MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
THE GENERAL COUNSEL
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
THE ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 22, 1961

SUBJECT: Testimony on the President's Program

In response to inquiries from within the Department, this is to inform you that under this Administration the same procedure that has been observed in the past for clearance of testimony upon budget estimates, budget policy, and legislative proposals is to be observed.

Quoted and summarized below are the relevant guidelines:

1. Testimony upon legislative proposals and Budget requests or estimates must be handled in accordance with the clearance procedures contained in Bureau of the Budget Circulars No. A-19 and A-10. These stress the relating of all statements to the Program of the President; and assume that all interested officials will state and argue their views forcefully within the Executive Branch, but once a decision is made will whole-heartedly support it at all times.
2. All witnesses should comply with the directions contained in the Budget Bureau Director letter of December 31, 1958:

"It is understandable that officials and employees will feel strongly about the importance of their own agency's work, and will sometimes believe that a larger budget might be in order. Such feelings, however, must be related to an awareness that our budget resources are not adequate to accommodate in any one year all of the things that might be desired. The President is responsible for reviewing the total needs of the executive branch in the light of tax and debt policy and for deciding among competing requests for priorities. Executive branch personnel are expected to support the President in his budget recommendations.

"As you and your staff prepare to justify your portion of the budget before Congress, you will want to observe the requirements set forth at the President's direction in Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-10. It is expected that witnesses will carefully avoid volunteering views differing from the budget, either on the record or off the record. While direct questions at hearings must be answered frankly, it is expected that a witness who feels that he must set forth a personal view inconsistent with the President's budget will also point out that the President's judgment on the matter was reached from his overall perspective as the head of the Government, and in the light of overriding national policy. The witness should make it clear that his personal comments are not to be construed as a request for additional funds."

Robert S. McNeirne
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The President felt it would be more appropriate if you were to issue the attached directive to those concerned in your Department, instead of having it come from the White House, inasmuch as this does not seem to be of concern to the other Departments and agencies (although, if you will send me a copy of your directive, the President suggested that I might want to send it as a model to other Department heads).

Theodore C. Sorensen
Special Counsel to the President

Carbon copy of memorandum and attachment to:
Honorable Arthur Sylvester
March 15, 1961

In response to inquiries from within the Department, this is to inform you that under this Administration the same procedure that has been observed in the past for clearance of testimony upon budget estimates, budget policy, and legislative proposals is to be observed.

Quoted and summarized below are the relevant guidelines:

1. Testimony upon legislative proposals and Budget requests or estimates must be handled in accordance with the clearance procedures contained in Bureau of the Budget Circulars No. A-19 and A-10. These stress the relating of all statements to the Program of the President; and assume that all interested officials will state and argue their views forcefully within the Executive Branch, but once a decision is made will wholeheartedly support it in public testimony.

2. All witnesses should comply with the directions contained in the Budget Bureau Director letter of December 31, 1958:

"It is understandable that officials and employees will feel strongly about the importance of their own agency's work, and will sometimes believe that a larger budget might be in order. Such feelings, however, must be related to an awareness that our budget resources are not adequate to accommodate in any one year all of the things that might be desired. The President is responsible for reviewing the total needs of the executive branch in the light of tax and debt policy and for deciding among competing requests for priorities. Executive branch personnel are expected to support the President in his budget recommendations.

"As you and your staff prepare to justify your portion of the budget before Congress, you will want to observe the requirements set forth at the President's direction in Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-10. It is expected that witnesses will carefully avoid volunteering views
differing from the budget, either on the record or off
the record. While direct questions at hearings must
be answered frankly, it is expected that a witness who
feels that he must set forth a personal view inconsist-
etent with the President's budget will also point out that
the President's judgment on the matter was reached
from his overall perspective as the head of the Govern-
ment, and in the light of overriding national policy. The
witness should make it clear that his personal comments
are not to be construed as a request for additional funds.

The instructions referred to above are designed to insure that all
agencies make their maximum contribution to the Administration's
program. It is the responsibility of each agency head and each Ad-
ministration witness to familiarize himself with those instructions
and to insure that his actions reflect a properly coordinated Executive
branch position.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Project No. 45 - Instructions on Statements and Testimony before Congressional Committees.

I have a draft statement, which has been cleared by Cy Vance and Arthur Sylvester as to substance. However, there is a White House development which we all believe has an important bearing on how this whole matter is handled.

As you know, the Budget Bureau had drafted a government-wide directive on the subject of the behaviour of witnesses before Congressional committees. Ted Sorenson has re-worked a draft, and discussed it with the President yesterday. The President has some ideas of his own on the subject, and the paper is being re-drafted now by Sorenson. He hopes that it can be released within the next day or two. The President is apparently quite sensitive about the handling of this subject in the light of possible Congressional repercussions.

Under the circumstances, we strongly urge that you await the Presidential directive before we attempt to commit anything to paper over your signature. It would be our hope that the Presidential directive, widely circulated here, under a direction from you for strict compliance would be the most effective way of handling this problem. In any event, we feel that it would be unwise to attempt to draft anything until we see what is in the Presidential directive.

Norman S. Paul
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)
requirement, validate requirements, recommend approval for the implementation, monitor the implementation, and evaluate performance.

4. The C3S Systems Directorate, OJCS, will implement the attached procedures and will initiate actions to revise the appropriate documents to eliminate duplication of procedures and insure consistency of policy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. WATSON
Colonel, USMC
Acting Secretary

Attachment

Reference
* Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 12 June 1981, "The Planning Phase of the DOD PPB System"
POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

SN-7-82
FOREWORD

This document provides a consolidated statement of policy and common procedures for the management of joint C2 systems and C2 systems with joint/combined implications. Joint C2 systems provide the NCA and the commanders of the unified and specified commands with the ability to conduct joint and combined operations. In addition to joint C2 systems, command, control, and communications systems and equipment with joint implications are those that:

a. Are intended to provide NCA connectivity.
b. Have been designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority as systems/equipment having cross-Service, cross-command, cross-program, or international implications or that are of special interest. This includes prioritizations by a commander of a unified or specified command.

Commonality of C2 functional tasks, objectives, and responsibilities is established as a matter of policy. The procedures provide common channels and a single set of documents to establish objectives, identify deficiencies, translate the deficiencies into statements of requirements, validate the requirements, recommend approval for implementation, monitor the achievement of capabilities, and evaluate performance.
## CONTENTS

1. General Considerations .......................... 1
2. Tasks Supported by Command and Control Systems ........ 3
3. General Objectives for Command and Control System Elements ........ 7
4. Management Concept for Joint Systems and Equipment 11
   a. General ........................................ 11
   b. Responsibilities ............................. 12
   c. Procedures .................................. 13
      (1) Establishing Objectives ................. 13
      (2) Identification of a Deficiency ....... 13
      (3) Translation of the Deficiency Into a Statement of Requirements 13
      (4) Validation of the Statement of Requirements 14
      (5) Approval of the Implementation Proposal 14
      (6) Monitorship of Implementation to Fielding 15
      (7) Evaluating Performance ................. 15
   d. Classification of Joint Command and Control Systems and Systems/Equipment With Joint Implications 15
      (1) General .................................. 15
      (2) Classification ............................ 16
         (a) Joint Command and Control Systems/ Equipment ................ Hi
         (b) Systems/Equipment With Joint Implications ............... 17

