US UNIFIED COMMAND IN EUROPE

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CONTENTS

I  The European Command, 1947-1951  1
II  The Reorganization of 1952  6
III  The US European Command, 1952-1953  12
IV  The US European Command, 1954-1959  19
V  The US European Command, 1959-1963  24

Appendix: US Unified Commanders in Europe  34
I. The European Command, 1947-1951

The antecedents of unified command in Europe go back to the command arrangements of World War II and the U.S. European Theater of Operations. The story began formally with the JCS approval of the first Unified Command Plan in December 1946 and the subsequent establishment of the European Command in March 1947.

The adoption of the first Unified Command Plan resulted from the conflicting command arrangements in the various theaters and areas of the world at the close of World War II. The European Theater was no exception. With the Allied victory in Europe, the combined Allied Expeditionary Force was dissolved on 14 July 1945, and the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, was named Commanding General, US Forces in the European Theater (COMUSFORTHEME) with all US Army ground and air forces in Europe under his command. General Eisenhower also served as the Commander in Chief, US Forces of Occupation in Germany, and General Mark Clark, as Commander in Chief, US Forces of Occupation in Austria, reported to General Eisenhower. The naval forces required for occupation duties and for support of the US Army in the ETO were assigned to the Commander Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER), who also reported to COMUSFORTHEME. Besides COMNAVFORGER, there was a Commander Naval Forces Europe (COMNAVFEurope) with headquarters in London, who was the senior naval officer in Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa and who operated directly under CNO.1 Thus, in the months following the end of the war in Europe, US military interests in that area were served by a patchwork command organization whose channels and responsibilities were often unclear. It was not until September 1946 that action was initiated to create a more orderly command organization.

The lead was taken by CSA, who submitted an outline command plan for JCS consideration. Although the plan centered on the command problems of the Pacific, it considered the other theaters and proposed the establishment of seven unified commands throughout the world, including a European Command. The Army plan called for a European commander to exercise unified command over all forces allocated to him by “the JCS or other authority.” It also charged him with missions of supporting US policy in Europe, occupying Germany, and planning for major emergencies in Europe.2

The CSA proposal set off considerable discussion and counter proposals within the JCS on command relations. CNO submitted an outline plan that, as far as Europe
was concerned, would have continued the existing European Theater of Operations.  

After consideration of the Army and Navy plans, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Admiral Leahy, presented the JCS his version of a unified command plan. With respect to Europe, it provided for a unified command identical to that in the Army proposal.  

After further consideration of the various plans, the JCS approved a Unified Command Plan (UCP) on 12 December 1946 which provided for the following commands:  

- Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean, and European, besides recognizing the existence of the Strategic Air Command.  
- Each commander was to exercise unified command over component forces consisting of Army, Army air, and naval forces, with each command normally consisting of two or more components. The plan specified that each commander would have a joint staff with appropriate members from the components of the Services under his command. The European Command included in the UCP had the same missions as had originally been processed by the CSA.  

Following Presidential approval, the UCP became effective for the Far East, Pacific, and Alaskan Commands on 1 January 1947, but activation of the other commands, including the European Command, was delayed. The JCS did, however, forward CG USFET an informational copy of the UCP. CGUSFET realized that his mission was performed mainly by ground and military government forces, that the naval component was exceptionally small, and that air forces could be materially reduced since they made only a nominal contribution to the occupation mission; therefore he requested that the JCS authorize the European Commander direct command over Army ground forces without the establishment of an intermediate component headquarters. The JCS approved this exception to the UCP on 12 February 1947, thereby eliminating an Army component commander and headquarters from the European Command.  

In February 1947, CSA recommended that the JCS should establish the European Command on 15 March 1947 and designate CG USFET the unified commander in Europe with the title of "Commander in Chief, European Command" (CINCEUR). The JCS approved this recommendation on 24 February and notified CG USFET that the UCP would become effective for the European Command on 15 March 1947. The JCS named Lt. General Lucius D. Clay, CG USFET designate — replacing General Joseph T. McNarney on 15 March 1947 — as CINCEUR and directed all forces reporting to CG USFET to report to CINCEUR, who would exercise unified command over those forces in accordance with the UCP. At the same time, the JCS designated CSA as the executive agent of the JCS for the European Command. Thus the European Command was created.
on 15 March 1947 with General Clay as the first commander in chief. Although the European Command was a unified command on paper, in actual operation it was preponderantly an Army command concerned primarily with the occupation of former enemy territories.

With the creation of the European Command, CNO redesignated ComNavEU the Commander, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (ComNavEastLant) in order to avoid confusion and to better describe the operational areas involved; however, ComNavEastLant remained an independent Navy commander under CNO control. Then in October of that same year and upon the recommendation of CNO, the JCS established the US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean as a naval commander under their direction and made appropriate revision in the Unified Command Plan. The mission of the Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (COMNAVASTLANC) included: conduct of naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East; support of the European Commander in his mission; support of US occupational forces in Europe; support of US and Allied troops in the Free Territory of Trieste; and support of US policy within the scope of his command responsibility. CNO changed the short title of the Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean to CINC EUR on 3 May 1948.

In June 1948, as a result of the rising tensions in Europe, the JCS added two additional responsibilities to the mission of CINC EUR: supervision and coordination of all plans and actions of US forces under his command and such other forces as might be made available for meeting a general emergency; and maintenance of reserve forces that might be employed elsewhere in the event of an extreme emergency. The JCS made the required revision in the UCP and forwarded the revision to CINC EUR on 30 June 1948.

The JCS again revised the CINC EUR directive in the UCP in July 1949 to reflect Presidential action ending military government in Germany. By an Executive Order of 6 June 1949, the President established the post of US High Commissioner for Germany to be the supreme US authority in Germany. In outlining the responsibilities of the High Commissioner, the President prescribed certain responsibilities and relationships between the High Commissioner and CINC EUR. Consequently, the JCS modified CINC EUR's mission to include those instructions. The revised mission charged CINC EUR: to render the office of the High Commissioner and other US civilian agencies in Germany the same general logistical and administrative support as had been furnished to the Military Government; upon the request of the High Commissioner to take necessary measures for maintenance of law and order and such other actions as
required to support US policy in Germany; and to advise the High Commissioner on military matters in Germany, submitting the necessary reports and recommendations to the JCS in the event of major differences of opinion. The revised mission further directed CINCEUR to execute intelligence, historical, information, and psychological warfare missions under JCS directives, closely coordinating those activities in Germany with the High Commissioner's office. With SecDef and State Department approval, the JCS forwarded the revised directive to CINCEUR on 18 July 1949. CINCEUR operated under that directive until the fall of 1950.

In October 1950, CSAF requested the JCS to clarify the status of the Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Europe (CINCAFE) — a component commander of CINCEUR since the creation of the Department of the Air Force in 1947. CSAF cited the recent augmentation of US Air Forces in the United Kingdom and surmised that, in view of the current international tension, similar actions to strengthen US capabilities in Western Europe were likely in the near future. Therefore he recommended that CINCAFE's position should be established on a level with CINCEUR and CINCEIM and proposed the creation of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) as a JCS specified command with a mission of: supporting CINCEUR, CINCEIM, and CG SAC; supporting occupation forces in Europe; participating in combined planning for the United Kingdom; and supporting US policy within the scope of his command responsibilities. The JCS approved the Air Force recommendation on 20 November 1950 and informed CINCEUR of their action, and on 11 January 1951, they designated Lt. General Lauris Norstad as CINCAFE and promulgated the necessary change to the UCP. Subsequently, General Norstad assumed command of USAFE on 22 January 1951. With the establishment of USAFE and the previous establishment of HELM, the JCS had in reality created three specified commands in Europe: CINCEUR—predominantly Army; CINCEIM—Navy; and CINCAFE—Air Force.
Chapter I

Footnotes

1 See Appendix F of (TS downgraded to R) JCS 1476/5, Rpt by Jt Staff Planners, "Review of US Command Structure and Theater Boundaries in Europe," 25 Jan 46, CCS 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 3.

2 (TS) JCS 1259/12, Memo by CSA, "Unified Command Structure," 17 Sep 46, same file.


4 (TS downgraded to C) JCS 1259/21, Memo by CINCS of the Army and Navy, "Unified Command Plan," 14 Nov 46, same file, Sec. 4.

