Historical Division
Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE CONGO--1960

Byron Fairchild
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The post-independence collapse of authority in the Belgian Congo, in July 1960, made it necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to extend the scope of their active interest in the region. Until then their interests and activities had been confined to participating in the review of policy proposals. The mid-summer crisis gave them, however, the additional responsibility of actively directing a large-scale logistical effort in support of a major military operation by the United Nations.

Early in the year, the gradual transfer of sovereign rights planned for the Congo by the Belgian Government had been impatiently swept aside by the African leaders. At the round-table conference in Brussels in January and February 1960, the Congolese delegates had presented a common front in their desire for immediate independence, no matter how divided they were on other issues. Accepting the inevitable, the Belgian Government had agreed in the course of the conference to grant the Congo its independence on 30 June and to hold a Congo-wide Parliamentary election at the end of May. (1)

(1) New York Times, Thurs., 21 Jan 60; AP daily bulletins, No. 92, 27 Jan 60, and No. 73, 21 Feb 60; Royal Institute of International Affairs, The World Today, vol. 16, No. 9, Sep 60, pp. 368-369.

Squalls appeared on the political horizon almost at once. Of the seven major "parties" in the Congo, none gained enough seats in the election to assure it of even 30 percent of the votes in the Chamber of Representatives. Patrice Lumumba, whose MNC party won some 39 of the 137 seats, emerged as leader of the largest single bloc. The Abako, under Joseph Kasavubu, the Conakat party of Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe, and a dissident wing of the MNC led by Albert Kalondji in Kasai
Province, together garnered about 27 votes, but were allied chiefly by their growing opposition to a tightly centralized, unitary type of government. (2) On the basis of the MNC Party's weak victory in the May elections, the Belgian Resident Minister authorized Mr. Lumumba to seek out the possibilities of forming a government. Nearly two weeks of political bickering and maneuvering followed. Unable to persuade Mr. Kasavubu and his followers to participate in Lumumba's efforts to form a government, the Resident Minister withdrew his authorization and offered it to Kasavubu. Now it was Lumumba's turn to react. Bitterly assailing the Belgian Minister, Mr. Lumumba immediately declared that he and his followers would not cooperate in any arrangement with Mr. Kasavubu. (3) Four days later, the New York Times reported, however, that on the previous day, 20 June, Mr. Lumumba had conferred with the other Congolese leaders and that a "deal" was apparently taking shape whereby Mr. Lumumba would head the Government as Premier and Mr. Kasavubu would become Chief of State. On the day after the meeting, the Lumumba bloc mustered 74 votes—a clear majority—in the Chamber of Representatives on a roll-call to elect a presiding officer. A few hours later, after discussing the vote with Kasavubu, the Belgian Resident Minister withdrew the latter's mission to form a government and offered the Premiership to Lumumba, who, in accepting it, expressed his hope "for sincere friendship and economic cooperation with Belgium." (4) This new turn of events was not
at all to the liking of Kalondji's followers. "Several thousand" of them, while Kasavubu was being installed as Chief of State, demonstrated before the Parliament Building, demanding the inclusion of their leader in the new government. (5)

Further demonstrations, street fights, rioting and tribal clashes in the interior punctuated the independence celebrations, which began on Wednesday, 29 June, and continued over the following week-end.

Congolese officials, undoubtedly with some justification, at first ascribed the rioting to nothing more than frayed tempers or an excess of exuberance. Greater importance was attached to the clashes in the provinces between tribal groups. On the occasion of the signing of a treaty of friendship and collaboration with Belgium, on 29 June, Premier Lumumba was reported to have asked the Belgian commander of the Force Publique to take firm action to control the situation, particularly in Kasai Province where the threat was considered to be especially serious. The next day Lumumba introduced a disconcerting element into the official ceremonies and abruptly transformed their atmosphere by delivering a militant speech in which he recited the sufferings of the Africans at the hands of the whites. (6) On Monday, 4 July, a clash took

(4) New York Times, 18 Jun 60; Ibid., 21 Jun 60, Ibid., 22 Jun 60.

(5) Ibid., 28 Jun 60.

(6) New York Times, 30 Jun 60; Ibid., 1 Jul 60.
place between troops and tribesmen in Coquilhatville, in Equator Province about 400 miles northeast of Leopoldville, during a demonstration that had its origins in economic discontent and a consequent demand for self-rule. Firing into the crowd, the troops killed ten people and wounded more than twenty. News of the affair sparked another outbreak of street fighting in Leopoldville, and at this point the American Ambassador, Clare L. Timberlake, who had arrived less than a week before, warned that Americans might have to be evacuated. Armed patrols quickly restored order in the capital and Ambassador Timberlake shortly decided not to put his warning into effect, at least for the time being. (7) On Wednesday, 6 July, the

omnious report reached Leopoldville that mutinous elements of the Force Publique at Thysville, about 80 miles to the southwest, had disarmed and locked up their Belgian officers. Although crowds, described as "somewhat argumentative," gathered in the African quarters and a demonstration by about 200 soldiers took place in front of the Parliament Building, Leopoldville remained calm. But calm suddenly gave way to panic early on Friday morning, 8 July, when refugees began pouring into the city with stories of rape and looting by the mutineers in the outlying districts. As the troops in Leopoldville rose against their officers and joined the mobs in the streets, white residents took shelter in their embassies or fled across the river to Brazzaville in the French Congo. Before the day was over, the American Embassy was surrounded by an angry crowd, river crossings to Brazzaville had been closed off, and communication with the outside had been cut. Public order and authority appeared to have completely broken down. (8)
Concern for the safety of American citizens in the Congo compelled the United States Government to take official cognizance of the situation. State Department estimates placed the number of Americans in the entire area at 347, of whom about 80 had taken refuge in the Embassy compound in Leopoldville. (9) The Washington Liaison Group, the inter-

departmental agency that was responsible for the general supervision of evacuation plans and on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented by the Chief of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, had been closely following the developments of the week-end in the Congo and had suggested to the Operations Directorate (J-3) of the Joint Staff that the armed services might soon be called on for assistance in an evacuation operation. When, after the menacing events of the preceding days, communications between Washington and Leopoldville were severed on the morning of Friday, 8 July, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, decided that American citizens must be evacuated. (10)

(9) J2DM-258-60 cited in preceding note. A New York Times despatch, 10 Jul 60, estimated the total at "about 2000." The actual number evacuated by 2 Sep 60 (excluding U.S. officials) came to 1,686. (UNK) WLG, "Survey of Initial Evacuation Events," n.d. (File ref 2 Sep 60), JIOA File, Evacuation Situation in the Congo.

(10) J2DM-358-60, previously cited. Interview with Captain E.G. Gardner, USN, JIOA, on 20 Mar 61.
Later the same morning, Rear Admiral Frank O'Beirne, Director, J-3, established a two-man "task force" in the Joint War Room to serve as an information center and to coordinate requests for assistance. As the scope of the Congo operations broadened, the task force expanded in numbers and function. Reaching a peak strength of five officers, including representatives of the Logistics Directorate, it acted, and was sometimes referred to, as a Battle Staff, directing the activities of USCINCEUR for J-3 in the name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (11)


The problem of providing transport facilities and whatever security might be required for an evacuation operation did not at first put any great tax on available resources. Indications were that the few Americans believed to be in the Congo could be taken to some temporary safe haven beyond the frontiers, such as Brazzaville, Accra or Luanda, and that it would not be necessary for them to leave the continent. As soon as he established radio communication with Washington on 8 July, by way of Brazzaville and Paris, Ambassador Timberlake reported that the immediate need was for helicopters and light planes to bring Americans in from the outlying areas. The J-3 "task force" at once arranged with USCINCEUR for three helicopters from Germany and one from Wheelus Field, Tripoli, to be flown to Brazzaville in C-124 transports. The first one arrived the next day and the others followed soon afterward. The four transport planes and another that had been sent on ahead as a "pilot" plane were placed under the "operational control," of the Ambassador for evacuation
flights, and three attaché aircraft in neighboring countries were made available for the same use if needed.

(12) (UNK) JWR, Congo Log-July 60, Entries for 8 Jul 60 and 9 Jul 60; (S) JIOA Sitrep No. 6, 12 Jul 60, and WLG, "Survey of Initial Evacuation Events," n.d., both in JIOA files, Evacuation Situation in the Congo.

(13) (UNK) Transc of tel conv. Adm O'Bierne and Gen. Jark, 8 Jul 60, JWR, Congo Log-July; (S) Msg, CINCLANTFLT to COMNAVIRLANT, et al., 8 Jul 60 (Op Order 39-60), JIOA file, "Evacuation Situation in the Congo." WASP's estimated arrival off the Congo was 20 July.

Along with these preparations,
The decision to evacuate Americans from the Congo and the preparations to this end led in turn to the possibility of further, more burdensome levies on American military resources. The first information received in the Joint Staff on 8 July indicated that the State Department had accepted responsibility for evacuating all Europeans and that MATS would have to be drawn upon for additional planes. In previous instances elsewhere, the State Department had placed transport requirements directly on the Air Force, which in turn had levied directly on MATS, but it was the view of the JCS representative in the Washington Liaison Group that the Congo problem called for the evaluation and coordination of such requirements by the Joint War Room task force.

During the weekend of 9 July rioting and rapine continued to spread in the Congo, while at the same time the military transports and helicopters that were arriving appeared to be more than adequate for American evacuation needs. Consequently, when the French Government requested aid in evacuating French nationals, the State Department on 11 July agreed that any space available in Embassy-controlled aircraft after American nationals were accommodated would be offered to Europeans.

Meanwhile, however, the Belgian airline Sabena had diverted
its entire fleet to the Congo and Air France was re-routing planes into Brazzaville. The availability of commercial transportation and the arrival of rapidly increasing numbers of American military aircraft on the new and different mission of providing airlift for a United Nations force virtually eliminated the possibility that additional requirements would be placed on the Air Force for evacuation purposes. After making the initial evacuation arrangements, the Joint Staff, which was becoming involved in the new task, was only occasionally concerned with evacuation measures.

That American armed forces might be called upon to restore order in the Congo was also to be considered. On Friday, 9 July, when the disintegration of the Force Publique removed the major safeguard of public order, the Belgian Government took immediate steps to reinforce the 2,500 Belgian soldiers that had remained in the Congo. Two companies of paratroopers arrived from Belgium over the weekend, additional troops moved in from the neighboring trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, and preparations to send further reinforcements from Belgium were announced. But the arrival of the Belgian troops merely added fuel to the fire. Although the Congolese
Foreign Minister, Justin Bomboko, was reported to have asked for Belgian intervention, the Premier, Patrice Lumumba, quickly denounced it as a violation of the recently concluded treaty. On Tuesday, 12 July, serious fighting took place between the Belgian forces and units of the Force Publique at Matadi and Boma, near the Belgian base at Kitona, on the lower Congo River. Adding to the chaos and intensifying the anti-Belgian animosity in the province of Leopoldville, Governor Moïse Tshombe of Katanga had in the meantime declared his intention of seceding from the Leopoldville government and of setting up a fully independent state. He had further indicated that Katanga would welcome Belgian military aid. (16)

(16) N.Y. Times, 9 Jul 60, and 10 Jul 60; CIA, OCI No 3492/60, Current Intelligence Memo, 11 Jul 60, in JWR, Congo Log-July; (S) JCS Current Intelligence Brief, vol. 11, 12 Jul 60; (S) ibid., vol. 11, 13 Jul 60.

In the course of these developments, officials of the Congolese Government had approached Ambassador Timberlake with an invitation for American assistance...
The Congolese Government had also requested help from the United Nations, Secretary of State Herter disclosed at a meeting with Admiral Burke, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Department representatives on Tuesday, 12 July. He had already talked with the President.
and with Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Herter said, and he believed that American troops should not be sent to the Congo "unless they were absolutely essential to save lives." The United Nations, he continued, should provide the necessary troops and military advisors, preferably French-speaking African troops. The possibility of a temporary joint command was then discussed. Admiral Burke expressed the view that if such a command were established it should be a United Nations command and that American forces should not be placed under either Belgian or Congolese command. Admiral Burke agreed that the "most logical" course would be to provide logistical support for contingents furnished by other African states rather than sending American troops at this time. (19) Later in the afternoon, the Joint Chiefs met to

(19) (TS) Adm. Burke's memo of a conversation, Enc. to JCS 2261/21, 13 Jul 60, JMF 9111/9109 (8 Jul 60), sec. 1.

consider a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which had been drafted in J-3 as an expression of views on the message received from Ambassador Timberlake that morning. [ ]
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State Herter, the Deputy Secretary of Defense assured Secretary Herter that he concurred with the latter's suggestion concerning the desirability of the United Nations acting on the problem.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense also informed Secretary Herter that steps to meet the threatened food shortage in Leopoldville had been taken. In his telephone message that morning, Ambassador Timberlake had expressed particular concern about the flour supply, stating that an urgent need existed for one hundred tons of "hard winter wheat flour". At Secretary Herter's mid-day conference with Admiral Burke and the Secretary of Defense's representatives it had been decided that the Joint Chiefs would tell USCINCEUR to be ready to ship the flour promptly, by air, but not to make actual shipment without further direction. A message to this effect was dispatched to USCINCEUR late Tuesday evening, with the request that the Joint Chiefs be notified as soon as possible if it appeared necessary to call on MATS for additional aircraft. (21)
At this point, the tempo and volume of activity rose sharply and did not begin to diminish for several weeks. As to the flour shipment, complications developed almost immediately. USCINCEUR had at first replied that the shipment could begin within twelve hours, if directed, but an exchange of messages and telephone conversations on Wednesday morning, 13 July, disclosed that no hard winter wheat flour was available in the European Theater -- only American standard issue flour, the suitability of which was in question. Although the Deputy Secretary of Defense had apparently understood from the discussion with Secretary Herter, the day before, that the shipment could be made from Lome, Togoland, this information had not yet reached the Joint War Room. Later in the day, 

(22) (S) Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 13 Jul 60, DA-IN 24068; (S) Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 13 Jul 60, DA-IN-24158; (TS) Ltr, DepSECDEF to SecState, 12 Jul 60; all in JMF 9111/9103 (8 Jul 60), sec 1.

on 13 July, Rear Admiral E.B. Grantham, in charge of African Affairs for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), called a conference of the appropriate Joint Staff, Service and State Department representatives to discuss the various requests that were pouring in. USCINCEUR had raised the question whether aviation gasoline would have to be sent to airfields in the Congo and had reported that the Belgian Government proposed to ask logistical support for the airlift of troops; Ambassador Timberlake had put in a request for Air Force operations and survival personnel and for communications equipment and technicians to be sent to the Kamina airfield; the Department of Defense itself had reopened the question of sending military attaches to the Congo. At the meeting with Admiral Grantham it was determined that the only logistical support authorized was that required to help evacuate Americans;
none would be furnished the Belgian military forces except as part of a United Nations effort. The State Department representative soon afterward cleared up the remaining points. The hundred tons of flour were to come from Togoland; no aviation gasoline was to be shipped at this time; the appointment of three, French-speaking attaches (one from each Service) was approved; and the movement, upon "valid request" by the Ambassador, of communications equipment and technical personnel, but not of operations or survival personnel, was authorized. No sooner had these questions been disposed of than the J-3 Battle Staff received a telephone call from Paris with the information that the American Ambassador in Brussels had asked USCINCEUR whether 1800 tons of foodstuffs could be provided and transported to the Congo, beginning the following day and continuing at a rate of 180 tons daily for ten days. USCINCEUR reported, however, that the aircraft available in the theater would be sufficient only for the first two daily movements and suggested that MATS be brought in on the third day to complete the requirement by flights from the continental United States by way of the South Atlantic route. (23)

(23)(UNK) Entries for 12-13 July 60, JWR Congo Log-July.

Noting that the aircraft and equipment desired by the Belgian Government were available in the European Theater and that aviation fuel was on hand at Dakar and Accra, the Joint Chiefs dispatched a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense expressing their belief that "prompt action" to
restore order in the Congo was "mandatory and in the best interests of the United States."

On the same day, 13 July, Secretary-General Hammarskjold convened the Security Council of the United Nations to consider the Congolese request for aid, which he recommended be given through the medium of a United Nations emergency force, similar to the one that had been created in the Palestine crisis. A resolution introduced by the Tunisian representative, calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to provide military aid until such time as the Congolese Government could fully meet its national security tasks, was adopted in the early morning hours of 14 July. The Belgian representative expressed his Government's willingness to withdraw its troops upon introduction of a United Nations force and to cooperate fully with the United Nations. Calling attention to the statement of the Belgian Government and assuring the Security Council that the United States stood ready to respond to "any reasonable United Nations request in the fields of transportation and communications," Ambassador Lodge announced
that the United States Government voted for the resolution, but with the express understanding that the withdrawal of Belgian troops was contingent upon the successful provision of United Nations aid. (25)


As soon as the Congo problem became a United Nations responsibility, the State Department and the Defense Department (ISA) informed the J-3 Battle Staff that action on the various requirements that were being considered and discussed by the Joint Chiefs and their staff agencies should be halted. But at the same time the Defense Department was given a "firm requirement" to airlift 300 tons of standard American flour from Evreux, France, to Leopoldville for the account of the United Nations. Alerted by the J-3 Battle Staff in mid-afternoon of 14 July and officially directed to proceed later in the evening, USCINCEUR had the first plane loaded and on its way before dawn the next morning. Twenty-three sorties and some eighty hours later, the shipment was completed. In the meantime, at the request of the United Nations, USCINCEUR had dispatched seven planes to Lome and had delivered the hundred tons of hard winter wheat flour to Leopoldville. (26)

(26) (UNK) Entries (1100 and 1500) for 14 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log-July; (S) (NOFORN) JWR Sitrep 4-60, 19 Jul 60, JUR 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), sec 1; (C) Msgs. JCS to USCINCEUR (JCS 930020). 14 Jul 60, JWR 9111/9108 (3 Jul 60), sec 1.

These requirements and USCINCEUR's previous efforts were dwarfed, however, by the demands attendant upon the organizing of the United Nations emergency force. The J-3 Battle Staff had an intimation of what was to follow when an "exploratory" request was received on 14 July from the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the transportation, starting three days later, of from 1000 to 1200 fully equipped Tunisian troops. After ascertaining from J-4 that the movement could get under way as requested, provided the State Department authorized it before the end of the day, the Battle Staff was informed by ISA that the Department of State had approved the move of 593 troops, but that it was to begin as soon as possible since the troops were ready to go. Less than half an hour later the J-3 Battle Staff directed the Operations Division of USCINCEUR to undertake the task with its own airlift resources including, if necessary, the ten aircraft standing by at Furstenfeldbruck, Germany. (27) Shortly afterward the Joint War Room again

(27) The two companies and attendant airlift were released from alert status on 16 July. (UNK) Briefing Sheet, J-3, Fr JCS, 11 Aug 60, subj: Military Alerts in Germany. Ref Congo Mobilization, JMF 9111/9103 (9 Jul 60), sec. 3.

called USCINCEUR, to warn of a possible move of 500 Ghanain troops from Accra, but the next morning this was changed to a firm requirement to transport 1200 Moroccans from Rabat and an additional 419 Tunisians. Early that morning, on 15 July, twelve hours after USCINCEUR had been directed to start moving the troops, the first aircraft arrived at Tunis. By the following morning, 16 July, the entire first contingent of Tunisian troops had arrived in Leopoldville. (28) By the

(28) (UNK) Entries for 14-15 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log-July; (C) (NORTH), Enc 2 to JWR Sitrep 3-60, 18 Jul 60, JMF 9111/9103 (15 Jul 60), sec 1.

night of 21 July, at the end of the first week after the United Nations resolved to take action, more than 3000 troops with more than 200 tons of equipment had been transported to
leopoldville by American aircraft under the control of
CINCEUR. (29) Of these, 1,073 men had been lifted from Tunis,

(29) (U) The total UN force in the Congo at this time
amounted to about 5,200 men of whom approximately 850 had been
transported by the United Kingdom, approximately 500 by the
USSR, and Ethiopia had provided the airlift for 617 men of its
own contingents. (State Dept Press Release 413, 23 Jul 60,
State Dept Bulletin, vol. XLII, No. 1102, 8 Aug 60, p. 223.)

637 had been brought from Ghana and nearly 900 from Morocco.
Approximately 560 Swedish troops from the UN Palestine force
had been picked up in Cairo, and the UN commander, General
Von Horn, with a headquarters party, had been transported
from Jerusalem. In addition, 236 of the Ghanaian troops
had been airlifted from Leopoldville to Stanleyville. All in
all, the troop lift had, in this first week, required sixty-
ine sorties, and at least twelve more flights were either in
the air or scheduled to take off with the remainder of the
Swedish and Moroccan components. Future commitments had
already been accepted by the State Department on a scale that
promised no lessening of the effort for some time to come. (30)

(30) (C) (NOFORN) Encs 1&2 to JWR Sitrep 7-60, 22 July
60; (C) (NOFORN) Enc 4 to JWR Sitrep 5-60, 22 Jul 60; both
in JMF 9111/9109 (15 Jul 60), sec. 1.

In addition to the troop movements and flour shipments,
CINCEUR had been called on to provide logistical support
for the United Nations force. The major items were helmet
liners, rations, light aircraft and vehicles. By the end of
the first week, 4000 helmet liners, painted UN blue, had
been delivered in Leopoldville, and the Joint War Room task
force had alerted USAF and to make ready another 7000 for
shipment. Ten C-47 aircraft, made available by USAF, were
on route to the United Nations Command, the last of them
being delivered on 24 July. Twenty 1/4-ton "jeep" trucks, drawn from Army stocks in the continental United States, were also on their way by the end of the week. These requirements had been filled without much difficulty. Rations presented a greater problem, however. When first informed that the State Department had authorized the shipment of 300,000 "C" rations to the UN Command, both the Joint War Room task force and the J-4 had pointed out that the pork content of American rations would make them unsuitable for Moslem troops, while the Air Force Liaison Officer with the UN Planning Group questioned the availability of transport in view of the large tonnage involved. A series of telephone conversations established the urgency, but also the possibility of spacing the requirement over a 30-day period. Although agreeing that transportation on the basis of 75,000 rations per week could be arranged by withdrawing three planes from the troop lift, US CINCEUR protested that 35,000 man-hours would be needed to remove the pork content. As an alternative US CINCEUR suggested that pork-free rations be obtained direct from production lines in the United States. Further discussion between the J-3 Battle Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA) revealed that, because of the pressing need, the United Nations would accept the rations as they were and would separate them after delivery. The J-3 Battle Staff therefore instructed US CINCEUR on 20 July to proceed accordingly. The first shipment arrived at Leopoldville the next day. (31)
When first called upon to support the UN operations, the European Command's air transport facilities had consisted of three C-130 squadrons with an assigned strength of 51 aircraft, of which 45 were actually on hand, one MATS rotational squadron of 12 C-124's, and three C-119 squadrons. Because of their limited range, the C-119's could not, however, be regularly employed in the Congo operation, but were available only for an occasional special mission. As the scope of the airlift became more recognizable, it had become evident that USCINCEUR's resources would have to be augmented. On 16 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Air Force to dispatch two MATS squadrons (24 C-124's) to Europe as soon as possible and to place them under the operational control of USCINCEUR. Air lift requests mounted sharply in the next few days and on 19 July USCINCEUR requested an additional reinforcement. The Air Force was unwilling to transfer C-130 aircraft as recommended by USCINCEUR, but indicated that another two squadrons of C-124 aircraft could be sent to Europe without jeopardizing the ability of MATS to react to general war requirements. On the recommendations of J-3, the Joint Chiefs approved this second augmentation, and the additional squadrons arrived at Chateauroux Air Base on 21 July. With these reinforcements, according to


(33) (C) Msg, JCS to CSUSAF (JCS 980155), 16 Jul 60; (U) Memo, Dir for Opsns for Dir, Jt Staff, 19 Jul 60; (C) Decision On Deployment of C-124 a/o, Secy, JCS, 19 Jul 60; (U) Msg, JCS to CSUSAF (JCS 501784), 19 Jul 60; all in JMF 9111/9108 (5 Jul 60), Sec. 1. (S) (NOFORN) JWR Sitrep 7-60, 22 Jul 60, JMF 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), Sec 1.
USCINCEUR, the saturation point of the air route to Leopoldville had almost been reached. Intermittent fuel shortages had already made an appearance at Kano, Accra and other fields, USCINCEUR had reported, while the number of aircraft that could be handled at one time at Leopoldville was limited by inadequate facilities and insufficient support personnel. For this reason, stated USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs, further reinforcements would not expedite the movements in the near future, although increased maintenance difficulties might make an additional augmentation necessary. (34)

(34) (UNK) J3M-425-60, for Chr, JCS 21 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log - July.

Among the troops being considered by the United Nations for movement during the next two or three weeks, and which had made the reinforcement of USCINCEUR's transport fleet seem necessary, was an Ethiopian contingent. The process of arranging transportation for this unit illustrates rather clearly the procedures by which UN requests were handled and the problems that were sometimes encountered. On 16 July, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA) warned the Joint War Room task force to expect requests covering the movement of a small force from Guinea, a battalion from Mali, a battalion from Ethiopia, and reinforcements for the Tunisian, Moroccan and Ghanaian troops. When advance warning such as this was received either from ISA or from the Air Force Liaison Officer with the UN Planning Group, the Joint War Room task force in turn alerted the appropriate Joint Staff divisions and USCINCEUR, but no actual measures were taken to schedule movements until the State Department, after approving a formal UN request, placed a "firm" requirement on the Defense Department. In this instance, as in others, the
formal request, when finally received, differed somewhat from the advance information. As the UN planning progressed, the Battle Staff in the Joint War Room was told on 19 July that the anticipated contingent from Ethiopia would total two battalions. In the meantime, all these probable movements except the Mali and Ethiopian detachments had been established as firm requirements and had been assigned priorities by ISA. However, EUCOM, which set the precise schedules for the various airlifts, informed the Battle Staff on 19 July that General Norstad had taken a personal interest in the Ethiopian movement and that a message recommending it be given a high priority was being forwarded to the Joint Chiefs. It was pointed out in reply that no official request even to consider the movement had yet been made but that USCINCEUR's views would be forwarded to ISA for discussion with the State Department. (35) When a

(35)(UNK) Entry for 16 Jul 60 (2125) and Entries for 19 Jul 60 (1225, 1250), JWR Congo Log - July. (S) JWR Sitreps, 2-60, 17 Jul 60, and 4-60, 19 Jul 60, JWR 9111/9109 (15 Jul 60), Sec. 1

firm requirement for the Ethiopian contingent (1340 men, 100 tons of equipment and 9 vehicles) was established three days later, J-3 Battle Staff was disturbed to find that Stanleyville was to be the destination. Except for the single shuttle lift of a few Ghanaian troops to Stanleyville, all UN troop lifts conducted by USCINCEUR had been to Leopoldville. No general authority existed, the Battle Staff informed the UN Liaison Officer, by which troops could be landed at any other destination. Also there was doubt about the security of the Stanleyville airfield, and it was believed that a large increase in the number of support personnel would be necessary if landings were scheduled for Stanleyville. The next day (22 July), after ISA reported that the field was
safe and that the UN would authorize additional support personnel, an operational problem developed. The high elevation of the airfield at Addis Ababa made the use of C-124's impracticable, according to USCINCEUR, but, if C-130's were used, the planes, after discharging at Stanleyville, would be compelled to fly on to Leopoldville to refuel for the return flight to Addis Ababa, since there was no jet fuel at Stanleyville. Nevertheless, this would be feasible, USCINCEUR advised the J-3 Battle Staff. The information from USCINCEUR was in turn presented to ISA, which soon afterwards assured the Battle Staff that the movement from Addis Ababa direct to Stanleyville had the full approval of the State Department and OSD. USCINCEUR was immediately instructed to proceed with the operation. No rearrangement of the established priorities was necessary, for by the time the first plane left Addis Ababa on 25 July the other, higher priority, troop lifts were already in progress. (36)

(36) (UNK) Entries for 21 Jul 60 (1145, 1715), 22 Jul 60, 23 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log - July.

Although a matter of occasional concern, the problem of fuel supply and support personnel at African airfields seems not to have reached major proportions. When the UN operations were just getting underway, USCINCEUR reported on 16 July that support personnel in the Congo itself numbered 97 U.S. Army and 65 Air Force officers and men. After the rush to get started was over, the numbers were reduced, and on 25 July they stood at 73 Army and 59 Air Force personnel. It was at this time, at the beginning of the second week, that the question whether the strength was adequate to service an expanded operation was raised. But as the additional troop movement proceeded, the support strength rose during the
following week to 80 Army and 99 Air Force personnel reported on 29 July. Two days later Army personnel had been reduced to 61 while Air Force strength stood at 91. On 4 August, when the UN troop lifts appeared to be tapering off, approximately 39 Army and 78 Air Force support personnel were reported present in the Congo. (37) The fluctuation in

(37) All figures except the last are from the respective Joint War Room daily Sitreps. Figures for 4 August are from (UNK) Entries for 4 Aug (0322, 1745) in JWR, Congo Log - August. All figures are exclusive of transient aircraft crews.

reported strengths suggests that temporary additions to the service and maintenance crews could be, and apparently were, quickly dispatched as and wherever the operations demanded. The supply of aviation fuel was likewise more critical at the end of the first few days than it was in subsequent weeks. Fuel stocks at Kano, the most convenient staging and refueling field between Wheelus Field and Leopoldville, were limited by the capacity of the rail connection with the seacoast and by the requirements of commercial airlines, and after three or four days it had become necessary to divert flights to Accra, where, as a result of the sudden increased demands, a similar shortage threatened to develop. The supply at Leopoldville could not be replenished because in the general disruption of affairs the pipeline to Matadi had been shut down and dredging operations, which kept the channel from Matadi to the sea open, had ceased. By 25 July, however, the fuel situation was well in hand. The WASP, on its arrival off the coast, had been ordered to Accra where it discharged some 200,000 gallons of aviation gasoline on 26 July. A Swedish port unit had moved into Matadi. The pipeline was reopened and dredging operations were resumed.
With the arrival, during the week, of U.S. Navy tankers and commercial carriers at Matadi, Lagos and Dakar adequate reserve stocks appeared to be assured. (38)

However promptly and adequately the military Services could respond to an unforeseen demand upon their physical resources without dislocating the normal organization of staff and command responsibility, they could not similarly meet an extraordinary charge against their fiscal and accounting capabilities without resort to an ad hoc arrangement. Under instructions transmitted by word of mouth through customary staff channels, aircraft, men and equipment could be dispatched halfway around the world and be diverted to some special purpose for extended periods of time, but financial accountability and costs on the other hand could not be shifted so easily. The method of handling financial matters that would arise from supporting the United Nations had been discussed informally by the Director of Logistics, Admiral Persons, and his Deputy, on the one hand, and Admiral Grantham of OSD (ISA), and the Air Force Budget Director, on the other, soon after the UN Congo operations got under way. It was agreed then that the Air Force should be designated as the central agency in the Defense Department for such matters. In making this recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 19 July, the Director of the Joint Staff noted that any such arrangement should not, however, be permitted to interfere with the operational responsibilities of either the Joint
Chiefs or the commander of the unified command. (39) The

Department of the Air Force was accordingly designated on 4 August as Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense, with authority to perform all the financial functions of the Department of Defense that were associated with the UN Congo operation. The "operational aspects involving employment of elements of the military forces" were specifically retained as a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (40)

Two questions soon arose: 1) whether the Joint Staff would continue to be informed of individual UN requirements by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) or whether the Air Force would now be the channel; and 2) whether the Air Force or the Joint Staff would be the action agency for the transfer of parts and equipment to the United Nations force. Although, on the first question, J-3 was somewhat concerned about receiving requests through the Air Force since priorities were set by ISA, it was agreed that the Air Force should receive all requests from the State Department and transmit to the Battle Staff in the Joint War Room all those involving military air or sea lifts. As to the second question, requests for the transfer of equipment or parts from the continental United States were to be taken care of directly by the Air Force; while those involving transfers from EUCOM sources would be passed on to the Battle Staff.
for action. (41) The relationship between the Joint Staff and the Executive Agent was further defined early in October when the Air Force established specific procedures permitting routine requests for materiel support to go directly from the UN to the Executive Agent Representative in Europe, thence to the appropriate source of supply. The Air Force was also designated as the action agency for operational and special requests, unless the requests involved an overseas activity or source, required special sea or air lift, or affected the combat capability of U.S. forces, in which case the Joint Chiefs were to take necessary action. The designation of an Executive Agent meant little change, however, in actual practice. Because USCINCEUR's resources were chiefly involved, the Battle Staff continued to receive and act upon the UN requests for assistance and, although the Air Force replaced ISA as the official intermediary, the requests and information concerning them continued to reach the Battle Staff directly from the State Department. (42)


In the meantime, one of the knotty political entanglements had created something of a policy problem. The Congolese Government, in approaching the United Nations for help, had placed its appeal on the basis not of restoring law and order but of repelling an act of aggression by
Belgium troops. (43) Although making no finding of

(43) (U) Statement by Pres. and the Prime Min of the Congo, Enc to JCS 2262/23, 13 Jul 60, JMP 9111/9108 (5 Jul 60), Sec. 1.

aggression, the United Nations had called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops, but while the UN force was moving in, the Belgian troops had been reinforced also. By 20 July Belgian forces totalled approximately 7,400 men (including one battalion in Ruanda-Urundi), most of whom were in Leopoldville Province. (44) The Soviet representative on

(44) (S) (NOPORN) JWR Sitrep 5-60, 20 Jul 60, JMP 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), Sec. 1.

the UN Security Council promptly seized upon this opportunity to charge the United Nations with dereliction of duty and to encourage Premier Lumumba to look to the Soviet Union for unilateral support in expelling the Belgians. Negotiations between the Belgian commander and the local representatives of the United Nations had produced an agreement on 19 July that the UN forces would relieve all Belgian troops in the Leopoldville area by Saturday, 23 July, which the Security Council had followed up by bidding the Belgian Government "to implement speedily" the withdrawal called for in the resolution of 14 July. (45) When the


Belgian authorities encountered difficulty in meeting the deadline, Ambassador Timberlake and the USCINCEUR Liaison Officer in the Congo agreed, at the request of UN Representative Dr. Ralph Bunche, to transport the troops
in Leopoldville to the Belgian base at Kitona in American aircraft. With this help all the Belgian troops in the city - numbering about 1000 - could be withdrawn in two days, Ambassador Timberlake reported. When informed of the arrangement by CINCEUR headquarters on the morning of 21 July, the Battle Staff in the Joint War Room cited the lack of authorization for intra-Congo airlifts, particularly for transporting Belgian troops, and instructed USCINCEUR to stay the movement. Subsequent telephone messages from USCINCEUR later in the day indicated that the number of troops to be lifted could be reduced to 450, that all the local authorities considered American help highly important, and that the movement would not adversely affect USCINCEUR's other commitments. But when the Battle Staff notified USCINCEUR the following morning that approval had been obtained from the State Department it was learned that the American authorities in Leopoldville, on being instructed not to go ahead with the movement, had worked out a new arrangement by which Sabena Air Lines would divert its planes from the evacuation run to the Belgian troop lift and the American planes would take care of the evacuees. Shortly afterward the State Department rescinded its approval of the troop lift.

(46) (UNK) Entries for 21 Jul 60 (1025, 1255, 1310, 1645, 1935, 2045) and 22 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log - July. (C) (NOFORM) JWR Sitrep.8-60, 23 Jul 60, JWR 9111/9109 (15 Jul 60), Sec. 1.

The prospect of Soviet intervention raised by Premier Lumumba's threats to call in Soviet troops if the Belgians failed to leave immediately had prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the possible courses of action the United States might take in this event. To forestall
unilateral intervention by the Sino-Soviet bloc the Joint Chiefs recommended that the United Nations: 1) declare an embargo on shipments of arms to the Congo and a blockade against the further introduction of troops other than of the United Nations; 2) earnestly caution the Soviet Union not to interfere in the Congo; 3) close all airports in the Congo to Soviet military airlifts and be ready to obstruct Soviet use of airfields by blocking the runways; 4) prepare to "physically restrict ship passage into the mouth of the lower Congo." In addition, the United States should, "through the United Nations, and directly" bring pressure to bear on the countries along the air routes to deny overflight privileges and staging facilities to Soviet military airlifts. In the event that military intervention by the Sino-Soviet bloc took place or was actually attempted, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the United States take such action within the United Nations as would lead to an early withdrawal of Belgian forces as well as Sino-Soviet forces, and in addition be prepared to take, unilaterally if necessary, "appropriate military action ... to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo." (47)

(47) (S) JCS 2262/25, 21 Jul 60, as revised by Decision On (22 Jul 60), JMF 9111/9103 (9 Jul 60), Sec. 2.

In accordance with a decision of the National Security Council on 21 July, when a preliminary draft of the Joint Chiefs' views had been discussed, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 22 July and to the Secretary of State on 23 July for their further consideration. (48)

(48) (S) Briefing Sheet, J-5, for Chrm, JCS, 22 Jul 60; (S) JCSM-321-60, for SecDef, 22 Jul 60; (S) Memo, Col. P.E. Smith, Actg Dir Off of NSC Affairs, ISA, for SecState, 23 Jul 60; all in JMF 9111/9103 (9 Jul 60), Sec. 2.
The possibility of Soviet intervention in the Congo and the views of the Joint Chiefs in this regard were again discussed by the National Security Council in its meeting on 1 August.

(49) (C) Note to Control Div, from Sec JCS, 5 Aug 60; (C) SM-759-60, for Dir J-5, 5 Aug 60; both in JFRF9111/9108 (3 Jul 60), Sec. 2. (TS) NSC Action 2276, 1 Aug 60, Appr by Pres., 12 Aug 60.

The UN troop lift requirements had dropped off considerably at the beginning of August. The only large scale request that came in was for one battalion of Irish troops, which was not scheduled to move until about 18 August. Since the pressure appeared to be easing, the possibility of releasing some of the aircraft was now raised. At this time, approximately 115 aircraft (47 C-130's and 68 C-124's), including the European Command's entire fleet of C-130's, were allocated to the Congo operations.

(50) (UNK) Airlift Readiness Rpt, 7 Aug, in Entry for 8 Aug 60 (1417), JFR Congo Log - August. Of the total planes, 31 were out of commission, in maintenance, on this date. As of 25 July, the total aircraft available for the operation had amounted to 117 planes (45 C-130's, 71 C-124's). (TS) EUCOM, Annual Historical Rpt, 1960, App. C., p. 15.

As a result, according to U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), Army training exercises had been delayed and a backlog of
transport commitments in the theater had piled up. For these reasons, and to conduct periodic inspections, USAFE on 3 August proposed to withdraw all C-130's from the Congo airlift. Not long afterwards, the Air Staff inquired about the return of the four MATS squadrons that had been placed under USCINCEUR's operational control. Plans for inactivating certain MATS units later in the year were handicapped, the Air Staff stated, by the lack of information concerning the return of the planes. But J-3, although looking forward to the time when the United Nations could shift to commercial charters for its transport needs, could not foresee the release of any of the aircraft until the future of the UN operations became clear. (51)

(51) (UNK) Entries for 3 Aug 60 (1155, 1200) and 10 Aug 60 1342), JWR Congo Log - August.

As it happened, the early August lull was succeeded by another flurry of activity. On 12 August the J-3 Battle Staff received a firm requirement for a contingent of Tunisian troops and an Ethiopian battalion to be moved as soon as possible, and the next day the State Department informed the Battle Staff that the United Nations wanted "a lot of troops as rapidly as possible." The movements that might materialize from these requests would extend the range of the airlift considerably. It was probable, the Battle Staff was informed, that approximately 3,400 troops would have to be transported within the next two to four days from five different countries, one of which was Indonesia, to separate destinations in the interior of the Congo as well as to Leopoldville. A few days later transportation was requested for a small detachment of Indian troops from New Delhi, and on 24 August a firm requirement was placed on the Joint Staff for the airlift of 750
Belgian troops from Kamina to Brussels, beginning two days later. (52) For the most part, however, the burden of

activity stemming from the mid-month requests fell on the Joint Staff and not on USAFE; what problems they presented turned out to be staff problems rather than operational. As a result of cost figures and other data assembled by J-3 the Indonesian movement, for example, was finally scheduled for sea transport. In the number of troops to be transported the final requirements were somewhat smaller than the original indications, and as the matter of priority was studied the urgency proved less pressing than it had first appeared to be.

By 24 August J-3 was convinced that the emergency was almost over and that a gradual "phase-down" of the airlift could begin. By this time, the total strength of the UN force amounted to approximately 15,700 officers and men, of whom 12,902 had been airlifted by the United States. Although some additional commitments were to be expected, the Joint Chiefs agreed that two of the C-124 squadrons could be returned to MATS control. USCINCEUR was accordingly authorized on 26 August to release them as soon as the European theater could return to its normal readiness posture. The Joint Chiefs informed USCINCEUR that they planned to release the remaining two MATS squadrons as soon as possible, consistent with the Congo situation and USCINCEUR's requirements, particularly as regards to closing out the fueling and staging stops along the route and the operating arrangements in the Congo. But the
Joint Chiefs further stated that they considered any radical change in route and airfield operations inadvisable for the time being. (53) In reply, USCINCEUR estimated that beginning on 1 September two squadrons could be returned to MATS, that a third squadron could be released on 7 September, and the fourth on 21 September. The first two squadrons were released almost on schedule—nine C-124's were returned to MATS control on 2 September and the remainder within a few days—but then USCINCEUR decided to postpone releasing the other two squadrons. In actual fact, the Joint Chiefs by their message of 26 August had intended to authorize the withdrawal of only two squadrons; USCINCEUR on the other hand was interpreting that message as authority to release all four squadrons. USCINCEUR's decision to extend the time schedule, as far as it concerned the last two squadrons, concealed the misunderstanding, although telephone conversations on two occasions on the subject of slowing down the return of the planes should have indicated and corrected the misapprehension. That a lack of agreement existed did not come to light until 20 September, when USCINCEUR informed J-3 that it wished to release one of the two remaining squadrons the following day and the other about ten days later. Only then was it made completely clear to USCINCEUR that these last two squadrons were not to be returned to MATS until the Joint Chiefs determined that the situation permitted it and until
they specifically directed USCINCEUR to release them. (54)

(54) (C) JWR Sitrep 45-60, 29 Aug 60; (C) 49-60, 2 Sep 60; both in JME 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), Sec. 2. (UNK)
Entries for 5 Sep (0952), 7 Sep (0905) and 20 Sep, JWR Congo Log - Sept 60.

On 30 September, at the recommendation of J-3, the Joint Chiefs directed USCINCEUR to release one of the two squadrons and requested USCINCEUR's recommendations on returning the other. By 9 October the squadron that had been released was back in the United States under MATS control. In the meantime, USCINCEUR's recommendation that the Congo air route be closed down and the last squadron be returned to MATS control at the completion of its currently assigned UN mission had been rejected by the Joint Chiefs. A month later, on 8 November, the Joint Chiefs, deciding that half the squadron would suffice USCINCEUR's needs, authorized the release of six aircraft, but before the planes could be returned they withdrew their authorization. In spite of protests by MATS, the squadron was still under USCINCEUR's control at the end of 1960. (55)

(55) (TS) Memo, J-3 for JCS, 1 Nov 60, Enc to JCS 2262/54, 3 Nov 60; (C) Msgs, JCS to USCINCEUR (JCS 985512), 8 Nov 60; both in JME 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60), Sec 6. (S) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR (JCS 985640), 30 Sep 60, JME 9111/9108 (8 Jul. 60) Sec. 5. (C) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR (JCS 986737), 5 Dec 60, JME 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60), Sec 7. (C) JWR Sitrep 77-60, 11 Oct 60, JME 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), Sec 4. (UNK) Entry for 17 Nov (1130), JWR, Congo Log - Nov 60.

The progressive deterioration of affairs in the Congo was the primary consideration in the development of the Joint Chiefs' views on the retention of the MATS planes. In response to the UN resolution of late July, the Belgian forces in the Congo had not departed, but had been gradually redeployed to the base at Kitona, near the mouth of the
Congo River, and eastward into Katanga Province, whose separatist movement had met with Belgian sympathy and support. By the end of the first week in August, all the Belgian troops, who now numbered about 9,000 men, had withdrawn to Kitona and into Katanga. The method of conducting the redeployment—for the Belgians withdrew only when relieved by a UN contingent—and the refusal of the UN command to intervene in factional or tribal clashes on behalf of the central government became a source of increasing friction between the UN authorities and Premier Lumumba in particular. A continuation of the process into Katanga and the eventual withdrawal of Belgian forces to Europe hinged partly upon the status of the bases at Kitona and Kamina but chiefly upon the attitude of Premier Tshombe of Katanga, who had threatened to resist by force and arms the entry of UN troops into his province. By 14 August, negotiations with Tshombe had, however, advanced sufficiently to permit the UN forces to begin moving into Katanga. The first Belgian troops had been returned to Belgium a few days before, and by 3 September all Belgian tactical units had been withdrawn. There remained only the support personnel and technicians at the two bases—about 1000 at Kamina and 500 at Kitona—plus a few military advisors retained by Tshombe who was raising a gendarmerie force in Katanga. But in relieving the Belgians, the UN force had also replaced them as the object of Congolese resentment. Caught in the power struggle between Kasavubu and Lumumba and between the Central Government and the Katanga regime, the UN troops met with harassment.
from several directions. By mid-September the Congo again appeared to be heading towards utter anarchy. Then, with the arrest, release and re-arrest of Lumumba and the emergence of Kasavubu's Army chief into a dominant role, chaos gave way to confusion, calm and crisis in rapid succession.

To avoid trouble with the Congolese the State Department had at first been reluctant to authorize airlifts to and from the interior of the Congo, particularly if the lift involved Belgian troops. When the UN Force began

(57) See above, p. 52.

relieving the Belgians in the interior, the airlift could no longer be confined to Leopoldville. The next step was to assist in the Belgian withdrawal. On 27 August the inevitable occurred when eight crew members of a MATS plane at Stanleyville were seized and severely beaten by Congolese troops, and probably owed their lives only to the prompt intervention of an Ethiopian UN detachment. Until this time, American aircraft crews had been required by the Ambassador to wear civilian clothes and had been forbidden to bear arms, but thereafter the Defense Department insisted that crew members be provided with side arms. The Stanleyville incident threatened to put an end to American participation in airlifting Belgian troops, which had been scheduled to start the day before. By limiting the loading points to Kamina and Kitona, except for one detachment from Elizabethville, and by prohibiting planes that were carrying Belgian troops from stopping at any other airfields in the Congo outside Katanga, the movement was continued, however, without further unpleasantness. By 3 September, a total of
1,367 Belgian troops had been airlifted to Brussels in American aircraft. Two final contingents, which completed their movement on 14 September, raised the total to 1,696. (58)

(58) Entries for 27 Aug, 28 Aug, 31 Aug, 1 Sept, 2 Sept, 3 Sept, JWR, Congo Log August-Sept 1960. (C) JWR Sitrep 47-60, 31 Aug 60; JNR 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60) Sec 2. (C) JWR Sitrep, 51-60, 4 Sep 60; 50-60, 15 Sep 60, Ibid., Sec 3.

