USCENTAF
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
LESSONS LEARNED
REPORT

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM
AUG 90- FEB 91
Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Lessons Learned (Public Affairs)

See Distribution

1. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM validated the role of air power in modern warfare and demonstrated the U.S. combat capability of the Army/Navy/Marine/Coast Guard/Air Force team. It also provided a true test of not only our ability to project combat power, but also our ability to execute and sustain combat support missions. Public affairs was one of the functional critical areas to the outcome of the war.

2. Sometimes public affairs is taken for granted. This moment in history taught us the important contribution internal and public information programs can make during warfare. Much was done well, but there are also challenges to overcome.

3. This lessons-learned report identifies issues that commanders and public affairs officers, NCOs and civilians must address to refine public affairs doctrine, policy, training, planning and execution.

4. Public affairs is a function of command, take these lessons learned and capitalize on the things done right and improve in the areas where improvement is required.

CHARLES A. HORNER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Readiness is our Profession
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In any military operation, whether armed combat or exercise, one significant value is the assessment of lessons learned. Such was clearly the case of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Every functional area benefited from the test of its doctrine, policy and war-fighting capability. Public Affairs was certainly no exception.

In today's "instant information" environment, Public Affairs plays a role in the prosecution of warfare as significant as logistics, intelligence and communications. No Commander-in-Chief can, or will, conduct military operations without a clear sensing of public opinion or without a viable mechanism to communicate to the public and to the troops what they have a right and need to know -- within the generally accepted bounds of operational security and safety of American combatants. The Department of Defense dictum is, "maximum disclosure with minimum delay."

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were the first full-scale tests of modern warfare to come under the real-time scrutiny of the probing media. The role of the media and, subsequently, the role of military Public Affairs personnel in combat, became a "second front" and has left many questions yet to be answered.

This lessons-learned compendium is the result of inputs from both deployed Public Affairs offices and those at home stations. Every Public Affairs office in the Air Force -- active, Guard and Reserve -- was invited to participate.

It also summarizes extensive discussions that came out of the USCENTAF Public Affairs Conference held at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, from 17-19 June, where major issues arising from the lessons-learned inputs were identified and discussed.

This report does not focus on the more global concerns of such issues as security review versus censorship, host nation restrictions or sensitivities, the composition of media pools, or the ability/propriety of independent journalists to have free and open access to the battlefield. Instead, it centers on the needs of Air Force Public Affairs in the combat environment. Specifically, it addresses shortcomings in the process of Public Affairs planning, training, organization and logistic/equipment support.

In general, the Air Force Public Affairs mission in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was professionally conducted and successfully executed. But, there were areas of concern that need to be addressed, and problems that need to
be resolved before the Air Force becomes involved in the next contingency operation. This report surfaces many of them and provides recommendations for the war planners. Many of the issues have now already been addressed and are actively being worked to resolution by SAF/PA and other Public Affairs proponent agencies.

Most likely the major cause of many inefficiencies and problems in-theater was the lack of on-the-shelf contingency plans and associated pre-deployment resources needed to initiate and sustain Public Affairs operations at deployed locations. Logistics, manpower, supply and equipment support had not been predetermined, tasked or sourced. It was fortunate that Operation DESERT SHIELD allowed some ramp-up time to develop necessary plans and source and task necessary resources. In future contingencies the Public Affairs effort must be organic to the war-planning and war-fighting effort.

A second major weakness was the lack of appropriate training to prepare deployed Public Affairs personnel for joint combat contingency operations. Even basic media escort techniques appeared to be lacking. Public Affairs personnel were generally unprepared to operate in the combat environment, were untrained in basic mobility areas (e.g., small arms, chemical warfare), and did not understand the concept and role of a component command in the unified command structure.

One perceived difficulty by deployed PAs was the PA organizational structure, particularly in regard to manning levels and the rank structure at USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs. There was general agreement among deployed PAs that manning at USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs was insufficient to adequately support the theater Air Force Public Affairs requirements. While the manning and organization of USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs were adequate to support the USCENTAF Commander and his staff, they were apparently inadequate to support theater-wide Air Force Public Affairs requirements.

These, then, are the three recurring themes throughout this report: (1) planning, (2) training, and (3) organization -- basic precepts for executing any functional mission. Public Affairs is certainly not bankrupt in these areas, but we must focus greater attention on its wartime role. Our personal successes as Public Affairs professionals are essential if the Air Force is to maintain the support of the American people and the Congress. We must clearly, accurately and continuously emphasize our wartime role in messages targeted to our important publics. This report provides a blueprint for future planning and action in this regard.

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LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES
Public Affairs
Lessons-Learned Report Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and Operation DESERT SHIELD began. Crisis response operations throughout the Air Force immediately geared up, requiring 24-hour manning support in key functional areas. Public Affairs was among them.

The execution of any operations order as well as the tasking and management of all Air Force resources to support Operation DESERT SHIELD, including all Public Affairs assets, belonged to Headquarters U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, under the command of Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Commander, 9th Air Force and USCENTAF.

Deployments to the Persian Gulf began on 7 August 1990. Very early in the initial deployment phase, it was determined that the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and USCENTAF Rear battle staffs would combine at Langley AFB to work total USCENTAF Operation DESERT SHIELD logistics, manpower and personnel requirements. Consequently, the TAC Public Affairs staff, including its battle staff representatives, performed both TAC and USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs roles.

The initial Public Affairs challenge in the battle staff was to identify and prepare for deployment Public Affairs personnel and equipment. Numerous considerations went into the process of identifying the numbers, types and ranks of Public Affairs personnel who would deploy to support the time-phased deployments of combat-ready, war-fighting units and organizations. Among them were the types of weapons systems to be deployed, the total number of Air Force personnel projected at any particular deployment location, and the estimated workload to accomplish the basic Public Affairs mission in the broad areas of internal information, media and community relations.

Two Public Affairs officers were tasked to start up USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs operations and were in the AOR by 25 August 1990. A number of weeks would pass before the office would become fully operational due to a variety of logistical and support considerations. An administrative position was later authorized and, as war seemed evident, two Public Affairs NCOs and an additional officer were eventually added.
To meet the growing demands for internal information support both at deployment sites in the Persian Gulf and at Air Force installations worldwide, a seven-member internal information team consisting of one Public Affairs officer and six NCOs and airmen arrived in December to supplement the USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs operation.

Back at Langley Air Force Base, the USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs operation was augmented with representatives from other Air Force commands and organizations, including Guardsmen and Reservists, to assist in accomplishing the total USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs mission. Likewise, many Public Affairs positions at bases in the U.S. left vacant by deployments were backfilled with active and reserve forces personnel.

There are many who would say Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were conducted on four fronts...at sea...in the air...on the ground...and in the Public Affairs arena. This report deals, specifically, with the latter. The effort was internal as well as external. It tested individuals, organizations and systems and the broader aspects of the role Public Affairs played in the war effort and defined what that role should be in future contingencies.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were the first operations in over 20 years that Air Force Public Affairs was called upon to prove itself on a sustained and mass scale in support of a wartime operation.

With the thought of building for the future on lessons learned before, during and after Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, USCENTAF Rear gathered together a representative cross section of Public Affairs participants most directly involved in the war effort (Atch 2). Held at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 17-19 June 1991, the objective of the USCENTAF Public Affairs Conference was to identify and examine in-depth lessons learned while impressions and experiences were still fresh in the minds of many of the key players.

To prepare for it, a request was made Air Force-wide for after-action reports. These formed the basis for the conference group discussion guides and are included in the U.S. Central Command Air Forces Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Public Affairs Lessons-Learned Report Supplement.
The broad range of issues and recommendations that came out of the conference fell into these basic categories:

- Plans and Guidance
- Training
- Logistical Support
- Personnel Management
- Media Matters
- Information Products and Product Support

All inputs have been entered into the Joint Uniform Lessons-Learned System (JULLS).

While many of the problems associated with the Air Force Public Affairs aspects of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM had interrelated causes, there was agreement among both conference participants and those who submitted written after-action reports that inadequate planning and training degraded the overall Public Affairs effort.

This is not to say, however, that Air Force Public Affairs people did not rise to the occasion and, in general, perform splendidly in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Rather, it identifies an important management shortcoming and, perhaps, the most important lesson learned.

If the job is to be done with the greatest degrees of efficiency and professionalism, and if Public Affairs people are to be respected and counted upon as reliable, credible members of the war-fighting team by their commanders, peers and the publics they serve in wartime -- particularly the media -- they must be fully prepared and given the tools to do the job. There must be a blueprint to guide them that gives a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities in wartime Public Affairs -- the whos, what, wheres, whys and hows of mission accomplishment in the wartime environment.
The lack of a war-fighting Public Affairs template was the most limiting factor of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and severely degraded the ability of Public Affairs personnel to perform at their peak during initial operations. Even the most rudimentary guidelines for establishing a bare base Public Affairs operation were initially absent. War-fighting operations plans that did exist either had inadequate or outdated Public Affairs annexes or none at all. While the near void created problems at every Air Force Public Affairs office around the globe involved in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, nowhere was its impact greater than at deployment locations.

Although it was clear that USCENTCOM was the theater authority, guidance started coming from everywhere, revealing a serious lack of understanding of joint operations and the chain of command. "Stovepiping" from MAJCOMs to deployed units exacerbated the problem.

More often than not, when guidance was sought out through the appropriate channels to satisfy a specific, time-sensitive need, it was so slow in coming as to have been irrelevant and meaningless by the time it arrived. Often it did not come at all. Further, when it did start coming, Public Affairs personnel who had been operating without it were suddenly confronted with a new way of doing business. As a result, it was sometimes even ignored.

The overall effect was that Public Affairs personnel, both at home and in the AOR, were frequently forced to operate absent standardized guidance. While the full implications may never be completely defined, there is a consensus that it affected media credibility, did not allow Public Affairs/Commander relationships to grow and made the jobs of deployed Public Affairs personnel far more cumbersome and difficult than they needed to be. The recommendations provided by the conference working groups provide some excellent guidelines to reduce and, hopefully, eliminate future problems in this all-important management area.
Closely associated with the planning and guidance problems was training, or the lack thereof, to prepare Public Affairs personnel for the multiple, unique Public Affairs responsibilities and challenges in the AOR. While familiar, in a broad sense, with "the way we do it back home," the need to establish Public Affairs operations in the bare-base, joint-service environment by a corps of relatively inexperienced junior officers and enlisted personnel presented a whole new set of obstacles. They seriously impacted upon the ability of Public Affairs offices throughout the AOR to adequately support the Public Affairs aspects of unit missions.

Few of those deployed had any direct wartime or contingency operations experience. Many fertile fields exist for developing mutually beneficial training programs to improve command/Public Affairs understanding and interdependency. One is to include Public Affairs as part of every Air Force operational exercise and contingency plan and to incorporate realistic Public Affairs-oriented scenarios as part of every Air Force and joint service war-gaming exercise.

Problems associated with inadequate training manifested themselves in a number of areas. Public Affairs personnel were uneducated in joint contingency operations and were unaware of the chain of command. Even in the absence of plans and guidance, basic knowledge of joint contingency Public Affairs operations and the chain of command in the AOR probably would have eliminated many problems. Conversely, Public Affairs personnel who had previous joint deployment experience were quite successful. This suggests that inasmuch as possible, Public Affairs personnel throughout the Air Force should be afforded the opportunity to participate in joint contingency exercises and that a system be established to identify and track joint service experience/exercise participation in Public Affairs personnel management systems.

Joint operations Public Affairs training is an important aspect of professional development not only to the Air Force, but all service components. It is the surest means of ensuring multiservice interoperability and the standardization of procedures, jargon and guidance across service lines.

Complicating the uncertainties as to how and where to go for coordination, security and policy review, public and internal release authority, etc., were the communications difficulties between USCENTAF Forward Public Affairs and the units. Once in the AOR, Public Affairs personnel at the units felt they had
inadequate contact with USCENTAF Forward. Consequently, training needs in-theater, orientations on management relationships, coordination procedures and host nation sensitivities, were made more difficult.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM also revealed that deployed Public Affairs personnel were unskilled in conducting media training for deployed unit spokespersons and had not received adequate training themselves prior to deployment. Deployed commanders, key staffers and Public Affairs personnel should expect to find themselves in personal interview situations at virtually any time, particularly during media-intensive wartime contingencies like Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Media training is an area that needs attention Air Force-wide. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, inhibitions and reluctance to do interviews because of lack of training meant lost opportunities.

In addition to these and other training deficiencies covered in greater detail throughout the report, was the lack of small arms and chemical warfare training provided to deployed Public Affairs personnel prior to their deployment. Again, the problem's root lies in the fact that Public Affairs is not included in wartime contingency or mobility plans. Since there is no defined commitment for Public Affairs, its personnel took a back seat when it came to tapping into already overextended training and supply channels prior to deployment. As a result, most Public Affairs personnel in the AOR were ill-equipped both in training and equipment for their own survival had the war progressed into their areas.

In summary, Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM revealed training inadequacies which need attention if Public Affairs is to be more professionally prepared for future contingencies. The need for Public Affairs training applies not only to those within the Public Affairs arena, but extends to all war planners, leaders and decision makers involved in the wartime contingency effort.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Logistical support to initiate and sustain the Public Affairs mission was a major problem throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Most Public Affairs personnel arrived in-theater without the most basic supplies and equipment to establish Public Affairs operations. TAC was the only MAJCOM that had developed the fully instituted concept of the Public Affairs Contingency Kit (PACK) as part of its own wartime contingency planning. However, even this effort was fractured. Missing elements, the lack of equipment standardization and the incompatibility of computer systems helped diminish their value.

Many deployed Public Affairs personnel, regardless of host command, had great difficulty in getting their operations underway as a result of equipment and supply shortages and systems incompatibilities. Time spent learning unfamiliar computer systems and chasing after equipment and supplies only served to hamper the ability of Public Affairs personnel to zero in on accomplishing the Public Affairs mission. Further, when equipment and supply needs were determined, there was confusion surrounding means of funding the requirements and little means of maintaining, servicing and repairing equipment that was on hand.

Overall, the lack of standardized PACKs and compatible computer systems put severe limitations on the ability to coordinate and cross-feed information. The greatest effect was that Public Affairs personnel simply could not provide for the timely release of information.

While it is difficult to say which of the logistics problems presented the greatest obstacles and challenges, the lack of dedicated transportation and communications were certainly among them. In some instances, it reinforced the perception of visiting media, who were dependent upon Public Affairs support to get them and their products where they needed to be at specific times, that the Air Force didn’t have sufficient support mechanisms in place for the media.

Nagging problems associated with insufficient logistics support to the Public Affairs effort in the AOR proved problematic. While the seriousness of the situation varied from location to location, satisfying the needs and requirements of the Public Affairs operation were obviously given, in general, low or no priority relative to combat requirements. This problem was compounded by the fact that most deployed PAs did not know how to work the system to obtain needed support.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

With no predetermined mobilization requirements established, the responsibility for estimating the numbers and types of Public Affairs personnel required to start up and sustain Public Affairs operations in the AOR was assumed at USCENTAF/PA (Rear).

With deployments already well underway, USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs brought together in conference the war planners and resource managers from the commands, including the Guard and Reserve, responsible for supporting the Operation DESERT SHIELD (and, eventually, Operation DESERT STORM) effort. The purpose of the conference was to propose policy, to provide the mechanism through which personnel and equipment taskings and assignments would occur and to provide focus and direction. The result was ANNEX F to the Operation DESERT SHIELD Operations Order (Atch 3).

The annex called for a progressive buildup and the doubling of in-theater Public Affairs resources if and when war broke out. This portion of the plan was never executed due to changes in personnel policy. The net result was inadequate staffing at some locations where media interest and Public Affairs support requirements were the heaviest, and overstaffing at others where the Public Affairs support requirements were not as critical.

Subsequently, the numbers, ranks and types of deployed Public Affairs personnel seemed insufficient to meet the many needs that arose at deployment sites and headquarters locations in the AOR. This problem was magnified greatly as Public Affairs office manning requirements stretched to 24-hour operations. Most offices had only two Public Affairs personnel assigned.

Public Affairs personnel tasking was fraught with problems from the beginning. It contributed to unit integrity difficulties already described and complicated the backfill process at bases back home, from which Public Affairs personnel had been deployed to the AOR. It also identified the need at the outset of any contingency for the rapid identification of competent Public Affairs personnel at all ranks throughout the Air Force for tasking by the supported CINC.

Air Reserve, Component (ARC) assets could have been a valuable resource, but a variety of reasons left this resource untapped. Backfilling at stateside bases, for example, revealed one set of problems. The premise of the IMA program is that the Reservist is the automatic backfill when the active duty resource is deployed. However, policy dictated that all
active duty Public Affairs resources had to be exhausted before an IMA (or any Reservist or Guardsman) could be assigned. The result was that IMAs were not utilized in the positions for which they had trained.

A second set of problems developed because Air Force policy during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM dictated that only volunteer Reserve Forces Public Affairs personnel, unit or IMA, could be utilized. In most cases, stateside Public Affairs personnel tapped to backfill those deployed lacked experience in the command and were unfamiliar with the weapons systems and the unit mission at the base to which they had been assigned.

Adding to the problem was the fact that even with skeleton Public Affairs staffs, the Public Affairs business flourished at most stateside bases. Commanders, command Public Affairs offices and headquarters operations were able to make few adjustments in normal, day-to-day demands to alleviate the burdens on minimally staffed bases where heightened media and family support responsibilities increased the workload. While there is great consensus that without the Reserve Forces volunteers the Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Public Affairs effort would have suffered, there is consensus also, that policies inhibiting the most effective utilization of Reserve Forces Public Affairs assets were not as effective as they might have been.

The much-publicized issue of deploying females to the AOR in high-visibility positions because of cultural differences presented its own unique set of problems in Public Affairs deployment. As time progressed, however, the issue of deploying females proved not to be as critical as it appeared initially.

Rank sometimes surfaced as a problem in the professional and social relationships between Public Affairs personnel and Arab nation officials and counterparts. Some host nations were rank conscious as a result of hierarchial systems in their own cultures. Junior officers and enlisted personnel were considered inferiors, requiring that higher ranking intermediaries be used.

Personnel management and organization is an underpinning function that drives the success of Public Affairs in contingency operations. Much effort early on to develop appropriate Public Affairs personnel policies is essential.
MEDIA MATTERS

The consensus was that the lack of a media plan and timely, consistent guidance, complex coordination procedures, and the requirement for approvals up to the highest levels in the chain of command were at the root of many problems encountered with the media. Rigid media pool rules, cumbersome clearance requirements established by DOD for military-generated audio and video products, restrictions on media flights in the AOR and the lack of control in processing and escorting media in, out of and around the AOR were among the results.

Part of the problem stemmed from the media's unhappiness with the pool system and the perception that the military was trying to control the news by denying the media the opportunity to go where they wanted to go. Many Public Affairs personnel felt that media pool rules could have been more flexible without compromising safety or security and should have been designed to accommodate the specific, and dissimilar, needs of broadcast and print media.

Another media irritant centered around the inability of the military to service combat audio and video products needs. While Public Affairs personnel in the field could approve the release of products the media had created, they apparently could not release audio and visual products created through military resources. The internal review process and DOD-level release authority for military-produced footage was cumbersome and counterproductive.

In the eyes of the media, time delays in the review and clearance of military-generated products made them of little or no value. Since visual media could not get to every place they wanted to go and couldn't cover everything they wanted to cover, they were dependent upon what the military could provide. The inability to get gun camera and battle damage imagery was particularly frustrating to the media and helped widen the gap in the military/media relationship.

Efforts to get regional hometown media to the AOR to personalize the war buildup for audiences back home was perceived as difficult. Both the media and Public Affairs personnel were hamstring in the absence of clear guidelines and established, standardized procedures for getting to the AOR. Approvals, clearance channels and travel arrangements were difficult to understand and coordinate on both sides. Host nations added to the confusion by constantly changing the rules.

The most easily executed hometown media trips were those MAC was able to control itself. Very strict guidelines were adhered to for media traveling under MAC auspices. All were escorted and MAC maintained close contact with unit and JLB Public Affairs personnel so that there were few surprises.
Initially, Public Affairs personnel at the JIBs provided escort for visiting media to those sites that were approved for media visits. As the waves of journalists arriving in the AOR increased, the JIBs could no longer provide escort due to staffing limitations. The responsibility for picking up and escorting media to deployment locations fell on already overburdened Public Affairs personnel at the units, who shared the problem, also, of having unannounced media representatives show up at the units.

The restrictions and limitations imposed upon both the media and Public Affairs personnel serving them resulted in many lost opportunities of telling the multifaceted Air Force story throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and helped fuel the media criticism heaped upon the military at the conclusion of the war. Neither the military nor the media were blameless. It is clear that neither U.S. nor Saudi officials were prepared for the vast numbers of news media representatives who wanted to cover Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in the AOR.
INFORMATION PRODUCTS AND PRODUCT SUPPORT

Deployed Air Force personnel existed in a veritable information vacuum during the early weeks of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The lack of a contingency plan to support internal in-theater information needs presented one of the most formidable challenges to deployed and stateside Public Affairs personnel. Communicating with the deployed troops was one of the Air Force’s most important responsibilities but, as an offshoot of planning, equipment, logistics support and staffing problems already outlined, was one that could not be addressed quickly or easily. The USCENTCOM decision not to produce an internal publication or immediately commence AFRTS operations contributed to the problem.

For some time, the European edition of STARS AND STRIPES was the deployed person’s only formal news connection with the outside world. Though there were delays in getting it established in-theater, it proved to be an extremely effective information tool, since it carried news about the deployment and news of what was happening at home.

As deployed Public Affairs personnel sought their niche in the organization and sorted out space and equipment problems, newsletters (Atch 4) and bulletin boards and organized commanders’ calls attempted to fill the internal information voids and provided the link between commanders and the troops.

Recognizing the priority of internal information programs in the AOR, USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs requisitioned equipment and personnel from the supporting MAJCOMs to get the weekly DESERT DEFENDER underway. The first issue came off the press on 30 August 1990, three weeks after the first troops had deployed. Each issue got progressively better, culminating with the final regular edition on 5 April 1991, and a 350,000-copy printing of a special four-color commemorative edition in May. Its biggest problem was time delays between publication and arrival at sites in the AOR.

Distribution problems plagued DESERT DEFENDER throughout its life, which affected the timeliness of its content. Others felt that its content may have been oriented too much toward the senior leadership and did not contain enough information about stateside units from which they had deployed. Regardless, the DESERT DEFENDER was well received in the AOR and throughout the Air Force. A readership survey among readers in the AOR revealed that 75.5 percent of the respondents rated it adequate to valuable in keeping them informed.

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The USCENTAF Rear Public Affairs Digest (Atch 5), however, was not a success. Targeted to deployed Public Affairs personnel, it attempted to assimilate and standardize policy and guidance. The information arrived too late to be useful, if it was useful at all, and some deployed Public Affairs personnel never received it.

The impact of the AFNEWS team effort in creating the USCENTAF News Service was great. It is one of the biggest Public Affairs success stories of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Deployed Public Affairs personnel throughout the AOR depended upon USCENTAF News Service articles (Atch 6) for unit news letters and bulletin boards, as did the DESERT DEFENDER staff and internal information offices throughout the Air Force Public Affairs network. Equally well received throughout the AOR Public Affairs community, for which it was intended, was the USCENTCOM News Service (Atch 7). Both were very valuable in getting news out to the troops.

Early deployment of the Hometown News Center team also proved to be a valuable resource. Although limited by certain host country sensitivities, such as the inability to record Christmas greetings, it still served a most needed requirement in getting the story back to the local hometown communities.

One great Public Affairs failure in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the relationship between Combat Camera and Public Affairs. Combat Camera could have been the prime provider of unit audiovisual support. Release approval for Combat Camera products rested at the Pentagon. Once products got there, they appeared to fall into a black hole, never to emerge. Neither stateside nor deployed units could get them. Requests for Combat Camera support at deployment locations were almost universally denied. Consequently, Public Affairs personnel had to pick up the slack when assigned photographic and other audiovisual duties by their commanders, exacerbating already serious staffing problems and diverting attention from more important Public Affairs tasks. In order to provide for their own needs and the needs of the media, Public Affairs officers had to circumvent the system. The Combat Camera/Public Affairs relationship in future contingencies is an issue that begs resolution by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD/PA) at the earliest opportunity.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PLANS & GUIDANCE
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN; PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEXES; PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

TITLE: LACK OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN

OBSERVATION: During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there was no overall contingency Public Affairs plan. Existing operations plans contained, at best, inadequate Public Affairs annexes to satisfactorily support the contingency mission. With little or no guidance for commanders regarding Public Affairs in established operations plans, commanders were not able to fully utilize Public Affairs personnel to support resulting mission accomplishment.

DISCUSSION: While an effort was made to develop CENTAF Annex F to the DESERT SHIELD OpOrd, lack of real world experience and no established Public Affairs plan on which to base the annex and its specified actions resulted in handicapped Public Affairs support. The lack of an established Public Affairs plan compounded the already present difficulty of developing a Public Affairs program in a bare-base environment.

LESSONS LEARNED: The lack of a Public Affairs plan was the most significant limiting factor in accomplishing the Public Affairs mission. The impact resulted in a poorly defined Public Affairs organizational structure; inadequate or inconsistent Manning levels; little or no logistical support; confusing or non-existent Public Affairs policies; cumbersome news release procedures; and an overall poor definition and understanding of Public Affairs responsibilities by deployed Public Affairs personnel, as well as their respective commanders.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA should convene a war-planning conference to develop a basic Public Affairs wartime contingency plan, and to integrate this plan into existing contingency plans. On a long-term basis, AFNEWS should serve as the office of
primary responsibility for developing comprehensive Air Force Public Affairs planning and manning support. This operation and Operation Just Cause have firmly pointed out the significant lack in contingency planning training at the Defense Information School (DINFOS). Such contingency training must become a central theme in all DINFOS courses. Joint planning conferences must also be convened to ensure interoperability and common doctrine.
OBSERVATION: A general lack of guidance was evident in the dispersal and management of Public Affairs resources in-theater. Public Affairs implementing plans for bare-base operations were also non-existent for deployed Public Affairs personnel.

DISCUSSION: At the onset of DESERT SHIELD, Public Affairs personnel deployed with little or no information on how to begin bare-base operations at the deployment site, or even what equipment or supplies would be necessary for the most basic Public Affairs functions. Other staff agencies appeared to have at least rudimentary plans to go by and arrived with enough equipment, i.e., communications gear, to begin operations.

LESSONS LEARNED: Public Affairs personnel began deployed operations further behind the power curve than their compatriots due to the lack of even the most basic guidelines/objectives. This inadequacy resulted in valuable lost time as personnel attempted to figure out what their roles and duties were, and how best to accomplish them with limited or non-existent logistical support. Through trial and error, borrowing other staff agency equipment or purchasing equipment and supplies from the local economy, some Public Affairs personnel were eventually able to arrive at acceptable levels of production and support. Other Public Affairs staffs continued to function at substandard levels throughout the contingency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA must develop a basic general contingency plan to direct supporting MAJCOM and deployed Public Affairs activities from the start of any operation. In turn, supporting MAJCOM and field Public Affairs staffs should tailor the
basic plan to accommodate the specific requirements of the parent command or field unit. Emphasis should be placed on the operational needs of Public Affairs activities, to include manning, equipment, transportation assets, and communication. Unit Public Affairs personnel must review local unit deployment plans, prior to the execution of the plan, to ensure that their specific needs are addressed through prior home station acquisition, or prearranged support in-theater. The Defense Information School (DINFOS) can set the foundation for Public Affairs planning by providing more detailed training in that area to incoming Public Affairs personnel. Public Affairs personnel, at all levels, need to take an active role in ensuring local implementing plans address their missions and roles, and that all members of their Public Affairs staffs are trained and combat-ready for any future contingency.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE; PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY/DIRECTIVES

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

OBSERVATION: Public Affairs guidance was slow, and in many cases, too late to respond to issues raised from the field. "Current" guidance often contradicted previously received guidance, resulting in additional delays as clarification was requested.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs guidance was difficult to work and frequently excessively late. To assist the field, interim agencies attempted to fill the information void. However, the result was less than satisfactory as field Public Affairs personnel ended up receiving conflicting or contradictory guidance from several well-intentioned sources.

LESSONS LEARNED: Public Affairs personnel were handicapped in responding to queries and dealing with the media, and in providing information to home stations, when they were unable to get firm, clear-cut guidance on Public Affairs policy. Because of the sensitivity of the situation and the need to maintain some semblance of credibility and openness with both the internal and external publics, Public Affairs personnel were often forced to make personal interpretations of policy guidance received, hoping that their interpretations were accurate. The question of whom the deployed Public Affairs personnel were responsible to in policy and guidance matters never appeared to be resolved to either their satisfaction or understanding. This phenomenon was exacerbated by the lack of guidance from CENTAF (Forward) PA and the need for CENTAF (Rear) PA to fill that void. There were also early questions in the field regarding CENTCOM's role/authority in developing and dispatching policy guidance.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: Public Affairs personnel need to be aware of the fact that policy and guidance flows to them from OSD/PA through the unified and Air Force component commands. Supporting MAJCOMs have no role in establishing or implementing policy guidance and need to reinforce the understanding and stay within the confines of the guidance provided by the joint command in order to minimize the possibility of conflicting guidance for the field. To prevent any manning deficit at higher headquarters from delaying guidance release or clarification, a DOD-level Public Affairs guidance liaison group should be established, manning provided by the services from active or reserve forces. The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff should make every effort to clearly define the chain of command and ensure this structure is provided to and understood by the deployed Public Affairs elements.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

TITLE: LACK OF OR OUTDATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

OBSERVATION: There was a definite inconsistency in receipt of Public Affairs guidance during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Not all Public Affairs units received higher headquarters guidance, and those that did, oftentimes found the guidance was already outdated.

DISCUSSION: Though efforts were being made to transmit guidance to deployed PAs, the guidance was directed to unit rather than wing-level needs. New guidance did not always reference the previous guidance it superseded, confusing the situation further and forcing the PAs to make assumptions that their actions were consistent with the intent of the guidance previously received.

LESSONS LEARNED: In the context of a wartime situation, current, consistent guidance is essential to successful Public Affairs support, and was severely lacking throughout the course of the conflict. Without a common understanding of direction, PAs made the best of their own circumstances, hoping their actions were the right ones. Further complicating the situation, individual CONUS MAJCOMs provided guidance to their respective Public Affairs personnel that was too often contradictory to that sent to the PAs by higher headquarters. With the majority of Public Affairs personnel in theater being from the junior officer and enlisted ranks, and without previous wartime Public Affairs experience, the potential for serious errors in action or judgment was very high.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD and SAF/PA must be more timely in their response to issues requiring guidance or clarification, and previously transmitted guidance requiring updating. The Air Force
component command needs to ensure that supporting MAJCOMs receive their guidance equally as fast and as accurately to preclude conflicting transmittal of guidance or clarification from the supporting MAJCOMs to the field PAs. Because circumstances differ from one deployed location to another, i.e., different host-country sensitivities, deployed PAs should be allowed to localize the general guidance provided by higher headquarters, whenever possible. To assist units in guidance cross flow among the deployed PA offices, a public affairs directory, prepared by the Air Force component command PA, would be invaluable.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: POLICY GUIDANCE; SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TITLE: INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

OBSERVATION: Throughout the contingency, various staff agencies issued policy guidance statements that were in contradiction with statements previously released by other staff agencies. Confusion existed between security classification and publicly releasable information.

