this deployment prompted the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to commission Fred Hoffman, a forty-year veteran of the AP and a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to conduct an in-depth review of the deployment and make recommendations to improve future media pool evolutions. Drawing from the experience in Panama, the ASD(PA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a message to the CINCs, which was signed by General Powell, reminding them of their planning and operational responsibilities for future pool deployments.
August 1990 - A seventeen member pool deployed for three weeks to cover the deployment of U.S. combat forces to Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia. Pool correspondents were the first western media on the ground in the Kingdom and provided the only coverage of the operation for the first week of the deployment. CNN, the television component of the pool took a satellite ground station to provide direct television and radio feeds. Print journalists were able to file directly to their respective bureaus for the first time ever due to the availability of quality commercial communications facilities. While in Saudi Arabia, the pool experienced unprecedented access to U.S. military forces and was able to cover all aspects of the operation including naval units at sea. The pool deployment was considered one of the most successful ever with pool products receiving wide play in all national and international media.

Prepared October 31, 1990
MEDIA POOL ROTATION SCHEME

Wire Services

- 3 month rotation, beginning 1 July 1985
  - OCT-DEC 90  AP  - Photographer
     UPI  - Correspondent
     Reuters  - Correspondent
  - JAN-MAR 91  AP  - Correspondent
     UPI  - Correspondent
     Reuters  - Photographer
  - APR-JUN 91  AP  - Correspondent
     UPI  - Photographer
     Reuters  - Correspondent
  - JUL-SEP 91  AP  - Photographer
     UPI  - Correspondent
     Reuters  - Correspondent

Magazines

- 3 month rotation, beginning 1 July 1987*
  - OCT-DEC 90  - U.S. News and World Report
  - JAN-MAR 91  - Newsweek
  - APR-JUN 91  - Time
  - JUL-SEP 91  - U.S. News and World Report

* Note: Original scheme was a 4-month rotation, but rotation would not move to next magazine until and immediately following an actual pool (not an exercise)

Newspapers

- In order of ANPA Listing. 3-month rotation/3 per quarter
  - OCT-DEC 90  - Cox Newspapers
     Capital Cities Communications, Inc.
     Pulitzer Publishing Company
  - JAN-MAR 91  - The Christian Science Monitor
     The Chronicle Publishing Company
     The Washington Post
  - APR-JUN 91  - Cowles Media Company
     News American Publishing, Inc.
     Chicago Tribune
  - JUL-SEP 91  - Gannet Co., Inc
     Central Newspapers
     Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Radio

- 3-month rotation, beginning 1 July 1985

- CBS Radio has requested that their rotation coincide with that of CBS Television every two years.

- OCT-DEC 90 - AP Radio
- JAN-MAR 91 - Mutual/NBC Radio
- APR-JUN 91 - UNISTAR Radio
- JUL-SEP 91 - ABC Radio

Television

- 3-month rotation, beginning 1 July 1985

- OCT-DEC 90 - NBC
- JAN-MAR 91 - ABC
- APR-JUN 91 - CBS
- JUL-SEP 91 - CNN
MEMORANDUM FOR OSD ODS CELL

SUBJECT: Desert Shield Media Guidelines

1. Attached is a copy of current media guidelines which are distributed to all media processes by the JIB.

2. Please remind White House Press that, although most of them will not accompany the President to field units, a White House Media pool will do so. All of the locations are covered by the guidelines i.e., location, troop strength, etc. We hold the parent news organization responsible for the activities of their respective correspondents in the AOR.

3. Strongly encourage the White House Press to give the attached rules a look.

4. If there are any questions, please contact us.

Attachment

K. R. GILLETTE
Major, USA
Riyadh JIB Media
5. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES ARE RELEASABLE:

(a) Arrival of major U.S. units in CENTCOM AOR when officially announced by a U.S. spokesperson. Mode of travel (sea or air) and date of departure from home station.
(b) Approximate friendly force strength figures, by service.
(c) Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures, by service.
(d) Approximate enemy casualty and POW figures for each action, operation.
(e) Non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding U.S. air, ground, and sea operations (past and present).
(f) Friendly force size in an action or operation will be announced using general terms such as "multi-battalion", "Naval Task Force", etc. Specific force/unit identification/designation may be released when it has become public knowledge and no longer warrants security protection.
(g) Identification and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.
(h) Generic origin of air operations such as "land" or "carrier based".
(i) Date/time/location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results.
(j) Types of ordnance expended will be released in general terms rather than specific amounts.
(k) Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in theater or operational area.
(l) Type of forces involved (infantry, armor, Marines, Carrier Battle Group).
(m) Weather and climate conditions.
(n) Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.) after approval of host nation government.
(o) Conventional operation nicknames.
(p) Names and hometowns of U.S. Military units/individuals may now be released.

6. If you are not sure whether a planned action will violate a ground rule, consult with your escort officer PRIOR TO TAKING THAT ACTION.

7. Media MUST support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

8. Media should be prepared to cover the high cost of visiting Saudi Arabia (such as $100 per night lodging, $30 per meal dining, ground transportation, telephone calls, etc.). RIVALS ARE A MUST.

9. Interviews with military personnel entering/departing the Ministry of Defense or other public places will be coordinated in advance by the Joint Information Bureau. THERE WILL BE NO "AMBUSH" IMPROMPTU INTERVIEWS.
I CERTIFY THAT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT:

DATE:

NAME: ________________________________

VISAS EXPIRATION: ____________________

MEDIA AFFILIATION: ____________________

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REQUESTED, BUT NOT MANDATORY.

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: ________________________________

ADDRESS: _________________________________________

PHONE: _________________________________________

MEDIA AFFILIATION
MAILING ADDRESS: _________________________________________

PHONE: _________________________________________

PASSPORT NUMBER AND COUNTRY OF ISSUE: ________________

ADDRESS IN COUNTRY: _________________________________________

PHONE: _________________________________________

(JIB PERSONNEL WILL CHECK PICTURE ID'S)

I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO COMPLY WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE MEDIA GUIDELINES AND ANY ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS THAT MY MEDIA ESCORT MAY PROVIDE:

SIGNATURE: ________________________________
Mr. Pio Dal Cin  
Via Kennedy, 11  
31013 Codogno’ (Treviso)  
Italy

Dear Mr. Dal Cin:

Thank you for your recent letter requesting to cover Operation DESERT SHIELD. In order to cover the operation, you must first obtain a visa from a Saudi Arabian Embassy or Consulate. After obtaining a visa, you can make transportation arrangements with any number of commercial air carriers providing service to the area.

You can obtain more information about covering Operation DESERT SHIELD by contacting the Combined Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia at 966-3-891-8555, ext. 5461/5439. If we can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
Dear Mr. Williams,

I was given your name and address by the press office of the American Base in VICENZA Italy, following my request of being sent to the area of operation "Desert Shield" as a photographer who is trying his best to be where "History is turning itself into reality". In order to do that I have been to Berlin for the downing of the wall last year, to Prague and Romania to document the historical fall of the communism. I have been to the occupied territories in the Gaza Strip. Also in 1986 to the Venice Summit with President E. Reagan. Lately I have been to the "Helsinki Bush Gorbacev Summit and I was the only photographer there from Italy to be accredited. I also work with the ASSOCIATED PRESS as a stringer for the TREVISIO area in Italy. I speak and write English, Italian and French. Should you need any further info I will be more than glad to forward them to you*. I am including some of the letters written to me by the American Ambassador in Italy in 1986 Mr. Raab.

Please give me a chance. Photography is my life and life is my photography.

Name PIO LAST Dal Cin BORN IN Conegliano V.TO (TREVISIO) ITALY on October 15th 1956 resident in CODOGNE" (Treviso) Via John and Robert Kennedy No 11 Passport number K710946 issued in Treviso on November 9 1987. Telephone number 0039438794742
MEMORANDUM

To: Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps

From: Pete Williams

Re: Plans for pools and flight for auxiliary staff
in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield I have met twice, at their initiative, with
the bureau chiefs of several news organizations that are regular members of the Pentagon
press corps. We discussed complaints from their correspondents in Saudi Arabia and the
progress in refining a new plan for pool coverage in the event of hostilities in Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. We also discussed a request from news organizations in the Pentagon
press corps who cited difficulty in getting visas for staff and who accordingly wanted help in
getting additional personnel to the region, should hostilities break out.

After the second meeting, on November 28th, I briefed Secretary Cheney and General
Powell on a concept for combat pools, the result of a month of planning and discussions
within the Pentagon and with military commanders in the Gulf. After making some sugges-
tions, the Secretary and the Chairman approved the concept. I then briefed a representative of
the Saudi government. Our staff has since been preparing the more detailed version of the
pool concept that will become part of the overall military plan for the operation. That work
has proceeded over the past week, while I was with the Secretary on his trip last week to
NATO and Poland. A summary of the concept is attached. I am interested in your comments
or questions.

The Secretary and the Chairman also approved the idea of sending a US military C-141
aircraft to Saudi Arabia, if hostilities were to break out, carrying supplemental news media
personnel to help cover the story of combat, given that most news organizations have only
very small staffs in Saudi Arabia now -- in many cases, only one correspondent. The objective
is to help prevent the pool operation from breaking down through a lack of news media
representatives necessary to make it work -- the editors, producers, technicians, writers, and
pool coordinators who will be essential to successful pool operation.

This flight would be a one-way trip, transporting representatives of US news organiza-
tions who regularly cover the Pentagon. Space for cargo will be extremely limited: each
passenger would be allowed one small suitcase. Equipment cases should be shipped separately. I
solicit your comments on that list as well. The bureau chiefs who first suggested the idea
said it was predicated on their inability to get more than one or two visas at a time from the
government of Saudi Arabia. Should the visa picture open up, I suggest we readdress the need
for the plane.

Thank you for your continued suggestions and comments.
Department of Defense
Contingency Plan for Media Coverage of Hostilities
Operation DESERT SHIELD

The objective of this plan is to ensure news media access to combat areas from the onset of hostilities, or as soon thereafter as possible, in Operation DESERT SHIELD. This is a three-phased plan for exercising and deploying rotating correspondent pools, aligned with front line forces to permit combat coverage.

Each pool would consist of eighteen news media personnel: three newspaper correspondents, two wire service correspondents, two three-member television crews, one radio correspondent, one wire service photographer, one newspaper photographer, one news magazine reporter, one news magazine photographer, one Saudi reporter and one third-country reporter. Membership in the pools would be drawn from news media personnel already in Saudi Arabia.

In Phase I of the plan, which would begin immediately, the first two pools would be formed by the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran and randomly exercised at least once every two weeks to provide training for media participants and U.S. military personnel. These pools will always be exercised simultaneously to ensure that operational security is preserved. During Phase I, the pools would familiarize themselves with troops and equipment, cover activities in the areas to which the pools are sent, and exercise their ability to file news stories from the field.

Phase II would begin by deploying the pools when hostilities are imminent, putting them in place to cover the first stages of combat. If such prepositioning is not possible, the pools would be moved forward from Dhahran as quickly as possible to the immediate area of conflict. As soon as possible, additional pools would be deployed to expand the coverage. The size of these pools will be determined by the availability of transportation and other operational factors. These additional pools could be used to fill the gaps in coverage, if the conflict is spread over a wide area. Air Force, Navy, amphibious, and logistical support units will be covered by additional smaller pools, which will be rotated to ensure continuous coverage.

Security review for all pool material would be performed at the source, where the information was gathered, and transmitted to the Joint Information Bureau at Dhahran, where it would then be available to journalists covering the operation. Ground rules would consist of those currently in effect.

Phase III would begin when open coverage is possible and would provide for unilateral coverage of activities. The pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under U.S. Central Command escort.

13 December 1990
### Proposed News Media Listing for DOD Contingency Airlift

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
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<tr>
<td>CBS-TV</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
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<td>NBC-TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC/ABC/CBS crews for local affiliates</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
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<tr>
<td>REUTERS</td>
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<td>ABC Radio</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Washington Post</td>
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<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
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<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
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<td>Boston Globe</td>
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<td>Gannett News Service</td>
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<td>New York Post</td>
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<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
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<td>Army-Navy-Air Force Times</td>
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</table>

**Total:** 120

14 December 1990
MEMORANDUM

To: Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps

From: Pete Williams

Re: Plans for pools and flight for auxiliary staff in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

December 24, 1990

On December 14, I sent you a memorandum outlining the plans for pools and a flight for auxiliary staff in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. In order to receive your comments and discuss any questions you might have, I invite you to attend a meeting of bureau chiefs on January 4, 1991, in Pentagon Room 1E801, #7, at 2:00 p.m. Due to limited seating, I ask that only you or your representative attend.

Please call Captain Dave Thomas or Lieutenant Commander Gregg Hartung at your earliest convenience to confirm that you will attend or send a representative. They will arrange for parking, if you will be driving, and to have someone meet you and clear you into the building. They can be reached at (703) 693-1074/6.

I hope you will be able to attend.
What are the minimum editing and transmission staff needed to support a photo pool operation? Would AP and Reuters be able to send in extra staff to help handle the editing and transmission of the pictures? Could we be assigned two seats on the C130 for pictures technicians? Would they need Saudi visas?

Do you envisage that pool operations and independent media operations will exist side by side or will all material be pooled out of Dhahran at the outbreak of hostilities?

A number of bureau chiefs I have talked to have expressed the wish that we could have a guidance discussion in the near future. I hope it can be arranged. Thanks for all your help in the past particularly in persuading the Saudis to rotate our pictures staff. That has worked well.

Yours truly

[Signature]

Bruce Russell
Bureau Chief
Mr. Bruce Russell  
Washington Bureau Chief  
Reuters  
1333 H Street, N.W.  
Suite 410  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Russell:

In his absence, Pete Williams has asked me to reply to your letter of December 14 in which you raised numerous questions regarding the operation of press pools and the possible airlift of news media representatives to Saudi Arabia in the event of hostilities. We hope that Pete's memo to bureau chiefs, also dated 14 December, answered your questions. If not, he will be happy to address any remaining questions at the bureau chiefs meeting scheduled for January 4. We look forward to seeing you then.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Taylor  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)
14 December 1990

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

Dear Pete

With the possibility that hostilities in the Gulf could break out as soon as three weeks from now we would appreciate some guidance on how the Pentagon would expect us to contribute to a news pool operation.

From the print media side the issue is not complicated. Reuters has three correspondents in Saudi Arabia and others in cities in the Gulf area and would be ready to contribute to the 14 small pools that you outlined at our last meeting. However our staff there would not be enough to cover many pool assignments and we would like to have more Americans on the spot for the pools. So if you are sending a backup C130 press pool plane in after the event we would like to apply for three writing positions on it.

However the question of the photos pool is much more complicated. From talking to our wire photo colleagues it appears they would like more information too so perhaps it would be useful if you could arrange a bureau chiefs meeting.

An important question is how pool pictures would are to be filed. We have our own satellite dishes but the British MOD has told our people in London that these will be jammed. Can an alternative method of filing pictures be worked out in advance? Will the DOD provide telephone lines for filing these pictures?

Will all pool material be made available in Dhahran or is the plan to bring it back to Washington? If it is in Dhahran has the DOD made an arrangement for an assignments editor to control such a complex operation as multiple pools. Would you look to us for help? If the pictures and texts are distributed in Washington would your office welcome any technical help from us on distributing the pictures?

To whom are the pool pictures to be distributed - to pool members only or to everyone who wants them?

Will pool material be censored before distribution?
COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL (CCP)
MEDIA GROUND RULES

THE GROUND RULES BELOW ARE DESIGNED TO (1) PROTECT THE SECURITY AND THE SAFETY OF SERVICE MEMBERS, (2) PROTECT NEXT OF KIN SENSITIVITIES WITH REGARD TO WOUNDED AND KILLED SERVICE MEMBERS AND (3) ALLOW CCP MEMBERS THE GREATEST PERMISSIBLE FREEDOM AND ACCESS IN COVERING OPERATIONS.

1. GENERAL. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE "ON THE RECORD." SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE POLICY. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, POOL PRODUCTS WILL BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE. NOTE: THE PAO ON-SCENE WILL CONDUCT THE SECURITY REVIEW; HOWEVER, IF A MEDIA SEGMENT IS IN QUESTION BETWEEN THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE AND THE PAO, THE PRODUCT WILL BE EXPEDITIOUSLY HAND-CARRIED TO JIB DHARAHN FOR REVIEW OF THAT SEGMENT. THE QUESTIONED SEGMENT ONLY WILL BE REVIEWED SO AS NOT TO HINDER RELEASE OF THE REMAINDER OF THE POOL STORY. IF NO AGREEMENT CAN BE MADE BETWEEN DIRECTOR, JIB UMAHRAH AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTING THE STORY, THEN THE PRODUCT WILL BE EXPEDITIOUSLY FORWARDED TO OASD(PA) FOR REVIEW AND RELEASE DECISION.

A. ALL NAVY EMBARK STORIES WILL STATE THAT THE REPORT IS COMING "FROM THE ARABIAN GULF, RED SEA OR NORTH ARABIAN SEA." STORIES WRITTEN IN SAUDI ARABIA MAY BE DATED "EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA, CENTRAL SAUDI ARABIA, ETC." STORIES FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES MAY BE DATED "FROM THOSE COUNTRIES ONLY AFTER THEIR PARTICIPATION IS RELEASED BY DOD. NO SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WILL BE USED WHEN FILING THE STORIES.

B. YOU MUST REMAIN WITH YOUR MILITARY ESCORT AT ALL TIMES, UNTIL RELEASED, AND FOLLOW THEIR INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING YOUR ACTIVITIES. THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT INTENDED TO HINDER YOUR REPORTING. THEY ARE INTENDED TO FACILITATE TROOP MOVEMENT, ENSURE SAFETY, AND PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

C. YOU MUST BE PHYSICALLY FIT. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES, YOU WILL BE MEDICALLY EVACUATED OUT OF THE AREA.

D. YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO EITHER CARRY A PERSONAL WEAPON OR WEAR THE DESERT CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM.

E. CCP MEMBERS WILL NOT BE EMBARKED IN AIRLIFT OR GROUND TRANSPORTATION CARRYING DECEASED SERVICE MEMBERS.

F. MEDIA MUST CARRY AND SUPPORT ANY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL GEAR THEY TAKE WITH THEM, INCLUDING PROTECTIVE CASES FOR
PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT, BATTERIES, CABLES, CONVERTERS, ETC.

G. WHEN ASSIGNED TO A POOL REPRESENTING A SPECIFIC TYPE OF MEDIA, I.E., TV, RADIO, PRINT, OR PHOTO, THAT POOL MEMBER WILL PERFORM THAT TYPE OF COVERAGE ONLY. NO UNILATERAL COVERAGE WILL BE ALLOWED, TO INCLUDE PERSONAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO.

H. POOL COORDINATORS (FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING: TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSMAGAZINE, WIRE, NEWSPAPER, AND PHOTO) WILL MAINTAIN UP-TO-DATE LISTS OF NEWS MEDIA FOR WHOM THEY WILL BE RESPONSIBLE.

I. EACH COMBAT POOL (TO WHICH NEWS MEDIA HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED) WILL HAVE A DESIGNATED SPOKESPERSON WHO WILL ATTEND POOL MEETINGS AND GATHER INFORMATION FOR THEIR POOL. THAT INDIVIDUAL WILL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING LESSONS LEARNED FROM POOL DEPLOYMENTS AND PROVIDING THAT INPUT TO THE JIB.

J. UPON REGISTERING WITH THE JIB, NEWS MEDIA SHOULD CONTACT THEIR RESPECTIVE POOL COORDINATOR FOR EXPLANATION OF COMBAT POOL OPERATIONS.

K. INTERVIEWS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL ENTERING/DEPARTING THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OR OTHER PUBLIC PLACES, I.E., THE JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU, WILL BE COORDINATED IN ADVANCE BY THE JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU. THERE WILL BE NO "AMBUSH" INTERVIEWS.

L. NIGHT OPERATIONS

(1) NO LIGHT SOURCE WILL BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT UNLESS IT IS A FLASHLIGHT FILTERED WITH A RED COLORED LENS. ONLY WITH PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE ESCORTING PAO OR MILITARY SERVICE MEMBER CAN ANOTHER LIGHT SOURCE BE USED.

(2) LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. THE USE OF FLASH CAMERAS AND ACTIVE VIDEO CAMERAS DURING NIGHT ACTIVITIES/OPERATIONS IS PROHIBITED, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED BY THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER.

2. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES ARE RELEASABLE:

A. ARRIVAL OF MAJOR U.S. UNITS IN CENTRAL COMMAND AOR WHEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY A U.S. SPOKESPERSON. MODE OF TRAVEL (SEA OR AIR) AND DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM HOME STATION.

B. APPROXIMATE OVERALL, COMBINED FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES, AFTER REVIEW BY HOST NATION GOVERNMENT.

C. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES, BY SERVICE.

D. CONFIRMED ENEMY PERSONNEL KILLED IN ACTION (KIA) AND DETAINED FOR EACH ACTION AND/OR OPERATIONS.

E. NON-SENSITIVE, UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION REGARDING U.S. AIR, GROUND AND SEA OPERATIONS (PAST AND PRESENT).
F. FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED USING GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "MULTI-BATTALION", "NAVAL TASK FORCE", ETC. SPECIFIC FORCE/UNIT IDENTIFICATION/DESIGNATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT HAS BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND NO LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION.

G. IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.

H. GENERIC ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS SUCH AS "LAND" OR "CARRIER-BASED."

I. DATE/TIME/LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS AND ACTIONS AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS.

J. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED, IN GENERAL TERMS.

K. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR SORTIES FLOWN IN THEATER OR OPERATIONAL AREA.

L. TYPE OF FORCES INVOLVED (INFANTRY, ARMOR, MARINES, CARRIER BATTLE GROUP).

M. WEATHER AND CLIMATE CONDITIONS.

N. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, GROUND UNITS, ETC.) AFTER APPROVAL OF HOST NATION GOVERNMENT.

O. CONVENTIONAL OPERATION CODE NAMES (DESERT SHIELD).

P. NAMES AND HOMETOWN OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS / INDIVIDUALS.

Q. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINING TO WOUNDED OR INJURED PERSONNEL MAY BE FURNISHED TO THE MEDIA:

(1) THE DATE OF ADMISSION TO OR RELEASE FROM A MEDICAL FACILITY.

(2) CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE PATIENT'S CONDITION, PHRASED AS "STABLE/GOOD/FAIR/SERIOUS/CRITICAL."

(3) BIOGRAPHICAL DATA NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO MEDICAL TREATMENT, SUCH AS UNIT, AWARDS, MOS/NEC, EDUCATION, AGE, LENGTH OF SERVICE, ETC.

(4) A DESCRIPTION OF THE PATIENT'S CONDITION, OTHER THAN PROVIDED FOR ABOVE, WILL BE PROVIDED ONLY WITH THE INFORMED CONSENT OF THE PATIENT. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE LIMITED TO IDENTIFYING THE TYPE OF WOUND OR INJURY SUFFERED (E.G., SMALL ARMS WOUND, FRAGMENT WOUND, ARM FRACTURE, ETC.)

3. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT RELEASABLE:

A. NUMBER OF TROOPS
B. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT

C. NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL SUPPLIES (E.G., ARTILLERY, TANKS, RADARS, TRUCKS, WATER, ETC.)

D. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS / SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). (UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.)

E. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS (EITHER WHILE ASSIGNED AS A POOL MEMBER OR UPON RETURN FROM POOL OPERATIONS).

F. INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

G. PHOTOGRAPHY THAT WOULD SHOW LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, ESPECIALLY AERIAL AND SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY.

H. PHOTOGRAPHY THAT WOULD REVEAL THE NAME OR SPECIFIC LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS.

I. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DETAILS.

J. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE TARGETS, METHODS AND RESULTS.

K. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL UNITS, UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY /TACTICS (AIR OPS, ANGLES OF ATTACK, SPEEDS, ETC.; NAVAL TACTICAL/EVASIVE MANEUVERS, ETC.)

L. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELED OPERATIONS.

M. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING SHIPS, WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED OR UNDERWAY.

N. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.

O. COVERAGE OF RELIGIOUS SERVICES IN KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.

P. THE FOLLOWING PROHIBITIONS APPLY TO MEDIA COVERAGE OF WOUNDED AND INJURED PERSONNEL:

(1) VISUAL AND AUDIO RECORDINGS OF PERSONNEL IN AGONY OR SEVERE SHOCK ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(2) IMAGERY OF PATIENTS SUFFERING FROM SEVERE DISFIGUREMENT OR UNDERGOING PLASTIC SURGERY TREATMENTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(3) INTERVIEWS WITH OR VISUAL IMAGERY OF PATIENTS UNDERGOING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.
(4) Imagery that shows a recognizable face, name tag, item of jewelry or other identifiable features before confirming casualty’s next of kin have been identified.

(5) Release of home address of service member(s) interviewed.

4. Procedures and Policies for Coverage of Wounded and Injured Personnel -- Medical Facilities

A. The governing concerns for news media coverage of wounded and injured personnel are patient welfare, patient privacy and next of kin considerations. Subject to the guidelines, CCP visits to medical care facilities during and after outbreak of hostilities are authorized. Public affairs escort is required.

B. Requests to visit medical care facilities will be coordinated by the JIBS in Riyadh and Doha, by PA escorts, or by component command PAOS.

C. Visits to medical care facilities are approved only with the permission of the facility commander. CCP visits must not interfere with medical treatment.

D. CCP members may visit those areas of a medical facility approved by the commander. Under no circumstances would CCP members be permitted into an operating room during operating procedures.

E. Permission to interview or photograph a patient will be granted only with the consent of the attending physician and facility commander and the patient’s oral or written informed consent, witnessed by the PAO escort. “Informed consent” means that the patient understands that his/her picture and comments are being collected for news media purposes and that they may appear nationwide in news media reports.

5. Interviews with U.S.-held POWs or returning U.S. POWs

A. Media interviews and news conference with U.S.-held prisoners of war and other detained personnel will not be granted unless authorized by OASD(PA).

B. Interviews and news conferences with returned U.S. prisoners of war and other detained personnel will not be granted unless authorized by OASD(PA). Press contact will take place only after returning personnel receive medical evaluation and appropriate briefings and debriefings. For PA purposes, returning personnel will be briefed before meeting with the press and advised to consider operational security, the welfare of other returned personnel and their families, and the safety of other detained personnel when making their remarks.
6. IF YOU ARE NOT SURE WHETHER THE ACTION THAT YOU TAKE WILL JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND POTENTIALLY COST AMERICAN LIVES, CONSULT WITH YOUR ESCORT OFFICER PRIOR TO TAKING ACTION.
CERTIFY THAT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT:

DATE: ____________________

NAME: ____________________

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: ____________________

ADDRESS: ____________________

PHONE: ____________________

PASSPORT NUMBER AND COUNTRY OF ISSUE:

VISA EXPIRATION: ____________________

ADDRESS IN COUNTRY:

PHONE: ____________________

(JIB PERSONNEL WILL CHECK PICTURE ID'S)

I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO COMPLY WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE MEDIA GUIDELINES AND ANY ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS THAT MY MEDIA ESCORT MAY PROVIDE:

SIGNATURE: ____________________

BADGE NUMBER: ____________________

COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL
MEDIA GROUND RULES FORM (12/90)
OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) IS A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY MILITARY OPERATION AND IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE CASE OF THE CCPs BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL. AN OPSEC COMPROMISE COULD ALERT FORCES HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AN IMPENDING U.S. MILITARY OPERATION AND COULD THEREBY JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF U.S. FORCES. THEREFORE, ALL CONCERNED MUST STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE "NEED-TO-KNOW" POLICY. INDIVIDUALS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH CCP OPERATIONS SHOULD NOT BE INFORMED WHEN CCPs ARE ACTIVATED. THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES SHOULD BE ADHERED TO BY ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN CCP OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AS WELL AS CIVILIAN NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

- UPON RECEIVING NOTIFICATION THAT THE CCPs HAVE BEEN ACTIVATED, HAVE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO TELL YOUR FRIENDS AND CO-WORKERS ABOUT YOUR ABSENCE.

