OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS OF 1965

16 August 1966

CI #10

THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET. INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS AND ATTACHMENTS HERETO CARRY THEIR APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION.

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADE AND DECLASSIFICATION

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

OSRD/DOC DIV
CY R-4
F01 637A

Log No. 202692

127

EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 50 USC 552
(b)(1) (80-F01-0997)
This study presents an account of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic crisis of April-May 1965. It is one of a series prepared by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in response to DJSM 1111-61 and other JCS authorizations, in accordance with which WSEG has been conducting studies of command problems and procedures and decision making during recent critical incidents. The overall purpose of these studies is to provide empirical data concerning the operation of the national military command structure in actual-crisis situations, in order to aid, through understanding and recognition of the phenomena of crises, in the development of an improved command and control system.

The specific purpose of the study has been to examine in detail the operation of command and control at the several levels of authority involved, emphasizing the flow of action from the decision-making level to the operator in the field. The interaction of the several military command levels and the interaction between the military and political functions have been the two points of concentration.

The report is based upon an exhaustive analysis of message traffic, telephone traffic, logs, reports, and other records within the JCS. In addition, key personnel were interviewed in Washington, Santo Domingo, CINCLANT, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

All of the headquarters and command levels involved eventually produced reports on their role in the crisis. In addition, the politically controversial character of the U.S. intervention led to Congressional hearings, for which massive back-up material was prepared. The command reports were all essentially of a broad "lessons learned" nature, and as such, represent important complementary material to this study which has focused on the command and control and
decision-making aspects. The JCS produced two "lessons learned" studies, one in May 1965 and a more detailed version in October 1965; the XVIIIth Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division produced "Stability Operations in the Dominican Republic." An interesting "Analysis of Operations," comparing the Dominican affair with Marine operations at Chulai, South Vietnam, in May 1965, was undertaken by the JCS in June 1965 and elicited much useful information from the various commands involved. In their complementary capacity, the JCS and the command reports should be read for a level of procedural and operational detail not included in this study.

The unparalleled access of the press to the U.S. activities during the crisis meant that public accounts at the time were fuller and more accurate than usual. In addition, numerous articles and several books by journalists later appeared.

One major source of data was not available. This was the transcript of the closed hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1965 during which key military and State Department personnel testified. No complete copy of the transcript was ever sent to the Pentagon nor did individuals testifying receive transcripts of their own testimony. However, leaks to the press from the testimony in November 1965 and later, support much of what can be inferred from but not proven by the existing available official records.
INTRODUCTION

The Dominican crisis of 1965 was one of the sharpest and most controversial in which the U.S. has been involved. It arose almost without warning at a time when U.S. attention was concentrated upon the increased commitment to Vietnam. The Caribbean area, with the exception of the minor trouble in Panama in January 1964 and Haiti in April 1963, had been quiescent ever since the Cuban missile crisis of October-November 1962. Within a few days in April 1965, the U.S. was compelled to take drastic steps which it found distasteful but necessary. Coming on the heels of the Administration's decision to intervene massively in Vietnam and in view of the clouded character of the issues at stake in Santo Domingo, the U.S. intervention provoked a storm of contention which has even yet not subsided.

This report does not presume to pass judgment on the U.S. intervention, even with the benefit of a year's hindsight. In the last analysis the decisions made were based upon specific individual judgment, in an environment of grossly inadequate intelligence on what was actually happening in Santo Domingo. Under the circumstances, the key personnel often tended to act on the basis of long-held preconceptions rather than upon hard facts of the moment.

What is described herein is the anatomy of a crisis. In order to preserve the full flavor of that crisis, the events therein have been described in considerable detail. It was felt that any distillation could not truly transmit the inexorable pressures of time and events under which the participants functioned. This report attempts to describe the hour-by-hour development of the crisis, the perceptions of that crisis as held by operators and decision makers in Santo Domingo and Washington, and the problems encountered in responding to
that crisis. Some of these problems were real, some apparent; some were temporary, others were long term.

Many threads run through this story—intelligence estimates, both political and military; operational problems of alerting and deployment; planning; decision making and decision transmitting; political-military coordination in the field; information flow; command organization. These threads never appeared individually in isolation. They were always inextricably intertwined, and this is how the problems deriving from them were met by the decision makers and the commanders. To separate them into discrete categories for discussion in the body of the paper would again tend to lose the flavor of the crisis, and would transform this report from the description of the anatomy of a crisis to more of a policy analysis.

While the main point of concentration is essentially upon the military problems involved, great attention is paid to all issues of political-military coordination. This was an overwhelmingly political crisis, since there was never any doubt about the U.S. military capability to achieve whatever objective it chose. An ambassador and several successive military commanders worked or tried to work as closely as possible, in what is probably the best example of this sort of crisis field cooperation and its ramifications that has yet occurred. Both the successful and the unsuccessful aspects of this merit close examination. The overall political situation is considered in detail since this was the environment into which a U.S. military force was introduced, and the nature of the environment, in its numerous transformations, controlled the character of military operations.

Because of the numerous abbreviations and personal names which appear in the text, a glossary and a list of key personnel are provided for the reader's convenience, along with a chronology of U.S. military actions, in Appendix D.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE DOMINICAN BACKGROUND</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Background to the Revolt</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The XVIII Airborne Corps Plan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CRISIS BREAKS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Initial American Reaction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fall of the Reid Government</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Recapitulation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE TWO OF THE REVOLT</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Military Involvement Begins</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Military Counterattack</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure of the Counterattack</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MARINE LANDING</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations for the Airborne Deployment</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Developing Situation in Santo Domingo</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Activation of Joint Task Force 122</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE AIRBORNE DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The In-Flight Change of Objective</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations to Receive the Airborne Force</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANS AND OPERATIONS</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing the Mission</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and the Scene in Santo Domingo</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tactical Intelligence Picture</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of the Embassy</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with the Junta</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Political Developments</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE U.S. INCREASES ITS COMMITMENT</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Activities During the 30th</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Key Presidential Meeting</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Change in the Command Structure</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the International Security Zone</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Overnight Pause</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Decision to Reinforce</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. THE DOMINICAN BACKGROUND

The fabled island of Hispaniola, the island of Columbus and site of the first European settlement in the New World, has, since the end of the Spanish Empire, been undoubtedly the most wretched territory of all Latin America. Haiti and the Dominican Republic have each a record of misgovernment, anarchy, and brutality, unbroken save for periods of U.S. occupation,\(^1\) and matched only by the state at the other end of the same island. The nation which fell under the control of General Rafael Trujillo in 1930 was no stranger to his methods.\(^2\)

While Trujillo did succeed to some degree in bringing the Dominican Republic into the modern world, he simultaneously blotted out the political life of the country, so that with his assassination in May 1961, the suppressed desires of the nation exploded in a formless fashion with no recognized leader available to channel those drives constructively. With the possibility of unrestrained violence, exploitable by Cuba, overhanging the country, the U.S. positioned an amphibious force off the island during the most critical period of the change of regime. American diplomacy played a major role during the next seven months, creating the patchwork government which kept the country functioning. However, between May 1961 and September 1965, the Dominican Republic was to have seven governments.

In December 1961, a U.S.-supported Council of State was installed which held a caretaker post until general elections could be held in December 1962. It took, in other words, eighteen months to achieve even a modicum of stability necessary for the holding of elections.

\(^1\)American military visits to the Dominican Republic are of very long standing. The earliest, a cutting out expedition against pirates in the harbor of Puerto Plata, was carried out by United States Marines in the year 1800.

\(^2\)The country covers an area of 18,703 square miles, and contains a population of some 3.3 million. The capital, Santo Domingo, held some 375,000 people as of 1960.
Even the Council of State was not free of travail. Two weeks after it was installed it was overthrown by a military coup headed by the Secretary of State for Armed Forces, and then restored two days later when said Secretary was himself arrested by other military elements.

The elections of December 1962, the first honestly and democratically held in the country's history, brought to the presidency Dr. Juan Bosch, an idealistic writer, social reformer and political scientist and long-time opponent of Trujillo, who had lived in exile for the previous twenty-four years. Bosch's victory was overwhelming, having won 60 percent of the total vote and twice as much as his nearest rival. The hostility of the old elite which felt its traditional prerogatives threatened immediately became obvious. Even under Trujillo, they had been given assignments befitting their own sense of social station.

The program of social and economic reform of Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), was not, in fact, very radical, and was generally moderate, sensible, and long overdue. Nevertheless, Bosch's inadequacy as an administrator and the lack of shrewd administrative talent to assist him tended to keep alive the fears and hatreds between classes and groups. His policies, probably unintentionally, did not promote reconciliation.

In addition, his permissive attitude toward the Communists caused alarm. As an idealist he opposed restrictions on any group and permitted the Communists to return from their exile by previous governments. These soon began their old propaganda campaigns. Bosch's opponents used his permissiveness as a weapon against him, and conservative elements in the country organized protest marches in August and September 1963 against what they claimed to be the rising influence in and growing infiltration of the government by leftists.

In September 1963, Bosch was overthrown in a quick and bloodless military coup led by one Colonel Wessin y Wessin, on the grounds that Bosch's alleged leftist proclivities were slowly delivering the country into the hands of the Communists. Curiously, there was little support
for Bosch in response to the coup. The U.S. which had initially enthusiastically supported Bosch had by this time cooled somewhat, presumably for the same reason. Nevertheless, the Kennedy Administra-
tion angrily broke relations with the new junta and did not restore them until several months later.

In the meantime one of the ruling triumvirate, Donald Reid Cabral, had become the senior member and to all intents and purposes acted as president. Though his rule was authoritarian, it was not dictatorial by Dominican standards, and he began a few efforts at reform of the economy, the bureaucracy and the military. Reid was liked by local U.S. officials and he himself was known for his close links to American interests in the country.

The triumvirate government had been under almost constant crit-
icism. Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and left wing
groups insistently condemned the lack of a constitutional government and agitated for the return of constitutionality. Among people who had never yet received the better lives expected after the death of Trujillo, the call for constitutionality had a wide appeal. Military elements, dissatisfied for one reason or another with the government's policies, were frequently involved in plots against it, and some of the plots were only narrowly averted.

Elections were scheduled for September 1965 as the first step in returning to constitutional government. It was widely accepted that Reid would be a candidate, but many groups suspected that he would either postpone the elections because he lacked a solid political base or would manipulate them to assure his own succession. Reid had antagonized the old Trujillo group of military leaders because, in his efforts to clean up the military structure, he had ousted some of them. He was also in disfavor with the middle and lower ranking officers because they felt he was not moving rapidly enough in his reform measures. Some of the latter group were "young Turks", strongly pro-Bosch and opposed to Wessin and his clique.
The problem of reorganizing the armed forces and police had faced successive governments since 1961. None had been successful, but Reid was doing more than his predecessors. In January 1965 a mission headed by USCINCSOUTH, General O'Meara, had visited the Dominican Republic to discuss military problems. This visit presumably encouraged Reid to tighten his control of the military, and shortly thereafter he had made several changes in the senior military ranks, removing those involved in graft or who were ineffective, and replacing them with men he considered more capable and more willing to carry out reforms. He had made no move, however, to reduce the size of the military establishment, despite the drain it imposed on his economic program. The services were all pinched, to some extent, however, and their resentment over this unusual situation soon became manifest.

Political parties in general were poorly organized for the coming elections. Ex-President Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR) and the PRD displayed the greatest capability, but unless their two exiled leaders were able to return for the campaign, their chances of winning seemed slight. Both Bosch and Balaguer feared Reid would prevent their return just for this purpose.

Three left wing parties, the Moscow-oriented Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), the Peiping-oriented Dominican Popular Movement (MCP), and the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) were all illegal and unable to participate in the elections under their own names. These three groups, together with the PRD and the small local Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC), formed the political base for the revolution that was about to break.

There were, in addition, numerous minor parties of varying political hues. The PRD had won a sweeping victory in the 1962 elections, but had lost ground with Bosch's exile and had fragmented. The PSPD in April 1965 had an estimated strength of about 1,000 well indoctrinated members; the MCP 300-800; and the APCJ, originally a non-Communist organization formed to fight Trujillo, was the largest with an estimated 3-4,000 plus 20,000 sympathizers. Because of its background, it
still had many non-Communist members, but the leadership was believed by U.S. intelligence to have come under Communist control in 1963. In the months preceding April 1965, the leftist groups were the most vocal in calling for a return to constitutional government. The outlook for the country was not, therefore, very promising. The U.S. Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, reported early in the year his belief that "we were almost on the ropes in the Dominican Republic." Nevertheless, it appears certain that the revolt took him by surprise.

A. IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLT

It has been proven extremely difficult to prepare a documented account of the plotting against the government in the months prior to April 1965. Some of this was known to U.S. intelligence and embassy sources; some was not. Accounts prepared or offered by Dominican sources in the aftermath of the revolt must naturally be suspect since self-justification was the order of the day on all sides. Estimates of intentions and aspirations especially must therefore be considered to be speculative.

The conspiracy which opened the revolt was planned by a group of young officers, mainly from the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions in camps near Santo Domingo, and the PRD. The interests of the two groups coincided since the junior officers probably believed that military reform could be effected much more rapidly by the return to power of Bosch. The PRD, for their part, had never ceased to regard themselves as the legitimate heirs to political power because of their honest election victory of 1962. Apparently their plotting began in September 1964 and a target date of 1 June 1965 was established.

As is customary in Latin American intrigues, rumor soon began to spread.

1 Much of the above information comes from DIA, Special Intelligence Supplement, Background and Assessment of the Dominican Situation, 21 October 1965, SECRET-NOCORN.
2 Joint Staff, Dominican Republic Fact Sheet, prepared for CJCS use in Congress, 1200 hours, 29 April 1965, SECRET.
In addition, reports received at CINCLANT as late as April 12 indicated the existence of at least two separate groups plotting Reid's overthrow. The Reid government itself had information several weeks before 24 April that Bosch, certain PRD elements, and a group of Junior officers were involved in a plot to overthrow Reid and reinstate Bosch. One faction of the PRSC which had allied itself with Bosch and the PRD was probably also involved. In addition, apparently some of the PRD members of the conspiracy had approached the MPD several days prior to the revolt to ask their support in an attempted coup. Reports also had Bosch in touch with certain segments of the APSJ, seeking propaganda support for his return.\(^2\)

Reid himself was later to claim that he had known of the plot fifteen days before the outbreak, while Wessin told a reporter in August 1965 that "I had reported the conspiracy to President Reid for fifteen or twenty consecutive days, but he did not pay any attention to me."

The military plotting group apparently was divided concerning objectives. One element planned to replace the triumvirate with a military junta which would hold early elections with all parties and party leaders participating. Another element had been secretly conspiring with Bosch and the PRD to take advantage of the confusion that would attend a coup attempt to seize control of the situation and to restore Bosch to the presidency. The move was planned to take place about 1 June, when the campaign for the September elections was about to begin. Bosch, however, later told reporters that the revolt was actually planned for the 26th of April.

There may also have been some outside intervention into the situation at this point. The XVII Airborne Corps report on their role

\(^1\)Interview, U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
\(^2\)CINCLANT to JCS, 261436Z June 1965, Resume and Analysis of Dominican Republic Operation, SECRET.
in the Dominican affair claimed that during the period April 9-23, 22 Cuban-trained agents and 20 more agents trained in Russia, China, or the Soviet Bloc entered the Dominican Republic with forged passports or via covert night entry. This entry presumably was prompted by the intention to exploit the instability of the political scene.\(^1\) The source of this information, however, has not been ascertained.

The fact that the government knew of the plotting led to a premature implementation of the coup attempt. \(^2\)

Consequently, Reid acted and on the 24th of April ordered seven officers discharged for involvement in the plot. Furthermore, Reid was well aware that the FRD considered themselves the legal government and were not going to rely on purely legal methods to regain it.

The Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Rivera Cuesta, went during the morning of the 24th to one of the Army camps near Santo Domingo, known as the 16th of August Camp, to arrest personally those officers known to be key plotters. Instead he and his handful of aides were seized by the camp garrison and imprisoned. This was the catalyst. The plot leaders were aware now of the government's knowledge of the conspiracy and were thus compelled by events to order the coup implemented.\(^1\)

Two points of significance should be noted. In the first place, apparently there was no single coherent coordinated plot with a single agreed set of objectives. The plotters, the Army "young Turks" and the FRD primarily, were not specifically after the same objective. For most of the Army plotters, Army reform was sought first and the return of Bosch was a means to achieve that reform. For the FRD, the return of Bosch was an end in itself.

\(^1\) XVIII Airborne Corps, Stability Operations in the Dominican Republic, no date, SECRET.

\(^2\)
Secondly, the premature implementation of the plot probably resulted in many unforeseen consequences, the most critical of which was the opportunity it offered the extremist groups.
II. U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

U.S. contingency plans for operations in the Dominican Republic had existed since the last days of the Trujillo era. The Commander, Nineteenth Air Force and the Commanding General, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, had assisted CINCLANT since April 1962 in contingency planning for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This was in accord with JCS instructions to CINCSTRIKE to designate commanders for such planning assistance.

The plan in effect when the crisis broke was [ ]

[ ] Originally approved 10 March 1964, the designation had been changed on 2 October 1964 to [ ] and approved by JCS SM 54-65 of 21 January 1965. JCS SM 249-65 of 18 March 1965 had again redesignated the plan as [ ]

[ ]

The October change was not entered in the J-3 copy of the plan until 29 April.
The command organization for Dominican operations was Joint Task Force 122. This consisted of the Second Fleet staff augmented to form a joint task force, in existence for planning only until activated for operations. Operational command would then be exercised by CJTF 122 through CINCLANT to the JCS. The Commander JTF 122 under Plan would be prepared to:
Initial combat operations would emphasize the restoration of law and order in the objective area. As soon as practicable, action would be taken to control those facilities through which governmental control is exercised, appropriate objectives including docks, terminals, communications centers, barracks, power plants, water works, military and police headquarters, governmental buildings and facilities.

Posttactical operations would shift in emphasis to civil affairs and counterinsurgency activities.
The CINCLANT plans staff in late April had just completed a review of [ ] after the JCS change of March. The plan was then extremely current in its essence and concepts of operations. The differences would appear in certain of the supporting annexes.

A. THE XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS PLAN

The Army Task Force Plan under [ ] was the responsibility of the Headquarters staff XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. Their plan was subject to review by CONARC in his capacity as CINCARSTRIKE and by the JTF 122 staff under its normal nonactivated planning role.

On April 24, the day the Dominican crisis began, the XVIII Airborne Corps was prepared to execute, in support of the CINCLANT OPLAN, its own [ ] dated 20 June 1963. [ ]
This confusion and misunderstanding in regard to force level persisted long after the crisis. Lt. General Palmer, the U.S. Commander Dominican Republic, stated in a draft report as late as mid-June that the "CINCLANT OPLAN for the Dominican Republic called for a Marine BLT and a two-battalion airborne brigade, a total of three infantry battalions." In fact, called for the equivalent of ten infantry battalions.
III. THE CRISIS BREAKS

In detailing the development of the crisis, the main reliance will be on U.S. messages and phone calls, in an essentially chronological sequence, in order to present the situation as the U.S. command authorities saw it. However, in places, confusion and contradiction were extreme and here narrative text, based upon our later knowledge, will be interpolated, describing what was actually happening.

The first news of the commencement of the outbreak came to the Dominican people soon after noon on the 24th of April. Between 1330 and 1400 local time, the FRD party press and publicity secretary, during a regular FRD political radio program, announced that the military had revolted against Reid and that the Army Chief of Staff and other Army officers were being held prisoner. He called on the people to join the revolt.

At the 16th of August Camp, the rebellious officers apparently started distributing arms to veterans groups and to all who desired them. It was announced on the radio that arms were available.¹

It was at 1530 hours when the first notification of the developing situation was transmitted to Washington.² A CRITIC message from the Embassy stated that Santo Domingo was rife with rumors of a coup, promoted by an announcement over two radio stations that a number of Army officers, including the Chief of Staff, had been ousted. Word of the overthrow of the government had brought crowds into the street. The government, about 1300, had announced a nationwide curfew as of 1600, but the government radio station, Radio Santo Domingo, was

¹DIA, Background and Assessment.
²Washington and Santo Domingo are both in the same time zone, local time being ZULU time minus five hours. However, Daylight Saving Time came into effect on April 25, so that local time became ZULU minus four hours. Within the body of the text, all times will be given in local time (EDT until midnight on 24 April, DST after that) but message citations in the footnotes will retain their ZULU date-time groups.
taken over shortly thereafter by a group representing "young and honest" military officers who urged the people into the streets to celebrate. The station had called all "constitutional" forces to resist "exploiters," and denied that the government was in a position to enforce a curfew.

The message went on to say that the Embassy "believed the Dominican government to be in trouble," but that there was no evidence that it had been overthrown. The seizure of Radio Santo Domingo was seen as an isolated incident.¹

The message was signed by the Deputy Chief of Mission, William Connett, a member of the Embassy staff for the previous five months, who was in charge in the absence of Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett. Bennett had gone to the U.S. the day before, Friday, for reasons which are obscure. One account gives the purpose of the visit as purely personal, to attend to family affairs; another states that he sensed the coming explosion and wished to confer with the Department over it. He was at his family home in Georgia when the crisis broke and did not reach Washington until Sunday. He was not to return until the afternoon of Tuesday, April 27, so that Connett played a key role in conditioning the Washington outlook with his analyses and observations of the first three days.

Bennett's absence is especially unusual since, the day before his departure, he had mentioned in his regular weekly report to State that there were again rumors that some generals might try to overthrow Reid during the weekend. However, he had apparently not taken these seriously, terming them the usual Santo Domingo rumors.

¹American Embassy, Santo Domingo (hereafter called AmEmb) to DIRNSA, 2420302 April 1965, CRITIC.
A following message provided some background information, stating that the coup attempt appeared to have been sparked by the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) in collaboration with some military and police elements. An ominous note was provided by the first suggestion that extreme leftists were believed to be lending support.³

DIA, in its October 1965 report, claims that the U.S. Army Attache visited the 16th of August Camp during the afternoon but was told that Army Chief of Staff Rivera Cuesta could not be seen and that an uprising had occurred which proposed to install a military junta. This information, especially the very significant last point, does not appear to have been passed on to Washington. At least no record of it exists. Since the question of the rebels' objective assumed considerable importance, such information was vital to Washington. It indicated what was not known then, that apparently the military plotters were divided in their objectives. One element planned to replace Reid with a military junta which would hold early elections with all parties and party leaders participating. Another group, however, had been covertly conspiring with the PRD and perhaps with Bosch himself, although this has never been fully confirmed, to exploit the confusion attendant upon a coup in order to seize control and then to restore Bosch to the presidency.

The Embassy reported at 1850 that the situation remained unclear, although the government had been successful in retaining most of the important mainstays of its military support in Santo Domingo.
Army Attache had reported that General Wessing y Wessin was fully in support of the regime and had sent troops and tanks to protect the National Palace.\(^1\)

The situation indeed seemed to be a typical Latin American flash-in-the-pan. Reid himself called the Embassy and told the Air Attache that he planned to encircle the Army camp north of Santo Domingo to smother the revolt.\(^2\) Reid also addressed the nation at 2035 on radio and TV, claiming that his government was in full control except for the two Army camps. He demanded the surrender of these by 0500 the next day and confirmed that the rebels had indeed seized the Army Chief of Staff.\(^3\)

At 2203 the Embassy sent in its first detailed assessment of the situation. The key issue of political involvement was unclear and thus far the Embassy had no information tying any political group directly to the plot. Nevertheless, it emphasized that the persons involved in the temporary takeover of Radio Santo Domingo were of "leftist PRD ilk." Groups in the street displayed predominantly pro-Bosch (and some pro-Balaguer) sentiment, but this was probably largely spontaneous. Based on the recent plotting, the Embassy felt that both the PRD and the PR must be suspected, as well as the extremists, although no information had yet been uncovered tying the PR to the present situation. The Embassy expressed no doubt that certain well-known PRD figures were in the forefront from the outset.\(^4\)

The situation began to change in the early hours of the 25th. The Embassy expressed concern over the deterioration, reporting rebel troops entering the city in large numbers from the outlying camps. The rebels were claiming they were determined to restore constitutional government. The Dominican Air Force was apparently remaining

\(^1\) AmEmb to SecState, 242350Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^2\) AmEmb to SecState, 2500322 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^3\) AmEmb to SecState, 2502222 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^4\) AmEmb to SecState, 2503032 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
loyal but could not do anything until daylight. Although sporadic
firing could be heard, the city police were not interfering with the
rebel effort to establish a position in town.  

Reid called the Air Attache to ask him to ascertain if the Air
Force would fight at the expiration of his 0500 ultimatum. Presum-
ably he could not personally reach the Air Force because of communica-
tions difficulties. At any rate, the answer the Air Attache received
to his query from the Air Chief of Staff was negative. Reid now was
clearly in desperate straits.

At 1002 the Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Attaches at the Embassy
directed a sitrep to CNO with significant information. At 0430 the
government had issued a decree naming Wessin Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces. At 0715 Reid had called the Embassy and spoken with the
Naval Attache, requesting U.S. Government intervention because his
Armed Forces were reluctant to combat the rebels. This is one of the
critical moments of the crisis, even though at the time it was not taken
too seriously. Reid had raised for the first time the possibility of
a direct U.S. intervention.

Soon after, the Secretary of State for the Presidency had called
the Embassy, indicating his concern over the large number of armed
citizens in the streets and recommending steps be taken to protect
the Embassy from possible mob violence.  

The Attaches ascribed the reluctance of the Armed Forces to attack
the rebels to the difficulty of fighting in the city and to a genuine
desire to avoid bloodshed. Nevertheless, the Dominican military

1AmEmb to SecState, 250744Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL
2AmEmb to SecState, 250931Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
3It is not clear what basis there was for fear of a mob attack directed
against the U.S. Embassy. Coming on the heels of Reid's request for
U.S. aid, the warning seems suspiciously like another tactic to pro-
voke U.S. intervention.
leaders, the Attaches all felt, now seemed to be recognizing the danger that their failure to support Reid was leaving the way open for the political left to advance to power. The leaders were therefore attempting to come up with a plan for a military junta of nonrebel military leaders, to take over the government from Reid and then to take steps to negotiate with the rebels to restore peace. The Attaches pointed out that the scheme was probably unacceptable to the rebels and generally infeasible.¹ In any event, they felt Reid's hours were numbered. It thus appears that the military leaders, instead of rallying to support the Reid government, were actually contemplating overthrowing it themselves.

Since the Attaches had excellent personal contacts among the Dominican military hierarchy, their information in this period is of unusual interest. Their actual role in these first two days of the revolt has been open to some question. Since some of their activities never became a matter of formal record, the allegations that the Attaches from the very outset had urged vigorous action to crush the revolt can neither be proved nor disproved. Certainly they offered continuous guidance to the military chiefs, but just how far the guidance went or what promises may have been made cannot be established.

Throughout this critical period of crisis, the term "loyalist" was widely used in U.S. circles to denote the forces opposed to the rebels. The expression tended to create an image which, no doubt, conditioned the Washington estimate of the situation and therefore influenced U.S. actions. The term is a misnomer, since the military chiefs were loyal only to themselves and, as will be seen, permitted Reid to fall, and then resisted the rebels only when they felt their own interests compelled it. The term will not appear in these pages, but rather forces opposing the rebels up to May 7th will be termed "junta forces."

¹JANAF Attaches, to CNO, 2514022 Apr 1965, SECRET.
Connett at the Embassy reported an hour later with amplifying information. After Reid's call to the Naval Attaché requesting U.S. intervention, Connett had phoned back, asking Reid what he meant by intervention. Reid asked Connett to come to the Palace where he told the DCM that the Communists were taking advantage of the situation while the government forces were unwilling to act decisively. The troops around the Palace, Connett observed, did not appear ready for action. Reid also confirmed that military commanders not collaborating with the rebels were thinking of establishing a junta. Base commanders elsewhere around the island were refusing to send troops to the capital for fear of the safety of their own bases.

Connett told Reid that the situation was moving too fast for the U.S. to do much in influencing the rebels to desist, and recommended as a last resort that Reid consider the junta proposal. He expressed the Country Team's opinion that the junta would not be acceptable to the rebels, but it might avoid bloodshed as at least a ploy.

PRD representatives had twice called the Embassy to say that Reid had offered to turn the government over to the PRD group, and asked that the U.S. Ambassador or his Deputy be present at any turnover. Connett gave them no encouragement, feeling that since the rebels were apparently riding the crest of the wave, representations to them would be useless. To associate the U.S. openly with the PRD group might tie the U.S. to any number of unfavorable political combinations. Connett was convinced the PRD was trying to use the U.S. as a lever against Reid and he suggested that the U.S. would certainly have to be clearer on the composition of a new government. He then stated that "for the present, the PRD appeared to be in the hands of its more extremist element."

He further confirmed that the rebel Army units had been passing out weapons to the populace.¹

¹AmEmb to SecState, 2515152 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
A. THE INITIAL AMERICAN REACTION

The development of the crisis was brought to the attention of the Chairman JCS, the first of the senior military people to be so alerted, at 0813 on Sunday morning, the 25th. He was informed by the DDO that State was considering a request to DOD to position a naval force off Santo Domingo as preparation for a possible evacuation. However, there was no urgency implied and the subject of Santo Domingo was reported inter alia with news items on Southeast Asia.\(^1\)

A similar initial casual reaction came from the Director of Operations, JCS, on being informed at 0819. He wondered why State did not try to use commercial aircraft for any evacuation because of both the cost of deploying a task force and the political implications it carried. He further expressed disbelief that either side in the revolt would be likely to begin attacking U.S. nationals. However, data had already been gathered by the DDO on the numbers of potential evacuees, the resources and disposition of the Caribbean Ready Phibron.\(^2\)

At 0905 a message from the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in State, came to the Deputy Director for Operations, J-3, requesting that, as a result of the serious deterioration of the situation in Santo Domingo, DOD direct vessels suitable for the embarkation of up to 1200 U.S. citizens to proceed to the vicinity of the city. Vessels on arrival should remain out of sight of land until further orders. The earliest possible arrival of the ships should be ensured.\(^3\) The request was approved by the Secretary of State.

\(^1\)Emergency Action Telephone Tapes, 25 Apr 1965.
Once the NMCC became involved, it was found that the LANT/South Desk which had for so long had nothing urgent in its area of responsibility, had been assisting the Pacific Desk in the handling of the Vietnam affairs, specifically the Rolling Thunder air strikes. So enmeshed was the LANT/South Desk in these matters, that they were unable immediately to disengage when the Dominican crisis broke. Consequently for the first several days the North American Desk handled the crisis within the NMCC until the LANT/South people could free themselves of their other assignments.


\(^3\)RDA/CIR (State) to DDO, J-3, JCS, 2513002 April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The DDO in the NMCC ascertained from CINCLANT that the Carib Phibron was 280 miles east of Santo Domingo, off Vieques where Exercise QUICK KICK had just been completed. This was some ten hours steaming away. The Phibron consisted of the helicopter carrier, USS BOXER, and a half dozen other ships carrying the Sixth Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU-Battalion Landing Team 3/6). While the ships were all combat loaded, they could take on large numbers of refugees under emergency conditions. More than enough capacity was available to pick up evacuees at north coast ports as well.

The DDO called the CJCS at 0953 with details of developments and got his approval to honor the State request and was instructed by the Chairman to obtain the approval of the political authorities as well. Unable to reach the SecDef who, with Mr. Rusk, was to meet with the President at Camp David at 1000, the DDO got approval from Deputy SecDef Vance at 1000. Both Vance and the CJCS agreed with the intention to keep the force involved to the minimum.

Advance notice of the approval of the State request was given CINCLANT at 1002, stressing the need for strict moderation in the size of forces deployed. The formal JCS message to CINCLANT went out half an hour later.

CINCLANTFLT transmitted the order to Task Group 44.9, the Carib Phibron, with an estimate of potential evacuees: Santo Domingo-1200; Haina-300; La Romana, San Pedro de Macoris, Puerto Plata, Puerto Manzanillo, Barahona, Cabo Roja-350. The Commander Task Group 44.9 (CTG 44.9) was cautioned to execute the alert deployment quietly. While interest centered on Santo Domingo, he was to take whatever resources remained available after enough to provide a lift for 1200 people off the capital had been established, and to place one ship off the north shore and one or more off the lesser ports of the south coast to permit evacuation here if later directed.

1EA Telephone Tapes.
2JCS 009731 to CINCLANT, 251432Z April 1965, SECRET.
3CINCLANTFLT to CTG 44.9, 251606Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
What apparently had happened was that the young officers who had initiated the revolt Saturday morning now made evident their intention to having nothing to do with a new junta but to press for the return of Bosch and the constitutional government.

At this point representatives of several conservative Dominican parties visited the Embassy and expressed their concern over the pending return of Bosch and of leftists. They made no explicit request for U.S. intervention but expressed the hope that the U.S. would exert its influence toward moderation and a noncommitted interim government until free elections, uncontrolled by a faction, could be held. Three hours later the Embassy reported some political party activity to persuade Balaguer to return in order to drain strength from the Bosch bandwagon.

Radio Santo Domingo was still asking the populace to be calm and not to indulge in violence. It called upon general support for a return of Bosch, claiming that only Wessing Wessin held out in opposition to the revolt.

This situation began to change as the day drew on. The Embassy notified Washington at 1622 that the Air Attache had just been told by Air Force Chief of Staff de los Santos that the Air Force had decided to fight to prevent the return of Bosch and were joining Wessing in this endeavor. The move was based on the fear that a return of Bosch would mean a turnover of authority ultimately to Communists.

Late in the afternoon Connett sent a cable which marked another of those points upon which later events were to turn, although evidence produced after the event would seem to indicate that Connett was merely reflecting rather than creating the tone of U.S. policy. Connett stressed the extreme confusion of the situation, with no identifiable

---

1 AmEmb to SecState, 251710Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
2 AmEmb to SecState, 252036Z April 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
3 AmEmb to SecState, 251733Z April 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
Hughes... exercising any effective control over the government. All members of the U.S. Country Team, he flatly stated, felt strongly that it would be against U.S. interests for Bosch to return and to assume power, especially in view of the extremist role in the coup and their announced coup advocacy of a Bosch return as favorable to their long-term interests. The Country Team agreed that the de los Santos-Wessin "plan" was the only course of action likely to prevent a Bosch return and to contain the growing disorder. Bloodshed was a risk as a result of any such action, but the U.S. should seek to minimize it and to encourage unity among the armed forces. (The "plan" was not described.)

Connett also reported that the Navy Chief of Staff Rivera Caminero had just announced his intention to join Wessin and de los Santos. He asked, as had they, what U.S. support he could expect if needed. The Country Team did not believe a show of force was in the U.S. best interests at the moment, especially in view of the late date, when the next 24 hours would determine the course of events. However, Connett flatly warned that if the present conditions bordering on anarchy continued, the Country Team might wish to reconsider its position. The Attaches were hammering home to all three military chiefs the strong Embassy feeling that everything possible should be done to prevent a Communist takeover.¹

Concern over the Communist role was growing in Washington by this time, and at 1255 State so informed the Embassy. State assumed Connett and his people were in touch with the leaders of the armed forces to urge them to unite to form a provisional government capable of restoring order and preventing a Communist takeover.²

The situation was summarized by State Operations Center for the 1740. The divisions among the military leaders had at first seemed to open the way to pro-Bosch elements and to a restoration of

¹AnEmb to SecState, 252022Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²SecState to AnEmb, 251655Z, April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
his regime. The Dominican Embassy in Washington had received a call early in the afternoon from Santo Domingo to the effect that "the military junta to whom Reid had turned over power" had already decided to turn over the government to Jose Rafael Molina Urena, former president of the Chamber of Deputies. Then, however, the military leaders had stiffened their position and united in opposition. The position of Reid was unclear. It was not certain he had ever turned over power or resigned, and if he had, it was uncertain to whom he had surrendered power.¹

This information from the Dominican Embassy was misleading. Reid had not turned over power to anyone. There was, in fact, no government.

Moments later the Embassy called State Ops with news that two Dominican F51s were strafing the National Palace.² A later message developed the information, reporting air attack on the rebel headquarters at the 27th of February Camp as well. De los Santos had informed the Air Attaché that he, Wessin and Rivera had thought that they had made a deal with the rebels during the afternoon under which Molina Urena would not be sworn in and that instead, a military junta would take power. A rebel leader, Hernando Ramirez, had asked time to discuss the arrangement with his followers, but as night drew on, the military leaders began to suspect that the rebels were merely playing for time. Consequently, they decided to initiate military action as an indication of earnest intent. De los Santos expressed fear that the delay would give Bosch time to arrive from his home in Puerto Rico.³ Bosch had been heard over Radio Santo Domingo at 1910, asking popular support and promising to return.⁴

¹State Ops Center to NMCC, 252140Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²State Ops to NMCC, 252200Z April 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
³AmEmb to Sec State, 252355Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
⁴AmEmb to SecState, 260050Z April 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
C. A RECAPITULATION

It may be well at this point to recapitulate in the light of what became known of the true situation afterwards. The picture of confusion and contradiction continues and deepens and will be presented as such, but a clarification of certain points, very unclear at that specific moment, will assist in following the emerging crisis.

Reid had addressed the nation at 1930 Saturday evening, stating that the 16th of August and the 27th of February Army Camps were in revolt but that the government was in complete control everywhere else. However, when Reid called on the military forces to surround and take the two camps in line with his ultimatum, the military failed to support him, claiming they wished to avoid bloodshed. They also very probably thought the revolt was intended to establish a military junta, a move toward which they would have been sympathetic, since Reid, as has been explained, had little support among the senior military leaders.

The total force involved in the original revolt is estimated to have been some 1000 officers and men, but by Saturday afternoon and evening FSPD, APCJ, and MPD members were out inciting crowds and staging rallies. In addition, numerous PRD members came out in support of Bosch's return.

On Sunday morning the three service chiefs told Reid they would not support him and, at about 1000, a rebel military group headed by the National Police officer, Col. Caamaño, entered the National Palace and arrested Reid and his ministers. Lacking military support, Reid resigned. A PRD leader, Molina Urena, who as expresident of the Chamber of Deputies under the Bosch government was in the constitutional succession to the presidency, installed himself in the Palace, declaring himself provisional president until Bosch could return.

The installation of Molina by the young army officer rebels and the PRD was apparently taken as a betrayal of the alleged "deal" by
The military chiefs who had been content to see the revolt succeed in ousting Reid. Now suddenly they were faced by the return of Bosch. This was the beginning of the civil war in Santo Domingo.

During the afternoon, the extremist parties ranged the city, urging the populace to join the revolt. At this time several thousand weapons from the 27th of February Camp were distributed to civilians, including automatic weapons and grenades. Extremist groups took advantage of the situation to avenge old grudges by sacking and burning the headquarters buildings of several smaller non-Communist parties as well as some business establishments. Rebel broadcasts over Radio Santo Domingo called for greater public support and watchfulness against an effort by Wessin to enter the city during the night.

The distribution of weapons was a particularly serious matter. U.S. sources have always maintained that the Communists had done this, but the rebel military leaders have equally insisted that it was done at their direction.
IV. PHASE TWO OF THE REVOLT

The belated decision of the military chiefs to counterattack the rebels opened the second phase of the revolt. Air attacks were launched on the National Palace area, the rebel camp, and later on the western or city side of the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River, the only bridge and therefore the key to access to the capital. Invariably damage became indiscriminate. This apparently was a major tactical blunder since the attacks in the city outraged a great majority of the populace and turned their sympathies toward the rebels.¹

That the attacks had some impact was indicated by the appearance of a group of rebel emissaries at the Embassy very late on the 25th to ask that the U.S. entreat the military chiefs to halt the air attacks. An Embassy officer merely told them that both sides should cease violence and that the rebels should try to negotiate in good faith with the legitimate military leaders.²

Connett, an hour later, sent his latest estimate and recapitulation. From present appearance, he said, the coup plot was from the beginning an effort to bring back Bosch. However, several key military leaders had apparently been led to believe otherwise at a critical moment on Saturday night by talk of a military junta, and had decided they were not willing to engage in a civil war to save Reid. By Sunday afternoon, the issue had clarified. It became one of opting for Bosch's return at the call of the PRD and extremists or action by the strongly anti-Bosch military leaders to retrieve the situation. The moment of decision, as Connett saw it, came with the developing effort shortly after midday to install Molina Urena as the interim president. At this point the military chiefs decided to act.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 072155Z May 1965, SECRET.
²AmEmb to SecState, 250100Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Connett stressed that the Country Team opposed Bosch's return but hoped that U.S. prestige would not have to be committed to this end, especially in view of the degree of Bosch's popularity and of the fact that he was the constitutional president. The Country Team felt that the foundation of a military junta and the promise of early elections was about the best that could be hoped for at the moment. Indications from meetings with representatives of five parties earlier in the day were that such a solution would be acceptable to them. No one was talking of returning Reid to power and little was said of Balaguer. In regard to the latter, the Country Team did not think it advisable to bring him back at that moment.¹

Throughout the 26th the Embassy was engaged in feverish efforts to achieve a cease-fire and negotiations. Numerous offers and peace proposals poured in from different persons and political parties in Santo Domingo. At 0700 Connett reported that both Wessin and de los Santos had requested the intervention of U.S. troops, but that he had informed them that the U.S. had no plans for such action. Wessin was now apparently in command of all the forces opposing the rebels.²

This request for U.S. military intervention is most significant since it indicates at what an early date the antirebel leaders were already thinking in terms of U.S. troops to retrieve the situation for them.

At this juncture the newly formed antirebel front received a jolt. The Navy Chief of Staff Rivera called the U.S. Naval Attache to tell him that the Dominican Navy had changed its mind and was joining the rebels. Apparently his break with Wessin and the Air Force was the result of petty interservice jealousies.³

¹AmEmb to SecState, 260215Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 261102Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³AmEmb to SecState, 261120Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The Embassy viewed the development seriously. With the Navy on the rebel side, Wessin and de los Santos were seen to be gravely weakened, especially psychologically. While garrisons elsewhere in the country were still claimed by Wessin and de los Santos, their value was doubtful. Control of Radio Santo Domingo and the establishment of a provisional government under Molina had weakened the cause of the military opposition to the rebels, now based at the San Isidro Airfield, eight miles east of the city.

However, very soon afterwards the Naval Attache reported that Rivera was already having second thoughts about his decision and had said that he might support the San Isidro group after all if they would take vigorous action against the rebels. Unfortunately, much of the Navy had already defected.

Connett felt that the chances now for the formation of a military junta under pressure seemed slight. Probably nothing short of a major U.S. involvement, he felt, could prevent the return of Bosch at this stage. While both de los Santos and Wessin had requested U.S. troops, Connett felt that a U.S. combat force commitment would have grave implications and serious repercussions in Latin America. The U.S. would be cast in the role of an interventionist power opposing a popular revolt. He did not believe the U.S. could effectively make a case that this was a Communist-controlled movement at the present time, although the Embassy knew Communists were deeply involved in the rebel movement. Consequently, he had told Wessin not to expect U.S. troops.

The only effective alternative that he could see which remained open to the U.S. was a strong diplomatic initiative to prevent Bosch's return, through the creation of a military junta which would definitely schedule elections for September. The Country Team, he reiterated, believed there was a serious threat of a Communist takeover and that very little time remained in which to act.
Under the circumstances, he requested that he be authorized to make clear to Molina Urena and the rebel military officers the serious U.S. concern over Communist influence in the present revolutionary movement, U.S. desire to avoid continuing disorder and interservice feuding, and the strong conviction that the formula suggested above was in the best interests of the Dominican people.

Connett ended on an ominous note. He believed any decision to use a show of force to back up the U.S. diplomatic effort should be held in abeyance pending the results of the representations for which he sought authorization. At the same time, he foresaw a distinct possibility that such resources might have to be employed.  

This message posed the dilemma which faced the U.S. and which became eventually the focus of contention about the whole affair. The question he implicitly raised for the Washington decision makers was the degree of the danger of a Communist takeover that we were willing to accept before we felt it necessary to act.

The Embassy suggested a few hours later a direct approach to Bosch, recalling U.S. support to him during his government and advising him of U.S. concern about leftist elements in the revolt. The objective would be to seek his support for a junta which, the Embassy said, was now looked upon favorably by some of the military and almost all non-Communist political parties.  

Meanwhile, in the city, events began to take an uglier turn. Radio Santo Domingo began urging the people to attack the police, while wives and families of Air Force pilots were taken from their homes to the Duarte Bridge, where they were placed in the line of fire of the attacking aircraft. Names and addresses of pilots were given over the radio, thus inviting mob action to sack and destroy their homes.  

---

1 AmEmb to SecState, 261330Z Apr 1965 SECRET.  
2 AmEmb to SecState, 261855Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.  
3 AmEmb to SecState, 261345Z Apr 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
A battle was under way between radio stations as well. Molina Urena appeared on television at 1345, announcing the victory of the revolt, and dismissing the ability of a few planes to stay the course of events. Concurrently, Radio San Isidro became the organ of the antirevolt group, hammering on the theme of Communist domination of the revolt and repeating earlier promises of all-party elections in September.¹

A. AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BEGINS

Despite the dispatch of the Carib Phibron to the Santo Domingo area, there continued to be no particular concern in the Pentagon over the developments in the Dominican Republic. CINCLANT, late Sunday, had discovered that eleven of the thirteen Military Group (MILGROUP) members assigned to Santo Domingo were in Panama attending a conference. Concerned with the lack, in the absence of the MILGROUP, of a direct communications link between the Phibron and the Embassy, LANT called the NMCC to request that the MILGROUP personnel be returned as quickly as possible.² The prevailing attitude in the JCS was still relaxed and the problems involved in returning the MILGROUP to Santo Domingo were more apparent than the urgency of their return.³

Some of CINCLANT's uncertainty had been cleared up, figuratively, by a more definitive statement of the U.S. position given the Deputy CINCLANT by the DDO late Saturday night. The DDO had just been told by the State Department that the U.S. was not taking positions at that time, but was trying to let the Dominicans settle their own affairs, in the hope the situation would not be exploited by leftists. While the U.S. would not be happy to see Bosch return, we would certainly not oppose him.⁴ CINCLANT continued to go on this basis through Sunday and into Monday, the 26th.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 262205Z Apr 1965, UNCLASSIFIED
²EA Tapes, Apr 25.
³The MILGROUP radio was in a building separate from the Embassy. Of the two MILGROUP people still in Santo Domingo, one had his neck in a cast while the Embassy did not think it advisable for safety reasons to send the other man across to the MILGROUP building.
⁴EA Tapes, Apr 25.
In the meantime, during the morning of the 26th, Connett in Santo Domingo had ordered Phase I of the Embassy Emergency and Evacuation Plan implemented, effective 1030, with the exception of action referring to the actual evacuation. Americans in the city were being advised to prepare for possible evacuation.¹

State instructed the Embassy at 1430 to approach authorities on both sides to inform them that the U.S. had received a request from Americans living in the Dominican Republic for immediate evacuation. The U.S., therefore, requested a cease-fire and the cooperation of both sides in permitting an evacuation. The ships offshore would be willing to evacuate other foreign nationals as well. Both sides were to be told they would be held accountable by the U.S. for American lives. State told Connett for his own information that the U.S. hoped to build on a cease-fire to obtain some kind of provisional government committed to fair impartial elections at the earliest date.²

This message seemed to indicate the ambivalence in U.S. policy. On the one hand, Bosch's return was opposed and Connett was urged to support the formation of a military junta, while, at the same time, he was to urge strong action by the junta. On the other hand, here State speaks in terms of a possible compromise to create a provisional, and implicitly, a coalition government.

