SUPPLEMENT TWO

EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT during period 1 March - 31 May 1956

(Revised Version)

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The President approved the following supplementary US policy on control of armaments: "If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a system is proven to the US to be satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with the other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the forthcoming session of the United Nations Subcommittee, the United States Representative is authorized to indicate that such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of 2.5 million men for the US, USSR, and China; corresponding appropriate levels for the UK and France and others to be determined after consultation with the representatives of these States."

Annex to NSC Action No. 1513, 1 Mar 56.

In the face of certain rejection, the Soviet Representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Council withdrew a proposed resolution calling for a halt to further tests of nuclear weapons. During the discussions of this resolution, the Indian Representative, Mr. Krishna Menon, served notice that if nuclear weapons tests were carried out by the United States in the Pacific Trust Territory, India would demand that the World Court rule on whether administrative powers have the authority to stage such tests in trust territories.


Testifying before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission emphasized that the suggested cessation of stockpiling nuclear materials for weapons was an eventual goal, not an immediate one. Mr. Strauss stated that it "could well prove suicidal" for the United States to halt nuclear production before the Soviet Union accepted adequate safeguards to insure compliance with the agreement to cease production. Mr. Strauss also announced that nuclear tests were scheduled for April 1956 in the Pacific proving ground.

NYT, 8 Mar 56, 8:8.

President Eisenhower issued a letter of instructions to guide Mr. Stassen at the forthcoming meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee. The policy statement declared that the United States would continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan; that the acceptability of any international system for regulation and reduction of armaments depended primarily on the scope and effectiveness of safeguards, especially inspection; and that the United States should give priority to early agreement on confidence-building measures and on other measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament that were feasible and in accord with approved policy. Further,
the annex set forth specific proposals related to limitation on use of weapons, inspection, control of nuclear materials, and control of manpower and major weapons.

(S) Ltr, Pres to Stassen, 10 Mar 56, enc to DPC [Pres Spec Cmte on Disarmament Problems] Note No. 21 (Rev. 2), "Instructions to Mr. Stassen," 15 Mar 56, JSSC files.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson replied to Mr. Stassen's letter of 19 January 1956 that had requested studies of the benefits and disadvantages to the United States of various force levels. Mr. Robertson concurred with views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (24 February 1956) that it was virtually impossible to conduct a meaningful study of the impact which reductions would have on US security in the absence of knowledge about the conditions that would exist at the time when the reductions were to occur. A realistic evaluation could be made only in the light of information that would become available through the implementation of the Eisenhower proposal. Mr. Robertson proposed that no further action be taken at present on Mr. Stassen's letter.

(TS) Ltr, Dpty SecDef to Stassen, 14 Mar 56, quoted in N/H of JCS 1731/277, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

Secretary of Defense Wilson and Admiral Radford testified before the Subcommittee on Disarmament (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations). Mr. Wilson called the President's Geneva proposal (21 July 1955) "a practical first step toward disarmament." He believed it "essential" that the United States continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive and safeguarded disarmament program. Admiral Radford informed the subcommittee that the President's proposal--exchange of blueprints, mutual aerial reconnaissance, and ground inspection of key sites--had been refined to the point where it could rule out the possibility of decisive surprise attack.

(U) "Control and Reduction of Armaments," Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Cong, 1st Sess, Pt 4 [Washington: GPO, 1956].

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson forwarded to Mr. Stassen the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (29 February 1956) on the four-volume report of the Task Forces on a comprehensive inspection plan. Generally endorsing these comments, Mr. Robertson specifically noted the importance of maintaining the distinction between the Eisenhower proposal and the comprehensive inspection system: "We should avoid creating the impression that the limited measures involved in an initial step would be adequate for the larger undertaking." With regard to the recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the development and implementation of an inspection system not be dependent upon the acceptance of an armaments limitation agreement, the Department of Defense considered that the Annex to NSC Action No. 1513 (1 March 1956) was controlling policy insofar as the Eisenhower proposal (21 July 1955) was concerned.

(TS) Ltr, Dpty SecDef to Stassen, 15 Mar 56, quoted in N/H of JCS 1731/181, 20 Mar 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 61.
The US Delegation to the forthcoming London sessions of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee requested departmental comments on a draft informal working paper on the first stage of disarmament. The paper had been prepared to reflect US views in regard to the British-French position. The draft called for declarations not to use nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression, for establishment of an international control organ, for study of the feasibility of limiting nuclear test explosions and of accounting for future production of fissionable materials, for contributions of fissionable materials to peaceful stockpiles, for agreement on reduced levels of conventional armaments and armed forces, for declarations of strength and dispositions, and for phased expansion of controls and inspection.