## Appendices

Appendix A References ................................ A-1
Appendix B Outline and Submission Schedule of Command and Control System Master Plans, Summary Plans, and Programs ............................. B-1
Appendix C Format for the Submission of Required Operational Capabilities ........................................ C-1
Appendix D Procedures for the Modification, Improvement, and Introduction of Joint C2 Systems ......................... D-1
Appendix E Format for Technical Analysis and Cost Estimate for Operational Requirements ................................ B-1
Appendix F Command and Control Five Year Summary Plan ................. F-1
POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. General Considerations
   a. The NCA exercises operational direction and administrative support of US forces worldwide, under all force postures. The capability to exercise these functions is provided by interoperating command and control (C2) systems, which also provide appropriate capabilities at the various command echelons for which they were designed. The total capability created by these interoperating systems is not a single system, nor is it planned to become one. Some C2 systems are dedicated to the support of the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, for the most part, C2 systems are designed, developed, procured, and employed to satisfy mission requirements of the Service or command that normally uses them. At any given time, connectivity of the systems is structured to support the information exchange and command communications requirements of the prevailing situation. Therefore, compatibility of C2 procedures and interoperability of C2 systems and the communications supporting them are essential.
   b. A basic consideration for implementation of joint C2 systems is the assumption that major losses in US warmaking and C2 capabilities, as well as serious disruption of US policymaking capabilities, are possible. Such losses should not prevent the NCA and other commanders from controlling the execution of military options and performing the C2 functional tasks. Therefore, physical and functional survivability of the C2 functions and of
interconnecting communications is a critical planning factor.

c. A corporate goal of the Department of Defense is to acquire a flexible, survivable, and effective worldwide C2 capability supported by adequate interconnecting communications, where required. The development of concepts and procedures, the acquisition of material, the establishment of facilities, and the training of personnel to achieve this goal may cut across established organizational lines of responsibility. Conceptually, C2 equipment should form an entity; however, in its aggregate it is too amorphous and evolutionary for consideration as a single major acquisition. Because of the various major procurements needed for implementation of C2 capabilities, close coordination among DOD components is mandatory to insure that C2 and supporting communications programs maximize benefits to be derived and are phased to be available at a useful time.
d. The urgency, during crisis, of communicating warning and intelligence from all sources to the NCA and of passing decisions and commands to the military forces requires that systems be responsive and reliable, and as survivable as the NCA and as the commands and forces they support. Compatibility of procedures and interoperability of equipment are mandatory in furthering success of joint and combined operations. Several factors dictate special emphasis on management procedures to minimize unnecessary duplication of systems without enforcing standardization where it does not provide clear advantages. These factors are: resource limitations; an evolving technological base; multiple requirements for interfaces;
the need for compatible procedures throughout the chain of command; and the need to involve end users in the evolutionary growth of existing capabilities.

2. Tasks Supported by Command and Control Systems
   a. Command and control systems, regardless of the level of command supported, accomplish their purpose by providing the means to perform all or applicable portions of the following tasks:

   (1) Monitor the Current Situation, Including the Status of US and Non-US Forces. This is the process of sensing critical information concerning the political, economic, and military situation on a worldwide basis. The process requires all-source information collection and processing to recognize unique events, to identify changes in the status of US and non-US force capabilities and in the politico-economic environment. The term "all-source" means total information as provided from all available resources without regard to functional origin. Situation monitoring includes assessment of environmental conditions, logistic capabilities, status of forces, intelligence, and plans as they affect allocation and expenditure of resources in support of projected national policy initiatives and force activity levels. It includes direction of strategic and tactical reconnaissance activities and requires a continuing assessment of the integrity of C2 systems.

   (2) Formulate Responses to Warning and Threat Assessment. The process includes evaluation of enemy intentions, current enemy capability to carry out
intentions, and the selection, adaptation, or formulation of plans responsive to the specific situation.

(a) In the strategic sense, the process is initiated by reports of critical indications of change in the level or direction of unfriendly economic, political, or military activity in terms of specific threats to US or allied forces, territory, or national interests.

(b) In the tactical sense, the process is initiated by reporting and displaying information that an enemy has initiated hostilities. It provides information on the origin, objectives, and nature of the attack and includes subsequent confirmation of the validity of the warning. It provides the basis for relating attack indications to planned options for initial response.

(3) Select Options, Employ Forces, and Execute Operation Plans

(a) For deterrence, this is the process of perceiving the pattern of enemy response to US activity and assessing the impact of US activity on the enemy posture and capability to initiate hostilities. It includes issuing force alerts and monitoring achievement of increased readiness status. It also includes planning for dynamic employment of forces to counter enemy initiatives and recommending a course of action that best meets the situation. Direction and control of forces must provide for the selected force employment options to be implemented as intended.
(b) For force employment to control escalation, the process includes selecting appropriate responses, implementing operation plans, perceiving the changes in patterns of enemy response to US activity, and assessing the impact and effectiveness of US activity in terms of the enemy response. It also includes planning for dynamic alternatives to force activities, directing deployment and redeployment of forces, and monitoring the US force activities in response both to their own direction and to enemy activities.

(c) For force employment in response to hostilities, the process includes determining and directing US force activities in response to tactical warning and recommending an appropriate response based on attack assessment.

(4) **Perform Attack, Strike, Damage, and Residual Capability Assessment**

(a) The performance of attack assessment includes the process of deriving projected attack patterns and impact points from sensed attack events to determine the character and expected effectiveness of an attack. The process includes evaluation of the effects of the projected attack on US force capability.

(b) The performance of strike, damage, and residual capability assessment includes the process of acquiring strike and damage reports, correlating them to provide a perception of the extent of damage to friendly and enemy forces,
and evaluating the impact of damage upon enemy
and friendly force residual capabilities and
resources. The process also includes identifica-
tion of requirements and priorities for recovery
and reconstitution of US forces.
(5) Reconstitute and Redirect Forces. This process
includes acting on status reports concerning the
location, condition, and availability of military
resources after attack. The process includes
reviewing the progress of directed activities
and planning subsequent force employment options
based on damage assessment and residual capabilities.
(6) Terminate Hostilities and Active Operations.
This is the process of perceiving a willingness
on the part of the enemy to negotiate termination
of hostilities, projecting the results of current US
and enemy activity, and assessing enemy intent and
residual capability. The process includes develop-
ing plans for recovery and redeployment to deter
renewed conflict and monitoring the achievement of
the directed recovery posture to insure that the
conflict terminates under conditions favorable to
the United States.
b. These generic tasks define the purpose of C2 systems
and apply to the full spectrum of operations, at all
levels of command. A command level may at any given
time require the definition of subtasks which more
closely delineate command-unique functions and which
amplify the above generic tasks with scenario or
command level specifics.
3. **General Objectives for Command And Control System Elements.**

   a. C2 systems perform common tasks within the US command hierarchy in the pursuit of common missions. Hence, individual systems must exhibit certain attributes to insure that C2 is not the limiting factor in US warfighting capability but rather provides options for execution of plans and aids exploitation of battlefield opportunities. The general objectives are stated below for each of the C2 system elements. They are planning factors for the identification of deficiencies in existing systems and provide rationale for stating requirements. Although presented by C2 system element, the entire list must be considered in its relationship to the C2 functional tasks so as to generate balanced capabilities within systems.

   b. The general objectives for the Joint Command and Control System Elements are:

      (1) **Command Facilities.** Achieve survivability through mobility, redundancy, hardness, deception, dispersal, or combinations thereof for continuity of operations under the worst probable conditions of conflict, including nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.

      (a) Within any definable command structure, at least one command center must survive the threat projected by latest JCS-approved documents.