It would appear that no decision had yet been made to evacuate. Rather preparatory ground work was being laid in the event an evacuation was implemented. Already the event was receiving attention at the highest national levels in Washington. The White House Situation Room requested the NMCC at 1455 to expedite all information "if and when the ships go into DomRep," because of the President's personal interest.³

¹AmEmb to SecState, 261606Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²SecState to AmEmb, 261830Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³EA Tapes, April 26.
The Embassy forwarded a suggested evacuation plan involving dual operations, the ships pulling into the harbor of Haina, some eight miles west of the city, along with helicopter lifts to the ships from the old polo grounds adjacent to the Embajador Hotel, a large establishment on the far western edge of the city, remote from the downtown disturbances, which would be a useful concentration point for evacuees. Helicopters could pick up evacuees from interior points as well. Connett did not recommend the ships entering Santo Domingo harbor proper as this would necessitate the movement of evacuees to them through the most dangerous parts of the city.¹

Three hours later two FRD representatives of Molina Urena visited Connett in regard to the evacuation. They agreed to the American request, and promised to declare a cease-fire and not to interfere with the evacuation. The safety of U.S. nationals would be guaranteed and the U.S. Navy ships allowed to dock at Haina. The rebels also promised to provide protection for the evacuation effort. The U.S. attaches, in the meantime, spoke with Wessin and de los Santos on the one hand and with Col. Caamaño on the other and had received assurances of cooperation from both sides.²

With these assurances in hand, Connett suggested several methods for the actual evacuation process, recommending that it commence about daybreak, 0600 local time, April 27. At this time he still had no estimate of the number of people desiring evacuation.³

As arrangements for the evacuation proceeded, other military preparations were set in motion by Washington. Around midafternoon a decision was made by a group, which apparently included the CJCS and Mr. Vance, to alert paratroops and their airlift to DefCon 3, but not to move any C-130s.⁴

---

¹AmEmb to SecState, 262030Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 262352Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³AmEmb to SecState, 270030Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
⁴Memo, Ter. 26 Apr 1965.
Clearly by this time the concern in Washington over a leftist success had grown and the whole situation began to appear in a different light. The Director for Operations notified Deputy CINCLANT at 1633 that he had just left a meeting between the Joint Chiefs and the SecDef in which the subject was: The J-3 stated the type units that were to be alerted. The Deputy CINCLANT said that they would prefer a directive in terms of mission or results expected rather than in terms of specific forces, but the J-3 informed him that no one yet knew the requirements.

The J-3 emphasized the need to launch preparatory steps at once, although he did inform Deputy CINCLANT that at the meeting of the Chiefs and the SecDef, the general view was that it was not very likely at this point that the plan would have to be implemented.  

The alert was to be executed in place without movement of forces or loading of equipment or personnel aboard aircraft.  

---

1EA Tapes, 26 April 1965.  
2JCS 9802 to CINCLANT, 262349Z Apr 1965, TOP SECRET.
STRIKE COMMAND, an addressee in the message, called J-3 at 0210Z to point out that DefCon 3 procedures normally moved troop carrier aircraft automatically to their troop pick-up points. The Director for Operations emphasized in reply that the guidance from above was that "nothing moved yet." It was an interesting example of the by-passing of military procedures because of political considera-
tions.

These moves were all viewed, however, as essentially preparatory. The J-3 told Deputy CINCLANT at 1800 that the SecDef just did not expect any significant evacuation, and that it was hoped that the cease fire agreed to by both sides for the evacuation could be used as a device for dampening down the heat in the situation.¹

The tone of conversations during these hours between CINCLANT and the Joint Staff indicated that the military tended to feel that the Embassy was exaggerating the threat potential in the situation.

The State Department notified the Embassy in the small hours of Tuesday morning that since security considerations were not an element in establishing a target hour for beginning the evacuation, State wished to defer a decision until developments in the next six to eight hours could be assessed. The tentative time for beginning the evacuation was to be noon of that day, the 27th. The Embassy was directed not to initiate the move, however, without specific directions from Washington.²

A J-3 breakdown of U.S. nationals in Santo Domingo listed some 2732 persons. ³

¹EA Tapes, 26 Apr 65. Apparently a Brewers' Convention was being held in Santo Domingo at this time and it was suspected by the military that pressure from this group was one of the key factors behind the State Dept. request for evacuation.
²SecState to AmEmb, 2705582 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
There was still no good estimate of the number of these Americans wishing to be evacuated, but around midnight the Embassy announced to the press that probably some 400 to 500 Americans would leave Santo Domingo. The original estimate had been about 250 people.

A few minutes later Connett told State that the estimate was now 800-1000 and recommended the evacuation begin at 0900 local time instead of noon. CINCLANT, on hearing this, expressed concern over the mounting size of the possible evacuation, pointing out that ships which loaded evacuees were immobilized and the troops they carried out of action for the time it took for the ships to steam to San Juan and back. This could be serious in the event that the situation deteriorated further.

At this point too the apparently agreed-upon cease fire in Santo Domingo began to crumble. Connett reported (by this time Ambassador Bennett was in San Juan en route back to Santo Domingo to take charge) at 0530 that he could find no real sign of a willingness to negotiate on either side. The Dominican Navy and Air Force had become convinced negotiations were no longer a feasible path. Consequently, they intended to issue an ultimatum to the rebels that morning between 0600-0800 local time, demanding that the rebels agree to the formation of a military junta which would promise free elections with participation by all by September 1st or face a maximum bombardment effort against the city. Civilians would be warned to evacuate and a decision period would be allowed the rebels before the attack was launched. The U.S. Air Attache estimated a capability of 20-30 planes in such a bombardment.

Connett stressed that his ability to influence the situation remained greatly hindered by lack of communications which had also

---

1EA Tapes, 27 Apr 1965.
prevented him from informing the military leaders at San Isidro of the kick-off time for the evacuation so that they could arrange a cease-fire. All telephone lines to San Isidro were out and were unlikely to be repaired. The Naval Attache did get agreement from the Dominican Air Force not to bomb near the Embajador Hotel. Consequently, Connett saw no reason to delay the entry of CTG 44.9 into Haina which was under the control of Rivera Caminero and his Dominican Navy. On the other hand, Connett advised against any commingling of U.S. and Dominican ships, lest it be taken as an indication of U.S. support of or participation in any naval bombardment of Santo Domingo.\(^1\)

The evacuation which had only shortly before seemed to be a simple operation now became increasingly involved in the actions of the revolt itself. The Carib Phibron which had been some thirty miles offshore was told at 0924 to close in to ten miles, but to go no closer until a definite decision on the evacuation had been reached.\(^2\) The procedure for the evacuation had also changed. Instead of evacuees being ferried from the Hotel to the ships at Haina, they would be transported by vehicle to Haina, starting at 0600. Apparently there were some political objections in Washington to flying in that many helicopters.

During the morning the rebel "Foreign Minister" asked for U.S. mediation to prevent the air bombardment of the city. He proffered a most interesting suggestion, namely, that military officers on both sides might be prevailed upon to agree to a settlement which could then be "imposed on the civilian rebel government."\(^3\)

---

\(^1\)AmEmb to SecState, 270930Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^2\)CINCLANT to COMCARESEAFAVON, 271324Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^3\)AmEmb to SecState, 271415Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Before any U.S. mediation could be undertaken, however, an incident occurred which was to carry grave consequences for U.S. policy. Around 1000 a group of armed rebels approached the Embajador where the hundreds of evacuees were gathered. Claiming to be looking for military "juntaists", the rebels bullied Americans, lined up some against a wall and fired automatic weapons over their heads into the ceiling before departing. Connett immediately protested to the rebel leaders, but these denied any control over the gunmen. The DCM warned them the U.S. would undertake no talks until the situation at the Hotel improved.¹ No Americans had been injured but it was the first overt threat against American lives. As it turned out, it was also to be the only threat to U.S. lives, but the incident was crucial in conditioning the outlook of the Washington decision makers.

As the confusion over the situation thickened, State sent Connett a resume of what it understood to be the state of affairs at 1148: there were 1000 Americans and other foreign nationals desiring evacuation concentrated at the Embajador Hotel two or three miles west of the city proper; the Dominican Navy and other Dominican leaders had agreed to evacuation by U.S. ships through Haina ten miles west of the Hotel; when the evacuation began, the Embassy planned to move the Americans by bus and auto to Haina where they would walk aboard U.S. Navy ships; there was a military column of Wessin's forces coming into the city from the west and the approach of this column made it inadvisable to attempt the evacuation at this time. On the basis of this understanding of the situation, the Embassy was instructed by State to proceed with the evacuation when the Embassy believed it safe to do so, with the details to be worked out between the Embassy and CTG 44.9.²

¹AmEmb to SecState, 271430Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²SecState to AmEmb, 271548Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
Connett's efforts had managed to extend the crumbling cease-fire until noon and around 1130 he apparently told State by phone that the moment had come to evacuate. At 1145 the CJCS was informed by the DDO of the State request that the evacuation commence at 1200. The evacuees were already en route to Haina, so that by the time the ships came into shore, all would be assembled at dockside.  

The JCS directed CINCLANT at 1257 to execute the evacuation and, upon completion of the lift to San Juan, to return the Carib Phibron to station off Santo Domingo. Sitreps were to be submitted to the JCS hourly until the operation was completed.  

Within the city the mediation efforts of the Embassy collapsed when, around 1200, the Dominican Air Force representatives broke off a meeting with the Naval Attache to begin the bombardment of the city.  

When the SecDef was informed by the DDO of the State request for evacuation, he asked how far offshore the Phibron would remain and by what means the evacuees would be ferried out to the main fleet. The matter was of some consequence since apparently at this moment it was intended that the President would make a statement on the matter. The DDO ascertained from CINCLANT that there were four LCM-8s and one LST available for ferry and that, presuming the main fleet were still ten miles offshore, several hours would be required to complete the lift. However CINCLANT did not know precisely the distance of the Phibron offshore nor when the Phibron planned to start the lift.  

1EA Tapes, 27 Apr 1965.  
2JCS 9840 to CINCLANT, 2716572 Apr 65, SECRET.  
3AmEmb to SecState, 2716152 Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.  
4EA Tapes, 27 Apr 65.
The dispositions were apparently decided on the scene. At 1543 the Embassy suggested the main fleet come closer inshore so that watching crowds could see that U.S. aircraft were not engaged in the bombing of the city as rumors had it. Furthermore, since the presence of the Phibron was known, the Embassy felt that its appearance inshore might have a useful psychological effect.¹

(In the meantime Ambassador Bennett had returned to Santo Domingo, having been flown into San Isidro Airfield during the day in a U.S. helicopter, and had taken charge of the Embassy and the evacuation at 1300).

The Embassy reported the move of evacuees, by bus, truck, Embassy car, and helicopter, from the Hotel to Haina completed without incident at 1534.² The ground vehicle convoys had been escorted by National Policemen. Apparently it was then decided to have one of the main Phibron units, the transport USS RUCHAMKIN actually dock at Haina, along with an LST. This was reported by the DDO to the SecDef at 1547, three and a half hours after the SecDef's questions. This information presumably came from the Embassy through State. In addition, the Embassy and the CTG 44.9 had on their own initiative moved four helicopter loads of Marines, 40 men, from the BOXER to the dock to provide shore security against the reported armed rebels among crowds near the dock area.

This employment of troops had not been specifically authorized by the political authorities in Washington, yet it was accepted without comment by the SecDef.³

The record indicates a certain amount of confusion over the timing of the evacuation itself. The Embassy reported at 1642 that the operation was over by 1330, while another message at 1910⁴

¹AmEmb to SecState, 271943Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 271934Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
³EA Tapes, 27 Apr 65.
⁴AmEmb to SecState, 272042Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
stated that all helicopter and military personnel had cleared the area by 1645, with the two ships involved having left the harbor before that. The Embassy personnel had returned to Santo Domingo where the Embassy was under police protection.1 The above-stated times indicate that apparently the evacuation actually was completed when it was first reported to the SecDef that the ships were at the dock and Marines were ashore.

The evacuation of 1172 people, however, had been successfully completed without incident. Those people desiring to leave had been taken out, although several times that many potential evacuees had chosen to remain in Santo Domingo.

Political cover was prepared against the expected suspicion of U.S. interference. State notified all South American posts that, in speaking to Latin Americans about the evacuation, they should avoid any suggestion that the U.S. was supporting or opposing any particular faction. U.S. diplomats were to emphasize that the purpose was to evacuate U.S. nationals and other foreigners after local Dominican authorities had stated that their lives were in danger. These steps, it should be stressed, were taken only after repeated U.S. efforts to obtain a cease-fire and to mediate the civil war had failed. No speculation was to be offered on the length of time it would take to complete the evacuation.2

B. THE DOMINICAN MILITARY COUNTERATTACK

While the evacuation was being carried out, the counterattack mounted against the rebels by the military chiefs proceeded with seeming success. While the air and naval "bombardment" (the term is really too pretentious in view of the size of the forces involved in

1 AmEmb to SecState, 272310Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
2 State to all Diplomatic Posts in Latin America, Circular Telegram 2056, 280000Z April 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
the attack) continued, tanks of Wessin's supposedly elite column from San Isidro forced their way across the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama and secured a bridgehead on the west bank in the city. At the same time General Montas Guerrero, in command of what was called the well-trained Third Infantry Battalion at San Cristobal, fourteen miles west of Santo Domingo, declared his support of the military chiefs, and thereupon moved against the city. He arrived with his thousand troops in the western areas of the city by 1800, and his arrival, coupled with Wessin's successful advance, seemed to indicate the imminent collapse of the revolt. The Embassy was so confident of this result that it commented to State that "the mop-up should be able to be carried out though some of it may be rough."1

The Embassy's expectation seemed justified when shortly before 1600, Molina Urena appeared at the Embassy with twenty advisors.2 Ambassador Bennett reported that it was clear that they recognized the superiority of the forces against them and a concensus was to end further bloodshed. Bennett made clear his emphatic view that the senseless shedding of blood must end, at the same time reminding them that it was their actions on Saturday which had initiated the fratricide and called forth counterreaction. He reminded them of early U.S. support of Bosch and stated that the latest effort to restore him was now obviously unsuccessful. They therefore should start anew. This

---

1AmEmb to SecState 272247Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL. It turned out, however, that the antirebel forces were weakened by the habit of placing military guards outside the homes of all prominent government and military officials, so that numerous soldiers were kept out of action by this useless duty.

2The most reliable secondary account of the crisis by the New York Times correspondent, claims that there had been a previous development. At 1600, several rebel officers appeared at the Embassy and told Bennett they wished to end the bloodshed and wished him to negotiate or mediate. He denied any authority to do either but promised to send any proposals they might have on to San Isidro and the junta HQ. The officers then asked Bennett if he would try to persuade Molina Urena to accept the verdict of the rebel military commander and cease resistance. This Bennett agreed to do and sent one of the Embassy political officers to find Molina Urena at the National Palace. The Embassy officer found Urena and his aides and presented his message. Urena at first refused to agree but eventually yielded to the persuasion of his aides and promised to go to the Embassy. This account claims to be Bennett's own, but there is no record of it in the official sources which have been available for this study.
last statement, as recorded in Bennett's message, is ambiguous. Presumably he was suggesting that the Bosch supporters give up their hopes for the time being.

During the meeting, word was brought in that the air attacks had ceased and Bennett urged a mutual approach to a settlement. However, he reiterated that there was no question that the Communists had taken advantage of the "legitimate" rebel movement, having been tolerated and even encouraged by the FRD. Although he felt the FRD was obviously a democratic party, they had given the Communists free rein in tolerance of looting and of arms distribution to civilians. Molina and his group denied the Ambassador's charge, whereupon he challenged them further to explain the appearance of Castro-type "barbudos" on the rebel TV program Sunday who had "spouted pure Castroism."

Bennett also emphasized that the Embassy staff four times the day before had succeeded in persuading the Air Force to delay their air attacks, and that on each occasion the rebels had attempted to exploit the delay to their own advantage.¹

¹AmEmb to SecState, 280230Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Despite the obvious significance of Molina Urena's visit, Bennett did not report it, at least in written form, for some six and a half hours. The reason is not clear. It may be that he did not wish to mediate a compromise settlement, but preferred that events proceed on their apparently inexorable way to a conclusion involving the total collapse of the rebel movement.

An hour later Bennett followed up with a review of the situation, since he felt that there was much inaccurate press reporting in the U.S. This was the first mention of a problem that was to grow increasingly severe with the passage of time and the growth of the U.S. commitment in the Dominican Republic. By the end of the week there were already almost one hundred and fifty newsmen in Santo Domingo. The attitude of many was more sympathetic to the rebel movement than was that of the Embassy, and their skepticism concerning Embassy statements led to a mutual irritation and growing breach between the U.S. Government and the press over the issue.

Bennett insisted in his cable that the U.S. had not tried to impose any particular solution, but had aimed instead to promote a cease-fire and peace talks. However, the Ambassador continued, neither side had at any time been willing to sit down to talk.

He stated that there was good evidence that many Army leaders, some very pro-Balaguer, who led the rebels at first were thinking of forming a straight military junta and "seemed not to understand the FRD extreme left political objective of the return of Bosch." This
confusion of purpose had contributed to the early vacillation on the part of some key elements in the revolt.

Bennett claimed the Communists had moved with extraordinary speed to capitalize on the situation. Embassy contacts revealed that the Communist groups were well and heavily armed. Many known Communists were presently inside the National Palace, and the Embassy had identified some radio announcers as 14 June members. It became abundantly clear very soon that the Communists were not only making a major effort but also committing what appeared to be their full resources to promote their own purposes by backing Bosch's return to the presidency, which had been their declared objective since the 1963 coup.

Bennett went on to describe the situation at the moment. Leaders of the Molina Urena "government" had admitted their inability effectively to maintain order in the city. Arms had been indiscriminately distributed to all, including known Communists, by Army elements, some of which were gullible and some otherwise. Mobs were under virtually no control, while the rebel radio incited them against various political groups.

Despite solemn promises, U.S. lives had been endangered during the Hotel incident. The tactics of the rebels in using wives and children of Air Force officers as shields and hostages at the Duarte Bridge were termed "horrible" by Bennett. He also referred to Bosch's evasive answer when asked by newsmen to comment on the Duarte Bridge incident.

He gave two more indications of the extremist trend; the fact that one of the first actions by the rebels after taking control in part of the city was to sack the headquarters of opposing political parties, and the definite Castroist flavor given to TV broadcasts.

1 In reference to this point made at the end of Chapter III, it will be noted that Bennett here does not claim that the arms distribution was made by the leftists. This theme was developed later in the crisis.
Bennett summarized by denying that the intent of his comments was to heap the blame on one side only. This was not, however, a case of "freedom fighters" against a military oligarchy. The fact was that even valid elements of the PRD in their "thirst for power" accepted and welcomed support from violent Communist and Castro elements which proved better organized to take advantage of the situation than the PRD probably realized.  

Despite the Ambassador's protestations of impartiality, the cable probably set a capstone upon the growing fear in Washington of a Communist coup. Bennett had documented the extremist role but had not recommended any specific course of action for U.S. Implicitly, the policy for the U.S. was to support the military chiefs in their total suppression of the revolt. It should be noted too that the Ambassador had been in the Embassy in command less than nine hours when he sent this message.

However, the matter of Communist influence might well have seemed to be one rapidly becoming academic as the military chiefs drew closer to victory. Wessin's forces from the Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA) were over the bridge on the east as Montas Guerrero drove in from the west. While no formal junta had been declared by the end of the 27th, the military chiefs had signed a decree declaring martial law, and they seemed able to enforce it. At 0025 on the 28th Bennett reported what must have seemed a decisive event, that Molina Urena and most of his aids, including Col. Casamano, had taken asylum in the Colombian Embassy. Presumably this, in the more traditional Latin American coup-attempt sequence, should have signalled the collapse of the revolt. In addition, PRD leader Martinez Francisco went to Wessin's headquarters at San Isidro and broadcast an appeal to the rebels to lay down their arms.

1AmEmb to SecState, 280345Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
2AmEmb to SecState, 280425Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
28 April

These developments tended to produce a rosette view in Washington. Late on the 27th, State had signalled Bennett that, on the basis of his earlier reports of the afternoon, it seemed clear that the tide had turned in favor of the military chiefs, and consequently he should take the earliest opportunity to reach them and urge upon them a policy of moderation and no reprisals.  

Within the Joint Staff a similar view prevailed. The NMCC early morning briefing on the 28th at the change of teams indicated that "the Dominican revolt is collapsing." This outlook was further reflected by the much-reduced telephone traffic during the first half of the 28th as compared to the previous twenty-four hours. 

Nevertheless, there was still some feeling of uncertainty in the Embassy. Telephone conversations between State and the Embassy and the MILGROUP and CINCSOUTH indicated concern on the part of the Ambassador over the location and ready availability of the TG 44.9 Marines. There had been some firing against the Embassy and, as the street fighting spread, nervousness in the Embassy likewise grew. 

As the military chiefs' counterattack proceeded, the separation of their forces in three separate groups began to cause serious difficulties. Around 0700 de los Santos asked the Embassy to acquire fifty walkie talkie sets as soon as possible in order to permit centralized control of the attacks on the rebels who by this time were concentrated in the most densely built up portions of the city. 

---

1SecState to AmEmb, 2723282 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
2EA Tapes, 28 Apr 1965.
3A note is in order here concerning the terminology of Santo Domingo and its parts. The portion of the city referred to in this message is that which lies in the southeast corner, where the Osama and the sea meet at a right angle. This is the heart of the city, the commercial and business center, and the most densely populated. It is also the oldest portion of the city and occupies the site of the original settlement of 1497. However, its name is Cuidad Neuva or the New City. This derives from the fact that when Santo Domingo was founded by Columbus in 1497, it replaced Isabella on the north coast of Hispaniola as the premier city of the Indies. As such it was referred to as "the New City," to distinguish it from Isabella which then became "the old city." To compound the confusion even further, the old New City is really almost all new since Santo Domingo was almost totally destroyed in the hurricane of 1930, very few Spanish relics having survived. The image of the New City as one of narrow crooked Spanish colonial streets was quite in error. It is now a typical Central American city of small stucco and wood buildings and comparatively few large structures.
The Embassy recommended to State that the radios be sent at once and delivered to San Isidro, that is, directly to Wessin's headquarters.1

Presumably the recommendation was challenged in State on the grounds that it very blatantly violated U.S. self-professed impartiality in the crisis. The Attachés in the Embassy addressed an appeal to the CNO in support of the Embassy recommendation, commenting that the communications problem of the antirebel forces was serious and that failure to solve it could well be the difference between success and failure.2

At about this time the MILGROUP team got back to the country and the Chief, Col. Quilty, USMC, went out to San Isidro. There he met the junta chiefs and was appalled at the chaos and confusion. In an almost hysterical meeting, the junta named Montas Guerrero as their leader. They had no contact with the Army forces west of the river. It appears that they had never possessed tactical communications although these had been programmed by the MILGROUP since 1962. Rebel control of the downtown commercial communications terminal left them with no communications at all. This was their most urgent military need at the moment.

The Ambassador himself then intervened in a message to State an hour later, pointing out that it was the combined judgment of the Country Team that the radios were critical. The Air Force, Wessin, the Navy, and Montas forces were at different points, and hours would go by without contact. The superiority of the combined forces would not necessarily avail if they were divided into distinct pockets facing "leftist forces" and a heavy psychological propaganda barrage about "the people's struggle for liberation." Equally serious in the

1AmEmb to SecState, 281135Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
2JANAF Attachés to CNO, 281632Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Attaches' view, Bennett said, was the effect on the morale of the antirebel force if we seem to deny them "this equipment which, after all, has civilian as well as military uses." The antirebel forces were not asking for offensive weapons, but merely the means to talk.

The Ambassador continued by drawing a very sharp line as far as the overall situation was concerned. He regretted that a military solution had to be relied upon for a political crisis which had been engendered by the confused democratic left, all valid elements of which were now in asylum or in hiding, as much from the extremists who have come to dominate the rebel situation as from the opposing military forces." The plain fact of the situation was that while leftist propaganda naturally would try to fuzz the crisis as a fight between the military and the people, the issue here was now a fight between Castro-type elements and those who opposed it. Bennett stressed that "we should be clear as to the situation."

He said he did not wish to be dramatic, but that if we denied simple communications equipment and the opposition here to a leftist takeover should lose for lack of heart or otherwise, "we may very well be asking in the near future for the landing of Marines to protect U.S. citizens and possibly for other purposes. Which would Washington prefer?"

Thus did the Ambassador present the picture to the decision makers in Washington. Clearly there were no doubts in his mind. The decision makers could only react accordingly.

Consequently, it was first decided to send the radios but not to San Isidro. Rather they would be delivered to the USS BOXER from which they would, by means unstated, be sent ashore to the antirebel forces. Also emergency medical supplies were gotten under way to Santo Domingo by sea.

1AmEmb to SecState, 281718Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
It was not until 1700, after the situation in the city had dramatically come apart, that the Embassy was notified by State that the radios would be delivered directly to San Isidro by a USAF aircraft. The dispatch of the radios, however, had produced a minor but illuminating illustration of inadequate coordination with agencies and persons working at cross-purposes in the heat of crisis.

The radio issue became involved with the ferrying into Santo Domingo of more newsmen; contradictory orders on this point were going to CINCLANT from various agencies. In the case of the newsmen, OSD/PA demanded the reporters be sent in by helicopter to San Isidro. In the meantime, State was questioning whether or not this would be compatible with a neutral status. In the case of the radios, there was confusion over whether it should be considered a military matter. Presumably State raised the suggestion that they handle the radios and thus try to avoid the charge of U.S. military interference in the Santo Domingo situation. However, the radios, in San Juan, were half owned by the Army and half by the Navy. There was inordinate confusion too both in San Juan and in Washington over just how many of the radio sets actually existed.

Finally, CINCLANT was ordered to do nothing until the Washington scene cleared. There was talk of flying the radios in covertly. It wasn’t until 1645 that a direct phone call from the CJCS to the colonel handling the affair at Ramey instructed the latter to use a USAF aircraft to fly the sets to San Isidro. The CJCS said he had been so instructed by Under Secretary of State Mann who was heading the State side of Dominican developments. CINCLANT reported delivery of the radios an hour and a half later.

1SecState to AmEmb 2821132 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
2EA Tapes, 28 Apr 1965.
C. FAILURE OF THE COUNTERATTACK

One of the most difficult aspects of the Dominican crisis to understand is the unbelievable transformation of the situation during the afternoon of the 28th. Between noon and six o'clock, all the expectations that had developed collapsed and all the fears burgeoned. The cause was the failure of the counterattack by the military chiefs and the sudden quite unexpected revival of the rebels.

Around noon all seemed to be going well. Bennett wired State that he had heard that General Antonio Imbert, an antirebel figure and the sole surviving assassin of Trujillo, had gotten through to the Air Force at San Isidro to tell them he had taken the National Palace. Progress was being made on establishing a junta, and the Embassy was urging that the decision be made as soon as possible so that the military units still remaining on the rebel side, which might decide to defect, would have someone to whom they could surrender. Imbert was supposed to head a five-man junta with officers from the three services and the Armed Forces Training Center (Wassin's elite command) but not including Wassin.\(^1\)

The formation of the junta was formally announced by the Air Force radio an hour later. It consisted of a three-man group representing the three armed services, with Colonel Pedro Benoit of the Air Force as the apparent spokesman. The relative youth and political inexperience of the three officers clearly indicate that the three were to be merely figureheads for the three service chiefs. It was a thinly veiled guise. The announcement stated the purpose of the junta to be "the preparation of the nation for free and democratic elections.\(^2\)" Despite this step, Bennett was concerned over the "Communist efforts to nullify the Wassin forces." He feared the propaganda had effectively poisoned the minds of the people and had

\(^1\)AmEmb to SecState, 281529Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^2\)DR Fact Sheet, prepared for CJCS, 291200Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
convinced them that Wessin was the *bête noire* of the play and that the U.S. was backing him.¹

Then at 1:45 Bennett sent an alarming message. Colonel Benoit had just called the Embassy to request that the U.S. lend 1200 Marines to help restore peace. Bennett stated that he gave Benoit no encouragement, since he did not believe that the situation justified such action. Furthermore, he didn't believe Marines should be employed in a street-cleaning role.

Bennett reasserted that while the preponderant military forces were on the side of the military chiefs, these were separated and without communications. The psychological advantage thus lay with the rebels. The situation was not very logical and a test of nerves was under way. Bennett felt that the State message requesting that he temper Wessin in the matter of reprisals was drawing unduly optimistic conclusions. He had learned that Wessin had not advanced beyond the bridgehead and was not, all in all, making a very determined showing. The junta's ground forces were confused and the Air Force was carrying the burden of attack against the rebels. The Embassy Attaches, accordingly, still considered the outcome in doubt.

The Ambassador suggested that State might "wish to do some contingency planning in case the situation should break apart and deteriorate rapidly to the extent that we should need Marines in a hurry to protect Americans."²

An hour later, Bennett reported that the Acting Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo had called to see if something couldn't be done to get Bosch to disown the leftist leadership which had now clearly taken over the rebel movement. Bennett stated that

¹AmEmb to SecState, 2816192 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 2818502 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
the PRD moderates were either in hiding or in asylum. Bosch, he felt, was still misleading the U.S. press, where a simple statement from him deploiring the situation would help greatly. The Ambassador reaffirmed what was now the major issue, "If the rebels are victorious now, let us make no mistake about it; this will be a takeover by the extreme left."¹

Suddenly the whole situation had changed. While the political facade of the rebels had collapsed, their armed forces remained intact, and in the morning's fighting it had been the junta forces which had proven to be a hollow shell. The situation had indeed broken apart. Wessin had made a feeble effort to break out of his bridgehead and, with the loss of a couple of tanks, stopped further offensive action. Resistance was obviously stronger than he had expected, but not so much as to call for his conduct. On the west, Montas' men had met some resistance too and his force simply melted away. Within the city, law and order had thoroughly broken down. The people attacked the hated National Police and drove them into hiding or killed those they caught. Armed mobs rampaged in the downtown portion of the city, looting homes and stores, and even firing an occasional shot at foreign embassies.

The reason for the revival of the rebels cannot be documented or in any way proven. It is the belief of most impartial observers that it was at this time that the Communists did step forward to lend their organized strength to rallying the collapsing revolt. Whether they at this point actually assumed control of the revolt is the most controversial issue of the entire crisis. It was never clear then nor is it ever likely to be. Nevertheless, the assumption was made in Santo Domingo and in Washington that the extremists were now fully in control.

As the afternoon wore on, the crisis moved with increasing speed toward its climax. At 1615 Bennett in a CRITIC message sent the text

¹AmEmb to SecState, 2819452 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
of the formal request for U.S. military assistance from the newly formed junta. It read:

The Military Junta of Government, conscious that the present revolutionary movement against democratic institutions which the Junta represents, is directed by communists and is of authentic communist stamp, as shown by excesses committed against the population, mass assassinations, sackings of private property, constant incitations to continue the flight broadcast by Radio Habana, and which movement, if victorious, will convert this country into another Cuba. We request, with responsibility and in categoric manner, that the United States Government lend us its unlimited and immediate military assistance so that such a grave situation may definitively be controlled.

Three hours later Bennett sent another CRITIC message. In regard to his earlier statements that American lives were in danger, the Santo Domingo police chief had just informed Bennett that he could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans en route to the evacuation area at Maima. He had also received a message from Benoit urgently requesting a reply to his official request for assistance. The Ambassador said he was sending the Air Attache to Benoit by helicopter in order "to get a statement from him," which he had no doubt Benoit would give.

In addition a delegation of U.S. residents had just left his office, after having advised him that there was no protection left in their residential areas and stressing their belief that Americans would be the logical target of leftist mobs which had been sacking so many Dominican homes. The police were unable to fill requests for additional guard duty even the previous night, and it was obvious that they could no longer protect individual homes. Bennett had recommended that all American residents assemble at the Embajador for evacuation, but he mentioned that many permanent residents naturally were not anxious to take this step.

1AmEmb to DIRNSA, 282015Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The message ended dramatically with comments that the AID office had just been broken into and that the evacuation area was being fired upon by rebels.¹

The impact of these messages was so great that the President asked to speak personally to Bennett. This telephone conversation was probably decisive. During the course of it, gunfire struck the building but apparently the President received the impression that the Embassy was under heavy machinegun fire. Furthermore, as the President later related the incident, the Ambassador and his secretary were under their desks as Bennett spoke to the President. Needless to say, this seemed a very convincing argument, and the image created of the situation around the Embassy probably crystallized the decision to land the Marines.²

However, several hours before this last message, measures were already in preparation to land U.S. forces and to launch the most massive U.S. intervention in Latin America since the Mexican War.

A parenthetical note must be added here. With these requests for military assistance, we enter one of the most violently contentious aspects of the Dominican crisis. During the hearings on the crisis before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1965, it was revealed, according to an authoritative leak to the press the following November, that the U.S. had actually elicited the request from Benoit in terms of aid to protect U.S. lives, and thereby provided ourselves with a legal justification for intervention. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in his formal statement on the Dominican crisis following the Senate Hearings, stated that Benoit's original request had been denied in Washington. However, Benoit was also told that the United States would not intervene "unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic." The evidence presented in the above pages would appear to

¹AmEmb to SecState, 2823022 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²President Johnson stated in a news conference of June 18, "as we talked to our Ambassador to confirm the horror and tragedy and the unbelievable fact that they were firing on Americans and the American Embassy, he was talking to us from under a desk while bullets were going through his windows."

TOP-SECRET - 57 -
support this statement which itself was based upon the secret and not yet revealed testimony of the hearings.

It should be kept in mind too that the message traffic and NMCC EA tapes do not tell the entire story. Obviously much passed by telephone between the Embassy and State which did not reach the form of written messages.

As to the phone conversation between the President and the Ambassador, here too it becomes difficult to establish what actually happened. What is known is that Embassy officials later denied that the Embassy building had ever been fired on by automatic weapons, while the building itself never showed any bullet marks.¹

The issue of the threat of Communist control was at the heart of the whole U.S. response. As stated above, the degree of this control was never established and the later backing away from early claims of complete Communist control would seem to indicate a later awareness of an exaggerated fear at the time. However, it has been claimed by senior military participants in the crisis that the issue was presented to the President, presumably by his intelligence advisors, in terms of there being maybe "two chances in ten" of a Communist takeover. The President decided that he wished to take no chances.

¹On 3 May 1966 Ambassador Bennett appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in regard to his appointment as Ambassador to Portugal. During questioning on the Dominican crisis, he said that "quite a few bullets were picked up in the Embassy garden" and that while tile over his window had come off, he couldn't recall any bullet holes in his office. He had "hit the deck" only once, when an aircraft had come low over the Embassy. Since only the junta had planes, it was the junta and not the rebels who put him under the desk.

Finally, Bennett admitted that "some exaggeration crept into reports" during the crisis.

V. THE MARINE LANDING

In Washington, the deteriorating situation in Santo Domingo was increasingly attracting attention at the highest level. In mid-afternoon of the 28th there had been a White House meeting of the President, the SecDef, and the CJCS, and presumably Rusk and Mann from State. On his return to the Pentagon, the CJCS directed the LANT/South Division of J-3 to alert CINCLANT that the TG 44.9 Marines were to be prepared to land in Santo Domingo. This was done at 1737.

The Director for Operations personally called CINCLANT at 1745 with more details. Admiral Smith, CINCLANT, reported that two of the ships in the task group had unloaded their evacuate passengers in San Juan and were returning to Santo Domingo. The other large attack transport had departed the Santo Domingo area with a load of evacuees, but was being recalled, since she carried necessary heavy equipment for the landing force.

Admiral Smith commented that the necessity to evacuate civilians, against which he had argued earlier in the week, would eventually
affect the combat capability of the Phibron and its reaction time.¹

Following these instructions, CINCLANTFLT then alerted COMCARIBSEAFRON to the possibility of a Marine landing.²

There was a considerable amount of overlapping and confusion in orders during the next several hours. This was probably the result of requests from the Ambassador coming through several different agencies simultaneously. The Pentagon was being informed by CTG 44.9 via COMCARIBSEAFRON and CINCLANT and also from State through its direct telephone line to the Embassy. CTG 44.9 was in communication with the Embassy only through couriers and one very imperfect "ham" radio. He also had single-side-band communication with CINCLANT.

The orders issued to CINCLANT were carefully qualified by the stress laid on their warning and preparatory nature. These orders were not to be construed as an execute; this would be issued separately. Clearly the intention was to maintain a tight control over any U.S. actions. However, events tended to outrun communications. Just as the previous day had seen CTG 44.9 land U.S. Marines on the dock at Haina without any authorization from a superior headquarters, the situation again compelled independent actions by the commander on the scene in support of his directed objectives.

At 1722 Commodore Dare, CTG 44.9, signalled COMCARIBSEAFRON that he had received by voice radio a request from the Embassy to evacuate up to 300 persons from the polo field area. The Ambassador had suggested that armed Marines be sent to the polo field as the Dominican police could not guarantee protection of the evacuation. Dare told COMCARIBSEAFRON that he was sending in an unarmed path-finder platoon and an MP detachment, while an armed and armored

¹EA tapes, 28 April 1965.
²CINCLANTFLT to COMCARIBSEAFRON, 282146Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
company would be on five-minute alert in the event there was real
trouble.\footnote{CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON 2821222 Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.}

When this message was received at State, they called the NMCC
at 1819 to ask what the force was for. The Team Chief assured them
the mission of the force was to light the polo field for incoming
helicopters.\footnote{EA Tapes, 28 Apr 65.}

CTG 44.9 reported again at 1750 that in personal contact with
Bennett, via voice radio, the Ambassador had requested a platoon-sized
augmentation of armed Marines to reinforce the Embassy guard. Dare
had concurred and the troops had been dispatched to the landing zone
(presumably the polo field) from whence they would move to the Embassy
by Embassy bus.\footnote{CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON 2821542 Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.}

\[\]

It was unclear at both CINCLANT and in the JCS at this point
whether or not CTG 44.9 had asked the Ambassador if he wanted the
full complement of Marines and the Ambassador had refused, or whether
the two preliminary deployments were a separate matter, in addition
to the full deployment. The matter assumed considerable significance
because the President was shortly to meet with Congressional leaders
on the crisis, and he wished to be in a position to state unambiguously
the U.S. situation at the moment. Since the movement of troops ashore and, indeed, the entire U.S. initiative, had been left to the Ambassador's decision, it was important to know what he had requested of Commodore Dare.¹

The beach at Haina had been investigated and found usable. The Commodore recommended against delay beyond evening twilight. However, he gave no indication of the Ambassador's wishes at the moment.² The Embassy, in the meantime, had entered Phase II of its Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) Plan at 1845.

¹EA tapes, 28 Apr 1965. The meeting of the Congressional leaders at the White House was later the source of contention. The group met during the evening and the President described the situation, of how the Embassy was under attack, Americans and foreign nationals attacked and in danger. ( enduring)
²Clearly, the meeting had been called to apprise the Congressional leaders of a decision taken rather than to seek their counsel in arriving at a decision, but in view of the information presented by the President, sentiment among the Congressional leaders would appear to have been fully in support of the President's action.

²CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON 282300Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
At 1900 the Commodore reported that he was preparing to land; 176 persons had been evacuated from the polo field and 21 from Haina. No other evacuees were known to be in the vicinity.¹

Deputy Chief of Staff, CINCLANTFLT, Vice Admiral Wylie, who was handling the crisis at CINCLANT, called the J-3 at 1901 with word that CTG 44.9 had just reported that, after a request by the Ambassador, he had commenced landing troops. [C]

In a call from the CJCS to the J-3 20 minutes later, the CJCS was obviously still unaware of the initial landing and requested word as soon as it arrived. The J-3 did not tell him the substance of the phone conversation with Admiral Wylie at 1901.²

In the meantime, the JCS directed CINCLANT at 1921 to order CTG 44.9 to close Santo Domingo, prepare to land, to close the remaining elements of the MEU from Roosevelt Roads to land all Marine units now aboard USS BOXER as soon as possible, to secure the hotel and polo field, the action being subject to the Ambassador's approval and timing to marshal aircraft needed to lift the two BCTs and to ready all units for immediate departure when separately directed. CINCLANT was asked to advise the JCS immediately of the timing of the first troops ashore, timing of the overflights if executed, and the time when the BCTs would be ready for departure.³ By this time these moves were already under way.

Commodore Dare confirmed to COMCARI SEAFRON at 1920 that the Ambassador had called late in the afternoon requesting Marines ashore and had stated that he would seek authorization from Washington. He had called back five minutes later confirming his request, and in

¹COMCARI SEAFRON 282230Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
²EA tapes, 28 Apr 1965...
³JCS 9927Z to CINCLANT 282321Z Apr 65, SECRET.
consequence, troops were started ashore. Dare also stated that in view of the lack of daylight, he did not intend to call in the over-flight aircraft at this time.¹

Minutes later Admiral Wylie notified the J-3 that the Ambassador did not want the overflights at the moment. Also, the MILGROUP from Panama had been delivered to Haina.²

The contradictions and confusion over the situation were compounded by a message from the Ambassador sent at 1915. In it he stated that in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation, he "had just asked the BOXER to provide helicopter evacuation for Americans assembled at the hotel, including a "company for security purposes" (?) in view of the sniping going on around the Embassy buildings. He had also requested a "pathfinder platoon" to land on the Embassy grounds for the protection of the chancery. He expressed the hope that this action would give some heart to the "loyal forces." The breakdown of all government authority and the possibility that the remaining forces available to it may soon tire or become physically incapable of maintaining their present position led him to recommend that serious thought be given in Washington to armed intervention, which would go beyond the mere protection of Americans and would seek to establish order in the country. All indications pointed to the fact that if the present efforts of loyal forces failed, power would be assumed by groups closely identified with the Communist party. If the situation described above were to come to pass, Bennett reiterated, his own recommendation and that of the Country Team was that we should intervene "to prevent another Cuba arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation."

Pending this decision, Bennett recommended that additional military units be dispatched to the area since the present forces available were considered inadequate to execute the mission he had suggested as a last resort.³

¹CTG 44.9 to CONCARIBSEAPRON 282320Z Apr 65, CONFIDENTIAL.
²EA tapes, 28 Apr 1965.
³AmEmb to SecState 282315Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The ambiguity of the Ambassador's remarks concerning forces requested further muddled the picture for Washington in its attempts to pin down precise numbers. More than that, however, Bennett's telegram was the capstone in the process leading to major U.S. involvement in the Dominican crisis. It definitively expressed the near certainty of another Cuba. While the thought had been raised repeatedly, directly and indirectly, by both Connett and Bennett during the previous three days, it assumed special cogency in view of the apparent collapse of resistance to the revolt.

In the meantime the troop landing continued. CINCLANT reported to JCS at 1944 that two rifle companies only had been committed, of which one-third were already at the polo ground. ³

A few moments later Commodore Dare signalled COMCARIBSEAFRON that no hostile activity had been reported in the landing zone, and that in the process of landing, he had embarked additional evacuees. ⁴

With the coming of the night and the smooth operation of the landing, there appears to have been a relaxation of tension at the

³CINCLANT to JCS 282344Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
⁴CTG 44.9 to COMCARIBSEAFRON 290018Z Apr 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
Embassy and possibly second thoughts about the necessity for a major intervention. Commodore Dare reported about 2450 that the Ambassador preferred to delay until the next day his comments on forces additional to those now on the scene. He also added parenthetically that he and the Ambassador were working in the closest harmony.¹

Bennett found things quiet around the polo field at this time with no more sniper fire as Marine platoons guarded the perimeter of the field and the Embassy. He reported no Americans hurt at the Hotel, but he admitted he had little knowledge of what was going on downtown.²

One alarming piece of intelligence reaching the Embassy concerned reports that the riot control police were being killed by the mobs and that the police fortress, Fortaleza Ozama, was probably going to be seized. Within it was a store of weapons of unknown magnitude.

He received at this time another urgent message from Colonel Benoit, repeating that American lives were in danger and that conditions were of such disorder that it was impossible to provide adequate protection. He therefore formally asked again for temporary American intervention to restore public order.³

Still, while by midnight 526 Marines were already ashore, there had been no known incidents involving either U.S. troops or nationals. The Ambassador's ambivalence is indicated too by his continued opposition to overflights, feeling they would be counterproductive at this time.

¹CINCLANT to NMCC, 290352Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 290412Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³AmEmb to SecState, 2905102 Apr 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
State was also striving to accomplish contradictory ends. This was apparent when Reid Cabral during the night asked asylum in the U.S. Embassy. Bennett wished to grant it, but on seeking guidance from State, was told that giving asylum or arranging evacuation would, if it became known, prejudice the position of neutrality the U.S. was striving to keep. State suggested as alternatives that Reid be taken aboard the BOXER or moved into the Papal Nunciatura.¹

During the night the major preoccupation of the Joint Staff was the preparation of reinforcements should they be needed. During the last hours of the 29th, it appeared that such reinforcements might be only an academic affair. The uncertainty of the requirement as seen by the Ambassador led to an understandable hesitation on the part of senior U.S. military officers to launch urgent measures.