Mag. USDEL London to SecState, 3992, 8 pm 15 Mar 56, reproduced as DPC Note No. 42 "Draft Informal Working Paper on the First Stage," 27 Mar 56, COS 092 (4-14-45) BP Pt 5.

The Disarmament Subcommittee (Canada, France, USSR, UK and US) of the U.N. Disarmament Commission resumed its sessions in London. At the first London meeting (69th Subcommission session since its creation in 1954) the US Delegate, Mr. Stassen, read President Eisenhower's letter of 1 March 1956 to Premier Bulganin. M. Jules Moch, the French representative, tabled an Anglo-French working paper that attempted to synthesize previous positions. Three stages of control were envisaged, to begin with the signature of a disarmament treaty creating a control organ. During the first stage there would be a freeze at existing armaments levels and the establishment and initial operation of an inspection and control system, followed by some initially agreed reductions in forces. During Stage Two nuclear test explosions would be limited and regulated, the first half of agreed reductions would be completed, control and inspection would be continued and developed, and the control organ would become capable of verifying the cessation of nuclear production for military uses. Stage Three would include the prohibition of nuclear test explosions for military use, the prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons, the completion of agreed reductions in two steps, the allocation of savings in military budgets to the improvement of standards of living throughout the world, and the operation of the control organ to ensure continued observance of the disarmament treaty.

20 Mar 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the revision of the outline plan for an armaments inspection system requiring less than one thousand personnel (23 February 1956). The revision was to state more precisely the extent to which important elements of exchanged information could be verified and to indicate the degree to which such a system could provide the elements of information essential to provide against surprise attack.


21 Mar 56

Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the US Atomic Energy Commission announced that the Soviet Union had recently exploded another nuclear device. This was the fifth US announcement of Soviet nuclear weapons tests in the past eight months.


21 Mar 56

At the 70th meeting of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Stassen tabled two informal working papers. The first proposed a small demonstration test of control, inspection, and reporting in small strips of US and Soviet territory by representatives of the five nations on the subcommittee; the second, the exchange of technical missions by the five nations for the reciprocal preliminary study of methods of control, inspection, and reporting. The two proposals might be carried on jointly or separately, Mr. Stassen said.

(U) U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.70, 21 Mar 56, JCS HS files. The texts of these proposals are included as annexes 3 and 4 to U.N. doc. DC/83, 4 May 56, JCS HS files.

22 Mar 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that amendments be made in the US draft working paper for a first stage disarmament plan (15 March 1956). In commenting on the draft, the Joint Chiefs assumed that the initial step in the plan would be agreement to the Eisenhower proposal (21 July 1955). The draft paper con-

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted detailed comments to correct these deficiencies and omissions.

(FO) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "First Stage Disarmament Plan," 22 Mar 56, derived fr JCS 1731/185, same subj, 21 Mar 56, as amended by Dec On, 22 Mar 56 and by N/NI, 3 Apr 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 61.
22 Mar 56

Mr. Stassen presented the US position on levels of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures at the 71st meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee. Assuming a reasonably stable political situation, the United States would be willing to reduce its force levels during the first stage of a disarmament plan to 2.5 million. The Soviet Union would reduce to the same level and other states to "relatively equitable levels." Military expenditures and armaments levels would be reduced in proportion to manpower levels. Reductions would be gradual, reciprocal, and safeguarded. However, discussion at this session centered around British-French answers to Soviet questions about the Anglo-French working paper (19 March 1956).

(U) U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.71, 22 Mar 56, JCS HS files.

26 Mar 56

Mr. Stassen suggested at the 72d meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee that as part of the ground and air inspection system, each state should obligate itself to provide information in advance of all projected movements of its forces through international airspace or water or over foreign soil. He argued that this measure would decrease the possibility of surprise attack and increase confidence. The delegates discussed the relationship of this and previous US proposals (21 and 22 March 1956) to the Anglo-French proposal (19 March 1956). Soviet Representative Gromyko promised to comment on the Anglo-French plan in the near future.

(U) U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.72, 26 Mar 56, JCS HS files.