      (b) The surviving command center(s) must be capable of supporting all mission-required C2 functional tasks of the supported command throughout all phases of any conflict.
(c) Alternate operating facilities are required to assure the survival of a military command and control capability. The physical size of alternate facilities may influence the capability that can be incorporated. In addition, adverse conditions for communications will exist during hostilities. Nevertheless, alternate facilities must meet the following basic operating requirements:

1. Operate continuously with qualified watch teams, maintaining a readiness to support the general war command function.

2. Provide immediate access to a continuously updated data base of information required for direction of the US military forces. This capability can result in part from using information from the primary command centers. However, reliance on primary command centers should not limit or degrade the capability to operate independently with data received directly from external sources.

3. Transition rapidly without prior warning from a standby mode of operation to performing as the primary military center. When an alternate becomes the primary center, other facilities will continue to maintain their capability to assume the primary center function, if required.

4. Communicate continuously with other major facilities.
(2) Communications. Achieve flexibility, survivability, and security (including physical) of communications in support of operations throughout the spectrum of force postures.

(a) Communications must survive the disruptive physical and electromagnetic effects incident to nuclear attacks.

(b) Telecommunications planning should provide for the use of allied, commercial, and other-agency communications systems by US forces. US unilateral telecommunications must be provided in those cases where US policy dictates.

(c) The communications should be flexible in order to provide endurability and to permit reconstitution and restoration using all surviving systems. Flexibility includes the ability to limit and manage traffic into bandwidth-constrained systems.

(d) Communications must continue to operate under severe ECM conditions through use of ECCM design features and operating procedures.

(3) Warning Systems

(a) Provide warning regardless of enemy tactics or technology, natural disturbance, or US situation through a system combination of availability, detection probability, and geographic coverage of all known and probable attack launch points.

(b) Insure that neither a strategic weapon impact on the United States nor an attack upon
a US satellite occurs without prior warning having been received by the NCA.

(c) Insure that warning/characterization information has sufficient validity so that immediate force preservation actions can be initiated for those elements where appropriate.

(d) Provide credible warning/characterization information as soon as possible after initiation of an attack and continually thereafter.

(e) Provide sufficiently accurate data to support meaningful sensor information correlations.

(4) Command and Control Procedures

(a) Refine and continuously evaluate procedures in order to reduce redundant information requirements; eliminate unnecessary reports; and provide complete, accurate, reliable, and timely information to the NCA and other appropriate decisionmakers.

(b) Provide the capability to support dynamic operations and nuclear employment planning. Support should be based on current intelligence, warning, attack, residual capability, and damage assessment, force status and employment, and enemy tactics information.

(5) Command and Control Data Collection and Processing

(a) Achieve a user-oriented data management system capable of supporting centralized and distributed data bases and performing the directory and locator functions related to remote access of the data bases.
(b) Achieve a simple, highly responsive, standard data update, retrieval, and manipulation capability for use by authorized functional users via remote terminal in support of decisionmakers.

(c) Achieve compatibility and interoperability through standard terminology, data elements, codes, formats, symbology, system and application software, data base structures, and procedures.

(d) Achieve secure ADP system interaction among ADP facilities and interaction directly with other systems (i.e., NATO Command and Control Information System, DOD Intelligence Information System, and generally supporting functional ADP systems--such as logistics/personnel--often used in crises).

(e) Achieve ADP connectivity, data timeliness, reliability, credibility and availability, and operational procedures to provide an ad hoc crisis action planning capability.

4. Management Concept for Joint Command and Control Systems and Equipment

a. General. Some of the references in Appendix A stipulate characteristics that C2 systems and equipment must possess to provide functional integrity and robustness. These characteristics, together with compatibility of procedures and interoperability of equipment, allow routine and predictably reliable structuring of DOD C2 systems into networks to support the information exchange and command
communications requirements of any given situation. This paragraph:

(1) Lists management responsibilities common to all DOD components for certain C2 systems and equipment.
(2) Establishes the procedures to be used for exercising the common responsibilities.
(3) Defines the C2 systems and equipment to which the common responsibilities and procedures apply.

The procedures are to guide all DOD components in accomplishing their common responsibilities within the framework of the consolidated policy established in the preceding paragraphs. The procedures described in the appendices are intended to:

(1) Enhance through coordination the ability to achieve the corporate DOD goal of obtaining a flexible, survivable, and effective C2 capability.
(2) Provide periodic top-level review of programs in achieving balance in the C2 capability, including the requirements of commanders of unified and specified commands.
(3) Permit integration of new characteristics (as concepts evolve) into the overall capability rather than as isolated fixes.
(4) Highlight deficiencies/gaps for remedial action.
(5) Reduce documentation.

b. Responsibilities

(1) The references in Appendix A identify certain managerial responsibilities which are shared by all DOD components. These responsibilities are:

(a) Establishing objectives.
(b) Identifying deficiencies.
(c) Translating deficiencies into statements of requirements.
(d) Validating the requirements.
(e) Recommending an implementation.
(f) Monitoring the implementation through fielding of a capability.
(g) Testing and evaluating the capability.

(2) Executive authority for individual managerial functions may vary according to the specific item being addressed. However, as a matter of policy, for the systems and equipment in subparagraph 4d, all DOD components share in the process leading to implementation of the capability.

c. Procedures. The following common procedures are established to carry out the responsibilities enumerated above:

(1) Establishing Objectives. JCS Pubs 11, 12, and 19 and Annex C (Command, Control, and Communications) to the JSPO state the joint C2 objectives. Objectives may be periodically approved by appropriate authority and will, until reflected in the above objectives documents, represent additional guidance.

(2) Identification of a Deficiency. Appendix B (Outline and Submission Schedule of C2 System Master Plans, Summary Plans, and Programs) provides the primary vehicle for the commanders of the unified and specified commands to identify deficiencies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a yearly basis. In cases of urgency, deficiencies may be identified and submitted at any time in accordance with Appendix C.

(3) Translation of the Deficiency Into a Statement of Requirements. Appendix C (Format for the Submission
of Required Operational Capabilities) provides the vehicle for submission of a statement of requirements in nontechnical language, together with justification and, optionally, a description of characteristics. A mandatory distribution list provides for coordination. This format is to be used when a requirement is to be validated by the joint process in accordance with the references of Appendix A. When, in accordance with the references of Appendix A, validation of a requirement with joint implications is a Service responsibility, the Service-validated statement of requirement will be coordinated with the addressees listed in Part III of Appendix C. While the format of the Service-validated statement of requirement may vary from that in Appendix C, the same data elements must be addressed to permit full coordination.

(4) Validation of the Statement of Requirements.
Appendix D (Policy for the Modification, Improvement, and Introduction of Joint C2 Systems) provides the policy, procedures, and responsibilities of DoD components for validation of joint requirements.

(5) Approval of the Implementation Proposal. Appendix E (Format for Technical Analysis and Cost Estimate for Operational Requirements) provides the procedures, responsibility, and documentation for approving and assigning implementation proposals for operational requirements validated under joint procedures. The data elements of Appendix E (albeit not necessarily in the format of that Appendix) are to be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the directives in Appendix A require that Service/Agency validation information
be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for supervision of the validation process.

(6) **Monitorship of Implementation to Fielding.** Appendix F (Command and Control Five Year Summary Plan) provides the vehicle for an annual coordinated review of the evolutionary improvement of joint C2 systems and equipment having joint implications as defined in subparagraph 4d. It also permits assessment of how well the objectives are being met with decentralized implementation of OSD centralized C2 direction.