DISCUSSION: Lack of staff agency coordination was very evident throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Several agencies released messages on policy guidance without fully understanding or being aware of the previously stated Public Affairs policy on the same subject. For example, in November, Security Police issued classification guidance stating that general geographic locations of deployed units in the AOR were unclassified. While the message included Public Affairs guidance that also stated release authority rested with Public Affairs, it appeared to contradict the longstanding release rule on not disclosing specific locations, and led many to believe that release authority was no longer required from higher headquarters.

LESSONS LEARNED: Confusion was generated among commanders and Public Affairs personnel who questioned whether non-Public Affairs policy invalidated or superseded previous Public Affairs policy on the same matter. In the case of the Security Police message, a follow-up message had to be generated adding specific Public Affairs guidance on information release. Problems generated on guidance concerning mailing addresses and deployed sites were never completely resolved.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff should "remind" other staff agencies, at the onset of the operation, that they need to coordinate with Public Affairs whenever
addressing public information release. Deployed Public Affairs personnel should be thoroughly briefed by the Air Force component command Public Affairs staff that unclassified and releasable are not always one and the same. Deployed Public Affairs personnel need to convey this fact to their respective deployed unit commanders and staffs.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS; HIGHER HEADQUARTERS INTERFACE

TITLE: DOD/THEATER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

OBSERVATION: Official versions of the same subjects, be it policy guidance or intelligence summaries, differed as CENTCOM and DOD addressed the issues.

DISCUSSION: Depending on the location, Washington or Riyadh, information dispensed to Public Affairs personnel and the media was, on too many occasions, contradictory or incomplete. Determining what was fact, what was fiction, and what lay somewhere in between became one of the major challenges of the operation.

LESSONS LEARNED: There appeared to be a very real coordination problem between higher headquarters, geographically separated from the battle, and the in-theater command element at Riyadh. Regardless of good intentions, disparate information led many media representatives, as well as Public Affairs personnel, to question the validity of official reports, and to speculate on exactly what the government was trying to hide from the public and why. Government credibility was affected, and led to the beginnings of the negativism/confrontive stance evident in media/government interface as the operation continued.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: As in the matter of policy guidance, clear lines of "official spokesmen" need to be set early on in any contingency operation. While decisions or statements on government policy matters may more appropriately reside in Washington, D.C., information release authority on operational matters is best left at the in-theater operational command level. Both levels should concentrate on what they know best, and refer queries out of their level of "expertise" to the more appropriate source.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 5
KEYWORDS: NEWS SOURCES; CASUALTY IDENTIFICATION PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE; RELEASE OF CASUALTY INFORMATION

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE AND CASUALTY IDENTIFICATION

OBSERVATION: During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there existed no consistent DOD policy for notification of next-of-kin. Public Affairs guidance on release of casualty identification information was inadequate and untimely.

DISCUSSION: Prior to and during the escalation of the conflict, deaths and casualties continued to occur in the AOR. Public Affairs personnel frequently found themselves in situations where information on the victims was requested by the media, yet they were unable to verify the accuracy or truth of any speculation.

LESSONS LEARNED: Several elements contributed to Public Affairs difficulties in working with the media on casualty reporting. Without firm DOD policy on notification of the next-of-kin, time lags of two days or longer could occur before Public Affairs could openly acknowledge the situation. Requests for higher headquarters guidance on the matter often came equally as late as to have no relevance to the issue in question. Additionally, circumstances were further complicated when next-of-kin personally contacted or agreed to work with media back in the CONUS. While Public Affairs personnel were still unable to release the information, family members were telling all to the press. That the credibility of the Air Force and Public Affairs was hurt by time delays and the disconnect between policy and reality is unquestionable.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD needs to make the policy on casualty release a part of the standard Joint Operations Planning System. Policy should be finalized, distinct and understandable well in advance of future contingencies. The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff, in theater and in
CONUS, needs to disseminate the guidance on combat/non-combat casualty notification via supporting MAJCOM (SAC, MAC and TAC) Public Affairs. Deploying personnel should be well-versed in the policy prior to deployment. Families of deployed personnel should be briefed, as part of base support activities during the deployment, on the impact of premature release of casualty information prior to official acknowledgment.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: CASUALTIES; POW/MIA CLEARANCE; NEXT-OF-KIN

TITLE: DOD CASUALTY, POW AND MIA GUIDANCE

OBSERVATION: DOD guidance covering casualties, MIAs and POWs was not available when the first casualty occurred. Eventual guidance was slow in reaching the field PAs who needed the information in order to work appropriately with the assembled masses of the media in the AOR.

DISCUSSION: Due to the delay in developing or transmitting PA casualty, MIA and POW guidance to field PAs, deployed PAs were unprepared for the media response generated by the first casualties of the operation. Subsequent guidance was bulky (30 pages) and so involved that its complexity made the guidance inadequate for the situation deployed PAs encountered with the media.

LESSONS LEARNED: The combination of time-lag and complexity of higher headquarters' casualty, MIA and POW guidance resulted in media reporting information, in many instances, before clearance to do so had been given. The potential for families learning of traumatic events involving their loved ones through media channels prior to official notification was great, and could have resulted in very negative press for the military.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD should develop standardized Public Affairs policy and guidance as it relates to casualties, MIAs and POWs now, rather than waiting till the next conflict develops. Guidance should be clear and straightforward, and not so convoluted that the deployed PA is unable to respond to the situation with the media in a timely manner. This would increase military credibility with the press and reduce the chances of unpleasant consequences resulting from premature media notification of next-of-kin.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 1
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS; PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE; PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATION

TITLE: CENTAF FORWARD PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE

OBSERVATION: Insufficient manning at CENTAF Forward Public Affairs impacted on its ability to provide field assistance and to handle media requirements.

DISCUSSION: Often, guidance on sensitive issues was inadequate, slow in arriving or confusing for deployed Public Affairs personnel. Early restrictions existed on aircrew interviews and morale/religious topics due to host-nation sensitivities. With insufficient CENTAF Forward Public Affairs manning, frequently CENTCOM Joint Information Bureaus by-passed CENTAF Forward Public Affairs entirely, going directly to deployed Public Affairs staffs for support. As the headquarters staff arrived after the initial deployment of many Public Affairs personnel, perceived changes in release authority, photo documentation, etc., resulted in confusion at many field locations.

LESSONS LEARNED: Sketchy or untimely Public Affairs guidance was of little use to deployed Public Affairs personnel. The delayed establishment of the headquarters staffs (both CENTCOM AND CENTAF) complicated matters for previously deployed Public Affairs teams which had been actively conducting programs on their own initiative and with little or no official guidance to go by. Stories or material forwarded for CENTAF Forward Public Affairs approval often got delayed, impacting on deployed personnel’s coverage of their units. Consequently, guidance on release authority and other aspects of Public Affairs, when sent to the field by CENTAF Public Affairs, was viewed as an unnecessary, cumbersome, ineffective business when compared to earlier methods. Guidance was not considered necessary on how to do the job, but rather on how to handle the sensitive issues BEFORE they became issues.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA, through AFNEWS, should clearly delineate the requirements for a fully-staffed Air Force component command, forward element, Public Affairs directorate, and through unified commands, ensure all plans adequately address Public Affairs manning, organization and resource requirements. Specific billets should be identified throughout the Air Force as supporting wartime contingency organizations (in support of these commands). The Air Force Public Affairs functional managers should ensure that personnel are available and provided to meet such requirements. Personnel so assigned should deploy with the basic plan to support the contingency operation, adapting it as necessary to meet the needs of the various deployed sites. Guidance from the operational command headquarters should reflect plan requirements and reaffirm the role and importance of the deployed commander in supporting the Public Affairs initiatives. Deployed Public Affairs personnel should arrive at the AOR with a standardized Public Affairs Contingency Kit, and sufficient guidance and information to begin initial bare-base operations. News media pool information should be readily available to Public Affairs staffs, and they should be informed by the in-theater Public Affairs directorate on the means of obtaining such information. Training, prior to contingency deployment is absolutely essential for Public Affairs personnel, beginning with introductory courses at the Defense Information School, and continuing with realistic unit exercises and supplemental MAJCOM training sessions.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 2
PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: WARTIME PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING; PUBLIC AFFAIRS WARGAME SCENARIOS

TITLE: WARTIME PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING

OBSERVATION: A lack of Public Affairs expertise in wartime scenarios was readily observable at many deployed sites. This inexperience in dealing with Public Affairs matters was witnessed in both the commanders and the Public Affairs personnel deployed.

DISCUSSION: Deployed wing commanders did not always have a full knowledge of or interest in utilizing Public Affairs support in their mission accomplishment. As Public Affairs personnel themselves had no experience in combat Public Affairs and had not been trained to do so, they were unable to bridge the gap with their respective wing commanders. The gap was further widened by the fact that Public Affairs manning at CENTAF (Forward) Public Affairs and some deployed units was insufficient and at ranks lower than what they probably should have been. This disparity sent an improper signal to the commander and added a professional credibility problem to the commander/Public Affairs relationship.

LESSONS LEARNED: Valuable mission time was lost by both the command element and the Public Affairs staff in learning to conduct Public Affairs activities in a battle zone. Because of inexperience in this area, Public Affairs personnel had difficulty defining their own roles, let alone explaining those roles to their commanders. When wing command positions were held by vice commanders or deputies for operation, the matter was further compounded by the lack of their familiarity with media/Public Affairs issues.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA should task MAJCOMs with developing wartime Public Affairs training for commanders and those who could assume command roles during
wartime contingencies. For the Public Affairs personnel, the Defense Information School should incorporate wartime Public Affairs operations into their basic Public Affairs training course. MAJCOMs should also develop supplemental/refresher training courses for Public Affairs officers and NCOs to keep them "warrior-ready" for future contingencies.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING; JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) SKILLS; MEDIA ESCORT

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING FOR JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

OBSERVATION: Public Affairs personnel did not always have the skills required to operate in a joint command environment.

DISCUSSION: Many Public Affairs personnel, used to escort media throughout the AOR, did not know the proper way of doing so. Frequently PA escorts knew little more about the mission they were escorting the media to than the media did. While operational lessons-learned were incorporated into operational flying programs almost from the onset of the deployment, PA lessons-learned were not relayed to follow-on PA personnel arriving in country.

LESSONS LEARNED: Without the necessary media escort training for JIB-supporting PAs, PAs were unable to provide quality, professional escort of news media during the operation. Military/media interface was not always established, and, consequently, opportunities for media coverage of mission support and accomplishments were too frequently lost.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD/PA needs to identify training requirements for joint operations Public Affairs offices. Emphasis should be placed on the joint nature of the PA mission and proper media "handling" techniques. MAJCOMs should provide training to Public Affairs personnel, both for bare-base operations and for joint bureau support, prior to any future operations and on a periodic refresher basis when once firmly established.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 1
KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING; BARE-BASE OPERATIONS; PUBLIC AFFAIRS EXPERIENCE

TITLE: MID-LEVEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER TRAINING

OBSERVATION: Many deployed Air Force mid-level Public Affairs officers were inexperienced in operations in a joint environment. This manifested itself in their unfamiliarity with techniques for providing media training to potential interviewees and an unawareness of how to prioritize efforts for bare-base Public Affairs operations.

DISCUSSION: Air Force Public Affairs Officers enter the career field as junior officers, and receive no additional formal training following the basic officer course at the Defense Information School (DINFOS). Training at DINFOS does not currently address deployment or bare-base Public Affairs operations. Consequently, many Public Affairs officers, the majority of whom were junior ranking, lacked the experience or training to fully support their units of assignment.

LESSONS LEARNED: Some deployed Public Affairs officers had no aircraft operations background and were unprepared to deal with operational issues. This situation was further compounded when the Public Affairs officer deployed to support a unit other than his/her parent stateside organization. As junior officers, many Public Affairs officers lacked joint experience and were even unfamiliar with command structure and the coordination process. With limited media experience, they were also unable to conduct media training for deployed unit spokesmen, increasing the likelihood that errors in fact or inappropriate information would be received by visiting media representatives.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Though SAF/PA Skills Enhancement Workshops are available for first-time base-level Public Affairs officers, detailed skills-oriented
training is necessary for all mid-level Public Affairs officers. Air University or DINFOS should develop mid-level Air Force Public Affairs officer training programs to prepare Public Affairs officers for future contingencies. Training should include, but not be limited to Public Affairs in a joint arena; bare-base contingency Public Affairs operations; and media training techniques. The focus of the training should be on practical matters and be issues oriented. MAJCOM Public Affairs should ensure that their respective Public Affairs officers receive this training at the appropriate point in their career cycle. If deployment occurs before training has been completed, copies of training manuals, handouts, etc., should be provided to the deploying Public Affairs officer for reference purposes.
Deploying Public Affairs personnel were not adequately informed, nor prepared, for joint Public Affairs operations, different chains of command, or specific host-nation sensitivities.

Lack of a formal in-briefing/orientation for Public Affairs personnel assigned to the AOR degraded their ability to successfully support the unit mission. At headquarters level, this omission impacted on the Air Force contribution to CENTCOM support. Confusion in the proper chain of command resulted in multiple taskings from outside the command, creating unnecessary work and confusion in an already confusing situation. Public Affairs staffs were placed in a position of doing the best they could under the circumstances, and hoping for the best outcome for their efforts.

Valuable time was lost by Public Affairs personnel as they attempted to determine appropriate levels for release authority, hometown media travel, security and policy review, and overall Public Affairs guidance. Without knowledge of sister services, Public Affairs personnel were unable to support the entire spectrum of mission or service components at the deployed site. In many cases, the credibility of the Public Affairs staffers was damaged due to the delays in releasing internal information products resulting from security and policy review misunderstandings. There was a very strong potential for host-nation public relations problems in matters such as religion, female military members, etc., due to the lack of higher headquarters guidance on these issues.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff must assume responsibility for in-briefing all deployed Public Affairs officers and NCOs as soon as possible after arrival in-country. This briefing should include theater Public Affairs policies, host-nation sensitivities, and specific responsibilities within the chain of command. Each Public Affairs officer and NCO would then be responsible for cross-feeding this information to other members of their respective Public Affairs offices.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS MEDIA TRAINING; PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN

TITLE: MEDIA TRAINING FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

OBSERVATION: Many deployed Public Affairs personnel were unfamiliar with and unprepared for the possibility of being the deployed site spokesman in a media interview situation. Unsure of themselves, they were unable to adequately prepare other base personnel to serve as spokesmen for their units. At the Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs), there existed a daily requirement to media train senior officers involved in daily press briefings and interviews.

DISCUSSION: Though deployed Public Affairs personnel were experienced in working basic Public Affairs issues comparable to those encountered back at homestation, many individuals were not prepared to handle some media-related issues at deployed units. Lack of training and experience in this regard were the main factors contributing to the problem.

LESSONS LEARNED: Though junior in rank to other staff agency chiefs, many deployed Public Affairs officers and NCOs found themselves as chiefs of the deployed Public Affairs divisions. As such, they were often expected to serve as spokesmen for their units in addressing media representatives visiting the deployed sites. With little or no training or experience in this area, many Public Affairs personnel avoided direct contact with the media, or delegated the responsibility to another member of their staff. Likewise, little or no media training was provided to other base officials who were dealing with the media as Public Affairs personnel themselves were not prepared to do so. At the JIBs, some Public Affairs personnel responsible for training the senior leadership seemed unsure themselves as to what was the optimum media response for these senior leaders to convey. While there were some Public Affairs officers at the JIB with obvious skill in media training techniques and approaches, the manning in this
area was inadequate to handle the amount of training required. Though no serious problems were reported, the potential for security breaches or misinformation from the deployed units to the media was high. Likewise, the potential for burnout rate at the JIBs would have been significant if the operation had continued for a greater length of time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Everyone in the Air Force is a potential media spokesperson, especially Public Affairs personnel. As the commander’s representative, we need to be prepared to go before the camera at any time and with limited notice. We also owe it to commanders and their staffs to provide sound advice to them on dealing with the media they may encounter in their command roles. To accomplish both of these taskings, SAF/PA and MAJCOM Public Affairs should develop media training programs for Public Affairs officers and NCOs. The Defense Information School should also expand on its basic media training program with entry level Public Affairs trainees, with the emphasis on contingency support. For JIB support, the joint command Public Affairs functional managers should make every effort to ensure that JIB tasking highlights the need for experienced media relations personnel. The Air Force Public Affairs functional managers should endeavor to fill JIB taskings with personnel having such qualifications.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING; PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPLOYMENT

TITLE: PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

OBSERVATION: Some Public Affairs personnel deployed without completing the necessary small arms and chemical warfare training. Others arrived in theater without the critical chemical warfare gear.

DISCUSSION: Throughout the operation, Public Affairs personnel arrived in theater ill-equipped to be involved in combat operations. Mobility training in small arms and the wear and maintenance of chemical warfare gear was often not accomplished prior to arrival in the AOR. In this known high-chemical-warfare-threat area, Public Affairs personnel arrived without gear, and resorted to finding equipment in theater from far less extensive supply channels.

LESSONS LEARNED: The lack of a mobility commitment for some commands was the reason given by Public Affairs personnel for why they were not provided training or given the proper gear for the contingency. Without the official justification or authorization specified in a planning document, Public Affairs personnel took less priority in the noticeably over-extended training and supply channels in the CONUS. Operational commitments to the mission by the deployed unit's staff agencies, and the demands of daily mission support on Public Affairs personnel effectively eliminated the opportunity to receive the necessary training from sources in theater during hostilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA must expand the definition of mobility support to encompass Public Affairs personnel assets Air Force-wide. The most opportune way of doing so is through contingency plan development, where specific training and equipment support is stated and required. MAJCOMs should be responsible for ensuring all their Public
Affairs personnel are combat-ready by incorporating mobility requirements into MAJCOM support plans, and by managing the MAJCOM Public Affairs mobility program through periodic reports from or inspections of field units.
Logistical Support for the Public Affairs Mission
KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY KITS; PACKS; PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

TITLE: DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY KITS (PACKS)

OBSERVATION: There was no standardization in the development of or requirement for PACKs to support Public Affairs operations in the AOR.

DISCUSSION: With the exception of Tactical Air Command, most supporting commands did not have comprehensive, detailed requirements for the development and use of PACKs during the contingency. Equipment packages for the other commands varied from one command to the other, and, in some cases, consisted of little more than a handheld briefcase with papers and pens carried by the deploying Public Affairs staffer. With little guidance on what to expect during the deployment, PACK preparation, if considered at all, was a “best-guess” attempt based on the person’s experience in CONUS peacetime operation.

LESSONS LEARNED: Immediate Public Affairs operation on arrival at the deployment site was all too often unfeasible due to the unavailability of necessary supplies and equipment. Lack of standardization, even among staffs that had fairly well-prepared PACKs, resulted in multiple, incompatible computer systems which prohibited cross-talk between the systems. Additionally, many Public Affairs personnel, though computer literate, had computer systems with which they were unfamiliar. Refocusing of time and attention on learning the new software detracted from the ability of the Public Affairs staffs to provide immediate, timely, unit mission support.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA should establish specific standards for the development of Air Force-wide PACKs. To allow cross-talk between computer networks, computer selection should be clearly defined and not arbitrarily made by individual Public
Affairs offices. MAJCOM Public Affairs staffs should ensure standardization in development and content of the PACKs by including PACKs in Public Affairs unit inspections. MAJCOM Public Affairs should also establish the requirement for standardized computer training for all assigned Public Affairs personnel to permit immediate computer use by deployed personnel on arrival at deployed locations.
There was no consistency or standardization in the types and amounts of equipment available for deployment with deploying Public Affairs personnel. Many Public Affairs personnel deployed without equipment, while others deployed with minimal or substandard equipment.

The Public Affairs deployment for DESERT SHIELD was initiated without any standardization existing as to the types or amounts of equipment needed to support Public Affairs activities in the AOR. There were no checklists available in some commands to ensure that the proper equipment was deployed, nor was there any established procedure for training on or maintenance of any equipment that may have been included in the Public Affairs Contingency Kit (PACK). Likewise there was no reference listing for the types or amounts of expendable equipment to be included in the kits, nor packaging standards to preclude damage to equipment or supplies in transit.

The Public Affairs mission at many deployed sites was hampered by a lack of equipment and supplies. Coordination to obtain such equipment from homestation was handicapped by the requirement that the kits be unit funded. In addition, there appeared to be no provisions for identification of stocked PACKs for use by deploying units. Coordination on critical Public Affairs issues and timely release of information to the news media was not always possible because of inadequate or missing Public Affairs office equipment and supplies.

SAF/PA should establish a standard checklist of items required for PACKs and task MAJCOMs to fund a specified number of PACKs in each command for deploying Public Affairs use. These
kits should be placed at selected key bases for Air Force-wide dispersal, managed by the MAJCOM Public Affairs. A detailed listing of all Air Force PACKs should be maintained by each MAJCOM, with inter-MAJCOM coordination involved in the actual distribution of the PACKS. Procurement actions related to PACKs should also include provisions for maintenance, training, and ready-reserve supplies and equipment.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT; PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS LOGISTICS SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: Deployed Public Affairs staffs were hampered in the performance of their duties by the lack of logistics support for their activities. Though this was significant in day-to-day operation, its impact was more acutely felt in conjunction with media visits to deployed sites.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs personnel deployed to the AOR faced many logistical problems minimizing, if not preventing, them from satisfactorily providing their support to the unit mission. With facilities and equipment in short supply in the AOR and subject to airlift requirements, the norm was for Public Affairs logistical needs to take lower priority to the needs of the operational agencies and even some support agencies. Transportation was difficult, at best, to obtain; office space consisted in many cases of a corner in the rear of a primary agency’s tent; and communication equipment, including facsimile machines, was "shared" with other agencies. The overall affect was the minimization of the importance of the Public Affairs staff in overall mission accomplishment.

LESSONS LEARNED: Many Public Affairs staffs reported having difficulty obtaining vehicle support for conducting Public Affairs business at their deployed sites. When interviews occurred at opposite ends of the installation, lag times in "hitching a ride" or waiting on base bus transport ate up valuable manhours of the already undermanned staffs that could have been devoted to other Public Affairs duties. Scrounging for transport became professionally and personally embarrassing when it impacted on support provided for visiting media representatives. Lack of access by escorted media to messing or billeting facilities further estranged the media from the military community they came to cover during the war. Both the Air Force and Public
Affairs were often perceived in a more negative light in the critical first stages of contact when the tone of media coverage can be affected by perceived slights or inadequacies. The lack of adequate facilities in which to even establish the Public Affairs office also conveyed the impressions that Public Affairs personnel were on "the second string," and not as important to the success of the unit mission as other staff agencies.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:**

Public Affairs Annex F to operational contingency plans should include dedicated vehicle support for the Public Affairs staff. The vehicle should be justified in terms of supporting news media escort, accomplishing duties in support of the internal information program, and providing rapid response to the commander in routine and emergency situations. Annex F should also ensure that adequate office space is available for the Public Affairs office to conduct a satisfactory internal information program (i.e., produce a site newsletter or newspaper), provide media support (escort and news release activities), and be responsive to any additional Public Affairs taskings deemed necessary by the site commander. Site commanders should be encouraged in an appropriate section in Annex F to allow visiting media to use messing and billeting facilities while covering the unit story at the deployed site. Legal representatives should be consulted regarding reimbursement of expenses.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS; FIELD/HHQ COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS

OBSERVATION: Lack of dedicated communications assets severely degraded the CENTAF Public Affairs mission in the AOR. There were numerous delays in coordinating news releases, responses to query and visits by news media personnel.

DISCUSSION: Many deployed Public Affairs offices did not have ready access to the commercial, secure or tactical phones which are necessary for the timely coordination of key Public Affairs issues. No Table of Allowance authorizations existed for purchase of critical communications to support the Public Affairs mission.

LESSONS LEARNED: The lack of access to dedicated communications systems hampered the ability of Public Affairs personnel to meet mission requirements. Man-days were lost because of inefficient "work-arounds" necessary to support the unit mission. The situation was further handicapped by the lack of alternative communications networks such as walkie-talkies, cellular/satellite telephones, high-speed facsimile machines, and access to various commercial information/wire services through electronic mail.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA should ensure that communications systems, to include dedicated secure and tactical phones, walkie-talkies, computer dial access, and facsimile machines be added to the standardized Public Affairs Kits (PACKs) developed for contingency operations. MAJCOMs should ensure that communications equipment is included in MAJCOM funding requirements, and made an integral part of the prepositioned PACK set-up.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 3
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT; MEDIA SUPPORT

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

OBSERVATION: Lack of transportation for Public Affairs activities was a constant problem throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The impact was felt in several areas, with media support being the most affected.

DISCUSSION: Though deployed commanders were generally receptive to the transportation needs of their Public Affairs staffs, when the combat operation intensified, Public Affairs transportation requirements became of secondary importance. Media interest in the same time frame, however, inversely increased. The situation varied with location, as rear deployed Public Affairs staffs had more success and support for their efforts, while there was greater difficulty for those staffs closer to the battle area. Again, the latter case normally resulted in the greater media interest.

LESSONS LEARNED: Air Force, unit and Public Affairs credibility was damaged by the lack of transportation support available for media escort. Significant media coverage of unit operations was often lost due to the inability of the Public Affairs staffs to get the media to the right place at the right time to do their stories. With different requirements for different media representation (print versus broadcast), the transportation problem was further compounded. What should have been perceived as the Air Force interested in and supporting media coverage of the contingency for the public, was often viewed as just toleration of a necessary evil.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF, MAJCOM and unit Public Affairs should address transportation requirements in war plans and Public Affairs annexes. Coordination with same-level logistics staff agencies should be initiated prior to contingencies so that
Public Affairs transportation needs, supporting both print and broadcast mediums, can be identified by unit type codes in the time-phased deployment document.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Because of the unexpected and often short notice nature of DESERT SHIELD deployment, Public Affairs personnel were not fully prepared for immediate departure to the AOR. Necessary mobility actions accomplished by other support agencies often came as a surprise to the personnel deploying in Public Affairs.

Though many Public Affairs officers and NCOs in Tactical Air Command were identified for contingency mobilization, other members of the same staff, and Public Affairs personnel from non-mobility commands such as Military Airlift Command, were not. Early deployment actions were fast and furious from CENTAF Rear Public Affairs, with the intent being to have Public Affairs support in place simultaneously with arrival of the deployed command element. However, several deploying Public Affairs personnel were unable to respond as quickly as intended due to the necessity to accomplish the necessary mobilization requirements.

The mind-set that only TAC was deployable, and the notion that only previously identified Public Affairs personnel could be called up in support of a contingency was quickly dispelled when DESERT SHIELD deployment began. The manpower requirements soon exceeded the available pool in TAC, and unit integrity in support of Military and Strategic Airlift Command assets necessitated the call-up of Public Affairs personnel never before identified for mobilization. Though time was critical in positioning Public Affairs support in theater with the command element and prior to the arrival of the media, delays were encountered as personnel all rushed to get the requisite small arms and chemical warfare training, chemical warfare suits and desert fatigues, and official/personal passports. Because of the steady
buildup of the operation during DESERT SHIELD, the delays did not have a serious, long-term impact on overall Public Affairs support. However, if the contingency involved a rapid response and outbreak of hostilities, the time delays could have had a serious impact on Public Affairs support and media coverage of Air Force operations.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA should make the determination and subsequent announcement that all commands are mobility-eligible to support contingencies in which the Air Force is a participant. MAJCOMs, in turn, should ensure that all Public Affairs personnel are identified as mobilization-ready by requiring field Public Affairs staffs to verify mobilization training and the availability of personal mobilization kits. If necessary, this validation could be evaluated in MAJCOM inspections to field Public Affairs offices.
KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS UTCs; PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPLOYMENTS

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS "PACKAGE" DEPLOYMENTS

OBSERVATION: Deployment of the basic Public Affairs UTCs was insufficient to meet the many needs that arose at the deployment site. Additional commander tasking required skills not available in the XFFG1 (Public Affairs officer) or XFFG2 (Public Affairs NCO) UTC.

DISCUSSION: Most of the Public Affairs taskings were based on covering the basic requirements for a Public Affairs Officer (G1) and an NCO (G2). In a few instances, XFFG4 packages, which included one officer, two NCOs and an information specialist, were deployed. However, the latter was an exception. In many cases, administrative support had to be obtained from 702's elsewhere, who were already overwhelmed. At the deployment sites, commanders often tasked Public Affairs personnel to shoot still or video clips for return to home stations, expecting a skill from these deployed personnel that they, more often than not, did not possess.

LESSONS LEARNED: Deployed Public Affairs personnel possessed the Public Affairs AFSC and the skills developed to handle Public Affairs matters. Photographic capability is not required for the career field. Consequently, personnel tasked to perform these functions often took considerable time from their primary Public Affairs roles to develop even rudimentary photographic skills. As many did not deploy with photography equipment, Public Affairs personnel spent additional time trying to obtain such equipment and then learning to operate it well enough to produce a product that met with commander approval. When the commander requested photographic support from Combat Camera, it was denied, compounding the photographic support problem, and placing greater demands on Public Affairs personnel to satisfy the need.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM showed that still and video photography are a priority with deployed commanders. For future contingencies, the operational tasking command should minimize the single person G1 and G2 deployments, and instead go with the standard package Public Affairs UTC XFFG4 (which includes administrative support), adding one 231XX video and/or still photographer to the Public Affairs team. AFNEWS should coordinate with AAVS and the Air Force component command to ensure that photographic needs at the deployment site are met by individuals qualified to perform that function (AFSC: 231XX).
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPLOYMENT; UNIT INTEGRITY; PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING SUPPORT

TITLE: UNIT INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

OBSERVATION: Deployment of Public Affairs personnel did not consistently adhere to the concept of unit integrity of support assets.

DISCUSSION: While deploying TAC Public Affairs personnel were selected to support their respective units, SAC and MAC units were often conglomerates of different active, Guard and Reserve aircrews and aircraft. In some cases, the site commander was assigned to a tenant unit at home station which had no assigned Public Affairs personnel. In these cases, the Public Affairs officer or NCO working for the commander would often be an unknown element to the commander and not readily responded to by him as a primary member of his staff.

