SUPPLEMENT FOUR

to

EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

1 December 1957 - 15 October 1959

HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT SECRETARIAT
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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10 Dec 57

Addressing an appeal to President Eisenhower concerning disarmament and better East-West relations, Premier Bulganin deplored what he alleged to be an sharply intensified military preparations by the US, the UK, and other NATO members. He made inter alia the following proposals "to terminate the armaments race": (1) The nuclear powers should undertake "for the present only" an obligation not to use nuclear weapons, and announce as of 1 January 1958 the cessation of nuclear tests for at least two or three years. (2) The same powers should refrain from stationing any kind of nuclear weapons whatsoever within the territory of East or West Germany. This, he said, could lead to the creation of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe if the two Germanys would then agree to renounce the production of nuclear weapons, for they would be joined in this agreement by Poland and Czechoslovakia. (Though this was an endorsement of the proposals in the UN on 2 October 1957 by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, Bulganin did not mention Rapacki.) (3) Efforts should be made to conclude a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. (See item of 12 January 1958.)


15 Dec 57

President Eisenhower answered a public statement of 28 November 1957 by Prime Minister Nehru appealing to the US and the USSR to stop all nuclear testing and proceed to bring about effective disarmament. The President assured the Prime Minister of his concern regarding this subject and cited the constant efforts of the US to achieve a just system of disarmament and a secure peace for all nations. He mentioned in particular the latest plan advanced by the West, at the London disarmament talks on 29 August 1957. The USSR, however, had thus far rejected all US proposals as a basis for negotiation. The US was now at a stage at which testing was particularly required for developing the defensive uses of nuclear weapons. To stop tests under these circumstances, as an isolated step and without assurances that measures going to the heart of the problem would follow, would be "a sacrifice which we could not in prudence accept." To do so, the President said, could increase rather than diminish the threat of aggression and war. In his opinion any country desiring an agreement not to use nuclear weapons should be prepared to end their production and devote all future production of fissionable material to peaceful uses. The US had proposed such measures, together with the transfer to peaceful uses of fissionable material tied up in existing stockpiles of weapons, but thus far the USSR had given no reasoned explanation of any objections it might have to such proposals. The US would continue to seek a disarmament agreement, including the cessation of nuclear testing, that would promote trust, security, and understanding among all people.


19 Dec 57

The 15 NATO heads of government, after conferred in Paris 16-19 December 1957, issued a declaration of principles containing the following passage: "We continue firmly to stand for comprehensive and controlled
disarmament, which we believe can be reached by stages. In spite of disappointments, we remain ready to discuss any reasonable proposal to reach this goal and to lay a solid foundation for a durable peace. This is the only way to dispel the anxieties arising from the armaments race." In a communiqué of the same date the heads of government noted with regret the negative attitude of the Soviet Government toward Western efforts to make progress on the question of disarmament during the past year. It had rejected the Western proposals at the London disar-

mament talks though those proposals had been approved by 56 members of the UN, and it had now deadlocked disar-

mament negotiations by declaring its intention to boycott the UN Disarmament Commission though that Commission had been expanded to 25 nations by vote of a strong majority of the General Assembly. Should the Soviet Government persist in this attitude toward the new Disarmament Com-

mission, the Western powers would welcome a meeting at the foreign-minister level to resolve the deadlock.


26 Dec 57

A proposal by Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, that some of the provisions of the Four Power disarmament "package" of 29 August 1957 be separated for negotiation with the USSR was transmitted to the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary for preliminary consideration at the NSC meeting of 6 January 1958. Mr. Stassen proposed separate negotiation of the following:

(1) A two-year inspected suspension of nuclear testing by all nuclear powers, beginning 1 September 1958 or as soon thereafter as the agreement might call for. The monitoring system was to include 8 to 12 properly equipped stations in the USSR, a like number in the US, and "suit-

able" numbers in other "necessary locations." The in-

spectors were to have the right to make prompt on-the-

spot observations at any point indicated by their instruments as the probable site of a nuclear explosion prohibited by the agreement.