5 See above, p. 1.


7 See 14 Dec 46 notation on (TS) Memo, CoS to CINC of Army and Navy to President, 12 Dec 46, same file.

8 (C) Memo, JCS to CINC Army Forces Pacific, CINC Pacific, and CG Alaskan Dept., 16 Dec 46, same file, Sec. 5.


10 (S) Mag, CG USFET to JCS, SX 1191, 8 Jan 47, same file.


12 (C) JCS 1259/33, Memo by CSA, "Creation of the European Command," 17 Feb 47, same file.

13 (C) Mag, JCS to CG USFET, WAR 0211, 24 Feb 47, same file.

14 (C) JCS 1259/34, Memo by CNO, "Change in Title, U.S. Naval Forces Europe," 28 Feb 47, same file.


16 (U) JCS 1259/72, Note by Secys, "Change in the Short Title of the Commander in Chief: US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean," 3 May 48, same file, Sec. 10.


18 (TS) Mag, JCS to CJCS, WAR 84947, 30-Jun 48, same file, Sec. 11.


22 (TS) JCS 1259/192, Memo by CINCSAF, "The Unified Command Plan," 4 Oct 50, same file, Sec. 22.


25 (U) Mag, CINCSAFE to CSAF, AF IN 16322, 22 Jan 51, same file, Sec. 24.
II The Reorganization of 1952

By the end of 1951, there existed in Europe a number of US military commands and agencies. As discussed above, CINCEUR, CINCEUIN, and CINCSAF reported to the JCS, and there were also the separate Army commands of Trieste United States Troops (TRUST) and US Forces Adriatica (USFA). The situation in Europe was further complicated by the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG) in London that supervised and coordinated for the JCS the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Missions in Europe and by the Military Representative (MREP) who represented the Secretary of Defense on the European Coordination Committee (ECC) and was responsible to the JCS for the military aspects of the Mutual Security Program. As a result of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and the subsequent establishment of the NATO machinery, the JCS had named CINCUS, CG AFE, CINCEUIN, CG USAF, and JAMAG as the JCS Representatives, Europe (JCSRE) in January 1950 to serve as the JCS agency for the supervision of NATO and US joint planning in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Northwest Africa. (CINCSAF replaced CG AFE as a member of the JCSRE in January 1951.) At the request of the NATO nations, President Truman had designated General Eisenhower the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) on 19 December 1950. The Presidential directive also assigned General Eisenhower "operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission, of the U.S. Forces, Europe; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean." The overlapping functions of those commands and agencies and the areas where directive authority was obscure called for a reorganization of the US military structure in Europe.

In early 1952, CSA brought this faulty command structure to JCS attention and recommended the immediate establishment of a satisfactory command organization in Europe. CSA considered the principle of a single unified command the only valid solution and noted that the President in his 19 December 1950 directive had, in effect, given General Eisenhower such authority over all US forces in Europe. CSA proposed that the JCS inform General Eisenhower of their desire to simplify the European Command structure and forward to him two possible solutions for consideration. Those two solutions were: that General Eisenhower exercise, in addition to his SACEUR duties, direct command of US forces in Central Europe including a US Communications Zone (COMZ) headquarters to coordinate and direct logistic support
of all US forces in Central Europe; or the designation of a US unified commander for Central Europe who would operate as General Eisenhower's deputy for purely logistical and administrative functions and such operational responsibilities as General Eisenhower might delegate.³

The JCS approved the Army recommendation on 8 February 1952 and dispatched an appropriate message to General Eisenhower. At the same time they directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, to examine the problem.⁴

General Eisenhower supported a third solution. He recommended the establishment of a US Military Representative, Europe (USMILREP), to serve as a single focal point for US military interest in Europe. Such a USMILREP would be the JCS representative in Europe, being senior to CINCEUR, CINCINLH, and CINCUSAFR, but subject to SACEUR authority in accordance with the Presidential directive. While General Eisenhower did not propose a unified command, he stated that the organization should conform in every respect to the principles of unified command. General Eisenhower's proposal would have continued JUCON, JCSN, and USAF as JCS commands, but with a channel of communication through the USMILREP to JCS to insure complete coordination. He also included provision of a permanent joint staff for the USMILREP.⁵

After consideration of the Eisenhower proposal, the JCSCJUSC submitted its report to the JCS reflecting the divergent views of the Services. The Army and Air Force supported a single unified commander with responsibility and authority for all US military activities in Europe; the Navy, however, favored the Eisenhower proposal for a USMILREP.⁶

After further consideration of the matter, and on the recommendation of the Ops Deps, the JCS approved on 9 May 1952 a draft message for General Eisenhower designating him as US Military Representative in Europe with authority "to establish, under a Deputy a separate U.S. joint staff to administer those U.S. military matters of a joint nature, particularly in the fields of logistics, administration, and related matters."⁷ The JCS forwarded that draft message to SecDef for approval, but before SecDef had taken action on it, the JCS forwarded him a revision of the message, approved after consideration of additional comments from General Eisenhower. The revised message provided for the maximum delegation of authority by the USMILREP to his deputy to deal directly in the USMILREP's name with CINCINLH, CINCUSAF, CG USAF, and CG TWST in military matters of joint concern. The revised message also approved the selection of General Handy as Deputy USMILREP (Dep USMILREP), as
had been recommended by General Eisenhower. Upon SecDef approval, the JCS dispatched the message to General Eisenhower on 23 May 1952.10

Although General Eisenhower was turning over his command as SACEUR to General Ridgway on 30 May 1952, he notified the JCS on 29 May of his arrangements for General Handy to assume his duties as Dep USMILHEP and submitted a proposed letter of instructions for General Handy. These proposed instructions delegated the Dep USMILHEP authority to "direct and coordinate US military matters of a joint nature" within the USMILHEP's area of responsibility and placed CINCEUR, CINCCELM, CINCUSARE, and CGs USFA and TRUST under Dep USMILHEP's control for this purpose.11 The JCS considered these proposed instructions "somewhat broader" than they had envisioned, and they forwarded General Eisenhower an acceptable redraft of the instructions. The redraft limited the Dep USMILHEP's authority to coordination and administration of US military matters, "particularly in the fields of logistics, administration, military aid and related matters requiring coordination in the general European area." The redraft authorized the Dep USMILHEP to "deal directly" with CINCEUR, CINCCELM, CINCUSARE, and CGs USFA and TRUST, but did not place those commanders under Dep USMILHEP control as proposed by General Eisenhower.12

Apparently disagreeing with that JCS action, General Eisenhower notified the JCS that it was impossible in the limited time available before his turnover of command to effect the changes necessary and to take the action previously planned; therefore he passed the problem to General Ridgway.13 Thus the designation of the Deputy USMILHEP had not been effected when General Ridgway assumed command as SACEUR on 1 June 1952.

Upon his assumption of command, General Ridgway immediately took up the matter of US command structure in Europe. After reviewing the various proposals and the views of CINCEUR, CINCCELM, and CINCUSARE, he recommended to the JCS the vesting of US military authority in Europe in one individual who would serve two roles, that of SACEUR and that of Commander in Chief, US European Command ("USCEUR"). USCEUR would exercise unified command, excluding such operational command as was exercised by NATO commanders, over all forces allocated to him by the JCS including the existing US military commands and agencies within SACEUR's area of responsibility. General Ridgway proposed that the existing JCS commands in Europe become the major subordinate commands of USCEUR. He also proposed that the JCS instruct USCEUR to establish a separate headquarters with a deputy and a joint US staff and to delegate to that deputy the authority and responsibilities as USCEUR deemed appropriate.14
The JCS accepted General Ridgway's recommendation for a unified command in Europe in late June, and with SecDef and Presidential approval, they designated General Ridgway as the Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) on 7 July 1952. They also rescinded their 23 May directive naming SACUR the USNILESP in Europe and directed USCINCEUR to:

"exercise unified command and authority, excluding such operational command as is exercised by NATO commanders, over all U.S. forces allocated to you by the JCS or other competent authority, to include existing U.S. military command and agencies within the area of SACUS's responsibility, including Continental Europe, the United Kingdom, North Africa, and Turkey, and within such other areas as the JCS subsequently may specify." USCINCEUR's authority did not extend, however, to US forces in Berlin, Austria, Trieste, and Yugoslavia. The JCS directive assigned USCINCEUR the functions of the JOSER, MIKEP, and Director JANAAG and authorized him to establish a headquarters with a deputy and joint staff, using the personnel of JANAAG as the nucleus of the headquarters. USCINCEUR was instructed to delegate to a deputy such authority and responsibility as was deemed appropriate. The directive also designated CINCIN, CINCBON, and CINCSAFE as component commanders of USCINCEUR, terminating their status as JCS commanders except that CINCEUR continued as the JCS specified commander for Berlin (with the stipulation that his title would be changed) and CINCEUR and CINCSAFE continued as JCS specified commanders for those missions assigned to them outside of USCINCEUR's area. JCS informed USCINCEUR that the Unified Command Plan and other appropriate directives would be revised accordingly, but pending receipt of such, they assigned him the following missions: support of SACUR; support of US policies within the scope of his command responsibility; coordination of logistical and administrative matters in his command; administration of the military aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Europe; provision of advice to the JCS on military aspects of US policies; and provision for US military representation to all NATO, international, and US national agencies in Europe.

