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USS COLE (DDG 67) - Endorsements to the Investigating Officers Report
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USS COLE (DDG 67) - Appendices

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5800
27 Nov 00

From: Captain United States Navy,
/6130
To: Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

Ref: (a) Verbal order by VADM Charles W. Moore, Jr., USN, of 12 Oct 00
(b) SECNAVINST 5800.7C, JAG MANUAL
(c) Jane's Book of Fighting Ships 1999-2000
(d) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command secure web site at www.cusnc.navy.smil.mil
(e) Phone conversation between Special Agent (SA), NCIS and Investigating Officer, CAPT USN of 8 Nov 00
(f) COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 of 1 Jul 99
(g) COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 1000-98 of 16 Jul 98
(h) COMFIFTHFLT 111003Z JUL 00
(i) COMFIFTHFLT 191523Z SEP 00
(j) DoDD 2000-16, "DoD Combatting Terrorism Program Standards," (CH-1) of 10 May 99
(k) OPNAVINST 3300.53, "Navy Combatting Terrorism Program," 1 May 92
(n) U.S. Navy Regulations of 14 Sep 00 with Change 1
(o) OPNAVINST 3120.32C, "Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy," 11 Apr 94
(p) USCENTCOM OPORD 97-01A

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: X1, X3, X4, X5, X6
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

(r) SECNAVINST 5500.29B, "Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by Personnel of the Department of the Navy in Conjunction with Law Enforcement, Security Duties and Personal Protection, (CH-1)," 28 Sep 92

Encl:
(1) Extracted copy of USS COLE (DDG 67) Ship's Deck Log from 110304B OCT 00 to 121115C OCT 00
(2) Extracted copy of USS COLE (DDG 67) Engineering Log from 120000C OCT 00 to 172359C OCT 00
(4) COMUSNAVCENT ltr 5800 Ser 00/1082 of 14 Oct 00
(5) COMUSNAVCENT ltr 5800 Ser 00/1179 of 7 Nov 00
(6) Email to LTJG [REDACTED], USNR containing 101215Z OCT 00 readdress msg of ATACSUM (DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//NAVATA/C//22A4//0821002Z OCT 00)
(7) COMFIFTHFLT 051503Z OCT 00, 051513Z OCT 00
(8) COMFIFTHFLT 121026Z OCT 00
(9) COMUSNAVCENT 151730Z OCT 00
(10) USS COLE (DDG 67) Personnel List from PNC [REDACTED], USN (FOUO)
(11) USS COLE (DDG 67) Damage Control Diagrams
(12) Sheet of four photographs depicting hull damage to the USS COLE (DDG 67) from the explosion on 12 Oct 00
(13) DAMAGE LIST FOR USS COLE (DDG 67) provided by Executive Officer (not all inclusive)
(14) MEMORANDUM of Background Information on Defense Fuel Supply Point (DFSP) Aden ltr ME0036 of 15 Oct 00
(15) NAVCENT Information Paper: U.S. Navy Port Visits to Aden, Yemen
(16) Force Disposition (0630:19 OCT 00)
(17) USS COLE 081141Z OCT 00
(18) Memorandum from CDR Kirk S. Lippold, USN, Commanding Officer USS COLE (DDG 67) undated - received 23 Oct 00
(19) Interviews conducted by Investigation Officer, CAPT [REDACTED] USN, on various dates
(20) Memorandum from LCDR [REDACTED] USN of 22 Oct 00
(21) Statement from LT [redacted] USN of 20 Oct 00

(22) COMFIFTHFLT 251103Z SEP 00

(23) COMFIFTHFLT 281333Z SEP 00

(24) COMFIFTHFLT 011343Z SEP (sic) 00 (Error in month - should have been October)

(25) USDAO SANAA YM 111218Z OCT 00

(26) USDAO SANAA YM 110756Z OCT 00

(27) Email from DMDS Mail to CDR [redacted] sent 15 Sep 00, containing USS COLE 151200Z SEP 00 and USS COLE 111641Z OCT 00

(28) Statement by SK3 [redacted] USN

(29) LTJG [redacted], USNR, interview by LCDR [redacted] JAGC, USN on 16 Oct 00

(30) Memorandum from LTJG [redacted] USNR of 20 Oct 00

(31) Email from Special Agent (SA) [redacted] NCIS to CDR [redacted] JAGC, USN, on 02 Nov 00 FW: AT/FP TRAINING FOR USS COLE (DDG 67)

(32) COLENOTE 1300: ADMINISTRATIVE AND COLLATERAL DUTY ASSIGNMENTS of 02 Oct 00

(33) NAVATAC BASELINE 00 CENTCOM AOR from Navy Antiterrorist Alert Center - Washington D.C. of 5 Aug 00

(34) NAVCRIMINVSERV MIDDLE EAST BAHRAIN//MEBJ//081641Z SEP 99

(35) USS COLE 071856Z OCT 00

(36) Memorandum from LT [redacted] USN, of 21 Oct 00

(37) Emails from CDR [redacted], USN, sent to LT [redacted] USNR, on 20 Nov 00 regarding USCENTCOM Threat Level system

(38) COMUSNAVCENT 101400Z OCT 00

(39) DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//0022//221930Z SEP 00

(40) COMFIFTHFLT 291009Z JUN 99

(41) USDAO SANAA YM 070453Z MAY 00

(42) COLEINST 3300.55, Force Protection Program, of 9 Sep 00

(43) CNO WASHINGTON DC 191301Z JUN 99

(44) Table depicting changes to Joint Pub 3-07.2 by CNO WASHINGTON DC 191301Z JUN 99

(45) COMGWBATGRU 211130Z JUL 00
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(46) TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 OF ANNEX M OF COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01

(47) APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX C to COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01: Force Protection Plan Format for Routine Ship Visits/Share Basing

(48) CTF 50 102230Z OCT 00

(49) USS COLE (DDG 67) THREATCON MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (C5 SUPP) of 11 Oct 00

(50) LT [redacted] USN interview by LCDR [redacted] JAGC, USN on 16, 19, 20, 21 Oct 00

(51) LTJG [redacted] USNR emails on Force Protection Training

(52) USS HAWES 280635Z AUG 00

(53) USS DONALD COOK 261251Z AUG 00

(54) USS BARRY 301650Z MAY 00

(55) USS TAYLOR 230715Z NOV 99

(56) CTF 50 111800Z OCT 00

(57) Interviews conducted by LCDR [redacted] JAGC, USN

(58) Information regarding small arms from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana 16 Nov 00

(59) Results of interviews with LT [redacted] USN, by LT [redacted] USNR

(60) USS COLE (DDG 67) Plans of the Day from 08 Aug 00 - 12 Oct 00

(61) Statement from LT [redacted] USN

(62) USS COLE (DDG 67) NAVIGATION BRIEF FOR ENTERING ADEN, YEMEN 12 Oct 00

(63) Results of interview with LT [redacted] USN, by LT [redacted] USNR

(64) USS COLE (DDG 67) Sea & Anchor Detail Watchbill (Fuel Stop in YEMEN) approved by CDR Kirk Lippold, USN, effective 12 Oct 00

(65) Statement from LT [redacted] USN

(66) Statements by QM2 (SW) [redacted] USN, of 13 Oct 00 and 14 Oct 00

(67) USS COLE (DDG 67) Entering Port Checklist (completed) for 12 Oct 00

(68) Statement from ENS [redacted] USNR

(69) Statement by SN [redacted] USN

(70) Sheet of four photographs found on the COMUSNAVCENT secure web site, depicting a vacant Refueling Dolphin Seven in Aden, Yemen
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(71) Sheet of four photographs of USS COLE (DDG 67) moored to Refueling Dolphin Seven

(72) Interview with ET3 [redacted] USN by LCDR Tracy Riker, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(73) Statement by ET3 [redacted], USN of 16 Oct 00

(74) Statement from GM2 [redacted] USN of 16 Oct 00

(75) USS COLE (DDG 67) Inport Watchbill for 12 Oct 00

(76) Duty Section 3 qualification issues

(77) Designation as Command Duty Officer ICO LT [redacted], USN, ser 3120 of 07 Apr 00

(78) Annotated Duty Section 3 Watchbill

(79) USS COLE's (DDG 67) Small Arms Report of 11 Oct 00 from Relational Administrative Database Manager

(80) Topside Diagram of USS COLE (DDG 67)

(81) Statement by SK1 [redacted], USN

(82) Personnel survey conducted by CAPT [redacted], USN, on 25 Oct 00

(83) Interview with TM3 [redacted] USN, by LCDR Thomas Copenhaver, JAGC, USN, on 16 Nov 00

(84) Interview with STG3 [redacted] USN, by LT Robert J. O'Neill, JAGC, USN

(85) Interview with FC2 (SW) [redacted] USN, by LCDR Copenhaver, JAGC, USN, on 16 Nov 00

(86) Interview with SN [redacted], USN, by LT Robert J. O'Neill, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(87) Interview with SK1 [redacted] USN, by LT Robert J. O'Neill, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(88) Interview with SH2 [redacted] USN, by LCDR Tracy Riker, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(89) Email from LCDR [redacted] USN sent 29 Oct 00 RE: Force Protection Plan for USS COLE (DDG 67)

(90) Interview with FC3 [redacted] USN, by LCDR Tracy Riker, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(91) Interview with GM3 [redacted] USN, by LCDR Thomas Copenhaver, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(92) Interview with GSMFN [redacted] USN, by LT Robert J. O'Neill, JAGC, USN on 16 Nov 00

(93) Interview with GSMFN [redacted] USN, by Special Agent (SA) NCIS, FBI and Special Agent (SA) NCIS of 23 Oct 00

(94) FD-302 on QM2 [redacted], USN, by Special Agent (SA)
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(95) Interview with FCC USN, by unnamed agents on 16 Oct 00

(96) Interview with SK3 USN, conducted by LCDR Thomas Copenhagen, JAGC, USN on 17 Nov 00

(97) FD-302 on SK3 USN, by Special Agent (SA) FBI on 24 Oct 00

(98) FD-302 on DC1 USN by Special Agent (SA) NCIS of 15 Nov 00

(99) Interview with LT USN, Operations Officer and Command Duty Officer, by LT Michael Navarre, JAGC, USNR, on 16 Nov 00

(100) Notes of interview with FN USN, by Special Agent (SA) NCIS

(101) Import Training Records for Ship's Self-defense Force from 17 Nov 99 to 9 Jul 00

(102) Muster Sheets for Level 1 FP/AT Training

(103) Level 1 Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism Training Package, omitting "Out of Harm's Way"

(104) MA1 (SW), USN interview by LCDR JAGC, USN, on 15 and 16 Oct 00

(105) Statement from MA1 (SW) USN, of 23 Oct 00

(106) Statement from FCC (SW) USN, of 23 Oct 00

(107) Statement from GM1 USN, of 23 Oct 00

(108) Statement from ISC (SW) USN, of 23 Oct 00

(109) COMSECONDFLT 211445Z MAY 00

(110) Bills from COLEINST 5530.1A

(111) MEF DEPLOYERS CD-ROM from COMDESRON 50

(112) USCENTCOM JRAC MACDILL AFB, FL ANTITERRORISM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT of the commercial port in Aden, Yemen

(113) OPS BRIEF USS COLE (DDG 67) 08 OCT 00

(114) OPS BRIEF USS COLE (DDG 67) 10 OCT 00

(115) OPS BRIEF USS COLE (DDG 67) 12 OCT 00

(116) Force Protection Power Point Brief, Parts 1 and 2

(117) Force Protection Brief Disks-Parts 1 and 2

(118) USS HAWES 161400Z AUG 00

(119) USS DONALD COOK 171700Z AUG 00

(120) CTF 50 190800Z AUG 00
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(121) CTF 50 191245Z AUG 00
(122) Email from LCDR [REDACTED] USN, to CAPT [REDACTED] USN, sent 29 Oct 00.
(123) Email from CDR [REDACTED], USN, to CAPT [REDACTED] USN, sent 31 Oct 00 RE: Follow-up question response
(124) Email from COL [REDACTED], USMC, to CAPT [REDACTED], USN, sent 31 Oct 00 RE: Force Protection
(125) Email from CAPT [REDACTED], USN, to CAPT [REDACTED], USN of 16 Nov 00
(126) Email from CDR [REDACTED], USN, to CAPT [REDACTED], USN of 16 Nov 00, received on 15 Nov 00
(127) Email from LCDR [REDACTED], USN to LT [REDACTED], USN, of 04 Sep 00 RE MALTA ISP
(128) Import Security Plans and Approvals for USS COLE (DDG 67) from 16 Aug 00 to 06 Sep 00.
(129) CJCSI 3121.01A (Standing Rules of Engagement) of 15 Jan 00 pp. A-2-B-B-3 of 15 Jan 00
(130) COMUSNAVCENT/N3//080916Z SEP 96
(131) DCTT Briefs for USS COLE (DDG 67)
(132) Memorandum from CCGD 3 Force Protection Officer to NAVCENT Force Protection Officer of 14 Oct 00
(133) COMSIXTHFLT 240603Z SEP 99
(134) Email from COL [REDACTED] to CAPT [REDACTED] sent on 22 Nov 00

App: (A) Fatality Reports of Deceased Personnel
(B) Casualty Reports of Injured Personnel
(C) Photographs of USS COLE (DDG 67) in Aden
(D) Video Tapes - 8mm and VHS
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. On 12 October 2000, between 1115C and 1118C, the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer USS COLE (DDG 67) was attacked by terrorists while taking on fuel in Aden Harbor, Yemen. Two individuals maneuvered an approximately 35-foot boat, along USS COLE’s (DDG 67) port side, amidships, and exploded the boat. Seventeen crewmembers were killed and 42 others were injured. The explosion ripped a 32 by 36-foot hole, centered approximately at frame 208, in the port side. The blast damage is far more extensive than the visible hole suggests.

2. This was not a random act, but rather an attack resulting from careful, deliberate planning. The attack occurred at the beginning of lunch for the crew and approximately 45 minutes into the refueling evolution.

3. Aden, Yemen was the first stop for USS COLE (DDG 67) in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility after transiting the Suez Canal on 9 October 2000. It was a Brief Stop for Fuel only, and not a liberty port. Aden, Yemen was in Threat Condition (THREATCON) BRAVO at a HIGH Threat Level under the old Department of Defense terrorist Threat Level rating system. USS COLE (DDG 67) received notification on 10 October 2000 in an email from its immediate superior, Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO, that the Threat Level for Yemen had changed to SIGNIFICANT under the new Department of Defense terrorist Threat Level rating system. However, the new system had not been implemented by United States Central Command.


5. USS COLE (DDG 67) executed a total of 31 of the 62 Force Protection measures required under THREATCON BRAVO by COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection).
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ship "waived" 19 measures and failed to accomplish 12 others. Of the 31 measures not performed, 12 measures were key and may have prevented the suicide boat attack or mitigated its effects.

6. ☐ USS COLE (DDG 67) had a trained crew and an active Force Protection Program. In pre-deployment workups, the ship received a "BRAVO ZULU" (Well Done) message for its performance efforts in Force Protection and Anti-Terrorism training from Commander, United States SECOND Fleet. During deployment, USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted frequent Operations/Intelligence briefings, Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training for the entire crew, and ship-led "Mediterranean-Arabian University" briefings, where Force Protection was sometimes discussed.

7. ☐ Despite the training, the ship did not fully protect itself from attack because it lacked deliberate planning and execution of an approved Force Protection Plan. Additionally, the ship had spent approximately two months in the SIXTH Fleet Area of Responsibility and had port calls in Villefranche, France; Barcelona, Spain; Valletta, Malta; and Koper, Slovenia, where the Threat Levels were LOW and THREATCONS were ALPHA with BRAVO enhancements (ALPHA PLUS). When USS COLE (DDG 67) arrived in Aden, Yemen, the Threat Level was HIGH and THREATCON was BRAVO. Aden, Yemen was USS COLE's (DDG 67) first port after entering the Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility. THREATCON ALPHA imposes fewer Force Protection measures. Coupled with the crew's low threat awareness of Yemen, including its Threat Level and THREATCON, the ship's "mindset" was one not ready to face a THREATCON BRAVO scenario. The focus of the ship did not appear to be on Force Protection. Some members on duty had no idea they were in THREATCON BRAVO. The ship did not inform its Immediate Superior In Command of its actual Force Protection posture. The duty section was not properly briefed. The Bridge was not manned. There was little control of boats coming alongside. No one, including the Commanding Officer, had the "big picture" on the boats in the immediate vicinity of USS COLE (DDG 67). Regardless of the fact it was lunchtime, there was no senior leadership topside.

8. ☐ In the case of USS COLE (DDG 67), the terrorist boat showed neither hostile act nor hostile intent prior to the
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...explosion. To the contrary, as the attackers maneuvered alongside of the USS COLE (DDG 67), observers saw several people on the ship's bridge, waving to the crew, some of whom returned the greeting.
Subject: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. **Introduction.** On 12 October 2000, sometime between 1115C and 1118C, an explosion occurred adjacent to and amidships of USS COLE (DDG 67) as the ship was moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven (Latitude 12-47.54N, Longitude 044-58.55E) in Aden, Yemen [encls (1),(2),(3)]. The explosion killed 17 crewmembers, injured 42 other crewmembers, and caused severe damage to the ship. As directed by reference (a) and enclosures (4) and (5), I was assigned to conduct an investigation in accordance with reference (b) into the facts and circumstances surrounding the actions of USS COLE (DDG 67) in preparing for and undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Aden Harbor, Yemen on 12 October 2000. Advised in enclosure (4) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has jurisdiction to investigate acts of terrorism, I was specifically directed not to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the explosion that occurred external to, but in the vicinity of USS COLE (DDG 67), or the persons who may be involved in that explosion. I arrived in Aden, Yemen on 13 October 2000 and was assisted in this investigation by Lieutenant Commander [Redacted], JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant [Redacted], USNR. On 7 November 2000, I received additional tasking contained in enclosure (5) that directed me to cover the following specific issues:

   a. Force Protection posture of the USS COLE (DDG 67), to include submission and approval of the Force Protection Plan, any Force Protection matters waived or not implemented and crew awareness;

   b. Relationship between Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO and USS COLE (DDG 67), to include guidance from the battle group and analysis of the approval process for the Force Protection Plan;

   c. Force Protection training for USS COLE (DDG 67), to include pre-deployment training and internal ship training; and

   d. For each Sailor killed or wounded, the casualty response, brief chronology of medical care and circumstances of injury or death.
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2. **Background.**

   a. USS COLE (DDG 67) departed from its homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, on 8 August 2000, under the operational control of Commander, United States SECOND Fleet. On 18 August 2000, the ship transferred to the operational control of Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet. While in the SIXTH Fleet Area of Responsibility (Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas), USS COLE (DDG 67) was under the tactical command of Commander, Task Force SIX ZERO. The duties of Commander, Task Force SIX ZERO were exercised by Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO TWO, until 2 October 2000. After this date, Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO, embarked on USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73), became Commander, Task Force SIX ZERO. During the second half of August and through the first half of September 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) patrolled the Mediterranean Sea and made port calls in Barcelona, Spain; Villefranche, France; Valletta, Malta; and Koper, Slovenia. After departing Koper, Slovenia, the ship conducted operations in the southern Adriatic Sea until leaving for the Suez Canal on 6 October 2000. USS COLE (DDG 67) transited the Suez Canal on 9 October 2000, at which time the ship transferred to the operational control of Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet, and the tactical control of Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE, embarked on USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72)). On 12 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) stopped in Aden, Yemen for a Brief Stop for Fuel.

   b. The 12 October 2000 explosion on USS COLE (DDG 67) killed 17 United States Navy Sailors, injured 42 others, and caused severe damage to the ship. At the time of the incident, the Threat Level was HIGH, and the Threat Condition (THREATCON) was BRAVO in Yemen. Initially, the cause was unknown, but it was soon suspected that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber, the identity officially unknown at this time and presently being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Immediately after the incident, Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet set Threatcon CHARLIE for "United States Naval Forces assigned to FIFTH Fleet and operating in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt" [encl (8)]. Soon thereafter, Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command set Threatcon DELTA for Yemen [encl (9)].
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c. Casualties. The casualties and injured personnel are identified below [encl (10)], and further information is contained in Appendices A and B, which provide a separate attachment for each individual casualty (deceased and injured, respectively):

(1) CASUALTIES: 17 United States Sailors were killed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLODFELTER, Kenneth Eugene</td>
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<td>COSTELOW, Richard NMN</td>
<td>ETC</td>
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<td>MSSN</td>
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<td>ITSN</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUNN, Cherone Louis</td>
<td>SMSN</td>
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<tr>
<td>McDANIELS, James Rodrick</td>
<td>ITSN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>EN2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWENS, Ronald Scott</td>
<td>EW3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALMER, Lakiba Nicole</td>
<td>SN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARLETT, Joshua Langdon</td>
<td>ENFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROY, Patrick Howard</td>
<td>FN</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUX, Kevin Shawn</td>
<td>EW2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANTIAGO, Ronchester Mananga</td>
<td>MS3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUNDERS, Timothy Lamont</td>
<td>OS2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWENCHONIS, Gary Graham Jr.</td>
<td>FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIPLETT, Andrew NMN</td>
<td>ENS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIBBERLEY, Craig Bryan</td>
<td>SN</td>
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</table>

(2) INJURIES: Forty-seven United States Sailors were medical evacuees. Of that 47, 42 Sailors were injured as a result of the explosion; five Sailors' injuries were non-explosion related:

(a) INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION

<table>
<thead>
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<th>NAME</th>
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<tbody>
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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

NAME

RATE
OSSN
SHZ
EW3
FC2
GMC
FC3
FCCS
BM3
BMC
MS3
FC2
GSM1
GSCS
SN
GM3
GSM2
SH3
GSMFN
GSE3
GSMFN
DCFN
SH3
OS2
QMC
PC2
OS3
HTFN
SR
EMC
SK2
FC1
FCC
FC3
LT
OS1
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

(b) INJURIES NOT A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RATE</th>
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d. Damage. The damage included an approximate 32-foot wide hole centered at frame 208, in a rough and wide tear-drop shape.

e. Pictorial evidence.