(2) Establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in the western USSR and Central Europe. This zone would be between approximately 3 degrees and 23 degrees, both east longitude, and from 45 degrees north latitude to the Arctic Circle.

(3) Establishment of an inspection zone in eastern Siberia, the Arctic, the northwestern US, and western Canada. All of Siberia east of 108 degrees east longi-

tude would be included, plus the Soviet Arctic Circle territory in the Murmansk area. The West would submit to inspection the Arctic Circle area of Norway, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, plus enough of the northwestern US and western Canada to make the total counterbalance the total Soviet area in the inspection zone. The entire inspection zone would be subjected to aerial and limited ground inspection of the type proposed in the Four Power disarmament package of 29 August 1957.

(4) Establishment of a technical committee to study only the technical requirements of a system to assure that outer-space objects were used and maintained only for peaceful purposes.
(5) Establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the UN Security Council to supervise any of the foregoing measures agreed on, as well as any future agreed measures. (See 1st item of 6 January 1958.)

Dec 57

Rpt by Spec Asst to Pres for Disarmament, "Revision of U. S. Policy on Disarmament," nd, Encl to (3) Memo, Exec Secy to NSC, "U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 26 Dec 57; referred to in (3) JCS 1731/246, 30 Dec 57. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.

In an article in Foreign Affairs the well-known atomic scientist Edward Teller stated among other things that a nuclear test was easily noticed only if it was performed "in the most obvious manner" and that there could be no doubt of a nation's ability, if it resorted to secret testing, to render observation of such testing "difficult and uncertain." "A ban on nuclear tests," he wrote, "has been widely advocated as a simple, practical and beneficial first step toward disarmament. In fact, such a ban could not be enforced, would make a future war more brutal and would be beneficial only to that party which could and would violate the ban by secret testing." Edward Teller, "Alternatives for Security," Foreign Affairs, vol XXXVI (Jan 1958), pp. 204, 205.

31 Dec 57

Harold E. Stassen briefed the National Security Council Planning Board on his proposal concerning the 29 August 1957 Four Power proposals. Among other things he stated his strong disagreement with Dr. Edward Teller's assertion in the current Foreign Affairs (see preceding item) that undetected clandestine testing could be easily accomplished. There was little likelihood, Mr. Stassen thought, that tests could be conducted in either the USSR or Communist China without being detected by inspection stations previously installed in accordance with his proposal.

1956. (3) Memo, Spec Asst to JCS for NSC Affairs to CJCJS, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 2 Jan 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.

31 Dec 57

In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against the adoption of Mr. Stassen's proposal to break the 29 August 1957 Four Power package of disarmament proposals (see item of 26 December 1957). The JCS believed the soundest course was adherence to the basic principles of the Four Power proposals. They were aware that the political climate had changed somewhat since the formulation of those proposals but believed this circumstance could be met by flexibility in stating the positions of the West within the basic principles. They considered Mr. Stassen's proposal to
be dangerous on three counts: (1) its abandonment of the inseparability principle, which had made the Four Power proposals "barely acceptable" from the security point of view of the US and the other NATO powers; (2) its failure to include control of fissionable material along with the proposal to suspend nuclear testing; and (3) the advantage given the Soviets in the boundaries of the inspection zones, which would include a sizable portion of the US and western Canada containing numerous important military and industrial installations whereas the coverage of comparable Soviet territory was "negligible." (See 1st item of 6 January 1958.)

4th Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 31 Dec 57, derived from JCS 1731/247, 30 Dec 57. Both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.
Prime Minister Macmillan proposed in a nation-wide broadcast from London that the West seek "a solemn pact of nonaggression" with the USSR as a first step toward relieving world tension. He felt that though the world situation was one in which the balance of power made war virtually impossible, it was also one in which the West must seek a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. He promised that Britain would continue to seek such an agreement.

Commenting on this proposal, New York Times correspondent Drew Middleton wrote that Washington had "little confidence that another nonaggression pact repeating the mutual nonaggression commitments taken by all members of the UN would do more than create a false feeling of security where no security existed."