For example, late on the 29th Admiral Wylie of CINCLANT informed the Vice J-3 that CINCLANTFLT had directed FMFLANT to airlift a Marine company from Lejeune to Guantanamo Bay. Wylie first thought that the move was to replace the troops in the TG 44.9 ship RUCHAMKIN which, while taking refugees into San Juan, had been rammed by a tug. Actually the unit was to replace the company of the Phibron BLT which, according to custom, had been left in Guantanamo during the Phibron’s cruise period. Since the Phibron BLT was now facing possible combat, CINCLANTFLT was attempting to bring it up to full strength.

The CJCS and the SecDef discussed the matter and decided to hold up the move, because of possible political impressions it might give throughout Latin America. This decision was passed on to CINCLANT with the further information that the President had specifically directed that there be no movements of troops out of the continental U.S. until he gave the word.²

Part of the Marine force was loaded and taxiing when the recall order reached them.

¹State to AmEmb, 2911032 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²EA tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
In a conversation between the CJCS and the Vice J-3 at 2037, the CJCS said he would ask the SecState to try to ascertain the Ambassador's requirements. Apparently the Ambassador had originally talked in terms of 1200 men, but when the CTG 44.9 immediately offered 1000 as a starting force, Bennett dropped the number to 400. The inability of the JCS to gain a clearer picture of the Ambassador's requirements was compounded by a communications jam in the Embassy, which became so severe that the Embassy found it necessary to announce to State that only State messages in or out would be handled. In consequence, the NMCC lacked certain key messages from Bennett during these hours. The JCS thus had to rely upon State to transmit information to the Pentagon or upon whatever CTG 44.9 could relay.\(^1\)

Shortly after 2200 Commodore Dare first reported to CINCLANT that the Ambassador preferred to wait for daylight before deciding on additional troop requirements. Bennett also had asked that a senior representative of CTG 44.9 come ashore the next morning to discuss all aspects of military participation. This message for the moment took some of the urgency out of the situation as far as the JCS were concerned.

News of the Marine landing had been given by the President in a national television broadcast at 2050, at which time he mentioned only the need to protect U.S. lives and property.

However, despite the apparently fixed figure of 400 as the Ambassador's requirement, CTG 44.9 reported at 2356 that 526 men were ashore. The President had announced 400 ashore but actually there were then only 250 on land.\(^2\) The discrepancies in available information led to some urgent coordination among State, NMCC, and White House Situation Room representatives around midnight. Contradictory information on the preparation for a possible airborne deployment also seemed to increase as the hours passed.

\(^1\) EA Tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
\(^2\) Ibid.
Another problem which came up at this time was that of the precise military mission of the force ashore. OSD/ISA raised the matter of rules of engagement -- at whom and under what conditions should the Marines open fire; how far inland were they permitted to go; could they, for example, force a column through to the Embassy? The reaction in the JCS was to wait until the situation clarified, hopefully by the morning hours.

A. PREPARATIONS FOR THE AIRBORNE DEPLOYMENT

Apparently the President had been convinced of the necessity of alerting the forces on the basis of an extremely rapid response time, in the event that the situation in Santo Domingo underwent a drastic deterioration requiring almost instantaneous response.

The timing was reviewed by CJCS and the Vice J-3 during the evening of the 28th and it was determined that sixteen hours would be needed to marshal and load the force. However, CINCSTRIKE had not taken advantage of the two-hour additional warning given as a result of the telephone alert prior to dispatch of the formal JCS directive. The force would thus not be ready until noon on the 29th.
The airlift scarcity, it should be added, was due to heavy Southeast Asia requirements.

There was a considerable White House interest in the timing issue. The White House Situation Room at midnight asked the NMCC for a review and confirmation of timings. The NMCC at first suggested that the WHSR hold off its requests until morning when much would hopefully have clarified, but the WHSR insisted that it had to have some such data on hand in case the President should call down for it. The Situation Room reported that the CJCS had informed the President's Special Assistant for International Security Affairs, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, at 2030 that the first two BCTs, 2,000 men, could be in Santo Domingo by 0500 on the 29th, followed each succeeding twenty-four hours by 2,000

\(^1\)EA tapes, 29 April 1965.
more men. The WHSR wanted data on the numbers of men, types of units (down to company level), and times of arrival. It needed these figures as soon as possible, otherwise any Presidential query would have to be answered on the basis of the Chairman's comments to Bundy.

The J-3 Atlantic/South Division representative expressed some surprise that the Chairman had promised that the first units could land in just five hours from that time, but the WHSR reiterated their earlier information, that the Chairman had told Bundy the troopers were loading up as they talked (at 2030) and could be put in by 0500 the next day. On checking with the Vice J-3 the NMCC was told the correct timings were 1700 instead of 0500, and 1700 on each of the two following days. These data were passed at once to the WHSR. It may be presumed that Bundy had misunderstood the Chairman.\(^1\) It is an interesting example of how erroneous information circulated at the very highest levels too.

Another misunderstanding appeared at this time in the matter of type load. The Vice J-3 had told CINCSTRIKE some hours earlier his thoughts on the advisability of at least keeping in mind the possibility of sending the troopers with only a light "riot control" configuration. Apparently CINCSTRIKE had sent the word on to ARSTRIKE at Fort Monroe in terms of a crash requirement. ARSTRIKE called the NMCC at 0030 for guidance, reporting that the troop commander did not know whether to continue to load with the standard heavy load or to hold back in view of the possibility of a reconfiguration.

The NMCC DDO explained that the Vice J-3 had spoken in terms of planning only and had not changed the JCS directive to continue the

\(^1\)EA tapes, 29 April 1965.
standard loading. The feeling in the JCS had been that the President, just before he went on TV, might want more troops into Santo Domingo in a hurry, and a light configuration might have saved a few hours. The misunderstanding, accordingly, was resolved.¹

This problem had no sooner been disposed of than another appeared. At 0123 the WHSR called to the attention of the NMCC an Embassy message regarding the desperate need for medical supplies in Santo Domingo where the Dominican Red Cross estimated minimum casualties of 400 dead and 1200 wounded. The WHSR presumed that the military would fly in emergency medical supplies and had learned that instead these were going by ship. The Ambassador had expressed concern over the delay that would result.

This request for more airlift came just at the moment when the airlift issue bulked large in Joint Staff concern. At 0137 the DDO questioned CINCLANT on the airlift needed for the airborne deployment. The JCS had just learned the magnitude of the airlift required. ²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.
The CINCLANT Watch Officer stated that, as far as he knew, there was no CINCLANT requirement for the five-minute separation, and that he would clarify this point to CINCSTRIKE who could take it up with XVIIIth Airborne Corps and AFSRIKE.

Furthermore, the DDO reported, there had been some misinterpretation of the JCS directive alerting the four remaining BCTs and the requisite airlift. Apparently MATS had understood the order as requiring that simultaneous lift for all six be ordered to remain in place. This would have meant, of course, that MATS would be unable to fulfill its global commitments. The DDO stressed that the JCS intent was clear, that there was to be a twenty-four-hour separation between the Power Packs.¹

STRICOM shortly called back with a suggested change which would reduce aircraft requirements to manageable proportions, based upon their best intelligence as to the nature of the operation. Furthermore, they had just become aware of the limitation imposed on the number of aircraft which could be employed by the capacity of the landing area (San Isidro Airfield). ²

The DDO concurred and strongly urged STRICOM to resolve the problem bilaterally with CINCLANT so as to avoid having the JCS make the decision for them.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.
B. THE DEVELOPING SITUATION IN SANTO DOMINGO

The second half of the 29th was a crucial period in the U.S. intervention. While message traffic from the Embassy indicated a reduced sense of immediate danger, the decision was made in Washington to reinforce the original group of Marines ashore with a sizeable force. There was still no clear picture of the situation available to the decision makers and it may be presumed that, in the absence of hard facts, a measure of safety and flexibility was sought through the deployment of additional forces.

By morning, drastic efforts were being made to gather critical information, to the extent of direct calls from the CJCS to TG 44.9. Around 0900 General Wheeler called the Task Group and asked for four items of intelligence: the strength of the opposing forces; the location of the bulk of the two forces; the apparent leaders on either side; any particular man who stood out as an "anti-Communist" leader.

An hour later CTG 44.9 called the Chairman with answers to his questions, presumably derived from the Embassy. Rebel forces were estimated to consist of 1400 military and 3000 nonmilitary armed civilians. The strength of the junta forces was unknown, except that they consisted of Air Force, Navy, and training school troops under Wessin. The rebel forces were concentrated largely in the southeast corner of the city, west of the river, while junta forces were believed to be largely east of the river. Commodore Dare identified Benoit as head of the junta and Montas Guerrero as chief of the "loyal" forces.

Dare also proffered an additional piece of information, that the Ambassador wanted no more Marines landed at this time.1

Twenty minutes later the CJCS again called Dare, asking if there were still fighting going on. Dare replied that there was "no fighting declared in the area this morning," an ambiguous answer.

1 EA tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
which is open to several interpretations as to his meaning, based upon his understanding of the situation. The Chairman also wished to know what had happened to the thousand Army troops Montas Guerrero was reported to have brought into the city from San Cristobal. Dare did not know. As to the police and their current status, Dare reported that downtown they were ineffective, but that in the outlying areas they still held control. The Chairman asked directly if the Commodore felt that the situation required more Marines ashore, the Ambassador's position notwithstanding, to which Dare responded in the negative, assuming that his mission was unchanged.

The last question is interesting as it perhaps indicates a change in the current of events. Up to this point, the decision makers in Washington had relied almost exclusively upon the Ambassador's judgment in regard to the extent of U.S. intervention. There now appears another, Washington-based, pressure for an increased U.S. commitment. In other words, it seems that now elements in the decision-making group and their advisors had decided that only an intervention would save the day, and these elements began increasing pressure toward that end, irrespective of the Ambassador's position.

Around 1000 Bennett reported that the firing in the city had reduced in volume. He also stated that the junta had prepared a plan of action to clean up the rebel area, but that the morale of the junta troops was very low. The junta chiefs were attempting to use the U.S. presence to restore morale and Radio San Isidro, the junta-controlled station, was actually urging the U.S. Marines to join the impending clean up. To counter the poor junta morale, Bennett stated that the rebels could also be assumed to be tiring. Furthermore, they had not yet wished or been able to break out of the center of the city. His assessment concluded that the establishment of law and order depended upon whether the 2000 or so remaining junta troops could hold together long enough to effect their mission. If they did not do it quickly, large-scale defections were likely.  

1 AmEmb to SecState, 2914212 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
There are two most interesting aspects to this message. Where just a day before the junta forces were described as in a process of disintegration, they now were preparing plans to "mop up" the rebels. Secondly, the junta was very obviously trying to draw the U.S. in as deeply as possible.

Several hours later, Bennett reported on a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps where there was general agreement that no basis existed for diplomatic intervention in the situation at this time. Several of the Latin American envoys also supported the Marine landing as the only means of achieving some protection.¹

About this time the decision was made in Washington to land more Marines, despite the Ambassador's position on the matter. At 1415 the Vice J-3 alerted CINCLANT of the coming message to land 500 more Marines and to deploy two BCTs to Ramey. He stressed that the CTG 44.9 should be informed that State knew of and approved the move. The formal JCS message went out an hour later, specifying that the mission of the additional troops would be the protection of U.S. citizens. The two BCTs were to be chopped to CINCLANT operational control upon execution of the deployment and were to maintain a two-hour alert while standing by at Ramey. The message underscored the need for secrecy; no statements were authorized except as directed by OSD/PA.²

The movement of the two BCTs to Ramey was presumably part of the political nature of the U.S. deployments. The BCTs, only minutes from Santo Domingo, represented new pressure being brought to bear on the situation in the city, without requiring the actual deployment into the city itself.

¹Amb to SecState, 291755Z Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²JCS 001023 to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, 291914Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
This half-step forward illustrates the ambivalence among the Washington decision makers and the play of contradictory forces. Presumably it was still hoped that the junta forces would bestir themselves and destroy the rebels despite the repeated statements by Bennett that these troops were of little combat effectiveness. However, it will be recalled that during the morning he had contradicted himself by reporting their plans to "mop up" the rebels. Furthermore, while strong forces, primarily the military and several key officers in State were urging strong decisive action in the form of a major and all-out U.S. commitment, there were obviously elements who hesitated to agree with such a step. Had there been a universal acceptance of the Communist menace among the decision makers, there was no need to take the half-step to Ramey.

Thus far the commitment had been piecemeal but all within one dimension, that of landing Marines actually in the area. The landing of Marines for police duty was one thing; an airborne assault landing quite another. The Caribbean was accustomed to U.S. Marines in police duties, and later even the sternest critics of the U.S. intervention were to agree that the initial Marine landing could have been justified and would have been accepted by the Latin American states for what it purported to be. An airborne landing of U.S. Army forces was a new dimension which changed the nature of the U.S. intervention and opened wide the Pandora's Box of political controversy.

With this decision came increased efforts to improve communication and the flow of information from the city to Washington. At 1420 the Vice J-3 directed the EA Room to arrange for him to make a call to Commodore Dare every thirty minutes on the single side-band, and then, in talking with the TG, informed them of the necessity for half hourly situation reports. There was nothing new to report at the moment from the TG, but the Commodore had just gone ashore and presumably would send back current information within a couple of hours.
It should be recalled, in this effort to reconstruct the hour-by-hour development of the situation, that the Pentagon still had no independent information source of its own, and was still relying upon information received from the Embassy and transmitted either by CTG 44.9 or from State itself. A full situation report from Dares, such as the TG promised above, would be the first to come from a senior U.S. military officer on the scene.

An additional aspect to this problem came to the surface at this time.

The SecDef had repeatedly found himself embarrassed by the lack of key information with which to reply to the President's queries. Hence, it became a matter of special concern for the military to develop immediately an up-to-the-minute pipeline from the Dominican Republic.

Following his conversation with TG 44.9, the Vice J-3 informed the Deputy SecDef that a report from Dares would soon be forthcoming. Mr. Vance, however, had just received word from State of a conversation with the Ambassador in which Bennett had spoken of a general war weariness and had said that both he[...]

did not see at this time "a need for direct intervention." This was another indication of the Ambassador's apparently increasing hesitation. This curious and unaccountable ambivalence, this tendency to oscillate between extremes at the slightest change in the wind, complicated immeasurably the efforts in Washington to understand the situation.

3EA tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
Consequently, there appeared a growing disenchantment with the Ambassador's judgment among key military figures, which strengthened their desire to get on-the-spot military appraisals of the situation. It began to seem that the Ambassador, having raised the alarm and put the machine into motion, was now attempting to brake it before anything major had been accomplished.

Less than two hours after the decision to land the 500 additional Marines, and less than that after Bennett's comment about "no need for direct intervention", the situation changed again. Sniper fire against the Embassy was claimed to have begun at 1340, and return fire by the Marines on guard had killed two snipers. The hostile fire had ceased by 1630 with no casualties or damage inflicted on the Embassy or its staff. However, shortly before 1600 Bennett asked State to transmit to Commodore Dare his request to land the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the Phibron. At 1600 the Vice J-3 directed CINCLANT to notify CTG 44.9, and the formal JCS message followed ten minutes later, specifying "no change in mission."2

Ambiguity remained extraordinarily prevalent. Twenty minutes after the Vice J-3 had alerted CINCLANT, the former was called by the Deputy SecDef who reported that the Ambassador's request had apparently been unclear as to whether he wanted the troops actually ashore or merely to be ready to go ashore. The Deputy SecDef directed that the troops be put ashore, but that they would not be committed to anything until a more complete picture of the situation was available. It was later determined that Bennett and Dare, in their review at the Embassy of the situation at this time, had decided jointly to ask for additional forces.

1EA tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
2JCS 1037 to CINCLANT, 292011Z Apr 1965 SECRET.
Bennett soon after this sent to State his recommendations on the area to be sealed off and protected, this apparently being the purpose of the additional force landings. He reported that Dare felt he would require three hours to disembark his entire force which would gather at the Hotel. By that time, Bennett again repeated, as he had through the day, that he hoped to have a clearer picture of the situation. He felt it would be necessary to expand the perimeter of the area already being secured, the first phase to secure the residential area of the city from the Hotel to the National Palace. Most Americans lived in this area and securing it would best safeguard U.S. lives and property. Furthermore, this was the Embassy area, and many of the Diplomatic Corps were nervous. Securing the area would also help gain the political support for further necessary military action on our part.

The Ambassador offered estimates, admittedly very conjectural, on the forces engaged. The rebels comprised, at best guess, a "hard core of Communist-trained fighters" numbering some 1500, 1000 regular Army troops, and up to 4000 irregulars. (This hard core of 1500 was a new element, unmentioned previously.) It was uncertain how many of these rebels would engage in direct combat with junta forces.

The Ambassador drew a gloomy picture of the junta dispositions. Wessin on the east of the city had approximately 1000 men; Imbert commanded 300 from the Police Palace near the Embassy; Rivera Cuesta had 200 at the Intendencia General; Rivera Camino 100 men from Jaina gathered at the fair grounds; only a fraction of the original 9700 police could be accounted for. The junta had failed to bring in troops from the countryside for reasons which were obscure but which included poor communications, uncertainty as to where control of forces in the field lay, and lack of leadership. Bennett noted that an Embassy officer had spent the day at the junta headquarters at San Isidro and had found great confusion with nothing being accomplished.¹

¹AmEmb to SecState, 2920232 Apr 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
A major concern of the embassy during this period was the critical shortage of food supplies in the city which had resulted from the interdiction of the roads leading into the city. The Ambassador asked State for emergency authorization to distribute all U.S. surplus food stocks currently in Santo Domingo warehouses. Medical supplies were similarly a desperate problem and a great deal of cable traffic concerned Embassy requests for more supplies.

The JCS in the meantime continued its efforts to obtain independent military assessments of the situation by suggesting that Commodore Dare send a small communications liaison group to the San Isidro headquarters of the junta or to the headquarters of Montas Guerrero. This would permit a flow of information as well as establish a link between the U.S. forces and the fragmented junta units. Dare replied that he would not likely be able to establish such links until morning, since his communications facilities were currently being utilized in the landing.

The whole issue of communications capability was then opened as Dare requested more communications both ashore and afloat. The JCS responded with energetic efforts to supply him with whatever he needed.

The estimate of developments held in Washington at this time saw the situation polarizing, with most of the original rebel leaders of the FRD withdrawing from the conflict and calling for a cease-fire. The rebel forces were considered to be fully under the control of Castroite-Communist elements. One intelligence summary also reported some indications that old line Trujillo elements, exiled until now, might be attempting to return in order to exploit the chaotic circumstances of the hour.\(^1\)

\(^1\)CINCLANT to CINCLANTFLT 292030Z Apr 1965 SECRET.
Based upon the body of information available by this time, a decision had apparently been made at the highest levels that a direct military intervention might very soon become necessary to retrieve the situation. Hope that the Marine landing would encourage the junta and discourage the rebels was clearly fading in Washington by late Thursday. The SecState notified the White House at 1715 that a message had been sent to the Embassy requesting an estimate of the current situation and whether direct U.S. intervention was necessary to save it. The cable reiterated that "we could not afford to permit the situation to deteriorate to the point where a Communist takeover occurred."^1

The form that such an intervention might take now assumed key significance. The SecState, in his effort to maintain what he called the "fig leaf of neutrality and nonintervention," suggested that once the landing forces were all ashore, an international safety zone be established over the area from the Embassy westward to the Hotel. On raising the issue with Dare, it was learned that he and the Ambassador had already, by 1600 that is, discussed and planned for just such an arrangement. There had been some initial concern in the JCS that State might be laying an excessive demand upon him in view of his available force.~2

This was the second step in the intervention concept, an extension really of the mission for protection of U.S. lives. The issue of the mission was to grow more complex in the next twenty-four hours.

C. THE ACTIVATION OF JOINT TASK FORCE 122

Until this point, Commodore Dare, CTG 44.9, was the senior U.S. military representative in Santo Domingo. With the whole operation about to expand with astonishing suddenness, the command organization was revamped to support it.

As early as the 26th CINCLANT had initiated steps to activate JTF 122 under Vice Admiral K. S. Masterson (Commander U.S. Second Fleet) as Commander JTF 122 designate. At 1830 on the 28th Masterson

^1SecState to White House, 2921152 Apr 1965 SECRET.
^2EA tapes, 29 Apr 1965.
had been directed by the Deputy CINCLANT "to form a nucleus for a
joint staff for JTF 122; to move to the waters off the Dominican
Republic; to be prepared to assume the duties of CJTF 122; and to
execute OPLAN 310/2 on directive."

Masterson and a group of nine officers left Norfolk by air at
2045 on the 28th, arriving at Ramey eight hours later. They were met
and briefed by Rear Admiral Caldwell, COMCARIBSEAPRON, and with him
flew to San Juan for further briefings. From here the group flew to
Ponce at 0615 on the 29th, arriving at first light, and embarked on
the USS LEAHY which got under way immediately for Santo Domingo. On
arrival off the city, Masterson transferred to the BOXER and assumed
command as CJTF 122 at 1632 on the 29th.1 This, it will be noted,
was twenty hours after he left Norfolk.

Masterson was briefed by Commodore Dare on the situation ashore,
and as his first act, took immediate steps to improve the intelligence
picture which he found was extremely poor. Late in the evening an
intelligence officer was sent ashore to remain at the Embassy in order
to gather information for transmission to CJTF 122 via covered communi-
cation circuits through Washington or by helicopter from the Embassy
to the BOXER, a step which proved immediately beneficial. The officer
also provided a coordination point with the Ambassador and the Embassy
staff, an arrangement suggested to Dare by the Deputy J-3 in order that
all interested parties be coordinated on military plans and operations.
With the Ambassador, State, the JCS, CINCLANT, and CTG 44.9 all
involved, it had become crucial to tighten up the system. The repeated
references to this requirement in high-level conversations indicates
the seriousness with which it was viewed.

1Commander JTF 122 (Comdr US 2nd Flt), Operation Power Pack, 28 Apr-
7 May 1965, TOP SECRET, 9 May 1965.
The Marine landing was now in process and was completed at 2130 on the 29th when the units landed at Haina linked up with the troops then in the vicinity of the polo field. CTG 44.9 was then dissolved and redesignated CTF 124, acting under CJTF 122.

The BLT of the Carib Phibron was to be brought up to full strength by the dispatch of two companies by air from Camp Lejeune to Guantanamo and thence by destroyer to Santo Domingo. The full BLT would thus be available on shore by early morning. ¹

Thus as the second day of American military operations drew to a close, U.S. Marines were preparing to expand their perimeter and airborne troops were in the air en route to Puerto Rico. It is now necessary to examine the airborne operations.

¹EA tapes
VI. THE AIRBORNE DEPLOYMENT

The airborne troops involved in the Dominican operation were the 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, and under the command of XVIIIth Airborne Corps. The Commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps reported to CONARC which was also ARSTRIKE. Late on the 29th operational command of the 82nd was chopped to CINCLANT.

The XVIIIth Airborne Corps was notified by phone at 2230 on the 26th by the USCONARC/CINCLANT plans officer of a possible contingency alert for ARSTRIKE. An hour and a half later the Corps received an info copy of a CINCSTRIKE message to ARSTRIKE directing that two BCTs be placed in Defcon 3 for ARSTRIKE. This information was relayed verbally to the 82nd Airborne Division. The message requested identity of units and the approximate number of aircraft to move these units, configured for parachute assault. From the beginning, then, the expectation was that of a parachute assault landing.
In examining the airborne deployment, it is necessary to keep in mind the meaning of Defcon status as it applies to airborne operations. A Defcon 3 status is attained when the unit is ready to load.

As the 82nd began to prepare in response to the alert, it encountered a series of unexpected problems deriving from its normal duties. The difficulties were not serious in their effect on deployment, since they were resolved before the force was ordered into movement. However, they are illustrative of the type of circumstance which could be of crucial importance. They would have been so had the airborne troops been ordered to Santo Domingo immediately on the 26th or 27th instead of after the intervening three days of alert waiting.

These problems arose out of Exercise Blue Chip, a regular demonstration for the Service schools which had been in preparation for the three weeks prior to the 26th. Blue Chip called for four days of operations by the 82nd, a two-day exercise repeated once. The first big drop was held on the 26th with the follow-up scheduled for the 28th, but because of weather, the second drop was delayed and was rescheduled for the 29th. The first drop had been carried out when the Division was alerted, but rigging for the second drop had already begun. Blue Chip loads were already on the rigging lines and partially prepared for rigging. CINCSTRIKE had asked that he be given control of Blue Chip this year, a responsibility previously exercised by CONARC, and in accordance with that responsibility, he continued to plan for its execution as scheduled. Responsibility for cancellation lay with the JCS. CINCLANT apparently did call the J-3 General Operations Division (Joint Exercise Control Group) about the issue when the first alerts went out but did not receive any guidance.
Since no word came from higher headquarters to halt Blue Chip, the Division decided to continue it as scheduled, especially since the Dominican alert might, like others the Division had responded to, turn out to be a false alarm.  

Therefore because an early decision to cancel the demonstration was not made, the contingency loads and the Blue Chip loads were rigged concurrently. It is unclear whether the issue was taken to the JCS. Certainly CINCSTRIKE was aware of it, since the J-3 of STRICOM was the Blue Chip commander, while the Deputy CINCSTRIKE was also present at Fort Bragg for the exercise.

Only five rigging lines were available to rig both the contingency loads and the Blue Chip loads. The contingency heavy engineer loads were rigged at the departure airfield with, according to a Division report, "considerable effort and loss of efficiency." 

It was not decided that contingency loads would rig prior to the Blue Chip loads until 0950 on the 27th. Priority for loading aircraft still remained with Blue Chip, and indeed the Blue Chip heavy drop was loaded aboard 33 aircraft on the 28th. Late in that afternoon it was decided at Division Headquarters to go ahead on the Blue Chip personnel drop, but to stop the further loading of equipment. At midnight the 82nd was instructed by ARSTRIKE, on order of CINCSTRIKE, to cancel the Blue Chip heavy drop and to put Power Pack I on Defcon 2. The 33 Blue Chip aircraft were ordered to be unloaded.

Furthermore, late on the 28th CINCSTRIKE warned the Division that four more BCTs would be placed on Defcon 2 with modified heavy drop rigging. However, another CINCSTRIKE message at 0025 on the 29th ordered a two-battalion brigade task force (Power Pack II) to Defcon 3 effective at once. This task force was not to rig for heavy drop. In response to this message, the Division Commander placed the entire Division on Defcon 3.

1 Interview, CG 82nd Abn Division, Fort Benning, 8 September 1965.
2 USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, Analysis of Operations, 21 Jun 65, SECRET.
Loading of the 111 heavy drop Power Pack I aircraft did not begin until 0110 on the 29th and was not completed until eighteen and a half hours later. The delay resulted from the late establishment of Air Force inspection points for the loaded aircraft and the fact that the Blue Chip unloading and Power Pack loading had to be done concurrently and in nighttime. Keeping the loads separate was time consuming. It might be added that the unloading was necessary, even though the Blue Chip loads were a full standard combat heavy load, because the equipment used in demonstrations was intentionally older and second line material.\textsuperscript{1}

In part the delay can be accounted for by the definition of Defcon 2 as applied to airborne operations, as described above. The 111 heavy load aircraft had all to be loaded, and troops alongside their personnel carriers, before Defcon 2 was attained. Launching of these latter aircraft could have started much earlier, especially since the heavy drop equipment proved unnecessary in the actual establishment of the initial airborne lodgement in the Dominican Republic.

Despite the several technical reasons mentioned above, there had been an overall delay caused by the failure to cancel Blue Chip when the first concrete indications of a crisis became evident.

The delay in getting the force airborne and into Ramey was viewed critically at top decision-making level, since the intent was clearly to position the troops rapidly in Puerto Rico where their presence could exert some political influence that perhaps might lead to developments which would render unnecessary their ultimate deployment to Santo Domingo. The take-off came almost three hours after the JCS had expected it. The JCS had gone on the basis of a two-hour alert for the airborne troops, but in airborne procedure, this meant two hours to get the troops to the field. Two more hours was planned for loading and launching. This procedural misunderstanding, plus the fact that it took CINCLANT more than half an hour to transmit the launch order to the airborne units, produced the unexpected delay. The JCS

\textsuperscript{1}Interview, HQ 82nd Abn Div, San Isidro Airfield, D. R., 11 Aug 65.
had originally thought the delay was a result of Air Force problems in moving the aircraft, but this was not the case.

The last aircraft of the parachute assault elements was launched at 2234 on the 29th.

The first recycle aircraft were originally programmed to move the airlanded portion of Power Pack I, but other higher priority units were injected into the airstream, and, as will be seen, a certain amount of confusion resulted.

A. THE IN-FLIGHT CHANGE OF OBJECTIVE

At 1750 the possibility of going direct to San Isidro and airlanding the assault echelon was first mentioned within the JCS. The idea was received with consternation, and arguments were immediately offered against such a radical plan revision. At 1903 the Deputy SecDef directly posed to the Vice J-3 the question of when the decision would have to be made if it were decided to send the airborne force directly to San Isidro instead of to Ramey. He asked if the force could land that night. While the Vice J-3 was gathering information on the point, Mr. Vance called directly to CJTF 122 aboard the BOXER to ask if San Isidro were capable of taking C-130s at night. CJTF said the field was reported useable but he did not know whether any warning would be required.

A few minutes later the CJCS directed the Vice J-3 to alert the airborne force to the possibility of a diversion to San Isidro for an airlanded operation. The Chairman pointed out that security during an airlanded operation should not be a problem, since there had never
been any rebels reported at San Isidro, nine miles away from the rebel-held downtown area of the city.

This sudden change in plans would appear to have arisen from a meeting of the decision-making group at this time. The situation of the junta forces was apparently viewed as critical and the small force of Marines ashore would be too fully committed to the defense of U.S. lives and property to do much to influence the course of events. The CJCS stated the reason to the Vice J-3 at 1935, namely, the fear that the "whole thing was going to fold up on us unless we could get some troops in. If we were to wait until dawn, we might not have anything to support." The purpose, then, was to support the junta forces, a clear change in the prior single mission of the U.S. intervention.

The Chairman at this time directed that J-3 start planning actively to divert the BCTs to San Isidro; that CJG 44.9, in preparation for diversion of the airborne deployment to San Isidro, send some of his officers with members of the Air Attache's office to San Isidro to ensure that the field was lighted and ready for the airlanding of airborne units.

The Chairman said the Attache would know about the security situation at the field since he was reported to have been out there an hour ago. The Vice J-3 told him that the Deputy CINCLANT was strongly opposed to the airlanding at night, and offered an alternative; namely, to go into Ramey as scheduled and then drop as configured on San Isidro at first light next morning. He argued that the aircraft parking problem at San Isidro, inevitable confusion of a night landing, and security all weighed in favor of a drop at first light.

The conversation also revealed a curious lack of information on Admiral Masterson and his whereabouts. Three hours after Masterson had taken command as CJTF 122, neither the Chairman nor the Vice J-3 knew of it. Nor did they know on what ship he was stationed.¹

¹EA tapes, 29 April. Admiral Masterson's location was clarified for the CJCS at 2335Z.
The Vice J-3 was particularly concerned about the change in plan and pursued the issue to STRICOM. STRICOM told him that it would be "almost impossible" to airland instead of drop. Since all the equipment in the heavy drop element was rigged on pallets, two special items of equipment, 25K loaders and cranes, would be needed to unload the aircraft. STRICOM estimated that fifteen loaders would be needed plus five special cranes (which were not at San Isidro and were not air-transportable anyway) in order to unload Power Pack I (PPI) in twelve hours. It was "almost impossible" to unload by hand.¹

This information was passed to the Deputy SecDef by the Vice J-3, along with an estimate of one and a half to two days unloading time. In the meantime, none of the troops engaged in unloading would be available for operations. The latter estimated that the decision to divert to San Isidro would have to be made within two hours, or by 2200.

At 2106 the decision had not yet been made, as the decision makers continued to meet in the White House. (Mr. Vance stayed with Mr. Ball in his office at State, the two acting as executive agents for the operation on behalf of DOD and State.) The Vice J-3 continued his desperate effort to muster effective arguments against the change in plan, drawing with CINCLANT's help, a picture of the airborne troops landing and finding themselves under heavy attack with only their personal weapons and basic individual load of ammunition for defense.

Soon after, however, the decision was made, and the CJCS at 2135 notified CINCLANT that the former's attempt to block a change in plan had failed. The political authorities wished the first Power Pack to be airlanded. The CJCS was interested in the delay that would result if the airborne force were allowed to continue to Ramey to do minimum reconfiguring before being sent on to San Isidro for an airlanding, an alternative that had been raised to the deployment direct to San Isidro. Discussion of the point indicated that such a move would

¹EA tapes, 29 April.
provide no real gain and would only sacrifice several more hours. It was decided that the force should be sent straight to San Isidro for the airlanding as soon as possible, during hours of darkness, and that if the field were incapable of handling all the aircraft involved, some could fly to Ramey to wait there until the San Isidro saturation eased. The Deputy CINCLANT reported that a few minutes before, CTG 44.9 had notified him that San Isidro was ready to take any type of aircraft on fifteen-minute notice.

The CJCS repeated that the mission of the airborne force was protection of American lives. The CJCS did not mention the mission of preventing a junta collapse.

The formal JCS directive to CINCLANT ordered the diversion and gave authority to phase the remainder of the air column through Ramey, in the event of congestion, until traffic conditions permitted an orderly landing. Safety was stressed. CINCLANT was to ensure that "friendly forces" in the airfield area were alerted for the landing and to assist in air control and unloading.

The decision also involved employment of a huge portion of Air Force airlift resources, cutting deeply into aircraft currently committed to Southeast Asia.

As the Power Pack I units approached their destination, it was agreed between the Tactical Air Command (not APLANT as such) and CINCLANT that TAC should have operational control of the aircraft until the troops were on the ground, after which OPCON would switch to CJTF 122. This irregular procedure, TAC not being in the chain of command, was necessitated by an involved arrangement agreed upon to improve the landing situation at San Isidro.

1EA tapes, 29 April.
2JCS 1089 to CINCLANT, 300117Z April 1965, SECRET.
The flight stream consisted of four elements, Serials A, B, C, D. A carried the troops and consisted of thirty-three aircraft; B carried part of the equipment. B happened to be first in the stream because it had been rushed out of Pope AFB more rapidly than personnel could be moved at that time. TAC recommended that Serial B go on to Ramey and, taking advantage of its headstart, do some reconfiguring there. Serial A would go on to San Isidro, and land the troops who would then be available to try to unload Serials C and D as they followed in.

This was the way the situation eventually worked out. San Isidro could park a maximum of fifty planes and really only forty safely. The huge aircraft were kept taxiing around the field, nose to tail in elephant-train fashion. It might be added that in the confusion of the landing, the Joint Staff was never able to determine exactly how many aircraft went to Ramey, since knowledge of the arrangement with TAC seems not to have been disseminated widely. What was generally believed was that the entire force, as per change in the plan, was going directly to San Isidro.

As the huge air stream moved south, air traffic control communications in the southeastern U. S. and en route proved inadequate to handle a movement of such magnitude. Delays in making position reports, due to channel saturation, frequently caused two to three-hour delays in knowing aircraft positions. This caused some concern for the timely alerting of air rescue operations, as well as complicating the problem of controlling the deployment into San Isidro.

Brigadier General Delashaw, commander of the Air Force Task Force, was aboard a TAC airborne command post orbiting over San Isidro and controlling the air stream as it approached the objective area.

---

1. CINCAFLANT to CINCLANT, 242138Z June 1965, SECRET, Analysis of Operations.
2. Interviews, J-3, Joint Staff.
He remained in control until Air Force control facilities were established on the ground, after which he returned to Ramey to conduct further operations from there.

The first aircraft, carrying Major General York, Commanding General of the 82nd, landed at San Isidro at 0216. Ten minutes later CINCLANT notified the NMCC, reporting that the airfield lights were on and the tower manned by U.S. Navy personnel.¹

Beginning at first light and throughout the day, Marine fighters from Roosevelt Roads maintained a combat air patrol over the airfield area.

One footnote will be of interest here, in view of the tremendous concern generated over the change in plans from an air drop to an air landing. Once the force was on the ground and had time to examine the drop zone on which they would have descended had not the change occurred, it was found that the area was covered with jagged coral outcroppings. In addition, a great many small trees which had dotted the area had recently been cut down, leaving hundreds of spike-like stumps. In the words of the CJCS, "The area would have been completely unsuitable for an airdrop and would have caused numerous injuries."²

The drop zone had been selected on the basis of a map study by the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and about a year prior to the crisis, the military Attachés in Santo Domingo had been requested to inspect the DZ. Apparently there had not been an adequate foot reconnaissance which would have revealed the coral outcroppings in the grass. In the intervening year, furthermore, the trees had been cut down, creating a new hazard.³

¹EA tapes, 30 April.
²CM-659-65, Memorandum to the Director Joint Staff — Analysis of Operations, 8 June 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³Interview, J-2 USCONDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
B. PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE THE AIRBORNE FORCE

As the airborne force moved south, arrangements were undertaken by American command authorities on the scene to smooth the way and to prepare for the employment of the force. Admiral Masterson was now in command and would take operational control of the paratroops once they landed, but the Admiral was aboard the BOXER offshore and communications between the ship and shore points were still imperfect.

At 2200 Masterson held a teletype conference with the Deputy CINCLANT on the change in the airborne deployment plan. During the conference, General Imbert of the junta group came aboard the BOXER to discuss the junta's situation and to plan for the introduction of the U.S. airborne forces which had previously been expected during the daylight hours on the 30th. Imbert assured Masterson that San Isidro was in friendly hands and that he and his aides would accompany JTF 122 personnel to the airfield to help prepare it for the incoming aircraft.

At 0020 the aides to Masterson and General Tompkins, Deputy CJTF, along with a captain from the Phibron, went with Imbert and his group to San Isidro where the field was found to be secured by Imbert's troops. A U.S. Navy lieutenant was stationed in the airfield control tower to assist in the landings.1

On arrival at the field, General York was met by a USAF major from the Embassy, but lost him in the darkness and furious activity of the landing. York wandered in the dark around the field until a civilian car with five men in it appeared. One was General Imbert and he took York to the control tower where JTF 122 people were in charge.2

A JTF 122 liaison officer delivered to York a copy of Masterson's reply to a JCS planning directive, in which the Admiral had outlined

1Commander JTF 122, Report, 9 May 1965.
2Interview, Fort Benning, Georgia, 8 September 1965.
an immediate mission for York's troops. York reported to Masterson at 0830 aboard the BOXER and was directed to assume command of all the ground forces. Furthermore, the CJCS had emphasized to General Bowen, the CG of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, his desire to see York assume the role as soon as possible (the command had to be assigned to him by CJTF 122). The Chairman also suggested that York move his headquarters close to the Embassy to permit an improved degree of military-political coordination. In furtherance of this objective, York and General Tompkins went by helicopter from the BOXER to confer with Ambassador Bennett at the Embassy.

As part of the effort to improve communications and coordination, Colonel Quilty, USMC, the MILGROUP Chief, reported to Masterson at 0900 to act as CJTF 122.2, an additional liaison mechanism between the Embassy and Masterson. A voice communication circuit also was established between the MILGROUP and the Embassy and Quilty. By this time Masterson had some voice communications with his component units, although this was erratic, and was using helicopters for the delivery of classified traffic.

---

1EA tapes.
2CJTF 122, Report.
VII. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

As the airborne deployments got under way, there remained a vast cloud of uncertainty over the mission of the U.S. intervention. The paratroopers, as with the Marine landing force, had been instructed merely that their mission would be to protect American lives. The confusion of information which existed at the upper decision-making levels was fully paralleled at lower echelons. There was no clear picture of who the enemy was, what the U.S. forces would do, or what the objective might be. This led to a spectrum of expectations as to the mission.

A. ESTABLISHING THE MISSION

General York, for example, has stated that en route to Santo Domingo he deduced for himself, from available information, a reasonable mission. Initially he would secure the airhead and establish a bridgehead across the Ozama River. Beyond that he fully expected that U.S. forces would be directed to clear the city of rebel forces. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy, Connett, also expected that to be the mission, and believed that York was prevented from doing so when the junta forces collapsed.¹

The mission, however, was being worked out on a tentative basis by the joint political and military decision makers in Washington. Shortly before midnight on the 29th, the CJCS instructed the Vice J-3 to direct CJTF 122 to prepare a planning directive using certain guidelines. The rebels were concentrated in the southeast part of Santo Domingo. CJTF's objective was to establish road blocks and cordons to the extent possible around the perimeter without unnecessarily endangering his forces. He was to accept the fact that small

¹Interviews, U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo, and Fort Benning, Ga.
rebel groups might infiltrate the area. The plan was to be based initially on using forces ashore and be extended when the airborne troops arrived. Hopefully the cordon would be established in connection with a cease-fire pending OAS determination of a termination of hostilities. Masterson was also asked for his estimate of additional troops needed in addition to the Marines ashore and the two BCTs en route.\(^1\)

The CJCS called Masterson at 2208 to ask his opinion on establishing an international safety zone. Masterson said that his predecessor, Commodore Dare, had been discussing the problem with him and that he saw no difficulties in doing it with the forces available. In answer to the Chairman's query about the planning directive, Masterson said that it was just in the process of coming over the teletype. The Chairman requested that it be given urgent attention.\(^2\)

The Admiral called the Vice J-3 at 2336 to say he could carry out the provisions of the JCS planning directive. He stressed that he would like the additional Marine company of the BLT, and was assured by the Vice J-3 that it was en route aboard two destroyers and would arrive around sunrise. He wanted to be sure he had authority to begin to establish the international safety zone as soon as possible, and this was confirmed by the Vice J-3.

Around 0100 a personal message from the CJCS to Masterson stated that, at a highest level meeting just concluded, problems connected with the mission of forces and the deployment of airborne troops had been discussed. The OAS was now in session and was not expected to terminate until the early morning hours. Therefore a decision as to the establishment of the cordon mentioned in the earlier JCS planning directive was deferred pending OAS action.

\(^1\)EA tapes, 29 April. Also JCS 1088 to CINCLANT, 300056Z April 1965, TOP SECRET.

\(^2\)EA tapes, 30 April.
The Chairman asked for an outline of Masterson's plan and his estimate of troop requirements as soon as possible.

The Chairman cautioned that in regard to press queries, military commanders should respond, relative to the 82nd's deployment, that the paratroops were to reinforce the Marines for the purpose of protecting U.S. lives and other foreign nationals. No other conjecture or response was to be made.

In the matter of command arrangements, the Chairman repeated his earlier expressed wish that the senior ground force officer (York) be appointed overall ground force commander as soon as possible, and that his command post be established at the Embassy.

Depending on the results of the OAS meeting, Masterson might be directed during the night to begin establishing an international safety zone, the eastern limit of which would be in the Embassy area and extending westward to the polo grounds. ¹

Masterson sent his plan concept to CINCLANT at about the time the airlanding began. The plan envisioned that on landing, Army forces would establish a local defense perimeter around the airfield and screen the field from the east and north. The brigade (minus the screening and security elements) would move to an assembly area west of the field. When assembled they would effect the relief of junta forces holding the Duarte Bridge and the bridgehead on its western end; secure the bridge; establish a cordon and road blocks east of the river from the bridge to the sea. The Marines would establish a line running north and south, one block east of the Embassy, from the sea inland, effectively sealing off the westernmost sector of the city where most embassies and foreign residences were located.

¹JCS 1092 to CJTF 122, 300527Z April 1965, TOP SECRET.
The assumption was that junta forces as available would be willing to patrol the wide stretch of the city between the Marine north-south line and the airborne troops along the river.

Masterson felt the plan was sufficiently conservative not to endanger his forces. However, he felt that two more battalions would be needed to seal off effectively the southeast portion of the city, utilizing only U.S. troops. (Apparently, he was already not too confident of any junta support.) He requested permission to open the operation as soon as the airborne forces arrived.\(^1\)

Apparently he had not yet received the Chairman’s message of an hour before, deferring the establishment of the cordon until the OAS had deliberated.

On arrival York received a handwritten message from Masterson, along with his outline plan, directing York to be prepared to carry out his mission with the fewest possible casualties and minimum force.\(^2\)

The immediate function of the airborne units was not apparent to the Embassy either. State notified DOD shortly after midnight of an earlier alert to the Embassy (time unknown), which told Bennett that 2000 airborne troops would land at San Isidro, beginning about 2300, and that authorities at the airfield, the junta, would be notified by DOD. The message stressed that the action continued to be on a basis of protecting U.S. lives. The OAS, Bennett was told, would meet at 2200 and was expected to consider multilateral action under Article 39 of the OAS Charter and might call on all sides for a cease-fire. A committee would likely be constituted to proceed to Santo Domingo for the purpose of bringing about a cease-fire and establishing the basis for a return to constitutional government.

\(^1\) CTF 122 to CINCLANT, 300608Z April 1965, SECRET.
\(^2\) Interview, Fort Benning, Georgia, 8 September 1965.
The message told Bennett, for his own private information, that the U.S. was considering the feasibility of interposing U.S. forces between the rebels and the junta forces in order to bring about the cease-fire, thus giving the OAS time to address itself to and find solutions for basic problems. This move would be consistent with our primary purpose which was to protect U.S. lives and with our general policy of opposing the spread of Communist-controlled governments in this hemisphere.1

Bennett replied within the hour, asking for guidance on whether the Marine detachment which had disembarked on the previous afternoon had been authorized to move eastward to clear the residential area between the Hotel and the Embassy as discussed in some of yesterday's cables. "Now," Bennett went on, "we have Deptel 189 in regard to the arrival of airborne troops. Is it planned that these troops will immediately begin operations in view of the statement that action continues to be based on a need for the protection of U.S. lives?"2

The message is a little ambiguous. It is not known exactly when Bennett first learned of the paratroop deployment. Masterson at 2336 told the Vice J-3 that he had told Bennett, but it is not known whether this warning preceded the earlier mentioned cable from State to Bennett. Connett has said that the Embassy learned of the incoming force only half an hour prior to the landing.3

The 0200 resolution of the OAS was transmitted to Bennett at 0350 and gave him the first clear mission. The resolution called for a cease-fire and appealed to both sides to permit the establishment of a neutral international security zone encompassing the Embassy area of the city, within which nationals of all countries would have safe haven. Bennett was thereby given authority, on the basis of

1SecState to DOD, 300445Z April 1965, SECRET.
2AmEmb to SecState, 300532Z April 1965, SECRET.
the resolution, to use forces to establish a zone encircling both the Embassy and the Hotel. The zone could be enlarged to include the National Palace if, in the judgment of Bennett and the military commanders, it appeared feasible and desirable.