With the departure of the Belgian combat units, Mr. Hammarskjold and Dr. Bunche believed that the support personnel could be withdrawn from Kitona and Kamina, and that the UN Command could assume control of the two bases with the assistance of a few Belgian technicians as civilian employees and with the former commanders acting as civilian administrators. (59)

(59) JWR Sitreps 43-60, 27 Aug 60; 46-60, 30 Aug 60; 47-60, 31 Aug 60; JNR 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60), Sec. 2.
(60) (S) Drft memo for SecDef, Enc to JCS 2262/32, 9 Aug 60, JMF 9111/9105 (6 Aug 60).

(60) (S) CSAM 286-60, 15 Aug 60, sub: The Kitona-Banana Complex; (S) JCSM-363-60 for the SecDef, 19 Aug 60; both in JMF 9111/9105 (6 Aug 60).
Planning for the purely military operations that might become necessary as a result of Soviet intervention, or threat of intervention, had been approved by the National Security Council at the beginning of August, but it had become bogged down in disagreement among the Services over the agency to whom the planning should be assigned. (62)

(62) See pp. 52-54 above for the basic recommendations and NSC approval.
J-5, which had been directed to draft a preliminary study, reported to the Joint Chiefs on 20 August that responsibility for over-all planning should be assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). The choice was reached partly through a process of elimination. The Joint Staff, according to J-5, should not be responsible for preparing command level or detailed theater level plans since it would be inconsistent with the Joint Chiefs' primary responsibility of providing strategic guidance to commanders, would require a more adequate technical staff and library than were available to the Joint Staff, and would compel the Joint Chiefs to review their own plans and coordinate their annexes with those of their subordinates. Having narrowed the choice to CINCEUR, USCINCEUR and CINCLANT, J-5 listed the advantages and disadvantages of each. But it would appear unlikely that J-5 based its recommendations on the "pros and cons;" since CINCLANT lacked important advantages listed for both CINCEUR and CINCEIM, namely, an experienced, well-designed contingency planning staff, conveniently located for coordination with associated nations, and lacked also USCINCEUR's advantage of controlling sizeable forces from all Services which were readily available for initial deployment to the Congo. Only one of the four advantages listed for CINCLANT—that it was least likely to be simultaneously involved in other large scale contingency operations—could be considered absolute, and there was subsequent disagreement about its factual accuracy. The disadvantages listed by J-5 similarly provided little basis for rational choice. Probably the deciding factors were the "additional considerations," which to J-5 indicated the desirability of eventually establishing a new unified command with
responsibility for Africa South of the Sahara. If this were to be done, J-5 suggested, it would be preferable not to assign contingency planning for the Congo to either USCINCEUR or CINCNEIM. (63)

(63) (TS) Enc "D" to JCS 2262/36, 20 Aug 60, JMF 9111/9109 (8 Jul 60), Sec 3.

(64) (TS) Enc "C" to JCS 2262/36, 20 Aug 60, Ibid.
(65) (TS) App to Enc "A", JCS 2262/36, 20 Aug 60; Enc "C" and Enc "D" to same, Ibid.

(66) (TS) Enc "E" to JCS 2262/36, 20 Aug 60, Ibid.
(67) (TS) Enc "F" to JCS 2262/36, 20 Aug 60, Ibid.

(68) (TS) JCS 2262/43, 3 Sep 60, JCS OPLAN 200-60, App to Enc "A" (p. 229) and Annex "A" to Enc "A" (p. 238), JMP 9111/9108 (3 Jul 60), sec 5.
(69) (TS) CSAM 345-60, 23 Sep 60; (TS) Memo, CNO for JCS, 23 Sep 60; (TS) CMCM 40-60, for JCS, 22 Sep 60; JMF 9111/9103 (9 Jul 60) Sec 5.

(70) (TS) JCSM-425-60, for SecDef, 24 Sep 60, Ibid.
(71) (S) Memo, C/S, USA (CSAM 350-60) for JCS, 29 Sep 60, JCS 2262/47, 30 Sep 60; (TS) Memo, C/S, USAF (CSAFM 470-60) for JCS, 4 Oct 60, JCS 2262/48, 4 Oct 60; both in JMF 9111/9108 (3 Jul 60), sec 5. (C) Memo, SecDef for JCS, 6 Oct 60, Enc to JCS 2262/49, 6 Oct 60; (S) Memo, C/S, USA (CSAM 363/60) for JCS, 14 Oct 60, with attchd drft memo for SecDef; (TS) Memo, Chm, JCS (CM-19-60) for SecDef, 29 Oct 60, Enc "A" to JCS 2262/53, 29 Oct 60, with views of C/S, USA, C/S USAF, CNO and Cmdt, USMC, attchd as App "A", "B", and "C" to Enc "B"; all in JMF 9111/9108 (5 Jul 60), sec 6.
Task Force commanded by a Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, comprising a "modest" permanent planning staff and such forces as might be made available for operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs, and whose planning staff should be located in the Hampton Roads area. At their meeting on 9 December, the Joint Chiefs discussed at considerable length a draft of a message to CINCLANT, which had been prepared in J-5 in implementation of Secretary Gates' decision. Now the question at issue, raised by the Chairman, was whether the Secretary of Defense had intended both operational and planning responsibility to be assigned to CINCLANT. Failing on two subsequent occasions to resolve the issue, the Joint Chiefs decided to defer further consideration of the problem until they could meet with the Secretary of Defense, which they did on 29 December. At that time, Secretary Gates informed them that his intent had been for CINCLANT to have over-all responsibility for both planning and operations until the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense took "affirmative steps" to relieve CINCLANT of such responsibility. He cited as an example the possibility of the Joint Task Force Commander relieving CINCLANT of the over-all command of operations if the former were established ashore and engaged in a large scale military operation and the further possibility of the Joint Task Force Commander being made a Unified Commander if the operation were of sufficient magnitude. (72) With this

(72) (C) Memo, SecDef fr Chm, JCS, 21 Nov 60, Enc to JCS 2262/56, 25 Nov 60; (C) Memo, Dir, Jt Staff for JCS, JCS 2262/59, 6 Dec 60, and Enc thereto; (C) Decision On JCS 2262/59 and /60, 9 Dec 60 (SM-1283-60); (C) Note, Secy, JCS to Control Div, 21 Dec 60; (C) 1st N/H of JCS 2262/36, 29 Dec 60; all in JMP 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60), sec.7.
clarification, the last hurdle was cleared, for on
9 December the Joint Chiefs had approved the nomination of
Lt. Gen. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., the Deputy Commanding
General for Reserve Forces, CONARC, to command the Joint
Task Force. On 4 January 1961, CINCLANT was officially
notified that he was to have responsibility for planning
and operations with respect to Africa South of Sahara and
that General Freeman had been designated commander of the
Joint Task Force. After five months, the arrangements
for undertaking contingency planning were at last in order.

By this time the UN forces in the Congo were learning
that the way of a peacemaker does not lead to popularity.
Gradually thrust into the role of buffer, the United Nations
had become the target of denunciation from all parties to
the internal strife. As foreign nations sought to turn
that strife to their own purposes, the UN forces had also
become the only insulation against a civil war of the type
waged in Spain during the 1930's, a conflict supported by
"volunteers" and equipment from two opposing, foreign
ideological camps. A withdrawal of the UN forces from the
Congo or indeed any weakening of the UN effort might well
have led to a situation of the sort for which the Joint
Chiefs desired to have plans in preparation. The continued
danger of foreign intervention made it seem necessary to
keep USCINCEUR's airlift capabilities in being and the air
route to the Congo in operation after the original purpose
had been served.
The greatest demands on USCINCEUR's airlift resources and the peak effort in this respect had been concentrated in the first seven weeks following the UN decision to send troops to the Congo. By the beginning of September, the UN force had been built up to a total of 16,013 troops, of whom 13,133, with 3,079 tons of equipment, had been flown into the Congo by the US Air Force. The task had been difficult not because there was any one over-ridingly important problem on the solution of which the success of the operation depended but rather because so much had to be done in a relatively short time without previous preparation. In the four months from 1 September to the end of the year, only 2,914 troops and 899 tons of equipment were airlifted into the Congo. An additional 1,736 troops had been brought in by sea transport during October. By the end of December, the United States had flown 15,947 troops into the Congo from sixteen nations ranging over the globe from Canada to India. It had been, in the words of USCINCEUR's historian, "the longest airlift in history from the standpoint of route miles."
THE CONGO
1961-1962

July 1965
Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Page #1
INTRODUCTION

On 1 January 1961, the US was adhering to a policy toward the Congo and the other newly independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa that was designed to encourage an orderly Western-oriented development of the region in cooperation with the former colonial powers and thus to prevent the dislocation and disruption that would provide opportunities for Communist penetration and exploitation. This basic policy had been adopted by the NSC in April 1960. In terms of military and strategic interest, the US objective was to deny the area to Communist control. The role of the JCS in carrying out this policy consisted in making a periodic survey of the entire area's strategic importance and in assisting the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) in supporting the Department of State in the task of projecting American influence into the region.\(^1\)


The statement of US policy had been adopted in April 1960, and was shortly followed by Belgium's granting the Congo independence. Almost at once the Congo was plunged into anarchy, and when Congolese security forces collapsed, Belgium felt compelled to send troops to its former colony to restore order. A series of armed clashes fought during July between Congolese and Belgian troops demonstrated, however, that the independent citizens of the Congo would not cooperate with their former overlords. Instead, the Central Government of the Congo called upon the UN for aid, and requested the US to send 2,000 troops to assist in the task of restoring order.

Rather than embark upon a unilateral military venture, the US, which had first been primarily interested in the evacuation of American nationals, chose to support the UN Emergency Force that was created in answer to the Congolese plea for aid. The most important form of US support was the providing of aircraft to transport UN troops and supplies to the Congo and to evacuate Belgian troops from the area. At the same time, however, planning was begun to meet the contingency of intervention by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. A joint task force was established under CINCLANT to develop and maintain plans for military operations in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^2\)

\(^2\) (TS) "The Congo--1960," draft chapter for JCS history, passim.
The Rival Congolese Factions

The months following independence in the Congo saw the erection of a trio of governments. The Central Government of the Republic, headed by President Joseph Kasavubu, had its capital at Leopoldville. It was this, the "legitimate" government that had requested UN assistance, a plea which resulted, among other things, in the dispatch of an emergency force that soon numbered some 19,000 men.

The second government was that of secessionist Katanga Province. Moise Tshombe, leader of this faction, claimed that Katanga should remain independent of the central government; but since this was the richest portion of the Congo, the revenues from its natural resources would be essential to the survival of any Congolese government. Tshombe derived his support from foreign investors, former Belgian colonial officials, and a collection of European soldiers of fortune.

The third government, with its capital at Stanleyville, claimed sovereignty over the entire Congo, including Katanga Province. The Stanleyville government was headed by Antoine Gizenga, who had been indoctrinated in the tenets of Communism and was a disciple of Patrice Lumumba, the rabidly anti-colonial ex-premier of the central government. Lumumba, although removed from office by Kasavubu, and later arrested by the Congolese army, was recognized by the Soviet Union as the legitimate head of the Congo's government. For the most part, the supporters of the Stanleyville regime were the most radical Congo nationalists and the most vigorous foes of colonialism.\(^3\)


Soviet Protests at the UN

Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council met from 12 to 14 January to consider a Soviet complaint of "fresh acts of Belgian aggression against the Congo." The basis of this charge was Belgium's reintroducton of troops into the Congo when it became obvious that Congolese forces could not maintain order. Since some Belgian contingents bound for the Congo used bases in neighboring Ruanda-Urundi, a UN trust territory, the Soviet delegation also claimed "flagrant violations of the international status" of that state. Apparently the Security Council agreed with the Deputy US Representative to the UN, who characterized the Soviet allegation as, "to say the least, a total distortion," for the complaint was rejected.\(^4\)

\(^4\) (U) *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XLIV, No. 1108, p. 199.
Framing a New Statement of US Policy

On 23 January, just three days after John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President of the United States, the JCS began work on a memorandum setting forth for the Secretary of Defense their views on conditions in the Congo. A revised memorandum finally was approved and on 30 January forwarded to Robert S. McNamara, President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense. In brief, the JCS expressed increasing concern over the Congo situation, alluded to the danger to other sub-Saharan nations if Communism should gain a foothold in the Congo, and recommended actions designed to stabilize the situation and lead eventually to the establishment of a pro-Western Congolese democracy.

Addressing themselves first to the role of the UN, the JCS recommended that the US continue to press the Secretary General to instruct the UN Congo force to take positive action to restore order. They believed, moreover, that this force should be strengthened as necessary to accomplish this objective and also should be assigned an impartial and efficient leader. The establishment of peace, however, would not solve the Congo problem, so the Secretary General should be urged to guide and assist the troubled nation in the development of a responsible and effective government. In addition, the UN should act to halt the flow of military supplies to the Stanleyville government and to other dissident groups.

(5) (TS) JCSM-46-61, 30 Jan 61, derived from JCS 2262/72; (TS) JCS 2262/70, 24 Jan 61; both in JMF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).
Like the JCS, the President and his civilian advisors were disturbed by recent events in the Congo. In his State of the Union message, delivered on 30 January, the President, while pledging continued support to the "heroic efforts of the UN to restore order," warned that "mounting tensions, unsolved problems, and decreasing support from many member states" had combined to jeopardize the success of this UN undertaking. On the same day


the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the JCS on a new statement of US policy regarding the Congo. In addition, the Assistant Secretary sought their opinion concerning capabilities for and possible consequences of US military intervention in that chaotic nation.

The policy proposed for JCS consideration was designed to reverse the "drift toward fragmentation in the Congo" and thus prevent the nation from coming under Communist control. It called for strengthening the UN mandate so that the world organization would have exclusive responsibility for maintaining law and order throughout the Congo and for bringing about a "military neutralization" of the area. If necessary, the UN might use force in disarming and controlling the various Congolese armed contingents and in cutting off outside support for the contending factions. Once order had been restored the US, the UN, and other interested nations would cooperate to bring about the creation of a stable coalition government within which all the principal Congolese political elements would have representation. Until the desired coalition attained the necessary stability, however, the UN would have to provide administrative and technical help. An interim UN administration, moreover, would greatly diminish, if not eliminate, the possibility that a rabble-rouser such as Lumumba could seize power.

(7) (S) Appendix to JCS 2262/73, 31 Jan 61; JMF 9111/9105 (30 Jan 61).

On the following day, 31 January, the JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that they agreed both that the UN mandate for action in the Congo should be strengthened and that some sort of UN administration should be established over that nation.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), in stating to the Department of State the Department of Defense views on the Congo policy, repeated the views of the JCS concerning the US capability for intervention. Like the JCS, he expressed agreement with the proposed strengthening of the UN mandate and the suggested establishment of a UN administration for the Congo.

After these views on Congo policy had been transmitted to the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 2 February requested the judgment of the JCS on three specific items: 1) the improvements that might be required by the UN Congo force in order to carry out the proposed new mandate; 2) the manner in which the UN should proceed in bringing discipline to a unified Congolese army; and 3) the type of training and manner of employment that should be proposed for Congolese troops. The Assistant Secretary also invited other comments on the implementation of the new Congo policy.

Since it admittedly was possible that the new policy might fail, the Assistant Secretary informed the JCS that an alternative policy was being devised to achieve US objectives in the Congo peaceably. As a last resort, however, the US might be forced to intervene with its armed forces, and for that reason the Assistant Secretary now asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs on: 1) the probable military consequences of such a move; 2) the US capability for effective action; and 3) the present status of contingency planning.
The possibility of military action also was raised at the first meeting of the interdepartmental working group on the Congo on 6 February. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs specifically invited the committee members to consider the possibility that the attempt to form a workable coalition might fail and to examine the feasibility of other policies, including military action.\textsuperscript{(11)}

\textsuperscript{(11)} (S) Encl to JCS 2262/78, 13 Feb 61; JM 9110/9105 (30 Jan 61).

On 17 February, the JCS, in response to the memorandum of 2 February, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their views on the problems of implementing a strengthened UN mandate for the Congo and their opinions upon various aspects of US military intervention in that nation. In general, the JCS believed that UN forces, in carrying out this new mandate, should exhaust all avenues of peaceful persuasion before resorting to force. If, however, a more vigorous UN effort was to succeed, the organization's military staff would have to be strengthened, the channels of command improved, and the structure of forces reorganized. Because of the time that would be required to reorganize the Congolese armed forces, the JCS were convinced that the UN, initially at least, would have to use its own troops against dissident groups.

Addressing the specific questions posed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the JCS recommended that the UN Congo force be reorganized on a regional basis, that the regional commanders be provided with political advisers, and that the predominantly infantry force be given sufficient reserves, proper medical support, and adequate communications. This force should establish control by persuasion when possible, by "psychological and economic operations," and when absolutely necessary, by force. Any training program for Congolese troops should be conducted by UN personnel and be oriented toward the basic training first of ground forces and later of police and gendarmes. When sufficiently prepared, the Congolese units could assist the UN in establishing law and order. The JCS, accepting the Assistant Secretary's invitation to comment upon other related problems, warned that the US should be prepared to give financial, material, and technical support to the expanded UN operation. For its part, the UN should encourage the use of Belgian technicians in nonpolitical positions.
On 21 February, the JCS again informed the Secretary of Defense of their concern regarding the dissident factions within the Congo and recommended that these factions, the Stanleyville regime in particular, be isolated from their sources of armament.

The Death of Lumumba

This recommendation was occasioned by a dramatic, though ephemeral, rise in the popularity of Gizenga's anti-Western nationalism. This outpouring of sentiment favorable to the Stanleyville government stemmed from the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

During January, the Central Government had handed Lumumba over to Moise Tshombe, an implacable foe of the deposed prime minister. The prisoner was led away to Elisabethville where, according to the Katanga government, he was shot while attempting to escape. This pat explanation satisfied no one, and anti-colonial leaders throughout Africa denounced both Kasavubu and the Belgian-supported Tshombe for conspiring to eliminate this most fervid of Congolese nationalists. For the moment, it appeared that Gizenga, as Lumumba's political heir, was the only Congolese leader to whom the nations opposed to colonialism could, in good conscience, give their support.

Katanga's belated announcement, made on 13 February, that Lumumba had been killed occasioned rioting in front of Belgian embassies at Cairo, Moscow, and Belgrade. The USSR, moreover, used Lumumba's assassination as an excuse to demand the dismissal of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, whom the Soviet Union accused of masterminding the Congolese leader's murder. Besides condemning Hammarskjold, Russia also called for: the removal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo; the arrest of Kasavubu's chief of staff, who had been responsible for the transfer of Lumumba into Katangan hands, and of Tshombe; the disarming of the Congolese National Army; the termination of UN operations in the Congo; and full recognition of Gizenga's Stanleyville government as the sole authority over the nation.(13)

President Kennedy reacted to this latest crisis by declaring on 15 February that the US would continue to support the UN effort in the Congo and to recognize the Kasavubu regime as that nation's legitimate government. In addition, the President stated that all
members of the UN were duty bound to oppose "any attempt by any government to intervene unilaterally in the Congo."(14) The US


Ambassador to the UN, in a speech delivered that same day before the Security Council, emphasized the traditional US opposition to colonialism, endorsed the existing Congolese central government, and called upon the UN to take prompt and effective action to end the crisis. Such action, he continued, would consist of halting all foreign military assistance or intervention, except that conducted within the framework of the UN, and restoring peace and order throughout the Congo. To complement these actions, the various Congolese armed forces should be unified and reorganized as a single non-political body.(15)

(15) (U) Ibid., vol. XLIV, No. 1133, pp. 359-364.

The Security Council Resolution of 21 February

The Security Council had an opportunity during mid-February to weigh the opposing views of the US and Soviet Union concerning the UN activities in the Congo. The occasion of this debate was the council's discussion of a resolution, originally introduced by the UAR, Ceylon, and Liberia, which would authorize the use of force to prevent civil war in the Congo. On 21 February, this resolution was adopted. An alternative resolution, which embodied the Soviet program of liquidating the UN's Congo operation, was rejected.

The resolution of 21 February, which the US had supported, bore a striking resemblance to the proposed Congo policy discussed within the Kennedy administration. In addition to strengthening the UN mandate, the keystone of the new policy, the Security Council called for the removal from the Congo of all foreign military personnel and political advisers who were not under UN control, the reorganization of the Congolese army as a non-political unit, and the convening of the Congolese parliament. This last course of action could lead to the formation of the kind of coalition sought by the US. The proposed elimination of unauthorized foreign advisers was an aspect of the resolution that coincided with the announced policy of both the US and the Soviet Union.(16)

US Contingency Planning

(17) (TS) SM-432-61, 18 Apr 61, derived from JCS 2018/243; both in JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61), sec 2.

(18) (TS/NOPORN) CINCLANT Contingency OPLAN, Africa (South of the Sahara), No. 330-61 (C); JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61), sec 2.

(19) (S) J-3 Briefing Sheet for CJCS, 2 Oct 61; (S) JCSM 712-61, 10 Oct 61, derived from JCS 2018/297; all in JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61).
An Easing of Tensions Within the Congo

When the JCS had first begun their review of contingency plans for sub-Saharan Africa, both civil war and armed Communist intervention seemed likely. The Security Council resolution that resulted in the broadening of the UN mandate for Congo operations ended, however, at least for the time, the menace of Russian intervention. Likewise, the danger of full-scale civil war also abated in the months immediately following the Security Council action.

During March 1961, Tshombe met with Kasavubu at Tananarive in the Malagasy Republic. The two leaders agreed to the establishment of a loosely knit Congolese confederation; Katanga would be a partner in this union, and the existing central authority would voluntarily yield most of its powers over the various provinces. Although
Kasavubu at the time appeared willing to accept this arrangement, he later rejected it by endorsing the Security Council's resolution of 21 February, thus indicating his desire to bring the entire Congo under a single government.

In April President Kasavubu again conferred with Tshombe, this time at Coquilhatville in the Congo. When Tshombe, on 25 April, indicated that he was about to break off the talks, Kasavubu had him imprisoned. Although the Katangan leader remained under arrest until 22 June, his confinement apparently did not alter his determination to preserve the independence of his province, for upon being released he vowed to defend Katanga against the central government no matter what the cost.

Although the discussions with Tshombe accomplished nothing, the central government did manage a short time later to reach a rather precarious accommodation with the Stanleyville regime. The scene of this political merger was a session of the Congolese parliament held near Leopoldville, beginning on 27 July. The delegates, among them Gizenga's supporters, created a new Government of National Unity. The nominal head of this coalition was President Kasavubu, but executive power actually was held by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, a moderate neutralist. Gizenga was chosen first vice-premier.

Apparently Gizenga was satisfied with this solution, for he promptly dissolved his government. He refused, however, to move from Stanleyville to Leopoldville in order to assume his new duties. He also saw to it that his military forces remained intact and independent of the new government's control. (24)


**US Military Action Against Katanga, September 1961**

The greatest single obstacle to a unified Congo remained the dissident Katanga regime. In keeping with its instructions to bring peace and unity to the Congo, the UN command on 13 September ordered its forces at Elisabethville to compel Tshombe, using force if necessary, to rid himself of some 500 foreign mercenaries. The Katangans, however, resisted so successfully that the UN contingent appeared for a time to be in grave danger of being isolated and destroyed. The US Government reacted to the situation by expressing, on 16 September, official concern over the fighting in Katanga and by reaffirming its support of the UN operation in the Congo. (25) Two days later the US agreed to a UN request that
In the meantime, Secretary General Hammarskjold, while on route to a meeting with Tshombe, had perished in a plane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. He was succeeded by U Thant, who was designated Acting Secretary General on 3 November. Shortly after taking office, U Thant was faced with the necessity of carrying out a new resolution on the Congo, for on the 24th the Security Council authorized the use of whatever force might be necessary to drive the foreign mercenaries from Katanga. (30)
Renewed Fighting, December 1961

Tshombe replied to this resolution with a threat to wage total war, using poisoned arrows, if necessary, against the UN forces. This outburst was followed by a succession of attacks against UN personnel stationed in Elisabethville. U Thant reacted to this wave of violence by directing on 3 December that the UN force act vigorously to restore order in the city. On 5 December, since an organized Katangan attack seemed imminent, he ordered the troops to take whatever action was necessary to restore UN rights in Elisabethville. Fighting erupted that same day as the UN force began a campaign that soon brought the city under its complete control. (31)


In his public statements, as well as in private conversations with US diplomats at the UN, the Acting Secretary General explained that the Congo offensive was designed to weaken the Katangan forces to a point where they could no longer prevent the unification of the entire nation. Force, he said, was not being employed in order to gain political ends; the UN did not wish to impose any particular political order on the Congolese people. In any event the US continued to support UN policies. (32)


A concrete example of American support was the employment of C-130 and C-124 transports to assist in the rapid build-up of UN forces at Elisabethville. (33) Although this intra-Congo airlift was suspended in mid-January when the situation had become more stable, the US made it clear that, in the event of future emergencies, it was willing to resume the operation. (34)

(33) (C) JCSM-6-62, 4 Jan 62, derived from JCS 2262/124; both in JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).

(34) (C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 1271, 16 Jan 62; JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).

The US also sought to assist the UN diplomatically by attempting to arrange a meeting between Tshombe and Adoula. The Katangan leader agreed, and as a result, U Thant, whose UN forces by this
time controlled Elisabethville, proclaimed a temporary truce. At Kioton the two leaders conferred on 20 and 21 December, with Tshombe apparently accepting the authority of the Leopoldville government.

The settlement, however, was dependent upon ratification by the Katanga assembly, and no sooner had Tshombe returned to Elisabethville than he announced that the recent agreement had been forced upon him by the US. The provincial assembly took up this cry, declaring that Katanga need not honor an agreement that had been made under duress. (35)


Guidance for US Policy Toward Africa

In November 1961, shortly before the Security Council voted to have the mercenaries expelled from Katanga, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had requested the views of the JCS on a Department of State paper, "Guidance for US Policy toward Africa." The paper, which differed little in content from earlier policy statements, set forth both long-term and short-term objectives for US policy.

The long-term objectives, which were to be gained in from two to ten years, included: identification of the US with the rightful goals of the African states; sufficient economic support from non-Communist nations; an intensification of US influence upon certain "bellwether" countries; and regional, political and economic agreements among the African nations. The principal military goal remained the denial to Communist nations of military bases and strategically significant military influence in any African state. In addition, the US would seek an agreement among the African governments limiting the importation of arms to the amounts needed for self-defense.

The short-term objectives, to be attained within two years, dealt primarily with the training of African leaders, the means of identifying the US with the rightful ambitions of the emerging states, and the continued economic support of the African countries. Again, the main military objective was to deny the area to Communism, but the US would encourage preliminary steps toward arms limitation agreements among the nations of Africa and would maintain for the time being those US bases presently vital to the national interest.

To attain these objectives, the US would follow certain courses of action among them the establishment of relations with African leaders. Economic and diplomatic encouragement were also to be provided, and the African states would be warned of the Communist menace and advised of any departures from their professed ideal of neutrality. Although care would have to be exercised to avoid contributing to an arms race which would negate its efforts toward arms limitation, the US would be prepared to give military assistance to these nations.
Because of the arbitrary boundaries of many African states, the US should, however, make no further commitments to assist in the defense of any country's territory. In deference to African sentiment on the subject, the US ought not to oppose attempts to create a nuclear-free zone embracing that continent. (36)

(36) (S) Enclosure to attachment to JCS 2121/113, 17 Nov 61; JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61).

(37) (S) JCSM-837-61, 1 Dec 61, derived from JCS 2121/114; both in JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61).

(38) (S) Attachment to 1st N/H of JCS 2121/114, 15 Feb 62; JMF 9111/9105 (15 Nov 61).
Determining the US Role in UN Military Planning

(39) (S) Attachment to JCS 2121/134, 9 Apr 62; JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61).

(40) (S) Appendix to Encl B to JCS 2262/101, 13 Dec 61; JMF. 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).

(41) (S) Encl to JCS 2262/101, 13 Dec 61; (S) Dec on JCS 2262/101, 15 Dec 61; both in JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum for the Secretary of State, expressed his agreement with the JCS recommendation that, for the present, there be no formal review of UN plans. He also recommended that the US mission at the UN urge a plan to strengthen and expand his military staff. Another JCS recommendation of which the Deputy Secretary approved was the assignment to the Congo of a senior officer who would serve as military adviser to the US Ambassador and would provide information and recommendations concerning the existing situation and UN military plans. The Department of State approved the JCS recommendations.

(42) (TS) JCSM-871-61, 15 Dec 61, derived from JCS 2152/102; (TS) Msg. JCS to "SARMA Leopoldville, JCS 2516, 160010Z Dec 61; (3) 1st N/H of JCS 2262/101, 28 Dec 61; all in JMP 9111/201 (11 Dec 61).

Concerning both the review of UN plans and the dispatch of a senior military adviser to the Congo and also advised the Department of Defense that talks were being conducted regarding the improvement of the UN military staff. (43)

(43) (S) 1st N/H of JCS 2262/102, 28 Dec 61; JMP 9111/201 (11 Dec 61).

Discussing the US Intelligence Effort in the Congo.

(44) (C) Attachment to JCS 2262/103, 25 Dec 61; JMP 9111/201 (11 Dec 61).

(45) (C) Attachment to JCS 2262/106, 9 Jan 62; JMP 9111/201 (11 Dec 61).
The US and the Reorganization of the Congolese Armed Forces

The Downfall of Gizenga, January 1962

During January 1962, while the US was taking an increasing interest in military developments within the Congo, the Adoula government, with UN support, continued its efforts to extend its authority over the entire nation. The dissident redoubt at Stanleyville collapsed almost immediately. On 8 January, the national parliament summoned First Vice-Premier Gizenga to Leopoldville to face charges of leading a secessionist movement. The accusations were based on the mutinous conduct of troops loyal to Gizenga and the fact that he had thus far refused to participate actively in the Congolese coalition. Gizenga at first accepted the summons, then vacillated, and finally refused. Fighting then broke out in Stanleyville between national forces and the private army which Gizenga had maintained. UN troops immediately intervened to avert civil war, and after order had been restored Gizenga surrendered. On 20 January, the former leader of the Stanleyville faction was brought to Leopoldville and imprisoned. Recalling perhaps the fate of Lumumba, U Thant informed Prime Minister Adoula that UN troops would be available to protect the prisoner. (48)

(48) (U) Facts on File, vol. XXII, Ns. 1106, 1108.

The Adoula-Tshombe Meetings, March-June 1962

The arrest of Gizenga, however, eliminated only one of Prime Minister Adoula’s rivals, for the dissident Katanga government on 4 January 1962 had formally rejected the agreement reached at Kitona in late December. According to Tshombe, Katanga would for the present neither adhere to the Congolese constitution nor expel the foreigners serving in the provincial government and armed forces. Once the central government had proved its good faith, Katanga might reconsider this decision. (49)

(49) Ibid., vol. XXII, No. 106.

Further talks between Adoula and Tshombe, begun during March, came to an end in mid-April. Nothing was accomplished during this session to bring any nearer to realization the dream of a unified Congo. Whereas Tshombe demanded an autonomous Katanga within a federated Congo, Adoula remained equally insistent that the province be integrated into the republic. Neither the rival leaders nor their respective followers seemed at all willing to compromise. (50)


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Prospects for a settlement, however, improved unexpectedly on 17 May, the eve of still another meeting between the two men, when Tshombe announced that he would agree to a merger of Katanga with the rest of the Congo. The only condition mentioned at this time by the Katangan leader was the release of some 4,000 prisoners held by the central government. (51) A further sign of progress toward unity came on 30 May, when Adoula and Tshombe agreed to the integration, under UN auspices, of Katangan units into the Congolese army. (52)

Any expectations that the Congo could quickly be unified were shattered by mid-June. On the 12th Tshombe accused Adoula of refusing to make concessions and of choosing instead to rely upon UN armed might to gain his ends. (53) By the end of the month Tshombe had withdrawn from the talks, leaving the situation about as it had been in late January.

US Policy Directives for the Congo, March and May 1962

While Adoula and Tshombe engaged in this fruitless series of discussions, the Department of State was issuing policy directives for those involved with the Congo problem. On 15 March 1962, the State Department enumerated, as the objectives of US policy regarding the Congo, the "reintegration" of that nation, the reorganization of its armed forces, the continuation of foreign aid and enactment of accompanying measures to bring financial stability and economic recovery to the Congo, and the improvement of diplomatic relations between the US and the Congo. These same objectives were again set forth in a second policy directive issued on 16 May.

In order to achieve a unified Congo, the US at first planned to apply indirect pressure on Tshombe. The US would attempt to convince the Belgian government that it should induce the mining corporations operating in Katanga to pay taxes to the central rather than the provincial government. Later, however, the US decided to increase this initial pressure by urging the UN to advance a unification plan if Tshombe and Adoula should fail to agree. The US would seek Belgian and British advice on any such plan and also the support of
these nations in its implementation. Should Tshombe then reject the UN formula, the US would support the central government's effort to assert its rightful authority.

The reorganization of the Congolese armed forces would begin with the sending to the Congo of a small US advisory team that would prepare recommendations for submission to the central government. US, UN, and Congolese officials would then work out a program based upon these recommendations. The actual reorganization and training of the armed forces would be conducted under UN auspices, but foreign advisers might be employed in carrying out the program. To ease the economic dislocation that would be caused by the reorganization, various nations were to establish a fund which the UN would use to create employment for ex-soldiers.

Although the US was willing to continue assistance to the Congo and desired that Belgium also undertake technical and financial programs, all foreign aid would be channeled through or coordinated by the UN. In addition, the UN was to play a dominant role in bringing financial stability and economic progress to the Congo. Among the projects to be undertaken by the UN and various specialized international agencies were public works, the distribution of food to the unemployed, budget reform, improvements in administration, and improvements in the transportation system.

Finally, the US sought the establishment at Washington of a Congolese Embassy, a move which would strengthen diplomatic ties between the two countries and also give the Congo a voice in any intra-African discussions held among the ambassadors at the US capital. (54)

(54) (c) Attachment to JCS 2121/127, 19 Mar 62; JMP 9111/9105 (1 Mar 62); (c) Attachment to JCS 2121/1145, 22 May 62; JMP 9111/9105 (16 May 62).

Summary

In brief, US policy toward the Congo remained unchanged during this period, for the US from January 1961 through May 1962 gave unhesitating support to the UN efforts to bring order to the Congo. Although the phrases used to describe the American goals varied somewhat, the US worked steadfastly for the unification of the Congo, the establishment of a workable coalition, and the continued presence in the Congo of some form of UN authority until the new government had attained sufficient stability to maintain order throughout the nation. Throughout these 18 months, the principal military objective was the denial to the Communist bloc of a bridgehead in the Congo.

By the end of May 1962, some progress had been made toward the realization of these aims through support of the UN's Congo operation. The Stanleyville regime, which had been supported by the Soviet Union was dissolved, and its leaders were either dead or under arrest. Moreover, the danger of armed Communist intervention appeared to have
passed. In spite of these successes, Katanga Province continued to defy the central government, and until this dissidence had been at least moderated, neither Congolese unity nor the establishment of a stable coalition could be achieved.
CHRONOLOGY
June 1962 - December 1962

26 Jun 62 (No. 1)

Katanga's President Moise Tshombe left Leopoldville, breaking off his negotiations with Congolese Premier Cyril Adoula. This departure resulted in the collapse of the latest in a series of UN-sponsored negotiations aimed at reuniting Katanga with the central Congo government.

Prior to his departure, Tshombe and Adoula had made considerable progress toward accommodating their differences concerning the four major problem areas of the projected Congo federation: economics and finance; transport and communication; monetary policy; and military organization. They had agreed to the establishment of four commissions, each composed of representatives of the Congo, Katanga, and the UN, to work out the details of the preliminary agreements that had been reached in each of the above four areas.

The success promised by the Tshombe-Adoula agreements was never realized because of Tshombe's departure; the failure of their talks appears, on the other hand, to have set the stage for the implementation of a series of US-backed UN actions designed to accomplish what the negotiators had not.

(C) Mags, Leopoldville to SecState, 3145, 26 Jun 62; 3147, 26 Jun 62; (U) New York Times, 27 Jun 52.

26 Jun 62 (No. 2)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul H. Nitze transmitted to Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland the Defense Department suggestions for improving the air arm of UN forces in the Congo (UNOC).

The entire UNOC air force consisted at this time of 4 Ethiopian F-86s, 5 Swedish J-29s, and 6 Indian Canberras, flown and maintained as "national contingents." Nearly two-thirds of this slender force was, moreover, grounded or of marginal use, and the UN apparently envisaged considerable delay in reconstituting it. Although this situation disquieted the US, and although the UN had itself put out feelers to the US on the availability of T-33s for the formation of a standardized air force, the US felt that the UN should work to improve the existing arrangement of national contingents.

To this end ASD (ISA) drawing upon recommendations submitted on 5 June by the Joint Staff, submitted a list of several actions by which UNOC could improve the efficiency of the air arm. Several logistical actions were recommended, as was a clarification of the mission requirements of the air arm. Additionally, UNOC should, for the longer term, ask Sweden to provide the entire tactical air arm.
In the short run, there were certain operational actions that would help convince Katanga of UN air superiority and determination to act, if necessary:

1. An increased reconnaissance program over Katanga.
2. Periodic shows of force over Katanga.
3. Increase in the number of aircraft available to the UN, by at least two J-29s.
4. Development of UNOC plans for rapid introduction into the Congo of bombs and other munitions that might be necessary in the event of hostilities.
5. Equipping the Ethiopian F-86s with rockets.

(See item 10 August 1962.)
Acting with and upon the advice of the JCS, ASD (ISA) informed the Department of State that, from a military viewpoint and subject to certain modifications, the State Department's proposed "Guideline for Policy and Operations" for the Congo provided "an adequate basis of foreign policy and operational guidance."

According to the "Guidelines" US policy continued to be based upon the assumption that support of the UN in the Congo was the best course under present circumstances. The US had to be aware, however, that Congo nationalism was on the rise, that the Congolese would become more and more sensitive to UN infringement of their sovereignty, and increasingly impatient with the slow progress of UN programs. Nonetheless, a stable unified Congo, non-aligned but pro-Western, could still eventuate; and the US could best help bring this about by supporting moderate nationalists in the key positions of power, and by working for as much centralization of power as feasible.

In pursuit of this basic end, the US had several specific long and short-range objectives in the Congo, such as: 1) minimizing Soviet Bloc influence and activity; 2) supporting a "successful nation-building effort" under UN auspices; 3) rehabilitating the Congo economy; 4) encouraging the establishment of a full and close relationship between the Congo and Belgium; 5) peaceful reintegration of all secessionist groups under a new constitution; and 6) the establishment of the security conditions necessary for economic growth and governmental stability, by a redefinition of the role, and reorganization, of the Army, Gendarmerie, and police forces.

In pursuit of these various objectives, several lines of US action were suggested, including:

1. Continued political and material support of the moderate Central Government, so that it might demonstrate economic progress and consolidate its political position.
2. Assisting the UN in keeping such troops in the Congo as were necessary to assure law and order and bring about reunification.

3. Imposition of a systematic program of pressures on both Tshombe and Adoula to bring about peaceful re-integration of Katanga and participation of the Conakat party in a coalition government.

4. Helping Adoula broaden his personal political base, while at the same time developing relations with the more extreme elements, in order to moderate their attitudes.

5. Aiding the reorganization and training of the Congolese armed forces, under UN auspices.

6. Support of a long-term nation-building program by urging UN and Belgian participation, resolution of outstanding Congo-Belgian issues, re-introduction of private investment, and Congo membership in and/or cooperation with various international economic organizations.

7. Impressing UN leaders with the need for flexibility in their operations, and the necessity of adjusting themselves to the rise of Congolese nationalism and a growing rapport between the Congo and Belgium.

8. Encouraging the Congolese government to join moderate African councils.

9. Continuation of close consultation with Belgium and the UK, recognizing at the same time that although their special interests have worked against formulation of common policies, agreement was possible on the objective of unity.

Any of the above objectives and lines of action might be modified or eliminated, the "Guidelines" concluded, if: 1) the Adoula government fell; 2) the OOC drifted rapidly to the left; or 3) the UN withdrew before Katanga was reintegrated and some measure of stability and security restored.

The only changes on the "Guidelines" suggested by the JCS and DOD were two additions to the "long-range objectives" of the US in the Congo: denial of military bases and influence to the Soviet Bloc; and a "cooperative" Congolese attitude regarding such US security needs as rights of overflight and airfield and port facilities.
29 Jun 62  
At a meeting of the UN Congo Advisory Committee (CAC), U Thant announced that it was too early to draw any conclusions from the apparent breakdown of negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe (see item 26 June 1962) and that he intended to continue to press for the resumption of talks. Adopting a pessimistic tone, the Secretary General went on to say that, in view of the possibility that Tshombe would resume his secessionist activities, it might become necessary in the next few weeks to invite the Security Council to review the entire Congo situation, in order to clarify and strengthen existing mandates or provide new ones.

U Thant also expressed his concern over the Katangan Independence celebration scheduled to be held in Elisabethville on 11 July, and noted that the UN was trying to dissuade Tshombe from holding the celebration. (See item 12-17 July 1962.)

3 Jul 62  
In a conversation with Ambassador Gullion, Congo Premier Adoula outlined his reaction to the breakdown of his negotiations with Tshombe. Adoula was at a loss as to what steps he might now take. He was adamant, however, in refusing to renew negotiations with Tshombe until he had some assurance that Tshombe would not continue his stalling tactics. For the same reason Adoula also refused to participate in the work of the Commisssion established by him and Tshombe, until their purposes had been adequately defined.

6 Jul 62  
The US Mission to the UN (USUN), in an assessment of the Katanga problem, reported general agreement at the UN that the current situation could not be allowed to drift much longer because "time was working for Tshombe." The UN delegation believed that delay favored Tshombe because: 1) the UN financial crisis would not permit maintaining substantial military forces in the Congo after the beginning of 1963; 2) Adoula's political position was deteriorating rapidly and would probably not remain tenable unless Katanga was reintegrated shortly; 3) the GOC's economic problems were mounting because it was devoting too much of its energies to the Katanga problem.
On 12 July, the UN retaliated for the participation of some two thousand soldiers in a Katangese Independence celebration on 11 July by establishing a road block at what had been the only remaining major uncontrolled route to the Katangese capital. The UN justified the roadblock on the grounds that, inasmuch as Tshombe had
agreed to limit the troops participating in the celebration to a token force, the size of the demonstration had been a breach of faith.

In reporting the incident to the State Department, the US Consul in Elisabethville noted that, although some form of counteraction to the Katangese insult was justified, the establishment of the roadblock put the UN out on a limb, and created a potentially dangerous situation.

Five days later an estimated 10,000 women (members of the Association of Katangese Women), armed with sticks and stones, attacked the UN roadblock. The attack, which UN troops repulsed by using clubs and by firing into the air, resulted in a number of casualties on both sides.

Reportedly, United Nations spokesmen indicated that they believed the attack had been staged by the Katangese government for political purposes. This view was support by the US in a public statement released by the State Department.

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18 Jul 62 (No. 9)

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 198, 19 Jul 62.

20 Jul 62 (No. 10)

At a press conference in Helsinki, U Thant said that he would ask the UN Security Council for a new mandate on the Congo, or at least a renewal of the old mandate. Thant said that the failure of negotiations between the Central Congolese Government and Katanga was attributable to Tshombe and his two colleagues, Munongo and Kimbe, whom he characterized as "a bunch of clowns."

The US Special Military Advisory Team, Republic of the Congo (headed by Col, M.J.L. Greene, OASD (ISA), and hence called the Greene Team) submitted its report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). The report thoroughly examined the background and present status of the Congolese Armed Forces, presented conclusions, and recommended several courses for the reconstitution, supply, and training of Congolese forces.

Having concluded, among other things, that the Congolese would require foreign training, advice, and material assistance to establish an effective armed force that could provide internal security, the Greene Team recommended that:

1. The US take the initiative in proposing a broad program, under a UN "umbrella," for the modernization and training of the Congolese Armed Forces. In addition, the US should organize, also under UN auspices, a small international military staff to monitor the program.

2. The Congolese be urged to reorganize their armed forces into a single, unified military structure, embracing an Army reduced from the present 25-30,000 to 14,000, a small air force for transport and liaison missions, and a small naval force of river patrol craft.

3. Major General Mobutu be invited to the US for an orientation tour. Other Congolese officers should be given school and orientation tours.

4. Any material aid furnished to the Congolese should be phased in accordance with demonstrated Congolese progress.

5. The governments of Belgium, Canada, and Norway or Sweden be urged to establish or expand various training and advisory programs.

6. An English language training program be established as soon as possible for Congolese military personnel.

7. The Congolese air force should have six US advisers and ample US material support; the air force should also be urged to contract with a civil airline company for operation and maintenance of its aircraft.

8. The Congolese Army should be given an immediate token grant of vehicles, radio sets, repair parts, and "C" rations.

9. The US should maintain on duty in the Congo a small US military team, attached to the embassy but not part of the military attache system, with the following missions:
a. Maintaining liaison with Congolese military authorities,

b. Monitoring the training of the Congolese armed forces,

c. Monitoring the use of any US military equipment supplied to the Congo, and

d. Recommending changes in the amounts and types of military assistance.

(See item 8 Aug 62)


24 Jul 62 (No. 12)

U Thant told the CAC that recent evidence of Tshombe's bad faith and hostile attitude and the approaching UN financial crisis combined to suggest the necessity for a change in the UN's Congo policy. U Thant thought that the situation called for a more positive approach to Congo problems, including the use of all means short of force. U Thant specifically proposed the adoption of a series of measures (largely economic) to end the Katanga secession. He warned that these measures might lead to resumption of hostilities, and indicated his belief that he was not empowered under the existing mandate to use force. He therefore asked the CAC, particularly those members who had troops in the Congo, whether they thought he might undertake this new course of action under the existing directives, or whether it would be necessary for him to approach the Security Council for a new mandate.

The CAC representatives agreed that the existing mandate was sufficient to cover the expanded program of action contemplated by U Thant, but expressed the hope that the use of force would not be necessary. They agreed to consult their governments and report their official positions to U Thant at a subsequent meeting scheduled for 31 July (see item).