NYT, 5 Jan 58, 1.3. *ibid.*, 5:1.

The National Security Council:

1. Noted and discussed Mr. Stassen's latest disarmament proposals of 26 December 1957, in the light of the views of the JCS (see item of 31 December 1957).
2. Noted the President's decision that the US should continue to adhere to the Four Power proposals of 29 August 1957 for the time being.
3. Noted Presidential approval of the recommendations of the Science Advisory Committee Panel on Disarmament that the following technical studies be made by representatives of the Science Advisory Committee, Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency:
   a. A study in the area of nuclear testing of losses to both the US and the USSR consequent on total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates and the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension (see item of 21 March 1958).
   b. A study to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range-rocket-test agreement to assure that it would be carried out for peaceful purposes, such as launching scientific reconnaissance vehicles (see item of 23 March 1958).

(This action was approved by the President on 9 January 1958.)

NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958, files of Control Div., JCS

Vasily V. Kuznetsov, a First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, and General Mikhail S. Malinin, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, announced at a news conference in Moscow a new cut of 300,000 men in the Soviet armed forces. Forty-one thousand of these would be withdrawn from East Germany and 17,000 from Hungary.

Commenting on this announcement, New York Times correspondent William J. Jorden, wrote that Western sources had estimated the Soviet Army strength at 4,000,000 men in 1956. In May 1956 approximately 1,200,000 of these men had been released. Thus upon completion of the current cut the Soviets would have an armed force of about 2,500,000 men, provided no large number had been taken into the army in the meantime. This figure of 2,500,000 was the figure discussed in...
East-West disarmament talks as the size of the armies to be allowed the USSR and the US.

NYT, 7 Jan 58, 1/4.

Premier Bulganin followed up his letter of 10 December 1957 to President Eisenhower with another, in which he stressed the interest of the USSR in the "speediest" solution of the disarmament problem. He thought a commission consisting of all member states of the UN should be created to examine this problem and that its urgency warranted a special session of the General Assembly. The USSR was also prepared, he said, to consider the question in a smaller body, but with the understanding that at least half of the participants should be representatives of the Socialist countries or of neutral states that had "given proof of their devotion to the cause of peaceful coexistence." But since conditions for resuming disarmament talks in the UN were lacking, he went on, the USSR proposed a summit meeting of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization national leaders, plus the leaders of a few other states (not specified), at which the most urgent disarmament questions could be discussed. He mentioned (1) the "immediate" suspension of nuclear weapons tests by the USSR, the US, and the UK, and the renunciation of atomic weapons by these countries; (2) the Polish proposal for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe; (3) a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states; (4) the termination of war propaganda; and (5) reduction of the number of foreign troops in the territories of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states, including German territory. Agreement concerning these problems or certain ones of them could, Bulganin said, prepare the way for talks about various important matters apparently not ripe as yet for consideration, such as substantial reduction in armed forces, total prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of states, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from foreign territories, including Germany, and the simultaneous liquidation of foreign military bases. He made clear in this last regard, however, that the USSR would be ready to discuss these matters at any time the Western nations might be, including at the proposed conference.

(U) Ltr, Bulganin to Eisenhower, 8 Jan 58, Encl to Memo, Dir Exec Secretariat of State Dept to SecDef, "Premier Bulganin's Letter of January 8, 1958 to the President," 10 Jan 58, COS 092 (4-14-45) sec 74.

M.S. Handler, New York Times correspondent in Bonn, wrote that with a further reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany the troop balance would shift temporarily in favor of the US. He cited what he called reliable sources in estimating that the Soviet strength of ground and air forces was then approximately 185,000 men. The total US manpower in West Germany he estimated to be "well within the reach of 250,000."

NYT, 9 Jan 58, 3:1.