Bennett was directed to use every means to communicate to the Dominican people and to the various political authorities the purpose of the zone and its OAS sanction.¹

By 0800 the forces available were almost ready to undertake the mission. The CJCS in a phone conference with CJTF 122 ascertained that 1700 paratroops were just then forming up, with one battalion starting to move to the bridge and due to arrive there within an hour. The lack of heavy equipment did not reduce their combat capability for this mission. York was with Masterson as he spoke and confirmed the readiness. On York's recommendation, Masterson asked the Chairman to send the remaining four BCTs in the OPLAN with minimum essential equipment.²

B. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SCENE IN SANTO DOMINGO

As the first U.S. military operations were about to begin, during the morning of 30 April, it will be worth pausing in the narrative to focus for a moment on the broader context, after concentration in the last section on U.S. activities. This will not only recall the general setting in which U.S. forces were operating, but will present the problem of understanding the situation as they saw it.

As to the general scene in Santo Domingo, a relatively static situation prevailed. The junta forces hung onto their bridgehead; but, on the other hand, the rebels had not attacked and had not moved out from what was becoming their main stronghold in the southeast corner of the city. In the downtown area, mobs were looting and

¹SecState to AmEmb, 3007502 April 1965, SECRET.
²EA tapes, 30 April 1965.
burning but the degree of damage inflicted and of casualties is extremely difficult to pinpoint. As in the opening days of the revolt, impressions varied markedly. For example, just after midnight of the 30th, the Deputy SecDef relayed to the CJCS the substance of a conversation between Under Secretary of State Ball and the Ambassador Bennett had said the "carnage downtown was incredible," and asked for emergency medical support. At the same time newsmen were reporting a less violent picture.

The one point at which actual "fighting" was occurring between the rebels and their opponents was at the National Police fort called the Fortaleza Ozama, a massive old structure on the river bank. It had come under siege by the rebels early on the 30th, and throughout the day reports on the status of the fight. It was of more than passing significance, since the Fortaleza was believed to contain a large arsenal of small arms. Reports as to the weapons themselves varied considerably. Some U.S. sources spoke in terms of 10,000 automatic weapons; another reported only 800 Mauser rifles. In addition there were reported to be nearly 800 policemen in the Fortaleza, whose capture would seriously weaken the junta cause.

U.S. concern over the Fortaleza was expressed by the CJCS to CINCLANT at 1300 on the 30th. Stating the Fortaleza was still holding out but was weakening, the Chairman asked if there were any steps which JCTF 122 could prudently take to assist or to relieve the besieged police and deny the arsenal to the rebels. Masterson was not to construe this request as an order, but it was to be left purely to his judgment. The Chairman suggested that any U.S. moves include not only Marines and paratroopers but the Dominican navy as well.

1EA tapes, 29 April 1965.
2JCS to CINCLANT, 301703Z April 1965, TOP SECRET.
At 1540 the Fortaleza was reported completely under rebel control.  

Then there was the issue of the total Dominican casualties. Admittedly, no precise figure can ever be fixed, but the extreme variations in the estimates inevitably raises questions. For example, on the 4th of May CINCLANT reported to the JCS (from the U.S. Commander, Dominican Republic) that the Chief of the Red Cross Mission (Dominican) had reported that on the previous day there were between 1500 and 2000 dead in the city who were to be buried in a common grave. Two days later the Ambassador reported that the Red Cross had provided a figure of 600 confirmed wounded and 150 confirmed dead since the revolt began. Bennett felt the figures were very conservative and that many bodies had been disposed of.

\[ \text{TOP SECRET} \]

\[ \text{CINCLANT to JCS, 040820Z May 1965, SECRET} \]
without records being kept.\textsuperscript{1} Four days after that, on the 10th, Bennett forwarded the latest Red Cross estimates as 500-600 dead and 1000-odd wounded.\textsuperscript{2}

The issue of exaggeration was slow to break down. Even more difficult to obtain than reasonably accurate total casualty estimates were estimates of those supposed to have been murdered by the rebels in cold blood, as opposed to casualties resulting from the armed clashes with junta forces. As late as 17 June, the President in a news conference spoke of "some 1500 innocent people murdered and shot, and their heads cut off" and of "six Latin American embassies that were violated."\textsuperscript{3} None of this turned out to be true. On 4 May the President had used in a speech Bennett's information that there were 1000-1500 dead bodies in the streets. Newsmen immediately checked and found that there was no substance at all to the claim.

The size and capability of the rebel force were also persistently overestimated. Alarms were sounded on several occasions on reports of impending rebel attacks on the Embassy, National Palace, etc. None came to pass. Furthermore, "attacks" were fire fights, rather than assaults, and the "fighting" that "raged" between junta and rebel forces apparently did far more damage to the buildings of Santo Domingo (mostly stucco-covered and of slight construction so that a single bullet makes quite an impressive hole) than to the men on either side.

The effect of this exaggeration upon the decision makers can be seen in their reactions. Faced with a difficult situation in which there was an undoubted element of Communist conspiracy, with inadequate communications, with wildly conflicting information coming through, decision makers were given a picture of the situation (or perhaps it would be fairer to say, developed their own conception of the situation on the basis of these several factors) which called for drastic action.

\textsuperscript{1} AmEmb to SecState, 0601452 May 1965, SECRET.
\textsuperscript{2} AmEmb to SecState, 1023152 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\textsuperscript{3} Under Secretary of State Mann, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that he had no idea where the President had found this figure.
This constant use of hyperbole was quickly recognized by the press and led directly to the poisoning of relations between the press corps on the scene and the U.S. command there. The newsmen felt that there had been repeated efforts to misinform them and almost as a body they became intensely hostile to the U.S. intervention. While without doubt much of the misinformation was the result of the unbelievably inadequate intelligence arrangements, this paper thus far has documented enough instances where words and actions varied markedly at least to admit that the press corps had a basis for complaint.

C. THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE

The differing estimates of the size of the Fortaleza arsenal were merely an indication of the chaotic intelligence picture that was found by the incoming U.S. troops. So contradictory were reports on the situation downtown that even three months later the J-3 of the 82nd was certain that the arms in Fortaleza had for the most part been given by the police to civilians in the vain hope that the civilians would assist them. When the weapons just disappeared, the junta and the U.S. assumed that they had all automatically passed into the possession of the active rebels.¹

Since the intelligence problem was, throughout the crisis, one of the most pervasive and troublesome, a summary of the difficulties may well be presented at this point. Problems relating to what might be called strategic intelligence, intelligence of the sort which led to the U.S. intervention, have been described above. There was, in addition, a major problem area in tactical intelligence once U.S. forces came ashore and undertook operations.

¹Interview, HQ 82nd Abn Div., San Isidro, D.R., 11 August 1965.
In some cases data simply did not exist anywhere. There was no street directory of Santo Domingo in existence, nor was information on many of the rebel leaders below the top level available from any source.

When first alerted at their home base, the 82nd did not know where to turn for information, whether CINCSRIKE, CINCLANT, or XVIIIth Abn Corps. They had no secure communication link to CINCLANT so they felt they could not go direct to LANT for classified data. Normally, the route was via Corps, but Corps was unable to do much initially to help. Most of the information the 82nd Airborne had when Power Pack I landed was derived from the press. They had not received copies of any State messages nor had copies been sent by those agencies which were addressees. There was thus little information upon which to base plans for force organization and deployment. ¹

Therefore, once on the ground, the airborne units initially had only the sketchiest picture of the organization and disposition of the rebel and junta forces, making more difficult the task of evaluating the situation and taking appropriate action. Not only was this key combat-type intelligence very sparse, but the lack of personality information meant that no one had any clear picture, six days after the revolt began, of just who was doing what among all the Dominican leaders. What was painfully apparent was that the Embassy staff had virtually no contacts among the rebels, if indeed any, in sharp contrast to the continuing liaison that was carried out with the junta. Even among the junta, however, it was uncertain where the power and

¹Interview, HQ 82nd Airborne Division, San Isidro, 10 August 1965.
From the mass of unrelated and often contradictory information available, intelligence had to be produced, and this had to be done simultaneously with the planning and operations which should have been founded upon such intelligence.

It was a week after the airborne D-day before the Embassy was able to respond to requests for information on personalities.

There was a shortage of maps and the ones available were, with the exception of an Esso map, out of date. The town plan (the 1960 Ciudad Trujillo sheet AMS 1:12,500) showed a nonexistent airfield, while street names (many like the name of the city itself, changed after the old dictator departed the scene) were not current. The area on the east bank of the Ozama, north and south of the bridge, where the 82nd strung its screen, was found to be no longer open ground, but thickly settled with a poor housing district. Since location reports were sent in by units on the basis of street names, considerable confusion resulted. The map situation became worse as the force increased in the next week.\(^2\)

The two logical sources for intelligence available to the airborne forces were the Marines who had been in the vicinity for the past four days and the Embassy. The Marines, unfortunately, could contribute little beyond information on their own immediate front. The Embassy, for other reasons, was also of less immediate help than might have been expected.

\(^1\)Interview, USCOMDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
\(^2\)USCOMDOMREP, Analysis of Operations, op.cit.
D. THE STATE OF THE EMBASSY

A brief picture should be drawn from available information of the Embassy during this period. The Embassy, after all, was the senior American headquarters, the source of all information that went to the Washington decision makers and determined their actions, and also the operating arm of U.S. military and political activity on the scene.

The Embassy, by Friday morning, had been under intermittent small arms fire for two days and, while no casualties had been suffered, the firing added to the already overpowering strain imposed by six days of the highest tension. The Embassy staff had been able to enjoy very little sleep, so that by this time their efficiency had markedly run down.

There was considerable concern until the whole Marine BLT had been landed that the rebels might attack and overrun the Embassy. (The building did not even have a fence around it to provide minimal protection against a sudden rush.)

As a consequence of the pressure, the Embassy presented to the incoming airborne officers a picture of "chaos" and of "complete disorganization." These were not invidious statements, since all the commanders soon came to admire the Ambassador and his staff for their performance under intense stress. This was, nevertheless, the image that the focal point of U.S. operations presented on the morning of 30 April.

1 Interview, USCOMDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 11 August 1965.
There were about twenty-five Foreign Service officers in the Embassy staff when the crisis broke, the size of the group reflecting the concern over Dominican affairs felt in the Department of State. The officers had been reorganized to fulfill a crisis mode of operation, nonessential sections being put to other special uses. The Economics Section, for example, had been given a role in organizing the evacuation.

When the Phibron came inshore, the Embassy had initially very poor communications with the command ship, but a crude system, employing a ham radio owned by an American resident of Santo Domingo, was rigged during the week and did provide some capability between the Embassy and the Phibron. While it was not a secure connection, security was considered a less urgent matter in such a time of crisis.¹

Coordination measures have already been mentioned in passing. A Marine colonel had come ashore with the initial 400 Marines and had gone to the Embassy to act as liaison. A naval officer also eventually (May 2) was assigned to the Embassy.² These officers, plus other personnel, were in a coordination center set up in the rotunda of the Embassy by the MILGROUP Chief. This group attempted to coordinate all military activities, the evacuation, the liaison effort with the Junta at San Isidro, and the Marine protective measures.

¹Interview, U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo, 10 August 1965.
²This naval officer, a lieutenant commander, who was the personal liaison officer for CJTF 122, reported later that, on his arrival, there seemed little awareness among the Embassy staff of the need to keep Masterson informed. Communications were poor at best, but the liaison officer felt that the lack was due to a failure to understand the need rather than primarily to facilities shortage. However, one may suspect that by this date the Embassy had come to realize that CJTF 122 was a superfluous headquarters which was not really playing a role, and therefore just did not bother to keep information flowing out to the ship.

Another indication of what appears to have been the increasing isolation of Masterson was his request to CINCLANT on Friday morning for a Political Advisor, apparently such augmentation was actually called for in OPLAN 310/2-63. He requested CINCLANT to raise the issues with the agencies concerned, but recognized that they might prefer to have their representatives act as liaison to the JTF rather than to be assigned as staff augmentation. Nothing ever came of the request.
TOP SECRET

Once the airborne units arrived, Generals York and Tompkins (Deputy CJTF) made frequent trips to the Embassy during the period when Tompkins had his headquarters at the polo grounds and York his at San Isidro.

One major difficulty in coordinating political and military activities was the lack of knowledge among key Embassy personnel of the U.S. U.S. contingency plan being partially followed. Connett never saw OPLAN 310/2-65 nor was he briefed on it before the airborne deployments had begun. He was not sure whether the Ambassador had seen the plan or been briefed either, but thought it unlikely, at least until the very last minute.

E. COORDINATION WITH THE JUNTA

U.S. contacts with the junta were significant on two grounds. In the first place, they provided intelligence. In the second, they clearly indicated that our public professions of neutrality were incorrect.

With the exception of a couple of periods when contact had been lost, the Embassy Attaches had managed to remain in touch with the Dominican military chiefs. The MILGROUP chief, it will be recalled, had also established contact with them when he returned to the island. Basically, though, the job of liaison was left to the Attaches. These were under the control of the Ambassador and had an intelligence gathering function which the MILGROUP staff formally did not. In fact, involvement of the MILGROUP in intelligence gathering normally would have been considered detrimental to the MILGROUP function of military assistance.

The three Attaches tried to keep au courant as to the attitudes and actions of their respective Dominican service chiefs. The most effective job in this respect apparently was done by an Army major of the MILGROUP, who, according to several informants, was able to keep close to the junta heads at San Isidro. Of course, such information as the Attaches did gather at San Isidro (where


TOP SECRET
The MIGROUPE Chief had established a liaison detachment on the 28th or 29th) did not always get back to the Embassy because of the communications problem.

The second aspect of this coordination with the junta, discussed along with its consequences in Section II, consisted in the early stages, of encouragement to the military chiefs to unite and to resist in order that their combined resources could counterbalance the initial rebel's successes. Quite unequivocally, the Embassy was seeking a junta military victory over the rebels. It was when this hope had faded that the U.S. command authorities decided to commit a major U.S. force of increasing magnitude. The unwillingness of the U.S. Government to admit this and its protestations to the contrary were among the key elements in the development of the wave of criticism which arose over the Dominican action.

At any rate, when the first airborne forces arrived, it was the plan of CJTF 122 and York to employ the junta forces in combination with the U.S. troops to seal off the rebel stronghold. To arrange this and to get the broader feel of the situation, Generals York and Tompkins went to the junta headquarters. The Ambassador had suggested that they discuss the plan with the junta and secure their acquiescence.\(^1\) This was around late afternoon. Contradictory times from several sources make it difficult to follow the activities during this most crowded of crisis days. The Embassy reported the visit at 1700 but Masterson puts it as after 1200.

Before the meeting is described, however, a most interesting and revealing pair of messages must be mentioned. Both were concerned with the junta, one from Bennett at 1425 and one from State to Bennett at 1445, presumably sent before his message had been received at State.

Bennett reported that his Air Attache had attended a meeting of the junta at San Isidro and had been given a letter from Benoit for the Ambassador. Benoit hoped that U.S. forces would not have

\(^{1}\)CJTF 122, Report.
to become engaged, and asked the U.S. not to enter combat operations until he asked us to. The junta agreed to try once more to crush the rebels, but if the attempt failed, they then would have to call for U.S. assistance.

Bennett said that some of the Dominican commanders apparently felt they could clean up the revolt without U.S. aid. This latest junta position, he pointed out, was inconsistent with their previous urgent appeals for U.S. intervention. He suggested that it must be viewed against the background of the highly emotional environment in which it was made as well as the background of the growing fatigue of the military commanders whose behavior was becoming less and less consistent.

The Embassy Country Team, the Ambassador reported, held doubts as to whether the junta forces currently had the capability to reestablish order without U.S. help. Despite the junta's new position, the Embassy doubted "whether the military commanders had the determination to see the thing through." Even if they had, there was good reason to believe the present Dominican forces were demoralized beyond the ability to do so.¹

In curious contradiction of Bennett's description of the junta attitude was the cable sent from State. Presumably it reflected the impressions of the junta developed in State during the period from the initial Marine landings on Wednesday until the present. The message was a review of the high points of U.S. policy toward the current crisis. Bennett was first encouraged to use his influence to persuade the junta forces that no useful purpose would be served by rash or ill-advised action. This should not deny them the right to defend themselves, but their most important task was to preserve their existence as an organized Dominican force as a base for the earliest possible effective expansion.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 301825Z April 1965, SECRET.
The junta should understand that the crisis was entering a political phase and they should make every effort to capitalize on their position as the only existing organized authority. They should use this position to ensure that OAS action would not result in the ascendancy of Communist groups to political power. U.S. tactics would be designed to support the junta in the achievement of that goal.

State then commented that it was seriously concerned with the change in the junta attitude in regard to the role of U.S. military forces. It conjectured that the junta might believe that the U.S. intended to attack and eliminate the rebel forces in the city. Actually the U.S. immediate objective was to establish the safety zone referred to in the OAS resolution. Insofar as U.S. military forces at San Isidro were concerned, the immediate objective was to secure their position there and on the Ozama leading to it.

Strictly for his own information, Bennett was told that, subject to later developments, a second phase of the U.S. overall plan would be to establish a defensive line around the rebel area of the city so as to contain them there and thereby to give the junta forces an opportunity to rest and regroup and to establish authority over the balance of the city and the countryside.

Bennett was to point out to the junta the U.S. hopes that establishment of the international security zone (ISZ) would not be opposed by the rebel forces and that such a zone would considerably reduce the perimeter which the junta itself would be obliged to defend.¹

The cable is not merely the first concrete statement of U.S. objectives. Its comment on the junta's change of attitude presumably does not refer to the change Bennett spoke of. Instead it appears State is one step back. With the entry of the first U.S. Marines, the junta forces virtually ceased to take any active role. State

¹ SecState to AmEmb, 301845Z April 1965, SECRET.
therefore concluded that the junta was now confidently expecting the U.S. to do its fighting for it. On the other hand, the other comments in the cable in regard to "rash action" seem to refer to the junta attitude discussed by Bennett. The opaqueness of the messages is illustrative of the general situation, especially as regards the junta. It may be that State's reference to the junta change of attitude concerned the possibility that the junta now expected the U.S. to support them in a general attack, however rash and ill-advised, on the rebel stronghold.

State's concern was that the junta would shatter itself in such a venture in the expectation of U.S. military aid. Bennett, on the other hand, seemed more concerned that the sudden newly reborn belligerence of the junta could prove politically embarrassing to the U.S. in its efforts to support a position based upon intervention in response to appeals for aid from the collapsing Dominican authorities.

If State's cable did indeed refer to the same junta change of attitude as did Bennett's, it must be presumed that he had earlier apprised them by phone of the contents of Benoit's letter. The operation of two independent nonmilitary communication links from the Embassy to Washington throughout this crisis makes it exceedingly difficult for the researcher to establish what information was available to the decision makers and to the operators at any given time.

To return to the thread of the story, the meeting between the U.S. military commanders and the junta took place at San Isidro. Present were Benoit, de los Santos of the Dominican Air Force and his Deputy Chief of Staff. For the Americans, there were York, Tompkins, Connett, the U.S. Air Force Attache, the G-3 of the 82nd Airborne and the Army major from the MILGROUP.
York’s initial impression of the junta was of their total ineffectiveness. They seemed unwilling to assess their situation in reasonable terms and had only a sketchy knowledge of their resources and their disposition.

Tompkins presented Masterson’s plan and after some discussion, Benoit agreed. A lengthy harangue then ensued as to the employment of the junta forces that would become available as a result of the deployment of the airborne troops to the bridge and the bridgehead, relieving the Dominicans. Benoit vehemently called for an attack on the rebel stronghold, which would also perhaps relieve the besieged Fortaleza Ozama. Connett encouraged this idea until York took him aside and advised him against such a course. York bluntly told Benoit his Dominican forces were too weak and ineffectual to undertake offensive action, and that if they did so irrespective of his warning, U.S. forces would not support them.  

Apart from the fact that York had no authority to undertake offensive action which would have represented a fundamental departure from his original terms of reference, sketchy though they were, he did not feel at this point strong enough himself for such an enterprise. Hence, his earlier recommendation for four more BCTs.

York and Tompkins instead stressed the vital need for the junta forces to maintain the link between the incipient international security zone manned by the Marines in the west and the paratroop positions in the east. If this link were not maintained, there would be no connection between the two U.S. forces. It was apparently not intended that the junta troops maintain such a link indefinitely. Masterson had cabled CINCLANT at 1040 to say that the U.S. forces would shortly be moving out on their assigned tasks and that it was hoped the junta forces could be persuaded to patrol a line connecting the northern flanks of the two U.S. lines. However, Masterson, added that “if and when reinforcements

1Interview, Hq 82nd Abn Div, Santo Domingo, 11 August 1965. Also, CG 82nd Abn Div, Fort Benning, 5 September 1965.
arrived, the encirclement would be completed with U.S. forces and
the noose tightened.¹

After considerable argument, York and Tompkins finally obtained
what they thought was a junta agreement to follow their plan. However,
during that day the Marines and paratroops had moved to their
assigned positions and consolidated, the junta forces, instead of
pushing on west across the city to form the link, withdrew east through
the American forces back to San Isidro.² Only the small group holding
the National Palace held their ground.

Militarily, the junta forces were then out of the picture
completely until 14 May.

F. MULTILATERAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

During the week, as the U.S. was drawn step by step into an even
greater commitment, political efforts to halt the crisis also gained
momentum. International interest, especially Latin American, was
apparent from the very first, since U.S. actions raised memories of
earlier American methods in the Caribbean. The approbation of Latin
American embassies in Santo Domingo was not generally reflected by
their home governments. Desire to stop bloodshed and violence
generally was also manifest. The Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo,
for example, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, had spoken for the for-

gn diplomatic community on Sunday, the 26th, in asking the military
chiefs to halt the air attacks.

On the 27th, the U.S. had first raised the situation with the
Peace Commission of the OAS in Washington. The next day the full OAS
Council had met for a U.S. report on the evacuation and on the darkening
scene in Santo Domingo. On the 29th, the U.S. reported the initial
Marine landing, and both in expectation of criticism and to develop a
multilateral action, special U.S. emissaries were sent to visit major
Latin American capitals to explain the U.S. actions and to encourage
a joint OAS action. The U.S. described the threat of a leftist take-
over, but mainly relied upon the humanitarian aspects of the interven-
tion as its defense.

¹CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 001440Z April 1965, SECRET.
²CJTF 122, Report.
Many of the Latin delegates expressed concern over the legality and appropriateness of the U.S. action, and press reactions throughout Latin America were generally unfavorable. The burden of the criticism was that the U.S. should not have acted unilaterally, but should have at least informed the OAS of its intentions. The principle of non-intervention on a unilateral basis by one American nation in the affairs of another was the key issue.

The Council, seeking impartial information, sent a message to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo, requesting a report on the crisis and on the chances for arranging a cease-fire.

During the 29th, the OAS voted to call a special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Americas for 1 May, with only Uruguay opposing the vote. At this session, the U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, stated that the U.S. would transfer its responsibilities to the OAS at the earliest possible moment. He proposed that the Council call on all sides to reach a cease-fire and to establish a neutral zone for refugees around the embassy area. The Council voted at 2200 on the 29th, with four abstentions, to approve such a resolution. The abstentions were based on the questionable legality of the resolution since the Council had only hours earlier already voted to refer the Dominican crisis to a special "meeting of consultation" of the Foreign Ministers.

On the 30th, the Council received a report from the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo which suggested that both sides might be agreeable to a cease-fire. The Council went into secret session and voted to send Jose A. Mora, the Secretary-General of the OAS, on a peace-seeking mission to Santo Domingo. A special peace committee was also voted, composed of representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama. Its mandate called for fact finding, conciliation, and mediation roles. The committee was to offer its good offices to both sides.
As events turned out, the two objectives of the OAS had to be obtained separately rather than concurrently, so that political activity in the period 30 April - 2 May divided into two phases. First the cease-fire was achieved, to be followed by negotiations for the establishment of the ISZ.

The lead in seeking a cease-fire was taken by the Papal Nuncio.

Nevertheless, he made progress. State cabled Bennett during the morning that they had just been informed by Mora that the Nuncio had the agreement of Benoit, Bosch, and Molina Urena for a cease-fire, a guarantee of personal safety of all individuals, and a commission of the OAS to arbitrate.

Bennett was therefore directed to contact Wessin and other key leaders in the junta, including especially those now at San Isidro, and to inform them of the firm U.S. determination to prevent a Communist takeover and of the general U.S. strategy of building up the junta as the only organized group in the country. Once the junta leaders were fully informed of the U.S. position and it had been made clear that we did not know and would not necessarily support all the suggestions the Nuncio might make, Bennett should make a helicopter available to the Nuncio. The U.S. did not wish to be put in a position of impeding the Nuncio's efforts to carry out the OAS request. ¹

¹SecState to AmEmb, 301315Z April 1965, SECRET.
Mention should be made here of the curious role Juan Bosch had been playing during the previous six days. While ostensibly the revolt had been undertaken in his name, his conduct had been strangely ambivalent. He displayed no real leadership. It had been expected that he would attempt to return to Santo Domingo from Puerto Rico, but the U.S. had privately prevented any aircraft departure. Furthermore, he had apparently been unable to get any guarantee that he would be allowed to land at either San Isidro or at the international airport. He had therefore remained in San Juan, surrounded by newsmen, and delivering occasional statements. Yet it seemed quite clear that he was not in control of events on the rebel side.

Nevertheless, he was the titular leader of the rebel cause and so was approached on the cease-fire effort. It had been Bosch who had insisted upon an OAS presence in Santo Domingo before any cease-fire could be accepted by the rebels.

State cabled Bennett at 1235 that it had just learned that Bosch would shortly make a radio appeal to the rebels to accept a cease-fire. The Ambassador was instructed to inform the Junta, if Bosch actually did speak, that this was consistent with U.S. policy and to urge them to make a similar appeal. The position was hedged, however, by a request to Bennett to ask Masterson to send his best qualified staff officer to junta headquarters to raise morale, to act as adviser, and to arrange for any supplies that they might need. This last included adequate communications between the task force and junta headquarters as soon as possible.1

1SecState to AmEmb, 301635Z April 1965, SECRET.
30 April

On receipt of this message in the NMCC, the JCS instructed Masterson to supplement the Ambassador's efforts and to urge Wessin to agree. It suggested Masterson recommend to Wessin that he boast of his strength while agreeing. The Ambassador was to be told of this message and of Masterson's actions.¹

Masterson assigned York to represent him in the negotiations with Wessin, since he did not wish to leave his command post. Apparently the conference at San Isidro was lengthy. At about the time the cease-fire instrument was actually being signed, the CJCS called Masterson to ask about progress, and mentioned that information reaching him indicated that Wessin was "being difficult and will not agree because he's getting help." The Admiral said he had sent Tompkin out of San Isidro to assist York in presenting the views of both Masterson and the JCS.

The cease-fire agreement was finally signed at San Isidro by representatives of the Dominican Army, Navy, and Air Force; the FRD, the U.S. Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio (for the rebels); and General York for Admiral Masterson.² Colonel Caamaño, now the key rebel leader, did not sign initially but it was expected that he would do so the next day.

The cease-fire was signed at 1730, to take effect an hour later. Bennett, commenting on the truce, said that the junta leaders were not optimistic over practical results, inasmuch as the rebels had repeatedly over the last week tried to exploit any truce to strengthen their own position.³

Nevertheless, U.S. Army and Marine Corps commanders were informed that the U.S. would adhere to the letter and the spirit of the cease-fire.

¹JCS to CINCLANT, 301712Z April 1965, TOP SECRET.
²CJTF 122, Report.
³AmEmb to SecState, 010230Z May 1965, SECRET.

There was considerable confusion over just when the cease-fire would take effect, several different times reaching Washington. A meeting of the decision makers had been scheduled at the White House to discuss implications, but this was cancelled around 1800 when no news had come from Santo Domingo that the cease-fire had actually come into effect.
VIII. THE U.S. INCREASES ITS COMMITMENT

The day of the 30th in Santo Domingo opened with the airborne landings and closed with the paratroopers and Marines in their appointed planned positions. On the political side, the cease-fire was achieved. In Washington, military activity concentrated on plans to reinforce the units in the Dominican Republic, while political activity centered upon assessments and reassessments as to whether more or less reinforcements really should be sent.

A Marine and Army security force was around the Embassy. A company from the airborne units has been ordered by the JCS into the Marine area, in order to identify the airborne troops with the Marine mission of protecting lives and with the creation of an ISZ, but only a platoon had been sent.¹ The Marines were patrolling by night along a rectangular perimeter, from the Hotel to the sea, along the sea to a point just below the Embassy, north past the Embassy and just slightly east of it, and then westward to the Hotel again, along a line bounded by the abandoned Andrews Airfield.

¹JCS to CINCLANT, 301703Z Apr 1965, TOP SECRET.
Around midnight of the 30th Masterson sent a sitrep to CINCLANT, giving the above details and reporting that relief of the "loyal" forces holding the bridghead at the western end of the bridge had been completed. He reported that the junta had agreed to occupy a cordon area from above the link-up point to the projected location of the loyalist link-up with the Marines. However, in the light of the reported junta strength of 1000-odd men and in view of their morale and physical condition, he doubted any immediate offensive action by the junta. Opposing them, the rebels were estimated to number from 5000 to 50,000—a rather extreme variation.

Masterson's assessment was that the junta faced a determined enemy who was willing to fight, "using the techniques of the trained guerrillas." The junta forces appeared to be without strong leadership, especially at the top echelon, and the necessity for operation through a junta delayed decision making. Masterson's initial impression of complete demoralization had been brightened by a marked improvement in junta morale in consequence of the American presence. However, even if the will existed, the capability for launching an effective offensive was dubious. The Admiral believed that the best that could be hoped for from them under the current situation would be to fill the portion of the proposed cordon with U.S. forces on either flank. It was for this reason that he had requested the additional four battalions.

The Admiral stressed that if the enemy were to be subdued, it would have to be done almost entirely by U.S. forces. He realized, however, having said it, that this was beyond the present terms of reference.

Finally, he suggested that since the current and planned disposition of airborne forces did not appear on the surface to justify the stated mission of protecting lives by the establishment of the ISZ,
the 82nd Airborne dispositions should be justified on the need to protect the airfield.¹

A. MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE 30TH

While the above paragraphs describe the situation at the end of the 30th, the process of reaching that status was marked by frantic activity and not a little confusion. This was due in large part to the continuing information lag, to an on-scene command structure that hourly showed itself to be increasingly inadequate, and to extraordinary uncertainty at all levels as to just what the current and the next objectives would be.

The Vice J-3 alerted CINCLANT to this problem and suggested that he set up a system of priorities. Troops with minimum essential equipment were to take priority over anything else. Since a Presidential

¹CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 010545Z May 1965, SECRET.
²JCS 1095 to CINCLANT 301310Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
decision to send in the four additional BCTs would be made, in all probability, by noon, it had become a matter of urgency to prevent any airlift jam before it began or to remedy it if one currently existed.

The Vice J-3 pursued the issue with TAC in a series of phone calls over the next several hours, making it quite clear that: (1) when the order to go was received for the four BCTs, they must reach the island in the shortest possible time; (2) the mission required only minimum essential equipment; and (3) General York was satisfied that he already had received enough heavy equipment. The problem lay not in TAC but with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps which seemed uncertain of what it wanted to have airlifted. TAC's major concern was whether additional airlift resources should be called in and how much. The Vice J-3 kept insisting that a plan be developed which would indicate a reasonable trade-off among the three key factors of time, aircraft availability, and type of load. He did not wish to halt operations worldwide when he was pretty certain the job could be done with currently assigned aircraft operated under a strict system of priorities.

The CJCS took a hand in the problem at 1116, calling direct to XVIIIth Corps where he spoke with the Chief of Staff. Corps HQ had not yet been informed by CINCLANT of York's request of hours before for the four additional battalions with minimum essential equipment.

---

1EA tapes, 30 Apr 1965.
30 April

However, the J-3 informed him that the CJCS wished to raise the matter of troop reinforcements on an incremental basis in the discussions with political authorities, which were to take place shortly.

B. A KEY PRESIDENTIAL MEETING

From the very start the President was personally involved in the Dominican crisis. He made three television addresses on the crisis, the first on Wednesday night after the initial Marine landing, another on Friday after the first airborne landing, and again on Sunday night. The decision makers, the President, the SecState, the SecDef, Deputy SecDef, the UnderSecState, and the CJCS, the Presidential Special Assistant for International Security Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence, had met almost continuously all Thursday late into the night, and met again Friday morning.

The intelligence picture at this time as presented to the President is not known. Within Santo Domingo things were quieter by Friday morning. There had been no attacks on U.S. forces and only minor sniping at the Marines. No U.S. casualties had yet been suffered, although this was expected to change when the Marines and paratroopers moved out to occupy their assigned positions. Diplomatic activity was under way to try to ease the situation.

Nevertheless, during the late morning, the President decided to reinforce massively the U.S. commitment if it should be necessary. The President apparently said that he wanted the military men to figure out what was required to take and hold the island and the rest of the decision group to figure out what it takes to make it look pretty. The quote is from a second party. Another paraphrase of the directive was that if we have to, we'll take and hold that and the military job is to tell me how to do it.
The interpretation drawn from this by the Joint Staff and transmitted by them to the pertinent subordinate headquarters was expressed by the Vice J-3 in a call immediately after the White House meeting ended to TAC. He explained that he was coming direct to them, rather than through LANT because of the apparent slowness of LANT in transmitting information downward as well as upward. Everything that was in the OPLAN was to go as fast as it could be delivered there with minimum essential equipment, followed by another airborne division. Consequently, the discussions earlier that morning and the Vice J-3's efforts to keep the airlift requirements within the original budget were cancelled and TAC would have to use whatever assets it could muster. However, the President wanted firm timing on the lift of the additional battalions and these had top priority.

Deputy CINCLANT suggested that the whole naval task force, apart from the MEB, might not be needed, and J-3 left that to his discretion. He did suggest LANT might wish to retain a capability of establishing a cordon, especially against some Cuban interference or infiltration. Deputy CINCLANT mentioned that the Marine airlift battalion (1/6 Marines) was standing by at Camp Lejeune, following Masterson's unofficial desire to see the rest of the MEB on the scene.
until this conversation, the Joint Staff had been unaware of
the alerted Marine airlift battalion, although it had been on twelve-
hour alert for more than a day.¹

At 1159 the JCS formally directed CINCLANT to place all forces
committed to OPLAN 310/2-65 in Defcon 3,² and followed up shortly
thereafter with an order to make maximum preparation for the immedi-
ate launch of the four BCTs with minimum essential equipment. The
order emphasized that the force must move with minimum delay upon
receipt of the movement execute. However, the order repeated that
this was not an execute message.³

It seemed to prove unusually difficult to get across to the
XVIIIth Airborne Corps and to the 82nd that the heavy equipment tail
could be dispensed with, since at 1200 the Vice J-3 learned from TAC
that loading of those 80 extra loads was being continued. He urged
extraordinary measures be taken to establish proper priorities in
accord with the situation and with the several JCS orders. There
seemed to be an infuriating slowness of communication among the per-
tinent subordinate headquarters, especially LANT, STRIKE, and TAC.

Eleven hours later the matter of heavy equipment was still of
concern to the Joint Staff. Even the efforts of the Army Chief of
Staff and the Commanding General CONARC did not suffice to reduce the
outflow of heavy equipment from Bragg under the direction of XVIIIth
Airborne Corps. It was generally felt at top command levels that

¹EA tapes, 30 Apr 1965.
²JCS 1112 to CINCLANT, 301559Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
³JCS 1113 to CINCLANT, 301602Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
⁴JCS 1116 to CINCLANT, 301628Z Apr 1965, SECRET.
"they were overdoing it," but the Corps apparently was under the impression that it was responding to a call from York. In view of this high motivation, the flow continued, despite the efforts to halt it.

Of the eleven C-130s needed, LANT already had nine. The J-3 suggested further that the helicopters which LANT had desired to load aboard an LPH and get under way should not go in a half empty ship, and told CINCLANT that he had the authority to load troops if he chose. CINCLANT had been reluctant to commence marshalling the shipping for the MEB because it would inevitably have stirred press comment. The J-3, however, indicated that the best estimates available to the Joint Staff pointed to the need for both airborne divisions plus the full MEB, and perhaps more, to do the job the President had directed. The Joint Staff felt it would be best to send in a huge preponderance of force to "clean up the situation quickly" before a mounting crescendo of criticism grew and before the rebels got themselves more firmly fortified physically and spiritually.¹

On checking both these points with the CJCS (the airlift battalion and marshalling of amphibious lift), the J-3 was advised to hold up CINCLANT action until the afternoon meeting at the White House. At 1300 CINCLANT was informed by the Vice J-3 that the SecDef had ordered a hold on the airlift Marine battalion but authorized the helicopter movement.²

These repeated calls which went over again and again the same subjects indicate the state of uncertainty which prevailed at the several military headquarters during the afternoon of the 30th. This flowed in large part from the Presidential decision of the morning

¹CINCSRIKE reported to the JCS that the 101st Abn Div, the remainder of the 82nd, and the HQ XVIIIth Abn Corps attained Defcon 3 at 0300Z on the 1st, and were passed under the operational control of CINCLANT at 0630Z.
²EA tapes, 20 Apr 1965.
with its inherent ambiguity. While the decision was interpreted by the military as representing a green light for preparation of a massive deployment, mounting political inhibitions and constraints acted as a brake. There was apparently divided opinion among the decision makers on the wisdom and necessity of a massive deployment. Presumably doubts had already begun to appear. Furthermore, the Presidential decision was followed shortly by the cease-fire negotiations which tended to change the entire picture significantly.

It should be mentioned that the Joint Chiefs themselves met during Friday afternoon for the first formal meeting since the crisis began (excluding the meeting with the SecDef on Monday).

C. A CHANGE IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE

The position of Vice Admiral Masterson as CJTF 122 had become blurred. The imminent expansion of the Dominican force outmoded JTF 122 in regard to command arrangements, as well as to force size. Furthermore, a tone of increasing impatience is evident in phone calls and messages from the command authorities over the repeated inability to get information moving from and through the JTF headquarters. The difficulty had become very apparent by Friday. Masterson's position on a ship for a headquarters prevented him from keeping a tight control of events. The system of liaison officers at San Isidro and the Embassy had worked after a fashion but would
clearly become inadequate. His staff and facilities were simply too small.

In fact, once General York were to move his CP from San Isidro to the Embassy, as he had been instructed to do, CJTF 122 would become a redundant command layer, since York and the Ambassador could go directly to Washington without first having to get to Masterson's ship in order to use his communications with Washington.  

Furthermore, and this is a key factor, Masterson had not been able to involve himself in the political-military teamwork which was so critical. The presence of the senior American military commander was required in continuous collaboration with the senior American diplomatic representative.

The command changes were made at the Friday morning White House meeting, the President designating Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer to take command of all the forces ashore. General Palmer was then DCSOPS, DA, and was scheduled to take over as commander of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps on 17 May.  

At 1130 Palmer, who was in Washington, was given his instructions by the CJCS. He was to proceed to Fort Bragg, the Corps HQ, at once and there to pick up an austere headquarters with communications support from the Corps (a total of 112 men), and thence to go as soon as possible to Santo Domingo.

His announced mission was to save U.S. lives. His unstated mission was to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. The President had stated that he would not allow another Cuba, and Palmer was to take all necessary measures required to accomplish this mission. He would be given sufficient forces to do the job.

1 About 2100Z Masterson reported that York was unable to move his CP next to the Embassy at the moment. Since there had been firing near the Embassy, it apparently was not yet considered fully secure. York intended to send his deputy in first with the advance echelon of the HQ.

2 It is interesting to recall that Admiral Smith, CINCLANT, had retired on the 30th, and was replaced by Admiral Moorer. Thus two key commanders were new to their jobs.
Lastly, he was to get close to Ambassador Bennett and coordinate all actions with him.¹

There was some ambiguity in his appointment and several hours later it was still unclear in senior military circles, especially in the Army, whether Palmer would command only the ground element or would be the overall military commander.

Palmer arrived in the early morning hours of Saturday, the 1st, at San Isidro and joined General York. He first reported to the JCS at 0300, that he would take command of all ground forces as soon as possible and would also establish contact with the Ambassador. He had learned that only two battalions of the 82nd were on the ground and that the second pair had been withheld. In view of the mission given him by the CJCS, he fully agreed with York and requested that movement of the 82nd continue.²

It is interesting to note that in this first message, Palmer refers only to command of ground forces. Palmer called the NMCC direct at 0445 after his arrival and briefing at San Isidro. In regard to the command issue, he said he was immediately assuming command of the paratroops only, since his available communications to the Marines across the city were inadequate to exercise control. He had six C-130 loads of headquarters equipment with him.

The DDO expressed surprise at the problem of Palmer's communications, since Masterson had earlier indicated that he had good communications to both the Marines and to San Isidro.

Palmer also requested clarification of the command arrangements, and asked if the CJCS had wanted him to take command of the entire U.S. military operation and whether or not CJTF 122 would phase out. The DDO pointed out that CINCLANT would have to decide. They had

¹USCOMDOMREP, Stability Operations in the DR, June 1965, draft, SECRET.
²General Palmer to JCS, 010720Z May 1965, SECRET.
earlier that night just designated York as CRT 160 with the Marines under him, and presumably Palmer would be assigned this post the next day.

Palmer was briefed at San Isidro on the situation as it was seen by the American military command on the scene. The rebels had soundly defeated the junta forces which would probably have been destroyed had the U.S. not intervened. The withdrawal of the junta forces to San Isidro left only the small group holding the National Palace still actively resisting the rebels. The junta forces did not fight hard or well and Wessin had done little at all as a leader. 1

In regard to the cease-fire, Palmer had an interesting comment. He stated that since General York had not signed the cease-fire, he told York that he viewed the situation as a most dangerous one, and that he, Palmer, did not therefore recognize any cease-fire at that time. It will be recalled that Masterson, in his report, specifically includes York among the signers.

In the phone call to the NMCC at 0445, Palmer revealed an interesting reaction to his first exposure to the situation. He told the DDO that he desperately needed clarification of his mission. The DDO replied that the main hopes in Washington at the moment were on the cease-fire, although there were reports through the night of continuing firing, and that Palmer should not take any action based on the operational concept as he, the DDO, knew it. The issue would be clarified the next day, and so Palmer was not to take any offensive action that would tend to negate the achievement of the cease-fire. Palmer wanted to know his mission after the cease-fire. Would he go house to house disarming the rebels? The DDO emphasized that Palmer's...
mission was to contain by the cordon and not to take any offensive action.

Here was brought forth, for the first time, the contradictory trends in U.S. policy of the moment. On the one hand, Palmer had been told to prevent another Cuba; on the other, a cease-fire had been signed which, fragile though it was, suddenly seemed to become central in American policy. The sudden emergence of conflicting military and political objectives must have been particularly confusing to Palmer. Arriving in the full expectation, shared by all the other American officials, political and military, on the scene, that U.S. forces would be used to smother the rebels, he now found his operations rigidly circumscribed. The situation in Santo Domingo was a far cry from the one he had anticipated in view of the mission he had been given.

Following his briefing at San Isidro, Palmer went by helicopter to the Embassy, landing at the old Trujillo palace next door, which eventually was to become his HQ. There was a fire fight in progress along the street just east of the Embassy, and Palmer and party came under fire from a school north of their landing area as they climbed the high fence between the old palace and the Embassy. Palmer's first impression of the Embassy was of "complete disorganization bordering on utter confusion."

Here he soon learned that Ambassador Martin, the special Presidential envoy, had just concluded negotiations for the formal establishment of an ISZ.

D. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ZONE

It will be recalled that the political activities during the day of the 30th were divided into two phases; the first aimed to achieving a cease-fire, the second to negotiate the ISZ as authorized by the OAS. This latter involved acceptance by the rebels of formal occupation by U.S. troops of a major piece of the city. The establishment of the ISZ was an unusually confusing episode in a very confusing story.

- 134 -
Although an ISZ had been under discussion for several days, a definite plan had not yet been decided upon. Masterson told the DDO at the NMCC at 1544 that they were working very hard trying to find a workable plan, and that such an ISZ would require, in the absence of a cease-fire, a very considerable force. (This call came before the cease-fire agreement had been signed, but it would seem that the JTF staff had not undertaken to develop plans covering both cease-fire and no-cease-fire cases.) His Deputy, General Tompkins, specifically was working on the plan. Because of York's presence at San Isidro, Masterson said he would probably not be able to get York's approval prior to sending the proposed ISZ plan to Washington. When asked by the DDO if he had discussed the matter with the Ambassador, the Admiral replied that the matter had been discussed in general terms with Bennett that morning. Masterson said the Ambassador "had no definite feelings about it -- would like to have a zone established. We'll have no difficulty in convincing him there. However, we believe the zone will have to be smaller than is required to include all the embassies."\(^1\)

At about the same time as the above phone call, ex-Ambassador John Bartlow Martin arrived at San Isidro and was moved by helicopter to the Embassy. Here he personally took over the task of representing the U.S. in negotiations with the rebels. Martin was a journalist and writer who had been pressed into service by President Kennedy and named Ambassador in Santo Domingo after the establishment of the Council of State Government in 1962. Martin had been popular with and respected by Dominicans of virtually all political groups. He had retired to private life but had responded to the President's request at midnight Thursday that he go to Santo Domingo in an effort to ease the situation. It is difficult to see just what could have been expected of him, since the U.S. position on the crisis by this time seemed to admit of no compromise. Martin was a well-known

\(^1\)EA tapes, 1 May 1965.
liberal and it is believed that initially he was sympathetic to the better aspirations of the rebels. His presence was also probably indicative of a recognition that Bennett’s standing with the rebels had been so impaired that some other official was needed to represent the U.S. in any negotiations, a role which, for obvious reasons, the U.S. military commander could not fulfill.

Martin began his meetings with the rebels after the cease-fire agreement had been signed Friday night. At 2300 on the 30th Secretary General Mora of the OAS arrived and presumably joined the discussions which went on through the night and into the morning.