(1) Appendix C is comprised of still photos depicting various scenes onboard USS COLE (DDG 67), including internal and external damage.

(2) Appendix D consists of VHS and 8-mm videocassette recordings of various topics including the following: interior and exterior damage on the ship; interviews with USS COLE (DDG 67) Sailors; loading of caskets in Yemen; and the docking of the ship onboard the Heavy Lift Transport, Blue Marlin.

f. Visits to Aden, Yemen. Since 20 September 1997, a total of 30 United States Navy ships, including USS COLE (DDG
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67), have stopped in Aden, Yemen. On 29 December 1998, a Defense Energy Support Center contract was awarded for fueling in Aden, Yemen with Arab Investment, Manufacturing and Trading Company. The contract period runs from 9 June 1999 - 8 June 2004. Twenty-seven of the 30 United States Navy ship visits were Brief Stops for Fuel. [encls (14),(15)]

3. Difficulties encountered. There were numerous difficulties encountered from the outset of this investigation. The following highlights the major areas of concern.

   a. Safety, security and transportation. Yemen was in THREATCON BRAVO at a HIGH Threat Level prior to the USS COLE (DDG 67) incident, and during our stay there, tensions were high. Yemen was placed under THREATCON DELTA soon after our arrival. Accordingly, travel was restricted and highly regulated for Force Protection reasons by Commander, Task Force DETERMINED RESPONSE (subsequently Commander, Joint Task Force DETERMINED RESPONSE). In order to ensure safety of United States personnel, transportation was circumscribed as follows:

      (1) Riding in taxis or other public transportation was prohibited.

      (2) Designated cars, vans and trucks were required to travel with an armed escort.

      (3) The number of available vehicles was small, and the demand high. Approximately 300 Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, the Federal Emergency Support Team, Naval Criminal Investigative Service agents and other officials were eventually present in Aden, Yemen and working out of the same temporary headquarters at the Aden Hotel. [encl (16)] Consequently, much time was spent attempting to find transportation to/from the pier.

      (4) Due to the location of the USS COLE (DDG 67) at Refueling Dolphin Seven, upon arrival to the pier, it was necessary to take a small boat to the ship. Small boats were limited in number and irregular in schedule.

      (5) After moving almost all military forces out of the Aden Hotel and onto United States ships on station, boats
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became the primary means of transportation, usually taking 1-2 hours each way.

b. Availability of Ship’s Force.

(1) The crew of the USS COLE (DDG 67) had just undergone an extremely traumatic experience, and initially the majority of the crew was fragile and extremely emotional. In many instances, personnel had to be approached very carefully and gently, often they initially had difficulty discussing the incident or anything leading up to it. After the five-day delay in the removal of the trapped remains, the crew dealt with three straight days of seeing their fallen shipmates taken off the USS COLE (DDG 67). The day after the remaining deceased were taken ashore, a memorial service was held, followed by a flag raising ceremony. There were also several days of damage control requirements that involved the entire crew.

(2) As of 2 November 2000, Ship’s Force personnel were no longer readily available for me to interview as the USS COLE (DDG 67) crew was returned to their homeport. Crewmembers were placed on leave until 1 December 2000. With assistance from commands in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we were able to obtain some clarifying statements. Nonetheless, there are two minor areas that remain somewhat uncertain. It is unclear from the evidence whether the Husbanding Agent came aboard the ship from a garbage barge or another boat. It is also unknown as to what kind of craft the Pilot climbed onto when he disembarked USS COLE (DDG 67).

(3) Notwithstanding all of the stressful situations the crew encountered, they were all extremely helpful during the course of this investigation. They made themselves immediately available for interviews - in some cases multiple interviews over the course of several days. Several took the time to write detailed statements regarding the actions of the ship leading up to the time of the incident. This investigation could not have been completed as expeditiously as it was without the full cooperation of the USS COLE’s (DDG 67) crew, from the Commanding Officer on down. Additionally, they provided all readily available documents, and in some instances
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went to great lengths to recover documents that had been believed lost, destroyed, or otherwise unrecoverable.

c. Limitations. The specific focus of this investigation, outlined in enclosures (4) and (5), and the express limitations of my inquiries described above, were necessary to prevent this investigation from interfering or inadvertently compromising the Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal investigation into the suspected act of terrorism. As a consequence of those limitations, I was unable to interview the Harbor Pilot, the Husbanding Agent, officials from the Aden Port Authority, and officials from the United States Navy contractor, Arab Investment, Manufacturing and Trading. Accordingly, I was precluded from inquiring into what security measures, if any, could or should have been provided by either the Aden Port Authority or Arab Investment, Manufacturing and Trading. However, it is noted that, according to the United States Defense Attaché, Sanaa, Yemen, the Navy contractor (Arab Investment, Manufacturing and Trading) does not provide security to United States Navy ships at the Refueling Dolphins. While other investigations and subsequent crew interviews may establish additional details, I was able to gather sufficient information to have an accurate chronology and understanding of the events.

d. Material condition of USS COLE (DDG 67). After the explosion, USS COLE (DDG 67) was an unstable, vulnerable platform. Excellent damage control and dewatering procedures reduced an initial port list of five degrees to less than three degrees. On 14 October 2000, we boarded the ship, took pictures, inspected the damaged areas, started collecting documentary evidence, and took statements from the crew. However, between 0200-0300 on 15 October 2000, the material condition and ship’s stability worsened; the remaining operational gas turbine generator (Number 3) tripped offline, and the ship started taking on more water. United States Navy vessels in the immediate area provided damage control assistance by sending equipment and personnel to the USS COLE (DDG 67) to assist in dewatering and stabilization. Commander, Task Force DETERMINED RESPONSE dispatched me to assist the damage control evolution. There were three other periods of power loss for various reasons and various lengths of time.
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during the days following the explosion and during the course of the investigation.

e. Communications. The nation of Yemen does not have the telecommunications infrastructure that United States government organizations normally rely on. At the outset, the cell phones we brought from Bahrain could not function in Yemen. Commander, Task Force DETERMINED RESPONSE purchased local mobile phones, but the supply was limited and demand very high. Moreover, the switchboard at the Aden Hotel was severely taxed by the large volume of calls made by the response team. Additionally, with very limited SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and NONCLASSIFIED Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) mail and message accessibility, one unclassified facsimile machine, and one classified facsimile machine to serve the entire joint team, the result was frequent lapses in communication.

f. [ ] Unavailable or lost/missing documents. The following documents could not be obtained due to destruction by fire or flooding as a result of the explosion:

(1) [ ] The fueling bill was destroyed in the oil lab;

(2) [ ] Current training qualifications stored on the Relational Administrative Database Manager (RADM), on the Local Area Network (LAN), were not recoverable

(3) [ ] Receipts for garbage pick up and sewage removal from the Port of Aden, Yemen Husbanding Agent,


   a. As described in reference (m), Joint Pub 3-07.2, Appendix J, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to ensure a uniform plan for implementation of Force Protection measures among the service components, approved the establishment of a Threat Condition (THREATCON) system. The THREATCONs, ranging from the lowest to the highest, are identified as NORMAL, ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE and DELTA. Under this system, specific
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anti-terrorist protective measures are implemented for each condition.

(1) THREATCON NORMAL applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

(2) THREATCON ALPHA is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.

(3) THREATCON BRAVO is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists.

(4) THREATCON CHARLIE is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

(5) THREATCON DELTA is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely.

b. The THREATCON is normally set by the senior United States Defense Representative in a country; in the case of Yemen, the United States Defense Attaché Office. Senior Commanders can also establish higher THREATCONS for forces under their command operating within a given country. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the theater can direct a higher THREATCON. On 12 October 2000, Yemen was in THREATCON BRAVO.

c. The THREATCON is determined through analysis of a combination of all factors affecting the security environment. The Terrorist Threat Level is one factor used to determine the THREATCON. Other factors used to establish the THREATCON include the political-military situation, security threats not directly related to terrorism (e.g., conventional conflict, humanitarian crisis, crime, drugs, etc.), capability of host nation security forces, physical Force Protection attributes, and others. There is no automatic or mandatory correlation between Terrorist Threat Levels and THREATCONS, although higher
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Threat Levels will generally result in United States Defense Representatives and Commanders setting higher THREATCONS. A change in Terrorist Threat Level does not automatically result in a change of THREATCON.

d. The Terrorist Threat Level is a narrowly focused methodology used to determine the threat posed by terrorist groups within a given country. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the theater Commander-in-Chief set the Department of Defense Terrorist Threat Level. The theater Commander-in-Chief can choose to establish a higher Threat Level for countries within the theater Commander-in-Chief's Area of Responsibility.

e. In accordance with reference (1), (DoD Directive 2000.12H, "Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence") under the "old" system, the Terrorist Threat Level was determined by a specific set of factors to include, existence, history, capability, intent and targeting of United States interests by terrorist groups within a given country. The earlier version included five levels: NEGLIGIBLE, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and CRITICAL.

f. The Terrorist Threat Level in Yemen was assessed as HIGH under the "old" system because terrorist groups existed in Yemen, had a history of conducting attacks, and had the capability and the intent to conduct attacks. This assessment in September 1999 was based on the "poor security environment in the country, as well as the presence of a number of transnational terrorist and indigenous extremist groups that could pose a threat to Department of the Navy personnel," according to Naval Criminal Investigative Service Threat Assessments for Yemen.

g. DIRNAVCRIMINYSERV WASHINGTON DC 0821002 OCT 00 [encl (6)], received by the ship on 11 October 2000 in an email from Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO, stated that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) has approved a new terrorism Threat Level methodology for use by the Department of Defense and that the Threat Level for Yemen was SIGNIFICANT. This system had not been implemented by United States Central Command when the attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67) occurred.
h. The new system, though not in effect in the United States Central Command, has four levels: LOW, MEDIUM, SIGNIFICANT, HIGH, plus a category of "No U.S. Defense Presence." The Threat Level in Yemen was assessed under the new system to be SIGNIFICANT. SIGNIFICANT is defined as: "Anti-U.S. terrorists are present and attack personnel as their preferred method of operation or a group uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method but has limited operational activity, the operating environment is neutral."

i. At the time of its Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, USS COLE (DDG 67) had the following Threat Assessment/Force Protection documents available to them: Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center baseline for the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility dated 5 August 2000; Naval Criminal Investigative Service threat assessment and security overview of Aden, Yemen, dated 8 September 1999; and Naval Criminal Investigative Service message dated 8 October 2000 advising of a change in the terrorist Threat Level methodology (from the "old" five-point system to the "new" four-point system).

j. On 9 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) "chopped" from SIXTH Fleet to FIFTH Fleet. Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO became the ship's Immediate Superior In Command. While under the operational control of Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet, USS COLE (DDG 67), prior to making a Brief Stop for Fuel, was required to review the Force Protection measures enumerated in COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) and develop a Force Protection Plan for Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO's approval.

k. By implementing Force Protection measures appropriate to the existing THREATCON, a ship postures itself against terrorist threats as they are understood by the chain of command. Some flexibility is provided in both directions. Supplemental measures may be required by the Task Force Commander, or proposed by the ship based on local conditions. Additionally, ships may request deviations from measures that are inappropriate in view of local conditions. Absent approval of any deviations, a ship operating under THREATCON BRAVO is expected to implement measures 1 through 62 of COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection).
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1. Deviations to a Force Protection Plan are to be expected in view of local conditions and circumstances. The mechanism for requesting and approving deviations is established, and provides an auditable means for fine-tuning Force Protection as details of the local situation unfold. Included in this category of deviations are those measures which foreseeably could not be implemented for lack of personnel or material assets. Further, deviations may be necessitated where common sense justifies them in response to unforeseen conditions or circumstances that occur or are discovered after the formal request for deviations has been submitted. Beyond these two categories of deviations, the Task Force Commander would expect that all remaining measures will be implemented.

m. On 7 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) submitted its Import Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) to Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO. The plan did not request any deviations and provided that USS COLE (DDG 67) would implement the 62 Force Protection measures specified for THREATCON BRAVO. Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO approved the plan on 11 October 2000.

n. “Import Security Plan” was the subject line found on the message template provided by Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO in July 2000 for units to submit Force Protection Plans. The term is not used in the FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility, and the subject line should have been “Force Protection Plan.”

o. On the morning of 12 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) entered the Port of Aden and moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven. Of the 62 Force Protection measures USS COLE (DDG 67) was to execute, the ship accomplished 31 measures and waived 19 more due to conditions in Aden. Twelve (12) measures were not accomplished. The ship’s execution of its Force Protection Plan is discussed in this report in the context of whether or not the performance of certain Force Protection measures could have made a difference in the ultimate outcome.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

Background

1. The USS COLE (DDG 67) is an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer built by Ingalls Shipbuilding. Laid down on 28 February 1994 and launched 10 February 1995, USS COLE (DDG 67) was commissioned for service on 08 June 1996. On 12 October 2000, the ship had a crew of 26 officers and 270 enlisted personnel. [ref (c), Jane's Book of Fighting Ships, encl (17)]

2. The Commanding Officer is Commander (CDR) CDR Kirk S. Lippold, USN. He assumed command of USS COLE (DDG 67) on 25 June 1999. [encl (18)]

3. The Executive Officer is Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) USN. He assumed his present duties onboard USS COLE (DDG 67) on 20 December 1999. [encls (19),(20)]

4. The following is a brief timeline leading to the 12 October entry into Aden Harbor. [encls (18),(21)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08 Aug 00</td>
<td>Departed homeport Norfolk, Virginia</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Aug 00</td>
<td>Inchop to SIXTH Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-25 Aug 00</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Aug - 01 Sep 00</td>
<td>Villefranche, France</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-8 Sep 00</td>
<td>Valletta, Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-15 Sep 00</td>
<td>Koper, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Oct 00</td>
<td>Inchop to FIFTH Fleet/Transited the Suez Canal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct 00</td>
<td>Entry into Aden Harbor, Yemen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5. COMFIFTHFLT 251103Z SEP 00 requested diplomatic clearance from the American Embassy Sanaa, Yemen, for USS COLE (DDG 67) to conduct a Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen. USS COLE (DDG 67) was an information addressee on the message, which listed the expected arrival and departure date as 16 October 2000. [encl (22)]
6. COMFIFTHFLT 281333Z SEP 00 requested a modification to the diplomatic clearance from the American Embassy Sanaa, Yemen, for the USS COLE (DDG 67) Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen, which was changed to 13 October 2000. USS COLE (DDG 67) was an information addressee on the message. [encl (23)]

7. On 1 October 2000, Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet sent a message (with an erroneous date-time-group of 011343Z SEP 00) to the American Embassy Sanaa, Yemen, with USS COLE (DDG 67) as an information addressee, in which the diplomatic clearance request was again modified to reflect an expected 12 October 2000 Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen. [encl (24)]

8. On 11 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) was granted port clearance for a Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000. [encl (25)]

9. USS COLE 081141Z OCT 00 was the Logistics Requirements (LOGREQ) message to American Embassy Sanaa, Yemen. It requested a berth at Refueling Bunker Seven, 220,000 gallons of F-76, and a Collection, Holding, and Transfer barge to collect sewage “at least twice.” [encl (17)]

10. In USDAO SANA YM 110756Z OCT 00, the Logistics Requirements message reply, USS COLE (DDG 67) received diplomatic clearance. The United States Defense Attaché “acknowledged” the ship’s arrival time, fuel requests, and stated Collection, Holding and Transfer disposal would be by barge. All services were to be coordinated with the Husbanding Agent upon arrival. The message stated the ship’s request for Refueling Bunker Seven had been passed to port authorities. The message requested that the ship fly the Yemeni flag, advising that either the Pilot or Mansoob Representative (Husbanding Agent) would most likely bring a flag. The Logistics Requirements message reply was transmitted only to USS COLE (DDG 67). [encls (19),(26)]

11. Master Sergeant [redacted], USA, Operations Coordinator for United States Defense Attaché Office, Sanaa, Yemen, said that the USS COLE (DDG 67) was the only addressee on the Logistics Requirements message reply
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because the United States Defense Attaché Office tries to limit the number of addressees on its messages. [encl (19)]

Threat Knowledge

12. The Force Protection Officer is Lieutenant (LT) ______, USN, whose primary billet is Weapons Officer. He reported aboard USS COLE (DDG 67) in April 2000 and assumed the collateral duty of Force Protection Officer in June 2000. [encl (28)]

13. The Assistant Force Protection Officer is Lieutenant (junior grade) (LTJG) ______, USNR, whose primary billet is Strike Division Officer. He reported aboard USS COLE (DDG 67) in December 1998 and assumed the collateral duty of Assistant Force Protection Officer after attending the Force Protection Officer/Anti-Terrorism Training Officer course 12-15 July 2000. [encls (29), (30), (31)]

14. The Commanding Officer designated LT ______ as Force Protection Officer and LTJG ______ as Assistant Force Protection Officer in writing in the USS COLE (DDG 67) Collateral Duties List. [encl (32)]

15. The Assistant Force Protection Officer, LTJG ______, said he was not notified of the ship's scheduled Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen until on or about 3 October 2000, at which time he started gathering threat assessment information on the port. [encl (19)]

16. Prior to the USS COLE’s (DDG 67) scheduled Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen, LTJG ______ (Assistant Force Protection Officer) obtained, in addition to information provided by Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group websites, the following threat assessment/Force Protection documents pertaining to Yemen:

a. Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center’s baseline for the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility, dated 5 August 2000 and downloaded from the SECRET
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Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) on 3 October 2000 by LTJG [redacted], the Assistant Force Protection Officer; [encl (33)]

b. NAVCRIMINVSERVFO MIDDLE EAST BAHRAIN 081641Z SEP 99, a threat assessment and security overview of Aden, Yemen, downloaded from the Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network website on 5 October 2000; [encl (34)] and

c. DIRNAVCINVSERV WASHINGTON DC OCT 00, readdressed via email from Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO on 11 October 2000. [encl (6)]

17. In August 2000, the Threat Level for Yemen was HIGH, according to the most recent Naval Criminal Investigative Service Threat Level message available at the time. [encl (34)]

18. Under the Department of Defense five-point Threat Level rating scale (NEGligible, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and CRITICAL), Aden, Yemen was rated as a HIGH Threat Level in both the NAVCRIMINVSERV MIDDLE EAST BAHRAIN 081641Z SEP 99 message and the Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center baseline summary of 5 August 2000. [encls (33), (34)]

19. The 5 August 2000 Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center summary of Yemen described the following conditions:
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20. In addition, NAVCRIMINVSERVFO Middle East Bahrain 081641Z SEP 99 noted (paragraph 8.D) that "ships visiting Aden will now be able to refuel at one of the two fueling 'dolphins' located near the mouth of the harbor. The dolphins will allow U.S. Naval vessels to enter Aden and refuel without having to go pierside." This Naval Criminal Investigative Service message was referenced in the USS COLE (DDG 67) Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) for Aden. [encls (34),(35)]

21.