General Ridgway initiated action immediately to implement the JCS directive. He notified the JCS that he was prepared to assume command as USCINCEUR on 1 August 1952 and requested the JCS to instruct CINCEUR, CINCBON, and CINCSAFE to report to him on that date. He selected General Handy as his deputy with the title of Deputy Commander in Chief, US European Command, and directed General Handy to establish the Headquarters, US European Command.

The JCS informed CINCEUR, CINCBON, and CINCSAFE, who had already received copies of the USCINCEUR directive, of General Ridgway's assumption of command as USCIUER on 1 August and terminated them as separate JCS commanders on that date.
except as specified in the US CINC EUR directive.\textsuperscript{21} At that same time the former European Command was to be redesignated the US Army Europe (USAREUR) with the former CINC EUR becoming CINCUSAREUR.\textsuperscript{22} The JCS also disestablished JAMAG effective 1 August and named CSA the executive agent for the new command.\textsuperscript{23}

General Ridgway assumed command of the US European Command on 1 August, becoming a US unified commander as well as a JCS commander. Thus, for the first time since the adoption of the UCP in 1947, a true unified command existed in the European area.
Chapter II

Footnotes


3. (TS) JCS 1259/223, Memo by CSA, "US Command Structure in Europe," 2 Feb 52, same file, Sec. 27.


11. (S) Msg, Eisenhower to JCS, ALO 1144, 29 May 52, same file.

12. (S) Msg, JCS 919102 to Eisenhower, 29 May 52, same file.

13. (S) Msg, Eisenhower to JCS, ALO 1161, 30 May 52, same file.

14. (TS) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, info to CINCNOR, CINCINNATI, and CINCSAF, ALO 1295, 11 Jun 52, same file, Sec. 30.


17. (TS) Mag, JCS 912973 to Ridgway, 7 Jul 52, same file, Sec. 31.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


21. (TS) Mag, JCS 914580 to USLONSF, CINCCUSAF, CINCINNATI, and CINCSAF, 28 Jul 52, same file.

22. (TS) Mag, Ridgway to JCS, ALO 1222, 29 Jul 52. (TS-SI) Mag, JCS 914577 to Ridgway, 30 Jul 52. Both in JCS 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 31.

23. (TS) Mag, JCS 914593 to Dir JCS, 29 Jul 52. (TS-SI) SM-1216-52 to CSF, CSF, and USAF, same subj, 29 Jul 52. Both in JCS 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 31.
III The US European Command, 1952-1953

The establishment of the US European Command did not settle all of the problems of command organization in Europe; a number of these remained for the JCS to resolve in the latter part of 1952 and 1953. The most pressing of these problems included USCINCEUR's logistic authority, the boundaries of USRICOM, and the revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to reflect the revised command arrangements in Europe.

The question of USCINCEUR's logistic authority had quickly arisen. The JCS directive of 7 July 1952 had granted USCINCEUR authority to "coordinate" joint logistic matters, but USCINCEUR complained to the JCS in October 1952 that his logistic authority was inadequate and requested "command authority" in the logistic field. The JCS split on this matter, the Army favoring and the Navy and Air Force opposing the request. After further consideration and with SecDef approval, the JCS granted USCINCEUR "directive authority" in logistic matters. They also instructed USCINCEUR to establish under his headquarters a joint military construction agency to supervise the combined construction program to meet US military requirements in Western Europe.

In connection with this assignment of logistic authority, SecDef directed USCINCEUR on 22 November 1952 to move the Headquarters, USRICOM, from its location in Frankfurt to the Paris area, which SecDef considered "the critical area of logistic activity." USCINCEUR selected Loges near Paris for his new headquarters site, and after considerable negotiation, the French Government gave its consent. SecDef approved the new headquarters location provided that a "determined effort" be made to hold to a minimum the number of personnel involved. Subsequently, SecDef obtained from Congress the funds for the Loges facilities, and in May 1954, USRICOM Headquarters moved from Frankfurt to Camp des Loges.

The lack of a precise definition of USCINCEUR's area of responsibility was another of those problems of command organization in Europe confronting the JCS. The JCS directive of 7 July had assigned USCINCEUR command over all forces "within the area of SACTUR's responsibility, including continental Europe, the United Kingdom, North Africa, and Turkey, and within such other areas as JCS subsequently may specify." Soon after his assumption of command, however, USCINCEUR requested JCS confirmation of a definition of his area to include the United Kingdom, all the countries of continental Europe (including the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Spain, and Portugal), Turkey, the Mediterranean Islands, French and Spanish Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and contiguous sea areas. Since this definition included areas not within SACEUR's responsibility, the JCS were faced with a re-evaluation of the political implications involved in General Ridgway's dual position as a NATO commander and as a US commander. They requested General Ridgway's opinion, as SACEUR, of the consequences of further extension of USCINCEUR's responsibilities outside of the NATO countries, particularly Berlin, Austria, Trieste, and Yugoslavia. General Ridgway replied that in principle USCINCEUR's area of responsibility should be coterminous with the area of the North Atlantic Treaty area for which SACEUR had responsibility; however, he considered that there were rational exceptions to this principle. The first of such exceptions was the United Kingdom, and General Ridgway saw no serious consequences resulting from the extension of USCINCEUR's responsibility to cover Berlin, Austria, Trieste, and Yugoslavia so long as he maintained a separate and distinct US headquarters and staff for his US responsibilities. He also urged the transfer of responsibility for Berlin from CINCUSARUR to USCINCEUR to eliminate CINCUSARUR as a JCS specified commander.

Also included in the consideration of USCINCEUR's area was the question of command responsibility for North Africa. CSA favored the assignment of joint planning for all of North Africa (French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) to USCINCEUR; CNO recommended assigning North Africa to CINCUSARUR. CSA subsequently modified his position, recommending the assignment of joint planning and base rights negotiations for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya to USCINCEUR and the postponement of the assignment of responsibilities in the remainder of North Africa.

CSA's modification of his position enabled the JCS to reach agreement on a directive defining the USFCON area, and with SecDef concurrence, they dispatched it to USCINCEUR on 2 December 1962. That directive defined USCINCEUR's area as: Norway, Denmark, Western Germany, Berlin, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste; the Mediterranean Sea and Islands (exclusive of the Balearics), the Algerian Departments of France, the United Kingdom, and the waters adjacent to those countries. The directive limited USCINCEUR's authority in the remainder of continental Europe to the covert planning necessary to facilitate the extension of military activities therein, and it assigned USCINCEUR responsibility for the military aspects of base rights negotiations and for joint planning in French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Since that directive assigned Berlin, Austria, and Trieste to USCINCEUR, the JCS eliminated USARKUR as a JCS specified command, designating USFA and TRUST as uniservice commands under USCINCEUR.
The revision of the Unified Command Plan to provide for the US European Command raised still another problem for JCS consideration. When the JCS established USEUCOM in July 1952, they had directed the JSPC, with the collaboration of the JLPC, to prepare the necessary changes and modifications to the UCP. JSPC and JLPC undertook that task, but their report reflected the divergent views of the Services. As far as USEUCOM was concerned the divergencies centered on the authority of USCINCUSUR in logistic matters, the area of USEUCOM, and the missions of CINCUSAREUR, CINCEUR, and CINGUSAFE as specified commanders. By separate actions, the JCS resolved the problems of the logistic authority of USCINCUSUR and the area of USEUCOM and eliminated USAREUR as a JCS command, but a split remained on the missions of CINCEUR and CINGUSAFE. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps supported the assignment of joint planning for the Middle East area to CINCEUR, while the Air Force favored assignment of that responsibility to CINGUSAFE. The majority view prevailed and the revised UCP adopted by the JCS on 24 December 1952 assigned planning responsibilities for the Middle East to CINCEUR. The JCS forwarded the revised UCP to SecDef for approval on the same date.