- HAVE PRE-ARRANGEMENTS MADE THAT WILL ALLOW YOU TO DISAPPEAR WITHOUT AROUSING SUSPICION AND WITHOUT CREATING ANY SIGNIFICANT DISTURBANCE IN YOUR WORK.

- THINK HARD ABOUT THINGS YOU DO OR SAY THAT MIGHT BE OUT OF THE ORDINARY OR GIVE INDICATIONS/SIGNALS THAT YOU ARE DOING SOMETHING UNUSUAL. COULD A GOOD REPORTER/INVESTIGATOR DETERMINE THAT SOMETHING UNUSUAL IS GOING ON?

- HAVE YOUR EQUIPMENT, CLOTHING, AND OTHER MATERIAL NEEDED FOR THE DEPLOYMENT READY TO GO, BUT NOT IN A PLACE THAT YOUR GETTING TO IT OR ITS ABSENCE WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS.

- DRIVE YOURSELF TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA, TAKE A CAB OR HAVE THE POOL COORDINATOR DROP YOU OFF.

- KEEP THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE BEEN CALLED AWAY ON THE POOL A SECRET. THE LIVES OF U.S. SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN DEPEND ON YOUR ABILITY TO DO THIS.

- FOLLOW THE GROUND RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN YOU BY YOUR PAO ESCORT.

DON'T

- INADVERTENTLY TALK ABOUT ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR CALL-UP, OR THE ASSEMBLY AREA.

- LET THE EQUIPMENT YOU TAKE WITH YOU GIVE AWAY THAT THE CCPs HAVE BEEN ACTIVATED.

- STORE YOUR EQUIPMENT OPENLY WHERE ITS ABSENCE WILL BE OBVIOUS OR
WHERE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET WITHOUT ATTRACTING ATTENTION.

- HAVE A FRIEND TAKE YOU TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA.

- CALL ANYONE.

- NOTIFY YOUR BUREAU THAT THE CCPS HAVE BEEN ACTIVATED.

2. THE ABOVE GUIDELINES ARE NOT ALL INCLUSIVE. THEY ARE OFFERED IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING SIMPLE RULES TO INCREASE SECURITY AWARENESS. THE LIVES OF THOUSANDS OF U.S. AND ALLIED SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN DEPEND ON THE COOPERATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL OPERATIONS.
ALERT PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL ACTIVATION


POOL COORDINATORS, AND BY EXTENSION, CCP MEMBERS, WILL NOT BE TOLD IF THE ACTIVATION IS AN "EXERCISE" OF THE CCPs OR AN ACTUAL "ALERT" OF THE CCPs.

CCP MEMBERS NEED TO REPORT TO THE PRE-DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA DRESSED FOR DEPLOYMENT AND WITH THE APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

ALL INVOLVED WITH THE ACTIVATION OF THE CCPs NEED TO REMAIN CALM AND UNEXCITED. VOICE INFLECTION, NERVOUS BEHAVIOR, ETC., ARE ALL INDICATORS THAT SOMETHING EXTRAORDINARY IS UNDERWAY AND COULD ALERT FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. FORCES THAT OPERATIONS ARE IMMINENT.
ESSENTIAL ITEMS FOR POOL MEMBERS

DURING CCP DEPLOYMENTS, POOL MEMBERS WILL EXPERIENCE THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE TROOPS. WE WILL PROVIDE PURELY MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS WEB BELTS, CANTEENS, FLAK VESTS, CHEMICAL SUITS, GAS MASKS, ETC. POOL MEMBERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REST OF THEIR EQUIPMENT - PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL.

CLOTHING -- CLOTHING MADE OF POLYESTER OR DOUBLE-KNIT MATERIALS SHOULD NOT BE WORN. THEY TEAR EASILY, DO NOT BREATHE WELL, AND CATCH FIRE EASILY.

-- BOOTS - RECOMMEND BROKEN-IN, LIGHTWEIGHT HIKING BOOTS, WITH SOLES THAT WON'T SLIP ON THE WET DECK OF A SHIP OR AIRCRAFT. MEDIUM OR HIGH- TOP BOOTS PROVIDE BOTH ANKLE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION FROM SCORPIONS, ROCKS, SNAKES, ETC.

-- SOCKS - RECOMMEND AT LEAST FOUR PAIR.

-- TROUSERS - SHOULD BE OF HEAVY COTTON TWILL OR DENIM MATERIAL WHICH WILL NOT TEAR EASILY.

-- SHIRTS - SHOULD BE OF SIMILAR MATERIAL AND LONG-SLEEVED FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SUN AND INSECT BITES.

-- SWEATERS - RECOMMEND DARK, WOOL SWEATER FOR COLD NIGHTS.

-- HATS - RECOMMEND A "FLOPPY" WIDE-BRIMMED, SAND COLORED HAT.

TOILETRIES -- TOWEL, SOAP, SHAVING EQUIPMENT, TOOTH BRUSH, TOOTHPASTE, TOILET PAPER, SUNSCREEN, INSECT REPELLENT, SKIN LOTION, LIP BALM, BAND-AIDS, ASPIRIN, ETC.

MEDICATION -- CCP MEMBERS SHOULD BRING WITH THEM ANY REQUIRED PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION. RECOMMEND AGAINST ASSIGNING NEWS MEDIA AS CCP MEMBERS WHOSE CONDITION COULD BECOME SERIOUS OR LIFE-THREATENING IF THEIR MEDICATION IS NOT ADMINISTERED PROPERLY OR IS NOT AVAILABLE. MEDICATION WILL NOT BE RESUPPLIED.

SHOTS -- CCP MEMBERS SHOULD HAVE CURRENT IMMUNIZATIONS FOR WORLDWIDE TRAVEL. GAMMA GLOBULIN, FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HEPATITIS, IS ESPECIALLY RECOMMENDED.

PASSPORT -- A VALID U.S. PASSPORT AND CURRENT VISA IS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT.

MISCELLANEOUS -- CCP MEMBERS MUST PROVIDE AND CARRY ANY PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES THEY DEEM NECESSARY (I.E., PROTECTIVE CASES FOR EQUIPMENT, BATTERIES, CABLES, CONVERTERS, TAPES, ETC). A SMALL PEN KNIFE AND FLASHLIGHT (WITH RED LENS) WILL BE USEFUL IN THE FIELD.
MONEY -- CCP MEMBERS SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM OF $100 TO COVER MINIMAL EXPENSES (SUCH AS MESSING ABOARD SHIP, INCIDENTALS, ETC.). CASH IS A MUST AS THERE MAY NOT BE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO CASH MONEY ORDERS OR TRAVELER'S CHECKS.
PHYSICAL CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STRESS. CCP MEMBERS WILL EXPERIENCE VERY DEMANDING PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS WHILE DEPLOYED WITH OPERATING FORCES. A PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST WILL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE JIB DIRECTOR TO HELP DETERMINE THE PHYSICAL FITNESS OF COMBAT CORRESPONDENTS. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY PARTICIPATING NEWS MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS TO SCREEN THE INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVES WHOM THEY ASSIGN TO THE CCPs. THOSE NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO, AFTER ASSIGNMENT TO A CCP AND DEPLOYMENT TO OPERATIONAL UNITS, ARE DETERMINED UNABLE, PHYSICALLY AND/OR MENTALLY, TO FUNCTION IN THE STRESSFUL ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH THEY WILL BE EXPOSED, WILL BE EVACUATED. CONSEQUENTLY, VALUABLE POOL REPORTS COULD BE FORFEITED IF A CCP MEMBER IS UNABLE TO REMAIN WITH THE OPERATING FORCES.

PREGNANCY. THE POTENTIAL RISK TO A PREGNANT WOMAN OPERATING AS A CCP MEMBER IS GREAT. PROPER OBSTETRIC CARE, IF NEEDED, WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE IN THE FIELD.
MEMORANDUM

January 7, 1991

To:        Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps

From:      Pete Williams

Re: Ground rules and flight for auxiliary staff
          in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

Thank you for attending our meeting last Friday. As in the past, your comments were
valuable and appreciated. I believe we share the common goal of working out a system under
which information will be disseminated to the American people without jeopardizing operations
or endangering the lives of U.S. service members.

The overwhelming view expressed during the meeting was that the ground rules should be
brief and clear in order to be effective. We agree and have boiled them down to one page
(copy attached). We adopted the suggestion many of you made and now list only that
information which should not be revealed. The second page of the attachment contains
guidelines to follow which are intended to meet the specific operational environment of the
Persian Gulf.

You will note that we eliminated many of the earlier proposed ground rules, especially
those which would have failed the critical test for combat ground rules: whether that
information would jeopardize the operation, endanger friendly forces, or be of use to the
enemy. As many of you noted, while every military operation has unique characteristics, past
experience shows that reporters understand their heavy responsibility in covering combat. In
the end, it is that professionalism upon which we will depend.

I am still working with the Saudi embassy to obtain visas for your people who may go
over on the Air Force plane. As soon as I have the details worked out, I will pass them to
you. In the mean time, we need the information listed below as soon as possible for the staff
members you wish to send on the C-141.

a. Name of news organization

b. Full billing address of news organization

c. Fax number of news organization

d. Full name(s) of representative(s)

e. Social security number(s)
f. Passport number(s)

g. Names and home, business, cellular (if applicable) and beeper phone numbers of two people (primary and backup) who will serve as your points of contact for activation of the flight

This information can be faxed to us at (703) 693-6853, attention: LCDR Gregg Hartung. You may verify receipt by calling (703) 693-1074.

Thank you for your continuing suggestions and comments.
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
GROUND RULES

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-board equipment, or supplies (e.g. artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," multi-battalion," multi-division," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information or photography, including aerial and satellite pictures, that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined, "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless DoD has publicly acknowledged participation by that country.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security and lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air ops angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

You must remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting. They are intended to facilitate movement, ensure safety, and protect operational security.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for explanation of pool operations.

2. If you are unable to withstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with the forward-deployed forces, you will be medically evacuated out of the area.

3. Security at the source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to security review prior to release to determine if they contain information that would jeopardize an operation or the security of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will not be withheld just because it is embarrassing or contains criticism. The public affairs officer on the scene will conduct the security review. However, if a conflict arises, the product will be expeditiously sent to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director. If no agreement can be reached, the product will be expeditiously forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified through the JIB Dhahran.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

Subject: Media Airlift for Operation DESERT SHIELD

1. In response to your request,* the Joint Staff will do
everything possible to meet the 12-24 hour movement window from
Andrews AFB. We advise the following:

a. Cost of transporting the media pool personnel, who we
understand will be on invitational travel orders, will be
borne by the parent organizations of the representatives.
One-way fare will be approximately $911.00 per person, plus a
$1.65 charge for each pound of baggage over 70 pounds.

b. Given the scope of airlift missions underway at this time
and through 31 January 1991, we would prefer not to plan
specifically for use of only a C-141 type aircraft to support
this requirement. We have notified USTRANSCOM and when
hostilities begin, will pass the requirement to them for
execution. Based on all operational constraints, USTRANSCOM
will provide airlift support with available resources. This
could mean that the 130 media representatives could be moved
on another type of dedicated aircraft.

2. The Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), Directorate for
Logistics (J-4), will notify you of aircraft availability times.
We request that you do preliminary work to identify
representatives and certify their eligibility and billing
information in advance. Prior coordination with the passenger
terminal at Andrews is also advisable.

3. Our point of contact is the Mobility Desk representative,
J4-LRC, extension 70744.

Michael P. C. Carns
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:
* ASD(PA) memorandum, undated, "Media Airlift for Operation DESERT
SHIELD"
January 15, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEFS OF THE PENTAGON PRESS CORPS

SUBJ: Ground rules and guidelines for correspondents in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

Last Monday, I sent you copies of our revised ground rules for press coverage of combat operations and guidelines for correspondents that are intended to meet the specific operational environment of the Persian Gulf. I appreciate the comments I have received from some of you and understand your concerns, particularly with respect to security review and pooling in general. I also was pleased by the general consensus that the one-page version of the ground rules was an improvement.

The ground rules have been reviewed and approved with no major changes. They became effective today.

The guidelines were revised to comply with operational concerns in Saudi Arabia. We added a provision that media representatives will not be permitted to carry weapons, clarified the escort requirement, added a sentence giving medical personnel the authority to determine media guidelines at medical facilities, and deleted the sentence saying the JIB in Dhahran would verify next of kin notification on casualties. We also added a section, in response to many questions, which clarifies our policy on unilateral media coverage of the forward areas during the period when the pools are operational.

Last Saturday, I conducted a conference call with the majority of the CENTCOM public affairs officers, who were gathered in Riyadh and Dhahran, and discussed the ground rules and guidelines to ensure that the intent and purpose of the ground rules is clearly understood.

I appreciate your counsel and remain ready to discuss any problems or questions you may have.

Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
GROUND RULES

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize
operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons
systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including
amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be
described in general terms such as "company-size," multibattalion," multidivision," "naval task force," and
"carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such
as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed
or cancelled operations.

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces
or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as
follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that
the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi
Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries
outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that
country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical
deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit
designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception,
targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue
operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and
evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such
as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that
information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM.
Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

3. Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Larry King Live

CNN TV

January 31, 1991 9PM

Washington, D.C.

Interview with Pete Williams

PETE WILLIAMS: What we've decided to do is not discuss downed U.S. aircraft while an active search and rescue is underway. We're not trying to hide the number of U.S. aircraft that go down, that number will come out. We're simply saying that when aircraft go down there's a search and rescue mission underway, we're not going to discuss it, we're not going to answer questions about it, we're not going to publicly announce it.

ANNONCER: Welcome to Larry King Live. Tonight, Pete Williams, standing on the front lines between the Pentagon and the press. The Defense spokesman walks a thin line, giving out war news while protecting military secrets.

Now, here's Larry King.

LARRY KING: Good evening from Washington.

A couple of quick notes. We will have, as we have had the last two weeks, a Saturday night edition of Larry King Live this week, a special edition of Larry.
Larry King Live this Saturday night. We'll be here, we hope that you're here with us.

Here's a quote. "We just cannot discuss that. I cannot tell you why we don't discuss that, because then I would be discussing it."

That sums up the present frustrations of Pentagon briefings, reporters hungry for war news, monitored at every turn, censors, military faced with the difficult challenge of giving up data reports from the front while restricting off limits information.

Standing between it all is Pete Williams, who by the way, is the author of that quote, and is our special guest for the full hour of Larry King Live tonight, and we'll be taking your calls for Pete, your chance to find out who this person is.

He is -- were you Congressman Cheney's aide?

WILLIAMS: I was. I had the privilege of working for him for three years in the House of Representatives when he was Congressman Dick Cheney of Wyoming. I did press for him and a little legislative work too.

KING: You're a Wyominger?

WILLIAMS: Wyomingite, yes.

KING: Oh, Wyomingite.

WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. Casper, Wyoming is my home town. The fact that he's from Wyoming and I'm from Wyoming is strictly
coincidental.

KING: Yes. Were you in the media?

WILLIAMS: I was. I worked as a reporter, radio and television reporter out there for about fifteen years.

KING: Radio stations in Wyoming, television in Wyoming?

WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. Right. Both.

KING: Call me Larry, Pete.

WILLIAMS: Excuse me. All right, I will.

KING: Why did you leave the exalted realm and world of the camera and the microphone for press?

WILLIAMS: Well, I enjoyed it very much. I enjoyed my time in Wyoming. I got to go out and interview people who climbed mountains and who were doing water policy and all those things that you do when you're covering a state like Wyoming. But I got an opportunity to go to work for Dick Cheney in the House of Representatives, and I respect him greatly, respected him greatly then. I'd covered him when I was a reporter, got to know him then and watch him at work. And he did me the great honor of inviting me to come to work for him, so I did. I never imagined, of course, then that I'd be doing what I'm doing now.

KING: Did he ask you to come when he was elected, or was it sometime after?

WILLIAMS: No, it was sometime after. It was in 1986 that I went to work for him and he was elected before that.
KING: Did you like the other side? Did you like the handing out the information when you used to be the person asking the question?

WILLIAMS: Oh yeah. It's a lot easier to ask the questions. Not as well as you do, but in general you don't have to know the answer when you ask the question. You're trying to find out information.

I enjoyed it a great deal. I loved being a reporter, but I'm enjoying what I'm doing right now.

KING: Yeah, but a lot of reporters would have difficulty doing what you're doing right now. They don't want to be -- for want of a better term, I don't mean this derogatorily, but flack...

WILLIAMS: Sure.

KING: The spokesperson.

WILLIAMS: When I first started the job and I was writing my first press release, it's a great mental adjustment because I was writing this release about some statement that Congressman Cheney had made and, you know, you sit there and you want to say, [uses a reporters-type voice] however, critics of the Cheney plans say... So you have to fight that for awhile. But if you respect the guy you work for and if you believe in him then it's -- the transition is much easier.

KING: Are -- what are your self rules, or were your self rules in the post in Congress, before we move to this current post?
For example, you couldn't have agreed with everything that the Congressman agreed with.

WILLIAMS: Right.

KING: How do you draw a kind of line?

WILLIAMS: Well, you have to say that you're -- do you fundamentally believe in what he stands for. If you don't, then to sit there day, after day, after day and write press releases about what he says, and what he believes, and what he's doing, if you don't believe in that then you have to do something else. You don't expect to agree with everything.

He was very good about allowing the staff to debate with him, but then once he made up his mind then we marched forward. And I think that's fair.

KING: So on a moral issue you'd have to leave.

WILLIAMS: You would if you didn't agree with what your boss was doing. I don't see how you could live with yourself and get up and look at yourself in the mirror.

KING: If you didn't support this war you couldn't do this job.

WILLIAMS: That's right.

KING: When he became Secretary of Defense did you automatically know, he's going to ask me to be the spokesperson?

WILLIAMS: No. It all happened very fast. As you recall the -- well, to show you how keyed I was in on the decision, I had
gone to a meeting with a colleague of mine, Patty Howe, and had come back and there was a big stack -- it was a Friday and I was walking back to the office thinking, I might cut out of here a little early today, and I came back and there was a big stack of messages in my "In" box, and I thought, what's going on for a Friday afternoon? I walk in with TV sets on CNN and there is Bernie Shaw with a picture of my boss over his shoulder. And I thought, what's this all about? And the President comes out and says I'm going to ask Dick Cheney to be my new Secretary of Defense.

   KING: That's when you knew.

   WILLIAMS: That's when I found out. I learned it...

   KING: Did you then say, I'm going to be spokesperson?

   WILLIAMS: No, no. I had no idea. I was trying to get through the next hour and deal with all those phone calls.

   KING: Did you expect to be, though?

   WILLIAMS: No, it never entered my mind. And then he said the next day that it was his intention to do that, and of course, I was delighted.

   KING: By the way, why did you want that? Some might have said, you know, I don't need to be the spokesperson for the Department of Defense. It's got more minuses than pluses. We could make a case of the minuses.

   [Laughter]

   WILLIAMS: Well, I viewed it as a great challenge and an
enormous opportunity to learn. I mean, I'm from Casper, Wyoming and I just in the past year have been able to tag along with the Secretary of Defense when he met Mikhail Gorbachev and Lech Walesa, and those are things that we don't do much in Natrona County, so those were great opportunities for me.

KING: All right. Are you his spokesperson, or the Department of Defense's spokesperson?

WILLIAMS: That's an excellent question. I think you're both. I think I have an obligation to, when I'm in the briefing room I'm speaking for the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corp. I work very closely with them. I'm not out there on my own just sort of making it up as I go. I work very closely with the variable spokesmen that those military departments have. I'm also the spokesman for Dick Cheney. I think you have to have a very close relationship with your boss.

I wasn't in nobody's Rolodex around Washington as a great military expert. I wasn't invited to be like Anthony Cordesman coming on television to do military analysis back in those days. You have to have, I think, a very close relationship with your boss. If I didn't, I couldn't be doing this job. But there is a dual role.

KING: Are you married?

WILLIAMS: No, sir.

KING: Would it be tough on a marriage?
KING: Would it be tough on a marriage?

WILLIAMS: Well right now I think it would be, yes.

KING: What makes a good spokesperson?

WILLIAMS: Well, I guess you might be a better judge of that -- to answer that question than I am.

KING: Well, I think you're very good. I watch you, you're appealing to listen to, I find myself feeling informed. But I don't know if you're good, for example, maybe you're lying.

[Laughter]

WILLIAMS: In other words, I have a lot of credibility, is what you're saying.

KING: You have built credibility through personality and through an apparent knowledge of subject.

WILLIAMS: Well, I think I...

KING: So I would say you're doing a great job. Is that the role, do to a great job for the Department of Defense? Then you're filling the role.

WILLIAMS: Well, I guess -- let me answer it this way. I'll tell you what I think the job of the Assistant Secretary -- what I do for public affairs. I think I'm sort of in the middle. I try to anticipate questions that reporters are going to ask. I go around and ask people in the Department questions and elicit answers from them, and then I can build up knowledge about something and be able to answer questions about that. I'm sort of -- I'm sort of a
wholesaler of...

KING: ...then have to regard you as straight.

WILLIAMS: You have -- when you go up there's a standard routine. When you go up for Senate confirmation for this job, they say, would you ever lie for your country. And of course there's only one answer to that question, and the answer is no. You have to maintain credibility, you have to be believable. The Department puts a lot of trust in you, and you have to treat that very seriously.

KING: You may say no comment, but you will not tell a knowing lie.

WILLIAMS: Absolutely. If you don't know, you say I don't know.

KING: Might you also go to bat at times for the press? Might you say, General, Mr. Secretary, I think you ought to tell them this?

WILLIAMS: Sure. You are an advocate at times. I mean, that's -- if you look up the definition of a job in the Defense Department Handbook, in the DOD regulations, it says that you are the public affairs advisor for the Department. Now, I happen to work with two people who don't need a lot of public affairs advice. I've said before that some press secretaries spend as much time explaining the press to their boss as they do explaining their boss to the press. Now, I don't have that problem with Dick Cheney. He
worked in the White House, he was Chief of Staff, he's been in Congress. He knows how it works. Colin Powell also has had a lot of political experience. I don't need to give them that advice. But they're thinking about a lot of other things sometimes, and I think sometimes I weigh in with that. And I find a very receptive audience in both of those two people.

KING: Pete Williams is our guest. There's lots more. He's our guest for the full hour. We'll be including your -- your chance, hey, it's a live briefing with him, with you, after this. Don't go away.

* * *

KING: Our guest is the chief Pentagon spokesperson, Pete Williams. Actually, his title is, what, Assistant Secretary...

WILLIAMS: For public affairs.

KING: Of Defense for Public Affairs.

We'll be going to calls in a little while, but we have on the phone Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas, one of the more powerful and more articulate members of the United States Senate, who has a -- I hear her smiling -- who has a question for Pete.

NANCY KASSEBAUM: Nancy? Thank you for calling.

SENATOR NANCY KASSEBAUM: Hi, Larry. Well, it's a pleasure.

First, I'd just like to say to Pete Williams I think he's done an outstanding job as a spokesman for the Pentagon.
WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Secondly, I want to take this opportunity to call in because I've had a number of calls from Kansas, and I'm sure you've heard from a number of people too, regarding mail to the troops. There seems to be a growing question, and I realize that in many ways it's the biggest operation we've ever had regarding mail overseas. But I wondered if you could just on -- while you're there where many can hear you around the country, talk a bit about what's happening with mail to the troops.

KING: Is there a problem, Nancy?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well, I'm just beginning to get a lot of calls from family members who say that they're not receiving mail.

KING: Okay. Pete?

WILLIAMS: Well, it's always a problem when you have troops on the move. In the early days of Operation Desert Shield, when forces were still coming into the country it took a little while for the mail delivery system just to catch up to the huge size of this deployment. It was an astonishingly large deployment in a very short period of time. And it did take awhile for the mail to catch up. And then I think we were doing pretty well. Now some of the forces are moving, some of them are moving way forward, way out in the vast desert, and it's a little hard for the mail to catch up to them sometimes.
It's a problem we're aware of, it's one that we're working on, and it's obviously very important to the troops and very important to their families. But as they move there are going to be some lags there getting mail to them.

KING: I believe in World War 2 it was like three months. What is the time now?

WILLIAMS: I haven't heard of what it is for a forward unit, but of course, then every single piece of mail was censored. I mean, you know, you talk to people in World War 2 who got letters that had little holes in them -- and we're not doing that now, of course.

KING: Thanks, Nancy.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well thank you. Let me just say on censoring, though, aren't all packages run through to be checked?

WILLIAMS: They're run through metal detectors, they're screened like that, but in World War 2, literally, I've heard that every single piece of mail was opened and read, and that would slow it down considerably.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well thank you. I know it means a lot just to have reassurance on that.

WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Thanks, Larry.

KING: Thank you. Thanks, Nancy. That was Senator Kassebaum of Kansas.
What do you like least about this?
WILLIAMS: About this job?
KING: This past two weeks.
WILLIAMS: Well, on a personal. I guess I would say, people say the first casualty of war is truth. I think the first casualty is sleep. I think that's a problem for everybody. But I'm not whining about that. The people in the Arabian Peninsula have it a lot worse than I do, and I'm aware of that.

I think that when you have casualties that's always the hardest part of the job, dealing with that. I think that's very difficult.

KING: In this open openness, in this CNN syndrome where everything is there, is it hard to have secrets anymore? I mean, I would imagine the old kind of briefing was, hey Pete, go out and tell them that doesn't happen anymore. I don't want to guess at that. But that ain't the way it is.

WILLIAMS: Well, I think, first of all, no, it's not hard to have secrets anymore. There are still future plans that we never discuss, they've never discussed that before in military operations. Reporters understand that, and there's a whole big, long list of future plans that haven't been discussed...

KING: Do you know?
WILLIAMS: I don't know them all. I think, you know...

KING: Are you on a need-to-know?
WILLIAMS: All people in the Department are on the need-to-know basis. I don't need to know all the future operations for the next several weeks. I can't discuss them anyway. So I'm not concerned about that. But there's a great deal of secret, classified information. I think most people that work in the Defense Department that I know of are extremely sensitive about keeping their country secrets, and...

KING: Do you like the fact that the public can see briefings?