27 Mar 56

At the 73d session of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, Soviet Delegate Gromyko characterized the Anglo-French plan (19 March 1956) as inadequate and tabled a proposed resolution for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. The sole references to nuclear weapons were provisions for prohibiting further test explosions and for ensuring that atomic weapons were excluded from armaments of troops in German territory. The Soviet proposal called for a three months' freeze of armaments and forces at levels obtaining on 31 December 1955, followed by gradual reduction in three years to the levels advanced in the Soviet plan of 10 May 1955.

A U.N. Control Organ would be created to regulate disarmament and inspect conventional military facilities in territory of participating states. Initially, control and inspection would be carried on at ground control posts, but the question of using aerial photography would be examined "at a specified stage of the execution of the general disarmament programme."

A trial zone for limitation and inspection of armaments would be created in Europe to include both East and West Germany and adjacent states. The Soviet draft made no reference to either the Anglo-French synthesis (19 March 1955) or the US confidence-building measures (21, 22, and 26 March 1956).

(U) U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.73, 27 Mar 56, JCS HS files.

2 Apr 56

Mr. Stassen's office asked the Department of Defense to comment on formulae proposed by the United Kingdom for the computation of the level of armaments for force levels to be prescribed in a disarmament treaty. The formulae would
prescribe the number of men permissible for every major
weapon or group of weapons, and the treaty would limit
armaments by establishing a ratio of weapons to men.

Memo, Dpty Spec Asst to Pres for Disarmament
Peaslee to SecDef, 2 Apr 56, app to enci to JCS 731/187,
Note by Secys, "Limitation of Armaments," 10 Apr 56, CCS
C92 (4-14-45) sec 62.

During the 75th session of the Disarmament Subcommittee
the British, French, and Soviet delegates discussed the
Anglo-French synthesis (19 March 1956) and the Soviet
resolution (27 March 1956). Mr. Stassen tabled an
unofficial draft working paper on a First Phase disarm-
ament program prepared in London by the US Delegation.
The working paper was offered as a synthesis of the best
US, Soviet, British, and French ideas, and was welcomed
as such by the French delegate, M. Moch. First, the
working paper called for prompt exchange of technical
missions and for small demonstration tests of control
and inspection. Concurrently, the Five Powers on the
Subcommittee would organize a preparatory armaments
regulatory commission to agree on reduced levels of con-
ventional armaments, armed forces and military expenditures
of the five states. A control and inspection plan would
be drawn up to include both aerial inspection and ground
control posts. Operations would be conducted principally
through the use of member nations as executive agents.
A committee of jurists would be appointed to draft a treaty
for the first phase disarmament program. When agreements
had been reached on the reduced levels and on the inspec-
tion and control system, blueprints would be exchanged,
an arms freeze begun, the inspection and control system
installed, and advance notice of projected troops move-
ments given. Thereafter, other states would be invited
to join the system. The preparatory commission would
then be replaced by a permanent armaments organization,
and controls extended to future production of fissionable
materials and to tests of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously,
first phase reductions of conventional armaments and forces
would be made. Finally, states would begin transferring
fissionable materials from past production to stockpiles
for peaceful use. Upon completion of this first phase
program, a conference would be called to consider the feas-
ibility of further reductions and to study the possi-
bilities for further decreasing or eliminating the nuclear
threat.

Msgs, USDEL London to SecState, 4/393, 2 am 4 Apr
56; 4395, 2 am 4 Apr 56, both in JSSC file "Numbered
Disarmament Cables." DPC Note No. 47, "United States
Draft Working Paper for the First Phase of a Comprehensive
Agreement for Disarmament," 4 Apr 56, CCS C92 (4-14-45)
BP Pt 5. The verbatim minutes are published as unclassi-
fi ed UN doc., DC/SC.1/PT.75, 3 Apr 56, JCS HS files.

Little or no progress was made in one off-the-record and
seven official meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission
Subcommittee. In response to Soviet questions, Mr. Stassen
clarified the US draft working paper (3 April 1956) and
stated the US position on continuing the testing of
nuclear weapons. Soviet representative Gromyko firmly
rejected the Anglo-French synthesis (19 March 1956) and
aerial inspection. The Western Powers rejected the sections of the Soviet-proposed resolution (27 March 1955) that provided for creating a zone in Europe in which armaments would be limited and inspected and for prohibiting troops in German territory from including atomic weapons among their armaments. Progress was blocked by Soviet refusal to move toward Western positions, although the Soviet delegate did not reject the US draft working paper.