10 Jan 58 At a news conference Secretary of State Dulles said among other things that he thought the resumption of disarmament talks "highly likely" despite the fact that
the Soviet Union had broken all lines of communication regarding this subject. He did not think the proposals of the West would be substantially different from those of 29 August 1957 if the talks were resumed. As to the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, he said he did not think this plan was very practical. Though the plan was presented as one of partial neutralization, it was in reality one of almost total neutralization: for if it were not possible to have modern weapons in the affected area, it might be imprudent to maintain any forces there either, because they would be in an exposed position.


12 Jan 58

Replying to Premier Bulganin's letter of 10 December 1957, President Eisenhower gave assurance that (1) the US would "never" support any aggressive action by any collective defense organization or any member thereof, and (2) the US would "always" be ready to move toward the development of effective UN collective security measures to replace regional measures of the same kind. He pointed out that a suspension of nuclear testing, which Bulganin had proposed, would leave untouched the heart of the armsaments problem—that is, the "mounting production", primarily in the USSR and the US, of new types of weapons. As for Bulganin's proposed denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the range of modern weapons made such a zone of slight significance. Inter alia the President proposed that (1) outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes; (2) the production of nuclear weapons should be ended; (3) the testing of nuclear weapons should be stopped, not merely for two or three years, but indefinitely; (4) measures should be taken to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack; and (5) technical studies should be undertaken jointly by the US and the USSR concerning the possibilities of verifying and supervising the carrying out of the steps involved in the foregoing proposals but without commitment regarding their interdependence or their ultimate acceptance. The President stated his willingness to meet personally with the Soviet leaders and the leaders of other interested states to discuss these proposals and those in Bulganin's letter of 10 December, but only after adequate advance preparation through diplomatic channels and by foreign ministers.


13 Jan 58

A petition urging a stop to nuclear tests, signed by 9,235 scientists from 43 (44) nations, was presented to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold by Dr. Linus Pauling of the California Institute of Technology. The petition emphasized the menace to the health of the world's peoples involved in the constantly increasing level of atmospheric radioactivity resulting from continued nuclear explosions. (See item of 13 June 1958.)

13 Jan 58
Amintore Fanfani, Secretary General of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, made it clear in a speech at Naples that the Italian Government was not interested in the inclusion of Italy in the Central European atom-free zone proposed by the USSR.

NYT, 13 Jan 58, 1:7.

16 Jan 58
Secretary of State Dulles, in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, proposed the formation of an international commission to ensure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. New York Times correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt, in his article covering the event, speculated that the proposal might foreshadow separation of the question of space controls from the rest of the Western disarmament package to offer the possibility of a "first step" agreement on disarmament.

NYT, 17 Jan 58, 1:8.

21 Jan 58
Secretary of State Dulles cabled his views on the Rapacki Plan (see items of 10 December 1957 and 14 February 1958) to the US Embassies in NATO countries, plus those in Moscow and Warsaw. From the disarmament standpoint, the Secretary said, the plan and its Soviet variant appeared to be only another form of the basic Soviet "ban the bomb" proposal. His over-all conclusion was that it contributed nothing to progress toward the settlement of European problems.

[Redacted] Mag, SecState to Paris (and others), TOPOL 2486, 21 Jan 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 74.

22 Jan 58
Premier Khrushchev, addressing a meeting of agricultural workers at Minsk, said among other things that he would agree to end production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a condition that atomic and thermonuclear weapons and tests of such weapons were outlawed and that all Western bases around the Soviet Union were liquidated. He insisted that the Soviets were not frightened by these bases, for the USSR now had a rocket, "tested and perfected," with which to wipe out the bases. Boasting of Soviet military might, he declared that Moscow could send a missile with a hydrogen warhead to any spot on the globe. The Soviet Government would not be intimidated, he asserted, and would never accept agreements that did not recognize the legitimacy of all the world's Communist governments. As to negotiations concerning the control of outer space, Khrushchev maintained that the only reason the West had raised the issue of prohibiting the use of outer space for tests of military weapons was to ban intercontinental ballistic missiles. The reason for this, he said, was that the USSR had them and the US did not. The US wanted to prohibit weapons that threatened its territory but retain in its hands other kinds of weapons "to keep all the world in fear."

NYT, 26 Jan 58, 1:8.