22. Under the new Department of Defense terrorism Threat Level system, not implemented by United States Central Command, SIGNIFICANT is defined as: "Anti-U.S. terrorists are present and attack personnel as their preferred method of operation, or a group uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method but has limited operational activity. The operating environment is neutral." [encl (6)]

23. Both the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) interpreted this new Threat Level rating of Yemen as a "decrease in Threat Level" (Commanding Officer) and changing to "one level lower" (Executive Officer). [encls (18),(20)]

24. The Commanding Officer stated that due to the new Threat Level rating for Yemen, he and the Force Protection Officer discussed "the potential for reduced Force Protection requirements. After a brief discussion, we both agreed that the Force Protection measures, as required by THREATCON BRAVO, would remain the same. Our situational
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awareness was centered around a Threat Level of HIGH vice SIGNIFICANT, since this would leave us at a higher readiness posture upon entering FIFTH Fleet and Aden, Yemen." [encl (19)]

25. Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO sent DIRNAVMINVSVR WASHINGTON DC 082100Z OCT 00 to USS COLE (DDG 67) without comment. The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Force Protection Officer, and Assistant Force Protection Officer assumed the new terrorist Threat Level rating system was in effect even though the message clearly states that the Defense Intelligence Agency is "currently in the process of converting all [Areas of Responsibility] to the new process. Until all [Areas of Responsibility] reflect the new methodology, [Naval Antiterrorism Alert Center] will continue to provide the old threat level as a means to compare the new system to the one being phased out." However, United States Central Command had not yet implemented the new system, and neither the ship nor Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO apparently knew of this fact. [encls (6),(18),(20),(36),(37),(132)]

26. In addition to threat assessment messages for Yemen prior to its Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, USS COLE (DDG 67) received COMUSNAVCENT 101400Z OCT 00, which placed specific liberty restrictions (e.g., a 2200 curfew) in the FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility due to increasing tensions among the Palestinian, Israeli, and Lebanese peoples. [encls (29),(38)]

27. According to LTJG [REDACTED], the Assistant Force Protection Officer, USS COLE (DDG 67) requested the latest threat assessment information in Logistics Requirements messages for other ports; specifically, La Maddalena, Italy and Bahrain. [encls (17),(26),(27)]

28. In USS COLE 081141Z OCT 00, the ship's Logistics Requirements message to the American Embassy Sanaa, Yemen, the ship did not request threat assessment information on Aden, Yemen. [encls (17),(26)]
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29. [RESTORED] USS COLE (DDG 67) did not possess DIRNAVCRIMINUSERV Washington DC 221930Z SEP 00, [RESTORED] [encls (19),(39)]

30. The September 1999 and September 2000 Naval Criminal Investigative Service threat assessment messages described in detail ship berthing facilities in-country, while the September 2000 message provides no information on port facilities and berthing. The identified threat in the September 1999 message is directed at Department of Defense personnel.

31. COMFIFTHFLT 291009Z JUN 99 directed the implementation of specific Force Protection measures upon receipt, established THREATCON BRAVO for "United States Naval Forces assigned to FIFTH Fleet and operating in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait", and provided references for Rules of Engagement and rules for the use of deadly force. The USS COLE (DDG 67) referenced this message in its Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) of 7 October 2000. [encls (35),(40)]
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Force Protection Plan

33. COLEINST 3300.55 is USS COLE’s (DDG 67) latest Force Protection Instruction, dated 9 September 2000. [encl (42)]

34. COLEINST 3300.55 erroneously refers to DODINST 2200.12, “Protection of Department of Defense Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence,” which is actually DoD 2000.12H of the same title, dated February 1993. [encl (42), ref (1), DoD 2000.12H]


36. COLEINST 3300.55 also refers to OPNAVINST 3300.55, “Navy Combating Terrorist Program Standards,” which is not yet available through official Navy distribution channels. It is available in “advance copy” from the Chief of Naval Operations (N34 office code) secure web site (http://198.250.25.40/force/default/htm). [encl (42)]

37. Enclosure (1) to COLEINST 3300.55 is the THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan worksheet, which lists 64 Force Protection measures. These 64 measures correspond precisely with the 64 Force Protection measures listed for THREATCONs ALPHA through DELTA in CNO 191301Z JUN 99, “Shipboard Physical Security Guidelines.” [encl (42),(43)]


39. Prior to CNO 191301Z JUN 99, OPNAVINST 3300.53’s “Shipboard Terrorist THREATCON Measures,” were identical to the measures outlined in DoD 2000.12H and Joint Publication 3-07.2. [refs (k), OPNAVINST 3300.53, (l), DoD 2000.12H, (m), Joint Pub 3-07.2]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG-67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

40. USS COLE (DDG 67) referenced CNO 191301Z JUN 99 in its "Import Security Plans" (i.e., Force Protection Plans) while under the operational control of Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet, because the Chief of Naval Operations Force Protection Guidelines are followed in SIXTH Fleet. COMSIXTHFLT 240603Z SEP 99, subject "Revised SIXTHFLT Shipboard THREATCON," references the Chief of Naval Operations message as authority for Force Protection measures. As of 24 November 2000, COMSIXTHFLT 240603Z SEP 99 was still current guidance and available on the Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet secure website (www.c6f.navy.mil/N3/forum/rosetta/force/240603zsep99.txt). USS COLE (DDG 67) also referenced this Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet message in its "Import Security Plans" while operating in SIXTH Fleet. [encls (42), (43), (128), (133)]

41. Prior to transitioning into FIFTH Fleet, the Commanding Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) authorized the Force Protection Officer to modify the ship's THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan worksheet from COLEINST 3300.55 in order to make it correspond with Force Protection Measures 1-94 from COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection), which are derived from Joint Publication 3.07-2. [encls (19), (42), (46)]

42. Ships under the operational control of Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet follow CNO 191301Z JUN 99, which corresponds with Joint Publication 3-07.2 in 48 of 59 specific THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO measures. Two measures contained in Joint guidance for THREATCON BRAVO but absent in Chief of Naval Operations guidance give the ship additional options to warn or deter approaching craft at a distance. Measures (31) and (33) from Joint Publication 3-07.2 (also DoD 2000.2H) appear in COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 as measures (31) and (34), respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOINT PUB MEASURE</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>33</th>
<th>Man signal bridge or Pilot House and ensure that flares are available to ward off approaching craft.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[encls (43),(44),(46), ref (k), OPNAVINST 3300.53]

43. For the Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen, the Force Protection Officer modified the ship’s THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan worksheet from COLEINST 3300.55 in order to comply with Force Protection Measures 1-62 for THREATCON BRAVO from COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection). [encl (19),(49)]

44. COMGWBATGRU 211130Z JUL 00 provided Force Protection guidance in the Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility to Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO units, including a message template for “Inport Security Plans,” which is the incorrect term for Force Protection Plans in the Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility. USS COLE (DDG 67) referenced COMGWBATGRU 211130Z JUL 00 in its “Inport Security Plan” for Aden, Yemen of 7 October 2000. [encls (35),(45)]

45. COMGWBATGRU 211130Z JUL 00, cited in USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) of 7 October 2000 as reference (a), provides a sample message format which states, in part, that for “recommended deviations” from required measures the ship should give a reason for the recommended deviation. This message defines “deviation” as, “measures you will not use/don’t apply to your unit.” [encl (45)]

46. According to COLEINST 3300.55, the Assistant Force Protection Officer was supposed to submit a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan and Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) to the Force Protection Officer, for review and recommendation to the Commanding Officer, 10 days prior to a port visit. In the case of the ship’s Brief Stop for Fuel to Aden, Yemen, the Assistant Force Protection Officer did not meet this 10-day deadline for
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submitting the THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan to the Force Protection Officer. [encls (19), (42), (30)]

47. □ USS COLE's (DDG 67) process for producing a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan is as follows: the Assistant Force Protection Officer gets information on the Threat Level for the port and any other pertinent information about the port, then the Assistant Force Protection Officer and the Anti-Terrorism Training Officers meet and discuss any special considerations; they write an initial THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan and route it through the Force Protection Officer and the Executive Officer, to the Commanding Officer. Upon the Commanding Officer's approval, the ship sends a Force Protection Plan to its Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC). Once the Immediate Superior In Command approves the plan, the Assistant Force Protection Officer and Force Protection Officer produce a final THREATCON Implementation Plan for the Commanding Officer's approval. [encl (19)]

48. □ COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) includes the measures that ships operating in the Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility are to follow in certain THREATCONs, or request deviations from, prior to entering port. USS COLE (DDG 67) referenced the OPORD 99-01 in its Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) of 7 October 2000. [encls (35), (46)]

49. □ According to COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection), the measures serve two purposes:

First, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship's resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship's activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target. [encl (83), ref (f), COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01]

50. □ COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection), reference (d) on the USS COLE (DDG 67) Inport Security Plan
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(Force Protection Plan), provides the template for drafting Force Protection Plans. One of the formatted line items is reserved for "recommended deviations" from Force Protection Measures. [encl (47)]

51. █ USS COLE 071856Z OCT 00 transmitted its Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) for its 12 October 2000 Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen, in accordance with Commander Task Force FIVE ZERO Force Protection guidance, the threat assessment for Aden, Yemen, THREATCON BRAVO for Yemen, and the COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01. [encl (35)]

52. █ USS COLE 071856Z OCT 00 stated the ship would implement all THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO Force Protection measures (Numbers 1-62) of COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) during its Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000, with no deviations. [encls (35),(46)]

53. █ The Commanding Officer, Force Protection Officer, and Assistant Force Protection Officer said they were not sure where the ship would be berthed in Aden, Yemen, so they drafted the USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Plan for a worst-case, highest-restriction scenario, which was a pierside mooring, accessible to vehicles and foot traffic. [encls (18),(29),(30),(36)]

54. █ CTF 50 102230Z OCT 00 approved the USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Plan for implementing Force Protection Measures 1-62 from COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) and said that in messages for future port visits or Brief Stops for Fuel the ship should cite "Force Protection Plan" in the subject line instead of "Inport Security Plan." [encl (48)]

55. █ Once Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE embarked aboard ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group) had approved the ship's proposed Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan), the Commanding Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) approved the ship's THREATCON Implementation Plan for Aden, Yemen, submitted by the Force Protection Officer/Assistant Force Protection Officer and reviewed by the Executive Officer on 11 October 2000. [encls (18),(30),(42),(49)]
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56. [redacted] The Commanding Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) delegated to the Force Protection Officer the authority to “waive” measures from the ship’s THREATCON Implementation Plan as necessary. [encls (19),(50)]

57. [redacted] Although it was the practice of the USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Team to meet a week to ten days prior to a port visit to discuss Force Protection aspects of a port, as noted in the Plans of the Day for 18 August, 25 August, 6 September and 23 September, the Force Protection Team did not meet prior to the ship’s Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen. [encls (29),(51)]

Port Preparation

58. [redacted] The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and the Force Protection Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) reviewed the following “Lessons Learned” regarding the Port of Aden, Yemen prior to arrival [encl (18),(19),(20)]:

USS HAWES (FFG 53) 280635Z AUG 00 [encl (52)]
USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) 261251Z AUG 00 [encl (53)]
USS BARRY (DDG 52) 301650Z MAY 00 [encl (54)]
USS TAYLOR (FFG 50) 230715Z NOV 99 [encl (55)]

59. [redacted] The USS HAWES’ (FFG 53) “Lessons Learned” contained the following highlights [encl (52)]:

a. The Pilot offered good advice.
b. The ship moored to Mooring Dolphin Seven located at 12-47’57”N 044-58’54”E.
c. Refueling pump rate was slow (75GPM).
d. Husbanding Agent provided great support.
e. Garbage was disposed of via barge.
f. Husbanding Agent provided flag of Yemen.

60. [redacted] The USS DONALD COOK’s (DDG 75) “Lessons Learned” contained the following highlights [encl (53)]:

a. Berthed at Dolphin Number Seven.
b. Language barrier with Pilot was a challenge.
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c. Twisted ship to go starboard side to; however, 
   Commanding Officer had to insist that the Pilot moor 
   the ship starboard to due to the pilot’s resistance. 
   Pilot wanted to moor port side to.
d. Made up two tugs with polypropylene hawsers.
e. Berth was a short platform (150’ long).
f. Outbound pilot proficient in English and quite 
   responsive.
g. Fuel was good quality and constant pressure.
h. The Harbor Master was willing and able to respond to 
   a change in schedule, and USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) 
   entered, fueled and departed with minimal difficulty.
i. Harbor capacity is only one ship at a time, being 
   limited by the capacity of the fueling dolphins.

61. The USS BARRY’s (DDG 52) "Lessons Learned" contained 
the following highlights [encl (54)]:

   a. Moored to Refueling Bunker Seven in position 12-47.95N, 
      044-58.94E with 13’ beneath the keel.
b. Received 86,000 gallons of F-76; transfer took 
   approximately three hours.
c. Expect Pilot to bring United Yemen flag to be flown.
d. Pilot was competent and cordial.
e. Garbage disposal was by small boat.
f. Pilot brought a United Yemen flag.

62. The USS TAYLOR’s (FFG 50) "Lessons Learned" contained 
the following highlights [encl (55)]:

   a. Dolphin Number Seven is not marked on DMA chart 62098, 
      but is marked on British Admiralty Chart 3660. It is 
      located in position 12-47’57”N 044-58’54”E.
b. Dolphin is 171.6 ft long.
c. USS TAYLOR (FFG 50) moored port side to.
d. Experienced 15-minute delay waiting on the Pilot.
e. Pilot spoke only broken English; did not understand 
   Commanding Officer.
f. Crane at fueling pier inoperative (repair status 
   unknown) and approximately 40 personnel were required 
   to manhandle the hose.
g. Fresh water, Collection, Holding and Transfer removal, 
   and trash removed by barge.
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63. USS COLE (DDG 67) had the following active Casualty Reports (CASREPS) upon entering Aden, Yemen: [encl (56)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASREP NUMBER</th>
<th>NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00040</td>
<td>Retractable kingpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00044</td>
<td>Towed array SQR-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00046</td>
<td>URN-25 TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00047</td>
<td>MT 21 (CIWS) (Close-In Weapon System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00048</td>
<td>Piping/heating group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00049</td>
<td>Galley steam kettle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00050</td>
<td>1B ejector pump controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00051</td>
<td>Gear assembly, main reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00052</td>
<td>Generator/processor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00053</td>
<td>TDSS (Tactical Decision Support Subsystem)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. Without a known air threat or large surface combatant threat in Aden, Yemen, the following USS COLE (DDG 67) primary weapons systems were not applicable to inner harbor defensive situations, such as countering a small boat attack or repelling boarders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON SYSTEMS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MK-41 VLS (SM2)</td>
<td>Vertical Launch System (Standard Missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-41 VLS (TLAM)</td>
<td>Vertical Launch System (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-41 VLS (VLA)</td>
<td>Vertical Launch System (Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-45 LWGM</td>
<td>Light Weight Gun Mount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-15 CIWS</td>
<td>Close-In Weapon System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARPOON (CANISTER)</td>
<td>Harpoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-32 SVTT</td>
<td>Surface Vessel Torpedo Tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBOC</td>
<td>Super Rapid Blooming Outboard Chaff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[encls (19), (56-58)]
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65. **USS COLE** (DDG 67) had the following weapons and non-lethal devices available for waterside security such as attack by a small boat or ultralight aircraft. [encls (19),(36),(46),(57),(58),(59)]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-MM pistol</td>
<td>28²</td>
<td>50 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-14 rifle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>460 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60 machine gun</td>
<td>4³</td>
<td>600 meters (man sized target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 grenade launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31 meters (min. safety separation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal machine gun</td>
<td>4 mounts³</td>
<td>1829 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns (12-Gauge)</td>
<td>14²</td>
<td>40 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concussion Grenades</td>
<td>Unknown¹</td>
<td>Exact qty Unknown⁵ (create shock waves)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NON-LETHAL DEVICES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLOWANCE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire Hoses⁴</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Approximately 35-40 yards⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

¹ Approximate weapon ranges and information regarding concussion grenades furnished by Mr. Terry O'Brien from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana.
² Weapons were issued to certain inport watchstanders.
³ All four .50-cal tripods were installed with weapons mounted, and two M-60s were on the bridge wings while inport Aden, Yemen.
⁴ Can be utilized to repel boarders and counter small boats and ultralight aircraft.
⁵ It was determined there were concussion grenades onboard, though the exact quantity onboard is unknown.
⁶ Approximate range per Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Force Protection Officer.
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66. The Navigation Brief for Aden, Yemen was scheduled to be held in the Wardroom, USS COLE (DDG 67) at 1900 on 11 October 2000, but was changed to 1400 by the Executive Officer because the ship would be going into the Navigation Detail for exiting the Red Sea around the 1900 timeframe. [encls (60),(61)]

67. The Commanding Officer approved both the Navigation Brief and Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Chart 62098 ["Gulf of Aden, Yemen: Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor)"]]. Neither the expected berth nor the heading was noted in the written Navigation Brief, as Refueling Dolphin Seven is not printed on the chart. [encls (3),(62),(63)]

68. Prior to entering port, DMA Chart 62098 did not depict Refueling Dolphin Seven. (The dolphin, now depicted on enclosure (3), was loosely hand-drawn on the chart by LT [redacted], the Navigator, during an investigator's interview.) [encls (3),(63)]

69. The latitude and longitude of Refueling Dolphin Seven were identified in the "Lessons Learned" after port visit reports submitted by USS BARRY (DDG 52), USS HAWES (FFG 53), and USS TAYLOR (FFG 50). [encls (52),(54),(55)]

70. During the course of the Navigation Brief, the Commanding Officer stated that the ship would moor starboard side to in order for USS COLE (DDG 67) to get underway as soon as possible, should the situation so warrant. [encl (18),(21)]

71. The Sea and Anchor Watchbill for 12 October 2000 was signed by the Commanding Officer and posted to be effective and cancelled on that date. [encl (64)]
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Entry into Aden, Yemen

72. The following is a timeline of the day’s events for USS COLE (DDG 67) using the Ship’s Deck Log and the Engineering Log from 12 October 2000 in Aden, Yemen.