12 Apr 56
Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, testifying before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed that (1) an upper limit should be set on the size of thermonuclear bombs to be placed in the US stockpile; (2) a limit should be set on the number of large thermonuclear bombs to be stockpiled; (3) concentration should be increased on stockpiling a wide range of very small nuclear weapons; and (4) tests of multimegaton thermonuclear weapons should be stopped. "Control and Reduction of Armaments," Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Cong, 2nd sess, Pt 6 [Washington: GPO, 1956].

18 Apr 56
A Working Level Meeting of 12 nations, including the United States, unanimously adopted the text of a Statute for a proposed International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the purpose of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace address (8 December 1953). The statute was to be presented for consideration at an international conference that would convene in September 1956. (U) Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIV, (30 Apr 56), pp. 729-730; vol XXXV, (21 May 56), pp. 852-859. NYT, 19 Apr 56, pp. 1:7, 3:2.

21 Apr 56
President Eisenhower stated publicly: "We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety... So long as freedom is threatened and armaments are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a strong military establishment ourselves and strengthen the bonds of collective security." Yet war in our time has become an anachronism. "Hence our search must be unceasing for a system to regulate and reduce armaments under reliable safeguards." The Soviet Union had refused to accept such safeguards. "But we cannot slacken our efforts to lift the burden of armaments and to remove their threat." This step would permit the devotion of atomic energy to peaceful uses that could bring about development of a new industrial age.
NYT, 22 Apr 56, 1:28; 3:8.

23 Apr 56
Soviet Communist Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev said in a speech in Birmingham, England, that the USSR "will have a guided missile with a hydrogen bomb that can fall anywhere in the world."
NYT, 24 Apr 56, 1:8, 6:2.
23 Apr 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary of Defense with a statement on the need for multimegaton thermonuclear tests. The statement pointed out that the tests were a fundamental part of building an adequate defense against nuclear attack. A moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons would be dangerous to US security unless the moratorium were preceded by universal acceptance of a comprehensive disarmament system providing effective safeguards to insure compliance by all nations and giving adequate warning of possible evasions and violations. This statement was prepared in response to an oral request by the Under Secretary of State.

(U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Need for Multimegaton Thermonuclear Tests," 23 Apr 56, Enc1 to JCS 1731/192, Note by Secya, same subj, same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 62, Pt 1.

24 Apr 56

An impromptu discussion occurred between Mr. Stassen, Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet, British, and US officials at a Soviet reception in London. Mr. Stassen stated and explained the US position. Khrushchev repeatedly expressed opposition to aerial inspection, reiterated the desire to co-exist in peace with the United States, offered to reduce armaments and manpower without inspection, suggested that both sides reduce their armed forces in Germany, expressed doubts about U.S. intentions in regard to disarmament, indicated a high regard for President Eisenhower, calculated that the time was not ready and that the Disarmament Subcommittee could not agree, and directed Soviet Delegate Gromyko to talk further with US representatives. Khrushchev suggested that Mr. Stassen come to Moscow to visit Ambassador Bohlen, during which visit the occasion for further talks might arise.

msgid, USDEL London to SecState, 4852, 3 am 25 Apr 56, JSSC file "Numbered Disarmament Cables."

25 Apr 56

(U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Limitation of Armaments," 25 Apr 56, derived fr JCS 1731/190, Rpt by JSPC, same subj, 19 Apr 56, as amended by Dec On, 25 Apr 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 62.
At the 83rd meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, Soviet Delegate Gromyko indicated that his Government, in order to facilitate reaching agreement on both conventional and nuclear disarmament, would be prepared to consider amending or expanding its proposal of 27 March 1956. The Soviet Union was willing to discuss conventional and nuclear disarmament simultaneously, but was in no case willing to make reductions of conventional armaments dependent upon reaching agreement on control of nuclear weapons. But the Soviet delegate refused to comment favorably on either the Anglo-French synthesis (19 March 1956) or the US draft working paper (3 April 1956).

(U) U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/PV. 83, 26 Apr 55, JCS HS files.

In a series of bilateral meetings, Mr. Stassen and Mr. Gromyko explored Soviet and US positions on disarmament. Gromyko indicated that the Soviet Union might voluntarily reduce its forces, and Mr. Stassen suggested the desirability of exploring further the possibility of combining very small conventional reductions, as suggested by Mr. Khrushchev, with the small but significant steps on inspection and control suggested by President Eisenhower. Although Gromyko was "more forthcoming in giving Soviet reasons and analysis than in previous sessions," the bilateral talks were inconclusive.