During discussions with US representatives following the meeting, U Thant made it clear that he now thought he had authority under existing resolutions to undertake all measures short of force, and had abandoned the idea of seeking a new Congo mandate from the UN.

(S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 265, 26 Jul 62; (C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 246, 25 Jul 62.
Congoese Premier Adoula formally proposed a new constitution for the Congo, and called on the UN to provide expert assistance in drawing up the final document. Adoula hoped that the constitution would be ready for presentation to the Congolese Parliament in September. He noted that the proposal had grown out of the work of the committees established during the recent Adoula-Tshombe talks (see item 26 Jun 62). The State Department quickly endorsed Adoula's statement saying that his initiative would make possible immediate concrete steps to achieve integration.

The following day Tshombe announced that the proposed constitution, incorporating significant concessions to the Katangese demand for self-rule, was "what we have always wanted."


The delegates to the CAC reconvened and gave their governments' general approval to U Thant's continuation of his proposed course of action without recourse to a new mandate (see item 24 Jul 62). They were, however, still apprehensive concerning the possibility that Thant's proposed expansion of the existing mandate to encompass all measures short of force might in fact lead to a new outbreak of hostilities. The members of the Committee apparently felt, nonetheless, that this risk was preferable to calling a Security Council meeting that would be undesirable and probably fruitless.

(C) Msgs, USUN to SecState, 298, 31 Jul 62; 438, 13 Aug 62.

U Thant appealed to the members of the United Nations for their continued assistance in his efforts to reunify the Congo. U Thant characterized the current situation in the Congo as particularly crucial in view of the lives, effort, and money already expended, and the financial crisis which the UN faced because of the unprecedented drain on its resources caused by the Congo operation. It was U Thant's desire to effect a peaceful solution to the problem; but, he observed, peaceful endeavors had so far not produced fruitful results. U Thant called on the member governments to use their influence to persuade the principal parties in the Congo to settle their differences peacefully. He noted that if such persuasion should finally prove ineffective, he would ask them to consider what further measures might be taken. As a specific measure he mentioned the application of economic pressures upon the Katangese authorities, which might, as a last resort, culminate in the prohibition of all trade and financial relations between

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Katanga and the member states.


At the request of ASD (ISA), the JCS reviewed the report of the Greene Team (see item 23 Jul 62) for the Secretary of Defense. The JCS found the Greene Team recommendations to be generally sound and consistent with US objectives in the Congo, and they concurred in each of them. Regarding the recommended immediate shipment to the Congo of vehicles, radio equipment and rations, the JCS noted that this measure would not make any major contribution to the military effectiveness of the Congolese armed forces, who were in greater need of reorganization, training, and discipline. This shipment would, however, serve as a political earnest of US intention to support a nation-building effort in the Congo. (See item 15 Aug 196;...

Prior to furnishing any equipment or deploying the US military liaison team proposed by the report, the JCS continued, the US should secure GOC agreement to the general concept of the Greene Team Report, and the GOC should afford the US military team access to the facilities and information necessary for performance of its duties. A conventional military assistance program should then be implemented "in an orderly manner... consistent with the long term needs of the Congolese armed forces." The US should be aware, the JCS warned, that any aid program might encourage a GOC attack upon Katanga.

UN support should be obtained prior to a US attempt to implement a military assistance program for the Congo. After this, however, the program should be developed and administered bilaterally between the US and the Congo. (See item 23 Aug 62).

With the above recommendations, the JCS also forwarded to the Secretary of Defense information on the cost and availability of equipment for immediate shipment, and proposed Terms of Reference and a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) for the US military liaison team in the Congo (See item 20 Dec 62).

(C) JCSM-607-62, to SecDef, 8 Aug 62, derived from JCS 2262/115, 4 Aug 62; (C) JCS 2262/114, 1 Aug 62; both in JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec 2.
The US Mission to the UN handed Brigadier Rikhye, Military Advisor to the Secretary General, US recommendations regarding improvement of the UNOC air arm.

Brigadier Rikhye noted in response that many of the US recommendations were already being carried out. He went on to say that the UN had abandoned the idea of a T-33 air force and that it would not, furthermore, be possible, as the US had recommended and the Brigadier himself wished, to persuade Sweden to take on the entire UNOC fighter responsibility.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 246, 1 Aug 62; (C) Msg, SecState to London, 795, 8 Aug 62; (U) New York Times, 5 Aug 62.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, CA-821, 20 Jul 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, A-196, 15 Aug 62.
13 Aug 62
(No. 19)

In accordance with instructions from the Department of State, USUN solicited the UN's views on the US sending a token shipment of military equipment to the ANC. Acting for the UN, Under Secretary-General Bunche replied that such a transaction was a "properly...bilateral matter," of which the US need simply inform the UN upon implementation.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 330, 10 Aug 62; (C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 438, 13 Aug 62.

14-17 Aug 62
(No. 20)

Sporadic fighting broke out between Katangese and Congolese troops in the vicinity of Albertville. UNOC attributed the action to attempts by the Katangese to take Albertville and viewed it as a direct challenge to UN authority. Consequently, with the approval of UN headquarters, UNOC told Katangese officials to cease all military movement. Katanga claimed that its gendarmerie had acted in self defense, but ordered a cease fire nonetheless.

(During the crisis UNOC had explicit authorization to halt Katangese military operations, by all means at its disposal.)


15 Aug 62
(No. 21)

ASD (ISA) recommended to the Department of State that, as recommended in the Greene Team Report (see item 23 Jul 62), a token shipment of military equipment be made to the Congolese Armed Forces. Although all of the equipment recommended by the Greene Team was not immediately available, ISA said, that portion that was on hand should be shipped as soon as possible, for political impact. (The full "token shipment" recommended by the Greene Team would have cost over $2,000,000; the value of the equipment immediately available was $100,000.)

Adopting in part the JCS position regarding the token shipment (see item 8 Aug 62), ISA stated that the impact of the shipment would be more political than military. According to ISA, the primary purpose of the shipment would be "to create a climate of trust in which the Congolese would be more amenable to acceptance of the long range concept for force modernization." However, where the JCS had recommended that the GOC should agree to the concept of the Greene Report before any shipments were made to the Congo, ISA recommended that the concept of the Greene Team Report should be presented to the GOC at
the time the token shipment was made.

ISA recommended, finally, that UN officials should be informed of the contemplated shipment, and their approval and support secured. (See items 23 Aug and 7 Sep 62).

(c) JCS 2262/116, 17 Aug 62, JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec 2.

16 Aug 62
(No. 22)

18 Aug 62
(No. 23)

UNOC military officials in the Congo revealed to Ambassador Gullion the outlines of their planned actions in the event the UN was drawn into hostilities in Katanga (see item 14-17 Aug 62). The objectives of the UN would be capture of Elisabethville, Jadotville, and Kaminaville—rather than all points in Katanga, which UNOC did not feel it was strong enough to control. To secure these objectives, the UN would, in sequence: concentrate its forces; clear the Elisabethville area; and send forces to Jadotville and Kaminaville. Having secured these three points, the UNOC would then conduct "mopping-up" actions at Katanga (town), Mitwaba, Kapona, and Baudouinville. Action against Kolwezi, where many of the white mercenaries were centered, would be "assessed by UNOC after the capture of Jadotville, when it would be decided whether to continue on to Kaminaville or to
advance on Kolwezi.

In presenting the plan to Ambassador Gullion, UNOC officials emphasized repeatedly that US airlift would be absolutely essential to the successful concentration of forces and equipment, and that additional fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft would also be required. (See items 19 and 28 Aug 62.)

(S) Msgs, Leopoldville to SecState, 412, 413, 18 Aug 62.

Upon learning that UNOC had a contingency plan for seizing control of key locales in Katanga (see item 18 Aug 62), the Secretary of State emphasized strongly to Ambassador Gullion that the resumption of military action between Katanga and UNOC would have "disastrous consequences" both for the UN and for US policy. The Secretary stated that the US purpose in supporting the UN in the Congo was to bring about a stable and peaceful Congo free from the chaos that would create Communist opportunities. To this end, the US was seeking reintegration of Katanga by peaceful means. The Secretary recognized that conflict between UNOC and the Katangese was possible and that UNOC contingency planning for self-defense was therefore justified. The Secretary thought that contingency planning for the protection of the civilian population was also justified. The US should be very careful not to give the UNOC any encouragement in planning for any larger or more aggressive actions.

It was not the purpose of the UN, the Secretary continued, to integrate Katanga into the Congo by force, or to destroy Tshombe. If the present attempt to bring about integration by economic persuasion did not succeed, then the US would need to re-examine its policies with a view to developing "new tactical possibilities" for securing peace in the Congo. (See item 28 Aug 62.)

(S) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 293, 19 Aug 62.

UN Secretary General U Thant distributed a Plan for National Reconciliation in the Congo to the members of the UN Security Council. The plan was the result of a month of negotiations between the US, Great Britain, Belgium, and the UN, which had followed the breakdown of talks between Adoula and Tshombe on 26 June (see item), and was a modified version of a proposal developed by the US on the basis of these talks (see item 9 Aug 62).

U Thant's plan (see Appendix I for text) had two parts: proposals for reunification, and "courses of action" the UN would follow to secure the adoption of the proposals. The proposals included the following:

20 Aug 62 (No. 25)
1. The Central Government, assisted by UN experts, would prepare a draft constitution taking into account the views of the state (provincial) governments and interested political groups in the Congo. The draft was to be completed by September.

2. Again assisted by UN experts, the Central Government would prepare a draft financial law setting forth arrangements for the division of revenues, and regulations and procedures for the utilization of foreign exchange. The views of all state governments and interested political groups would be invited and taken into account. The financial arrangements would to the maximum degree possible assure retention by the individual state of revenues generated within its area. The Central Government and the state governments would have separate sources of taxation, but would, until such definite arrangements had been established, share equally the revenues from taxes and duties. An international agency would control the utilization of foreign exchange, taking into account the individual needs of each state, but making available for the essential needs of Katanga 50 per cent of the foreign exchange generated within this state.

3. An international council would work out a plan for currency unification.

4. Armed forces commanders who had not already done so would take an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic. A military commission composed of one representative of the Katanga Government and one representative of the Central Government, assisted by UN experts, was to develop within 30 days a plan for the rapid integration of all military units into the national armed force. This plan would, in turn, be implemented within 60 days. The military commission would, during all this time, enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Congo, to inspect progress and compliance.

5. The conduct of foreign affairs would be reserved to the Central Government.

6. The Central Government would declare a general amnesty immediately.

7. All central, state, and local authorities were to cooperate fully with UNOC.

8. The Central Government would be reconstituted to provide equitable representation for all political and provincial groups; in addition, some ministerial posts would be assigned to members of Tshombe's party.

In pursuance of the plan the Secretary General planned to undertake the following "courses of action":

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1. Phase I - Both the proposals and courses of action would be presented to Adoula; upon his acceptance, the proposals would then be presented to Tshombe. The proposals were to be explained to the Katangese authorities, who would be expected to reply within ten days. At the same time, Adoula would be urged "to enact or decree legislation" (if it did not already exist) regulating imports and exports to and from the Congo. Interested governments would, for their part, make public statements of their determination to see the end of Katangese secession, and would take other steps in concert with the UN showing their support for the Central Government. The US, for instance, would consider giving the GOC a small "impact" shipment of military equipment (in demonstration of support) and additional aid upon completion of agreements on the utilization of foreign exchange; the UN would assist the GOC in modernization of the army; and Belgium would help with the collection of duties on Belgian exports to the Congo. Also during this phase representatives of the Union Minière Haut-Katanga were to be invited by the Government of the Congo to discuss matters of mutual interest, including the Government's attitude regarding the future activities of the company.

2. Phase II - During the ten days following the presentation of the UN plan, all governments would urge the Katangese to accept the UN plan. If the Katangese failed to indicate immediate acceptance, they would be presented with a ten-day time limit, after which the members of the UN would, if requested by the Central Government, comply with the Central Government's regulations regarding exports of copper and cobalt from Katanga. If the secession continued, more stringent measures were to be taken, including the withdrawal of Belgian technicians, suspension of communications services, the cessation of air traffic, and a blockade of imports and exports.

3. Phase III - If Phase II failed, the Congolese Government would request all interested governments to refuse importation of copper and cobalt from Katanga, unless the shipments were authorized by the Central Government.

4. Phase IV - Upon the failure of Phase III, discussions between the interested governments and the UN would take place regarding other measures which might be taken.

In presenting his plan to the Security Council, U Thant stated that the Katangese authorities must respond affirmatively to his proposals "within a quite brief period." He also informed the Council that Robert Gardiner, Chief of the UN operation in the Congo, had already been instructed to begin implementing the plan.
Gardiner had already acted on the 19th by presenting the U Thant Plan to the GOC. On the 21st Adoula's government gave its complete acceptance to the Plan. See item 24 Aug 62.)

23 Aug 62
(No. 26)

ASD (ISA) forwarded to the Department of State the DOD comments on the Greene Team Report. Using, in many cases, the language of the JCS comments (see item 8 Aug 62) ISA endorsed the Team Report. Also, like the JCS, ISA recommended that any military assistance program to the Congo be administered bilaterally, after UN support had been obtained. But, in consonance with views expressed earlier to the Department of State (see item 15 Aug 62), ISA felt that the token shipment of military equipment should be made before the GOC approve the concept of the Greene Team Report; the JCS had felt that no shipments should be made before this approval was obtained. ISA did recommend, however, that shipments other than the token shipment should not be sent to the Congo until the GOC had agreed to the concept of the report, and had requested UN assistance for the broad training program envisioned by the report. Neither should the US military liaison mission recommended by the Team report be sent until the GOC had done this, and until the US and UN had agreed upon an assistance program and the nature of US support thereof. In the meantime, ISA recommended that one US Army officer should be assigned liaison duties in the Congo.

ISA emphasized that the UN had procrastinated for over two years in the matter of training the ANC. Positive US action, to prod the UN and the GOC, would be necessary to get any effective training program underway.

(c) Memo, Dep ASD (ISA) to Dep USecState (P-1 Aff), 23 Aug 62; ASD (ISA), NESA Br. Files.

24 Aug 62
(No. 27)

Robert Gardiner presented U Thant's Plan for National Reconciliation (see item 19 Aug 62) to Katangese officials (Tshombe being absent). Gardiner did not present the "courses of action" of the U Thant Plan; however, in response to questioning by the Katangese, he stated that although the UN did not intend to impose the plan, "the plan was not open to negotiation, and that there was a ten-day time limit on Katangese acceptance.

The following day, in a message to the Secretary of State, US Ambassador Gullion opined that Tshombe had deliberately absented himself from Elisabethville at the time of Gardiner's presentation and that this...
Indicated a "first installment in a new round of delaying tactics." Gullion added that he thought Tshombe would never seriously consider integration unless it was made clear to him that he could not resort to the delay and evasion which had frustrated past efforts at a settlement. (See items 28 Aug and 2 Sep 62.)


The US, UK and Belgium released public statements announcing their support of the U Thant plan for reunification of the Congo.


In a message to Ambassador Gullion, the Secretary of State emphasized that achievement of a peaceful settlement was paramount among all questions of Congo policy. Such considerations as the ten-day time limit on Tshombe's acceptance of the U Thant plan were clearly subordinate to this end. The proposal offered Tshombe was not, Secretary Rusk said, a mere formality which must be performed before the inevitable application of enforcement measures. On the contrary Rusk believed that foreclosure of a peaceful negotiated settlement would raise "very grave and far-reaching questions" for US policy. In the Secretary's view the alternative routes to settlement were far from clear. A military solution was certainly "unpromising," and solution by economic sanctions was unlikely, given the reluctance of several "key" governments to cooperate in such a program.

(S-EYES ONLY) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 351, 27 Aug 62.

Ambassador Gullion assured the Secretary of State that he understood fully that US policy in the Congo looked to integration of Katanga by peaceful means. But, in a long discourse responding to the Secretary's 19 August exposition of US policy (see item), the Ambassador explored the implications of that policy and the possibility that force might eventually be necessary to achieve its objectives.

The Ambassador emphasized at the start that the UNOC contingency plan was "just that and nothing more - a plan drawn up by military men against the contingency
that they may be attacked”; the plan might not have
the approval of UN Headquarters or have any official
status, but it was the sort of plan whose absence US
officials had long deplored and whose completion they
had long urged.

The Ambassador also emphasized that, to the ex-
tent a choice was available, the UNOC would surely
limit its use of force to "quelling incidents or pro-
tecting the civilian population," as the Secretary had
suggested. UNOC was convinced, however, (as were the
Ambassador and the entire Country Team) that it could
not submit passively to a significant attack; self-
preservation would require that it engage the main body
of attackers. With regard to choice of objectives,
force requirements, and elements of strategy there
could be differences of opinion (as indeed there were
among the members of the Country Team) but there was
unanimity "in Leopoldville" that the UNOC force could
not "sit down in Elisabethville" while its perimeters
and lines of communication were attacked and destroyed.

In assessing UN military intentions in the Congo,
the Ambassador continued, the US should realize that
the UN considered itself in an entirely different re-
lation to the Central Government than to Katanga or any
other province. If negotiations failed and the UNOC
tried to subdue the Katangan rebels, UNOC would not
interpose itself to protect the latter. It would, on
the other hand, intervene to protect the UNOC, as it
had demonstrated during the Albertville incident (see
item 14-17 Aug 62).

Under the U Thant Plan (see item 20 Aug 62), UNOC
would be less likely to confront situations that might
involve hostilities, the Ambassador thought, inasmuch
as the plan sought to provide a reasonable, peaceful
solution, using economic sanctions for leverage.
Nevertheless, hostilities might occur, and the U Thant
Plan should not be put forth with US support if the US
was not prepared to accept its full implications. If
hostilities occurred in the implementation of the U
Thant Plan, and the US then withheld its full support
from the UN (as, for instance, by refusing to provide
necessary airlift), the results for US policy would be
"grievous." The UN would have to use force decisively,
the Ambassador said; otherwise the very conditions the
Secretary feared--chaos and Communist opportunity--would
likely result.

The Ambassador saw only two alternatives to the U
Thant Plan. the ANC could resort to force, seeking help
from any quarter to end the secession and thus giving
the Communists an obvious opportunity. In a less likely
case, the UN could turn over responsibility to the ANC
in an orderly manner, after that organization had been
made equal to such responsibility. Then, the UNOC could
try to consolidate its own territory in a long and risky
civil war. This course would relieve the strains being put on US alliances by the UN Congo operation, but it would cause incalculable harm to the UN and to the lives and property of allied nationals in Katanga—far greater harm than anything to which the implementation of the U Thant Plan would expose them.

(S) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 480, 28 Aug 62.

The UK, Belgian, and US consuls at Elisabethville presented Tshombe with a joint statement of their governments' views on the UN Plan for National Reconciliation (see items 20 and 24 August 1962). The consuls emphasized that their governments, as well as those of West Germany and Italy, were united in support of the plan. They indicated, in addition, that Katangese acceptance of the plan would permit their governments to help in the development of the economy of the whole Congo. They further stated that "prompt" acceptance would be an "act of political wisdom," whereas a Katangan refusal to accept the plan would produce a situation where a later solution as favorable to the interests of Katanga would be difficult to obtain.

Tshombe replied that his government was giving the plan serious study and would reply when the study was completed (see item 2 Sep 62).

(c) Msgs, Elisabethville to SecState, 341, 346, 28 Aug 62.

The Government of Katanga announced that Congolese troops had landed at Kamina air base in North Katanga and that it was protesting the action to the UNOC.

The following day Gardiner, replying for the UN, expressed his surprise at the Katangese protest, pointing out that the Congolese landed at Kamina had been placed under UN authority as a result of long-standing plans of which Tshombe had been aware. He indicated that since the troops were under the absolute control of the UN force commander and consequently obliged to observe all the agreements and principles of the UN, there was no reason to consider their deployment to Kamina as an act of the Central Congolese Government. Mr. Gardiner therefore categorically rejected the Katangese protest.

(U) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 535, 3 Sep 62; (U) New York Times, 3 Sep 62.
Tshombe's reply to the proposals of the U Thant plan (see items 19 and 24 Aug 62) were received by the UN. Although he deplored what seemed to him an ultimatum in the plan, the Katangese leader termed U Thant's proposals a basis for the establishment of a "viable" Congo, and promised to reply within the given time limit. He greeted "with enthusiasm" the plan's call for a federal constitution, and stated that the long delays in reaching such a federal solution could not be ascribed to Katanga—they had been the consequences of policies adopted by representatives of the US, and of the UN, up to the time of the nomination of Mr. Gardiner. Indeed, Tshombe felt that the best way to achieve a rapid and lasting settlement would be to designate jurists to prepare new constitutional drafts, which might then be presented to the parties for agreement.

Tshombe also agreed "in principle" to the integration of his forces with the Congolese Army and to the sharing of his revenues with the Central Government. He proposed, however, that UN and Katangese experts study the question of revenues and that the amnesty to be offered by the Central Government should cover all deeds and all persons connected with the developments of the past two years. Finally, Tshombe requested that the supporting powers announce solemn guarantees of the effective application of the plan.

(U) Msg, USUN to SecState, 654, 3 Sep 62; (U) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 699, 3 Sep 62. (U) New York Times, 4 Sep 62.

In a State Department press release, the US indicated its satisfaction with Tshombe's response to the U Thant plan (see preceding item). USUN was instructed, in a message of the same day, to urge the UN Secretariat to treat Tshombe's message as an acceptance and to announce its intent to initiate the first steps in the plan immediately.

(U) Msg, SecState to USUN, 542, 3 Sep 62; (U) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 390, 3 Sep 62.

USUN informed Under Secretary-General Bunche of its concern over the possibility that the Congolese move into Kamina (see item 2 Sep 62) might complicate the implementation of the reconciliation agreement. The US therefore requested that the UN direct Gardiner to explain the reasons for the movement to Tshombe personally in order to assure him that the move did not
presage aggressive action against Katanga.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 545, 4 Sep 62; (C) 
Msg, USUN to SecState, 660, 4 Sep 62.

Ambassador Gullion noted that Tshombe’s reply to 
U Thant’s plan (see item 3 September 1962) obviously 
contemplated new negotiations that would provide Katanga 
with the opportunity to continue stalling a settlement. 
In Gullion’s opinion references to the “approaching 
insolvency” of the UN supported his contention that 
Tshombe was contemplating outlasting the UN, as well as 
Adoula. Gullion pointed out that even the most positive 
of Tshombe’s statements was conditional, and applied 
to the principles of the constitution rather than to the 
concrete measures of the plan. Tshombe’s response was 
focused on a “truly Federal Constitution,” which, the 
Ambassador felt, was synonymous with loose confederation. 
Tshombe’s agreement on financial measures also appeared 
conditional since the reference to his funds and his 
right to dispose of them seemed to imply that his offer 
to contribute to the budget referred to the net exchange 
available after the needs of Katanga had been met.

Gullion felt the US should be wary of agreeing to 
Tshombe’s proposal of a guarantee by the supporting 
powers for the effective execution of the plan, since 
this might be construed as US association with the 
Katangese interpretation of the plan.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 536, 4 Sep 62.

As a first step in a concerted effort to engage Tshombe 
in the implementation of the U Thant plan (see item 20 
Aug 62), USUN recommended to the UN that it urge Adoula 
to take the various measures required of him in the plan. 
When this was accomplished, the UN could then urge 
Tshombe to start paying 50 per cent of Katangese revenue 
to a depository designated by Adoula. Once this “single 
most important step in the entire process” had been 
taken, then Tshombe could be urged to carry out various 
other steps preparatory to reaching a final settlement. 
Once Tshombe had taken these steps, the US reasoned, it 
would be difficult for him to “stall or renege” on his 
agreements.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 550, 4 Sep 62; (C) Msg, 
USUN to SecState, 675, 5 Sep 62.

The Katangese Government issued a statement in which 
it described the movement of Congolese troops to Kamina 
as “a last minute political and military maneuver” by
its opponents. The statement went on to say that Katanga would not permit itself to be intimidated, and that it was "counting on the powers that guarantee it fair and proper treatment to put an end to the provocation" represented by the presence of troops of the Congolese army at Kamina.

(OUO) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 401, 6 Sep 62.

7 Sep 62 (No. 39)
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, informed ISA that UN officials had been advised of the proposed token shipment of military equipment to the Congo (see item 23 July, 8 and 15 Aug '62) and had posed no objection (see item 13 Aug '62). At the time the shipment was delivered, Mr. Kitchen continued, the US would present a general description of the Greene Team Report to the appropriate Congolese authorities. In the meantime, the Department of State was attempting to interest other western governments in participating in the modernization of the ANC. (See item 8 Oct '62).

(C) 1st N/H to JCS 2262/116, 14 Sep 62, JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul '62) sec 2.

7 Sep 62 (No. 40)
Robert Gardiner conveyed to Adoula and Tshombe, U Thant's satisfaction over the favorable responses they had given the UN plan. In a letter to the two leaders, Gardiner emphasized that the Secretary-General considered the responses to be complete acceptance of the plan, and that he expected that the initial steps in its implementation would be rapidly undertaken. Gardiner noted in this connection that he planned to present them with a second letter in which he would detail the UN plan for implementation (see item 11 September '62).

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 572, 7 Sep 62; (U) Msg, USUN to SecState, 674, 5 Sep 62.

11 Sep 62 (No. 41)
Gardiner followed up his letter of 7 September to Adoula and Tshombe (see item) with another in which he detailed the UN proposal for implementing the U Thant plan. According to UN Under Secretary Ralph Bunche, the UN proposal was "almost identical" to the plan submitted by Stevenson to U Thant on 5 September (see item)

(C) Msg, New York to SecState, 675, 5 Sep 62; 710, 8 Sep 62; (C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 608, 11 Sep 62.
A twenty-man UN force on reconnaissance patrol near Elisabethville encountered a one hundred-man Katangese force. A fire fight ensued, leaving two Katangese dead. The same evening, Tshombe summoned a UN representative and the Western consuls in Elisabethville to the local morgue where the bodies of the slain Katangese gendarmes were displayed. There, before television cameras, Tshombe proceeded to denounce the consuls as liars, to term Western guarantees worthless, and to claim that the US wished to annihilate the native population of Katanga. The next day he apologized to the consuls, but indicated that the recurrence of such incidents as the fire fight would undermine his political control.

Ambassador Gullion, acting on information that the Congo government was planning to move troops into northern Katanga, warned Adoula that such a move at this time would hurt his government by alienating US and world opinion.

Adoula indignantly replied that the movement of Congolese troops anywhere in the Congo was an internal matter and therefore not the concern of the US or the UN.

In reporting on this meeting to the Department, Gullion opined that such ANC movements would reflect Adoula's belief that the negotiations with Tshombe were certain to break down again. If negotiations did break down, Adoula wanted his forces to be deployed in positions from which they might end the Katangese secession by force.

The President made a formal Finding and Determination (under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) permitting the expenditure of $150,000 for a token shipment of military equipment to the Congo (see items 23 July, 8 August, et seq).

(The token shipment arrived in the Congo on 8 October).

(c) Ltr, Dir NESA Br, ISA, to DCSOPS, USA, 14 Sep 62; ISA, NESA Br. Files. (c) Mag, SecState to Leopoldville, 448, 14 Sep 62; (c) Mag, DA to USARMA Leopoldville DA 919570, 26 Sep 62; (U) New York Times, 9 Oct 62.
In a conversation with Gardiner, Adoula turned down a UN request that Congolese representatives consult with Katangese and UN officials on the drafting of the new Congolese constitution. Adoula held that Tshombe's views had been made clear during their previous negotiations (see item 26 Jun 62) and in the work of the constitutional commission. The new constitution would incorporate Tshombe's views, Adoula said; when completed, it would need only to be submitted to the parliaments of the provinces for approval.

Ambassador Gullion reported to the Department of State that Adoula's position was probably based on his belief that Tshombe, aided by constant appeals to Western opinion, might succeed in having each step toward integration depend upon prior discussion, agreement, and even ratification by Katanga, of all 220 articles in the proposed constitution. Gullion, along with the UK and Belgian Ambassadors in Leopoldville, shared Adoula's opinion that Tshombe might well use this method to delay integration indefinitely.

Gullion also forwarded Gardiner's report that Adoula did not expect to secure passage of the proposed constitution by the present Congolese parliament, which was "out to get him"; he was therefore considering presenting it first to the provinces for consideration.

At Tshombe's invitation, Congolese and UN experts arrived in Elisabethville to participate in the reconstituted commissions of experts (see item 26 June 1962), which under the U Thant plan (see item 26 Aug 62) were to work out the problems of Congolese reunification. Shortly thereafter, the commissions began deliberations.

The UN mission in the Congo received a letter from Tshombe, in which he reasserted his position that the only government suitable for the Congo was a fully decentralized federation. Tshombe thought that, in order to insure that the institutions set up under the proposed constitution would function in a manner which would not undermine his position, it was necessary that the constitutional proposals dealing with the competence of the federal government be developed through consultations among the parties involved.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 748, 26 Sep 62.
USUN reported that U Thant and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak had agreed that Tshombe was unlikely to implement the reconciliation plan unless he was forced to by the termination of UMHK payments to Katanga. As a result, Gardiner had been asked to comment on a plan by which:
1) Adoula would send a letter to the UMHK saying that he expected all UMHK payments to be made to the Central Government; 2) the Congo Parliament would pass legislation requiring that all payments by the mining companies be made directly to the Central Government; 3) Adoula would ask the Belgian Government to assure UMHK compliance with the new law; 4) Adoula would request UN support; 5) the Secretary-General would elicit from the appropriate governments their help in obtaining compliance with the law; 6) the Secretary-General would request Security Council approval of his action and ask for specific authority to guard UMHK installations. (See item 27 Sep 62.)

USUN also reported that U Thant had indicated to Bunche that, if this effort to implement his plan failed, he would go to the Security Council and ask for authority to withdraw UN forces from the Congo.

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 905, 25 Sep 62.

OASD (ISA) forwarded to the Department of State a suggested organization for a UN military training mission in the Congo. Like the Greene Team (see items 23 Jul 62 et seq) ISA thought that the UN training effort should be separate from the operational mission of UNOC and should take care to respect Congolese sovereignty. ISA envisaged, consequently, three separate UN missions in the Congo: a Civilian Operations Mission, the UN Command in the Congo, and a UN Military Training Mission; each reporting to and subordinate to the UN Special Representative in Leopoldville.

The UN Military Training Mission, having perhaps 275 personnel as its eventual full strength, would be comprised of a commander with a small international staff, and functional sections that would be national in character (e.g., an entirely Belgian contingent might handle all training of the Army). The Mission Commander would exercise command over his immediate staff, and would be responsible for coordination of the various functions. He and his staff would have direct access to the appropriate levels of the Congolese Defense Ministry and the ANC.

Depending upon the degree to which the US participated in the UN program, it might be advisable, ISA suggested, that certain "key" positions on the Military
Mission's staff, such as Deputy Commander, be held by US military officers.

25 Sep 62 (No. 50)

The UN representative at Elisabethville, Eliud Mathu, reported that the Katangan delegates on the reconciliation commissions (see item 18 Sep 62) had effectively thwarted progress. The Katangans had insisted at the commission meetings, Mathu said, that the UN plan was merely a "basis for discussion" rather than a formula requiring implementation.

Although the commissions met again the following day the sessions were reportedly unproductive because of continued Katangese insistence that Tshombe's reply to the plan had been an acceptance in principle only.

26 Sep 62 (No. 51)

Gardiner informed Tshombe that he had received information that Katanga had for some time been building up the size and material strength of its gendarmerie and air force, and was continuing to recruit mercenaries. The UN official asked Tshombe for his explanation of these developments.

In reply, Tshombe refused to give Gardiner any information on the size of his forces, and dismissed the charges concerning the mercenaries as fabrications to justify new acts of force by the UN.

26 Sep 62 (No. 52)

Gardiner obtained a copy of the draft Congo had been submitted to Adoula by the commission of international jurists. The US therefore knew the provisions of the document and was able to analyze its contents before it was submitted to the Congo parliament (see items 11 and 16 Oct 62).

27 Sep 62 (No. 53)

Immediately upon receipt of the UN message proposing new steps to be taken against Tshombe, (see item 25
Sep 62) Gardiner consulted with Adoula. Both were enthusiastic about the proposal and Adoula immediately drafted the suggested letters to the UMHK, the Belgian Government, and the UN.

(Subsequently, the UN made it clear that Gardiner had only been asked to comment on the proposal and had exceeded his instruction in counseling Adoula in the preparation of draft texts. In addition, the UN instructed Gardiner to inform Adoula that the proposal would not be implemented as long as discussions with Tshombe regarding the U Thant plan continued.)

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 759, 27 Sep 62; (C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 978, 29 Sep 62.

Tshombe presented the US Consul in Elisabethville with a letter in which he indicated his reluctance to continue participating in the work of the reconciliation commissions until he had been consulted on the draft constitution. There did not seem to be any desire on the part of the GOC or the UN to engage in the commission discussions, Tshombe said. The Katangan leader also complained that the repeated provocations by UN and Congolese troops created a climate not conducive to successful negotiations. Tshombe proposed that to eliminate this obstacle to successful negotiations and restore his confidence in the good faith of the UN and the Congolese Government, all forces in Katanga return to their respective "permanent" positions. Tshombe insisted, finally, that the Central Government halt its military moves in northeastern Katanga—which, he charged, were attempts to separate this area from the rest of the province.

(OUO) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 511, 27 Sep 62.

In a message to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Gullion warned that, if the measures envisioned by the U Thant plan were exhausted and Congolese unity had still not been attained, two questions, each with significant military aspects, would face the US:

1. How would the UNOC force be extricated from the Congo?

2. What or who would replace it?

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 767, 28 Sep 62. (See item 12 Oct 62 for Defense Department action stemming from this message.)
Under Secretary of State George McGhee met with Adoula in Leopoldville to urge him to agree to consultation with Tshombe on the proposed constitution. McGhee, who was to spend three weeks in the Congo in an attempt to hasten a Congo settlement, emphasized that US domestic considerations dictated that every opportunity be given Tshombe to implement the U Thant plan. The Under Secretary pointed out that the chance of Tshombe carrying out the plan in the absence of discussions was small, and that consultations were a prerequisite to the adoption of stronger measures by the US and UN and the other interested parties. McGhee added that he thought Tshombe's insistence on consultations was reasonable.

Adoula, as on previous occasions, rejected these arguments and said he intended to submit the constitution to the Congo Parliament immediately after his Cabinet had commented on it. The presentation to the Cabinet was scheduled for the afternoon.

During the McGhee-Adoula meeting, Congolese Minister of Education Ngalula reported on his ten days of discussions with the Katangese in Elisabethville. Ngalula maintained that the Katangese did not intend to carry out U Thant's plan and cited as evidence the fact that, despite agreement to share revenues equally between the Congo and Katanga, the Katangese held that the sharing should only take place after Katanga's needs were met. The Katangese were also insisting that the integration of the military establishments could take place only after the Congolese forces evacuated northern Katanga, the UN left Elisabethville, and 'constitutional provisions re: the military' were adopted.

In conversations with McGhee the same day, the UN Chief Economist in the Congo, Badre, who had recently returned from Elisabethville, reported that he, like the Congolese, felt that Tshombe was playing for time in the expectation that the UN would soon liquidate its operation in the Congo.

In a telegram to Gardiner, Secretary-General U Thant outlined the steps contemplated by the UN to secure Tshombe's compliance with the terms of the U Thant plan. The first step envisaged by U Thant was for Gardiner to determine from Tshombe, definitely and within a stipulated time, whether he intended to proceed with the implementation of the plan. Gardiner was to make it clear that UN military forces would not leave Katanga before reunification. If it appeared that Tshombe did not intend to implement the plan, the
Secretary-General intended to put into effect the "courses of action" which he had set forth when the plan was proposed (see item 20 Aug 62).

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 978, 29 Sep 62.

The Central Congolese Government began military operations in South Kasai Province to end the secessionist movement that had been active in the province for the past two years. On the following day the UN reported that government forces had taken effective control of Bakwanga, capital of South Kasai, and had arrested secessionist leader Albert Kalonji.

In assessing the significance of the Congolese action Ambassador Gullion pointed out that the "victory" would boost the morale of the Central Government and strengthen Adoula in his relations with his political opposition. Gullion also thought that the government's action would have a chastening effect on Tshombe by removing his principal "ally," Kalonji, and by demonstrating the capability of the Congolese army for effective planning and action.


As Under Secretary McGhee prepared to depart Leopoldville for Elisabethville and talks with Tshombe, Adoula told the Under Secretary that he thought his visit to Elisabethville would impede a settlement of the Kasai problem by delaying implementation of the U Thant plan. Adoula believed that, if the plan should fail or its implementation be delayed, his government would fall and more radical elements would take its place. He warned that the U Thant plan was the last effort at a solution through negotiation that he could support and that, if the plan failed, he would be obliged to attempt to resolve the problem by the use of force. He also noted that if the plan failed, and he thought it would, those who took over the Congo would turn to another source (presumably the Soviet Union) for aid.

In addition, Adoula expressed interest in the Greene Team recommendations and in the forthcoming shipment of military goods to the Congolese army (see item 14 Sep 62). Adoula thought that the US should begin now to supply aid in order to preclude other nations from doing so. Finally, the Premier believed that Tshombe and other secessionists would forego their plans only when they knew that a capable Congolese force existed.

McGhee replied briefly that his trip to Elisabethville was necessary, since he had come to the Congo to
make on-the-spot observations and to express personally to both sides US determination to see the plan through.

On the same day, at his first meeting with Tshombe, McGhee expressed US concern over the possible weakening of the Central Government because of political intrigue against the Adoula regime and the protracted negotiations over the U Thant plan. The Under Secretary pointed out that, if Adoula's position were seriously undermined, he might seek non-Western help and more radical means to bring an end to the Katangese secession. Such an eventuality, McGhee said, would bring far more suffering to Katanga than the successful implementation of the U Thant plan. He therefore urged Tshombe to cooperate in implementing the plan before Adoula's situation deteriorated further.

McGhee concluded his discussion with Tshombe by saying that the US could not tolerate a divided Congo and was determined to support the reconciliation plan by every appropriate means. He warned that if he went back to Washington and was unable to convince the US government of Tshombe's willingness to carry out the plan, the US would, of necessity, be obliged to consider the alternative policies available.

(S) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 816, 4 Oct 62;
(C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 545, 4 Oct 62.

In response to an inquiry from Under Secretary McGhee, the Department of State set forth the measures the US was prepared to adopt to aid the UMHK in the event that the company was adversely affected by its cooperation in the Spaak-U Thant proposal (see item 25 Sep 62). First, the Department said, the US could loan the UMHK 119,000 tons of copper. This amount of copper was in excess of the maximum US stockpile objective. This represented five months' production of the UMHK. Furthermore, as compensation for physical damage to UMHK installations, the US might supplement assistance from the Congolese and Belgian governments and loans from the Export-Import Bank by:

1) making import aid grants to the UN for the Government of the Cong, to provide a source of foreign exchange for imports of US replacement equipment for the UMHK;

2) providing PL 480, "Food for Peace," supplies for unemployed or uprooted African workers;

3) loaning counterpart funds generated by agricultural assistance programs, to help finance the cost of reconstruction and of payments to unemployed UMHK workers and officers.

(C) Msg, SecState to Elisabethville, 349, 4 Oct 62.
5 Oct 62  
(No. 61)

The British Consul at Elisabethville, acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, told Tshombe that, unless there was rapid progress toward implementation of the UN plan, the UK suspected that other measures would be taken against Katanga, measures that the UK would be unable to prevent and would in fact not wish to prevent. The British Consul urged that Tshombe immediately deposit 50 per cent of his revenues and foreign exchange. He suggested that this might be done for a two months trial period pending full implementation of the U Thant plan.

(C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 552, 6 Oct 62.

5 Oct 62  
(No. 62)

In a conversation with Ambassador Sullivan, who requested that the US supply the GOC with transport planes, and pilots to fly them. Adoula thought that with such assistance he would deal with Tshombe successfully.

Ambassador Sullivan, in passing this request to the Department of State, warned that the USSR was reputedly "ready and willing" to provide transport aircraft, and that the GOC might be forced to accept them if the U Thant plan failed.

(See items 26, 27 Oct and 31 Oct 62).

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 829, 6 Oct 62.

6 Oct 62  
(No. 63)

At their final meeting in Elisabethville, McGhee gave Tshombe a list of proposed actions which he hoped Katanga would take to expedite the implementation of the U Thant plan (see item 20 Aug 62). McGhee's proposals called on Katanga to: 1) implement the first steps of the plan without waiting for the promulgation of the constitution; 2) institute an immediate cease-fire and standfast, and agree to their supervision by a tripartite observer group; 3) have Katangan officers take the oath of allegiance to the Central Government; 4) open the Lubilash bridge on the main road and rail routes to the rest of the Congo; 5) release the non-military UN goods in its possession; 6) furnish the Foreign Exchange Commission with full information on Katangese finances; 7) cooperate in expediting the work of the commissions; 8) set aside for the use of the Central Government a sizable sum of money as a "down payment" on the revenues to be turned over to the Central Government and 9) open telecommunications with Leopoldville.

(See item 10 Oct 62).

(C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 578, 10 Oct 62.
In a letter to ASD (ISA), the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs reported that the Department of State shared the view of the Department of Defense (see items 8 and 23 Aug 62) that the Greene Team Report (see item 23 Jul 62) was basically sound and consistent with US policy objectives in the Congo. The Department of State agreed further that early action should be taken on the report; to this end, the US Embassy in Leopoldville would be instructed, in accordance with the recommendations of the Department of Defense, to present the concept of the Greene Team Report to the GOC (see item 25 Oct 62).

The Department of State had serious doubts, however, regarding the advisability of administering military assistance to the Congo bilaterally, as both ISA and the JCS recommended. Rather, the retrenching and reorganization of the Congolese Armed Forces should be an international program under UN aegis until such time as the UN withdrew from the Congo. The establishment of a conventional MDAP agreement with the GOC would only highlight in an undesirable way the close connections of the Aouila regime with the US, and could provoke Soviet or other Communist offers of military assistance. A conventional bilateral assistance program might become advisable in the future, but for the present the US should promote a UN program which would, at least in its early stages, give the appearance of a UN development and administration. The US could contribute to this program in a manner to be agreed upon with the UN. When other nations began to participate in the UN program, and if substantial US material aid were necessary to the program, then it might be advisable for the US to make bilateral arrangements with the GOC. (See item 17 Dec 62).

(c) JCS 2262.118, 18 Oct 62, JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62), sec 2.

After concluding his talks in Elisabethville, Under Secretary of State George McGhee submitted a report to the Department of State in which he sought to assess Tshombe's position in Katanga and the causes of recent Katangese actions. The unreliability of Katangan policy did not stem simply from Tshombe's personal preferences, McGhee said, but was primarily the result of pressures exerted on Tshombe by the political forces within Katanga from which he drew his support. The primary source of influence on Tshombe, according to McGhee, was the group of approximately 15,000 Belgians in Katanga who had remained in the province after Congolese independence and who now enjoyed great prosperity which they felt depended upon the success of the secession. The leaders of this group were, moreover, able to exert a strong influence on the governments of Belgium and other European nations. As individuals the members of this
group were interested only in making "a killing" and attached little importance to the long range prospects of Katanga. Consequently, they felt that they could only lose from a Katangese association with the Congo, which while offering no immediate advantage, would result in the diversion of revenue and foreign exchange from the province, restrictions on their freedom to remit foreign exchange, higher taxes, "loss of freedom," and erosion of the Katangese government's administrative efficiency. A second pressure felt by Tshombe, McGhee said, came from indigenous Katangese who had undergone a "nationalist transformation" during the Katanga-Congo dispute, and who thus did not want to be submerged in the Congo, whose tribes were, in fact, their traditional rivals. There was, according to McGhee, no doubt of Tshombe's popular support among either the Katangese or the Belgians.

McGhee thought that Tshombe was personally sincere in his willingness to accept union with the Congo along extremely loose federal lines, but that each step he took toward integration in accordance with the UN plan evoked the sharp opposition of some group in Katanga. In any event, McGhee thought it clear that Tshombe would not carry out the hard decisions he had promised unless the alternatives were even more distasteful.

In describing US policy in the Congo, McGhee noted that it was not based on the merits of Tshombe's or Adoula's position. A righting of the wrongs in the Congo by the US, McGhee thought, was as impossible as it was irrelevant. The US supported Adoula not because he was "right," but because his aims coincided with the US objective of Congo unification. If, for whatever reason, Tshombe proved unwilling or unable to carry out the U Thant plan, the US must acknowledge that its tactics had failed and move on to stronger measures.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 845, 8 Oct 62.

9 Oct 62 (No. 66) UN headquarters made public a report from UNOC regarding the build-up of aircraft and mercenaries in Katanga. The UNOC report presented evidence of the construction of new and better runways in Katanga, the employment of at least 14 and probably nearly 50 mercenaries in the Katangan air force, and the purchase by Katanga of 15 new aircraft.


9 Oct 62 (No. 67) A coalition of Congolese nationalist parties condemned the U Thant plan and Adoula's acceptance of it as a surrender to secessionists and a betrayal of the long
The nationalists objected especially to the proposed federal constitution; it, they said, together with "rising tribalism" and the "extreme weakness" of Adoula's government, would bring about the "accelerated decline" of central authority over the provinces.

(U) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 851, 9 Oct 62.

10 Oct 62

DIA estimated for OASD (ISA) the capabilities of military forces in the Congo, as follows:

1. Congolese National Army. Despite some progress in reorganization by General Mobutu, the ANC was still an undisciplined, poorly trained, and unreliable force. Its logistical support functions were extremely weak, and the condition of its equipment was generally poor. The weaknesses of the ANC would, moreover, be magnified in any attempt at operations against Katanga, inasmuch as problems of distance, terrain, and transport would all have to be overcome. It was highly doubtful whether outside military assistance—from whatever source and of whatever form—could appreciably enhance the capabilities of the ANC at any early date.

2. Katangan Gendarmerie. The Katangan Gendarmerie had expanded in recent months to an estimated strength of 18,000 men, and had been augmented by additional mercenaries and aircraft. The morale of the gendarmerie seemed good, its loyalties undivided. Training under mercenary supervision was proceeding at an increased tempo. The Katangan gendarmerie was considered capable of conducting successful defensive operations against the ANC anywhere in Katanga.

3. UN Forces. The UN force was estimated at 13,620, of which 9,600 were located in Katanga. As presently organized and supported, the UN forces were not equipped to engage in effective military operations outside Elisabethville. If, however, the UN forces were given additional support and freedom of military action, including air support, they would have a "good" chance of ending organized Katangan military resistance.