LESSONS LEARNED: Without the familiarity bred from daily interaction, commanders were more hesitant about utilizing deployed Public Affairs assets from another unit or command. Public Affairs personnel, on the other hand, experienced mission-impacting resistance from their commanders at a critical time in the operation. While the situation improved over time as trust by the commander was placed in his Public Affairs personnel, media and internal information opportunities were lost in the early days of the deployment.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The operational tasking MAJCOM should endeavor, whenever possible, to ensure unit integrity of Public Affairs personnel. When circumstances preclude this, i.e., lack of Public Affairs personnel in the unit, deployment priority should go to Public Affairs personnel having weapon system familiarity with the systems of the deploying unit. In the most extreme case, Public Affairs personnel from the same MAJCOM as the deploying unit should be selected.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL; PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPLOYMENTS

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

OBSERVATION: In-theater Public Affairs manning was subject to limitations that restricted full utilization of the Public Affairs manpower pool.

DISCUSSION: Inadequacies in the coordination process, limitations on the use of Reserve Force personnel and in-country manpower ceilings resulted in unnecessary restrictions on the available manpower pool to support contingency Public Affairs operations. Though MAJCOMs Air Force-wide did supply personnel to fill Public Affairs billets, the pool of volunteers from other than the major supporting commands, of TAC, SAC and MAC was never conveyed to CENTAF functional managers. AFMPC required that sourcing come from active-duty resources until these resources were depleted. Consequently, the Reserve volunteer pool could not be utilized. CENTCOM manning ceilings also prevented the deployment of additional Public Affairs personnel to support, in some cases, visibly undermanned Public Affairs staffs.

LESSONS LEARNED: Though Public Affairs manning was designed to meet the most basic Public Affairs needs in theater, additional manning would have increased the capability and opportunity of the deployed staffs to fully support their deployed units' missions. When manpower deficits were noted, CENTCOM ceilings on the deployment of additional personnel to the AOR prevented CENTAF functional managers from responding to the need. The restriction on the use of Reserve Force personnel effectively deprived Public Affairs of using verifiable Public Affairs "experts", many of whom were established in the media field in their civilian capacities. Though early coordination was lacking between CENTAF functional managers and Air Force supporting commands on the availability of a volunteer Public Affairs manpower pool, CENTAF and SAF/PA did eventually develop
an attrition reserve pool of Air Force-wide Public Affairs personnel. This pool was not used, however, due to the limited casualty rate in Public Affairs and the termination of the conflict.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION:**

The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff must have access to the full range of Public Affairs personnel throughout the Air Force to support future contingencies. Though factors such as unit integrity and weapon system familiarity must be driving factors in personnel selection for deployment to best support the deployed commander, unit and mission, consideration should also be given to qualified volunteers and experts in the Public Affairs arena, regardless of active or reserve status.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 5
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: MANNING SHORTFALLS; DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING

TITLE: COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING SHORTFALLS/EXCESSES

OBSERVATION: Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, many deployed Public Affairs offices operated with misallocated personnel resources. While some shops suffered from minimum manning, others had more manning available than the mission of the deployed site required. Policy and procedures for manning assistance were never explained or fully understood by deployed Public Affairs personnel.

DISCUSSION: From the perspective of deployed Public Affairs personnel, there appeared to be little consistency in the match-up of Public Affairs manning with the requirements of the deployed site. While sites with host-country media prohibitions (Oman) were able to function with sufficient manpower to handle internal information programs only, other sites without such media prohibitions (UAE) found manpower inadequate to handle both the media and internal requirements.

LESSONS LEARNED: Manpower limitations in multi-program Public Affairs offices, difficult from the onset of the operation, were compounded once hostilities broke out and 24-hour manning was required by site commanders. With only two personnel assigned to most sites, even maintaining an active internal information program resulted in 7-day work-weeks and 12-hour-or-more work-days. As a result of the manning shortage, media/internal opportunities were lost in the prioritization of Public Affairs responsibilities by deployed Public Affairs personnel.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Air Force component command Public Affairs for future contingencies should give serious consideration to increasing Public Affairs manpower allocations. At a minimum, two officers and two enlisted personnel should be assigned to each site, assuming a media/internal
approach to Public Affairs. This would enable the staff to handle initial Public Affairs taskings, as well as provide backup manning for 24-hour-a-day operations.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: AFRES/PA SUPPORT; ANG/PA SUPPORT; PA DEPLOYMENTS

TITLE: ACTIVE DUTY, GUARD AND RESERVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELATIONSHIPS

OBSERVATION: Sourcing MAJCOMs experienced difficulties in initiating Public Affairs deployment action of their assigned Guard and Reserve Public Affairs assets.

DISCUSSION: Sourcing MAJCOMs reported difficulties when they attempted to deploy MAJCOM-gained Guard and Reserve Public Affairs personnel. Since the objective was to have unit integrity to ensure weapon system familiarity, functional managers attempted to recall types (officers, NCOs) and quantities of personnel from these units to best support the deploying squadrons or wings. This objective frequently did not match the personnel assets available.

LESSONS LEARNED: Due to a lack of understanding by the supporting MAJCOM functional managers as to which Reserve Force Public Affairs personnel were available and where they were assigned, there were disconnects in Reserve Force sourcing. In several cases, functional managers contacted deploying units for specific ranks or individuals only to learn the rank was not present in the unit's Public Affairs manning, or the individual was no longer assigned.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: MAJCOM functional managers should know what Guard and Reserve assets they have available to them, and maintain current rosters of names, ranks, addresses, phone numbers and training status of MAJCOM-gained Public Affairs personnel. Contact should be established and maintained with both Guard and Reserve Public Affairs headquarters to ensure data reflects current Reserve Force Public Affairs manning.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS RANKS; EXPERIENCE-LEVELS OF DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

TITLE: IMPACT OF RANK AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

OBSERVATION: Generally speaking, Islamic/Persian Gulf area officials were very rank conscious and sensitive about dealing with individuals they considered to be of inferior ranking or prestige.

DISCUSSION: Vital communications and contacts with key host-nation officials were hampered by the emphasis placed on senior ranking status by these officials. Host-nation officials were reluctant to deal with many deployed Public Affairs personnel, even though they were chiefs of their respective offices, because of the cultural norms equating status of the person being visited with respect for the visitor.

LESSONS LEARNED: Public Affairs personnel, the majority of whom were junior enlisted and officers, faced many unnecessary difficulties operating within the constraints of the Arab society. Programs were delayed or not even initiated because of lack of host-nation support resulting from their unwillingness to deal with perceived "inferiors." Unless a higher ranking mediator ran interference, Public Affairs personnel were not able to fully support their respective deployed commanders or the unit's mission.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The tasking operational MAJCOM should make every effort to request MAJCOM sourcing within the context of host-nation sensitivities or cultural expectations. Sourcing MAJCOMs should follow suit when selecting personnel to fill deployment billets. Sourcing MAJCOMs should also ensure deploying Public Affairs personnel are aware of the expectations of their host countries, and the different approaches they could take to work within the constraints, i.e., utilize their wing commander or his staff agency heads for host-nation rapport.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING; PUBLIC AFFAIRS TASKINGS

TITLE: EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINGENCY TASKINGS

OBSERVATION: Increased workloads and extended hours required for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM support often out-stripped the capacities of the minimally-manned Public Affairs staffs.

DISCUSSION: Combining the normal output of Public Affairs with the increasing demands resulting from contingency operations, many Public Affairs personnel found themselves unable to keep up with the pace. Dedication to duty and pride in their Public Affairs role were often negated by internal (commander-directed) or external (higher-headquarters-directed) taskings that exceeded the number of personnel assigned to the individual staffs.

LESSONS LEARNED: In the best of situations, minimally-manned Public Affairs staffs were often mismatched with the workload of their deployed sites, particularly at sites with high media interest and access. In worst case scenarios, additional duty taskings for historical photography, protocol support and comparable commander requests resulted in the inability of the Public Affairs staff to adequately perform its duties.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: A minimum of two individuals at small, non-media accessible sites, should be sent to support contingency requirements. In all other cases, the minimum should be two officers and two NCOs, the rationale being in two parts: to accommodate the demands of contingency operations, and to provide adequate manning to maintain two shifts of Public Affairs staffers under 24-hour-a-day conditions, a very real probability during combat operations. The Air Force component command Public Affairs functional managers need to closely coordinate with
Reserve and Guard Public Affairs counterparts to ensure Reserve Force manning, if utilized, meshes into manning criteria, i.e., weapon system familiarity, rank structures, etc. The Air Force component command Public Affairs element in country should incorporate such subjects as work-pacing and total force utilization into briefings to newly deployed Public Affairs personnel.
KEYWORDS: CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING; CENTAF FORWARD PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TITLE: CENTAF FORWARD PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSIGNMENTS

OBSERVATION: Given the wide scope of responsibility for management of in-theater Public Affairs resources, CENTAF Forward Public Affairs was inadequately manned and ranked.

DISCUSSION: Although the working relationships between CENTAF Forward Public Affairs and the CENTAF Forward commander were no less than outstanding, working relationships between CENTAF Forward and Rear Public Affairs, the Joint Information Bureaus and the deployed Public Affairs offices were less than satisfactory due to manning shortfalls and rank representation of key staffers. While the Navy and Marine Public Affairs directors were 0-6 equivalents, and the Army an 0-5, the Air Force director was an 0-4. Other service Public Affairs staffing consisted of between 12 and 15 personnel, while Air Force staffing at the CENTAF Forward Public Affairs office, at its peak, was only six. Of this complement, the staff ranking was an 0-4-select deputy, one captain, two NCOs and one administrative assistant.

LESSONS LEARNED: Inadequate manning to handle all the responsibilities involved in deployed Public Affairs impacted on the amount and quality of support that CENTAF Forward Public Affairs could provide to the deployed Public Affairs shops, and the essential contact and crossfeed on their behalf between forward and rear Public Affairs staffs. It was perceived by field personnel and non-deployed MAJCOM/PA staffs that inadequate rank impacted on the interface between CENTCOM Public Affairs and the Air Force component command Public Affairs element in the AOR. Though an internal information team deployed to join the CENTAF Forward Public Affairs staff, the deployment occurred in January, well into the operation and well after
the field Public Affairs offices were estab-
lished and attempting to function. Demands on
the internal team for support throughout the
AOR made their contributions to CENTAF Forward
Public Affairs management marginal, at best.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

SAF/PA and the Air Force component command
Public Affairs functional managers should
guarantee that the Air Force component command
Public Affairs forward element staff is suffi-
ciently manned from the very onset of the
deployment. At a minimum, the staff should
have at least 6 people assigned, headed by a
colonel/lieutenant colonel, with a lieutenant
colonel/major as deputy. The staff should be
augmented by sufficient officers and enlisted
Public Affairs specialists and administrative
assistants to allow 24-hour-a-day operations in
support of local and field requirements.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
KEYWORDS: CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING; PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT

TITLE: NEED FOR FULLY MANNED AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

OBSERVATION: Inadequate manning levels at CENTAF (Forward) PA created guidance, coordination and communication problems for deployed Air Force wings and Public Affairs officers. As a result, there was a significantly downgraded support system for deployed Public Affairs offices and personnel.

DISCUSSION: There appeared to be no central management of Public Affairs resources in theater. To obtain information on the conducting of Public Affairs activities, deployed Public Affairs personnel oftentimes resorted to dealing with CENTCOM or Joint Information Bureaus to fill the void created by the perceived lack of Air Force Public Affairs leadership in country.

LESSONS LEARNED: With information being misdirected to the wrong Public Affairs channels, rather than through an in-theater component command Public Affairs channel, manning needs required for media support and a strong internal information program were not met. Deployed Public Affairs personnel had to juggle their own time and manning to meet the demands on their resources. Because of the lack of a support system at the headquarters due to minimal manning, Public Affairs personnel suffered from the lack of timely guidance for Public Affairs actions; were unable to funnel prime media coverage ideas theater-wide; and missed opportunities to cover significant aspects of the Air Force mission. Overall, in-theater Public Affairs efforts lacked coherency and focus.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: Future SAF/PA Public Affairs contingency plans must include manning requirements for filling the Air Force component command Public Affairs forward element as well as deployed base Public Affairs offices. Equipment and deployment requirements should be specified in as much detail as practicable, and be part of the overall operational responsibility of the Air Force component command Public Affairs forward element in order to provide centralized management of Public Affairs activities in theater throughout all facets of the contingency.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 1
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU MANNING; AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS

TITLE: JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) ASSIGNMENT

OBSERVATION: The three JIBs - at Riyadh, Dharhan and Dubai - were initially run by Navy leadership. The highest ranking Navy representative was a captain, while the highest ranking Air Force member at any JIB was a lieutenant colonel.

DISCUSSION: Many Air Force personnel assigned to the JIBs felt they did not receive equitable treatment because of Air Force's lack of rank representation. Deployed Air Force Public Affairs personnel highlighted inappropriate usage of Air Force resources, and less media coverage of Air Force operations.

LESSONS LEARNED: Overall consensus of deployed Public Affairs personnel assigned to the JIBs was that the Air Force was handicapped by not having an 0-6 Public Affairs representative at, at least, the CENTCOM headquarters JIB in Riyadh. After-action reports and verbal feedback referenced misuse of Air Force manning (e.g., using senior Public Affairs NCOs as drivers and administrative assistants), resistance to suggestions for coverage of Air Force operations, and frequent "jumping" of command channels, with CENTCOM JIBs bypassing CENTAF/PA and going directly to deployed sites with taskings.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: During future contingencies, the Air Force component command Public Affairs director needs to ensure Air Force rank at the main JIB supporting the deployment, if not at all JIBs in theater, is commensurate with that of sister services. The senior Air Force component command Public Affairs officer should also be of the appropriate rank to deal more effectively with his/her counterparts at the joint command headquarters.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS:  ROTATION POLICY; PUBLIC AFFAIRS ROTATIONS

TITLE:  CENTAF/JIB ROTATIONS

OBSERVATIONS:  There appeared to be no consistency in the rotation of Public Affairs personnel from the varying assignments in the AOR. Personnel at different sites (JIB and field) and from different supporting MAJCOMs often rotated on different schedules across the Public Affairs career field.

DISCUSSION:  As DESERT SHIELD evolved into DESERT STORM, Public Affairs personnel were rotated back to CONUS for no apparent reason and without regard to time spent in country. Some JIB personnel rotated between 90-120 days. Public Affairs personnel from other supporting MAJCOMs, most noticeably MAC, also rotated earlier than those in TAC. Resentment among Public Affairs personnel was evident.

LESSONS LEARNED:  Different rotation policies contributed to morale problems, not only among Public Affairs personnel, but throughout the deployed contingent. Deployed personnel were not always aware of commander-directed rotations, emergency rotations and possible higher headquarters policies. As morale decreased, mission accomplishment and the momentum to do so became more difficult. The resulting vacuum of information was filled with speculation and assumptions that certain people were favored over others, certain people were forgotten, or that higher headquarters did not have a handle on the personnel deployed in theater. Commander-directed redeployment also produced a "domino effect" on replacement personnel back in the CONUS. Rotations had to be initiated out of cycle using personnel allocated to fill other positions. Voids created by commander-directed rotations based on his belief the Public Affairs staffer was no longer needed were often required to be refilled again at a later date when circumstances in country changed.
Public Affairs assignments should be consistent, not only across the spectrum of field units to JIBs, but from one supporting MAJCOM to another. DOD should establish an open-ended deployment policy at the onset of the operation without personnel orders stating or implying a specific return date. Barring emergency rotations back to CONUS, commanders should adhere to the stated DOD policy, and not readjust rotations without consulting with the Air Force component command Public Affairs functional managers.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: CONUS BACKFILL; MANNING AUGMENTATION

TITLE: STATESIDE BACKFILL FOR DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

OBSERVATION: CONUS Public Affairs evidenced little curtailment of activities during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Business was expected to go on as usual, even though staffing in already small offices was significantly reduced by deployment of personnel.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs activity during the contingency did not correspond to manning available at CONUS bases. In the optimum situation, routine media and community relations, and internal information programs continued as before, only with personnel carrying extra workloads while the primary person in charge was deployed. In worst case situations, the contingency resulted in increased Public Affairs activities as attention had to be given to more involved family support action and the increased local media interest resulting from the deployment of base personnel.

LESSONS LEARNED: Doing much more with less became the norm in Public Affairs during the contingency. Though some commanders requested backfill assistance, most did not, yet they maintained the same or greater momentum for their Public Affairs staffs. Continued backfill by reducing one Public Affairs staff to augment another would have, in the long run, compounded the problem. MAJCOM taskings also continued with no apparent consideration given to the reduced manpower at the CONUS sites.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: MAJCOMs need to reprioritize their field taskings during operational contingencies. MAJCOMs should also encourage commanders to do the same through operational, not just Public Affairs, channels. If backfill is necessary, individual mobilization augmentees from the Reserve forces should be used to the maximum extent possible.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
Media were not prepared or equipped to go into the war zone. While guidelines were set for them, the media, more often than not, did not adhere to them. This was most noticeable in the structure of the media pool, which was too rigid to accommodate the needs of the varying media sources represented, and which was eventually disbanded.

Many problems surfaced regarding media coverage of the desert war. PAs repeatedly encountered difficulties responding to the sometimes conflicting needs of print versus electronic media representatives. Rather than tailoring the media pool to the story or issue best suited to a particular type of media, pools were developed with representatives of several different affiliations as the primary focus. Further compounding media handling, not all members of the media came to the AOR equipped with chemical warfare gear or protective clothing. As the Joint Information Bureaus were not equipped to respond to this need, equipment had to be secured locally by the JIB, increasing the demands already placed on them for media handling. Finally, while media were aware of the "rules of engagement" while in theater, media repeatedly ignored the rules while in pursuit of their stories.

Policy guidelines are totally ineffective if there is no enforcement of them, which was the case with the media violations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Safety and security of individuals and operations were constantly jeopardized, so much so that in the case of Bob Simon and his CBS crew, the violation could have been deadly. The rigidity of the media pool may have contributed to the media violations as the press was not getting the stories or the opportunities to pursue the stories they wanted under the constraints of the DOD-established pool. With the lack of equipment, i.e.,
chem gear or protective clothing, an actual chemical attack in the media coverage areas could have been catastrophic.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD needs to rethink pool composition for future conflicts, refocusing the emphasis on story line versus affiliation. At a minimum, Joint Information Bureaus should be allowed the flexibility of adapting the pool concept to the theater and situational environment. Once guidelines have been established for the press, DOD needs to allow theater commanders to enforce the guidelines and take appropriate steps when violations occur, i.e., prohibition of further coverage from the war zone by the offending media representative or affiliation. For the protection of the press, DOD needs to establish a table of allowances to equip the JIBs with issue items for media while in theater. Joint Public Affairs operations plans should develop procedures for the issuing of and return from the press of protective equipment while covering the hostilities.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: COMBAT CAMERA; GUN CAMERAS; CENTAF ORIENTATION FLIGHTS

TITLE: LACK OF AIR WAR VIDEO AND AUDIO PRODUCTS FOR MEDIA USE DURING DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

OBSERVATION: During the operation, media frequently expressed discontent with the lack of adequate combat video and audio products. Tight control was exerted on camera footage and methods to acquire, review and release the footage were not available.

DISCUSSION: The nature of the air war was such that it became impossible for news media to adequately cover all of the operations. Consequently, they depended heavily on the military for video coverage opportunities. While the potential existed for production, approval and release mechanisms to be organized to effect timely release of products to the press, the potential was never realized. Elevated release authority requirements impacted on timely transfer of "news" items to the media. While field Public Affairs personnel could approve release of news media photos, they could not make release of Air Force-produced video or audio products.

LESSONS LEARNED: Many excellent media opportunities to tell the "Air Force story" were lost due to the limitations imposed on video/audio material in the AOR. Media were unable to do timely stories on fighter and bomber pilots in the early stages of the war, creating an information void on the homefront, and setting a negative starting tone for media/military interaction. While orientation flights could have resolved the issue of releasing Air Force audio/video products to the press, orientation flights could have been increased, giving the media greater opportunity to relay their own first-person accounts of the combat. Without actual footage of the "heat of battle," media expectations of what the war would be like, and the public's view of the
same, did not match the reality of what occurred. Media pools eventually disbanded when the media realized the possibilities of video release had "dried up."

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD must allow wartime information and product release authority to remain in the hands of home station and deployed Public Affairs officers to satisfy informational needs of both stateside and deployed locations. As photography is a significant means of confirming success stories related in briefings and interviews, the unified and component command should establish a clearance structure to ensure Public Affair personnel gain access to, review, clear and release appropriate battle damage assessment and gun camera footage. Local-level approval should be allowed on unit-specific gun camera release within guidelines established by the Air Force component command. The Air Force component command Public Affairs office, in conjunction with the joint command, should also develop opportunities for the media to cover the air war through such means as orientation flights and gun camera footage.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 1
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: MEDIA ESCORT; JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) MEDIA; JIB/DEPLOYED SITE INTERFACE

TITLE: CENTCOM JIB MEDIA ESCORT

OBSERVATION: The CENTCOM JIB at Riyadh did not consistently provide escort resources, i.e., manning and transportation, to and from deployed sites scheduled for media visits.

DISCUSSION: Deployed sites tasked to support media visits by the CENTCOM JIB were often required to arrange for the pickup, delivery and escort of the media to the site. In many cases, that involved traveling to the JIB or the media's location to transport the representative to the site, then returning him/her back to the starting point when the visit concluded.

LESSONS LEARNED: Most of the deployed Public Affairs offices were not adequately staffed to take on this added responsibility, in addition to their own media escort and transport when at the site. Transportation support was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain for daily routine Public Affairs activities, let alone for media escort external to the operation of the site. While escort and transport, though challenging, could have been arranged while at the deployed location, using limited Public Affairs manning to obtain and take a vehicle off base for non-operational use compounded the situation for Public Affairs staffers. Air Force credibility with the media, and Public Affairs credibility with their support agencies at deployed sites were both negatively affected.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: JIBs, despite their own internal pressures and problems, must provide escort and transport for their own taskings to and from deployment locations. Once on site, the responsibility for media escort and/or transport belongs to the site Public Affairs staff. Coordination needs to be made between JIBs, the Air Force
component command Public Affairs staff, and the deployed site PRIOR to the media visit to take into account manning and transportation availability in the time frame requested by the JIB.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: REGIONAL MEDIA TRAVEL; NEWS MEDIA TRAVEL; MEDIA VISITS

TITLE: REGIONAL MEDIA TRAVEL TO THE AOR

OBSERVATION: During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, guidance, approval and procedures for regional media visits were in a constant state of flux. Some visits were approved; some deployed without approval; and some did not get off the ground.

DISCUSSION: Regional media started deploying with units and on MAC aircraft before procedures were established and implemented. Host nations constantly changed procedures for allowing media to visit various deployed sites. No one organization was set up to work the deployments in the AOR. Some deploying media had no hometown tie to the deployed forces and were looking for "free tickets" to the AOR. Approval types (theater, country, base) and level (DOD, CENTCOM, CENTAF) were unclear. Units/aircraft bringing regional media were unsure of the units they intended to visit. Some locations had no responsible agency to work the visit.

LESSONS LEARNED: Regional trips went to those who worked through the problems and persevered or those who came anyway, unannounced, without coordination. Host nations were angered over lack of control over regional media. Regional media showed up at bases unannounced. Several visits at the same time to one location were unavoidable. A lack of guidance left media wandering around, in some cases, unescorted. Some media were treated royally, and others shunned.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: DOD needs to establish, early on, which countries are allowing media, and identify unique requirements and procedures. Theater and country clearance should be delegated to theater Public Affairs personnel, and base clearance delegated to the Air Force component.
command Public Affairs forward element, based on coordination with the deployed unit Public Affairs contact. All procedures should be spelled out in guidance by theater Public Affairs prior to any regional deployment. Special procedures must be established for travel where there is no unit tie (who supports and how).
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INFORMATION PRODUCTS &
PRODUCT SUPPORT
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: DESERT DEFENDER; CENTAF NEWSPAPER

TITLE: DESERT DEFENDER DEPLOYMENT NEWSPAPER

OBSERVATION: Outdated information and slow receipt of the DESERT DEFENDER in the AOR impacted on its value as an internal information asset.

DISCUSSION: More often than not, outdated information was being conveyed to the AOR via the DESERT DEFENDER due to lag times in delivery of the product to deployed sites. Content was considered heavily senior-leadership oriented, and of little interest or value to the troops in the field. (Note: A DESERT DEFENDER readership survey indicated 75.5% rated the newspaper adequate to valuable in keeping them informed on Air Force matters in general. Audience orientation was not measured.)

LESSONS LEARNED: Though overall information in the DESERT DEFENDER was good, its timeliness and perceived focus on senior leadership made it less valuable to the readership, composed predominantly of junior officers and enlisted personnel. Changing mail delivery points and differing distribution methods from one deployed site to another made the publication less effective.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: If a command newspaper is to be developed for a contingency, staffing and printing capability should be deployed to the field and collocated with the Air Force component command Public Affairs forward element. This would increase the timeliness of the product and make it more cost-effective. It would also allow greater control over delivery and distribution. If collocation is unfeasible, alternative siting in an adjoining country is the next best option.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 2
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: AFNEWS/CENTCOM NEWS SERVICE

TITLE: AFNEWS/CENTCOM NEWS SERVICE SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: Although started too late, AFNEWS/CENTCOM News Service support was one of the "success" stories in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

DISCUSSION: Both services proved invaluable to deployed Public Affairs staffs in getting information out to the deployed troops. Material from both sources was frequently used in deployed unit newsletters and sometimes displayed on Public Affairs bulletin boards.

LESSONS LEARNED: Everything seemed to work well with both AFNEWS and CENTCOM News Service, though the latter was occasionally less timely than the former. Message format was expedient. The only complaint was CENTCOM's policy of not running bylines on news service stories.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Defense Information School should incorporate mandatory rather than optional computer training into the Public Affairs entry-level program. MAJCOM Public Affairs can then build on this foundation with supplemental or refresher training during the reassignment of Public Affairs officers or enlisted personnel. Joint command officials should refrain from removing by-lines from published stories as these serve to identify the origin of the articles and provide greater credibility to readers.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 2
KEYWORDS: CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIGEST

TITLE: THE VALUE OF THE CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIGEST AS AN INFORMATION TOOL

OBSERVATION: The CENTAF Public Affairs Digest did not meet the needs of the deployed Public Affairs personnel supporting Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

DISCUSSION: Intended as a means of getting useful CENTAF-oriented information out to the field, the digest was initiated in November 1990. Inputs concerning media, internal information, manpower and support, and tracking lists of deployed Public Affairs personnel were included in its content. Copies of the digest were mailed to all deployed Public Affairs offices.

LESSONS LEARNED: As an information tool, most deployed Public Affairs personnel did not find the information useful or meaningful to their deployment situation. Digests ran afoul of the same distribution problems as the DESERT DEFENDER, or were not received at all by their intended addressee. In the latter case, several deployed Public Affairs personnel were not even aware of its existence.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Discontinue this type of product to disseminate information to deployed field Public Affairs personnel, as improved communication links, such as electronic mail, would adequately achieve the same intent.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: EUROPEAN STARS AND STRIPES; DEPLOYMENT NEWSPAPER PRODUCTS

TITLE: EUROPEAN STARS AND STRIPES

OBSERVATION: European Stars and Stripes served as a valid information source for deployed personnel.

DISCUSSION: Though often late in transmittal to the AOR, European Stars and Stripes served as a functional outlet for information-starved deployed personnel. For several months it was the only information source from the "outside" available to some deployed sites. An additional point in its favor was that the troops viewed it as a meaningful source of information because its content consisted of stories about the deployment and the troops who supported it. It also covered a wide range of news topics, particularly from the United States.

LESSONS LEARNED: Though meeting most of the positive requirements for an information source, the delay in getting it established in-theater was considered a negative factor.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Future contingencies should include immediate delivery of the particular Stars and Stripes available (European or Pacific) to the deployment location. With an anticipated large readership, consideration should be given to increasing the circulation in the deployment area so that more personnel have access to it. The Air Force component command or supporting command Public Affairs elements should maintain requirements listings and assist in getting the paper distributed to all deployed sites.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 2
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE (AFRTS)

TITLE: DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF AFRTS SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: The apparent delay in CENTCOM's request for AFRTS support directly affected the services provided by AFRTS, and the use of this valuable information tool by deployed Public Affairs staffs. After AFRTS services were requested, CENTCOM provided minimal logistics and operational support to maintain radio and television operations.

DISCUSSION: The use of AFRTS by CENTCOM was viewed as an afterthought by AFRTS and Public Affairs personnel. Though AFRTS support in the form of mini-TVs, Armed Forces Satellite-Transmitted Radio Service (AFSTRS), transportable, over-the-air broadcasting services via portable AFRTS contingency vans and satellite network (SATNET) was offered in mid-August of 1990, CENTCOM did not initiate the request until mid-September. For AOR areas outside of Saudi Arabia, AFRTS support was never requested at all.

LESSONS LEARNED: Contingency planning did not include AFRTS in command information requirements. The delay by CENTCOM in requesting AFRTS support for Operation DESERT SHIELD directly affected services provided during DESERT STORM. AFRTS was not available to provide command information, news and entertainment broadcasts to several areas in the AOR.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA, through AFNEWS, should include AFRTS contingency plans and support in the basic Public Affairs contingency plan. An AFRTS representative should deploy with the initial cadre of the Air Force component command Public Affairs staffs to serve as liaison between the in-theater component command Public Affairs element and AFRTS support elements. Once established at the deployment site, Public
Affairs and the deployed commander should be allowed access to base radio service to announce immediate messages to troops at unmanned radio stations.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: COMBAT CAMERA; PHOTO CLEARANCE AUTHORITY

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS AUDIOVISUAL REQUIREMENTS

OBSERVATION: Audiovisual documentation by Combat Camera was untimely and not up to expected Public Affairs standards. Support to base Public Affairs staffs in the AOR was inconsistent.

DISCUSSION: From the perspective of deployed Public Affairs personnel, Combat Camera seemed overwhelmed with photo coverage procedures. A requirement existed for photo products to be sent to the Joint Combat Camera Center in Washington, D.C., for release approval. However, documentation was not made available to deployed units, CONUS bases, MAJCOMs, 9th Air Force Public Affairs or AFNEWS, in a timely manner. Public Affairs staffs were denied use of photography that could have enhanced internal information programs at the deployment sites and home stations.

LESSONS LEARNED: Because of the conflict between Combat Camera requirements and the information needs of deployed Public Affairs staffs, Public Affairs personnel relied less and less on Combat Camera support and more and more on their own capability and creative ways around the system. Many Public Affairs personnel simply released photo documentation on their own or their commanders' authority. While no serious issues resulted from this unorthodox approach, the potential for breaches of security or the release of inappropriate material was great.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Audiovisual support must be included in operational contingency plans and Public Affairs annexes to those plans. Ideally, Combat Camera should provide audiovisual support to the deployed Public Affairs offices, but if that is not possible, dedicated photographic assistance...
is a must. Release authority should be delegated to the lowest level, specifically the deployed wing commander, under advisement by Public Affairs and intelligence experts.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: COMBAT CAMERA; PUBLIC AFFAIRS AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: The audiovisual release process during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was untimely and inadequate to meet the needs of the Public Affairs mission.