At this juncture a serious failure of military-political coordination occurred. Inexplicably Martin was either not given the outline plan of Masterson’s staff for the ISZ or chose to disregard it. It may well be that this plan still had not yet been fully developed. Possibly the separation of the military and the political commands prevented Martin from being thoroughly briefed by representatives of JTF 122. Consequently, on Palmer’s arrival at the Embassy, he found that Martin had agreed to the establishment of an ISZ which put the U.S. Embassy on its very front line and, Berlin fashion, could only be reached from the sea over the beach or by helicopter, as it contained no airfield. There was no secure overland access to the ISZ from San Isidro to the east. The western boundary, which was to have included the Feria area, was drawn to include only the polo field and the Embajador Hotel. The Marine landing area adjacent to Haina, Red Beach, lay to the west beyond the boundary.¹

Shortly after noon on the 1st, a meeting was held at San Isidro which included Bennett, Mora, junta representatives, York and Tompkins for Masterson. Curiously Palmer was not present and no reason has been ascertained for his absence. General Tompkins has left a vivid description of the meeting which bears verbatim repetition:

¹Interview, USCOMDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
"Ambassador Martin was present and had just returned from a meeting with the rebel chief. The meeting had apparently ended about noon. Ambassador Martin had an Esso road map of the city. Drawn on the map in red was the outline of the ISZ described in CJTF 020820Z. Ambassador Martin had negotiated with the rebels on the basis that the western area shown on the map represented the International Safety Zone and that there would be no advance beyond these boundaries. The Zone drawn on the Ambassador's map did not conform to our recommendation to the JCS.

"I [General Tompkins] asked Ambassador Bennett and Martin as to when the ISZ had been established, who had approved it, and why was CJTF 122 not informed as to the fact and the prohibition of any movement beyond the limits of the Zone. Ambassador Martin disclaimed any responsibility. I pointed out to the Ambassador that no military man would enclose the polo field area in such a restrictive manner.

"I stated in the strongest possible polite language that to have the military committed unilaterally to new boundaries and rules, and then fail to tell the military, was an inexcusable piece of madness and one to which I took most violent exception. I requested repeatedly as to who had marked the Esso map which neither I nor York had seen before. Ambassador Bennett admitted that all our discussions with the junta were based on the 1:12,500 map carried by General Tompkins. Ambassador Bennett did not seem to be able to remember who marked the Esso map which he had furnished Ambassador Martin for the latter's discussions with the rebels on 1 May.

"Ambassador Martin asked if I wanted him to go back and negotiate the ISZ on the basis of the one shown on my map. I told him that to do so would be unnecessary, politically unwise, that we could accommodate ourselves to the agreement he had reached on the ISZ and that I would take the responsibility of committing CJTF 122. The meeting ended."1

1CJTF 122, Report. Also interview with General Tompkins, CINCLANT, 10 July 1965.
It would appear that the person responsible for the 122 which Martin negotiated was the MILGROUP Chief, who was the senior military man located at the Embassy. He, at the request of the Ambassador, had hastily sketched on the Esso map what either he understood to be or assumed would be Masterson's concept. This was all done, apparently, in a great hurry as Martin dashed off to meet with the rebels.\(^1\)

What is quite apparent is that Masterson had not managed to make clear to the people in the Embassy just what he intended to do. Had he been present on the spot or had York or Tompkins been, it is not likely the error would have been made. On the other hand, there are indications that Martin came onto the scene somewhat impatiently eager to solve the situation, and may, in consequence, have chosen to disregard what he knew the U.S. military proposed.

E. THE OVERNIGHT PAUSE

After the meeting of the NCA Friday morning at which the President made his decision to "take and hold" the island, there was no full formal meeting until the next morning. The evening session to discuss the implications of the cease-fire had been cancelled when news of the signing of the cease-fire did not arrive in time. The next session was scheduled for 0830 on Saturday, so that the twelve-hour pause gave time for a general squaring away of the many matters which had come up in the previous two hectic days. As an indication, phone conversations were much reduced in volume among the principals during these hours.

What was of special significance about this pause was that it appeared to give time to perfect to a fine degree the readiness status of the various forces which had been alerted during the afternoon of the 30th. The JCS had notified CINCLANT during the evening that the National Command Authorities would not meet until the following morning, and that, as a result, no decision concerning the deployment of

\(^1\) Interview, USCOMDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 11 August 1965.
alerted forces was expected, barring an unforeseen emergency, until 0900 the next day.\footnote{JCS 1205 to CINCLANT, 010026Z Apr 1965, SECRET.} All command levels were grateful for the time and the Washington decision makers were reassured that it would be usefully employed.

However, there were limitations to what could be done by the military in perfecting these preparations, since the political authorities were keeping a very tight rein on the whole operation, both as far as additional U.S. deployments were concerned as well as operations by U.S. forces in Santo Domingo.

An example of the latter type of control occurred when at 1655 on the 30th, the Marines reported that they were taking casualties from fire from the area north and east of the Embassy. They requested permission to return fire with the 106mm recoilless rifle and 3.5-inch rockets. Permission was granted by JTF 122 to use the 3.5 rockets only.\footnote{CJTF 122, Report.}

A day later, a similar control on weapons usage was sent to Masterson, instructing him "not to use tear gas except when necessary in self defense without prior clearance from Washington."\footnote{EA tapes, 1 May 1965.} (The quaint ambiguity of the message may have been deliberately intended.)

In the matter of additional troop deployments, it had been made perfectly clear, as one participant put it, that "the President was approving everybody involved." Consequently, it was with some alarm that the Joint Staff received an indication at 1800 Friday night that some of the forces alerted that noon were already moving. A check with CINCLANT found no confirmation of the rumor at that headquarters, and the Vice J-3 reiterated that no execute had yet been given.\footnote{EA tapes.}
However at 2138 the Deputy CINCLANT called the DDO to say that they had heard through usual staff channels that part of the third BCT really was already airborne. They had called CONARC about the reports and had been told that CONARC had learned through a liaison officer that the CJCS had authorized General York to call for anything else he wanted, and that York had indeed asked for more. More troops, therefore, had been moved out and were airborne. CINCLANT asked for a clarification from Washington, repeating that their understanding had been that no execute had been given for anything. As to any private authorization, they had heard nothing of this earlier.

The Vice J-3 immediately called Admiral Wylie who read him excerpts from the pertinent XVIIIth Airborne Corps message, calling for aircraft departures at fifteen-minute intervals over a period of fifty-seven hours. Neither Wylie nor the Vice J-3 was familiar with the message format and even conjectured that it might be a planning message. However, Wylie was informed at this point that telephone confirmation had been received at a staff level, that the initial elements of 1/505 Airborne Infantry had been launched, the basis being the Wheeler-York agreement.

The Vice J-3 got the CJCS into the conversation and the Chairman's first response to the information was that the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had been authorized to move its headquarters and perhaps this deployment had created the confusion. The DDO interrupted with word that the Army had the same information -- a battalion was moving. The Chairman's reaction was as violent as that of Wylie and the Vice, J-3. The battalion must be turned around at once and put on the ground. Furthermore, there was no private agreement between the Chairman and General York.

An hour and a half later the problem seemed to have been resolved. It had been ascertained that the battalions were not moving, but rather only the tail of the first two BCTs. The Vice J-3 had gone to TAC to get this information, but when he relayed it to CINCLANT, Wylie
told him that the CINCLANT liaison officer at Fort Bragg, XVIIIth Airborne Corps HQ, stuck to the original report of troops moving. Apparently there were some troops from alerted units going with the authorized Power Pack I tail. The Vice J-3 called Bragg and spoke with the Deputy Division Commander of the 82nd, Brigadier General Linville, who confirmed that indeed the 2/505 was en route. The Vice J-3 ordered them stopped immediately and turned around, explaining that the political authorities were keeping a rigid check on deployments. Linville reported fifteen to twenty aircraft were southbound with the battalion.

It became clear during the conversation that the "pause" as result of the cease-fire, coming on the heels of the drastic Presidential decision of the morning had actually had a disruptive effect on military preparations. In the first place, information on the pause was slow to reach lower command levels. Secondly, the engine, put into high gear for several hours, could not be automati-
cally slowed down. Linville pointed out that he was still operating under the guidance from General Bowen, the CG XVIIIth Airborne Corps who that morning had told them to expect not only Power Pack II but Power Pack III to go in at once. Furthermore, when General Palmer had passed through Fort Bragg en route from Washington to Santo Domingo during the afternoon, there had been no doubt in his mind either as to immediacy of the additional deployments.

Linville had later been told by Admiral Needham at CINCLANT to get York the support he needed, and this presumably was interpreted as meaning troops. Needham had promised to get the 82nd a message on this but it had never arrived. Nevertheless, the 82nd and XVIIIth Airborne Corps had been information addressees on the JCS directive to CINCLANT ordering the additional units alerted, but this message was explicitly labeled as "not an execute message."

The Vice J-3 had directed that the unauthorized aircraft either be brought back to Bragg, put into Homestead or McDill AFB in Florida, or into Ramey, depending on their location when reached.
...was then reported that the "contaminated people," as they were referred to, had really been unloaded at Ramey and kept there, while the aircraft continued on with their support equipment and Power Pack I tail to San Isidro. However at 0457 on the 1st it was definitely reported that they were indeed at San Isidro.\textsuperscript{1}

The episode was interesting on several scores. In the first place, the urgency with which senior commanders in the Joint Staff and CINCLANT responded when the issue arose was clearly indicative of the military awareness of the political constraints operative at the moment and of their rigid adherence to those constraints.

The episode further demonstrated the usefulness to the Joint Staff of being able to reach down several command levels to help resolve the issue. The willingness of the Joint Staff to go directly to TAC or the XVIIIth Airborne Corps materially expedited the clarification of the problem. All parties involved tended to agree that had CINCAFLANT and CINCARLANT been activated for Dominican operations, such misunderstandings could have largely been avoided. Accordingly, the JCS suggested to CINCLANT that he activate AFLANT, ARLANT, and LANTPLQT for the preparation, control, and movement to the Dominican Republic of forces designated.\textsuperscript{2} CINCLANT in turn requested CONARC and COMTAC to activate ARLANT and AFLANT immediately.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} EA tapes, 1 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{2} JCS 1216 to CINCLANT, 011550Z May 1965, SECRET.
\textsuperscript{3} CINCLANT to CONARC and COMTAC, 011554Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Another pertinent observation is that of the slowness of communications from the top level down to lower subordinate headquarters, in this case from the decision makers to the 82nd. The decision to pause apparently did not filter down quickly enough in all its implications. Associated with this point is the demonstration in the incident of the potential confusion inherent in verbal orders or understandings. The confusion created led to an emotional environment in which clearly marked JCS directives were misread, in the zeal to support forces in the field.

Another illustration of the political restraint on troop deployments came in the incident of the LPH USS OKINAWA. It will be recalled that early on the 30th, at the request of CINCLANT, the JCS authorized the deployment of a Marine helicopter squadron from Morehead City, North Carolina, to Santo Domingo via the carrier OKINAWA. The ship was due to arrive to load the helicopters early on the 1st. CINCLANT and the Marine Corps were both in favor of loading an additional BLT aboard the OKINAWA, along with the helicopters, so that the ship would not sail virtually empty. They pressed throughout the night for authorization to load the troops, but the CJCS and others felt that to do so would violate the restriction on any movement of troops outside the country until so authorized. Certainly the suggestion was sensible, but the political restraints were at the moment dominant over what made military sense. Furthermore, the Marines themselves were concerned over domestic press reactions to the loading of Marines which would invariably have almost immediately become public information.

The position of the CJCS, however, was inflexible and, in fact, he was concerned over the delay imposed on the deployment of the helicopters by the efforts to load troops on the LPH as well. Only after the White House decision group had met on Saturday and agreed on additional deployments was CINCLANT ordered to embark a BLT in the OKINAWA.  

1EA tapes.
2JCS 1219 to CINCLANT, 011612 May 1965, SECRET.
F. THE DECISION TO REINFORCE

Throughout the night of 30 April - 1 May during the pause, there was a critical need for hard data and sound estimates from the field, upon which the decision makers could base their deliberations in the 0830 Saturday meeting.

Two positions on the matter of troop deployments had already developed. The State Department had become cautious. It is difficult to ascertain how much support Bennett and Connell had in the Department in their original requests for intervention. At any rate, by this time concern had arisen in State over the scale of forces proposed for introduction into the island. There were 1580 Marines and 2362 paratroops already there, and State apparently felt that these, in view of the cease-fire, might well be adequate.

The CJCS, speaking for the military, was advocating major deployments on the theory that it was best to be prepared for anything and in line with the philosophy of not sending a boy to do a man's job. Palmer had requested two more battalions to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of the junta troops, with possibly two more battalions to come after that. The forces alerted for possible deployment were massive in comparison. Because of State opposition, the CJCS was attempting to get authorization on an incremental basis, hence his hesitation to move Marines aboard the OKINAWA.

The SecDef apparently was also reluctant to commit too much to the Dominican Republic. His hesitation may have been the consequence of a general growing awareness that U.S. forces were, in all probability, going to be on the island for some time. Accordingly, arrangements should be made in that light with a more orderly progression of deployments and support mechanisms in place of the emergency moves of the previous three days.

The J-3 commented in this vein to CINCLANT early Saturday morning in detailing what directions the CJCS wished LANT to follow, suggesting that LANT begin thinking in terms of a long tour of duty in Santo
Domingo and organize its logistics accordingly. Furthermore, LANT was to be prepared to support completely a possible OAS force.1

Bennett fully supported Palmer's request for more troops, and although the first message stating his belief in the need for more troops was not sent until noon on the 1st, it may be presumed he had earlier expressed his opinion via phone to State. His message stated that Palmer had submitted separate recommendations on the order of force levels required. Since there was a major disparity between what Palmer had requested and what the JCS were preparing to send, it would be interesting to know Bennett's reactions to the more massive deployment.2

The final decision on deployments would, of course, rest with the President, who, in the words of one of the principals, "was running the war out of his pocket."

In the matter of information, there was not enough to form a truly coherent picture of the situation. It was now a week since the revolt had begun and four days since the U.S. intervention had been initiated with the evacuation. Reports of sporadic firing seemed to indicate that the cease-fire was only imperfectly in effect. Furthermore, with Palmer now on the scene, Washington was really dealing with two separate commanders. Palmer, not yet organized in his headquarters and with inadequate communications, uncertain of his mission and even of his place in the command organization, could send only spotty information. On the other hand, Washington command authorities had experienced difficulty in getting information from Masterson as to his operations in Santo Domingo. He had been very slow in reporting the movement of the Marines and paratroops to their assigned lines, in informing Washington of his plans and of the state of his dealing with the junta. Further irritation developed when early that evening

1IAA tapes.
2AmEmb to SecState, 0116542 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
one press reported U.S. casualties. This was brought to the
President's attention and he called the SecDef for further details,
only to find that the SecDef knew nothing on the matter at all. This
problem of information reaching the command authorities faster through
press channels than through regular military reporting channels
exacerbated the problem which had appeared earlier in the crisis:

This unsatisfactory situation led to the creation of a special
task force within the NMCC to collect and collate all incoming infor-
manation from all sources, for transmittal to the SecDef and the Joint
Chiefs. The operation of this mechanism is described in an appendix
to this study.

Information on what was going on in the rebel camp was even more
sparse. There was no shortage of reports, but these were noted
chiefly for their number and their inaccuracy.

The White House meeting at 0830 was held on schedule. After
careful deliberation, it was decided to deploy part of the alerted
forces. What was done in effect was to respond to Palmer's requested
reinforcements rather than with the massive two-division-plus force
which was being readied.

This problem of press coverage seems endemic in crisis situations,
since no press control mechanism exists except when a state of war is
declared. The problem is treated in WSDU Report - Southeast Asia
Reporting Systems - 2 May 1966, SECRET.
LANT was instructed that the first echelon of troops must not arrive at San Isidro prior to 1600, the reason being that an OAS meeting was scheduled for early afternoon and the JCS did not wish additional troop landings to occur before the meeting. In view of the flying time involved, however, it would not be possible to get troops to the island before the deadline anyway, but the point was considered of such significance that it was specifically included in the directive.

Finally, there was to be minimum publicity. The Vice J-3 emphasized two other points. The JCS were sending a message to LANT "assuming" that APLANT and ARLANT had been activated, rather than a specific directive to do so. Speed in this matter was important. Also, it was made very clear to LANT that the reason the JCS had adopted the system of phone alerts followed by formal messages was to expedite movement. Hence, LANT should immediately transmit such telephone alerts on down the full chain of command.  

The formal JCS execute messages went out an hour or so later—in regard to the 4th MEB at 1209, and in regard to the third and fourth BCTs, the three Marine airborne companies, and the 1600 deadline at 1212. This latter mentioned that there was no change in mission. A third message to CINCLANT directed that the fifth and sixth BCTs be prepared to load.

After the formal messages had gone out, Admiral Wylie at CINCLANT called the NMCC for clarification on a point in relation to the preparation of the fifth and sixth BCTs.

---

1EA tapes, 1 May 1965.
2JCS 1218 to CINCLANT, 011609Z May 1965 SECRET. JCS 1220 to CINCLANT, 011612Z May 1965, SECRET. JCS 1221 to CINCLANT, 011621Z May 1965, SECRET.
The key element of the issue was the influence on timing which could result from the several interpretations possible of the JCS instructions. Not only was it a matter of men but of materiel which presumably, in a "prepare to load" situation, would slow a response considerably if it then had to be loaded upon receipt of the execute. The term "optimum posture" was also ambiguous, since it implied a fully loaded force.

The DDO checked with the Vice J-3 and notified CINCLANT that there had been no intention of preventing the airborne people from loading troops. The 82nd could determine what "optimum posture" was. Wylie said he would send his message to that effect. However, this would seem merely to have sent the ambiguity on down. Furthermore, this conversation took place at 1343, two and a half hours after the verbal JCS directive to LANT and only now was the LANT directive going out to the 82nd at Fort Bragg.

The episode illustrated the danger inherent in the use of the oral alerting method as price for saving time.

As part of the deployments, the JCS also ordered LANT to include the Power Pack psychological warfare contingent called for in the OPLAN. A capability to operate in four cities was required. The whole operation would be under the control of the senior USIA man on the island.  

1EA tapes, 1 May 1965.
2JCS 1230 to CINCLANT, 011959Z May 1965, SECRET.
Last, CINCLANT was requested to alert all U.S. public information facilities in Santo Domingo to give maximum publicity to the humanitarian role of JTF 122 -- food distribution, medical care and supplies, etc.\(^1\)

Later the JCS authorized CINCLANT to deploy to Ramey at his discretion one tactical fighter squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron with support equipment and personnel.\(^2\)

\(^1\) JIB CINCLANT to SUB JIB AmEmb, 011936Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^2\) JCS 1235 to CINCLANT, 012205Z May 1965, SECRET.
\(^3\) SAC to JCS, 010420Z May 1965, SECRET.
\(^4\) CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 010032Z May 1965, SECRET.
IX. EMPLOYING U.S. FORCES

While these basic decisions were being taken in Washington with consequent military deployment activity, the scene in Santo Domingo throughout Saturday, the 1st, was relatively quiet. The cease-fire, it will be recalled, had gone into effect, or at least was declared to be in effect, and became the central focus of American attention. If the cease-fire were to hold, U.S. policy would be compelled to follow a line quite different from what it might do if the cease-fire turned out to be ineffective.

Bennett at dawn reported the city somewhat quieter and ascribed this to the cease-fire as well as to pure exhaustion of the antagonists. Because of the latter effect he felt the U.S. could expect the cease-fire to be at least partially effective. Added to exhaustion was a respect for U.S. forces. However, Bennett cautioned that the fact must be recognized that the cease-fire at this stage left the extremists in control of the heart and of other large areas of the city. If the cease-fire did take effect, this was a major problem to be faced in the immediate future.¹

The message is interesting because it articulates the dilemma which had come to the fore. Having launched a military intervention under the guise of impartiality, the U.S. had found it unavoidable to sign the cease-fire, thus freezing the situation and creating a condition under which U.S. forces might be prevented politically from achieving the U.S. objectives they were prepared to achieve militarily. The clash between the political desire to end the bloodshed and the military one of eliminating the rebels was now quite apparent.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 011000Z May 1965, SECRET.
The ambiguities surrounding the U.S. objectives and missions, as publicly enunciated, compared to the underlying realities added to the above dilemma. The effort to appear to be impartial in the face of actual partiality came under the concerted fire of the now very sizeable press corps in Santo Domingo. Their reports clearly bothered senior U.S. officials. The SecState complained to Bennett about news stories from the city, linking U.S. troops to operations alongside Wessin's forces. The SecState expressed the fear that "inaccurate accounts" might damage the "publicly assumed role of impartiality," and urged Bennett to persuade the wire services to publish "corrections."  

The public image was causing trouble. At the OAS meeting during the morning of the 1st, the Venezuelans accused the U.S. of violating the OAS Charter by sending in troops. Chile demanded the troops be withdrawn, while Mexico proposed that the meeting adopt a statement expressing concern, surprise, and consternation at the unilateral American acts.

Within the U.N. the Security Council announced that it would meet on 3 May in response to the Soviet charge that U.S. actions constituted armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic.

Washington's concern was with more than the verbal barrage which was not unexpected. A State circular telegram went out around noon on the 1st to all posts in Latin America, warning that the situation might produce Communist-inspired direct physical attacks against U.S. lives and property, especially official buildings. Posts were warned to take all precautions necessary and appropriate, and to report by cable as soon as possible "for the President's information" the steps which had been taken.  

---

1SecState to AmEmb, 0106332 May 1965, SECRET.
2SecState to all ARA Posts, 0115452 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
This warning was shortly followed by one to the same posts stating that, wherever possible, U.S. officials should recommend to U.S.-owned private businesses that they be on the alert for sabotage attempts. In cases where appropriate, local governments should be warned of the possibility of such attacks.¹

As to the future of the cease-fire, Bennett and the other senior Americans on the scene clearly did not expect it to last. They had become fully convinced of the extremist nature of the revolt and felt duplicity was inevitable. Commenting on reports that the rebels were shelling the electric plant around noon, the Ambassador commented that "it was a fine Castro way to observe a cease-fire."² Local American business representatives had come to see him during the morning and had expressed a similar conviction, that the forces leading the rebels were "pure Castro" together with some misguided and fanatical military officers like Caamaño.³

The conviction led to a rather extraordinary willingness to believe anything which reinforced it. At 1300, for example, Bennett reported that information reaching the Embassy indicated that tonight, "just a few hours after the rebels had signed the cease-fire," they planned to attack the Embassy in order to seize personnel there and to hold them as bargaining hostages. The reports stated that the rebels would use artillery, tanks, and frogmen with explosives.⁴

---

¹SecState to all ARA Posts, 0118362 May 1965, SECRET.
²AmEmb to SecState, 0116422 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
³AmEmb to SecState, 0116422 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
⁴The rebels had some light artillery, mostly recoiless rifles, and were reputed to have 20 tanks at this point. The frogmen are an especially delightful touch. It is a common characteristic of small and insignificant nations that they develop an elaborate system of elite units, latter day Praetorian Guards. Usually it has been in the form of the "paratroopers" or "rangers." In the Dominican Republic ingenuity went further. To counter Wessin's "CEFA" or Armed Forces Training Camp "elite units," (we have seen how elite they turned out to be), the Dominican navy developed a super elite, the frogmen. Some of these joined the revolt. These people ran around in black-rubber suits and, apart from a futile, heroic and botched effort to blow up the Duarte Bridge (three frogmen were killed by American paratroops), they did nothing more than provide an exotic bodyguard for Caamaño. Yet at the time they were regularly described by the press as "highly trained," "elite," etc., much as had Wessin's force been.
Bennett had asked the Marine Guard Commander to take special precautions.¹

While quite conceivably such a scheme could have been concocted, such an attempt in the face of the Marine armament available in defense of the Embassy certainly seemed highly unlikely and quite out of character with the military activities of the rebels thus far. The rebels, it should be recalled, had up to this time not resisted the U.S. troops with anything more than sniper shots and occasional automatic weapons bursts. Indeed, such an actual attack as Bennett suggests had taken place only once during the revolt, that being Wessin's abortive attack across the bridge on Tuesday.

While Bennett was reporting, as he should have, any information of significance, the willingness to consider this threat significant is interestingly illustrative of the state of mind still prevailing in the Embassy.

Bennett followed up this bit of information with a summary of his opinions on the cease-fire and its implications. He stated that he felt compelled to say frankly that the cease-fire was about to have very serious consequences for the U.S. The junta forces "which were not very aggressive in any event" were obeying the cease-fire, while the rebels were following the usual Communist tactic of complaining about violations "while they planned larger operations." As a result of the cease-fire, Bennett claimed, the junta forces withdrew across the Duarte Bridge so that there were presently no troops in the area to establish a line between the bridge and the ISZ, a mission which had been assigned to the Dominicans. This left a gap under which the vital road north could be used by the rebels.

Bennett said he realized that there were larger reasons for the cease-fire, but "we have had that." The Embassy "continued under attack throughout the night" and the rebels had the convenient excuse

¹AmEmb to SecState, 0117142 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
that the attackers are guerrillas whom they did not really control. Both U.S. Army and Marine forces have suffered casualties. The Ambassador concluded by remarking that the Colombian and Ecuadorian ambassadors were with him at the moment and saw these facts in clearest terms.¹

²

Shortly after this, Bennett was informed by State of the additional deployments. The short-term reinforcements were to be two more battalions of the 82nd Airborne as reinforcements for the San Isidro perimeter and a Marine battalion to reinforce the ISZ: the medium-term reinforcement--1500 marines to be seaborne as soon as possible with twenty more helicopters and to debark on arrival in three to four days, the longer term--ten ships to embark 4000 marines for arrival after six days with a decision to land these to be made later.²

Around midnight Masterson also expressed concern to CINCLANT. He pointed out that under the terms of the cease-fire, the U.S. forces must remain in place, while the effect of the agreement would assist the Communists by giving them time to build up. Furthermore, he feared the rebels would derive a psychological advantage by claiming that the U.S. sought the cease-fire because we were losing. He did not believe there was any possibility of a stable situation under the current conditions, since the rebels, for all practical purposes, controlled Santo Domingo. The situation had grown worse since the mass distribution of weapons. He was convinced that "the longer the cease-fire continued,

¹AmEmb to SecState 011830Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²SecState to AmEmb, 012100Z May 1965, SECRET.
the harder it would be to eliminate the virus." The junta forces were useless, so full responsibility devolved upon the U.S. Therefore, in view of these observations, he recommended that the troop build-up continue with the objective of having on the scene a U.S. force capable, on a no-notice basis, of sealing in the rebels as a first step in re- storing Santo Domingo.

Masterson closed by adding that he had checked his basic observa- tions with Palmer and Bennett who had concurred.¹

A. INITIAL OPERATIONS PLANS

In view of the deep distrust of the cease-fire on the part of the senior U.S. officials on the spot, the key question throughout the 1st and after was how to employ U.S. forces so as to contain and eventually to suppress the rebels while apparently maintaining the terms of the cease-fire. Discussions centered about the most appropriate type of perimeter, while in the background, comparatively unspoken, was the possibility of an eventual use of U.S. troops to clear the city and wipe out the rebel forces.

The JCS, in a personal message from the Chairman, asked Masterson during the evening of the 1st for recommendations, stating that material was needed by 0800 on the 2nd for consideration at a high-level conference. The meeting would discuss alternative courses of action with particular attention to the Santo Domingo area. In view of the shortness of time, the CJCS expected Masterson's report to be rough (and mostly based upon Palmer's thoughts). ]

¹ CJTF 122 to CINCLANT, 020418Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
B. The present planned perimeter, from the bridge to the Marine
easternmost location. (Plan B)

C. Further out than the presently planned one on a line to be
selected by CINCLANT. (Plan C)

The role of U.S. troops would be to control the flow in and out of the
perimeter of men, materiel, food, water, and electricity.

Masterson was specifically asked:

1. To estimate the forces required to man each perimeter suggested.

2. To estimate the difficulty of maintaining each perimeter, the
   risks and costs involved.

3. Assuming needed forces were provided, how long it would take
to put each alternative into effect. 1

A copy of this message was also sent to Palmer.

Masterson replied seven hours later. His comments on all three
suggested courses of action were predicated upon two basic assumptions:

1. That U.S. troops would in no way be prohibited from using
   conventional arms or equipment available as required to establish
   the perimeter, although the force used would be the minimum
   necessary;

2. That to man a perimeter it was first necessary to move out to
   a perimeter through rebel-held area. In other words it would
   be necessary to fight our way to the desired perimeter.

1 \text{JCS 1237 to CINCLANT, 012340Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.}
In the meantime an astonishing error had occurred. The copy of the JCS message that was sent to Palmer was addressed to him as Commanding General, XVIIIth Abn Corps. Accordingly, it was forwarded to Fort Bragg, the HQ of the Corps and here, for an equally unaccountable reason, it was held. Palmer received it many hours later and was apparently never was told about it earlier by Masterson who would have no reason to think Palmer had not received his copy. Bennett, Palmer, Masterson and Tompkins met on board the BOXER during the 2nd to discuss operations, but it seems Palmer never learned of the

\[1\text{CITF 122 to CINCLANT, 020714Z May 1955, TOP SECRET.}\]
exchange of messages with the all-important request for an estimate of forces needed.

Palmer made clear at a much later date that he did not agree with Masterson's estimate and would not have concurred with it.1

This then was the senior military commander's appreciation of the situation on the morning of the 2nd. In a sense, however, the choice had been predetermined by events. During the afternoon of the 1st Palmer had directed York to reconnoiter for a secure route through Santo Domingo which would allow a link-up between the paratroops and the Marines. A strong combat reconnaissance patrol from the 82nd had, accordingly, advanced west through the city, meeting with rebel resistance and suffering two killed and two wounded, until it reached the Marine line. The patrol was then withdrawn, and no further patrolling undertaken in view of the rebel complaints that the probe had constituted a violation of the cease-fire. The probe had been a key action, however, as it demonstrated the feasibility of an LOC which could be secured later if authorized, and also confirmed the presence of hostile rebel forces in the area.2 The feasibility of Plan B had thus been established. Resistance had not been especially strong, so it is surprising that Masterson, hours later, should have indicated such caution in his estimate for the JCS.

Palmer's first report (about which more will be said later in a different context) was sent by Masterson to the JCS at 0418 on the 2nd and reinforced the concern over the cease-fire. Palmer said he had met with Bennett and "saw eye to eye" with him on the serious risks inherent in the present cease-fire and the necessity for more U.S. forces ashore. His military problem was to close the gap in the cordon and at the same time avoid a charge of provocation and

1USCOMDOMREP, Report.
2Ibid.
breach of the cease-fire. He realized that this dilemma was particularly acute with respect to the employment of junta forces in this role, although he was fully aware that these forces were not effective in any case. He reported that the motorized patrol of the 82nd had probed through the city to the Marines, losing two killed and two wounded, the reconnaissance confirming that hostile forces controlled the gap and "owned" the bulk of the city, with U.S. troops positioned primarily on the edges.

Palmer agreed with Bennett and Martin that the cease-fire favored the insurgents who could consolidate their hold on the city without interference. Furthermore, they continued to fire without provocation on the Marines and Embassy and on the 82nd's positions at the western end of the bridge, while an effort by them to blow up the bridge had been thwarted. U.S. forces were firing only in defense, and employing appropriate weapons such as the M79 grenade launcher and the 106mm recoilless rifle when fired on by machine guns.

As a result of the probe and to avoid further charges of cease-fire violations, Palmer had directed forces to remain within their present positions while negotiations were under way. This meant staying out of the gap since the insurgents interpreted entry as a breach. Under these ground rules he would be unable to complete the cordon and accomplish his mission of keeping the rebels bottled up. If this continued, and the cease-fire remained in effect, Palmer believed the result would be an inevitable deterioration in the military situation. He asked for guidance on this point.

He continued that he had been under the earlier incorrect impression that two BLTs were ashore, but had found only one in position. He hoped that another BLT and additional airborne battalions would give him a much greater capability to carry out his assigned mission.¹

¹CTF 120 to CJTF 122, 012245Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
In the meantime the additional U.S. forces were beginning to arrive. The Power Pack II units were coming in by 1400 Saturday, with landings planned for every five minutes. The 900 Marines had started coming in from Camp Lejeune via their own aircraft at 1800 on the 2nd.\(^1\)

An hour and a half later, Palmer sent his first formal sitrep as COMLANDFORDOMREP to CINCLANT. After describing his positions, he stated a summary of his plans.

a. Once the force build-up reached the required level, he proposed to cordon off the southern half of the city to prevent reinforcement or escape of the enemy force.

b. Following establishment of the cordon, his forces would move to destroy the enemy force in the southern part of the city.

c. Execution of the plan would be dependent upon the decision concerning the cease-fire agreement.

d. His commander's operational plan continued to be XVIIIth Abn Corps OPLAN 310/2L.\(^2\)

It should be noted that this message and the previous one from Palmer were respectively ten and eleven hours in reaching the JCS from the time of sending. During this period, as a result, there was no clear picture in Washington of just what the military situation was.

The key military problem of the moment was the closing of the gap between the two American-held sections. Not only would this confine the core of the rebel forces, but it would divide that core from the weaker less-organized rebel elements in the northern parts of the city. Furthermore, it would prevent, or at least make difficult, rebel communication with or passage to the rest of the country via the Peynado Bridge across the Rio Isabella, to the north of the city and just west of the junction of the Isabella and the Ozama. With

\(^1\) NMCC to White House, 020317Z May 1965, SECRET.

\(^2\) COMLANDFORDOMREP to CINCLANT, 020038Z May 1965, SECRET.
roads to the east and the west blocked by U.S. forces, the Peynado Bridge was the sole link between the rebel stronghold and the rest of the country.

B. THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

There was an amazing lack of information on developments outside Santo Domingo, a lack which represented another failure of intelligence. Needless to add, the sentiments in the rest of the country could have been critical. Had there been real widespread active (instead of passive) support for the rebels there, the entire U.S. problem would have been transformed. Instead of clearing or containing a city, the U.S. would have had to think in terms of the occupation of the whole country.

On the morning of the second, eight days after the revolt had begun, for example, Ambassador Martin mentioned in a cable to State that "the situation outside the capital is unknown to me." Two hours later at 0800, the special NMCC task force notified the SecDef that intelligence reports indicated that three towns in the provinces were controlled by rebels. These were La Romana on the eastern end of the island, Altagracia in the central area northwest of the capital, and Binao north of Altagracia.1

1EA tapes, 2 May.
The contingency plan had not included a requirement for Special Forces so the last-minute effort to deploy and employ them was not without problems. The proper equipment was not always available nor was the intelligence upon which to base counterinsurgency operations at hand. Reporting to both Washington and to CINCLANT tended to be irregular and spotty in coverage because of the sensitive nature of the Special Forces operations. Operations were known to and authorized by the minimum number of pertinent U.S. authorities.

C. THE POLITICAL ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

With a full day of observation and contact behind him, Ambassador Martin sent in early on the 2nd some grim thoughts. First were some personal impressions. He had visited Col. Caamano in the New City and came away with the impression of a "crafty, dangerous, but not crazy man." Martin felt Caamano had dug himself into a hole from which he could not escape alive, and was therefore using everybody -- the FRD, the FSP and all the other groups -- to win. Should he win, Martin feared, he could become another Castro.¹

Martin's comment on Caamano's sanity presumably derives from the latter's curiously erratic conduct during the eight days of the revolt. He had taken asylum in the Salvadorean Embassy on Sunday night; the next day, in a phone conversation with the U.S. Embassy, had sworn to fight to the death; the next day he had come to the U.S. Embassy prepared to lay down his arms and accept the junta and the proposed elections. Now once again he was going to fight to the death.²

Bennett and Martin each sent to State, around 0500, an estimate of the situation at the moment. Martin's was more general and far ranging. He asserted at the outset that no political solution encompassing a rapprochement between the opposing forces

¹AmEmb (Martin) to SecState, 020810Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 020512Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
was possible, given all the present circumstances. What had begun as a PRD rebellion had been taken over by extremists. These included some of the military who had gone so far that they had nothing to lose, plus hard-core Communists. Communist/non-Communist tags, Martin stressed, no longer mattered. Rebel leaders, especially Camano, were "effective fanatics," although the rank and file of the movement were probably not Communist. However, it was virtually impossible at this time to separate innocent followers from leaders.

Martin was convinced that the rebels could have defeated the "loyalists" easily, had not the arrival of U.S. forces prevented it. Nonetheless, the junta armed forces had virtually disintegrated, and their "gutless generals were now waiting for us to do the job for them." Among the generals, Imbert came out best. The junta had no visible popular support and probably little future independent of the U.S.

Martin also reported that the cease-fire was in effect and that Mora, Secretary General of the OAS, was taking active steps to stop the bloodshed and to reach both sides. Significantly too, rebel surrenders had begun.

Martin concluded with three observations: (1) assuming that the cease-fire was effective, it restricted us and left the rebels in control of a large part of the city; (2) the cease-fire offered the U.S. time to develop political alternatives, such as buying rebel guns or finding a more acceptable replacement for the junta, or other such political steps; and (3) given the pressures over since Trujillo and the hate generated by the recent bloodbath, it was probable that military action would be required soon. The attitudes on both sides made it probable that military action would be necessary to assure pacification. Consequently, Martin recommended that the U.S. "get all the mileage possible" out of the present situation before that time.¹

¹AmEmb (Martin) to SecState, 020900Z May 1965, SECRET.
Bennett's message complemented Martin's. He considered that the key factor was the cease-fire, and with the five-member OAS commission due to arrive the next day, the U.S. had no real alternative to testing it. He reiterated his own and the Country Team's grave doubts as to the wisdom of a cease-fire which assisted the rebels, although he recognized that the "highest U.S. policy interests might make this course desirable." Nevertheless, the major U.S. concern, that "Castro/Communists" could somehow take over the country could now be discarded as long as the U.S. kept strong forces ashore.

The next job, as Bennett saw it, if the cease-fire did not collapse, which was perfectly possible, would be discreetly to assist the junta to commence operating as some kind of government. With a legal base and a recognized government established, the disarmament of the rebels would be the next priority task. "Cease-fire or no," the Ambassador said, "this would require U.S. military action." He hoped the U.S. would have the aid of an OAS presence in such operations. He closed by adding that he and Martin were in essential agreement.¹

A contrast in approach may be detected here between the two Ambassadors. Bennet continues to rely upon the junta; Martin discards them.

It is of interest that both Bennett and Martin now felt that the situation was already passing into a political phase, but that, nonetheless, U.S. military action of one sort or another would inevitably be required. Bennett speaks of "disarmament of the rebels," while Martiné refers to "pacification." It is far from clear as to what each actually was implying, but in both cases there would seem to be a recognition that the moment when U.S. forces could simply have crushed the revolt by direct attack had politically passed. Military action was inevitable, but it would now be constrained and not with the unlimited objective of smashing the rebels to pieces.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 020900Z May 1965, SECRET.
During the evening of the 2nd, some sixteen hours after the above telegrams had been sent, Bennett and Martin indicated that their thinking was moving more and more in the direction of some political settlement. Martin who had, it will be recalled, arrived in Santo Domingo with sympathies for the rebel cause, had made clear his serious concern over extremist control of the revolt. Now, however, he gave due weight to the other side of the coin. He told Washington that "it seemed clear that there remains a distinctly popular element to the rebel movement, totally apart from extremism but of course cleverly played on by the Communists." Sources confirmed to him that the movement represented the long-pent-up frustration at the imagined indifference to public welfare at the hands of postcoup [post-Trujillo assassination] regimes. Martin's sources reported that the people behind the rebel lines talked less of Bosch than of constitutionality "to which they attach almost mystical quality." Even more they talked about Wessin "who represented all that the man in the street is against." There was a strong implication from sources who had a good knowledge of the people that the removal of Wessin would deprive the extremists of a major weapon that they had used to gain support.

Martin suggested that State carefully consider this move as a bargaining counter. However, Caamaño had told the British Charge d'Affaires that only the return of Bosch and of constitutionality would be acceptable as terms.

Bennett followed Martin's cable with some comment on Martin's opinions. Martin, he said, was fully convinced now that the revolt started Sunday by the PRD was under the complete domination of Castro Communism, although Martin made clear that he did not consider the

---

1 AnEmb (Martin) to SecState, 030010Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
leadership of the PRD to be Communist. He was quoted as saying that he imagined Bosch was as heartbroken as he about developments.

Bennett also mentioned that the foreign diplomatic corps almost unanimously approved the U.S. troop landing, several Latin American embassies having sent their thanks for U.S. protection. This theme Bennett had reiterated time and again.¹

While emphasizing Martin's convictions on the role of the extremists, Bennett also reflected increased sensitivity to the political dilemma facing the U.S. He reported late on the 2nd that the day had brought no change in the political situation. No effective government existed. The junta was very weak, enjoyed little support, was indecisive and was composed of members who completely lacked stature. Reported efforts to form a cabinet had not materialized. Bennett felt that the probabilities of a negotiated settlement under present cease-fire conditions did not seem to have improved, notwithstanding the arrival during the day of the OAS commission.

Bennett then delineated, for the first time, the very serious issue of the attitude of the populace toward the American role. The problem had two aspects: (a) the reason for the American presence in Santo Domingo and (b) the widespread popular belief that we were supporting Wessin against the people, Wessin having become the bete noir. The Ambassador recommended an urgent psychological campaign to improve the U.S. image. However, as to the actual physical presence of U.S. soldiers, the population had been extraordinarily indifferent.²

Clearly both Ambassadors saw now the dilemmas confronting the U.S. The original objective of preventing a possible Communist takeover had been achieved, but now an alternative had to be developed.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 030215Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
²AmEmb to SecState, 030125Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Instead of the earlier expectation that a hastily formed military junta would suffice, it had now become apparent that such would not suffice, that the revolt had far deeper roots than just Communist conspiracy. However, we had created the junta and were for the moment stuck with it. The guidance on dealing with the junta became remarkably ambivalent. Around noon on the 2nd State informed Bennett that it was rejecting Benoit's request for permission to establish the junta headquarters in the Congress building inside the ISZ. State flatly declared that in keeping with the strategy of impartiality which had been enunciated early in the week, it could not honor a request of this sort. DOD had also instructed military commanders "to avoid over-identification" with the junta force. State thought that the junta from its own point of view would want to do the same in regard to the U.S.¹

This typified the confusion of thought prevalent at the moment. After a week of being told to form a junta, and to encourage it by every means to resist the rebels, the Embassy and the U.S. military on the scene were now to "avoid over-identification." Also, State's idea that the junta should try to keep the U.S. at arms length seems remarkably naive in view of their obvious total dependence upon the U.S.

D. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION FLOW AND COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

There had been impatience in Washington since the very beginning of U.S. involvement over the slowness of information flow from Santo Domingo, especially from the military commanders. By the 2nd this impatience had become extreme and finally the President himself took a direct hand.

The problem flowed in part from the rather confused command arrangements. It will be recalled that General Palmer's orders, given verbally, were not overly explicit, leaving open the question of just what his ultimate relationship to Admiral Masterson as

¹SecState to AmEmb, 021725Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
CJTF 122 and to CINCLANT would be. On arrival at San Isidro, he had found his communications to the Marines so inadequate that he assumed command of only the Army forces for the moment, and so informed the DDO at the NMCC around 0430 on the 1st in a phone conversation. However, he had earlier sent a formal message to CINCLANT announcing that he had assumed control of all forces ashore, thereby confusing LANT's understanding of the situation.

Palmer's questions concerning his relationship to CJTF 122 could only be answered by CINCLANT who had responsibility but who was slow in considering the changed circumstances. OPLAN 310/2 had been far surpassed in troop strengths involved, so that a command structure under which a full corps plus an MEB ashore were under the command of a floating task force headquarters was now clearly inadequate. CINCLANT, furthermore, seemed increasingly out of the picture. CINCLANT personally spoke to the DNS around noon on the 1st, about the propriety of Palmer's cabling on a "personal" basis to the CJCS for more forces, and emphasized that he intended to tighten his control of developments. It should be added that the use of personal messages between principals tended to slow down the already poor communication flow. By their very nature personals delayed the filtering down to action levels of key information.

As part of the effort, CINCLANT sent a message on command arrangements to CONARC, CINCLANTFLT, COMTAC, and CJTF 122 at 1900 on the 1st. He stated that OPLAN 310/2-64 and its annexes were the basic guidance in the Dominican situation, with Change No. 1 of October 1964 already promulgated. It was recognized that there had

1Typical of the communications uncertainty of the moment was the fact that this call came to the NMCC by means unknown. An NMCC check was unable to ascertain later just what channels were used.
2EA tapes, 1 May.
been and would continue to be deviations from the plan, but used as basic guidance it should help to keep the growing operation in coordination. To assist in this, the basic OPLAN and its several annexes were herewith reduced in security classification from TOP SECRET to SECRET. It was expected that when the forces currently ordered were in place, there would be an organizational change establishing COMDOMREP directly under LANT with near or more distant naval forces under LANTFLT in support.

CINCLANT also specified that ARLANT, LANTFLT, and APLANT were responsible for providing forces, controlling their movement to and from the area of operations, and supporting them logistically. He cautioned that the last-mentioned function would require careful coordination and cooperation.¹

LANT recognized at this time that command arrangements were not firm and would not be so for a day or two. The Deputy CINCLANT explained to the DDO that before current arrangements were altered, they wished to be sure that Palmer was fully operational with adequate communications and that assigned forces were well under way so Palmer would not be presented with a chaotic mess upon assumption of wider command.

With Palmer suffering from inadequate communications, with Masterson on the BOXER, and the whole picture clouded by ambivalent command relationships, the flow of information to Washington did not in any way improve. During the late afternoon of the 1st the President became personally involved in an effort to get more information up from Santo Domingo. Around 1730 on the 1st, he called the CJCS in reference to a cable from Ambassador Bennett reporting a deteriorating situation with sporadic firing at the Embassy by uncontrolled groups of rebels. The CJCS checked on the message with the DDO in the NMCC, but the NMCC had not received this message which

¹CINCLANT to CONARC, LANTFLT, COMTAC, CJTF 122, 0123002 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
apparently State and the White House had, and so the NMCC asked State Operations Center about it.