(7) **Evaluating Performance.** JCS MOP 183 and JCS Pub 19 contain provisions and methodology for evaluating command, control, and communications systems. A schedule of evaluation events for those systems is published annually. It provides a composite listing of JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercises and tests that are designated as command, control, and communications system evaluation events and evaluation objectives for those events. Inputs for the Schedule of Evaluation Events from the unified and specified commands, the Services, and Defense agencies are requested when the schedule is being prepared. The command, control, and communications systems evaluation objectives listed for each scheduled event are selected, as appropriate within the constraints of the exercise, to permit evaluation of strategic, theater/tactical, and Defense-wide systems.

d. **Classification of Joint Command and Control Systems and Systems/Equipment With Joint Implications**

(1) **General.** This paragraph specifies those joint C2 systems and systems/equipment with joint implications to which the procedures of subparagraph 4c, above, apply.
(2) Classification

(a) Joint Command and Control Systems/Equipment.

Joint C2 systems and equipment consist of:

2. C2 systems of the unified and specified commands.
   a. Command and control systems of the subordinate unified commands.
   b. Command and control systems of the headquarters of the service component commands.
   c. Command and control systems of the headquarters of joint task forces, when established and assigned.
3. C2 related management/information systems of the headquarters of the Military Departments having joint implications.
4. C2 support systems of DOD agencies.
5. Command, control, and communications assets controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certain deployable C3 assets are controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use in crises, contingencies, and special missions for augmentation in support of the local commander.
6. Warning Systems, communications networks, ADP capabilities, and procedures described in reference 5, Appendix A.
7. The National Communications System.
8. Defense-wide C2 systems/equipment. Defense-wide C2 systems/equipment include:
   a. The Defense Communications System.
(b) Systems/Equipment With Joint Implications.

References 7 and 20, Appendix A, establish the context in which certain systems and equipment are considered to have joint implications. To the extent that tactical command, control, and communications equipment falls under the purview of those references, they will be covered by the policy and procedures of the preceding paragraphs. In addition to the provisions of references 7 and 20, the following types of equipment have joint implications and come under the purview of the policy and procedures established in preceding paragraphs:

1. Equipment that is intended to provide NCA connectivity.

2. Equipment that is intended to provide connectivity for the commanders of unified and specified commands.

3. Systems and equipment that have been designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher
authority as having cross-Services, cross-program, cross-command, or international implications or that are of special interest. This includes priority items of the commanders of unified and specified commands.
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

1. JCS Pub 2, 1 October 1974, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

2. JCS Pub 10, 11 April 1980, "Tactical Command and Control, and Communications Systems Standards (U)."

3. JCS Pub 11, 1 April 1968, "Tactical Communications Planning Guide (U)."


15. DOD Directive 5105.19, 10 August 1978, "Defense Communications Agency (DCA)."


17. DOD Instruction 7250.10, 10 January 1980, "Implementation of Reprogramming of Appropriated Funds."


19. JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 131, (latest revision), "Joint Communications Security Policy (U)."


21. JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 167, 14 November 1975, "Mobile/Transportable Communications Assets Controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

22. JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 183, 5 November 1979, "Command, Control, and Communications Systems Evaluation Program."

23. JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 185, 9 December 1980, "Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (U)."


25. MJCS-209-83, "Defense Communications System Five Year Program Joint Validation Procedures."
APPENDIX B

OUTLINE AND SUBMISSION SCHEDULE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM MASTER PLANS, SUMMARY PLANS, AND PROGRAMS

1. Plans are submitted to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commander of each unified or specified command, by the Service headquarters of the Military Departments, and by the Defense agencies.

2. The plan submitted by a commander of a unified or specified command for approval is called a "Command and Control System Master Plan." This is a document which sets forth the concept, description, and general improvement plan for the C2 system. It describes the composition of the C2 system and the functional and organizational relationships among all elements of the system. It provides guidance and objectives to the component or subordinate commands for the development and operation of the system, describes specific required operational capabilities (ROCs) for improvement of the system, and prioritizes the ROCs.

3. The plan submitted by a Service headquarters of a Military Department or by a Defense agency for information is called a "Command and Control System Summary Plan." This document sets forth, in summary form, the concept and description of the C2 management/information systems of the Service headquarters of the Military Departments and the C2 communications networks of the Defense agencies. It describes the general composition and capabilities of the existing elements of the C2 system and presents an overview of the functional and organizational relationships related to interoperability with and responsiveness to the National Military Command System (NMCS).
4. The program submitted to the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the improvement of the NMCS is the "NMCS Five Year Master Objectives Program" (NMCS PYMOP). This program lists all ROCs, both validated and unvalidated, for the modification and improvement of the NMCS. It also provides a basis for planning, programming and budgeting for a 5 year period. The NMCS PYMOP will be updated and submitted annually in December.

5. Command and Control System Master Plans will be submitted and updated at least annually in accordance with the following schedule:
   
   - ADCOM--November
   - SAC--December
   - LANTCOM--January
   - PACOM--February
   - USEUCOM--November
   - USREDCOM--December
   - USSOUTHCOM--January
   - MAC--February

6. Command and Control System Summary Plans will be submitted and updated at least annually in accordance with the following schedule:
   
   - US Army--October
   - US Navy--November
   - US Air Force--December
   - US Marine Corps--January
   - DCA--February
   - DIA--October
   - DMA--November
   - DNA--December
   - DLA--December
   - NSA/CCS--February
APPENDIX C

FORMAT FOR THE SUBMISSION OF REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

(The required operational capability (ROC) provides the originator of the Joint C2 requirement an opportunity to express, in non-technical language, the essential elements of the requirement. It should contain as much of the information indicated below as possible, based on best estimates. Part I is required with each ROC submission and should provide sufficient information for initial processing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Submission of Part II is optional. Additional information determined to be necessary will also be provided to the JCS and to the Service/agency evaluating the ROC. The mandatory distribution of the ROC (Part III) is intended to provide initial coordination.)

REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR:

Insert short descriptive title of the requirement.

Include security classification, if applicable.

Unclassified titles are desired.

PART I (REQUIRED)

SECTION I. STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT

1. Description. Describe the requirement by indicating:
   a. General characteristics in sufficient detail to present a clear picture of the requirement. Characteristics stated will represent mandatory or minimum acceptable performance features unless indicated as "desirable"; i.e., those features to be achieved without disproportionate increase in cost, complexity, and leadtime while maintaining the required standards of reliability and maintainability.
   b. The effect the ROC will have on the capability to support the National Military Command System.
   c. Whether the requirement is for a new item or a replacement. Indicate its relationships to other ROCs and to other items or material in use.

C-1
d. Broad concept of employment of the requirement (how, when, where, and by whom).
e. Other standard or developmental equipment with which the requirement must be compatible.
f. Hardening required against nuclear, electromagnetic, chemical, and biological warfare.
g. Recommended security classification of the requirement and of the development effort, and other restrictions.
h. Desired calendar year of initial/full operational capability.
i. Recommendations for Service/Defense agency responsible for development and funding.

SECTION II. JUSTIFICATION

2. Reason for Requirement. State why existing system cannot satisfy the requirement. Indicate objectives, missions, or functions that will be prejudiced by failure to develop the proposed requirement. Relate the ROC to one or more specific C2 system objectives. State why it will make a major contribution to effective command and control for the period in which it is required. Cite enemy threat from approved intelligence estimates. Additionally, furnish information on:
   a. Time-phasing of requirement in relation to present installation and future objectives.
   b. Make reference to studies, exercise reports, or other documents which bear on the requirement.

SECTION III. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT, FEASIBILITY, AND PRIORITY

3. Operational Concept. Describe envisaged operational concept in sufficient detail to permit planning for integration into the overall C2 system. Include consideration of:
   a. Command centers for which the requirement is applicable and numbers required.
b. Whether continuous or intermittent operation is planned.
c. What satisfaction of the requirement will accomplish, such as effects achieved strategically, technically, or administratively.
d. How and when the required capability will be operationally employed and controlled.
e. How the new capability will operationally interface when employed with other systems as appropriate.
f. What information must be exchanged, with appropriate comments regarding perishability, time sensitivity, fidelity, error rates, languages, and other elements which directly affect system architectures, engineering, design, and implementation.