WILLIAMS: Oh sure, I think that's important. I think briefings are frustrating for reporters, but we do the best we can. A good reporter wants to have it all layed out, a good reporter wants to know all the aspects, and then he wants to chose the facts that he use to tell the story just as he were covering a trial or piecing together a story about something that happened with the police department. I mean, you want to know all the facts that you can get your hands on. And the essence of journalism is the process of selection. And you want as many facts as you can, select the facts to tell your story.

In military operation it's more complicated. There's a time lag, there's some things that we simply can't say because they would jeopardize an operation or the lives of the troops. And so reporters go to briefings, I think they find it a little frustrating that we can't answer all their questions. But yes, I think it's
fine that briefings, that people can see them. I think they help them to learn about it.

KING: How do you control getting testy?

[Laughter]

WILLIAMS: Well...

KING: I mean, do you have little things you do?

WILLIAMS: I hope I'm not testy. I try not to...

KING: But I assume you want to.

WILLIAMS: Well, no. I don't think so. I mean, I think that -- my own view of it is someone watching a briefing at home. Well first of all, there's a sort of double dynamic. There's the people in the briefing room with you that you see day-in, day-out that work in the Pentagon, people like...

KING: That sit in the same place...

WILLIAMS: ...like Wolf Blitzer from CNN.

The Pentagon is unique among defense establishments in the world in that reporters come to work and work in the Pentagon. Now, they don't go to work in the British Ministry of Defense, and they don't go to work in the ministry in the Soviet Union, they don't do that in Italy. Our reporters have a building pass, they get the run of the halls, just as I do. I mean, they can't go into the classified parts, obviously. But they work just down the hall from me. I see these people all the time. I see them in the morning when I go to get a cup of coffee, I see them at night as I walk
out...

KING: ...go on stage together.

WILLIAMS: And then we all go on stage together.

KING: And we watch.

WILLIAMS: And that's right. And so these are people that I work with all the time, and I know them, and you know, these are professionals that cover the Department of Defense, and they are good folks, and they have to ask hard questions. That's their job. I have a different job. I took an oath of office for a different purpose right now, so I have a different job. But we understand that.

So I guess that I sympathize with what they're going through, I know why they ask those questions, and I think that gives you a certain amount of -- I mean, that's their jobs, they have to ask those questions.

KING: And do you think they respect you, they know that that's your job?

WILLIAMS: Well, whether they respect me or not, they know that's my job.

KING: Pete Williams is our guest. Back with more, then your phone calls. This is Larry King Live.

* * *

KING: Our guest is Pete Williams. We're going to start including your phone calls. A couple of quick things, then we'll
intersperse other questions.

As a person from the press, the word censorship has to be the most distasteful word to you. A press guy hates it.

WILLIAMS: Sure.

KING: How do you justify it?

WILLIAMS: Well, there isn't any censorship right now. I mean, I guess I can understand reporters wanting to call it censorship, because what's happening right now bugs them, but let me just explain what happens. First of all, there've been 500, let's say roughly, press reports, written reports filed from the pools that are covering the military operation right now, since this operation began, since Operation Desert Storm started, since we went to the pools. What the rules say is that we hope reporters will not disclose information that can jeopardize a future operation of the lives of the troops, future troop movement, specific tactics, supplies on hand, operational weaknesses. Now, there really isn't any quibbling on the ground rules. Same ground rules we had in Vietnam, World War 2, Korea.

In World War 2 there was censorship, full-field censorship. You filed for a public affairs officer, he took his pen out and said okay, Larry, you can't say this, you can't say this, thanks very much. And that was that. In this operation a public affairs guy will look at it right there in the field and say, I wish you wouldn't say this.
KING: Just wish.

WILLIAMS: This would violate ground rule number nine. And he says, gee, I've read ground rule number nine. I disagree with you. It goes to the press center in Saudi Arabia right with everything else, it isn't held up. They have the same discussion there. If they can't agree they call me.

We've reviewed three such reports and we've let them all go. But if we disagreed, I still can't stop them. If it were a piece from Charles Jaco of CNN, I would call CNN on the phone and say please don't do this. But the ultimate decision rests with the news organization.

KING: Can you pull Jaco's credentials?

WILLIAMS: We could, we could. But that...

KING: But you wouldn't.

WILLIAMS: But that's the same -- the same wasn't true in Vietnam.

KING: In World War 2, though, and Vietnam, Ernie Pyle could walk up to any guy in a foxhole and say, what do you think of this. You can't do that here.

WILLIAMS: Well, those were operations that went on for many years. This one is not going to. In Vietnam you had a mature -- what military people call a mature theatre of operations. There was a well established system of helicopters, you could -- you know, you could get up in the morning, you could walk out to where the
helicopters were taking off, jump on one if there was space, go up to the front, spend a couple of days, and come back. It isn't like that. This is a vast desert, there isn't an intense ground activity...

KING: But what is your worry if a reporter, if Charles Jaco walked up to a guy in a tank and said how's things going? Why does that worry you?

WILLIAMS: It doesn't worry me, but the problem is how's he going to get there. What we've -- there's a thousand reporters right now in Saudi Arabia. They would all like to go up and talk to guys in tanks. It would overwhelm the operation. There isn't a way for them to get there and get back, so we've said we'll have small groups that file for the...

KING: Otherwise it would be non-manageable.

WILLIAMS: Absolutely.

KING: Okay. Anything -- any...

WILLIAMS: Not that want to manage the news, I just want...

[Confusion of voices]

WILLIAMS: ...logistically.

KING: Any word on the CBS guys?

WILLIAMS: Unfortunately no.

KING: Are you sending, are you trying all the time?

WILLIAMS: Well, CBS just today, in the past 24 hours, went up to where Bob Simon and his crew were last seen, talked to some
people there. We still don't know. We're trying to find out. It's a subject of great concern to us, of course.

KING: Are they guessing? I mean, would you guess if Iraq -- if Iraq has them wouldn't Iraq tell you they have them, or would you think normally you'd be told we have these people?

WILLIAMS: One would think so. I certainly would hope so, if they did.

KING: You have no idea.

WILLIAMS: No, we don't, unfortunately.

KING: Clearwater, Florida. We'll go to calls for Pete Williams. Hello.

MAN: Good evening, Larry.

KING: Hi.

MAN: Thank you very much.

KING: Sure.

MAN: Great job as always, particularly the Saturday shows. Very good.

KING: Thank you.

MAN: Mr. Williams.

WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

MAN: Wonderful job on TV.

WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.

MAN: And real good, the balance is wonderful. We're a military family, and my comment basically, you were transparently
honest and sincere, and I argue with civilians a lot. If you could just take a little more time to explain the why that you are saying this for security. My Dad was career military and we understand, but I think civilians don't understand range and bearing on a missile thing, or why you can't forecast your future intentions. I think the military person, or family says gee, I know that reason, but I think civilians, or at least people I argue with locally say you guys are lying, you guys are...

KING: Okay, we only got 30 seconds to the break.

WILLIAMS: It's a good point, and we have to try to do that harder. When we say, I'm sorry I can't answer your question, I think we should always say why that is, explain -- perhaps I did say that, you know, that if we discuss it then I'd be discussing it. Maybe the quote you opened with wasn't the best way to say it. But I think if we explained it a little more people will understand.

KING: World around town, you want to run for the Senate in Wyoming?

[Laughter]

WILLIAMS: I'm just trying to get through this operation.

KING: I'm giving you word around town.

WILLIAMS: I see.

KING: Want to be a network anchor? Word around town.

[Laughter]

WILLIAMS: Well, I'm very flattered.
KING: You can deny.

WILLIAMS: I never thought when I was working for Congressman Cheney in the House that I would be doing what I'm doing now. I'm not very good at predicting what's going to happen in the future.

KING: We'll be back with Pete Williams. We'll have an update on the news as well. Don't go away.

* * *

KING: Our special guest for the full hour tonight is Pete Williams. He's the chief spokesperson for the Pentagon. You have seen him worldwide daily at the Pentagon briefings.

Back to your calls. Sierra Vista, California. Hello.

MAN: Yeah. I'd like to talk to Mr. Williams. I'd like to ask him does he really believe he can be objective when in reality the people who pay his salary are -- of course have vested interest on what information does and does not go out?

KING: We're the people who pay his salary, but go ahead.

WILLIAMS: Well, that's true. I guess nobody thinks about this job in just the short term. I mean, I don't think any good person doing what I'm doing goes out and says how can I get through Friday. Your long term credibility is at stake. You asked earlier about am I a spokesman for the Department of Defense, and I said, in part yes. I mean, the credibility of the military is on the line here, people are watching very closely. Suddenly the whole world is
watching what the U.S. military is up to.

We have to be very careful with what we say, that's why we want to get -- we don't want to get ahead of ourselves and get out and speculate about something before we can prove it. So we have to be careful to be able to stand behind what we say.

KING: Also, you have no prerequisite to go on. There's never been a war televised and there's never been a briefing, I think, telecast to where the enemy can watch the telecast.

WILLIAMS: I guess that's true. I hadn't thought about that, but I suppose...

KING: Sure. There's no one ever been in your position.

WILLIAMS: Right. But whether the other side is watching or not, I mean, even in the old days they would still have learned about it so you -- the kind of information that you put out I don't think can change. But the point is, I mean, you have to be very careful not to mislead people in your briefings because that could come back to haunt you, and then if you were caught in that a couple of times intentionally, then who's going to believe you after that? So credibility is at stake.

KING: I heard you today explaining bodies will come back next week, they will go to Dover, Delaware as an embarkation point and then go out to wherever the families wish them to. And there will be special ceremonies as the families wish, private or public, or whatever. But the press is not allowed at Dover, and your point
was it's just...

WILLIAMS: It's a transit point.

KING: Transit point. So what if they question were asked, so what, why can't we go to the transit point?

WILLIAMS: Well, I guess it's a matter of being sensitive to family concerns. There may have been other transit points along the way. Dover, Delaware has developed some sort of status beyond what I think it should be.

KING: That happened with the Marines...

WILLIAMS: Sure. And I understand that. But there are -- there may be transit points in Europe, as returning servicemen go through some point in Europe and they're changed to another plane. The same thing may happen at Dover. I mean, there really isn't much to see there, and I think out of sensitivity to the families the coverage opportunities ought to be where the ceremonies are.

KING: But as a newsman you would also say, okay I understand that and I respect that, but why can't I go, why can't I do a mood piece?

WILLIAMS: Since -- I mean, there's nothing to see, really. I guess. And again...

KING: As a good reporter would say, let me determine.

WILLIAMS: Sure. I understand that.

KING: Is that hard for you, this call?

WILLIAMS: Well, to some extent, but I have to step in -- I
have to be an intermediary for the sensitivities of the military too. It wouldn't be fair to families to say okay, you decide whether you want the ceremony -- or the transit at Dover, Delaware called, and we'll just let everybody call you and ask.

KING: Do you think the only point is to tweak the interest, or is the Pentagon fearing that seeing this in one mass will turn public opinion against?

WILLIAMS: No. I don't think public opinion is so fragile that if casualties come back it's instantly going to dissolve. I think people understand that there may be some casualties involved.

KING: Corpus Christi, Texas, for Pete Williams. He is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Hello.

WOMAN: Thank you, Mr. King. Yes, Mr. Williams, I want to thank you for a job well done, but what I would like to ask you is what is the government's opinion, behind-the-scenes opinion about Peter Arnett and CNN being used as a propaganda machine for Hussein?

WILLIAMS: Well, as many people have said before Peter Arnett is a very experienced, outstanding reporter.

KING: Pulitzer Prize winner.

WILLIAMS: Absolutely.

There is a historical value to having a reporter there, because after it's all over, and after he's out he can report freely on what he's seen. At the same time -- I feel also that I -- that people in my position, or at least I feel that I shouldn't -- I'm
not the government press critic, I'm the spokesman for the Defense Department. I'll leave the press criticism to Tom Shales and writers like him.

I do think, though, that when this is all over there are some very serious questions that we're going to have to ask each other. We're going to have to look again at our policy. We've changed our policy as we go.

In the early stages of this operation, when Iraq took American prisoners of war, they showed them on their television and people said why don't you bomb their television antennae and take them off the air so they can't do that anymore. Of course, as you know, we did that. Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to transmit those pictures to other countries where they could be picked up. They took him off the air of the Satellite Network, and then Peter Arnett and his crew bring in an uplink. And now the Iraqis again have the ability to get the message out.

I don't know what the Department ultimately thinks of that.

KING: Are you worried about the Iraqi message?

WILLIAMS: I'm not worried about the Iraqi message. I don't think the American people...

KING: How on earth could -- would anyone be worried about dissemination of -- why would that scare someone? Is Saddam going to come on suddenly and massive Americans are going to march for him? What is going to occur that's bad?
WILLIAMS: I don't think it's Americans that Saddam Hussein is trying to reach. I think he's still trying to reach an Arab audience, a Moslem audience. And propaganda is an important tool in war time, and I think, you know, it's another thing in his favor.

KING: Well, wear another hat.

WILLIAMS: Sure.

KING: If you were the editor of the Washington Post, where Mr. Shales works, or you ran CBS, or NBC, or whatever, and you could get an uplink, wouldn't you have an uplink? And if you could have an Arnett, wouldn't you have him there?

WILLIAMS: I suppose I would. I would hope that the news organizations that use their reports -- I mean, I think CNN's been very careful to label them as propaganda, as indeed they are, and we all understand that. I'll tell you that I try very hard, as I say, not to be the government press critic. I raise it as a troubling issue but I don't have the answer for you on whether it should be done or not.

KING: When it troubles you, though, do you come down on the side of it's still better to get the information than not get it? Or do you come down on the side of this case it's better not to? Personally. As a personal -- non-governmental hat.

WILLIAMS: Well, it's hard for me to do that since it's hard...

KING: I know. But you wear a lot of hats. You were a
journalist, so you know how everybody feels in this situation.

WILLIAMS: Sure. I can understand CNN's desire. I guess I wish there were other reporters there as well, but it's a difficult time. I understand why CNN has Peter Arnett there. I think we all understand the difficulties under which he works and the censorship that's imposed upon him. I just hope that news organizations that use his reports edit them and think about them very carefully because they have to realize what it is, it's -- all he is allowed to put out is propaganda.

KING: Okay. Is this war, in your opinion, as a journalist and as a spokesperson, going as well as it would seem to be going, based on today's briefings?

WILLIAMS: Yes, I think so. I think we in the Department have to be careful -- I mean, in the early stages I think we were all pleased at how well everything was working. We had a lot of new weapons that had never been tested before, people said these new smart weapons won't work. Well, they did, they worked exceptionally well. But we were the ones out there -- you know, people always accuse the people in Washington of spend control. This was euphoria control. I mean, we were out there earlier saying don't -- you know know, this operation's going to go on for awhile, it appears to be going well now, but you know, a lot of things can happen, let's not get out of control in what we say. But objectively, in terms of what we had hoped to accomplish, and where we are now, I don't think
you'd deny that it's going well.

KING: How do you feel about what's happened to you?

WILLIAMS: Well, a little overwhelmed. It happened so fast.

KING: How do you feel? I mean, suddenly, suddenly you
were an internationally known person.

WILLIAMS: I guess the way I think of it and the way to
manage it is it's not me, it's -- the person who's internationally
known is the spokesman for the Pentagon.

KING: Who happens to be you.

WILLIAMS: Who happens to be me right now. But nobody...

KING: You can divorce that?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think you have to, to some extent. But
the other part of it is that it insulates you -- it just all
happened so fast that you don't spend a lot of time gazing out the
window at the River Entrance of the Pentagon thinking, hmm, you
know. It just happens. One thing comes after the other, the hours
tick by, and you just sort of...

KING: Have you had a dinner date since this started?

WILLIAMS: One.

KING: Gone to a movie?

WILLIAMS: No.

KING: Was it a casual dinner or a war-type dinner?

WILLIAMS: It was a quick dinner. [Laughter]

KING: Our guest is Pete Williams. Back with more phone
calls on Larry King Live, right after this.

* * *

KING: Let's go back to your calls for Pete Williams. Tunsten, California. Hello.

WOMAN: Yes. My question is for Mr. Williams. Throughout a lot of the Pentagon briefings a great deal of discussion has gone on regarding the image you project. A lot of the general consensus among the people is that sometimes you are a little rude and curt. Is that the real Pete Williams, or is that a throwback of your position?

WILLIAMS: Well, I try not to be rude or curt. There are sometimes when we can't answer questions as much as we'd like to, we can't go into any more detail, and we're trying to get to as many questioners in the Pentagon briefing room as we can. And perhaps -- I catch myself perhaps going to quickly. I understand what you're saying, but I try very hard not to be rude.


MAN: Yes. My question is why can't the Defense Department go ahead and release videotape much faster than it's actually doing?

WILLIAMS: Well, there are two sorts of videotape that are -- well, I guess there are three. There's the videotape that reporters themselves are making, and that's -- I don't believe there's any problem there, that's coming out very quickly. The second thing is what's called combat camera. They are teams that
have been around since the 2nd World War, since movie cameras, and they go with units, they are a part of units, they are fundamentally not public affairs people, they are there to document for the U.S. military what their units do. However, when combat camera tape comes to the Pentagon we review it to see if we can release some of it, and we have been doing that. And the third kind of videotape is that made on the airplanes and the helicopters, it's called gun camera tape. And -- or gun camera -- I guess it is videotape. And some of that has been released as well.

I think we need to do better at releasing more of that. It gives a good idea of the capability of the systems. And we're sensitive to that and we're trying to release more of it.

KING: Do you get to talk to General Schwarzkopf?

WILLIAMS: I try not to bug General Schwarzkopf very much. He's a busy guy. I talk to Colin Powell frequently. When he first came to the Pentagon he put a little phone on your desk that you could press the button and it rings on his desk. He's very good, he's very accessible about that. So if I have a question I can either ask someone in his staff or I can call him directly.

KING: Jean Kirkpatrick said the other night on this program that Colin Powell's the best known General this country's ever had because -- I guess we could make a case for that, right? With television more people would know that face than any other General we've ever had.
WILLIAMS: It could well be. He's a very capable man. He deserves the reputation.

KING: Our guest is Pete Williams, and we go to Roanoke. Hello.

WOMAN: Yes. I have been very bothered the last couple of weeks about the censorship. Why has the military not imposed stricter censorship toward journalists when they are interviewing the bomber pilots who are coming back. They are providing their names on television as well as in some cases the bases that they are from.

WILLIAMS: Well, the -- in the early days of this operation we pulled the guidance off the shelf for this theater of operations. It was when there were just dozens of people in the area instead of hundreds of thousands. And the old guidance said you shouldn't use servicemen's names. And you probably remember the flap about that in the early days. With thousands of people there that clearly makes no sense anymore. It's been done before. The Air Force view is that it's not a problem. If service men and women want their names used it's a choice that they make.

KING: And what would the enemy do with the name anyway?

WILLIAMS: Exactly.

KING: We'll be right back with Pete Williams on Larry King Live.

* * *

* * *
KING: Our guest is Pete Williams.

This just in. U.S. troops in the Gulf can be required to take unapproved drugs for protection against biological and germ warfare, a judge ruled late Thursday. The court declines to second-guess the Defense Department's decisions regarding how to equip and prepare the Armed Forces for war with Iraq. U.S. District Judge Stanley Harris wrote there was a class action suit arguing that the troops should be warned of the risk of side effects from unapproved drugs.

WILLIAMS: That court decision, I just heard about it today too. They're not unapproved drugs in the sense that they've never been used before. What this is is, let's say that drug like valium has been used for years, it's well known to be safe when properly administered. It can be a drug that's effective in someone who's been exposed to a chemical warfare agent, a chemical weapon. And it's not feasible to say, you know, you're lying there, you're suffering the effects of a chemical weapon and we say, well we'd love to give you this injection but first sign here. So what we've asked is a waiver from that. We've gotten it from the Food and Drug Administration. That was challenged in court and the court said that's okay.

KING: Athens, Georgia for Pete Williams. Hello.

MAN: Larry, I was just calling to ask Pete, today in the news there was something that came out that the Pentagon was going
to cut back on the amount of information that was given to the press. My question to Pete is how they going to cut back on something that they've already not given out enough information as it is?

KING: What are you cutting back on? How do you go back from zero?

WILLIAMS: Well, I'll tell you what the specific one is. It's a very specific case. And it's the case of pilots whose aircraft is shot down over hostile territory. Now, in Vietnam we did not give out every day a summary of aircraft that had been shot down in the previous 24 hours. It was done periodically. I talked to my predecessor, Jerry Freidheim who had that job during Vietnam and he told me that it came out every couple of days, once a week, something like that. In this operation we've been saying so far every time a plane goes down. We got thinking that that's not a wise thing to do. We're telling the other side that there's a plane down, and we would hope that a search and rescue operation from the United States can get to that downed pilot before Iraq does.

KING: So what do we say?

WILLIAMS: So we're simply saying now that we're going to wait -- if there's a search and rescue operation we're going to wait until it's over before we acknowledge that an aircraft has gone down, or if they find the guy and get him out.

KING: Are we going to say twelve planes went out and only
eleven came back?

WILLIAMS: No. We're just going to say the current number of U.S. aircraft down is twelve, and then when we're through with the search and rescue operation we'll raise it to thirteen. It's -- in today you asked about instant communication. The reason for this is let's say you're a pilot and you engage another plane. You don't know for sure whether you shot it down sometimes. You're flying away, you get out of there, you think you hit it but you don't know whether it went down. If we acknowledge 18 hours later that a U.S. plane is down, then they're going to start looking. We want to get to those folks first.

KING: How are you dealing with all the rumors that we killed our own Marines today, that this was friendly fire?

WILLIAMS: That's -- well, friendly fire is something that happens in combat, especially when you have a close...

KING: In all wars.

WILLIAMS: Absolutely. When you have a close fight where units are very close together, I think, again, you asked about credibility before, I think it's important for us to say only what we know and not what don't know. We have no conclusive evidence whether those light-armored vehicles were shot by hostile fire or enemy fire -- or friendly fire.

KING: At this minute you don't know.

WILLIAMS: Exactly.
KING: Will you know?

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know. Depending on how the light armored vehicles were damaged it may be impossible to tell. Sometimes military commanders will tell you they can't tell. In Panama, we did acknowledge some casualties from friendly fire.

KING: We'll be back with our remaining moments with Pete Williams. Where has the hour gone? Don't go away.

* * *

KING: Our guest is Pete Williams. The caller is from Arlington, Virginia.

MAN: Hello. I was in a command post last week when CNN broadcast live from Turkey that the first 40 F-16s were now taking off for Iraq. The pilots in the command post went ballistic that CNN was providing this information live to Iraq.

KING: How did we know it?

MAN: For Pete Williams, did this live coverage endanger Air Force pilots' lives in that mission?

WILLIAMS: Well, it's difficult to prevent reporters from reporting what they can see with their own eyes. I would think not. There were so many planes flying at that point in the operation that I would say probably not.

KING: What's the toughest part of all of this? Reporting casualties?

WILLIAMS: Sure. I mean, personally the hardest part is.
The other part of it is this such an immense operation that just trying to keep yourself informed is a full-time job too.

KING: When you get up in the morning do you shower, get dressed and go right in, or do you call in?

WILLIAMS: No, I go right in.

KING: You go right in.

WILLIAMS: I go right in and call on my cellular phone as I'm driving in on Rock Creek Parkway.

KING: And you are in at what time?

WILLIAMS: Oh, it varies. I'm not the earliest arriver in the whole world. It depends. It varies. During this operation I've been in at four in the morning, six in the morning, eight in the morning. Today I came in at 8:30. So it varies.

KING: And Colin Powell, as a military guy, is easy to work with.

WILLIAMS: Oh yes, sir. He's very accessible and very forthcoming.

KING: And of course Dick Cheney. How's he holding up under all this?

WILLIAMS: He's terrific at his job, yes.

KING: Likes it better than Congress?

WILLIAMS: I think he probably does. He misses Congress, but I think he's enjoying what he's doing.

KING: Is Colin Powell going to be a Five Star General?
WILLIAMS: The last Five Star General was a General from World War 2. That would be a congressional decision. I doubt that would happen.

KING: Doubt it?

WILLIAMS: Well, you know, the talked about a fifth star for Admiral Crowe when he retired from the Joint Chiefs. It would be an exceptional thing. He would certainly deserve it but I don't know that it would be done.

KING: And therefore exception for Schwarzkopf too.

WILLIAMS: Yes. Yeah. But I don't know.

KING: They're not given out lightly.

WILLIAMS: No, they're not. The last ones were from World War 2.

KING: Thanks, Pete.

WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. A pleasure. Thank you very much.

KING: What's with the sir?

WILLIAMS: I'm sorry. It's a habit.

KING: Pete Williams.
SUBJECT: Media Pools and Allegations of Press Censorship in Operation Desert Storm

QUESTION: What are your views on news media complaints that the Department of Defense has imposed unnecessary restrictions on news media organizations by requiring them to gather news as members of media pools, as opposed to letting them operate independently, and by unnecessarily censoring news reports coming out of Saudi Arabia?

ANSWER: Last August, after Operation Desert Shield was announced, the government of Saudi Arabia declined to grant visas to western reporters interested in covering the deployment of U.S. troops. After some discussions with the Saudis, we were able to get their permission for the DoD National Media Pool to go to Saudi Arabia. This gave American news media their first access to Operation Desert Shield, and eventually led to access for other western reporters.

The DoD National Media Pool operation lasted for about two weeks before being disbanded. By then, the United States Central Command was able to establish a Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran that could assist news media organizations in covering the deployment of U.S. and other coalition forces into the Gulf area.

Since the commencement of hostilities, Central Command has adopted a system of correspondent pools to permit reporting from forward units and from air bases and combat ships. Pools are necessary because U.S. ground troops are widely dispersed, because of anticipated fast-moving ground operations, and because of the problems that would be encountered in filing news reports from desert locations on the battlefield.

Today, there are over 1,000 news media representatives there, and the only practical way for them to get to forward locations is for the U.S. military to take them there as members of pools that represent the wire services as well as the other print and broadcast media. We also assist them in getting their pool reports back to the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran for local distribution and transmission to parent news organizations. Until the conflict reaches a stage where we can establish independent news media coverage, we believe pooling offers the media the best opportunity for covering the battlefield and getting their stories back to the United States in a timely manner.

Despite some complaints about the pool operation, I would like to point out that there also are some reporters who have said that the system is working better than they thought it would. So, the negative reports are not unanimous. I might also add that on the morning after hostilities began, the Department of Defense transported 126 news media representatives to Saudi Arabia to assist media organizations in enhancing their ability to cover combat operations. This was done in response to requests from the media over the period of several months prior to hostilities and reflects efforts we have made to help the media.

With respect to the complaints about censorship, I must point out that the Department of Defense has no authority to censor news media reports in the strict sense of the word. However, to prevent the publication or broadcast of information or images that could jeopardize operations or endanger the lives of our troops, we established ground rules and a system of ground rule review for the combat pools. This process is designed to give public
affairs officers the opportunity to look at written news stories, photographs and videotape and make reporters aware of any inadvertent violations of ground rules prior to publication or broadcast.