On 13 February 1953, after reviewing the UCP, SecDef questioned whether the proposed designation of the Service Chiefs as executive agents of the JCS for purposes other than strategic direction and operational control of forces was in the best interests of efficiency and economy. He pointed out that certain functions had been assigned to USCINCUSUR by him directly or through the Service Secretaries. SecDef stated that in the future it might be desirable that "functions except in the broad fields of strategic direction and operational control of forces should be assigned to the unified commanders on the authority of the Secretary of Defense and exercised either directly or through the Service Secretaries acting as Executive Agents." SecDef asked the JCS to add to the UCP a description of those responsibilities that the CINCUs exercised on direct authority from him, including a statement in USCINCUSUR's mission that policy direction, general supervision, and instructions in the fields of military procurement, base rights negotiations, and base construction would be provided by SecDef or such agency as he might designate. The JCS, however, were unable to agree on the modifications proposed by SecDef, and since a Department of Defense reorganization plan was pending, they deferred action on the UCP.

This deferment did not last long. On 2 June, CSA reminded the JCS that the CINCUs needed the revised UCP for use in preparing their emergency plans. In CSA's opinion, SecDef's 13 February memo indicated his substantial agreement with the
revised UCP; therefore the JCS should make the few specific changes desired by SecDef. Accordingly the JCS incorporated SecDef's proposed changes, including the addition to USCINCIRC's mission, into the UCP and resubmitted it on 17 June 1953. The JCS also informed SecDef that the DOD Reorganization Plan No. 6, then under study, might require fundamental revisions in the UCP.

Because of the possibility of fundamental revision, SecDef approved the revised UCP on 16 June 1953 "for the specific limited purpose of utilization by military commanders in the preparation of emergency plans and without prejudice to later modifications in these plans in light of action on reorganization." Thereupon the JCS forwarded the revised UCP to the CINCs on 26 July 1953 for use in preparation of emergency plans only. The revised UCP of 26 July 1953 did not supersede any previous directives, and the original UCP of 1947 with its many changes and revisions remained in effect.

The informational UCP of 1953 assigned USCINCIRC a mission of: maintaining the security of USCONCOM; providing US liaison to SACEUR; exercising directive authority in the field of logistics; exercising duties in the fields of military procurement, base rights negotiations, and base construction and in other fields as directed by SecDef; providing within his area of responsibility for US military representation to all NATO, international, and US agencies; occupying US areas of responsibility in Germany and Austria; preparing and coordinating US joint plans for his area with plans of SACEUR; and supporting CINCLANT, CINCENTH, CINCSAF, and CINCSAC in their missions. The 1953 UCP assigned CINCENTH, as a specified commander, the additional responsibility of preparing joint plans for North Africa (exclusive of the area assigned to USCINCIRC) and the Middle East.

On several occasions in early 1953, SecDef had questioned the need for a Deputy USCINCIRC, and consequently the JCS had suggested that the JCS re-examine Deputy USCINCIRC's terms of reference and restudy the concept of SACEUR serving as USCINCIRC, considering whether the two jobs should be separated. SecDef formally requested a JCS review of the matter on 29 May 1953, and the JCS directed JSFC to review USCINCIRC's terms of reference.

The JSFC report, submitted to the JCS on 26 August 1953, presented the split views of the Services. The Army-Air Force saw no new facts of "strategic significance" requiring modification of USCINCIRC's current terms of reference. The Navy, however, believed that the US was building a command structure in Europe beyond its requirements and stated that an officer "with substantially less than unified command
authority could best fulfill the need for coordination of US military matters in Europe. Thus the Navy recommended the designation of CINCUSAF, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCUSIM as specified commanders for North Europe, Central Europe, and South Europe and the Mediterranean, respectively, under a US UNREP with coordinating responsibilities. Subsequently the JCS sought the views of CINCUSAF, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSIM, and USOTMUR. The latter three supported the Army-Air Force view; only CINCUSIM recommended approval of the Navy proposal.

After consideration of those comments, CNO reiterated the faults that he found with the existing command arrangements in Europe, but bowed to the preponderant view for continuation of the existing military organization in Europe. Upon the agreement of CNO, the JCS apprised SecDef on 17 March 1954 of their review and support for retention of USOTMUR as a unified commander under his current terms of reference. SecDef accepted their advice, thus settling the question of command organization in Europe.
Chapter III

Footnotes

1 (TS-M) Mag, JCS 912973 to General Ridgway, 7 Jul 52, GCS 391 (1-24-42) Sec. 31. See above, p. 9.

2 (S-M) Ltr, USCINCEUR to CSA for JCS, "Establishment of a Joint Logistical Command in Europe," 18 Oct 52, enc1 to (S-M) JCS 1259/256, same subj, 21 Oct 52, same file, Sec. 34.

3 (S-M) JCS 1259/262, Rpt by PLRC, "Establishment of a Joint Logistical Command in Europe," 10 Nov 52, same file, Sec. 35.


5 (TS-M) Mag, JCS 924400 to USCINCEUR, 21 Nov 52, same file.

6 (C) Ltr, SecDef to USCINCEUR, 22 Nov 52, enc1 to (S-M) JCS 1259/267, "Functions and Organization of Headquarters, U.S. European Command," 26 Nov 52, same file, Sec. 36.

7 (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 19 May 53. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 29 May 53. Both reproduced in (S) JCS 1259/283, "Movement of Headquarters, USCINCEUR," 3 Jun 53, same file, Sec. 39.


10 (TS-M) Mag, JCS 912973 to General Ridgway, 7 Jul 52, same file, Sec. 31.

11 (S-M) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, 261761Z Sep 52, 26 Sep 52, same file, Sec. 33.

12 (S-M) Mag, JCS 920329 to USCINCEUR, 6 Oct 52, same file.

13 (S-M) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, 211347Z Oct 52, 21 Oct 52, same file, Sec. 34.


17 (TS-M) Mag, JCS 925272 to USCINCEUR, 2 Dec 52. Actual message not in the file -- see DecOn JCS 1259/269, GCS 391 (1-24-42) Sec. 36.


20 (TS-M) JSPC/492, "Revision of the Unified Command Plan and Modification of Certain Directives," 19 Sep 52, same file, Sec. 33.


22 (TS-M) JCS 1259/270, Rpt by JSPC, "Revision of the Unified Command Plan and Modification of Certain Directives," 15 Dec 52, same file, Sec. 36.

24(C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Revision of the Unified Command Plan and Modification of Certain Directives," 13 Feb 53, encl to (C-SI) JCS 1259/270, same subj, 19 Feb 53, same file, Sec. 38.


29(TS) Memo, Acting SecDef to JCS, "Revision of the Unified Command Plan and Modification of Certain Directives," 30 Jun 53, encl to (C-SI) JCS 1259/287, same subj, 2 Jul 52, same file.


32(TS) Memo, JCS to JCS, 8 May 53, same file, Sec. 39.

33(C) Memo, SecDef to GJCS, 29 May 53, reproduced in (TS) JCS 1259/293, "Movement of Headquarters, USCINCEUR," 9 Jun 53, same file, Sec. 39.


36(TS) SM-1672-53 to USCINCEUR, CINCSAECOM, CHINCEUR, and CINCSAFE, "Terms of Reference, USCINCEUR," 2 Oct 53, same file, Sec. 44.

37(TS) Ltr, Dep USCINCEUR to CSA, "Terms of Reference, USCINCEUR (U)," 24 Nov 53, encl to (TS) JCS 1259/309, same subj, 14 Dec 53. (TS) Ltr, CTCS/SM to CSA, same subj, 4 Nov 53, encl to (TS) JCS 1259/307, same subj, 4 Dec 53. (TS) Ltr, CTCS/SM to JCS, same subj, 4 Dec 53, encl to (TS) JCS 1259/313, same subj, 9 Feb 54. (TS) Ltr, CTCS/SM to JCS via CIO, same subj, Ser 000545, 29 Oct 53, encl to (TS) JCS 1259/305, same subj, 16 Nov 53. All in GCS 381 (1-26-42) Secs. 44, 45, and 46.