4. Technical Feasibility. Specify feasibility studies, component development, or other technical data related to the requirement which will assist in determining the technical feasibility of the requirement. (After research of the user input, a technical feasibility statement and a statement regarding industrial potential to support a requirement will be made in the Technical Analysis/Cost Estimate, which is prepared by the supporting Service/Defense agency.)

5. Priority Category. Prioritize the ROC in relation to other requirements of the command. Priorities furnish guidance on the degree of urgency associated with a requirement for programming and justification of funds and personnel in meeting the requirement.

PART II (OPTIONAL)

SECTION I. CHARACTERISTICS

6. Performance Characteristics. List specific performance characteristics to permit clear understanding of features
that are "essential," to the capability's acceptance. List also features that are "desirable." Performance characteristics should provide sufficient guidance to form the basis for technical characteristics and preliminary engineering design. These characteristics influence the development of the capability more than any other portion of the ROC. Describe what the capability should do and specify both upper and lower performance limits. As a general guide, include applicable reliability characteristics and, as applicable:

a. Improvements expected in (1) efficiency of gathering, processing, or disseminating information; (2) SIOP execution or monitoring; or (3) support of the NCA or other Command, Control, and Communications system users; or (4) survivability or hardening.

b. A complete operational profile which describes functions, time required to accomplish the functions, dynamic actions or changes that occur, job title or description of individual who will use the resulting capability, and reaction time required.

7. Security Considerations. Describe those security requirements considered essential by users, including aspects of OPSEC and COMSEC; e.g., transmission, emission, cryptographic, and physical security elements. Insure that qualitative COMSEC requirements are an integral part of the system planning and development.

8. Physical Characteristics. Those characteristics considered necessary by the user to influence development. Items to include, as appropriate:

a. System weight limits.

b. Configuration, silhouette, dimensional and cube limitations, crew space, and operator station layout.
c. Durability factors to indicate degree of ruggedness.
d. Security requirements to include TEMPEST consider-
ations, if required.
e. Vulnerability characteristics, specifying hardening
required or desired in terms of nuclear effects environ-
ments in which the material would be required to survive.
The effect levels specified should include blast, ground
shock, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and electro-
magnetic pulse. Consideration should also be given to any
shock-mounting requirements for sensitive equipment.
f. Vulnerability factors specifying protection from
electronic countermeasures for appropriate systems in
a threat environment should be addressed. Appropriate
ECCM technology should be incorporated to reduce the
possibilities of intercept, deception and effects of
jamming.

9. Maintenance Characteristics. State those maintenance
characteristics operationally required by the user. Give
consideration to:
   a. Design to permit ease of accessibility to often-
      checked items.
   b. Incorporation of "go/no-go" simple test equipment
      or procedures.
   c. Use of quick disconnect type fittings on electrical
      connections and harnesses or other interface surfaces
      where design will permit use of quick disconnect
      fittings.
   d. Type and level of maintenance support envisaged;
      e.g., contract or in-house.
10. Human Engineering Characteristics. State user requirements for compatibility with physical and mental capabilities of operating personnel. For example:
   a. Information needs for operator decisions; e.g., fields of view, warning alarms, and communications.
   b. Procedures for allocating functions between man and machine.

11. Priority of Characteristics. List physical, maintenance, and human engineering characteristics in relative order of priority to the user.

12. Quantitative and Qualitative Personnel Considerations. In consonance with the stated operational concept for the installation, state the user requirements for personnel to maintain and operate the material. For example:
   a. Total personnel requirement, saving in personnel, or generation of additional personnel requirements.
   Any increase in manpower as a result of this action must be in accordance with JCS NOP 173, 7 May 1981, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities," if applicable.
   b. Description of requirements for new skills, knowledge, and special arts.

13. Training Considerations. State training requirements envisaged by the user to be necessary, including, if possible, the concept of how training should be accomplished; e.g., school, contractor.

SECTION II. ASSOCIATED CONSIDERATIONS

14. Related Capabilities. Include requirements for other new capabilities and special requirements that will be necessary as a result of the ROC, such as COMSEC equipment, additional electric power, and environmental control needs.
ROCs for ADP equipment will include comments as to related software requirements.

15. Additional Comments. Include any other information not included in the foregoing that may be helpful in understanding the requirements.

PART III (REQUIRED)
DISTRIBUTION OF ROC

a. Action copies:

   Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
   QJCS (C3 Systems Directorate)
   CINCAD
   CINCLANT
   USCINCEUR
   CINMAC
   CINCPAC
   USCINCREDS
   USCINCSO
   CINCSAC
   Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

b. Information copies:

   Chief of Staff, US Army
   Chief of Naval Operations
   Chief of Staff, US Air Force
   Commandant, US Marine Corps
   Director, DCA
   Director, DIA
   Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
   Director, DLA
   Director, DMA
   Director, DNA
APPENDIX D

PROCEDURES FOR THE MODIFICATION, IMPROVEMENT, AND INTRODUCTION OF JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. Purpose. To provide policy and to assign responsibility for the modification and improvement of joint command and control systems.

2. Policy and Procedures

a. The operational requirements validated by the Services and agencies in accordance with Service and agency procedures will be evaluated and coordinated in accordance with references 6, 7, and 20, Appendix A, and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in keeping with provisions of those references.

b. The following guidance applies to the processing of the required operational capabilities (ROCs) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the ROCs from unified and specified commands and the National Military Command System. Requirements shared by the commanders of several unified and specified commands pertaining to a common capability will be processed as multi-command ROCs (MROCS).

   (1) ROCs will be documented in the format of Appendix C and submitted to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally as part of the Command and Control System Master Plan (Appendix B). NMCS ROCs will be submitted individually to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Significant time-sensitive ROCs can be submitted at any time.

   (a) The format of Appendix C permits submission of a qualitative description of the required capability (Part I, Appendix C). In the event that more detailed information is available, the quantitative
optional Part II of Appendix C may be submitted simultaneously. Part III of Appendix C lists the required distribution of the ROC. Part III insures early coordination and provides a source of comments for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Action addressees of ROCs will provide comments to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, within 60 days of receipt of the ROC. Comments of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should include a statement of applicability of the requirement to their C2 system.

(c) Information addresses are invited to submit comments to OJCS. Comments concerning existing or planned programs that might satisfy the requirement are particularly desired.

(2) The Director for C3 Systems OJCS, will process ROCs of the commanders of unified and specified commands and of the NMCS submitted to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for validation in accordance with the following procedures. Upon receipt, the Director, C3 System, will:

(a) Review the ROC for general suitability and consistency with goals for developing C2 systems. The applicability to other unified or specified commands will be addressed during consideration of initial comments from the DOD components. The review includes verification that the ROC is a new requirement and does not duplicate previous requirements. Send a memorandum to the originator, normally within 90 days, acknowledging the ROC and, where appropriate, requesting clarification or further information.
(b) Forward the ROC to the designated Service or agency to conduct a preliminary estimate or a TA/CE in the format of Appendix E. Responsibility for performing this evaluation will belong to the Service responsible for support of the respective unified or specified command unless it is determined by formal coordination or applicable directive (e.g., DCA for DCS matters) that responsibility should be assigned to another component.

(3) The designated Service or agency will evaluate the requirement in terms of potential candidate solutions, considering their operational utility, their technical feasibility, other programs, and economic soundness, using Service/agency procedures. The results of the preliminary estimate or Technical Analysis/Cost Estimate (TA/CE) will be forwarded to the Director for C3 Systems, OJCS, and will be used as the basis for validation. Information copies of completed preliminary estimates or TA/CEs will be provided in accordance with Appendix C distribution.