If a reporter disagrees with the public affairs officers' assessment, the matter is quickly referred to the chief of the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran for his review. If he cannot resolve the issue, it is expeditiously referred to the Pentagon. If the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs agrees that the contested information requires protection, he confers with the correspondent's Washington bureau chief in an effort to make the government's case. However, if the news organization concerned insists on publishing or broadcasting the contested information, the government has no power to stop it. Therefore, the Department of Defense is not censoring news reports in the way they were censored during World War II and in Korea, where the military did have the power to excise material from news reports.

Since the security review process was implemented in Operation Desert Storm, well over 500 pool reports have been filed. Only three them were sent to the Pentagon for arbitration, and all three were decided in favor of public release.

SOURCE: OASD(PA): DPL
Col P. Alexandrakos
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Rev 2/2/91
TO: OSG (PA) STORM CELL (ATTN: LCCOR W. KORACH)  
SUBJ: 19 PAGES OF SUMMARY POOL REPORTS RELEASED (13 VIOL) 
INFO: LTCOL OLSN, DEPUTY PAO, CCPA TAMPA (CCPA INPU) 

4 Feb 91. Lawrence Jolidon, USA Today. A piece about a town in northern Saudi Arabia. "Shoppers in the uniforms of the U.S.A., France and Egypt, and a few non-descript foreign civilians, wide in and out of the stores in groups searching for the best buys in radios, watches, souvenirs of Saudi Arabia and winter clothes to help ward off the chilly desert nights...Telephone booths are also popular...The town's few restaurants and hotels are doing rush business...The town has a raffish reputation among the U.S. military. Periodically, Military Police vehicles with machine guns mounted on the roof patrol the streets and parking area, warning the troops not to stay too long. On recent days the town has been declared off-limits to some U.S. units...Some U.S. officers said the town even has a drug trade.

4 Feb 91. Michael Hedges, The Washington Times. This is a detailed piece covering the air/ground war plans. I quote extensively from the piece. "With the 1st Infantry Division - In an effort to destroy 50 percent of the Iraqi forces facing U.S. divisions planning to attack, the Air Force will shift a high percentage of its planes here for three or four days of saturation just before an offensive begins. 'We would use all the aircraft in the inventory for the preparatory bombing,' said Air Force Major Bob Baltzer, 41 of Dayton, Ohio. 'The goal is to attrite his military power down to half of what it is before the bombardment.' The day before a ground offensive should be a hell of explosives and steel for Iraqi troops in trenches and bunkers according to officers who have worked on the bombing plan. 'The B-52's will fly over from high altitude straight and level and aim for a specific area, more like a harassment or zone type of bombing,' Major Baltzer said. 'We'll role the F-15E's in at night,' he said. The F-15E Eagles have sophisticated radar and optics for finding and hitting targets in the dark. 'During the day the F-16's will attack with precision bombing,' Major Baltzer said. 'They can put a 2,000 pound bomb on a bunker. They will be hitting specific gun emplacements and command centers.' 'Finally, if the Iraqis try to shift any armored vehicles to an area where they think an attack will occur the Air Force will strike them with A-10 Warthogs, specifically designed as a tank killer,' Major Baltzer said...Major Baltzer was confident the Air Force could accomplish a great deal with the bombing of Iraqi positions. He said that by using satellite images, fly-overs by reconnaissance planes and other types of intelligence the military had identified a high percentage of the targets pilots will try to destroy. 'We have a very good idea of what the targets are, he said. Asked if the Air Force feared a last minute shifting of assets by the Iraqis before the battle started, he said, 'They have demonstrated that they plan to stay in fixed positions and try to ride out the bombing.' Once the attack is underway, the Air Force role switches to one of close support for columns of tanks and armored vehicles...Air Force (spotters) will travel with each
a missile close to the USS NICHOLAS, the CO is quoted as saying his initial thoughts were that he came to close to MISSOURI's gunfire. Other possibilities given: stray surface-to-air missile (hostile or friendly), artillery type unguided rocket or a near miss from a anti-ship missile. The story concludes with a short section about USS NICHOLAS spotting and destroying a mine.

10 Feb 91, Thomas Ferraro, UPI. SECDEF and GEN Powell were so busy getting updated on war that they canceled a date with eight "Scud Busters." Eight soldiers received Army commendation medals for their roles in shooting Scud missiles out of the skies Jan. 21. The eight had waited nearly two hours for Cheney and Powell before going ahead with the ceremony without them.

9 Feb 91, Anthony G. Miller, UPI. Staff Judge Advocate story set in leathernack country. In normal times the JAG would give legal advice only to the Commanding General and his staff. But this is war, and with miles between the troops and any other lawyer the JAG fills out the wills, straightens out family support snags and reviews appeals of Article 15 punishment meted out to Marines before forwarding them to the commanding general for this verdict. The reporter notes that unlike Vietnam the Gulf war is virtually drug and alcohol free. Saudi officially bans alcohol in accord with Islamic law.

9 Feb 91, Stewart Powell, Hearst Newspapers. Patriot antimissile system is steadily being refined to destroy incoming Scud-B warheads and missile bodies. Lt.Col Smith said his battalion has been adjusting the system's computer software since the outset of DESERT STORM to insure destruction of the entire 37 foot Scud missile. Military officers declined to discuss the numbers of Patriots fired by the battalion in order to knock down 17 Scud missiles fired at Riyadh.

10 Feb 91, Peter Gosselin, Boston Globe. When members of Charlie Co. 3rd Battalion launched their first Patriot missile against an Iraqi Scud headed for Riyadh, it was the first time most had ever heard the Patriot in action. At between $500,000 and $1,000,000 per missile, the missile is fired infrequently in training sessions.

9 Feb 91, Peter Katel, Newsweek. "Patriot crews don't reach for their chem-warfare suit and masks when the Scud alert sounds. 'We do the job of engaging, and if we get indications that it is a chemical attack we figure we have time. The first thing is to get the mission going.'"

9 Feb 91, Carol Morello, Philadelphia Enquirer. A story about two National Guardsmen, both Muslims, who oppose the war and have been assigned to rear areas as clerk typists. "It's not for the cause of God, and I can't be a part of it," said Specialist Cheveron Scott to his commander. Private Jerry Walker said "I don't want to have to put my weapon on another day longer than I have to." Both see the war as a war of aggression, not self defense and feel their Islamic beliefs and the war don't fit together. Walker and Scott both love Saudi Arabia and its "public displays of piety," but admit that
provide a "seed corn" for a future Iraqi air force. While the admiral and his intelligence officers grapple with the big picture, sailors such as Bosun Mate First Class Michael Wold are more concerned with other aspects of the threat. Wold is an EOD technician who blows up floating mines when they are discovered. He says this is easy. Wold and other EOD specialists are looking forward to tackling the unexploded ordinance and land mines in Kuwait after the war. The way they look at it, each land mine they will work is one that didn't kill a soldier or Marine.

653 11 Feb 91, David Alexander, UPI: Pilots flying F-16s against Iraqi positions agree that there is still a lot of work to be done. "There is a lot to target up there," said LtCol Billy Diehl, commander of an F-16 squadron. "It's definitely a target rich environment." They're seeing a lot of tanks and artillery pieces. LtCol Mike Scott said he saw a lot of vehicles and armor during his flight over Iraqi Positions. He said a group of bombers had gone in before and he could see fires on the ground from the attack. "We saw some more fires after we left and so I suspect that we hit something," he said. Another pilot said despite the pounding the Iraqis are taking, they're still firing anti-aircraft guns and missiles. "We're definitely attriting the guys. We're taking out a bunch of stuff out there," said Lt Gary Cooper. "It's just a matter of when the higher ups say its now time to go to the other war."

654 11 Feb 91, Christine Hauser, UPI. (Pool notes taken from a press briefing given aboard the MSO USS Adroit). The notes cover a wide variety of subjects concerning the job of a MSO and lots of interviews with crew members. The crew members interviewed discussed their jobs, talked about their own feelings about the war and staged a mine sweeping demonstration for the press. Some also complained about the low combat pay and slow mail. The crew made sure the reporter knew how important mine sweeping was to the safety of the other Navy vessels.

655 The U. S. Marines are on the move as they push closer to Saudi Arabia. Marines still insist "the mission is defensive" until Mr. Bush gives a ground war order. Though Marines are within two hours drive of Kuwait City, few expect any thrust to be quick or simple. "We expect resistance, we expect casualties. A lot depends on the intensity of our artillery and air support. Some Iraqis will fight, some won't. "I'm pretending this is a baby Iraqi," said a young marine as he vigorously slits a sandbag outside his tent on Monday. He was quick to explain to a passing newsman that he was only kidding.

656 Carol Morello, Philadelphia Inquirer. COL Robert Flowers, Commander, 20th Engineer Brigade, makes a series of visits to his battalions to deliver pep talks to his soldier and to explain their mission. He spoke to them of fear, as if it were a more formidable enemy than the Iraqis. "There are going to be some very tough days ahead for you," he told them. "I won't sugarcoat it. I expect you to deal with
Northeastern Saudi Arabia hit a border police outpost with mortars and light missiles and took eight rounds of artillery fire Monday night. Iraqi artillery strikes have been notoriously inaccurate, perhaps due to a lack of solid intelligence of U.S. positions. The Marines are arrayed along the Kuwaiti frontier and prepared for a ground thrust into the Iraqi-occupied emirate.

842 19 Feb 91. Denis D. Gray. Associated Press. 2nd Marine Division near the Kuwaiti border. While many criticize restrictive coverage and censorship clamped upon them by the U.S. military, few journalists with combat troops like the U.S. Marines have been hear to complain that they are not getting enough taste of life in the field. Only a very small percentage of the 1,300 journalists in Saudi Arabia assigned to so-called “combat pools” and those who end up with the Marines here get more than they bargained for. The nearly dozen journalists with the 2nd Marine Division, now poised near the Kuwaiti border, dig their own foxholes, fill sandbags and help pitch their “fly tent,” a tarpaulin shelter exposed on two sides to rain and the bitterly cold winter wind. Some prefer to sleep in surrounding holes rather than jammed cheek-by-jowl inside. “The Marines have a certain attitude that we should be pulling our own weight out here. Sometimes they forget we are civilians and didn’t go through Marine boot camp,” said Linda Patillo, a correspondent for ABC television. She’s averaged one hot shower a week, washes her hair with cold water out of a canteen and asks male tent-mates to close their eyes when she changes clothes. The Public Affairs Office, which handles the journalists, appears to be at the end of the already spartan Marine supply line. And some journalists are sent out from the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, which organizes the pools, lacking basic necessities like sleeping bags, canteens, ponchos and even “flak jackets,” which protect every Marine against shrapnel. While preferring open coverage to pools, Patillo said she saw some advantage to the latter. “By being forced to stay out in the field we have gained valuable insight into the men who may have to fight this war. You don’t get that living in a hotel and flying out here in a helicopter to spend a few hours on the ground.”

843 19 Feb 91. Susan Sachs, Newsday and Colin Neckerson. Boston Globe. Near the Kuwait Border units of the heavily-armoured Tiger Brigade, an Army force attached to the Marines for Operation Desert Storm, directed missile and mortar fire at an abandoned border checkpoint that in the past has been used as an Iraqi forward observation post. Lt. Col Jan Huly said the Iraqis were sending out foot patrols in an apparent attempt to glean intelligence on Marine positions.

844 19 Feb 91. Jeff Franks, Reuters. U.S. Marines near the Iraqi border. Iraqi forces fired eight artillery rounds Monday night at 2nd Marine Division units near the Kuwaiti border, but the shells landed harmlessly in the desert, a Marine spokesman said. “It was harassment and interdiction fire. There were no casualties,” said Lt. Col. Jan Huly at a briefing Tuesday.

south of Baghdad. For reasons that have puzzled the allied military planners, Iraq has left its own southern border to the south of its capital relatively undefended. The significance is that Iraqi military commanders now have painful confirmation of their earlier suspicions that the allies had moved some significant ground forces at least temporarily to a possible jumping off point far to the west of Iraq's massed tanks and minefields inside Kuwait.

**VIOLATION:** Rule 6 giving specific information on tactical deployments and disposition that jeopardizes operational security.

846 19 Feb 91. Michael Reages, The Washington Times. Skirmishes along the Saudi-Iraq border illustrate the growing contact between opposite armies here as evidence grows that a ground offensive may be imminent. Shortly after midnight Iraqis started sending small patrols his way. The Iraqis would appear to move forward as if to surrender then disappear down small defiles, popping up at other locations. After giving the enemy ample time to surrender, he ordered machine guns to fire on them. I waited to fire at the patrol in hopes of gathering prisoners who could provide the division with undated intelligence. "I tell my soldiers that every live prisoner is worth 100 dead guys," he said.

847 19 Feb 91. Peter Copeland, Scripps Howard. Northern Logistics Base, Saudi Arabia. During every day of ground combat the heavy Army units bundled into the VII Corps are expected to use 300 to 500 semi-trailers just for ammunition, and the big M1-A1 tanks need to be refueled every five hours to 10 hours. The troops handle nearly 600 different types of ammunition.

848 18 Feb 91. Dave Hendrickson, Milwaukee Journal. Eleven men and eight women of the 13th Evacuation Hospital share a GP large tent they call the "jungle." The tent had been subdivided with ponchos, blankets, green plastic sheets, all strung on clothesline. Everything from meals to showers is communal. "You get to know people during a two-week AT, but not like this." Everyone who lives in the "jungle" works in the operating room.

**VIOLATION:** The current concern is about the vaccinations everyone has been receiving for anthrax, one of the biological weapons that Iraq has threatened to use. Spec. 4 Bonnie Johnson, an operating-room tech from Cumberland, Wis. said the anthrax vaccinations reminded her of the experience with Agent Orange in Vietnam, in which a supposedly harmless chemical later was found to cause a variety of health problems.

849 19 Feb 91. Gary Regenstreif, Reuters. "It appears as though they have given up the border. We were expecting to fight across it. It makes it easy for us when we roll across." US Army forces seized an Iraqi observation post abandoned after being bombed by allied aircraft. The post was bombed by US Air Force aircraft with what is believed to have been 500 lb bombs. Troops found AK-47 shell casings, old clothing and documents. No soldiers were found. A decrease in the number of Iraqi patrols slipping into Saudi Arabia has been noticed, with less movement north of the border. "It was nice. I have never been across the border before."
NOTE TO COL. MULVEY OR COL. LEHIGLE FROM JOE ABLIGHT: I AM PRETTY SURE THIS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE GROUNDS RULES AS THEY ARE WRITTEN DOWN.

THE FACT THAT MILITARY IS IN THIS AREA IS NO LONGER A SECRET BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS PRINT AND TV REPORTS, BUT IF YOU ARE FEELING YOUR BUT THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED, YOU HAVE MY PERMISSION TO SPIKE IT.

POOL REPORT - ABLIGHT - ARTILLERY - REPORT EIGHT - PAGE 6

WRITTEN SATURDAY FOR 10: AM PICKUP, FEB 1.

THIS CONTAINS NEWS.

BY JOSEPH ABLIGHT, Cox Newspapers

WITH U.S. FORCES, THE UNITED STATES ON MONDAY FIRED HUNDREDS OF ARTILLERY ROUNDS INTO SOUTHERN IRAQ INTO A WEAKLY DEFENDED STRETCH OF DESERT SOUTH OF BAGHDAD.

THE BARRAGE WAS A RESULT OF THE MUSLIM GAMING EARLY MORNING HOURS, FORCING THE IRAQ MILITARY COMMAND TO ESTIMATE ON SHORT NOTICE WHETHER THIS IS AN ALLIED FEINT OR A PRELUDE TO AN Actual ATTACK ON THIS REGION.

AMERICAN ARTILLERY OFFICERS SAID IRAQI OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE FIGURING OUT FROM THE NEAR SIMULTANEOUS APPEARANCE OF MUZZLE FLASHERS ON THE HORIZON THAT THIS WAS AN ARTILLERY STRIKE AND NOT ANOTHER AIR RAID. AND IN THE FIRM DESERT SAND, THE SHELLS DIG solluNGER BURROWS THAT ARE UNMISTAKABLE SIGNATURES OF GROUND FIRED WEAPONS.

THE ARTILLERY ROUNDS FELL INTO A ZONE OF TARGETS WEST OF THE TRIANGULAR JUNCTION OF THE KUWAIT, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA. FOR MONTHS, IRAQ HAS CONCENTRATED VIRTUALLY ALL OF ITS NUMBER OF MILLION TOUSSAND ARTILLERY GUNS IN AND AROUND KUWAIT ITSELF, FOR ATTACKS THAT HAVE PULLED THE ALLIED MILITARY PLANNERS: IRAQ HAS LEFT ITS OWN SOUTHERN ALGERIA TO THE SOUTH OF CAPITAL RELATIVELY UNDEFENDED.

AMERICAN ARMY ARTILLERY MEN-SAID MINUTES AFTER FIRING THEIR ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE MILLIMETER howitzer INTO IRAQ THAT THEY BLEIR SHOTS WOULD HASTEN THE END OF THEIR SERVICE IN SAUDI ARABIA.

“AFTER TIME,” SAID SGT. GERALD MOORE, TWENTY-TWO OF PERRY, FLORIDA, A BUNKER. “FINALLY WE ARE NOT JUST SITTING AROUND WRITING, I AM NOT SAVING WE ARE WARMONGERS OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. DON’T WANT TO SEE ANYONE KILLED OR NOTHING, BUT WE CAME HERE FOR MISSION.”

MORE
THE ARTILLERY STRIKES FELL INTO A VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED STRETCH OF IRAQI DESERT. THE TERRAIN IS GENTLE, ROLLING DESERT WHOSE SURFACE IS HARD ENOUGH FOR RAPID MOVEMENT BY TANKS, TRUCKS, AND EVEN FOUR WHEEL DRIVE CIVILIAN STATION WAGONS. IN SOME PLACES THERE ARE RIDGE LINES RESEMBLING LOW BUTTES IN EASTERN UTAH.

THE ARTILLERY BOUNDS JOINED ON OR NARrow IRAQI AIR DEFENSE POSITIONS AND FACILITATED A CONCENTRATED AIR STRIKE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ BY AMERICAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. THE GUNSHIPS WERE THOUGHT TO BE HITTING SCATTERED ARMED UNITS THAT ARE DEPLOYED IN RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBERS SOME THIRTY MILES BACK FROM THE IRAQI-SAUDI FRONTIER.

Given the over-all scale of the Allied Air Campaigns, Monday's air attack was a pinprick. The significance is that Iraqi military commanders have painful confirmation of their earlier suspicions that the Allies had moved some significant ground force at least temporarily to a possible jumping off point far to the west of the old site near the Iraqi-British border.

THE ARTILLERY BOUNDS LANDED EAST AND SOUTHEAST OF BAGHDAD AND SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF THE IRAQI HIGHWAY THAT RUNS ALONG THE EUPHRATES RIVER AND HAS BEEN USED TO CARRY SUPPLIES FROM FACTORIES NEAR BAGHDAD TO FRONTLINE IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT. THE NEAREST KUWAIT BORDER POST IS WAY NORTHERN MILES.

Major Bill Vockery, twenty-nine, of Richmond, Kentucky, the commander of one of the U.S. artillery batteries that fired one five-five caliber howitzers, said the artillery barrage into this part of Iraq is likely to put Iraqi military commander in a military quandary. "He's got to be getting kind of worried," said Vockery. He's got to be looking at it and saying, 'We've got all my armored forces down in Kuwait because of our air superiority. I can't get much forces over here right now."

Vockery said he understands the Iraqi positions in the area where the shells fell are mainly of "artizans and youngsters who never had a mission."
FEB EIGHTEEN

THE DILEMMA CONFRONTING SENIOR IRAQI COMMANDERS WAS SURROUNDING
BY THE REALIZATION THAT BY DAYLIGHT MONDAY, THE AMERICANS COULD
HAVE MOVED THEIR CANNONS FIFTY MILES IN ANY DIRECTION, MAKING ITS
EXACT POSITION A CONTINUING MYSTERY.

THE UNITED STATES CHOSE TO RISK ITS CANNONS SITTING QUIET DURING
WHILE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WERE MADE TO ARRANGE FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW
FROM KUWAIT. IF IRAQ REFUSED TO WITHDRAW, A GROUND OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD COST THOUSANDS MORE LIVES.

A GROUP OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS SPENT THE NIGHT WITH ONE OF THE AMERICAN CANNON BATTALIONS THAT FIRED INTO
THE STRATEGICALLY SENSITIVE IRAQI REGION.

THE CANON SHEETS SEEMED TO COUNTER (SPELLING) UNDERFOOT AS
THE HORIZON DREW NUMBER ONE MAN YANKED THE ROPE CALLED A
LANCET AND TRIGGERED AN EAR-PUNISHING EXPLOSION.

OFF TO THE NORTHWEST, A LINE OF FLAMES APPEARED ALONG THE
HORIZON AS IF TRAVELERS ON A PASSING CANNONプレゼント UNICORN., SECONDS LATER THE NOISE OF CANNONS SHATTERING GRIFFIN
IN RAPID SUCCESSION: THE FIRST KURDS OF HOWITZER FIRE WERE FOLLOWED
BY HUNDREDS OF SLOW MOVING ROCKETS FROM THE ARMY'S SHORT RANGE
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHING SYSTEM (MLRS) UNITS. THE MLRS SHOT LIKE FLAMING ROCKETS RISING SLOWLY AT ROUGHLY A FORTY-FIVE DEGREE ANGLE TO THE SKY. THEN DISAPPEARING FROM SIGHT.

SPECIALIST JASON WISE, TWENTY, OF RINGOLD, GEORGIA, SAID
WE ARE FINALLY DOING OUR JOB. WE ARE FINALLY FIRING ON THE ENEMY.
ASKED HOW HE WOULD FEEL IF HIS UNIT IS ORDERED TO GO INTO IRAQ AS
A PART OF A GROUND OFFENSIVE. WISE said: IF IT HAPPENS, WE ARE
GOING TO DO OUR JOB AND HOPE THERE IS NO CASUALTIES.

Sergeant Dennis Elliott, twenty-one, of Marion, North Carolina, SAID:
IT KNOCKS A LOT OF NERVES YOU WANT TO KNOW IF WE CAN
SETTLE THE SCORE WITH SADDAM.

ANOTHER SOLDIER WHO DECLINED TO BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME, SAID:
WHO WANTED TO SEE THE CANNONS PERFORM ITS MISSION. WORRIED AS IF A GROUND WAR COMES, SOME CIVILIANS CANNOT
BE CASUALTIES OF HIS CANNON SHELLS. HE SAID HE WAS GLAD HE HAD TRAINING BUT WISH HE COULD TREAT ALL WOUNDED CIVILIANS HE MIGHT ENCOUNTER IF HIS UNIT WOULD SEND INTO IRAQ OR KUWAIT.

Sergeant Carl Chatham, thirty-five, of Marshall, Texas, THE CHIEF OF THE FLIGHT MAN CREW THAT FIRED ONE HOWITZER, SAID:
WE HAVE BEEN TRAINING SINCE WE ARRIVED FIVE MONTHS AGO FOR THIS
MISSION. AS FAR AS I CAN TELL, THE MISSION WORKED WELL. IT WAS A
IMPROVEMENT FACTOR FOR TEAMWORK. WE HAD BEEN SITTING HERE ALL THIS
AND WE WOULDN'T DO ANYTHING.

STAFF SGT. SCOTT MICKLE, TWENTY ONE, OF BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN, SAID: IT WAS PRETTY EXCITING. IT WAS LIKE THE BEGINNING
OF THE END IN TERMS OF MY GOING HOME.

WEATHER: MONDAY MORNING CLEAR, WINDLESS
19 Feb 91, Joseph Albright, Cox Newspapers, with U.S. forces near the border. Reaction at the front to the Gorbachev Peace Initiative. A soldier who recently arrived from Germany describes his reaction "Honestly, what I felt was disappointment. I felt they had taken so much of my time, my family, all the loving things a person needs and I feel that we should at least go in there and kick somebody's ass for it. I wish it could be Saddam Hussein's."

Other soldiers were said to have other things to discuss at the chow hall including: a battalion commander who left his HUMVEE for an hour and had it stolen or soldiers gathering spare parts by stripping wrecked military vehicles along the supply route. The only hostilities around the unit for the day revolve around two soldiers, one of whom was a cook, almost getting into a ruckus in the mess tent over insults about a woman. Apparently the cook, carrying his spatula, and the other participant, had to be restrained.

19 Feb 91, Kifner, New York Times in Saudi Arabia with the 101st Airborne Division. After months of preparation many here are saying the long wait is nearly over. Skirmishes along the Saudi border have been picking up as reconnaissance parties probe for Iraqi strengths and weaknesses. It is said that the intricacies and contradictions of Middle East politics seem little-known to most of the troops, although "there seems little questioning of their mission." The story indicates that the main motivation, troops say over and over in interviews, is simply to get back home.

VIOLATION: Rule 6, listing of size of friendly force units, page 851/2; lists division's size as 17,000 soldiers, of whom 800 are women.

19 Feb 91, Mark Mooney, media outlet not listed, near the Northern Saudi Border. Description of a visit to the 18th Airborne Corps by Lt. Gen. Waller. General Waller, who is characterized as having "surprised President Bush at the outbreak of war by saying the Army would not be ready until mid-February," is quoted as saying during the visit "It doesn't appear that it's going to be long." The general is said to have dismissed suggestions that peace initiatives from Russia would affect his preparations for war. In arriving General Waller is said to have emerged from his helicopter "with a heavy, brass topped walking stick." General Waller is quoted as saying further, after noting that the mid-February date has passed, that "I've felt I've been right all along."

18 Feb 91, Laurenlee Jolidon, USA Today, with Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Description of Army Combat camp life. Since arriving the engineers are said to have formed a strong but unfamiliar bond—of paratroopers who haven't jumped in months, after having been "sent to a conflict where airborne missions are unlikely and available aircraft for training jumps scarce." Soldiers say they wouldn't want to jump here anyway—too many sharp rocks on and just below the surface. Mail is discussed—more mail is going out than coming in. The Army post office system changed the battalion's overseas mailing address when it moved north last month and no letters with the new address have reached them.
Nights are described as warmer than a few weeks ago, but still cold enough for sleeping bags or more. Army-issue bags are described as not warm enough, which has necessitated some soldiers sleeping in "body bags."

854 19 Feb 91, Carol Morello, Philadelphia Inquirer, with Army firefighters in northern Saudi Arabia, as seen through the eyes of unit members, including a married couple who were located near each other, but may not be long because the wife had to be removed from a combat area. As the couple prepare for separation "casual chat" is abandoned for serious talks and "death scenarios" in the event one is killed. An officer tells of writing a letter to his wife, which he mails to his father to give her, if he does not return home. He says "My fondest wish is that she never gets to read it. I want to go back and be able to destroy it."

855 17 Feb 91, Joseph Galloway, U.S. News and World Report, with the 24th Division, 91st Chemical Warfare Company. The people who reportedly know the most about "bugs and gas" are characterized as the ones worried the least about the agents. They indicate the U.S. is prepared for the threat but describe it as "a nuisance, something that might slow us down a bit to clean up our vehicles, but hardly more than that." In describing a company's capabilities a "secret weapon" is identified—a platoon of six state-of-the-art, German-made, M-93 Fox Amphibious Warfare vehicles. The German government is identified as having provided more than 60 of the vehicles to coalition forces. Crews for the vehicles say there's only one drawback to the FOX—it's totally "alien" and unrecognizable among tanks and such. The solution—flying of a big skull and crossbones flag from the vehicle.