Before this investigation could go further, a new element intruded. At 1806 on the 1st the SecDef called the CJCS to tell him that State had just spoken to the Embassy where someone told them that the airborne units had moved across from the bridgehead to link up with the Marines in a patrol action and had then returned. Two men had been killed and several wounded. The SecDef had heard nothing about this previously and personally doubted it. The CJCS had heard nothing either although Palmer had said in his early afternoon message that he was going to try to move west to link up with the Marines. (This was the reconnaissance patrol previously described.)

By 1903 the NMCC had established that the accumulation of items which had disturbed the President -- reports of violations, the cable about the possible attack on the Embassy, etc. -- really represented nothing new but rather more of the same. The cease-fire violations continued but there were no indications of any profound changes in the military situation.

At 1930 General Clifton at the White House called the DDO for some specific information for the President, specifically when would Palmer be in command or was he now, and where was his first sitrep. The DDO called the CJCS for answers but the CJCS stated that it was not yet known whether Palmer was in command or when he would be. All they knew was that Palmer was commanding the Army troops only. The Chairman felt that Palmer was probably delayed in taking command of the whole force until he could move over from San Isidro to the Embassy.

The DDO reported to General Clifton that Palmer was trying to move his 112-man headquarters over to the Embassy and to set up a command there over all ground forces. The SecState had asked Ambassador Bennett to assist Palmer by making room for him at the
Embassy. Once there, the DDO added, we could expect to start receiving sitreps from him.

However, this was more easily said than done. When the Embassy learned the size of Palmer's HQ force, they reported around 2300 on the 1st that they could not possibly accommodate it, having planned on only forty men. The Embassy was unbearably crowded as it was. State Operations Center, in notifying the DDO of this problem, said that one of their people knew from experience that there were several buildings near the Embassy which could be used as headquarters. The CJCS, when told of this, directed that Palmer be told of the State recommendation and to act accordingly. This would avoid the necessity of using tents.

At 2005 on the 1st the Deputy CINCLANT notified the DDO that Palmer had taken over command of all ground forces at 1945 that day. However, he had indicated that he was not yet able to move from San Isidro because of the communications problem. Masterson who had sent up this information had no idea when the move to the Embassy would take place.

Palmer finally decided to relocate only his CP to the Embassy, establishing it and his G-2/G-3 staff elements in the Embassy building, leaving the main headquarters at the airfield. The next day Palmer moved his CP into the old Trujillo Palace next door and was operational at 1400 on the 3rd. By 1500 on the 4th his full HQ was in operation in the Palace.1

Thus Palmer was operating with only an austere staff during the two critical days 2-4 May.

The problem of just what Palmer was commanding and from what location became involved in the derivative problem of sitreps from the scene. Impatience at the top level over the absence of such reports from Palmer has already been noted. Masterson, in the call to CINCLANT concerning Palmer's location, had reported about 2000 that a high-level meeting had just concluded and that a sitrep was being prepared. However, when the DDO asked Deputy CINCLANT whether or not the sitrep

1USCONDOMREP Report.
CINCLANT
ADM MOORER

CJTF 122
COMDR UNIFIED OPS DOMREP
HQ, USS NEWPORT NEWS
VADM MASTERSON

CTF 120
COMLANDFORDOMREP
HQ, SAN ISIDRO
LGEN PALMER

CTF 121
AF COMPONENT
HQ, RAMEY AFB
MGEN McNICKLE

CTF 124
USN COMPONENT
USS BOXER
CAPT DARE

4TH MEB
HQ, POLO GROUNDS
BGEN BOUKER

82ND ABN DIV
HQ, SAN ISIDRO
MGEN YORK

*Transferred from USS BOXER at 0800 2 May 1965.

FIGURE 3. Command Structure as of 4 May
would be Palmer's, a CTF 120 sitrep, he was told that it would not, since Masterson was still senior officer and so the sitrep would be from CTF 122 and would include Palmer's report. Admiral Needham commented that until things were organized ashore, CINCLANT intended to maintain the CTF 122 organization, but expected in three or four days to go to a different command arrangement.

This information was reported by the DDO to the CJCS and then to Clifton at the White House. Clifton made clear that the sitrep arrangement was not likely to please the President who wanted to know directly what Palmer was reporting. He asked that some arrangement be made so the White House could get information copies of whatever came from Palmer to anyone. The President wanted to read what Palmer was saying as quickly as he read the Ambassador's reports. Clifton said he realized that this involved violating all the normal command channels, but that this was a matter of considerable concern on the part of the President.

The DDO consulted the CJCS and Admiral Needham and it was decided that Palmer should be instructed to send a sitrep for all the ground forces with CTF 122 merely as an information addressee.

At 2211 on the 1st Clifton again called the DDO with a request from the President for a wrap-up of the day's activities, to be delivered to the White House an hour and a quarter hence. It was to be simple and to the point, and, Clifton stressed, "Keep it in English—no abbreviations. He doesn't even want NMAC, because he doesn't know what they mean. JTF doesn't mean a thing, but Admiral Masterson does."

The DDO checked with the CJCS on the contents of the briefing. It was decided to give plans for the next day, forces en route, forces alerted, forces there, casualties, and accomplishments of the day. The wrap-up was dispatched to the White House and well received. At 0010 on the 2nd Clifton asked the DDO for another wrap-up by 0630, expressing the urgent wish for a single message signed by Palmer. He said State had also directed Bennett and Martin to get some special reports up to Washington on their observations and estimates.
An hour later the DDO called the LANT Duty Officer to inquire whether Palmer had been heard from. He expressed the President's concern and likely irritation if nothing had been heard from Palmer before the 0630 wrap-up was delivered. The DDO urged that special efforts be made to reach Palmer and get a sitrep from him.

At 0338, just as General Clifton had warned the NMCC he would, the President called the DDO for the latest information. The DDO gave him information from an Embassy cable that U.S. casualties were two Marines dead and twenty wounded plus one Army dead, one possibly dead, and sixteen wounded. This was a cable that had come in previously. The latest military report in hand gave two Marines dead, one Army dead and twenty-two wounded. The President was surprised that the NMCC did not know how these casualties had occurred.

The DDO went to CINCLANT for the latest casualty figures and relayed these to the White House a couple of hours after the President's call. He was astonished to learn that the President was trying to call Palmer at San Isidro. This information he immediately relayed to CINCLANT as illustrative of the President's interest and as further incentive for increased efforts to get a sitrep system into operation. The President had tried to reach Palmer on single side band, but on the failure of this connection, he was trying through commercial lines.

This fact, the DDO pointed out, was a very pointed indicator of the President's desire to talk to Palmer. The President finally got through to Palmer via the Air Force C-130 TALKING BIRD that was at San Isidro and several circuitous relay routes.

Finally at 0614 the CINCLANT DDO notified the DDO that a message from Palmer to Masterson had been sent by Masterson to CINCLANT, the JCS, and the Embassy. This was the message the contents of which were described earlier in this section. Palmer had sent it as a TOP SECRET personal to Masterson at 1845 the previous day. Masterson had transmitted it to the JCS at 0418 on the 2nd. CINCLANT had
investigated the delay, alerting Masterson as to its seriousness via single side band, and had learned that failure of JTF 122 circuits were the cause of the delay in transmission. The DDO requested that LANT have Palmer address his sitrep to them but information copies should go to the JCS, the White House, the SecState at once. He pointed out that a similar system was operative for PAC where essentially everything that went from subordinate commands to PAC also went to the JCS, and for the most part to the White House and State also.

The DDO also asked LANT if Palmer's reply to the CJCS message on the three proposed plans had been received, inasmuch as the Chairman required Palmer's estimates in another hour. However, for reasons stated earlier in this section, Palmer had never received the JCS request.

The White House in the meantime tightened its information requirements. State, CIA, and the NMCC were informed in early afternoon that the President desired that in all information reports on the Dominican Republic prepared in Washington for the White House: (1) times be reported as EDT using a twelve-hour system, and (2) all abbreviations be identified at least the first time used on each page.

State similarly alerted Bennett to the President's desire for a Country Team report twice a day, to be available 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. in Washington. This report should include a joint estimate of the political, military, and relief situation and recommendations, for any additional Washington action not already entrain. Reports should specifically include the personal recommendations of the Ambassador and the Commanding General, whether agreed or not. Bennett was told that this instruction would supersede any other instructions he now had on periodic sitreps, but did not change the requirement for immediate spot reports on specific problems or changes in the situation.¹

¹SecState to AmEmb 0218552 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
As a result of expressed Presidential interest and of the gradual subsidence of confusion in the command structure and communications pictures, the flow of information improved markedly after the 2nd.
X. ESTABLISHING THE LOC

Even though Palmer's recommendations on the three JCS-suggested plans had not yet been received, it was clear by the morning of the 2nd that action on one of the plans would be undertaken fairly soon.

The SecDef, on informing the CJCS, was disconcerted to learn that the two units would not fully close San Isidro until the following morning, the reason being airfield and airspace congestion.

The Vice J-3 phoned the deployment order to CINCLANT at 0952, urging that notifications be made down the chain of command by phone, in order to avoid delays that resulted from awaiting formal message orders, delays which had marked the earlier deployments for this reason. Furthermore, there would be more than the usual lapse of time between the verbal and the written orders because the SecDef wished to discuss the deployment with other people.¹

CINCLANT was also told to land the Marines from the OKINAWA immediately on arrival.²

Deputy CINCLANT immediately called General Bowen, the departing Commanding General, XVIIIth Abn Corps, at Fort Bragg to relay the execute. He followed up with a call to CONARC, explaining his bypassing them in the interests of speed. Furthermore, he intended that CONARC maintain control over the airlift of unnecessary heavy equipment. ³

¹The formal message was sent five hours later. JCS 1252 to CINCLANT, 021826Z May 1965, SECRET.
²JCS 1245 to CINCLANT, 021406Z May 1965, SECRET.
not long after this, the JCS also directed CINCLANT to deploy the remainder of the tactical air support units to Ramey, but cautioned that Power Pack III was to have airlift priority over this move.2

A. THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT PLAN B

In the two days since the cease-fire had been signed, the rebels had been relatively quiescent, and had made no effort to push out of Ciudad Neuva. Nevertheless, the gap between the Marine positions on the west and the paratroops along the river remained a source of menace. Failure to close it and the possible consequent escape of the armed rebels to the countryside could jeopardize the whole U.S. effort at containing the revolt at minimum cost to all concerned. During the afternoon of the 2nd the problem suddenly became critical.

At 1208 on the 2nd, the Deputy SecDef, Mr. Vance, notified the Chairman that there would be a White House meeting in Mr. Bundy's office that evening at 2100 for the purpose of reviewing the situation and, particularly, to consider the ramifications of an order to implement Plan B. Up to this point, there did not appear to be any special urgency about such a decision.

However, in something over an hour, the climate had begun to change. At 1319 CINCLANT personally called the CJCS to describe a conversation he had just held with Palmer. The latter had reported that he was attending a conference at the Embassy and that the situation in the city seemed to be deteriorating. The OAS Commission was over at San Isidro with no road access to the Embassy. Palmer said he felt that it was becoming more apparent hourly that the gap would have to be closed. The Chairman explained that it was planned to do so and that a message would soon be on its way, but that the decision makers preferred not to undertake the action that day. The hope was that the U.S. could persuade the OAS Commission to come forward with

---

2 JCS 1250 to CINCLANT, 021750Z May 1965, SECRET.
the suggestion that the gap be closed for humanitarian reasons—to facilitate the distribution of food, water, and medical supplies. The idea was to "get some sort of political peg to hang our hats on," and the Chairman recognized the validity of this.

CINCLANT also added that Palmer had just received the missing JCS message which had gone to Fort Bragg. It was not until an hour previously that CINCLANT had been able to notify the NMCC of the full details of the confusion.

The Chairman decided on the basis of CINCLANT's conversation with Palmer to call the latter personally a few minutes later. He asked Palmer whether he feared a further deterioration that day as compared to yesterday, to which Palmer replied affirmatively. He pointed out that a program of vicious anti-American propaganda was under way, that looting continued, and that starvation was rife. Not having any access to the center of the city, the U.S. forces could do nothing in the way of relief measures. He offered several points as a rational for immediately opening a corridor.

In the first place, the OAS-authorized ISZ had no access to it by sea, the OAS Commission, for example, having had to go by helicopter from San Isidro. Similarly the international airfield, Punta Caucedo on the coast southeast from San Isidro, was similarly cut off.

Secondly, he and all the American officials there felt that the situation was bound to deteriorate as a result of the violent anti-American propaganda. It was estimated that there were still 1000 to 4000 "young civilians" who had not yet decided whether to cease fighting and who would continue to loot and shoot.
as long as they thought they could get away with it. The hard core, Palmer said, were about 2500 in number, and it was this group whom the 1000 to 4000 "small fry" were imitating. Furthermore, the city was full of weapons. Palmer then said that "before the fracas started, the government issued 10,000 arms which we have discovered are mostly machine pistols, etc." Also, he had had reports from the junta that arms were being unloaded from an unidentified freighter in the main wharf area, and, on flying over the vessel, had found her riding high in the water. He thus felt that the reported arms had already been unloaded.

The Chairman explained Washington's preference that the suggestion come from the OAS Commission, pointing out that the difference in timing between Palmer's suggested time and the JCS time for opening a corridor would only be some 14 or 15 hours. Therefore, he recommended that the situation be allowed to simmer that much longer.

Palmer replied that the Ambassador felt that there would be some advantage to doing the job now, before the Commission had a chance to settle down, especially since Bennett reported Mora as being sympa-thetic. However, he agreed with the Chairman that the extra time would allow for explanation to the Commission. Also, it would permit utilization of certain psychological warfare equipment, such as loud-speakers and leaflets, which were just now beginning to be landed.

Nevertheless, Palmer strongly urged that the move be undertaken sooner rather than later the next morning, suggesting 0600 or 0700 as the start time, since light came early and people arose early.

Palmer was pleased to hear of the deployment of the fifth and sixth BCTs, since he continued to fear that the Embassy was in danger, placed as it was right on the edge of the ISZ. Inasmuch as the Marine heavy equipment--artillery and tanks--was available there, however, he was sure any attack could be held.

1This statement by Palmer would appear to substantiate the belief, alluded to earlier, held by the G-2 at the 82nd Abn HQ that the original issue of weapons (before the Fortaleza fell) had been made by the government forces and not the rebels.

2EA tapes, 2 May.
As backup for Palmer's position, Ambassador Bennett at 1400 sent a formal endorsement of Palmer's request to establish a corridor, specifying that he had Mora's approval. He asked State to authorize him to have Mora inform Caamaño of the forthcoming operation. It would appear that he had immediate second thoughts on this last point, most probably in view of an almost certain disapproval by Palmer, and so decided not to do so "in view of the military factors."

The formal JCS message which the Chairman had mentioned went out to CINCLANT at 1403. It stated that the JCS desired that U.S. forces be prepared to establish at daylight, on 3 May, a perimeter linking the Marine forces and the airborne troops at the Duarte Bridge. The general trace of the perimeter was that envisioned in Alternative Plan B of JCS 1237. If there were any actions which COMLANDFORDOMREP considered he must undertake that day in order to be prepared to execute the mission at daylight the next morning, he should notify the JCS at once.

To guide Palmer's thinking and to provide a ready response to questions as to the need for the perimeter, the message stated that it was apparent that as U.S. forces increased, a ground LOC between the two U.S. forces would be necessary if we were to be able to capitalize on the use of Haina and San Isidro. Therefore, a secure route between the two forces was militarily mandatory.

The JCS asked what additional forces would be required to maintain the perimeter once established. Lastly, Palmer was ordered not to establish the perimeter until specifically directed.

In anticipation of Palmer's estimate of additional troops to man the perimeter, the JCS directed CINCLANT to place the seventh, eighth, and ninth BCTs of the 82nd Abn in optimum readiness condition for deployment. At 1528, the Chairman, in a conversation with Admiral

---

Footnotes:
1 AmEmb to SecState, 021800Z May 1965, SECRET.
2 AmEmb to SecState, 021844Z May 1965, SECRET.
3 JCS 1251 to CINCLANT, 021803Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
4 JCS 1253 to CINCLANT, 021837Z May 1965, SECRET. It is interesting to note that in a call to JAC in regard to this order, the Vice J-3 explained that the term "optimum readiness" was used rather than a Def-Con level since the "Air Force uses one Def-Con and the Army uses another." This term was flexible and open to interpretation according to circumstances.

---
Moorer, informed him that while no one among the command authorities was inclined to launch the operation that day, there was serious consideration being given to launching it about 6 or 7 a.m. the next morning. 

Therefore, CINCLANT was to prepare to move the Marine battalion as well as the three airborne units.¹

At 1555 the Chairman again called Palmer who told him that with the full agreement of Bennett and Martin he was prepared to move at midnight. The rationale was that the rebels would be worn out from the day's excitement and most of them would be asleep when the U.S. forces began to advance. There would be no warning given, but at daylight the psychological warfare apparatus would go into operation to inform the populace of what had occurred.

The Chairman was clearly concerned that, even with the two additional battalions, Palmer's forces would be stretched dangerously thin. He called Palmer again ten minutes later pointing out that the OAS Commission would not have had time to act by midnight, and that if U.S. troops should be sighted or heard going through the city, serious consequences could occur. (He was, of course, referring to the unpleasant possibility of U.S. forces having to fight a night engagement in city streets against an enemy of unknown strength.) He didn't doubt that Palmer could do it, but rather wondered if there might not be a better way to do it. As to the Commission's not acting, Palmer's response was that the Ambassador was maneuvering to use Mora's acquiescence alone as approval in order to avoid a general discussion of the enterprise with the whole Commission. Palmer reiterated the reasoning that by quickly and quietly doing it, and then by immediately following up with psychological warfare operations and food distribution along the LOC at daybreak, the rebels would be prevented from attacking the U.S. lines.

¹The formal message assigning the 1/8 Marines to forces committed to the Dominican Republic was JCS 1258 to CINCLANT, 0222592 May 1965, SECRET.
He further assured the Chairman that his military judgment, as well as the Ambassador's political judgment, supported the move. A certain sensitivity on the part of the Chairman as to the possible overriding of Palmer's judgment by the Ambassador is apparent here, as the Chairman had asked if this were Palmer's recommendation as well as Bennett's. As to fighting in the dark, Palmer's point was that if the troops were to run into difficulties, they would merely sit out the darkness and then complete the operation by daylight. However, he was convinced it could be done with little or no actual fighting and at least risk to the innocent populace all around.¹

As the event turned out, Palmer received first word of the decision of the White House meeting not from his military superiors. At 0055 on the 3rd, he phoned the Chairman and spoke with the DDO—the Chairman being in a car without a radio on his way back from the White House. Palmer was calling from the Embassy from which Bennett had just spoken with the President and had received the President's approval. Palmer said he would await a call from the Chairman to confirm the decision.²

At that moment, the SecDef interrupted the conversation, apparently not realizing Palmer was on the line, and preempted the line to tell the DDO to inform the Chairman as soon as possible of the decision to

¹EA tapes, 2 May.
²Interview, USCOMMOMREF, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
³At this very same moment, Bennett sent word to State that the OAS Commission agreed and requested authority to move.
2 May

have Palmer go ahead. Palmer was to use the phrase "establish the line of communication." Also, the DDO was to tell the Chairman to deploy the three airborne BCTs and the Marine airlift battalion. The SecDef was in the SecState's office in case clarification was needed.

The DDO replied that he had just been talking with Palmer. The SecDef ordered him not to relay this information to Palmer, but the DDO stated that, while he personally would not do so, Palmer already had received the news from the Embassy. The SecDef commented that the Embassy did not have any authority to issue any order like that.

When the Chairman was notified by the DDO, he questioned the absence of a specified time in the SecDef's instruction, although he assumed it meant at once, but would check with the SecDef to be certain. He was interrupted by his secretary with word that a message for him from Palmer had just arrived, stating that he was prepared to commence the operation anytime after midnight and expected thereby to have established the perimeter and the link-up by daylight, around 0500. A check with the SecDef clarified the fact that Palmer was to move at once.

At 2018 Palmer called the Chairman again and explained that when he and Bennett had returned from their successful meeting with the Commission, the Ambassador had called the President who gave the go-ahead. Palmer, obviously eager to get into action, had called to obtain the JCS authorization. This the Chairman gave with the timing to be left to Palmer.

The Chairman next relayed these instructions to CINCLANT, along with the order to move the three airborne units and the Marine battalion. Twenty minutes later the Vice J-3 similarly relayed them to the Deputy CINCLANT.¹ The formal execute message to Palmer went out at 2140, ordering him to execute the operation starting at any time after midnight 2-3 May, to establish a line of communication from the Duarte Bridge to the ISZ.²

¹EA tapes, 2 May.
²JCS 1261 to CINCLANT, CTF 120, 030140Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
CINCLANT was directed ten minutes later to deploy the last three BCTs, but not to allow these deployments to interfere with the current airlift of essential logistics support of forces already in the Dominican Republic. This last requirement was due to a partial reversal of the situation previously existing. While men were still the prime demand, the rations which they were on were now down to a very austere level, and an effort was under way to improve that supply situation.

The actual achievement of the LOC was anticlimatic, in view of the concern generated by the thought of the operation. Three battalions of the 82nd moved westward shortly after midnight to link up with the Marines who advanced a short distance eastward to meet them. A cryptic message from Palmer at 0304 on the 3rd reported that the link-up had occurred at 0111. There had been no incidents. The operation had taken one hour and 14 minutes.

The route selected (see Figure 2 - Central Santo Domingo), in line with the rationale for the LOC and in light of the cease-fire, was calculated on the basis of the shortest distance and the least rebel resistance. Generally the earlier reconnaissance patrol route was followed. At the western end the LOC deliberately avoided the known hot spot at Avenida Puerto Rico, and instead turned south along Calle San Juan Bosch. Doing so turned out to be a costly decision, since had the more northerly route been taken, the LOC would have had to include Radio Santo Domingo (RSD), the significance of which, according to Palmer, was not so apparent at that time. It is difficult to understand how it could not have been apparent however, since, as the next section will relate, efforts had already begun on the 2nd to jam RSD.

It was also questioned later why Palmer did not go through the heart of the rebel territory on a route which would have encompassed the main banks, the post office, and the main telephone exchange, all

---

1 JCS 1262 to CINCLANT, 030153Z May 1965, SECRET.
2 COMLANDFORORDREP to CINCLANT, 030704Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
3 Connell stated in an interview with the author that he had expected the LOC to include RSD, but that sometime during the night, the lines were changed. He knew who was responsible but would not say.
three of which later became valuable pawns in Caamaño's hands. However, Palmer was convinced that to have taken this route would have meant encountering and having to defeat the main rebel forces. In view of the rationale for the LOC and of the cease-fire, this would not have been permitted by the OAS Commission, whose approval had been made a precondition of the operation by the President.¹

Palmer reported on the operation and on his future plans to Masterson at 0751 on the 3rd. He was preparing to start distributing food that morning along the LOC and was supporting the USIA information effort with psychological warfare equipment. He reported that the previous afternoon the security perimeter of the ISZ had been pushed out on its eastern edge for a distance of two blocks with no opposition, thus providing the Embassy with much better protection.

At daylight, he intended to extend the secure area two blocks north and south of the LOC in order to make it secure from small arms fire. Any civilian or irregular forces entering or crossing the LOC would be disarmed, but he would allow free access along the LOC to the city as far as possible. Palmer realized the potential for trouble in this.

His intention was to weaken any popular support of the rebel forces. The poorer population of the city lying north of the LOC were believed to support the rebels to a greater degree than those in the New City, but the armed rebel elements in this area were relatively weaker in arms and organization. On the other hand, the better-off people south of the LOC did not support the rebels, but the best trained and best armed hard-core rebels were concentrated in the southern part, the commercial heart of the city. He believed the poorer element north of the LOC would be susceptible to the psychological warfare/civilian relief program and that their support of the rebels could be weakened. The existence of the LOC

¹USCOMDOMREP, Report. Also, interview, USCOMDOMREP, Santo Domingo, 9 August 1965.
should tend to dry up rebel resistance north of the LOC. Furthermore, junta "President" Benoit had reported that he had established road blocks to prevent movement of arms from the New City to the countryside.

Palmer commented that he had established solid military liaison with the junta headquarters at San Isidro and would support it to the extent desired by the Ambassador. The morale of the junta forces, he observed, appeared to be rising as a result of U. S. operations.

Now that the LOC was open, Palmer hoped to move heavier equipment overland from San Isidro to establish better communications and staff facilities at his CP near the Embassy. As soon as communications permitted, he would recommend the establishment of Commander U. S. Forces DomRep, "chiefly" under CINCLANT, in accord with the command relations indicated by CINCLANT in his message of 1900 on the 1st.

Ambassador Bennett sent to State a summary of the rationale for the LOC, listing the need for ground access to the airfields from the ISZ, vital to the supply of U. S. troops and for relief distribution, as well as providing for the safety of the Commission as it moved about the city. The entire emphasis was on the humanitarian aspects of the operation, on what it would mean in terms of relief measures.

Another purpose, which was to remain unstated, was to permit the movement of the junta forces at San Isidro across the city to begin a nibbling process from the northwest against the rebel-held northern portion of the city where rebel forces were believed to be weak. Whether this ever did occur became one of the most violently

1 CTF 120 to CJTF 122, 021151Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
2 AmEmb to SecState, 030530Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
3 Interview, CINCLANT, 2 July 1965.
controversial aspects of the whole U. S. intervention. It has not proved possible to ascertain definitely the truth here, since conflicting evidence of solid nature is found on both sides. However, any junta activity was not to come for another ten days.

The paratroopers began the distribution of food during the afternoon of the 3rd to a population who, for the greater part by far, showed their friendliness and gratitude. There was intermittent sniper fire, of course, sometimes heavy and that morning the U. S. casualties had risen to six dead and forty-one wounded. Pursuit of snipers involved the paratroops in house-to-house and rooftop fighting which was conducted extremely well. There was trouble too over the next two days with organized mobs which attempted to enter the LOC. In this period, the original thinly held lines were widened, and with the passage of time these lines became elaborate sandbag, pillbox and wire entanglement complexes.

On a step-by-step basis, a set of rules was developed for the ISZ/LOC. No loyalist or rebel troops, armed or unarmed, would enter the ISZ from any direction, nor would any be allowed to leave the ISZ—a rule necessary because, according to Palmer's report, there were junta troops in the ISZ at the time of the cease-fire—nor would any be allowed to traverse the LOC in either direction, east and west, or cross it, north and south. At established checkpoints on the eastern edge of the ISZ and in the LOC, unarmed individuals (all persons were searched by U. S. soldiers) were allowed to pass back and forth from the rebel zone. Later, a differentiation was made between junta troops and government police, allowing the latter to move in and out of the ISZ and through the LOC with arms on the basis that they were needed to reestablish law and order. The police were not, however, allowed to make arrests within the ISZ.

It is of interest to note that Palmer developed his own rules of engagement, never having received any guidance from the JCS on this.
In mid-June, in response to a query from OSD, the NMCC researched the point and were unable to find any record of such guidance.

The rebel reaction to the LOC when dawn came on the 3rd and they found American troops in their midst was much less violent than we had feared. In fact, later that day, Mora reported that Caamano and his group had made no great outcry in meeting with the OAS Commission about the establishment of the LOC. Caamano had even proposed to the Commission that the rebels and the U.S. forces establish a joint military police service along the line to prevent Americans being shot at.\(^1\)

\(^1\)AmEmb to SecState, 032330Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
XI. THE SITUATION STABILIZES

The establishment of the ISZ was to be, it turned out; the only major planned U.S.-initiated military operation of the whole crisis. The only major military clash was not to come until mid-June, and then it arose from rebel initiative long after the situation had been stabilized. Although it was not fully realized at the time, the LOC had trapped 80 percent of the rebel forces in a fairly confined area. Their entrapment was complete, with food, water, and power supplies in U.S. hands. Rebel morale began to sag at once, although the more farsighted among the rebels had probably realized when the first U.S. Marines came ashore that their cause was hopeless.

It has been stated in an official State Department chronology that two of the extremist groups discussed on 4 May the advisability of withdrawing their top leaders from open activity, and that the leaders of all three extremist groups decided to withdraw 5 May.\(^1\)

This, of course, was not immediately apparent. Palmer maintained a very cautious view. Later during the day of the 3rd he sent Masterson a report on enemy capabilities. The rebels, he felt, had four courses of action and capabilities for each. 1) They could remain in their present area of operations, conducting "determined but mobile" resistance by sniper fire. 2) If the cease-fire were broken, they could conduct attacks with forces numbering up to several hundred, although such coordinated attacks on objectives would be seriously hampered by the lack of tactical communications equipment. 3) If forced from Santo Domingo, the rebels could conduct guerrilla operations at critical locations throughout the country. 4) If forced to flee Santo Domingo,

\(^1\)Congressional Record, Senate, Sept 16, 1965, pp. 23311-14.
they could consolidate their forces in another area of the country, the most likely being Santiago, as it was the only other telephone center in the nation.\(^1\)

As the crisis entered a political phase, it may also be said that the crisis ended. High-level attention reflected this in falling off markedly after the successful and surprisingly simple accomplishment of the LOC. Henceforth, the Dominican Republic was handled as a policy issue without the high urgency which had characterized the first week. The overwhelming force which the U.S. now disposed on the island (probably four times more than both sides combined, by the time the U.S. force levels reached their peak) clearly excluded any threat of a Communist seizure of power or even of a Communist capability to perform serious mischief.

---

A. THE PROBLEM OF RADIO SANTO DOMINGO

Even though the military threat of the rebels had been contained, they still had one weapon which they used with increasing stridency and skill. This was Radio Santo Domingo. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the LOC had narrowly missed including RSD within its limits. Apparently, its location was not known at the time Palmer decided on a route. Intelligence was woefully weak on the subject and the failure of the intelligence agencies to have full information on such a critical facility must be accounted as one of the most serious deficiencies in the whole Dominican affair. It was not even clear until much later that RSD was not a single station, but was several facilities in different locations -- studios, outlets, and transmitter sites.

\(^1\) COMLANDFORDOMREP to CJTF 122, 032053Z May 1965, SECRET.
The subject of jamming RSD had apparently been under consideration from the beginning, but it was not until around 1000 on the 2nd that the CJCS informed the J-3 that the high command would like to try jamming. The rationale was that RSD was being used for propaganda purposes, and effectively so, while Radio San Isidro, the junta-controlled radio, was not. Jamming operations, however, should not hamper our own communications.

There was a mobile capability for jamming available, both in the form of a naval vessel and of aircraft. The CJCS wanted these equipments located and used first. However, the impression in the JCS was that conventional military resources could do a great deal of the jamming because of the frequencies which the rebels were using. There was one critical caveat -- the jamming must be done without detection. While the rebels would know at once that they were being jammed, they might not be able to pin the blame on the U.S. unequivocally. Therefore, any inquiries were to be denied.

The JCS directed CINCLANT early in the afternoon of the 2nd to employ all resources to jam RSD to the maximum extent.

commenced jamming at 1600 that day.  

Jamming operations were conducted with both Army equipment ashore and Navy equipment afloat over the next several days. From the start it proved difficult and only partially effective, so that from the 4th on consideration was given to the use of more direct means to deny RSD to the rebels. Palmer planned to use Special Forces units, but was told to wait for further consideration since any overt move of this sort could upset the new formal cease-fire which was signed

\[1\] JCS 1249 to CINCLANT, 021734Z May 1965, SECRET.
\[2\] JTF 122 to CINCLANT, 022336Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
on the 5th. It took several days to determine whether or not the jamming was effective. In the interim there was clearly no enthusiasm either in Washington or at CINCLANT for a more forceful approach to the problem.

It was even feared in State that the jamming alone could be counterproductive and inquiries were made by USIA as to whether or not jamming could be done on a selective basis. For example, USIA suggested that while voice broadcasts should be jammed, funeral dirges should not. (Presumably RSD was playing dirges in honor of the fallen rebels.) In passing this selective jamming instruction to CINCLANT, the CJCS said he "did not know particularly why dirges should be so honored and he didn't care to pursue the subject much further."

Suddenly at noon on the 4th the jamming was ordered halted, and consideration given to putting RSD out of business by simply cutting off all power to it, the Santo Domingo power plant being in U.S. hands. However, it was decided this could have serious adverse consequences, since there was no way selectively to cut off power to RSD alone. Furthermore, restoration of power to the whole city was seen as a major step toward normalcy. It was learned a couple of days later that RSD had auxiliary power facilities anyway.

Later on the 4th jamming was ordered renewed by USIA, following the results of a survey by a newly arrived technical team, which indicated that, theoretically, jamming could be fully effective.
It is not clear whether such a plan was devised, as events overtook the order. On the 13th junta aircraft, without the prior knowledge of U.S. authorities, attacked RSD and its main transmitter sites near the Peñado Bridge in a successful raid from which RSD

1USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 090045Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
2JCS to CINCLANT, 132311Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
never fully recovered. To smash further the rebel capability, junta special forces destroyed the #2 alternate studio and transmitter site north of the Duarte Bridge on the 14th. Thereafter, the rebels were denied effective broadcasts to the country as a whole and could only reach the city with a weak signal. Nevertheless, they did retain some capability which we were never able to destroy completely.

The whole jamming episode is a confused one. Information on the rebel radio facilities was so sparse that there probably never was a really clear picture in Washington of the situation. As late as the afternoon of the 9th, for example, a week after the jamming issue was first raised, State cabled the Embassy for answers to four questions. If the RSD studios only some four blocks from the LOC were in friendly hands, would the rebels be unable to broadcast or could they establish studios elsewhere? Where is the precise location of the broadcasting tower or towers used by RSD? If the tower or towers are farther removed from the rebel zone than the studios, would their possession or destruction be a more efficient way of taking RSD off the air? How about the OAS taking over all radio facilities?

It is interesting to note that Bennett's reply stated that it was his and Palmer's joint judgment that the best way permanently to deny facilities was to have the OAS Commission require that all radio facilities in the country be placed under its control.

There was the other side of the propaganda coin, namely, U.S. efforts against the rebels. The U.S. effort really didn't get under way until the LOC was put through. By then Bennett was seriously concerned over the effectiveness of RSD. He called State on the morning of the 3rd about the need to communicate more with the

1 U.S. troops, initially thinking they were being attacked, shot down one of the aircraft.
2 USCINDOMREP Report.
3 SecState to AmEmb, 0918402 May 1965, SECRET.
4 AmEmb to SecState, 1102152 May 1965, SECRET.
TOP SECRET

Dominican people. They were friendlier to the U.S. than most Latin Americans, he felt, but the Communists were "pulling out the stops to change these attitudes" by whipping up a superficial form of anti-Americanism. There were only a few manifestations of change so far, and Bennett did not think the anti-American campaign would succeed. Nevertheless, the facts of the situation had to be presented to the Dominican people soon.\(^1\)

The military psychological warfare program was placed under the control of a USIA officer who arrived on 4 May. As overall information controller, he also directed the jamming and other efforts aimed at denying the rebels their propaganda capability. There was initially some concern among the military when their operations were subordinated to USIA, but relationships developed smoothly and harmoniously.

In the long run the RSD story has a distinctive Dominican fairy tale flavor. The U.S. ceased jamming rebel transmitters on 24 May and, as part of the negotiations effort, thereafter the rebels were allowed equal radio time. This, however, was not on RSD but on OAS-developed broadcasting facilities, since Imbert reneged on his promise to turn over RSD, captured in his 14-21 May drive, to OAS control, and proceeded during the summer to use RSD for increasing critical comment on the U.S. presence.\(^2\)

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

When the LOC was put through, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was already six days old. International political reactions had developed which initially caused the U.S. as much concern as the political situation with the Dominican Republic itself.

It was Latin America and the OAS which formed the focus of U.S. efforts to defend its actions. At the 1 May meeting of the OAS Council when the resolution establishing the Peace Commission had been passed, the Council had voted down a resolution demanding the

\(^1\)AmEmb to SecState, 0311352 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^2\)USCOMDOMREP, Report.
withdrawal of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the diplomatic investigation
launched by the U.S. to ascertain sentiment in Latin American capitals
for the formation of an inter-American military force to take a role
in Santo Domingo found discouragingly little favor.

To promote this suggestion further and to present justifications
for the U.S. intervention, Ambassador-at-Large Harriman was dispatched
to Latin America to visit Peru, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil. The
former Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Mr. Moscoso, was
sent on a similar mission to Mexico and Venezuela.

The U.S. formally offered a resolution to the OAS Council on 3
May, authorizing formation of an inter-American force. The resolution
requested OAS members to make military contingents available to the
"meeting of consultation of the Foreign Ministers." These forces
were to assist the OAS Peace Commission to carry out its mission of
reestablishing peace and normal conditions in the Dominican Republic.
The U.S. hoped that its own forces could be merged into the OAS force.
The initial reception was mixed and only Brazil made a provisional
commitment of troops.

The problem of "internationalizing" the situation and thereby
placing an OAS imprimatur on the U.S. military presence was not helped
by a statement by the President on 3 May in which he said the U.S. did
not intend to allow the Communists to set up any government. The
implication was of a very general U.S. right to intervention. The
already extensive and vocal criticism of the U.S. intervention grew,
even more intense at what was termed the new "Johnson Doctrine."
Other administration spokesmen backed away from this implied position
and offered explanations that the feeble political structure in the
Dominican Republic made it a special case, and that similar uprisings
elsewhere in Latin America would not automatically result in such
hasty intervention.

In this statement the President backed away from his earlier
dogmatic assertion that the Communists had actually seized control
of the revolt. He said only that they had tried to take control.
Other U.S. Government officials also began to indicate that the issue of the degree of Communist participation and control had never really been clear. Nevertheless, they insisted that there were certainly Communists present and so rather than wait for further evidence, a delay which could have been crucial, it was decided to intervene on the basis that prevention was much easier than cure.

However, the reaction to the implications of the President's comments showed that the Latin Americans were less convinced than ever. Despite this general fence-sitting position of the OAS states, there actually was remarkably little overt hostile reaction to the U.S. intervention. The warnings which State had earlier sent to all Latin American posts, and for their transmission to American businessmen in those countries, proved unnecessary. There were no serious riots or dangerous demonstrations anywhere in the continent, although standard student demonstrations did occur in Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago.

In the meantime, the U.N. Security Council met on 3 May at the demand of the Soviet government for an emergency meeting. The Soviet Union introduced a resolution condemning the U.S. and demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces on the grounds of open armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. Only the Uruguayan delegate supported the Soviet demand for withdrawal. Generally the Security Council supported the U.S. contention that the OAS was the proper organ through which to control the crisis and that it was already successfully doing so.

Ambassador Stevenson told the Council that the U.S. intervention had two aims: to protect U.S. lives and to give the inter-American system a chance to deal with a situation within its competence. He said that there had been no time for deliberate consultation and for the organization of international machinery which did not already
exist. He also gave the Council a list of three Communist-oriented political parties and nine Communist leaders who were trying to win control of the Dominican Republic.

It was not until 6 May that the U.S. attempt to create an OAS force succeeded when the ministerial meeting of the OAS voted 14-5 for the U.S. resolution with Venezuela abstaining. It was a bare two-thirds majority, but was, nevertheless, accounted a diplomatic victory for the U.S. Venezuela, Paraguay and Costa Rica immediately offered armed forces. The U.S., to gain the necessary votes, had promised to withdraw some of its forces as soon as OAS force units could replace them and to place the entire U.S. force under the nominal control, although not active command, of the OAS.

The resolution in effect transformed the U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic from a national to an international force, which was the most immediate of the U.S. objectives in offering the resolution.

C. THE POLITICAL SCENE IN SANTO DOMINGO

Within the city, even before the LOC had gone through, there were signs that the mass weight of U.S. armament was already stabilizing things. One indicator was that at noon on the 2nd the Ambassador recommended to State that the evacuation which had been going on continuously since 27 April be halted and all embassies be so notified. He commented that all the foreign nationals arriving at the Embajador up to the previous evening had been evacuated and that a substantial number of foreigners but only a few Americans continued to arrive at the Hotel for evacuation. The majority of those now arriving were

\[1\] Venezuela's actions were generally curious. On 3 May two Venezuelan destroyers appeared in Santo Domingo and moved thence to San Juan with no clear explanation of their mission. Baffled U.S. Navy officers made provision for their participation in TF 124, but the two ships suddenly departed on 7 May, without having joined the TF.

The only other non-U.S. presence in the area up to this point had been that of the Canadian cruiser, HMCS Annapolis, which had arrived 1 May and remained in the Dominican Republic—Puerto Rico area prepared to evacuate Canadian nationals.
noted, to be from countries with long waiting lists for immigration visas to the United States, and many of those seeking evacuation were found to have been on the immigration lists for years. Because of this suspicious development, the reduction in danger to U.S. and foreign nationals, and the availability of hotel accommodations in the ISZ, Bennett recommended ending the evacuation. If it were continued, there would be another 300-450 waiting to leave that day.¹

By midday on the 3rd the OAS Commission had had time to look around. Mr. Bowdler of State, who had been assigned to support the Commission, reported their first reactions. They were appalled, he said, over conditions, and the Ambassadors of their own countries had told them that only the arrival of U.S. forces had saved the country from "chaos and a bloodbath." The initial reaction among the Commission and their advisors was that traditional attitudes toward non-intervention were "pure romanticism", and they were already talking among themselves in terms of a much greater OAS involvement.²

Bennett was also working at the problem of convincing not only the Commission, but as many other nations as possible. He reported that he had offered at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps to transmit communications for any of his foreign colleagues "interested in getting to their capitals the truth about what was happening."³

Taking advantage of the Commission's first reaction, State on the afternoon of the 3rd told Bennett that an expansion of the ISZ, to include embassies not now included inside the safe area, was under consideration. He was asked to have the Ambassadors of such embassies both ask the OAS Commission to seek rebel agreement not to obstruct such an expansion and also notify their respective Foreign Offices.⁴

¹AmEmb to SecState, 021515Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
²AmEmb to SecState, 031450Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
³AmEmb to SecState, 0311352 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
⁴SecState to AmEmb, 0320492 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The Ambassador reported the next day that this had been done. The OAS Commission had raised the issue with Caamaño who had agreed. Accordingly, the JCS authorized CJTF 122 at 1800 on the 4th to extend the western edge of the ISZ four blocks to the east. The expansion included within the ISZ the Ecuadorian and Salvadorian embassies, but the British, German, and Japanese embassies were too far downtown to be included. Palmer told CINCLANT that he would be prepared to make random patrols to these three embassies if it appeared feasible for insurance purposes.

Once the expansion move was undertaken it was resisted by some snipers, and the rebels claimed it was a violation of the cease-fire. An OAS spokesman denied this, pointing out that the rebel commanders had agreed on the 3rd to the extension and had then even suggested additional blocks be added to assure safety from snipers. The rebel agreement was in the form of a note to the Commission and on this basis the Marines had advanced. Nevertheless, the job was carried through with only this light resistance and completed by nightfall on the 4th.

With the rebels penned in by U.S. forces, the chief American concern was to get some sort of government into operation both to erode rebel strength and to restore some measure of normality to the capital. On the morning of the 3rd State sent its thoughts and suggestions to Bennett and Martin. It seemed essential and urgent to State that the U.S.: (a) continue to avoid alienating the junta forces which were the only organized group in the country favorable to the U.S. position; and (b) that we begin to create an organization for building up as broad a base of popular support as possible for whatever provisional government might emerge from the present crisis. However, both Bennett and Martin had agreed that political hatreds were such as to leave little hope that the junta as presently

---
1 JCS 1409 to CINCLANT, 042149Z May 1965, SECRET.
2 EA tapes.
constituted was the right group around which the Dominicans were likely to rally. State suggested a four-part program.

In line with a suggestion of Bennett, the junta could be expanded by two to five respected noncontroversial Dominicans, predominantly or wholly civilian. This would be a delicate operation and would have to be done in such a way as not to antagonize the junta. State offered a list of possible candidates with this suggestion. The junta should also consider whether it would be feasible to strengthen and unify command of the four branches of the armed forces so as to have a better base for reconstruction of the armed forces and police, which could then command the respect of the people and begin to restore order.

Thirdly, State suggested that the junta might organize temporary "Councils of the Provinces" which could assist in organizing and controlling the distribution of relief, thereby helping to get U.S. personnel into the countryside. Lastly, Bennett was asked whether there was any possibility of some kind of trusteeship, involving distinguished Latin Americans not of Dominican nationality. This was not likely, but should nonetheless be considered. Betancourt of Venezuela and Figueres of Costa Rica had suggested the idea.¹

Bennett's attitude toward the rebels, and, to a degree, toward the junta too, was by the end of the 3rd fairly stern. He felt that Martin's public statement the day before to the effect that the rebels were now dominated by the Communists, a belief fully supported by the Embassy, had "made the position crystal clear. In our judgment, the new position leads us to the inescapable conclusion that we cannot now negotiate with the rebel leaders. Negotiations with the Communists can be justified when we have something to gain. Here we haven't. The rebels are hemmed in." Bennett was convinced that the American position and strength left the U.S. free to do things

¹State to AmEmb, 0314592 May 1965, SECRET.
it thought ought to be done without prior consultation with the rebel leaders.

At the same time, Bennett pointed out, we were dealing with a weak junta which owed its survival to the U.S. We should not alienate the junta but we should move to influence the development of a smaller more professional military establishment which could serve as a constructive force in rehabilitating the country. He emphasized that Martin's statement had put the U.S. in a favorable position in dealing with both rebels and "loyalists" alike. This fact should be a basic principle in our future diplomatic and military efforts.¹

However, it must be said in Bennett's defense that he was under no illusions as to the worth of the junta. His direct reply to the above-mentioned State message revealed his sentiments. He agreed that the junta held little prospect for rallying popular support. Above all it needed a couple of civilian members. Bennett stated flatly that the "old guard generals" must be ousted. The U.S. could not afford to be "overly solicitous as to junta sensitivities on the

¹AmEmb to SecState, 040630Z May 1965, SECRET.
point of the composition of the military leadership. The most important problem was Wessin's retirement which should be encouraged but may not be possible."

The potentially risky situation in the provinces required action too. Work projects should be undertaken as soon as possible to provide employment, and relief supplies were in demand. Local governments should be supported and the desperate need to provide back pay for workers should be satisfied.