DISCUSSION: Multiple audiovisual demands were made on Public Affairs staffs supporting the contingency. Internally, stateside offices needed photo documentation to keep personnel at home station informed on the status and condition of their deployed units. Deployed commanders also frequently requested photo documentation for historical record keeping. Externally, restrictions on the media meant that they were unable to get the photo documentation they required for story coverage, and thus, relied on the military, and specifically the Public Affairs staff, for audiovisual support.

LESSONS LEARNED: Combat camera, first viewed as the prime supporter for Public Affairs audiovisual requirements, proved inadequate throughout the operation. Complicated release requirements made photo documentation untimely and unnewsworthy for both the military media and the civilian media outlets. Even when Public Affairs personnel assumed photo coverage responsibility, they were handicapped by approval authority restrictions and the lack of development and processing capability for film products. Many opportunities to tell the Air Force story were missed or not optimized to the fullest because of inadequate audiovisual support.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Whether or not Combat Camera ever supports Public Affairs during contingency operations, approval and release authority must be delegated as low as possible within the constraints of security classification. Optimally, the deployed unit commander should be authorized to approve or disapprove release of photo coverage.
of his operation, based on the advice of the usual staff agency "experts," i.e., Public Affairs, Judge Advocate, etc. Photo documentation support should be included in deployment packages, with a still and video photographer, or an individual dual-qualified to fill the role, attached to the Public Affairs Office during the contingency.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PHOTO COVERAGE; PHOTO SUPPORT; AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT

TITLE: PHOTO SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OBSERVATION: Dedicated photographic support was not established for deployed Public Affairs offices. This lack of support impacted negatively on the success of the deployed units' internal information programs.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs did not have dedicated audiovisual support for their operations. Many Public Affairs requirements were short notice, and did not lend themselves to the unit's available audiovisual scheduling procedures, or, in some cases, actually overtaxed the limited resources of this support agency.

LESSONS LEARNED: While many Public Affairs staffs utilized personally owned photographic equipment and actually took photos in unit support, they lacked photo processing and development capability. In many cases, locally contracted photo services were used by the deployed Public Affairs staffs, which could have resulted in breaches of security or violated host-country sensitivities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Dedicated photographic support should be provided to Public Affairs at deployed locations. Options include dedicating a staff member from the unit's photo lab to work for and with Public Affairs personnel, or including an audiovisual technician in the Public Affairs deployment package.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 3
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS; INTER-/INTRA-THEATER PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS (INTER- AND INTRA-THEATER)

OBSERVATION: Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there were consistent, continuing communications problems at all levels of Public Affairs. These problems existed both on a logistics as well as a procedural level.

DISCUSSION: Deployed Public Affairs personnel reported inconsistent and inadequate access to communications channels while in the AOR. Equipment, such as commercial telephone lines, tactical lines, and telefax, were routinely unavailable for the Public Affairs staff. While use of equipment belonging to other agencies was permitted, it was subject to the mission requirements and demands of the owning agency, and not always available when needed by Public Affairs.

LESSONS LEARNED: There was a confusion factor among Public Affairs personnel on policy and guidance matters, and on how to conduct bare-base Public Affairs operations, all attributable to the lack of ability to communicate base-to-base and base-to-higher headquarters. Having limited contact with CENTAF (Forward) Public Affairs, deployed Public Affairs personnel were unaware of the fact that the director's staff and the internal staff were not co-located. Likewise, early releases from the field were not cleared or releasable to the media in a timely manner due to the inability of the deployed staffs to keep track of the material's status at higher headquarters. Though some computer capability was available at some bases, Public Affairs personnel were unaware of the procedures for sending or receiving stories electronically. Stories went untold, missions undocumented, and media relations were uncomfortable, at best.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Dedicated communications lines need to be made available for Public Affairs use. Incorporation of this requirement into basic general
contingency plans and supporting MAJCOM plans and annexes would assure the availability of the equipment, such as telephones and mobile land radio units, datafax, tactical lines, etc. SAF/PA, through AFNEWS, should incorporate comm gear into the Public Affairs Contingency Kit requirements, with MAJCOMs using higher headquarters authorized funding to ensure field Public Affairs staffs are able to purchase the needed equipment. Computer selection and training should be standardized by SAF/PA Air Force-wide to ensure that Public Affairs personnel are capable of using this communication tool and have mutually compatible equipment with which to communicate. Access to computer bulletin boards such as the Air Force Public Affairs Network and Air Force News Service should made available to deploying Public Affairs staffs. Deployed Public Affairs personnel should be able to release stories to local and external audiences, upon wing commander approval, under advisement by the appropriate reviewing agency, i.e., operations, maintenance, civil engineers, etc.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS MESSAGE TRAFFIC; INTER-THEATER GUIDANCE

TITLE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATION (MESSAGE TRAFFIC/INTER-THEATER GUIDANCE)

OBSERVATION: Communication across the spectrum of deployed Public Affairs staffs was lacking at almost every stage of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs personnel were continuously frustrated in their communications efforts in the AOR. Though guidance and direction was needed and sought by personnel, it was either not forthcoming or was conflicting from the many channels in the AOR that should have been able to provide it. Newsletters and conversations with senior-ranking officers and enlisted personnel became the primary method to resolve unfounded rumors and speculation.

LESSONS LEARNED: The prime element in the communication crisis appeared to be the lack of communication capability to and from the AOR. However, other factors played equally significant parts. Deployed Public Affairs personnel were never informed by CENTAF Forward Public Affairs as to the locations or methods of contacting other Public Affairs staffs in country. Some Public Affairs personnel were not even sure where they were supposed to be assigned. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service was not initially available, and commercial radio and television was extremely limited. Most Public Affairs staffs did not have the capability of reproducing sufficient copies of unit newsletters to adequately meet the needs of their base populations. Commanders who did conduct regular commanders' calls were considered to have effective troop information programs. Though Public Affairs personnel did the best that could be expected under their respective circumstances, the internal information program definitely was not as substantive as it could have been with better communications support.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA, through AFNEWS and MAJCOM Public Affairs, should incorporate commercially-leased transponders, copiers/reproduction equipment, and audio distribution systems into Public Affairs contingency plans and wartime planning annexes. Annex F taskings should also highlight the importance of commander/senior officer leadership interface with the deployed troops via commanders' calls, office visits, etc., to help dispel rumors and to enhance staff morale and motivation.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS NETWORKING; INTRA-THEATER COMMUNICATION

TITLE: LACK OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS NETWORKING DURING OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

OBSERVATION: Public Affairs networking or cross-talk was severely lacking among deployed units during the operation. This lack was evident on a small scale, at deployed sites, and on a larger one, throughout the AOR.

DISCUSSION: Throughout DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Public Affairs personnel appeared to operate in isolation from each other. Where other staff agencies communicated within and beyond their immediate agency, Public Affairs personnel operated on the level of single-office entities. Proactivity was limited, and responsiveness to the current issue or situation the norm. Aware of only their activities and the mission of their immediate unit, it was difficult, if not impossible, to know or to convey to their deployed site community, where their collective actions fit in the overall mission objectives of the contingency.

LESSONS LEARNED: Several factors contributed to the lack of networking or cross-talk among Public Affairs personnel in the AOR. Perhaps the greatest factor was the limitation on availability of communications equipment for Public Affairs use at the deployment location. Hand-held radios to connect personnel from the same office were not part of the Public Affairs equipment package. Lack of telephone availability or access stifled any attempts to contact other deployed Public Affairs offices for cross-talk on how to handle the different situations that impacted on Public Affairs staffs. Limited contact with the CENTAF Forward Public Affairs staff virtually eliminated this opportune means of passing along information from one deployed Public Affairs site to another.
RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA, MAJCOM/PA and field units must ensure that dedicated communication capability is included in Public Affairs contingency plans and supporting annexes. Additionally, SAF/PA should authorize MAJCOM funding for the purchase of communication equipment, i.e., walkie-talkies, cellular phones, field phones, etc., for inclusion in the Public Affairs Contingency Kit. The Air Force component command Public Affairs staff must make every effort to establish and maintain continuous contact with deployed Public Affairs staffs in order to serve as a liaison between deployed staffs and a backup for out-of-service comm capability.
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: ELECTRONIC MAIL

TITLE: USE OF ELECTRONIC MAIL AS AN INTERNAL INFORMATION TOOL

OBSERVATION: Electronic mail, when available, was effectively used by Public Affairs personnel in the AOR.

DISCUSSION: Though an effective and timely internal information tool for deployed Public Affairs staffs, not all personnel had access to equipment required to receive it, nor were they trained in how to use it.

LESSONS LEARNED: With communications problems inter- and intra-theater among Public Affairs personnel, those that could use the electronic mail system were able to obtain much needed guidance and direction, and to communicate on a real-time basis with higher headquarters and home stations. For those who could not, communications problems continued throughout their stay in the AOR.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF or MAJCOM Public Affairs should standardize and make mandatory the use of electronic mail by assigned Public Affairs personnel. Routine information could be transmitted via E-mail during peacetime operation, allowing personnel to develop the skills and confidence required for contingency use.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 2
Deployed members of the Reserve Forces received little information through CENTAF Forward Public Affairs internal information channels to satisfy their unique information needs. Issue/policy-oriented topics such as rights protected under the Sailors and Soldiers Relief Act, pay procedures, stateside dependent benefits, leave accounting, etc., of interest and concern to this specific public were never or seldom addressed. If any such information for deployed Reserve Forces audiences was sent, it never reached those for whom it was intended. Further, internal information products produced in the AOR carried little or no material about the Reserve Forces units or personnel assigned as part of the deployed Total Force organization. Parent stateside Reserve Forces organizations were negligent also, in that information about activities at home was not sent for inclusion in internal products.

While much of the internal information sent to the AOR via message traffic and the DESERT DEFENDER had relevance to the active forces, the perception of deployed Guardsmen and Reservists was that there was little to nothing geared specifically for or about them. Public Affairs offices at deployed locations were either unaware that Guardsmen and Reservists were part of their organization or, recognizing that they were, received nothing from Guard/Reserve or headquarters to pass on to them.

Deployed Guard and Reserve units and individuals received minimal in-country internal information support or recognition from either CENTAF or Public Affairs offices at deployed locations. Many Reserve Forces members felt "in the dark" about what was or would be happening to them, both at the deployed site and back at their home stations. Morale was
noticeably affected as well, as the publicity
and encouragement for their efforts, evident in
internal coverage of the active force, was
missing for the reservists.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Recognizing that the rank of the Guard and/or
Reserve individuals would be a primary concern/
consideration in establishing a Total Force
Public Affairs office at a deployed location
(an active duty person should always be sen-
ior), some consideration should be given in
future plans of deploying Guard and/or Reserve
Public Affairs personnel to AOR locations where
Total Force war-fighting operations have been
established. Home units of Guard and Reserve
organizations mobilized as part of the Total
Force makeup of deployed operational units
should insure that news from home is provided
to the public affairs office at the deployed
location, regardless of whether or not a Guard
or Reserve Public Affairs person is there.
Reserve Forces headquarters organization Public
Affairs offices should provide, on a timely,
continuing basis, news and feature materials of
interest to these specialized publics to rear
and forward Air Force element Public Affairs
offices for inclusion in internal information
products. The joint command responsible for
orchestrating contingency support needs to
ensure that Public Affairs programs recognize
the unique needs of Guard and Reserve publics
included in the deployment. The Air Force
component Public Affairs staffs, forward and
rear, should work closely with the Reserve
Forces Public Affairs communities to address
unique information needs via such channels as
news service, mailing and message lists, com-
mand deployment newspaper, etc. Active
deployed Public Affairs personnel and com-
manders should be trained in and sensitized to
the fact that their responsibilities are Total
Force in nature, and that Guard and Reserve
units and individuals at deployment sites
should be given the same support and attention
as active-duty organizations and personnel.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
IN THE
COMMAND STRUCTURE
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS; IN-COUNTRY COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ELEMENT

TITLE: POSITIONING OF CENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE

OBSERVATION: The CENTAF Forward Public Affairs staff was physically separated from facilities occupied by the CENTAF Forward command element. This dislocation had a negative impact on the support CENTAF Public Affairs could provide to deployed units, and the interrelationship between Forward and Rear Public Affairs staffs.

DISCUSSION: Though located at the same deployment site, the office of CENTAF Forward Public Affairs was located approximately 20-minutes from the CENTAF command headquarters. In order to coordinate with the command section and obtain commander approval on release items, media visits and Manning issues, CENTAF Forward Public Affairs personnel were required to leave their office and travel to the command location.

LESSONS LEARNED: Due to the volume of coordination that was required on Public Affairs matters, CENTAF Forward Public Affairs had to dedicate a minimum of 40 minutes in round trip travel to command headquarters. As a result, CENTAF Forward Public Affairs was unable to provide the continuity of contact with deployed field units, and frequently had to delegate responsibility for field support to junior Public Affairs officers. This delegation of responsibility also impacted on the interrelationships between CENTAF and CENTCOM Public Affairs staff elements, with CENTCOM oftentimes jumping channels and dealing directly with the deployed field units. To the field, this was perceived as a direct result of the disinterest or lack of support on the part of CENTAF Forward Public Affairs. Likewise, several critical Manning issues being worked by CENTAF Rear Public
Affairs were unnecessarily delayed because CENTAF Forward Public Affairs was enroute to or from the command section and, thus, unavailable to work the immediate issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The Public Affairs Annex F to operational contingency plans should state that the Air Force component command Public Affairs forward element be colocated with the command section at the deployed location. As command interface is equally as time-consuming as field support, the Air Force component command Public Affairs officer forward needs to maintain availability to respond to both taskings. As media support can be expected to be as high and dramatic as it was in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the requirement for additional space for media staffing/support should also be specified.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 3
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADDITIONAL DUTIES; PROTOCOL ACTIONS

TITLE: ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES TO DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

OBSERVATION: Additional duties, beyond the realm of Public Affairs, were often assigned to deployed Public Affairs personnel during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

DISCUSSION: From the onset of the operation, Public Affairs personnel, both officer and enlisted were repeatedly tasked to perform additional duties for their commanders in the absence of a deployed asset. Personnel served as protocol officers, security police augmentees, administrative specialists and transportation drivers, rather than being utilized in their much needed and officially assigned Public Affairs capacity.

LESSONS LEARNED: Utilization out of the Public Affairs AFSC in which they were trained and deployed degraded the effectiveness of the support Public Affairs personnel could provide to deployed commanders or units. Inadequate staff Manning at the onset was further compounded by the removal of a duly assigned Public Affairs staff member. Credibility of Public Affairs was also impacted when personnel were viewed as not being needed enough in the Public Affairs area that they could perform duties in another unrelated area.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA and MAJCOM/PA war plan annexes must reinforce the necessity for full-time utilization of Public Affairs personnel. The Public Affairs role and its importance to the mission should also be reinforced at Corona Conferences during peacetime, and by the Air Force component commander in the theater of operations.

SUBMITTED BY GROUP 4
CENTAF AFTER-ACTION CONFERENCE REPORT

KEYWORDS: COMMANDER/PUBLIC AFFAIRS INTERFACE; COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

TITLE: COMMANDER/PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELATIONSHIPS DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

OBSERVATION: There were inconsistencies in the relationships between deployed Public Affairs personnel and the commanders they were in the AOR to support.

DISCUSSION: Public Affairs personnel experienced a wide range of relationships with deployed unit commanders during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. While some commanders were supportive and actively involved their Public Affairs staffs in unit mission accomplishment, others treated their staffers as an afterthought and did not fully utilize them or their skills.

LESSONS LEARNED: Many Public Affairs staffs were physically separated from the command section, limiting their visibility with the commander and lessening their value to his mission. The lack of dedicated transportation support to get from the Public Affairs offices to the command facilities compounded the problem. In several other cases, Public Affairs personnel were tasked by their commanders to perform duties as historical photographers, protocol officers and even security police, thus, invalidating their Public Affairs role and their reason for being deployed in the first place.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: SAF/PA, through AFNEWS, should initiate contingency plans that stress the importance of Public Affairs as the commander's primary tool for informing the internal and external publics on the status of his unit's contingency operations. If additional support is needed in such areas as protocol or photography, deployment managers should address individuals with the skills and AFSCs for those areas. The Air
Force component command Public Affairs director should also address this issue early on in message traffic to deploying and deployed unit commanders.
DEPLOYED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL
(Includes All Overseas Locations)

Lt Col Joe Smith............. 190AREFG/PA, Forbes Field KS (ANG)
Lt Col Michael Gallagher...... ESD/PA, Hanscom AFB MA (AFSC)
Lt Col Philip Crowley......... HQ USAFE/PA, Ramstein AF GE (USAFE)
Lt Col Phillip Lacombe........ HQ MAC/PA, Scott AFB IL (MAC)
Lt Col Thomas Sack............ 1TFW/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Lt Col Virginia Pribyla...... AFDTC/PA, Eglin AFB FL (AFSC)
Maj Gary Perugini............. 33TFW/PA, Eglin AFB FL (TAC)
Maj James Pasierb............. HQ PACAF/PA, Hickam AFB HI (PACAF)
Maj Jerry Brown............... 36TFW/PA, Bitburg AB GE (USAFE)
Maj Johnnie Ainsley.......... USAFADWC/PA, Tyndall AFB FL (TAC)
Maj Keith Gillett.............. 375MAW/PA, Scott AFB IL (MAC)
Maj Linda Leong............... 93BMW/PA, Castle AFB CA (SAC)
Maj Louis Tiedemann........... HQ TAC/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Maj Neil Talbott.............. 944TFG/PA, Luke AFB AZ (USAF)
Maj Oscar Seara............... 836AD/PA, Davis-Monthan AFB AZ (TAC)
Maj Thomas Boneparte......... 100AD/PA, Whiteman AFB MO (SAC)
Maj Todd Fruehling............ HQ MAC/PA, Scott AFB IL (MAC)
Capt Barney Welch............. 416BMW/PA, Griffiss AFB NY (SAC)
Capt Brad Schuldt............. HQ 7AD/PA, Ramstein AB GE (SAC)
Capt Christine Queen......... 28AD/PA, Tinker AFB OK (TAC)
Capt Daniel Cullum............. Chanute TTC/PA, Chanute AFB IL (ATC)
Capt Dave Turner.............. 2BMW/PA, Barksdale AFB LA (SAC)
Capt Earl Shellner............ AFNEWS, Kelly AFB TX (AFNEWS)
Capt Gary Carruthers......... 7241ABG/PA, Iraklion AS Crete (USAFE)
Capt Jack Giese.............. SAF/PA, Washington DC (SAF/PA)
Capt James Tynan............... 831AD/PA, George AFB CA (TAC)
Capt Jeffrey Whitted......... AFN Frankfurt GE (AFRTS)
Capt Joe Davis............... 832AD/PA, Luke AFB AZ (TAC)
Capt Joe Stephenson......... 22AREFW/PA, March AFB CA (SAC)
Capt Kevin Baggett............. HQ TAC/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Capt Kevin Krejcarek......... HQ USAFE/PA, Ramstein AF GE (USAFE)
Capt Lance Jay............... 100AD/PA, Whiteman AFB MO (SAC)
Capt Paul Wilson............... 4TFW/PA, Seymour Johnson AFB NC (TAC)
Capt. Ralph Scott ............ 21TFW/PA, Elmendorf AFB AK (PACAF)
Capt. Ray Martell ............. 3AF/PA, RAF Mildenhall UK (USAFE)
Capt. Rebecca Colaw .......... 354TFW/PA, Myrtle Beach AFB SC (TAC)
Capt. Richard Reibeling ...... 314TAW/PA, Little Rock AFB AR (MAC)
Capt. Robert Thompson ...... 366TFW/PA, Mountain Home AFB ID (TAC)
Capt. Sandi Slaven ........... 171AREFW/PA, Pittsburgh PA (ANG)
Capt. Thomas Barth .......... 363TFW/PA, Shaw AFB SC (TAC)
Capt. Thomas LaRock .......... HQ TRANSCOM/PA, Scott AFB IL (TRANSCOM)
Capt. Willis Humiston ....... 66ECW/PA, Sembach AB GE (USAFE)
Lt. Casey Mahon ............. 380BMW/PA, Plattsburgh AFB NY (SAC)
Lt. Douglas Kinneard ......... 834ABW/PA, Hurlburt Field FL (MAC)
Lt. Jennifer Fay .............. 388TFW/PA, Hill AFB UT (TAC)
Lt. Jim Knotts ............... 317TAW/PA, Pope AFB NC (MAC)
Lt. Kelly Ann Dinning ....... 437MAW/PA, Charleston AFB SC (MAC)
Lt. Melissa Watson .......... AFROTC/PA, Maxwell AFB AL (ATC)
Lt. Michele Madden .......... 314TAW/PA, Little Rock AFB AR (MAC)
Lt. Stephen Turner .......... 60MAW/PA, Travis AFB CA (MAC)
Lt. Anne Noland ............ 160AREFG/PA, Rickenbacker ANGB OH (ANG)
Lt. Donald Collins .......... 1TFW/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Lt. Marie Moreilhon ......... 42BMW/PA, Loring AFB ME (SAC)
Sgt. David Smith ............ HQ USAFE/PA, Ramstein AB GE (USAFE)
Sgt. James Chumley .......... 169TFG/PA, McEntire ANGB SC (ANG)
Sgt. Basil Kuzyszyn .......... 435TAW/PA, Rhein Main AB GE (MAC)
Sgt. Fred Spriggs .......... HQ SAC/PA, Offutt AFB NE (SAC)
Sgt. Wilt Baker .............. HQ TAC/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Sgt. Christopher Aune ...... 366TFW/PA, Mountain Home AFB ID (TAC)
Sgt. Dan Luoma .............. 40AD/PA, Malmstrom AFB MT (SAC)
Sgt. Daryl Green ............ 305AREFW/PA, Grissom AFB IN (SAC)
Sgt. Lee Hincher ............ 487TFW/PA, RAF Lakenheath UK (USAFE)
Sgt. Pat Miller .............. 347TFW/PA, Moody AFB GA (TAC)
Sgt. Phillip Stanton ........ AFOPA-MW, Chicago IL (SAF/PA)
Sgt. Rick Fuller ............. 1776ABW/PA, Andrews AFB MD (MAC)
Sgt. Thaddeus Hosley ....... 32TFG/PA, Soesterberg AB GE (USAFE)
Sgt. Thomas Cocchiaro ....... 443MAW/PA, Altus AFB OK (MAC)
Sgt. Dale Warman .......... 1776ABW/PA, Andrews AFB MD (MAC)
TSgt Donald Schmidt....... 4TFW/PA, Seymour Johnson AFB NC (TAC)
TSgt Doug Hamilton....... 62MAW/PA, McChord AFB WA (MAC)
TSgt Fernando Serna....... AFNEWS, Kelly AFB TX (AFNEWS)
TSgt Jack Siebold......... SWC/PA, Ellsworth AFB SD (SAC)
TSgt James Curtis........... 28AD/PA, Tinker AFB OK (TAC)
TSgt Janie Blaney......... 416BMW/PA, Griffiss AFB NY (SAC)
TSgt Larry Reetz.......... 313TAG/PA, RAF Mildenhall UK (MAC)
TSgt Linda Mitchell....... 10TFW/PA, RAF Alconbury UK (USAFE)
TSgt Louis Arana-Barradas. 401TFW/PA, Torrejon AB Spain (USAFE)
TSgt Marvin Kusumoto..... 1TFW/PA, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
TSgt Mike Otis............. 138TFG/PA, Syracuse NY (ANG)
TSgt Richard Corral....... 831AD/PA, George AFB CA (TAC)
TSgt Robert Shelton...... 37TFW/PA, Tonopah Test Range NV (TAC)
TSgt Ronnie Woods......... 836AD/PA, Davis-Monthan AFB AZ (TAC)
TSgt William Dowell....... 5CCG/PA, Robins AFB GA (TAC)
SSgt Andy Glaze........... 4392ASW/PA, Vandenberg AFB CA (SAC)
SSgt Anthony Hearst....... HQ TAC/CSV, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
SSgt Catherine Green...... Lowry TTC/PA, Lowry AFB CO (ATC)
SSgt Davis Beaulieu....... 33TFW/PA, Eglin AFB FL (TAC)
SSgt Dee Ann Heiderscheit. 4TFW/PA, Seymour Johnson AFB NC (TAC)
SSgt Detroit Whiteside... 363TFW/PA, Shaw AFB SC (TAC)
SSgt Gina Kravitz......... 316AD/PA, Ramstein AB GE (USAFE)
SSgt Gordon Honeycutt..... 1606ABW/PA, Kirtland AFB NM (MAC)
SSgt Harold Jones......... 436MAW/PA, Dover AFB DE (MAC)
SSgt Joel Ridenour....... 926TFG/PA, New Orleans NAS LA (AFRES)
SSgt Kelly Godbey......... 9SRW/PA, Beale AFB CA (SAC)
SSgt Lloyd Tilmon.......... 354TFW/PA, Myrtle Beach AFB SC (TAC)
SSgt Mike Daigle......... 157AREFG/PA, Pease AFB NH (ANG)
SSgt Mike Spaits.......... 2BMW/PA, Barksdale AFB LA (SAC)
SSgt Randy Mitchell...... 62MAW/PA, McChord AFB WA (MAC)
SSgt Robert Pease......... 23TFW/PA, England AFB LA (TAC)
SSgt Robert Sexton........ 832AD/PA, Luke AFB AZ (TAC)
SSgt Sarah Hood.......... SAF/PA, Washington DC (SAF/PA)
SSgt Sherrie Hosch........ 20TFW/PA, RAF Upper Heyford UK (USAFE)
SSgt Steve Smith......... 410BMW/PA, K.I. Sawyer AFB MI (SAC)
Sgt Adrian Jones.......... HQ TAC/CSV, Langley AFB VA (TAC)
Sgt Debbie Walke .......... 379BMW/PA, Wurtsmith AFB MI (SAC)
Sgt Eric Boomhower ......... 42AD/PA, Grand Forks AFB ND (SAC)
Sgt Gary Kunich ............. 388TFW/PA, Hill AFB UT (TAC)
Sgt Kenneth Fidler .......... 401TFW/PA, Torrejon AB Spain (USAFE)
Sgt Laurie White ............ 3SSW/PA, Peterson AFB CO (AFSPACECOM)
Sgt Pauline Aldridge ....... AFMTC/PA, Lackland AFB TX (ATC)
Sgt Roy Lake ................. 384BMW/PA, McConnell AFB KS (SAC)
Sgt Troy Prine ............... 48TFW/PA, RAF Lakenheath UK (USAFE)
SrA Ralph Ellis .............. 93BMW/PA, Castle AFB CA (SAC)
A1C Cliff Ulmer ............. 305AREFW/PA, Grissom AFB IN (SAC)
A1C Donald Kusturin ......... US Air Force Academy CO (USAFA)
A1C James Roth .............. 23TFW/PA, England AFB LA (TAC)
A1C John Pavliga ............. 375MAW/PA, Scott AFB IL (MAC)
A1C Karen Green ............ 169TFG/PA, McEntire ANGB SC (ANG)
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* 1Lt Michele Madden  
* 1Lt Marie Moreilhon  
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* 2Lt Donald Collins  
* 2Lt Anne Noland  
CMSgt Bob Crouch  
CMSgt Tony Magaldi  
* CMSgt David Smith  
* SMSgt Wilt Baker  
SMSgt Herm Bell  
* MSgt Thomas Cocchiaro  
* MSgt Daryl Green  
* MSgt Daniel Luoma  
* MSgt Robert Shelton  
MSgt Max Sydow  
* TSgt James Curtis  
* TSgt Gordon Honeycutt  
TSgt Sharon Naimo  
Mr Michael Kinchen  
Mr Joe Kowalczyk  
Mr Art Mathison  

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<td>MSgt Thomas Cocchiaro</td>
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<td>443MAW/PA</td>
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<td>Grissom</td>
<td>305AREFW/PA</td>
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<td>MSgt Daniel Luoma</td>
<td>Malmstrom</td>
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<td>MSgt Robert Shelton</td>
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<td>TSgt James Curtis</td>
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<td>TSgt Gordon Honeycutt</td>
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<td>TSgt Sharon Naimo</td>
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<td>Mr Michael Kinchen</td>
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<td>Mr Joe Kowalczyk</td>
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<td>Mr Art Mathison</td>
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( * = Deployed Overseas)  
(** = IMA)

**Working Groups**

1 = Media Support  
2 = Communications/Communication Products  
3 = Facilities/Equipment/Training  
4 = Manning/Personnel  
5 = Management Issues
GROUP #1

MEDIA SUPPORT DISCUSSION GUIDE

- Media relations/operations
  -- Media use of materials/photos
  -- Size of pools
  -- Numbers/experience levels of escorts
  -- Print/electronic media requirements/needs/demands
  -- Advance notification of media arrivals
  -- Unannounced media show-ups
  -- Defectors/uncontrollables
  -- Security
  -- Credentialling
  -- Communication vehicles available for media use in filing stories
  -- Group vs unilateral attention
  -- Pooled interview opportunities
  -- Media "unit tracking" pros and cons
  -- Crossfeed/problem resolution
  -- Background briefs

- JIBS
  -- Setup/effectiveness
  -- Pro-active story marketing by the JIBs
    --- Successes/failures
    --- Selling sexy, unsexy weapons systems
  -- In-country airlift/"orientation" flights
-Leaks by family members
  -- "How to handle media" training
  -- Do's and don’ts training
- Media Training for AOR/service/unit spokespersons
- Open/closed bases
  -- RON restrictions
  -- Host country policies/sensitivities
- Base media centers
  -- Billeting/transportation/messing/equipment for media
  -- Hometown news media visits
    --- Problems/solutions stateside
    --- Logistics
    --- Space A availability/dedicated space
    --- Approval/coordination processes
- Classification/clearance difficulties/conflicts
  -- Release "policies"/actualities
  -- Coordination/approval requirements/procedures
    -- DOD; SAF/PA, CENTCOM, CENTAF (Forward and Rear) home
      unit release problems
  -- Casualty/POW notification
GROUP #2

COMMUNICATIONS/COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS DISCUSSION GUIDE