38(TS) JCS 1259/319, Memo by CIO, "Terms of Reference, USCINCEUR," 16 Mar 54, same file, Sec. 47.

IV The US European Command, 1954-1958

The story of the US European Command (USEUCOM) from 1954 through 1958 is not that of changes and problems peculiar to the European Area, but rather of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and changes affecting the unified and specified commands in general. The first of those changes resulted from the Presidential revision in October 1953 of the portion of the Key West Agreement of 1948 providing for the designation of executive agents for the unified commands by the JCS. The revision stated that thereafter the SecDef would name a military department as the executive agent for each unified and specified command. SecDef designated the new executive agents for the unified and specified commands on 15 January 1954. The Department of the Army replaced CSA as the executive agent for USEUCOM, while the Navy and Air Force became the executive agents for HEIM and USAFE, respectively.

At the same time, SecDef requested the JCS to submit recommendations on "the division of strategic world areas into specific unified commands" and on the responsibilities and authorities to be exercised by the military departments in carrying out their executive agencies. The JCS approved and forwarded to SecDef in June 1954 their recommendations on executive agency responsibilities, but they could not agree on the division of strategic world areas into specific unified commands. The Army and Air Force favored the adoption of a new UCP dividing the world into seven strategic areas -- including Europe and the Middle East -- with a unified commander in each area, eliminating CINCIN EU and CINCUS AE as specified commanders. The Navy and Marine Corps, however, recommended modification of the existing UCP to bring it into accord with the revised Key West Agreement.

After several months of controversy, the JCS concluded in early September 1954 that the unsettled conditions in Europe and the Far East made a major UCP revision inadvisable at that time. Consequently, they submitted to SecDef a revised UCP that redesignated the executive agency responsibilities in conformance with the revised Key West Agreement. SecDef returned the UCP to the JCS in late December and directed them to restudy it, keeping in mind the following policies: the strategic unity of areas assigned to the unified and specified commands; holding the number of commands to the absolute minimum; provision for clearer lines of authority; maximum efficiency in the use of men and resources; responsibility of commanders for execution of missions assigned to subordinate elements within statutory provisions; no establishment of Service activities overseas not subordinate to a unified command without approval of SecDef;
and peacetime organizational structure fully effective and responsive to immediate combat operations. In February 1955, the JCS replied that after careful restudy of the unified command structure, they remained convinced that a major revision at that time was inadvisable. They resubmitted the UCP approved the previous September, informing SecDef that they would keep it under continuous review for necessary changes.

SecDef approved the revised UCP on 2 March 1955 and directed the JCS to review and report to him on the UCP at least annually. The new plan, forwarded to the CINC on 9 March 1955, superseded both the original UCP of 1947 and the UCP of 24 July 1954. The new UCP made few changes in USUCOM. It reflected the transfer of executive agency from the CSA to the Department of the Army and listed the same functions for USCINCUSAF as contained in the UCP of July 1953, with the exception of deleting the missions of USCINCUSAF exercised under the direction of SecDef: supervision of military procurement, base rights negotiations, and military construction; and administration of the military aspects of the Mutual Security Program. Except for the change in executive agents, the status and missions of CINCEUR and CINCUSAF remained the same under the new plan.

In compliance with the SecDef directive for an annual report, the JCS reviewed the UCP in early 1956. In considering the simplification of the world-wide command structure, the JCS questioned the status of CINCUSAF and CINCEUR as JCS specified commanders. They agreed to eliminate CINCUSAF as a specified commander and to transfer his responsibilities to USCINCUSAF, but the status of CINCEUR was not so easily settled.

The JCS had established in January 1956 the Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC) in Washington for the preparation of joint plans for North Africa (exclusive of the area assigned to USCINCUSAF) and the Middle East. Since the Army and Air Force viewed CINCEUR’s primary mission as joint planning for that area, they no longer saw a need for CINCEUR and recommended its disestablishment. The Navy and Marine Corps argued for the retention of CINCEUR to meet the requirement for a commander on the scene prepared to carry out operations in the Middle East, citing the rising Arab-Israeli tension to reinforce their position.

The Navy-Marine Corps argument prevailed, and on 4 June 1956, the JCS approved a revised UCP eliminating CINCUSAF as a JCS commander, but continuing CINCEUR as a specified commander with a mission of maintaining the security of his command and supporting USCINCUSAF, CINCLEST, and CINCSAC. The Chiefs further agreed that since the personnel of the JMEPC could form the nucleus of a staff for a JCS command in the Middle East, the UCP should make provision for the establishment of a unified command there to be activated when required. Thus they added a Middle East Command (MECOM) to the UCP, with planning responsibilities for the Middle East.
area. Until the activation of JEXOM, however, planning for the Middle East was assigned to the JCSPO. The JCS plan stipulated that JINH was to be disestablished as a specified command upon the activation of JEXOM. 16

SecDef approved the revised UCP on 21 June,15 and the JCS abolished USAFE on 1 July and distributed the new UCP to the CINC on 3 July.16 With the elimination of CINCUSA as a specified commander, only CIUCILDM remained in the contradictory dual role of component commander of USCINCEUR and JCS specified commander.

The UCP of 3 July 1956 made no changes in the mission of USCINCEUR except to delete the responsibility for occupying US portions of Germany and Austria and for furnishing the required advice and support to the US High Commissioners in those countries.17 This change merely reflected the termination of the US occupation of Germany and Austria in 1955.18

The JCS review of the UCP in 1957 resulted in a revised plan in a new format, but made no substantive changes in the mission of USCINCEUR. The revised plan continued CINCEUR as a specified commander, defining his area of responsibility as "the countries of the Middle East lying to the east of Libya and south of Turkey, the Arabian and Red Seas and the Bay of Bengal."19 The JCS submitted the UCP to SecDef on 25 May 1957,20 and he approved it on 17 September 1957, subject to certain minor changes.21 The JCS dispatched the approved UCP to the CINC on 24 October 1957.22

In April 1958, President Eisenhower addressed a message to Congress concerning the reorganization of the Department of Defense. Among other things, the President proposed to shorten the existing chain of command running to the commanders in the field. The new line of authority would extend from the President to the SecDef through the JCS to the commanders of unified and specified commands, thereby eliminating the executive agency procedure and removing the military departments from the operational chain of command.23

With the subsequent Congressional approval of this reorganization plan, the JCS approved the necessary revision to the UCP to reflect the change in the line of command.24 After both SecDef and Presidential approval, the JCS forwarded the revised UCP to the CINC on 8 September 1958.25 In the new plan, USCINCEUR retained the same missions as had been assigned to him in the UCP of 1957, with the only change being the deletion of the executive agency of the Department of the Army. (The executive agency of the Department of the Army for USWECOM was terminated on 15 September 1958.26) The new UCP continued to provide for the future activation of the Middle East Command, and until such activation, the plan designated CINCEUR, in addition to his USWECOM component commander responsibilities, a specified commander for the Middle East.
Chapter IV

Footnotes

1 (U) JCS 1498/48, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Changes Made in the Key West Agreement by October 1, 1953 Revision," 21 Jan 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) Sec. 44.

2 (U) Memo, SecDef to Service Secys. and CJCS, "Executive Agent Responsibilities for Unified Command" 15 Jan 54, COs 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 45. Later issued in (U) DOD Dir 5100.2, same subj, 16 Mar 54, same file, Sec. 47.

3 (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Unified Commands," 15 Jan 54, encl to (U) JCS 1259/311, same subj, 25 Jan 54, same file, Sec. 46.


7 (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 29 Dec 54, encl to (S) JCS 1800/230, same subj, COs 370 (8-19-45) Sec. 48.

8 (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Unified Command," 18 Feb 55, der. from (TS) JCS 1259/327, 21 Jan 55, COs 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 53.

9 (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Unified Command," 2 Mar 55, encl to (C) N/H to JCS 1259/337, 10 Mar 55, same file.

10 (C) SM-180-55 to CINCs, "Unified Command Plan," 9 Mar 55, same file, Sec. 54.

11 See above, p. 15.

12 (C) SM-190-55 to CINC, "Unified Command Plan," 9 Mar 55, COs 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 54.

13 (S) JCS 1259/348, Rpt by JSPC, "Unified Command Plan (U)," 9 Mar 56, same file, B/P. #9.


15 (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Unified Commands," 21 Jun 56, encl to (C) JCS 1259/ 357, same subj, 3 Jul 56, same file, Sec. 61.