(S/NOFORM) Memo, DIA to ASD (ISA), 10 Oct 62, ISA, NESA Br. File.

Tshombe accepted most of the proposals made by McGhee on 6 October (see item), but gave only qualified approval to the remainder. The proposals Tshombe agreed to without reservations were: 1) immediate deposit of a sizable sum to the credit of the Congo Government, 2) resumption of traffic over the Lubilash bridge, 3) release of nonmilitary UN equipment held by

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Katanga, 4) furnishing full information on Katangan foreign exchange and revenue to the commissions, 5) speed-up of the work of the commissions, and 6) the opening of telecommunications with Leopoldville.

In regard to the remainder of the proposals McGhee had made—for the continued implementation of the U Thant plan while awaiting the promulgation of the constitution, and for the institution of a cease-fire and a cessation of military movement—Tshombe said that he would agree to them only if the UN roadblocks at Elisabethville and the Congolese-UN forces at Kamina were withdrawn. He also said that he expected the proposed military standstill would apply to UN troops as well as to indigenous forces. Finally, Tshombe agreed to have his officers take an oath of loyalty to President Kasavubu but only "within the framework of a federal army . . . organized on the basis of a constitutional regime."

On the following day, in a statement to the consuls in Elisabethville, Tshombe announced that he had taken or would shortly take action to: open the Lubilash bridge, deposit two million dollars to the credit of the Congo, reopen telecommunications with Leopoldville, accelerate the work of the commissions, and provide figures on foreign exchange and revenues to the appropriate Commission.

Reporting Tshombe's reply to the Department of State, McGhee observed that the concessions were calculated to buy time and regain the "psychological initiative," at a minimum cost. McGhee found Tshombe's conditional acceptances of little worth, and his inclusion of UN forces in the standstill agreement completely unacceptable.

(c) Msgs, Elisabethville to SecState, 578, 10 Oct 62; 586, 11 Oct 62; (c) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 881, 11 Oct 62.

A State Department analysis of the new constitution drafted for the Congo by an international panel of jurists (see item 55 Sep 62) indicated that, if the national government exercised all the potential powers of the constitution, the Congo would have a highly centralized form of federal government, leaving the provinces little more autonomy than they presently had. Tshombe, the Department thought, could reject it on the plausible grounds that it did not grant the degree of local autonomy called for in the U Thant plan.

To meet this problem, the Department thought that Adoula should be persuaded not to identify himself with the draft constitution, but rather to present it to the provincial presidents as simply the work of the UN
experts and as having no official standing. He should also leave the way open for Tshombe to submit his views on how the draft might be modified. The US would, on its part, act through the UN to get the draft constitution modified.

(C) Msgs, SecState to Leopoldville, 575, 10 Oct 62; 582, 11 Oct 62.

Under Secretary McGhee met with Congo President Kasavubu and urged him to respond to the concessions that Tshombe had announced (see item 10 Oct 62) with actions that would demonstrate the good faith of the Congo government. McGhee also suggested to Kasavubu that the Congo government treat the draft constitution as merely a UN suggestion, subject to changes based on the views of the representatives of the various provinces (see item 11 Oct 62).

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 893, 12 Oct 62.

ASD (ISA) directed the attention of the JCS to Ambassador Gullion's warning of possible military contingencies in the Congo (see item 28 Sep 62), commenting that it now seemed advisable for the US to begin planning for them. Accordingly, ISA requested the views of the JCS on:

1. US military support required to assist in a phased or precipitate withdrawal of all UN forces from the Congo.

2. The nature and extent of US military intervention in the Congo to restore order.
   a. With assistance from present UN forces.
   b. Without assistance from UN forces but in coordination with Congolese forces.
   c. Without assistance from UN forces, and with total collapse of organized Congolese forces.

(See item 17 Nov 62)

(C) JCS 2262/117, 16 Oct 62, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62).

Tshombe supplemented the concessions which he had earlier announced (see item 10 Oct 62), by offering new proposals concerning a cease-fire and standstill arrangement for military forces, a draft loyalty oath, and plans concerning the transfer of foreign exchange and revenues.
These proposals were taken up by the "constitutional commission in session in Elisabethville, where, despite UN efforts, the Central Congolese Government agreed only to 1) a cease-fire arrangement covering Congolese and Katangese forces in North Katanga, and 2) the adoption of a resolution by the Foreign Exchange Commission by which Katanga agreed to make information on the Katangan economy available to the Commission. (Even these agreements were repudiated by Adoula on 17 October; see item.)

(C) Mags, Elisabethville to SecState, 596, 12 Oct 62; 622, 626, 15 Oct 62; 638, 16 Oct 62; (C) Mags, Leopoldville to SecState,909, 915, 916, 15 Oct 62; 930, 16 Oct 62; 942, 17 Oct 62.

17 Oct 62
(No. 74)

Ambassador Gullion informed the State Department that even the limited agreements which had been reached between the Congo and Katanga were in a precarious position because of internal Congolese opposition. The pressure exerted by the UN to bring about the recent agreements had caused resentment among the members of the Congolese government, who believed that the agreements would lead to a further prolongation of negotiations. According to Gullion, members of the Congo Cabinet were insisting that Adoula repudiate the accords reached with Katanga at Elisabethville and ask the UN to leave the Congo. Some were suggesting that the Congo government turn elsewhere for aid.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 940, 17 Oct 62.

17 Oct 62
(No. 75)

In a radio broadcast Adoula accused the UN and "certain consular missions" of pressuring the Congolese negotiators in Elisabethville, and announced that the Congo government would not adhere to the agreements reached at Elisabethville (see item 12-16 October 1962). These agreements, Adoula asserted, were contrary to the provisions of the UN plan. Adoula also said that his government would no longer tolerate delays in settling the Katangese problem and would take all measures necessary to "face up to the situation"; the need for immediate action was made even more imperative inasmuch as the Katangese gendarmerie had lately been "pushing its operations" in North Katanga. (See items 19 and 20 Oct 62.)

(U) Mags, Leopoldville to SecState, 946, 961, 18 Oct 62.

19 Oct 62
(No. 76)

In a message to Brussels and other posts, the State Department outlined and explained the US conviction that
a substantial grant of economic assistance to the Congo might be useful in solving the Katanga problem.

The US was determined, the Department said, to bring about the peaceful reintegration of Katanga, but it wished to avoid the use of economic pressures against Katanga or a military build-up of Congolese forces. On the other hand, the US was also unwilling to see the U Thant plan fail merely because Tshombe had "announced his willingness to make progress towards integration at a different speed and in a different manner than was envisaged under the plan."

The Department thought that a peaceful solution to the problem would require that Adoula make further concessions to Katanga, especially on the issue of the constitution. Prolongation of negotiations and the granting of greater concessions to Tshombe would, however, seriously jeopardize Adoula's political position. It was necessary, therefore, to strengthen Adoula so that he could withstand the pressures of further compromise and delay. The best available method of accomplishing this was to increase economic aid to the Congo so that Adoula could demonstrate to the Congolese Parliament and public that his policy of cooperation with the UN and the West was beneficial to the country. It was hoped that Adoula, thus fortified, could then be induced to adopt a "constructive position" toward reunification.

In addition, the Department noted, extensive foreign aid for the Congo could be justified on purely economic grounds.

In light of the above the US government was convinced that the immediate announcement of a plan to make substantial foreign aid available to all of the Congo had become a vital element in the solution of the Congo crisis. The US was therefore proposing that a $50 million fund in input grants and credits to the Congolese government be created, in addition to US food shipments. Of this sum the US was prepared to announce the availability of $25 million, and expected the Belgian government to undertake to provide about $15 million more, with the rest to be supplied by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy. (See items 31 Oct and 3 Nov 62.)

(c) Msg, SecState to Brussels, Circular, 693, 19 Oct 62.

19 Oct 62 (No. 77)

The US Ambassador in Brussels reported that Adoula's action in rejecting the Elisabethville accords (see item 17 Oct 62) had produced a hostile reaction toward the Congo regime in the Belgian press and in business and Parliamentary circles—all of whom felt that Adoula's action had thwarted Tshombe's sincere attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement. In view of this situation the Ambassador thought that it would be extremely difficult
for Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak to obtain government support (see item 25 Sep 62) for the application of economic pressures on Tshombe.

(c) Msg, Brussels to SecState, 629, 19 Oct 62.

In a report prepared at the request of the State Department, Ambassador Gullion sought to explain Adoula's repudiation of the recent agreements reached in Elisabethville (see item 17 Oct 62). Adoula's action, according to Gullion, resulted principally from his own misgivings, and those of many other Congolese leaders, that the proposed accords would adversely affect the speedy execution of the U Thant plan. All of the Congo cabinet and most of the members of the Congolese Parliament, Gullion pointed out, felt that first step compromise measures, such as those proposed by Tshombe (see items 10 and 12-16 Oct 62) would only serve to delay reaching a real solution. Moreover, the Congolese generally did not appreciate the importance of world opinion and were thus unreceptive to UN and US entreaties to make concessions to Tshombe for propaganda effect.

Gullion thought that despite his fundamental opposition to the Elisabethville proposals, Adoula might have accepted them if it had not been for the pressure exerted on him by his political supporters, who had violently opposed the concessions in order to demonstrate to the Congolese extremists that they were sufficiently zealous in defending Congolese rights and interests.

(c) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 991, 20 Oct 62.

25 Oct 62
(No. 79)

The President formally approved the recommendations of the Greene Team Report (see item 23 Jul 62). Immediately messages were sent to Leopoldville and New York, instructing US officials to present the report to the UN and then, assuming UN approval, to urge the GOC to request such a program from the UN. Specifically, the GOC should request the UN to:

1. Institute a broad program for modernization and training of the ANC.

2. Organize a small international military staff to monitor the program.

3. Provide or assist in obtaining six advisory personnel for the Congolese air force, and assist in implementing a reorganization of the air force.

4. Secure a civilian educator as temporary advisor to the Congolese General Staff on matters of troop education and provide or assist in obtaining advisors to the GOC to assist in establishing a Military Academy.
5. Urge Belgium to continue and expand its present military assistance program.

6. Establish an English language training program in the Congo.

7. Secure or assist in obtaining advisors to the Congolese naval element.

8. Provide or assist in obtaining six civilian or military surgeons, and military pharmaceutical and supply technicians, to assist in the reorganization and expansion of the Congolese military medical service.

The Leopoldville and New York posts were asked to discuss the program with UN officials and secure UN approval as soon as possible. The US officials were not, however, to promise any material support for the program at this time; the US would commit itself to material aid only after demonstrated improvement by the ANC. (See item 26 Oct 62.)

The US Embassy in Leopoldville was further requested to recommend the best means for presenting the US proposals to the GOC as well as any other suggestions for strengthening Adoula's position. (See item 26-27 Oct 62.)

(C) Memo, DepDir NESA Region, ISA, to DepASD (ISA) 25 Oct 62; ISA, NESA Br. Files. (C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 645, 25 Oct 62; (C) Msgs, SecState to USUN, 1099, 1100, 1101, 25 Oct 62.

In a message to the Secretary of State, the Congo Country Team listed the "main needs" of UNOC for decreasing its vulnerability and freeing the US from the continual danger of "sudden rescue calls." According to the Country Team, UNOC should have, in addition to its present force, the following:

1. one "genuine" paratroop battalion with its own airlift and quartermaster company;
2. one armored car battalion with airlift;
3. one-half squadron of fighters (12) with a "full range of armaments";
4. one engineering bridge company.


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UNOC informed the US Embassy in Leopoldville that the Ethiopian F-86s in the UN force had left the Congo. UNOC warned that, in view of the Katangan build-up (see item 10 Oct 62), its air force might soon be inferior to the Katangese, and that UNOC could, as a consequence, lose its military credibility.

(c) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1002, 25 Oct 62.

McGhee told the Belgian Ambassador in Washington that the US could not accept the defeat of Adoula. In fact, the US was designing policies to bolster Adoula's position and to bring additional pressures to bear on Tshombe in the event that progress was not achieved on the U Thant plan. McGhee also noted that the US was presently moving toward the implementation of the retraining program outlined in the Greene Team Report (see items 23 Jul and 25 Oct 62), and was programming $50 million in Congo aid, $25 million of which was to be used in the following six months. He urged the Belgian Government to cooperate in the aid program.

(c) Msg, SecState to Brussels, 687, 26 Oct 62.

The US proposal for the modernization and training of the ANC and the program for implementing this proposal (see item 25 Oct 62) were given to Brigadier Rikhye, the Secretary General's Military Advisor. In subsequent days, both the Brigadier and Under Secretary-General Bunche indicated their general concurrence with the plan. The UN refused, however, to give formal approval to the plan until it had received a formal proposal from either the US or the GOC (see items 20 and 25 Dec 62).

(c) Mags, USUN to SecState, 1057, 27 Oct 62; 1532, 29 Oct 62; 1721, 9 Nov 62; 2371, 15 Dec 62.

In two messages to the Department of State the US Embassy in the Congo recommended the manner it considered best for presenting to the GOC the US proposals for retraining the ANC (as requested; see item 25 Oct 62). The principal GOC interest in any reorganization of the ANC was material, the Embassy said. Without doubt, the ANC was in much greater need of training and organization, but its leaders did not think so. To foster the essential training and organization, therefore, it was very important that the US make it clear that material aid would also be part of the program. The best way for the US to do this at the present moment, the Embassy thought, would be to underwrite an increased civil air contract carrier for the GOC. If this were done, the objections that the
GOCC would have to the plan—multilateral participation, UN control, and seeming expansion of Belgian influence—might be overcome (see item 26 Dec 62).

As the Department had requested, the Embassy also proposed several other US actions that could buttress the position of the GOC, including:

1. Continued reassurance to the GOC that the US supported the U Thant plan.

2. Announcement, as soon as possible, of as much of the proposed $50 million aid program as could be assured (see items 31 Oct and 3 Nov 62).

3. Increased grants to the GOC of agricultural surplus goods (see item 3 Nov 62).

4. Subject to Adoula's permission, an aerial and/or naval show of force in, or visit to the Congo.

5. A visit to the Congo by a high-ranking US personage, such as the Vice President.

6. Removal from the US of Michel Struelens, Katanga's propagandist. (See item 6 Dec 62.)

7. Increased publicity in the US of mounting US support for the GOC.

8. A major propaganda program, overt and covert, in the Congo, on the behalf of the GOC.

(See item 31 Oct 62.)

(C) Msgs. Leopoldville to SecState, 1012, 26 Oct 62; 1017, 27 Oct 62.

31 Oct 62
(No. 85)

The US elaborated to Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboke the steps it was willing to take to support the GOC, together with the steps it expected the GOC to take toward unification.

The US was willing, Bomboke was told:

1. To contribute, over the next six months, $25 million to finance imports to the Congo (see item 3 Nov 62), and to urge other interested governments to add a like amount.

2. To urge the International Monetary Fund to send a team to the Congo to aid in integration of currency.

3. To support a plan for training and modernizing the ANC (see item 25 Oct 62).
4. To furnish substantial military equipment to the ANC, as quickly as such equipment could be assimilated by the modernization program.

5. To offer the GOC a new Food for Peace shipment (see item 3 Nov 62).

6. To provide funds for the immediate delivery by Panama Airways (the GOC contract carrier) of additional transport aircraft (see item 26 Dec 62).

In taking these actions, the US hoped and expected that the GOC would for its part take the following actions:

1. Initiate new direct negotiations with Katanga, including immediate talks aimed at putting tripartite observation teams in North Katanga and other areas of political conflict.

2. Faithfully support the "cease-fire and stand-fast" efforts of the UN in North Katanga (see following item).

3. Issue forthwith an amnesty for Katangese and thereafter facilitate by every means the execution of their oath of loyalty to the GOC.

4. Cooperate in the development of a realistic plan for integration of Katangan armed forces.

5. Adopt a more realistic and flexible attitude in foreign exchange currency negotiations.

6. Facilitate cooperative arrangements with the Katangese in such matters as telecommunications, customs, and immigration.

7. Make a public statement of confidence in the ultimate success of the reconciliation plan and peaceful integration of Katanga.

8. Cooperate fully in the execution of a broad program of modernization and training for the ANC.


Bomboko's reply to this demarche was twofold: 1) he insisted that the GOC had carried out its obligation, and that it remained for Tshombe to demonstrate good faith; and 2) he expressed appreciation for US actions. The Congolese Minister felt, that the US should, in addition to present assistance, supply a few combat aircraft to the ANC, in order to provide the GOC with the means of exerting additional pressure on Tshombe. US officials gave him no hope that such aircraft would be provided.
(On the following day, the US made a similar presentation to Adoula. Adoula was very receptive to the US proposals and was especially impressed by the prospective arrangements with Air Panama. He also indicated that he intended to cooperate with the UN on a number of outstanding issues, including arrangements for a military standfast.)

(C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 669, 31 Oct 62; (C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1040, 2 Nov 62.

31 Oct 62
(No. 86)

Tshombe informed Mathu that he would agree, as the UN had for ten days been urging, to tripartite observer groups being sent to North Katanga immediately to regulate a cease-fire in that province. Tshombe's action followed by four days acceptance of the same proposal by Adoula.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1014, 27 Oct 62; (C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 698, 1 Nov 62.

31 Oct 62
(No. 87)

The US learned that, after a trip to the Congo, Bunche was "optimistic for the first time" and convinced that the problem could be resolved before the end of the year. Bunche now felt that the UN had many "ways and places" to "hurt" Tshombe if he refused to cooperate. (See items 2, 6, 7, and 9 Nov 62.)

According to Bunche, Adoula was "delinquent on a couple of counts" in the implementation of the U Thant plan. Tshombe, however, had "done nothing," and consequently bore most of the blame for the lack of progress. The UN planned, Bunche said, to jog both Adoula and Tshombe with letters reviewing the areas toward implementation and lack thereof (see item 2 Nov 62).

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1571, 31 Oct 62.

2 Nov 62
(No. 88)

In a message to USUN, the State Department expressed its concern that the UN seemed to be adopting an interpretation of the U Thant plan different from that held by the US. Referring to recent indications that the UN would soon proceed to stronger measures to end Katanga's secession (see item 31 Oct 62), the Department emphasized that the US would not at this time support UN attempts to utilize economic or military coercion against Katanga, unless there was adequate Katangese provocation and prior consultation between the US and the UN.

The US did not believe, the Department said, that attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement had been exhausted. The announcement of plans for a forced
settlement at this time would only destroy the progress that had recently been made, by encouraging Adoula to withhold the concessions necessary to reach a solution.

The US also questioned the timing of the proposed application of stronger measures. In view of the Cuban crisis, and the preoccupation of India with its border dispute, the time was particularly inopportune to provoke or risk the outbreak of hostilities in the Congo. Further, an increase in economic pressure would depend to a large extent on Belgium, and recent evidence of Belgian reluctance to undertake new measures in the Congo (see item 2 Nov 62) suggested that such pressure was at present impractical.

(When Bunche learned later in the day that the US was apprehensive about UN intentions in the Congo, he expressed "astonishment." See, however, items 6, 7, and 9 November 1962.)

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1167, 2 Nov 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1623, 2 Nov 62.

2 Nov 62
(No. 89)

The Department of State instructed USUN to inform Under Secretary-General Bunche that the US shared his concern over the weakness of UNOC's air arm (see item 25 Oct 62) and had, consequently, approached Italy regarding the provision of Italian F-86s to the UN force.

(Bunche was informed of the above by Assistant Secretary Cleveland on 7 November (see item), at which time he was also told that the US would support proposed UN approaches to Greece and the Philippines for yet more F-86s.)

(See item 14 Nov 62.)

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1170, 2 Nov 62; (C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1672, 7 Nov 62.

2 Nov 62
(No. 90)

The UK announced its intention to provide $2 million in foreign aid to the Congo. (See items 19 Oct and 3 Nov 62.)

(C) Msg, London to SecState, 1749, 2 Nov 62.

2 Nov 62
(No. 91)

Gardiner, acting on behalf of the Secretary General, sent identical letters to Adoula and Tshombe reviewing the status of the U Thant plan and indicating those phases of the plan that remained to be implemented.
Gardiner began by pointing out that the plan had been submitted for acceptance, and that prolonged discussion and negotiation were contrary to the Secretary-General's intent and were in fact insuring the failure of the plan. Although some progress had been made, there had been no real beginning toward the execution of the plan. Gardiner then evaluated the progress that had been made in the various areas covered by the plan as follows:

1. Constitution: now scheduled for presentation to the Congolese Parliament, with GOC support, in November. It was hoped that the views of the provinces would be presented when the Parliament and provincial assemblies considered it.

2. Foreign exchange: Katanga's claim that its needs would have to be covered before it would deposit its receipts with the Monetary Council was not in conformity with the plan. The Monetary Council was the proper body to determine what was essential for Katanga.

3. Revenues: Katanga was understood to be offering 25 to 30 per cent of its revenues, which was not in accordance with the plan.

4. Monetary: no progress had been made on unifying the Congo's currency in spite of the time limits set by the plan.

5. Military: the early or immediate oath-taking by the Katangan gendarmerie called for by the plan was being held up by Katangan insistence that it was conditional on the proclamation of an amnesty. In addition, no progress had been made toward the creation of a plan for military integration (and the time limit set by the plan would not be met).


7. Amnesty: no progress.

8. Cooperation with the UN: Katanga had not expelled its mercenaries or permitted the free movement of the UN in south Katanga.


Gardiner asked the two leaders to reply immediately; he did not, however, set a time limit for their replies.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1037, 1 Nov 62.
The Belgian Government informed the State Department that it was disturbed by the UN view that the new Congo draft constitution (see item 11 Oct 62) was fully consistent with the UN reconciliation plan and provided adequate autonomy for the provinces.

The Belgians shared the State Department view that the draft constitution provided an even more centralized form of government than existed under present laws, and that therefore Tshombe would not accept and should not be expected to accept it without modification.

The Belgian Government was also unhappy to learn that in the event that replies to Gardiner's letter (see item 2 Nov 62) were unsatisfactory, U Thant intended to call a meeting of the Security Council for the purpose of obtaining authority to take further steps toward securing Kantangan integration. The Belgian Government indicated that it had no intention of committing itself in advance to any further steps contemplated by U Thant.

(C) Msg, Brussels to SecState, 661, 2 Nov 62.

McGhee urged Tshombe to "put aside any thought of blame" for the current situation in the Congo, and to take steps to implement those parts of the UN plan which Gardiner had indicated remained to be implemented (see item 2 Nov 62). Specifically the Under Secretary urged Tshombe to:

1. Release nonmilitary UN supplies.

2. Make provisional payment of foreign exchange to the Monetary Council on a regular monthly basis, until final arrangements were completed.

3. Make provisional payment of revenues to the Central Government on a regular monthly basis, until final arrangements were worked out by the Commission.

4. Have Katangan military leaders take the oath of allegiance to the Central Government.

5. Close the Katangan Foreign Ministry and overseas offices.

6. Accept a new deadline for the completion by the Military Commission of a plan for the integration of the armed forces.

7. Cooperate with the Central Government personnel
in Elisabethville in setting up a Congo customs and immigration station.

(C) Msg, SecState to Elisabethville, 414, 3 Nov 62.

Special Adviser to the President, Chester Bowles, took time out from an official tour of Africa to apprise the State Department of his views on the Congo situation, particularly as it related to US relations with the nations of Africa. Bowles reported that recent US actions relative to the Congo had stirred feelings in the African countries ranging from concern to bitterness and disillusionment over the probable results of US policy. Bowles agreed with the consensus expressed in the African nations that he had visited that Tshombe was stalling on a settlement that he had no intention of consummating. He felt that if, despite its strong declarations in support of a settlement, the US failed to back the UN in getting Tshombe to take immediate irreversible steps toward integration, then it would suffer a grave political defeat in both Africa and Asia.

Bowles outlined several possible results of US inaction. The seeming reluctance of the US to carry through on the implementation of the U Thant plan, recognized by Africans as a US "brain child," would result in a general anti-US reaction throughout the Afro-Asian nations. India and Nigeria would probably withdraw then from the UN force. The complete collapse of the UN effort under these circumstances, Bowles thought, could set the stage for the bloody, bitter division of Africa between the anti-West forces led by the USSR and the "white supremacists" supported by a Welensky-Salazar-Verwoerd coalition. It was generally believed in Africa, Bowles noted, that consultations among the "white supremacists" were already taking place to provide a well-armed and politically coordinated force to cope with the coming crisis.

Bowles suggested that in order to avoid the unfortunate results of continued indecisiveness, the US should encourage and bolster Adoula's position, publicly support the prompt implementation of the U Thant plan, and appeal to Tshombe to take positive steps toward a solution. In addition Bowles recommended that the US strengthen UN forces in the Congo with an airborne battalion, engineers, and additional fighter aircraft. The paratroops, Bowles suggested, could be used to set up tax collection points along the route used for the transport of copper from Katanga to Angola.

Bowles recommended that if Tshombe continued to stall, the US should support the imposition of effective economic sanctions, and if necessary as a last resort, the use of armed force by effectively reinforced UN troops

(S) Msg, Monrovia to SecState, 439, 3 Nov 62.
The Department of State announced that the US Government had decided to make $25 million available to the GOC to finance imports. The Department revealed at the same time that, on the previous day, the US and GOC had agreed to a $2.67 million shipment of agricultural commodities under the Food for Peace Program. These goods were to be sold in the Congo for local currency, the proceeds to be applied by the UN to the economic development of the Congo.

(U) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 681, 3 Nov 62.

U Thant told a CAC meeting that time was running out on the implementation of the UN plan. The Secretary-General indicated that if satisfactory replies to Gardiner's letters to Adoula and Tshombe (see item 2 Nov 62) were not received by 15 November, he would consider the plan "scrapped," and seek alternative solutions. Following the Secretary-General's remarks, Bunche told the meeting that the UMK and mercenary strongholds at Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi could be brought under UN control, and that he thought this could be accomplished peacefully.

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1651, 6 Nov 62.

The President approved a "Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo" prepared by the State Department for the eventuality that the present UN efforts to renew progress toward implementation of the UN plan were unsuccessful. Under the plan, the US, in consultation with the UN, Belgium, and UK, would attempt to strengthen the UN posture and the Adoula Government in an effort to convince Tshombe that his continued stalling would not be fruitful. These measures would be accompanied by efforts to persuade Adoula and Tshombe to resume work on the implementation of the UN plan, and by the UN presenting an outline of the specific steps it expected both parties to take. Tshombe would be expected to release blocked UN supplies, have his military take the oath to the GOC, begin regular payments of revenue and foreign exchange, accept the establishment of a GOC customs station in Elisabethville, close down his Foreign Ministry, and grant the UN freedom of movement in South Katanga. Adoula for his part, would be expected to facilitate parliamentary consideration of the new constitution subject to Katangese modifications, issue an amnesty, and adopt a more flexible approach to the problems of the military and economic commissions.

In order to strengthen the credibility of UNOC, US Air Force cargo planes would be supplied to UN to transpor
equipment to Elisabethville. An attempt would be made to get fighter squadrons from European nations to supplement the UN air forces or, that failing, to send US aircraft, manned by foreign pilots. Efforts would also be made to get additional troops for the UN, if needed.

In order to strengthen Adoula and US influence on him the US should accelerate the implementation of the Greene Team Report (see item 23 July 1962 et seq), and attempt to get foreign financial support for the Congo to supplement US aid. In order to deprive Katanga of the remaining indications of independence, moreover, direct postal and telecommunications to Katanga should be cut off, and Katangans required to use Congolese passports.

Tshombe and Adoula would be advised, finally, that in the event that Tshombe did not carry out the measures requested of him within a definite period of time (one month was suggested), Belgian technicians would be withdrawn from Katanga, and Belgian companies operating in Katanga would be requested to pay their taxes directly to the GOC. (These steps, the plan admitted, would require the prior approval of the UN and Belgium, and the acquiescence of the UK.)

The State Department plan noted by way of conclusion that, although the US preferred to avoid the risks inherent in the pursuit of its recommendations, it believed that these risks were preferable to the dangers that would arise from the collapse of the UN effort.

In approving the Contingency Plan the President directed that discussions be initiated with the Belgians on the question of sanctions against Tshombe (see items 27 and 29 Nov 62).

(3) JCS 2262/119, 16 Nov 62, JMF 9111/3100 (6 Nov 62).

In a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Cleveland, Under Secretary-General Bunche revealed more facets of the new inflexible UN view of the Congo problem (see item 6 Nov 62). Bunche stressed first of all, the difficulties that the UN was experiencing with Adoula because of his inflexible attitude concerning negotiation with Tshombe. In the face of such adamant opposition, Bunche said, the UN was not prepared to involve itself, as the US wished, in further mediation between Adoula and Tshombe on the constitutional issue. At any rate, Bunche observed, the US emphasis on the constitutional settlement was probably exaggerated, since Tshombe too had recently indicated a lack of interest in the problem.

Bunche was generally optimistic about a successful resolution of the Congo situation. He thought that
Tshombe was losing ground, inasmuch as he had permanently lost North Katanga and did not even have full control of Elisabethville. Furthermore, the UN had been strengthened militarily by the use of Congolese troops for peace-keeping functions. Bunche predicted the gradual attrition of Tshombe's position, and said it would not be long before the UN would be in Kolwezi and Jadotville.

The UN official admitted, nevertheless, that the UN force was seriously weakened by the withdrawal of the Ethiopian F-86s. Requests had been made, however, to Greece and the Philippines for replacements; the US, Bunche hoped, would support these requests.

Bunche went on to say that no specific action was contemplated when the 15 November deadline mentioned by U Thant (see item 6 November 1962) expired. He also sought to correct the impression conveyed by U Thant that the UN was prepared to abandon the U Thant plan entirely if the replies to Gardiner's letters (see item 2 November 1962) proved unsatisfactory. Bunche said that in this event the UN intended to consult the US, Belgium and the UK regarding future steps--either within the framework of the plan's "courses of action" or in the form of new measures to be proposed by the UN. Bunche pointed out, however, that the new steps envisaged would be carried out by the GOC and the UN without outside help, or by the UN alone if this proved necessary. Although Bunche avoided specifying the steps contemplated in the event new action was decided upon, he did suggest that they would involve the establishment of a GOC customs and immigration agency at the UN-controlled Elisabethville airport.

On the following day, commenting on Bunche's remarks, USUN informed the State Department that the UN Secretariat appeared "prepared to initiate real pressure on Tshombe with or without US, Belgium and UK support," although these governments would probably be consulted before any action was undertaken. The UN Secretariat said that it had sufficient forces at its disposal to establish GOC customs and immigration services at Elisabethville, while at the same time curtailing the expected Katangese reaction to this step and thus avoiding major fighting.

(See item 9 November 1962.)

(S) Msgs, USUN to SecState, 1672, 7 Nov 62; 1686, 8 Nov 62.

9 Nov 62 (No. 99) In an interview with U Thant, Under Secretary McGhee made it clear that the US expected the UN to make a "convincing case" that Tshombe had been given a "fair deal" before it resorted to actions which might lead to a renewal
of hostilities. McGhee said that the US was not opposed to exerting pressure on Tshombe to get him to carry out the plan, and that he was himself going to Brussels to get Belgian support for such measures. He noted, however, that neither the US nor Belgium was willing to force Tshombe to accept an extreme formula that would leave him no alternative but to resist the UN with force.

McGhee pointed out that by adopting a moderate stand on the constitutional and revenue issues, the UN would demonstrate to the Western world that Tshombe had been given an opportunity to accept a reasonable constitution. If under these circumstances Tshombe refused to cooperate, further UN action would be obviously justified.

On the problem of Katanga's payment of foreign exchange receipts to the Central Government, McGhee suggested that the UN assure Tshombe that Katanga would receive a fair share of funds automatically, in accordance with a guaranteed agreement. This assurance would dispose of a major Katangese objection to the implementation of the UN plan. As for the constitution, McGhee suggested that the UN support a modification of the prepared draft (see item 11 October 1962), which would allow Katanga a degree of autonomy within a Congolese federation.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1237, 8 Nov 62; (C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1724, 9 Nov 62.

9 Nov 62 (No. 100)

In a conversation with the US Consul in Elisabethville, Gardiner stated that the situation had passed the stage where compromise was possible, for there was no hope that Adoula would make concessions to Tshombe. When the US Consul cited the reluctance of the Western powers to undertake measures which might entail the use of force, Gardiner replied that the powers no longer had a choice in the matter. He pointed out that the US had developed the U Thant plan, including the courses of action, and could not now abandon its own creation. Further, US abandonment of the plan would result in the withdrawal of the UN, thus leaving the way open for Soviet intervention.

The impression the US Consul gained from this conversation was that the UN was declaring its independence of Tshombe, Adoula, and to some extent even of the Western powers, and was now determined to settle the Congo problem—alone if necessary. The Consul commented that the UN appeared to be giving Tshombe a choice between capitulation and economic sanctions, with no room for a gradual negotiated settlement; the Consul himself felt that this might in fact be the only practical course
of action for the UN to take.

10 Nov 62
(No. 101)

Ambassador Gullion reported that the long-awaited Parliamentary crisis of the Adoula Government had been put off because of the Parliament's inability to raise a quorum. (See item 28 November 1962).

(C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 733, 9 Nov 62.

11 Nov 62
(No. 102)

Acting on orders from Bunche, Gardiner supplemented his letters of 2 November (see item) to Adoula and Tshombe by presenting them with a list of specific actions which the UN expected them to take as tangible evidence of their intention to adhere to the UN plan.

The new request called on Adoula to: 1) permit the UN to give Tshambe a copy of the constitution; 2) assure the safety of the Katangan officers proceeding to Leopoldville to take the loyalty oath; and 3) assure the safety of the Katangan parliamentarians coming to Leopoldville.

Tshombe was asked to: 1) upon receipt of assurances from Adoula or UNOC, send gendarmerie officers to Leopoldville to take the loyalty oath; 2) announce immediate steps to implement revenue, financial, and currency provisions of the plan; 3) permit GOC customs and immigration officials to begin their work; 4) allow free UN movement in Katanga; 5) cooperate with UNOC in the elimination of mercenaries from the gendarmerie.

Although Adoula completely accepted this proposal, Tshombe responded with counterdemands on the UN (see item 13 November 1962).

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1095, 10 Nov 62.

13 Nov 62
(No. 103)

Ambassador Gullion commented to the Department of State upon the recent military judgments of UN Headquarters officials (see items 6, 7 and 9 November 1962). The entire US Country Team, Gullion related, agreed with the UN that Jadotville and probably Kolwezi would have to be taken if Katanga began hostilities; but the ability of the UN to capture and hold these key points was not as unquestioned as UN Headquarters seemed to assume.

USARMA Leopoldville doubted that UNOC could, with its present equipment, achieve its objectives in Katanga while at the same time keeping open its lines of communication. Until UNOC was equipped with armored cars that
could range freely over the Katangan road net, any UN forces holding Jadotville, Kolwezi, and other centers would be as isolated and pinned down as those presently in Elisabethville.

(See items 16 November and 15 December 1962.)

(c) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1123, 13 Nov 62.

In a lengthy and tendentious reply to Gardiner's letter (see item 2 November 1962), Tshombe said that Katanga would continue to do its part in the implementation of the U Thant plan, in spite of the Central Government's obstructionist tactics on the constitutional and amnesty issues.

In assessing the reply for the benefit of USUN, Bunche said that although the letter did contain qualified agreement on several points, it was replete with legalisms and evasions and could not be considered an acceptance of Gardiner's appeal.

(c) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1788, 14 Nov 62; (OUO) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 754, 13 Nov 62.

Colonel Greene (ISA) discussed the Greene Team Report (see item 23 July 1962) with Major General Mobutu, and presented the Congolese leader with the list of actions that the GOC should take to implement the plan (see item 25 October 1962). Mobutu reacted with general satisfaction to the list of actions recommended for the GOC, but he argued that the strength proposed for the ANC by the Greene Team Report--15,000--was too low by 5,000; both politically and militarily, the GOC could not afford so small an army under present circumstances. Mobutu agreed, however, to participation by more than one nation in the training force and, more reluctantly, to UN supervision of the program. Mobutu promised to recommend to the GOC adoption of the general line of action proposed by the Report. Colonel Greene encouraged Mobutu to secure GOC approval, emphasizing that the Congolese had to initiate the request for assistance, and that no assistance would be forthcoming until a common program had been agreed upon by the various parties.

(See item 20 December 1962.)

(c) Msgs, Leopoldville to SecState, 1127, 14 Nov 62; 1138, 16 Nov 62.
The Department of State summarized for USUN and other posts the progress the UN had made in obtaining additional aircraft for UNOC, as follows:

1. Indian Canberras. The five Canberras formerly in the Congo were in India for repairs. Because of the Sino-Indian dispute, their return was uncertain.

2. Ethiopian F-86s. The three F-86s withdrawn from the Congo (see item 25 October 1962) would be returned when overhaul was completed.

3. Swedish Saabs. The UN had requested more combat-configured Saabs; no reply had yet been received.

4. Greek F-86s. The UN had requested four; Greece had not replied.

5. Philippine F-86s. The Philippines had asked for more information on a UN request for planes.

6. Italian F-86s. The UN had requested planes and pilots; no reply had yet been received.

The Department said that the US had supported or would support the UN requests to each government except the Philippines, which the US did not wish to "press." The US also planned to inform the UN that F-86s might be available from Iran.

(See item 31 December 1962.)

(C) Msg, SecState Circular, 909, 14 Nov 62.

UN headquarters requested that the US provide the following equipment for UNOC: 120 2 1/2 ton trucks, with one year's spare parts, 3 water trailers, and ammunition, including rifle cartridges, mortar bombs, and mines. The UN also requested airlift of these items from the US, and of Bailey bridging equipment from the UK, to the Congo. In addition, the UN asked the US to undertake an internal airlift of UN vehicles from other points in the Congo to Elisabethville.

On 17 November, Ambassador Gullion told the Department of State that the UN's request reflected a new "positive attitude" toward the equipment needed by UNOC. He recommended that the US provide the equipment to the UN.

(See items 27 and 29 November and 15 December 1962.)

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1146, 17 Nov 62; (LOU) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1853, 16 Nov 62.
(8) DJSM-1460-62 to ASD (ISA), 17 Nov 62, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62).
22 Nov 62
(No. 109)
A USUN official informed the UN that the US would, as requested (see item 16 November 1962), provide internal airlift of UNOC vehicles from Albertville to Elisabethville. (See item 29 November 1962.)

(c) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1908, 22 Nov 62.

25 Nov 62
(No. 110)
The State Department directed Ambassador Gullion to tell Adoula that the US was putting into motion a program of action designed to strengthen the GOC while bringing about the reintegration of Katanga in accordance with the UN plan. According to the State Department program, the US would issue a policy statement reaffirming its support of the GOC and the UN plan. Further, a letter would be sent to Tshombe urging him in strong terms to move forward in carrying out the plan (see item 29 November 1962).

With regard to military programs, the US intended to speed delivery of the supplies requested by the UN (see item 17 December 1962), and announce the immediate provision of large cargo aircraft to be used by the UN for duty in the Congo (see item 29 November 1962). Moreover, the US planned to announce its intention of carrying out the provisions of the Greene Team Report, when the GOC formally requested such a program from the UN (see items 20 and 28 December 1962).

(Ambassador Gullion was already familiar with the elements of the State Department Plan since he had participated in its formulation during a trip to Washington. The Ambassador was awaiting receipt of the text of the plan so that he could help Adoula through a Parliamentary crisis (see item 28 November 1962). In fact, on the day after the program was dispatched from Washington but before he had received it, Gullion, feeling that he could delay no longer, informed Adoula of the outlines of the impending US program.)

(c) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 763, 24 Nov 62; (c) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1192, 25 Nov 62.

26 Nov 62
(No. 111)
In the course of a speech, Kasavubu proclaimed the amnesty called for by the U Thant plan. Four days later, however, Katanga dismissed the Kasavubu proclamation as an "expression of intent" rather than as announcement of an amnesty.

(OUO) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 838, 3 Dec 62.

27 Nov 62
(No. 112)
Spaak concluded a round of discussions with US officials in Washington by joining the President in issuing a joint
statement threatening Katanga with severe economic measures if there was no significant progress toward unification of the Congo within "a very short time."


27 Nov 62
(No. 113)

UN Under Secretary General Bunche assured a USUN official that US military supplies recently requested by the UN (see item 16 November 1962) were intended solely to bolster the defenses of UN forces in Elisabethville, and not for the initiation of military action against the Katangese.

In passing this information on to the State Department, the USUN indicated that it thought the UN explanation should be accepted at face value.

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 1988, 27 Nov 62.

28 Nov 62
(No. 114)

The US Consul in Elisabethville gave Tshombe a letter from Under Secretary McGhee expressing disappointment that Tshombe had not taken more substantial steps since their meetings in October (see items 4 and 6 October 1962) to implement the U Thant plan. McGhee warned that the UN might soon be forced to take more positive action to end the secession and that Tshombe would have to act quickly if a peaceable solution were to be reached. He suggested that to demonstrate his adherence to the plan, Tshombe should immediately release blocked UN supplies, facilitate the payment of foreign exchange revenues and customs to the Central Government, close the Katangese Foreign Ministry and its overseas offices, cooperate with the Central Government immigrations and customs officials in Elisabethville, and send Katangese officers to Léopoldville to take the oath of allegiance. McGhee also urged Tshombe to stop Katangese air strikes against the Congo army in North Katanga.

Tshombe rejected McGhee's message and indicated that he was determined to maintain his position without compromise. He said that in the event that economic sanctions were imposed on Katanga "every bridge, every road, every plant in Katanga will go into the air."

(C) Msg, SecState to Elisabethville, 445, 24 Nov 62; (C) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 814, 28 Nov 62.

28 Nov 62
(No. 115)

The Congolese Chamber of Deputies failed in an effort to vote "no confidence" in the Adoula Government. Although a motion of "no confidence" was supported by a vote of 50 to 47, it fell short of two-thirds majority required under the Congolese constitution.
Gullion noted that the government "victory" was achieved at the price of political concessions that had greatly weakened its position. It was now doubtful that Adoula would be able to get favorable parliamentary action on the proposed constitution.

Gullion noted that the Embassy had put its future relations with opposition groups in some jeopardy. An intensive US efforts to support Adoula in this political crisis.

(8) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1245, 28 Nov 62; (U) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1237, 28 Nov 62.

29 Nov 62 (No. 116)

The JCS ordered USCINCEUR to dispatch 3 C-124s to the Congo to airlift 25 UN vehicles from Albertville to Elisabethville. The dispatch of these planes for intra-Congo airlift dramatized the deterioration of the Congo situation, inasmuch as standing US policy, as suggested and supported by the JCS in early 1962, was that US participation in intra-Congo airlift should be limited to emergency situations.

(On 3 December, two of the C-124s involved in this airlift landed their first cargoes at Elisabethville.)

(3) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 7550, 24 Nov 62; (C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 1271, 16 Jan 62; (C) JCSM-6-62 to SecDef, 4 Jan 62; both in JMF 911/4031 (17 Sep 61); (LOU) Msg, Elisabethville to SecState, 480, 3 Dec 62; (U) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 7623, 29 Nov 62.

29 Nov 62 (No. 117)

U Thant agreed to a US-Belgian proposal that the UN embark upon certain steps preliminary to the "courses of action" called for under the UN plan (see item 20 August 1962). Under the US-Belgian course of action, which had evolved from consultations between McGhee and Spaak (see item 27 November 1962), Adoula would come to New York and confer with the UN and the various interested governments in an effort to arrive at a formula regarding the nature of the draft constitution, and at a division of revenues that would prove more acceptable to Tshombe than the current proposals. To induce Adoula to come, the Congolese leader would be informed that the UN intended to undertake a series of measures, such as beginning to equip and train one or two ANC battalions, designed to bolster his political position. In addition, an effort would be made to persuade the UMHK to pay taxes, duties and royalties to the Central Government, instead of to Katanga; if Tshombe opposed this move, the Secretary General would request the Belgian Government to undertake the "measures necessary to carry out this operation."

The newly agreed proposal also alluded to the eventual use, if necessary, of stronger economic pressures to secure Tshombe's cooperation in a final solution to the Congo problem.
Adoula flatly rejected a UN proposal (see item 29 November 1962) that he go to New York to consult with the interested governments and the UN on new measures to end the Katangese secession. He said that he no longer had any patience with attempts at a negotiated settlement, and did not intend to leave the Congo in the midst of the existing political crisis.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1321, 6 Dec 62.
In a message to USUN, the Department of State reviewed US actions with respect to the Congo. At this time the US was concentrating its efforts, the Department said, on obtaining UMHK participation in a plan that would lead to the UMHK paying its foreign exchange and revenues to the GOC. The US felt that this was the quickest way to bring about reintegration with a minimum risk of reprisals by the Katangese. The resultant transfer of funds would, moreover, have more immediate and practical benefit to the GOC, and constitute a more serious handicap to continued Katangan secession than a longer-range effort such as an embargo.

In this new emphasis on bringing the UMHK to terms, the US had not, the Department emphasized, abandoned its support of additional measures under the UN plan if they became necessary.

On the same day, in pursuance of the course of action outlined above, the Department instructed Ambassador MacArthur in Brussels to urge the Belgian Government to continue its efforts to persuade the UMHK to pay its taxes and other duties to the GOC instead of Katanga.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1518, 6 Dec 62; (C) Msg, SecState to Brussels, 847, 6 Dec 62.

US immigration officials informed Michel Struelens, Tshombe's "official representative" and propagandist in New York, that he must leave the US within 15 days or face deportation.

(See item 11 December 1962.)

(3) JCS 2262/120, 7 Dec 62; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62).

7 Dec 62
(No. 123)

The Congolese Parliament, unable to succeed in an earlier attempt to vote "no confidence" in the Adoula regime (see item 28 November 1962), recorded its displeasure with Adoula by censuring his Minister of Justice.


8 Dec 62
(No. 124)

U Thant told the US that, since Adoula was not coming to New York (see item 5 December 1962), he was proceeding with the implementation of Phases II and III of the "courses of action" set forth in the Thant Plan (see Appendix I and item 20 August 1962). The Secretary-General indicated he would begin by sending a series of letters to the interested governments requesting their cooperation in instituting economic pressures against the Katangan regime.

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2216, 8 Dec 62.

10 Dec 62
(No. 125)

Gardiner delivered a letter from U Thant to Tshombe affirming the UN's intention of pressing for an end to the Katangese secession, and accusing Tshombe of deliberately holding up the implementation of the Thant Plan while paying lip service to its objectives. The UN was implementing the courses of action set forth in Phases I through IV of the Thant Plan (see Appendix I), Tshombe was told, and was calling upon various states to undertake actions which would impress upon Tshombe and his colleagues the "advisability of abandoning . . . [his] policy of secession and civil war." At the same time, U Thant said, the UN command in the Congo would pursue with increasing vigor the objectives of the UN plan, such as achieving complete freedom of movement throughout the Congo, eliminating the Katangan mercenaries, and bringing an end to hostilities. U Thant concluded by urging Tshombe to begin carrying out the plan without further delay.