0546C Sea and Anchor Detail [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
0736C Set Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine [encl (2), Engineering Log]
0737C Set Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
* 0746C Pilot picked up [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log {3}, Navigation Chart]
0746C Pilot Ibrahim is on the bridge [encl (1), Ships Deck Log]
0849C Moored Starboard side to Refueling Dolphin in Aden, Yemen [encl (2), Engineering Log]
0851C Moored Yemen [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
* 0920C- 0940C Husbanding Agent arrived [encl (20), Executive Officer’s Statement]
0927C Secured from Restricted Maneuvering [encl (2), Engineering Log]
0930C Secure Sea and Anchor Detail [encl (2)]
0935C Secure Nav Detail [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
0940C Secure Sea and Anchor Detail [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
* 0940C Pilot departed USS COLE (DDG 67) [encl (20), Executive Officer’s Statement]
0940C Shifted the Officer of the Deck from the Pilot House to the Quarterdeck [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
1031C Commenced refueling at station 3, approx. frame 126, STBD side [encls (2), Engineering Log, (19), IO’s Interview with Commanding Officer]
1115C Explosion logged onboard USS COLE (DDG 67) [encl (1), Ship’s Deck Log]
1118C Explosion on port midships, USS COLE (DDG 67) [encl (2), Engineering Log]

* Times approximate
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73. At 0546C, 12 October 2000, Sea and Anchor Detail was set for USS COLE (DDG 67). [encl (1)]

74. USS COLE's (DDG 67) track on entering Aden Harbor, Yemen, was uneventful. The ship did have difficulties raising Aden Port Control and the Pilot. [encls (18),(20), (36),(65),(66)]

75. The difficulty in raising Aden Port Control resulted in an approximate 30-minute delay before entering Aden Harbor, Yemen. [encl (18)]

76. USS COLE (DDG 67) overheard on Bridge to Bridge radio that Aden Port Control encountered difficulty communicating with another ship. [encls (18),(36),(65)]

77. USS TAYLOR (FFG 50) experienced a 15-minute delay entering the Port of Aden, Yemen waiting for the Pilot, according to its "Lessons Learned" for Aden Harbor, Yemen. [encl (55)]

78. USS COLE's (DDG 67) watch team completed the Entering Port Checklist. As Aden was not a liberty port, the ship did not pass the word for all hands to shift into the Uniform of the Day. [encl (67)]

79. On 12 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) set the Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine at time 0736C according to the Engineering Log and at time 0737C according to the Deck Log. [encls (1),(2)]

80. The Pilot boat came alongside at 0746C. The Pilot, Mr. Ibrahim, embarked via the Jacobs ladder rigged over the side on the port side of the fantail. [encls (1),(3),(20)]

81. According to the Navigator and the Underway Officer of the Deck, the Pilot appeared to be quite professional. [encls (36),(65)]

82. The Pilot informed the Commanding Officer that the ship would be mooring port side to Refueling Dolphin Seven. After a few minutes of discussion, the Pilot explained that the pier refueling connection would not
reach back aft if USS COLE (DDG 67) moored starboard side to Refueling Dolphin Seven. [encls (18), (36), (65), (68), (69)]

83. The Commanding Officer informed the Pilot that USS COLE (DDG 67) could take on fuel forward on the starboard side, thereby accomplishing the Pilot’s goal of refueling the ship with a short refueling hose and the Commanding Officer’s desire to go starboard side to Refueling Dolphin Seven. [encl (18)]

84. The Pilot relented and agreed to moor the ship starboard side to Refueling Dolphin Seven. [encls (18), (36), (65), (68), (69)]

85. USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) had also encountered problems with the Pilot wanting to position the ship port side to rather than starboard side to. Despite the Pilot’s resistance, USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) moored starboard side to. [encl (53)]

86. USS COLE (DDG 67) proceeded at 5 knots until within the Eastern Harbor entrance. [encl (18), (21)]

87. The Pilot had arranged for two tug boats and two line handling boats to assist in the mooring. [encls (18), (21)]

88. Speed was then increased to 10 knots at the Pilot’s request until in the inner basin in the northwest. At approximately 0818C, the forward tug made up with a line through the bull nose. [encls (1), (3), (18)]

89. Once in the center of the basin, at approximately 0830C, the ship was twisted to port with the assistance of a tug aft. [encls (3), (18), (21)]

90. Once abeam of Refueling Dolphin Seven, the forward tug was let go and both tugs slowly pushed USS COLE (DDG 67) against Refueling Dolphin Seven, starboard side to. [encls (18), (21)]

91. Two small white boats came alongside at approximately 0830C to assist with mooring lines. [encls (20), (21)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

92. The two small boats were manned by three or four men in each boat. The boats were small craft about 25 feet in length with dirty white hulls, open cockpits, and inboard motors. [encls (20),(21)]

93. At 0849-0851C the ship passed its first line to the Refueling Dolphin and was moored starboard side to Refueling Dolphin Seven. [encls (1),(2),(18),(21)]

94. Photographs in enclosures (70) and (71) depict Refueling Dolphin Seven when vacant and with the USS COLE (DDG 67) moored. [encls (70),(71)]

16 October 2000 - USS COLE (DDG 67) moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven in Aden Harbor, Aden, Yemen. View facing ENE into the inner harbor.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

16 October 2000 - USS COLE (DDG 67) moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven in Aden Harbor, Aden, Yemen. View facing East into the inner harbor.

16 October 2000 - USS COLE (DDG 67) moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven in Aden Harbor, Aden, Yemen. View facing South to Aden Peninsula. Two other vacant Refueling Dolphins are apparent.
95. The Pilot became agitated and impatient about the mooring process. The Commanding Officer, explaining that every time they tried to push him to the dolphins they did not come in close enough and pushed off too fast, it would cause the tape to become clogged up and not blow out. [encls (18)]

96. Spring lines 2, 4, 6, and 8 were made up to mooring dolphins. Seven lines were made up to each bollard. Lines 2 and 4 were made up to the separate bollards after [encls (20)]

97. Lines 1 and 7 were passed with two small working boats to mooring buoy over the bow to help moor the ship. [encls (18), 21]

98. Just before departing Sea Lane Area D, a small boat came alongside portside and threw a line up to USS COLE (DDG 67). The boat was white, approximately 15-20' feet with a green tarp covering the deck. Three men were in the boat, one about 50 years old, one about 30 years old, and a boy about 13 years old.
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They yelled to the crew, "garbage, garbage." The fantail detail asked the bridge whether the ship was sending off garbage. [encl (72),(73)]

99. As the fantail detail waited for a response, two men attempted to climb the Jacobs ladder over the port side fantail that had been extended for the Pilot. The fantail Shotline Petty Officer, GM2 [redacted], walked over to the head of the ladder and motioned with her M-14 (loaded with shot line) for the men to descend back to the boat. They did. [encl (73),(74)]

100. The Commanding Officer, in response to the fantail’s request whether the ship was sending off garbage, said the ship was not planning to use trash services. The Underway Officer of the Deck instructed the fantail to wave off the boat. The fantail detail threw the line back to the boat and the boat pulled away. The boat remained in the vicinity of USS COLE (DDG 67), eventually pulling alongside a small red and yellow boat. The boy transferred to the red and yellow boat. [encl (36),(64),(69),(72-74)]

101. The Underway Officer of the Deck requested verification that the small boat had cleared the ship. The Junior Officer of the Deck reported to the Officer of the Deck that the boat had departed. [encl (18)]

102. Upon hearing that two unidentified individuals were trying to come on board, the Executive Officer went down to the Jacobs ladder on the port side fantail. A well-dressed man appeared to be the expected Husbanding Agent. The Executive Officer allowed him to climb aboard. He introduced himself as the Husbanding Agent. It is unclear from the available information whether the Husbanding Agent came aboard the ship from a garbage barge or another boat. The Executive Officer and a Petty Officer searched his carrying bag. It contained a cellular phone and papers. The Executive Officer called for the Supply Officer who arrived and escorted the Husbanding Agent inside the ship. The Jacobs ladder was raised at the direction of the Executive Officer. [encl (20)]
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103. The Husbanding Agent provided the Supply Officer and Supply Leading Chief Petty Officer (Chief [redacted]) with receipts for garbage pickup (three receipts) and Collection, Holding, and Transfer removal (three receipts). [encl (19)]

104. The receipts the Husbanding Agent provided the Supply Officer and Chief [redacted] [redacted] [encl (19)]

105. Around 0925C, the ship had all lines doubled. USS COLE (DDG 67) secured from restricted maneuvering at 0927C, 12 October 2000. [encls (2),(18)]

106. The USS COLE (DDG 67) secured from Sea and Anchor Detail according to the Engineering Log at 0930C. [encls (2),(18),(20)]

107. USS COLE (DDG 67) secured from Navigation Detail and Sea and Anchor Detail according to the Deck Log at time 0935C, 12 October 2000. [encl (1)]

108. USS COLE (DDG 67) was moored approximately at position 12-47.58N 044-58.55E on the North side of the East channel, at a heading of approximately 250 degrees True. [encls (3), (63)]

The Inport Watch

109. Between the time the Executive Officer returned to the Bridge and approximately time 0940C, he directed the Quarterdeck be stationed at starboard amidships, since this would allow for both good oversight of the refueling, as well as an unobstructed view of the Refueling Dolphin. [encl (20)]

110. The Command Duty Officer for 12 October 2000 was LT [redacted], whose primary billet was Operations Officer. He reported aboard USS COLE (DDG 67) in March 2000. [encl (21)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

111. [Redacted] Though not signed, the Inport Duty Section Three Watchbill was posted on the Quarterdeck and outside the Ship’s Office. LT [Redacted] (Senior Watch Officer) and OSCS [Redacted] (Watchbill Section Leader) confirmed that the Watchbill was not signed. [encls (19),(75)]

112. [Redacted] Twenty-one (21) of 73 personnel were not fully qualified for their watch stations on the 12 October 2000 Duty Section Three Watchbill, according to paper copy printouts from the Relational Administrative Database Manager, dated 22 April to 2 October 2000. Ens (ENS) [Redacted], Information Systems Officer, annotated the qualification status of watch standers on a copy of a Duty Section Three Watchbill. [encls (32),(75)]

113. [Redacted] The reporting dates for the 21 unqualified personnel from the 12 October 2000 Inport Watchbill, as furnished by PNC [Redacted], ranged from April 1998 to August 2000. [encl (76)]

114. [Redacted] Two additional watch standers (LT [Redacted], Command Duty Officer, and QMC [Redacted], the scheduled 0400-0800 Officer of the Deck) from the 12 October 2000 Duty Section Three Inport Watchbill were listed as not qualified. Documentation was produced to confirm their qualifications (Command Duty Officer letter signed by the Commanding Officer and the service record was reviewed showing Officer of the Deck qualification). [encls (19),(77)]

115. [Redacted] The Commanding Officer stated his Duty Section Three for 12 October 2000 was qualified, but the verification of all watch station qualifications as of 12 October 2000 could not be accurately determined due to the damage to the Relational Administrative Database Manager system. [encls (19),(78)]

116. [Redacted] At 0930C, at which time Inport Duty Section Three assumed the watch, the following personnel, whose duties had direct Force Protection implications, assumed their respective watches: [encls (19),(57),(75),(78)]
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>WATCH</th>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>BRIEFED?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Command Duty Officer</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCS</td>
<td>Section Leader</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK1</td>
<td>Officer of the Deck</td>
<td>9-MM</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH2</td>
<td>Petty Officer of the Watch</td>
<td>9-MM</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Messenger of the Watch</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM3</td>
<td>Topside Rover (Forecastle)</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Backup Alert Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC2</td>
<td>Topside Rover (Fantail)</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STG3</td>
<td>Internal Rover²</td>
<td>9-MM³</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Backup Alert Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC1</td>
<td>Security Action Team¹</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC1</td>
<td>Security Action Team</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STG2</td>
<td>Backup Alert Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC3</td>
<td>Backup Alert Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM3</td>
<td>Backup Alert Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Dual Watch
²Unable to accurately verify qualifications
³Qualification for weapon expired [encl (79)]
⁴FC1 [redacted] was unaware he was on duty [encl (19)]

117. Enclosure (80) is a diagram depicting the topside locations of the Inport Watch Team for USS COLE (DDG 67) while inport Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000. [encl (80)]

118. The three Quarterdeck watches and the two external Rovers were all wearing helmets and flak jackets. The Rovers had two means of communication, the Wireless Internal Communication System (WICS) radio and a whistle. [encl (19)]
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119. SK1 [REDACTED], the Inport Officer of the Deck, was originally scheduled for the 1200-1600 watch; however, he swapped for the 0800-1200 watch. OSCS [REDACTED], the Enlisted Watch Section Leader, was unaware of the swap. [encls (19),(81)]

120. Although assigned differently on the inport Watchbill, TM3 [REDACTED] and STG3 [REDACTED] said they were directed to switch watches by OSCS [REDACTED], the Section Leader. However, OSCS [REDACTED] does not recall telling them to exchange their assignments. [encl (19)]

121. LT [REDACTED], Command Duty Officer, stated, “While I was still observing the mooring evolution on the forecastle, the Enlisted Duty Section Leader, OSCS [REDACTED] approached me. He told me that he was mustering all of the day’s security forces for briefing as soon as we secured from the Special Sea and Anchor Detail.” LT [REDACTED] in a later statement stated OSCS [REDACTED] had briefed the watch section. [encls (19),(21)]

122. The Quarterdeck and Roving Patrol watch standers were not briefed. [encls (19),(82),(83-88)]

Implementing the Force Protection Plan

123. The following is a summary of COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) shipboard THREATCON measures for THREATCON BRAVO: [encl (46)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>ALPHA MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brief Crew on port threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brief security personnel on threat and Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Review security plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inspect spaces not in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Post armed sentries onboard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Post armed sentries pierside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ensure security personnel have communication systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Issue night vision devices, if appropriate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>ALPHA MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Review pier/ship access control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Coordinate security with local authority and other forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ID all personnel entering pier/landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Establish unloading zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Deploy pier-side barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Post signs in local language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Inspect all vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Inspect all personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Direct liberty boats to inspect ship, if appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ensure unauthorized craft kept away from ship/monitor authorized craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Identify/inspect workboats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Secure spaces not in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Regulate shipboard lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Rig Hawsepipe/rat guards/anchor collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Raise ladders/clear ship of unnecessary gear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Conduct security drills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Review THREATCON BRAVO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>BRAVO MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Maintain appropriate THREATCON ALPHA measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Review liberty policy, if appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Conduct divisional quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>List bilingual personnel and have warning tape on hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lock parked vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Implement measures to place picket boats/crews on 15-minute standby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Post armed brow watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Restrict vehicle access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Man signal bridge/flares available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Place armed sentries on superstructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Arm Quarterdeck watch and SAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Provide ammo/shotgun for Quarterdeck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Arm Command Duty Officer/Assistant Command Duty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Utilize husbanding agent/local authority for control of craft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>BRAVO MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Arm sounding and security patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Brief ammunition bearers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Ensure expedient issue of firearms/ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Inform local authorities of action taken as THREATCON increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Test internal communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Ensure watches conduct random searches pierside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Inspect ship's hull and boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Move cars/crates/trash away from ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Hoist ship's boats not in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Consider no public visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Set material condition Yoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Reduce ship's entry points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Spaces not in use secured/inspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Remove unused brow and gangway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Maintain capability to get underway on short notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>.50 caliber mounts and ammo in ready service lockers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Prepare firehoses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Obstruct unauthorized helicopter landings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Review crowd control procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Monitor local communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Inform local authorities of action as threat increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Review THREATCON CHARLIE measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124. After mooring at Refueling Dolphin Seven, the Force Protection Officer, in accordance with the authority delegated to him by Commanding Officer, USS COLE (DDG 67), "waived" the following 19 Force Protection Measures listed in COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection). The "waivers" were not documented:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Protection Measures &quot;Waived&quot;</th>
<th>Commanding Officer &amp; Force Protection Officer Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Number 6: Consistent with local rules, regulations and SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), post qualified armed pier sentry and pier entrance sentry.</td>
<td>• &quot;Due to the configuration of Refueling Dolphin Seven, no brow was put down onto the pier; however, an armed Quarterdeck watch was established and access could be controlled by the Quarterdeck.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 8: If available, issue night vision devices to selected posted security personnel.</td>
<td>• &quot;USS COLE (DDG 67) was not expected to remain in port after dark, therefore goggles were not issued. Goggles were available.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 10: Coordinate pier and fleet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment) and define methods of activation and communication.</td>
<td>• &quot;No other ships were in port requiring coordination, and due to the location of the pier and length of the visit, no local authorities needed to be consulted.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 12: Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish unloading zone(s) on the pier away from the ship.</td>
<td>• &quot;There was no cargo to be loaded on the ship at this port.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection Measures</td>
<td>Commanding Officer &amp; Force Protection Officer Rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Waived&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Configuration of the fueling dolphin did not require deployment of barriers, since no vehicles other than boats could gain access to the dolphin.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 13: Deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship. Barriers may be ship’s vehicles, equipment, port provided barrier systems, marine containers, or items available locally. Consistent with local conditions, 400 FT standoff from the ship is preferred.</td>
<td>&quot;Since Aden Port Control controlled access to the Refueling Dolphin, signs were not required. Also, no visitors were expected other than Husbanding Agent.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 14: Post signs in local language(s) to explain visiting and loitering restrictions.</td>
<td>&quot;No vehicles other than boats had access to the Refueling Dolphin.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 15: Inspect all vehicles entering pier and check for unauthorized personnel, weapons, and/or explosives.</td>
<td>&quot;Liberty was not authorized for Aden and no liberty boats were contracted for use.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 17: Direct departing and arriving liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship and give special attention to the waterline and hull. Boats must be identifiable night and day to ship’s personnel.</td>
<td>&quot;COLE’s anchor was left at the dip and due to the short time period of the visit, it was deemed not necessary to install these devices.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 22: Rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<th>Commanding Officer &amp; Force Protection Officer Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 24:</strong> Conduct security drills to include bomb threat and repel boarders exercises.</td>
<td>&quot;Due to the length of the visit, a drill was not deemed necessary due to the potential disruption to refueling operations.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 27:</strong> Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship and crew.</td>
<td>&quot;No liberty was authorized for Aden, Yemen.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 30:</strong> Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check them before entering.</td>
<td>&quot;No vehicles were on the Refueling Dolphin, nor any rented for the visit.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 31:</strong> Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15 minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with M16 rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades.</td>
<td>&quot;USS COLE (DDG 67) was moored starboard side to and the RHIBs were not lowered and used while inport. The security risk of having the boats in the water on 15 minute alert was deemed a greater risk than leaving in the skids for the short length of the visit.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 32:</strong> Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish armed brow watch on pier to check identification and inspect baggage before</td>
<td>&quot;Due to the location and configuration of the Refueling Dolphin, along with its controlled access, the minimal manning of the Refueling Dolphin with only the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>personnel board ship.</td>
<td>refueling crew, and the fact that no brow had been put across, an armed Quarterdeck watch was deemed sufficient security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;No vehicles were on the Refueling Dolphin, nor were any rented for the visit.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 33:</strong> Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreement, establish unloading zone(s) and move all containers as far away from the ship as possible (400 feet stand-off distance preferred).</td>
<td><strong>Number 45:</strong> Instruct watches to conduct frequent random searches under piers, with emphasis on potential hiding places, pier pilings, and floating debris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Due to the configuration of the Refueling Dolphin, and the fact that no brow had lowered, all areas on the pier were visible and could be observed from the ship.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number 56:</strong> Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.</td>
<td><strong>Number 56:</strong> Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Due to the configuration of the Refueling Dolphin, and the fact that no brow had been lowered onto the dolphin, access to the Quarterdeck was considered secure enough that fire hoses were deemed not necessary.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Subj:** COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Protection Measures &quot;Waived&quot;</th>
<th>Commanding Officer &amp; Force Protection Officer Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Number 57:</strong> Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner as to prevent hostile helicopters from landing.</td>
<td>• &quot;Due to the short duration of the visit, the flight deck had not been completely blocked since all lines and line handling equipment was still laid out.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Number 60:</strong> Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.</td>
<td>• &quot;No high-risk personnel were expected to visit the ship.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[encls (18), (36), (46)]

125. USS COLE (DDG 67) did not lower its two RHIBs for possible use as picket boats [Measures 31 (THREATCON BRAVO) and 73 (THREATCON CHARLIE)]. USS COLE's (DDG 67) only boat davit is configured on the starboard side amidships; therefore, after mooring starboard side to the dolphin, the ship could not lower its boats. [encls (50)]

126. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) [Redacted], United States Defense Attaché, Sanaa, Yemen, stated that prior to assuming duties, "during at least one BSF [Brief Stop for Fuel] prior to my arrival (while we were in THREATCON CHARLIE), a USN ship put a small boat (RHIB) in the water for security reasons, ... and the Yemeni Navy objected to this as a sovereignty issue, even though we believe we had not had any previous problems with this." [encl (134)]

127. LTC [Redacted] pursued a dialogue with the Yemeni Navy on the issue of United States Navy ships using small boats as security boats. "In my March 2000 meetings with the Southern Area Commander and in my Apr 00 initial office call with the Minister of Defense, I requested that USN ships be allowed to put a small boat in the water as long as the Harbour Master was notified. Both the MOD [Minister of Defense] and SAC [Southern Area Commander] agreed to that request. This was not again an issue as we moved to THREATCON BRAVO, when it is not a requirement to put a security boat in the water. I am not aware if any
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other USN ships put boats in the water or if there was any Yemeni Navy reaction.” [encl (134)]

128. USS COLE (DDG 67) did not inform Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE embarked aboard ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group), of the 19 waived measures from its approved Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan). [encls (19),(35),(48),(89)]

129. LT [redacted], Force Protection Officer, said he intended to notify Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE embarked aboard ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group) of USS COLE’s (DDG 67) deviations from its approved Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) in a message after the ship departed Aden, Yemen. [encl (50)]

130. LTJG [redacted] knew USS COLE (DDG 67) deviated from its approved Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) but did not know why the ship did not report that fact to Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE embarked aboard ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group). [encl (19)]

131. USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Commanding Officer and Force Protection Officer stated they executed the following Force Protection Measures from COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection): [encls (18),(36),(46),(50)]

Number 1: Brief crew on the port specific threat, the Security/Force Protection Plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures. Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the Officer of the Deck.