(S) Msgs, USDEL London to SecState, 4914, 11 pm 26 Apr 56; 4955, 7 pm 29 Apr 56; and 4992, 9 am 1 May 56; all in JSSC file "Numbered Disarmament Cables."

The President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems provided Mr. Stassen with a proposed revision of the US draft working paper (3 April 1956). The revision incorporated the Eisenhower proposal (21 July 1955) for exchange of military blueprints and for mutual US-Soviet aerial surveys as a preliminary step to a first phase disarmament plan. Other changes in language made the working paper more explicit and brought it into consonance with approved US positions on disarmament. (The revised working paper was not introduced by Mr. Stassen in subsequent Subcommittee sessions.)

(S) DPC Note No. 47, R-1, "Proposed Revision of the United States Draft Working Paper for the First Phase of a Comprehensive Agreement For Disarmament," 20 Apr 56, and Addendum 1 to DPC Note No. 47, R-1, 27 Apr 56; DPC-RA-22, Summary Minutes, DPC mtg 26 Apr 55, item 1; all in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP Pt 5.

1 May 56

This study represented a more thorough development of the elements of information included in the JCS outline plan (19 August 1955) for implementing the Eisenhower proposal (21 July 1955).

(TS) JCS 1731/189, Rpt by JIC in collab w/JSPC and JLPF, "Elements of Information Essential to Provide Against Surprise Attack," 19 Apr 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 62.
1 May 56

The President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems informed Mr. Stassen of its view that he should avoid leaving the US draft working paper (3 April 1956) with any "continuing status" in the Disarmament Subcommittee. The committee felt that the working paper did not fully represent the agreed US position and suggested three possible courses: (1) formal withdrawal of the 3 April draft, (2) appropriate language in a summary statement at the close of the London sessions without formal withdrawal; and (3) substitution of the revised working paper approved by the committee 27 April 1956.

Mag. SeaState to USDEL London, 6563, 7:10 pm
1 May 56, JSSC file "Disarmament Cables 1956."

4 May 56

The 20-minute 84th meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee was devoted largely to procedural matters. However, the UK and French delegations introduced a working paper on control, with proposals for the structure, administration, and personnel of the control organ, rights of the organization, obligations of participating states, action in event of breaches of the treaty, and steps to provide warning of an attack. The documents was designed to bring up to date working papers on control submitted separately by France and the United Kingdom during sessions of the Subcommittee in the fall of 1955 and to relate these earlier proposals to the recent Anglo-French working paper (19 March 1956). In addition, Mr. Stassen tabled a summary memorandum outlining the US position. The memorandum included the statement: "This summary may be considered in place of the draft working paper proposal of 3 April [1956] . . . . However, in introducing the summary, Mr. Stassen did not withdraw the earlier working paper. Less detailed than the 3 April draft paper, the summary memorandum listed seven interrelated points that reflected basic US policy: (1) an immediate beginning on the reduction of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures could be made under a sound agreement with adequate inspection; (2) comprehensive disarmament and drastic reductions could be made safely only as parallel progress was realized in solving important political issues; (3) the nuclear threat could be brought under control by working out suitable and safeguarded arrangements for halting production of fissionable materials to be used in explosive weapons and for transferring fissionable materials to stockpiles for peaceful use; (4) an adequate and effective inspection system must include effective aerial inspection, should include forces and facilities outside national boundaries, must provide against great surprise attack, and was essential for sound agreement; (5) the objectives of the first practical steps of a disarmament plan should be to decrease the nuclear threat, reduce the burden of armaments, provide against surprise, increase economic development, lessen tensions, prevent an arms race, prepare for further stages of disarmament, and improve the prospects for peace; (6) small-scale demonstration of inspection methods and technical exchange of inspection teams would be desirable to facilitate study and advance negotiations; and (7) implementation of the President's Geneva proposal (21 July 1955) would prove to be a beginning for a significant move toward disarmament.

At its 86th meeting the U.N. Disarmament Commission Sub-committee agreed to adjourn and submit the record of its London sessions to the parent body. At this meeting the Canadian delegate read into the record a Four-Power Declaration, the first four-power paper introduced at the conference. This document was a generalized statement of principles by which the four states had been governed during the talks. The Soviet Union, however, had rejected these proposals. The declaration closed with an expression of the "conviction that a reconciliation of the opposing points of view is possible and necessary . . . ." In reply, Mr. Gromyko claimed that the Soviet Union had taken Western views into consideration in proposing that conventional armaments be treated separately from nuclear armaments. Further, the Soviet Union had declared its readiness to discuss simultaneously nuclear and conventional armaments, provided that agreement on conventional weapons was not made contingent upon agreement on atomic weapons. Gromyko concluded with remarks about the importance of reaching agreement on disarmament. Replies by Western delegates stressed the need for safeguards.