16 (C) Msg. JCS 995629 to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAF, 28 Jun 56. (C) SM-548-56 to CINC, "Unified Command Plan," 3 Jul 56, both in COs 381 (1-24-42) Sec. 61.

17 (C) SM-548-56 to CINCs, "Unified Command Plan," 3 Jul 56, same file.


19 (C) JCS 1259/304, Rpt by JSPC, "The Unified Command Plan," 27 May 54, COs 391 (1-24-42) Sec. 73.

20 (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Unified Commands (U)," 29 May 57, der. from (C) JCS 1259/304, "The Unified Command Plan (U)," 27 May 57, same file, Sec. 73.

21 (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Unified Commands," 17 Sep 57, encl to (C) JCS 1259/ 401, same subj, 20 Sep 57, same file, Sec. 75.
22(c) SM-749-57 to CJCS, "The Unified Command Plan (U)," 24 Oct 57, same file, Sec. 76.

23(U) JCS Pub 4, Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 Jul 63, p. 5.


25(c) Memo, DepSecDef to CDS, "Organization of the Department of Defense," 4 Sep 58, encl to (c) JCS 1259/42, same subj, 5 Sep 58, JCS 391 (1-24-42) Sec. 80.

(c) SM-643-58 to CJCS, "Unified Command Plan (U)," 9 Sep 58, same file, Sec. 81.

26(c) Msg, JCS 947829 to USCINCHINCR, 10 Sep 58, same file, Sec. 81.
In 1959 and 1960, the story of the US European Command (USJEUCOM) became complicated by the question of command arrangements for the Middle East. This question was raised as the result of the 1958 JCS reorganization and the abolition of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (JMEPG), which had been established in 1956 to prepare joint plans for North Africa (outside of USCINCEUR's area) and the Middle East. A complicating factor was the position of CINCEME as both the component commander of USCINCEUR and the JCS specified commander for the Middle East. As an interim measure, the JCS assigned the JMEPG functions to the appropriate directorates of the Joint Staff until the entire subject of Middle East planning and command could be reviewed.

Meanwhile, the Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff studied the assignment of Middle East planning and in February 1959 presented the JCS four possible alternatives: the establishment of a Middle East Command (MECOM) or a Military Representative for the Middle East (USMILREME) to make such plans; the assignment of Middle East planning to USCINCEUR; the assignment of this function to CINCEME in his role as specified commander for the Middle East; or the absorption of this planning responsibility within the Joint Staff. The study recognized the advantages in the creation of a MECOM or a USMILREME, but noted State Department opposition to a US military command or planning agency in the Middle East. The study concluded that consolidation of Middle East planning under USCINCEUR would enable him to coordinate Middle East planning with his NATO activities and to integrate planning for eastern Turkey with Middle East planning. The study also concluded that though the assignment of general war planning for the Middle East to CINCEME would have several advantages, it would continue the "confused" relationship between CINCEME and USCINCEUR. The study dismissed the absorption of Middle East planning by the Joint Staff as "basically unsound on a long-term basis."

After some consideration of the Joint Staff study, the JCS sought the views of USCINCEUR and CINCEME. USCINCEUR replied that the JMEPG functions should be assigned to a unified commander who should also have the specified command mission for the Middle East currently assigned to CINCEME. If the activation of MECOM had been ruled out, USCINCEUR saw himself as the logical unified commander for the job. This arrangement, he stated, would better conform to the concept of unity of command.
allow him, as the unified commander responsible for furnishing and supporting the initial forces for the Middle East theater, to control the entire operation.5

CINCHEM informed the JCS than any continuation in the division of planning and operational responsibilities for the Middle East would compound "many obstacles" and impede "the attainment of optimum US military effectiveness" in that area. Since his specified command responsibilities were not complicated by any direct NATO affiliations, and since NCOM was not to be activated, CINCHEM recommended the assignment of the JNCSPO functions, including the preparation of command level war plans for the Middle East, to him in his capacity as specified commander for the Middle East.6

The JCS were unable to reconcile the divergent views of USCINCEUR and CINCHEM. CSA and CSAP thought the assignment of Middle East planning functions to CINCHEM would violate the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. Further, they considered it "an anomaly" to permit CINCHEM, a subordinate of USCINCEUR, to exercise operational control over the forces of his superior. Therefore they recommended: the extension of USEUCOM to include the Middle East, pending the establishment of NCOM or USMILMEM; the disestablishment of MCM as a specified command; and the redesignation of the naval component command of USCINCEUR as US Naval Forces Europe.7

CNO and CNG, on the other hand, were convinced that the experiences in Suez and Lebanon had demonstrated the necessity for retaining a specified commander for the Middle East who was unencumbered with concurrent NATO responsibilities and who could move instantly to contain a Middle East contingency. They opposed the assignment of theater-level planning and contingency operations for the Middle East to USCINCEUR and recommended the retention of CINCHEM as the specified commander for the Middle East with all planning for that area consolidated under him until the establishment of NCOM was politically feasible.8

The JCS forwarded their divergent views to SecDef on 15 July 1959.9 SecDef also ducked the issue, directing the JCS to continue "for the time being" the current arrangements for Middle East planning by the Joint Staff.10

In August 1959, CNO proposed to change CINCHEM's title, in his capacity as the naval component commander of USCINCEUR, to Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAV3UR) -- a title more descriptive of his responsibilities in USCINCEUR.11 USCINCEUR concurred in the proposal. He noted, however, that if the purpose of the title change was to distinguish between CINCHEM's roles as component and specified commander, he would recommend the title Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle
East (CINCSPCOMME) for the latter role. The use of the title CINCSPCOMME, he said, was "a practice already well established." Despite further discussion of the Navy proposal in view of USCINCHUR's comments, the JCS could not agree and decided to take no further action on the matter.

In November 1959, CSAF complained of CINCSELM's practice of identifying himself as CINCSPCOMME when exercising his specified command responsibilities. CSAF pointed out that the JCS had neither recognized nor authorized that title in either the UCP or the JSCP. CSAF considered the use of the terms CINCSPCOMME and Headquarters, Commander in Chief, US Specified Command Middle East, incorrect and misleading, and he recommended JCS action to discontinue CINCSELM's use of those terms. In rebuttal, CNO stated that the UCP clearly designated CINCSELM as a specified commander with NSCOM in his general area of responsibility. CNO considered the use of the title CINCSPCOMME "inextricably" related to the situation within the unified command structure where CINCSELM had dual responsibilities as the naval component commander of USEUCOM and as a specified commander for the Middle East. He called CSAF's proposal "unnecessarily restrictive of a very practical and customary means of facilitating the performance of CINCSELM's Middle East mission."

Before taking action on the Air Force proposal, the JCS discussed the whole subject of Middle East command arrangements with SecDef on 30 January 1960. As a result of that meeting, the SecDef made the following decisions: CINCSELM's status as a specified commander should be confirmed with the same responsibilities as currently assigned to him in the UCP; as a specified commander and under JCS direction, CINCSELM should continue to make contingency plans for the Middle East, including general war plans in support of the Middle East Emergency Defense Plan (NEEDP); he should be authorized to carry out such other contingency planning for JCS approval as he considered necessary for operations in his area; he should be informed that the title CINCSPCOMME was no longer authorized and advised to use the title CINCSELM when conducting operations in the Middle East; and in his capacity as naval component commander of USEUCOM, CINCSELM should be redesignated the Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAV3UR). The JCS informed CINCSELM of the SecDef decisions and promulgated the necessary revision to the UCP, redesignating USUCINCHUR's naval component commander CINCUSNAV3UR.

Thus the distinction between CINCSELM as the naval component of USEUCOM and as the specified commander for the Middle East was effected, but the problem of USUCINCHUR's subordinate commander also being a JCS specified commander still remained. The role of USUCINCHUR in the Middle East was to be questioned again.
in 1963, but in the intervening period several developments in USCENTCOM further confused Middle East command arrangements.

With SecDef and Presidential approval, the JCS forwarded a revised UCP to the CINC's on 4 February 1961.19 The new plan extended USCENTCOM's area, for military assistance purposes only, to include North Africa and the Middle East. This extension merely incorporated an assignment of Military Assistance Program (MAP) responsibilities made by SecDef in 1955,20 but which had never been reflected in the UCP. The new plan also provided for a Middle East Command (M3CCOM), and until the activation of M3CCOM, it assigned CINCEM contingency and general war planning responsibilities for the M3CCOM area.