As to State's suggestion about using non-Dominican "wise men", he felt this would be ticklish. The Dominicans would resent any such arrangement and even a direct OAS trusteeship did not appear feasible at this point.¹

A few hours later Bennett made a few recommendations. He claimed that the lack of reaction in the countryside showed that there was simply no popular national demand for Bosch. The majority of the people in the rebel zone were private individuals who were tired of the whole affair. The first priorities were to restore the government to a functioning organization and to restore the capital to normal. In pursuit of the first, the junta should be dealt with as the de facto successor to the Reid Cabral triumvirate government. As to the second, the U.S. should not impede movement, but should open the city to free traffic, subject to arms search. To reduce the number of loose weapons, the Ambassador suggested that ten dollars be offered for each weapon turned in to U.S. forces.

He concluded his message with a few comments on the communications problem facing him. In the earlier period of genuine urgency and crisis, his communications had been generally adequate, but now with the greatly increased number of American officials coming into Santo Domingo and having to communicate with Washington, a serious

¹AmEmb to SecState, 0407152 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
situation had developed. All channels to and from the Dominican Republic were overloaded and running hours late. For example, the first section of the text of the President's 2 May speech had been received at 1030 on 3 May, but the final section was not received until 2240 that day. Bennett was there without this important material all that day. Telephone, Bennett stated, was just as unsatisfactory as were Defense message channels. Not only did these delays affect his operations, but a serious public relations problem was developing with correspondents who tended to blame delays on the official U.S. monopoly of facilities.¹

Up to this point the Bennett-Martin relationship with the OAS Commission had gone very well, with the Commission during its first day supporting the U.S. down the line. However, Bennett reported at 0400 on the 4th, after the first Commission meeting with the rebels, that the shift in the Commission's attitude which he had feared might take place when the "Communists talked to the OAS" had indeed occurred. The previous night, on their arrival, the Commission was thinking of finding a political solution to a most urgent situation. Today, Bennett reported, they had fastened on the idea of drafting a new cease-fire drawn up in great detail as to the delineation of zones occupied by the three forces (rebel, junta, and U.S.) and requiring obligations not to alter zones without the Commission's agreement.

Bennett felt this was a grave and exceedingly disadvantageous development which would tie U.S. hands. The Commission, he was sure, failed to see how a detailed cease-fire would play into the hands of the rebels. Furthermore, he suspected that behind the Commission's attitude was a reluctance to assume responsibility for making a recommendation that would in effect be an endorsement of U.S. military intervention. One member had told Bennett that "we recognize the imperative need for what you have done, but as Latin Americans it makes us very unhappy."²

¹AmEmb to SecState, 041134Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
²AmEmb to SecState, 040810Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
At this point the rebels executed an extremely shrewd political maneuver. On the day before, the 3rd, Bosch had announced from Puerto Rico that a constitutional congress in Santo Domingo had elected Col. Caamaño president of the Dominican Republic under provisions of the constitution in effect when Bosch himself was deposed. The congressmen had voted 49-10 in Caamaño's favor.

It would appear that the Embassy did not take this development seriously and, in truth, it certainly did have a rather hollow ring. At any rate, the following day Caamaño was indeed formally sworn in as president in a full ceremony. Bosch had apparently given up his rights so that congress could elect a "constitutional president", and Caamaño would serve out the unfinished balance of Bosch's term.

That the rebels had pulled off a coup is clearly evident from the urgent tones in Embassy and State cables on the matter. Bennett conceded that the rebels had seized the political initiative by announcing the formation of a provisional government. He urged that fast action be taken to counter the move. He had decided to suggest a broad-based junta including respected civilians representing all important sectors of Dominican society. The new junta would be headed by Imbert who appeared to the Embassy as the only man with the qualities to establish the authority of the new government. Bennett had begun a series of wide-ranging conversations toward this end.

State, in turn, warned all Latin American embassies that it anticipated efforts by the new Caamaño government to seek recognition from the Latin American states. All posts were to discourage such recognition by "active measures". It was to be pointed out that the rebel government was a rump, a facade only, since the rebels controlled only a small portion of Santo Domingo and held no sway outside the capital.

---

2AmEmb to SecState, 041730Z May 1965, SECRET.
3SecState to all Latin American embassies, 042103Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Soon after midnight on the 5th Bennett reported some second thoughts on the sudden turn of events. He saw in the rebel proclamation of the provisional government a sign of weakness, sensing that it was actually intended to counter the U.S. establishment of the LOC. It was an effort, in short, to create an image in the face of overwhelming U.S. strength and of increasing rebel defections.

Nevertheless, he was taking immediate steps to promote the formation of a new provisional regime to replace the junta which had patently proven ineffective. What he sought was a "Government of National Reconstruction" (GNR), but his efforts were being hampered by a lack of civic mindedness and by the dominance of personal interests. He was trying first outside the forum of the OAS but would consult with them the next day if he had not yet achieved success.

He repeated that the Commission was now primarily interested in codifying the cease-fire, which would tie U.S. hands and create a serious problem.¹

By the end of the 4th the Commission had prepared a draft of a new cease-fire, called the Act of Santo Domingo, which they presented to Bennett, asking U.S. cooperation in making it an effective instrument. The Ambassador cabled State that he felt a new cease-fire document was unnecessary and reiterated his conviction that it would reduce U.S. freedom of action. Yet the U.S. could not put itself in the position of refusing the Commission request. He suggested that he be authorized to deliver a note to the Commission, declaring that the U.S. had been cooperating under the 30 April cease-fire and would continue to lend full cooperation to the work of the Commission. Palmer concurred in this recommendation.²

¹AmEmb to SecState, 050515Z May 1965, SECRET. It is interesting to note that as the crisis aged, the classification of Embassy messages was raised. In the early stages "unclassified" or "confidential" had been the rule, but with the great swarm of newsmen wandering around the Embassy, it was found that they were actually reading the Ambassador’s mail and then reporting it verbatim in the public press. Consequently, every subsequent account of the crisis is filled with direct quotes from Embassy or State messages.
²AmEmb to SecState, 050255Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The Act of Santo Domingo was signed by the junta and the rebels, but not by the U.S., late on the 5th. Presumably Bennett's method of avoiding signature had succeeded. Bennett was very disturbed, however, by the Commission's reference to the rebel government as the "constitutional government", a term which, though they affected it, he felt gave them unwarranted status.¹

The act stated that parties who subscribed to the act:

"1. Would ratify the cease-fire of 30 April.

"2. Accept establishment of the ISZ.

"3. Assume the obligation of especially respecting the ISZ within which there is guaranteed, in a form which the OAS considers convenient, adequate protection and security of all persons who find themselves in that zone of refuge.

"4. Assume the obligation of giving necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or the international agency which the OAS designates in order to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or in the Dominican Republic the distribution of food or medicines sent as a result of the appeal made by the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

The parties also assume the obligation to provide all facilities which the OAS might request so that medical and public health personnel which the governments send can go to any part of Santo Domingo or the Dominican Republic to render their services.

"5. Assume the obligation of giving all necessary guarantees for the evacuation of those asylees from the Embassies or diplomatic missions which are requested.

"6. Assume the obligation of respecting the diplomatic missions and giving all the necessary cooperation to guarantee the security of all the personnel in those missions and the persons who have asylum or refuge in them.

"7. Declare to accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Commission appointed by the meeting of foreign ministers for the purpose of the faithful fulfillment of what is agreed to in this document."²

The act changed nothing as far as the U.S. was concerned, but only aided the rebels by providing them with an OAS status. Once the act was signed, four members of the Commission returned to Washington, leaving one member with Secretary General Mora to observe the maintenance of the agreement.

¹AmEmb to SecState, 050200Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
²AmEmb to SecState, 050250Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
The U.S. political effort about this time had three objectives: to undermine the rebel "government"; to establish a government of its own choice; to continue to attempt to justify the U.S. intervention.

The effort to undo the effects of the formation of Caamaño's "constitutional government" continued full scale, with State providing other agencies with arguments to be used to discourage any foreign recognition. In a circular telegram to DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH

AmEmb to SecState, 0796302 May 1965, SECRET.
and the White House on the 6th, State asserted that the U.S. refused to recognize any legality in the Caamaño government. It had no basis in fact, since the Bosch constitution had been superseded and the country governed by the junta under the previous 1962 constitution. Even the OAS had recognized this. Caamaño personally had no claim to the presidency. He had no control over the country, he had held no offices in line to the presidency, nor was he even a member of Bosch's party.1

The third aspect of the U.S. political endeavor, the creation of a Government of National Reconstruction, proved immensely difficult. The Ambassador's main problem lay in persuading good men to serve in the new government. The bitter truth was that the country was pitifully short of leadership resources, so that "good" candidates were men who in other societies would have been far beneath consideration for a senior government role. Bennett put it well when he said that there was a desperate shortage of good men to begin with and that when one had been found, he was reluctant to serve. "There were few good ones willing to serve, but a lot of poor ones more than willing." He did feel, however, that the junta had been impressed with the fact that the U.S. was not going to support the "old regime."2

1SecState to DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, White House, 062133Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
2AmEmb to SecState, 060245Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
The concern about the countryside remained constant despite any concrete intelligence on which to base it. On the 8th State alerted Bennett and his relief distributor, Mr. Solomon of State, that the rebels were reported to be "gaining ground in La Romana." Food was short and steps should be taken to assist if investigation proved a need. State urged that the Embassy be especially alert to rebel activities in other areas outside the capital and be ready to act decisively to counter any.2

It might be mentioned here parenthetically that some American officials retrospectively felt that the countryside had been overwhelmingly in favor of Bosch's revolt, but that the fact that the police and military apparatus in the countryside remained intact and passive led to a similar general passivity and a fence-sitting role only.

By 8 May Bennett, by Herculean efforts, had managed to organize a new government, headed by Imbert, which was sworn in that day. Imbert asked all civil servants to return to work on the 10th so that public services could be restored, promising that salaries would be started that day. He also said that "the U.S. had not been consulted about his appointment" and that when an OAS force arrived, he wanted

4 SecState to AmEmb, 081949Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
U.S. troops to leave as soon as possible. Later he amended this statement to the effect that he considered U.S. forces part of the OAS force and so they could stay in the country until peace was fully established.

The State Department announced that the U.S. would recognize neither government at the moment, and intended to withhold any recognition until the OAS machinery had been moved into the country to restore order.

The Ambassador was hopeful of results. He felt that the creation of the Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) had recaptured the political initiative and if it could be made to function, time would no longer be on the side of the rebels. He so stated in his morning sitrep to the President on the 8th. He hoped that over the weekend the GNR could accomplish some priority tasks such as the removal of Wessin and other "defunct" generals, the start of disarmament of the rebels under OAS auspices, and payment of civil servants, steps which might materially affect the GNR's image and the "U.S. decision in regard to recognition."2

The GNR did indeed take two of the needed steps. It promised, as mentioned above, to begin paying civil servants (the U.S. providing

1 AmEmb to White House, 081144Z May 1965, SECRET.
2 AmEmb to SecState, 081535Z May 1965, SECRET.
the funds) and it exiled six of the old guard generals, including Montas Guerrero, to Puerto Rico, and retired two more. By their performance, neither heroic nor even professionally competent, there was general agreement among U.S. officials that these people deserved no better. By deserting Reid and allowing the government to collapse, they were in great measure responsible for the ensuing calamity. However, expectations in regard to Wessin were not so satisfactorily fulfilled. Wessin at first led Bennett to believe he would resign, but on the 11th Bennett learned that he had changed his mind and had refused to leave. Imbert supported him. The Ambassador was furious over what he considered a "definite double cross by Imbert," in addition to Wessin's breaking of his own word. Wessin had earlier expressed his willingness to resign in a formal letter to Bennett, but had apparently changed his position following a conference with Imbert.

However, rather than directly challenge Wessin and Imbert, State recommended that the issue of Wessin's resignation be left as a matter between him and Imbert, for fear that it would damage the GNR "if it appeared that the U.S. was calling the shots." By the 10th Bennett and Palmer both evinced optimistic expectations that the situation would rapidly improve. The GNR would grow in strength while the trapped rebels would gradually drift away and their position erode to a point at which the GNR could reassert its control. It actually seemed as though they considered an early surrender as likely.

However, Martin appears to have disagreed with them. He pointed out in a long cable on the 10th that the basic problem remained, even after the old guard military men had been shipped out. The revolt

---

1 AmEmb to SecState, 091743Z May 1965, SECRET.
2 AmEmb to SecState, 110530Z May 1965, SECRET.
3 State to AmEmb, 110506Z May 1965, SECRET.
against the Reid government had been, at the outset, almost surely an attempt by the PRD leaders and others to reverse the coup against Bosch of September 23, 1963. At the time of that coup, the people did not protest. "The ideas of social and economic justice which Bosch promulgated, however, did mobilize the latent and legitimate revolutionary aspirations of the Dominican people, especially among the young." These were now being mobilized once more by the rebels. The GNR, Martin thought, might meet this problem by instituting wide reforms and by divorcing itself from discredited politicians and generals. He felt that Imbert could provide the strong hand needed now, and that current measures represented a good program, but only temporarily.

Martin stated that the situation had passed through two stages since his arrival - (1) the military cease fire to stop the bloodshed, (2) the formation of the GNR as an entity to counter the rebel government. We were now in a third stage, the political-military propaganda struggle between the rebels and the GNR. He then analyzed the comparative positions of the rebels and the GNR.

As for the rebels, he frankly stated that it was virtually impossible to assess their position with confidence. The Papal Nuncio and Secretary General Mora, and others, believed that Caamaño realized his defeat and wanted out, but was a virtual prisoner of the extremists. On the other hand, other sources, "equally reliable and in some ways better informed," said the rebels were confident of victory. It was not impossible, Martin warned, that both views contained truth and changed from hour to hour. He said that he had quietly opened lines to Caamaño in an effort to arrange his surrender or at least to open negotiations with Imbert, but with little real hope of success.

Unquestionably, Martin felt, the rebels held a major propaganda advantage, especially through RSD. The demonstrations being daily organized were not so much pro-Bosch as anti-American. The rebels
were linking in the public mind constitutionality with food and jobs, and were striving to consolidate their political position as champion of the masses against the U.S. military - San Isidro military - upper-class and middle-class government. They were far ahead of us in this contest.

As to the GNR, Martin spoke of the struggle to find good men while trying to rid the GNR of its "old guard image". To help counter the rebel image of the GNR as just another "reactionary business-class government with a military strong man overlay," Martin admitted that "the Ambassador and I had helped arrange and the Attaches helped carry out the deportation of the old generals, and tomorrow or tonight that of Wessin who has become a symbol, rightly or wrongly, to the masses of military opposition to constitutionality and the aspirations of the masses."

Martin suggested an interim policy for the U.S. for the next couple of weeks which called for all-out support of the GNR short of recognition, meanwhile waiting to see if any new political constellations or figures appear, free of Communist domination, who might mobilize the aspirations of the masses. He believed bloodshed had "destroyed" the old parties and political figures, and he warned that the U.S. be careful not to get locked into any firmer a position than his recommended policy would do.

As to U.S. troops, even though the cloak of the OAS force helped greatly, he recommended that we get U.S. forces out as soon as possible and make every effort to avoid a full-scale military occupation, even under the OAS auspices, unless nothing else could prevent a Communist take-over. By as soon as possible, he meant, hopefully, six months or less, or as long as it took a Dominican government to restore order and for us to help it retrain and restructure its armed forces.

He gloomily forecast that whatever government emerged, the U.S. must continue playing a strong political role in the Dominican Republic.
It must retain troops there as long as necessary. The process of disintegration, Martin asserted, had gone so far that the Dominican Republic alone could not reorganize its affairs for a long time without assistance. ¹

Ambassador Martin remained on the scene for four more days and then departed for good on the 14th.

¹ AmEmb(Martin) to SecState, 100520Z May 1965, SECRET.
XII. CONCLUDING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

During these days of negotiation and political activity, the several incomplete aspects of the military picture were filled out.

A. COMMAND ORGANIZATION

It will be recalled that Palmer had assumed control of all Army and Marine forces at 1700 on the 1st, although he was unable, because of communications problems, to exercise full command right away. He was to be COMLANDFORDOMREP, but this title was dropped in favor of CTF 120. Palmer's difficulties in taking over his command and the consequent confusion in information flow led to an insistence from Washington that a more direct relationship be arranged speedily.

On the 4th, CINCLANT directed a new set of command relationships to be effective at 0100 on the 5th. These were to be interim arrangements only. Palmer with the Army and Marine units now assigned to CTF 120 would report directly to CINCLANT as CTF 120 and COMLANDFORDOMREP. He was to use the title CTF 120 in all his communications. Masterson was to retain the command of JTF 122 with the forces currently assigned less those assigned to Palmer's command.¹

In short, Palmer had become co-equal with Masterson who commanded TF 121 and TF 124. In the case of the latter, Captain Dare who had commanded TG 44.9 from the very outbreak of the crisis, was replaced on the 4th by Vice Admiral McCain, Commander Amphibious Forces Atlantic. McCain was senior to Masterson but nevertheless was willing to operate under him.

This was an intermediate step toward the final establishment of USCOMDOMREP. There was apparently some disagreement on Masterson's

¹CINCLANT to CJTF 122 and CTF 120, 041808Z May 1965, SECRET.
FIGURE 4. Command Structure 5-7 May
role. CINCLANT later complained that the intermediate step had been unnecessary and bothersome, that the placing of all ground forces under Palmer prior to the dissolution of CJTF 122, had produced no substantial benefits and had unnecessarily confused command lines for three days. CINCLANT's position was that JTF 122, including the land forces (CTF 120), should have remained intact until USCOMDOMREP, as eventually constituted, was ready to assume command.

USCOMDOMREP was not activated until 7 May. CINCLANT claimed that the key to this was the availability of Palmer's communications facilities, that the delay had been with Palmer's full agreement, and that there was no alternative but to keep the overall control on the scene in the hands of CJTF 122 who did have complete communications facilities aboard his flagship.

This position has been disputed on the basis of solid evidence. Masterson's communications throughout the crisis had repeatedly proved inadequate, and by the time he moved to the NEWPORT NEWS, the crisis had passed. Secondly, his separation from the Embassy, the heart of the U.S. operation, had been a constant difficulty.

It will be noted that under the interim structure Masterson was left in command of the Air Force Task Force. Palmer strongly opposed this and insisted upon full control of all in-country forces.

The final reorganization occurred on the 7th. Effective 1200 that day JTF 122 was dissolved. TF 120 was also dissolved and Palmer "with the Army forces under his command" was designated Commander U.S. Forces in Dominican Republic (USCOMDOMREP). In addition to the Army forces, the CINCLANT message ordering the new command arrangement rather ambiguously stated that elements of the AF forces, naval forces, MAAG, and JACC within the country would be "attached to" USCOMDOMREP. While the Marines weren't specifically mentioned they, with the Army troops, were to be under Palmer's command.
FIGURE 5. Command Structure after 7 May 1965
As U.S. forces presently within the Dominican Republic were relieved, detached, or withdrawn, and departed the country, they were to revert to the command of the appropriate component commander-in-chief under CINCLANT. As additional forces were furnished for duty within the country, they would become elements of the Army forces under USCOMDOMREP, or became elements of the AF forces, naval forces, MAAG, or JACCC attached to USCOMDOMREP. The instruction stated that it was its intent that all Army, Navy, and Air Force forces physically within the Dominican Republic come under USCOMDOMREP and that Army, Navy, and Air Force forces designated for Power Pack but not physically located within the Dominican Republic remain under their component commanders-in-chief under CINCLANT.

USCOMDOMREP would:

a. Conduct military operations as directed by CINCLANT.

b. Conduct civil affairs and paywar as directed by CINCLANT in coordination with the Ambassador.

c. Coordinate military operations with recognized Dominican military leaders to the extent that this did not contravene the aims of the U.S.

d. Operate, or delegate the operation of a JACCC in the Dominican Republic for all air operations entering, over, or departing the Dominican Republic.

e. CTF 121 and CTF 124 would remain under CINCAFLANT and CINCLANTFLT respectively to support USCOMDOMREP. USCOMDOMREP was directed to effect direct liaison with CTF 121 and CTF 124 to levy operational support requirements, keeping CINCLANT and respective component commanders-in-chief informed. The instruction stated that CTF 121 and CTF 124 support USCOMDOMREP.

CINCLANT reserved the prerogative of directing, through the component commanders-in-chief, the actions of CTF 121 and CTF 124
should there be a military involvement with other powers in the Caribbean.\footnote{CINCLANT to CINCAPLANT, CINCARLANT, CTF 122, CTF 124, CTF 120, CTF 121, 070010Z May 1965, SECRET.}

The last item in the CINCLANT instruction is interesting. CINCLANT was concerned lest Cuba intervene both indirectly and directly in the Dominican imbroglio, and ship patrols along the Dominican coasts had been designed to provide surveillance in case the Cubans attempted to send in weapons and supplies to the rebels. By the 10th, a heavy air surveillance system was in operation, with U.S. destroyers on a distant search and the Dominican navy being used for inshore patrol. This fear presupposed an up-country rebel organization to receive and use the weapons, and this, as we have seen, did not, by all evidence available exist. However, this concern could potentially have made more sense than that of possible Cuban air or naval interference which CINCLANT also apparently nourished. On the 5th the JCS wired CINCLANT that it recognized the threat of Cuban MIGs and also the very limited air defense capability of the Power Pack forces. To meet this threat, the JCS was considering the deployment of a squadron of F-104As to Ramey.\footnote{JCS 1457 to CINCLANT, 051529Z May 1965, SECRET.} This squadron was sent to Ramey on the 7th.

CINCLANT later explained its reasons for the limitations of USCOMDOMREP authority to the boundaries of the Dominican Republic on two grounds. The first was to insure that USCOMDOMREP was not involved in any Cuban actions since "the proximity of the two islands made it quite possible that Cuban aircraft and Cuban ships might be operating in the seas and in the airspace in the vicinity of the Dominican Republic. CINCLANT purposely reserved to himself the prerogative of controlling operations relating to Cuban forces." Secondly, CINCLANT imposed the limitation in order that there not be necessary a later readjustment when the OAS force came into being. It would be extremely awkward, CINCLANT suggested, if the OAS force were to be involved inadvertently in matters impingeing on either Cuban or Haitian affairs.\footnote{CINCLANT to JCS, 142056Z May 1965, SECRET.}
The cryptic comment on Haiti is also interesting, but nothing has been found which explains it.

During the course of the crisis, the command arrangements had passed through three stages as the character of the operation changed. Initially, support of the Ambassador in the evacuation had been given by CINCLANT with assigned forces operating under the naval component, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. When the U.S. objective became more clearly the prevention of a feared Communist takeover, the JCS had chopped Army and Air Force units to CINCLANT, and JTF 122 had been established directly under CINCLANT to command all Army, Navy, and Air Force forces being introduced into the island. When the scope of deployments threatened to exceed vastly the original OPLAN, when the inadequacies of the JTF had become manifest, and when the operations of U.S. forces ashore had become localized, JTF 122 had been dissolved and USCOMDOMREP established to control all U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic and to conduct operations, supported by Air Force and naval forces under their respective component commanders.

B. FORCES DEPLOYED
The President's acute awareness of the political sensitivity of the whole affair led him to attempt to gather up as many Spanish-speaking American soldiers as could be found for duty in the Dominican Republic. During the first week in May the problem was examined by the SecDef and it was clear that the difficulties involved in drawing men from disparate units were insuperable. State also suggested the use of Puerto Rican National Guard units to replace U.S. forces, but this too appeared infeasible. CINCSOUTH (where numerous Spanish-speaking Americans had designedly been sent for duty) offered these men, but again they were too integrated in regular units to be separated and usefully reformed into new units.

As early as the 5th it was quite clear that no additional forces would be necessary beyond the 82nd and the MEB, support units of which were still coming in, so the JCS authorized CINCLANT to establish an appropriate Defcon for all forces nominated for OPLAN 310/2 but not actually engaged in operations.1 Three hours later the JCS specifically directed CINCLANT to return all such forces to normal operations and operational control.2

However, support forces continued to move into the island. Finally, on the 14th the JCS, in a cable to CINCLANT, noted that the logistics elements and support units requested by USCOMDOMREP had now substantially closed the area, and requested CINCLANT to monitor closely all future introductions of U.S. personnel and equipment and to hold such to the minimum commensurate with the task. CINCLANT was to coordinate the introduction of any additional forces and equipment with the JCS.3

1JCS 1495 to CINCLANT, 052014Z May 1965, SECRET.
2JCS to CINCLANT, 052358Z May 1965, SECRET.
3JCS to CINCLANT, 142128Z May 1965, SECRET.
Concern apparently had arisen in political quarters over the continuing troop deployments at a time when the crisis was clearly past and the issue of troop withdrawals already under discussion.

C. THE OAS FORCE

The OAS force was highly significant in a political sense. It was the first occasion on which an inter-American ground combat force had been created, deployed and involved in operations. However, nearly all the activity involved in this enterprise came after the period of interest for this study, after, that is, the middle of May. Nevertheless, certain interesting planning activities did get underway at an earlier date.

The OAS, on the morning of 6 May, had voted the establishment of a Latin American peace-keeping force, an action which opened a new phase in Dominican operations and a new direction in the relationship of the OAS members. In preparation for this development, the JCS undertook certain studies relating to force contributions and command structure. Plans were also made for the bulk of the logistics requirements to come from U.S. sources. In addition to the JCS studies, the Inter-American Defense Board undertook, at the request of the OAS, similar studies on the form of the peace-keeping force, and made recommendations paralleling those of the JCS.

It will be recalled that the effort to arouse Latin American interest in an OAS force and to elicit troop contributions had commenced early in the crisis. Not merely had the senior State Department missions toured the major capitals in this regard, but every U.S. ambassador in Latin America had been instructed to exert the utmost pressure in this direction. Since the whole effort was improvised and with no background of thought or preparation, the Latin Americans were cautious and insisted upon more specifics from the U.S.

State had numerous inquiries from its ambassadors as to the types of forces the Latin states might supply, and requested JCS recommendations. The JCS passed the request to CINCLANT, asking recommendations
on: (1) size and type of forces and how they should be equipped; (2) command structure under which they would operate; (3) source of logistic support; (4) total forces required. CINCLANT was told that as an initial input he was to consider forces from Argentina and Brazil as priority, although the whole evaluation was needed as soon as possible.\footnote{JCS to CINCLANT, 040112Z May 1965, SECRET.}

CINCLANT replied the following day with his suggestions. In the matter of size and type of forces and equipment he recommended that for Argentina and Brazil, company-size units were preferred with the maximum limited to a battalion, while for all other countries he recommended the minimum deemed necessary to achieve political objectives. The forces should be infantry/military police in nature, trained in counteguerrilla and riot control techniques, with equipment that should as far as possible be compatible with American equipment. Naval participation should be limited to one or two destroyers or comparable types per country for use in coastal patrol. Participation by OAS air units was not desired at present because of limited facilities.

The command structure envisioned by CINCLANT was essentially that set forth in the 310/2 OPLAN with contributed forces under the operational command of the appropriate task force commanders.

Logistic support should be provided by the Latin American states within their capabilities, with additional support to be provided by the U.S. Service counterpart.

CINCLANT again emphasized that total forces should be kept to a minimum deemed necessary for political purposes with initial emphasis laid on obtaining ground units that were readily identifiable and visible to the press and to the Dominican people.\footnote{CINCLANT to JCS, 041602Z May 1965, SECRET.}
On the 7th CINCLANT amplified his views on the command structure. In the intervening three days, the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), as it was now termed, had become more of an entity and so CINCLANT could be more specific. He recommended that the commander of the IAPF be authorized to accept under his command in the Dominican Republic such forces as might be made available to him by the U.S. or the Latin states and to employ these to achieve the aim of the OAS. He recommended that Palmer be designated commander or deputy commander of the IAPF, but that he should, in any event, retain command of U.S. forces as USCOMDOMREP. As for air and naval contributions, these should be assigned to TF 124 and TF 121 and organized as IAPF units within the task forces.¹

The JCS approved on 7 May the concept of an IAPF, and generally supported CINCLANT's recommendations in JCSM-344-65 to the SecDef the following day. The American military generally were reluctant to commit the operational control of U.S. forces to Latin American hands. They did not object to subordinating Palmer to the titular command of a Latin American officer.²

¹CINCLANT to JCS, 072058Z May 1965, SECRET.
²AmEmb to SecState, 150512Z May 1965, SECRET.
FIGURE 6. Command Structure of the Inter-American Force
An act formally establishing the Inter-American Force (IAF - a third name) was signed on the 23rd in Santo Domingo. General Hugo Panasco Alvim of the Brazilian Army (he was Chief of the Department of Production and Works) was designated commander and Palmer Deputy Commander. This followed by two days the Brazilian government's approval of a contingent of 1350 troops for the IAF. General Alvim arrived on the 29th and was sworn in as Commander IAF on the 31st.

Operation PRESS AHEAD, as the deployment of the IAF units was named, began with the arrival in Santo Domingo on 14 May of a Honduran rifle company plus a military police platoon and a medical section, a total of 250 men. This was followed on the 15th by a Costa Rican Civil Guard platoon. It's deployment typified the problems involved in PRESS AHEAD. The commander of the MILGROUP in San Jose had notified CINCSOUTH on the 13th that Costa Rica was prepared to contribute a 21-man force to the IAF, each man armed with a .38 caliber revolver and a basic load of ammunition for it. The men had nothing else - no bedding, mess kits, ponchos. However, the President of Costa Rica had asked that 5 Costa Rican newsman be allowed to accompany the 21-man platoon to record the historic event, since this was the first overseas deployment of Costa Rican troops.¹

A Nicaraguan rifle company of 164 men also arrived on the 15th. The Brazilian force, consisting of a headquarters, an infantry battalion, a reinforced marine company, a marine military police platoon, and an air force detachment arrived in Santo Domingo between the 23rd and the 26th. On the 21st the Nicaraguans and Hondurans were moved into the ISZ to prepare to take over part of that sector, while on 2 June IAF troops assumed control of the demilitarized zone around the National Palace (agreed to by the GNR and the rebels). The first IAF operations were OAS MP patrols - Costa Rican, Honduran, and U.S. - around the ISZ, beginning on 24 May. IAF observer teams, composed of Latin American officers, were also formed for the investigation of cease-fire violations. These teams quickly established

¹COMUSMILGRP Costa Rica to CINCSOUTH, 131530Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
liaison with Imbert, Caamaño, and the U.S. forces, and were operational by 26 May. Their all Latin American membership made liaison with the rebels easier. On 11 June the west central sector of the ISZ was turned over to the "Latin American Brigade" of Nicaraguans and Hondurans. By this date there were some 1600 Latin American troops in Santo Domingo.¹ Later during the summer a Paraguayan rifle company was to join the IAF.

D. U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Throughout the first two weeks in May, the U.S. forces had been under intermittent fire. Rebel violations of the Act of Santo Domingo seemed to increase daily after its signing on the 5th. Combined with this was a persistent fear among the American command of some rash move by the rebels which would decide the U.S. to breach the cease-fire and, by a single military blow, end the whole deadlock. Palmer reported on the 8th that he was collecting violations of the cease-fire by the rebels to provide the Ambassador with ammunition in the event the decision were made to breach the cease-fire and to take military action. Palmer said he had plans ready and adequate forces and could "clean out the city if this is so directed." Personally, however, he didn't feel that the rebels could take the present pressure indefinitely and hoped "we can win this one in a relatively peaceful manner without great loss of lift."²

The next day Palmer expanded on his thoughts. He commented that with the additional staff officers provided him by CINCLANT, he felt he had a more representative joint staff and could organize a more comprehensive effort in directing operations and activities. He said that the whole Country Team felt that the U.S. could maintain pressure on the rebels for four or five days more with acceptable risks in the form of economic unrest and civil disorder in Santo Domingo. Since the city played the key role in the nation's economy, the free flow of

¹NMCC Operational Summaries.
²USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080150Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
labor, money and goods into the city was vital. On the other hand, such freedom of movement conflicted with the U.S. desire to maintain psychological, military and political pressure on the rebel area.\(^1\)

The U.S. pressure continued all around the rebel area with a tight control on all goods entering the rebel zone. The rebel area itself was further compressed when on the 10th Bennett requested State's permission to move the ISZ line one block further east to stop fire hitting the U.S. Embassy and French Embassy. The move had been approved by Mora who suggested that it be done, and then approval was sought from the OAS Commission, in order to avoid any negotiation with the rebels. Bennett warned, parenthetically, that to the extent that we treated both sides alike, we strengthened the rebels and their will to resist, at the very moment when we had been hoping to defect some of their top leadership.\(^2\) In any event, the commission approved the move (whether before or after the act has not been determined), while Caamaño raised no objections and pulled back his forces. The eastward extension was completed at 2200 on the 13th.\(^3\)

As the days passed with no perceptible concrete change in the situation, a few of the inevitable unpleasant incidents took place involving U.S. troops and unarmed Dominican civilians. The Administration in Washington, already under severe political pressure for its Dominican intervention, reacted with a demand for a 24-hour sitrep daily on such incidents or on any which cast discredit on the U.S. Even negative reports were desired.\(^4\) The sensitivity of the Administration on this point merely reflected the fear that this sort of thing might grow worse as time passed in the deadlock status.

The tenor of Palmer's messages also contributed to the sense of concern. Early on the 13th, for example, he reported that he and

\(^1\)USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 0903402 May 1965, TOP SECRET.
\(^2\)AmEmb to SecState, 1017152 May 1965, SECRET.
\(^3\)AmEmb to SecState, 1220452 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
\(^4\)JCS 2038 to CINCLANT, 1320322 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
Bennett had met with the OAS Commission to review the situation since the return of the full membership of the Commission. His impression was that the Commission did not hold much hope for a successful political solution at this time. Thus Palmer felt military action might be required to break the stalemate and to make some progress toward stability.¹

The concern over the possibility of actual fighting was evident in messages from State around this time. There was an openly stated belief that "we could not afford another Budapest." The analogy between U.S. troops clearing the rebel zone and the Russians demolishing the Freedom Fighters in Hungary in November 1956 was more than merely academic. Underlying the State concern was the belief, based upon exaggerated estimates of rebel strength, that rebel resistance would equate with that of the Hungarians. Perhaps the greatest irony of the whole Dominican crisis is that the same exaggeration which brought the U.S. into the affair, exaggeration of rebel strength, Communist influence, damage and dead in the city, also may have prevented the U.S. from a swift military solution to the problem. Overestimates of rebel strength and capability produced estimates of civilian and rebel dead, plus possible destruction to the city, which were completely unacceptable politically.

The constant sniper fire plus several incidents in which U.S. troops were shot when they inadvertently entered the rebel zone added to the frustration of the U.S. military. Above all, the belief that a stalemate could not last indefinitely apparently was the basis for the spurt of contingency planning at this time. No single origin for the orders to Palmer has been found, and it is hard to imagine that he was directed to prepare such plans without State's approval. Apparently a piece of paper was required in Washington which provided a feel for what was involved in an operation to smash the rebels and to provide a basis for further discussions. At any rate the JCS on the 10th directed CINCLANT to prepare a plan as soon as possible to take the rebel stronghold if directed.²

¹USCOMDOMREF to CINCLANT, 130645Z May 1965, SECRET.
²JCS to CINCLANT, 101626Z May 1965, SECRET.
CINCLANT passed the order to Palmer who forwarded a plan to CINCLANT eight hours after the original JCS instruction. The plan is of major interest since it reflects the then current estimates of the U.S. command in Santo Domingo on a number of key facets to the situation. Palmer's "derived" mission was to conduct operations to clear the city of armed rebels and to restore law and order in order to assist in the establishment of a stable government. His estimate of the rebels put four-fifths of their forces (about 1000-1500 of these being "hardcore") in the southeast portion of the city, the remaining one-fifth in the north and west sectors. He believed that the rebels' most probable course of action was to defend in place; exploit the situation for propaganda and political purposes; go underground in the city; and when necessary or appropriate, to counterattack along the Calle de Marzo in an attempt to break through the U.S. position and then scatter to the hills to the north and west.

As for the GNR forces, Palmer mentioned only that 500 army and police held the National Palace. Other friendly troops were available but were not planned for use in the operation.

His concept of operations was to isolate the city completely to prevent the escape of rebels and to cut their LOC into the city. Isolation would consist of the establishment of a tight blockade through the city and by the establishment of a screen east of the Ozama from the Duarte Bridge to the Peynado Bridge and the Rio Isabella. This latter operation would be a helicopter assault, employing a three-battalion brigade and a cavalry squadron to help screen along the rivers.

After the isolation of the city, the 4th MEB and the rest of the 82nd Division would conduct a coordinated search and clear operation south and east to the sea to capture rebel forces there. The attack could be halted at any time the rebels wished to surrender. After completion of this operation, the area to the north would be cleared. In all cases minimum firepower would be employed. Palmer visualized
that the operation could be carried out with the forces ashore. He was aware that the GNR had made some plans of their own to regain control of the city, but it was doubtful that they had either the will or the capability to carry them out.

Quick-reaction forces to meet situations arising elsewhere in the country had been established, and since all the force ashore might be utilized in the seizure of the city, Palmer suggested that it might be necessary to call on the HLT afloat as a quick-reaction force. To secure San Isidro airfield during the operation against the city, the plan visualized the use of one artillery battalion of the 82nd, organized as infantry and ashore without their guns, plus two other artillery battalions and an engineer battalion not otherwise employed in the city operation.¹

On the arrival of the plan at CINCLANT, some concern was expressed over its caution, especially over the restricted use of firepower, CINCLANT fearing consequent U.S. losses would be severe. However, CINCLANT sent the plan on to the JCS, terming it acceptable with certain comment. USCOMDOMREF should use all available U.S. forces including tanks, air support, air reconnaissance, and naval gunfire in such a way and as necessary to reduce U.S. losses while achieving the objective. CTF 121 and CTF 124 would be ready to assist. Any civilians found opposing U.S. forces would be treated as enemies and dealt with accordingly. Execution of the plan would require strong public information support which must be directed from Washington. Lastly, the clear current aim should be the elimination of the hard-core Communist element which should not be allowed to escape and melt into the populace.²

CINCLANT apparently took the JCS request for a plan more seriously than it was intended. The intent of the JCS, to have something on

¹USCOMDOMREF to CINCLANT, 110450Z May 1965, SECRET.
²CINCLANT to JCS, 1112582 May 1965, SECRET.
paper and in hand, was made clear to CINCLANT by the Vice J-3 who pointed out that the plan "met the requirement and was just going to remain status quo." There was nothing "pushing" the plan at all.¹

The following day, the 12th, the JCS were surprised to receive an information copy of a Joint State Defense Message from State to Bennett. It asked for a contingency plan for the resumption of normal operations in the industrial sector in the northern part of the city. No decision would be made, however, to implement such a plan until it had become clear that the current OAS efforts to achieve a coalition government had failed. The northern area had to be freed from fighting in order to get the economy running again. What was involved was really the establishment of an additional safety zone. The message requested Bennett's reactions as to the local political effects, while the military command was to estimate the additional forces required to establish and to maintain the extended perimeter, along with an estimate of casualties, U.S. and rebel.²

Again, the origin of this idea is unclear. Presumably the continuing political deadlock with the resultant slow strangulation of the economy, not merely of the city but of the whole country (Dominican industry, such as it was, being concentrated around the capital city), led to thoughts among the U.S. command in Santo Domingo of a U.S. military operation which would liberate at least this vital portion of the city, if not totally smash the rebels the way the above-mentioned plan would have. The initial JCS reaction was one of concern that no mention had been made of coordination with the JCS in this purely military activity. It was not even clear who represented "Defense" in the message.³ Representations were apparently made, although the record does not reveal them, and a formal message from "OSD" to the JCS on

¹EA tapes, 11 May.
²SecState to AmEmb, 121757Z May 1965, SECRET.
³EA tapes, 12 May.
the 13th specified that the JCS had responsibility for the military planning aspects of the State/Defense message.\(^1\) The JCS, in turn, directed CINCLANT that the military plan or plans submitted in response to the State/Defense message be forwarded to the JCS for review, approval, and coordination with appropriate agencies.\(^2\)

The Ambassador sent to State on the 15th the Joint Embassy/USCOMOMREP plan for the seizure of the northwest area of the city. As to political reactions, all he could say was that there were too many unknowns to make a meaningful prediction.\(^3\)

Palmer, in the meantime, forwarded the military plan to CINCLANT for review as per instructions. His plan called for a simple three-phase operation. Phase I extended the present LOC to seize and secure the still bothersome main RSD station; Phase II extended the ISZ north to seize and secure a line of departure for operations to the north; Phase III was an attack north to destroy rebel forces there and to capture the industrial complexes.\(^4\)

The JCS queried CINCLANT as to whether, in the event that he was directed to take over the northern portion of the city, this was the plan he desired to implement, or whether he had modifications or alternatives. He was also asked how long it would take him to move after receiving the execute. An overall assessment of the plan was requested.\(^5\)

However, CINCLANT had anticipated the JCS request and had sent such at the very same moment as the JCS message went out to him. He stated that the concept of operations was considered feasible and desirable, and that his only modification was to suggest that the entire LOC be wired in to prevent any crossing except at specified

---

\(^1\) OSD to JCS, 131315Z May 1965, SECRET.
\(^2\) JCS to CINCLANT, 131718Z May 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.
\(^3\) AmEmb to SecState, 140130Z May 1965, SECRET.
\(^4\) USCOMOMREP to CINCLANT, 140609Z May 1965, SECRET.
\(^5\) JCS to CINCLANT, 141718Z May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
points. This presumably would avoid the possibility of some of the rebels beaten in the northern zone escaping south through the LOC to reinforce the main rebel force in the new city.  

In answer to the JCS message, CINCLANT sent in some further more specific comments. They agreed with the plan; Palmer was ready when directed; there was very little additional information on the rebels, perhaps 4000 in the New City, 1000 in the northern area. CINCLANT's assessment was that there could be very bitter and costly fighting involved, but he felt that the job had to be done.  

Palmer, in commenting to LANT on its last message to the JCS, asked only flexibility in setting H-hour and authority for a judicious use of tear gas.  

However, Palmer had in the meantime received a verbal disapproval of the immediate implementation of his recommended operation in a phone conversation with the CNO who was acting as CJCS.  

On the 15th the JCS, in a JCSM to the SecDef, approved both the purpose and the proposed method of execution at the appropriate time of the Bennett/Palmer plan. The memo pointed out that it appeared certain that Caamaño would refuse to agree to the establishment of a new safety zone under the auspices of the OAS. Therefore, the U.S. should be prepared to take unilateral action to clear the industrial portions of Santo Domingo to allow the city to return to normal. The JCS recommended that approval be granted Bennett and Palmer to execute the military phases of the plan immediately following Caamaño's refusal. This fact should be transmitted to the OAS Commission before they conferred with Caamaño and their support for a military action solicited. Should the OAS Commission be unwilling to authorize the move, they would be informed of the U.S. intent to carry out the action unilaterally.  

---

1CINCLANT to JCS, 141718Z May 1965, SECRET.  
2CINCLANT to JCS, 142016Z May 1965, SECRET.  
3USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150331Z May 1965, SECRET.
In this connection, the JCS urged that every effort be made to return the Brazilian, Colombian, and Panamanian representatives to the Commission to join the Argentine and Guatemalan representatives (who alone remained in Santo Domingo), prior to the time when the rebels were confronted with the proposal for a new safety zone. Their presence, it was felt, would increase the likelihood of OAS approval of the action.¹

As it turned out, the GNR on the 14th launched its first offensive action since Wessin's defeat at the Duarte Bridge on the 28th against the northern industrial area. Imbert moved his forces by sea and overland from Wessin's camp at San Isidro, presumably avoiding the LOC and ISZ, and also brought in outlying garrisons. By the 19th RSD had been captured, and the banks of the Ozama reached on the 21st, the whole northern area having been cleared. Imbert claimed 240 rebels killed, but later U.S. estimates reduced this to a small fraction of the original claim (perhaps 25-35 killed).² The U.S. expectation of bitter and costly fighting had not come to pass, and it was evident that U.S. intelligence had grossly overestimated the capability of the rebels in the area. Since that same intelligence had given the GNR forces neither the capability nor the will to do the job, the fact that it was done was evidence that there had been much less resistance than expected. In fact, it is difficult to believe that Imbert would have launched the offensive if he had agreed with the U.S. intelligence estimates.

There were widespread charges that the U.S. had assisted the GNR drive, but Palmer admits only that, when Imbert's troops drew close

¹JCSM-372-65, Military Considerations Relative to the Conduct of Operations by USCOMDOMREF, 15 May 1965, SECRET.

²
to the northern edge of the ISZ and the LOC, it was only wise to keep in touch with their movements. Accordingly, he directed that ground vehicular liaison teams with radios be attached to the southern flank elements of the GNR forces.¹

Actually Imbert's drive led to strained relations with the U.S. In an effort to maintain declared neutrality, Palmer apparently refused to allow the junta aircraft the right to use San Isidro airfield for support of the ground drive. U.S. trucks were kept driving up and down the taxiways to prevent their use, the main runways being fully utilized by U.S. aircraft. A request by Wessin to the U.S. command to prevent rebel Dominican Navy ships from running down the river to the sea had to be refused on the same grounds. As a result, for a period around the 18th the command in Santo Domingo almost expected to find itself being fired on by both sides.²

As Imbert's drive drew to a close, the Deputy SecDef, in Santo Domingo on his peace-making mission, was instructed by the SecDef to tell Imbert that the U.S. would not tolerate his moving south of the LOC, through the LOC or around it via sea. It was therefore clear at this date that only a political solution would be permitted.

The GNR offensive apparently took Palmer by surprise, and compelled a hasty reassessment of his plan to seize the northern area. In a personal message to CINCLANT and the CJCS at 0600Z on the 16th Palmer propounded forcefully a new plan which really combined the two contingency plans he had been asked to prepare in the previous five days. He stated that with the arrival of secretarial level visitors (Bundy and Vance had arrived on their mission), he was fully aware of the urgent effort being made to find a political solution to the crisis that would avoid bloodshed and city fighting operations. Nevertheless, he felt that the rebels had won a major political victory in getting their case to the U.N. and had thereby exposed the weakness of the OAS.³

¹USCOMMANDREP Report.
²EA tapes.
³The U.N. had again taken up the issue and had voted to send observers to Santo Domingo.
Therefore it was only prudent to consider what military contingent operations were open to the U.S. in the event our political strategy failed.

Palmer believed these operations could be conducted with a minimum loss of life and material damage. While it would be easier to restore order to the city through a political settlement, if this were not in our grasp in the next few days, the recommended military operations would be preferable to a continuation of the present strategy which invited only a steady deterioration and the eventual loss of the country. The political strategy to justify such military operations to the OAS and the U.N. was admittedly difficult but the stakes were too high not to give it a try.