(U) U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/PV.86, 4 May 56, JCS HS files.

The US Delegation to the London talks of the U.S. Disarmament Commission Sub-committee summarized the conferences, concluding that some advances had been made but that disagreement remained.

(7) Msg, USDEL London to SecState, 5110, 6 pm 5 May 56, JSSC file "Numbered Disarmament Cables."

The United States exploded a nuclear device, opening a new series of tests in the Pacific proving grounds.

NYT, 5 May 55, 11; 10:7.

Mr. Stassen reported to the National Security Council on the London sessions of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Sub-committee. The President directed Mr. Stassen and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems to prepare a report on the US response to a possible Soviet announcement of a unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces and a reduction in, or withdrawal of, Soviet Forces in East Germany. The Council noted that recommendations for additions to, or modifications of, US policy on control of armaments would be developed by Mr. Stassen and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems and submitted for Council consideration.

(5) NSC Action No. 1553, 10 May 56, appvd by Pres on 16 May 56, JCS Sect files.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson recommended to Mr. Stassen's office that the United Kingdom be discouraged from introducing in the London talks its proposed formulae (2 April 1956) for limiting armaments. He advanced the reasons listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (25 April 1956) and indicated further that the Department of Defense had initiated its own studies of Communist manpower-weapons ratios, ways and means of offsetting possible Sino-Soviet Bloc force concentrations, the status of civilian equipment readily available for military use, and the problems of longer US lines of communication. The Department of
Defense recommended that the results of these studies be given careful consideration by the National Security Council prior to introduction in an international forum. (63) Ltr, Dpty SecDef to Dpty SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament, 11 May 56, quoted in N/H of JCS 1731/190, 14 May 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 62.

14 May 56

The Soviet Union announced that it had decided: (1) to reduce its armed forces by 1.2 million men during the year ending 1 May 1957 (in addition to the reduction of 650,000 in 1955); to disband 63 divisions and independent brigades, including three air divisions and other units numbering more than 30,000 men stationed in East Germany, to disband a number of Army schools, and to put 375 warships in reserve; (3) to reduce armaments, military equipment, and military expenditures in conformity with the reduced force levels; and (4) to give the demobilized men the opportunity of obtaining employment in industry and agriculture. "The Soviet Government will be ready to discuss the question of a further reduction in its armed forces if the Western Powers, the United States, Britain and France on their part make corresponding cuts in their armed forces and armaments." The announcement was prefaced with a propaganda blast at the Western Powers for not reaching agreements with the Soviet Government on disarmament.

(U) DPC Note No. 73, 15 May 56, JSSC files. NYT, 15 May 56, 8:1-8.

14 May 56

The US Government took a "show me" attitude toward the Soviet announcement of a unilateral reduction of its armed forces and conventional armaments. A White House statement observed that the Soviet move would be more significant if the Soviet Delegate at the London talks had been more willing to accept the Western disarmament proposals made there. State and Defense officials also indicated some skepticism about the Soviet announcement, pointing out that the world had no way of checking on Soviet performance.

NYT, 15 May 56, 1:7, 9:4; 16 May 56, 1:8, 8-6.

18 May 56

Mr. Stassen announced to the press that the Special Task Groups on Disarmament were being asked to resume their consideration of disarmament problems on 29 May 1956. They would consider the matter in light of the Soviet announcement of unilateral reduction of forces and in light of the recent London sessions of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee.

(U) Press Conference by Mr. Stassen, 18 May 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.

21 May 55

The United States exploded its first air-borne hydrogen bomb in the Pacific proving ground.

NYT, 21 May 56, 1:8, 16:3.

31 May 56

The President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, with Mr. Stassen in the Chair, discussed the status of the 3 April 1956 US working paper on First Phase Disarmament and of the proposed revision (27 April 1956). (The subject had also been discussed at a meeting of the committee on 17 May 1956.) Interdepartmental differences appeared, and the committee decided "to postpone further discussion of the April 3 US Draft Working Paper until such time as new US policy recommendations are developed and under consideration.