(4) When it is determined that the requirement meets the criteria of DOD Directive 5000.2, OJCS will forward the validated requirement to the Defense Acquisition Executive as a Mission Element Needs Statement.

(5) The DCA will provide technical guidance and recommendations to the Service or Defense agency evaluating the ROC. Other Services and agencies will provide appropriate assistance and comment.

(6) Based upon the review of the preliminary estimate or of the TA/CE above, the OJCS will initiate the validation process. The validation process is a joint
action which identifies the preferred solution to the requirement, or any portion thereof, and the estimated funding profile, and assigns the Executive Agent.

(a) If the ROC is not validated, the originator will be informed and reasons for the nonvalidation will be given.

(b) If the ROC is validated, the budgeting/programming actions below will be initiated.

(7) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for satisfaction of the ROC if required.

(8) Selected programs for validated ROCs will be immediately forwarded to the appropriate Service or agency for initial PPBS actions.

3. Responsibilities

a. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands

Identify and document requirements for modifications and improvements to their C2 systems in the format of Appendix C. Forward ROCs to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for consideration and to the other commanders of unified and specified commands, the Chiefs of the Services, and the Directors of Defense agencies for information. Forward comments on ROCs received from other commands to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, within 60 days of receipt. Comments should specifically address the applicability of the ROC to the command.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Review ROCs for validation and recommend programs for their satisfaction.

c. Chiefs of the Services; Directors of the Defense Agencies
(1) Take action, when assigned, to evaluate ROCs submitted for validation to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Support, review, and comment on the evaluation efforts of other components. Determine if existing programs, with modification if needed, could satisfy the requirement.

(2) Program, budget, and fund for fulfillment of those improvements for which the Service/Defense agency has funding responsibility.

(3) For out-of-cycle requirements for which the Service or agency has funding responsibility, prepare a Program Change Request, coordinated with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense.

(4) Approval of funding may be made for certain programs without prior approval of the Secretary of Defense provided overall strengths are not changed, if Total Obligation Authority changes are within limits imposed by DoD Instruction 7250.10, and if previous decisions by the Secretary of Defense are not affected.

d. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Develop and validate ROCs for modification and improvement of the NMCS and submit them to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
APPENDIX E

FORMAT FOR TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND COST ESTIMATE FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

(The following is the format for a Technical Analysis and Cost Estimate (TA/CE) submission.)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(The Executive Summary should be a stand-alone section of the TA/CE.)

1. **Scope.** State the purpose of the TA/CE being summarized, identify the specific requirement to which the TA/CE is related, and provide a brief description of the scope of the TA/CE.

2. **Background.** Include all essential information required to understand the document. Present material in a logical and sequential manner.

3. **Summary.** Summarize the facts presented in the TA/CE. This should include all alternatives and should not be a generally worded abstract.

4. **Conclusions and Recommendations.** Point out the most desirable course of action (best alternative) and summarize the reasons for selecting that alternative, including any associated risks. Alternatives must address communications requirements, if applicable. Recommendations will not be limited to the alternative but may include other items, if appropriate (further studies, etc.).

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS/COST ESTIMATE

1. **Introduction.** Include the objective of the TA/CE and detailed background information about the subject as well as such items as threats, desired goals, existing capabilities, etc.
2. Technical Feasibility Factors Analysis. Include the technical feasibility of developing and producing capabilities to satisfy the requirements within the timeframe specified. Include identification and assessment of technical risks that may influence effectiveness, cost, and operational date of the requirements.

3. Alternatives. Present each alternative (description, risks, costs, rough schedules, advantages, disadvantages). Analyze alternatives, including benefit and cost estimate, lease versus buy, etc. Only the two, or at most three, most viable alternatives should be presented. Other alternatives and the rationale for rejection may be presented concisely to show that they were considered.

4. Recommended Alternative. Address conceptual information to the extent feasible, including, if possible:

   a. Project Engineering Concept. Scope of the recommended alternative, its general configuration, and other technical characteristics. Relationship between this approach and ongoing or programmed future projects/programs will be discussed. Included, as available, will be appropriate consideration of the following:

      (1) Summary of required equipment.
      (2) Statement of the interface and integration requirements.
      (3) Identification of required documentation.
      (4) Required ancillary equipment.
      (5) Security requirements.
      (6) Facility requirements.
      (7) Engineering support requirements.
      (8) Communications support requirements.
      (9) Electromagnetic pulse requirement.
b. Project Implementation Concept. Nominations of the Service or Defense agency to implement the operational requirement. Training and logistic support to be furnished as part of the implementation phase and initial operational capability will be addressed. An implementation schedule to include key milestones and the relationships between key events will be provided if available.

c. Conclusion. A general conclusion supporting or suggesting information to the ROC, with accompanying rationale.

5. Cost Estimate. It is recognized that complete and detailed cost and manpower information may not be readily available at this stage of development. To the extent it is available, it should be presented with an indication of whether "current year" or "then year" (escalated) dollars are used.

a. Summary of Cost and Manpower Estimate.* Provide a breakdown for each funding Service, Defense agency, or other funding source, as applicable, in the format prescribed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Service or funding source)**</th>
<th>(PE***), (FY)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior Yrs.</td>
<td>Current Yr.</td>
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* Reflect only the additive costs resulting from the improvement or addition of facilities covered by this plan. Do not include previously existing ongoing costs.

** Insert the appropriate Service, Defense agency, or other funding source.

*** Insert applicable Program Element number here.
Funds ($ in thousands):

R&D
Procurement
Construction
O&M*
Military Pay

Manpower
Military
Officers
Enlisted

Civilian

b. **Rationale.** Explain briefly the basis for computations, phasing of cost and manpower estimates in relation to work schedule, estimated procurement lead-time, and major items of cost (lease, contractual operations, ADP, other station facilities, transmission media, etc.). Note anticipated problem areas, if any.

c. **Cost Offsets Summary (if applicable)**

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<th>Description</th>
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* Breakout by object class identification; e.g., civilian personnel, supplies, operation and maintenance contracts.
APPENDIX F
COMMAND AND CONTROL FIVE YEAR SUMMARY PLAN

1. General
   a. The Director for C3 Systems, OJCS, is charged with developing programs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure adequate command, control, and communications support to the commanders of unified and specified commands and the NCA for joint and combined operations; conceptualizing future systems design; and providing direction to improve C2. In addition, the Director, C3 Systems, OJCS, is responsible for determining satisfaction of individual Service requirements in joint systems and for coordinating requirements, evaluating alternatives, and recommending courses of action in the assignment of responsibilities and allocation of resources to agencies, the Military Services, and unified and specified commands to accomplish planning and programming. A major management tool to carry out these responsibilities is the Command and Control Five Year Summary Plan (C2FYSP).

2. Scope of the Command and Control Five Year Summary Plan
   a. The scope of the C2FYSP will encompass the validated requirements for joint C2 systems, and for systems/equipment with joint implications, as defined in subparagraph 4d(2) of the Policy and Procedures for Management of Joint Command and Control systems. The documents listed in paragraph 5 below identify many such systems/equipment.
   b. The C2FYSP will not routinely develop separate threats, objectives, missions, or requirements. However, the comparative analysis of the documents in paragraph 5 will identify and recommend solutions for inconsistencies in threat, objectives, or missions and deficiencies, inconsistencies, or duplications in stated requirements.
c. The C2FYSP will display validated quantities, OSD approved funding, and phasing for all items needed to provide an end-to-end mission capability.

d. The C2FYSP may include recommendations of an advisory nature. These recommendations should highlight weaknesses of joint C2 systems in the areas of joint and allied interoperability as well as survivability. Cross-Service prioritization of Service-unique programs/resources with joint implications will be avoided.