(U) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2225, 10 Dec 62.

11 Dec 62
(No. 126)
Adoula notified the UN and 17 interested governments that the GOC was imposing an embargo on shipments of copper and cobalt from Katanga province, and requested that the governments not accept such shipments unless revenues on them had been paid to the GOC.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1551, 8 Dec 62; (C) Msg USUN to SecState, 2337, 13 Dec 62.
The UN requested the Belgian Government to exert pressure on the UMKH to transfer its payments from Katanga to the GOC. In addition, the Secretary-General asked the governments of Portugal, South Africa, and UK to institute the measures necessary to prevent the shipment of Katangese copper ore through their territories and/or to exert their influence on Katanga's neighbors to prevent shipments through their territories.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1551, 8 Dec 62; (C) Msgs, USUN to SecState, 2262, 11 Dec 62; 2337, 13 Dec 62; 2348, 14 Dec 62.

Tshombe informed the UN that he had given conditional approval to a proposal for the payment of UMKH revenues to the GOC which had been presented to him by Belgian and UMKH officials. Tshombe agreed that Katanga would immediately inform the UMKH that it could begin paying the total sum of foreign exchange arising from exports to "an international body designated by the interested parties." The international body would, in turn, assure to Katanga 50 percent of the foreign exchange it received from the UMKH.

(On 18 December, Tshombe agreed to a UN request that he send delegates to Leopoldville to discuss the details of the payment plan.)

(C) Msgs, Elisabethville to SecState, 913, 13 Dec 62; 943, 18 Dec 62; (C) Msg, SecState to Elisabethville, 499, 13 Dec 62.
At a meeting of the CAC, the Secretary-General announced that he was going ahead with the implementation of the Thant Plan and was presently at the stage of calling upon several interested states (see item 11-12 December 1962) to give effect to the pressures envisaged in Phases I through IV of the "courses of action." U Thant said that although the UN intended to proceed peacefully with carrying out the measures called for under the plan, the UNOC was fully prepared to defend itself should Tshombe elect to oppose UN action by force. UN troops in the Congo had been alerted, U Thant said, and were prepared for any such eventuality.

The Secretary-General also circulated copies of a short draft letter that he indicated would be sent on the following day to all the UN member governments. The letter requested their support of the copper and cobalt embargo imposed by Adoula (see item 11 December 1962).

On learning of the draft letter that U Thant had distributed at the CAC meeting, US officials protested the decision to proceed with this step before the Belgian efforts to switch UMKH payments had been completed. Bunche, speaking for the UN, explained that the C members were not satisfied with Tshombe's letter (see preceding item), which U Thant had also shown the Commission, and had favored the draft letter in support of the embargo. Bunche also pointed out that Tshombe had agreed to divide only foreign exchange, but not taxes, duties, and royalties. Moreover, since Adoula had already made public his letters to the 17 governments requesting their cooperation with his embargo, the Secretary-General had had no choice but to issue his letter of support.

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14 Dec 62
(No. 132)

In a message to Leopoldville, the Department of State summarized the progress made in securing the participation of other nations in the Greene Team program for training and reorganizing the ANC (see items 23 July 1962, et seq). According to the Department, Belgium had agreed, at least in principle, to the plan, as had the Canadians. In addition, Italy was willing to send a team of specialists to assist in the Air Force portion of the plan. The US, for its part, was preparing a possible bilateral aid agreement to provide equipment for the training program. The entire program, however, awaited a Congolese request to the UN for assistance (see item 20 December 1962).

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(C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 874, 14 Dec 62.
14 Dec 62
(No. 133)

(TS/SENSITIVE) Memo, Capt. William D. Houser, USN (Chmn SG) to CJCS, 14 Dec 62, OCJCS Files, 091 Congo.

15 Dec 62
(No. 134)

(TS) Memo, ASD (ISA) to SecAF and DJCS, 15 Dec 62, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62); (TS) Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, 17 Dec 62, OCJCS File 091 Congo.

16 Dec 62
(No. 135)
(TS-EYES ONLY) Msgs, SecState to USUN, Unnumbered, 161400 [Local] Dec 62; SecState to USUN, 1690, 18 Dec 62.

17 Dec 62
(No. 136)


17 Dec 62
(No. 137)
In accordance with a recommendation from AID, concurred in by the Department of Defense, the President authorized the use of $4,000,000 for military assistance to the Congo "without regard to the requirements" of the Foreign Assistance Act [i.e., in the absence of a MDAP agreement with the recipient of the aid under the terms of the Act, but in an instance judged "important to the security of the US" by the President]. The purpose of this authorization was, according to AID, that the US "be prepared to furnish directly to the Republic of the Cong ... defense articles on a grant basis" in the immediate future. This aid would be the US contribution to an international program by which Belgium and other Western countries would, with the support and cooperation of the UN, organize, re-equip, and retrain the ANC. The implementation of such a program would demonstrate US support of the Central Congolese Government, making it less likely to apply for assistance to governments "with radical tendencies," while making its Katang
adversary more likely to comply with the U Thant Plan for National Reconciliation. (See item 20 December 1962.)

(C) Memo (Admin, AID) for President, 17 Dec 62; (C) Presidential Determination No. 63-9, 17 Dec 62; both in JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec 2.

18 Dec 62 (No. 139)

From Nassau, where he had flown to meet Prime Minister Macmillan (see item 19 December 1962), President Kennedy announced that he was sending a military mission to the Congo. Headed by Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman, the Mission would survey the needs of UN forces and their ability to deal with feared increases in tensions. News reports included statements from "informants" that the Soviet had begun new moves in the Congo and that the Truman mission was in this respect an attempt to forestall Soviet intervention in the Congo situation by giving further evidence of US concern.

(See items 19 and 31 December 1962.)


18 Dec 62 (No. 140)

(S) SM-171-62 to D/JS, 18 Dec 62, OCJCS Files 091 Congo.

19 Dec 62 (No. 141)
In a message to the Department of State, the US Congo Country Team listed and evaluated the military forces in the Congo. Forces were listed as follows:
Ground Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN in Katanga</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC in Katanga</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN outside Katanga</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC outside Katanga</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga Gendarmerie</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN combat</td>
<td>6 (plus any enroute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga combat</td>
<td>12 (10 Harvards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN transport</td>
<td>31 (plus 16 charter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga transport</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN helicopters</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga helicopters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN light aviation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>6 (Harvards)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After discussing the command structures, training morale, logistics, communications, and mobility of the opposing forces, the Country Team estimated the probable course of a new military confrontation in Katanga. Although the Katanga Air Force might win or at least contest aerial supremacy at the outset, the UN and ANC forces in Katanga should be able to defend themselves and in the end assert control of the province.

(C) Msg, Leopoldville to SecState, 1462, 19 Dec 62.

In a message to all US diplomatic posts in Africa, the Secretary of State explained US policy in the Congo, for the US representatives' guidance in interpreting recent UC courses of action for their host governments. According to the Secretary, the US had not changed its policy objective, integration of the Congo on the basis of the U Thant Plan; it had simply recognized that present conditions in the Congo required more vigorous methods for attaining its objective. The UN's financial problems, the possibility that India would withdraw its large contingent from UNOC, the increasing weakness of the Adoula regime, the resurgence of left-wing strength in the Congo, and the renewed activity of the Soviets in the Congo—all these factors had combined to convince the US that an immediate end to the Katanga secession was an "urgent necessity." Thus, recent US moves to provide additional equipment to the UN and to send a military survey mission to the Congo should be viewed as actions that showed firm US support for the UN. In none of these moves was there any US intent to dominate areas in Africa like the African nations, the US wanted only an integral sovereign and independent Congo, as envisioned by the U Thant Plan, with Katanga as a productive part.

(C) Msg, SecState Circular, 1125, 19 Dec 62.
19 Dec 62
(No. 144)

USUN learned that Soviet officials in New York had approached U Thant and suggested that, if he accepted US military aid in the Congo operations, he should accept similar Soviet aid.

USUN did not know what response U Thant had made to the Soviet approach.

(See item 22 December 1962.)

(S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2411, 19 Dec 62.

19 Dec 62
(No. 145)

President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, and their respective advisers discussed the Congo at some length during a meeting at Nassau. US policy, including the rationale for the Truman Mission, was explained to the Prime Minister and his advisers, who continued, nevertheless, to manifest the same reservations toward US and UN plans that the UK had held during the formulation of those plans: viz., that the UK opposed the concept of sanctions generally, and would not participate in them. The UK continued to feel that the imposition of sanctions would result only in the US occupying Katanga; and that the UN should abandon its military role in the Congo and provide only economic and technical assistance. The UN should not, in the UK view, "get involved in imposing a political pattern on a particular country."

The US had only hoped to obtain British acquiescence in the stronger measures that the US, UN, and Belgium might feel compelled to take pursuant to the Thant Plan. This limited objective the US evidently achieved, since at the end of the Nassau talks, on 21 December, the President and Prime Minister agreed, in the words of their communiqué, to continue their efforts toward an "equitable integration" of the Congo.


20 Dec 62
(No. 146)

The Director of Military Assistance notified the Chairman JCS, that the JTD and Terms of Reference for the US Military Liaison Group, Republic of the Congo (recommended by the JCS on 8 August; see item) were approved. The JCS were requested to establish and man the group, the personnel for which should begin arriving in Leopoldville in January 1963.

(On 27 December, the Secretary, Joint Staff, transmitted this request to CSA for action. The Military Liaison Group was to consist of two Army and one Air Force officers, four enlisted men, and one civilian.)

(C) Memo, ASD (ODMA) to CJCS, 20 Dec 62; (C) SM-1436-62 to CSA, 27 Dec 62; both in JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec 2.
The GOC finally requested that the UN initiate action toward reorganizing the ANC. The GOC request was substantially the same as the line of action suggested by the US (see items 25 October and 14 November 1962), modified only in that it: 1) made less emphatic the UN control of the program; 2) gave more emphasis to Congolese sovereignty; and 3) withheld final Congolese approval for the force levels forecast by the Greene Team Report. (See item 28 December 1962.)

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2472, 22 Dec 62; (C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1706, 17 Dec 62; (C) Msg, USARMA Leopoldville to DA, AFIN 34757, 24 Nov 62; (C) Msg, OSD to USARMA Leopoldville, DEF 922367, 3 Dec 62.

Under Secretary General Bunche told Ambassador Yost in New York that, before the end of the month, the UN would assist the GOC in establishing customs and immigration offices in Elisabethville. Simultaneously, without waiting for further build-up, the UN would also begin to exercise its right to freedom of movement in Elisabethville in this was included, Bunche made clear, the removal of Katangan roadblocks.
On the following day, Ambassador Stevenson told
the Department of State that in view of this UN atti-
dude, the US needed to decide quickly what steps it
thought necessary to end the secession and then attempt
to "concert" these steps with the UN. The US could
suggest, for instance, that the UN merely interrupt trial
movements within Elisabethville, rather than immediately
attempting to exercise its rights to freedom of movement.
Then, if necessary, the exercise of the right of freedom
of movement in Elisabethville would be a second step, to
be followed if necessary by exercise of the same right
throughout Katanga. While urging the UN to adopt these
or similar more gradual measures, the US should also
advocate delaying the first steps until 15 January, by
which time more UN equipment and aircraft would have
arrived.

(S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2468, 22 Dec 62; (C)
Msg, USUN to SecState, 2454, 21 Dec 62.

The Department of State informed USUN that the US had
concluded that U Thant was unlikely for the time being
to accept a direct US military involvement in the Congo,
if only because the USSR was "in the wings" offering
military assistance to the UN (see item 19 December 1962
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, moreover, was anxious
that the US defer any final decision on military involve-
ment while he continued to attempt persuading the UMEK
to send a representative to Leopoldville for revenue
discussions. USUN was instructed, therefore, to inform
U Thant that, in deference to his views, the US would
"defer decision" regarding participation of a US air
squadron in the Congo (see items 11, 15, and 17 December
1962). At the same time, U Thant should be told that
the US had not abandoned the idea, but was keeping
the situation under constant review.

Even in making this approach, however, USUN should
also, the Department continued, express "deep concern"
that the UN appeared to have abandoned its efforts at
conciliation in the Congo. USUN was to emphasize that
the UN military build-up in which the US was cooperating
was meant, in the US view, to bring about a peaceful
reintegration of Katanga. The US was, in fact, studying
appropriate means by which the US and UN could "restart
negotiations" while the military build-up was in progres:

On the 22nd, Ambassador Yost communicated the gist
of the US plea for new UN conciliatory moves to Bunche,
who rejoined that the UN was already pursuing, and would
in the future, pursue the path of conciliation to the
greatest extent possible.

Yost did not at this time give the formal US de-
ferral to U Thant's views on US military participation.
Later in the day, however, the US position was made
abundantly clear when the US agreed to provide the items of equipment U Thant had requested in lieu of direct US involvement (see following item).

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1733, 21 Dec 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2469, 21 Dec 62.

22 Dec 62 (No. 151)

At the request of the Secretary of State and with the specific approval of the President, USUN offered the UN the following US military assistance: 1) provision of the ten aircraft requested by U Thant, if the UN would accept F-84s in lieu of F-86s; 2) transportation of Bailey bridging equipment from Leopoldville to Elisabethville; 3) airlift of the 30 trucks requested by the UN to the Congo, beginning in one week; 4) provision, on a continuing basis, of three transport and one tanker aircraft for UN internal transport and "uppo" on the Congo; and 5) substitution of armored personnel carriers for the armored cars U Thant had requested (see item 15 December 1962).

Under Secretary-General Bunche, acting in U Thant's absence, made "definite decisions" in favor of each US suggestion, except for the substitution of F-84s for F-86s; in this case, because the only qualified crews for F-84s were from NATO nations, Bunche felt obliged to refer the matter to U Thant (see item 29 December 19).

(TS-EYES ONLY) Msg, SecState to USDEL Nassau, 31, 20 Dec 62; (S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1740, 22 Dec 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2476, 22 Dec 62.

22 Dec 62 (No. 152)

USUN advised Under Secretary-General Bunche of the method favored by the US for the UN's dealing with hostile acts by the Katangan Air Force (KAF). Because of the small number of UNOC aircraft and the volume of air space over Katanga, the US thought that the best method for halting KAF attacks would be to strafe its aircraft on the ground. Before undertaking such an operation, however, UNOC should, the US thought, have adequate justification and have given advance notification of its intention to attack. By "adequate justification," the US meant that the UN should establish "clearly" whether Katangan planes had in fact committed any alleged hostile acts. In giving "advance notification," the UN should make public the exact rules of engagement it would observe, so that no one could "misunderstand" its meaning.

(S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2469, 22 Dec 62; (C) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1727, 21 Dec 62.
24 Dec 62  
(No. 153)  
In an already-tense Elisabethville, Katangese troops fired on a UN helicopter, forcing it to crash-land and killing one of its passengers, an Indian officer. Beside this dramatic event there was sporadic rifle fire in and around the city all during the day. Each side blamed the other for the outbreak, which closed business houses and cleared the streets of the town.

Meanwhile, in Leopoldville, in an attempt to strengthen the shaky position of the Adoula regime, President Kasavubu recessed Parliament until 15 March 1963 and thereby dispelled the hopes of a Tshombist-leftist coalition for toppling the Adoula regime with a vote of 'no confidence.'


26 Dec 62  
(No. 154)  
The Department of State instructed USUN to inform the UN that the US was prepared to provide $1.4 million to finance six months' foreign exchange costs of providing an airlift capacity for the GOC. (See items 25 and 26-27 October 1962.)

(C) Mag, SecState to USUN, 1749, 26 Dec 62.

27-28 Dec 62  
(No. 155)  
The final impetus to the fall of Tshombo's Katangan regime was provided, not by him or by the UN or by the GOC, but by Katangan gendarmes who, momentarily unresponsive to Tshombo's commands, finally offered adequate provocation to the heretofore restrained UNOC forces in Katanga.

Late on 27 December, after several days of intermittent small-arms firing, these Katangan gendarmes began to direct mortar and machine gun fire at UN troops in Elisabethville. Within a few hours, UN officials contacted Tshombo, who acknowledged that his forces were indeed firing upon the UN troops and promised to try to arrange a cease-fire at daybreak. The Katangan leader was not able, however, to order or persuade his troops to cease firing, and he asked for further talks with UN officials. He was duly received on the morning of the 28th by Mathu, UN civilian chief in Elisabethville, and General Prem Chand, the local UN military leader. The UN officials did not negotiate with Tshombo, but rather told him that he would have to agree in writing to remove Katangan roadblocks in the Elisabethville area and withdraw his forces to areas designated by the UN. Tshombo refused to sign a statement to this effect, claiming that he was not "Mathu's slave" and that he needed to consult with his advisers. Faced with this refusal, the UN officials informed Tshombo that he could return to his residence but must remain there. At the same time, 1500 hours on the 28th, the UN gave the order for its forces to advance upon the Katanga roadblocks.

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Tshombe returned to his residence, from whence, in a few hours, he sought the advice of the US Consul. The US official told Tshombe that the "entire UN organization" would undoubtedly stand behind the decision not to permit any more Katangan roadblocks in the Elisabethville area; the Consul advised Tshombe, therefore, to sign the UN draft statement.

Tshombe did not, however, heed the Consul's advice. Later in the evening of the 28th, he escaped to Rhodesia. (See item 30 December 1962.)

(S) Mags, Elisabethville to SecState, 1010, 28 Dec 62; 1034, 30 Dec 62. (C) Mags, Elisabethville to SecState, 999, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1006, 1012; all 28 Dec 62. (U) WP&T-H, 29 Dec 62.

The State Department was "gratified" by the effective manner in which the UNOC forces in Elisabethville were able to defend themselves without suffering or inflicting heavy casualties (see item 27-28 December 1962). The Department thought that the action of the gendarmerie in opening hostilities had given the GOC and the UNOC a unique opportunity to take "psychological action" to advance the unification of the Congo. The Department suggested that the UNOC-GOC "political psychological initiative" include, for example, public statements by the GOC that it did not seek unconditional surrender and would welcome the katangan gendarmerie into the Congo Army. GOC officials might also offer to supply the residents of Elisabethville with food and to facilitate the exchange of Katangan for Congolese currency.

(C) Msg, SecState to Leopoldville, 976, 28 Dec 62.

The UN acceded to the formal Congolese request that the UN assist in the reorganization of the ANC (see item 20 December 1962). In advising the US of this action, UN officials explained that the UN accepted "in toto" the proposals put forward by the GOC (see item 25, 26 Oct 1962, in which the US recommended these proposals to the GOC).

The UN officials said that the UN, in carrying out the proposals, could not associate itself with any formal US-Congo-bilateral military assistance agreement. The UN intended, rather, to prepare its own plan (i.e., a UN version of the Greene Plan). The GOC would then be asked to agree to this plan and to submit requests for participation by specific countries. In this way, UN hoped to forestall requests to participate from the Soviet bloc and from Israel, whose participation it feared, would anger the Arab states. The UN officials indicated, however, that they would have no objection t
the US including, in its response to UN requests for participation, a demand for assurances from the Congo that would be, in effect, a normal military assistance agreement.

(C) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2515, 28 Dec 62; (C) Dept of State internal memo, "Military Assistance Agreement with the Congo," 3 Jan 63, ISA, NESA Br. Files.

29 Dec 62 (No. 158)

UN Under Secretary Bunche requested the ten F-84s that the US had offered on 22 December (see item).

On the same day, however, Secretary Rusk decided that the US would withhold action on the UN request until the situation in Katanga was stabilized. In the meantime, the JCS were to alert USCINCEUR to the possibility that he would have to furnish the aircraft; still on the same day, the JCS performed this task.

(TS) Memo, Dep ASD (ISA) to Dep SecDef, 29 Dec 62; ISA, NESA Br. Files. (C) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 7997, 29 Dec 62.

30 Dec 62 (No. 159)

Acting under instructions, Ambassador Stevenson called upon Under Secretary Bunche in order to ascertain UN military intentions, now that Elisabethville had been secured (see item 27-28 December 1962), and to urge the UN to make a prompt public statement on the Congo.

Since the beginning of the fighting in Katanga, the US had been trying to get a clear picture of the intended scope of UN operations. UN headquarters in New York had told the US that the military operation would comprise only Phase I of UNOC's military contingency plan (see items 18 August and 31 December 1962), but reports had come from the field and from the UN itself that UNOC troops were already carrying on some operations unknown to UN headquarters, such as entering Kipushi and occupying Kamina, and were authorized others including an advance upon Jadotville. The US therefore remained uncertain of the actual nature of proposed UN moves, and unable to decide whether or not to supply fighter aircraft to the UN (see item 29 December 1962), and at what speed other equipment should be sent. For these reasons, Stevenson pressed Bunche for a description of the UN's intentions, but he received only assurances that UN operations were in effect completed for the moment and that immediate marches upon Jadotville and Kolwezi were not at present anticipated.

In suggesting to Bunche that the UN should issue a public statement, Stevenson reflected the US concern that the UN could not prosecute a military operation for which much of world opinion was unprepared, unless it
gave a rather explicit statement of what its political objectives were. Stevenson handed Bunche a proposed statement which would, the US believed, by stressing the UN's primary commitment to reconciliation in the Congo, put the UN action in perspective and within a political framework acceptable to a broad majority of the members of the United Nations. (See item 31 December 1962.)

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1770, 29 Dec 62; (S) Msg, SecState to Brussels, 956, 29 Dec 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2531, 30 Dec 62. (C) Msgs, USUN to SecState, 2524, 29 Dec 62; 2530, 30 Dec 62.

30 Dec 62
(No. 160)

Besides instructing Stevenson to urge the UN to state publicly its aims in Katanga (see preceding item and item 31 December 1962), the Department of State also suggested that he discuss with U Thant a UN attempt to secure Tshombe's cooperation in immediate practical steps toward reintegration. The Department had in mind a contact through the UK, suggesting that Tshombe and his principal assistants return to Elisabethville.

This proposed course of action was strongly opposed by Ambassador Gullion who offered his comments to the Department on the following day. Gullion saw no justification for bringing Tshombe back, and thereby assuring his continued leadership in Katanga. Such a move seems to Gullion to presume unwarrantedly that Tshombe's continued leadership would be beneficial to US and UN objectives in the Congo. Moreover, bringing Tshombe back under UN auspices would surely anger the GOC and would devastate UNOC morale.

There is no evidence that Stevenson discussed this specific US proposal with U Thant. At any rate, the UK had already begun its own efforts to persuade Tshombe to return and to urge a negotiated integration. Nevertheless, Gullion's fears never materialized. The UN did not give its support to the UK initiative; rather, it coolly maintained an attitude of "no objection to the return of Tshombe," but of insistence upon action rather than negotiation. Consequently, in early January, when Tshombe did return to Elisabethville and a position of some influence, the GOC vented its anger on the UK, but not on the UN or, as Gullion had feared, the US.


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30 Dec 62
(No. 161)

The UN forces in Elisabethville completed their reduction of the Katangan roadblocks, with little blood having been shed on either side.

On the same day, the UN moved against Katangan forces in other parts of the province. Both Kipushi and Kamina towns were captured by UN forces; and UN air-strikes against Kolwezi airfield, begun the previous day, succeeded in effectively neutralizing the Katangan air force.

(On 3 January, the final UN action against the Katangese took place when an Indian battalion occupied Jadotville. Tshombe's mercenaries and some gendarmes remained clustered at Kolwezi for yet another three weeks, but this city was finally entered peacefully by the UN on 21 January.)

(See item 31 December 1962.)

(U) WPET-H, 31 Dec 62, 4 Jan 63, 22 Jan 63.

31 Dec 62
(No. 162)

In a circular message to various posts, the Department of State summarized the status of UN and US efforts to strengthen the UNOC air arm with F-86s (see item 14 November 1962). It was now settled, the Department rela that from among the nations asked to participate, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines would send a total of fifteen aircraft during the next few weeks. Italy, however, would not provide pilots for its aircraft; Ethiopia, it was hoped, would send pilots for these craft.

(C) Msg, SecState Circular, 1151, 31 Dec 62.

31 Dec 62
(No. 163)

Lt. General Truman submitted to the JCS the final report of the Congo Military Mission. The report covered each of the purposes set for the mission by CJCS (see item 19 December 1962), as follows:

1. Equipment Requirements. In order to confront Tshombe with "overwhelming [UN] air superiority," and thus possibly force him to terms, the US should, upon UN request, provide: a) 10 F-84 aircraft for UNOC use; b) assistance in the delivery and support of 14 other fighters from the Philippines, Iran, and Italy (see preceding item); and c) POL facilities for 60 jet fighter sorties per day. In addition, the US should provide the trucks and APCs requested by the UN, three C-124s for intra-Congo airlift, mine detection and mine breaching equipment, six helicopters, various lesser support items and a minimum number of US personnel for temporary technical assistance. (The ground transport and C-124s had already been offered by the US and accepted by the UN; see items 17 and 22 December 1962.)
3. Evaluation of UNOC and Congolese Operation Plans. The present UN military plans in the Congo were sound and could be carried out by the present UN force if the requested equipment (see item 1. above and items 15, 17, and 22 December 1962) was made available. The UNOC plan had as its objectives Elisabethville, Kipushi, and Jadotville. For its tasks, it would employ 7 battalions of UN troops (not in coordination with the ANC) in three phases: 1) An Emergency Phase, during which Katangan roadblocks in and around Elisabethville would be reduced; 2) Phase I, including enlargement of the Elisabethville perimeter, neutralization of the communes adjacent to Elisabethville, and advance to the outskirts of Kipushi; and 3) Phase II, capture of Kipushi and advance to Jadotville, with simultaneous action by the UN forces at Kamina Air Base to secure Kamina town. Prior to the initiation of operations, UNOC planned to direct Tshombe to ground the Katangan Air Force and halt certain train movements. If he did not comply, the UN aircraft would destroy the KAF and interdict the rail lines. Congolese army plans were not written, as far as the Mission could discover, but General Mobutu's ideas, as described in conversations, were ambitious and over-optimistic. The ANC was actually capable only of very limited operations.

4. Longer-Range Probabilities.

a. The UN forces would be inadequate to the UN task when and if the Indian contingent was withdrawn.

b. There would be no "expanding requirement" for US forces in the Congo if the present UN force, given adequate equipment, carried out its responsibilities, as if the Katangese did not receive "outside reinforcement.

c. The Congo situation was not likely to degenerate into protracted guerrilla warfare.

d. The ANC's ability to maintain law and order in the absence of UN forces would depend upon future developments in Katanga, and upon the effectiveness of the proposed international training program for the ANC. The recommendations of the Greene Team Report (see item 23 July 1962 et seq.) should be implemented immediately by the US.

5. Evaluation of UNOC Terms of Reference, and of UNOC and ANC Leadership. The present terms of reference of UNOC could not be ascertained, since the only terms known to exist were clearly out of date. However, UNOC
obviously considered itself authorized to use force: a) for self defense, b) to expel mercenaries, and c) to establish its freedom of movement, i.e., to protect its supplies and personnel wherever they may be. Nonetheless UNOC was in sore need of comprehensive terms of reference.

UNOC officers, while not all impressive, were adequate to the UN's tasks. Among the ANC, only General Mobutu and one staff officer, Major Puati, counted for anything.

In forwarding the above report to the JCS, General Truman noted that UNOC had successfully executed the Emergency Phase and most of Phase I of its operation plan in the few days since the Truman Mission had returned. In view of these developments the Mission believed that the aircraft promised by the Philippines, Iran and Italy were sufficient for remaining UN tasks, if they arrived quickly; the US need not send the 10 F-84s, but should hold them ready for dispatch and continue searching for non-US crews. Otherwise, the Mission recommended, all other items of equipment should still be furnished to the UN immediately.

(The JCS had been briefed by General Truman on 28 December and had at that time given a "large measure" of approval to his mission's recommendations. On 7 January 1963, they informed the Secretary of Defense of their concurrence in the final report. They recommended that "such of the proposals of the Congo Military Mission as are requested by the United Nations should be implemented."

(TS) JCSM 11-63 to SecDef, 7 Jan 63, derived from JCS 2262/129, 3 Jan 63; (S) JCS 2262/129, 31 Dec 62; all in JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 2. (C) Note to Control 28 Dec 62, OCJCS File 091 Congo.

31 Dec 62 (No. 164)

U Thant issued a lengthy public statement regarding the recent hostilities in Katanga (see item 27-30 December 1962). Under urging from the US (see item 30 December 1962) he issued a far more detailed statement than he had originally planned. In it, he reviewed the UN mandates to the Secretary-General and the recent happenings in Katanga, and set forth the actions the UN now expected of Tshombe, Adoula and other principals in the Congo problem.

After repeating the frequently expressed sentiment that the UN sought no victory and no surrender in the Congo, U Thant emphasized that he intended nonetheless to persevere in implementation of the Thant Plan. He hoped in fact, for a speedy implementation of its provisions for reconciliation. The various parties would be given "a fortnight or so" to achieve this implementation, after which time, if reconciliation had not resulted, "other measures would be weighed" by the UN. "The time has passed for long delays," U Thant said. "Only acts now can count."
As an immediate first step, U Thant suggested that representatives of the UMKH and the Bank of Katanga go to Leopoldville at the earliest possible date for discussions with the GOC and the Monetary Council. In addition, Tshombe should:

1. Send his senior military officers to Leopoldville at once, to take an oath of allegiance to the President of the Congo.

2. Assure full liberty of movement for UN personnel throughout Katanga.

3. Cooperate with the UN in devising a plan for the immediate elimination of mercenaries from Katanga.

4. Accept the customs and immigration activities of the GOC in Katanga.

Adoula, U Thant continued, should at the same time:


2. Insure that the recently proclaimed amnesty (see item 26 November 1962) would be fairly and effectively applied throughout the Congo. Both parties, he emphasize must halt all troop movements in Katanga while the new efforts at settlement were under way.

The Secretary-General believed that the end of the Katangan problem was now in sight. So too was "an early beginning" of the reduction of UN military strength and an increasing concentration on UN technical assistance. For the speedy achievement of these goals, U Thant asked the cooperation of all Congo leaders.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN, 1778, 30 Jan 62; (S) Msg, USUN to SecState, 2538, 31 Dec 62. (U) WP&T-H, 1 Jan 63, (text).
Summary Analysis of Significant Events in the Congo: June - December 1962

The breakdown in negotiations between Tshombe and Adoula on 26 June (No. 1.)* caused the UN and the US and other interested nations to take a new look at Congo problems and policies. The UN soon made it clear that it would apply greater pressures upon Tshombe, if it could gather sufficient support from the UN membership. (Nos. 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15.) The US supported the UN stand and, after consultations with interested western allies, recommended to the UN a plan of action calculated to apply the requisite additional pressure. (No. 17.) In modified form, this plan became the UN "Plan for National Reconciliation" (the U Thant Plan), which served during the remainder of the crisis as the blueprint for UN actions in the Congo. (No. 25.) Late in August, with US and Western support, the UN presented appropriate portions of the U Thant Plan to Tshombe and Adoula for implementing but not, the UN emphasized, as a subject of new protracted negotiations. (Nos. 25, 27, 29, 31.) Adoula accepted the plan almost immediately (No. 25.) and Tshombe gave conditional approval. (Nos. 33, 34.) Soon, however, Tshombe began to insist that the plan formed merely a basis for further negotiation, particularly with respect to a new constitution for the Congo, rather than a guide to the actual reintegration of the country. (Nos. 33, 36, 46, 47, 50, 54.) For a time, the UN continued to exhort both Tshombe and Adoula to implement the U Thant Plan. (Nos. 37, 40, 41, 45.) But before the end of September the world body became convinced that Tshombe's insistence on negotiations amounted to a deliberate policy of obstructing the plan, and it began consequently to concentrate pressure on him. (Nos. 48, 53, 57.)

In October and November, under US pressure and mounting UN impatience, Tshombe began adopting a more compromising attitude. Although he continued to insist upon negotiations for a new constitution, he did offer a number of concessions to the Central Government. (Nos. 61, 69, 73, 104.) Adoula, however, was under increasing pressure from Leopoldville politicians to bring Tshombe down, and he did not feel able to make the further concessions, beyond those suggested by the UN plan, that Tshombe asked. (Nos. 56, 59, 67, 74, 75, 78, 101, 115.) Thus the reversal of position of the two men left the situation in the Congo no closer to solution than before.

The UN was inclined to back Adoula in his uncompromising attitude, since it was convinced that Tshombe had no real intention of cooperating in the U Thant Plan. Tshombe's concessions were interpreted by the UN as attempts to shift the blame for the Congo failure to the Central Government while continuing to stall in the hopes that Adoula would fall and the UN withdraw. Faced with this strategy, with the seemingly imminent collapse of the Adoula regime, with mounting financial difficulties of its own, and with the possible withdrawal of large contingents of UN troops, the UN began to seek an immediate showdown with Tshombe while it could still influence the course of events in the Congo. (Nos. 87, 88, 91, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104.)

*Numbers appearing in parentheses in the text refer to the appropriately numbered item or items of the chronology.

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Because of the pressures of western and domestic opinion, the US felt that it could not back the uncompromising stand which Adoula had adopted. On the other hand the US could see no alternative to continuing to support the Adoula regime. Its solution to this seeming dilemma was a policy designed to: 1) strengthen Adoula's position in Leopoldville through increased aid programs and new assurances of support, so that he would feel politically secure enough to make the compromises necessary to meet Tshombe half way and thus reach a settlement; 2) restrain the UN from a premature aggressive course; and 3) put more pressure on Tshombe to push him toward a settlement. (Nos. 59, 63, 65, 70, 76, 77, 82, 84, 85, 92, 93, 95, 97, 99, 110, 112, 114.)

It seemed for a moment at the end of November that this US policy had succeeded. Adoula survived a parliamentary crisis, (No. 115.) and the UN gave assurances of its non-aggressive intent (No. 113.) and agreed to a further attempt at negotiations and nonviolent sanctions. (No. 117.) This success was illusory, however. Early in December, Adoula spurned the UN attempt at further negotiation and was dealt another setback by his restive parliament. (Nos. 118, 123.) In this circumstance, the UN gave up its latest attempt at conciliation and began to implement the progres-
vive economic and political sanctions of Phases I through IV of the U Thant Plan. (Nos. 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 149.) Tshombe's tardy agreement to the channeling of some UNH taxes to the Central Government, a development which the US had urged, (Nos. 120, 130.) did not deflect the UN from this course.

From the end of GOC-Katanga negotiations in June to the failure of conciliation in December, tensions within the Congo had been slowly rising as hopes for a negotiated settlement waned. Throughout this period, Katangese skirmished with both the UN and GOC, and all three parties made charges and countercharges of aggressive activities. (Nos. 8, 20, 32, 35, 42, 43, 51, 58, 66, 68.) Until December, however, the JCS and DOD were not called upon for any new judgements or evaluations of Congo affairs. The only new military program under consideration by the Defense Department during this time, one whose origins antedated the crisis, was a military advisory and assistance program for the Congo, recommended in the Greens Team Report of 23 July. The program was sub-
mitted to and approved in turn by the JCS, Defense, and State during the summer and early fall, and became joined with US policy toward the current Congo crisis only in late October when it was approved by the President as part of the aid with which the US hoped to buttress Adoula for further negoti-
atations. (Nos. 11, 16, 19, 21, 26, 39, 44, 49, 64, 79, 83, 84, 97, 105, 132, 138, 146, 147, 157.) The only other action taken by the JCS with regard to the Congo during the summer and fall was to assure the Secretary of Defense that US contingency planning for the Congo would be adequate for any likely circumstance. (Nos. 55, 72, 108.) Without formal JCS approval and despite misgivings regarding the UN intentions, the US began in October to assist the UN in correcting some of the obvious military shortcomings of UN forces in the Congo, on the supposition that the UN's increased military potential might make Tshombe more amenable to compromise. (Nos. 80, 81, 89, 103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 116, 162.)
Going into December, then, the UN had improved its military position in Katanga and was more determined than ever, after the latest abortive try at negotiations, to bring speedy unification to the Congo. For the US, this situation had an alarming aspect. After several months of rather close identification of US and UN policy, the UN now appeared to be pulling ahead of the US in its willingness to risk violence in ending the Katangan secession; and the world body, in contrast to the caution displayed by the US, exhibited a strikingly confident and independent attitude. The US had to take care in this circumstance that it not be excluded from any new UN activities and consequently from a share in the important decisions that would follow Katanga’s collapse. Under these circumstances the US decided to support the UN policy and to build up UN military strength to the point where Tshombe would not dare offer armed resistance. The US also decided to use the new influence that would accrue from its support of the UN to counsel the UN against rash actions.

In the Defense Department, attention was first turned to the wisdom and the possible manner of direct US military involvement in UN Congo operations. The JCS addressed this question twice: the first time to say that direct US involvement should only be a last resort and should consist of a small Composite Air Strike Unit; the second time to affirm the existing consensus that UN and GOC forces should be able to defeat the Katangans, and to warn again against precipitate commitment of US combat forces. (Nos. 122, 126, 135, 142, 148.)

The first JCS recommendations were adopted by the Defense Department and recommended in turn to the Department of State. Subsequently, the Composite Air Strike Unit was offered to the UN, but the UN refused the US offer on the grounds that no great power should become directly involved in UN military operations in the Congo. The UN suggested that, instead of the strike unit, the US provide additional equipment and supporting personnel to UNOC. At first the US insisted that the Composite Air Strike Unit would be a better contribution, but eventually it acquiesced in the UN’s desires and began to deliver additional equipment, as well as new advice on the conduct of operations. (Nos. 126, 134, 135, 137, 150, 151, 152.) Still not completely convinced of the UN’s wisdom or efficiency, however, the US decided at the same time to send a military mission to the Congo. (Nos. 139, 141, 163.) Finally, to protect its flanks, the US also took pains to bring along Great Britain and to reassure the African states that it had no designs on any part of their continent. (Nos. 143, 145.)

In the midst of this intensive diplomatic activity, the Katangan secession ended in a manner apparently quite unrelated to the recent US initiatives. During the last week of December the Katangan gendarmes, temporarily unresponsive to Tshombe’s commands, began to fire on UN positions in Elisabethville. The UNOC force, long steeled for such an attack, bolstered by a month-long build-up, and but loosely reined by UN headquarters, quickly moved out, reduced the gendarmes’ Elisabethville positions, and broke Katangan resistance in all other important centers except Kolwezi. Tshombe, no longer able to influence either hostile party, fled to Rhodesia. (Nos. 144, 155, 161.)

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The US applauded the UN action but, still apprehensive that carnage and destruction might eventuate, it tried almost immediately to divert the UN to a "psychological initiative" that would return Tshombe and dispense largesse to all. (Nos. 156, 159, 160.) Actually the Katanga collapse was more complete than the US realized at first. The UN had little to fear from Tshombe for the time being. It could proceed in its task of formally reunifying the Congo without any great opposition. (No. 164)
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Nov. 29--Following, as made public here today, is the text of the plan submitted in August by U Thant. Acting Secretary General, under which the United Nations is working to achieve the reconciliation of Katanga Province with the Congo:

1. Constitutional Arrangements

The central Government will by September present and support in Parliament, until it is placed in effect, a draft constitution that will establish a Federal Government for the Congo. To this end, the central Government has requested the United Nations to make available to it the services of international experts in federal constitutional law.

The central Government calls attention to its communique of 29 July and invites all state governments and interested political groups in the Congo to submit to it their views on the dispositions to be made in this constitution. Their views, in so far as they are consistent with the federal character of this constitution, will be taken into account to the greatest extent possible.

Subject to such views as it may receive from the state governments and the interested political groups, the central Government will give the experts supplied by the United Nations the necessary instructions for the final preparation, by September, of a draft constitution containing the following division of powers between the central Government and the states:

A. The powers listed below will be reserved exclusively to the central Government:

   (a) Foreign affairs.
   (b) National defense (other than local police functions.)
   (c) Customs.
   (d) Currency, exchange control, and fiscal policy.
   (e) Interstate and foreign commerce.
   (f) Taxing powers sufficient for central Government needs.
   (g) Nationality and immigration.
   (h) Post and telecommunications.

B. The state governments will of course have control over their own administration and will be given all powers not expressly reserved to the central Government, including local police powers as well as taxing powers sufficient to meet the costs of local government activities.

2. Revenues and Foreign Exchange

The central Government will prepare, with the assistance of experts supplied by the United Nations, and will present and support in Parliament a draft financial law which will determine arrangements for the division of revenues between the central and state governments and regulations and procedures for the utilization of foreign exchange.

Appendix I
All state governments and interested political groups will be invited to submit their views on the laws to be proposed. In drafting these laws the commission will take into account the views expressed by state governments and interested political groups, the economic and financial needs of the several states, and the division of powers to be established by the new Federal constitution as set forth above, which will particularly affect the future financial needs of each state and of the central government.

The financial arrangements should so far as possible secure to the individual states the maximum of the revenues generated within their area and give the central government as well as the state governments their own sources of taxation. With regard to the utilization of foreign exchange, the arrangements should take into account the essential needs of each state, in particular those connected with the operations of industries which generate foreign exchange earnings.

The central government will commit itself to supporting in Parliament such legislation as may be needed to implement these definitive arrangements. Until the definitive arrangements have been implemented, the central government and Katanga agree (a) to share equally the revenue from all taxes and duties on exports and imports and from all royalties from mining concessions in accordance with the division proposed at the round-table conference held at Brussels in 1960; and (b) to pay all foreign exchange earned by any part of the Congo to the Monetary Council or to an institution designated by it which is acceptable to the parties concerned the Monetary Council will control utilization of all foreign exchange and make available for essential needs of Katanga at least 50 per cent of the foreign exchange generated in that state.

3. Currency

The central government will invite the United Nations to request the International Monetary Fund to instruct its experts to work out a phased plan for currency unification. The unification will take effect in all parts of the Congo 10 days after it is approved by the central government.

4. Military Arrangements

The commanders of all military, paramilitary or gendarmerie units who have not already done so will take the usual oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic. A commission composed of one representative from the central government and one representative from the state government of Katanga, with the assistance of the experts supplied by the United Nations, will develop within 30 days a plan for the rapid integration and unification of all military, paramilitary or gendarmerie units into a national armed forces and gendarmerie structure. This plan will be implemented within the ensuing 60 days. All central, state and local authorities will insure complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Congo for the aforesaid military commission and the United Nations experts assisting it.

5. Foreign Affairs

Since the conduct of foreign affairs is reserved to central government there will be no need for any state authority to maintain abroad any official in charge of foreign affairs or any diplomatic or consular mission. States desiring to maintain other type of representation abroad may do so with the concurrence of the central government.
6. Amnesty

Consistently with the settlement of differences effected by this agreement, the central Government will immediately decree, and if necessary present and support in Parliament legislation declaring a general amnesty.

7. Cooperation With the United Nations

All central, state and local authorities will co-operate fully with O.N.U.C. (United Nations Operation in the Congo) in the application and execution of United Nations resolutions.

8. Reconstitution of the Central Government

The central Government will be reconstituted so as to provide equitable representation for all political and provincial groups. Prime Minister Adoula will restate his offer to fill (blank) ministries with members of the Conakat party; in addition he will announce that these will be the ministries of (blank).

COURSE OF ACTION

The representative of the Acting Secretary General will adhere to the following course of action and will receive an assurance that governments are prepared to take the actions mentioned below in order to support the adoption of the proposal for national reconciliation and to achieve the reintegration of Katanga.

PHASE I

A. The proposal for national reconciliation and the course of action set forth in this memorandum will be presented immediately to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.

B. If this proposal for the course of action is approved by the Acting Secretary General, the governments' final agreement to presentation of these texts will be conveyed by their ambassadors at Leopoldville to the representative of the Acting Secretary General, who will then present them to Prime Minister Adoula.

At the same time he will outline orally, in general terms, the course of action. Prime Minister Adoula will be urged to accept the proposal and to carry out immediately all actions by the central Government called for in the proposal. If the proposal is accepted by Prime Minister Adoula, it will be presented to the Katanga authorities by the representative of the Acting Secretary General.

C. The Katanga authorities will be requested to indicate their agreement to these proposals within ten days after they are presented to them. The proposals will be explained to the Katanga authorities in detail and their attention will be called to the fact that, if accepted by the Katanga authorities, the United Nations and governments will use all means available to them to insure that the proposal is fairly carried out.
The representative of the Acting Secretary General will explain to the Katanga authorities that the United Nations resolutions give the United Nations a right to free movement of its military force throughout the territory of the Congo. The Katanga authorities will be informed that the United Nations will exercise its right to freedom of movement should a need for it arise.

For the time being the United Nations has no intention of establishing new garrisons in Katanga Governments, in their contact with the Katanga authorities, will support the position thus taken by the representative of the Acting Secretary General.

D. Contemporaneously with the actions called for in paragraph C above, Prime Minister Adoula will be urged to enact or decree legislation (if it does not already exist) regulating exports and imports to and from the Congo and, in particular, forbidding exportation or importation from or to the Congo of any goods not authorized by the central Government at Leopoldville.

E. As soon as the Acting Secretary General has indicated his approval of the course of action set forth in this memorandum, the following measures will be carried out in rapid succession:

1. Governments will issue public statements indicating their support of the central Government of the Congo and making clear their determination to see an early end to Katanga's secession. These statements will also express these Governments' approval of Prime Minister Adoula's recently announced intention to submit a draft Federal Constitution to Parliament by September. The Governments will consult with each other and with the Acting Secretary General on the text, tactics and timing of these statements.

2. The Government of the Congo will enter into negotiations with the Belgian Government to obtain its assistance in establishing arrangements for the collection in Belgium of duties on all goods exported from Belgium to the Congo (including Katanga).

3. In making reconnaissance flights over South Katanga, O.N.U.C. will avoid very low-level flights that might frighten the local population.

4. The United States will, through the United Nations, immediately consider giving the Government of the Congo a small impact shipment of military equipment.

5. The United Nations will promptly afford all possible assistance to the central Government in an urgent modernization program for the Congolese Army.

6. As soon as there is agreement on controls over utilization of foreign exchange to be established by the Government of the Congo, the United States will make additional aid available to that Government and Belgium and other states are considering similar action.

7. The Government of the Congo will ask the governments of neighboring countries to cooperate with it in establishing arms control and antismuggling measures.
In accordance with the Security Council's resolutions, the United Nations will again urge all member states to take the necessary steps to prevent all movements to the Congo, which are not authorized by the national governments, of mercenaries, arms, war materiel, or any kind of equipment capable of military use. Government will engage in diplomatic efforts to support such action.