24 Jan 58
The JCS replied to the memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) of 20 November 1957 forwarding the request of the Secretary of State for a preliminary statement of principles and an outline of an inspection system to ensure that outer space would be used only
for peaceful purposes. They felt strongly, they said, that it was impractical to develop such an outline inspection plan in isolation without subjecting US security to unwarranted risks—two in particular: (1) the danger that the development of a system designed only for the control of outer-space objects would deviate from the overriding principles of a comprehensive inspection system; (2) the danger that such a system might be misrepresented as a satisfactory substitute for a sound comprehensive inspection system. (See item of 12 February 1958.)

[Memorandum, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning," derived from (S) JCS 1731/248, 18 Jan 58. Both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 74.]
In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 12 January 1958, which among other things proposed certain subjects for discussion at a summit meeting, Premier Bulganin counterproposed the following problems inter alia for the agenda of such a meeting: (1) immediate suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and the renunciation by the USSR, the US, and the UK of nuclear weapons; (2) creation in Central Europe of a zone free from atomic weapons; (3) conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO member states and the Warsaw Treaty states; (4) reduction of foreign forces stationed in Germany and other European states; (5) an agreement on questions pertinent to the prevention of "sudden attack"; and (6) discontinuation of propaganda for war. The attention of the meeting should be focused on these problems as the most urgent, he said, but the meeting could discuss other "constructive proposals directed towards terminating the 'cold war'" provided there was unanimous agreement by all participants that these additional proposals required discussion. He again expressed the opposition of the USSR to a preliminary meeting of foreign ministers at which questions of substance would be discussed. The "prejudiced position of some of the possible participants" in such a meeting suggested that the meeting would only serve for the erection of additional obstacles in the way of a summit meeting. If only accord could be reached on having a summit meeting, he asserted, the procedural and other questions bearing on the practical implementation of such an accord could be solved without any special difficulties through the usual diplomatic channels. (See 1st item of 15 February 1958.)


The Deputy Secretary of Defense replied to the letter of the Secretary of State of 18 November 1957 on ensuring that outer space would be used only for peaceful purposes (see item of 24 January 1958). The Deputy Secretary pointed out that, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840 (see item of 6 January 1958), a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee had been appointed to study this problem. He therefore suggested that the views of the Department of Defense should be reserved until the panel had completed its study and the JCS had had an opportunity to assess its implications from the military point of view. (See item of 17 March 1958.)

(c) N/H of JCS 1731/24C, 13 Feb 58, COS 092 (4-14-45) sec 74.

Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki enclosed with a diplomatic note to the US a memorandum elaborating his proposal of 2 October 1957 in the UN for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (The Rapacki Plan). The area in which nuclear weapons "would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled" was now to include Czechoslovakia in addition to Poland and the two German states. The memorandum proposed diplomatic procedures for bringing the denuclearized zone formally into existence and a system of control machinery for ensuring its inviolability. (See items of 12 March and 3 May 1958.)
Replying to Bulganin's letter of 1 February about a summit meeting, President Eisenhower noted that the USSR wanted its proposals on the agenda of such a meeting while reserving a veto in the guise of the unanimity principle against proposals by the US. Bulganin's letter, as a whole, he observed, was a "slightly abbreviated and moderated edition" of Khrushchev's "rather bitter" speech at Minsk on 22 January (see item), and he could not avoid the feeling that the prolongation of repetitive public debate would not help the US and the USSR to move ahead to the establishment of better relations. Since an impasse had now developed between Bulganin and himself in their personal exchanges regarding a summit meeting, he suggested that perhaps less formal and less specialized contacts might provide a way out. The US was therefore consulting with certain other interested nations about the desirability of exploring through more normal channels the prospects of a top-level meeting that would have an adequate agenda and give promise of an eventual accord. (See item of 28 February 1958.)


Harold E. Stassen, the President's Special Adviser on Disarmament, resigned, the resignation to take effect immediately. (See item of 27 February 1958.)

NYT, 16 Feb 58, 1:1.