VIOLATION: Rule 1, identification of specific numerical information on on-hand equipment. page 855/1. six FOX vehicles).
destroy the chemical agent (cyanide).

20 Feb 91

No date listed, Tim Collie, Tampa Tribune. Writer summary: Terrorist attacks against Patriot missile systems and other strategic targets are expected right before G-Day or soon afterwards. U.S. military intelligence experts believe that Iraqi and Palestinian commandos are already in Hafir Al Batin waiting and watching. This story is based largely on one (unidentified) source who is a key intelligence aide to military commanders. His views are based on intelligence shared among U.S. commanders. The source is further identified as being posted with a frontline unit. It is indicated that "military analysts believe that Iraqi spies are good enough to determine when G-Day will occur two or three days beforehand." Additional material is discussed about terrorist cells and "current thinking" about their activity in Saudi Arabia. The expertise of "the source" before ODS is identified as being in Soviet and Eastern European spy organizations. Iraqi special forces commandos are characterized as being trained as well as any Warsaw Pact force after having been hand-picked from Republican Guard units.

VIOLATION: Rule 3, by inference, through listing of specific location, Hafir Al Batin, and Patriot Batteries (see summary).

VIOLATION: Rule 5, providing information on results of intelligence collection activities.

873 20 Feb 91. Jane DeLynn, Mirabella. A visit to the 85th Evacuation hospital on an air base in Eastern Saudi Arabia lists shortages of equipment which are needed such as specific types of sutures. The unit is now getting lots of things they never thought they'd see such as bronchoscopes, monitors and updated suction equipment.

874 20 Feb 91. Jane DeLynn, Mirabella. 85th Evacuation Hospital leads the good life with a basketball court, volleyball court, horseshoe pitching area, and a place to show movies once or twice a week. One member of the group says "I wouldn't have missed this for the world. This is where it's happening. We're making history and I am proud as heck to be here."

875 20 Feb 91. Jan DeLynn, Mirabella. Only anti-depressants available at the 85th Evacuation Hospital are tricyclics such as Elavil. The generic form of the 70s favorite drug of choice, Valium, is available, but only for a few days supply. The pharmacy stock of medication is fairly typical for a combat hospital. Any drug can be ordered from the US but it may take 30 to 45 days to reach the hospital. Soldiers with personality disorder problems such as alcoholism are sometimes able to remain in theater by attending the AA meetings held several times a week on the air base while service members undergoing major depressions are sent back to the U.S.

876 20 Feb 91. Harvey Dickson, Boston Herald. Patient census of the 85th Evacuation Hospital has been reduced in part through the cancellation of elective surgery in anticipation of receiving casualties from ground combat. Troops moving farther north has also contributed to a 50 percent reduction in the number of patients visiting the facility each day. There are 375
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POOL REPORTS

882 21 Feb 91, Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, in the Northern Arabian Gulf aboard carrier AMERICA. If a ground war begins, A6-E aircraft will start flying close air support missions for the first time and pilots admit "It's going to be dangerous." "It's not one pass, haul ass" says a pilot "you're making multiple runs and when you make multiple passes you get predictable." Targets will shift from pre-selected items to roving quarry picked on the spot by Marines, and new threats, in the form of small arms fire, shoulder-fired missiles and a "terrifying prospect—friendly fire," will have to be dealt with. "That's one of a pilot's biggest fears—making a mistake. That's why I'm going to positively know what my target is. I'm not going to have friendly fire," says one pilot. On working with other coalition forces a pilot states he hopes the battle won't require him to talk to the Saudi's or to the USAF. "I just want to deal with the Navy and Marines" he says.

VIOLATION: Rule 1, lists specific numerical information on tons of munitions aboard (ship's entire stock of 1,200 tons of bombs, missiles and cannon shells).

883 21 Feb 91, Christine Hauser, UPI, on a MEDEVAC flight with the 1620th Tactical Airlift Wing. A feature type story on a MEDEVAC flight involving two non-emergency patients, with non-combat-related ailments. Interviews conducted with one of two patients; one won't talk to press. Patient interviewed going to Germany for operation after dislocating his shoulder five times, three while playing sports, two while working on F-16. Various other interviews with flight crew, nurses and flight surgeons.

884 21 Feb 91, Paul Majendie, Reuters, on the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border with the 1st Armored Division. A profile of a combat photographer, who is a forensic photographer in the U.S. and a Vietnam Vet. Residual bitterness still lingers over Vietnam for the photographer, who states "I hope we achieve something with this one." On driving near the front the photographers escort, an Army Specialist, comments "That's why there have been so many accidental deaths with soldiers killed on the highway. Everyone thinks they are John Wayne out here."

885 20 Feb 91, Laurence Jolidon, USA Today, with Army Engineers. A "how it is to be a soldier" story told in a war-game-type dialogue and via short information bites. "Forget the games that come in boxes and magazines. Play the Real Army Game. It's not much fun, but it could change your life" says the writer. The reader is then taken through Army life in the desert as if someone were explaining the playing of a game for the first time. Some examples: "You're in "The Real Army. Pick a rank...pick another one. All the officer slots are filled," or "Your tent should be large enough for five people, but not for the 13 other guys who have also left home to join your
before the operation began, a shift in wind direction cleared smoke from burning oil fields in an area and more than 100 artillery pieces were spotted, then destroyed by air.

1044 24 Feb 91, William Dowell, Dean Fisher, Time Magazine. The 71st TFS was the first fighter group to arrive in Saudi Arabia after the crisis started. They fly F-15s, which are involved in escort duty for other planes. Pilots are running into far less anti-aircraft fire than during the first weeks of the war. "They are running out of ammo and we have taken out a lot of their triple-a." Kuwait is the scene of a lot of smoke and individual fires from combat. "It's amazing how much smoke is up there. It's 40 by 100 miles long. As far as you can see, it's black up there. You can see fires through the smoke. I don't know if they're tanks or vehicles, but there are whole bunch of them on fire." "I was thinking it was about time. It was on and off. I was almost relieved." There are so many airplanes over the Kuwaiti theater of operations that collisions are a major hazard. "It's a lot of airplanes in a small area."

1045 23 Feb 91, David Evans, Chicago Tribune. A possible Marine amphibious assault will be different than in past wars. Instead of using old-style landing craft, the Marines will be hitting the beaches in hovercraft. Three hovercraft are carried by the Amphibious Transport Ship Gunston Hall. The craft has a crew of three and four jet engines for power. The LCAC is fast and can move over shallow reefs and sandbars. It can transport men and equipment over a mile inland. An artillery battery of six howitzers can be transported to shore in five LCAC trips. The howitzers can be spread over a wide firing area due to a recent development in computerized fire control, the battery computer system. The Marines landing will also wear special glasses to protect against laser beams that can blind instantly. TOW missile launchers carried by Marine LAVs require a lot of maintenance and have a tendency to short out if exposed to salt water.

1046 24 Feb 91, Geoff Davidian, Houston Chronicle. In December and January, 36 million lbs of mail were received by a post office on a base in eastern Saudi Arabia. "Support from back home is one of the triads that has made our operations so successful." About one in twenty packages is addressed "to any soldier."

1047 24 Feb 91, Edith Lederer, Associated Press; Joan Lowy, Scripps-Howard News Service; Storer Rowley, Chicago Tribune. Allied tank columns rolled more than 12 miles into Iraq and tore up five miles of the Kuwaiti desert in just five minutes in the early hours of the ground war. F-16s pounded Iraqi artillery batteries in western Iraq which had been firing at the advancing allied force. "The lights of Kuwait City are still on. You can see occasional flashes from the ground fire that was going on — and it was happening both east and west of us." WARNING (GROUND RULE 6): The advance across an estimated 300-mile front from the Persian Gulf deep into Iraq appeared to follow pre-battle scenarios for the air-land campaign to breach Saddam Hussein's wall of bunkers in Kuwait and flank his army
from the west in the Iraqi desert. "They were in groups. I had expected to see a continuous line...but it wasn’t like that at all. You have heard people talk about the enormity of this air power... this (air power) pales in comparison." Close air support was flown against Iraqi artillery for Army troops advancing 10–15 miles into Iraq from the Saudi border. The Iraqi battlefield west of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border is thinly defended by Iraqi forces. "I would assume that the main (Iraqi) forces are in Kuwait. I’d say they're much heavier in southern Kuwait and further up at the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, where the Republican Guard is." Special care was ordered by commanders to pilots because many of the US casualties have been caused by pilots accidentally bombing their own troops. "We have to be a lot more careful." The Allies were advancing so fast that the Fire Support Coordination Line moved about five miles in five minutes. "Anything going north is a good sign. One aircrew saw the SCUD launch at 4:30 a.m.

1048 24 Feb 91, George Rodrique, Dallas Morning News. Pool members visited with several pilots from the 71st Tactical fighter Squadron, 1st TFW. One pilot was surprised the Iraqi air force didn’t help defend against the allied ground forces. "A lot of their airfields have been hit pretty hard. We still have a lot of airplanes up there, and they have not shown any activity in quite a while. I thought all along that we would have to have a ground war to push him out." "I think that the ground war will go quickly." "My brother is a ground spotter with the 82nd Airborne, up at the front. So obviously, I did not want him to have to walk across the border. Now that it has started, I hope it goes as quickly and violently as possible." "The air was going so well that we were kind of running out of targets." "We have been flying over those thing all the time and figured he’d light them off when the war started, and he did... and there’s a lot more planes in a small air space." About the Iraqi air threat: "We laugh about it," said an F-15 pilot. "We go up there with candy bars and stuff and we will be sitting there eating candy bars over top of Baghdad, because it is pretty much not a threat to us."

1049 24 Feb 91, Paul Baskin, UPI. Interviews with 71st TFS, 1st TFW pilots. "There’s a lot of air going in right now, a lot of A-10s were working below us." "We haven’t seen anything really in the air for quite some time now. They don’t want to fly when we’re up there, and they know we’re up there so they don’t go flying." About the length of the war, "I would think two weeks is my estimation but that’s a hopeful estimation and it’s coming from way down the chain." "There is some traffic and it is headed north (on roads)." About the Republican Guards: "I think they’re surrounding them right now so if they decide to fight it out with them, I imagine that will probably be some of the toughest fighting."

1050 24 Feb 91, John King, Associated Press. Marines aboard the USS Nassau rushed tank-fighting vehicles and other equipment ashore Sunday to help land-based Marines in their attack on Iraqi forces. About a dozen ships in the central Gulf steamed north to hook up with the forward elements of a Marine amphibious landing force. Marine Harriers shifted from bombing runs to close-air support of ground-based allied forces. Some sorties were
canceled due to the rain and heavy smoke over Kuwait. "I can't say that I expect something and I can't say that I don't," said Rear Adm John B. LaPlante, the amphibious task force commander, when asked if sea-based troops were likely to see combat soon. Mine clearing operations in the Gulf continue and the battleships are firing their 16-inch guns at Iraqi targets in Kuwait. Whether or not the landing force is sent into combat, the Admiral said its mission was to "fix certain Iraqi divisions in place so that they are unable to move out to the flank of the land based Marines or the flank of the Army forces." Naval forces were at full alert for possible chemical missile, naval or air attack. The step was a routine precaution taken at the commencement of ground hostilities. Reports that the amphibious forces had landed on a Kuwaiti island were erroneous.

1051 23 Feb 91, Jim Michaels, San Diego Tribune. At dawn Sunday U.S. marines attacked into the teeth of Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and began pushing northward into the occupied country, as allied forces began a massive ground attack. The Marines attacked with tanks and armored vehicles. The main thrust of the attack was made by marines from the 1st and 2nd Marine Division. Captured Iraqi soldiers have said that Iraqi artillery commanders have been given the go-ahead to use chemical munitions.

1052 22 Feb 91, Rowley/Lowy/Lederer. With lightning speed, allied forces surged across the Saudi border and raced north toward Kuwait City Sunday night as Iraqi resistance crumbled, fighter pilots said. Astounded by the speed at which allied armor and mechanized units were churning through the desert, U.S. pilots spoke of targets and missions being changed at the last minute because the front was advancing so quickly, "Some guys had said if this is your day off, you're going to miss the war," said one fighter pilot. The ground war is progressing about 10 times better than I would ever imagined," said another pilot. Pilots say the black skies over Kuwait are thick as a blanket which forced them to change altitude to attack targets.

1053 24 Feb 91, John King, Associated Press. Naval ships get word that the ground war is going well. Aboard the Nassau, the roar of constant AV8 Harrier jet takeoffs and landing were the only reminder of a war a few miles away. The Nassau and about 20 other ships in the amphibious force remained in the gulf ready to go. Harrier pilots flew both bombing and close air support missions.

1054 24 Feb 91, Dave Henderson, The Milwaukee Journal. No casualties from combat action had yet arrived at the 13th Evacuation hospital, by 5:30 a.m. Sunday. Rumors that the ground war was imminent ran through the hospital compound all day Saturday. Preparations for war began.

1055 Kifner, New York Times. When the 101st Airborne Division rode into battle, the ghost of Vietnam hovered along side their helicopters. This is chance to put the Vietnam stigma behind me," said a first sergeant. This is a war where striking wholesome-appearing young men and women treasure sands full of "Any soldier." MG Peay III distributes inspirational diagrams to
his troops, stressing discipline, leadership and the unit's rich history and lists of values, including "ethics, always. "Of course, if I did this in Vietnam, particularly my second tour, I would have been laughed out of town," said Gen Peay. "It's always been my fear that the American people wouldn't support us," a soldier said. "But the school kids write us and everything. "All the support we're getting, that's one reason morale is so good," said one officer. 1st LT Cynthia Dubots will be flying troops into combat on giant Chinook helicopters and evacuating the wounded. "I know when everybody get in the cockpit, they're going to have that scared feeling in their gut," she said. "But I'm just as qualified as anyone else.

VIOLATION RULE #1: "AMONG THE 17,000 SOLDIERS IN THE 101ST AIRBORNE ARE NEARLY 900 WOMEN."

1056 John Pomfret, Associated Press. With the 101st Airborne Division, More than 100 attack helicopters blasted deep into Iraqi territory Sunday to cut Saddam's supply lines and head for the Euphrates River. More than 2,000 men were airlifted scores of miles into Iraq. Apache assault helicopters led the attack, which was backed up by a strike for French forces. The Apaches flew in low, less than 50 feet off the ground, carrying hellfire anti-tank missiles. "Where life was created is where ass-loads of it is fixing to end," said one soldier. MG Peay ascribed the assault as one of the biggest ever launched by the U.S. Army. "We'll be moving in low, hard and fast," Peay added. In addition to being one of the largest air assaults in history, the invasion Sunday also marked the first time women flew helicopters on an air assault mission into enemy territory.

1057 24 Feb 91, Leon Daniel, UPI, The Big Red One unleashed its devastating artillery and rocketry on Iraqi forces Saturday. "There's no hiding from Artillery," said one officer. The 1st Division's armor roared across the desert and took up positions for an artillery raid using .155mm howitzers and mobile launch rocket systems. One artillery officer was gratified by the muted explosions of the rounds impacting impacting across the border. "That's their wakeup call," an officer said. "It says, Hello, boys, are you having fun now?" he added. "Artillery is the king of the battlefield."

another officer said. "We probably haven't put this much artillery together since World War II. This saves American lives."

1058 23 Feb 91, Christopher Hanson, Hearst Newspaper. A team of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment stands ready near the border, waiting for the word to advance. Their job like that of J.E.B Stuart, and George Custer's Civil War cavalry, was to serve as the eyes and ears of the main attacking force. "We try not to get actually engaged," says one soldier. "I've stopped being nervous, i want to get in there and get it over with," says one soldier. The units motivation for fighting was not hated of Iraqis. The focus of the soldiers anger was on Saddam. Soldiers said repeatedly in interviews that Saddam had to be stopped, that if he wasn't stopped now he would have to be fought again. One junior officer complained that the unit had not been issued enough desert camouflage uniforms and tan desert boots, although he had noticed that people in rear area headquarters had plenty of both.
hunger. He claimed that the Republican Guard, the elite unit the Iraqi army, was now down to one-quarter of its original strength and said most of the rest of the army was waiting for a chance to surrender. The prisoner claimed that Saddam had sent his son to personally supervise the plunder of Kuwait which included stealing all the cars, the gold, and medical supplies and equipment.

1160 26 Feb 91, Carl Nolte, San Francisco Chronicle. New system to replace tanks, other armored vehicles and helos on the battlefield with new equipment that comes complete with crews trained as a team. Sending replacement weapons and men up to the front is as old as war, but moving them up as a unit is as new as the Gulf War. It is as different as changing individual parts as compared to putting in whole component. "We learned that people who fight well fight for each other," said LtCol Chuck Cox. In Vietnam replacements were assigned to a tight little unit like a tank crew as if they were spare parts. They came in to a situation "where you know no one, and no one knew you. It is a scenario right out of an old war movie-- where a new man had to learn on the job, had to learn to fit in because if he didn't and there was no teamwork or coordination then the group could all die. The Wiz Ro changes the old concept. "We take already trained crews." and make them into teams. The result: American armor has actually gotten stronger in the field.

1161 24 Feb 91, Jeffrey Ulbrich, AP, with the XVIII Airborne Corps in Northern Saudi Arabia. A spot story on the Tactical Headquarters for the XVIII Airborne Corps. The HQ is described as being "made up of tents and vehicles huddled in a depression on the desert floor, with each vehicle carefully covered with camouflage netting." The aura in the tent is characterized as "business as usual, with little sign of emotion" as the go-ahead is given for the operation to begin. The Corps Ops Officer is quoted as saying "The big key was allowing the young troopers to get over their combat jitters," and "Thus far, our technology has worked. That technology, developed to fight the Soviets, is paying dividends."

1162 26 Feb 91, John Balzar, Los Angeles Times. with the Army's 18th Army Aviation Brigade in Northern Saudi Arabia. Observations about the stormy weather and its effect on Army operations. How "violent winds, which reached 30 knots, and swirling rains on Tuesday forced suspension of air resupply of forward U.S. Army units advancing deep in Iraq." Possible Violation: Rule 12, information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces.

1163 26 Feb 91, Kevin Cooney, Reuters, with the Army's 18th Aviation Brigade on the Northern Saudi Border. Similar to pool report 1162 on same subject, same unit, similar quotes. One quote "At the base camp of the 18th frustrated pilots and crews worked by their useless Chinooks securing them against the gusting wind."

1164 25 Feb 91, John Balzar, Los Angeles Times, with the 18th Army
daylight, most of the forces inside of Kuwait would have given up." Senior Marine commanders made repeated appeals to headquarters command posts tonight for assistance in handling the thousands of Iraqi troops that had been surrendering throughout the day.

1075 25 Feb 91. Jeff Franks of Reuters and Denis D. Gray of AP. U. S. Marines surged into Kuwait Sunday, punching through mine-sown defensive barriers and devastating a division of Iraqi troops but suffering only one killed and eight wounded. The low casualties were attributed to a combination of superb U. S. equipment and training and poor Iraqi morale. Forward elements of the division including tanks and artillery batteries were already near Kuwait City.

1076 25 Feb 91. Paul Majendie. U. S. tanks roared across the Saudi border into Iraq today heading straight for a clash with the elite Republican Guard. In the biggest mass movement of U. S. troops since World War Two, tens of thousands of soldiers swept across the desert for what military commanders believe could be a week of bloody clashes in Iraqi territory. In a flank assault aimed at reaching the cream of Iraq's army, they launched a blitzkrieg-style attack, eager not to get bogged down in minor skirmishes with the first small pockets. It could be the biggest tank battle the world has seen for half a century with General Ronald Griffith, commander of the 1st Armored Div. that fought Erwin Rommel's famed Afrika Korps in World War Two, summing up what is needed most now: "Armored warfare is as much about mobility as fighting."

1077 25 Feb 91. Joseph Albright, Cox Newspapers. A fast column of American and French soldiers drove northeasterward Sunday threatening to cut Saddam Hussein's military off from the northern two thirds of Iraq. American and French forces drove their trucks, guns and light tanks across the rock strewn desert nearly two hundred miles away from the main Iraqi troop concentrations in and near Kuwait. It was classic flanking maneuver of the kind military historians have been studying. "We moved a whole corps of over 100,000 people over 300 miles, mostly along one road, the Tapline Road, and we did that in sixteen day, with all the combat service support, all the logistics, all the ammunition." He attributed the success of the westward shift before the invasion to the efficiency with which the allied air forces have kept the Iraqi air force from striking into Saudi Arabia. From the point of attack the Americans and French would have to cover about 150 miles of hard packed desert before reaching the Euphrates River. The ancient lifeline that forms the storied fertile crescent as it flows south out of Syria to join the Tigris River. The allies penetrated the Iraqi frontier many miles due south of Baghdad. By striking close to Saddam's capital, Gen. Schwarzkopf forced the Iraqi command to make an emergency calculation whether the Americans might have in mind capturing the capital or whether they intend to veer east and south with a view of encircling the half million Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait.

VIOLATION: Rule 6 specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments and dispositions that would jeopardize security or lives.
the minefield in southern Kuwait safely. Iraq planned to bog them down in the minefield and then cut them to shreds with artillery. The plan failed.

24 Feb 91, Phil Davison, the Independent on Sunday, with the U.S. Marines. The Marines were dug in deep inside Kuwait tonight (Sunday) and poised to go farther, after punching through Iraqi defenses to create an impressive "breachhead" in the occupied Gvulf nation. It left the Americans in control of a large area not just near the border but well into the emirate. I saw at least 600 Iraqis rounded up as the Marines neared their objective, which I cannot name. On both sides of our track on the way in, Marines were crawling or sneaking up to foxholes looking for Iraqis then tossing in grenades to blow up any mines or booby traps.

25 Feb 91 Colin Nickerson, Boston Globe; Susan Sachs, Newsday; Jeff Franks, Reuters; Dennis D. Gray, AP with the 2nd Marine Div. Talks of the first days of fighting and advancing into Kuwait and then in holding positions overnight. Small pockets of Iraqi resistance but biggest headache seemed to Iraqi troops surrendering in such large numbers that they are a logistics problem. Among the prisoners—two colonels and a general of front line divisions. According to Col. Jan Huly, they are either surrendering outright or offering token resistance, then surrendering...not even retreating. Gen. Boomer cautions that armor ahead still offers "significant threat" but predicted a war of days, not weeks.

25 Feb 91 Steve Vogel, Times Journal. Notes from interviews with A-10 pilots flying CAS. They saw "columns and columns...as far as I could see" describing allied forces on the move. Said the "bad guys" aren't moving but there were many burned out or abandoned Iraqi vehicles. F-16 pilots said visibility was terrible and one said he didn't drop any of his weapons on his last two missions.

25 Feb 91 Phil Davison, The Independent. Covers 2nd MARDIV moving on its second objective on Monday. Talks of "piecemeal" attempts at counter-attacks by Iraqis and overnight, continuous machine gun and artillery fire by Marines. Describes Marine's capture, virtually with no resistance, of and Iraqi divisional field HQ, including a command and control center and living quarters. "There was not a single sign of life," he said.

24 Feb Ray Wilkinson, Newsweek Magazine. Dawn assault by Marine armor "blitzkreig" into Kuwait, virtually unopposed. Reports near disaster when spearheading M-60 tanks laid down a broadside which nearly fell on a Marine flank guard. Fire ceased immediately with no casualties. Describes use of mine-clearing land charges then men and equipment pouring through the breach. Then, "Iraqis appeared from all points of the compass...many were smiling." There was fear of chemical attack and chem gear was being worn. He counted "more than a dozen" Iraqi tanks still smoldering in their entrenched positions, unable to escape the "remarkably accurate" allied fire. Describes dozens of fires seen burning in the distance in the Burkan oilfield. VIOLATION: He places his unit, task force Ripper, at or near the Burkan oilfield.
Statement of Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate  
February 20, 1991

Some of the most enduring news reports during World War II came from Edward R. Murrow, who stood on a London rooftop and reported the German bombing raids. Fifty years later, Americans watched reporters on the rooftops of hotels in Riyadh and Dhahran -- and their colleagues with gas masks on in Tel Aviv -- describing incoming Scud missile attacks from Iraq.

It was the writer Henry Tomlinson who said, "The war the generals always get ready for is the previous one." The same might be said of journalists: the coverage arrangements for military operations in the Persian Gulf are frequently compared to what's remembered from Vietnam, Korea, or World War II.

But Edward R. Murrow's proposal to talk without a script so concerned the military that he had to record a series of trial runs on phonograph discs. He submitted them for approval, but they were lost. So he had to record six more before he persuaded the authorities that he could speak off the cuff without violating the censorship rules. Today, Arthur Kent, Sam Donaldson, Eric Engberg, and Charles Jaco can describe what they see -- and show it on television -- with no military censorship of any kind. And there are two other notable differences: they are live, and, at least in the case of CNN, their reports can be seen by the commanders of enemy forces just as easily as they can be seen by American viewers at home in their living rooms.

Operation Desert Storm isn't taking place in the jungles of Vietnam, or the hills of Korea, or across the continents and oceans of World War II. The campaign on the Arabian Peninsula has been designed to get a specific and unique job done. The press arrangements are also suited to the peculiar conditions there. But our goal is the same as those of our predecessors -- to get as much information as possible to the American people about their military without jeopardizing the lives of the troops or the success of the operation.

Origin of the Persian Gulf press arrangements

Saddam Hussein stunned the world when his troops rolled across the northern border of Kuwait last August 2nd. Within five hours, his army had taken Kuwait City. And from that day forward, the number of Iraqi troops in occupied Kuwait continued to grow and to move south, stopping only at Kuwait's southern border with Saudi Arabia.

That weekend, August 5th, President Bush sent Secretary Cheney to Saudi Arabia for discussions with King Fahd on how best to defend Saudi Arabia and the stability of the Persian Gulf. As history now knows, the first US forces began to arrive a few days after their
meeting, joining US Navy ships already in the region. On Wednesday, as the first US Air Force F-15's landed on sovereign Saudi territory, there were no western reporters in the Kingdom. We urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so that reporters could cover the arrival of the US military.

On Friday of that week, Secretary Cheney again called Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. Prince Bandar said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military could get them in. So we activated the DOD National Media Pool, a structure that had been in use since 1985.

The National Media Pool

The pool was set up after the 1983 US military operation in Grenada. While Grenada was a military success, it was a journalistic disaster, because reporters were kept off the island until the fighting was over. So a retired army major general, Winant Sidle, from whom this committee will hear later today, was asked to head up a panel of military officers and journalists to work out a plan for news coverage of future military operations. The result of their work was the Department of Defense National Media Pool, a rotating list of correspondents, photographers, and technicians who could be called up on short notice to cover the early stages of military missions.

It was this pool that covered the US Navy’s escort of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987. Its first big test in ground combat came in December of 1989, during Operation Just Cause in Panama. Just Cause was a mixed success for the pool. It arrived within four hours of when the shooting started, but it took too long to get reporters to the scene of the action. I think we learned some important lessons from what happened in Panama, and we've applied them to what's going on in the Gulf.