- Inter-theater among deployed PAs
- Between deployed/stateside unit PAs
- Between PAs at JIBs and units; CENTCOM, CENTAF, up and down chain of command
- Between deployed PAs and stateside headquarters PAs
- Between newly arrived PAs, CENTAF, CENTCOM
- Between deployed PAs and commanders
- Between deployed PAs/other staff agencies
- Between deployed commanders and troops
  -- Types/effectiveness of print/broadcast products
  -- Attempts at rumor control/morale maintenance
  -- "Face to face"/commanders calls
- CENTAF/PA assistance
  -- Do's and don'tsprinted or verbal
  -- Information exchanges/crossfeed
  -- Guidelines/guidance
  -- Nurturing/training
- Public Affairs guidance
  -- Sources
  -- Timeliness
  -- Complexity
  -- Relevance
  -- Consistency
AFRTS

-- Logistics in establishing at deployed sites
-- Successes and failures
-- TV/radio broadcast capabilities/costs/availability
-- Impact of host-country on ability of AFRTS to perform its role

DESERT DEFENDER

-- Stateside unit support
-- Staffing
-- Editorial input
-- Distribution
-- Effectiveness
-- Alternatives

AFNS/CENTCOM news service

-- Effectiveness/timeliness

Stars and Stripes

-- Usage of AOR-generated releases
-- Report identification
    --- Civilian/military
    --- Geneva Convention/ID cards
-- Distribution

CENTAF/PA Digest

Electronic mail

-- Availability
-- Usage in theater/to CONUS and back
-- Effectiveness
-- Alternatives
- Combat Camera
  -- Organization
  -- Support of PA requirements
  -- Relationships with PA, other staff, media
  -- Timeliness
- Reports/debriefs
  -- Historical documentation
  -- Rotating personnel debriefs
GROUP #3

FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT/TRAINING DISCUSSION GUIDE

- State of readiness/flexibility for deployment
- Bare base PA set-ups
  -- Problems/resolutions
  -- Communicating shortages
  -- Ability/inability to procure items, CONUS and AOR
  -- Re-stocking, re-supply
- PACKs
  -- Stateside preparation/support
  -- Future standardization, Air Force-wide
  -- Make-up
  -- Shipping/locating in AOR
- Telecommunications facilities/access (E-mail/fax/message)
- Equipment needs/shortfalls
  -- Other staff agency support
  -- Commander support
- Billeting
  -- Proximity to visiting media
- "Office" space
  -- Adequacy/inadequacy
  -- Proximity/access to commander
- Vehicle/transportation support
- Film processing capabilities
  -- In-country support/availability
- Advance training for deployment
  -- Media pool operations
  -- Understanding of responsibilities/"job descriptions"
  -- Chain of command understanding
  -- DINFOS
  -- Media training for key spokespersons
  -- Contingency operations
  -- Joint operations (PA emphasis)
  -- CENTAF PA Plan, Annex F

- Training in-theater
  -- CENTAF/PA interface
  -- Guidance/direction
  -- PA crossfeed
GROUP #4

MANNING/PERSONNEL DISCUSSION GUIDE

- PA deployment and unit integrity
- Manning shortfalls/excesses
- Communicating manning needs
  -- Procedures
  -- Successes/failures
- Stateside backfill
  -- Air Force "active duty first" policy
  -- IMA utilization
- Active Duty/Guard/Reserve PA relationships
  -- Air Reserve technician support
- Rank/experience levels in AOR
- PAs in the management structure
  -- Roles and relationships
  -- Additional duties
  -- Commander support/PA credibility
- Future deployment PA personnel in packages
  -- Photographer/videographer
  -- Admin support
  -- Protocol office
  -- Intel support
- Communication of personnel policies affecting deployed personnel
- PA family support relationships
- PA backup support for media pools, VIP delegations
- JIB/CENTAF/CENTCOM PA assignments
  -- Experience/rank levels
  -- Functions
  -- Rotations
  -- Escort duties
- Stateside PA workloads
  -- Reserve/Guard augmentation
  -- Work hours/procedures
  -- Battle Staff responsibilities/relationships
- PA time apportionment
  -- PA functions
    --- Internal
    --- Press relations
    --- Non-PA additional duties
    --- Community relations
GROUP #5

MANAGEMENT ISSUES DISCUSSION GUIDE

- PA/commander/commander's staff relationships
  -- Physical PA/commander proximity
  -- Rank disparity considerations
  -- Interpersonal communications
  -- Admin/vehicle support
  -- Additional duty levies
    --- Protocol
    --- Administrative functions
    --- Photography
    --- Historical documentation
    --- Briefing preparation

- Guidance development/coordination/dissemination
  -- Annex F, CENTAF Plan
  -- Conflicting PAGs
  -- Delayed PAGs/timeliness
  -- Guidance voids

- Chains of command

- PAG responsibilities
  -- OASD, SAF/PA, CENTAF Rear, CENTAF Forward, CENTCOM

- Jointness/standardized jargon/procedures
  -- Other services PA doctrine/methods of operation
  -- Utilization/employment of officers and NCOs
  -- Impact on Air Force PAs in getting the job done
- Deployment of PA personnel
  -- Selection processes
    --- Rank, levels of experience
    --- Unit/PA integrity
  -- Rotations
  -- Misassignment
  -- PA training/preparation
  -- Successes/failures
  -- Rapid deployment PA team concept
  -- Additional staffing needs to support PA/media
    --- Admin
    --- Photographers (still and video)
    --- Historians
    --- Intel
- Clearance/Security Review
  -- Withholding release of information already in the media
  -- Stateside PA/commander restraints
  -- Family members as news sources
  -- Conflicting policies
    --- Over control
    --- Approval levels
    --- Time delays
  -- PA media image
- Mobilization Contingency Funds
  -- Development/maintenance/staging of PACKs
  -- Equipment purchase/repair in AOR
-- In-country film processing/photo support
-- Dedicated fax capability

- Command PA/Relationships
  -- Stateside
  -- In-theater
  -- Between stateside commands/CENTAF Forward, CENTCOM
  -- CENTAF Rear, SAF/PA, OASD/PA, MAJCOMs, SOAs

- Combat Camera Operation
  -- Pre-deployment/deployment
  -- Clearances/release authority
  --- Timeliness
  --- Products (video/still)
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SUBJ: CENTAF ANNEX F (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO DESERT SHIELD OPORD

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE APPROVED CENTAF/PA ANNEX F IN SUPPORT OF CENTCOM'S ANNEX F TO THE DESERT SHIELD OPORD. THIS ANNEX INCLUDES INVALUABLE INFORMATION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS, PREPARATION, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, ETC. ALTHOUGH NOT EVERY AIR FORCE UNIT WILL BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN DESERT SHIELD, ALL AIR FORCE PA'S WORLDWIDE ARE PART OF THE TEAM, AND IF DESERT SHIELD EXTENDS INDEFINITELY, WILL LIKELY ASSUME A ROLE EITHER IN THE AOR OR IN SUPPORT OF CENTAF/CENTCOM (REAR). RECOMMEND YOU RETRANSMIT TO ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS.

2. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL DEPLOYING PA'S, WHETHER ACTIVE OR RESERVE COMPONENT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT UPON DEPLOYMENT, THEY BECOME CENTAF RESOURCES AND THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND IS FROM THEIR WING COMMANDER IN THE AOR TO CENTAF, TO CENTCOM, TO JCS.
MAJCOM'S, NGB, AFRES, AIR STAFF, ETC., ARE NO LONGER PART OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. THEY ORGANIZE, TRAIN AND EQUIP, BUT THE CENTAF COMMANDER (LT GEN HORNER) HAS OPERATIONAL CONTROL. CENTAF REAR/PA AT LANGLEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING ALL TASKINGS AND SOURCINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE PLAN.

3. QUESTIONS ON THE PLAN, ITS APPLICABILITY, OR CHANGES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO CENTAF REAR/PA, MSGT BELL, DSN 574-7019. QUOTE:

1. SITUATION:
   A. SEE CENTCOM ANNEX F TO DESERT SHELTER OPORD (TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)
   B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF EVERY MILITARY OPERATION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANNEX IS TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROVIDE POLICY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONS GOVERNED BY THIS PLAN.

2. MISSION STATEMENT:
   A. PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE CENTRAL AIR FORCES COMMANDER, HIS SENIOR STAFF AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS.
   B. AUGMENT AND SUPPORT PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING OPERATION
DESERt SHIELD AS DIRECTED BY U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND.
   C. TO FOSTER AND ENHANCE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF
      OPERATIONS CONDUCTED DURING DESERT SHIELD BY PROVIDING THE
      PUBLIC AND PARTICIPATING FORCES FACTUAL INFORMATION.
   D. ESTABLISH AND MANAGE AN INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM.
   E. ASSIST NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMRS) IN THEIR
      COVERAGE OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD ACTIVITIES.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:
   A. UNLESS DELEGATED USCENTCOM WILL RETAIN PUBLIC RELEASE
      AUTHORITY FOR ALL INFORMATION WITHIN THE AOR.
   B. CENTAF WILL DELEGATE CLEARANCE AUTHORITY FOR INTERNAL
      RELEASES TO DEPLOYED PA'S.
   C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES WILL BE AS AUTHORIZED AND
      DIRECTED BY ASD/PA AND CARRIED OUT BY THE USCENTCOM/CCPA0; THE
      DIRECTOR, JPA0; AND SUBORDINATE COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
      OFFICERS. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING, COORDINATING, AND
      DIRECTING MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES WILL REMAIN WITH
      USCENTCOM/PA IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH CENTAF/PA; AND
      APPROPRIATE TASK FORCE AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.
   D. ALL DEPLOYED UNITS WILL COORDINATE ALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ACTIVITIES WITH CENTAF/PA (FWD). ALL OTHERS WILL COORDINATE WITH CENTAF/PA (REAR). INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR RELEASE BY UNITS NOT IN THE AOR BUT WHICH MAY IMPACT UPON OPERATIONS IN THE AOR WILL BE COORDINATED WITH CENTAF/PA (FWD) THROUGH CENTAF/PA (REAR).

4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
   A. GENERAL:
   (1) OASD/PA PROVIDES OVERALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY AND GUIDANCE AND WILL MANAGE THE MEDIA RELATIONS PROGRAM IN THE CONUS.
   (2) USCENTCOM/CCPA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MEDIA RELATIONS PROGRAMS IN THE AOR. THE SECONDARY MISSION IS TO MANAGE THE INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
   (3) CENTAF/PA (FWD) WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING AND MANAGING THEIR AOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS, SUPPORTING THE AIR FORCE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM (AFNEWS, KELLY AFB TX. 78241-5000), AND FOR COORDINATING CENTCOM-DIRECTED MEDIA SUPPORT WITH THE UNITS IN THE AOR.
(4) CENTAF/PA (REAR) WILL SUPPORT CENTAF/PA (FWD) AS DIRECTED. THEY WILL DEVELOP AND MANAGE AN INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM FOR REAR FORCES AND SUPPORT THE AIR FORCE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM. THROUGH THE CENTAF REAR BATTLE STAFF PROVIDE 24-HOUR SUPPORT TO CENTAF/PA (FWD) AND DEPLOYED UNITS. BASED ON CENTAF/PA (FWD) REQUIREMENTS, TASK MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT FROM CONUS SUPPORTING COMMANDS. PROPOSE AND DISSEMINATE CLEARED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY CENTAF/PA (FWD). COORDINATE CENTAF RELATED MEDIA AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIONS WITH CENTAF/PA (FWD).

(5) SUPPORTING COMMANDS WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE THEIR COMMAND INTERNAL INFORMATION, MEDIA AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS IN PLACE.

(6) DEPLOYED UNIT PAOS WILL DEVELOP, IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE AN AGGRESSIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM AND WILL SUPPORT COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND MEDIA REQUIREMENTS AS DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

(7) SEE APPENDIX A TO THIS PLAN FOR MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS OUTLINED IN THIS PLAN.

(8) SEE APPENDIX B TO THIS PLAN FOR EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS OUTLINED IN THIS PLAN.

(9) SEE APPENDIX C TO THIS PLAN FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPLOYMENT CHECKLISTS ASSOCIATED WITH TASKS OUTLINED IN THIS PLAN.

B. SPECIFIC:

(1) FULL, FACTUAL, AND TIMELY INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED BOTH TO INTERNAL AUDIENCES AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC NEWS MEDIA CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AND/OR OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS BY ALL ORGANIZATIONS. THE RULES OF OPSEC AND COMSEC WILL BE FOLLOWED.

(2) EACH DEPLOYED UNIT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY WITH A MINIMUM OF ONE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ONE ENLISTED. AFTER ARRIVAL IN THE AOR, ADDITIONAL MANPOWER MAY BE REQUESTED THROUGH PERSONNEL CHANNELS. SPECIFIC TASKINGS WILL BE SOURCED VIA THE CENTAF TPFDD.

(3) EACH DEPLOYING INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT AVIATION UNIT (ACTIVE COMPONENT, AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AIR FORCE RESERVE) WILL BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY WITH SUFFICIENT ORGANIC PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSETS (PER PARAGRAPH 2) TO SUPPORT THE DEPLOYED COMMANDER.
(4) CENTAF/PA (FWD) WILL MANAGE THE DISTRIBUTION OF IN-THEATER PA RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

(5) PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS) SHOULD BE COORDINATED TO ACHIEVE COMMAND OBJECTIVES.

(6) SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS MAY CONDUCT NEWS CONFERENCES AT SUSTAINMENT BASES WITH APPROVAL OF THEIR MAJCOM. SENIOR COMMANDERS AT DEPLOYED LOCATIONS MAY CONDUCT NEWS CONFERENCES WITH APPROVAL OF CENTCOM/CCPA.

5. TASKINGS:

A. ALL AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING THIS OPERATION WILL:

(1) IDENTIFY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT NEEDS AND COORDINATE AS TASKED BY CENTAF BATTLE STAFF.

(2) ENSURE THAT ALL AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESOURCES ENTERING THE AOR CONTACT CENTAF/PA (FWD).

(3) PUBLICIZE DESERT SHIELD ACTIVITIES THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE INTERNAL INFORMATION CHANNELS.

(4) PREPARE, COORDINATE (PER CURRENT GUIDANCE), AND SUBMIT MATERIALS FOR USE IN AIR FORCE INTERNAL PRODUCTS TO
CENTAF/PA (REAR) AND SUPPORT AIR FORCE INTERNAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.

(5) DISSEMINATE CLEARED NEWS, PHOTO, RADIO AND TELEVISION RELEASES TO THEIR SUBORDINATE UNITS.
(6) ASSIST NMRS AS NECESSARY.
(7) SUBMIT NMR TRAVEL REQUESTS TO CENTCOM FOR COORDINATION AND APPROVAL. PROVIDE INFO COPY TO CENTAF/PA (FWD) CENTAF/PA (REAR), SAF/PAT AND MAC/PA, AND ALL UNITS INVOLVED INCLUDING ANY DESTINATIONS OR STOPS IN THE AOR. (GUIDANCE HAS BEEN ISSUED SEPARATELY.)

B. CENTAF/PA (FWD) WILL:
(1) IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE AN AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM AS DIRECTED BY THE CENTAF COMMANDER, BASED ON GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY USCENTCOM OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.
(2) SUPPORT ALL CENTCOM DIRECTED TASKINGS.
(3) ESTABLISH AND MANAGE THE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM.
(4) ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR THE CLEARANCE AND RELEASE OF ALL INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR RELEASE THROUGH BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRODUCTS.
(5) Determine feasibility of NMR requests to enter AOR.

(6) Develop procedures for CENTCOM/PA media requirements and to support the Air Force Internal Information Program. At the beginning of hostilities, execute the procedures developed.

(7) Establish procedures for review and approval of information that can be used by home station commanders and in Air Force internal information programs to keep families and local communities aware of the activities of the deployed units, as well as the purpose behind the unit deployment.

(8) Review the extent of public affairs support at each deployment location. Validate manpower and support requirements needed to conduct the public affairs program in the AOR.

(9) Review and verify arrangements for distribution of English-language newspapers.

(10) Provide support as needed to deployed PA personnel to include the coordination of higher headquarters instructions and established media ground rules.
(11) PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES, CUSTOMS, MONETARY SYSTEM, LIVING CONDITIONS, AND OTHER INFORMATION APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF INTERNAL PRODUCTS IN THE AOR AND THROUGH CENTAF/PA (REAR).

(12) ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO EVALUATE THE AOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS, TO INCLUDE REPORTING PROCEDURES, STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS, SURGE MANPOWER AUGMENTATION, ETC.

C. CENTAF/PA (REAR) WILL:

(1) BASED ON VALIDATED DEPLOYED UNIT PA REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFY AND EXPEDITE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IN SUPPORT OF THIS PLAN.

(2) OBTAIN FROM CENTAF/PA (FWD) AND DISTRIBUTE CLEARED PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS SUPPLEMENTAL TO THIS PLAN.

(3) DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT AN AGGRESSIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF THE VARIOUS INTERNAL PUBLICS. PUBLICIZE DESERT SHIELD ACTIVITIES THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE INTERNAL INFORMATION CHANNELS.

(4) COORDINATE ALL REQUESTS FOR AAVS PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT.

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(5) Assist CENTAF/PA (FWD) with NMR travel requests and arrange escorts as necessary.

(6) Accept queries from PA offices and civilian news media, and coordinate responses with appropriate authorities.

(7) Assist NMRS as necessary.

(8) Prepare, publish, and distribute a weekly newspaper to all deployed units, supporting commands, etc. This product should contain information designed to inform deployed Air Force personnel concerning CENTAF/CC command objectives.

(9) Publish a monthly CENTAF/PA news digest containing public affairs command interest initiatives, and cross feed information.

(10) Publish a periodic CENTAF news service containing news and feature stories received from deployed public affairs units.

(11) Maintain a record of releases and responses to queries.

(12) Assist coordination of news courier service in support of DoD media pool as appropriate.

D. Public Affairs personnel deploying in support of units
WILL:

(1) BE ASSIGNED AND REPORT TO THE SENIOR INSTALLATION COMMANDER REGARDLESS OF THEIR MAJOR COMMAND AFFILIATION. ALL AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL RESOURCES AT ONE LOCATION WILL OPERATE AS A CONSOLIDATED STAFF.

(2) IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE AN AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM AS DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR INSTALLATION COMMANDER, BASED ON GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY CENTAF/PA (FWD) OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.

(3) CLOSELY MONITOR AND FOLLOW PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

(4) UPON ARRIVAL AT THE DEPLOYED LOCATION, CONTACT CENTAF/PA (FWD). DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS NEEDS AT THE SITE, DETERMINE MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND FORWARD REQUEST THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.

(5) DISCUSS PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES WITH THE SENIOR Deployed Commander, Advising of News Media Interest and Procedures to be Followed in the Event of an Accident or Incident. Keep the Commander Informed of All Public Affairs Activity Throughout the Operation.

(6) ESTABLISH LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER
DEPLOYED UNIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS, AS NECESSARY.

(7) CONTACT CENTAF/PA (FWD) PERIODICALLY.

(8) DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT AN AGGRESSIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAM AT THE DEPLOYED LOCATION TO INCLUDE:

   (A) PREPARING A PERIODIC NEWSLETTER TO INFORM PERSONNEL OF THE STATUS OF THE OPERATION, TO GIVE THEM NEWS FROM HOME STATIONS AND TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE UNIT COMMANDER. ALL AOR NEWSLETTERS WILL BE MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

   (B) FORWARDING COPIES OF PERIODIC NEWSLETTER TO CENTAF/PA (FWD), CENTAF/PA (REAR), HOME STATIONS OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL AND ALL SUPPORTING MAJCOMS AT DEPLOYED LOCATIONS WEEKLY.

   (C) VERIFYING THE AVAILABILITY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND HOME STATION NEWSPAPERS. REPORT DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS TO CENTAF/PA (FWD) OR HOME STATION AS REQUIRED.

   (D) DEVELOPING AND FORWARDING TO CENTAF/PA (FWD) AND CENTAF/PA (REAR) LOCATION-SPECIFIC PRESS KIT INFORMATION, BY APO.

(9) IF HOST NATION ALLOWS, ESCORT AND ASSIST NMRS IN
THEIR COVERAGE OF THE OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED CENTCOM NMR GROUND RULES TO INCLUDE THE SUPPORT OF CENTAF/PA (REAR)-COORDINATED NMR VISITS AND CENTCOM/PA REQUIRED SUPPORT.

(10) DEVELOP AND DISPATCH INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC UNIT ACTIVITIES UPON REQUEST IAW GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THIS PLAN AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

(11) IN COORDINATION WITH CENTAF/PA (FWD) AND WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS ESTABLISHED BY THE HOST COUNTRY, CONDUCT LOCAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS EVENTS.

(12) RESPOND TO ANY ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT INVOLVING DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL. COORDINATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITY WITH CENTAF/PA (FWD).

(13) FOLLOW PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY CENTCOM AND CENTAF FOR SECURITY REVIEW, CLEARANCE AND PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION, TO INCLUDE STORIES, PHOTOGRAPHS, FILM AND VIDEOTAPE.

(14) DEVELOP A LOCAL PLAN TO IMPLEMENT ACTIONS DIRECTED IN THIS OPORD.
DESKET SHIELD APPENDIX A - MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

PART A: ASSUMPTIONS

1. WHILE MAJCOMS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN DESERT SHIELD ARE PRIMARY PLAYERS, THE ENTIRE AIR FORCE PA COMMUNITY WILL BE INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION.

2. MAJCOMS WHICH ARE PRIMARY SOURCES FOR DESERT SHIELD SUPPORT (MAC, SAC, TAC, USAFE AND PACAF) WILL NOT BE TASKED TO SUPPORT OTHER JCS OPERATIONS (JTF-BRAVO, ETC.) FOR THE DURATION OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

3. WITHIN LEGAL CONSTRAINTS, RESERVE FORCES (USAFR & ANG) WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED A SOURCE OF PA SUPPORT.

4. REMAINING SENSITIVE TO THE IN-THEATER ENVIRONMENT, OVERALL DEPLOYMENT POLICY WILL BE BASED UPON A "GENDER NEUTRAL" POLICY.

5. MAJCOMS MUST MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE, CONTINUING PA MISSION OUTSIDE THE AOR, BOTH AT HQ MAJCOM AND ITS SUBORDINATE BASES.

6. MAJCOMS MUST ALSO MAINTAIN SOME CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO OTHER WORLD EVENTS IN ADDITION TO THE SWA AOR.

7. SUSTAINMENT OF DESERT SHIELD THROUGH SEVERAL ROTATION CYCLES WILL LIKELY EXCEED THE CAREER FIELD'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED TASKINGS FOR IN-PLACE ASSETS AND "SURGE CAPABILITY."

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7. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITY, IF ANY, IS UNPREDICTED AT THIS TIME.
8. THE AIR FORCE WILL NOT TRANSITION TO A PCS OPERATIONAL FOOTING FOR DESERT SHIELD BUT, RATHER, REMAIN ON A TDY SCHEDULE.
9. THE "MAJCOM MIX" SUPPORTING CENTCOM/PA FORWARD, CENTAF/PA FORWARD, OPERATIONAL SITES, ETC., WILL CHANGE FROM ROTATION TO ROTATION. THE MIX WILL BE TIED TO WHICH MAJCOMS ARE MOST TASKED FOR AOR SITE OPERATIONS; MAJCOMS WITH FEWER SITE TASKINGS WILL CARRY A GREATER NON-SITE TASKING.
10. ADDITIONAL MANNING SHOULD BE "PULLED" SELECTIVELY INTO THE AOR RATHER THAN "PUSHED" AUTOMATICALLY FROM OUTSIDE.

PART B: AOR SITE MANNING
(SUSTAINMENT PHASE)

1. IN GENERAL, THE SENIOR PA MEMBER WILL BE PROVIDED FROM THE AVIATION PACKAGE. THE JUNIOR PA MEMBER WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE BASE WHICH DEPLOYS THE COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENT.
2. THIS PROCEDURE MAY BE REVERSED, IF NECESSARY, IN CERTAIN CASES INVOLVING RESERVE FORCES.
3. FOR LARGER OPERATIONS WHICH CONSIST OF AVIATION PACKAGES FROM DIFFERENT LOCATIONS, PA ASSETS MAY BE TASKED FROM EACH SUPPORTING WING BASE.
4. AS NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL MANNING WILL BE TASKED FOR SOURCING
   BY OTHER MAJCOMS (ATC, ESC, AFLC, AFSC, ETC.)

PART C: CENTAF/PA FORWARD

(MANNING, PRE-HOSTILITY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>TAC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>TAC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>ATC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART D: CENTAF/PA REAR

(MANNING, PRE-HOSTILITY)

DESSERT DEFENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-4/E-6</td>
<td>MAC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4/E-6</td>
<td>SAC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4/E-7</td>
<td>TAC (IN-PLACE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4/E-6</td>
<td>AIR FORCE RESOURCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: FOUR OTHER ASSETS FOR CENTAF/PA (REAR) AUGMENTATION TO BE SOURCED FROM AIR FORCE ASSETS.

PART E: CENTAF/PA FORWARD

(TRANS-HOSTILITY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>TAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>MAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART F: ADDITIONAL MANNING REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYED UNITS.

(TRANS-HOSTILITY)

- 354TFW (DEPLOYED)........1 PAO......MAC
- 37TFW (DEPLOYED)........1 PAO......TAC
- 1TFW (DEPLOYED)..........1 PAO......TAC
- 33TFW (DEPLOYED)..........1 PAO......PACAF
- 314TAW (DEPLOYED)........1 PANO......MAC
- 2BMW (DEPLOYED)..........1 PAO......SAC
- 416BMW (DEPLOYED)........1 PAO......SAC
- 94TAW (DEPLOYED)..........1 PAO......MAC
- 401TFW (DEPLOYED)........1 PAO......USAF

(NOTE: DESIGNATION OF DEPLOYED UNITS IS USED TO INDICATE AOR)
LOCATIONS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS, RATHER THAN SPECIFIC WINGS.)

PART G: CASUALTY/EMERGENCY REPLACEMENT
(TRANS-HOSTILITY)

1. WHEN NECESSARY, CENTAF/PA FORWARD WILL BACK-FILL CASUALTIES AT
SITES USING ASSETS AVAILABLE AT CENTAF FORWARD AND ELSEWHERE
IN-THEATER.

2. AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, CENTAF/PA REAR WILL "PIPELINE"
REPLACEMENTS TO CENTAF/PA FORWARD BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS Route
POSSIBLE -- EITHER DIRECT FROM HOME STATION OR THROUGH A POE.

DESERT SHIELD APPENDIX B - EQUIPMENT KIT

THE FOLLOWING LIST INDICATES ITEMS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PA
EQUIPMENT KITS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.
ASTERISKED * ITEMS SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE MAIN PA
CONTINGENCY KIT AND HANDCARRIED BY DEPLOYING PA PERSONNEL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* ALUMINUM, CUSHIONED ANVIL CASE WITH HAND GRIP TO CONTAIN HAND-CARRIED PA SUPPLIES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINER SUCH AS A NESTING BOX (115-00-820-4896)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD DESK (CAN ALSO SERVE AS SUPPLY STORAGE CONTAINER)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(7110-00-267-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* PORTABLE, BATTERY-POWERED TAPE RECORDER WITH AC ADAPTER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35mm SLR CAMERA WITH NORMAL LENS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* PORTABLE MICROCOMPUTER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* EXTERNAL DISK DRIVE FOR MICROCOMPUTER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* PORTABLE PRINTER FOR MICROCOMPUTER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTRA RIBBON FOR MICROCOMPUTER PRINTER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTABLE RADIO WITH SHORT-WAVE BAND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOL KIT WITH PLIERS, HAMMER, SCREW DRIVERS, ADJUSTABLE WRENCH, NAILS, NUTS, BOLTS, WIRE, STRING, DUCT TAPE, AND ELECTRICAL TAPE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE ANSWERING MACHINE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY DUTY EXTENSION CORD (10-FOOT MINIMUM)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* AUDIO CASSETTE TAPES (C-60/90)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HAND-CARRY FOUR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* FILE FOLDERS (HAND-CARRY 10)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* SURGE PROTECTOR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* SWISS ARMY KNIFE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORDION FILES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* FLASHLIGHT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Batteries for all battery-powered equipment (hand-carry enough to support hand-carried battery-powered equipment)

- Ball point pens
- Number 2 pencils
- Pencil sharpener
- Erasers
- Three-ring binders for publications
- Bond paper (8 1/2 x 11) (hand-carry one ream)
- Carbon manifold paper
- Envelopes (9 x 12)
- Envelopes (business; 4 x 9 1/2)
- Disks for microcomputers (formatted)
- Program disks (basic operating system) plus spellchecker, wordprocessing) and backup copy
- Correction tape or whiteout
- Blank file labels
- Felt tip markers (highlighters)
- Glue sticks or rubber cement
- Headline transfer kit

UNCLASSIFIED
MASKING TAPE
* PAPER CLIPS
THUMB TACKS
PICA RULE
PROPORTIONAL WHEEL (PROJECTION SCALE)
* 18-INCH RULER
RULED WRITING TABLETS
* SCISSORS
CLEAR TAPE WITH DISPENSER
SINGLE-EDGE RAZOR BLADES
* STENO PADS (HAND-CARRY 1)
STRAPPING TAPE
COMPUTER PRINTER PAPER
AFR 190-1 (AS SUPPLEMENTED)
AFR 10-4
USAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF DIRECTORY
DICTIONARY
THESAURUS
ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK (CURRENT EDITION)
CALENDAR WITH JULIAN DATES
UNCLASSIFIED

PA ANEXES OF APPLICABLE OPLANS
ZIP-LOCK BAGGIES
NEWS RELEASE LETTERHEAD
DD FORM 2266, HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE DATA
DEPLOYING WEAPON SYSTEM FACT SHEET
KEY PERSONNEL BIOGRAPHIES (AS APPLICABLE)
HOLE PUNCH (HAND-HELD OR DESK TOP)
ASSORTED RUBBER STAMPS (FOUO, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, DATE)
STAMP PAD AND INK
DEsert SHIELD APPENDIX C - DEPLOYMENT PA CHECKLISTS

PART A: PA OFFICER/ENLISTED PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST

1. UPON NOTIFICATION OF UPCOMING DEPLOYMENT, ENSURE PERSONAL NEEDS (E.G., EMERGENCY DATA CARD, WILLS, POWER OF ATTORNEY, ETC.) ARE ATTENDED TO.

2. OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON NECESSARY PERSONAL PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS FROM MOBILITY RESOURCE CENTER (MRC) AND PERSONNEL CONTROL CENTER (PCC).

3. VERIFY CURRENCY IN WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING, MEDICAL INOCULATIONS, ETC.

4. DETERMINE WHO YOU WILL BE REPLACING IN COUNTRY AND WHETHER

UNCLASSIFIED
THERE WILL BE OVERLAP ON YOUR ASSIGNMENT.

5. FROM MAJCOM/PAR OBTAIN SUGGESTIONS ON PERSONAL ITEMS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED OR ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY AT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE.