Number 3: Review security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.
Number 4: Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use.

Number 5: Consistent with local rules, regulations, and Status of Forces Agreement, post qualified armed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry. Rifles are the preferred weapon.

Number 7: Ensure sentries, roving patrols, response force, and the Quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate. If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light).

Number 9: Review pier and shipboard access control procedures.

Number 11: Tighten shipboard and pier access control procedures. Positively identify all personnel entering pier and fleet landing area—no exceptions.

Number 16: Inspect all personnel, hand carried items, and packages before allowing them on board. Where available, use baggage scanners and walk through or hand held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship.

Number 20: Secure spaces not in use.

Number 21: Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment. Lighting should include illumination of the waterline.

Number 23: Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, jacob ladders, etc., when not in use. Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines.

Number 25: Review individual actions in THREATCON BRAVO for possible implementation.

Number 26: Maintain appropriate THREATCON ALPHA measures.

Number 28: Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade to determine the status of on-board personnel and to disseminate information.

Number 35: After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Provide shotgun and ammunition to Quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the Quarterdeck can be covered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>If not already armed, arm sounding and security patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Implement procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition from Small Arms Locker (SAL). Ensure a set of SAL keys are readily available and in the possession of an officer designated for this duty by the Commanding Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Inform local authorities of actions taken as the THREATCON increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Test internal communications, communications with local authorities, and communications with other U.S. Naval ships in port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Conduct searches of the ship’s hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Move cars and objects such as crates and trash containers as far from the ship as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Hoist boats aboard when not in use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Consider terminating all public visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Set materiel condition yoke, main deck and below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship’s interior by securing selected entrances from the inside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Maintain capability to get underway on short notice or as specified by Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

Number 55: Ensure .50 caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50 caliber machine guns will be maintained in the armory, prefire checks completed, and ready for use).

Number 58: Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylum seeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures.

Number 59: Monitor local communications (e.g., ship-to-ship, TV, radio, police scanners).

Number 61: Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases.

Number 62: Review individual actions in THREATCON CHARLIE for possible implementation.

132. USS COLE (DDG 67) did not accomplish the following Force Protection Measures from COMUSNAVCENT/COMPOTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) during its Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Protection Measures Not Accomplished</th>
<th>Basis for Non-Accomplishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Number 1: Brief crew on the port specific threat, the Security/Force Protection Plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore.</td>
<td>• Although the Commanding Officer and Force Protection Officer say this measure was accomplished, the crew's lack of awareness of the THREATCON and Threat Level, as shown in an informal survey by the Investigating Officer and interviews, indicate this measure was not accomplished. The survey results are in the crew knowledge area later in the Findings of Fact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 2: Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.</td>
<td>• Quarterdeck and Rover Sentry watches were manned and armed, but personnel were not briefed on threat and Rules of Engagement by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

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<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Command Duty Officer, Force Protection Officer, Section Leader, or Officer of the Deck (inport).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Number 18**: Control authorized watercraft and keep unauthorized craft away from the ship.

- **Number 19**: Identify and inspect workboats.

- Prior to assuming the watch after Sea and Anchor Detail secured, the Inport Watch Team was not briefed on the applicable THREATCON and Threat Level for Yemen, and not provided guidance on control of small watercraft. During Sea and Anchor detail, the ship kept away one watercraft. At some time after the Husbanding Agent boarded, the Commanding Officer decided to authorize garbage boats to come alongside. The Officer of the Deck and Command Duty Officer were unaware of the number of service boats that were alongside USS COLE (DDG 67) at any given time. Members of the crew, including one member of the watch team (TM3 ...) saw the approach of the suicide boat. He, along with other crew members topside, assumed the boat to be a garbage boat.

- The ship did not inspect workboats.
**Subj:** COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Number 26: Maintain appropriate THREATCON ALPHA measures.</td>
<td>• In view of the fact the ship did not accomplish Measures 1, 2, 18, and 19, it cannot be said the ship accomplished this measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 29 (second part): Ensure the warning tape in the Pilot House and/or Quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English.</td>
<td>• Ship did not have an Arabic linguist and had not obtained an audiotape through other means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 34: Man Signal Bridge or Pilot House and ensure flares are available to ward off approaching craft.</td>
<td>• Neither Signal Bridge nor Pilot House were manned. Flares were available at both places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 36: If not already armed, arm all members of the Quarterdeck Watch and Security Action Team. In the absence of a Security Action Team, arm two members of the Self-Defense Force. [Note: Quarterdeck Watches were armed but Security Action Team was not.]</td>
<td>• Quarterdeck watches and three Rover watches were manned and armed. Security Action Team and Ship's Self-Defense Force were not armed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 38: Issue arms to selected qualified officers to include Command Duty Officer and Assistant Command Duty Officer.</td>
<td>• Command Duty Officer was not armed. Ship does not have an Assistant Command Duty Officer watch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 39: Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized</td>
<td>• Measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship were not implemented. The watches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

<table>
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<th>Force Protection Measures Not Accomplished</th>
<th>Basis for Non-Accomplishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>craft should be carefully controlled. Coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.</td>
<td>were not briefed concerning the need to carefully control authorized craft and were unaware of what boats were alongside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 41: Muster and brief ammunition bearers or messengers.</td>
<td>• No duty section brief was conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number 53: If two brows are rigged, remove one of them. Use only one gangway to access the ship.</td>
<td>• Not applicable, because the ship did not rig any brows.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[encls (19),(50),(83-88),(90-91)]

133. **USS COLE** (DDG 67) exceeded the requirements for THREATCON BRAVO Force Protection Measure Number 55 ("ensure .50 caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers") by mounting the weapons as well as the assemblies, thus saving time in the event they would be used. [encls (36),(46)]

134. **According to the ship's Force Protection Officer, with the .50 caliber machine guns mounted to the assemblies and ammunition in the ready service lockers, it would take five to seven minutes to load the ammunition and man the .50 caliber machine guns.** No one was assigned to man the guns on the Watchbill. [encls (50),(75)]

In Aden Harbor

135. **(U)** According to LTC [name redacted], USA, United States Defense Attaché, Sanaa, Yemen, he knows of no security measures provided for United States Navy ships by the refueling contractor, Arab Investment Manufacturing and
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Trading Company. Unless they are in Aden, Yemen on other business, the United States Defense Attaché Office does not visit the ships that visit the Port of Aden, Yemen. [encl (19)]

136. (U) According to LTC [redacted], USA, United States Defense Attaché, Sanaa, Yemen, "The Yemeni Navy offered no security for the USS COLE prior to the attack. Yemeni MOD [Minister of Defense] and the Yemeni Navy were informed of the USS COLE visit according to standard BSF procedures." [encl (134)]

137. (U) As the Topside Forecastle Rover, TM3 [redacted] noticed a Yemeni soldier on the Refueling Dolphin carrying an AK-47, and he reported to the Quarterdeck that he was concerned about this individual. [encl (19)]

138. (U) According to the Executive Officer, the Yemeni carrying the AK-47 was continuously present on the Dolphin from the time the ship moored. [encl (19)]

139. (U) Several hundred yards away there were two tankers, one of Panamanian registry named the RED SEA. A yellow ferry was going back and forth transferring goods to the tankers. Another ship was being set up for mooring by tugs. At some point a white Yemeni patrol boat passed near USS COLE (DDG 67). Five or six boats were operating at various times in the general vicinity of the dolphin. [encls (92-95)]

140. (U) At approximately 0940C, as the ship secured from Sea and Anchor detail, the Executive Officer escorted the Pilot from the Bridge to the fantail. It is unclear from the available information what kind of craft the Pilot climbed onto when he disembarked USS COLE (DDG 67). [encls (18), (20)]

141. At approximately 0945C, 12 October 2000, the Supply Officer, USS COLE (DDG 67) approached the Commanding Officer and recommended that the ship utilize a garbage barge. The Commanding Officer’s initial answer was no. Several minutes later, the Executive Officer and Supply Officer approached the Commanding Officer again, stating that the garbage pickup was extremely reasonable at only
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$150 USD. The Commanding Officer authorized a garbage barge to come alongside. [encls (18),(20)]

142. The USS COLE (DDG 67) Logistics Requirements message did not request garbage removal. The United States Defense Attaché Office, Sanaa, Yemen, Logistics Requirements message reply did not address garbage removal as part of the services to be provided. [encls (16),(26)]

143. The Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA) submitted an Import Refueling Checklist to the Commanding Officer requesting permission to take on fuel. After the proper signatures were obtained, the MPA was given permission to take on fuel. [encl (18)]

144. At approximately 1020C, SK3 went to the Wardroom to escort the Husbanding Agent around to coordinate the sewage Collection, Holding and Transfer and garbage boats. [encls (28),(96),(97)]

145. Around 1020C, the Husbanding Agent, under escort of SK3, went to the Quarterdeck and called for the person to hook up the line to the Collection, Holding and Transfer (CHT) barge. The Husbanding Agent put his bag down, but was reminded by Petty Officer that he could not leave the bag unattended. As the agent and Petty Officer waited for the ship’s Collection, Holding and Transfer engineers, the Husbanding Agent again put the bag down. Petty Officer had him pick the bag up again. Petty Officer told him he could leave the bag with the Quarterdeck. The Quarterdeck watch searched the bag and stored it in their podium. [encl (28)]

146. USS COLE (DDG 67) commenced taking on fuel at station 3, approximately frame 126, at time 1031C, 12 October 2000. [encls (2),(19)]

147. The following is a summary of the small boat movement portside USS COLE (DDG 67) after mooring. Identifying numbers for boats are used in subsequent findings of fact. All times are approximate. [encls (19),(28),(44),(96),(98)]
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>-CHT barge (1) and a garbage barge (2) tied up port aft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>-CHT barge (1) and attached garbage barge (2) move forward to forward CHT station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020C-1025C</td>
<td>-Garbage boat (3) was amidships port side (about where the explosion took place) between frames 174-220.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020C-1025C</td>
<td>-CHT barge (1) and a garbage barge (2), side-by-side, just forward of the missile deck, port side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1055C-1105C</td>
<td>-Garbage barge (2), detached from the CHT barge (1), and shifted aft to port side of flight deck. CHT barge (1) departed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100C-1110C</td>
<td>-The garbage boat (3) located amidships departed. Garbage boat (1) remains aft, port side of flight deck.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

148. The sewage Collection, Holding, and Transfer (CHT) barge (1) tied up port side, aft. Tied to the CHT barge was a garbage boat (2). The Collection, Holding and Transfer barge was 30' long, 8'-10' wide with an outboard motor. The Collection, Holding and Transfer barge was towing a small rowboat. The Collection, Holding and Transfer barge had four metal tanks, two were about 4' square, and two were smaller. All the tanks were rust colored. There were "local males barefooted in the garbage boat." The garbage boat (1) did not have a tank. [encls (28),(96-98)]

149. A second garbage boat (3) tied up amidships. Word was passed periodically from the Quarterdeck for trash to be brought topside. The Collection, Holding and Transfer barge and boat crews requested water from the ship. Petty Officer [REDACTED] left the Husbanding Agent under the watch of the Quarterdeck and obtained water for the crews. [encls (28),(88),(96),(97)]

150. Based on a fast refueling rate, refueling was estimated to be completed at approximately time 1330C-1350C, 12 October 2000. Shortly after completion, the Sea and Anchor Detail would be set. The Navigation brief for leaving Aden, Yemen was tentatively scheduled for approximately 1245C. The Executive Officer passed the word...
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over the 1MC (general announcing system) that refueling was going faster than expected and that they expected to be out of port after lunch. [encls (18),(20),(61),(92),(93)]

151. The Collection, Holding and Transfer barge(1) and attached garbage boat(2) moved forward up to the forward (CHT) station. At about 1055C the Collection, Holding and Transfer barge(1) was waved off and departed. The attached garbage boat(2) moved aft to the port side of the fantail. [encls (28),(96-98)]

152. According to the Chief Engineer, despite the fact the Collecting, Holding and Transfer hose had been hooked up, the USS COLE (DDG 67) never started pumping CHT to the barge. This was also confirmed by SK3 [REDACTED], who was topside with the Husbonding Agent. [encls (19),(28)]

153. The Supply Officer informed the Husbonding Agent the amidships garbage boat(3) was no longer needed. The garbage boat(3) departed between 1100 and 1110. Petty Officer [REDACTED] states the other garbage boat(2) remained alongside near the stern. [encls (28),(97),(98)]

154. Petty Officer [REDACTED] states that during the time the Collection, Holding and Transfer barge and garbage boats were alongside, the Husbonding Agent informed the Quarterdeck Watch of the boats coming alongside; however, the Quarterdeck Watch and the Command Duty Officer remember only “the trash barge.” [encls (28),(81),(86-88),(96),(97),(99)]

155. GMSFN [REDACTED] was standing the refueling overflow watch with HT3 [REDACTED]. He observed the garbage boat(3) very slowly pull off. He then watched the yellow ferry moving from the adjacent oiler. He noticed a small boat coming out from the city. The boat was coming “fast and hard from the direction of the ferry.” FN [REDACTED] thought about “radioing the Captain,” but the boat began to slow as it approached from the front port side of the USS COLE (DDG 67). From the first time he saw the boat approaching until it came alongside the USS COLE (DDG 67) was approximately 35 seconds. [encls (92),(93)]

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156. GSMFN described the boat as being about 35' long, 6-7' wide and had a shallow V-hull. It was white with fire red trim, and the deck was red. In front of the boat was a 4' - 5' storage well in the bow. He thought the boat was similar to the garbage boat, but was "brand new." The boat was manned by two males on the back of the boat. Both were in their early 30s, 5' - 6', thin, and "Arab looking." One was in back with his foot on the side. The second occupant of the boat was standing, but crouching slightly. [encls (92), (93)]

157. GSMFN believed this boat to be "just another garbage barge." The Quarterdeck Watch was unaware of the boat. [encls (81), (86), (87), (92), (93)]

158. Another topside Sailor, FN initially saw the white boat when it was about one-half mile out (his estimation). The boat approached the USS COLE's (DDG 67) bow and then turned parallel, coming down along the port side headed aft. [encl (100)]

159. The Forecastle Rover, TM3, saw the same white boat, which he said came toward the USS COLE (DDG 67) from the 11 o'clock direction (i.e., relative to the ship's port bow). He heard the word for "trash" passed on the 1MC (general announcing system) and assumed the oncoming white boat was a garbage barge. He moved over to the starboard side to monitor the person with the AK47. FC2, the Fantail Rover, did not see the boat. [encl (19)]

160. According to GSMFN, "as the boat approached, it slowed, was drifting toward USS COLE before it glanced of [sic] the COLE at about 5-6 knots and then pulled alongside." [encl (93)] The men waved to crew members, who waved back. Petty Officer was waiting for the Husbanding Agent to finish talking to the remaining garbage boat crew to ask him if the new boat was one of his service boats. [encls (28), (92), (93), (96), (97), (100)]

161. The following locations of key personnel at approximately 1115C are provided in enclosures (18), (20), (21), (36):

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**Subject:** INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>COMPARTMENT OR FRAME NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDR Lippold</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>In his cabin</td>
<td>02-146-1L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Training Room</td>
<td>02-350-2L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Command Duty Officer</td>
<td>Wardroom</td>
<td>02-126-4L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Force Protection Officer</td>
<td>Wardroom</td>
<td>02-126-4L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>Assistant Force Protection Officer</td>
<td>Wardroom</td>
<td>02-126-4L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK1</td>
<td>Officer of the Deck</td>
<td>Quarterdeck</td>
<td>01 level-frame 210 to 240, stbd side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH2</td>
<td>Petty Officer of the Watch</td>
<td>Quarterdeck</td>
<td>01 level-frame 210 to 240, stbd side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Messenger of the Watch</td>
<td>Quarterdeck</td>
<td>01 level-frame 210 to 240, stbd side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STG3</td>
<td>Internal Rover</td>
<td>Fwd Internal 01 Level</td>
<td>Internal between frames 110 and 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM3</td>
<td>Forecastle Rover</td>
<td>Starboard Bow</td>
<td>01 level, fwd of frame 110 to Bow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC2</td>
<td>Fantail Rover</td>
<td>Missile Deck</td>
<td>01 level and main deck, aft of frame 314 to Stern</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162. Sometime between 1115C-1118C, 12 October 2000, the boat exploded port side, amidships and adjacent to the USS COLE (DDG 67). [encls (1),(2)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAMAH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

**Force Protection Training**

163. The training chart below from reference (j), "DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards," provides the pre-deployment and career development Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection training requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF TRAINING</th>
<th>TARGET AUDIENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level I (For all Threat Levels)</td>
<td>Military, Department of Defense Civilians, and their family members (When family members are deploying or traveling on government orders).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness training conducted within six months prior to travel and delivered by a qualified instructor.</td>
<td>Level II - (AT/FP Officer) AT/FP Officers/NCOs or equivalent, who are then qualified to serve as the AT/FP advisor to the Commander and provide Level I instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III</td>
<td>0-5/0-6 Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level IV</td>
<td>0-6 to 0-8 Commanders/personnel, selected by Service/CINC/DoD Agency who are responsible for AT/FP programs or involved in AT/FP policy, planning and execution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

164. COLEINST 3300.55 is USS COLE (DDG 67) latest Force Protection Instruction, effective 9 September 2000. [encl (42)]

165. USS COLE (DDG 67) provided hard copy documentation for import Force Protection training for the period 17 November 1999 to 9 July 2000. The Commanding Officer stated that records for the period after 9 July 2000 were destroyed by the explosion. [encls (19),(101)]
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166. Prior to its deployment, USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted several blocks of Chief of Naval Operations-directed Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training for the crew. [encl (30), (102)]

167. LTJG [Redacted] (Assistant Force Protection Officer) received the Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training package used to train USS COLE (DDG 67) Sailors from the Force Protection Officer course held at Little Creek, Virginia. [encl (19)]

168. USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training consisted of the following: a brief; the movie “Out of Harm’s Way”; the distribution of handouts and a booklet; and a question and answer period. [encl (29), (30), (103)]

169. According to the Force Protection Officer and Assistant Force Protection Officer, each crewmember of the USS COLE (DDG 67) received Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training as of 11 October 2000. [encl (50)]

170. The Assistant Force Protection Officer, LTJG [Redacted], was responsible for documenting the accomplishment of Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training for USS COLE (DDG 67) Sailors; those training records were primarily kept in the ship’s Relational Administrative Database Manager system. [encl (19), (30)]