The true purpose of the National Media Pool is to enable reporters to cover the earliest possible action of a US military operation in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American press, while still protecting the element of surprise — an essential part of what military people call operational security. Of course, Operation Desert Shield was no secret. The President made a public announcement that he was ordering US forces to the Gulf. But because there were no western reporters in Saudi Arabia, we flew in the DOD media pool.

First reporters came on the DOD pool

We moved quickly, once we received permission from the Saudi government on Friday, August 10th. We notified the news organizations in the pool rotation that Friday night. They brought in their passports Saturday morning, and I took them to the Saudi embassy myself that afternoon, where the appropriate staff had been brought in to issue the necessary visas. One reporter had run out of pages in his passport, so we carried it across town so that the State Department could add some more.
The pool left Andrews Air Force base early Sunday morning, August 12th, stopping off to see the US Central Command operation in Tampa, Florida. The reporters interviewed General Schwarzkopf, who had not yet moved his headquarters to Riyadh. So the press pool got to Saudi Arabia before the commander of the operation had even set up shop there. The reporters arrived Monday afternoon, August 13th, and continued to act as a pool until August 26th. After the pool began filing its reports, the Saudis started to issue visas to other reporters. But the news organizations in the Pentagon pool asked that we keep it going until the visa picture cleared up.

Jay Peterzell was Time Magazine's representative on the pool. Afterward, he wrote this: "The Pentagon people worked hard to keep the press in the country." And he offered this assessment:

"The pool did give US journalists a way of getting into Saudi Arabia and seeing at least part of what was going on at a time when there was no other way of doing either of those things. Also, in the first two weeks after the wave of TV, newspaper, and magazine correspondents flooded into the country, they did not produce any story that was essentially different from what we in the pool had filed."

Starting with those initial 17 -- representing AP, UPI, Reuters, CNN, National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal -- the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations. They visited ships at sea, air bases, Marines up north, and soldiers training in the desert. They went aboard AWACS radar warning planes. They quoted generals who said their forces were ready and privates who said they were not. They wrote about helicopter pilots crashing into the sand, because they couldn't judge distances in the flat desert light. And reporters described the remarkable speed with which the US military moved so many men and women to the Gulf with so much of their equipment.

Planning for combat coverage

The mission given US forces in Operation Desert Shield was to deter further aggression from Iraq and to defend Saudi Arabia if deterrence failed. After the President in mid November announced a further buildup in US forces, to give the coalition a true offensive option, my office began working on a plan that would allow reporters to cover combat while maintaining the operational security necessary to assure tactical surprise and save American lives.

One of the first concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their request for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what might restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in
the event of a war, they asked us whether we'd be willing to use a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. We agreed to do so.

A US Air Force C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force base on January 17th, the morning after the bombing began, with 127 news media personnel on board. That plane left at the onset of hostilities, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one of their cargo airplanes to the job of transporting another 127 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.

The plan for combat coverage was not drawn up in a vacuum. We worked closely with the military and with the news media to develop a plan that would meet the needs of both. We had several meetings at the Pentagon with the bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps. We talked with the reporters who cover the military regularly. And we consulted with some of the people you'll hear from later today -- General Sidle and Mr. Hoffman -- and several of my predecessors in the public affairs office at the Pentagon. Because an important part of our planning was working with the news media, our drafts and proposals frequently became public. We did our planning in Macy's window, which meant that our false starts and stumbles were in full view.

Safeguarding military security

The main concern of the military is that information not be published which would jeopardize a military operation or endanger the lives of the troops who must carry it out. The preamble to the rules for reporters covering World War II summarized the issue by saying that editors, in wondering what can be published, should ask themselves, "Is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?"

In formulating the ground rules and guidelines for covering Operation Desert Storm, we looked at the rules developed in 1942 for World War II, at those handed down by General Eisenhower's chief of staff for the reporters who covered the D-Day landings, and at the ground rules established by General MacArthur for covering the Korean war. We carefully studied the rules drawn up for covering the war in Vietnam.

The rules are not intended to prevent journalists from reporting on incidents that might embarrass the military or to make military operations look sanitized. Instead, they are intended to prevent publication of details that could jeopardize a military operation or endanger the lives of US troops.

Some of the things that must not be reported are:

- Details of future operations,
- Specific information about troop strengths or locations,
• While a specific operation is underway, the details of troop movements or tactics,

• Specific information on missing or downed airplanes or ships while search and rescue operations are underway, and

• Information on operational weaknesses that could be used against US forces.

American reporters understand the reasoning behind these ground rules. They are patriotic citizens, and they don’t want anything they write to endanger lives. The ground rules are the least controversial aspect of the coverage plan for the war in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to ask that a copy of the ground rules and the guidelines be inserted at this point in the record.

The groundrule appeal process

The reporters covering World War II wrote their stories and submitted them to a military censor. The censors cut out anything they felt broke the rules and sent the stories on. The decisions of the censors were final. There is no such system of censorship in Operation Desert Storm. There is, instead, a procedure that allows us to appeal to news organizations -- before the harm is done -- when we think material in their stories would violate the ground rules. And the final decisions belong to journalists.

Stories written by reporters who are out with troops in the field are reviewed by military public affairs officers to ensure troop safety and operational security, then sent on to the press center in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for release. If, after talking things over with the reporter, the field public affairs officer believes information in a story violates the ground rules, public affairs officers at the press center review it before release. If they, too, believe the story would break the ground rules, they appeal it to us at the Pentagon for our opinion.

If we, too, think there’s a problem, we call bureau chiefs or editors stateside and discuss the story with them. We understand that news must move quickly, and we act as fast as we can. Our appeal process is intended only to allow us to discuss potential ground rule violations with editors and bureau chiefs and to remind them of the need to protect sensitive information. But unlike a system of censorship, the system now in place leaves the final decision to publish or broadcast in the hands of journalists, not the military.

Since Operation Desert Storm began on January 16th, over 820 print pool reports have been written. Of those, only five have been submitted for our review in Washington. We quickly cleared four of them. The fifth appeal came to us over the weekend, involving a story that dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. We called the reporter’s editor-in-chief, and he agreed that the story should be changed to protect sensitive intelligence procedures. This aspect of the coverage plan is also working well.
Only the pool stories, from reporters in the field, are subject to this review, not live television and radio reports or the thousands of other stories written in Dhahran and Riyadh, based on pool reports, original reporting, and the military briefings.

Getting access to the troops

As the number of troops in the desert grew, so did the number of reporters to cover them. The US and international press corps went from zero on August 2nd, to 17 on the first pool, rising to 800 by December. Most of those reporters, the good ones anyway, want to be out where the action is, just as they’ve done in previous conflicts. But with hundreds of fiercely independent reporters seeking to join up with combat units, we concluded that when the combat started, we’d have to rely on pools.

Before the air phase of the operation began a month ago, news organizations were afraid that we wouldn’t get the job done. They reminded us of their experience in Panama. But as viewers, readers, and listeners know, we had the pools in place before the operation started. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of air strikes, on board a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat, on the air force bases where the fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock, and with several ground units in the desert.

Carl Rochelle of CNN was asked on the air if he felt he had been allowed access to everything he wanted onboard the ships, and he said, "I must tell you I am more satisfied with the pool shoot I just came off than any of the others I’ve been on." Four days into the air campaign, Molly Moore of the Washington Post said, "It’s gone a lot smoother than any of us thought."

Those first days were not without problems. We know of cases where stories were approved in the field only to be delayed for over a day on their trip back to the press center in Dhahran. The first stories written about the stealth fighters were, for some reason, sent all the way back to the F-117’s home base in Nevada to be cleared. I’m sure some of the reporters you'll hear from later today will have examples of their own.

The biggest complaint from journalists right now is that more of them want to get out into the field. They are worried about how much access they'll have to the Army and the Marines in the event the President decides to proceed with the next phase of the campaign, intensifying action on the ground. And here’s where the contrasts with World War II and Vietnam are especially strong.

Access to the ground troops

Unlike World War II, this will not be an operation in which reporters can ride around in jeeps going from one part of the front to another, or like Vietnam where reporters could hop a helicopter to specific points of action. If a ground war begins on the Arabian Peninsula, the battlefield will be chaotic and the action will be violent. This will be modern, intense warfare.
Reporters at the front will have to be in armored vehicles or on helicopters. They'll have to carry their own gas masks and chemical protective suits along with all their other gear. Those with front line troops will be part of a highly mobile operation. It will be deadly serious business, and our front line units simply will not have the capacity to accommodate large numbers of reporters.

To cover the conflict, reporters will have to be part of a unit, able to move with it. Each commander has an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. While he can take care of the reporters he knows are coming, he cannot keep absorbing those who arrive on their own, unexpectedly, in their own rented four wheel drives. The pool system allows us to tell the divisional commanders how many reporters they'll be responsible for. And the reporters in these pools are allowed to stay with the military units they're covering, learning as much as they can about the unit's plans and tactics.

Our latest count shows that over 1400 reporters, editors, producers, photographers, and technicians are now registered with the joint information bureaus in Dhahran and Riyadh, representing the US and the international press. Not all of them want to go to the front. But more want to go than we can possibly accommodate. That's why we've had to rely on pools of reporters -- rotating groups whose stories and pictures are available to all.

Of course, the ground war hasn't started yet. US military units are re-positioning, some of them moving nearly every day. And if the ground war does start, it won't be like Vietnam, with minor skirmishes here and there and a major offensive every now and then. It will be a set piece operation, as carefully orchestrated as possible. In this sense, it will be like D-Day. It's useful to remember that 461 reporters were signed up at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force to cover D-Day. Of that number, only 27 US reporters actually went ashore with the first wave of forces.

So the situation on the ground in the Arabian Peninsula is a little like the picture before D-Day, with reporters waiting for the action to start. Even so, when Desert Storm began, 43 reporters were already out with ground units, and the number has been growing. By the end of this week, 100 reporters will be with Army units, 33 with the Marines on land, and 18 more will be out with the Marines on amphibious ships. That's in addition to the 19 covering the Navy on ships at sea, the 14 who have been roving around to air bases, covering the Air Force part of the campaign, and eight more covering the medical part of the story. So that's a total of 192 reporters who will be out with combat forces by the end of the week.

Pools are a compromise

The news business is an intensely competitive one. Journalists are accustomed to working on their own. The best are especially independent. In the setup imposed now in the Persian Gulf, each correspondent files a story that becomes available to everyone else. Pools rub reporters the wrong way, but there is simply no way for us to open up a rapidly moving front to reporters who roam the battlefield. We believe the pool system does three things: it gets reporters out to see the action, it guarantees that Americans at home get reports from
the scene of the action, and it allows the military to accommodate a reasonable number of journalists without overwhelming the units that are fighting the enemy.

The system we have now in Operation Desert Storm -- with two briefings a day in Riyadh and one in the Pentagon, pools of reporters out with the troops, a set of clear ground rules, and a procedure of ground rule appeal -- is intended to permit the most open possible coverage of a new kind of warfare. When it's all over, we very much want to sit down with representatives of the military and the news media to see how well it worked and how it might be improved.

I cannot deny that there have been problems. I know reporters are frustrated that they can't all get out to see the troops. But I believe the system we have now is fair, that it gets a reasonable number of journalists out to see the action, and that the American people will get the accounting they deserve of what their husbands and wives, and sons and daughters, are doing under arms half a world away.

When reporters arrived at General Eisenhower's headquarters in 1944, they were handed a book called Regulations for War Correspondents. In the foreword, he spelled out in three sentences the logic for the kind of system I've described to you today. Here's what he said to those journalists: "The first essential in military operations is that no information of value should be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations."

- end -
Mr. Pete Williams, ASD (Public Affairs)
Before Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Senator Glenn: The controversy surrounding the Pentagon rules on press
coverage of the conflict in the Persian Gulf involves two of the cornerstones of our
democracy. First, the fundamental right of the public to know what our government is
doing; and two, our government’s ability to defend our interests at home and abroad.
While our nation could not survive without either principle, the present conflict
reminds us that there also can be tensions between them. On behalf of the public’s
right to know, journalists strive to report on the details of military operations.
For the sake of troop safety and security, on the other hand, of tactical informa-
tion, military commanders strive to control the flow of information out of the
theater. Part of it may be in timing -- when do we know what, report only after
operations are complete, or is there a need to know ahead of time. TV, of course,
wants immediacy. They already have a tremendous, tremendous interest generated in
things going on over in the Gulf right now, just because of the very fact that we
have seen live on television, war being conducted from time to time -- live, real
time. Tomahawk missiles going past the hotel and things like that.

All this is taking place halfway around the world in a country with many
customs different from our own, and at a time when the military is preparing for a
ground war -- the likes of which our country has really not seen since World War II.
I know many of us in this room have experienced war up close and personal, first
hand. That experience, in my own case, has given me a particular sensitivity to the
security concerns of our military commanders. However, maybe just as war is too
important to leave entirely to the generals, as someone said in days past: reporting
it may be too important to leave entirely to just the Pentagon public affairs people
also. So we're glad today, to be able to hear from both sides.

I believe a free press serves an important function in war time. An independ-
dent press ensure the public has the information it needs to exercise its right to
its citizens. This is yet another irony, for while war reporting might lead to
opposition to government policy, no administration can build and maintain public
support for a war or anything else, without a free press. The public will never have
confidence in the government unless it believes it is getting the truth.

Out of all this back and forth, we come down to a simple question. How do we
ensure a balance between the two interests -- between the public’s right to know and
the military’s need for security? Keep one thing in mind, the sides in this debate
are not worlds apart. Just as journalists admit that there is a need for restraint,
military commanders acknowledge the need for media access. Out of this mutual
awareness has come the process by which the military has attempted to meet media
concerns and arrive at a mutually acceptable set of procedures to guide press
coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict.

While the results certainly do not please everyone, we would be wrong not to
acknowledge both the effort and the progress that has been made. We can and should
question how well things are working and how might matters be improved. For example,
there are many complaints now about the pool system and the extent to which escort
have become minders, cutting off interviews in mid-sentence, in addition to conducting after-the-fact security review. If this hearing can be a forum to examine such issues and perhaps provide an opening for review and refinement, we will have performed a valuable function.

Of course, there is not much time for such reflection. The conflict may soon enter a new phase. Once the ground war has begun, procedures tested during the introductory air war phase will be put to the real test. So I hope that today's hearing can help prepare us for that test.

With that, let me turn the gavel over to Senator Cole.

Senator Cole: Thank you very much, Senator Glenn.

Over the past few weeks there has been a good deal of discussion about the way the war in the Gulf is being covered. That is far from unique. One of the traditional tensions of American life is the ongoing debate about how to balance the desire of a free press for information with the need of a government to protect security and promote policy.

As we begin this hearing, I want to make my own view about the current state of that balance clear. I believe that the Pentagon is doing an honest, an honorable, and effective job of making sure that the American people have the information they need to make an informed judgment about the conduct and status of the war. In fact, I can personally assure you that the American people are getting more information through the press than members of Congress do in classified security briefings. Indeed, many of my own constituents tell me that they are staggered by the amount and quality of the information they get and are getting through the news media.

My own perception is that the Pentagon is not lying to the press or to the people, nor is it withholding critical information. At the same time, I do not believe that the Pentagon is perfect. For example, I agree with those who argue that the Pentagon press pools ought to be more active, and I agree that the practice of having all reporters constantly supervised by escort officers ought to end. But those criticisms do not support sweeping conclusions about censorship or dictatorship or state control of the media.

The fact that the Pentagon is doing a good job does not imply at all that the press is doing a bad job, or that their complaints have no merit. I have heard some people say that the press should only report good news about the war, and refuse, for example, to investigate the competing claims about whether coalition forces destroyed a command and control or an air raid shelter in Baghdad. I do not agree with such suggestions. The press is not a tool of the government. It is an independent operation which, at its best, allows us to confirm or correct official pronouncements by reporting the truth as best it can. But truth is a complex concept, and so are the roles and rights of the government and the press.

As we conduct these hearings, I would ask everyone to keep in mind a comment made to my staff by a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Jerry Friedheim. Mr. Friedheim wrote us that, "One difference between our country and virtually every other in the world is that even in wartime, information flows in America. Ideas compete, and we know what the military men and women who work for us are both doing and not doing. The constitutions institutions of the government -- the press and the military -- want it that way, and work to assure it. So the institutions all want the same result, and the contentions over how to achieve that
result in specific circumstances are the proper, predictable, give and take of constitutional adversaries, not of antagonists."

It is in that spirit that I hope these hearings will be conducted. I'm delighted to recognize my colleagues for any statements they may wish to make.

Senator Roth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you for holding these hearings. I can say that judging from the letters and comments I have heard from my people in the state of Delaware, this is a subject of great interest, and in many instances, of concern.

From the moment this war began, it has been distinguished from others before it. The same technology that has brought us the Patriot anti-missile missile and the Stealth fighter, has brought the media satellite technology. We now can see the war as it happens in each of our living rooms. This ability has created its own battles, which I like to call the war of the air waves. The ammunition used by both sides is instantaneous transmission. The inadvertent warriors are the press, and the victims, all too often, are accuracy and objectivity. We're quickly learning that in a war like this, of words and satellites, between democracies and a dictatorship, too often the dictator will have the propaganda advantage.

While freedom of the press is an explicit right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, many Americans are asking how free. I'm sure our panelists here today are aware of the genuine fear by many Americans that [beset] them by what they consider excessive reporting of the details of the war. In short, the same reporting which kept Americans on the edge of their seats the night the war began, is now being criticized as excessive and possibly dangerous for our troops. I believe there's a general fear by many Americans that the media suffers from what I call "get it on the air-itis." We're concerned that in the push to relay news almost instantaneously, the media might, at best, overstep the boundaries of accuracy and jeopardize the safety of our fighting troops.

The nature of the press in America is competitive. Each reporter wants to get the story first. A case in point was the announcement last Friday by the Iraqi Revolution Command Council that a withdrawal of Iraqi forces was proposed. Within minutes, media commentators and their analysts were quickly on the air speculating on the steps which would be taken in the withdrawal, the aftermath of withdrawal, and the reconstruction. Unfortunately, as the announcement by the Council was translated and reviewed more carefully, it became clear that it was a fraud, that the Iraqis' demands were unreasonable and unacceptable. Our hopes were dashed. The families of our soldiers in the Gulf are under tremendous emotional stress every day. It's hurtful to subject them to what amounts to an emotional roller coaster prompted by faulty or hastily-fed reports.

Another concern is the use of the media as a vehicle for propaganda to benefit Hussein. The overwhelming media presence, its live capabilities and its competitive nature give Saddam Hussein an opportunity for victory in a second war -- the propaganda war. Make no mistake about it, Saddam Hussein would not have invited Western journalists to stay in Baghdad unless he felt it could aid his cause.

Mr. Chairman, I have an extended statement. I don't want to take so much time as to read it in its entirety, but just let me say in concluding that obviously, the public's right to news and information, while protecting military strategies, the lives of our fighting soldiers -- men and women, is indeed, a very delicate balance. Like many Americans, I share the concern that the safety of our men and women in the
Gulf not be compromised in any way by press reports. However, at this time I believe our military leadership is trying to do its best to provide the news media with access to information without betraying any information which might be useful to the enemy.

I realize many members of our media may disagree with this, and that is, of course, what brings us to this hearing today.

Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join in thanking you for the work that you’ve done in organizing and convening this hearing today to examine the rules governing media access and coalition military operations in the Gulf War.

I think it’s important to say that it’s typical of our democracy that we can engage in this kind of vigorous public debate about the level of restrictions on media coverage of war, even while the war is being waged. As we discuss whether the restrictions placed on the media by the allied forces are too strict, I think it’s worth bearing in mind that however onerous the restrictions may be for American journalists, they pale in comparison to the restrictions that Saddam Hussein places on the media in Iraq. I know that’s an obvious statement, but sometimes it’s important to state and appreciate the obvious.

No journalists were sent in with Iraqi troops when they went into Kuwait, and as far as I know, none are there now. Journalists are shown what Iraq claims is damage to civilian homes and businesses in Iraq, but they’re not shown the horrendous damage that Iraq did to Kuwait. We see Iraqi babies being pulled from the wreckage of a military target in Baghdad, but we never saw Kuwaiti babies being tossed out of incubators in Kuwait.

As difficult as putting a balanced and complete story together may be for journalists in Washington and Riyadh, putting a complete and balanced story together in Baghdad is virtually impossible. A journalist who breaks the rules in Saudi Arabia could have his or her credentials pulled. But a journalist who breaks the rules in Iraq could be killed -- as happened to the British journalist a short time ago.

These contrasts, of course, just highlight the difference between Saddam’s dictatorship and our democracy. While reporters covering the Pentagon or Congress, for that matter, don’t always believe what they hear with their own eyes; in Iraq, they can’t always believe what they see with their own eyes. A mosque that’s reported to be knocked down by allied bombers, really hit by Iraqi personnel themselves; a weeping Iraqi woman decrying her country’s fate on television screens around the world, turns out to be a multi-lingual Iraqi official posing as a civilian. A journalist trying to make sense of Baghdad in wartime is like Alice trying to make sense of Wonderland.

I’m sure we all agree that Iraq’s restrictions on the media do far more to inhibit reporting than the restrictions employed by American and allied forces. But in considering the Pentagon rules on media coverage, I personally believe that restrictions on news coverage are absolutely necessary in order to protect the lives of our troops, and in order to increase the odds of military success. Certain restrictions, some of which may not have existed during the Vietnam or Korean wars, are needed simply because of recent advances in technology. This is, as Arthur C. Clark has said, the world’s first satellite war. Information arrives faster than the ability to sift, edit, analyze, and absorb its meaning. News is the first rough
draft of history, Ben Bradley said, but news in time of a high tech war comes in so fast, that watching TV is a little like looking over a journalist’s shoulders at his notebook while he scribbles away. We have the facts before we actually know the story. That poses very real new problems for the press, for the public, and for the military.

For the first time in history, an individual journalist at the front lines is technologically capable of reporting what he or she sees to a world audience in real time. Of course, Saddam Hussein or his own commanders in the field are capable of receiving that journalist’s broadcasts. The military implications of that reality are obvious. It would be potentially disastrous to allow journalists to broadcast whatever they wish from the front lines of our forces instantaneously, with no review by military authorities.

So I conclude, and I would guess that a wide sweep of us here on all sides of this discussion today, will conclude that the rights of the press to be free are not absolute, and they do not transcend the rights of our soldiers to survive. That may be an overly simplistic way of stating a basic reality, but I think it represents the balancing of societal or constitutional interests that must necessarily take place.

Where and how the balance is struck, where and how the restrictions begin and end, is what brings us together here today. I know there will be debate over the question of whether news can or should be managed in times of war. That’s a question that arises and has arisen every time that U.S. interests conflict, and the line between protecting our military strategy and protecting the public’s right to know has to be redrawn each time we enter a conflict. Control of access to sources of news in the Gulf certainly gives the military a powerful tool with which to affect the images the public receives of this war. The images the public receives may help shape its opinion of the war and its conduct.

So we may ask, is it legitimate for our government to attempt to control those images through media restrictions in order to keep American morale and support for our cause strong? There are some who say yes. Some argue that we should treat the media as a second front in this war, and that we should control, to the extent possible, the flow of negative images such as the bloody horror of battle, the return of coffins to the U.S., inevitably gruesome details of so-called collateral damage. On the other hand, and I think this is the prevailing view, it’s always been one of our guiding principles embodied in the first amendment, and protected throughout a long history of American jurisprudence that we allow truth to be determined in what Justice Holmes referred to as the marketplace of ideas. We’ve always been rightly fearful of direct governmental interference in that marketplace. We’ve always been wary of censorship and prior restraints. I think we have to remember in this context, as we have said so often in the last five or six weeks, that war is horrible, but it is sometimes necessary. So too, it’s my own belief that our people can be exposed to and accept the horror of war if they’re convinced of its justice and its necessity.

In the days immediately following the televised scenes of civilian casualties in the bombing of that bunker in Baghdad, my office received only nine calls about the bombing, and three of them actually supporting the bombing. Nine calls from a state of 3.3 million people -- that surprised me. I think what it said is that as horrifying and gruesome as the pictures from Baghdad were, the American people have accepted this war’s reality because they have accepted this war’s necessity. And most importantly, they have confidence in our military and the truthfulness of what’s being told us.
Thus far, there is no credibility gap between the American public and Desert Storm's military leaders. I know that some members of the media are concerned, however, about a credibility gap that may open up in part because of what they see as a lack of access to the men and women waging this war. Today we will ask, are the Pentagon's restrictions too tightly drawn, or too narrowly interpreted on the ground? Should the pools and the military escorts be abandoned, as one of our witnesses, Walter Cronkite, suggests this week in his article in Newsweek, and be replaced by a different kind of operation that leaves reporters free to roam the sands of Saudi Arabia, and then have their reports reviewed by military authorities prior to their transmission? Those are the kinds of questions that I know we will analyze closely today.

Given the fact that some censorship is required in wartime, the real question here is how can the rules best be drawn to accommodate our twin ideals of a free press and military success, and protection of our soldiers in combat.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today as we search for truthful answers to those critical and important questions.

(Introduction of Pete Williams by Senator Cole)

Mr. Williams: Thank you, very much. I should say thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee for this opportunity to be here. I feel like Walter Cronkite's warmup act this afternoon. (Laughter)

It's an honor to be here, and a pleasure to have this opportunity to describe what it is that we're up to, and how we came to the point where we are today. I do think, Senator Glenn, that you're right, that this hearing does provide value to continue this dialogue on how to do our jobs better. We don't pretend, by any means, to be the sole repository of wisdom, and there's a lot of experience in this room. I look forward to reading the transcript. I, unfortunately, have to bug out as soon as I'm finished here, and go back to the Pentagon, and I apologize for that, because I don't know about the rest of the people, I'm a lot more interested in hearing who's going to come after me than I am in hearing me.

But in any case, let me just say that some of the most enduring news reports that came out of World War II came from Edward R. Murrow, who stood on a rooftop in London and reported the German bombing raids. Now, 50 years later, Americans watch reporters on the rooftops of hotels in Riyadh and Dhahran, and their colleagues wearing gas masks in Tel Aviv, describing incoming SCUD missile attacks from Iraq.

It was the writer Henry Tomlinson who said, "The war that generals always get ready for is the previous one," and the same might be said of journalists. The coverage arrangements for military operations in the Persian Gulf are frequently compared to what's remembered from Vietnam or Korea or World War II.

But Edward R. Morrow's proposal to talk without a script so concerned the military, that he had to record a series of trial runs on phonograph disks. He submitted them for approval, but they were lost, so he had to record six more before he finally persuaded the authorities that he could speak off the cuff without violating the censorship rules. Today, Arthur Kent, Sam Donaldson, Eric Engberg, and Charles Jaco can describe what they see and show it on television at the same time, with no military censorship of any kind. There are two other notable differences that many of you have already noted -- they are live, and at least in the case of
CNN, their reports can be seen by the commanders of the enemy forces just as easily as they can be seen by Americans at home in their living rooms.

Operation Desert Storm is not taking place in the jungles of Vietnam or the hills and valleys of Korea or across the continents and oceans of World War II. The campaign on the Arabian Peninsula has been designed to get a specific and unique job done. The press arrangements are also suited to the particular conditions there. But our goal is the same as that of our predecessors — to get as much information as possible to the American people without jeopardizing the lives of the troops or the success of the military operation.