The Government of the Congo will invite representatives of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga to enter into discussions on matters of mutual interest, including the future attitude of the Government of the Congo toward the activities of U.M.H.K. (the company).

The United Nations will invite the Belgian Government and U.M.H.K. to discuss with it the problem of protecting Belgian nationals and Union Minière installations in Katanga.

At the request of the Government of the Congo, governments will, to the fullest extent possible, refuse to grant visas to Katangese or to permit their entry if they are carrying travel documents other than Congolese passports. Similarly, governments will indicate publicly their acceptance of the request of the Government of the Congo and will urge holders of their own passports to seek and receive the necessary authorization from the Government of the Congo before traveling to Katanga.

Governments will urge the Government of the Congo to make convenient arrangements for the issue of passports to all Congolese nationals desiring to travel for purposes which are consistent with the plan of national reconciliation.

PHASE II

During the 10 days immediately following the presentation of the plan of national reconciliation to the Katanga authorities, the following actions will be taken:

Governments will solemnly urge the Katanga authorities to accept that proposal. They will advise the Katanga authorities that the governments consider it a reasonable one. Governments will also urge other governments and private companies and individuals to support their efforts to gain acceptance by Katanga.

If the Katanga authorities indicate that they will refuse or delay, the governments will advise them that, if the proposal is not accepted within 10 days, the governments will, if so requested by the Government of the Congo, take all measures available to them to comply with the central Government's laws and regulations on exports on copper and cobalt from Katanga.

The Katanga authorities will also be told that if, in spite of that boycott, Katanga's secession continues, more stringent measures will inevitably be applied. These might include the withdrawal of Belgian technicians, the suspension of postal and telecommunications services, the cessation of all air traffic in and out of Elisabethville and a blockade of Katangese exports and imports by the establishment of road blocks on the railway lines leading to Katanga. Governments will consult with each other and with the United Nations on the timing and tactics to be used in making their approaches to the Katanga authorities.
(2) In connection with the action called for in paragraph E (10) of Phase I, U.M.H.K. will urge the Katanga authorities to accept the plan of national reconciliation.

PHASE III

If the Katanga authorities should fail to accept the plan of reconciliation within the stated period of time, the following actions will be taken (subject to the review and further consultation in the light of the circumstances existing at that time).

(1) The Government of the Congo will request all interested governments to refuse to permit the importation into their territory of copper and cobalt exports from Katanga which are not authorized by the central Government at Leopoldville.

(2) Governments will take such actions as are available to them to comply with this request and to assist in achieving the intended results.

PHASE IV

If the measures prescribed for Phase III do not induce the Katanga authorities to accept the plan of national reconciliation, governments will consult with each other and with the United Nations on other measures that could be then taken in light of the circumstances existing at that time.
(C) UNOC Force as of 29 Jan 1963, J-3 Sit. Rep 1-63, 31 Jan 63.

UNOC FORCE
AS OF 29 JANUARY 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>35</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>3,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Nations</td>
<td>824</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td><strong>15,654</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total UNOC Force: 15,654

Appendix II
US AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT IN SUPPORT OF UNOC
JULY 1960 - JANUARY 1963
(Source) J-3 Congo SitRep 1-63, 31 Jan 63

### AIRLIFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing Nation</th>
<th>Personnel Into Congo</th>
<th>Equipment (tons)</th>
<th>Personnel Out of Congo</th>
<th>Equipment (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7980</td>
<td>294.1</td>
<td>5029</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>119.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3532</td>
<td>1411.2</td>
<td>3879</td>
<td>135.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5152</td>
<td>705.3</td>
<td>3073</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>104.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3174</td>
<td>388.1</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3587</td>
<td>701.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>43.1</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>61.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3546</td>
<td>790.6</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6595</td>
<td>460.9</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>UAR</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>79.0</td>
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<td>Other Nations</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>3100.5*</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>36.8</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>8350.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,067</strong></td>
<td><strong>782.2</strong></td>
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*Includes approximately 2600 tons of supplies not attributable to any national contingent.

### Sealift Summary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing Nation</th>
<th>Personnel Into Congo</th>
<th>Equipment (tons)</th>
<th>Personnel Out of Congo</th>
<th>Equipment (tons)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>11320</td>
<td>3965</td>
<td>6369</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>985</td>
<td>1176</td>
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<td>Malaya</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>3842</td>
<td>204</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,335</strong></td>
<td><strong>5614</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,033</strong></td>
<td><strong>1558</strong></td>
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### TOTAL LIFT

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td>65,383</td>
<td>12309.5</td>
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Appendix III
CHRONOLOGY OF JCS INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY MATTERS.
CONCERNING AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
1960 - 1976

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
5 May 1977
CHRONOLOGY OF JCS INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY MATTERS
CONCERNING AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
1960 - 1976

Contents

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East Africa 79
Southern Africa 107
OPLANS for Africa South of the Sahara 123
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL

Origin

On 31 Dec 59, NSC 5920, a draft statement of US policy toward South, Central, and East Africa was circulated among NSC members for consideration. The draft statement saw the primary importance of South, Central, and East Africa as "its emerging political significance" and as an area that could have "an increasingly important influence on the course of world events." The principal problem affecting US interests was development of the dependent territories of the area in an orderly manner, preserving ties with Western Europe and limiting communist influence and penetration.

JCS Position

The JCS reviewed the draft policy statement and informed SecDef that they found it acceptable. With regard to the one divergency in the statement on general objectives, the JCS supported the majority view.

On 12 Jul 60, the Exec Secy, NSC circulated for comment a discussion paper entitled "National Security Implications of Future Developments Regarding Africa."

On 12 Jul 60, the Exec Secy, NSC to CJCS, et al., 12 Jul 60 (JCS 2121/68), JMF 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60).

On 14 Jan 60, the NSC adopted the statement of policy on South, Central, and East Africa and the President approved it on 19 Jan 60. The approved policy was circulated as NSC 6001, 19 Jan 60.

On 12 Jul 60, the Exec Secy, NSC to CJCS, et al., 12 Jul 60 (JCS 2121/68), JMF 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60).
On 11 Aug 60, the DJS informed the JCS that recent developments in the Republic of the Congo had illuminated the need for military attaches in the emerging African nations. This matter had been under discussion between the Services and Dept of State, but with only limited success. Of seven countries under consideration, attaché representation was accepted by Dept of State in three (Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria); partial representation was granted in a fourth (Republic of Congo); a fifth (Mali Federation) was still under consideration; and the other two (Guinea and Kenya) were deferred for six months. The DJS recommended that the JCS request SecDef to seek SecState support in fulfilling requirement for military attaches in the new African states.

(S) Memo, DJS to JCS, 1 Aug 60 (JCS 2121/71), JMF 9110/9105, 21 Jul 60.

On 28 Jul 60, the JCS views were transmitted to the NSC.

(S) Memo, Actg Exec Secy, NSC to CJCS, et al., 16 Aug 60, JFM 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60).

On 11 Aug 60, the JCS informed SecDef that the examples of Guinea and the Republic of the Congo indicated what could happen in the new African republics if the US did not have adequate military representation in the early and formative periods of their independence. Accordingly, they requested SecDef to seek the personal support of SecState in fulfilling the present and anticipated requirements for military attaches in all African nations.

(S) JCSM-347-60 to SecDef, 11 Aug 60 (JCS 2121/71), same file.

On 20 Oct 61, Dep Asst to SecDef forwarded to Dept of State a consolidation of DOD requirements for attaché representation in Africa for CY 1961.

(C) Memo, Dep Asst to SecDef to Dept of State, 20 Oct 60 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/71), same file.
On 6 Oct 60, SecDef requested the JCS to consider desirability and feasibility of establishing a specified command whose mission would be to develop and maintain contingency plans for military operations in Africa south of the Sahara. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Oct 60 (JCS 2262/49), JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 6.

On 29 Oct 60, the JCS could not agree on the establishment of a specified command for Africa south of the Sahara and forwarded their divergent views to SecDef. The CSA and CSAF favored establishment of a small specified command; CNO opposed such a command in favor of assignment of US military responsibility for the area to CINCLANT; and CMC thought that existing major commands were capable of absorbing increased responsibilities, with CINCLANT assigned responsibility for the area in question. The CJCS agreed with the CSA and CSAF. (TS) JCSM-491-60 to SecDef, 29 Oct 60; (TS) CM-19-60 to SecDef, 29 Oct 60; (JCS 2262/53), same file.

On 21 Nov 60, SecDef assigned to CINCLANT responsibility for planning and operations for Africa south of the Sahara, including the island of Madagascar but excluding the general geographic areas of responsibilities of USCINCEUR and the Middle East Command as set forth in the UCP. There was to be established under CINCLANT a Joint Task Force to carry out this responsibility. (For further action, see item of 4 Jan 61.) (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Nov 60 (JCS 2262/56), same file, sec 7.

On 21 Nov 60, SecDef decided to assign responsibility for planning and operations for Africa south of the Sahara to CINCLANT and specified that CINCLANT should establish a small joint task force headquarters for that purpose under the command of an US Army LTG. (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Nov 60 (JCS 2262/56), JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 7.

The JCS assigned CINCLANT responsibility for planning and operations in Africa south of the Sahara, including the island of Madagascar, but excluding those areas of Africa assigned to USCINCEUR and the Middle East Command in the UCP—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt.
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA--GENERAL

Origin

Date

JCS Position

4 Jan 61

(C) Msg, JCS 988107 to CINCLANT, 4 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/63), JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60).

Subsequently, on 19 Jan 61, the JCS advised CINCLANT that one O-6 from each Service and one O-5 each from USA, USN, and USAF were being ordered to CINCLANT for permanent duty to provide cadre for the African JTF. Appropriate support would be provided by CINCLANT. (For further action, see item of 17 Feb 71.)

(C) Msg, JCS 988981 to CINCLANT, 19 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/68), same file.

On 3 Nov 60, the Dep Asst to SecDef (Special Operations) suggested to ASD(ISA) the extension of US MATS routes in Africa for prestige purposes.

5 Jan 61

(S) JCS 2121/85, 29 Dec 60, JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec 1.

The JCS informed SecDef that the suggestion for "African Embassy Runs" as proposed by the Dep Asst to SecDef had many advantages, including prestige, flattering some new countries, and providing an added convenient service to US Embassies. They recommended that planning be initiated between DOD and Dept of State so that regular MATS flights could be inaugurated throughout Africa at an early date, eventually replacing the flights currently operating under the auspices of the UN. (For further action, see item of 5 Sep 61.)

(S) JCSM-1-61 to SecDef, 5 Jan 61 (JCS 2121/85), same file.
On 29 Jan 61, CNO proposed that each US Ambassador/Consular General in Africa be provided a C-47/R4D type airplane.

(5) Memo, CNO to JCS, 29 Jan 61 (JCS 2121/86), JMF 9110/9105 (29 Jan 61).

On 13 Jan 61, CINCLANT submitted to the JCS a terms of reference and joint table of distribution for Joint Task Force FOUR (Africa).

(5) Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 13 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/69), JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60).

On 14 Feb 61, the JCS approved the CNO proposal for each US Ambassador/Consular General in Africa to be provided a C-47/R4D type airplane.

(5) Memo, CNO to JCS, 29 Jan 61 (JCS 2121/86), JMF 9110/9105 (29 Jan 61).

On 17 Feb 61, the JCS approved the joint table of distribution for JTF FOUR subject to the incorporation of certain changes. Later, on 4 Apr 71, the JCS approved the terms of reference for JTF FOUR.

(C) Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 13 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/69), JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60).

(5) Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 13 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/69), JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60).
(U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 26 Jun 61 (JCS 2121/100), JMF 9110/3050 (27 Jan 61) sec 2.
On 18 Apr 61, the ASD(ISA) requested the JCS to submit a plan for establishment of regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa. (S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Apr 61 (JCS 2121/93), JMF 9110/3424 (31 Jan 61). The JCS informed SecDef that the most feasible premise for establishment of scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa at that time would be provision of regular air service to the various US Embassies on that continent. On that basis, the JCS had developed and submitted a plan for an African "Embassy Run" that would provide MATS service to twelve principal embassies on a weekly basis. The JCS believed that this plan was a realistic step toward full-scale MATS operations in Africa. (For further action, see item of 31 May 63.) (C) JCSM-591-61 to SecDef, 5 Sep 61 (JCS 2121/105), same file.

Actg ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on Dept of State "Guidelines of US Policy toward Africa." (S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Nov 61 (JCS 2121/113), JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61).
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<td>1 Dec 61</td>
<td>considered the content of the paper, in general, consonant with pertinent portions of JCS views on Basic National Security Policy requirements. The JCS considered that the Dept of State paper should be referred to the NSC and recommended that SecDef use their comments in preparation of a DOD response to Dept of State. (C) JCSM-837-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec 61 (JCS 2121/114), same file. On 19 Dec 61, Actg ASD(ISA) provided Dept of State the DOD response on the Guidelines paper for Africa, which included the views of the JCS, and in Mar 62, Dept of State issued revised Guidelines for Policy and Operations for Africa. (S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to USecState, 19 Dec 61 (Att to 1st N/H of JCS 2121/114); (S) Dept of State, Guidelines for Policy and Operations - Africa, Mar 62 (JCS 2121/134); same file.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>31 May 63</td>
<td>The JCS submitted the plan to SecDef recommending approval. They also requested approval of the conduct of a route survey to provide the basis for a fuller JCS examination of the feasibility of proposed routes and the economic implications. The JCS requested that SecDef obtain the concurrence and cooperation of the SecState in this matter. (C) JCSM-416-63 to SecDef, 31 May 63 (JCS 2121/163), same file.</td>
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On 6 May 63, the CSAF presented to the JCS an outline plan for the establishment of regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa. (C) CSAPM 232-63 to JCS, 6 May 63 (JCS 2121/163), JMP 9110/3424 (6 May 63).
On 10 Oct 63, SecDef approved major changes in US command arrangements for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (MEAFSA) area. He authorized the disestablishment of both CINCNELM and JTF-4 and the assignment of CINCSREKE to responsibility for the MEAFSA area in addition to his continuing mission of providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to augment other unified commands as directed. CINCSREKE's new responsibility included the conduct of operations in the area defined as "Africa, including the island of Madagascar, and the Middle East . . . to the PACOM boundary, including Ceylon, but excluding the general area of responsibility of USEUCOM [Turkey and North Africa west of Egypt]."

Included in this change would be the transfer of responsibility from CINCLANT/JTF-4 to CINCSREKE for preparation of contingency plans and conduct of operations in Africa south of the Sahara. USCINCEUR would retain responsibility for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 10 Oct 63 (JCS 1259/634-17), JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 7.

The JCS approved and forwarded to SecDef a revised UCP to accomplish the SecDef-approved changes. (C) JCSM-800-63 to SecDef, 15 Oct 63 (JCS 1259/634-18), JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).

SecDef approved the revised UCP on 21 Oct 63, and the President did likewise a week later. The JCS forwarded the new UCP to the CINCs on 20 Nov 63 to be effective on 1 Dec 63. CINCSREKE was given the concurrent title of USCINCSREKE to be used in connection with all activities conducted in his new area of responsibility, and on 1 Dec 63, CINCSREKE/USCINCSREKE assumed responsibility for the MEAFSA area. (C-GP 3) JCS 1259/634-22, 22 Oct 63; (U) 1st N/H of JCS 1259/634-22, 29 Oct 63; JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 7. (C) SM-1400-63 to CINCS, 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63). (S-GP 3) CINCSREKE/USCINCSREKE Command History, 1962-1963, p. 5.
**AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL**

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<td>On 13 Aug 64, the CSA informed the JCS that the situation and outlook in Africa posed serious problems with important politico/military implications. Accordingly, he recommended a joint State-Defense study to explore the basic problems confronting the US in Africa and to advance a more dynamic and coherent US response designed to weaken the communist position and to strengthen the Western position.</td>
<td>5 Sep 64</td>
<td>The JCS forwarded the CSA paper to SecDef, stating that they were in agreement with the general thrust of it. The JCS believed that it would be timely and prudent to reappraise objectives and policy in Africa in light of recent communist strategy and tactics in the area. They recommended early initiation of a study to that end and proposed an interdepartmental working group for that purpose.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C) CSAM-432-64 to JCS, 13 Aug 64 (JCS 2262/147), JMF 9110 (13 Aug 64).</td>
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<td>(C) JCSM-775-64 to SecDef, 5 Sep 64 (JCS 2262/147-1), same file.</td>
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On 20 Aug 64, Dep ASD(ISA) requested concurrence or comments on a proposed more flexible interpretation of the current US arms supply policy for tropical Africa.

(U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 20 Aug 64 (JCS 2121/184), JMF 9110 (20 Aug 64).

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<tr>
<td>On 6 Oct 64, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS views to Dept of State and an interdepartmental working group subsequently reviewed the problem of communist penetration of Africa.</td>
<td>17 Sep 64</td>
<td>The JCS concurred with the proposed message subject to revisions intended to: (a) extend the policy to the entire African Continent, including the Republic of Malagasy; (b) broaden the base of military assistance (third country) so as to develop other Western-oriented nations as possible sources; (c) prevent the current policy from being interpreted as an open invitation for requests for military assistance;</td>
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<td>(C) Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to Chm PPC, Dept of State, 6 Oct 64 (JCS 2262/147-2); (C) Ltr, Chm PPC, Dept of State to ASD(ISA), 29 Oct 64 (JCS 2262/147-3); same file.</td>
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<td>On 20 Aug 64, Dep ASD(ISA) requested concurrence or comments on a proposed more flexible interpretation of the current US arms supply policy for tropical Africa.</td>
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AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL

On 23 Jul 64, CSA requested that the JCS consider the establishment of a US-sponsored Pan-African Military School.
(U) CSAM-366-64 to JCS, 23 Jul 64 (JCS 2121/182), JMP 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec 1.

The JCS agreed that such a school merited further consideration and that there was a critical need in Africa for professional military training. They suggested to SecDef a Pan-African Military School, supported by the US and other pro-Western nations, with training offered similar to the Officer Leadership Training Course, Fort Knox. They recommended to SecDef that the views of the Dept of State be requested on the subject. On 13 Jan 65 Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the proposal to Dept of State.
(C) JCSM-1066-64 to SecDef, 24 Dec 64 (JCS 2121/182-2); (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 13 Jan 65 (JCS 2121/82-3); same file.

Origin                      Date                      JCS Position
17 Sep 64               (d) weight the emphasis toward economic assistance;
                        (e) influence African nations to relate military and police assistance to needs which are legitimate and in consonance with their ability to operate and maintain material which may be furnished.
                        (U) JCSM-B03-64 to SecDef, 17 Sep 64 (JCS 2121/184-1), same file.
                        The JCS views were informally forwarded to Dept of State with the concurrence of ASD(ISA).
                        (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 2 Oct 64 (JCS 2121/184-2), same file.

24 Dec 64

On 23 Jul 64, CSA requested that the JCS consider the establishment of a US-sponsored Pan-African Military School.
(U) CSAM-366-64 to JCS, 23 Jul 64 (JCS 2121/182), JMP 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec 1.

The JCS agreed that such a school merited further consideration and that there was a critical need in Africa for professional military training. They suggested to SecDef a Pan-African Military School, supported by the US and other pro-Western nations, with training offered similar to the Officer Leadership Training Course, Fort Knox. They recommended to SecDef that the views of the Dept of State be requested on the subject. On 13 Jan 65 Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the proposal to Dept of State.
(C) JCSM-1066-64 to SecDef, 24 Dec 64 (JCS 2121/182-2); (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 13 Jan 65 (JCS 2121/82-3); same file.
On 28 Apr 68, CSAF requested the JCS to obtain approval for the establishment of a trans-African military air route. 

(C) CSAFM-D-35-68 to JCS, 28 Apr 68 (JCS 2165/92), JMF 445 (26 Apr 68).

On 25 Jul 68, the JCS informed SecDef that the establishment of air routes across Africa south of the Sahara was a valid military requirement. They requested that their views be forwarded to SecState and that action be initiated to establish such routes to support US interests in the Middle East, East Africa, and South Asia.

(S) JCSM-771-68 to SecDef, 25 Jul 68 (JCS 2165/92-1), same file.

On 19 Aug 68, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the substance of the JCS views to Dept of State.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 19 Aug 68 (JCS 2165/92-2), same file.

On 15 Oct 68, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS a study, "The US and Sub-Saharan Africa," which examined present US policy in light of the area's increasing strategic significance to national interest. The commander recommended that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Regional Group and, if appropriate, to the Senior Interdepartmental Group for consideration.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 15 Oct 68 (JCS 2121/210), JMF 821/520 (8 Oct 68).
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<td>17 Feb 69</td>
<td>The JCS noted the DOD response to NSSM 9. (S) JCS 1887/761-1, 25 Feb 69, JMF 898/532 (12 Feb 69) sec 2.</td>
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<td>(S) NSSM 9, 23 Jan 69 (JCS 2101/552), JMF 530 (23 Jan 69); (S) JCS 1887/761, 12 Feb 69, JMF 898/532 (12 Feb 69) sec 1.</td>
<td>5 Mar 69</td>
<td>The JCS reviewed CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA's intelligence needs and concluded that his existing collection and reporting capability was adequate to meet virtually all his stated requirements. (S) SM-133-69 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 5 Mar 69 (JCS 2031/514-1), same file</td>
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<td>In Jan 69 USCINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA requested JCS support to increase immediately the intelligence reporting capabilities in the MEAFSA area by enlarging the intelligence collection system. (S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, n.d. (JCS 2031/514), JMF 211 (12 Jan 69).</td>
<td>11 Mar 69</td>
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<td>(S) JCS 2121/208-2, 19 Feb 69; (S) SM-168-69 to OASD(A), 24 Mar 69; same file.</td>
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AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL

Origin

Date
11 Mar 69

JCS Position

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRK/USCINCMEAPSA to CJCS, 13 Feb 68 (JCS 2121/208); (S) SM-220-68 to Dir DIA, 2 Apr 68 (JCS 2121/208-1); (S) JCS 2121/208-2, 19 Feb 68; JMF 212 (13 Feb 68).

(C) Memo, Dep ASD(IS) to CJCS, 17 Nov 70 (JCS 2482/97), JMF 821/731 (17 Nov 70).

1 Dec 70

(S) JCSM-557-70 to SecDef, 1 Dec 70 (JCS 2482/97-1), same file.

On 7 Dec 70, Dep ASD(IS) forwarded the JCS views to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (For further action, see item of 6 Feb 71.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(IS) to DepDir, USACDA, 7 Dec 70 (JCS 2482/97-2), same file.

6 Feb 71

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<td>(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Jan 71 (JCS 2482/97-3), JMP 821/731 (17 Nov 70).</td>
<td>6 Feb 71</td>
<td>(S) OM-556-71 to SecDef, 6 Feb 71 (1st N/H of JCS 2482/97-3), same file.</td>
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On 5 Mar 71, DepSecDef recommended to the President a revision of the UCP, and the President approved the revision on 21 Apr 71. (TS) JCS 1259/715-46, 26 Jun 71, JMP 040 (12 Sep 69) see 10.

The JCS issued a new UCP to implement the President's decision. The new UCP, to become effective on 1 Jan 72, eliminated CSCRICT/USCINCEUR responsibility for the Middle East and the Mediterranean littoral, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Africa south of the Sahara (including the Malagasy Republic) was not assigned to any unified or specified commander. The JCS stated that responsibility for contingency planning for that area oriented primarily to evacuation of US nationals and disaster relief would be assigned by a separate action. (For further action, see item of 23 Jun 72, OPLANs Section.)

(C) SM-422-71 to CINCAL et al., 30 Jun 71 (JCS 1259/715-46), same file.

On 10 Dec 71, USCINCEUR informed the JCS that he had revised the terms of reference for the MAAG/ Mission Chiefs and Defense Attaches in Middle Eastern and African countries assigned to USCINCEUR

The JCS forwarded the revised terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval.

(C) JCSM-68-72 to SecDef, 17 Feb 72 (JCS 2315/548-1), same file.
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL

Origin

to reflect the change in command channels necessitated by the recent change in the UCP (see item of 30 Jun 71). With regard to the countries of Africa south of the Sahara, USCINCEUR submitted revised terms of reference for MAAG Ethiopia; US Military Missions in Zaire and Liberia; and Defense Attaches in Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Date

17 Feb 72

JCS Position

On 10 Mar 72, Dep ASD(ISA) approved the revised terms of reference subject to certain administrative changes.

(C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCJ, 10 Mar 72 (1st N/H of JCS 2315/544-1), same file.

13 Dec 74

The DepSecDef informed Dr. Kissinger that the DOD believed the was "an objective and comprehensive review of US policy and interests" and adequately identified the key issues and policy options for decision. The DepSecDef then set forth specific DOD views on the key issues and options identified in the study. There was no separate JCS position on the study.

(S) Memo, DepSecDef to Dr. Kissinger, 13 Dec 74 (JCS 2121/225-2); same file.

27 Jun 75

The JCS issued a new UCP. The new plan still did not assign Africa south of the Sahara, including the Malagasy Republic, to any unified

On 24 Feb 75, the President approved unified and specified command changes, including disestablishment of ALCOM and CONAD and

On 25 Apr 74, 

(S) NISSM 201, 25 Apr 74 (JCS 2121/225); (S) Memo, NSC Staff to SecDef et al., 14 Nov 74 (JCS 2121/225-1); JMF 821/495 (25 Apr 74).
establishment of ADCOM. On 6 Jun 75, SecDef requested promulgation of a new UCP. 27 Jun 75

(C) Memo, Pres to SecDef, 24 Feb 75 (JCS 1259/758-37); (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 75 (JCS 1259/758-42); JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.

or specified command. The JCS directed that USCINCRED would, as requested by them, provide contingency planning, task force headquarters, and forces for the conduct of contingency operations for areas not assigned to another unified command. Such operations might be executed under direction of the National Command Authorities through the JCS under USCINCRED operational command or under operational command of another designated commander. The JCS also directed that USCINCRED would be prepared to conduct disaster relief activities or evacuation operations in areas not assigned to another unified or specified command when directed by the JCS.

(C) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75 (JCS 1259/758-43), same file.

On 11 Aug 76, the OpsDeps agreed that the Joint Staff should develop an assessment of the military interests and significance of Africa south of the Sahara. 8 Dec 76

The JCS approved a Joint Staff "Assessment of US Military Interests in Africa, South of the Sahara" for use in formulating plans and programs pertaining to US military interests in that area and forwarded the assessment to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and USCINCRED. The assessment concluded that existing planning documents indicated relatively low levels of threat perception and military interest priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to protect overall US interests in the region, increased US military attention might be necessary to formulate an appropriate military deterrent or alternative action. Current forces available

(S) JCS 2121/232, 2 Dec 76, JMF 821 (2 Dec 76).
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA—GENERAL

Origin Date JCS Position
8 Dec 76

for deployment to the region would be con-
strained by prior force commitments to other
theaters, an inability to respond rapidly,
inadequate logistics, and difficulty in
obtaining support from Western allies. The
assessment recommended the following actions
as appropriate: review of US military strate-
gic and intelligence priorities in Sub-Saharan
Africa to consider requirements for increased
emphasis; consideration of a reorientation
of unified command structure to provide the
commander of a unified command with clear
responsibility for concept and/or operational
planning in the area; provision of the assess-
ment to appropriate unified commanders; and
determination concerning requirements to
develop additional military concept and/or
operational plans for the area.

(S) JCS 2121/232, 2 Dec 76; (S) SM-996-76 to
CINCLANT, USCINC-mean, CINCPAC, and USCINCRED,
13 Dec 76 (JCS 2121/232); same file.
## WEST AFRICA
(Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Ghana, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria)

### Origin
On 29 Feb 60, NSC 6005, a draft statement of US policy toward West Africa was circulated among NSC members for consideration.

(S) NSC 6005, 29 Feb 60, JMF 9110/9105 (29 Feb 60).

### Date
14 Mar 60

### JCS Position
The JCS reviewed the draft policy statement and informed SecDef that, in order for the US to be kept adequately informed on military developments, they considered it desirable to include in the draft statement a provision for the establishment of technically competent observers in African countries. Subject to this comment, the JCS found the draft statement acceptable.

(S) JCSM-94-60 to SecDef, 14 Mar 60 (JCS 2121/62), same file.

On 15 Mar 60, OASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS views to the NSC. Subsequently, on 7 Apr 60, the NSC adopted the statement of policy on West Africa and the President approved it on 9 Apr 60. The approved policy was circulated as NSC 6005/1, 9 Apr 60, but it did not contain the provision for observers as recommended by the JCS.

(E) Memo, OASD(ISA) to NSC, 15 Mar 60; (S) NSC 6005/1, 9 Apr 60; same file.

### Date
4 Apr 60

### JCS Position
The JCS told SecDef that it was in the US national interest to have security forces in Liberia capable of maintaining internal

At the request of the Liberian Government, a US internal security team conducted a survey of Liberia during Nov-Dec 59 to review the defense
and security needs and grant assistance to the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF). On 8 Mar 60, ASD (ISA) forwarded the report of this survey to the JCS for comment.

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 8 Mar 60 (JCS 1787/17), JMF 9118.1/4060 (8 Mar 60).

On 24 May 60, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), forwarded to Dept of State the DOD position on the report of the US internal security team to Liberia, which incorporated the comments of the JCS.

(S) Memo, DMA to AsstSecState, 24 May 60 (1st N/H of JCS 1787/18), same file.
During 1959 and the first half of 1960, the JCS noted Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts to capitalize on the difficulties, desires, and prejudices of the new African nations such as Ghana and Guinea and the resulting steady gains in Bloc penetration there and the deterioration of Free World influence. (3) JCS 2121/76, 6 Oct 60, JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec 1.

The JCS informed SecDef of their concern about the threat to US security resulting from Sino-Soviet Bloc penetration of Ghana and Guinea during the past year and a half. They considered national regimes in Africa subject to Sino-Soviet domination unacceptable to the US and believed that action should be taken to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Ghana and Guinea.

On 31 Oct 60, DepSecDef forwarded the JCS views to SecState, and on 16 Nov 60, the USecState informed DepSecDef that the Dept of State shared the concern over the situation in Africa and that the JCS views would have "an important bearing" on forthcoming reviews of US policies in Africa by the NSC. (3) Memo, DepSecDef to SecDef, 31 Oct 60 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/76); (3) Ltr, USecState to Dep SecDef, 16 Nov 60 (2d N/H of JCS 2121/76); same file.
On 11 Jan 61, Guinea requested withdrawal of all Guinean troops serving the ONUC in the Congo not later than 20 Jan 61. After approval by the UN, Dept of State on 12 Jan 61 requested US military support for this withdrawal.

(3) JCS 2262/67, 13 Jan 61, JMF 9111/3410 (10 Jan 61).

The JCS agreed to support the UN request for lift of Guinean forces and directed CINCLANT to carry out the lift.

(3) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Jul 61 (JCS 1787/19), JMF 9118.1/4920 (20 Jul 61).

(C) Mag, JCS 988760 to CINCLANT, 14 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/67), same file.

(JCS 2262/67, 13 Jan 61).

(3) Ltr, Actg ASD(ISA) to Asst SecState, 31 Aug 61 (1st N/H of JCS 1787/20), same file.
On 6 Sep 61, the Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC) brought JCS attention the continuing increase of communist activity in Ghana and Guinea and recommended that the Ghana-Guinea problem be placed on the agenda of the next State-JCS meeting to determine that everything possible was being done to meet the situation. (S) JCS 2121/107, 6 Sep 61, JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec 1.

The JCS approved the recommendation of the JSSC. (For further action, see item of 9 Oct 61.) (S) Dec On JCS 2121/107, 8 Sep 61, same file.

On 6 Sep 61, the JSSC advised the JCS of the continued drift toward Sino-Soviet domination in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, and recommended that the problem be placed on the agenda for the next State-JCS meeting. (See item of 6 Sep 61.) (C) Memo, JSSC to JCS, 6 Sep 61 (JCS 2121/109), JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec 1.

The JCS informed the SecDef that recent intelligence indicated that Ghana and Guinea, like Cuba and North Vietnam in other parts of the world, had become principal distribution centers for communist aggression in Africa. While recognizing that the problems of Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were primarily political problems at the current time, the JCS recommended that policies, programs, and action being pursued toward those countries be reviewed with the SecState as a matter of priority to determine whether all that could be done was being done and to ascertain how the resources available to the Military Establishment might assist. (C) JCSM-709-61 to SecDef, 9 Oct 61 (JCS 2121/109), same file.

On 18 Nov 61, Actg ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS views to the Dept of State, suggesting the establishment of an ad hoc task force to examine the current situation and recommend appropriate courses of action. (S) Ltr, Actg ASD(ISA) to Dep USecState, 18 Nov 61 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/109), same file.
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<td>The JCS informed SecDef that the Dept of State paper was deficient in two important respects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 22 Dec 61 (JCS 2121/117), JMF 9113.10/9105 (22 Dec 61).</td>
<td></td>
<td>The JCS provided specific amendments to the paper and requested the SecDef to use their comments in preparation of the DOD response to Dept of State.</td>
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<td>(S) JCSM-11-62 to SecDef, 18 Jan 62 (JCS 2121/120), same file.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Dep ASD(ISA) incorporated the JCS views into the overall DOD comments on the paper which he forwarded to the USecState on 1 Feb 62.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dept of State issued revised &quot;Guidelines for Policy and Operations for Mali&quot; in May 62.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(S) Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to USecState, 1 Feb 62 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/120); (S) Dept of State, Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Mali, May 62 (JCS 2121/156); same file.</td>
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<td>On 4 Jan 62, the Actg ASD(ISA) asked the JCS for recommendations on courses of action that DOD could propose to Dept of State regarding the situation in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.</td>
<td>On 4 Jan 62, the Actg ASD(ISA) asked the JCS for recommendations on courses of action that DOD could propose to Dept of State regarding the situation in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.</td>
<td>The JCS informed SecDef that they had reexamined measures previously recommended (see item of 9 Oct 61) as well as other measures made known to them by Dept of State. As a result, they submitted both political and military courses of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Jan 62 (JCS 2121/118), JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec 1.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The military courses of action</td>
</tr>
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On 3 Mar 62, ASD(ISA) requested JCS recommendations or concurrence in a joint survey team report for Senegal and the Entente States (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey), which proposed a MAP for those states.

(‡) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Mar 62 (JCS 2315/153), JMF 9110/4060 (3 May 62) sec 2.

On 14 Mar 62, the JCS recommended to SecDef approval of the concept of military assistance to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey for purpose of providing minimum internal security and to extent feasible to assist in programs contributing to economic and social development. The JCS also recommended approval of specific FY 1962 MAP Program for those countries.

(U) JCSM-188-62 to SecDef, 14 Mar 62 (JCS 2315/157), same file.

On 22 Mar 62, the Dep Director of Military Assistance OASD(ISA), recommended to the US Agency for International Development (AID) the initiation...
On 27 Apr 62, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), requested the SecArmy to submit, through the JCS, specific recommendations concerning agencies to administer military assistance in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. On 16 May 62, the CSA recommended "US Military Missions" for those countries to administer military assistance. 

(C) JCS 2315/175, 17 May 62, JMF 9110/5191 (17 May 62).

On 25 May 62,

The JCS recommended the establishment of US Military Missions to administer military assistance in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. They submitted to SecDef JTDs and terms of reference for those US Military Missions. 

(C) JCSM-403-62 to SecDef, 25 May 62 (JCS 2315/175), same file.

On 13 Aug 62, the Dep Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA) informed the CJCS that, in the absence of Dept of State approval for
### WEST AFRICA

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<tr>
<td>On 15 Nov 63, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded for JCS concurrence or comment a Dept of State National Strategy Series paper on Nigeria. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS and Dir DIA, 15 Nov 63 (JCS 2121/171), JMF 9112.9/9105 (20 Nov 62).</td>
<td>10 Dec 63</td>
<td>The JCS concurred in the substance of the Dept of State paper, which they found to cover adequately US interests in Nigeria. They informed SecDef that some of the language, order of presentation, and lines of action should be revised for clarity and completeness, and they supplied specific recommendations in that regard. They also recommended to SecDef that, prior to DOD concurrence on this strategy paper on Nigeria, the official status of the &quot;National Strategy Series&quot; be established on a governmental basis and that pending resolution of that matter, further action on other studies in the series be suspended. (C) JCSM-965-63 to SecDef, 10 Dec 63 (JCS 2121/171-1), same file.</td>
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<td>On 29 Jun 64, SecDef directed a survey of MAP requirements for Guinea. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA conducted the survey and submitted a report to the JCS on 10 Nov 64.</td>
<td>17 Dec 64</td>
<td>The JCS informed SecDef that certain problem areas needed to be resolved before an assistance program for Guinea was initiated. Subject to resolution of those problems, the JCS considered</td>
</tr>
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(U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Apr 65 (JCS 1787/23-1), JMF 9118.1 (22 Mar 65).

The JCS informed SecDef that, subject to the incorporation of minor changes, the National Policy Paper provided an effective statement of US policy for Liberia.

(S) JCSM-331-65 to SecDef, 6 May 65 (JCS 1787/23-2), same file.

On 28 May 65, Actg ASD(ISA) forwarded DOD comments on the National Policy Paper to Dept of State and a revised version was circulated on 1 Jul 65 as "a comprehensive, authoritative and approved statement" of US policy toward Liberia.

(S) Ltr, Actg ASD(ISA) to Chm PPC, 28 May 65 (JCS 1787/23-3); (S) Dept of State Nat'l Policy Paper, Liberia, 1 Jul 65; same file.
On 26 May 65, the JCS approved a CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA request to consolidate the American Military Commission, Senegal, with the Office of the US Naval Attaché there and requested the commander to submit appropriately revised terms of reference for the consolidated activity. On 10 Jun 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted terms of reference for the Defense Attaché responsibilities for the MAP in Senegal.

(C) JCS 2315/364, 9 Jul 65, JMF 4060 (10 Jun 65).

On 15 Nov 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA requested JCS authorization to assist the Chief, US Military Mission to Mali (CHMALMISH), in drafting provisions to be proposed to American Embassy in Mali for an agreement concerning delivery of two C-47 aircraft.

(C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 15 Nov 65 (JCS 2121/195), JMF 9118 (15 Nov 65).

The JCS submitted the terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval.

(C) JCSM-563-65 to SecDef, 19 Jul 65 (JCS 2315/364), same file.

On 30 Jul 65, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), approved the terms of reference.

(C) Memo, DMA to CJCS, 30 Jul 65 (1st N/H of JCS 2315/364), same file.

On 19 Jul 65, the JCS informed SecDef that they supported the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA request. But, considering the responsibilities of the Dept of State for matters of negotiation of agreements and the requirement for Washington level consideration, the JCS proposed to request CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to insure that CHMALMISH used the information and guidance solely for purpose of providing information to the US Embassy in Mali.

(C) JCSM-901-65 to SecDef, 22 Dec 65 (JCS 2121/195-1), same file.

On 3 Feb 66, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the DJS that, after discussions with Dept of State, it appeared that the JCS objectives could be accomplished more rapidly through provision of guidance to the US Ambassador in Mali through Dept of State channels. This guidance would be prepared in coordination with the JS.

(C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 3 Feb 66 (JCS 2121/195-2), same file.
On 10 Nov 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS a draft of a possible Military Assistance Program agreement with Nigeria and requested approval to transmit this draft to the US Defense Attache in Lagos, Nigeria. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 10 Nov 65 (JCS 2413/3), JMF 9112.9 (10 Nov 65).

The JCS forwarded the draft agreement to SecDef. They recognized, however, the responsibilities of Dept of State for international agreements and the need to proceed in a manner that would not harm Nigeria's non-aligned foreign policy posture and its influence among Afro-Asian states. Moreover, they also considered it premature to define a MAP agreement before a determination of the scope, magnitude, and specifics of a possible program. Therefore, they had not approved the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA request to transmit the draft agreement to the US Defense Attache in Lagos. Rather they requested the SecDef to use the draft in developing a MAP agreement for Nigeria with Dept of State. (C) JCSM–902–65 to SecDef, 22 Dec 65 (JCS 2413/3–1), same file.

In light of DepSecDef action on the JCS proposal (see item of 12 Jan 66) for a US Military Training Mission with the Nigerian Army, action on the MAP for Nigeria was held in abeyance. (C) JCS 2413/3–2, 8 Mar 66, same file.
At the request of the President of Liberia for US security assistance, a US survey mission visited Liberia in Feb 1966 to examine threats to Liberia's security, the capability of Liberia's existing forces to meet such threats, and possible improvements in Liberia's security forces to counter security threats. On 17 May 65, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS comments on the report of this survey mission.

The JCS informed SecDef that the findings and recommendations of the survey mission were modest in scope and essentially emphasized a need for more training and supervision to improve performance levels within the limits of the five-year military assistance plan for Liberia. Subject to modification to three recommendations of the mission, the JCS concurred in the survey mission report and
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<td>On 21 Dec 66, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS terms of reference for the Defense Attaché to Ghana. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 21 Dec 66 (JCS 2401/3), JMP 9112.7 (21 Dec 66).</td>
<td>1 Feb 67</td>
<td>recommended approval of the report for implementation as promptly as feasible. (S) JCSM-405-66 to SecDef, 17 Jun 66 (JCS 1787/24-3), same file.</td>
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<td>On 16 Jun 67, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS for approval terms of reference for the US Military Mission to Liberia. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 16 Jun 67 (JCS 1787/25), JMP 841/037 (16 Jun 67).</td>
<td>28 Jul 67</td>
<td>The JCS forwarded the terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval. The Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), approved them on 29 Aug 67. (C) JCSM-429-67 to SecDef, 28 Jul 67 (JCS 1787/25-1); (C) Memo, DMA to DJS, 29 Aug 67 (1st N/H of JCS 1787/25-1); same file.</td>
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<td>On 22 Apr 69, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS revised terms of reference for the Office of the Defense Attaché, Senegal. These terms of reference replaced ones approved in Jul 65 (see item</td>
<td>2 Jun 69</td>
<td>The JCS forwarded the revised terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval. (C) JCSM-347-60 to SecDef, 2 Jun 69 (JCS 2315/468-1), same file.</td>
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<td>2 Jun 69</td>
<td>On 3 Jul 69, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the DJS that the revised terms of reference as recommended by the JCS did not appear to be cast in terms specifically applicable to Senegal in accordance with current guidance. The Dep ASD provided draft terms of reference prepared in his office and recommended that they be published if found acceptable. Subsequently, the JCS issued the terms of reference on 11 Jul 69. (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 3 Jul 69 (JCS 2315/468-2); (C) SM-453-69 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 11 Jul 69; same file.</td>
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| 24 Jan 70  | The CJCS furnished the requested plan to SecDef, recommending its approval for planning and requesting authorization to implement preliminary actions. (C) CM-4443-70 to SecDef, 24 Jan 70 (JCS 2413/12), same file. |

| 12 Jun 74  | The JCS authorized Operation KING GRAIN—Mali. (U) JCS 2121/226, 12 Jun 74; (U) Msg, JCS 8819 to CSAF et al., 12 Jun 74; same file. |

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| 12 Jun 74  | The JCS authorized Operation KING GRAIN—Mali. (U) JCS 2121/226, 12 Jun 74; (U) Msg, JCS 8819 to CSAF et al., 12 Jun 74; same file. |
On 22 Jan 74, the CSAF brought to JCS attention the significant expansion of Soviet military presence in Africa and stated that this development could be detrimental to free access to the continent of Africa and lines of communication linking the industrialized world. He cited the current deployment of TU-95/BEAR D long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea, for the fourth time since Jul 73, as indicative of Soviet interest in the area and of its intention to conduct such military activity with increasing regularity. The CSAF believed that the JCS should express their concern over this developing Soviet military activity in Africa to SecDef and to the Dept of State. (S) CSAPM 17-74 to JCS, 22 Jan 74 (JCS 2121/224), JMF 837/531 (22 Jan 74).

WEST AFRICA

Origin

On 22 Jan 74, the CSAF brought to JCS attention the significant expansion of Soviet military presence in Africa and stated that this development could be detrimental to free access to the continent of Africa and lines of communication linking the industrialized world. He cited the current deployment of TU-95/BEAR D long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea, for the fourth time since Jul 73, as indicative of Soviet interest in the area and of its intention to conduct such military activity with increasing regularity. The CSAF believed that the JCS should express their concern over this developing Soviet military activity in Africa to SecDef and to the Dept of State. (S) CSAPM 17-74 to JCS, 22 Jan 74 (JCS 2121/224), JMF 837/531 (22 Jan 74).

Date

4 Feb 74

JCS Position

The JCS informed SecDef of a recent increase of Soviet military activities in Guinea, including deployment of long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea and reports of a possible defense agreement between Guinea and the USSR for permission to establish Soviet military facilities on Tamara Island off Conakry. The JCS believed that this activity in Guinea as well as continuing Soviet economic and military involvement in North Africa and Somalia were examples of potential Soviet capability to exercise undesirable influence over lines of communication in the area. The JCS believed that DOD should voice its concern over this increase in Soviet military activity. If the Soviet increase in activity in Guinea could be successfully challenged by diplomatic initiatives, the need for more direct commitment of national resources to counter Soviet influence might be precluded. They recommended that this matter be raised with SecState. (S) JCSM-30-74 to SecDef, 4 Feb 74 (JCS 2121/224-1), same file.

On 25 Feb 74, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the Dept of State of the JCS concern and requested that appropriate diplomatic action be taken to determine Guinean intentions concerning Soviet installations on its soil. (S) Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 25 Feb 74 (JCS 2121/224-2), same file.
In Sep 75, USCINCEUR submitted to SecDef through the JCS terms of reference for the Defense Attaché to the Ivory Coast. The Attaché was also accredited to Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. (C) Ltr, USCINCEUR to SecDef, thru JCS, n.d. (JCS 2121/228), JMP 821/495 (17 Sep 75).

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<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>4 Feb 74</td>
<td>On 5 Mar 74, the AsstSecState replied to Dep ASD(ISA) stating that the Dept of State shared the concern over Soviet activities in Guinea and that the US Ambassador in Guinea had been briefed on the DOD concern. At an opportune time, the Ambassador hoped to raise this subject informally with the Guineans and seek clarification of Guinean intentions regarding Soviet military activity. (S) Ltr, AsstSecState to Dep ASD(ISA), 5 Mar 74 (JCS 2121/224-3), same file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 75</td>
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<td>The JCS submitted the terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval. (C) JCSM-396-75 to SecDef, 3 Nov 75 (JCS 2121/228-1), same file.</td>
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<td>3 Nov 75</td>
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<td>On 26 Feb 76, Actg ASD(ISA) approved the terms of reference with certain changes. (C) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 26 Feb 76 (JCS 2121/228-2), same file.</td>
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CENTRAL AFRICA
(Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Uganda, Angola, and Zambia)

Origin Date JCS Position
8 Jan 60

For JCS consideration of NSC 5920, a draft statement of US Policy toward South, Central, and East Africa, see item of 8 Jan 60, General Section.