The JCS clarified USCENTCOM's MAP responsibilities in the Middle East on 31 July 1961 when, with SecDef approval, they assigned USCENTCOM military assistance jurisdiction for the countries of the provisional M3CCOM ('the countries of the Middle East lying to the east of Libya and south of Turkey').21 The JCS justified this assignment to USCENTCOM rather than to CINCEM, who was responsible for Middle East planning, on the grounds that USCENTCOM had a large MAP division already administering several countries in that area, while CINCEM had only a small planning staff and could not handle MAP matters without a staff augmentation.22

In December 1960, USCENTCOM had requested JCS authority to issue and enforce area policy for some thirty US military units in Turkey which remained assigned to the military departments.23 A short time later, he had complained to the JCS that there were US military units in his Middle East area of MAP responsibility over which he had no control, and he had requested authorization to enforce area policy on those units.24 After a long delay, the JCS instructed USCENTCOM on 17 October 1961 to coordinate cold war matters and to implement US policy where appropriate for all US military units in the USCENTCOM area and in the Middle East countries for which he had MAP responsibilities. The JCS directive also authorized USCENTCOM to issue the necessary regulations and plans to fulfill these objectives.25 At the same time, the JCS directed the Service Chiefs to insure compliance with such regulations and plans issued by USCENTCOM.26 Consequently, besides MAP responsibility for the Middle East, USCENTCOM now had cold war duties there as well.

The rapid succession of world events in 1962 again brought command arrangements, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, to JCS attention. With the possibility of a US military commitment in the Congo, the CJCS requested the Joint Staff in December 1962 to review the current assignment of military responsibilities
for Africa south of the Sahara, indicating possible alternative arrangements. 27
In January 1963, the Chairman expanded his directive to the Joint Staff to include the Middle East, Southern Asia, and all of Africa — the MAJUS area. 28
When initiating their study, the Joint Staff faced the following arrangements in the MAJUS area: CINCJANT was responsible for planning and operations in Africa south of the Sahara, as accomplished by Joint Task Force FOUR (JTF-4); the Department of the Army was responsible for MAP matters in the same area; USCINCUR was responsible for North Africa and for cold war and MAP matters in the Middle East; CINCHEIM was responsible for contingency and general war planning and the conduct of operations in the Middle East; and recently created CINSTRIKE was responsible for maintaining a combat-ready reserve to reinforce the above commanders in the event of emergency.

In the preparation of its study, the Joint Staff sought the views of these involved commanders. 29 USCINCUR replied that the transfer of the North African states to another unified command was militarily undesirable, and he claimed a continuing requirement for the US military installations in North Africa. 30
With regard to the Middle East, USCINCUR advocated the same solution that he had supported in 1959 — the assignment of CINCHEIM's Middle East mission to him. He maintained that such an assignment would simplify the existing command arrangements by: placing USCINCUR, who currently commanded a major portion of the forces earmarked for deployment to the Middle East in the event of a war emergency, in command of such forces in both war and peace; permitting Middle East planning and operations to be controlled by the senior US commander in Europe, who was in the best position to evaluate the effectiveness of his assigned forces, to coordinate deployment of these forces, and to evaluate the effects of such deployment in light of resources available; and eliminating one specified commander (CINCHEIM) who had separate command channels as CINCHEIM and CINCSOUTH, thus furthering a SecDef objective of eliminating or consolidating headquarters. USCINCUR added that his staff would require little augmentation to accomplish CINCHEIM's staff functions relating to military planning and operations in the Middle East. 31

Both CINCHEIM and CINCJANT opposed any change in the existing arrangements in the Middle East. CINCJANT did recommend, however, that he be assigned MAP responsibility for all of Africa. CINSTRIKE favored the assignment of planning and execution of all operations in both the Middle East-Southern Asia and Africa south of the Sahara to him. 32
After consideration of these views, the Joint Staff submitted its study of alternative command arrangements for the NAFSA area to the JCS on 31 May 1963. This study defined the NAFSA area as the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa south of the Sahara, leaving North Africa west of Egypt in USCINCUEUR's area, and it presented the following six alternatives: a new US-based unified command given "routine operations" in the NAFSA area; CINCSTRIKE given "routine operations" in the NAFSA area; CINGSLIM given "routine operations" in the NAFSA area; CINCSTRIKE given the planning and execution of general war and contingency operations in the NAFSA area and cold war operations in Africa south of the Sahara, with other responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa remaining as currently assigned; continuance of the present command arrangements in the NAFSA area, integrating JTF-4 into the CINCLANT staff and assigning CINCLANT MAP responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara; and USCINCUEUR given "routine operations" in the Middle East and Southern Asia, with Africa south of the Sahara assigned to either a new command, CINCSTRIKE, or CINCLANT as proposed in the above alternatives.35

In their discussions of the Joint Staff study, none of the Chiefs favored the assignment of the Middle East area to USCINCUEUR. Both CSA and CSAF considered such an alternative workable, but saw "significant political and military considerations" militating against this arrangement. CON recognized that such an assignment had merit, but feared that preoccupation with the Middle East could divert USCINCUEUR/SACEUR from his primary responsibility of confronting the Soviet Bloc in Europe. He stated that the NATO allies might look with disfavor on any move to associate USCINCUEUR/SACEUR and US forces assigned to NATO in Europe with unilateral US interest in the Middle East. CON saw little difference in the relative advantages of assigning the Middle East alone to either USCINCUEUR or CINGSLIM; however, he thought the alternative of assigning both the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara to CINGSLIM a better solution.36

The JCS could not agree on any of the six alternatives, and on 12 July 1963, they forwarded their divergent views to the SecDef. CSA and CSAF recommended the assignment of all military responsibilities for the NAFSA area to CINCSTRIKE with the concurrent disestablishment of NEIM and JTF-4. CON proposed that CINGSLIM continue his Middle East planning responsibilities and that CINCLANT continue his planning for Africa south of the Sahara with the addition of MAP responsibility for that area and the incorporation of JTF-4 into his staff. CON favored the
assignment of all military activities in the MEAFSA area to CINCSTRIK3, using JTF-4's assets to augment NEILM.37 On 16 August 1963, SecDef approved the CSA/CSAF recommendation.38

In accordance with the SecDef decision, the JCS directed CINCSTRIK3 to prepare a detailed implementation plan for assumption of the new responsibilities and requested CINCSTRIK3 and CINCJFC to submit phase out schedules for NEILM and JTF-4.39

The implementation plan, prepared by CINCSTRIK3 and ultimately approved by the JCS, was based on a concept of "E-day" when CINCSTRIK3 would assume responsibility for the MEAFSA area. On "E-day plus one," NEILM and JTF-4 would be disestablished and USCINCJFCUR would turn over MAP and cold war responsibilities for the Middle East to CINCSTRIK3.40 To reflect those changes, the Joint Staff revised the UCP, adding the MEAFSA area to CINCSTRIK3's mission and deleting NEILM, the provisional MECOM, and USCINCJFCUR's MAP responsibilities for the Middle East from the plan.41

The JCS approved the UCP revision and submitted it to the SecDef on 17 September 1963.42 SecDef, however, requested a revised version of the entire plan, which the JCS forwarded on 15 October 1963.43 Secretary McNamara submitted the UCP to the President, adding a footnote assigning CINCSTRIK3 the concurrent title of USSTRICAPSA when conducting MEAFSA activities.44 The President approved the new UCP on 28 October 1963.45 The JCS made 30 November E-day and issued the necessary directives to the concerned commanders.46 On 20 November 1963, they published the new UCP to be effective on 1 December 1963.47

The President's 28 October decision and the subsequent JCS implementing actions ended the confusion in US command responsibility in Europe that had plagued the JCS since 1952. With the disestablishment of NEILM, USCINCJFCUR no longer faced the paradoxical situation of his naval component commander also being a JCS specified commander. Further, the shearing of USCINCJFCUR of his MAP and cold war duties in the Middle East reduced USJFCUR to NATO-Europe and North Africa west of Egypt — more accurately a European command. Now the US could meet the future with a streamlined and strengthened unified command in Europe.
Chapter V

Footnotes

1The JMFPO was established in 1956 as the Joint Middle East Planning Committee, see above, p. 20.

2(TS) Msg. JCS 955217 to CINCCENT, 19 Feb 59, derived from (TS) JCS 1977/84, "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (U)," 11 Feb 59, JMF 5020 (20 Feb 59).