Saddam Hussein stunned the world when his troops rolled across the northern borders of Kuwait last August 2nd. Within five hours, his troops had taken Kuwait City. From that day forward, the number of Iraqi troops in occupied Kuwait continued to grow and to move south, stopping only at Kuwait’s southernmost border with Saudi Arabia.

That weekend, August 5th, President Bush sent Secretary Cheney and General Powell and General Schwarzkopf to Saudi Arabia for discussions with King Fahd on how best to defend Saudi Arabia and preserve the stability of the Persian Gulf. As history now knows, the first U.S. forces began to arrive a few days after that meeting — joining U.S. Navy ships already in the region. On Wednesday, as the first U.S. Air Force F-15’s landed on sovereign Saudi territory, there were no western reporters in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We urged the Saudi government at that time to begin granting visas to U.S. news organizations so that reporters could cover the arrival of the U.S. military.

On Friday of that week, Secretary Cheney again called Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. Prince Bandar said the Saudis were studying the question, but that in the meantime, they would agree to accept a pool of U.S. reporters if the U.S. military could get them in. So we activated the DoD National Media Pool, a structure that has been in place since 1985, and been used since then.

The pool was set up after the 1983 U.S. military operation in Grenada. While Grenada was a military success, it was a journalistic failure, because reporters were kept off the island until the fighting was over. So a retired Army major general, Winant Sidle, from whom this committee will hear later today, was asked to head up a panel of military officers and journalists and academics to work out a plan for news coverage of future military operations. The result of their work was the Department of Defense National Media Pool — a rotating list of correspondents, photographers and technicians who could be called up on short notice to cover the early stages of military missions.

It was this pool that covered the Navy’s escort of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987; and its first big test in ground combat came in December of 1989 during Operation Just Cause in Panama. Just Cause was, at best, a mixed success for the pool. It did arrive within four hours of when the shooting started, but it took a long time, too long, to get reporters to the scene of the action. I think we learned some important lessons from what happened in Panama, and we’ve applied them to what’s going on in the Gulf.

The true purpose of the National Media Pool is to enable reporters to cover the earliest possible action of a U.S. military operation in a remote area where there is no other presence of American press, while still protecting the element of surprise...
-- an essential part of what the military calls operational security. Of course, Operation Desert Shield was no secret. The President had made a public announcement that he was ordering U.S. forces to the Gulf, but there were no Western reporters in Saudi Arabia, so we flew in the DoD National Media Pool.

We moved quickly, once we received permission from the Saudi government on Friday, August 10th. We notified the news organizations in the pool rotation that night, that we had approval to take the pool. They brought in their passports the next morning, Saturday morning, and I took them over to the Saudi embassy myself that afternoon, where the Saudis had brought in appropriate staff to issue necessary visas. In fact, one reporter had run out of pages in his passport, he traveled so often, so we called the State Department, carried the visa across to State, had them put extra pages in it, took it back to the Saudi embassy, and they added more pages.

The pool left Andrews Air Force Base early Sunday morning, August 12th, stopping off to see the U.S. Central Command operation in Tampa, Florida. The reporters interviewed General Schwarzkopf, who was back there and had not yet moved his headquarters to Riyadh. So, in fact, the press pool got to Saudi Arabia before the commander of the operation had even set up shop there. The reporters arrived on Monday afternoon, August 13th, and continued to act as a pool until August 26th. After the pool began to file its reports, the Saudis started to issue visas to other news organizations and other reporters, but the news organizations in the Pentagon pool asked if we could please keep the pool going until the visa picture had cleared up, which we did.

Jay Peterzell was Time Magazine's representative on the pool. Afterward he wrote this, "The Pentagon people worked hard to keep the press in the country." He offered this assessment: "The pool did give U.S. journalists a way of getting into Saudi Arabia and seeing at least part of what was going on at a time when there was no other way of doing either of those things. Also, in the first two weeks after the wave of TV, newspaper, and magazine correspondents flooded into the country, they did not produce any story that was essentially different from what we in the pool had filed." Those were his words.

Starting with those initial 17 -- representing AP, UPI, Reuters, CNN, National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal -- the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations. The visited ships at sea, they went to air bases, they talked with Marines up north, and soldiers training in the desert. They went aboard AWACS radar warning planes. They quoted generals who said the forces were ready, and privates who said they were not. They wrote about helicopter pilots who crashed into the sand because they couldn't judge distances in the flat, desert light. And reporters described the remarkable speed with which the U.S. military moved so many men and women to the Gulf with so much of their equipment.

The mission given to U.S. forces for Operation Desert Shield was to deter further aggression from Iraq, and to defend Saudi Arabia if deterrence failed. After the President in mid-November announced a further buildup of U.S. forces to give the coalition a true offensive option, my office began working on a plan that would allow reporters to cover combat, while maintaining the operational security necessary to assure tactical surprise, and to save American lives.
One of the first concerns of news organizations who cover the Pentagon in the Pentagon press corps, was that they didn’t have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover the hostilities. They didn’t know what the Saudi government’s policy would be, how the Saudis would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn’t predict what restrictions might be placed on commercial airlines in the event of a war, they asked us whether we would be willing to use a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements, and we agreed to do so.

A U.S. Air Force C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base on January 17th, which is the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. That plane left at the onset of hostilities, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders were willing to dedicate one of their cargo airplanes to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military’s commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action, so that they could get the story out to the American people.

The plan for combat coverage wasn’t something we drew up in a vacuum. We worked closely with the military and with the news media to develop a plan that would meet the needs of both. We had several meetings at the Pentagon with bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps, we talked with reporters who cover the military regularly, and we consulted with some of the people you’ll hear from later today, including General Sidle and Fred Hoffman, and several of my predecessors in the Public Affairs office at the Pentagon, including Jerry Friedheim, whom you quoted earlier. Because an important part of our planning was working with the news media, our drafts and our proposals frequently became public. We did our planning in Mary’s window, and that meant that our false starts and stumbles were in full view.

The main concern of the military is that information not be published which would jeopardize a military operation or endanger the lives of the troops who must carry it out. The preamble to the rules for reporters covering World War II summarized the issue by saying that editors, in wondering what can be published should ask themselves this question, is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?

In formulating the ground rules and the guidelines for covering Operation Desert Storm, we looked at those rules. We looked at the procedures developed in 1942 for World War II, at those handed down by General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff for the reporters who covered the D-Day landings, and at the ground rules established by General MacArthur for covering the Korean War. We carefully studied the rules drawn up for covering the war in Vietnam. Indeed, before the headquarters of Central Command had even moved to Saudi Arabia, General Sidle twice came back and helped us. He had a meeting with us at the Pentagon, and he also went down and talked to Captain Ron Wildemuth who is the public affairs officer for the Central Command, and talked with him about his experiences and his recollections and suggestions from what he learned in Vietnam.

The ground rules that we drew up are not intended to prevent journalists from reporting on incidents that might embarrass the military, or they’re not intended to make military operations look sanitized and tidy. Instead, they are simply and solely intended to prevent the publication of details that could jeopardize a military operation or endanger the safety of U.S. troops.
For example, some of the things that must not be reported: Details of future operations; specific information about troop strengths or locations; while a specific operation is underway, the details of troop movements or tactics; specific information on missing or downed airplanes or ships while search and rescue operations are underway; and information on operational weaknesses that could be used against U.S. forces. Again, that's nothing new. You'll find words almost identical to that in all those ground rules that I talked about from Vietnam and Korea, World War II, and previous military engagements.

American reporters understand the reasoning behind these ground rules. They are patriotic citizens. They don't want anything that they write to endanger lives. I would say that the ground rules are the least controversial aspect of the coverage plan for this war in the Persian Gulf, and, Mr. Chairman, I could read a copy of them at this point if you like, but perhaps it would be best to just ask that they be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator Cole: And may I make a request, if you could, we have so many Senators here and other panelists, could you summarize some of your statements so that we can move on and have a chance to... Whatever you'd like, I just make a suggestion.

Mr. Williams: Yes sir.

The next part of this question is the issue of what some people call censorship. You have the ground rules, how do you enforce the ground rules, and then the third aspect is access to the troops. Those are the other two points I need to talk about.

The reporters who covered World War II wrote their stories and submitted them to a military censor. That person cut out anything they felt shouldn't be published. The decision of the censor was final. There is no such system of censorship in Operation Desert Shield. Instead, there's a procedure that lets us appeal to news organizations before the harm is done, to discuss with them any material and story that we think would violate these ground rules. Here's how it works:

Stories written by reporters who are out with the troops, and this review, this ground rule appeal process applies only to the stories written by the stories out with the troops -- it doesn't apply to those back in Riyadh or Dhahran, those doing original reporting, those talking to their own sources, or those covering the military briefings, or indeed, anyone outside Saudi Arabia. The reporters who are out with the troops write their stories and show them to their public affairs officers who are with them on the scene. They discuss any problems. A public affairs officer might say there's a piece of information here in this line that violates ground rule number five. The reporter will say, yes, I agree, and change his copy. Or the reporter will say, I disagree with you, I've read the ground rule, I have a different interpretation, and the public affairs officer simply flags this story and sends it on to the press censor in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It's not held up, it's not treated separately, it's not held back, it goes on to the press center. There's another discussion there, with our director of the press center there, Colonel Bill Muldy, and the appropriate representatives of that medium of the newspaper story, the newspaper pool coordination, and so forth. They have a similar discussion. If the pool coordinator says yes, I see your point, what were we thinking, they'll change it there. If they disagree, they'll send it on to us in the Pentagon for our opinion.
If we, too, think there's a problem, then we call the appropriate bureau chief from that news organization and talk about the story with them. We understand that news delayed is news destroyed, we need to move quickly, and we act as fast as we can.

The appeal process that I've described to you was intended only to discuss potential ground rule violations with editors and bureau chiefs, and to remind them of the need to protect sensitive information. Unlike a system of censorship which leaves the final decision in the place of the military, the final decision in this case is in the hands of journalists, not the military. Since Operation Desert Storm began on January 16th, there have been over 820 print pool stories written by newspaper, wire service, news magazine correspondents. Of those 820, only five have been submitted to us in the Pentagon for review. We quickly cleared four of them. The fifth was a story that came up over the weekend, which described what we considered to be very sensitive intelligence methods that our troops in the field are using. We called the news organization, we described the problem to them, and in fact the news organization, a newspaper here in town, elected not to publish that story and not to release it to the rest of the pool. So I think that aspect of the coverage plan is working well.

I should also emphasize that the live reports that you see on television, clearly, are not subject to this kind of ground rule appeal process. You see on the screen sometimes cleared by military censors. Obviously, that's not the case if someone is talking live. The only way we have this appeal process is stories that are coming from the troops in the field.

The final part of this discussion, and perhaps the most controversial part, is access to the troops. As the number of troops in the desert has grown, so has the number of reporters there to cover them. The U.S. and international press corps has gone from zero on August 2nd, to 17 on the first pool, rising to 800 by mid-December, and is now over 1400. Obviously, most of those reporters, the good ones, want to be out with the troops. They want to be where the action is, just as they've done in previous conflicts. But with the hundreds of fiercely independent reporters seeking to join up with combat units, we concluded that when the combat started, we would have to rely on pools. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to describe a little bit about what this pool system is.

Before the air campaign began over a month ago, news organizations were afraid that these pools simply wouldn't get the job done, that they wouldn't get reporters out to see the action. They reminded us of their experience in Panama where we got them down there and they were treated to a discussion of the history of the Panama Canal from the Charge and the embassy -- not exactly what they, or we, had in mind.

But as viewers and readers and listeners know, we had pools in place before Operation Desert Storm began. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of the first air strikes. They were on board a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat. They were on the air force bases where the fighter planes and the bombers were taking off around the clock, and they were already out with several ground units in the desert.

Carl Rochelle of CNN was asked on the air how he felt this was going -- he'd covered a number of other pools. He said, "I must tell you, I'm more satisfied with the pool shoot I just came off than with any of the others that I have been on."


Now those first days were not without problems. We know of cases where stories were approved in the field, only to be delayed for more than a day on their trip back to the press center in Dhahran. The first stories written about the stealth fighters were, for some reason, sent all the way back to the F-117's home base in Nevada to be cleared, and that's certainly not something that we had in mind. I'm sure some of the reporters that you'll hear from later today will have examples of their own. But the main question right now is reporters' access to the field if there are hostilities on the ground, if what journalists are calling the ground war breaks out, or as we would say, the ground phase of this campaign.

Unlike World War II, this is not going to be an operation in which reporters can ride around in jeeps going from one part of the front to another, or like Vietnam, where reporters could hop a helicopter to specific points of action from day to day. If a ground war begins on the Arabian Peninsula, the battlefield will be chaotic, and the action will be violent. This will be modern, intense warfare. Reporters at the front will have to be in armored vehicles or in helicopters. They'll have to carry their own gas masks and chemical protective suits along with all their other gear. Those with the front line troops will be part of a highly mobile operation. It will be deadly serious business, and our front line units simply will not have the capacity to accommodate large numbers of reporters.

To cover the conflict, reporters will have to be a part of the unit, they'll have to be able to move with it. Each commander has an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. While he can certainly take the reporters that he knows are coming, he cannot keep absorbing those who arrive on their own, unexpectedly, in their own four wheel drives. The pool system allows us to tell the divisional commanders how many reporters they'll be responsible for. For the reporters in the pools, they're allowed to stay with the military units they're covering -- learning as much as they can about the unit plans and the unit tactics.

As I said earlier our latest count shows over 1400 reporters, editors, producers, photographers and technicians now registered in both Dhahran and Riyadh, representing the U.S. and the international press. In fairness, not all of them want to go to the front, but certainly more want to go than we can possibly accommodate, and that's why we've gone to this system of pools of reporters, rotating groups whose stories and pictures from the front are available to all.

Of course the ground war hasn't started yet, and in this situation, you have military units that are out there repositioning, some of them moving nearly every day. If the ground war does start, it won't be like Vietnam with minor skirmishes here and there, and a major offensive every now and then. It will be a set-piece operation, as carefully orchestrated as possible. In that sense, as General Powell has said before, it will be like D-Day. The situation that we have right there in the desert right now is like D-Day, with reporters waiting for the military action to start. It's useful to remember, by the way, that 461 reporters were signed up at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force to cover D-Day, and of that number, just 27 were actually ashore with the first wave of troops.

So the situation on the ground is a little like D-Day, reporters waiting for the action to start. But even so, when Desert Storm began, 43 reporters were already out with ground units, and that number has been growing. By the end of this week, 100 reporters will be with Army units; 33 with Marines on land; 18 more will be with Marines on amphibious ships; and that's in addition to the 19 who are covering the Navy on ships at sea; the 14 who have been roving around air bases covering the Air Force part of the campaign; and the eight more covering the medical part of the
story. That's a total of 192 reporters who will be out with combat forces by the end of the week.

Mr. Chairman, I have some heart-rending concluding remarks, but in the interest of time, I'll cut them out.

Senator Cole: Thank you very much, Mr. Williams. In the interest of time I'll limit my questions to three to five minutes, and I'd appreciate it if my colleagues would do the same.

Q: Just to get back to the question of access, Mr. Williams. Reporters are saying that there is an inadequate access problem, and that where access does exist, the use of military escorts impedes reporting in a way that's, I think, fairly obvious. You, yourself, were just in Saudi Arabia. Do you agree, and do you have any additional thoughts on the subject of the pool, its necessity up to now, and the question of having someone along with the reporter every time, apparently, to monitor what the soldier's saying to him.

A: Let me say that I agree that the biggest question is access to the troops. I've tried to spell out reasons why we can't simply open the front to folks to wander around and sort of have a "come as you are" wherever the divisions are.

The question of escorts is a vexing one. I had a telephone conference call before this operation started with as many public affairs officers as we could round up in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, and Dhahran. I'm sensitive to this problem, having been a former reporter myself. The idea of an escort is not to be a hovering presence. The ratio is not one escort to every reporter. They are there primarily to facilitate reporters getting to where they need to be, to look out for their needs, to keep them moving, to keep them joined up with the unit, to perform those military things that escorts do. They are there also to perform this part of the ground rule appeal process that I've described, where a reporter writes his story and then says what do you think.

They are not there to leap in front of the camera every time somebody says the word chaplain. And I keep seeing, every time there's a story on ABC about the escorts, I keep seeing this same, ancient piece of videotape taken during Operation Desert Shield where some public affairs officer heard a word and leaped in front of the camera. That's not the way it's supposed to work. Reporters are not supposed to hover around reporters. I can't deny that there's some of that going on. We keep asking them not to.

Part of what you see here, sir, as the operation has gone on, is just as you've seen reservists called up, learning how to fire tanks and brushing up on their training, you've also seen reservist public affairs officers as well, and they are practicing their trade in the full view of reporters. So escorts are not supposed to be a stultifying presence.

Q: One final question. In Vietnam there were no pools, there were no escorts. Apparently things have changed for a reason since Vietnam. Why were there no pools or escorts there? Why do we have pools and escorts here?

A: I tried to describe what the difference is on the battlefield.

Q: But there hasn't been a battlefield yet.

A: There is one right now, there are troops out there in the desert. Of course in that sense, you're right. That's another difference between Vietnam and this operation. Many of the reporters who have been commenting on our operation are
contrasting Vietnam during the Vietnam War to this operation where there is, in a sense, no ground operation yet. The difference is that in Vietnam you had what military commanders call a mature theater. You all know what that is from your time in the military -- that's a situation where you have helicopter routes built up. Somebody wakes up in Saigon and says I want to join up with this unit, hops on a helicopter, gets on a jeep goes out, joins up with that unit, stays there a couple of days perhaps, maybe a week, if it's a television crew maybe stay a day or so, come back, and file their stories. That is not an option in this operation. It isn't a mature theater.

Some of these units are way, way far away from where the press center is. We've established a sort of secondary press logistics operation at another Saudi base that's further up toward the front, but it's just not the kind of thing where you can hop a jungle taxi, a helicopter, and get up to where the troops are.

The second part about escorts is, part of that is driven by our agreement with the Saudis. This is still a sovereign territory, they are Saudi bases, and they asked that when U.S. reporters are on their facilities they be escorted by U.S. military personnel.

Q: Have you asked these escorts or public affairs personnel not to get involved in any way with the interviews between the reporters and the troops?
A: As I mentioned, sir, that was one of the comments that I made in my telephone conference call with public affairs officers before they went.

Q: So that is your policy.
A: Yes sir.

Q: And to your best knowledge it's being followed?
A: I keep hearing horror stories so there, obviously, are exceptions. But it's something that we keep working on.

Senator Cole: Thank you very much. Senator Roth?

Senator Roth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Q: Have there been any breaches that give you serious concern with the current policy? In other words, has the present program worked effectively, or have there been situations where valuable information has become available through the coverage of the media?
A: I would have to say, sir, that I think the program has worked well. It's not to say that, one of the unusual joys of my job is that I get complaints from journalists who think the system is too restrictive, and I get complaints in the Pentagon from military people who think the system isn't restrictive enough. But I would have to say that I don't know of any serious cases where this system, where reports that have been filed from the troops in the field, have caused any serious problems.

Q: Your rules and regulations, obviously, do not apply say to reporters in Baghdad.
A: Clearly not.

Q: How serious do you think the problem of propaganda from Baghdad has been? Has that been a significant factor? In other words, it's pretty obvious that Saddam
Hussein has used effectively, the right to stay there as a means of getting his message across. Has that been a serious problem from your standpoint?

A: I appreciate the question. I guess I've tried very hard in this job not to be the government's press critic. That's not what I'm paid to do. I would say from a military standpoint, from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, that clearly, only certain stories can get out of Iraq under the system that they have. So, for example, there are reports where military bombing missions may have caused civilian damage despite the best efforts of our pilots to focus their attacks strictly and solely on military targets. It's frustrating to us that reporters there are not allowed to go out and see some of the military targets that have been hit. The only reports that the Iraqis will permit out are those about civilian targets or problems where civilians have been hurt, or there's been collateral damage. That's clearly not an accurate picture about what's going on in Baghdad or Iraq, and it's frustrating to us that the Iraqis, obviously, won't allow that.

Q: As I understand it, Walter Cronkite will later propose that we go back to a system more similar to World War II, or similar to that use in World War II. I understand in part why you think that would not work out satisfactorily, but if you limited the number of reporters, would it be possible to go back where the individual reporters could have freedom of access, go where he wanted, and then depend upon censorship rather than the present approach?

A: I guess there are two parts to that. One is, I don't know whether that provisions envisions or does not envision censorship, again, like there was in World War II, but let's set that aside.

Q: I don't know either.

A: This battlefield is not going to be the kind of thing where a reporter can get in a four wheel drive and say I want to be with the 82nd Airborne, I'm just going to drive out there. First of all, right now, we hope very much that most people don't know where the 82nd Airborne is. Although many reporters, I think in their defense, do know, and have not reported it. But assuming they did know where it is, there are no roads to get there. They would have to simply get in their four wheel drives and head across the vast desert. And if they tried to do this after the campaign started, it would be in wartime. It would be not the kind of thing where there's a stable front, where there's a clear place that they would be safe to be behind. The second thing is, there would be units in the 82nd Airborne. I presume -- this is the case for all our military units -- where there would be security officers keeping 360 degrees of security. They have no way of knowing who this is driving up in their brand new white Land Rover.

So I don't think it's practical, I don't think it's possible. I think reporters, for better or worse, whether they like it or not, are going to have to depend on military transportation. That's why we came up with the pool system. We can send reporters out with the 82nd Airborne in advance, they can be there -- when there's action, they'll already be there.

Q: One final question. First, let me congratulate you for the excellent job you're doing. I know it's extraordinarily difficult. But going back to access to the troops and escorts, doesn't the presence of an escort provide an inhibition on the part of whoever might be questioned? In other words, if you're a GI, a sergeant, a corporal, and you're being asked questions by a reporter, and right there standing, an escort represents the government, does that not place a limitation on freedom? Is that necessary?

A: It's not necessary, Senator, and that's not the way the escort system is supposed to work. They're not supposed to be hovering minders that stand over the
Shoulder of the reporter in eye shot of the GI who’s being interviewed, scowling at them. That’s not the way it’s supposed to work.

Q: Is there one escort per reporter?
A: No sir. There aren’t that many escorts.

Q: What is the percentage? Do you have any idea?
A: I’ll have to check on that sir, I don’t know precisely what the ratio is.

Senator Cole: Thank you, Senator Roth. Chairman Glenn?

Senator Glenn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Q: About ten days ago the New York Times, Mr. Apple, wrote that the pool system may be on the verge of collapse. In fact some people are actually suing the government over this. Last Wednesday, Mr. Apple reported that in meetings with networks and bureau chiefs last fall you indicated that the use of press pools was not intended to be permanent. According to Mr. Apple you said, and I quote, "We want to go unilaterally as soon as possible." And there are references in the press rules, as a matter of fact, to the use of pools in the initial stages of the conflict. Are you giving consideration to abandoning the pools?

A: I don’t know that I’d say abandoning it. We're certainly hoping that at some point we can get beyond it. Reporters hate pools -- we hate pools, too. We would rather be in the business of trying to help get information out, than constantly having to supervise pools and referee problems among pool members. But I think we can’t think of any other way to do it right now.

If the military is going to say, and I don’t think we have any choice right now, we can’t say “Y’all come to the battlefield.” We can’t simply open it up, and whoever wants to go to the 82nd joins up there, and whoever wants to go to the 101st goes up there. It’s not practical. Those are mobile units. When the time comes, they’re going to move, and they can’t just take whoever happens to be with them at the time.

Q: The conflict so far has been an air campaign, and we expect a ground war very shortly unless something happens today or tomorrow. But there are very big differences, major differences, in trying to cover an air war as opposed to a ground war. What major changes do you see in the press rules as we move into a ground phase?

A: Substantially, very few changes. We will use the system we have now. We’ve gotten more and more, as every day goes by, more and more reporters out with ground units. As I say, the number has continued to grow, and the total number will be almost 200 by the end of the week with all forces — air, land, and sea. But we’ve concentrated here, over the past week, in trying to get more reporters out with ground units.

Q: I think we have two different wars going on in some respects. We’re there to win the military victory. Saddam Hussein, obviously, is playing for a political victory. He could, even in defeat, come out a winner. He could come out militarily a loser, but politically rise with greater stature in the Arab world. Media from other countries are complaining that they’re being unfairly denied access to the reporting pools. I agree with your responsibility to the American public and press first, but the international aspect of our coalition, I think, is very significant. What is the Pentagon policy with regard to foreign journalists?
A: The Pentagon policy is that we will have slots in our pools for international press. We have slots in our pools for Arab reporters, for Saudi reporters. We have other slots in our pools for international reporters -- clearly not enough to satisfy them, but there clearly aren't enough to satisfy American reporters, either. I should point out, however, that other nations have their own agreements. The British have their own arrangements for British reporters to cover British troops; the French, the French troops; and so forth.

Q: Are those slots filled now? Are the coalition reporters in those slots now and reporting back to their countries?
A: Yes sir.

Q: The Persian Gulf conflict may be very unique to the extent that host country concerns have affected press coverage. What rules have you imposed because of such host country concerns?
A: I think the initial pool I discussed that covered the first forces, was in reaction to that. The fact that there have to be --

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Q: -- someone watching the interviews, someone hovering over a reporter who wishes to interview one of the troops. Are those guidelines now in writing, or are they just being given verbally and sort of generally understood in the theater?
A: There are written guidelines and ground rules. It's also been made very clearly by frequent messages to our military folks over there what the proper role for escorts is.

Q: We've had comments about previous experience in Grenada and Panama, and back to Vietnam. But how pertinent, really, are the experiences in Grenada and Panama to this far, far larger operation? Are they really that pertinent? Those were really almost [police] actions compared to this.
A: That's right. They were only to the extent that I think we learned some lessons there and have tried not to repeat the same mistakes in this operation. In Panama, one could argue, and indeed some have with some justification, that we weren't ready. I think we were ready in this operation.

Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Q: Mr. Williams, I want to join with the others in complimenting you on the extraordinary job that I think you've done under very difficult circumstances. It seems to me that you have tried to balance both your service to the Department of Defense with service to the media -- helping us to know what's happening through them, and I congratulate you on your performance in a very difficult job. I think you're very credible. I think you'll make a great anchor man at some time after this is all over. (Laughter)
A: Thank you, sir.

Q: What strikes me as I listen to you and as I've read over some of the advance statements of those who will testify after you, is that while there is disagreement here, the ground of disagreement is extremely narrow between yourself and the press. There's a group on either side. One, I suppose, that would like not to have any press coverage at all and leave the coverage to what the military announces. There's another group on the other side, that would allow the press to go wherever they wanted to go, but it seems to me that most of the press covering the war and yourself, have some basic agreements here that you don't want to have any
coverage that would jeopardize the security of American troops, and you want to provide, however, as much coverage as possible within those limits. Am I correct in that reaction from your perspective? And what are, specifically, the major arguments? Is it really over the question of whether the pools should continue?