171. [Redacted] Consequently, the computerized training records for Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training were unrecoverable. However, LTJG [Redacted] provided some hard copies of training muster sheets for July and August 2000. [encl (19), (30), (102)]

172. The Force Protection Team consisted of the following members: LT [Redacted], USN; LTJG [Redacted], USNR; ENS [Redacted], USNR; FCC(SW) [Redacted], USN; ISC(SW)
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[Redacted]; USN; MA1(SW), USN; and [Redacted], USN. [encl (29),(31),(50),(104)]

173. Per COLEINST 3300.53, the Force Protection Team members were designated as Anti-Terrorism Training Officers. [encl (32),(42)]

174. USS COLE (DDG 67) Anti-Terrorism Training Officers assisted in the development of Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training lectures and conducted Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training. [encl (105-108)]

175. From 12-15 June 2000, all seven members of the USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Team attended a four-day Level II Force Protection Officer course, conducted by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Mobile Training Team at Little Creek, Virginia. [encl (29),(31),(50),(104)]

176. This Force Protection Officer course attended by USS COLE (DDG 67) personnel was a specially requested class, taught by Special Agent [Redacted] (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), and was open to anybody from the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) Battle Group. USS COLE (DDG 67) was the only ship that sent personnel to this class. [encl (31)]

177. Information from Naval Criminal Investigative Service indicates Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism Level III Training for Commanding Officers and Executive Officers from the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group was held on 16 February 2000, and even though Naval Criminal Investigative Service does not have a muster sheet for that training, Naval Criminal Investigative Service confirmed that CDR Lippold attended that session. [encl (31)]
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178. The following USS COLE (DDG 67) personnel attended the Shipboard Security Engagement Tactics (SSET) course on the dates indicated [encl (31)]:

- OS2
- GMC
- GM1
- FC3
- MA1

    - 10-14 May 1999
    - 24-28 April 2000
    - 24-28 April 2000
    - 5-9 June 2000
    - 5-9 June 2000

179. FC3 completed the Shipboard Security Engagement Weapons (SSEW) course, held 10-14 April 2000 at Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT), Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, Virginia. [encl (31)]

180. GMC and GMC completed the Anti-Terrorism Training Officer course (Level II), held 14-15 February 2000 at Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia. [encl (31)]

181. According to MA1, USN, who attended the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Force Protection Officer Course in Little Creek, Virginia, from 12-15 June 2000, the instructor noted that Yemen was a possible site for a suicide-swimmer attack. This comment was made in a general discussion, as there was not a dedicated training block on Yemen. [encl (104)]

182. In COMSECONDFLT 211445Z MAY 00, USS COLE (DDG 67) received a “Bravo Zulu” (Well Done) for its performance during the all Atlantic Fleet CY-00 Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection exercise. [encl (109)]

183. A Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism pre-deployment brief covering the FIFTH and SIXTH Fleet areas of responsibility was held for the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group onboard the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) in June 2000. All ships in the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group were required to send representatives. The brief was conducted by the Navy Anti-Terrorism Alert Center, and attended by LT and MA1 from the USS COLE (DDG 67). [encl (36)]
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184. Ltjg [redacted] was using bills from the ship’s physical security instruction, COLEINST 5530.1A (superseded by COLEINST 3300.55) to produce lesson plans to support the ship’s Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training program. [encls (19),(42),(110)]

185. According to COLEINST 3300.55, an Emergency Action (EA) binder was supposed to be maintained. At the time of the incident, an EA binder had not been created, but the Assistant Force Protection Officer, Ltjg [redacted], was developing one. [encls (19),(30),(42)]

186. According to COLEINST 3300.55, the Force Protection Review Committee meetings are supposed to be held quarterly. The Executive Officer said this had not been accomplished due to the fact it was a new instruction. [encls (19),(42)]

187. According to an email by Ltjg [redacted] dated 31 July 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) had conducted Force Protection meetings with the Anti-Terrorism Training Officers. Times were not available for any other Force Protection meetings. [encl (51)]

188. According to the Plans of the Day from 8 August to 12 October 2000, USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted Force Protection Team meetings on 18 August, 25 August, 6 September, and 23 September. On 15 August 2000, Force Protection training was conducted. [encl (60)]

189. In its Small Arms Report of 11 October 2000, provided by Lt [redacted] (Force Protection Officer), the USS COLE (DDG 67) documented the crew’s qualifications for the following weapons: .50-cal machine gun; 9mm handgun; hand grenades; M-60 machine gun; M-14 rifle; 12-gauge shotgun; 25mm chain gun; and M-79 grenade launcher. [encl.(79)]

190. The Executive Officer of USS COLE (DDG 67) said the ship conducted small arms qualifications often during its current deployment, but sometimes the operational tempo precluded such training. The latest training dates were not known. However, the latest available qualifications
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were for 9mm and hand grenade training dated 27 September 2000. [encls (20),(79)]

191. The USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted frequent Damage Control (DC) training while underway after beginning its deployment on 8 August 2000. [encls (18),(20),(131)]

**Pre-Deployment Information**

192. Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet provides Force Protection briefs at its headquarters in Bahrain or onboard individual ships after the ships inchnop to the Area of Responsibility. [encl (19)]

193. USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Operations Officer, LT , received the “MEF [Middle East Force] Deployers” CD-ROM, distributed by Commander, Destroyer Squadron FIVE ZERO (COMDESRON 50). [encls (19),(111)]

194. According to both the Force Protection Officer and Assistant Force Protection Officer, the “MEF Deployers” CD-ROM did not cover Force Protection; however, upon review by my investigating team, the “MEF Deployers” CD-ROM links directly to the Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command Secure website that highlights its Force Protection area under Command INFO. [encls (19),(111), ref (d), COMUSNAVCENT secure website]

195. accessed the Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group websites to gather Force Protection information for USS COLE’s (DDG 67) port visit to Aden, Yemen. The Force Protection website for Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command is the same one linked through the “MEF Deployers” CD-ROM. [encl (29), ref (d), COMUSNAVCENT secure website]

196. Commanding Officer, USS COLE (DDG 67) said the following: “In preparation for COLE’s entrance into the FIFTH Fleet Area of Operations, I made at least one 1MC [general announcing system] announcement to the crew about our need for increased Force Protection. The fact that we
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would now be operating in a theater where the threat was much higher and the possibility of direct action being taken against the crew and ship was a real possibility." [encl (18)]

197. United States Central Command conducted a Vulnerability Assessment for Aden, Yemen in May 1998 at the request of Military Traffic Management Command. [encl (112)]

198. The information in the Vulnerability Assessment was out of date. At the time the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command Vulnerability Assessment was conducted, the THREATCON assigned for Yemen was BRAVO, and the Threat Level, as directed by the Department of Defense and Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, was MEDIUM (based on the then-current five-point Department of Defense scale (NEGLIGIBLE, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and CRITICAL). [encl (112)]

199. The 17-page Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Vulnerability Assessment for Aden, Yemen is available on the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network website but is difficult to acquire, as the site has restricted access and is password protected. The following instructions are posted on the web site. [encls (19),(112), ref (q), Joint Security Directorate (JSD) secure website]

First Time Users
The Vulnerability Assessment Database and Reports areas are now restricted. Information in these areas are sensitive and require a "Need-to-Know". Passwords will be changed quarterly to enforce network security regulations.

To obtain access to these areas, CENTCOM customers need to contact their Component Force Protection office for a userID and password. If you are outside of CENTCOM or have any problems accessing the restricted areas, please contact the CENTCOM JSD Web Admin by eMail or at DSN 312-968-1531.
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200. USS COLE (DDG 67) did not possess the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command Vulnerability Assessment for Aden, Yemen. [encl (19)]

Operations/Intelligence Briefings

201. USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted frequent OPS/INTEL briefings, generally held daily at 0730 or 0800. Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism information was sometimes discussed during these briefings. [encls (57), (60), (113-115)]

202. The USS COLE (DDG 67) OPS/INTEL briefs held on 8 and 10 October 2000 do not contain any operational THREATCON or Yemen Threat Level information. The OPS/INTEL brief scheduled for 12 October does not contain this information either. [encls (57), (113-115)]

203. In the survey of 35 USS COLE (DDG 67) personnel conducted by the Investigating Officer, 22 had attended OPS/INTEL briefs. Of those 22, 17 do not recall anything being briefed on Yemen, its THREATCON or Threat Level. Additional areas and answers with regard to the survey are addressed later in the Findings of Fact. [encl (82)]

Mediterranean - Arabian University Briefings

204. During the USS COLE's (DDG 67) deployment, the Force Protection Team also conducted a series of briefings sometimes in conjunction with the OPS/INTEL briefings on the Commander, United States SIXTH Fleet and Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Areas of Responsibility under the collective title "Med-Arabian University." [encls (29), (50), (60), (104)]

205. The target audience of the "Med-Arabian University" briefings was Officers, Chief Petty Officers, and Bridge/Combat Information Center watchstanders who were not on watch. [encls (19), (50), (104)]
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206. Med-Arabian University briefs were held according to the Plans of the Day in the following Force Protection areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic and Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism/Force Protection/Stand Off Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Rules of Engagement/Anti-terrorism/Force Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[encl (60)]

207. According to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, Bridge/Combat Information Center watchstanders who were unable to attend OPS/INTEL and Med-Arabian University briefings were supposed to receive a copy of the brief. There was no documentation available on this point. [encls (18-20)]

208. On 17 August 2000, LT [Force Protection Officer] conducted a Med-Arabian University brief exclusively on Force Protection, covering the following topics: the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Counter-Intelligence structure; "Spot Reports" and "Blue Darts"; Threat Levels; THREATCONS; international terrorist incidents from 1980-1999; the East Africa American Embassy bombings in 1998; and terrorist Usama bin Laden. [encls (116),(117)]

209. Blue Darts are time-sensitive reports to warn unit and installation commanders of an imminent terrorist attack against their unit or installation. "Spot Reports" are time-sensitive reports in response to specific Force Protection/terrorist threats and are tailored to alert potentially affected Department of the Navy assets. [ref (e), Phone conversation with SA]

210. Additionally, a Med-Arabian University briefing covered the "Current Terrorist Threat" in both the EUCOM and Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command Areas of Responsibility. A slide entitled "Summary of DoD Terrorist Threat Levels U.S. Central Command" listed Yemen as having a HIGH Threat Level. [encls (116),(117)]
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211. Several crewmembers of USS COLE (DDG 67) stated that one of the "Med-Arabian University" briefings cited intelligence reports warning of possible terrorist attacks against United States warships operating in the FIFTH and SIXTH Fleet Area of Responsibilities by one of Usama bin Laden's groups (This Finding of Fact reflects crewmembers' recollection of what was briefed, not the actual content of the messages). [encls (57), (104)]

Commander, Task Force/Ship/Force Protection Plans

212. Task Force Organization. Annex A, pages A-1 and A-2 of reference (g), COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 1000-98, provides the following regarding Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (CTF 50) and its assigned forces. This information is also available in reference (d), COMUSNAVCENT secure website:

Commander, Task Force (CTF) 50 is the Commander of the Combined Naval Task Force (CNTF) and is assigned to the senior in-theater Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) Commander. CTF 50 shall execute routine CVBG deployments in the USCENTCOM AOR, and exercise Command and Control over assigned forces which may include an [Amphibious Ready Group] and the Middle East Force deployers*. The CNTF will provide naval presence, contingency support, and force, joint, bilateral and combined exercise opportunities and shall maximize training with friendly country naval (including naval air) and air forces.

* A Middle East Force (MEF) deployer is a surface combatant assigned to augment Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command to fulfill operational requirements in excess of organic Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) capabilities.

213. In accordance with reference (h), (COMFIFTHFLT 111003Z JUL 00) and reference (i), (COMFIFTHFLT 191523Z SEP 00):

a. 22 July - 24 September 2000 - Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO was Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO of the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group
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b. In September 2000, the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group departed the Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility and was relieved by the ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group.

c. 24 September 2000 to present - Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO was Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE of the ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group.

214. ■ USS HAWES (FFG 53) and USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) submitted Force Protection Plans for Aden, Yemen to Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO) embarked aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group) in August 2000, erroneously identifying the Threat Level for Yemen as MEDIUM and advising that they would not implement Force Protection Measure Number 30. [encls (118), (119)]

215. ■ COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) Measure Number 30 is, "Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check before entering." Neither USS HAWES (FFG 53) nor USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) provided a reason for the requested deviation. [encls (55), (118), (119)]

216. ■ USS HAWES (FFG 53) and USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) cited the following references in their Force Protection Plans for Aden, Yemen: [encls (118), (119)]

a. OPNAVINST 5330.14C/10DEC98
b. NCIS Threat Assessment/No date
c. CUSNCC OPORD 99-01/1JUL99
d. USCINCCENT OPORD 97-01/15APR99
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217. (U) USS COLE (DDG 67) cited the following references in its Import Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) for Aden, Yemen: [encl (35)]
   a. CGWBG 211130Z JUL00
   b. NCIS 081641Z SEP99
   c. CUSNC/C5F OPORD 99-01/1JUL 99
   d. C5F 291009Z JUN99

218. (U) Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO embarked aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group) approved USS DONALD COOK’s (DDG 75) Force Protection Plan with no changes; however, it advised DONALD COOK to review the latest Naval Criminal Investigative Service threat assessment (8 Sep 99) for Aden, Yemen and also provided the website (www.ncis.smil.mil) where the latest threat assessment could be found. Though there was a more recent Threat Assessment and Security Overview for Yemen, DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC 221930Z SEP 00, Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO was not an addressee. [encls (39),(120)]

219. (U) Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO (Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO embarked aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group) approved USS HAWES’ (FFG 53) Force Protection Plan with no changes and also advised the ship to be “aware” of its surroundings. [encl (121)]

220. (U) LCDR [REDACTED], N20 (Force Protection Officer) for Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO embarked aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group in August 2000, knew the Threat Level in Yemen was HIGH at the time USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) and USS HAWES (FFG 53) cited the Threat Level as MEDIUM in their Force Protection Plans, but did not correct either ship. He also did not query either ship as to why they were not performing Measure 30 because he said neither ship was going ashore. However, when asked by the Investigating Officer about other measures that may have not been applicable because they were not going ashore and did he know if they performed Measure 31, he responded, “each of those measures has some applicability to their plan, or they probably would have suspended those measures. I cannot confirm that they performed Measure 31; our
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"...assumption is that if a measure is taken, it is performed."

[encl (122)]

221. (U) Additionally, LCDR [redacted] confirmed that both USS HAWES (FFG 53) and USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) cited the wrong instruction number as reference (a) for the Navy Physical Security Manual, which should have read OPNAVINST 5530.14C instead of 5330.14C. [encl (122)]

222. (U) Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO’s point of contact on its Force Protection Plan approval to USS COLE (DDG 67) was LCDR [redacted], N21 (interim Force Protection Officer) for Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE embarked aboard ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group. According to LCDR [redacted], he knew it was a Brief Stop for Fuel only (no liberty) and that all measures (1-62) would be implemented. He stated:

The USS COLE did not request any [deviations] and no deviations were authorized. Unless a ship requests a deviation and the staff authorizes the deviation, the ship is expected to comply with the measures in their [Force Protection Plan] FPP (common sense). Any deviations from an approved FPP would have to be authorized by the same authority (CTF 50). [encl (89)]

223. (U) On 31 October 2000, in response to an email query, CDR [redacted] (Force Protection Officer, Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group) stated the following:

[W]e expect units to comply with all directed applicable measures, based on conditions they actually encounter. COLE requested no deviations and we approved none. We therefore expected them to comply with all applicable measures pertaining to the conditions they would encounter during their BSF. The approval of all measures listed under a THREATCON level allows the Commanding Officer and crew to adjust to changing conditions by employing all measures required to meet the situation. For example, we should not and do not try to predict if
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The ship will need to set a Quarterdeck watch; however, we do direct appropriate measures, in accordance with the THREATCON criteria, be adhered to if/when a Quarterdeck watch is set. The complete set of THREATCON measures contained in COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99/01 (Force Protection) provides for this flexibility, while covering import operations both pierside and at anchor. For all CTF 50 units, we thoroughly review each proposed Force Protection plan against the applicable Area of Responsibility THREATCON measures, current intelligence for the proposed port, and all available information on the expected threat. Requested deviations are carefully considered before any Force Protection plan is approved. [Emphasis added] [encl (123)]

224.(U) On 31 October 2000, the Investigating Officer asked the Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Force Protection Officer, Colonel [REDACTED], USMC, to explain how the word deviation is defined in reference to Force Protection Plans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IO QUESTIONS</th>
<th>COL ANSWERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “When we ask for ‘deviations recommended,’ how is deviation defined?”</td>
<td>• “A deviation to a Force Protection measure would be straying from the completion of the letter of the established procedure. For example: Measure says to ‘After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.’ And the Captain knows that the superstructure is fouled or unavailable for some maintenance reason, he may position</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAMAIH (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>those sentries in another location to accompany the same task. THEREFORE: The deviation, accomplishes the spirit and intent of the measure if not the letter of the measure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “If a ship does not perform a measure from its approved Force Protection plan because it does not believe the measure is necessary or inappropriate, is the ship required to report this to the ISIC?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Our order does not specifically state that you must go back and report to the [Task Force] Commander that you are not doing something you said you were going to, in a plan of which he approved based on what you told him. Since not specifically stated, I can not say something requires it. The operative word being ‘requires.’ On a personal/professional note, I would say if you told me you were going to do something, and based on that information I approved your plan, you OWE me a reason as to why/what you changed...!”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

225. (U) When Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO’s (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO embarked aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group) Chief of Staff, Captain (CAPT) , was asked if the staff required any qualifications prior to someone being assigned as the Group Force Protection Officer (FPO), and if so what are the requirements, he responded,

There are no explicit pre-requisite qualifications for the [Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO (CCDG-2)] Force Protection Officer collateral duty
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billet. For CCDG-2, the N20 or Assistant Intel Officer, was designated the first Force Protection Officer for the staff in 1997. The current N20, LCDR [REDACTED], was subsequently designated the Force Protection Officer when his predecessor detached. His selection, like many billet assignments, was a conscious decision based on his overall suitability for the job as determined by the Commander. Specifically, among other things, this suitability was based on his individual officer performance/professionalism, ability to work with other ships and staff FPOs, his grasp of potential threat scenarios and implications, and his familiarity with NCIS and USDAO capabilities and products. In July 1999, three months after his assignment as the Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO Force Protection Officer, LCDR [REDACTED] attended the Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism course at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, [Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia].

His response to the requirements question was, “None, although the FPO will be sent to Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training as soon as possible after assuming the staff FPO billet.” [encl (125)]

226. (U) When CDR [REDACTED], Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE, Force Protection Officer, ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group, was asked whether the staff requires any qualifications prior to someone being assigned as the Group Force Protection Officer, and if so what are the requirements, he responded,

The foundation of our approach while deployed is the “team” concept under the direction of a full time commander. The primary requirements for team members are operational experience and the Commander’s confidence in the officer’s capabilities. There are no written special requirements for the [Force Protection Officer] position in CCDG3. Right now, our Force Protection Team reflects a significant amount of operational experience from the surface and aviation communities, as well as significant experience in the
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5th, 6th and 7th fleet AORs. The team also uses the Ship’s Boatswain and Security Officer from ABE [USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72)] for selected issues. The written requirements I know of are:

Level II Training for FPO
Level III Training for COs/XOs
Level IV Training for CVBG & ARG CDR/COS/N3.