On 12 Jul 60, the US Ambassador in the Republic of the Congo received a written invitation from the Congolese cabinet to send US troops to the Congo to maintain law and order.

(S) JCS 2262/20, 12 Jul 60, JMF 9111/9108 (12 Jul 60) sec 1.

(TS) JCSM-295-60 to SecDef, 12 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/22), same file.
The JCS also directed USCINCEUR on 12 Jul 60 to obtain one hundred tons of hard winter wheat flour from stocks available to him and be prepared to airlift into Leopoldville, Republic of Congo when directed.

(S) Msg, JCS 979902 to USCINCEUR, 12 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/22), same file.

On 12 Jul 60, DepSecDef forwarded the JCS views to SecState, stating that it would be desirable to use troops from other Black African independent states to meet the problem or UN troops selected from a number of other nations as a second and lesser choice.

(TS) Memo, DepSecDef to SecState, 12 Jul 60 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/22), same file.

In Jul 60, the Belgian Government requested the US to provide the following, on a loan basis, for use in the Congo: two refueling gas trucks; 80,000 gallons of aviation fuel; C-124 aircraft; and 10 to 12 C-119 aircraft.

(TS) JCSM-301-60 to SecDef, 13 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/24), JMF 9111/9108 (12 Jul 60) sec 1.

The JCS informed SecDef that the requested equipment and personnel were available in the European Theater and the fuel available in Dakar and Accra. The JCS noted that Dept of State did not favor providing this equipment and fuel unless under the UN aegis. The JCS believed that prompt action was mandatory to restore public order in the Republic of the Congo. It was desirable that the Belgian request be supplied under the UN, but should the UN refuse to act, the JCS stated that the US should be prepared to provide the assistance unilaterally in order to preclude communist exploitation of the situation.
On 14 Jul 60, the UN decided to render assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Congo in restoring peace and security in that country, and the US agreed to provide logistical support of the UN Force in the Congo.

(C) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 20 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/30), JMP 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 2.

On 14 Jul 60, the UN decided to render assistance in restoring peace and security in the Republic of the Congo. The Secretary General was authorized to provide military assistance to the Republic of the Congo until the national security forces of that country were able to meet fully their tasks.

(C) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 20 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/30), same file.

On 20 Jul 60, the CJCS informed the SecDef that the US Military Services were providing a major contribution to the support of the UN Force in the Congo. Since any prolonged use of US military forces in providing that assistance would degrade US military readiness posture and US ability to react promptly to any other contingency operation, the CJCS believed that the UN should assume "normal" responsibility for the provision of logistic support for the UN Force in the Congo at the earliest possible date. Accordingly, he recommended that SecState be requested to make an appropriate policy recommendation to the UN on this matter.

(C) CM-569-60 to SecDef, 20 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/29), same file.
On 2 Aug 60, ASD(ISA) informed the USecState that resupply of the UN Force in the Congo would require a major logistics effort which should not be borne by the US. He suggested that the UN be encouraged to give priority attention to development of logistics policy and procedures for the operation of the force in the Congo.

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 2 Aug 60 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/29), same file.

In Jul 60, some officials of the Government of the Republic of the Congo indicated an inclination to request Soviet intervention if Belgian military forces were not withdrawn immediately from the Congo.

(S) JCS 2262/25, 21 Jul 60, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 2.

The JCS informed SecDef that there was an urgent need for the US to seize the initiative and create circumstances that would tend to forestall a Soviet decision to intervene in the Congo and, should the Soviets do so, create circumstances that would embarrass them and frustrate their aims. To forestall or impede introduction of Sino-Soviet Bloc military elements into the Congo, the JCS recommended US consideration of the following courses of action: recommend that the UN declare a blockade to preclude introduction of further non-UN sponsored military forces; foster general and especially UN objection to further introduction of non-UN sponsored military forces into the Congo; recommend a UN embargo on arms to the Congo; and encourage the UN to operate and administer immediately river and harbor facilities and pipelines in the lower Congo River using western technicians.
The JCS also recommended specific actions to forestall a successful Soviet airlift. Should Sino-Soviet military intervention be attempted or become a fact, the JCS concluded that the US should: make strong representation in the UN against the Sino-Soviet action; unilaterally with Belgians and within the UN and NATO encourage the Belgians to expedite withdrawal of all military forces from the Congo; be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo; after a Sino-Soviet intervention in the Congo, take action within UN to insist upon an immediate withdrawal when internal order had been secured; and bring pressure upon the Republic of the Congo directly and through the UN to request a Soviet withdrawal.  

(S) JCSM-321-60 to SecDef, 22 Jul 60 (JCS 2262/25), same file.
On 30 Aug 60, both CNO and CSAF brought to JCS attention the deteriorating situation in the Congo, culminating in the attack on an unarmed USAF crew at Stanleyville on 27 Aug 60 by the Congo Force Publique.

(S) Memo, CNO to JCS, 30 Aug 60 (JCS 2262/38); (TS) CSAFM 412-60 to JCS, 30 Aug 60 (JCS 2262/39); JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 3.

The JCS informed SecDef of their concern over the steadily deteriorating situation in the Congo. They believed that, unless immediate forceful action was taken by the US, a situation could develop that might not only be ruinous to the US but might also result in the Congo being taken over by communist advisors and technicians. They recommended specific actions by the UN and the US to remedy the situation, including the following: strong protest to the Congolese Government; search of Soviet Bloc ships and planes enroute to the Congo to inhibit introduction of arms and unauthorized personnel; action to identify and expel unauthorized agents from the Congo; demand for compensation for injuries suffered by US personnel in the Congo; and notes to other governments for support in the UN of the US position.
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<td>(TS) JCSM-425-60 to SecDef, 24 Sep 60, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 5.</td>
<td>24 Sep 60</td>
<td>(S) JCSM-395-60 to SecDef, 2 Sep 60 (JCS 2262/40), same file, sec 4.</td>
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<td>2 Sep 60</td>
<td>On 2 Sep 60, Actg ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS views to SecState, advising that SecDef concurred in them.</td>
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<td>(S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to SecState, 2 Sep 60 (1st H/H of JCS 2262/40), same file.</td>
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On 12 Oct 60, USCINCEUR recommended that 13 Harvard MK IV aircraft, originally provided Belgium through the MAP, be transferred to UN forces in the Congo. (C) JCS 2262/51, 21 Oct 60, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 6.

The JCS informed SecDef that the aircraft in question were excess to known military requirements and that there was no military objection to transfer of the aircraft to the UN. Before a decision on that matter, the JCS recommended that SecDef verify the UN request to the Belgian Air Force and consider the legal implications of the proposed transfer. The JCS noted that spare parts for the aircraft were not available except from commercial sources and at exorbitant prices.
On 29 Dec 60, Actg ASD(ISA) informed the CJCS that the Dept of State had determined that the UN had no interest in acquiring the aircraft.

(C) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Dec 60 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/51), same file.

On 14 Nov 60, the CSAF recommended that the JCS bring to SecDef attention the matter of security of USAF personnel currently operating in support of the UN airlift to the Congo.

(3) CSAFM 525-60 to JCS, 14 Nov 60 (JCS 2262/55), JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 7.

The JCS informed SecDef of their concern for the security of US forces currently supporting the UN operation in the Congo. Action had been taken within US military channels to reemphasize the subject of aircrew security. The JCS recommended that the UN be advised through appropriate channels of the US desire for a high degree of vigilance in this matter.

The JCS also recommended that the UN be requested to initiate a procedure whereby a designated UN field representative was charged with responsibility for informing USCINCEUR of any situation where the security of any airport used by US support aircraft became marginal or inadequate.

(3) JCSM-542-60 to SecDef, 29 Nov 60 (JCS 2262/55), same file.

On 13 Jan 61, Actg ASD(ISA) informed the CJCS that the US Mission to the UN had requested the UN command in the Congo to take appropriate
On 27 Dec 60, the UN formally requested the US to rotate Irish, Liberian, and Sudanese troops in the Congo during Jan and Feb 61. In addition, the UN requested confirmation in principle that the US would rotate UN troops. On 28 Dec 60, Dept of State informed the UN that the US would give sympathetic consideration to UN requests for rotation of troops of ONUC on a reimbursable basis.

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The JCS informed SecDef it was in the US military interest to furnish the means for rotating UN military elements to and from the Congo. Furnishing such support, however, should be governed by a number of stipulations. With respect to furnishing US means to repatriate withdrawn military elements, the JCS stated that every effort should be made to discourage and forestall such action, but established a number of criteria for such withdrawals. They recommended to SecDef the adoption of their policies, noting that the specific nature of their stipulations were necessary to conserve US manpower, time, and money.

ASD(ISA) forwarded a copy of the JCS views to the Dept of State on 19 Jan 61 and Dept of State acknowledged receipt on 2 Feb.

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ASD(ISA) forwarded a copy of the JCS views to the Dept of State on 19 Jan 61 and Dept of State acknowledged receipt on 2 Feb.
On 23 Jan 61, the CNO expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in the Congo and recommended to the JCS that they make recommendations to SecDef. (TS) Memo, CNO to JCS, 23 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/70), JHF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).

The JCS informed SecDef that unless immediate and strong action was taken soon there was the definite possibility that the entire Republic of the Congo would soon be under control of a communist dominated regime. The US should seek the establishment of law and order and an effective government, ultimately pro-Western and democratic. The US should urge the UN to take action as well as take certain unilateral actions. In the JCS opinion an overall US program should be developed. They recommended that SecDef seek governmental approval of these immediate and ultimate goals and implementation of specific actions by an interdepartmental task group.

(TS) JCSM-46-61 to SecDef, 30 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/72), same file.

Dep ASD(ISA) replied to the CJCS that DOD concurred in the JCS statement of goals, which were in consonance with US policy approved by the President on 1 Feb. Further, the President had directed the establishment of an interdepartmental task force, whose DOD representative would present JCS views as appropriate.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Feb 61 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/72), same file.
CENTRAL AFRICA

On 30 Jan 61, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on a "Statement of New United States Policy on the Congo," proposed by Dept of State, and US capabilities to intervene militarily in the Congo and the consequences thereof.

(S) JCSM-52-61 to SecDef, 31 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/73), JMF 9111/9105 (30 Jan 61).

The JCS reviewed the new policy and submitted comments to SecDef. The JCS concurred in a proposal for a strengthened mandate to the UN, but pointed out that it would be meaningless without adequate military force. On a broadly based Congolese government including all principal political elements in the Congo, the JCS considered that default to a coalition type of government was not in the best interests of the US. A strong central government headed by Kasavubu vigorously supported by the UN was considered to be the best chance of obtaining US objectives. The JCS concurred in the proposal for UN administration for the Congo, but only in the context of a strong centralized government headed by Kasavubu or a federated government that excluded the Lumumba faction. The necessary tactics must be developed, they said, for the fulfillment of this policy. The JCS concluded that the US was capable of military intervention in the Congo without degrading its general war posture to an unacceptable degree, but capability to conduct other similar operations elsewhere would be dependent on US commitment in the Congo.

(S) JCSM-52-61 to SecDef, 31 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/73), same file.

The same day ASD(ISA) furnished DOD comments on the new policy to Dept of State. In general they were consistent with JCS comments. He specifically included the JCS evaluation of the US capability to intervene in the Congo.

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 31 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/76), same file.
On 2 Feb 61, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on specific UN problems of implementing the proposed mandate for the Congo and on matters pertaining to US unilateral intervention in the Congo.

On 16 Feb 61, the DJS presented to the JCS an examination of the implications of external support to Congo factions from the military point of view.

On 21 Feb 61, the JCS informed SecDef that external support of diverse Congo factions, partiality toward Congo factions by some UN elements, the danger of collapse of the present government, and the growing prospect for civil war were having serious military consequences. The most serious factor aggravating these circumstances was the Gizenga (formerly Lumumba) regime at Stanleyville supported by Soviets, UAR, and "neutralist" Africa. Sudan was the most practical route for supply for this regime, and the Sudanese were under extreme pressure for transit rights.

The JCS furnished a list of recommended actions which would assist the UN in successfully undertaking and accomplishing the intent of the new proposed mandate. They also submitted their views on unilateral US intervention, which were substantially the same as presented in JCSM-52-61 (see item of 31 Jan 61).

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The JCS considered it essential that the Sudanese continue to resist these efforts. They suggested that the US provide the strongest possible diplomatic support and that the US consider an approach to Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Chad, and Republic of Congo (PR) on a joint declaration to prevent passage of military supplies through...
On 14 Mar 61, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on the feasibility of airlifting one Indian brigade to the Congo by 1 Apr 61.

(C) JCSM-164-61 to SecDef, 15 Mar 61 (JCS 2262/86), JMF 9111/3410 (14 Mar 61).

The JCS reported that to airlift the entire brigade would require all theater airlift, except those necessary for hard core general war requirements, plus one additional MATS C-124 squadron from CONUS and would cost 8 to 10 million dollars. The JCS believed that an already planned combination of airlift and sealift costing 2 to 3 million dollars was the most practical and economical method.

(C) JCSM-164-61 to SecDef, 15 Mar 61 (JCS 2262/86), same file.

The JCS views were concurred in by ASD(ISA) and transmitted orally to Dept of State. The UN Secretary General ultimately acceded to the US proposal for a combined air and sealift of the Indian brigade.

(C) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Mar 61 (JCS 2262/87), same file.
On 11 Dec 61, General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, observed that the US was becoming increasingly involved in UN military operations in the Congo and would suffer the consequences of any military reverse of the UN forces there. Consequently, he asked the CJCS was knowledge was available to the US of the military plans of UN forces in the Congo and had any qualified US military officer reviewed those plans?

(3) Memo, GEN Taylor to CJCS, 11 Dec 61 (JCS 2262/100), JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).

On 23 Dec 61, DepSecDef informed SecState that he agreed with the JCS on this matter and recommended that the US urge the UN Secretary General to strengthen and expand his military staff. On 16 Jan 62, USecState replied that actions were being taken to strengthen the UN capability for operations of the type being conducted in the Congo.

(3) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 61 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/101); (S) Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 16 Jan 62 (2d N/H of JCS 2262/101); same file.
On 13 Dec 61, the President directed that a general officer be assigned in the Congo to advise and assist the US ambassador in coping with the situation there. (TS) Msg, JCS 2587 to USWINCEUR, 13 Dec 61, JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).

On 29 Dec 61, the JCS submitted to the JCS views on US military airlift assistance in support of the UN Forces in the Congo. (U) JCS 2252/104, 29 Dec 61, JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).

The JCS informed SecDef that MG Mercer C. Walter, USA, had been selected for the mission as assistant to the US Ambassador in the Congo. (U) JCSM-871-61 to SecDef, 15 Dec 61 (JCS 2262/102), same file.

The JCS informed SecDef that: (a) so long as the US continued airlift into the Congo, Leopoldville should be the normal terminal and other flights should be based on political considerations, urgency, military security, and flight safety; (b) the UN should provide its own capability for airlift support in the Congo; (c) the US should disassociate itself insofar as possible from intra-Congo airlifts but retain the capability to respond to emergencies. The JCS recommended that SecDef discuss these issues with SecState so firm policy guidelines could be established. (U) JCSM-6-62 to SecDef, 4 Jan 62 (JCS 2262/104), same file.

A joint State-Defense message containing the JCS views was dispatched on 16 Jan 62. (U) Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Jan 62 (1st N/R of JCS 2262/104), same file.
On 8 Jan 62, Actg ASD(ISA) requested that the DJS, together with the Director of DIA and the Military Services, undertake a review of US military intelligence operations in the Congo and submit recommendations, as appropriate, on ways of providing more up-to-date, coordinated, and accurate information to appropriate US Government agencies. (U) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS, 8 Jan 62 (JCS 2262/106), JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 60).

During the period 7 Jun-12 Jul 62, a US Special Military Advisory Team visited the Republic of the Congo to develop recommendations to encourage and facilitate a program for creation of effective armed forces and gendarmerie for that country. The report of this survey team, submitted to ASD(ISA) on 23 Jul 62, recommended: increased direct US involvement in assistance to the Republic of the Congo under a "UN umbrella"; establishment of a small US military team to assist the Congolese armed forces and monitor the provision of US equipment; and provision of an immediate token grant of vehicles, radios, repair parts, and combat rations. On 31 Jul 62, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS comments and recommendations on the survey team report.

The JCS informed SecDef that the recommendations of the report were generally sound and consistent with the objectives of developing a unified, viable Congo with a disciplined military and police responsible to a stable government and of minimizing Sino-Soviet Bloc influence in the Congo. If a US determination was made to implement a US military assistance program for the Congo, the JCS believed that prior UN consultation and support should be obtained. After securing UN support, the JCS said, the program should be developed and administered on a bilateral basis between the US and the Republic of the Congo. They submitted to SecDef proposed terms of reference and an initial JTD for a US military team to be
Attended to the US Embassy in Leopoldville. The JCS recommended that SecDef approve the terms of reference and the JTD and use their views in further discussion of this subject with the Dept of State.

On 8 Oct 62, Dep USecState informed ASD(ISA) that Dept of State had reviewed the report of the Special Military Advisory Team and agreed that early action should be taken to present it to the Congolese Government. Dept of State was preparing an appropriate instruction for the US Ambassador in Leopoldville and, following approval of that instruction, steps would be taken to consult with UN authorities and other interested governments on the program.

On 20 Dec 62, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), informed the CJCS that the terms of reference and JTD for the US military team for the Republic of the Congo were approved. Pursuant to Presidential Determination of 17 Dec 62 covering military assistance to the Congo, he also requested the CJCS to establish and man the US Military Liaison Group, Republic of the Congo, to be in place during Jan 63. (For further action, see item of 8 Aug 63.)

(C) Memo, DMA to CJCS, 20 Dec 62 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/115), same file, sec 2.
On 12 Oct 62, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on comments by the US Ambassador in the Congo foreseeing possible contingencies involving employment of US forces eventuating from current UN efforts in the Congo. (U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Oct 62 (JCS 2262/117), JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.

On 12 Oct 62, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on comments by the US Ambassador in the Congo foreseeing possible contingencies involving employment of US forces eventuating from current UN efforts in the Congo. (U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Oct 62 (JCS 2262/117), JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.

On 11 Dec 62, ASD(ISA) informed the JCS of the deteriorating situation in the Republic of the Congo and requested JCS views on the following two questions: (1) Should the US make a positive offer of military support to the UN and the Congolese Government to counter possibility of Soviet intervention? (2) If such an offer was warranted, what should be the nature and dimension of the US military support offered? (C) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Dec 62 (JCS 2262/120), JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.

The JCS informed SecDef that the central issue of the Congolese problem was to keep a pro-Western regime in power and that additional actions should be taken to bolster the UN effort in the Congo to assure preservation of a Western oriented government. They stated that a commitment of US forces in the Congo should be made only if it was determined that collapse of the Central Congolese Government was imminent. Accordingly, the JCS recommended: a US effort to revitalize present UN political and military efforts in the Congo; implementation of the approved military assistance program for the Congo; an offer to the UN of a US military package consisting of one Composite Air Strike Unit with necessary support elements and requisite security forces if required to prevent collapse of Congolese Government; and timely announcements of US actions in support of UN operations in the Congo.

The Vice DJS informed ASD(ISA) that plans were being designed to provide a flexible response to a variety of conditions that might prevail in the Congo. These plans included a series of graduated responses ranging from a show of force to military intervention. Consequently, the Vice DJS considered the US prepared for the worst eventuality requiring military operations in the Congo. (C) DJSM-1460-62 to ASD(ISA), 11 Dec 62 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/117), same file.
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<td>(S) JCSM-983-62 to SecDef, 11 Dec 62 (JCS 2262/121), same file.</td>
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<td>On 11 Dec 62, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS recommendations to USecState, recommending that necessary action be taken to implement them. (For further action, see items of 15 and 21 Dec 62.) (TS) Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to USecState, 11 Dec 62 (1st H/H JCS 2262/121), same file.</td>
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<td>15 Dec 62</td>
<td>(TS) JCS 2262/124, 15 Dec 64, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.</td>
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<td>(TS) JCSM-1000-62 to SecDef, 15 Dec 62 (JCS 2262/124), same file.</td>
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<td>21 Dec 62</td>
<td>(S) JCS-2262/125, 21 Dec 62, JMF-9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.</td>
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On 15 Dec 62, SecDef requested the JCS to prepare a military annex to a Dept of State paper on the Congo for consideration by the President.

(TS) JCS 2262/124, 15 Dec 64, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.

As a result of developments in the Congo, the JCS reviewed their previous views of 11 and 15 Dec 62 (see items) in light of Dept of State Operating Plan for the Congo.

(S) JCS-2262/125, 21 Dec 62, JMF-9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 1.
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A US Military Mission visited the Congo during the period 20-27 Dec 62 to observe the situation and determine the need for further US equipment and support. The US Congo Military Mission submitted its report to the JCS on 31 Dec 62.

(S) Memo, LTC Truman to JCS, 31 Dec 62, Att to JCS 2262/128, 31 Dec 62, JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec 2.

7 Jan 63

The JCS told SecDef of their review of the final report of the Congo Military Mission and informed him of the status of actions to implement the report. The JCS noted that the US Congo Military Mission had recommended against introduction of any US combat units into the Congo and they concurred in that recommendation. The JCS stated that US response to recommendations in the report should be based on requests made by UN officials through Dept of State.
On 8 Jan 63, UN officials in the Congo requested a considerable amount of US assistance to move UN forces within the Congo to Kolwezi. A plan for an overland move was under consideration, but a parachute drop or a helicopter operation were the alternatives.

(U) JCSM-35-61 to SecDef, 11 Jan 63 (JCS 2262/130), same file.

The JCS informed SecDef that any overland move should be supported by a pioneer type operation. They believed that a helicopter operation of battalion size would require committing a US unit to a combat operation, which was against both US and UN policy. The JCS also advised SecDef that: a helicopter operation using 10 UN H19s was impractical; a two-company parachute operation in Kolwezi against the Katangan gendarmerie was feasible; and no US pilots, air crews, or technicians would take part in any of the proposed operations.

(U) JCSM-35-61 to SecDef, 11 Jan 63 (JCS 2262/130), same file.
On 8 Feb 63, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS recommendation on the strength and composition of UN forces in the Congo. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Feb 63 (JCS 2262/131), JMF 9111/3100 (7 Feb 63).

On 11 Jan 63, Dep ASD(ISA) provided the JCS views to Dept of State, who authorized the US Delegation to the UN to discuss the matter with UN officials. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Jan 63 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/130), same file.

The JCS recommended that: (a) the maintenance of law and order in the Congo be accomplished by the UNOC force; (b) the phase down in total strength from 19,000 to 8,000 be accomplished by 31 Dec 63; (c) the UN take the necessary steps during the next few months to secure qualified trained military units and return marginal units; (d) the Headquarters of UNOC force be moved from Leopoldville to Katanga; (e) logistic planning be accomplished far enough ahead to use more surface and less air transportation; (f) repair and maintenance be transferred to Kamina Base from Leopoldville; (g) the US continue to provide logistic support and available materiel on a case-by-case basis as requested. It was too early to estimate when National Congolese forces would be able to relieve rather than supplement UNOC forces. (U) JCSM-155-63 to SecDef, 23 Feb 63 (JCS 2262/132), same file.

Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS views to Dept of State on 2 Mar 63. With minor exceptions he noted that he was "in general agreement with the Chiefs' recommendations and believe that they will be helpful to you." (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 2 Mar 63 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/132), same file.
On 25 Feb 63, Dep ASD(ISA) requested the JCS views on a number of points raised in the report of the Cleveland Mission to the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville).

(U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Feb 63 (JCS 2262/133), JMP 9111/3100 (20 Feb 63) sec 2.

On 17 Jul 63, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on courses of action upon the withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo.

(U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Jul 63 (JCS 2262/137), JMP 9111/3100 (17 Jul 63).

The JCS reiterated their earlier statement (see item of 11 Dec 62) that the central issue of the Congo problem was to keep a pro-Western regime in power. They noted that the concept of UN umbrella over the program for retraining, reorganizing, and equipping the National Congolese Army had been previously endorsed by the JCS and was the best means for assisting the Congo. They specifically recommended that: (a) DOD and Dept of State take immediate action in the UN to resolve problems; (b) should these efforts fail, the US approach other nations to determine willingness to engage in a multinational training effort; (c) no member of USMILGRP should serve as a member of "UN Coordinating Group;" (d) the US set a high standard of training; (e) a Civic Action program be held in abeyance.

(U) JCSM-208-63 to SecDef, 13 Mar 63 (JCS 2262/134), same file.

On 2 Aug 63, the JCS informed SecDef that: (a) the risk involved in the withdrawal of UNOC forces by Dec 63 was acceptable and could be reduced by emphasis on retraining the ANC; (b) the continued presence of a small high-quality UNOC force would be desirable to assist in providing stability until the ANC was more capable; (c) US sponsorship of bilateral
On 30 Jul 63, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the CJCS that a bilateral military assistance agreement with the Republic of the Congo was signed on 19 Jul 63. He requested the JCS to activate and man as expeditiously as possible the US Military Mission, Republic of the Congo (previous action on this activity had referred to it as the "US Military Liaison Group, Republic of the Congo"—see item of 8 Aug 62).

(U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Jul 63 (JCS 2262/139), JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec 2.

The JCS directed CSA to activate and man the US Military Mission, Republic of the Congo.

(U) MJCS-134-63 to CSA, 8 Aug 63 (JCS 2262/139-1), same file.

On 2 Aug 63, arrangements for a peacekeeping force should receive no further consideration. The JCS recommended that US authorities urge the UN Secretary General to: (a) require the present UNOC force to initiate a determined effort to eliminate the lawless activities in Katanga; (b) plan on the withdrawal of the UNOC force in Dec 63; (c) secure standby authority to retain a 3 bn UNOC force for six months beyond Dec 63, dependent on the situation in Katanga. In addition, the JCS recommended that increased US participation in retraining the ANC should be undertaken only if there was a clear threat to maintaining a pro-Western regime in power.

(U) JCSM-590-63 to SecDef, 2 Aug 63 (JCS 2262/137-1), same file.
On 11 Jan 64, ASD(ISA) requested JCS views concerning modification of the MAP for the Congo, including training, which the US could undertake to assist the ANC in meeting the possible unstable situation which might exist in a relatively short period of time following the departure of the UN force in Jun 64.

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Jan 64 (JCS 2262/141), JMF 9111/4060 (11 Jan 64).

The JCS prepared and submitted a plan in conformance with the request. They concluded that given a political requirement to preserve a pro-Western regime in the Congo, the retraining of the ANC was an urgent military task, but action to enlarge the US role might prove counterproductive if it led either to a lessening of Belgian participation or to political difficulties for the current Congolese regime. Therefore, the JCS offered these additional views: (a) retraining should be undertaken by Belgians and Italians as planned; (b) diplomatic efforts should be intensified to persuade the Belgians and Italians to implement an effective training program before 1 Mar 64; (c) discreet efforts should be made to contribute to Israeli training efforts in the Congo; (d) the UN Secretary General should be urged to require the UN force to reduce lawlessness in the Congo and assist ANC in preparation for turnover; (e) US should not undertake direct operational training of ANC pending determination that it is demanded by US national interests.

For JCS consideration of topics for US-UK talks on military problems in various African countries, including Uganda, see item of 7 Dec 63, East Africa Section.
On 23 Apr 64, Actg ASD(ISA) informed the JCS that a requirement existed to provide helicopters, close air, and air transport support to the Congolese Armed Forces to assist in reduction of the Kwilu insurrection and maintenance of law and order.

On 30 Jan 64, JCS notified the JCS that a requirement existed to provide helicopters, close air, and air transport support to the Congolese Armed Forces to assist in reduction of the Kwilu insurrection and maintenance of law and order.

On 31 Jan 64, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the JCS plan and views to Dept of State, saying that he concurred in them, but at the same time he assumed that the JCS reservations would be resolved in such a way that the US would furnish training teams to the ANC.

SecState forwarded the JCS plan to the President and recommended that State be authorized immediately to undertake consultations with Belgium and the Congo with respect to the introduction of a limited number of tactical mobile training teams. The President approved this recommendation.

The JCS informed SecDef that they had reexamined their views as expressed on 30 Jan 64 (see item) on the subject of retraining of the Congolese National Army and considered that direct overt or covert participation...
The Actg ASD requested JCS views on the form of organization to perform the mission, proper controlling authority, nationality and source of personnel, and if appropriate, the agency to sign the contract.

(S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Apr 64 (JCS 2262/144), JMF 9111/3100 (23 Apr 64).

On 25 Jun 64, the JSSC recommended that the JCS express their concern to SecDef over the Congo situation, specifically exploring: (a) the apparent failure of the present US policy of supporting a broadly based moderate coalition by US military personnel in military or paramilitary operations to maintain security in the Congo was not desirable and should be avoided. Therefore, the JCS recommended that efforts be accelerated to have Belgium, Italy, or other third countries provide the necessary personnel for the support mentioned by the Actg ASD(ISA). If third countries failed to provide adequate support, the JCS recommended that the US consider augmentation of its present covert assistance, using foreign nationals or US civilian personnel, preferably the former. With regard to the question of control, the JCS recommended that: if personnel were provided by a third country, that country retain control; if personnel were provided through contract administered by a US agency, control be exercised by such agency; and US support under a civilian contract administered by AID or another agency, using personnel other than US military, be coordinated closely with the US country team in Leopoldville.

(S) JCS-M-134-64 to SecDef, 20 May 64 (JCS 2262/144-1), same file.

The JCS agreed to note the JSSC memorandum.

(C) JCS 2262/145, 8 Jul 65, same file.
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<td>type of government; (b) the prospects for Tshombe's success if he were the head of a strong central government; (c) the problem of rendering support through the Belgians.</td>
<td>8 Jul 64</td>
<td>The JCS provided SecDef the Joint Staff estimate, stating that it was an effective basis for evaluation of policy alternatives, ranging from &quot;wait and see&quot; to direct US military intervention. In view of the danger of the spread of communist influence throughout Central Africa, the JCS recommended that the US: (a) provide necessary materiel and financial assistance leading to effective operations by Congolese security forces; (b) continue to persuade the Belgians to increase and accelerate their support and leadership efforts; (c) supplement Belgian efforts with limited numbers of US advisory personnel; (d) continue along with Belgium to solicit assistance from other Western and African countries if Belgium did not assume responsibility; (f) accelerate current psychological operations; (g) exert appropriate diplomatic pressure to discourage assistance to the rebels. In addition, the JCS concluded that: (a) direct US intervention could be temporarily successful, but would not insure Congolese unity, and the US would be vulnerable to severe...</td>
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<td>On 25 Aug 64, the Joint Staff provided the JCS a general estimate of the Congo situation.</td>
<td>1 Sep 64</td>
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### CENTRAL AFRICA

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<td>1 Sep 64</td>
<td>international reactions; (b) a substantial unilateral US support program might be successful and while international reactions would be less severe, greater risks would be encountered in a continuing responsibility; (c) Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi must be diplomatically removed as rebel safe-havens; (d) a decision on extensive US involvement was not justified, pending Belgian and Congolese plans; (e) an early decision should be made concerning US assistance. If intervention became necessary, it should be executed without hesitation and with adequate forces to insure rapid success.</td>
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<td>12 Sep 64</td>
<td>The JCS informed SecDef that basically two courses of action were available: (1) the overt use of a joint task force in a parachute/air-landed assault operation; (2) the covert use of military forces to effect a clandestine night parachute landing. The JCS recommended: (a) a broad course of action, envisioning the initial effort being conducted by covert means</td>
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On 4 Sep 64, DepSecDef requested JCS views on appropriate US military courses of action that could be pursued to rescue the 25 Americans held by rebel forces in Stanleyville and an evaluation of the probability of securing the rescue of the individuals unharmed. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Sep 64 (JCS 2262/151), JMF 9111 (4 Sep 64).
It appeared that COMISH aircraft and other US marked aircraft and/or US military crews in the Congo were being used for missions in conflict with US policy. (C) JCS 2262/153, 22 Sep 64, JMF 911.1 (17 Sep 64).

On 4 Sep 64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded proposed revised terms of reference for the Chief of the US Military Mission (COMISH), Republic of

23 Sep 64

The JCS instructed CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA that aircraft with US markings and/or US military crews should not be employed on reconnaissance missions where they would be subject to enemy fire unless such use was essential to specific operations, the success of which was critical to US interests. (C) Msg, JCS 8970 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 23 Sep 64 (JCS 2262/153), same file.

12 Oct 64

The JCS forwarded the proposed revised terms of reference to SecDef, recommending approval. (U) JCSM 666-64 to SecDef, 12 Oct 64 (JCS 2262/154), same file.
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<td>the Congo. (For previous terms of reference, see item of 8 Aug 62.)</td>
<td>12 Oct 64</td>
<td>On 26 Oct 64, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), approved the revised terms of reference subject to certain changes (C) Memo, DMA to CJCS, 26 Oct 64, (JCS 2262/154-1), same file.</td>
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<td>(U) JCS 2262/154, 2 Oct 64, JMF 9111 (2 Oct 64).</td>
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<td>Dept of State imposed restrictions upon the conduct of air operations around urban areas by US-supported aircraft in the Congo. (TS) JCS 2262/155, 25 Oct 64, JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64).</td>
<td>27 Oct 64</td>
<td>(TS) JCSM-903-64 to SecDef, 27 Oct 64 (JCS 2262/155), same file.</td>
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<td>In mid-Jan 65, upon receipt of &quot;the first concrete evidence of the need to lift the current restrictions,&quot; ASD(ISA) immediately urged Dept of State to do so. (For further action, see item of 21 Jan 65.) (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to Roche, 15 Jan 65 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/155), same file.</td>
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<td>On 21 Dec 64, Dept of State indicated that the US Government believed that &quot;we must stop [the] fighting&quot; in the Congo and &quot;get onto political track while we are still ahead.&quot; (C) JCS 2262/160, 22 Dec 64, JMF 9111 (22 Dec 64).</td>
<td>24 Dec 64</td>
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CENTRAL AFRICA
Origin

Date

JCS Position

24 Dec 64

/jDep ASDCXSA
*TOFWarded the JCS views to Dept or^tate In
''light of a proposed UN Security Council
resolution, concurring fully with JCS views
on a cease-fire and withdrawal of mercenaries.
(C) JCSM-1071-6H to SecDef, 2*1 Dec 61) (JCS
2262/160); (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to USecState,
30 Dec 6*1 (1st N/H of JCS 2262/160), same file.

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The restrictions on air operations in the Congo (see item of 27 Oct 64) had not been lifted by mid-Jan 65. (C) JCS 2262/155-1, 18 Jan 65, JMF 9111 (25 Oct 65).

On 12 Jan 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA furnished a study on measures the Republic of the Congo could initiate under international law and custom against externally supported subversion and rebellion.

The JCS reiterated their earlier views and recommended that the restrictions be lifted. (C) JCSM-48-65 to SecDef, 21 Jan 65 (JCS 2262/155-1), same file.

The restrictions were relaxed on 19 Jan 65. (S) Msg, SecState to Amb Leopoldville, 19 Jan 65, JCS IN 86671; (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Jan 65 (JCS 2265/155-2); same file.
On 18 Feb 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA informed the JCS of his concern over the apprehension held in "certain circles" over the possible use of napalm in the Congo by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC). He pointed out that such apprehensions appeared to stem from undue sensitivity over the effect of the weapon, and that if the opposition continued, the US risked the denial to tactical air forces of one of their most effective weapons.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 12 Jan 65 (JCS 2262/161), JMF 9111 (12 Jan 65).

On 30 Mar 65, DepSecDef informed the CJCS that the question of use of napalm by the GDRC had been discussed with Dept of State. The Dept of State did not concur at that time in the introduction of napalm in the Congo because of the psychological reaction of the African states.

(S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Mar 65 (JCS 2262/163-1), same file.

The JCS informed SecDef that they agreed with CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and considered restrictions on use of conventional air support weapons militarily unwise. They believed that use of napalm should be based upon military considerations and that sovereign governments should be permitted to use the best conventional weapons available to them in their defense. Accordingly, they recommended that the present policy restriction on the use of napalm by the GDRC be rescinded and that this matter be raised with Dept of State.

(C) JCSM-I08-65 to SecDef, 16 Feb 65 (JCS 2262/161-1); (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Feb 65 (JCS 2262/161-2), same file.
On 14 Feb 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted a detailed military requirements plan for the Congo. (S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 14 Feb 65 (JCS 2262/162), JMP 9111 (14 Feb 65).

The JCS recommended to SecDef that the reappraisal of US cold war strategy and US policies toward Africa be expedited (see item of 31 Dec 64). They recommended, in the interim, that US policy for the Congo concentrate on the problem of denying this area to the communists and that the US adopt a position as follows: (a) Belgium and other European powers should shoulder the burden in the Congo; (b) the US should not accept responsibility for additional military tasks; (c) while avoiding commitment of additional military personnel, the US should be prepared to consider the provision of minimum materiel requirements that exceeded Belgian capabilities; (d) US pressures on the UAR, Algeria and other appropriate African countries should be to influence them to cease assistance to rebel forces. The JCS forwarded the study for possible use in the discussion at the scheduled multinational conference. (S) JCSM-198-65 to SecDef, 19 Mar 65 (JCS 2262/162-1), same file.

On 12 Apr 65, Dep ASD(ISA) informed DJS that JCSM-198-65 was extremely useful in preparing for recently held discussions in Brussels concerning Belgian support for the Congo. The results, he said, were consistent with the points raised by the JCS. The attached plan would be considered in terms of long range goals. (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 12 Apr 65 (JCS 2262/162-2), same file.
On 21 May 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposed to evacuate JTF LEO from Leopoldville, Democratic Republic of Congo, effective 15 Aug 65 and to replace the C-47 assigned to the Chief of the Military Mission (COMISH) there with a C-123 aircraft. (The JCS had directed CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to establish JTF LEO in Leopoldville on 11 Aug 64.)

On 22 Jun 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommended a minor modification to US policy in order to authorize the US Ambassador to the Congo (Leopoldville) to request Premier Tshombe to make known to Abbe Youlou (former President of Congo (Brazzaville)) US sympathy for Youlou's aspirations in Congo (Brazzaville).

On 17 Jun 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted to the JCS an analysis of military operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, assessing the methods, procedures, tactics, and actions that were successful there and might have potential application in other incipient insurgency situations. He recommended a proposal to SecDef for an ad hoc State-Defense committee to expand and refine this analysis.

The JCS approved the withdrawal of JTF LEO from the GDRC about 15 Aug 65 and the replacement of the C-47 assigned to COMISH LEO with a C-123.

The JCS decided that action to approach Youlou at that time was not in the best interest of the US.

The JCS noted the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA analysis but did not forward it to SecDef for any further action.
On 24 Apr 66, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded to the JCS a study of the minimum essential military assistance support required by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly with regard to development of a Force Aérienne Congolaise (FAC). He recommended that the study form the basis for high level government-to-government talks with objective of securing positive agreement to support the planned buildup of the FAC.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 24 Apr 66 (JCS 2262/169), JMF 9111 (18 Apr 66).

On 4 Feb 67, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded to the JCS a study of the need for a rapid reaction force for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) using present in-country assets. The US already had B-26 and T-28 aircraft there, but planned to remove the B-26s and turn the T-28s over to the GDRC. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommended transfer of two US C-46 aircraft to the GDRC when the T-28s were given to the GDRC and the B-26s removed.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 4 Feb 67 (JCS 2262/171), JMP 829/395 (4 Feb 67).

On 24 May 66, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded to the JCS a report on air operations in the Congo resulting from an on-site survey made during the period 3-12 May 66. The CJCS recommended that the conclusions and recommendation of this report form the basis for discussions of the subject in "the numbered committee."

(S) CM-1451-66 to DepSecDef, 24 May 66 (JCS 2262/170), same file.

On 28 Feb 67, the CJCS recommended to DepSecDef that the 303 Committee consider the possibility of transferring two C-46 aircraft to the GDRC at such time as the T-28s were allocated to the GDRC and the B-26s were removed from the Congo.

(S) CM-2143-67 to DepSecDef, 28 Feb 67, same file.
On 12 Sep 68, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded to the JCS a study prepared by his headquarters on "Uganda a Key Country in a Trans-African Air Route." The study recommended that: exploratory talks be undertaken with Uganda to determine types of military equipment Uganda desired; every effort be made to dissuade Uganda from procuring additional jet fighters; US indicate willingness to extend credit sales for study developed items; and jet fighters be provided to Uganda only on a clear quid pro quo basis. On 4 Oct 68, CSAF requested a JCS review of the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA study. (S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 12 Sep 68 (JCS 2390/3); (S) CSAFM J-5-68 to JCS, 4 Oct 68 (JCS 2390/3-1); JMF 864 (12 Sep 68).
On 1 Apr 69, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCEAFSA requested the JCS to obtain a C-123 or C-119 aircraft in lieu of a C-47 for the US Military Mission Congo (COMISH) support aircraft. The previous Nov CINCSTRIKE/USCINCEAFSA had requested one C-123K aircraft in lieu of a C-47 for the COMISH, but the JCS had turned down this request because the USAF had no C-123 aircraft available.

On 18 Jun 69, Dep ASD(ISA) approved the JCS request.

A Presidential determination made Gabon eligible for foreign military sales. On 3 Feb 73, USCINCEUR submitted proposed terms of reference for the US Defense Attache in Gabon. The JCS forwarded the terms of reference assigning security assistance responsibilities pertaining to Gabon to the Defense Attache, Chad. ASD(ISA) approved the terms of reference subject to two modifications, and they were forwarded to USCINCEUR for implementation on 3 Jan 74.

On 24 Mar 75, the report of the US Military Technical Assistance Team (MTAT) for the Republic of Zaire was forwarded for review and comment by the JCS. On 25 Mar 75, Dep ASD(ISA) requested a sanitized French version of the report, scaled
down within specified limits, along with JCS views and comments.
(C-NOFORH) Memo, Team Chief, Zaire MTAT to DJS, 24 Mar 75 (JCS 2262/177), JMF 829/495 (24 Mar 75) sec 1; (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 25 Mar 75 (JCS 2262/177-1), same file, sec 2.

communications to support the proposed air defense system were undefined in the report. The cost could be considerable and should be considered in air defense planning. While recognizing that US political and economic interests could be enhanced, the JCS expressed concern that rendering such military advisory assistance would precipitate immediate requests to which the US would be unable to respond favorably. They recommended that a high-ranking officer make a brief annual visit to Zaire in view of the importance the President of Zaire placed on such visits.
(C) JCSM-I36-75 to SecDef, 18 Apr 75 (JCS 2262/177-2), same file, sec 2.
On 2 Sep 75, the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, requested a review of list of equipment desired by the Government of Zaire and identification of items not contained in the Zaire MTAT (Rockwell) report (see item of 18 Apr 75) that would enhance the capabilities of Zairian forces. It was also suggested that an examination be conducted of an increase in ground transportation equipment and the addition of a light anti-tank weapon (LAW), or the substitution of LAW for the 106mm recoilless rifle.

(U) Memo, Dir DSAA to DJS, 2 Sep 75 (JCS 2262/177-3), JMF 829/495 (24 Mar 75) sec 2.

The JCS informed SecDef that 70 percent of the GOZ list of equipment was also listed in the MTAT report. Eighteen major items were in addition to the MTAT report, of which 90 percent were in the category of ground transportation or mobility equipment. The JCS made no attempt to justify these additions, but they indicated that enhanced capability could result. They found that the significant increase in ground mobility equipment and the addition of the M-72 LAW or its substitution for the 106mm recoilless rifle would enhance the overall capability of the forces structured in the Rockwell Report to counter the perceived threats to the security of the GOZ. In view of the fact that the Rockwell Report had not been presented to the GOZ, it was the JCS views that any US response to the GOZ concerning item from the GOZ list should recognize that a correlation was made between the items requested and the forces outlined in the Rockwell Report. Therefore, to be meaningful in assessing Zaire's military needs, the Rockwell Report should be available to the GOZ for comparison.

(C) JCSM-362-76, 23 Sep 75 (JCS 2262/177-4), same file.
On 24 Dec 75, ASD(ISA), in response to a request by President Bongo of Gabon, requested the DJS to establish a DOD team to undertake a survey of the Gabonese Armed Forces and paramilitary organizations.

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 24 Dec 75 (JCS 2121/229), JMF 834/495 (24 Dec 75).

The JCS informed SecDef that they had reviewed the Gabon Survey Team's report and believed it provided a comprehensive study of the political/military structure of Gabon, its perceived threats, and the priorities of its defense requirements. In addition they commented that:
(a) Gabon could be of strategic value to the US and therefore security assistance warranted favorable consideration; (b) if security assistance was deemed appropriate, it should be adequate but constrained from providing equipment beyond Gabon's defense needs or adversely affecting US force readiness; (c) coordination with the Government of France should be considered; (d) any commitment should complement other US security assistance in the area; (e) specific programs should be developed in consultation with appropriate agencies, including the JCS; (f) some consideration should be given to establishing US military representation in Gabon if a security assistance program developed. The JCS recommended that the report not be provided to the governments of foreign countries.

(S) JCSM-57-76 to SecDef, 20 Feb 76 (JCS 2121/229-2), same file.

On 3 May 76, ASD(ISA) requested Joint Staff review and a French translation of a sanitized version of the report for presentation to Gabon. The DJS made additional deletions in complying with the request, noting that the JCS had recommended that the report not be provided to the governments of foreign countries.

(C) DJSM-915-76 to ASD(ISA), 20 May 76 (JCS 2121/229-3), same file.
On 30 Apr 76, ASD(ISA) requested DJS to establish a Military Technical Advisory Team (MTAT) as a follow-on to the 1975 MTAT to Zaire. (See item of 18 Apr 75.)

(C) Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecArmy and DJS, 30 Apr 76, JMF 829/496 (17 Jun 76) sec 1.

The JCS forwarded the Zaire MTAT II Report to SecDef. They expressed concern that the Zairian Armed Forces did not currently have an adequate trainable manpower base to absorb the weapons systems and compressed delivery schedules envisioned in the report. The DIA threat assessment cast additional doubt on the need for the compression of time schedules to the five years contained in the report. The JCS considered it essential that no specific program, except the Ground Force Upgrade Package, be undertaken until a comprehensive survey was completed. The JCS believed that a modified report spreading out the force modernization program from five to fifteen years provided a militarily sound time frame for the development of a modern armed force for Zaire. The JCS recommended that: (a) the modified report be approved and then released for transmission to the Government of Zaire; (b) the Ground Force Upgrade Package be recommended to Zaire as an initial step; (c) a comprehensive training and manpower survey be conducted in the near future; (d) DOD direct (or guaranteed) credit with concessional features be granted to Zaire.