A: I agree with your characterization, sir. I think that is an accurate one. As I tried to indicate in my testimony, there really is no argument -- there may be some quibbling here and there, but there's fundamentally no argument over the ground rules. I think everybody understands that there are certain things that can't be blurted out in wartime. I don't think there's any, although there was some initial discomfort with it, I think we've gotten past the problem where everyone worried that this so-called ground rule appeal or security review, whatever you want to call it, process, would be a chill on reporting. We had some problems working it out early on, some cases where it took too long. I think the main problems now are simply access to the troops, and the question of pools.

We would certainly be willing to go to what reporters call unilateral coverage where you file to your own news organization only, but the other side of that is, there have to be some limitations on the number of reporters out in the field. I've talked with many bureau chiefs and editors of Pentagon press corps organizations who are concerned that unless we can open it up to a much, much, much larger presence in the field, then they would just as soon stay with the pool system, or perhaps have half pools and some unilateral where we can. But I think the main problem is access.

Q: Your discussions with the press are continuing on that, is that fair to say? Are you still open to input?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Perhaps something will come out of this hearing today that can be of help to you and to the press, obviously. Let me ask another question about the limits of your role, just to hear you speak on it. I know that some wonder whether the Department of Defense believes, and you believe, whether government in a time of war, has the right to try to manage press coverage of the war to help maintain public support of the war. Is that in any sense, in your opinion, an appropriate standard or goal for your activities?
A: Not for mine, no. There are people in government who do that, but they don't work in my office, and that's clearly outside the jurisdiction of what my job is.

Q: Who are they?
A: The public diplomacy folks who try to get a message out to the Arab world and to other nations about why we do what we do, why we fight. But that's not what I do in my office.

Q: So the one standard that you measure yourself, two standards. One is to try to gain the press access, I gather; and the limiting standard, the only limiting standard that you would apply, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that of what might be called battlefield security, security of personnel.
A: Yes sir. It's not legitimate for us to object to something because it's embarrassing or because it's critical or because we don't like it. There are only two tests -- one is security of an operation, and the other is the safety of troops.

Q: I want to talk a little bit about the Sibley Commission whose report I've read over and appreciate. In recommendation four, the commission stated, "a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by
the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible." Do you think the Department of Defense in the Persian Gulf War has acted consistent with that recommendation?

A: Yes sir, I do. The number of ground rules that we have for reporting on this operation is quite small compared to the number of ground rules that existed in Vietnam. So I think we have tried to boil it down to a simple as set as possible. Early on when we were stumbling around to where we finally got, some of the lists of ground rules we had were astonishingly complicated, and I think we agreed that if you couldn't understand ground rules, they weren't going to be effective, so we did try to boil them down to as simple and small a set as possible.

Q: Based on your relations with the American media thus far in the war, do you think that the media has applied voluntary rules of self discipline to itself? That is, self discipline to the extent of concern about the security of American military personnel there.

A: Yes sir, I have no question about that. I'm very impressed by it. A number of reporters... My experience all along, when I go to Saudi Arabia and there are reporters accompanying Secretary Cheney, folks who ordinarily during peacetime understand that their goal is to write what they think is proper and say what they think they should say, will go up to military commanders and say is it all right if I say this, or is it all right if I say that. I'm very impressed by their discipline and their understanding, and their patriotism.

Senator Cohen: Mr. Williams, if I could just follow that particular question, are you suggesting that the Sidle panel, which contained a number of recommendations, that those recommendations are not necessarily pertinent in this case because of the topography? In other words, the geography or topography is different, and therefore, different rules have had to be formulated. That's one side of the question, I suppose, because there are others who would argue that the rules are being formulated in order to hide behind the topography. The question is, what accounts for the change in the rules vis-a-vis the Sidle report? What is different?

A: A couple of things, and of course you'll hear from General Sidle and Fred Hoffman in awhile. They can give you, undoubtedly, a much more eloquent answer. But you have to remember what caused the Sidle panel to be put together, and that was the operation in Grenada -- a remote operation where there weren't reporters, and the military decided not to take any along with it on the first wave. The Sidle panel said isn't there something we can do to fix that. What they came up with was the idea of the DoD National Media Pool where you would have a permanent sort of rotating list, people on standby, ready to go, stuff in their trunk. You call them up and you say show up at Andrews, and they just appear with very short notice, and can be taken off to wherever the military might be doing some far-flung operation -- whether it be Grenada or Panama or evacuation in Liberia or the reflagging operation in the Gulf, whatever it might be. Then, as more reporters arrive, you would stand the pools down, and you would have open, or what some call unilateral coverage. That is precisely what we did in Operation Desert Shield. Even though technically, the thing was already public -- operational security wasn't an issue, but we used the pool because it was a ready means to do that. We got a pool over there, and then as more reporters came in, we stood it down. So a separate issue.

Now we come to the plan for covering combat in Operation Desert Storm. We're not technically using the Sidle panel's point-by-point blueprint for a national media pool, because there are 1400 reporters already there. We're simply using some of the architecture to form pools to cover individual divisions because we think that's the only practical way to do it. That's where the topography and the battlefield strategy come into play.
Q: Can I ask about what the criteria are that the Saudi government has established in granting visas? Are there any non-tariff barriers that might exist in those criteria? In other words, do they look behind the person applying and look to philosophy, background, experience, whether one is considered to be too aggressive, too pro or con a particular philosophical bent?

A: Number one, I don’t claim to be an expert on the Saudi visa process. The only time we get involved with that are when reporters are going to accompany Secretary Cheney on a visit, and then it’s people who cover him all the time at the Pentagon; or this case of 126 reporters that I told you about earlier. Looking at the list of reporters, the Saudi government is granting visas from all over the world -- not only here in the embassy in Washington, but indeed, reporters from many nations, and I think it would be very hard to hold that list up to the light and try to see something behind it.

Q: The question was raised about the escorts that go along with the reporters out in the field. That’s one form of potential type of censorship. Is there any indication you’re aware of that an attempt by any of the military officers in the field to discourage soldiers from talking to the press?

A: Not that I know of. Now reporters may know examples themselves, but it’s certainly not the policy of this Department of Defense to discourage reporters from talking, and indeed, I can think of many examples of stories that I’ve read where reporters have really talked, criticized the operation, invoked their ancient right to complain. I know of no such policy.

Q: Some of the rules have changed as the war has evolved. For example, initially, there were reports as to the location of a downed aircraft, what type of aircraft it was. The Pentagon said wait a minute, we’ve got a problem with that. It’s going to impair our search and rescue mission. So I think it was a 36 hour or 48 hour delay was imposed, as well as a restriction on identifying the particular type of aircraft. Did you hear any complaints from the press with respect to that?

A: Only some puzzlement that we couldn’t seem to enforce it with any degree of regularity, but it’s an interesting example. In Vietnam, the press rules said that downed aircraft will be identified periodically. Here is a situation in this operation, where as soon as an aircraft went down, someone says we just lost an F-13, we just lost an F-15. That was the way this operation started. Indeed, high people in our government were saying that. Then we all stopped and said wait a minute. We’ve got active search and rescue going for these airplanes, we should wait before we tell the other side there is a downed airplane. That skirmish you just had, which may have resulted in an airplane down did, in fact, down an F-18. So we are not specific any more about the kind of aircraft that’s gone down or where.

Q: I agree. What I’m asking you is has there been any complaint about that? It would seem to me that I’ve heard no complaint coming from the press that that has been a form of censorship or undue impediment to the reporting of the news.

A: I think there was some early complaint about it, but when they understood what it was that we had in mind, it wasn’t a problem. They were sympathetic.

Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my compliments to the high degree of professionalism which you’ve shown in your position.

A: Thank you, sir.

Q: There was a story in last Sunday’s New York Times by James LeMoyne about the Pentagon strategy, as he calls it. Here are some quotes from that very critical article of his. It says that "Three Pentagon press officials in the Gulf region said
they spend significant time analyzing reporters' stories in order to make recommendations on how to sway coverage in the Pentagon's favor, and Pentagon press officers warned reporters who asked hard questions that their requests for interviews with senior commanders and visits in the field were in jeopardy." That's one of the statements that he made in his article. A little later on he said, "At times, Pentagon press officers would stop an on-camera interview because they did not like what was being portrayed."

Another thing he said was, "If the troops' frank comments angered senior Pentagon officials, reporters' access immediately suffered." Then he gave an example. "For nearly two months, for example, this reporter had a standing request for an interview with the chief American commander, General Schwarzkopf. Over several weeks, a Pentagon press officer telephoned with updates on the chances of getting the interview, 'The General liked your last story,' the officer would say. Or more ominously, 'The General did not like your last story.' He said if articles were not 'liked,' the interview would probably be denied."

Another quote from this article is that "A Pentagon press official said privately that Army commanders felt there had been too many critical stories."

Can you comment on those quotes? Would it be proper for the people in the field, the so-called escorts, in any way to suggest that access to a soldier or to a commander would be affected by the type of story that was written?
A: It's not proper, Senator. It happens, nonetheless. I know of cases where unit commanders were upset by a story that was written, felt it reflected badly on their troops, and didn't want to see those reporters again. We've tried to weigh in those cases, and suggest that that's a very short term game, that that's not a legitimate concern, and they should think twice about that, and I think in many cases they have changed their minds. I can't say that military commanders aren't human, but it's certainly not a policy, and it's certainly something we discourage.

Q: So it is your policy to not link access on the part of reporters to anything that they might write, providing it's within your ground rules as to what may be said about troop movements and so forth?
A: That's right, and I can cite cases where reporters have written stories that commanders didn't like, but those reporters are right back with the commanders.

Q: That's a principle, we'll call that a principle. Another principle that you've enunciated here is that escorts should not hover around the reporters as they are conducting their interviews. Another point, you said they should not be in eye-shot, that your escorts should not be in eye-shot of the reporters as the reporters are interviewing...
A: Of the person interviewed, yes sir. In other words, if I'm being inter-
viewed by Senator Glenn here, from the Detroit News or whatever, the Toledo Blade, perhaps, would be a better example... (Laughter) If you're the public affairs escort and I'm the private down here in the trenches and I'm looking at you and you're a major and I'm a private, clearly that has some relationship. That's what I meant by eye-shot.

Q: It could have a chilling effect.
A: It could well have a chilling effect, yes sir.

Q: I think that principle might come as some surprise in the field, that your escort officers are not supposed to be actually within eye-shot, and that would include ear-shot, I assume, of the interview. I'm wondering if it wouldn't be wise.
if that is your principle, and it’s a good one, that it be clearly stated to your escort officers. From everything I’ve read, that is not the operating principle in the field.

A: I understand what you’re saying, sir. I do hear examples of this. I think in the main, public affairs escorts do a good job and do understand that they’re not supposed to be hovering, chilling presences.

Q: When we say hovering, chilling -- to be very specific, the escort officer should not be within eye-shot or ear-shot of the interview?
A: We’ll certainly look at that, sir.

Q: Is that your principle?
A: That is, indeed.

Q: You’ve indicated in response to Senator Glenn’s question that, he asked you whether or not these principles as to your escort officers’ conduct were in writing, and your answer was that you have written guidelines and ground rules. Were you referring to guidelines and ground rules for escort officers, or for reporters?
A: For reporters, but they benefit both. It spells out what each will do.

Q: But in terms of the type of principles we’ve just been talking about, that the escort officer or no one else should link access to an interview with what that person says substantively in interviews, and that the escort officer should not be within ear-shot or eye-shot of the interview. Those type of guidance for your escort officers, those are not in writing as principles yet, are they?
A: I don’t believe we’ve ever put some of those common sense things in writing, no sir. If a reporter says something bad, you should still let him back. I don’t believe we’ve ever had a rule like that, but we’ll certainly be happy to look at it. Some of those things I would call the rule of reason or common sense.

Q: There’s a lot of rules of reason and common sense that you put in writing. A: Some, but there are many more that we don’t, perhaps that we just expect good public affairs officers to know, and I think in the main, that’s the way they perform.

Q: I’m not saying in the main they don’t, I’m just saying I think it would clear the air a great deal if you put those kind of principles for your escort officers in writing as principles.

Thank you, my time is up.

Senator Cole: Thank you very much, Mr. Williams. You’ve been a good witness, very informative.
Mr. Williams: Thank you.
February 22, 1991

MEMORANDUM

To: Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps

From: Pete Williams

Subject: News Media Coverage of Operation Desert Storm

The number of reporters and photographers covering soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines taking part in Operation Desert Storm continues to grow. This week several more reporters joined up with Army and Marine forces in the field. Pools have also been permanently stationed on ships and air bases. Here is a summary of coverage arrangements for combat forces.

We have 97 reporters out with the Army, 34 with the Marines ashore, and 10 with the amphibious forces, for a total of 141 reporters with ground combat forces. That number should increase by 14 to 155 by early next week. We also have 10 reporters with the Navy on ships in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and 13 stationed on air bases. In Dhahran, we have a six-person Navy quick reaction pool and an eight-person medical quick reaction pool on standby. In all, 178 reporters, photographers, and camera crew members will be with U.S. forces by the middle of next week with another 14 on standby. I have attached a list showing how the reporters in the pool will be spread throughout the theatre.

Thank you for your continued suggestions and counsel.

Attachment
22 February 1991

OPERATION DESERT STORM
MEDIA POOL PERSONNEL LOCATOR

Wire Service

ARMY
AP
AP
AP
Reuters
Reuters
AP
UPI
UPI
John Pomfret
Neil MacFarQuhar
Robert Dvorachak
Gary Regenstreif
Kevin Cooney
Jeff Ulbrich
Paul Majencie
Fred Bayles
Leon Daniel
Mark Fritz
Tom Ferraro
101ST Airborne Division
VII Corps Headquarters
82ND Airborne Division
82ND Airborne Division
18TH Aviation Brigade
XVIII ABN Corps Headquarters
1ST Armored Division
3RD Armored Division
1ST Infantry Division
1ST Cavalry Division
24TH Infantry Division

MARINES
AP
Reuters
UPI
AP
Denis Gray
Jeff Franks
Anthony Miller
John King
2ND Marine Division
2ND Marine Division
1ST Force Service Support Group
Amphib Pool #15

AIRC FORCE
AP
Lederer
AF Pool #4
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AP
Reuters
AP
UPI
Alexander Higgins
Trequesser
.Rosenblum
Alexander
ARCENT Support Command
(STALLBY deploy in 48 hours)
Amphib Pool #6
(will deploy when OPTEMPO permits)
Navy Pool #3
(NSTALLBY deploy next rotation)
Navy Pool #11
(STALLBY quick reaction pool)

Newspapers

ARMY
Los Angeles Times
New York Times
Cox Newspapers
Wall Street Journal
USA Today
Knight-Ridder
Cox Newspapers
Detroit Free Press
John Balzar
John Kifner
Ron Martz
Bob Davis
Lawrence Jolidon
Carol Morello
Joe Albright
Frank Brune
18TH Aviation Brigade
101ST Airborne Division
24TH Infantry Division
82ND Airborne Division
20TH Engineer Brigade
20TH Engineer Brigade
18TH Corps Artillery
3RD Armored Cav Regiment
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International Newspapers

Arab News
The Independent
Saudi Newspaper

David Sharrock
Phil Davison
Sultan Al Bazie

ARCENT Support Command
1ST Force Service Support Group
1ST Force Service Support Group

Television

ARMY

NBC
Gary Fairman
Fritz VanKlein
Gary Matsumoto
Maurice Roper
Ronald Malo III
Robert Franken
Thomas Greene
Brian Haefli
George Lewis
Addison Armstrong
Bart Childs
Scott Pelley
Warren Arnstein
James Helling
Bob Martin
Mike Von Fremd
Keith Kay
George Bouza
Dermott VonKinder
George Davies
Martha Teichner
Decarvalho
Reinhardt
Jim Wooten
Rick Hull
Neil Papworth
Doug James
Sergei Bodic
Mitch Farkas
Arthur Kent
Tom Baer
Martin Schmidt-Bleek
John Sweeney
Mike Simon
Chris Turner

101ST Airborne Division
101ST Airborne Division
101ST Airborne Division
24TH Infantry Division
24TH Infantry Division
24TH Infantry Division
82ND Airborne Division
82ND Airborne Division
20TH Engineer Brigade
20TH Engineer Brigade
18TH Corps Artillery
18TH Corps Artillery
3RD Armored Cav Regiment
18TH Aviation Brigade
18TH Aviation Brigade
18TH Aviation Brigade
18TH Aviation Brigade
18TH Aviation Brigade
1ST Armored Division
1ST Armored Division
1ST Armored Division
3RD Armored Division
3RD Armored Division
3RD Armored Division
1ST Infantry Division
1ST Infantry Division
1ST Infantry Division
1ST Cavalry Division
1ST Cavalry Division
1ST Cavalry Division
2ND Armored Cavalry Regiment
2ND Armored Cavalry Regiment
2ND Armored Cavalry Regiment

MARINES

NBC
Tony Wasserman
Maurice Odello
Marc Dulmage
Kit Swartz

1ST Marine Division
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CDRVIICORPS MAIN FWD///PAO///
CDRXVIIIABNCORPS///PAO///
CG FIRST FSSG
CG FIRST MARDIV
CG SECOND MARDIV
CG FOURTH MEB
CG FIFTH MEB
CG I MEF
CG II MEF

UNCLAS

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

OPER/DESERT STORM

MSGID/SYS RRM/Osd (PA)///
APM/SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS - PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING MEDIA POOL PRODUCTS

REF A: SECDEF 23222QZ FEB 91

1. REFERENCE MESSAGE DEALING WITH PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR CONTINGENCY USE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GROUND PHASE OF OPERATION DESERT STORM IS RESCINDED.

2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ESCORT OFFICERS WILL INFORM ALL NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL BRIEFED ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OR CONTENT OF THE REFERENCED MESSAGE THAT THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND IS NO LONGER IN EFFECT.

3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ESCORT OFFICERS WILL DISCUSS THE EXTREME SENSITIVITIES OF CURRENT OPERATIONS, UNIT MOVEMENTS, AND UNIT LOCATIONS WITH POOL REPORTERS AND EMPHASIZE THAT POOL REPORTS FOR THE NEXT 48 HOURS MUST AVOID DISCUSSING ANY--REPEAT--ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD BE OF HELP TO THE ENEMY. NO--REPEAT--NO NEWS MEDIA POOL REPORTS, VIDEOTAPE, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND AUDIO TAPE WILL BE SUBJECT TO EMBARGO. HOWEVER, ALL POOL MATERIAL WILL BE SUBJECT TO CAREFUL SECURITY REVIEW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEWS MEDIA GROUND RULES AND GUIDELINES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED. PAO'S MUST BE ESPECIALLY VIGILANT FOR
INFORMATION THAT WOULD BETRAY UNIT LOCATIONS OR OPERATIONAL PLANS.

4. TO ASSURE THAT SENSITIVE INFORMATION DOES NOT INADVERTANTLY PASS
THE SECURITY REVIEW AT THE SOURCE, ALL AIR FORCE, MARINE AND NAVY
MATERIALS WILL BE SUBJECT TO A SECOND LEVEL OF SECURITY REVIEW AT JIB
DHAHRAH BEFORE RELEASE. ANY MATERIAL WHICH MAY POTENTIALLY VIOLATE
THE GROUND RULES SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BY TELEPHONE WITH JIB
RIYADH AND, IF NECESSARY, OASD/PA. PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH ARMY
MATERIALS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. UNTIL THEN, ARMY
MATERIAL WILL BE HELD AT KKMC.

5. THESE PROCEDURES WILL BE IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
What equipment is available? Do you have enough telephones, fax machines, etc?

Is any military communications equipment available for filing? Where?

What happens if there is a power/telecommunications outage? What are alternative means of moving media products?

How will pool print reports be sent to OASD(PA) for release in Washington?

What do media do after their initial filing?

How will SITREPS on media activities be provided to OASD(PA)? How often?

Do all media reps present in theater share the combat pool’s reports? How is material distributed?

**PHASE VI (Influx of Additional Media)**

If hostilities begin, additional media will want access to the theater of operations. Assuming access is granted, the following questions arise:

What problems will be created by additional media?

Where will they go?

Will they be folded into the mini pools?

In addition, the network anchors may request access. If granted:

Where will they go?

Who will escort them?

How will they travel in-theater?

What special requirements will they have?

Can CENTCOM/PA support them?
PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLANNING FOR MEDIA IN PERSIAN GULF REGION

Planning needs to be done for at least two scenarios: Plan A would be executed if CENTCOM/PA has lead time to work with before hostilities begin. Plan B would apply if hostilities break out with little or no warning. Each plan should follow the following outline:

**PHASE I (Preparation Period)**

Outline what has been done and what is being done now in the way of briefings, training, etc. to prepare CENTCOM public affairs people and the media for actions to be taken if hostilities break out.

What assumptions is this proposal based on?

Are the mini pools being exercised in any way?

How are unit commanders and PAs being prepared to support this proposal?

Are international media assigned to the pools?

Are host nation journalists included in the pools?

Is there adequate PA manning in-theater?

How will journalists be identified as noncombatants? Will procedures used be similar to those provided for in the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention?

Will security protection be provided to JIB Dhahran if hostilities break out?

Has the need for forward press camps or sub-JIBS been addressed?

Has the CINC issued any personal PA policy guidance to unit commanders? Will there be any CINC guidance on combat pools to reinforce the PA planning effort?

Will specific guidance be issued as to any restrictions on media reps carrying privately owned weapons for personal protection?

What is the rank equivalent of media reps?

Who will have release authority when hostilities begin?

**PHASE II (Plan Activation)**

What triggers plan activation?

Who notifies CENTCOM/PA?
Who activates mini pools? How?

How is OPSEC maintained, if required?

Who notifies OASD(PA)? When and how?

**PHASE III (Mini Pools Assemble)**

Where will the mini pools assemble?

Who's in charge at each location?

What activities take place after media assemble?

What transportation will be available to take media to the field? Is it pre-arranged/dedicated?

Who tasked the transportation support?

If not already tasked, what guarantees are there that it will be available when needed?

Who is providing field gear and chem gear? Have media members of mini pools been trained in use of chem gear?

Will weapons be issued to PA escorts?

**PHASE IV (Coverage of Combat Action)**

Who goes with which units? (Emphasis on TV networks/"heavy hitters")

Who escorts mini pools at each location?

Do you have enough PA people to cover all escorting duties?

Who will keep track of where mini pools are located? How?

How long will media reps be with the host units identified in the plan?

Is the size of the media pool too large to move with the unit?

If combat breaks out in an unanticipated location, will a pool be sent there?

How will reporters be handled when and if they cross combat lines? Does it depend on whose lines?

What are units instructed to do with journalists arriving in combat areas on their own?
What procedures are in effect for coverage of multinational units fighting alongside U.S. troops in the same engagement?

Have conditions at sea been factored into transportation planning for pools going to ships?

What will be done for coverage during an amphibious assault? First wave? Third wave?

Will media be allowed to fly on combat missions?

Will mini pools be routed in and out of combat areas? How often?

Plan states that operational requirements may prevent media reps from being returned by military transportation to their points of origin. Meaning of this is unclear, needs to be clarified.

Has consideration been given to regularly scheduled flights and ground transportation to provide continuous flow of personnel and file materials?

Will there be authority for escorted journalists to "space-A" back and forth to forward areas?

How will combat information be provided to media in Dhahran who are not in pool?

What will be done with journalists who are wounded or killed? Such casualties may not be at the front lines.

If media have portable transmission equipment can they file from the field?

Are controls planned for journalists taking their own communications equipment (i.e. radios, satellite phones, etc) capable of direct transmission from the combat area?

Will there be security review? By whom? How will problems be resolved?

Will there be daily briefings for media with the units?

What are requirements for subordinate commanders to provide public affairs operational reports summarizing significant events, daily operational press briefings, etc?

PHASE V (Filing of Media Products)

Where are the preplanned filing locations?

How do media/media products get there?

Is transportation pre-arranged/dedicated? Who tasked the transportation support?

If not already tasked, what guarantees are there that it will be available when needed?

What equipment is needed to facilitate filing?
Projected DoD Assets in AOR

Army: 7 Divisions

Marines: 6 Marine Expeditionary Brigades

Navy: 6 Carrier Battle Groups
2 Battleships

Air Force: Hundreds of Reconnaissance, Fighter, Cargo and Refueling Aircraft
Support Required:

- Enable media pool members to disperse throughout the combat area in order to provide balanced coverage . . .

- From the onset of the operation to divide the pool into small elements of from 1 - 3 persons, to facilitate coverage of the entire operation. . .
Begin exercising two pools:

- Two (3) member television crews: 6
- Radio correspondent (network): 1
- Wire service correspondents: 2
- Wire service photographers: 2
- News magazine correspondent: 1
- News magazine photographer: 1
- Newspaper correspondents: 3

Total: 16
Concept of Operation

Phase I
(Current Situation)
— CENTCOM forms pools
— Conducts realistic exercises for training
— Deploy at random, once every two weeks or so

Phase II
(Warning)
— Align pools with ground combat units
(Hostilities)
(No Warning)
— Move pools rapidly forward if no warning
— Constitute & deploy additional pools as required to cover Navy, Air Force, and rear support units

Phase III
— Mandatory pool coverage ends
— Independent coverage of operations
Supplemental Pools Required

- Air Force
- Navy Carrier Task Force
- Amphibious Task Force
- Logistical Support
- Ground Combat Forces

(Augmentation pools if necessary)
Supplemental Pool Composition

3 One (3) member television crew

1 Radio Correspondent

1 Correspondent (print)

1 Photographeer (print)

6 Total
Dedicated Resources

TRANSPORTATION
• Dedicated air & ground support essential to move media initially and move media products back to Joint Information Bureau Dhahran

COMMUNICATION
• Use of existing facilities, both commercial and military, on a not-to-interfere basis
• Use of military communication systems to move media products out of AOR as back-up in the event of failure of commercial facilities

EQUIPMENT
(To be issued to pool members by CENTCOM)
• Helmet
• Flak Vest
• Web Gear/Canteen
• Chemical Suit & Mask
Filing Procedure

Ground Combat Pools

Navy Carrier TF

Amphibious TF

Air Force

Logistics

Dhahran (Pool Coordination)

Security Review at source
Ground rules do not permit:

- Reporting specific geographic locations
- Reporting numbers (troops, aircraft or other tactical equipment)
- Publishing information on future operations
- Divulging security precautions being taken
- Coverage of any aspect of operation without PA escort
- Disclosing "Rules of Engagement" details
- Video/audio recordings of injured personnel in agony or severe shock at a medical facility
- Interviewing or photographing an injured serviceman without his/her permission
- Imagery of patients suffering from severe disfigurement at a medical facility
Justification for Support

- Many pools tend to encourage more balanced coverage of operations.

- Need to provide maximum access to avoid charges of Administration cover-up.

- The story will get out one way or another. Firsthand coverage is more accurate.
Media

- **400 Total Media**
  - 250 U.S.
  - 150 International

- **100 Outlets**
  - 75 Print
  - 25 Television
Desert Shield
Public Affairs
Assets

- CENTCOM 13
- ARCENT 110
- MARCENT 10
- NAVCENT 8
- CENTAF 24

TOTAL 165
Public Affairs Profile

- Reserve/Active Components
- Trained and Experienced
- Media experience ongoing:
  - Requests to date 2,830
  - Requests scheduled 2,066
  - Requests pending 784