[encl (126)]

227. (U) When CDR [REDACTED] (Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE), Force Protection Officer, ABRAHAM LINCOLN Battle Group (ALBG), was asked what Force Protection pre-deployment training they provide for the ships in their Battle Group, he responded,

ALBG ships get training but we don’t conduct it. Other units, such as NCIS [Law Enforcement Physical Security] team, conduct the training. Group staffs monitor by executing a [COMTHIRDFLT Force Protection Plan of Action and Milestones] in which we monitor the ships’ accomplishment for required training. This is part of the lead up to the big pre-deployment FP exercise that [COMTHIRDFLT] puts us through. I think it is worth pointing out that the USS COLE is a MEF deployer and not part of the ALBG. So we’re not aware of what specific pre-deployment training they received. But I would suspect it was similar fleet level training, perhaps with the [GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group]. [encl (126)]

228. (U) During the USS COLE’s (DDG 67) port visit to Valletta, Malta (4-8 September 2000), the ship sought to deviate from its approved Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) by not deploying barriers on the pier, based on a recommendation by Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the local Embassy security liaison. USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Force Protection Officer, LT [REDACTED], informed the Force Protection Officer for Commander, Task Force SIX ZERO (Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO TWO), LCDR [REDACTED], of this fact and was told to report the deviation in the ship’s after action port visit report. [encls (19),(36)]
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229. (U) In a telephone interview, LCDR [REDACTED], Force
Protection Officer for Commander, Task Force SIX ZERO,
confirmed that USS COLE (DDG 67) was directed to report the
deviation from its Inport Security Plan in Valletta, Malta
in the ship’s after action port visit report. An email
acquired later in the investigation also confirmed this.
[encls (19),(127)]

230. (U) However, in the telephone interview, LCDR [REDACTED]
acknowledged he did not intend to create a precedent by
authorizing USS COLE (DDG 67) to report its Valletta, Malta
development in the manner described, and stated that if a
ship deviated from its approved Inport Security Plan (Force
Protection Plan) he would expect to receive an immediate
voice, email, or hard copy message report. [encl (19)]

231. (U) While under the operational control of Commander, Task
Force SIX ZERO in August and September 2000, USS COLE (DDG
67) formally requested deviations from THREATCON ALPHA PLUS
measures in Inport Security Plans (Force Protection Plans)
for port visits in France, Spain, Slovenia, and Malta where
the Threat Levels were LOW and the THREATCONs were ALPHA
PLUS (with BRAVO enhancements). [encls (51),(128)]

232. (U) With regard to COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01
(Force Protection) Force Protection Measure Number 19
(“identify and inspect workboats”), according to Colonel
[REDACTED], USMC, Commander, United States Naval Forces
Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Force
Protection Officer, this measure requires ships to
physically board and inspect each workboat. [encl (19)]

Rules of Engagement

233. (U) While inport in Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000, USS
COLE (DDG 67) operated under the following Rules of
Engagement: Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules
of Engagement; and Commander-in-Chief, United States
Central Command theater-specific Standing Rules of
Engagement. [encls (56),(129),(130)]
234. (U) Under both the Standing Rules of Engagement and Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command Rules of Engagement, USS COLE (DDG 67) possessed the inherent right of self-defense for both the ship and its personnel. [encls (129),(130)]

235. (U) Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) define the "inherent right of self-defense" as follows:

A Commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend that Commander's unit and other U.S. Forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Neither these rules, nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules, limit this inherent right and obligation. At all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as amplified in the SROE, will form the basis for the judgment of the on-scene commander (OSC) or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. [encl (129)]

236. (U) Standing Rules of Engagement define "individual self-defense" as follows:

The inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend oneself and U.S. Forces in one's vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is a unit of self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense. [encl (129)]

237. (U) Standing Rules of Engagement identify and define the "elements of self-defense," which are "necessity" and "proportionality":

a. Necessity. Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorist(s) exhibits hostile intent.
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b. Proportionality. Force used to counter a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the commander at the time. [encl (129)]

238.(U) The Standing Rules of Engagement define "Hostile Act" and "Hostile Intent" as follows:

a. Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, U.S. Forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. nationals, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and/or other designated non-U.S. Forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. Forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel and vital U.S. Government property.

b. Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. Forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. nationals, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and/or other designated non-U.S. Forces, foreign national and their property. Also, the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. Forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital U.S. Government property. [encl (129)]

239. [encl (130)]

240.(U) Reference (r) authorizes use of deadly force as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed to prevent the threat of death or serious bodily harm to personnel or sabotage of a Navy ship. [ref (r), SECNAVINST 5500.29B, Use of Deadly Force]
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241. (U) USS COLE's (DDG 67) import watchstanders who were on duty at the time of the incident had an adequate knowledge or understanding of the applicable Rules of Engagement for self-defense and use of deadly force. [encls (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88)]

Crew Knowledge

242. (U) An informal survey was conducted by the Investigating Officer on 25 October 2000 of 35 USS COLE (DDG 67) personnel. This number comprised 11.8% of 296 personnel that were on board according to the Logistics Requirements message for Aden, Yemen.

a. The following areas were addressed to each individual:

(1) Knowledge of the Threat Level and THREATCON for Yemen;

(2) Whether briefs were conducted for the import duty section; what the person knew about Yemen;

(3) Whether the person recalled a LMC (general announcing system) announcement regarding a higher Threat Level or THREATCON;

(4) Whether the person recalled a LMC (general announcing system) announcement regarding the possibility of direct action against the ship;

(5) Why liberty was curtailed in Bahrain [despite curtailed in entire Area of Responsibility]; and

(6) Whether the person had ever attended an OPS/INTEL brief or been briefed on its contents.

b. The sample consisted of the following breakdown:

7 Officers
5 Chief Petty Officers (E-7 to E-9)
14 First and Second Class Petty Officers (E-5 to E-6)
7 Junior Sailors (E-4 and below)
c. Initially, I asked the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to just send in a variety of rates. As the number of personnel I interviewed depleted, I personally solicited individuals, with no set pattern established. The following summarizes the results of the survey:

(1) Only one person (FCC [REDACTED], a Force Protection Team member) of the 35 surveyed knew both the THREATCON for Yemen and the its Threat Level.

(2) Two other Force Protection Team members who were surveyed knew neither the THREATCON nor the Threat Level.

(3) Only 10 of the 35 personnel surveyed knew the THREATCON.

(4) Twelve (12) of the 35 personnel surveyed were assigned to the import duty section on 12 October 2000, and NONE of them recalled a brief being conducted for the duty section.

(5) Only 20 of 35 personnel surveyed knew the ship was refueling in Yemen. Five officers knew nothing else about Yemen; one officer (LTJG [REDACTED]) knew some of Yemen’s history. Seven of the 13 enlisted knew at least one specific thing about Yemen other than its being just a refueling stop.

(6) Of the 35 personnel surveyed, only two (both officers) recalled LMC (general announcing system) announcements about the increasing Middle East tensions affecting liberty in Bahrain.

(7) Only two of the 35 personnel surveyed associated past briefs or current operations with the possibility of a direct action against the ship.

(8) Eighteen (18) of the 35 personnel surveyed were aware of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affected them, chiefly with regard to liberty and pulling into Bahrain.
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(9) Twenty-two (22) of the 35 personnel surveyed had attended OPS/INTEL briefs. Of those 22, 17 did not recall anything about Yemen being discussed. [encls (17),(82)]

Responsibilities and Duties

243. (U) The Commanding Officer is charged with the absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his or her command. The duties and responsibilities of the Commanding Officer are established by United States Navy Regulations, general orders, customs, and tradition. Of particular importance is the Commanding Officer's duty to take all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense of the command. [ref (n), Navy Regulations 0802]

244. (U) The Commanding Officer is responsible to take appropriate action to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to installations, equipment, material and documents, and to safeguard them against acts of espionage, sabotage, damage, theft and terrorism. [ref (n), Navy Regulations, 0826]

245. (U) COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 (Force Protection) proclaims that “Commanders are responsible for Force Protection for their unit” and that “Commanders at every level will make Force Protection their number one priority and ensure that Force Protection is planned into every evolution from the start.” [ref (f), COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01]]

246. (U) The Commanding Officer will ultimately be responsible for the implementation of the Force Protection program. His duties include designating in writing the Force Protection Officer and the Assistant Force Protection Officer, proposing to the Immediate Superior in Command the appropriate ship's THREATCON as the Threat Level warrants, and approve a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan, in accordance with Immediate Superior In Command guidance. [encl (42), USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Program Instruction]
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247. (U) The Executive Officer is the direct representative of the Commanding Officer. The Executive Officer shall be primarily responsible under the Commanding Officer for the organization, performance of duty, and good order and discipline of the entire command. [ref (o), SORM, Section 302]

248. (U) The Force Protection Officer acts as the Commanding Officer’s primary resource in matters relating to Force Protection and is responsible for the overall implementation and execution of the Force Protection Program. [encl (42), USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Program Instruction]

249. (U) The Assistant Force Protection Officer is responsible for the administrative aspects of the Force Protection Program including the completion and documentation of training, obtaining timely intelligence and threat assessment reports, submitting a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan and Inport Security Plan (Force Protection Plan) prior to each port visit, maintaining a Force Protection Emergency Action Binder, maintaining a Security Alert Instruction, acting as Training Group Supervisor, and scheduling Force Protection Readiness Review. [encl (42), USS COLE (DDG 67) Force Protection Program Instruction]

250. (U) The Command Duty Officer inport is that Officer or authorized Petty Officer designated by the Commanding Officer to carry out the routine of the unit inport and to supervise the safety and general duties of the unit. These duties include conducting frequent security inspections, giving particular attention to the security of the unit’s boats and to the safety of personnel embarked therein. [ref (o), SORM]

251. (U) The Officer of the Deck inport is that Officer or Petty Officer on watch designated by the Commanding Officer to be in charge of the unit. He/she is primarily responsible for the safety, security and proper operation of the unit and ensuring the Quarterdeck watch, lookouts, anchor watch, and other sentries or patrols are properly posted and alert. [ref (o), SORM]
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OPINIONS

1. (U) Line of Duty. All of the injuries listed in the Preliminary Statement, and described in more detail in Appendix B, which occurred as a result of the explosion on the port side, amidships, adjacent to the USS COLE (DDG 67) between 1115C-1118C, 12 October 2000, were in the line of duty, not due to misconduct. [FF (162), (Appendix B)]

2. (U) Training. The crew of USS COLE (DDG 67) was a trained crew in Force Protection concepts. The crew completed Level I Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training, and the duty sections were trained in the use of deadly force. Additionally, the ship completed underway damage control training, frequent Force Protection training for duty sections, as well as small arms qualifications. All members of the ship’s Force Protection Team completed the four-day, Level II, Force Protection Officer course taught by Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Commanding Officer completed Level III Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism training. [FF (163-211)(240-241)]

3. (U) Force Protection Program. The Command had an active Force Protection Program. The ship had not fully implemented some programmatic phases of its recent Force Protection instruction but these deficiencies were minor, and did not detract from an otherwise effective program. [FF (12-16), (33-62), (163-211)]

4. (U) Mindset. According to USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Force Protection Plans submitted for Villefranche, France; Barcelona, Spain; Valletta, Malta; and Koper, Slovenia, the Threat Levels were LOW and THREATCONS were ALPHA “Plus.” When USS COLE (DDG 67) arrived in Aden, Yemen, the Threat Level was HIGH and THREATCON was BRAVO. Aden, Yemen was USS COLE’s (DDG 67) first port after entering the Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility. The crew, while trained, failed to shift their mindset or increase their awareness regarding the new threat environment. As a result, many of the ship’s crew were not attuned to, or even aware of, the heightened Threat Level. An email from
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Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO provided the new terrorism Threat Level methodology shifting to a new four-point system (HIGH, SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE and LOW). Under this new system, Yemen was rated as SIGNIFICANT. At a minimum this contributed to confusion as to the actual threat environment as the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer interpreted this as a "decrease in Threat Level." Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command had not implemented this new change in Threat Level methodology, therefore, the Area of Responsibility remained in the old five-point system (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW and NEGLIGIBLE) despite Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO disseminating the new system. [FF (4), (16-26), (29), (49), (231), (242)]

5. (U) Knowledge. Despite some initiatives involving selected personnel on board USS COLE (DDG 67), overall crew knowledge of the Threat Level and THREATCON in Aden, Yemen was low. The ship did not make effective use of information tools such as IOM (general announcing system), the Plan of the Day, the Commanding Officer's Night Orders, OPS/INTEL and the "Med-Arabian University" briefs, and duty section briefs in order to maximize the crew's awareness. [FF (116), (121-122), (192-211), (242)]

6. (U) Planning. The USS COLE (DDG 67) failed to engage in a deliberate planning process for their Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen. The ship had sufficient information about Aden, Yemen to critically evaluate and plan meaningful Force Protection measures prior to the ship's arrival. The ship made a perfunctory submission of a Force Protection Plan to the Task Force Commander. There was no systematic assessment of requirements or assignment of responsibilities to actually implement the required Force Protection Plan. Impromptu Force Protection measures were initiated immediately prior to and during the Brief Stop for Fuel, one of which exceeded the requirements for THREATCON BRAVO, others omitted entirely. The result was an unstructured assortment of Force Protection measures. [FF (12-62), (123-125), (128-134), (228)]

7. (U) Execution. There was no deliberate execution of the ship's Force Protection Plan. Neither the Command Duty Officer nor Force Protection Officer, both of whom were
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critical to the ship’s security posture, were involved in ensuring there was active identification and control of the boats coming alongside. The Commanding Officer should not have given the Force Protection Officer the authority to approve deviations from an approved Force Protection Plan. The duty section was not briefed on the Force Protection Plan. As a result, the Officer of the Deck and rovers relied on their general knowledge of providing security for the ship, and were unaware of the specific Force Protection requirements for the Port of Aden, Yemen. [FF (12-32), (109-125), (131-134), (147-149), (151-162), (241-251)]

8. (U) Supervision. During the Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen, there was a notable absence of supervision by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Command Duty Officer and Force Protection Officer in implementation of the Force Protection Plan. There was little interest in whether ship’s force was executing applicable Force Protection measures. By delegating to the Force Protection Officer the authority to deviate from USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Force Protection Plan, he could not have exercised meaningful oversight in plan implementation. There was no follow up to ensure the duty section was briefed or aggressively controlling the boats alongside the ship. [FF (109-125), (131-134), (147-149), (151), (153-162), (242-251)]

9. (U) Force Protection Measures. There were 62 Force Protection Measures USS COLE (DDG 67) was required to perform in Aden, Yemen. The ship waived 19 and completed 31 measures. Twelve (12) other measures remained uncompleted. [FF (123-125), (131-134)]

10. (U) Preventive Force Protection Measures. Nineteen (19) measures could possibly have prevented the suicide boat attack or mitigated its effect. Of those 19 measures, the ship accomplished 7. The remaining 12 were either waived by the Force Protection Officer under the authority delegated by the Commanding Officer or were simply not accomplished. The 19 measures that could possibly have prevented the attack are: [Those marked with an asterisk (*) indicate those the ship performed.]
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEASURE NUMBER</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brief crew on the port specific threat, the Security/Force Protection Plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures. Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the Officer of the Deck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*3</td>
<td>Review security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5</td>
<td>Consistent with local rules, regulations, and Status of Forces Agreement, post qualified armed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry. Rifles are the preferred weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*7</td>
<td>Ensure sentries, roving patrols, response force and the Quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate. If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Coordinate pier and fleet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment) and define methods of activation and communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists. Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship; authorized craft</td>
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### Measure Number vs. Measure

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure Number</th>
<th>Measure</th>
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<tr>
<td>should be carefully controlled, surveyed, and covered. Inspect authorized watercraft daily.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Identify and inspect workboats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Maintain appropriate THREATCON ALPHA measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ensure that an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for the area of operations is readily available. Ensure the warning tape in the Pilot House and/or Quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with M16 rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Man Signal Bridge or Pilot House and ensure flares are available to ward off approaching craft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Provide shotgun and ammunition to Quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the Quarterdeck can be covered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Issue arms to selected qualified officers to include Command Duty Officer and Assistant Command Duty Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized craft should be carefully controlled. Coordinate with host nation/local port authority, Husbanding Agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Conduct searches of the ship's hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEASURE NUMBER</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>before it puts to sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*54</td>
<td>Maintain capability to get underway on short notice or as specified by SOP. Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*55</td>
<td>Ensure .50 caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50 caliber machineguns will be maintained in the armory, prefire checks completed, and ready for use).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[FF (123-125),(131-134)]

11. (U) **Critical Force Protection Measures.**

a. Of the 12 Force Protection measures that might have prevented the event or deterred the terrorist boat but were not accomplished, there were 6 of particularly high importance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEASURE NUMBER</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Briefing the crew on the threat in Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Briefing watch personnel on Inport Force Protection Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Keeping unauthorized boats away from USS COLE (DDG 67) and supervise and monitor authorized boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Identifying and inspecting boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Manning the Signal Bridge or Pilot House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The collective failure to execute these 6 measures created a seam in the defensive posture of USS COLE
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

(DDG 67) and allowed the terrorist craft to come alongside the ship unchallenged by those responsible for the ship’s protection. [FF (123-125), (131-134)]

12. (U) Rules of Engagement. Roving Security patrols had a working knowledge of use of deadly force and the inherent right of self-defense under the Standing Rules of Engagement. The terrorist boat that positioned itself port side showed no obvious sign of hostile action or intention. Given the fact the sentries and watch section received neither a brief nor guidance on the handling of workboats, the sentries and watch section acted appropriately under their Rules of Engagement. [FF (116-118), (121), (122), (147-162), (233-242)]

13. (U) Task Force Oversight.

a. Task Force review of the USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Force Protection Plan was perfunctory. COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 is the Operations Order applicable to all units under operational control of Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet. The order requires ships to submit Force Protection Plans to their Task Force Commanders for approval. In this case, USS COLE (DDG 67) submitted a plan stating its intention to implement all 62 THREATCON BRAVO measures, many of which were inapplicable to USS COLE’s (DDG 67) Brief Stop for Fuel in Aden, Yemen at a Refueling Dolphin, demonstrating their failure to think critically about their posture in view of the prevailing circumstances.

b. Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO accepted this assessment, also demonstrating a failure to think critically about USS COLE’s (DDG 67) posture in view of the prevailing circumstances. For example, the ship’s watch personnel would be issued night vision devices, public tours would be terminated, parking on the pier would be discontinued, and the liberty policy would be reviewed. None of these measures were applicable. USS COLE (DDG 67) submitted these measures and Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO approved them.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR)-ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

c. Further exacerbating the situation was the ship's failure to notify Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO of measures it "waived" or otherwise failed to implement upon arrival in Aden. An Operation Order is an order and as such USS COLE (DDG 67) had an obligation to inform Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO of the deviations from an approved Force Protection Plan. Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO was not informed of the changes; therefore, Commander, Task Force FIVE ZERO had no idea of USS COLE's (DDG 67) Force Protection posture. [FF (33-57),(123-125),(128-129),(131-134),(212-232)]

14. (U) Threat Knowledge and Information.

a. (U) USS COLE (DDG 67) had sufficient available information to make an accurate assessment of the port Threat Levels and conditions in Aden, Yemen. The fact that the ship did not possess the most recent Naval Criminal Investigative Service threat assessment for Aden was not significant. Additionally, the fact United States Central Command had not implemented the new four-point Threat Level system was not significant.

b. (U) DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC 082100Z OCT 00 regarding the modification of the Terrorist Threat Level methodology was at a minimum confusing to USS COLE's (DDG 67) Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, and may have contributed to a perception of a lessened Threat Level in Aden, Yemen. [FF (14-32)]

15. (U) Arms. USS COLE (DDG 67) security personnel were adequately armed. [FF (65),(116)]


a. (U) Though not part of their primary mission, the United States Defense Attaché Office was not proactive with USS COLE (DDG 67) after the ship's arrival in Aden, Yemen for a Brief Stop for Fuel. After 30 United States ship visits spanning a three-year period, the United States Defense Attaché Office had accumulated information relevant to the ship's port visit.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

Information could have been provided regarding the contracted fueling company (Arab Investment, Manufacturing and Trading), security on the pier, the Mansoob representatives, why the Yemeni flag did not show up as the Logistics Requirements message reply and “Lessons Learned” indicated, boat appearances for ease in identifying which boats can come alongside and the latest threat and port information. Moreover, had the United States Defense Attaché Office representative met the USS COLE (DDG 67) upon their arrival, he or she could have informed the ship regarding the Yemeni Navy not providing security and possibly resulting in a heightened awareness aboard USS COLE (DDG 67).