(S-NOFORN) JCSM-359-76 to SecDef, 14 Oct 76 (JCS 2262/178-2), same file, sec 2.
EAST AFRICA
(Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique)

Origin
Date
JCS Position

For JCS consideration of NSC 5920, a draft statement of US Policy toward South, Central, and East Africa, see item of 8 Jan 60, General Section.

On 30 Dec 60, NSC 6028, a draft statement of US policy on the Horn of Africa, was circulated among NSC members for consideration. The draft statement claimed a US military interest in the area, particularly in view of the presence of critically required US communications facilities in Ethiopia.

(S) NSC 6028, 30 Dec 60, JMF 9110/9105 (30 Dec 60).

The JCS reviewed the draft statement of policy and informed SecDef that, from the military point of view, it was "generally acceptable."

(C) JCSM-18-61 to SecDef, 14 Jan 61 (JCS 2262/66), same file.

On 18 Jan 61, the NSC adopted the draft statement of policy on the Horn of Africa and the President approved it for implementation.

(S) Memo, NSC Staff to NSC, 18 Jan 61, same file.


(C) Ltr, US CINCEUR to JCS, 18 Jul 61 (JCS 2315/92), JMF 5191 (18 Jul 61).

The JCS forwarded the revised terms of reference to SecDef recommending approval.

(U) JCSM-598-61 to SecDef, 5 Sep 61 (JCS 2315/98), same file.

On 18 Oct 61, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), approved the terms of reference subject to certain modification.

(U) Memo, DMA to CJCS, 18 Oct 61 (1st N/H of JCS 2315/98), same file.
On 7 Apr 62, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS comments on Dept of State Guidelines of US policy toward the Horn of Africa, toward Mauritania, and toward Togo.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJOCS, 7 Apr 62 (JCS 2121/135), JMF 9110/9105 (7 Apr 62) sec 2; (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJOCS, 7 Apr 62 (JCS 2377), JMF 9113.11/9105 (7 Apr 62) sec 2; (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJOCS, 7 Apr 62 (JCS 2378), JMF 9113.9/9105 (7 Apr 62) sec 2.

On 26 Apr 62, Dep ASD requested JCS comments on Dept of State Guidelines of US policy toward the Horn of Africa, toward Mauritania, and toward Togo.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to USecState, 2 May 62 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/137); (S) Memo, Dep ASD(SAI) to USecState, 1 May 62 (2d N/H of JCS 2121/137); (S) Dept of State, Guidelines for Policy and Operations - Horn of Africa, Nov 62 (JCS 2121/158); JMF 9110/9105 (7 Apr 62) sec 2.

On 17 Jul 63, Actg ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on Dept of State "Strategic Study of Ethiopia."

(U) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Jul 63 (JCS 2262/136), JMFS 9114/9105 (17 Jul 63) sec 2.

On 29 Jul 63, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the JCS that, in accord with a Presidential determination of 29 Jun 63, military assistance to the Somali Republic was being implemented in accordance with the report of a US military assistance survey team

On 29 Aug 63, the JCS submitted to SecDef recommended terms of reference and JTD for the US Military Mission to Somalia.

The JCS informed SecDef that, while the study covered adequately the range of US interests in Ethiopia and was consistent with previous JCS views on Africa, they were concerned that this and other Strategic Studies were being produced before the official status of this document series had been established. Accordingly, they recommended that, prior to DOD concurrence in the study on Ethiopia, the official status of the Strategic Country Studies be established on an interdepartmental basis.

Subsequently, the Strategic Study on Ethiopia was revised, and on 19 Nov 63, the JCS informed SecDef that the revised version adequately covered US interests in Ethiopia. They again recommended that, prior to DOD concurrence in the study, the official status of the National Strategy Series be established on an interdepartmental basis.

The JCS submitted to SecDef recommended terms of reference and JTD for the US Military Mission to Somalia.

(U) JCSM-667-63 to SecDef, 29 Aug 63 (JCS 2315/292/1), same file.
Origin

of May 63. Arrangements were being made for an impact package and a mobile training team to be in country by the end of Sep 63. Accordingly, the Dep ASD requested action to establish a US Military Mission to Somalia and requested the JCS to prepare terms of reference and JTD for the Mission. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Jul 63 (JCS 2315/292), JMF 9112.11/4060 (15 May 63) sec 2.

On 11 Nov 63, ASD(ISA) requested JCS judgment on the suitability and adequacy of topics proposed for US-UK talks on military problems of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar), together with background papers on those topics. (U) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Nov 63, JMF 9110/3100 (11 Nov 63).

Date

29 Aug 63

29 Aug 63

JCS Position

On 15 Oct 63, the Director of Military Assistance, OSD(ISA), approved the terms of reference for implementation when the military assistance bilateral agreement with the Government of Somalia was signed. (U) Memo, DMA to CJCS, 15 Oct 63 (JCS 2315/292-2), same file.

7 Dec. 63

The JCS found the suggested topics suitable and adequate. They furnished short background papers on assessment of the threat, indigenous force capabilities, and US military interests. The external threat was not considered to be great, but border incidents and communist subversion constituted sources of threats to internal security. To counter these threats, indigenous forces required improvement and continuing assistance from the free world. US military interests in East Africa were seen as deriving from US objectives of excluding communist influence in the area, insuring continued UK military assistance, and maintaining a favorable climate for US overflight and base rights. If UK assistance continued, US military interests should require only limited activities. If necessary, other Free World countries should be encouraged to fill voids in the UK assistance program. If these efforts failed, the US should be prepared to provide internal security support. The JCS warned
On 29 Oct 63, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS guidance for use by Chief, MAAG, Ethiopia, in discussions with Ethiopian officials concerning force goals for the Ethiopian Navy and Air Force. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Oct 63 (JCS 2262/140), JMP 9114/4060 (29 Oct 63).

On 11 Jul 64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA informed the JCS that the current climate of US relations with Ethiopia pointed up an urgent need for review and

On 31 Dec 63, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the guidance developed by the JCS to the Chief MAAG, Ethiopia. (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to Chief MAAG, Ethiopia, 13 Dec 63 (JCS 2262/140-2), same file.

The JCS informed SecDef that they had reviewed US policies and programs for Ethiopia in context of comments and recommendations received
Origin: reappraisal of US short and long range goals for that country and a reassessment of US current and programmed military assistance as well as other actions to fulfill those goals. On 29 May 64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted a suggested six-year military assistance plan for Ethiopia, and on 5 Jun 64, the US Ambassador to Ethiopia advised the JCS that increased MAP for Ethiopia was required along with a distinct US objective to create and support effective Ethiopian armed forces.

(U) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 14 May 64 (JCS 2121/180); (U) Briefing Sheet for CJCS on JCS 2121/180-1; JMP 9114 (14 May 64) sec 1.

Date: 11 Jul 64

JCS Position: from the US Ambassador to Ethiopia and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and discussions in Washington during period 1-5 Jun 64. As a result, the JCS concluded that a substantial and prompt increase in US political, economic, and military assistance to Ethiopia was justified by: the importance of Ethiopia to US interests; the recent deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations; and Sino-Soviet progress in efforts to influence and subvert East African countries. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA had proposed a six-year MAP for Ethiopia ranging from $18.24 million for FY 1965 to $12.02 million in FY 1970 with a MAAG manpower ceiling varying from 126 to 121 for the same period. The JCS recommended: (1) expedited review of the National Policy Paper for Ethiopia to include reflection of US interest in the development and security of Ethiopia; (2) approval of a separate, basic US national objective to organize, train, equip, and support a 40,000-man Ethiopian Army and minimum, but effective, Ethiopian air force and navy forces as rapidly as possible; (3) approval of the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA MAP proposals with increased Service and MAP manpower and dollar ceilings to support the proposals.

(U) JCSM-591-64 to SecDef, 11 Jul 64 (JCS 2121/180-1), same file.

On 22 Jul 64, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the CJCS that the JCS recommendations would be considered in the context of overall US national policy.
On 22 Oct 64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA informed the JCS that the expected early delivery of MIG aircraft to Somalia would cause severe political reaction in friendly African countries and could pose very difficult military problems to the Imperial Ethiopian Government (IEG). Accordingly, he recommended: provision without delay of a Sidewinder capability for the F-86F aircraft then in the hands of the Ethiopian air force together with information on their effectiveness against MIG aircraft; programming of F-5 aircraft to permit delivery of eight in FY 1965 and four in FY 1966; and informing the IEG that in the event MIGs were provided Somalia and a threat existed against Ethiopia, the US would be prepared to come to Ethiopia's assistance if requested. (C) Msg, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 22 Oct 64, JMP 9114 (22 Oct 64).

The JCS informed SecDef of the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommendations. They considered that prompt initiation of the six-year Military Assistance Plan recommended by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA (see item of 11 Jul 64) was essential to attainment of effective Ethiopian military forces and to protection of US interests. The JCS recommended support of this plan with necessary funds to allow prompt and orderly implementation. They also recommended: authorization for Chief MAAG to inform Ethiopian authorities that a minimum of six (and preferably eight) F-5s would be delivered in early CY 1965 and the remainder in CY 1966; Sidewinders not be provided for the Ethiopian F-86Fs; informing the IEG of the effectiveness of the F-86Fs versus the MIG-15/17; and a reassessment of possible courses if the Soviets introduced further weapons into the area. (C) JCSM-1009-64 to SecDef, 3 Dec 64 (JCS 2315/343), same file.

On 18 Dec 64, SecDef informed the CJCS that he had approved a level of $15 million for the FY 1966 Ethiopian MAP. That level would fund four F-5 aircraft which, together with three funded
On 29 Jan 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommended that the JCS concur in a plan for the improvement of the Haile Selassie I Military Academy.

On 11 May 65, the CSA expressed to the JCS his concern over evidence of deteriorating relations between the US and Ethiopia and over prospects of Ethiopian recognition of Communist China.

On 12 Mar 65, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submission to Asst SecState.

On 24 May 65, the JCS informed SecDef of their concern with the deterioration in relations with Ethiopia and with the prospect of Ethiopian recognition of Communist China. They recommended:

On 3 Mar 65, the JCS forwarded the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA plan to SecDef. They considered that limited US support for the Academy would be desirable. They recommended that the plan be forwarded to the Dept of State as a basis for discussion and that a sanitized version be made available to Ethiopia.

On 3 Dec 64, in FY 1965, could be delivered in CY 1966. SecDef had also decided that Sidewinders would not be programmed for the Ethiopian F-86s and that the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA six-year Military Assistance Plan could not be approved because of limited MAP resources.

On 11 May 65, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 64 (JCS 2315/343-1), same file.

On 3 Mar 65, Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 29 Jan 65 (JCS 2121/182-4), JMF 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec 1.

On 3 Mar 65, JCS-r45-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65 (JCS 2121/182-5), same file, sec 2.

On 3 Mar 65, Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 12 Mar 65 (JCS 2121/182-6), same file, sec 2.
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<td>24 May 65</td>
<td>acceleration of efforts to determine and initiate specific action to improve US relations with Ethiopia; reconsideration of the level of military assistance for Ethiopia and increased Service and MAP manpower and dollar ceilings; and integration of the reappraisal previously recommended by the JCS (see items of 11 Jul and 31 Dec 64) with the critical look at overall African policy as mentioned by SecState in a circular message of 6 May 65.</td>
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<td>(S) JCSM-400-65 to SecDef, 24 May 65 (JCS 2449/1-1), same file.</td>
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<td>(C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Jun 65 (JCS 2449/1-2), same file.</td>
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On 22 May 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommended to the JCS: a reexamination of US broad commitments to support a 40,000-man Ethiopian army with unspecified quantities of military assistance; renegotiation and definition in quantitative terms of US MAP commitments to Ethiopia; and development and negotiation of a bilateral memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, establishing in the preamble that both governments were interested in a concerted program for improvement of armed forces but to remove open-ended aspects.

(C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 22 May 65 (JCS 2262/136-5), JMF 9114 (22 May 65).


On 2 Jul 65, the JCS informed SecDef that, subject to certain minor changes, the draft paper provided a suitable statement of US policy for Kenya.

The JCS informed SecDef of the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal for a bilateral memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia to stabilize and clarify US MAP for that country by defining and delimiting US commitments and those of Ethiopia. The JCS recognized the possible disadvantages of such a memorandum, but recommended consideration of it in this instance because of the importance of the MAP to US-Ethiopian political-military relation. They requested that this matter be raised with Dept of State.

(S) JCSM-509-65 to SecDef, 30 Jun 65 (JCS 2449/3), same file.

(C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 9 Jul 65 (JCS 2449/3-1), same file.
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<td>(U) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 May 65 (JCS 2387/2), JMF 9112.8 (17 May 65) sec 1.</td>
<td>2 Jul 65</td>
<td>(S) JCSM-522-65 to SecDef, 2 Jul 65 (JCS 2387/2-1), same file.</td>
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<td>On 28 Jul 65, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded to Dept of State the DOD comments on the draft policy paper, which included those of the JCS. Subsequently, on 9 Nov 65, Dept of State issued an approved National Policy Paper for Kenya. (S) Ltr, Dep ASD(ISA) to Chm PPC, Dept of State, 28 Jul 65; (JCS 2387/2-2); (S) Dept of State National Policy Paper, Kenya, 9 Nov 65, same file.</td>
<td>31 Aug 65</td>
<td>The JCS recommended approval of the letter, with minor changes, to SecDef and further that he forward it to SecState recommending his concurrence. (C) JCSM-663-65 to SecDef, 31 Aug 65 (JCS 2449/5-1), same file, sec 3.</td>
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<td>On 16 Aug 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA requested approval of a draft letter to Haile Selassie. Its intent was to develop a suitable rationale to assist the US Ambassador in influencing Ethiopian budgery processes toward training security forces. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 16 Aug 65 (JCS 2449/5), JMF 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec 2.</td>
<td>31 Aug 65</td>
<td>On 7 Sep 65, OASD(ISA) forwarded to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA an approved text for the letter to Haile Selassie. (C) Msg, OASD(ISA), 7 Sep 65 (1st N/H of JCS 2449/5-1), 13 Sep 65; same file, sec 3.</td>
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On 13 Dec 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA informed the JCS of a request by the US Ambassador to Ethiopia for assistance in obtaining an individual qualified to serve as a civilian advisor to the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense for a one-year period. (C) Msg, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 13 Dec 65, JCS IN 94978.

In Dec 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted revised terms of reference for the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Ethiopia, and for the US Military Mission, Mali. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 17 Dec 65 (JCS 2449/6), JMF 9114 (17 Dec 65). (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 22 Dec 65 (JCS 2121/198), JMF 9113.10 (22 Dec 65).

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<td>On 13 Dec 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA informed the JCS of a request by the US Ambassador to Ethiopia for assistance in obtaining an individual qualified to serve as a civilian advisor to the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense for a one-year period. (C) Msg, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 13 Dec 65, JCS IN 94978.</td>
<td>12 Jan 66</td>
<td>The JCS recommended to SecDef that the request for a civilian advisor be honored provided that: the position was established within MAAG, Ethiopia, JTD; the advisor was placed under the direct supervision of the Chief, MAAG, Ethiopia; graduation from a senior Service college was added to selection criteria as a desirable qualification; and the civilian advisor be briefed by the JS and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA prior to assuming his duties in Ethiopia. (C) JCSM-21-66 to SecDef, 12 Jan 66 (JCS 2449/7), same file.</td>
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<td>In Dec 65, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA submitted revised terms of reference for the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Ethiopia, and for the US Military Mission, Mali. (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 17 Dec 65 (JCS 2449/6), JMF 9114 (17 Dec 65). (C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 22 Dec 65 (JCS 2121/198), JMF 9113.10 (22 Dec 65).</td>
<td>15 Feb 66</td>
<td>The JCS approved the revised terms of reference after modifying those for the US Military Mission, Mali, so as to require the observation of end-item utilization. (C) JCSM-98-66 to SecDef, 15 Feb 66, JMF 9113.10 (22 Dec 65).</td>
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<td>On 11 Mar 66, the Director of Military Assistance, OASD(ISA), approved the terms of reference and the</td>
<td></td>
<td>On 20 Jan 66, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the JCS that their views would be fully considered in selection of a civilian advisor for the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense. (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 20 Jan 66 (JCS 2449/7-1), same file.</td>
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On 12 Jan 66, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded a country team study that proposed force goals for the Imperial Ethiopian Services. He recommended the study be used as a basis for goals discussion. 

(C) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 12 Jan 66 (JCS 2449/5-3), JMF 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec 3.

On 10 Feb 66, the US Ambassador to Ethiopia recommended that the US sell two C-130 aircraft to the Ethiopian Air Lines as an alternate means of meeting airlift requirements of the Imperial Ethiopian Military Forces.

(S) Msg, Addis Ababa 1002 to State, 10 Feb 66, JCS IN 96800.

On 15 Feb 66, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA provided them to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA on 15 Mar 66.

The JCS concluded that the proposed force goals were responsive to existing and anticipated threats and were attainable with an annual average MAP expenditure of approximately $15 million for the FY 67-71 time period. The JCS recommended the study to SecDef as a basis for discussion with the Imperial Ethiopian Government. On 1 Apr 66 Dept of State and ASD(ISA) concurred in the proposed force goals.

(U) 1st N/H of JCS 2449/5-4, 21 Apr 66, same file.

The JCS informed SecDef that there was no objection to the sale of the aircraft if it was commercially feasible and if financial arrangements could be made to satisfaction of US Government. To provide an alternative to C-130 aircraft, the JCS had already recommended (in connection with JSOP force levels) that the C-119G with jet pods be tested. They had further recommended that selection of a military transport aircraft for Ethiopia be deferred pending completion of that evaluation.
On 14 Nov 66, SecDef requested an evaluation of the facilities at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia from Dir, DDR&E, and CJCS. Dept of State considered that US reliance on Kagnew Station for an increasing number of missions placed a significant burden on US policy toward the Horn of Africa. (S) Memo, SecDef to Dir, DDR&E and CJCS, 14 Nov 66 (JCS 2449/11-1), JMP 9114 (2 Nov 66).

On 10 Apr 66, OASD(A) informed the JCS that their views were used by Dept of State in preparation of guidance for the US Ambassador to Ethiopia. (C) Memo, OASD(A) to DJS, 1 Apr 66 (1st N/H of JCS 2449/9-1), same file.

The JCS emphasized to SecDef the technically unique location of Kagnew Station and the lack of acceptable alternatives for mission relocation. (S) CJCS Briefing Sheet on JCS 2449/11-1, 7 Dec 66; JCS 2449/11-1 (JCSM-770-66, 15 Dec 66, is available through SSO Channels), same file.

SecDef informed Dept of State on 13 Jan 67 that no substantial reductions could be made at Kagnew without sacrificing capabilities and products. The DOD did not anticipate any expansion of the facility beyond that already requested. (For further action, see items 13 Jul 67 and 23 Jul 68.) (TS) Memo, SecDef to USecState, 14 Jan 67 (JCS 2449/11-5), same file.
On 15 Jun 67, DepSecDef requested JCS views with regard to any expansion at Kagnew Station and a phased relocation of Kagnew mission related to the communications, Atomic Energy Detection System, and contingency missions of Kagnew Station. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS and Dir, NSA, 15 Jun 67 (JCS 2449/11-8), JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66).

The JCS concluded that relocation, reduction, or elimination of missions assigned to Kagnew Station would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean areas. They recommended that NSA, the Services, and DCA be directed to prepare a consolidated, coordinated plan for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station and that the JCS be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on the plan. (For further action, see item of 23 Jul 68.) (TS) JCSM-397-67 to SecDef, 13 Jul 67 (JCS 2449/11-9), same file.

(C) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 May 68 (JCS 2121/209-1), same file.

(C) Msg, CINCSTRKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 27 Mar 68
JCS IN 98254.
On 23 May 68, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA requested MAAG authority to requisition previously programmed napalm bombs for Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (IEAF) training.

(S) Msg, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to SecDef, 23 May 68, JCS IN 33064.

On 4 May 68, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA requested JCS approval of a proposal to send a 20-man Joint Special Mobile Training Team (MTT) to train a cadre of Ethiopian instructors in counterinsurgency and civic action. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA estimated the cost at $70,000 and stated that the country team concurred in the proposal.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 4 May 68 (JCS 2449/15), JMP 832 (7 Jun 67).

The JCS approved the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal and recommended to SecDef that an additional $70,000 be allocated for the Ethiopia MAP and that dollar ceilings be raised as necessary to accommodate the increase.

(S) JCSM-387-68 to SecDef, 24 Jun 68 (JCS 2449/15-1), same file.

On 24 Jul 68, DepSecDef approved provision of a mobile training team to Ethiopia subject to the following: the team should avoid any involvement with tactical unit training or operations; the size of the team should be limited to 12; and the cost of the team should be absorbed within planned Ethiopian program.

(S) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 24 Jul 68 (JCS 2449/15-2), same file.
On 24 May 68, DepSecDef requested the views of the JCS on plans for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia. (TS) JCS 2449/11-13, 18 Jul 68, JMP 832/630 (28 Mar 68) sec 1.
On 18 Sep 68, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA forwarded to the JCS a MAAG, Ethiopia, study on force goals for the Imperial Ethiopian Military Forces (1970-1980) and requested approval of the study for use in developing future Ethiopian MAP requirements and in evaluating future materiel assistance requests. The study proposed a reduction in army strength from the present 40,000 to 30,268 active duty personnel and 4,590 reserve personnel with no major changes for the navy and air force.

(S) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS, 18 Sep 68 (JCS 2449/17), JMF 832/496 (18 Sep 68).

The JCS approved the study as a useful concept for recommending future Ethiopian force goal changes to JSOP, but they did not forward the study to SecDef since Ethiopian force goals had been confirmed in CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA's recommended position for JSOP FY 71-78.

(S) SM-724-68 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 1 Nov 68 (JCS 2449/17-1), same file.
A J-5 Background paper for the CJCS on the NSC Horn of Africa study stated that present US policy, including restrictions on US involvement.
EAST AFRICA

Origin

Date
29 Mar 71

JCS Position

(S) NSSM 115, 25 Jan 71 (JCS 2121/220); (S) Memo, NSC Staff to USecState et al., 29 Mar 71 (JCS 2121/220-1); JMF 821/520 (25 Jan 71).

Date
6 Dec 72

(S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Feb 72 (JCS 2010/426), JMF 225 (19 Feb 72); (S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 26 Oct 72 (JCS 2469/998), JMF 832/630 (26 Oct 72) sec 1.

(S) J-5 BP 25-71 for CJCS, 29 Mar 71, same fl!
EAST AFRICA

Origin

Date
6 Dec 72

JCS Position
(S) JCSM-517-72 to SecDef, 6 Dec 72 (JCS 2469/998-3), JMF 832/630 (26 Oct 72) sec 1.

23 Jan 74

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 24 Jan 73 (JCS 2469/998-4), same file. (Memo has handwritten notation of DepSecDef approval.

(S) JCSM-19-74 to SecDef, 23 Jan 74 (JCS 2449/22), JMF 832/630 (21 Jan 74).

(S) JCSM-19-74 to SecDef, 23 Jan 74 (JCS 2449/22), same file.
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<td>23 Jan 74</td>
<td>(S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to SecNav, 15 Mar 74</td>
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<td>(JCS 2449/22-2), same file.</td>
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<td>26 Mar 74</td>
<td>(S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Apr 73</td>
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<td>(JCS 2469/998-0); (S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et</td>
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<td>al., 21 Sep 73 (JCS 2469/998-13); JMP 832/630)</td>
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<td>sec 2.</td>
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<td>12 Feb 75</td>
<td>(S) JCSM-103-74 to SecDef, 26 Mar 74 (JCS 2469/</td>
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S cables
On 22 Jul 75, Dep ASD(ISA) requested information with which to answer Dept of State questions concerning the future of the Kagnew communications facility.

The JCS noted their belief that the Naval Communications Unit at Kagnew Station should remain in operation until permanent replacement.
at Asmara and dependence upon Ethiopian ports and facilities for staging during contingency operations. (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to DJS, 22 Jul 75 (JCS 2449/31), JMF 832/403 (22 Jul 75).

Date: 8 Aug 75

JCS Position: Facilities and systems were available or until benefits no longer justified risks (see item of 12 Feb 75). If developments precluded continued US presence at Kagnew, the JCS informed SecDef that USCINCEUR had a contingency plan for relocation of equipment and personnel. The JCS also informed SecDef that there were no planned requirements for use of Ethiopian ports and facilities for staging except for the protection and evacuation of US citizens, emergency disaster relief, and evacuation/relocation of Kagnew. The JCS believed that the airfields and ports in Ethiopia would be of continuing strategic importance in the Horn of Africa and were hopeful that US relationships with Ethiopia would insure that these facilities were not made available to inimical forces and that US forces would continue to have the necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements. (S) JCSM-323-75 to SecDef, 8 Aug 75 (JCS 2449/31-1), same file.

Date: 18 Sep 75

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS; 15 Sep 75 (JCS 2449/31-2), JMF 832/403 (22 Jul 75).
EAST AFRICA

Origin

Date
18 Sep 75

JCS Position

(C) JCSM-360-75 to SecDef, 18 Sep 75 (JCS 2449/31-2), same file; (TS) Memo, NSC Staff Secy to DepSecState et al., 1 Mar 76 (JCS 2449/32-4), JMF 832/472 (23 Oct 75). JCS 2449/32 series contains NSSM 233-1 and responses.

12 Jul 76

(S) Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jun 76 (JCS 2387/4), JMF 839/474 (28 Jun 76).

(S) DJSM-1196-76 to ASD(ISA), 12 Jul 76 (JCS 2387/4), same file.
Together with ASD(ISA), the DJS recommended to DepSecDef Clements that he sign a memorandum setting forth DOD positions on key issues and policy options. DepSecDef Clements signed the memorandum on 2 Sep 76. In it the DOD considered the NSSM 239 Study to be a comprehensive and objective review of
On 8 Oct 76, SecState agreed to provide a 12-plane military flyby in Nairobi on 12 Dec 76, Kenya Independence Day. SecDef supported the projects and requested the JCS to proceed with arrangements.

(C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Oct 76 (JCS 2387/3), JMP 839/381 (21 Oct 76).

The JCS directed USCINCEUR to provide for a flyby of approximately 12 AV-8 Harrier aircraft on 12 Dec 76.

(S) Msg, ACJCS 8103 to USCINCEUR 11 Nov 76; 1st N/H of JCS 2387/3; same file.

(S) Memo, DJS and ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef Clements, 25 Aug 76; (S) Memo, DepSecDef Clements to Asst to Pres for NSA, 2 Sep 76; both in JCS 2121/230-3, same file.

(S) Memo, ASP(ISA) to DJS, 12 Nov 76 (JCS 2449/31-3), JMP 832/403 (22 Jul 75).
EAST AFRICA

6 Dec 76

(C) Dept of State, Draft Action Memo for SecState, n.d. (JCS 2387/4-1), JMF 839/474 (28 Jun 76).

6 Dec 76

(JCS) MJCS-346-76 to ASD(IS), 6 Dec 76 (JCS 2387/4-1), same file.

6 Dec 76

(JCS) JCSM-401-76 to SecDef, 6 Dec 76 (JCS 2449/31-5), same file.

6 Dec 76

(JCS) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 76 (JCS 2449/31-5), same file.
On 5 Dec 61, Actg ASD(ISA) requested JCS comments on Dept of State "Guidelines of US policy toward Republic of South Africa."

(S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Dec 61
(JCS 2121/115), JMF 9110.1/9105 (5 Dec 61).
overriding US and Free World security interest; there was no specific caveat to moderate implementation of the policies so as to avoid carrying them to the point of precipitating internal disintegration and anarchy in South Africa; guidance with respect to military purchases should be recast to identify clearly pertinent factors and avoid unnecessary restrictiveness; and the objective course of action seeking legalization of "native nationalist movements" appeared imprudent. The JCS provided specific comments to clarify and enhance the paper and requested the SecDef to use their input in preparation of DOD response to Dept of State. (S) JCSM-876-61 to SecDef, 21 Dec 61 (JCS 2121/116), same file.

On 5 Jan 62, Actg ASD(ISA) forwarded to Dept of State the DOD response on the Guidelines paper for South Africa, which incorporated the views of the JCS, and in May 62, Dept of State issued revised "Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Republic of South Africa." (S) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to USecState, 5 Jan 62 (1st N/H of JCS 2121/116); (S) Dept of State, Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Republic of South Africa, May 62 (JCS 2121/147); same file.
On 3 Apr 64, DepSecDef requested JCS comments on a draft NSAM on US policy toward South Africa.
(S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Apr 64 (JCS 2121/176), JMP 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64).

The purpose of the draft NSAM appeared to the JCS to be twofold: (a) to defer the implementation of an apartheid policy in Southwest Africa as long as possible; (b) to persuade South Africa to accept International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in Southwest Africa and to provide an analysis of sanctions possible if South Africa did not do so.

The JCS informed the SecDef that the draft NSAM should be revised to reflect the following: (a) Dept of State should prepare a program consistent with the draft National Policy Paper (see item of 8 Apr 64) and the US should not be put in the position of attempting to force compliance by unilateral action; (b) stability in South Africa was desirable under all circumstances so long as communist penetration and racial discord remained an active threat to Free World interests and the US should refrain from actions that would reduce US ties and interests in South Africa; (c) an early decision should be made to proceed with the sale of three submarines and the US should consider favorably the sale of other military equipment related to the maintenance of international peace and security; (d) the JCS concurred in the draft National Policy Paper objectives of South African alliance with the Western Powers and continuance of existing US deep-space and tracking facilities.
On 6 Mar 64, Actg ASD(ISA) requested JCS review of the Dept of State National Policy Paper on South Africa. This draft paper proposed a new strategic approach to attain various US objectives, consisting of a joint demarche to the South African Government to reconsider and alter its course and to take steps to seek a modus vivendi acceptable to all races in South Africa, in exchange for promised advantages to its international political position.

(U) Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Mar 64 (JCS 2121/172-3), JHF 9110.1/9105 (16 Nov 63) sec 2.

8 Apr 64

The JCS concurred in the new strategic approach toward South Africa as proposed in the Dept of State paper, but did not agree with the apparent intent of abandoning, probably within a few months, the dialogue of persuasion in favor of selective and graduated pressures. They considered that US policy toward South Africa should be sufficiently flexible to permit pursuit of US diplomatic objectives in the international area and, at the same time, to safeguard military interests in the country. As long as racial discord and communist penetration in Africa remained active threats to Free World interests, the JCS believed that stability in South Africa was desirable under all
circumstances and that the US should do everything its political and moral position permitted to contribute to that end. The JCS recommended to Sec Def that the National Policy Paper be revised to reflect the above considerations.

(C) JCSM-290-64 to SecDef, 8 Apr 65 (JCS 2121/172-2), same file.

On 23 Apr 64, Acting ASD(ISA) forwarded the DOD review of the National Policy Paper for South Africa, which included the views of the JCS, to the Dept of State. (For further action, see item of 18 Aug 64.)

(S) Ltr, Actg ASD(ISA) to Dep of State, 23 Apr 6 (JCS 2121/172-3), same file.
On 24 Apr 64, NSAM 295 concerning US policy toward South Africa was published. (For JCS views on a draft of this policy, see item of 7 Apr 64.)

(S) NSAM 295 to SecState et al., 24 Apr 64 (JCS 2121/176-3), JMF 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64).

The JCS informed SecDef that the thrust of five provisions of NSAM 295 might lead the US to an inflexible position of attempting, without likelihood of success, to force South African compliance with external views in seeking precipitate solutions to South Africa's problem. The provisions were: (a) planning for alternate facilities if those in South Africa were evacuated; (b) negotiating agreements for alternate facilities; (c) suspending action on loans or investment guarantees; (d) analysis of sanctions possible if South Africa did not accept the decision of the ICJ; (e) postponement of any decision on sale of submarines to South Africa. The JCS considered such provisions counterproductive to US interests and reminiscent of tragic policies toward the Chiang Kai Shek and Batista governments. They reiterated their...
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<th>JCS Position</th>
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<td>22 May 64</td>
<td>earlier views and recommended as a matter of urgency that SecDef discuss the JCS views with the President and SecState and advise them to revise NSAM 295. (C) JCSR-439-64 to SecDef, 22 May 64 (JCS 2121/176-4), same file.</td>
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<td>7 Jul 64</td>
<td>On 7 Jul 64, Dep ASD(ISA) informed the JCS that their views expressed in JCSM-290-64 (see item of 8 Apr 64) had been incorporated in the formal DOD comments on the National Policy Paper on South Africa. If a paper consistent with DOD recommendations could be achieved, it would avoid the precipitate measures that could result in a loss of South Africa and the implementation of NSAM 295 would be governed accordingly. (For further action, see item of 18 Aug 64.) (C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Jul 64 (JCS 2121/176-5), same file.</td>
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<td>18 Aug 64</td>
<td>The JCS expressed serious reservations concerning the shift in the draft from the previous broad approach to one concentrating on Southwest Africa. They considered that the &quot;phase two&quot; approach should be revised to reflect earlier JCS opinions (see item of 8 Apr 64). Further, the revised approach should be initiated before or along with a similar persuasive approach concerning Southwest Africa. They drew attention to the apparent use of NSAM 295 as a basis for authority to support a &quot;new strategic approach.&quot; The JCS had</td>
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On 5 Aug 64, Dep ASD(ISA) forwarded a revision of the draft National Policy Paper for South Africa for JCS review. (For previous action, see item of 8 Apr 64.) (U) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Aug 64 (JCS 2121/163), JMF 9110.1 (5 Aug 64) sec 1.
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<td>18 Aug 64</td>
<td>had previously commented on NSAM 295 (see items of 7 Apr 64 and 22 May 64). They recommended that NSAM 295 be revised to reflect their previous views and revisions of the National Policy Paper based thereon. The JCS reiterated their views that the objectives of the US should include South Africa's alignment with the Western powers, continuance of existing deep space and tracking facilities in South Africa, and military sales for defense against external aggression. They also believed that the revision of NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper should avoid the implication that the US would be prepared to support sanctions or the implication that US forces might be committed to enforce any Security Council resolution calling for the imposition of sanctions in connection with the problems either of South Africa or Southwest Africa. (C) JCSM-716-64 to SecDef, 18 Aug 64 (JCS 2121/183-1), same file.</td>
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On 29 Sep 64, ASD(ISA) notified the Dept of State that the DOD concurred in the proposed National Policy Paper subject to certain comments. He forwarded the JCS views to Dept of State, but he left the matter of a return to the broad approach to State decision. He noted that NSAM 295 was an interim measure and should be superseded when the policy paper was approved. DOD believed that the proposed paper did not imply any decision on sanctions or the use of force. (C) Memo, ASD(ISA) to Chm PPC, Dept of State, 29 Sep 64 (JCS 2121/183-2), same file.
On 3 Oct 68, ASD (JSA) requested JCS comments on the importance of (a) South Africa’s airborne ASW role in the common defense and (b) new aircraft (P-3) for South Africa’s ASW mission.

(S) Memo, ASD (ISA) to CJCS, 12 Sep 64 (JCS 2121/186), JMP 9110.1 (12 Sep 64).

The JCS informed SecDef that they considered the sale of P-3 aircraft to South Africa to be in the US national interest. They recommended that SecDef strongly support this position. Not only was South African capability essential for ASW around the Cape of Good Hope, but the South African aircraft were approaching the end of their useful life.

(C) JCSM-794-64 to SecDef, 14 Sep 64 (JCS 2121/186-1), same file.

DepSecDef concurred in the JCS position to Sec State, but the “President disapproved the sale ‘at this time.’”

(C) Memo, DepSecDef to SecState, 15 Sep 64 (JCS 2121/186-2); (S) MFR, Spec Asst to Pres for NSA, 30 Nov 64 (JCS 2121/186-3); same file.
SOUTHERN AFRICA

Origin

(U) Memos, Dep ASD to DJS, 2 and 5 Oct 64 (JCS 2121/188), JMP 9110.1 (2 Oct 64).

Date

19 Oct 64

JCS Position

(C) JCSM-883-64 to SecDef, 19 Oct 64 (JCS 2121/188-1), same file.

Pursuant to the National Policy Paper on South Africa (see item of 18 Aug 64), Dep ASD(ISA) requested that the JCS make an analysis of the feasibility of the use of US military forces, possibly as a part of the UN "peace-keeping" action, to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding South-West Africa or to enforce, by means of a blockade or otherwise, international economic sanctions against South Africa.

(C) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Feb 65 (JCS 2121/189), JMP 9110 (24 Feb 65).

13 Apr 65

The JCS furnished the required analysis. In addition they advised that: there would be many unfavorable consequences resulting from the use of US military forces, even under a UN umbrella, against South Africa; the required diversion of major elements of US military power from essential defense tasks and commitments would result in serious reduction in US capabilities to deter and counter communist aggression; and US position clearly in opposition to sanctions and force and clearly in favor of nonviolent solutions should be adopted as the basis for US policy. They recommended that SecDef discuss the South African problem with the President and SecState, that they be advised of JCS views, and that the
On 6 Dec 65, Dep ASD(ISA) requested that the JCS analyze Rhodesian defense capabilities, estimate the nature and size of military force required to accomplish specific objectives, and point up any particular military problems in mounting the operations.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Dec 65 (JCS 2121/196), JMP 9112.5 (6 Dec 65).

On 16 Dec 65, Dep ASD(ISA) requested the JCS to analyze Rhodesian defense capabilities, estimate the nature and size of military force required to accomplish specific objectives, and point up any particular military problems in mounting the operations.

(S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Dec 65 (JCS 2121/196), JMP 9112.5 (6 Dec 65).

On 19 Jan 66, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on the strategic importance of port and airfield facilities in the Republic of South Africa and the alternatives to such facilities.

On 16 Jan 66, Dep ASD(ISA) requested JCS views on the strategic importance of port and airfield facilities in the Republic of South Africa and the alternatives to such facilities.

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On 21 Feb 67, DepSecDef requested the JCS and others for an assessment of minimum DOD requirements for use in the Republic of South Africa ports, yards, airfields, and real estate as well as an analysis of alternatives for meeting these requirements. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCSEt al., 21 Feb 67, (JCS 2121/205), JMF 855/470 (21 Feb 67).

On 19 Jan 66, the JCS, in a memorandum to the CJCS and others, expressed concern over the economic, industrial, and geographic position of Southern Africa with respect to the rest of Africa. Since unsettled conditions in the rest of Africa had increased the importance of South African facilities, the JCS continued to advocate a firm, patient, diplomatic dialogue with South Africa as the means offering the most potential for achieving US objectives (see items of 7 Apr and 14 Sep 64). (S) Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to CJCS 14 Jan 66 (JCS 2125/28-1), JMF 9166.2 (7 Jan 66).

On 5 Apr 67, the JCS informed SecDef that, although use of South African facilities was highly desirable, alternative solutions could be found for all current military requirements for facilities or contractual support in the Republic of South Africa. Such alternatives would, however, increase costs and result in less efficient use of available manpower, ship, and aircraft assets. The JCS also advised that: denial of airbase and overflight rights in South Africa would seriously complicate air operations in South Africa and adjacent areas; loss of South African facilities would reduce US capability to react to contingency situations in Africa south of the Sahara and in the Middle East and would degrade tracking and telemetry capability for space flights as well as DOD capability to support
On 13 Sep 67, the subject of US disengagement from South Africa was discussed at a NSC meeting. As a result, the Actg CJCS requested that this matter be addressed by the JCS.

(S) JCS 2121/206, 21 Sep 67, JMF 855/532 (21 Sep 67).

On 26 Sep 67, the JCS requested that SecDef discuss the following points with SecState: the serious JCS concern with the continued drift of the US Government toward a policy of disengagement from South Africa; the more immediate importance of relaxing restrictions that then prohibited US Navy and MSTS ships from making operational and maintenance stops at South African ports; and the increasing difficulties in military intelligence collection activities caused by the current US policy toward South Africa.

(S) JCSM-525-67 to SecDef, 26 Sep 67 (JCS 2121/206), same file.

On 19 Oct 67, DepSecDef forwarded the JCS views to USecState, noting the need for urgent completion of the current interagency review of US policy toward South Africa. On 15 Nov 67, USecState replied stating that he asked the Dept of State to move ahead as quickly as possible on a new regional National Policy Paper on Southern Africa that was designed to cover
On 5 Nov 68, the Policy Planning Council, Dept of State, requested comments of all concerned agencies on Dept of State proposed third draft of a National Policy Paper on Southern Africa. (S) Ltr, Dep of State to All Concerned USC Agencies, 5 Nov 68 (JCS 2121/211), JMF 821/532 (5 Nov 68) sec 1.

On 10 April 69, Dr. Kissinger relayed to SecState, SecDef, and DCI the President's direction for a comprehensive review of US policy toward Southern Africa (south of the Congo and Tanzania). The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa prepared the requested study and it was circulated within the NSC on 18 Aug 69. The study presented five options for US policy for the area:

[SOUTH AFRICA]

On 12 Dec 68, the JCS informed SecDef that the draft policy paper did not contain courses of action to implement fully US interests and objectives in the area. Moreover, some courses of action imposed unnecessary limitations on military activities in South Africa and could be counterproductive to US interests and objectives. The JCS recommended that the draft paper be returned to the Policy Planning Council for revision in order to develop realistic courses of action. (S) JCSM-739-68 to SecDef, 12 Dec 68 (JCS 2121/211-3), same file, sec 2.

On 16 Oct 69, a joint talking paper for ASD(ISA) and Dir J-5 stated that Defense interests in Southern Africa would be adversely affected most by options 4 and 5 and to a lesser degree by option 3, while they would be enhanced by option 2 and more so by option 1. The talking paper recommended submission of the study to the NSC with certain revisions. (S) Joint Talking Paper, n.d. (JCS 2121/212-3), same file, sec 2.
Subsequently, the Interdepartmental Group study was revised and recirculated on 12 Dec 69. The revised study added a sixth option—

A talking paper for SecDef and CJCS for a NSC meeting on 17 Dec 69 stated that Defense interests would best be served by options 1 and 2.

(S) Memo, NSC Staff to SecState et al., 12 Dec 69 (JCS 2121/212-5); (S) Talking Paper for SecDef and CJCS, n.d. (JCS 2121/212-6); JMF 821/532 (10 Apr 69) sec 2.

On 28 Jan 70, the President made the following decisions:

(TS) NSDM 38, 28 Jan 70, JMF 001 (CY 1970)
NSDMs.
On 12 February 70, Dr. Kissinger relayed to SecState, SecDef and others the President's direction for a study of US policy on Southwest Africa (Namibia).

On 17 Apr 70, the President made, among others, the following decisions with regard to Southwest Africa: current restrictions on official visits to, military contacts with, and overflights of Southwest Africa would remain in effect; the US would support, but would not propose, UN action to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of aspects of South Africa's administration of Southwest Africa.

(S) NSSM 89, 12 Feb 70 (JCS 2121/216), JMF 821/532 (12 Feb 70).

(S) NSDM 75, 17 Apr 70, JMF 001 (CI 1970) NSDM5.
OPLANS FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

**Origin**

18 Apr 61

**Date**

18 Apr 61

**JCS Position**

(TS) SM-432-61 to CINCLANT, 18 Apr 61
(JCS 2018/243), same file, sec 2.

See notation on (TS) CINCLANT OPLAN 330-61(63),
JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61) sec 1.

18 Dec 61

**JCS Position**

(C) SM-1377-61 to CINCLANT, 18 Dec 61
(JCS 2018/318), same file, sec 2.

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(TS) Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS et al., 7 Sep 61,
JMF 3142 (18 Feb 61) sec 1. (C) JCS 2018/295,
25 Sep 61, same file, sec 2.
OPLANS FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Origin

Date
29 Jul 64

JCS Position

(TS) JCS 2363/36-1, 23 Sep 64; (TS) JCS 2363/36-2, 28 Sep 64; (S) JCS 2363/36-3, 30 Sep 64; (TS) JCS 2363/36-4, 1 Oct 64; (TS) JCS 2363/36-5, 21 Dec 64; JMF 3149 (29 Jul 64) sec 2.

20 May 66

The JCS approved CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA OPLAN 512 (Revised) subject to certain changes. (S) SM-418-66 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA, 20 May 66 (JCS 2363/51-5), same file, sec 1.

(TS) Ltr, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA to JCS et al., 8 Feb 66, JMF 3149/512 (1966). (U) JCS 2363/51, 18 Feb 66, same file, sec 1.

(S) Ltrs, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA to JCS, 29 Nov 66 and 7 Feb 68 (JCS 2363/51-1 and JCS 2363/51-13) (S) SM-312-67 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA, 25 Apr 67 (JCS 2363/51-12); (S) SM-317-68 to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAPSA, 4 May 68 (JCS 2363/51-19); JMF 3149/512 (1966) secs 1 and 2.
OPLANS FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Origin

Date
29 Oct 70

JCS Position
(S) MJCS-414-70 to CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 29 Oct 70 (1st N/H of JCS 2363/118); (U) JCS 2363/30 Dec 70; (TS) MJCS-55-71 to CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 29 Feb 71 (1st N/H of JCS 2363/122; (U) JCS 2363/130, 15 Jul 71; (S) MJCS-298-71 to CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 4 Oct 71 (1st N/H of JCS 2363/130); JMF 349 (31 Jul 69).

(TS) Lt. CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS et al., 31 Jul 69; (U) JCS 2363/102, 29 Aug 69; (TS) SM-841-69 to CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 5 Dec 69 (JCS 2363/102-6); (U) JCS 2363/118, 5 Aug 70; JMF 349 (31 Jul 69).

23 Jun 72

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OPLANS FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Origin

Date
23 Jun 72

JCS Position

(S) JCS CONPLAN 0100, 17 Mar 72; (C) JCS CONPLAN 0200, 17 Mar 72; JMP 350 (17 Mar 72)
sec 1A. (S) JCS 2507-5, 6 Jun 62, JMP 350 (17 Mar 72):
OPLAN FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Origin

Date
12 Feb 75

JCS Position

(S) Mag, JCS 1318 to USCINCEUR, 12 Feb 75; (S) Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 20 Feb 75; (U) JCS 2449/29, 11 Mar 75; (C) Mag, JCS 8897 to USCINCEUR, 3 Apr 75; same file.

(S) Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 28 Jan 75; (U) JCS 2449/26, 7 Feb 75; JMF 345 (28 Jan 75).