6. DETERMINE OPERATIONAL ASSETS AT DEPLOYMENT SITE AND FAMILIARIZE YOURSELF WITH THESE ASSETS VIA AIR FORCE FACT SHEETS (E.G., WEAPON SYSTEMS) AND MAJCOM FACT SHEETS (E.G., DEPLOYING UNIT YOU WILL BE SUPPORTING).

7. DETERMINE PA TEAM MEMBERS, EITHER DEPLOYING IN THE SAME CYCLE OR EXPECTED TO BE IN COUNTRY, AT YOUR DEPLOYMENT SITE. (INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED FROM MAJCOM/PAR.) IF ROTATING IN SAME CYCLE WITH YOU, CONSIDER ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THEM PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

8. ENSURE “FLY-AWAY KIT” IS PACKED WITH THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES PER APPENDIX C TO CENTAF ANNEX F, DESERT SHIELD OPORD.

9. THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU’RE GOING TO DO AND NEED IN THE AOR BEFORE YOU DEPART HOME STATION. DEVELOP YOUR OWN GAMEPLAN AND COMPILe APPROPRIATE REFERENCE MATERIAL, I.E., REGULATIONS, PLANS, ETC., TO ASSIST YOU AT YOUR DEPLOYMENT SITE. BEGIN DEVELOPING A PRESS KIT FOR YOUR LOCATION.

10. WITHIN 48 HOURS OF DEPARTURE, CONTACT CENTAF/PA REAR (BATTLE
STAFF/PA DSN 574-7530) FOR UPDATES ON SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR REQUIREMENTS.

11. REVIEW UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS BACKGROUND NOTES ON DEPLOYMENT COUNTRY TO ASCERTAIN HOST COUNTRY SENSITIVITIES AND TO BETTER UNDERSTAND CULTURAL CONDITIONS AT THE SITE.

12. IF TIME ALLOWS, COMPLETE CURRENT PA PROJECTS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. IF NOT, TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONGOING PROJECTS TO HOME-STATION PA STAFF. ENSURE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS TO EASE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY.

13. ALWAYS OBSERVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) CONSIDERATIONS. DO NOT DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON UNSECURE LINES.

PART B: ON ARRIVAL AT DEPLOYMENT SITE

1. CONTACT PERSONNEL CENTER FOR INPROCESSING ACTIONS.
2. IF THERE IS OVERLAP WITH PREVIOUSLY Assigned PA PERSONNEL, DISCUSS STATUS OF PA OPERATIONS AND ISSUES/PRIORITIES AT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE.
3. MEET WITH SENIOR DEPLOYED COMMANDER AND DISCUSS HIS AGENDA AND HOW BEST YOU CAN SUPPORT HIS MISSION.
4. Determine chain of command and establish contact with members of the key staff, e.g., DO, LG, SP, JA, PSYOPS, etc.

5. Contact CENTAF/PA forward to inform of arrival.

6. Determine any additional requirements or taskings required by CENTAF/PA forward and reconfirm rules of engagement for PA.

7. Check with TMO to see if any additional PA equipment has accompanied your deployment or arrived during the same time period. (Continue this periodic check throughout tour of duty in AOR.)

8. Inventory/evaluate in-place equipment/supplies. If there are shortfalls, relay this information to CENTAF/PA forward.

9. Acquaint yourself with other staff agencies and points of contact to best accomplish the mission.

10. Familiarize yourself with deployed site PSYOPS and civic actions plans to determine their inter-relationship with PA activities.

11. Review PA continuity file to obtain an overview of daily operations at the deployment site.

In-country PA checklists

Part A: CENTAF/PA Forward Officer/Enlisted
1. PROVIDE IN-BRIEF TO NEWLY ARRIVED PA ASSETS OUTLINING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, STATUS OF THE PA OFFICES TO WHICH PA PERSONNEL ARE BEING ASSIGNED. (MAY BE DONE IN PERSON, IF POSSIBLE, OR BY MESSAGE OR TELEPHONE.)

2. PROVIDE NEWLY ARRIVED PA PERSONNEL WITH A COPY OF THE IN-COUNTRY TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF CENTAF/PA FORWARD AND OTHER PA OFFICES.

3. FOR ONGOING REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF CENTAF FORWARD, REFER TO PARAGRAPH 5C 1-10 OF CENTAF ANNEX F TO DESERT SHIELD OPORD.

PART B: DEPLOYED PA OFFICER/ENLISTED CHECKLIST

1. MAINTAIN DAILY CONTACT WITH SENIOR DEPLOYED COMMANDER (OR AT LEAST AS FREQUENTLY AS HE IS AVAILABLE.)

2. MAINTAIN AN ONGOING CONTINUITY FILE OF PA OPERATIONS AT YOUR DEPLOYMENT SITE.

3. MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT EVENT LOG HIGHLIGHTING MAJOR ACTIVITIES, ISSUES, ETC.

4. ENSURE A NEWSLETTER IS PREPARED. FORWARD COPIES TO CENTAF/PA REAR AND ALL SUPPORTING MAJCOMS AT DEPLOYED LOCATION WEEKLY.

5. MAINTAIN CONTACT THREE TIMES WEEKLY PREFERABLY TELEPHONICALLY, WITH CENTAF/PA FORWARD.
6. FORWARD INTERNAL INFORMATION ON ALL DEPLOYED UNITS UNDER A "JOINT FORCE" CONCEPT TO CENTAF/PA FORWARD.

7. ENSURE PA SUPPORT IS BEING PROVIDED TO ALL AF ELEMENTS ASSIGNED TO YOUR DEPLOYED LOCATION, REGARDLESS OF STATESIDE MAJCOM.

8. IF PAOS FROM MORE THAN ONE BASE/MAJCOM ARE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME DEPLOYED SITE, THE PA OFFICE AT THAT SITE WILL FUNCTION AS ONE CONSOLIDATED PA STAFF AGENCY. THE SENIOR RANKING PAO WILL WORK FOR THE SENIOR DEPLOYED COMMANDER, WITH ALL OTHER ASSIGNED PA PERSONNEL WORKING FOR THE PAO IN SUPPORT OF THE SENIOR COMMANDER'S MISSION.

9. COMPLY WITH TASKINGS PROVIDED BY SENIOR DEPLOYED COMMANDER, CENTAF/PA FORWARD, AND APPLICABLE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVES.

10. PERIODICALLY CHECK WITH TMO TO SEE IF ANY ADDITIONAL PA EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED DURING YOUR ASSIGNMENT TO YOUR DEPLOYED SITE.

PART C: PA OFFICER/ENLISTED PRE-ROTATION CHECKLIST

1. CONTACT CENTAF/PA FORWARD 30 DAYS PRIOR TO ROTATION TO
UPDATE THEM ON STATUS.

2. ENSURE REMAINING PA PERSONNEL ARE UP TO DATE ON CURRENT ISSUES/PROJECTS STILL REMAINING AFTER YOUR ROTATION.

3. IF YOU OVERLAP WITH YOUR REPLACEMENT, IN-BRIEF NEWLY-ASSIGNED PA PERSONNEL ON CURRENT STATUS OF OPERATIONS, ISSUES AND PRIORITIES AT DEPLOYMENT SITE.

4. IF YOU OVERLAP WITH YOUR REPLACEMENT, INTRODUCE HIM/HER TO SENIOR DEPLOYED COMMANDER AND POC’S IMPORTANT TO PA OPERATIONS.

5. PROVIDE REPLACEMENT WITH YOUR CONTINUITY FILE/SIGNIFICANT EVENT LOG AND ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS HE/SHE HAS ABOUT ACTIVITIES, PROJECTS OR EVENTS.

6. NLT FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM DEPLOYED SITE TO HOME STATION, PREPARE AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT OF YOUR DEPLOYMENT PA ACTIVITIES. FORWARD COPY OF THE REPORT TO CENTAF/PA FORWARD, CENTAF/PA REAR, AND DEPLOYED SENIOR COMMANDER, WITH INFO COPY TO MAJCOM/PA. UNQUOTE.
Air strikes start Desert Storm

Diplomatic process fails to dislodge Iraqis from Kuwait

WASHINGTON (AFNS) - Air strikes at targets in Iraq and Kuwait signaled the change of Operation Desert Shield into Desert Storm, the operation to force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply with United Nations resolutions, including pulling his forces out of Kuwait.

President George Bush ordered the move after deciding that no progress was being made in attempts to dislodge the Iraqi forces through international diplomatic efforts. In a national address Jan. 16, President Bush said that "the world can wait no longer."

"Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area, have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail."

Initial reports from the early raids depict a highly successful effort on the part of the allied air forces, but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a briefing Jan. 17, urged caution in interpreting the first day's results as a blowout of Iraqi forces. He reminded reporters that this is only the initial phase of a multi-phase plan to achieve the president's goal of forcefully removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The secretary said that coalition air forces had launched more than 1,000 sorties in the first 12 hours of Desert Storm while the Navy had launched 100 cruise missiles to take out specified, strategic targets ahead of the air raids.

Two aircraft were lost in the raids, one American and one British, the secretary said.

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, praised the air forces' performance but also urged caution in interpreting the apparently overwhelming victory as a collapse of the Iraqi armed forces.

Operationally, General Powell said that initial reports indicate an 80 percent success rate for the missions launched in the first strikes.

In a U.S. Central Command briefing in Saudi Arabia, officials confirmed the attack had begun and said the raids primarily were aimed against military emplacements, air defense assets, and command and control targets. Officials said U.S. Air Force aircraft included in the raids were F-15E Strike Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-4G Wild Weasels, A-10 Thunderbolts, F-111s, F-17s and B-52s. Navy and Marine aircraft included F-18 Hornets, AV-8 Harriers, A-7s and A-6s. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters also were involved.

Command and control for the operation was provided by Air Force E-3A Sentry and Navy E-2C aircraft, officials said. Air Force F-15s, Navy F-14s and Marine F-18s provided air cover during all phases, and EF-111s and EA-6s provided electronic combat support. Aerial refueling came from Air Force KC-10s and KC-135s and Navy A-6s.

Secretary Cheney said the operation included air forces from the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and involved more than 650 aircraft.

In explaining the massive operation to the nation, President Bush repeated the objectives of the operation. "Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait," he said. "The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions. And then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the gulf."

At the same time, the president also renewed his pledge that this would not be another Vietnam. "Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back," the president said.
Officials explain Desert Storm

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Briefs

Pass & ID
The Security Police are now issuing identification cards to anyone who needs one. They also have the capability to laminate damaged ID cards and flightline badges.

Pass & ID, located in the rear of the SP building, is open 24 hours a day.

Don't forget -- to get a card you must apply through PERSCO first.

Call the SPs at 850 for more details.

VITA volunteers
The Legal Office is looking for experienced VITA volunteers to assist with the 1990 tax program.

Call the Legal Office at 171 for more details or to volunteer.

Dining hours
Enlisted dining facility: Breakfast - 0500 to 0830; Lunch - 1200 to 1430; Dinner - 1830 to 2030.

Officers' dining facility: Breakfast - 0600 to 0830; 1130 to 1430; Dinner - 1900 to 2030.

MKT (South Loop): Lunch - 1000 to 1400; Midnight meal - 2230 to 0130.

Services hours
Tactical Field Exchange: 0530 to 2200.

Laundry: 0500 to 2200.

Counseling center
The community counseling center is open in tent city across from the street from the post office. The center offers individual counseling as well as group sessions (stress management and women's issues).

Hours of operation: Monday through Saturday - 0600 to 2400; Sunday - 0900 to 2400.

Desert Storm begins; Weasels first in, last out
By TSgt. Rick Corral
There was a quiet uneasiness shrouding the base. The Jan. 15 United Nations deadline authorizing force to push Iraq out of Kuwait was hours old and nothing had happened yet.

For many, the uneasy quiet was like the calm before the storm. Shortly after 1 a.m. Jan. 17 the storm blew in with full force as members of the multinational coalition, including the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), flew air strikes against targets in Kuwait and Iraq. Operation Desert Shield officially became Operation Desert Storm.

"Those first few days were very tense and exciting moments," said Col. Ron Karp, 35th TFW(P) commander. "It seemed like years ago, not days, when the wing received the war execution order. When we got the word, we very quietly started getting the last things ready.

"We brought in the aircrews just hours before we received the final mission execution," said Colonel Karp. "They were very calm and focused. They had worked for five months to get where they were. They had trained, practiced, and studied. They had flown together in their flights and had run their routes in their minds a thousand times. They were ready to go."

After the order was received, the maintenance crews put the final touches on the aircraft. "All the maintenance people were tremendous under very demanding conditions," said Colonel Karp. "Their dedication throughout the entire five months has been absolutely phenomenal. The people that have prepared the warbirds to go out and do their mission have exceeded anything I have ever seen."

I have witnessed nothing like what I saw in the early morning hours of January 17th. To my absolute thrill, as I was driving out on the line to send our guys off, I saw that the maintenance folks had put up very large American flags. They were brightly lit up and could be seen from all over the flight line. I've never seen anything like it in my life. As the men cranked up their jets and taxied toward the runway they saluted the flag and the maintainers as they passed by. And for those of us who watched that night as the warriors flew off to lead the way into battle, it will be a sight we will never forget."

"I could hear the F-4Gs taking off," said Sgt. Mike Crager, a 35th TFW(P) reproduction specialist. "I opened the door to my office and just watched them." See 3STFW(P)...

Operation Desert Storm underway
WASHINGTON (AFNS) -- Air strikes at targets in Iraq and Kuwait signaled the change of Operation Desert Storm into Desert Storm, the operation to force Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to comply with United Nations resolutions, including pulling his forces out of Kuwait.

President George Bush ordered the move after deciding that no progress was being made in attempts to dislodge the Iraqi forces through international diplomatic efforts. In a national address Jan. 16, President Bush said that "the world can wait no longer."

"Now the 28 countries with forces..."
CMSAF Gary R. Pfingston visits with troops during a dinner here Jan. 5.

Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, talks with aircrew members during his visit here Jan. 5.
SOMEBWHERE IN EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA -- Under the night's moonless sky, amid the commotion of scurrying aircraft maintenance crews, a high-pitched whirl could be heard as the A-10 Thunderbolt II engines cranked to life. In the early morning hours of January 16, the "Tank Killers" of the 354th and 23rd Tactical Fighter Wings and associated units prepared to fly into combat. It had begun.

After nearly five months of training to sharpen their skills, pilots and maintainers worked like men and women with something to prove.

"I feel good because this is what we've trained to do," said SSgt. Jackey Sperling, a weapons loader with the 354th Aircraft Generation Squadron. "I never felt I'd have a chance to do this...to test my training."

The first indication that the chance had actually arrived, according to Sergeant Sperling, was after several F-16s landed for fuel...fully-loaded with munitions.

"When we saw those F-16 Falcons," he said, "we knew we'd be going because we had already loaded our aircraft. I believe we'll win a great big victory."

At the end of the runway, where final aircraft checks are made, TSgt. Gary Price 354th AGS, also knew it was finally time to "do what we'd come to do."

In between launching jets, Sergeant Price said, they loaded everything from cluster bombs to missiles. He had just finished listening to President Bush speak, saying that the speech gave him goosebumps as he heard the President rally the American people in support of Operation Desert Storm. Others who heard President Bush's speech were equally touched by his words.
PA in the eye of the storm

In the past three weeks, we have seen a demonstration of our air-power capability unlike anything ever expected. Simultaneously, we have seen the media literally consumed with an insatiable appetite for information about Air Force operations in Desert Storm. At the same time, there were concerns from the media that there was insufficient information made available to the press, while many people back home felt the level of information was too high and might even jeopardize lives and operations.

Regardless, I can say that the level of PA professionalism equaled the level of our combat achievements during the first weeks of the war. Every one of you in the theater demonstrated a resolve and courage that absolutely no one can question. Under clearly the most difficult conditions, you have provided a continuity of internal and external information flow that has solidified the professionalism of the Air Force. The world points with tremendous pride to the U.S. Air Force, and you, singularly and collectively, contributed significantly to that pride.

The U.S. (and international) public today, because of your efforts and facilities of the media, know the U.S. Air Force — its people, its weapons systems, its capabilities — better than ever. Wild Weasels, LANTIRN, HARM, smart weapons, F-117s, F-15s, F-16s, F-111s, A-10s, B-52s, F-4s, AWACS, C-130s, air superiority/supremacy, stealth, interdiction, close-air-support, and hundreds of other terms, once used only in military circles, have taken on new and enlightened meaning for the public.

Old and venerable weapons systems are earning new public respect. Readiness and sustainability are viewed as essential to our combat preparedness. Strategic and tactical airlift, refueling, and bombing are more readily understood.

But this new enthusiasm for air power, obviously spurred by our Desert Storm successes, didn’t just happen. In part, it resulted from the professionalism of the nearly 100 of you deployed to the AOR, and the hundreds of us left in the rear to support your front-line efforts. We have tested the real capabilities of our combat potential, both in the air and with the media. Both are unequivocal successes.

"We have tested the real capabilities of our combat potential, both in the air and with the media. Both are unequivocal successes."

Hopefully, it will be over soon and you will be on your way home. But until then, keep the faith. You are in our thoughts and prayers constantly.
Col. Dennis Keegan
CENTAF Rear/PAK, DSN 574-5472

Total Force a reality

In 1973, it was called the Total Force concept. Today, it's a fact of life. Current Desert Storm operations demonstrated to the nation and the world that active and reserve forces can be successfully integrated and work toward mission accomplishment in both a peacetime and hostile combat environment. If ever there was an example of the cliché, "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts," the total force operation in the Persian Gulf is it. Whether manning ground positions on the Saudi/Kuwaiti border, or flying bombing runs or refueling missions in the Mideast skies, the active duty and reserve forces in the AOR have become a formidable fighting element, unified in the shared support of presidential order and dedicated to achieving freedom for the people of Kuwait.

Just as the tactical, strategic, airlift and logistical elements of the operation are working together as an effective fighting unit, so too are the active duty and reserve men and women of Public Affairs, bringing the story of this operation to the world community.

From the AOR, active and reserve PAOs and PANCOs are sending out stories to the "Desert Defender" and their home units, depicting as much as possible the sights, sounds and experiences of the desert conflict. With little advance notice, in many cases, they have provided escort for scores of national and international media representatives, enabling them to tell the Desert Storm story around the world.

In the ConUS, active and reserve forces are working together to successfully carry on the missions at stateside bases, never forgetting their responsibility to home audiences or the criticality of information crossfeed during this time of crisis.

Total Force has been a very real part of our successful Public Affairs operation for many years, but even more so since the Persian Gulf conflict began. I salute each and every one of you...active duty, Reserve and Guard...and share your pride, knowing that our contributions to this incredible effort are being made in the true spirit of Total Force. You are an extraordinary group of PA professionals, and I am privileged to be working with you.

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Lt. Col. Margaret Stanek
CENTAF Rear/PAS, DSN 574-7019

PAS PACKing it up

Though there are many unknowns associated with Operation Desert Storm regarding rotations, duration and ultimate outcome, preparing to deal with possible eventualities is a priority in the Support Division.

In addition to keeping a handle on who and
what are where in the AOR, PAS has been actively working several “hot items” that impact on deployed PA resources.

With the possibility of loss or damage to Public Affairs Contingency Kits (PACKs) during airlift or once in theater, PAS has been coordinating with our logistics folks in preparing two CENTAF maintained PACKs. The PACKs will contain all the items specified in CENTAF Annex F to the Desert Shield OPORD and will be designed to assist PAOs/PANCOs operating in a bare-base environment.

As supply channels are now operational in the AOR, these PACKs will not routinely be sent to deployed PA shops to replace depleted resources. Rather, they will be used to establish a new PA shop or to replace a PACK at locations which lose their previously established PA capability.

PAS hopes to have these PACKs on hand and ready to go within the next few weeks.

Pooling PA personnel

As we prepare for equipment shortfalls in conjunction with Operation Desert Storm, so too, have we looked at shortfalls associated with our deployed personnel.

At the present time, CENTAF/PAS has compiled a list of 48 PAOs, PANCOs and PA specialists to support continued PA-related operations in the AOR. MAJCOMs have identified some of these individuals for possible deployment in the future if the need arises. Others have volunteered from Air Force-wide resources to augment deployed PA offices should manning shortages occur due to stateside emergencies or operational contingencies.

Further backing up this reserve attrition pool is a list of 14 additional volunteers who could flow into the manning system if circumstances warrant. All in all, 62 PA personnel are in the “stand-by” mode for Operation Desert Storm support.

The “resumes” on these people are most impressive. The reserve pool covers the spectrum from senior officer Public Affairs directors to airman Public Affairs specialists. All areas of Public Affairs are represented, including command speechwriters, broadcasters and Air Force Academy instructors.

For those of us here at CENTAF Rear/PAI, the response to our request for attrition support was overwhelming and a reaffirmation of the kind of dedicated, professional individuals that we are fortunate enough to have in this career field.

For those of you in SWA, it's a positive acknowledgment of your value and your efforts in the AOR, and a reassurance to you that what you've established in the early days of the deployment will continue if you should leave the AOR.

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Lt. Col. Ernie Stepp
CENTAF Rear/PAI, DSN 574-5014

Procedures for clearing information

Everyone needs to be sensitive to OPSEC/COMSEC. Review AOR stories for sensitivities. Guidelines for AOR material are listed in the December issue of the CENTAF Digest.

We have seen a couple of good saves by local base newspaper editors who wondered about a story or a photograph from the AOR and called us. So far, their suspicions were justified and we were able to stop a potentially embarrassing story or photograph from appearing in the base paper. There are many AOR in-country sensitivities. We are here to help; if you have any doubts, call us.

Another internal area to watch is letters to the editors. Several base PAs have been given letters written by deployed people to be run as a letter to the editor. Again, their PA instincts have been correct and they have asked us. Basically, don’t run a personal letter as a “letter to the editor”
without written permission from the author and checking for sensitivities. The problem is most of us use different language and terminology when writing to friends than we would when addressing an editor. You may want to send a suggested rewrite for approval.

"Desert Defender"

Things have been changing with the "Desert Defender." The staff welcomes Sgt Angela McGuire from Fairchild AFB, WA, to our team. Early feedback from the readership surveys that were sent to the AOR in mid-December indicate the "Desert Defender" is a valuable source of information and for some, one of the few publications received. We will share a detailed analysis of the reader evaluation when available.

There was an overwhelming response from the readership asking for more home base information. The only way we can increase the amount of local news is by receiving more inputs from the base public affairs shops. It doesn't take much time for the editor to pull interesting events from the base newspaper and either E-mail the information to CENTAF/PAI or fax it using DSN 574-4941. We realize many shops are undermanned but think of those deployed to Desert Storm. Each base has been urged to mail copies of its base newspaper to its deployed Desert Storm people. Early responses to our survey indicated news from home bases is highly valued. Mail those base newspapers!

Community and base support photos, with cutlines, are still needed. Sending input to the "Desert Defender" is a great way to get double exposure for your writers and programs, and most importantly, support for the deployed troops.

We're grateful to several deployed PA professionals for providing us with a steady stream of material for the "Desert Defender":

- Capt Becky Colaw and SSGT Robert Pease, 23/354 TFW(P).
- Capt Jim Tynan and TSGT Rick Corral, 35 TFW(P).
- TSGT Marvin Kusumoto, 1 TFW(P).
- TSGT Dale Warman, 4 TFW(P).

Others have also contributed regularly, but those mentioned above have been the most prolific. On the other side of the coin, we have yet to receive anything from many deployed PAs. Please keep us in mind.

Internal division deployed

The internal information division has arrived in theater and has been busy producing material for internal and external use. We are already seeing an increase in AOR generated stories and features. Photos are also on their way; it just takes longer to get the photo pipeline flowing to you.

Deployed PAs in Operation Desert Storm who have a story idea and desire a team visit should contact CENTAF/PA in the AOR and request a visit.

NOTE: Chaplains no longer have to be referred to as "Morale Officers." The host nation Armed Forces Religious Affairs Department concluded the title "Chaplain" was not offensive.

Maj. Kathy White
CENTAF Rear/PAT, DSN 574-5007

Where it's at in PAT

During the full swing of the Desert Shield buildup, CENTAF Rear responded to 48 media queries concerning the deployment of forces into the Persian Gulf. After the 16 January commencement of Desert Storm, another 17 media requests/queries were handled.

The deployment of aircraft and people during Phase II of Operation Desert Shield resulted in
four news releases to 22 media outlets from world and national media communities as well as the Department of Defense. Air Force bare base operations on the Arabian Peninsula prompted the release of a definitive study of AF life under field conditions that was released to DOD news outlets.

As the authority for the release of information concerning the deployment of U.S. Air Force units, including the callup, activation and deployment of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units, CENTAF Rear was the conduit for unit proposals for deployment news releases. During Phases I and II, CENTAF coordinated on 89 messages requesting permission to release information to local media concerning their unit’s involvement in Desert Shield. Of those messages, approval was given to 23 after Battle Staff coordination.

Media on the move

Hometown media visits to deployed units in Saudi Arabia were temporarily suspended January 6. Coordinating message traffic since the program’s inception indicates 21 media trips were approved and conducted to deployed active duty Air Force units and 29 media trips were similarly completed by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. The resulting newspaper articles and electronic media coverage presents a positive picture of the Air Force’s global air power story to the public.

Media trips to the AOR resulted in news coverage of deployed Air Force units on 14 local radio and television stations affiliated with the three major networks. Most stations aired a steady stream of “Hello Back Home” messages and dedicated segments of evening and late night news programs to Operation Desert Shield deployment stories.

The 56th Tactical Training Wing’s media trip provided its local ABC-affiliated TV station material for six hours of video on deployed forces and several “Hello Back Home” greetings from MacDill people.

What comes in, what goes out

A telephone poll of active duty units conducting Hometown Media Visits provided approximate figures of news media products resulting from the visits. Most units reported that news media outlets had not completed their coverage of units in the area of responsibility. (Note: Units which have not forwarded an after action report on their Hometown Media Visits are encouraged to do so.)

To date, active duty Public Affairs offices have reported approximately 42 separate news and feature articles in the local newspapers of deployed units, with more articles promised.

Sumter, SC’s “Item,” covering the deployment of Shaw AFB’s 363d Tactical Fighter Wing, produced an 18-page insert featuring photos of
unit resources and interviews with deployed members. Little Rock AFB conducted one media trip, escorting area newspaper reporters. Deborah Mathes, "Arkansas Gazette" reporter, produced a four-page special edition on 314th Tactical Airlift Wing's deployment and additional features in six issues of the newspaper.

The local newspaper in Alexandria, LA, "The Town Talk," ran 14 articles under Jim Leggett's byline and five photographs detailing the lives of deployed men and women of England AFB's 23 TFW.

TAC-gained Air National Guard units that have deployed in support of Desert Storm have also had extensive media coverage. While most of this has been from their local outlets, some electronic and print stories have received national play. Based upon copies sent to CENTAF Rear, the 174th TFW, Syracuse, NY, has had almost daily radio, TV and newspaper coverage. Aircraft from the Syracuse unit and those belonging to 169th TFG, McEntire, SC, are seen regularly on CNN.

Reporting on deployed units from Pope and Seymour Johnson AFBs, NC, two television stations dedicated a solid week of TV coverage during the local news broadcasts, airing messages from 317th TAW and 4th TFW people. Charleston AFB's deployed unit sponsored three media trips and gathered information for one television news special, six news and feature stories and numerous radio spots filed from the deployed location.

Release of operational information

While public release of Desert Storm operational information remains at the National Command Authority/USCENTCOM levels, there are multiple opportunities to provide the American public and our own Air Force people with general information about our contributions in the Persian Gulf region.

However, while making every effort to tell an important story, care must be taken not to get out in front of the NCA/USCENTCOM by releasing Desert Storm specific information which has not been cleared. You may discuss the conflict in general terms, and reinforce the importance of a number of messages articulated by the Secretary of the Air Force in his White Paper, "The Air Force and the U.S. National Security: Global Reach — Global Power." Among these important messages are the following:

* Quality people are critical to high quality forces. History shows that the human dimension, the dimension of ready, well-trained forces, has been vital to success in conflict.

* Along with quality people, we have long depended on the force multiplier effects and competitive advantages of advanced technology to provide the maximum warfighting potential from today's Air Force.

* The U.S. has become an aerospace nation. We lead the world in terms of cutting-edge technology and we are now starting to reap the benefits of our investments in high technologies over the past decade. These investments are providing our Air Force participating in Desert Storm with decisive capabilities against the well-equipped Iraqi forces at minimum cost of casualties.

* The strengths of the Air Force, ably demonstrated during Desert Storm, continue to be speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality. The Air Force was the first on-scene when the president committed U.S. forces to protect Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield, and were first in combat when the president committed U.S. forces to Operation Desert Storm.

* Integration of forces has been key to any success — both within the United States forces and within the overall alliance framework.

While addressing the topic of Air Force participation in Desert Storm, and acknowledging the contributions of your unit to the campaign, specific references to operational matters should be avoided. Avoid speculation on current or future military operations, deployed unit missions, the effectiveness of weapons or tactics, and specific questions on whether forces/weapons/systems from your base have been involved in combat.
Desert Storm: The other side of the lens

As coalition air power dramatically announced the arrival of Desert Storm in the skies above Iraq, U.S. military people everywhere watched and prayed for their colleagues “in the sand.”

Most stayed glued to their television sets, witnessing history unfold. Network news jumped literally around the world and back again. Voice feeds from Baghdad, talking heads in Atlanta, pool video from Saudi, support activities at home stations — the Desert Storm story was being told in “real time.”

Public Affairs people could view the events from a slightly different perspective. Whether watching from a battlestaff position, PA office or living room, we knew what it took to rush those images to the screen. The next day, we knew what it took to tell the in-depth story in the newspaper.

We knew that, for every pilot, weapons loader or maintenance person on camera, there was a PA just off camera. We knew how many hours of hard work was behind each few minutes of pool video, how much coordination was behind each short media release or response, how much effort was behind each news photo.

We knew how it was possible for the news media to cover Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And, we knew who made that comprehensive coverage possible.

Military historians will endlessly recount the technology which led to victory in Desert Storm. They’ll analyze the merits of the F-117 stealth fighter, the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Patriot air defense system. However, their stories will never be complete unless they recognize two of the war’s most powerful, hi-tech weapons: the mini-cam and satellite uplink dish!

Modern war is fought on many fronts, some of which are not marked on a map. And, our Desert Shield/Desert Storm PA people are showing the precision accuracy needed to win in our very specialized theater of operations. Right on target, gang!

The Desert Storm PA team

As of press time, more than 185 Public Affairs people were currently TDY, had performed TDY or were ready to deploy TDY in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. With PA people from every major command, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, the operation represents a total force effort.