3. Structure of the Command and Control Five Year Summary Plan

a. The C2FYSP will consist of a data base and a summary document.

b. The data base will consist of program and project descriptions for each of the programs and projects discussed in subparagraph 2a, above. The data base is to be available in a convenient form for use as reference by OSD, OJCS, and Service decisionmakers and for deriving the contents of the C2FYSP summary document.

c. The summary document will be a single volume consisting of:

   (1) A summary of the comparative analysis of the plans examined, and appropriate recommendations.

   (2) A statistical summary of the data in subparagraph 2c for the projects considered, aggregated along recognized PPBS classifications, mission-related areas, or other categories found appropriate during development of the C2FYSP.

   (3) A short descriptive summary of the contents of each entry in the statistical summaries, maintaining traceability to individual projects and programs in the data base and highlighting issues.
4. Preparation of the C2FYSP. The Director for C3 Systems, OJCS, is responsible for the preparation of a draft of the C2FYSP in accordance with the guidelines above. Preparation of the C2FYSP will not be used as a basis for increased joint manpower authorizations. The OJCS will distribute the C2FYSP to the Services and agencies for comment. Draft C2FYSP will be revised/updated, as required; will be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the PPBS; and will serve as a major input to Annex C (Command, Control, and Communications) to the JSPD. The Services are requested to provide available information as needed for developing the C2FYSP.

5. INITIAL LISTING OF EXISTING DOCUMENTS

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM FIVE YEAR MASTER OBJECTIVES PLAN

MEECN MASTER PLAN

WWMCCS FIVE YEAR PLAN

WWMCCS SURVIVABILITY R&D PLAN

ENHANCED POSTATTACK WWMCCS CAPABILITY PLAN

CINCSAC CONNECTIVITY STUDY

CNO CONNECTIVITY STUDY

CINCSAC STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY STUDY

SECURE RESERVE FORCE TARGETING STUDY

DCA RECONSTITUTION STUDY

WWMCCS SELECTED ARCHITECTURE

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TEN-YEAR PLAN

AIR DEFENSE MASTER PLAN

DOD INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS MASTER PLAN

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PLAN

TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES C3 SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PLAN

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLAN FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS IN KOREA
4. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL.

HERBERT B. KUYKENDALL
Captain, USN
Secretary, JCS

Attachment
a/s
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
(Attention: J-31)
Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
(Attention: DOP, COOP-X)
US Commander in Chief, Europe
(Attention: ECJ3-CCD)
Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
(Attention: DOC)
Commander in Chief, Pacific
(Attention: J-33)
Commander in Chief, Readiness Command
(Attention: RCJ3-OB)
Commander in Chief, Southern Command
(Attention: SCJ3)
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
(Attention: DOCC, DOCO)
Commander, Alaskan Air Command
(Attention: DOC)
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
(Attention: JP, JL)
Director, National Security Agency
(Attention: S-14)
Director, Defense Communications Agency
(Attention: CCTC/G-650, C-660)
Deputy Directors for Operations, National Military Command Center
Chief, Alternate National Military Command Center
Chief, National Emergency Airborne Command Post
Chief, Strategic Defense Branch,
Strategic Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Strategic Offense Branch,
Strategic Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Nuclear Contingency Branch,
Strategic Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Nuclear Weapons Branch,
Strategic Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Nuclear Warfare Status Branch,
Strategic Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Requirements Branch, Joint Operations Division, J-3
Chief, Operations Branch, NMCS Support Division, J-3
Chief, Operations Branch, Telecommunications
Chief, Requirements Branch, WWMCCS Plans and
Requirements Division

-3-
EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (U)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOLUME I</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisions to the Publication</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBILITIES</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Services</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Communications Agency</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities in Connection with SIOP Execution Messages</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITIONS</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Options</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Action Messages</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executing Commander (SIOP)</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executing Commander (NATO)</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major NATO Commanders</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Readiness</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Command Authorities 3-5
NORAD/ADCOM Terms of Reference for Control of Nuclear Weapons 3-5
Prohibitions and Withholds 3-6

ZULU 3-8

CHAPTER 4
BACKGROUND 4-1
Section I Alert System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 4-1
Section II NATO Alert System 4-7
Section III Missile Warning Systems 4-17
Section IV Communication Systems 4-23

CHAPTER 5
AUTHENTICATION AND CODE SYSTEMS 5-1
General 5-1
CHAPTER 6

EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGES

General

Message Designators

Emergency Action Message Validity

Standard Alphanumeric Character Base

CHAPTER 7

TRANSMISSION OF EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGES

General

Acknowledgment Procedures

CHAPTER 8

EMERGENCY CONFERENCES

General
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Requests for Selective Release of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Designators</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Formats</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Contents</td>
<td>9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example</td>
<td>9-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nuclear Execution Messages</td>
<td>10-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
<td>10-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

VOLUMES I, II, III, IV, AND V

The abbreviations, brevity codes, and acronyms listed below are in use in Volumes I, II, III, IV, and V of the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ADCOM.............Aerospace Defense Command

AFSATCOM........Air Force Satellite Communications System

AIG.................Address indicating group

ALSIOP..............Collective routing indicator for Single Integrated Operational Plan emergency actions messages

ANMCC..............Alternate National Military Command Center

AUTODIN............Automatic Digital Network

AUTOSEVOCOM......Automatic Secure Voice Communications

AUTOVON.............Automatic Voice Network

BMEMS................Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

CAOSOP..............Coordinated Atomic Operations Standing Operating Procedures

CCPDS..............Command Center Processing and Display System

CEP..................Circular error probable

CIC..................Content indicator code

CINC................Commander in Chief

CINCAD..............Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command

CINCLANT...........Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCMAC.............Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command

CINCNORAD..........Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command

CINCPAC.............Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCSAC.............Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

CONUS..............Continental United States
CRI..............Collective routing indicator
DDO (NMCC)........Deputy Director for Operations (National Military Command Center), Joint Staff
DEFCON..........Defense readiness condition
DGZ..............Desired ground zero
DIRNSA...........Director, National Security Agency
DSP..............Defense Support Program
EA................Emergency action(s)
EAM...............Emergency action message
EAP...............Emergency action procedures
EAP-JCS..........Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ECP...............Emergency command precedence
EHF...............Extremely high frequency
EMERGCON........Emergency condition
ERCS.............Emergency Rocket Communications System
FLTSAT...........Fleet Communications Satellites
HF................High frequency
HF/SSB............High frequency/single side band
ICBM..............Intercontinental ballistic missile
IEMATS...........Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
J-3...............Operations Directorate, Joint Staff
JCS...............Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAN............JCS Alerting Network

x

Glossary
JSCP.................Joint Strategic Capability Plan
JTF..................Joint task force
LANTCOM.............Atlantic Command
LETCOM..............Alert condition
LF....................Low frequency
MAC....................Military Airlift Command
MEECN.................Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MHz...................Megahertz
MOLINK..............Direct communications link (US-USSR)
NATO.................North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA....................National Command Authorities
NE.....................North East
NEACP..................National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NM.....................Nautical miles
NW.....................North West
OJCS.................Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PACCS.................Post Attack Command Central System (SAC)
PACOM.................Pacific Command
PARCS..................Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System
SAC....................Strategic Air Command
SACEUR...............Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT...............Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SAO....................Selected Attack Option

xi

Glossary
SIOP..............Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM..............Sea-launched ballistic missile
SSBN..............Fleet ballistic missile submarine
TACAMO............Take Charge and Move Out (Navy VLF relay aircraft)
TDD..............Target DGZ designator
UHF..............Ultra high frequency
UK..............United Kingdom
US..............United States
USCINCEUR........US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCRED........Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command
USCINCSO........Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USEUCOM............US European Command
USREDCOM...........US Readiness Command
USOUTHCOM........US Southern Command
USSR.............Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VLF..............Very low frequency
WWABNCP...........Worldwide Airborne Command Post System
WWMCCS...........Worldwide Military Command and Control System
CHAPTER 1

GENERAL (U)

1. (C) Purpose. The purpose of the Emergency Actions Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to prescribe the emergency action messages and associated conferences and procedures used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain worldwide command and control of US Forces and US nuclear weapons.