Palmer said that he had not specifically discussed the above plan with Bennett, but they had discussed the military possibilities many times. Palmer's opinion was that strong measures would be
welcomed by most Dominicans who were tired of anarchy and would ultimately be supported by the OAS. Action along these lines had been discussed with Bennett, Secretary Mann, and Secretary Vaughn that afternoon. While no consensus had been reached, it was indicated that it would be wise to have a contingency plan ready for consideration.

It would be interesting to know whether the political officials were aware of Palmer's contingency plan to clear the city as forwarded on the 11th.

The JCS, in a memo to the SecDef on the 17th, approved this plan. They stated their belief that, in view of the unsettled political situation, the JCS conviction that the rebels had exposed the impotence of the OAS, and the U.N.'s recognition of the rebel cause, unilateral U.S. action to reduce the rebel stronghold was essential to prevent the establishment of another non-Western oriented regime in the hemisphere and to restore law and order in the country. By taking military action now, before the formal establishment of the IAFF, the U.S. would consolidate the recent gains of the loyalists, aid in restoring stability to major portions of the city, and confine the rebels to a small area. To wait for the IAFF to be established would be to lose the opportunity for decisive action, since the very presence of the IAFF would automatically tend to limit U.S. freedom of action.

The JCS formally recommended that CINCINT be authorized to direct USCOMINT to execute the plan at a time decided by him and the Ambassador.

Palmer's dilemma was to remain, however. In a cable of the 14th, he summed up all the frustrations, ambiguities and inconsistencies that bedevilled his role. He heartily concurred with

---

1The special mission of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Jack Vaughn had just arrived.
2USCOMINT to CINCINT and JCS, 160610Z May 1965, TOP SECRET.
3JCSM-377-65, Military Considerations Relative to the Conduct of Operations by USCOMINT, 17 May 1965, SECRET.
CINCCLANT's comments to the JCS on the unsoundness of the present U.S. military situation where our hands were tied for political reasons. The rebels had launched that day a ruthless violent and well-prepared campaign to defame the Ambassador and to convince the OAS Commission that the U.S. was really the aggressor. Every technique of the "big lie" was being utilized. U.S. troops were continually being accused of untrue violations of the cease-fire while it was the rebels themselves who had been committing violations at the rate of twelve to fifteen a day. Most were deliberate attempts to provoke U.S. troops.

The OAS Commission, Palmer went on, had not demonstrated its ability to control the situation. The rebels were clearly stalling for time and Palmer feared the country could slip away from us "while we dance on the point of a needle." He believed Bennett fully shared this view.

As to the U.S. adherence to and status under the "so-called cease-fire," it was "all very fuzzy in his mind." (1) He did not sign any cease-fire agreement nor has any other U.S. military officer. The formal Act of Santo Domingo of 5 May was signed by the rebels, the old Benoit group, and the OAS Commission, but not by any U.S. officials. (2) The terms of the cease fire were not clearly laid down and were subject to local interpretation. Restrictions on U.S. troops had been self-imposed. (3) Both the Ambassador and he had repeatedly stressed that they reserved the right to take unilateral action as they saw fit. (4) They likewise had reserved the right of self-defense. However, in this regard, he had directed that U.S. troops fire only when fired on first by the rebels. This placed our troops at a disadvantage not strictly in accord with the principle of self-defense. Usually the troops attack and destroy a position and then return to their own lines, but if the position made our own position untenable, he had directed that the troops adjust their lines accordingly. (5) If we weren't careful, we would find ourselves "in concrete and devoid of any freedom of action."
Palmer felt it was clear that U.S. troops could be picked off one by one in a battle of attrition.

The Ambassador and he had discussed recently the matter of checkpoints, and as a result they had reduced the number operating. Although the Ambassador supported this move, in order to show the rebels that we controlled this ring around the city and could cut it off completely at our will, other elements of the U.S. mission opposed the move on economic and humanitarian grounds. These, Palmer conceded, were valid objections, but they overlooked the fact that allowing any passage at all was on balance an advantage to the rebels. Nevertheless, he had reduced the checkpoints to two as indicated. Again, there were more or less self-imposed rules developed locally.

Palmer concluded by asking guidance. In the meantime, he said, they were doing their best to support U.S. policy as interpreted by Ambassador Bennett and himself. He continued to assume that his basic mission of denying the country to the Communists remained unchanged. The tone of frustration and his sense of drift in U.S. policy came through clearly in this message.

This then was the extent of the mid-May contingency planning. Even at that time it was essentially academic, since an American military offensive, especially a unilateral one, had already become politically impossible.

E. COMMENCING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES

There is a curious parallel between the Dominican affair and that in Lebanon in July 1958. In both cases we were no sooner in the country with forces than we began to think about getting out. In both cases, while these thoughts were under consideration, U.S. forces continued to increase to a maximum point at some later date. By 6 May discussion had already begun among the decision makers in Washington about some force withdrawals. The JCS naturally were

---

*USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 14O606Z May 1965, SECRET.*
concerned lest political considerations compel too hasty a withdrawal which could be seen in foreign eyes not merely as a retreat but as an admission of guilt in our intervention in the first place.

The JCS therefore queried CINCLANT on the issue. Assuming, CINCLANT was asked, that the cease fire remained in effect and the security mission remained essentially as at present, what size external military forces should remain in the Dominican Republic for the foreseeable future? On the assumption that the forces recommended in answer to this question were smaller than the U.S. forces now in the country, CINCLANT was asked when we could prudently start withdrawing U.S. troops; what the preferred order of withdrawal should be; and what the method should be—sea or air. Furthermore, on the assumption that the GNR became effective, what modifications would CINCLANT recommend for the first two questions? CINCLANT was to consider the questions in the light of the strength and effectiveness of the opposing forces, the political situation (on this part the Ambassador was to be consulted), and possible requirements for a quick reaction force for up-country contingencies.

The message concluded with the comment that the above points were in terms of U.S. forces only. If the OAS force were really to become operational, Latin American units might supplant U.S. troops to a considerable degree.

Palmer sent his recommendations to CINCLANT early on the 8th. As to forces that should remain, he pointed out that he was currently carrying out his mission with a total of twelve battalions.
The remaining force should retain at least one Marine helicopter squadron, the Army light air-mobile company, the current MP units, the paratroop forces, Special Forces group, ASA signal assets as well as an appropriately balanced logistics command.

Such a withdrawal, Palmer cautioned, could have a disastrous psychological effect. The remaining force too would be short of that needed to reduce the rebel stronghold should this be directed.

As to CINCLANT's question on modifications to his recommendations if the GNR became an effective body, Palmer commented that should OAS forces be introduced and U.S. forces reduced accordingly, any further changes would have to await the reconstitution of GNR forces. The present capability of these forces was limited to guard duty and local security, and their reconstitution would take months. Before
they could be relied on again, the status of the OAS force would undoubtedly undergo change.¹

CINCLANT agreed with Palmer in regard to the dangers of a premature withdrawal and felt that when political conditions had been met, there could be a reduction to eight or nine battalions. Over the long haul there would probably be a continuing requirement for perhaps half that size force. CINCLANT reported that Palmer had been in touch with CONARC in the matter of the order of withdrawal, and CONARC was interested in replacing the 82nd, over the long haul, with parts of an infantry division in order to continue with the scheduled reorganization of the 82nd. In the interest of overall readiness in the Caribbean, CINCLANT felt it desirable to withdraw the Marines as soon as militarily and politically feasible and to replace them with Army units. It was important to reconstitute the Carib Phibron and the ready backup forces of the Fleet Marine Force and its amphibious ships. This would improve Caribbean readiness and ease an existing tight situation in regard to Mediterranean deployments of ships and ELTs. (To be ready for the unexpected, CINCLANT commented, he had already established the capability to use the ships and Marines off the Dominican Republic for emergency action elsewhere in the Caribbean.)²

CONARC had supported Palmer's idea of an early withdrawal of the 82nd Airborne and of its replacement by other units. Within a couple of days, however, CONARC changed its position, essentially, because of the costs involved in such a substitution. Furthermore, it was felt that the 82nd could profitably utilize the experience since the division had not been on overseas service since the Second World War.

CINCLANT's appraisal for the long term was to turn out to be quite realistic. In the meantime, as will be delineated briefly in the next section, political developments and pressures impelled U.S. decision makers rapidly along the path to withdrawal of forces. The

¹USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 080820Z May 1965, SECRET.
²CINCLANT to JCS, 082322Z May 1965, SECRET.
JCS tended to take a cautious view but when on 25 May Palmer sent in a reasonable plan for a phased withdrawal, the JCS approved it. The concept was one of reduction from nine Army and three Marine battalions ashore (with one more HL T offshore on the OKINAWA) to a total of seven. The concept was based upon continuing progress to normalcy. The withdrawal was three-phased, consistent with Palmer's capability to maintain the physical separation of rebel and GNR forces, reduce rebel resistance south of the LOC, protect U.S. citizens and other foreigners, and provide a balanced force contribution to the IAF. 

These then were Palmer's four missions. As his force shrank, it was clear that the expectation called for a similar erosion of the rebel force by desertion. Thus the rebels would at no time be able to muster enough strength to keep Palmer from seizing the now enfeebled stronghold.

The first U.S. withdrawal came on 26 May when part of a HL T from the ISZ embarked, while the USS OKINAWA with its BL T sailed for Norfolk. It had been decided after all that the Marines should be completely withdrawn. As to their replacement or the replacement of the 82nd with part of a standard infantry division, this was seen to be politically unwise, so that when the last Marines left Santo Domingo on 4 June, the 82nd Airborne Division remained alone.
XIII. EPILOGUE

By the middle of May the crisis aspects of the Dominican affair had long passed. In the words of one senior Washington decision maker, "the operation in Santo Domingo was running itself." While high-level interest remained, it was not of the urgent type, and focused exclusively on efforts to resolve the political Gordian Knot.

As military problems and possibilities faded into the background and the political became dominant, a series of top-level missions was sent from Washington. These were in addition to the numerous senior political officials who descended on the island from the beginning of the U.S. intervention in various lines of endeavor. A major problem of political-military coordination was posed, primarily for Bennett and Palmer who were essentially responsible for integrating the efforts of the dozen or more U.S. agencies involved. Simultaneous efforts were under way by USIA to develop the propaganda and psych warfare program, by OSD to distribute food and relief supplies, by State to improve official relationships with the press,

Coordinating and integrating these efforts was never easy and not always possible because of the political and military dictates of the situation which, while they usually coincided in purpose and thrust, often conflicted with the economic and sociological dictates.

The most senior mission consisted of McGeorge Bundy (Presidential Special Assistant for International Security Affairs), Mr. Vance (Deputy SecDef), Under Secretary of State Mann and Assistant Secretary of State Vaughn, and arrived on 15 May to take over the negotiating task in a unilateral U.S. effort to resolve the deadlock.1 Originally intending to stay only forty-eight hours, the group quickly learned

1It is interesting to recall that the Vance-Mann team had been sent to Panama by the President after the riots of 9-11 January 1964, and had successfully dampened down the crisis.
that the situation did not permit a simple solution. Mann stayed
two days and Vaughn three, while Bundy remained until 26 May. Vance
did not leave until the 29th. Their efforts were directed in large
part to finding a government acceptable to both sides.

By the time this senior mission arrived, U.S. policy had become
one of actual as well as verbal neutrality. For example, when Imbert
opened his drive against the northern part of the city, the senior
U.S. mission suggested that Palmer interpose his forces between Imbert's
and the rebels. Palmer opposed the idea and was prepared to carry
his objections straight to Washington over the heads of the mission,
but the issue was dropped when Imbert's unexpected speed captured the
entire northern area.

With the conquest of the northern area, a new cease-fire was
arranged which went into effect on the 21st and was afterwards
indefinitely extended by the agreement of both parties.

A new three-man OAS commission arrived on 4 June and was able to
develop such conditions under the cease-fire that violations, almost
always by the rebels, were much reduced. With the creation of
the IAF, the presence of the new Commission, and the departure of
the last of the senior Washington representatives, there began the
gradual transfer of initiative from the U.S. to the OAS. More of the
OAS controlled the negotiations while General Alvim was able to
exercise considerable initiative and to provide later great impetus
to negotiations at the military level on military subjects. The
Latin American officers were able to do things which U.S. officers
could not, for example, such as entering the rebel zone for liaison
purposes.

The U.S. command soon established a close working relationship
with IAF HQ. [ ]

U.S. authorities were congratulating themselves on June 15 over
the fact that no casualties had been suffered by U.S. troops since
June when without warning the most widespread and violent battle between U.S. forces and rebels ever to occur exploded. Starting early that morning the rebels opened fire on (but did not assault) IAF positions around the full periphery of their zone. Fire fights raged all day and the 62nd had its one and only opportunity to hit back in vigorous offensive actions after six weeks of sniper attacks. In all, thirty blocks were taken from the rebels in house-to-house fighting, reducing the area under their control to a little over three-fifths of a square mile. U.S. casualties were five dead and thirty-six wounded, while the Brazilian troops who were hotly engaged also suffered five wounded. The rebels suffered an estimated eighty dead and eighty wounded with more than 350 captured.

The reasons for this rash rebel action have remained obscure, but Palmer and Bennett believed it was the consequence of pent-up frustrations, disunity, especially between moderates and extremists, lack of control over all elements, particularly the 14 of June Party which seemed to be providing the dominant Communist element in the Caamano forces, the effects of the psywar campaign, and the reluctant acceptance of the obvious fact that the OAS was not going to give them the victory they had failed to win by arms. Palmer was convinced that the clash seriously weakened Caamano, chewing up his most aggressive "commando" units and deepening the rebel sense of futility in the face of U.S. power. The irresistible power of the paratroops and their obvious capability to go straight to the sea had they been so directed was perfectly clear to the rebels.

Cumulative U.S. casualties after the 15 June battle had reached twenty-five dead and 163 wounded.

The negotiations between the rebels and the GNR, chaired by the OAS and with Ambassador Bunker as the special U.S. representative, lifting the role out of the hands of Bennett, were painfully difficult. It soon became apparent that Imbert, as head of the GNR, was as intractable as the rebels, instead of being the pliable instrument the
U.S. had expected him to be. He was soon using NSD to denounce the
U.S. and the OAS for preventing him from "wiping out" the rebels.
Imbert clung tenaciously to power and used every possible tactic
to retain his position.

Negotiations dragged on through the summer and at long last
culminated in September in the selection of García Gómez as interim
president acceptable to both sides. Elections were to be held in six
months. The agreement upon disarmament of the rebels proceeded slowly,
however, and it was not until October that the rebel zone was entered
by IAF troops and the zone as such ceased to exist. General Wessin
was compulsorily removed from the island and made consul general in
Miami while, as part of the agreement, the senior commanders of both
sides followed him to overseas assignments, having retained their
ranks. Colonel Caamaño in January 1966 went to London as military
attache, but the last of the old junta commanders did not finally
leave until the following month.

... troops. Earlier in the summer as the situation gradually eased, in
the sense that the danger of new trouble grew less and less, part of
the U.S. force had been moved to the countryside for training, and it
became clear that one brigade alone could perform the police function
that remained.
XIV. OBSERVATIONS

The Dominican affair was rich in useful lessons in crisis operations. Many more things went well than went poorly, but one overriding caveat must be kept in mind. This, as far as the U.S. intervention was concerned, was not a combat situation. The U.S. entry was unopposed and the only military clash of consequence came long after the situation had stabilized. Consequently, there was time and opportunity to make things go when they might not have gone so well had the operations of a hostile force been added into the equation.

The prime question -- should the intervention have been undertaken -- has not been addressed. In view of the information presented to the President and of the impressions created, he saw his only choice to order troops ashore, first to protect U.S. citizens and then to prevent a potential Cuba. Since the ultimate decision maker was unwilling to take any chance of a Communist seizure of power, intervention was inevitable. Since it is also inevitable that Communists will be involved in any political-social upheaval anywhere in Latin America, the Dominican crisis illustrated a keen dilemma for future U.S. policy toward the region.

A. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

[Signature]
The political circumstances causing a U.S. intervention as envisioned in the plan were either a call for U.S. assistance from a beleaguered Dominican government or the existence of a hostile government which had come to power as a result of a coup. The actual occurrence fell between the two assumptions. The U.S. intervened in what was essentially a civil war in which no real government as such existed, although both sides, with some degree of plausibility, claimed legitimacy.

Contingency plans at the lower levels, specifically Corps and Division, were outdated and not in accord with the latest JCS-approved CINCLANT OPLAN.

The experience pointed up the problem of time lag in the planning cycle. Lower headquarters are apparently not always able to maintain an updated plans file in accord with the CINC plans file. This is a consequence of the slowness of the normal planning system and of inadequate planning staffs at lower headquarters.

The matter of intelligence will be discussed at length but its relationship to contingency plans should be mentioned here. The lower command levels did not possess the intelligence required for the thorough execution of their own plan. It was not merely that the forces once in Santo Domingo, felt the need for intelligence of types which they did not possess because that need had not been foreseen. Although some simply did not exist, much of this needed information was available at other command levels or agencies. The truly serious planning deficiency lay in the fact that all the OPLANS (CINC, Corps, Division) specified that operations would include the capture of certain key facilities, and these were specifically listed. However, the intelligence
on these key facilities had not been gathered by the units to undertake those captures. The plans, in other words, were not supported by adequate intelligence.

B. INTELLIGENCE
The language used in cables and phone conversations tended to distort the situation and to create an impression in the minds of the Washington decision makers which did not turn out to be strictly in accord with the facts. "The Embassy was under attack;" "the carnage downtown was terrific;" "the city was shredded by air attack." While it has been shown that these impressions were used as the original justification for the U.S. intervention, it is surprising that the Embassy saw fit to pass on such information to Washington.
As a result of the continuous gross overestimation of rebel strength, the U.S. moved with caution militarily in the early days. The estimated rebel reactions to and cost of establishing the LOC and later of clearing the northern portion of the city are cases in point. It may well be that the same overestimates of rebel strength which led to the initial intervention also prevented the U.S. from undertaking military operations which could have quickly and decisively ended the whole affair. Even after the unexpectedly simple establishment of the LOC, the overestimates continued, until finally the GNR seizure of the northern portion of the city laid to rest the image of desperate and widespread resistance.
C. POLITICAL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN THE FIELD

The crisis represented an almost textbook example of political-military coordination in the field. This was probably the first time a sizeable U.S. military force had been tied so closely to a diplomatic officer. Bennett was the senior U.S. official on the scene, and although
'Masterson and Palmer when they arrived were nominally co-equal with Bennett, there was never any question that Bennett ran the show. It was his judgment upon which ultimately all rested in the early days. The role of the military commander was to coordinate with the Ambassador and to follow his lead. The Embassy and not the military headquarters was the focal point of U.S. operations.

On the military side, some senior military spokesman should have been present in the Embassy from the very start of the U.S. intervention. This might have avoided the difficulties that arose in attempting to assess the Ambassador's wishes on the 28th when for a period he vacillated so surprisingly in regard to the number of troops he wished ashore, asking for more troops to be deployed to the area but restricting the number ashore and rejecting overflights.

The JCS had to depend for information upon State or upon Commodore Dare (who was not ashore) via CINCLANT. Even Dare did not have much communication with the Embassy until late on the 28th.
A closer coordination would involve several points. If, as was intended, the senior military officer should join the Ambassador at the Embassy, the Embassy must be prepared to receive him. This involves facilities like space and communications. If the commander is to be apart from the Embassy, as were Masterson and Palmer at San Isidro, the Embassy should possess communications to him. The use of couriers, by helicopter or vehicle, was possible only in the absence of hostile military action.

Also it would appear that a thorough familiarity with the OPLAN on the part of the senior Embassy officials would facilitate the execution of the plan. The Embassy staff were clearly surprised at the magnitude of the forces which began to enter the country. This is a key deficiency which is easily remediable. Related to this point is the need to coordinate the Embassy Emergency and Evacuation Plan with the military OPLAN in order to give the military some idea of what might be expected of them in the matter of providing protection.

On the whole, political-military cooperation during the crisis was quite effective. The early instances of failure, such as the negotiation of the ISZ on the basis of a plan not approved by one of the senior military officers in the area, were due most probably to the problems of separation of the political and military headquarters. As time passed and the command structure was shaken down, an extraordinary degree of harmony grew to exist between the Embassy and USCOMDOMREP. In large part this was no doubt a product of the good personal relations between the Ambassador and General Palmer, and was evidence of the fact that the personal factor is of major significance in any joint political-military crisis coordination.

(In view of the serious impact which the real or imagined threat to the Embassy had upon subsequent developments, it may be useful to consider means of improving the protection afforded by Embassy buildings in those countries where physical assaults might occur.)
D. DECISION MAKING AND DECISION TRANSMITTING

Since the issues did not emerge simultaneously, the decision-making process followed a step-by-step pattern, decisions being made to meet the issues as they appeared. This process continued until the full U.S. force had been committed on an incremental basis and the situation in Santo Domingo stabilized through the establishment of the LOC. The incremental nature of the involvement, as at other times in recent experience, consisted in important measure of committing ourselves by day-to-day expedient reactions to still greater (and unwanted) involvement on the morrow. The Dominican crisis clearly illustrates the momentum which can develop in contingency situations.

The step-by-step nature of the commitment, as the U.S. was gradually drawn in, is illustrated in the following sequence of the first four days.

25 April - Task Group moved into position for possible evacuation, minimum force only to be employed.
26 April - Two BCTs (Power Pack I) alerted.
26 April - Evacuation by use of helicopter considered.
27 April - Task Group evacuation ships moved into Haina harbor for evacuation directly instead of through helicopters only.
27 April - Forty marines put ashore at Haina by CTG 44.9 to protect the evacuation.
28 April - Radios sent to junta forces at San Isidro.
28 April - Task Group ships with BLT ordered to close the beach and to stand by.
28 April - Airlift for Power Pack I marshalled and two BCTs loaded.
28 April - Marine platoon sent to guard Embassy.
28 April - Ambassador requests 400 marines ashore, 526 landed.
29 April - Communications group sent to junta headquarters.
29 April - Rest of TG 44.9 Marine BLT ordered ashore.
29 April - Two BCTs commenced movement to San Isidro.
Once the first paratroops had been deployed, the intervention became irrevocable.

As in other recent crises, decision making was physically concentrated in either the White House or the State Department. The participants usually included the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman JCS, and the Presidential Special Assistant for International Security Affairs. This group met either as a body or in smaller groupings. The CJCS, for example, spent much time with the Secretary of Defense in the office of the Secretary of State, while Mr. Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, operated with Mr. Mann (Under Secretary of State) as a joint Defense-State team specifically following the Dominican affair.

Actually, the decision-making line ran from the Ambassador in Santo Domingo to the State Department and finally to the White House. As has been pointed out, in the final analysis the decisions made in Washington in the opening days depended exclusively upon the Ambassador's judgment and upon his estimate of the situation.

The CJCS was the only military representative in the decision-making group, and, as such, spoke for the military point of view. No meetings of the JCS were held during the crucial early days when U.S. intervention was decided upon, the first meeting occurring on 30 April. The CJCS would report the decisions reached to the Director, Joint Staff, the Director of Operations, or the Vice J-3, and issue the resulting order directly. He also passed on information on the nature of the decisions taken and on the positions assumed within the decision-making group.

The decision transmitting process was essentially in line with familiar practice in previous recent crises. While the military
establishment, specifically the JCS and CINCLANT, were still geared to responding to the more formal traditional system of decision transmitting, they were able to accommodate to the informal methods. It might even be suggested that the system as used has indeed become the standard as a result of repeated usage, and therefore no longer presents any fundamental problems.

It was rather the ambiguity of the policy resulting from decisions which created problems for the military. The official line from Washington was to oppose the revolt and Bosch's return, and yet it was recognized in some quarters that this was a popular revolt with very considerable nonextremist support. The military commander in Santo Domingo was directed to buttress the feeble junta and to encourage it to destroy the rebels, and yet shortly afterwards he was told that the U.S. was not to become identified with the junta. Earlier the cease-fire to permit the evacuation was to be used to work for a permanent peace and a provisional government. The Ambassador and Connett clearly had one point of view, a single-minded one, and pursued it faithfully, but the highest councils of the decision makers appear to have been divided. Also while senior officials at State like Mr. Mann urged a hard line, there are clear indications that other elements in State regularly responsible for Dominican affairs were opposed, and wished to follow in practice the neutrality we professed. Added to all this were occasional conflicting requirements among U.S. military, political, relief, and propaganda agencies in Santo Domingo.

It is to the great credit of the military commanders involved that they were able to carry out orderly operations as directed in the face of these multifarious contradictory pressures.

The political authorities (the decision makers) maintained an extremely tight control over military deployments and operations, again in accord with recent custom, with the President himself approving all deployments and operations. The military fully recognized this fact of life and accommodated to it, the JCS reaction to the
unauthorized deployment of elements of Power Pack II clearly illustrating this sensitivity. At the same time, it is interesting to recall that the first landing of troops, the Marine guards at the embarkation point of the evacuation at Mina, was carried out by CTG 44.9 and the Ambassador without reference to Washington for authorization.

Military desiderata were overridden by political considerations not merely in the matter of operations in Santo Domingo and of deployments, but political constraints extended even to the bypassing of military standing operating procedures, such as when the first paratroop units and their airlift were ordered to DefCon 3 but were not permitted to load aboard the aircraft for fear of political reverberations.

E. COMMAND ORGANIZATION

The problems which arose in relation to command structure were derived in large part from the step-by-step character of the intervention and the consequent incremental "quasi-implementation" of the OPLAN (in the sense that everything in the plan ultimately went, under the specified command structure, but not all as a single coherent operation).

CJTF 122 was never really able to assert a grip over operations. The JTF was activated rather late, on the 28th, when events were already increasing their momentum, and, in addition, CJTF 122 took almost another full day to reach the scene. There then resulted the period when even the JCS were unaware of Masterson's location or whether he had assumed command as CJTF. By Friday noon the imminent potential expansion of the U.S. commitment, based on the Presidential decision of that morning "to take and hold the island," tended to outmode the JTF before it had barely begun to function. Masterson had only a small staff and was physically removed from the focus of U.S. control, the Embassy, and with inadequate communications to the city. The decision makers and senior officers in the JCS began
to display an increasing impatience over the inability to get information flowing from or through the JTF staff. The system of liaison officers at the Embassy and at San Isidro had worked imperfectly and would clearly have been inadequate under the expected transformation of the operation.

The manner of General Palmer's appointment was productive of problems. The use of informal verbal instructions, unconfirmed in writing, left open to misconstruction the two key issues of the extent of Palmer's command and of his mission. It remained ambiguous as to whether Palmer would command only the ground element or would supplant CJTF 122 as the overall commander. Presumably, this last was the intention of the high command in Washington, but it was not clearly articulated. As to his mission, he had been told to prevent another Cuba, but arrived to find that a cease-fire that had been signed with the rebels had seemed to become central in U.S. policy.

The revision of the command structure three times between the 28th and the 7th caused confusion, especially in the matter of information flow to Washington. The intermediate step on the 4th, making Palmer responsible directly to CINCLANT and co-equal with Masterson, was an indication of the JCS desire to end the JTF mechanism as quickly as possible in view of the delays it had tended to impose through its lack of facilities. In addition, Palmer was by the 4th located next to the Embassy where communications direct to Washington were available. Nevertheless, the confusion in the command picture especially during the period 30th - 2nd represented a potential danger had combat operations taken place.

F. THE FLOW OF INFORMATION

As has been usual in other crises, the flow of information to the decision makers was neither complete nor rapid enough to satisfy them. There was a continuous demand from the decision makers for detailed information on troop strengths, deployments, headquarters locations, rebel and junta capabilities, and every imaginable aspect
of the operation. This demand not only indicated the voracious appetite for detail typical of the top level in crises, but also represented the tight control maintained by the political authorities over all military operations in the Dominican Republic.

The inadequacy of information flowing to Washington in the early days was a function of intelligence failure, command organization problems, and inadequate communications facilities. The last point is discussed at length in Appendix B to this report, and it need only be said here that the military in Santo Domingo had a much more difficult problems. The confused command structure delayed transmission of information. Reports were slow in reaching Washington through the JTF and then CINCLANT, delays of many hours occurring. This was apparent very early and led the JCS to arrange the regular half hourly phone conversation with Dare and then Masterson, as a means of bypassing the slow formal message channels. The same thing occurred when Palmer reached the scene, and led to the President’s insistence that Palmer send a twice daily sitrep directly to the White House.

The reaching down by the National Command Authorities direct to the senior officials in Santo Domingo became standard quite early. The President demanded to speak with the man on the spot ultimately responsible, and hence his calls to Bennett just prior to the Marine landing or again to Bennett and Palmer to give permission to put through the LOC. This action continued a tradition of Presidential efforts to control local decisions and actions, going back to President Eisenhower in the Tachen Island crisis of February 1955, and continuing through the several crises of the Kennedy and Johnson years.

The JCS themselves also reached down to subordinate headquarters in issuing orders in order to avoid bottlenecks at CINCLANT or other senior headquarters. Such measures represented a useful mechanism for maintaining tight control as demanded by the political authorities.
The issuance of verbal orders prior to the dispatch of a formal order also was prevalent. By this means the JCS were able to alert the headquarters involved to the forthcoming order, thus granting an hour or two of extra time. The value of this mechanism was thoroughly proven, but it was also made clear that its usefulness depended upon an equally rapid transmission of the verbal order—warning by the senior headquarters to its subordinate headquarters. That responsiveness decays as distance down the chain of command increases was demonstrated on the night of the 30th - 1st, during "the pause" when, despite orders, XVIIIth Airborne Corps and the 82nd Division continued to load full combat loads and also committed the error of the unauthorized launch of some personnel of Power Pack II. It was because of this that the JCS began to reach down directly to headquarters below the CINC.

The use of personal messages from the NCA to the commanders on the scene while a useful and necessary mechanism continued to create problems, since the restriction severely limited the circulation among personnel responsible for action of the usually key information contained therein. CINCLANT, as the monitoring headquarters, apparently felt this difficulty keenly. Some means of parallel communication seems necessary so that information contained in such personals, which requires action, can be disseminated.

G. OPERATIONS

Such actual operations as were carried out in Santo Domingo were characterized by a high level of efficiency. It was in the deployments that difficulties were encountered.

In the alerting of the Power Packs it will be recalled that variations in understanding as to what different DefCons implied required the JCS to phrase its orders loosely, using terms such as "optimum readiness," in order the TAC and the XVIIIth Airborne Corps could each attain what approximated a DefCon 2. A better defined alerting system for contingency situations would seem to be called for in place of the DefCon system which was designed for use in general war.
The failure to plan at Division or Corps level for a less-than-full combat standard load introduced an initial delay factor. The term "riot control" as descriptive of the type equipment needed was too imprecise. It was surprising that no "austere" TOE was in existence at the moment at Corps or Division level, particularly since the 82nd Airborne had been specifically designated for Latin American contingency operations, few of which would seem to call for a full combat load.
Appendix A

CHRONOLOGY OF ALERTING AND MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATIONS RELATED TO THE DOMINICAN SITUATION
CHRONOLOGY OF ALERTING AND MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATIONS RELATED TO THE DOMINICAN SITUATION

TIME (EDT)  

25 April

1832  Minimum number of vessels suitable for embarkation of 1200 U.S. citizens directed to move to vicinity of Santo Domingo. Vessels to stay out of sight of land.

26 April


27 April

1257  Evacuation of U.S. citizens from Santo Domingo directed. Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (including BOXER) performing evacuation.

28 April

1920  Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron began landing Marines to protect American citizens.

29 April

1500  Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron closed Santo Domingo.

1514  Power Pack I directed to deploy.

30 April

0230  Power Pack I closed.

0800

1159
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (EDT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 May
1129  Fighter Interceptor Squadron (12 F-104) alerted.
1958  101st Airborne Division reverted to normal operations.

6 May
1756  Fighter Interceptor Squadron directed to deploy to Ramey AFB.

7 May
1639  Fighter Interceptor Squadron closed Ramey AFB.

13 May

14 May
2357  Nicaraguan Organization of American States Force (strength 159) authorized to proceed Dominican Republic.
1818  Honduras Organization of American States Force closed.

15 May
1930  Nicaraguan Organization of American States Force closed.

23 May
1959  Brazilian Organization of American States Force (strength 1129) authorized to proceed Dominican Republic.

26 May
1710  

SECRET

- 273 -
27 May

28 May

29 May

1000

Brazilian Organization of American States Force closed.

Marine Battalion Landing Team 1/2 aboard OKINAWA arrived Morehead City.

30 May

1943

All remaining Marine units alerted for withdrawal.

U.S. Army and Air Force units alerted for withdrawal on 28 May arrived CONUS.

1 June

1645

1913

2 June

1130

Marine Battalion Landing Team 1/8 reembarked.

3 June

1042

Reconnaissance Element (3 RF-101), one Fighter Interceptor Squadron (12 F-104) directed to return to normal operations.

4 June

0847

6 June

1300
Appendix B

COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This appendix presents only the highlights of the communications activities during the Dominican Republic crisis. Yet, it attempts to treat the significant communications aspects as relates to the overall command and control functions covered in the main body of this report.

The Dominican Republic operation was characterized by an expanding communications network beginning with very austere facilities and rapidly growing into a relatively large, diverse and high capacity system of communications. This buildup of communications proceeded as rapidly as personnel and equipment could be deployed to the objective area. Although these communications capabilities were stretched to the limit in the early days of the operation, essential command and control communications were established and maintained throughout the operation.

B. THE GROWTH OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES

At the outbreak of the crisis, the American Embassy was supported by limited commercial circuits, which were quickly expanded by additional commercial circuits from Santo Domingo to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, thence, through the Defense Communications System (DCS) from San Juan to Washington, D.C. and the NCA. Secure TTY was included in this original capability.

The commercial circuits going into the Dominican Republic were microwave radio circuits to the coast of the Dominican Republic and then overland by wire and cable to Santo Domingo. At Santo Domingo all commercial circuits were terminated and distributed through the commercial facilities which were located in the rebel-held area and thus subject to disruption at the pleasure of the rebels. Actually,
the circuits were not denied to the U.S. elements, and as a matter of fact were constantly expanded during the crisis. Commercial cables from Santo Domingo to San Isidro were also subject to rebel disruption because of their termination in the commercial facilities in the rebel-held area of Santo Domingo.

Another original communications facility available to the Embassy in Santo Domingo was the military radio equipment in the hands of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). This equipment was provided as a communications link with CINCSOUTH and was never used for other than indirect (relay through CINCSOUTH) communications with Washington or other U.S. commands.

The vulnerability of the commercial facilities resulting from possible rebel disruption caused an early expansion of U.S. communication facilities to provide additional and parallel circuits from U.S. military capabilities.
Beginning on 28 April, CINCLANT had one voice circuit with the Embassy in Santo Domingo. This circuit was provided through the DCS to Puerto Rico and thence via commercial means to Santo Domingo (Figure 1). On 29 April, CINCLANT had one voice and one secure TTY circuit with CJTF-122 aboard the USS BOXER located off Santo Domingo (Figure 2). These two circuits were from the normal point-to-point Navy system. Also, on 29 April, CJTF-122 established voice radio communications with the Embassy in Santo Domingo utilizing tactical Marine Corps man-pack radios, AN/PRC-47 (Figure 3). Prior to the establishment of this link, the lack of an adequate means of communications between CJTF-122 and the Embassy had made it necessary for a JTF-122 liaison officer to carry messages between these two points via helicopter. By 30 April, CJTF-122 had voice and TTY communications with the Service component commanders as shown in Figure 4.

On 2 May, CJTF-122 transferred his flag from the BOXER to the USS NEWPORT NEWS. This transfer improved the communications facilities available to the commander afloat since the conduct of flight operations
KEY COMMUNICATION LINKS

FIGURE 1. CINCLANT - American Embassy Link, 28 April 1965

FIGURE 2. CINCLANT - JTF-122 Links, 29 April 1965

FIGURE 3. JTF-122 - American Embassy Link, 29 April 1965
FIGURE 4. JTF-122 - Component Commanders Links, 30 April 1965
from the BOXER made necessary the lowering of the ship's antennas. The NEWPORT NEWS thus provided the focal point for the military communication network connecting CINCLANT with his deployed forces.

During the early part of May, additional long-haul communications facilities were provided by the installation of high-frequency, single side-band (SSB) radio systems as follows:

a. On 30 April, an AN/TSC-20 system was in operation between San Isidro and the Army Strategic Communication System's East Coast Relay Station (ECR) at Fort Bragg, N.C.

b. On 1 May, the AN/TSC-20 system was backed up by the installation of an AN/TSC-16 system between the same points.

c. An AN/TSC-25 system became operational on 8 May between Santo Domingo and the Mid-West Relay (MWR) Station of the DCS at Leavenworth, Kansas.

All of the leased long-haul circuits into the Dominican Republic were activated by 11 May and some initial problems were experienced as to reliability. The quality of these circuits gradually improved and by the end of May long-haul circuit reliability was consistently over 90 percent. The high level of reliability of the long-haul military radio systems can be seen from the performance data presented in Figure 5 as pertains to operation of the AN/TSC-20 and AN/TSC-16 for the month of May.
The planning documents for providing communications support for Dominican Republic operations were the C-E Annex/Signal Annex of CINCLANT and XVIIIth Airborne Corps OPLAN 310/2. These plans were based on the air drop deployment of a brigade-size force with minimum communications capability. Except for the assault echelon, even this austere deployment of communications elements did not follow the phasing of the Corps OPLAN 310/2. As the political/military situation deteriorated, the size of the military force escalated far beyond anything envisioned in the OPLAN, and during this rapid force buildup priority of air movement was given to parachute infantry battalions, and, consequently, the movement of alerted communications elements was either delayed or the units were reconfigured to meet minimum essential criteria. This type of austere and unplanned deployment of communications capabilities certainly imposes problems, yet it would appear that such undesirable features as this will of necessity characterize all crisis situations in which the demand for flexibility in military/political operations must take priority over the adherence to a rigid OPLAN. On the other hand, it does seem imperative that sufficient communications capabilities be deployed concurrently with any military force to enable the commander to control the troop elements of his force.

C. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
D. **COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION**

As part of the Dominican Republic Task Force, which augmented the NMCC, J-6 and DCA representatives worked together as a team to coordinate the evolving communications requirements that characterized the operation. This team tried to sense the developing needs for additional communications facilities, such as the requirements for direct circuits, and call-up circuits to meet these needs from commercial or military resources.

In the objective area a DCA-CONUS liaison team reported to U.S. COMDOMREP on 8 May and was assigned to the J-6 staff as a special unit to be called the DCA/Indigenous Communications Division. This unit immediately assumed full responsibility for long haul circuit activation, circuit restoration and the establishment of a circuit status control center.

E. **SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS**

During the early days of activity (prior to 29 April), much confusion and lack of knowledge existed concerning the actions of the Dominican Republic military leaders since they were separated from each other and from the American Embassy with virtually no means of communication with each other. The seriousness of this problem is seen from the pressure brought to bear to get 50 U.S. walkie-talkie radio sets for loan to Dominican Republic forces. (Detailed discussion in a prior section.)

Throughout the Dominican Republic operation, requirements continued to develop for communications to support special projects. COMDOMREP consistently resisted the diverting of essential tactical communications facilities for these purposes, but did take steps to insure that these special projects were supported. Some of the major special projects which developed are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

---

1*See Appendix C.*
The Solomon Group, headed by Assistant Secretary of State Solomon, was sent to Santo Domingo to supervise the distribution of U.S.-provided food supplies throughout the Dominican Republic. To coordinate this distribution, several radio stations were set up at major population centers in the country and a net control station was established in an American Embassy building in Santo Domingo.

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) provided policy coordination for a program designed to broadcast U.S.-oriented radio programs and to jam non-U.S.-oriented radio programs locally originated. Personnel and equipment from the State Department, Army Signal Units, the U.S. Navy, USIS, the Army Security Agency, and an Army Psychological Warfare Battalion were involved in this project.

The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was established to coordinate press coverage for the Department of Defense. This organization was provided with telephone service in the local area through the existing military facilities and commercial teletype circuit requirements to the U.S. were coordinated by COMDOMREP as well as the installation and maintenance support of a radio set (KWN-2) for JIB's use between Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico.

The Organization of American States (OAS) delegation established its original headquarters in the Embajador Hotel where initial communication consisted of limited local commercial telephones. The damaged and unreliable condition of these local commercial facilities made it necessary that OAS have other communications support. COMDOMREP met this requirement initially by providing four tactical FM radios (AN/PRC-10s) to the OAS. This was followed by the installation of VHF radio and spiral four-cable circuits and a switchboard tying the OAS headquarters into the military communications systems. Concurrently, efforts were directed toward the reactivation of key commercial communi-
cation support for OAS. This was a coordinated effort of the commercial telephone company, the U.S. military, and OAS representatives and resulted in satisfactory communications support for OAS. Also, three U.S. military radio operators were provided to operate MAAG radio sets for OAS radio circuits to CINCSOUTH.

F. COMMUNICATIONS AND A DELAY IN COMMAND CHANGE

The assumption of command of all operations ashore in the Dominican Republic by Gen. Palmer was delayed in order that the installation of satisfactory communications facilities could be completed which would permit him to control all elements ashore. During this period of delay, command channel messages continued to be routed through CJTF-122 and CINCLANT. There are differing opinions as to the validity of the reasons for this delay in turning over command. The counterview suggests that command and control would have been much improved had Gen. Palmer assumed command earlier and taken up his headquarters beside the American Embassy and thus be near the Ambassador, and, also, be able to use the direct communications facilities that the Embassy had with the NCA. This would have been desirable from the standpoint of being more responsive to the many inquiries and demands placed directly on COMDOMREF by the NCA, but would have tended to bypass the normal military command channels.

Also, it should be noted that any earlier additional load on the Embassy communications facilities may have been more than these facilities could have accommodated. For example, on 28 April the Embassy reported to the State Department that they were behind on even "flash" messages, and on the 29th the Embassy again said in a message that their communications facilities were flooded and that they were accepting only State Department messages.
An earlier colocation of COMDOMREP with the Embassy, and the availability of direct Embassy-Washington communications to him could possibly have obviated this confusion and embarrassment.

When Gen. Palmer was established as U.S. Commander, Dominican Republic, on 7 May, he had voice and TTY communications with the 11th MEB, CTF-121, CTF-124 (Navy Afloat), CINCLANT, the NMCC, and, of course, since he was adjacent to the American Embassy he had extensive local communication to the Embassy (Figure 6).

G. THE MATURE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

A general impression of the growth of the communications system as it evolved during the month of May can be seen from CINCLANT's communications diagram prepared as of the end of May (Figure 7).
FIGURE 6. USCOMDOMREP Links, 7 May 1965
Due to classified contents, Appendix C, consisting of pages 290 through 297 of Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) Study of Critical Incident #10, entitled *The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965*, 16 August 1966, have been withdrawn from this copy.
Appendix D

GLOSSARY AND LIST OF PERSONNEL
Glossary and List of Personnel

A. Glossary

APCJ
Carib Ready Phibron
CEFA
COMCARIBSEAFRON
CTG 44.9
GNR
Haina (Jaina)
JTF 122
MCP
MILGROUP
OAS
PR
PRD
PSPD

Pro-Castro 14th of June Party.
The Caribbean amphibious squadron carrying a battalion landing team of Marines continuously cruising the Caribbean area.
Dominican Armed Forces Training Center, the elite force of Wessin, based at San Isidro Airfield.
The Unified Command contingency plan for the Dominican Republic.
Commander JTF 122.
Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier - USN command subordinate to CINCLANT and controlling TG 44.9.
Commander Task Group 44.9 (Commodore Dare, USN).
Government of National Reconstruction, the successor to the junta, established under U.S. auspices on 8 May with General Imbert as leader.
The small seaport eight miles west of Santo Domingo.
Joint Task Force 122, the organization activated to implement
Peking-oriented Dominican Popular Movement.
Military Group, the new designation for the old MAAG.
Organization of American States.
Reformist Party (rightist group of Juan Balaguer).
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Bosch's party).
Moscow-oriented Dominican Popular Socialist Party.
Radio Santo Domingo, the main communications system in the country, controlled by the rebels.
The main military airfield eight miles east of Santo Domingo, location of the CEFA.
Task Group 44.9, the Carib Ready Phibron.
5. LIST OF PERSONNEL

Juan Balaguer - former rightist President and leader of the PR, in exile in April 1965.

W. Tapley Bennett - U.S. Ambassador in Santo Domingo.

Colonel Pedro Benoit - head of junta established April 27 by the military chiefs to counter the revolt.

Dr. Juan Bosch - former Dominican President and still leader of the PRD, in exile in April 1965.


Donald Reid Cabral - Dominican President overthrown by the revolt.

Admiral Rivera Caminero - Chief, Dominican Navy.

William Connett - Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo.

Brigadier General Rivera Cuesta - Dominican Army Chief of Staff.

Commodore (Captain) Dare - Commander Task Group 44.9 (Carib Phibron)

General de los Santos - Chief, Dominican Air Force.

General Montas Guerrero - a senior Dominican Army officer opposing the revolt.

General Antonio Imbert - antirebel leader, sole surviving assassin of Trujillo, and head of the GNR after 7 May.

Ambassador John Martin - former U.S. Ambassador to Santo Domingo sent as special Presidential envoy to solve the crisis.

Vice Admiral Masterson, USN - Commander Joint Task Force 122 (CJTF 122).

Admiral Moorer, USN - CINCLANT after 30 April.

Dr. Jose Mora - Secretary General of the OAS.

Vice Admiral Needham - Deputy CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT.

Lieutenant General Palmer, USA - Commanding General-Designate XVIIIth Airborne Corps and U.S. Commander Dominican Republic.

Admiral Smith, USN - CINCLANT until 30 April.

Major General Tompkins, USMC - Deputy CJTF 122 and first commander of USMC forces ashore.

Molina Urena - PRD-appointed provisional president after the outbreak of the revolt.

Colonel (later General) Wessin y Wessin - leader of the coup against Bosch and in April 1965 the leading military figure opposing the revolt.

Vice Admiral Wiley - Deputy Chief of Staff CINCLANTFLT and CINCWESTLANT.

Major General York, USA - Commander 82nd Airborne Division.