The in-place Desert Storm roster at press time included:

Lt Col Michael Gallagher.................Hanscom
Lt Col Thomas Sack......................Langley
Lt Col Virginia Pribila...............Eglin
Lt Col Phillip Lacombe...................HQ MAC/PA
Maj Jerry Brown.......................Bitburg
Maj Todd Fruenhling.....................HQ MAC/PA
Maj Keith Gillett.........................Scott
Maj Linda Leong........................Castle
Maj Gary Perugini..........................Eglin
Maj Louis Tiedemann....................HQ TAC/PA
Maj James Pasierb......................HQ PACAF/PA
Maj Johnnie Ainsley.....................Tyndall
Capt Thomas Barth......................Shaw
Capt Rebecca Colaw .................Myrtle Beach
Capt Ray Martell ..................Mildenhall
Capt Joe Davis ....................Luke
Capt Oscar Seara ............Davis-Monthan
Capt Joe Stevenson ...............March
Capt Dave Turner ................Barksdale
Capt Robert Thompson ..............Mountain Home
Capt James Tyman .................George
Capt Kevin Kragarek ..........HQ USAFE/PA
Capt Earl Shepper ...............Kelly
Capt Gary Carruthers ..........Intraktion
Capt Ralph Scott ...............Elmendorf
Capt Lance Jay .................Whiteman
Capt Theresa Gates ...............Andrews
Capt Donna Nicholas .............McGuire
1Lt Melissa Watson .............Maxwell
1Lt Kelly Ann Dunnig ..........Charleston
1Lt Michele Madden ..........Little Rock
1Lt Jennifer Fay ..................Hill
1Lt Casey Mahon .................Plattsburgh
2Lt Donald Collins ..........Langley
2Lt Marie Muehlhoen .............Loring
CMSgt James Chumley ..........Air Nat. Guard
SMSgt Wilt Baker .............HQ TAC/PA
MSgt Rick Fuller ...............Andrews
MSgt Phillip Stanton ..........AFPA - Chicago
MSgt Dan Luoma ..............Malmstrom
MSgt Pat Miller ..............Moody
MSgt Lee Hincher ..........Lakenheath
MSgt Thomas Cocciaro .........Altus
MSgt Daryl Green .............Grissom
Tsgt Jack Siebold ..........Ellsworth
Tsgt Mike Otis .............Air National Guard
Tsgt William Dowell ..........Robins
Tsgt Larry Reetz ..............Mildenhall
Tsgt Dale Warman .............Andrews
Tsgt Doug Hamilton ..........McChord
Tsgt Richard Corral ..........George
Tsgt Robert Shelton ..........Tonopah
Tsgt James Curtis ..........Tinker
Tsgt Marvin Kusumoto ..........Langley
Tsgt Linda Mitchell ..........Alconbury
Tsgt Fernando Serna ..........Kelly
Tsgt Ronnie Woods ..........Davis-Monthan
SSgt Dee Ann Heiderscheit ......Seymour Johnson
SSgt Kelly Godby ..............Beale
SSgt Lloyd Tilton .............Myrtle Beach
SSgt Joel Ridinour ..........Air Force Reserve
SSgt Robert Pease ............England
SSgt Gordon Honeycutt ..........Kirtland
SSgt Detroit Whiteside ..........Shaw
SSgt Andy Glaze ...............Vandenberg
SSgt Anthony Heart ................Langley
SSgt Mike Spauls ...........Barksdale
SSgt Sarah Hood ..........SAF/PA
Sgt Laurie White ..............Peterson
Sgt Gary Kunich .............Hill
Sgt Eric Boomhower ..........Grand Forks
Sgt Debbie Walke ...............Wurtzsmith
Sgt Pauline Aldridge ..........Lackland
Sgt Kenneth Fidler ..........Torrejon
Sgt Adrian Jones ..........Langley
Sgt Troy Prince .............Lakenheath
A1C Karen Green ..........Air National Guard
A1C John Pavila .............Scott
A1C Donald Kusturin ..........USAFA
A1C Cliff Ulmer ..........Grissom

In addition, heading TDY or notified for possible deployment to Desert Storm were:

Lt Col Catherine Roeder ............Andrews
Lt Col George Titus ................Lowry
Lt Col Portia McCracken ..........Hill
Lt Col Thomas Mahr ..........Los Angeles
Lt Col John Kirkwood ..........Andrews
Maj Garrett Mason ..........SAF/PA
Maj Robert Barca ..........Homestead
Maj David Sims ..........USAFA
Capt Larry Jenkins ..........HQ TAC/PA
Capt Daniel Cullum ..........Chanute
Capt Clemens Gaines ..........Scott
Capt Gary Turner ..........USAFA
Capt Michael Murk ..........HQ MAC/PA
Capt Julia Scott ..........Holloman
Capt Bob McCarty.........Moody
Capt Marilyn Howe ..........Wright-Patterson
Capt Ricky Sanford ..........USAFA
Capt Laura Spence ..........Los Angeles
Capt Guy Thompson ..........Bergstrom
Capt John Ames ..........Dyess
1Lt LeWonnie Belcher ..........Los Angeles
1Lt Katherine Germain .......Hanscom
2Lt Michael Paoli ..........MacDill
2Lt Mark Mientek ..........Hanscom
2Lt Darian Benson ..........Minot
2Lt Eric Butterbaugh ..........Wright-Patterson
SMSgt Vickie Andrews ..........Scott
MSgt Jimmy Hardenbrook ..........Los Angeles
MSgt Rick Gale ..........HQ MAC/PA
MSgt Dick Hodgson ..........Carswell
Tsgt Robert Scott ..........Maxwell
Tsgt Daniel Sherwood ..........Maxwell
SSgt Jeffrey Pines ..........Davis-Monthan
SSgt William Sankey ..........Patrick
SSgt Hope Greeley ..........HQ TAC/PA
SSgt Randy Mitchell ..........McChord
SSgt Mary Sellinger ..........Kelly
SSgt Brenda Coffey ..........Wright-Patterson
Sgt Sean Ruark ..........Los Angeles
Sgt Gary Cunningham ..........USAFA
Sgt Mark Reitz ..........Lackland
Sgt: David Honchul ..........Wright-Patterson
Sgt Carla Cook ..........Cannon
A1C Sonja Rushon ..........Hanscom
A1C Scott Ficinus ..........Whiteman
A1C Tony Jacob ..........Beale
A1C Steven Ball ..........Myrtle Beach
Returned from SWA deployments were:

Maj Thomas Boneparte.........................Whiteman
Capt Kevin Baggett..............................HQ TAC/PA
Capt Richard Reibeling.........................Little Rock
Capt Barney Welch................................Griffiss
Capt Paul Wilson.................................Seymour Johnson
Capt Christine Queen.............................Tinker
Capt Thomas LaRock..............................TRANSCOM/PA
Capt Jack Giese.................................SAF/PA
Capt Daniel Cullum..............................Chanute
1Lt Stephen Turner..............................Travis
1Lt Douglas Kinneard............................Hurlburt
SMSgt Basil Kuzyzsny.........................Rhein Main
SMSgt Fred Spriggs................................HQ SAC/PA
MSgt Christopher Aune........................Mountain Home
TSgt William Dowell..............................Robins
TSgt Janie Bianey.................................Griffiss
TSgt Donald Schmidt.............................Seymour Johnson
TSgt Jack Siebold...............................Ellsworth
SSgt Catherine Green............................Lowry
SSgt David Beauleau............................Eglin
SSgt Harold Jones...............................Dover
SrA Ralph Ellis.................................Castle
A1C James Roth......................................England

Sgt Barbara Lavigne............................Hurlburt
Sgt Bryan Hollenbaugh...........................Cannon
SrA Joseph Nuvolini............................Holloman

Our only Desert Shield PA casualty is:

Capt Brad Schuldt..............................HQ 7AD/PA

Currently TDY to CENTCOM/CENTAF Rear or Stateside backfill is:

Col Dennis Keegan...............................Air Force Reserve
Lt Col Karen Miller...............................Air Force Reserve
Lt Col Ernie Stepp...............................Air Force Reserve
Maj Mike Waters.................................Air National Guard
Capt Donna Eggleston...........................Nellis
Capt Theresa Timek..............................USAF
Capt Jan Lauer...................................Recruiting
Capt Deb Watros..................................Air Force Reserve
1Lt Barbara Sacra.................................Air Force Reserve
1Lt Joseph Wiggins..............................Air Force Reserve
2Lt Valerie Welter.................................Tyndall
TSgt Deborah Healey.............................North Bay
TSgt Joseph Cotton...............................Randolph
TSgt David Brown.................................Tinker
Sgt Angela McGuire..............................Fairchild

Returned from CENTCOM/CENTAF Rear or Stateside TDY were:

Lt Col Roland Rabb.............................Air Force Reserve
Lt Col Al Brown.................................Air National Guard
Maj S. Dian Lawhon..............................MacDill
Maj Jackie Trotter...............................Air Force Reserve
Maj Al Matecko.................................Air Force Reserve
Capt Fred Dickinson............................Kelly
Capt Mick Baker.................................Air Force Reserve
Capt Monica Taliaferro........................Air Force Reserve
MSgt Rolf Carter.................................Bergstrom
MSgt Jerry Stroud...............................Air National Guard
TSgt James Weslowski............................Tyndall
SSgt Sandra Whipps..............................McChord
SSgt Dave Malakoff..............................HQ SAC/PA
Sgt Elton Price.................................Scott
Sgt Curtis Libengood.............................Homestead
SrA Leo Brown.................................Plattsburgh

In addition, the following administrative support people have helped man CENTCOM/PA and CENTAF/PA, both in the forward and rear locations:

MSgt Donna Henry...............................HQ SAC/PA
TSgt Mike Palmer...............................Air National Guard
SSgt George Wilson.............................Peterson
Sgt Donovan Preston............................Eglin
Sgt Alvin Clark.................................Moody
Sgt George Franjevic............................Moody
Sgt Charles Prince..............................Kelly

Added to those TDY members listed above, the Public Affairs team roster includes...

...the permanent party staff of CENTCOM/PA at MacDill;
...the permanent party staff of HQ TAC/PA at Langley, dual-hatted as CENTAF Rear/PA since August 1990;
...the PA action teams at other MAJCOMs and AFMPC;
...PA escorts for hometown media visits; and
...home base PA staffs supporting deployed units.
RAAUZYUVRUVKAAA0329 0932215-UUCC--RHDIWMP.

AFNEWS KELLY AFB TX//IIB//

TO AIG 9333//PA/OP//CC//

AIG 10625//PA/OP//CC//

AIG 1730//PA//

AIG 1014

RUAGAA//COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//PAJ-CI//CRQ

RUCRF//AFOPA-MR 55 E MONROE SUITE 1525 CHICAGO IL

RCCBNA://FGC//NORTH BAY//PA//

RUYFPA//USTCENT//PA//

RUEPAA//USCENTCOM//CCPA/

RUEPAA//USCENTCOM//CCPA-CI//

RUVUME//30373AB SHEMY AFB AK//CC//

INFO RUEA=QH//WASH DC//CCL//

RUEA=QH//OSAF WASHINGTON DC//OS/US/MI//FM/AF/LL/A//OSX/SX//

RUEA=QH//USAF WASHINGTON DC//CC/CV//

CVA/XJ/LE//HC/1G/JA/SG/IN//SA/

/Q/FM//2/CN//CVS//CI//

RUVAAAF//HOS AFB TX//PA//

RUCNOS/US/AGN OS NEW YORK//MSC//

ZEN/HQ AFCOMS KELLY AFB TX//PA//

RUVAAA//AFC KELLY AFB TX//PA//

RUVAAA//AFB KELLY AFB TX//XO//

XMT 123TCF BLUE ASH ANG STN CINCINNATI OH

124TCF BLUE ASH ANG STN CINCINNATI OH

ACF//AF//XOR

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION I OF 3

SUBJ: DESERT STORM NEWS FEATURES (THESE AFNEWS MESSAGES SUPPORT APPENDIX I TO ANNEX F. CENTAF OPORD FOR DESERT SHIELD). THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS 03 STORIES

AFNEWS ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD FILENAME: VICTOR

AFNEWSIB-121 COMMENTARY: A TIME TO CELEBRATE AND REMEMBER

AFNEWSIB-122 NAMES PUT LIFE INTO JOINT OPERATIONS

AFNEWSIB-123 1ST OAVG GIVES SPECIAL DELIVERY

AT&T

AFNEWSIB-121 COMMENTARY: A TIME TO CELEBRATE AND REMEMBER

BY LT. GEN. CHARLES C. HORN

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES

BY THE TIME YOU READ THIS, A LOT OF OUR AIR FORCE PEOPLE WILL FINALLY BE HOME.

THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF STORIES ABOUT THE HEROES OF THIS WAR. HIGHLIGHTING WHAT OUR WARRIORS HAVE DONE THROUGH...

WHILE WE SALUTE OUR BEST, WE CAN'T FORGET OTHER HEROES OF THIS WAR -- THE FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND. THEIR BELIEF IN OUR JUST WAR, AND THEIR SUPPORT OF OUR WARRIORS GAVE US THE WINNING EDGE.

WE MUST ESPECIALLY APPLAUD OUR MILITARY FAMILIES. THEIR COURAGE AND SELFLESS SACRIFICE DESERVE THE SAME RECOGNITION AS GIVEN THE RETURNING HEROES.

I ALSO THANK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE COURAGE, DEDICATION AND SUPPORT THEY SHOWED THROUGHOUT OUR LONG DEPLOYMENT. THEIR...
AFNEWS-122 NAMES PUT LIFE INTO JOINT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON (AFNEWS) -- THE TERMS "URGENT FURY," "JUST CAUSE," DESERT SHIELD" AND "DESERT STORM" HAVE BROUGHT LIFE AND MEANING TO U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS. BUT WHO ACTUALLY COMES UP WITH THESE CATCHY, INFORMATIVE NAMES?
ENSURING THAT OPERATIONS ARE WELL-NAMED WITHOUT GIVING AWAY THEIR MISSIONS IS ONE OF THE PRIME JOBS AT THE PENTAGON'S JOINT OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE AND PLANS AND INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE. "QUOTE! WE NAME OPERATIONS SO WE CAN DISCUSS THEM WITHOUT REVEALING THEIR CLASSIFIED CONTENTS," SAID AN AIR FORCE JOINT OPERATIONS ACTION OFFICER. USING A CONTROL ROSTER, THE DIRECTORATE PROVIDES ACTION OFFICERS WITH TWO COMPUTER-GENERATED LETTERS FROM WHICH TO DETERMINE A JOINT EXERCISE NAME.
"QUOTE! WE DON'T CHOOSE PROPER NOUNS OR NAMES USED IN PREVIOUS EXERCISES, AND TO PREVENT CONFUSION, WE ALSO AVOID WORDS FROM THE PHONETIC ALPHABET," THE AIR FORCE OFFICIAL SAID. EFFORTS ARE MADE, HOWEVER, TO SELECT NAMES THAT WILL INSPIRE THE TROOPS TAKING PART.
HENCE, OPERATION JUST CAUSE IN PANAMA OR DESERT SHIELD/STORM IN THE PERSIAN GULF.
HE SAID SOMETIMES THEY ARE ABLE TO COME UP WITH NAMES THAT GIVE SOME SENSE OF WHAT THE MISSION MEANS WITHOUT REVEALING THE DETAILS.
"QUOTE! FOR INSTANCE, OPERATION STEEL BOX WAS A SOLID, POSITIVE NAME FOR AN EXERCISE TO REMOVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM EUROPE, THE NAME IMPLIED LEAK-PROOF EXECUTION, THUS REASSURING OUR ALLIES," HE SAID.
OPERATION NICKNAMES ALWAYS COME IN PAIRS AND ARE UNCLASSIFIED, SAI A NAVY OFFICIAL IN THE JOINT DIRECTORATE THAT IS THE SO-CALLED NICKNAMES CUSTOMDIAN OF THE CODEWORDS, "HE SAID THE OPERATION-NAMING PROCESS STRETCHES BACK TO THE NORMANDY INVASION, WHICH WAS CALLED OPERATION OVERLORD.
"QUOTE! UNLIKE OPERATION NICKNAMES, CODEWORDS ARE SINGLE.
CLASSIFIED WORDS USED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY," HE SAID. "THE WORDS THEMSELVES DON'T DESCRIBE ANYTHING, BUT THEY REPRESENT PLANS, SO WHILE WE COULDN'T TALK ABOUT THE UNCLASSIFIED NAME OF THE operation DESERT STORM, WE COULDN'T DISCUSS THE CODEWORDS INCLUDED IN ITS EXECUTION."
ACCORDING TO THE CODEWORD CUSTOMDIAN, THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF CATALOGED CODEWORDS AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES, BUT NONE CAN BE USED IN AN OPERATION'S NICKNAME.
"QUOTE! I REVIEW ALL PROPOSED NAMES TO ENSURE NO CODEWORDS ARE USED," THE OFFICIAL SAID. EACH JOINT COMMAND OR AGENCY IS ASSIGNED AN AREA OF LETTERED INITIALS FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE A NAME.
ACCORDING TO AN AIR FORCE INTEROPERABILITY SPECIALIST, OTHER NAMES OF OPERATIONS INCLUDE SHARP EDGE, WHICH EVACUATED U.S. CITIZENS FROM LIBERIA IN 1990, AND OPERATION EARNEST WILL, WHICH PROTECTED KUWAITI OIL TANKERS IN THE LATE-1980S. HE SAID WHILE MANY NAMES ARE PICKED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANS, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE MILITARY COMMAND HAS THE OPTION OF RENAMING AN OPERATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION.
"QUOTE! WE COME UP WITH THE WORKING NAME," HE SAID. "IF IT IS AN OPERATION INVOLVING MULTIPLE SERVICES, IT WILL BE CONSIDERED JOINT -- NO SERVICE FIGHTS ALONE ANYMORE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD," THE AIR FORCE OFFICER SAID.
"QUOTE! NEVERTHLESS, WHEN WE DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLAN NAMES, WE REALIZE THEY MAY NEVER BE USED BECAUSE THE CONTINGENCY MAY NEVER HAPPEN." (COURTESY ARMY NEWS SERVICE)
Although Sergeant Woodbury said the response from people in the camp was overwhelming, finding a place to deliver 2.5 tons of sundries proved to be more difficult.

(QUOTE) Originally, we went through all the proper channels: the Red Cross, the American Embassy in Kuwait City, and our military people in Riyadh," said the soft-spoken heavy equipment operator. (QUOTE) But there was so much red tape and legal considerations involved; it looked as though we weren't going to be able to deliver the goods to Kuwait City." Refusing to be stalemated, he took the issue to the Wing's senior operations staff, which located someone in Kuwait City who could help.

The 436th Airlift Control Element, deployed from Dover AFB, Del., to work airlift operations at Kuwait City international airport, had already made contact with a large hospital in the middle of the city with the help of the Army's 352nd civil affairs brigade at Camp Freedom, located just off the Kuwait City international airport.

The Air Force operations officer, Lt. Col. John Cirafici, said his people had already trucked in 13 crates of apples, candy and a three-quarter-ton truck load of other items specifically labeled (QUOTE) for the Kuwaiti children. Before Sergeant Woodbury's load, they had been getting one or two boxes of donated items on each aircraft that came through.

They were overwhelmed to see more than four tons of goods roll off the ramps of Ist DAWG C-130s. At the hospital the donations went to is called the Kuwait City Social Welfare Complex, located in the middle of the city, it's home to more than 500 orphans, handicapped children, and mentally handicapped children and young adults. Because of his involvement in the project, Sergeant Woodbury flew in to Kuwait City to deliver some of the items and turn the hospital staff around 3 p.m. the opportunity came to take the two pickup truck loads down to the hospital, but it could have been at night. The sky was covered from horizon to horizon with a blanket of oil smoke which nearly blocked out the sun -- just a dim orange disk overhead. Everything was bathed in an eerie light which added to the surreal images of burned-out homes, abandoned tanks, and piles upon piles of wrecked cars strewn everywhere. What had once been called one of the most beautiful cities in the Middle East now looked like a giant junk yard. Although Kuwait was free, the trauma of war still hung like a heavy shroud over everything.

When the two obviously military vehicles arrived at the gates of the hospital, there were first looks of concern, which immediately turned to wide grins. Realizing they had seen some of these visitors before were the civilian guards, who were no more than young boys armed with Soviet-made AK-47s. Flashing the "V" sign and waving the red flag convoy through to the main grounds, which only weeks before had been the site of an Iraqi anti-aircraft gun. Colonel Cirafici said the Iraqis had intentionally used the hospital as a shield. As the staff came out to welcome the group of Americans and one British Red Cross nurse, little smiling faces appeared at the windows several floors up in anticipation of another load of goodies. The staff literally drowned the guests with thanks and greeted them with a tangle of handshakes.

Although the staff members and volunteer workers were smiling, it was easy to see they had still not recovered from what they said was an "indescribable" seven months of Iraqi occupation. Samira al Khatlan, a young woman in her 20s and a volunteer at the hospital during the occupation, said it was really tough.

(QUOTE) They took all the food supplies, the medical equipment, even the clothes... She said the only way the patients survived was through the help and generosity of the Kuwaiti people and local shopkeepers who smuggled food and other supplies into the compound.

Ms. Samira said they would move supplies from one place to another to keep the Iraqi soldiers from finding them -- like "Tom and Jerry" playing "Cat and Mouse" to keep the 500 patients alive.

She described one small girl who defied the Iraqi soldiers from
her wheelchair, saying she didn't like Saddam Hussein and that she wanted him to die. Ms. Samira said that even though the girl could say very little because of shock and trauma caused by the occupation, the Iraqi soldiers were going to kill her. To protect the girl, Ms. Samira said volunteers risked their own lives trying to persuade the soldiers to disregard her because she didn't know what she was saying. Others threatened the Iraqi soldiers by telling them they would go to their commanding officers -- an act of extreme courage considering the fact soldiers were known to shoot patients who merely asked for food.

Their liberation came at 8 a.m. Feb. 27 when, Ms. Samira said, the Iraqi soldiers dropped their weapons, threw off their uniforms and started running through the streets "naked." (QUOTE) We are really thankful to the Americans for everything," said Ms. Samira, "because we need the food, we need the candies and all the other things. Most of the children were used to a much better life."
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TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

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DIST: PA (02) CSA (01)

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CP... DP...... INQ...... SE...... ITFW/CC......
CSA... DR...... JA...... SC...... IAF/CC......
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DA... MO...... LG...... SP...... SVC......

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AIG 8614

RAUGAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//PAJ-CI//CRQ

RULRFA/AFOPA-MR 55 E MONROE SUITE 1525 CHICAGO IL

RCCBNVA/FGC/NHQ NORTH BAY//PA/

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ZEN/HQ AFCOMS KELLY AFB TX//PA/

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BETTER STANDARD OF LIVING AND OVER THE LAST SEVEN MONTHS THEY HAVE BEEN LIVING WITH ALMOST NOTHING.” (COURTESY CENTAF NEWS SERVICE)

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MINIMIZE CONSIDER AMNP/ SUBJECT: CENTCOM NEWS SERVICE RELEASES
MSGID/SYS.RM/USCENTCOM CCP
Release includes the following CENTCOM NEWS SERVICE
RELEASES. PLEASE INCLUDE OUR CREDIT LINE WHEN USING THESE STORIES.
A: PRECISION TACTICS SUCCEED AGAINST SPECIAL TARGETS
B: COALITION AIRPOWER REGINS
C: NEW FOCUS IN AIR ASSAULT
D: ACTION IN RAS AL KHPFJ
STORIES FOLLOW:
A: PRECISION TACTICS SUCCEED AGAINST SPECIAL TARGETS
SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) --- AS ALLIED COALITION AIR STRIKES
CONTINUE AROUND THE CLOCK AGAINST TARGETS IN IRAQ AND OCCUPIED
KUWAIT, PRECISION BOMBING HAS SHOWN ITS WORTH. PARA AS OPERATION
DESERT STORM ENTERS ITS THIRD WEEK, MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE
BEEN MADE IN THE FIELD OF TARGET SELECTION AND DESTRUCTION WITH
THE LEAST AMOUNT OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES POSSIBLE. PARA EARLY ON
IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM'S PREDECESSOR, IT WAS
ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE AND PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY WOULD BE MAJOR TARGETS OF AIR STRIKES, SHOULD IT COME
TO OFFENSIVE ACTION. SINCE OFFENSIVE ACTION HAS IN FACT TAKEN
PLACE, HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS AND BRIDGES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO
PRIORITY TARGETS. PARA AS THE COALITION AIR STRIKES CONTINUE,
GEN. H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND, ANNOUNCED JAN. 30 THAT ALL OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. PARA SPEAKING TO INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA, SCHWARZKOPF SAID 31 LOCATIONS HAD BEEN ATTACKED WITH 535
SORTIES. PARA HE ADDED THAT THE BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
HAD BEEN LEVELLED TO RUBBLE. (END QUOTE) CREDITING
PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES AND TALAM CRUISE MISSILES FOR STRIKING
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL FACILITIES AS WELL AS MANY
AIRCRAFT. PARA (QUOTE) "WE HAVE ABSOLUTE CONFIRMATION THAT WE'VE
DESTROYED OVER 11 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL STORAGE AREAS. END
QUOTE) SCHWARZKOPF SAID. (QUOTE) "WE'VE ALSO DESTROYED OR HEAVILY
DAMAGED THREE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES. END
QUOTE) PARA AS FOR FUTURE INTENTIONS TO ELIMINATE IRAQ'S NBC
CAPABILITY, SCHWARZKOPF CONCLUDED, (QUOTE) "WE'RE GOING TO
CONTINUE A RELENTLESS ATTACK ON THIS VERY, VERY HEAVY WEAPON
SYSTEM. END QUOTE) PARA SINCE IRAQ HAS SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES DUE
TO ALLIED COALITION AIR STRIKES, IT HAS RESORTED TO HIDING
ITS PLANES IN HARDENED STRUCTURES THROUGHOUT KUWAIT AND IRAQ.
PARA ACCORDING TO SCHWARZKOPF, HOWEVER, THE ALLIED COALITION HAS
(QUOTE) COMPLETED A SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF THOSE HARDENED
SHELTERS. END QUOTE) PARA SCHWARZKOPF SAID MORE THAN 70 OF THE
SHELTERS HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY AIR STIKES AGAINST IRAQ. PARA AT
ONE POINT DURING HIS BRIEFING TO THE MEDIA, VIDEO TAPES OF ACTUAL
GUN CAMERA FOOTAGE SHOWED HARDENED SHELTERS, SOME WITH PLANES IN
THEM, BEING DESTROYED. PARA FOOTAGE SHOWN OF AIR ATTACKS AGAINST
THE TAJI AIRFIELD, ONE OF IRAQ'S MAJOR MIRAGE F-1 AND MIRAGE
ANOTHER FACET OF COALITION AIR STRIKES HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS BRIDGES IN KUWAIT, TARGETED AS PART OF A PLAN TO ISOLATE KUWAIT AND CUTOFF MILITARY SUPPLIES FLOWING INTO THE COUNTRY. PARA SCHWARZKOPF SAID 35 BRIDGES HAD BEEN TARGETED, AND 33 WERE ATTACKED WITH MORE THAN 750 SORTIES. PARA (QUOTE) OBVIOUSLY THEY HAVE VERY LIMITED RAIL LINES. (END QUOTE) SAID SCHWARZKOPF.

(QUOTE) SO IF WE CAN TAKE A RAILROAD BRIDGE OUT, IT MAKES A BIG DIFFERENCE. (END QUOTE) PARA THE TECHNIQUE USED, ACCORDING TO SCHWARZKOPF, IS TO BOMB THE BRIDGE CLOSE TO THE SHORE BECAUSE IT CAUSES MORE DAMAGE AND IS MORE DIFFICULT TO REPLACE. PARA ATTACKS ON BRIDGES SEEM TO BE SUCCESSFUL, APPARENT FROM THE DRAMATICALLY DECREASED RESUPPLY TRAFFIC. PARA (QUOTE) NIGHT IS THE TIME WHEN BEFORE, HE MOVED THE MOST AND RESUPPLIED THE MOST. (END QUOTE) SCHWARZKOPF SAID. (QUOTE) YOU'LL NOTICE ON ALL FOUR OF THOSE BRIDGES (SHOWN IN THE VIDEO TAPE), YOU ONLY SAW ONE VEHICLE. THAT'S ANOTHER INDICATION OF HOW WE'RE INTERDICTING HIS SUPPLIES. (END QUOTE) PARA IN TARGETING SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.

COALITION AIR FORCES HAVE VIRTUALLY HALTED IRAQ'S OIL REFINING CAPABILITY. PARA AT A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE FEB. 1, NAVY REAR ADM. MICHAEL MCDONNELL, JOINT STAFF DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, SAID DESTROYING IRAQ'S REFINING ASSETS WAS AN EARLY OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIED AIR CAMPAIGN, AND AFTER MORE THAN 35,000 SORTIES, THE CAMPAIGN'S SUCCESSES INCLUDE CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED STRIKES ON THE OIL-RELATED TARGETS. PARA (QUOTE) THERE IS LITTLE (REFINING) TO NONE BEING ACCOMPLISHED PRESENTLY. (END QUOTE) MCDONNELL SAID.

(QUOTE) SOME OF THAT'S BY CHOICE ON THE PART OF THE IRAQIS. SOME OF THAT'S A RESULT OF PRECISION BOMBING ON OUR PART. (END QUOTE) PARA MCDONNELL SAID THE COALITION IS TRYING TO TAKE (QUOTE) DOWN THE CHEMICAL NODES IN A REFINERY WITHOUT DESTROYING THE ENTIRE REFINERY. (END QUOTE) THIRTY

B: COALITION AIRPOWER REIGNS

SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- COALITION AIRCRAFT SORTIES NOW NUMBER OVER 37,000, ARMY LT. GEN. THOMAS KELLY JOINT STAFF OPERATIONS DIRECTOR ANNOUNCED AT A FEB. 2 BRIEFING. AN AVERAGE OF 2300 ADDITIONAL MISSIONS ARE FLOWN EVERY DAY. PARA TO DATE, ACCORDING TO KELLY, 284 TOMAHAWK MISSILES HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AT ENEMY SITES. TARGETING BY COALITION AIRCRAFT CONTINUES TO BE COMMAND AND CONTROL SCUD MISSILE SITES, AIRFIELDS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL FACILITIES, THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, AND BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. PARA (QUOTE) THEY HAVE LOST 59 AIRCRAFT TO DATE -- 28 AIR-TO-AIR, AND 31 ON THE GROUND (END QUOTE), SAID KELLY. PARA ACCORDING TO KELLY, THE NUMBER OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN AS OF JAN. 31 WAS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 85-90. PARA (QUOTE) THAT REGIME SOMEWHERE, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO BE PRECISELY SURE OF THE EXACT NUMBER. (END QUOTE) HE ADDED. PARA THE LATEST FIGURES AS OF FEB. 2, NUMBER U.S. AIRCRAFT LOST AT 15, INCLUDING AN A-10 AND AN A-6 THAT WERE RECENTLY SHOT DOWN ON FEB. 2. ALLIED AIRCRAFT LOSSES REMAIN AT SEVEN. PARA ACCORDING TO THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND BRIEFING, A MARITIME TASK FORCE HAS BEEN sucht up IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND IS OPERATING BELOW THE WATERLINE.