b. (U) There also appears to be an information gap between the United States Defense Attaché Office and ships under the operational control of Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet. For example, it would have been useful for United States Navy ships (as well as Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Operations Department) to know that in Aden Harbor, Yemen, small boats may be launched as picket boats without incident, so long as the Aden Harbor Master is informed. This was the result of an informal agreement between the United States Defense Attaché Office, the Yemeni Minister of Defense and the Yemeni Navy. [FF (10-11), (58-62), (126-127), (135-136)]

17. (U) Force Protection Planning. The Force Protection planning system places the onus on individual ships to gather information regarding Threat Levels and THREATCONS for the areas they deploy to and ports that they visit. There is however, no mechanism to ensure that the ship has in fact acquired this information. [FF (12-32)]

18. (U) Multiple Force Protection Systems. In SIXTH Fleet, USS COLE (DDG 67) conducted Force Protection planning in accordance with Navy guidelines promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations. While operating in the FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility, USS COLE (DDG 67) was required to conduct this same planning process in accordance with Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet policy which is based
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

on Joint Force Protection doctrine. The Chief of Naval Operations guidelines are similar but not identical to the Joint guidelines. Transiting ships should not have to switch between different Force Protection schemes when changing Area of Responsibilities. There should be a universal set of Force Protection measures for each THREATCON. [FF (4),(12-55)]

19. (U) Training Records. The loss of training records highlights a weakness in reliance on the Relational Administrative Database Manager (RADM) system and electronic data bases in general. Although timely records were not available, it appears many of the members on watch on 12 October 2000 were not fully qualified for the watch they were standing. [FF (110-115),(171)]


a. (U) Commander Kirk S. Lippold's performance as Commanding Officer did not meet the standards set forth in Navy Regulations. [FF (2),(23),(24),(48),(49),(52), (53),(55-58),(67),(109),(111),(112),(115),(116),(117), (121-125),(128),(129),(131),(132),(141),(147-149),(151), (154-162),(185),(186),(196),(202),(203),(242-246)]

b. (U) Lieutenant Commander [REDACTED] performance as Executive Officer did not meet the standards set forth in Navy Regulations and OPMNAVINST 3120.32C(SORM). [FF (3),(23),(55),(57),(58),(109),(111), (112),(116),(117),(121),(122),(128),(131),(132),(141), (147-149),(151),(154-162),(185),(186),(202),(203), (242),(247)]


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d. (U) Lieutenant [redacted] performance as Command Duty Officer did not meet the standards set forth in OPNAVINST 3120.32C (SORM). [Ref (110), (116), (121-125), (131), (132), (147-149), (151), (154-162), (242), (250)]
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) That all patients should receive in-depth clinical evaluations as their post-casualty treatment continues. This will be necessary to identify any further medical conditions that may arise post-incident. [opinion (1)]

2. (U) That all personnel who were assigned to USS COLE (DDG 67) have a comprehensive hearing evaluation done to determine and document any hearing related issues from the explosion and subsequent damage control efforts. [opinion (1)]

3. (U) That increased emphasis on Force Protection be incorporated into work-ups for every Battle Group and ship preparing to deploy. Key issues to emphasize in preparation for deployment include: [opinions (5-10)]
   a. Unit Commanders must ensure proper Force Protection planning occurs, responsibilities are assigned and the plan is executed properly;
   b. Do not assume Force Protection Measures will automatically be permitted by the host nation at the site. Likewise, do not assume the host nation will provide adequate security;
   c. Host nation restrictions and sensitivities may limit Force Protection options, necessitating close coordination with the local Naval Criminal Investigative Service office or United States Defense Representative (USDR);
   d. Self-assessments and corrections of deficiencies need to be accomplished prior to inchop; and
   e. The process for recommending and reporting deviations must be understood.

4. (U) That Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet Force Protection Office provide a "prior to inchop" brief (in person, via Video Tele-Conference, or taped presentation)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

regarding the Area of Responsibility Terrorist Threat Level, Fleet Force Protection Program, and "Lessons Learned." Additionally, review in-chopping units' self-assessment corrections and offer assistance in weak areas. This will ensure a personal touch and sensitize units to the Area of Responsibility, encouraging that the proper mindset is established for the applicable threat. [opinions (4),(5)]

5. (U) That Fleet and Task Force Commanders strongly encourage their units to incorporate daily reminders regarding THREATCONS and Threat Levels in such mediums as the POD, Navigation Briefs, OPS/INTEL Briefs, Night Orders, and Duty Section briefs, etc. [opinions (4),(5)]

6. (U) That full time Force Protection billets on ships be assigned and staffed to provide consistency and adherence to Force Protection guidance. Additionally, standardize the training and experience necessary to become a Force Protection specialist. [opinions (2-8),(13)]

7. (U) That in "HIGH" threat areas, United States Navy ships should be required to implement those Force Protection measures that establish positive waterside access control (ex. safety zone and picket boats). [opinion (11)]

8. (U) That United States Navy initiate dialogue with Department of Defense to identify ways to better integrate Department of State and other federal agencies in the development of host nation port security for United States ships and authority for United States ships to execute necessary Force Protection measures. [opinions (16),(17)]

9. (U) That Task Force Commanders should work closely with individual units to coordinate any changes or requested deviations to any approved Force Protection Plan. Task Force Commanders should provide ships entering an Area of Responsibility for the first time with a Welcome Aboard/Force Protection message, to include such items as websites, instructions, threat and vulnerability assessments, and points of contact. [opinions (6),(13),(17)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

10. (U) That United States Defense Attaché, the United States Defense Representative, or their representatives meet United States ships pulling into foreign ports that lack permanent United States Naval presence. If impracticable to do so, then provide the latest port and threat assessment information, and pier/area security being provided, if any, by other means. They also could reduce some of the initial confusion regarding personnel expected to visit the ship and identify the boats/barges that may be associated with the ship’s port visit. [opinion (16)]

11. (U) That shipboard Force Protection Measures be uniform throughout the Navy and other service components, thus ensuring consistency in the references and guidance used for Force Protection Plans. Such uniformity would ensure that units will receive the same guidance, even when operating in different fleets and will enhance a seamless transition from fleet to fleet. [opinion (18)]

12. (U) That Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, United States FIFTH Fleet work with higher authority to clarify the language of Force Protection measures [opinions (6), (7), (9-11), (13)]

13. (U) That commands utilizing the Relational Administrative Database Manager system be directed to produce "end of day" back up copies to ensure qualifications are not lost in the event of a computer server crash or other destruction. [opinion (19)]

14. (U) The United States Navy should encourage Department of Defense to develop a system by which threat analysis information is "pushed" to individual units, rather than putting the burden on the unit to "pull" information "down" from various sources. Additionally, websites for information such as Vulnerability Assessments should not be restricted access, password protected. [opinion (14)]

15. (U) That CDR Lippold’s chain of command assess his accountability under applicable laws and regulations [opinions (5-11), (20)]
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWHAI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

16. (U) That LCDR ________ chain of command assess his accountability under applicable laws and regulations. [opinions (5-11),(20)]

17. (U) That LT ________ chain of command assess his accountability under applicable laws and regulations. [opinions (5-11),(20)]

18. (U) That LT ________ chain of command assess his accountability under applicable laws and regulations. [opinions (5-11),(20)]
subj: command investigation into the actions of uss cole
(ddg 67) in preparing for and undertaking a brief stop
for fuel at bandar at tawahi (aden harbor) aden, yemen
on or about 12 october 2000

investigating officer's post script

1. (u) brief stops for fuel should continue once the united
states navy has determined that its ships will be protected in
the port of aden, yemen. if brief stops for fuel are
discontinued in aden, then the terrorists have achieved
success. the united states navy cannot yield to these
terrorists and must declare that it is serious in preventing
attacks on its ships and shore bases. from the top down we
have to be on the same sheet of music. our measures must be
refined to provide adequate and accurate means to protect our
navy's resources and assets. we have to be sincere and serious
about our force protection posture all the time and cannot
allow ships, shore bases, or our people to become complacent,
ever.

2. (u) with regard to requirements, force protection measures
that have been set forth to protect our ships and shore bases
must be performed. in the case of the uss cole (ddg 67),
because they were not properly executed, it is difficult to say
the force protection measures would not have deterred or
stopped the terrorist attack. if it is supposed to be done and
cannot be executed, the boss has to know. responsibility and
accountability are paramount. force protection instructions
must be reviewed, updated and followed to the letter.
procedures need to be defined and agreed to regarding boats and
boarders, and must be uniform and uniformly understood
throughout the fleet and the countries we visit.

3. (u) the force protection mission has to be understood.
threat and vulnerability assessments of all ports must be
readily available, and briefs to the crew must be mandatory.
information must flow from the commander to subordinates. a
threat cannot be recognized if it is not understood. this
deterrence must be evident when approaching a ship import or a
shore base.

4. (u) the terrorist attack and the resulting 17 deaths do
make it clear that united states warships visiting foreign
ports and high threat areas have to establish safety zones
around the ship and maintain positive control of those zones.
5. (U) We can never let our guard down and must ensure every command member knows the Threat Level/THREATCON applicable for their location and what is expected of them. Our Sailors are too important an asset and need to understand the threat so the team may function.
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USS COLE (DDG 67) - Appendices

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Appendix (A). Appendix (A) contains Fatality Reports of Deceased Personnel and is not releasable.
Appendix (B). The remaining portion of Appendix (B) contains Causality Reports of Injured Personnel and is not releasable.
APPENDIX B

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

Ref: (B-a) COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 1000-98

End: (B1) Medical Assets Review dtd 1 Oct 00

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

B-1. At approximately 1115-1118, 12 October 2000, an explosion occurred amidships, and adjacent to the port side of USS COLE (DDG 67) as the ship was moored at Refueling Dolphin Seven in Aden, Yemen. The explosion killed 17 crewmembers, wounded 42 others, and caused severe damage to the ship. Five crewmembers not wounded in the attack, but with pre-existing medical conditions that required treatment, were medically evacuated with the 42 wounded crewmembers. This attachment will provide findings and opinions concerning those that were medically evacuated as a result the explosion.

B-2. The enclosures to the appendix are a summary of the medical treatment each servicemember has received since the explosion. They have been enclosed as an alternative to the actual records.

B-3. A Special Intervention Response Team (SIRT) arrived on Aden, Yemen on 14 October 2000. This resource is similar to the "SPRINT" teams used in U.S. medical facilities. The SIRT provided support for a majority of the crew both before and after the remains were recovered. Assistance continued during the preparations to position USS COLE on MV BLUE MARLIN. No medical records were kept for any crewmembers that were provided this assistance.

B-4. Personnel evacuated from the ship before the SIRT arrival were provided equivalent stress intervention services in Bahrain, Landstuhl Army Medical Center and Naval Medical Center Portsmouth.

B-5. Appendix B is organized as follows. The initial findings of fact, supported by Enclosure B1, discuss generally the transfer of the patients from USS COLE to the United States. Thereafter each of the patients are discussed separately. The findings of fact for each patient are immediately followed by a set of enclosures unique to that Sailor.
APPENDIX B

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

FINDINGS OF FACT

B-1. Annex Q to reference (a) is the medical annex to the Fifth Fleet Operational Order. It contains the mass casualty evacuation guidance for individual units affected and Fifth Fleet response procedures. (Reference B-a)

B-2. Information concerning individual host nation medical treatment facilities in the AOR is contained in the OPORD. (Reference B-a, appendix 3)

B-3. The French Military Medical Center Medical Center in Djibouti is a 100-bed facility staffed by French physicians. The hospital's emphasis is on military-related trauma. There is an Emergency Department manned 24 hours a day by an emergency physician. The ICU is well equipped for stabilizing trauma patients. (Reference B-a, appendix 3, tab B)

B-4. A review of the medical facilities in Aden was completed by the Force Independent Duty Corpsman in September 2000. (Encl B1)

B-5. Saber Hospital in Aden is a 30 bed private facility with modern medical/surgical services and high standards of sanitation. It has a modern ambulance and emergency stabilization capabilities. (Encl B1)

B-6. Al Gamhoria Teaching Hospital in Aden is an older, 300-bed facility that offers many modern medical services. It has the most experienced medical/surgical staff in the area but it has lower levels of sanitation than Saber Hospital. (Encl B1)

B-7. As a result of this review, Navy medical personnel working in Aden and the Force Surgeon's Office in Bahrain knew Saber Hospital was the primary facility and Al Gamhoria was the secondary facility for emergency medical treatment in Aden. (Encl B1)
APPENDIX B

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIONS OF USS COLE (DDG 67) IN PREPARING FOR AND UNDERTAKING A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL AT BANDAR AT TAWAHI (ADEN HARBOR) ADEN, YEMEN ON OR ABOUT 12 OCTOBER 2000

OPINIONS

B-1. The care provided by the Yemeni hospitals most likely saved the lives of three Sailors; EW3 [redacted], MS3 [redacted] and HTSN [redacted] (FF B201, B240, B274, B275)

B-2. The care provided by the French military medical air evacuation team most likely saved the lives of two Sailors; GSM1 [redacted] and HTSN [redacted] (FF B258, B259, B276, B277)

B-3. The care by the French Military Medical Center staff in Djibouti prevented significant complications for four Sailors; EW3 [redacted], MS3 [redacted], MS3 [redacted] and GSCS [redacted] (FF B203, B204, B224, B242, B251)
From: COMUSNAVCENT Force Independent Duty Corpsman  
To: Captain [redacted] Force Surgeon  
Via: CDR [redacted] Deputy Force Surgeon  

Subj: MEDICAL ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES, VICINITY OF ADEN, REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

1. Having visited several hospitals and spoken with two of the nurses in the Ras Morbat Clinic (13 SEPT 00), one of whom has worked in Yemen for eighteen years, it is evident that the medical facilities in Aden and vicinity are in need of much restoration. After a decade of upheaval and war, facilities, equipment and overall general conditions are at a state of need and disrepair. As a result, care is greatly hampered and often disrupted. In addition, apart from the private hospital, Saber, the standards of sanitation and hygiene in many medical facilities are often not acceptable.

2. Supporting comments are provided:

   A. An expatriate in Aden would need to have medical insurance that includes air evacuation for even the simplest operation. For the general expatriate population, air evacuation can take up to 3 to 4 days to arrange, although in some instances it may be sooner.

   B. On occasions when an expatriate has had to be in hospital awaiting evacuation, Ras Morbat clinic nurses have taken it in turn to provide care. It would seem that Yemen needs a Florence Nightingale to raise the standards of nursing. Any expatriate patient may often also need his/her own carer, blood and perhaps even medical supplies to maintain long term care.

   C. AIDS, hepatitis and other infectious diseases found in blood are prevalent in this part of the world. Although it is reported that blood testing is done at the AL Gamhoooria Hospital, only on dire account should an expatriate have a local blood transfusion. If the need arose for a transfusion then blood should be sorted from other expatriates, shipmates etc. Saber Hospital nurses are reported to be available as a walking blood bank.

   D. For lack of sterile supplies, universal precautions are not always followed. If one has the misfortune to need to go to hospital and require an injection, the patient or his carer needs to ensure that sterile supplies and equipment are being used. Although Yemen reports a problem from the import of
unsanctioned medications, private pharmacies and some convenience stores, in Aden proper, appeared to be well stocked with medical consumables:

E. With regard to lab, X-ray and other diagnostic equipment, training for technicians and repair personnel is often inadequate. Much needed equipment is often not available, in disrepair or cannibalized for spare parts. In a word, simpler is better.

F. I was told that two years ago, thirty ambulances were given to the hospitals of Aden, by the Dutch people. The clinic staff has noted that these ambulances have had the equipment removed from them, and have been seen around the streets of Aden being used as family cars.

G. Although I observed several ambulances capable of providing patient transportation, I am uncertain of their equipment and readiness to cope with even minor trauma. On the other hand, the Dar Sad (Deminers) medical clinic is in possession of a 2 ton 3 patient transport. Three brand new single patient “Land Cruiser” type ambulances to be delivered any week now. The medics are well trained to provide intermediate level first aid to multiple personnel casualties, all courtesy of the US Government. Regarding Emergency Disaster Preparedness, there is no major plan in place for any facility.

H. According to Ras Morbat, the nearest hospital that could be used by expatriates with any confidence is the Baptist Hospital at Jibla. This is 230 kms from Aden, and is a four-hour journey by road. There are American and other expatriate Doctors working there. However, they do not have an Orthopaedic Dept. This facility, however, is too distant for the needs of any navy out at sea.

I. With the exception of the Airport, no medical facility is Airvac capable. Helicopters can land at the Dar Sad deminer’s training base and be transported to an emergency treatment facility from there. Point of contact would be the Navy EOD Det at mobile: or US Representatives in Sana’a.

J. Personnel and Hospitals visited:

A. Regional Director of Health Services: Dr. Al kaadar Nasser Masswar. Charged with the supervision of medical services from Aden to Taiz, this is the person who would co-
B. Ras Morbat Medical Clinic: Mr Roger Brugink
Tawahn, Aden, Republic of Yemen, Ph: [redacted], Email: [redacted] The Ras Morbat Medical clinic is a non-profit outpatient medical treatment facility in the city of Aden, approximately 10 Kms from the International Airport. It is affiliated with the Anglican Church of England. The pastor, Mr. Roger Bruggink, and his temporary staff of volunteer Doctors and Nurses provide care to the people of Aden, and vicinity, on a free of charge or care for work basis. In addition to providing general medical service to the community, they also conduct out patient eye surgery and they do home visits as well as provide care to inmates at various Yemeni prisons.

B. Aden General Hospital: Headed by Dr. Ahmed Alkine
(Fax: [redacted], this 200 bed facility was donated by the Saudi Arabian Government in 1992. Located in Sirah, 10 kms south of Aden Airport, it offers many of the services found in any western hospital but with limited levels of skill, diagnostics and sanitation. It has a 4 bed ER, 2 OR suits with 4 bed recovery room, a 58 bed surgical ward, 38 bed GYN/Obstetrical ward without a neonatal unit but 8 incubators, Cardiology, Orthopaedics with a Physical Therapy section, Urology, Ophthalmology, ENT, and a resident Anesthesiologist. It boasts a fairly modern medical library, a budding computer club and a conference hall which is being renovated for telemedicine capability. Unfortunately, this facility has been allowed to deteriorate for lack of spare parts, skilled technicians and medical staff. Much equipment is in various states of disrepair, 1 of three autoclaves work, 1 of two fixed X-ray units (SHIMADZU) work and most blood is sent out to Gamhoozia for testing. Although not to par with western standards, it has great potential for recovery provided proper funding and management. This is the site selected for training by the US Navy Medical training Center which once a year provides re-constructive surgery for land mine survivors as well as train local doctors in the performance of such surgeries.

D. AL Gamhooria Teaching Hospital: This much older 300 bed facility about 10 kms South West of the International airport and across the street from the University Medical Center, offers much of modern day medical services. It has the most experienced medical/surgical staff and some up to date equipment. Its mid to low level of sanitation, gloomy, dark and narrow passageways make it appear to be austere and inhospitable to westerners. This facility is administered by
facility. Patients will further medevac to for follow-on management.

E. Saber Hospital: Located in Al Mansoora, 3 klns from the airport is this 30 bed, private, facility with modern medical/surgical services and high standards of sanitation. It has a CT scan with other advanced radiology services, Laboratory with Blood analysis, chemistry and ELISA capability and a well supplied pharmacy. It offers elective procedures as well as emergency stabilization for the community at large. Its modern ambulance provides for patient transport. Most if not all the staff speaks English are highly experienced in their medical and surgical care. Nurses and Doctors provide for a walking blood bank. The owner is Mr. Saced Ba Huda. Mr. Shaikh Ba Zughifar is the Medical Director, Ph: [Redacted]. Due to its size, it mass casualty capabilities are limited.

F. Al Razi Specialist Hospital [Redacted] Not visited due to time constraints.

Very respectfully

[Redacted]

HMCS(SW)
Appendix (C). Photographs are classified and not releasable.
Appendix (D). Video Tapes are classified and not releasable.