3(TS) JCS 1977/84, Apt by J-5, "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (U)," 11 Feb 59, JMF 5020 (20 Feb 59).

4(TS) DecOn JCS 1977/84, "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (U)," 19 Feb 59, (S) JCS:1977/86, Note by Secys, same subj, 19 Feb 59. (S) MSG, JCS 95533 to USCINCEUR and CINCCENT, 20 Feb 59. All in JMF 5020 (20 Feb 59).

5(S) Mags. USCINCEUR to JCS 251310Z Feb 59 and 041010Z Apr 59, both in JMF 5020 (20 Feb 59).

6(S) Mag. CINCCENT to JCS 271301 Feb 59, same file.

7(TS) JCS 1977/93, Note by Secys (Red Stripe Paper), "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (U)," 15 Jul 59, JMF 5020 (29 May 59).

8Ibid.

9(TS) JCSM-272-59 to SecDef, "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group (U)," 15 Jul 59, same file.

10(TS) Memo, MilAsst to SecDef to CJS, "Reassignment of Functions of the Joint Middle East Planning Group," 7 Aug 59, reproduced in (TS) 1st H/ of JCS 1977/93, same subj, 10 Aug 59, same file.

11(C) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Change in Title of Naval Component Commander, U.S. European Command (U)," Ser 016H560, 12 Aug 59, reproduced in (C) JCS 1259/487, same subj, 12 Aug 59, JMF 5167 (12 Aug 59).

12(C) Mag. USCINCEUR to JCS, 3111202 Aug 59, same file.

13(U) H/ of JCS 1259/487, "Change in Title of Naval Component Commander, U.S. European Command (U)," 15 Sep 59, same file.

14(C) CSAPM 528-59, "Use of the Term 'Commander in Chief, U.S. Specified Command Middle East' and Related Terminology (U)," 19 Nov 59, reproduced in (C) JCS 1977/101, same subj, 23 Nov 59, JMF 5020 (29 May 59).

15(TS) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Use of the Term 'Commander in Chief U.S. Specified Command Middle East,' and Related Terminology (U)," Ser 0094481560, 30 Nov 59, reproduced in (TS) JCS 1977/102, same subj, 21 Dec 59, same file.

16(C) Note to Control Division, "Command Arrangements and Planning Responsibilities for the Middle East," 30 Jan 60, JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60).

17(C) Memo, Acting SecDef to CJS, "Command Arrangements and Planning Responsibilities for the Middle East," 3 Feb 60, enci to (C) JCS 1259/500, same subj, 6 Feb 60, same file.

18(S) SH-166-60 to CINCCENT, info to other CINCS, "Command Arrangements and Planning Responsibilities for the Middle East (U)," 19 Feb 60, JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60). (C) H/ to SH-663-59, "Unified Command Plan (U)," 17 Feb 60, CCS 381 (1-24-62) Sec. 81.

19(S) SH-1305-61 to CINCS, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 8 Feb 61, derived from (C) JCS 1259/516, same subj, 7 Feb 60, JMF 5160 (15 Jul 60) Secs. 1 and 2.

22(C) Mag, JCS 999757 to USCINCEUR, 31 Jul 61, JNP 4060 (29 Feb 60).

22(C) JCSH-401-61 to SecDef, "Assignment of Jurisdictional Responsibilities for Matters Relating to the Military Assistance Program (U)," 21 Jul 61, derived from (C) JCS 2215/71, same subj, 25 Apr 61. Both in JNP 4060 (29 Feb 60).

23(S) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, 009908 Dec 60, JNP 5165 (14 Dec 60).

24(S) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, 1415012 Dec 60, same file.

25(S) SH-1098-61 to USCINCEUR, "Command Relationships of US Forces in Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Turkey (U)," 17 Oct 61, same file.

26(U) SH-1099-61 to CSA, CTO, CSAF, and CINC, same subj, 17 Oct 61, same file.


28(TS) CH-212-63 to D/JS, "Possible Changes in the Unified Command Plan Affecting the Areas of Africa, Middle East and Southern Asia to the Western Boundary of CINCPEAC," 17 Jan 63, reproduced as Appendix D of (TS, Gp-3) JCS 1259/609, "A Study of Certain Command Arrangements (U)," 25 Feb 63, same file.

29(C) SH-105-61 to CINCPEAC, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 4 Feb 61 (Revised 10 Oct 62), JNP 5160 (15 Jul 60) Sec. 2.


31(TS). Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, 241345Z Mar 63, same file, Sec. 2.


33(TS, Gp-3) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS 171510Z May 63, same file, Sec. 3.

34(TS, Gp-3) Mag, 27 CINCPEAC to JCS, "Command Arrangements for the Middle East," 15 Mar 63, (TS, Gp-4) Ltr, CinCPEAC to JCS, "New Unified Command (U)," Sec 00056, 5 Apr 63, encl to (TS, Gp-4) JCS 1259/619, same subj, 11 Apr 63. (TS, Gp-4) Ltr, CINCPEAC to JCS, "The Unified Command Plan," 8 Apr 63, encl to (TS, Gp-4) JCS 1259/620, same subj, 11 Apr 63. All in JNP 5160 (18 Dec 62) Secs. 1 and 2.

35(TS) CH-621-63 to Service Chiefs, "Addendum to a Summary Study of Certain Command Arrangements," 31 May 63, encl to (TS, Gp-3) JCS 1259/632, same subj, 31 May 63, same file, Sec. 3.

36(TS) JCSH-106-63 to SecDef, "Command Arrangements in Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (C)," 12 Jul 63, derived from (TS, Gp-3) JCS 1259/634-5, "JCS Action on Certain Command Arrangements (U)," 24 Jun 63, same file, Secs. 4 and 5.

37 Ibid.

38(C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Command Arrangements in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara Areas (HAFSA)(C)," 16 Aug 63, encl to (C, Gp-4) JCS 1259/652-6, same subj, 17 Aug 63, same file, Sec. 5.

39(TS, Gp-4) Mag, JCS 27837 to USCINCEUR, CINCSTRK, CINCSTRK, et al., 17 Aug 63, same file.

40(U) Ltr, CINCSTRK to JCS, "CINCSTRK Programming Plan (U)," 5 Sep 63; encl.to, (U) JCS 1259/642-17, same subj, 6 Sep 63. (C, Gp-4) Dec On JCS 1259/642-12, "JCS Action on Certain Command Arrangements (U)," 14 Sep 63. Both in JNP 5160 (13 Dec 62) Sec. 5.

41(C, Gp-3) JCS 1259/634-12, pt by J-5, "JCS Action on Certain Command Arrangements (U)," 11 Sep 63, same file, Sec. 6.

42(C) JCSH-719-63 to SecDef, "Command Arrangements in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (HAFSA)(C)," 17 Sep 63, derived from (C, Gp-3) JCS 1259/634-12, "JCS Action on Certain Command Arrangements (U)," 11 Sep 63, same file, Sec. 6.
43(C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Command Arrangements in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara Areas (MBAPSA)," 10 Oct 63, encl to (C, Op-3) JCS 1259/634-17, same subj, 10 Oct 63, same file, Sec. 7. (C) JCSM-800-63 to SecDef, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 15 Oct 63, derived from (C, Op-3) JCS 1259/634-18, same subj, 11 Oct 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).

44(C) Memo, SecDef to President, "Command Arrangements in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara Areas (MBAPSA)," 21 Oct 63, encl to (C, Op-3) JCS 1259/634-22, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 22 Oct 63. (C) Memo, SecDef to President, "Unified Command Plan," 31 Oct 63, encl to (C, Op-4) JCS 1259/634-24, same subj, 1 Nov 63. Both in JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) Sec. 7.

45(C) Ist-W/H of JCS 1259/634-22, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 29 Oct 63. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., "Implementation of Command Arrangements for the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara Areas (MBAPSA)," 31 Oct 63, encl to (C, Op-3) JCS 1259/634-25, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 1 Nov 63. Both in JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) Sec. 7.

46(C, Op-3) Msg, JCS 3345 to CINCLENT, USCINCEUR, CINCGS, and CINCULM, 1 Nov 63, same file.

47(C) SH-1400-63 to CINCUs, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)(U)," 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).
US Unified Commanders in Europe

**CINCEUR**

<table>
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**USCINCEUR/SACEUR**

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<td>1 Jan 1963 - present</td>
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