2. (U) Concept. The Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are designed for use in emergency situations requiring one or more of the following general categories of actions:

Because of their sensitivity, the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are published in multiple volumes to restrict access to detailed procedures to appropriate users with a need to know. Furthermore, reproduction and release of these procedures are governed by JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 39, "Special Safeguards for JCS Papers." Under this policy, all agencies authorized to receive these procedures shall employ every suitable measure to protect them against unauthorized disclosure.

a. Reproduction to effect initial distribution of, to extend initial distribution of, or to reissue these Emergency Action Procedures will be restricted to that authorized by the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(1) Chief of Staff, US Army; Chief of Naval Operations; Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and Commandant of the Marine Corps, within their area of concern, are authorized to distribute Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within their respective Services following the guidance provided in JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 39 and based on a strict NEED TO KNOW.

(2) Commanders of unified and specified commands are authorized to distribute Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided to them, including extracts thereof, to their subordinate military activities or commands as required by their NEED TO KNOW. Whenever possible, extracts of these procedures rather than the entire publication will be used.
b. Requests for release of Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or for information therefrom, to any person or agency, military or civilian, not on the original distribution list for these procedures will be referred to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for appropriate action.

c. Because the emergency action procedures of the Services and unified and specified commands are frequently based on the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and contain extracts from them, the safeguards above apply to those Service and unified and specified command publications which reveal the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. (U) Revisions to the Publication. The Director for Operations, Joint Staff, is responsible for maintaining these procedures and for accomplishing revisions in accordance with JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 114. Holders of this document should submit comments and recommendations for improvement to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3 (ATTN: EA Division). The Director for Operations, Joint Staff, will revise these procedures as required, making urgent revisions by message and incorporating them into the next printed change.
CHAPTER 2
RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

1. (U) Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands

2. (U) The Military Services
3. (U) Defense Communications Agency. The Defense Communications Agency assures long haul, rapid transmission of emergency messages by exercising operational and managerial direction over the Defense Communications System in accordance with the mission, functions, and responsibility assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

4. (U) The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for accomplishing the tasks specified herein and for those matters which fall within its general cognizance as determined by its assigned functions.

5. (U) Responsibilities Connected with SIOP Execution and Termination Messages.
CHAPTER 3
DEFINITIONS (U)

1. (U) JCS Pub 1 contains standard definitions for planning and operational use. Listed below are selected definitions which do not appear in JCS Pub 1 and those which need to be expanded or redefined for specific application to the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where appropriate, each paragraph indicates the source document for the definition.
the commanders of the unified and specified commands, their forces, and other military and Government agencies.

9. (U) Executing Commander (SIOP). A commander to whom nuclear weapons are released for delivery against specific targets in accordance with approved plans. (SIOP 5 (basic))

10. (U) Executing Commander (NATO). (To be supplied)

13. (U) Major NATO Commanders. There are three Major NATO Commanders: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT); Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); and Commander in Chief, Channel (CINCHAN).
16. (U) National Command Authorities. The National Command Authorities consist only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The channel of communication for execution of the SIOP and other time-sensitive operations shall be from the National Command Authorities through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the the executing commanders. (DOD Directive 5100.30)

17. (U) NORAD/ADCOM Terms of Reference for Control of Nuclear Weapons
27. (U) ZULU. Greenwich mean time (the mean solar time of the meridian of Greenwich, England, used as the prime basis of standard time throughout the world). ZULU time is used in all emergency action messages.
CHAPTER 4

BACKGROUND (U)

(U) General. This chapter provides background information on the US and NATO Alert Systems and the US missile warning systems which affect the Emergency Action Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following descriptions are only brief summaries of the systems and do not duplicate all of the information available from primary sources. For authoritative and detailed information, users should refer to the source documents.

SECTION I

ALERT SYSTEM OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (U)
4. (U) Declarations by Commanders of Unified or Specified Commands
SECTION II

NATO ALERT SYSTEM (U)

1. (U) Purpose. This section summarizes the NATO Alert System. It is extracted from the Major NATO Commanders Alert System Procedures for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SM-1-79, which should be consulted for further details.
SECTION IV
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

1. (U) Purpose. This section describes selected communications systems available to support transmission of emergency action messages. Chapter 7 contains specific transmission policies.
4. (U) US Navy High Power VLF Relay Aircraft (TACAMO)
6. (U) Worldwide Airborne Command Post HF/SSB Network
7. (U) Worldwide Airborne Command Post UHF Systems
10. (U) **Air Force Satellite Communications System (AFSATCOM)**

(To be supplied.)
9. (U) Control of Systems
CHAPTER 6

EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGES (U)

1. (U) General. This chapter describes the system of JCS emergency action messages which direct specific actions authorized by the designated approving authority.
3. (U) Message Designators

c. (U) When used without reference to the actions they
implement, message designators are classified CONFIDENTIAL.

Message designators associated with their format or the
actions they implement are either SECRET or TOP SECRET,
6. (U) Emergency Action Message Validity
CHAPTER 8
EMERGENCY CONFERENCES (U)

1. (U) General
c. (U) Composition. Figure 8-5 lists the conferees for the Routine Missile Display Conference.
8. (U) Air Activity Conference
14. (U) **Changes to NORAD/ADCOM Procedures.** NORAD/ADCOM must notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff (ATTN: J-3) by message prior to making any changes in NORAD procedures that would affect the procedures or formats described in this chapter.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LERTCON CONFERENCE COMPOSITION (U)
(LERTCONS AND NATO Equivalents)
CHAPTER 9

REQUESTS FOR SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)

1. (U) General

2. (U) Message Designators
10. Message Contents. The information included in each part must be in accordance with the instructions in this paragraph.
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
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3. (U) Message Contents
5. (U) **Examples.** The following examples are based upon the hypothetical situation described.
SECTION VIII

RED ROCKET (U)

3. (U) Means of Transmission
3. (U) VOICE REPORTS OF RECEIPT ARE REQUIRED.

(Selective addressees) WILL ACKNOWLEDGE DIRECTLY TO THE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER BY THE FASTEST MEANS
AVAILABLE.

4. (U) INSTRUCTIONS IN TEXT ARE EFFECTIVE AT (date-time group
ZULU).
CHAPTER 13
EXERCISE EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGES (U)
SECTION I
GENERAL
SECTION X

WHITE ROCKET MESSAGE FORMAT
CHAPTER 14

EXERCISES (U)

1. (U) General. Exercises of emergency action procedures are conducted to insure a high level of proficiency in these procedures, to refine and improve existing procedures, and to provide a means for evaluating individual and system efficiency. To the extent that exercises accomplish these objectives, they are beneficial.
CHAPTER 15
COMMUNICATIONS TESTS (U)

1. General.
SECTION II

CRIS AND AIGs AUTHORIZED FOR USE
WITH EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGES (U)
CHAPTER 17

LOCATOR SYSTEM (U)

1. (C) General.

2. (N) Procedures.