C: NEW FOCUS IN AIR ASSAULT

SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- COALITION AIR FORCES HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL ANNOUNCED IN A RECENT PRESS BRIEFING, PARA ACCORDING TO ARMY LT. GEN. THOMAS KELLY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS. ALLIED FORCES HAVE
AFNEWSIIB-123 1ST DAWG GIVES SPECIAL DELIVERY
BY MSgt. TOM COCCHIARO
1630 TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING (PROVISIONAL)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SAUDI ARABIA (AFNEWS) -- THE WAR MAY BE OVER, BUT THE BATTLE
CONTINUES FOR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF KUWAITIS WHO ARE STILL
RECOVERING FROM THE SHOCK OF THE IRAQI OCCUPATION. ALTHOUGH THE
THREAT OF BRUTAL TREATMENT AND THE FEAR OF EXECUTION ARE GONE, THE
TINY EMIRATE IS STILL WITHOUT RUNNING WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND MANY OF
THE OTHER BASIC SERVICES NEEDED FOR SURVIVAL.

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKDROP THAT SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE 1630TH
TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING (PROVISIONAL), NICKNAMED THE LST DAWG FOR 1ST
DESSERT AIRLIFT WING, FELT COMPULLED TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP. LED BY
MSgt. ROBERT WOODBURY, A MEMBER OF THE 375TH CIVIL ENGINEERING
SQUADRON AT SCOTT AFB, ILL., A TEAM OF FOUR VOLUNTEERS COLLECTED
NEARLY 10,000 POUNDS OF FOOD, HEALTH SUPPLIES, TOYS AND OTHER ITEMS
FOR THE RELIEF EFFORTS IN KUWAIT CITY. OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CREW WHO
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SERGEANT MATELSKI. MOST OF THE GOODS WERE DONATED BY MEMBERS OF THE WING WHO HAD RECEIVED MORE "ANY SERVICE MEMBER" MAIL THAN THEY COULD USE.

QUOTE: OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS EVERYBODY HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO WITH ALL THEIR FOOD ITEMS.

SERGEANT WOODBURY SAID, "MOST OF THEM SAID THEY WERE GOING TO THROW THEM IN THE TRASH. I KEPT THINKING TO MYSELF THAT IT SEEMED LIKE AWWFUL BIG WASTE -- IT JUST SEEMED TO ME THAT WE COULD DO SOMETHING WITH ALL THE EXCESS FOOD AND HEALTH ITEMS.

QUOTE: INITIALLY, I THOUGHT ABOUT TAKING THE GOODS DOWNTOWN TO A LOCAL ORPHANAGE, BUT AS THE NEWS REPORTS CAME IN ABOUT THE HOMELESS IN KUWAIT CITY, THAT'S WHERE WE DECIDED WE WANTED THE STUFF TO GO."

STARTING AT ABOUT 6 EACH MORNING, SERGEANT WOODBURY AND HIS VOLUNTEERS SPENT THREE WEEKS COLLECTING DONATIONS FROM SEVERAL PICKUP POINTS -- SOMETIMES THREE TIMES A DAY. ONCE THEY ASSEMBLED THE DONATIONS, WHICH FILLED AN ENTIRE TENT, THEY SORTED THE ITEMS BY CATEGORIES, BEING CAREFUL TO REMOVE CERTAIN FOOD AND OTHER THINGS THAT WOULD EMBARRASS OR OFFEND THEIR MUSLIM BENEFICIARIES.

SERGEANT WOODBURY SAID THEY DECIDED TO SORT ALL LIKE ITEMS TOGETHER TO MAKE THEM EASIER TO DISTRIBUTE. HE SAID THEY HAD SOUPS, CANDY, SNACKS, TOYS, CANNED FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, TWO 40-GALLON TRASH CANS FULL OF KOOL-AID PACKETS AND SEVERAL OTHER MORE UNIQUE DONATIONS. SERGEANT CHANDARLIS SAID THE MOST UNUSUAL THING HE HAD
OF SG.

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KNOCKED OUT IRAQ'S AIR FORCE, AND RENDERED THEIR NAVY INEFFECTIVE. WE
ADDED, THESE STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL. PARA
QUOTE) WE STARTED OFF GOING AFTER THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT ALLOWED
THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY TO FUNCTION, AND WE CONTINUE TO
DO THAT, [END QUOTE] SAID KELLY. PARA (QUOTE) NOW THAT WE HAVE DONE
THAT, WE'RE ABLE TO FOCUS ON OTHER THINGS. [END QUOTE] HE SAID.
QUOTE) WE'RE CONCENTRATING ON BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.
WE HAD BEEN CONCENTRATING ON THE REPUBLICAN GUARD FOR SOME TIME, AND
WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO THAT. ALL OF THAT TAKES A TOLL. EXCEPT FOR
THE INCURSION JAN. 30, THEY HAVE BEEN IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SINCE
ABOUT MID-AUGUST WHEN THEY MOVED DOWN AND STARTED CAMPING IN [END
QUOTE] PARA WHEN ASKED BY A REPORTER WHAT KIND OF AIR ASSETS ARE
BEING USED IN THIS PHASE, KELLY REPLIED. [QUOTE] EVERY ASSET WE HAVE
THAT'S CAPABLE OF ATTACKING, FROM B-52S DOWN TO A-10s [END QUOTE].

THIRTY

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ACTION IN RAS AL KHAFJI

SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWO DAYS OF GROUND
ACTIVITY, THE PICTURE OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THE BATTLE AT RAS AL
KHAFJI HAS BECOME MORE CLEAR. DURING A FEB. 1 U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
OPERATIONS BRIEF, BRIG. GEN. PAT STEVENS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
LOGISTICS, GAVE THE BATTLE [QUOTE] A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE IRAQIS.
[END QUOTE] PARA PUTTING IRAQI EQUIPMENT LOSSES AT SEVEN TANKS AND
NINE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AT KHAFJI WITH 500 ENEMY PRISONERS
OF WAR CAPTURED, STEVENS SAID SAUDI AND QATARI FORCES FORCED AN
IRAQI BATTALION-SIZED UNIT OUT OF THE CITY. PARA THE ACTION BEGAN
WHEN AIR RAIDS CAPTURED THE CITY IN FORCE ENTERED THE CITY, AND WAS
ENGAGED BY FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR. WITH MARINE CORPS AH-1
COBRA ATTACK HELICOPTERS PROVIDING AIR SUPPORT. THE COALITION FORCES
SUBSEQUENTLY SUCCEEDED IN RETAKING CONTROL OF THE CITY. PARA
ACCORDING TO STEVENS, U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THAT BATTLE, WAS
LIMITED TO MARINE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, AS WELL AS MARINE CORPS
ARTILLERY AND COBRA ATTACK HELICOPTERS. PARA IN OTHER ACTION, STEVENS
SAID THE LATEST REPORTS OF THE IRAQI ATTACK NEAR WAFRA, IN WHICH 11
MARINES WERE KILLED, AND TWO WOUNDED, SHOW IRAQI LOSSES OF 33 TANKS
AND 28 APCS. IN ADDITION, 17 IRAIS WERE TAKEN PRISONER IN THAT
CONFLICT. PARA THE IRAQI FORCE INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION WAS [QUOTE]
BELIEVED TO BE A MECHANIZED BATTALION [END QUOTE] THAT CROSSED THE
BORDER WEST OF THE KUWAITI TOWN OF WAFRA IN T-62 TANKS, BTR-60
WEHELED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND MTLB TRACKED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. SOME
DISMOUNTED INFANTRY ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK. PARA RESPONDING
TO PRESS REPORTS OF IRAQI TROOPS MASSING FOR AN ATTACK NEAR WAFRA,
STEVENS SAID. [QUOTE] WE DO OBSEERVE MOVEMENT. WE DON'T NECESSARILY
CONCLUDE FROM THAT THERE'S ANY MAJOR ACTION ABOUT TO HAPPEN. WE WATCH
THAT OBVIOUSLY, VERY, VERY CAREFULLY, AND WE HAVE SUPERB RESOURCES TO
TRACK WHAT THE ENEMY IS UP TO. [END QUOTE] PARA IN A PENTAGON
BRIEFING LATER, L.T. GEN. THOMAS KELLY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, TOLD REPORTERS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN VARIOUS REPORTS OF
MOVEMENT IN ENEMY TERRITORY. PARA [QUOTE] WE DID BASED ON VARIOUS
MEANS, DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS ENEMY
MOVEMENT IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS JAN. 31. (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) WE DID TAKE ACTION TO COUNTER THAT MOVEMENT. BUT IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE TO GIVE AN INTENTION TO IT -- WERE THEY PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK -- WE SIMPLY DON'T KNOW. WE CAN'T READ THE IRAQI HIGH COMMAND OR SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MIND. (END QUOTE) PARA ACCORDING TO KELLY, THERE HAS BEEN SOME REPORTS OF REPOSITIONING GOING ON. SOME OF THE FORCES COULD HAVE BEEN RETURNING FROM THE ACTIONS IN AL-KHAFJI. THE COALITION COMMAND KNEW THERE WAS MOVEMENT, AND WENT AFTER IT. PARA (QUOTE) WE LIKE TO SEE THAT, (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) WHEN ENEMY TANKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND OTHER COMBAT VEHICLES COME OUT OF THEIR PREPARED POSITIONS, THEY'RE EASIER TARGETS. (END QUOTE) PARA KELLY SAID COALITION FORCES HAVE HAD A PROGRAM GOING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, REFERRED TO AS (QUOTE) BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. (END QUOTE) ALLIED FORCES ARE INTERDICTING THE ENEMY WHEREEVER AND WHENEVER THEY'RE FOUND. PARA (QUOTE) THERE WAS MOVEMENT. WE KNEW ABOUT IT, (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) YET, WE CAN'T ATTRIBUTE A MEANING TO IT BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WERE INTENDING TO DO. IF THEY ARE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO COME OUT OF THEIR POSITIONS, THEN IT WILL BE A LESS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. (END QUOTE) THIRTY MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BT
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1630 TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING (PROVISIONAL)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKDROP THAT SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE 1630TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING (PROVISIONAL), NICKNAMED THE LST OAWG FOR 1ST DESERT AIRLIFT WING, FELT COMPelled TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP. LED BY MSGT. ROBERT WOODBURY, A MEMBER OF THE 375TH CIVIL ENGINEERING SQUADRON AT SCOTT AFB, ILL., A TEAM OF FOUR VOLUNTEERS COLLECTED NEARLY 10,000 POUNDS OF FOOD, HEALTH SUPPLIES, TOYS AND OTHER ITEMS FOR THE RELIEF EFFORTS IN KUWAIT CITY. OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CREW WHO
### Routine

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### Section 2 of 3

**HELPED WITH THE COLLECTING, SORTING AND PACKING OF DONATIONS WERE**

**SSGT. MARK K. KRUSE, SSgt. JOHN W. MATELSKI, SSgt. BEATRICE B. NOERNBERG AND SSgt. JAMES A. CHANDARILS. MOST OF THE GOODS WERE**

**DONATED BY MEMBERS OF THE WING WHO HAD RECEIVED MORE "ANY**

**SERVICEMEMBER" MAIL THAN THEY COULD USE.**

**QUOTE**

**OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS EVERYBODY HAD BEEN TALKING**

**ABOUT WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO WITH ALL THEIR FOOD ITEMS,"**

**SERGEANT WOODBURY SAID. "MOST OF THEM SAID THEY WERE GOING TO THROW**

**THEM IN THE TRASH. I KEPT THINKING TO MYSELF THAT IT SEEMED LIKE AN**

**AWFUL BIG WASTE -- IT JUST SEEMED TO ME THAT WE COULD DO SOMETHING**

**WITH ALL THE EXCESS FOOD AND HEALTH ITEMS.**

**QUOTE**

**INITIALLY, I THOUGHT ABOUT TAKING THE GOODS DOWNTOWN TO**

**A LOCAL ORPHANAGE. BUT AS THE NEWS REPORTS CAME IN ABOUT THE HOMELESS**

**IN KUWAIT CITY, THAT'S WHERE WE DECIDED WE WANTED THE STUFF TO GO."**

**STARTING AT ABOUT 6 EACH MORNING. SERGEANT WOODBURY AND HIS**

**VOLUNTEERS SPENT THREE WEEKS COLLECTING DONATIONS FROM SEVERAL PICKUP**

**POINTS -- SOMETIMES THREE TIMES A DAY. ONCE THEY ASSEMBLED THE**

**DONATIONS, WHICH FILLED AN ENTIRE TENT. THEY SORTED THE ITEMS BY**

**CATEGORIES, BEING CAREFUL TO REMOVE CERTAIN FOOD AND OTHER THINGS**

**THAT WOULD EMBARRASS OR OFFEND THEIR MUSLIM BENEFICIARIES.**

**SERGEANT WOODBURY SAID THEY DECIDED TO SORT ALL LIKE ITEMS**

**TOGETHER TO MAKE THEM EASIER TO DISTRIBUTE. HE SAID THEY HAD SOUPS,**

**CANDY, SNACKS, TOYS, CANNED FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, TWO 40-GALLON**

**TANKS, CAN FULL KIDS-AID PACKETS AND SEVERAL OTHER MORE UNIQUE**

**DONATIONS. SERGEANT CHANDARILS SAID THE MOST UNUSUAL THING HE HAD**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**
WHEN I WENT TO DEL., TO WORK AIRLIFT OPERATIONS AT KUWAIT CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, I HAD ALREADY MADE CONTACT WITH A LARGE HOSPITAL IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CITY WITH THE HELP OF THE ARMY'S 352Nd CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE AT CAMP FREEDOM, LOCATED JUST OFF THE KUWAIT CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

THE ALCE OPERATIONS OFFICER, LT. COL. JOHN CIRAFICI, SAID HIS PEOPLE HAD ALREADY TRUCKED IN 13 CRATES OF APPLES, CANDY AND A THREE-QUARTER-TON TRUCK LOAD OF OTHER ITEMS SPECIFICALLY LABELED (QUOTE) FOR THE KUWAITI CHILDREN, BEFORE SERGEANT WOODBURY'S LOAD, THEY HAD BEEN GETTING ONE OR TWO BOXES OF DONATED ITEMS ON EACH AIRCRAFT THAT CAME THROUGH. THEY WERE OVERWHELMED TO SEE MORE THAN FOUR TONS OF GOODS ROLL OFF THE RAMPS OF 1ST DAWG C-130S.

THE HOSPITAL THE DONATIONS WENT TO IS CALLED THE KUWAIT CITY SOCIAL WELFARE COMPLEX, LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CITY. IT'S HOME TO MORE THAN 500 ORPHANS, HANDICAPPED CHILDREN, AND MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN AND YOUNG ADULTS. BECAUSE OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROJECT, SERGEANT WOODBURY FLEW IN TO KUWAIT CITY TO DELIVER SOME OF THE ITEMS AND TO MEET THE HOSPITAL STAFF AROUND 3 P.M. THE OPPORTUNITY CAME TO TAKE THE TWO PICKUP TRUCK LOADS DOWN TO THE HOSPITAL, BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN AT NIGHT. THE SKY WAS COVERED FROM HORIZON TO HORIZON WITH A BLANKET OF OIL SMOKE WHICH NEARLY BLOODED OUT THE SUN -- JUST A DIM ORANGE DISK OVERHEAD. EVERYTHING WAS LITHE IN AN EERY LIGHT WHICH ADDED TO THE SURREAL IMAGES OF BURNED OUT HOMES, ABANDONED TANKS, AND PILES UPON PILES OF WRECKED CARS STREW EVERYWHERE. WHAT HAD ONCE BEEN CALLED ONE OF THE MOST BEAUTIFUL CITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW LOOKED LIKE A GIANT JUNK YARD. ALTHOUGH KUWAIT WAS FREE, THE TRAUMA OF WAR STILL HUNG LIKE A HEAVY SHADOW OVER EVERYTHING.


ALTHOUGH THE STAFF MEMBERS AND VOLUNTEER WORKERS WERE SMILING, IT WAS EASY TO SEE THEY HAD STILL NOT RECOVERED FROM WHAT THEY SAID WAS AN "INDESCRIBABLE" SEVEN MONTHS OF IRAQI OCCUPATION. SAMIRA AL KHATLAN, A YOUNG WOMAN IN HER 20S AND A VOLUNTEER AT THE HOSPITAL DURING THE OCCUPATION, SAID IT WAS REALLY TOUGH.

QUOTE "THEY TOOK ALL THE FOOD SUPPLIES, THE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, EVEN THE CLOTHES," SHE SAID. THE PATIENTS SURVIVED WAS THROUGH THE HELP AND GENTILITY OF THE KUWAITI PEOPLE AND LOCAL SHOPKEEPS WHO SMUGGLED FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES INTO THE COMPOUND. MS. SAMIRA SAID THEY WOULD MOVE SUPPLIES FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER TO KEEP THE IRAQI SOLDIERS FROM FINDING THEM -- LIKE "TOM AND JERRY." PLAYING "CAT AND MOUSE" TO KEEP THE 500 PATIENTS ALIVE.

SHE DESCRIBED ONE SMALL GIRL WHO DEFIED THE IRAQI SOLDIERS FROM
HER WHEELCHAIR, SAYING SHE DIDN'T LIKE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THAT SHE WANTED HIM TO DIE. MS. SAMIRA SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH THE GIRL COULD SAY VERY LITTLE BECAUSE OF SHOCK AND TRAUMA CAUSED BY THE OCCUPATION, THE IRAQI SOLDIERS WERE GOING TO KILL HER. TO PROTECT THE GIRL, MS. SAMIRA SAID VOLUNTEERS RISKED THEIR OWN LIVES TRYING TO PERSUADE THE SOLDIERS TO DISREGARD HER BECAUSE SHE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT SHE WAS SAYING. OTHERS THREATENED THE IRAQI SOLDIERS BY TELLING THEM THEY WOULD GO TO THEIR COMMANDING OFFICERS -- AN ACT OF EXTREME COURAGE CONSIDERING THE FACT SOLDIERS WERE KNOWN TO SHOOT PATIENTS WHO MERELY ASKED FOR FOOD.

THERE LIBERATION CAME AT 8 A.M. FEB. 27 WHEN, MS. SAMIRA SAID, THE IRAQI SOLDIERS DROPPED THEIR WEAPONS, THREW OFF THEIR UNIFORMS AND STARTED RUNNING THROUGH THE STREETS "NAKED."

(QUOTE) WE ARE REALLY THANKFUL TO THE AMERICANS FOR EVERYTHING," SAID MS. SAMIRA, "BECAUSE WE NEED THE FOOD, WE NEED THE CANDIES AND ALL THE OTHER THINGS. MOST OF THE CHILDREN WERE USED TO A MUCH BETTER LIFE."

"O330"
FINAL SECTION OF 3
BETTER STANDARD OF LIVING AND OVER THE LAST SEVEN MONTHS THEY HAVE BEEN LIVING WITH ALMOST NOTHING."
(COURTESY CENTAF NEWS SERVICE)

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One para quote)

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Continue capability, destroyed Aircraft.

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A: PRECISION TACTICS SUCCEED AGAINST SPECIAL TARGETS
B: COALITION AIRPOWER REIGNS
C: NEW FOCUS IN AIR ASSAULT
D: ACTION IN RAS AL KHAFJI

STORIES FOLLOW:

A: PRECISION TACTICS SUCCEED AGAINST SPECIAL TARGETS

Saudi Arabia (CENT NEWS) -- As ALLIED COALITION AIR STRIKES
CONTINUE AROUND THE CLOCK AGAINST TARGETS IN IRAQ AND OCCUPIED
KUWAIT, PRECISION BOMBING HAS SHOWN ITS WORTH. PARA AS OPERATION
DESERT STORM ENTERS ITS THIRD WEEK, MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE
BEEN MADE IN THE FIELD OF TARGET SELECTION AND DESTRUCTION WITH
THE LEAST AMOUNT OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES POSSIBLE. PARA EARLY ON
IN 1991, STORM DESEST SHIELD, DESERT STORM'S PREDECESSOR. IT WAS
ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE AND PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY WOULD BE MAJOR TARGETS OF AIR STRIKES, SHOULD IT COME
TO OFFENSIVE ACTION. SINCE OFFENSIVE ACTION HAS IN FACT TAKEN
PLACE, HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS AND BRIDGES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO
PRIVITY TARGETS. PARA AS THE COALITION AIR STRIKES CONTINUE,
GEN. H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND, ANNOUNCED JAN. 30 THAT ALL OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. PARA SPEAKING TO INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA, SCHWARZKOPF SAID 31 LOCATIONS HAD BEEN ATTACKED WITH 933
SORTIES. PARA HE ADDED THAT THE BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
HAD BEEN (QUOTE) LEVELLED TO RUBBLE. (END QUOTE) CREDITING
PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES AND TLM CRUISE MISSILES FOR STRIKING
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL FACILITIES AS WELL AS MANY
AIRCRAFT. PARA (QUOTE) WE HAVE ABSOLUTE CONFIRMATION THAT WE'VE
DESTROYED OVER 11 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL STORAGE AREAS, (END
QUOTE) SCHWARZKOPF SAID. (QUOTE) WE'VE ALSO DESTROYED OR HEAVILY
DAMAGED THREE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES. (END
QUOTE) PARA AS FOR FUTURE INTENTIONS TO ELIMINATE IRAQ'S NBC
CAPABILITY, SCHWARZKOPF CONCLUDED, (QUOTE) WE'RE GOING TO
CONTINUE A RELENTLESS ATTACK ON THIS VERY, VERY HETEROUS WEAPON
SYSTEM. (END QUOTE) PARA SINCE IRAQ HAS SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES DUO
TO ALLIED COALITION AIR STRIKES, IT HAS RESORTED TO HIDING
ITS PLANES IN HARDENED STRUCTURES THROUGHOUT KUWAIT AND IRAQ.
PARA ACCORDING TO SCHWARZKOPF, HOWEVER, THE ALLIED COALITION HAS
(QUOTE) COMMISSIONED A SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF THOSE HARDENED
SHELTERS. (END QUOTE) PARA SCHWARZKOPF SAID MORE THAN 70 OF THE
SHELTERS HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ. PARA AT
ONE POINT DURING HIS BRIEFING TO THE MEDIA, VIDEO TAPES OF ACTUAL
GUN CAMERA FOOTAGE SHOWED HARDENED SHELTERS, SOME WITH PLANES IN
THEM, BEING DESTROYED. PARA FOOTAGE SHOWN OF AIR ATTACKS AGAINST
THE TALIL AIRFIELD, ONE OF IRAQ'S MAJOR MIRAGE F-1 PLANE

UNCLASSIFIED

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B COALITION AIRPOWER REGIONS

SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- COALITION AIRCRAFT SORTIES NOW NUMBER OVER 37,000. ARMY LT. GEN. THOMAS KELLY JOINT STAFF DIRECTOR OPERATIONS, DAILY BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON, JAN. 28, SAID AIR FORCE HAS FLOWN 1,800 MISSIONS TO DATE, AVERAGE OF 300 ADDITIONAL MISSIONS ARE FLOWN EVERY DAY. PARA TO DATE, ACCORDING TO KELLY, 284 TOMAHAWK MISSILES HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AT ENEMY SITES. TARGETING BY COALITION AIRCRAFT CONTINUES TO BE COMMAND AND CONTROL, SCUD MISSILE SITES, AIRFIELDS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. AIRCRAFT ALSO DESTROYED NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL FACILITIES, THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, AND BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. PARA (QUOTE) THEY HAVE 59 AIRCRAFT TO DATE -- 28 AIR-TO-AIR, AND 31 ON THE GROUND (END QUOTE), SAID KELLY. PARA ACCORDING TO KELLY, THE NUMBER OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN AS OF JAN. 31 WAS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 89-92. PARA Reports PART OF IRAQI'S AIRCRAFT ARE IN T. "WE HAVE LOST SOME WEASEL MISSIONS FLOWN DETECTED (QUOTE) ABSOLUTELY NO RADAR EMISSIONS WHATSOEVER. (END QUOTE) THIRTY C NEW FOCUS IN AIR ASSAULT

SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- COALITION AIRCRAFT HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL ANNOUNCED IN A RECENT PRESS BRIEFING. PARA ACCORDING TO ARMY LT. GEN. THOMAS KELLY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, ALLIED FORCES HAVE

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KNOCKED OUT IRAQ'S AIR FORCE, AND RENDERED THEIR NAVY INEFFECTIVE. HE
ADDED, "THESE STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL. PARA
QUOTE) 'WE STARTED OFF GOING AFTER THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT ALLOWED
THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY TO FUNCTION, AND WE'RE CONTINUING TO
DO THAT,' END QUOTE) SAID KELLY. PARA (QUOTE) NOW THAT WE HAVE DONE
THAT, WE'RE ABLE TO FOCUS RATE ON OTHER THINGS,' END QUOTE) HE SAID.
QUOTE) 'WE'RE CONCENTRATING ON BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH
WE HAD BEEN CONCENTRATING ON THE REPUBLICAN GUARD FOR SOME TIME, AND
WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO THAT. ALL OF THAT TAKES A TOLL. EXCEPT FOR
THE INCURSION JAN. 30, THEY HAVE BEEN IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SINCE
ABOUT MID-AUGUST, WHEN THEY MOVED DOWN AND STARTED 'GOING IN,' END QUOTE) PARA WHEN ASKED BY A REPORTER WHAT KIND OF AIR ASSETS ARE
BEING USED IN THIS PHASE, KELLY REPLIED, (QUOTE) EVERY ASSET WE HAVE
THAT'S CAPABLE OF ATTACKING, FROM B-52S DOWN TO A-10S (END QUOTE).

THIRTY
D: ACTION IN RAS AL KHAIFJI
SAUDI ARABIA (CENT NEWS) -- AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWO DAYS OF GROUND
ACTIVITY, THE PICTURE OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THE BATTLE AT RAS AL
KHAIFJI HAS BECOME MORE CLEAR. DURING A FEB. 1 U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
OPERATIONS BRIEF, BRIG. GEN. PAT STEVENS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
LOGISTICS, SAID THE BATTLE (QUOTE) A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE IRAQIS.
END QUOTE) PARA PUTTING IRAQI EQUIPMENT LOSSES AT SEVEN TANKS AND
NINE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AT KHAIFJI, WITH 500 ENEMY PRISONERS
OF WAR CAPTURED. STEVENS SAID SAUDI AND QATARI FORCES FORCED AN
IRAQI BATTALION-SIZED UNIT OUT OF THE CITY. PARA THE ACTION BEGAN
WHEN IRAQI INFRASTRUCTURE IN KHAIFJI ENGAGED BY FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR, WITH MARINE CORPS AH-1 COBRA ATTACK HELICOPTERS PROVIDING AIR SUPPORT. THE COALITION FORCES
SUBSEQUENTLY SUCCEEDED IN RETAKING CONTROL OF THE CITY. PARA
ACCORDING TO STEVENS, U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THAT BATTLE, WAS
LIMITED TO MARINE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, AS WELL AS MARINE CORPS
ARTILLERY AND COBRA ATTACK HELICOPTERS. PARA IN OTHER ACTION, STEVENS
SAID THE LATEST REPORTS OF THE IRAQI ATTACK NEAR WAFRA, IN WHICH 11
MARINES WERE KILLED, AND TWO WOUNDED, SHOW IRAQI LOSSES OF 33 TANKS
AND 28 APCS. IN ADDITION, 17 IRAQIS WERE TAKEN PRISONER IN THAT
CONFLICT. PARA THE IRAQI FORCE INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION WAS (QUOTE)
BELIEVED TO BE A MECHANIZED BATTALION (END QUOTE) THAT CROSSED THE
BORDER WEST OF THE KUWAITI TOWN OF WAFRA IN T-52 TANKS, BTR-60
WEHEELED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND MTLB TRACKED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. SOME
DISMOUNTED INFANTRY ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK. PARA RESPONDING TO
PRESS REPORTS OF IRAQI TROOPS MASSES FOR AN ATTACK NEAR WAFRA,
STEVENS SAID, (QUOTE) WE DO OBSERVE MOVEMENT. WE DO NOT NECESSARILY
CONCLUDE FROM THAT THERE'S ANY MAJOR ACTION ABOUT TO HAPPEN. WE WATCH
THAT OBVIOUSLY, VERY, VERY CAREFULLY, AND WE HAVE SUPERB RESOURCES TO
TRACK WHAT THE ENEMY IS UP TO. (END QUOTE) PARA IN A PENTAGON
BRIEF LATER, FEB. 1, ARMY L.T. GEN. THOMAS KELLY, JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, TOLD REPORTERS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN
VARIOUS REPORTS OF MOVEMENT IN ENEMY TERRITORY. PARA (QUOTE) WE
DID, BASED ON VARIOUS MEANS, DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS ENEMY

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MOVEMENT IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS JAN. 31. (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) WE DID TAKE ACTION TO COUNTER THAT MOVEMENT. BUT IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE TO GIVE AN INTENTION TO IT -- WERE THEY PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK -- WE SIMPLY DON'T KNOW. WE CAN'T READ THE IRAQI HIGH COMMAND OR SAODAM HUSSEIN'S MIND. (END QUOTE) PARA ACCORDING TO KELLY, THERE HAS BEEN SOME REPORTS OF REPOSITIONING GOING ON. SOME OF THE FORCES COULD HAVE BEEN RETURNING FROM THE ACTIONS IN AL KHAFJI. THE COALITION COMMAND KNEW THERE WAS MOVEMENT, AND WENT AFTER IT. PARA (QUOTE) WE LIKE TO SEE THAT, (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) WHEN ENEMY TANKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND OTHER COMBAT VEHICLES COME OUT OF THEIR PREPARED POSITIONS, THEY'RE EASIER TARGETS. (END QUOTE) PARA KELLY SAID COALITION FORCES HAVE HAD A PROGRAM GOING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, REFERRED TO AS (QUOTE) BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS. (END QUOTE) ALLIED FORCES ARE INTERDICTING THE ENEMY WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THEY'RE FOUND. PARA (QUOTE) THERE WAS MOVEMENT. WE KNEW ABOUT IT. WE WENT AFTER IT. (END QUOTE) KELLY SAID. (QUOTE) YET, WE CAN'T ATTRIBUTE A MEANING TO IT BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WERE INTENDING TO DO. IF THEY ARE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO COME OUT OF THEIR POSITIONS, THEN IT WILL BE A LESS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. (END QUOTE) THIRTY MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BT #2149
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