The State Department announced in a press release that, with the approval of the President, Secretary Dulles had designated Ambassador James J. Wadsworth to act as US representative in future negotiations for an agreement on the limitation of armament. Though replacing Harold Stassen in this new capacity, Ambassador Wadsworth was to retain for the time being his position as Deputy Representative of the US to the UN. According to the press release the Secretary of State had also asked certain qualified private citizens to advise and consult with him informally from time to time on broad disarmament policies. Four persons who had agreed to serve in this way were Alfred M. Gruenther, Robert M. Lovett, John J. McCloy, and Walter Bedell Smith.


In an aide-memoire to the US Government, the Soviet Government proposed a meeting of heads of government "in the nearest future" to discuss "a number of urgent international questions," including certain disarmament questions. A listing of the questions showed those on disarmament to be the same as the ones mentioned in Premier Bulganin's letter of 1 February to President Eisenhower. To expedite preparations for this summit meeting the Soviet Government suggested a meeting of foreign ministers in April 1958—"strictly limited to
questions relating to the organizational side of preparation . . . . Representatives might be sent to this foreign ministers' meeting by the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states, as well as by certain others outside these blocs such as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Austria. Or the meeting might be limited to the US, the UK, France, Italy, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, India, Yugoslavia, and Sweden. The composition of the subsequent summit meeting would in any case be separately determined. (See item of 6 March 1958.) Text in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXVIII (24 Mar 58), pp. 459-461.
1 Mar 58

The Polish Foreign Ministry announced in Warsaw that an aide-memoire had been received from West Germany rejecting Poland's proposal for talks between the two countries concerning the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

NYT, 1 Mar 58, 3:5.

6 Mar 58

In its reply to the Soviet note of 28 February 1958 the US regretted the necessity of concluding that the preparations for a summit meeting envisaged in the Soviet note would not assure that such a meeting would actually serve to reduce international tensions. Inter alia the US pointed out that the heads of government had agreed at their last previous meeting, in Geneva in 1955, to "work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission"; yet the Soviet Government now declined to work through this sub-committee or, indeed, the UN Disarmament Commission itself. Moreover, though Chairman Bulganin in his letter of 10 December 1957 to President Eisenhower had deplored the competition in producing ever-newer types of weapons, the Soviet note did not suggest dealing with this problem but seemed to assume that the production of ever-newer types of weapons would go on unchecked and uncontrolled. The US Government believed that a meeting of heads of government that was merely ceremonial or at which they "merely repeated promises already given or hopes already expressed" would not be warranted. Assuming that the heads of government would eventually meet, the US reiterated its desire that the meeting be held "not as a spectacle, not to reaffirm generalities, but to take serious decisions which will lead to an international atmosphere of cooperation and good will." (See item of 24 March 1958.)


6 Mar 58

Testifying before the Humphrey Subcommittee on Disarmament, AEC Commissioner Libby described the underground nuclear test conducted by the US in Nevada on 19 September 1957, called the Rainier shot. A 1.7-KT blast (one-tenth the yield of the Hiroshima bomb), the shot was fired at a depth of 800 feet. Fallout effects were negligible and the surface of the area was practically undisturbed. One of Mr. Libby's conclusions from the test was that an effective detection system, even one including ground inspection, would be extremely difficult to achieve. The test also strengthened his conviction that there should be no ban against nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes since the great potential in nuclear energy for man's benefit could not be realized without continued testing. He agreed with the US position that a prohibition of production of nuclear weapons should accompany any ban on testing. But such production, he thought, was even more difficult to control than testing, and he feared that should an agreement between nuclear powers banning testing be violated by the USSR that country would quickly surpass the US in atomic capability.

(U) US Sen, "Control and Reduction of Armaments" (Hearings before the Disarmament Subcomitee of the Omte on For Rel, 85th Cong, 2d sess; Washington, 1958), pt 15, pp. 1366-1383.
At an 85-nation conference on the law of the sea at Geneva, Poland joined India in calling for an end to nuclear explosions over the high seas. Both nations emphasized that such tests hampered freedom of navigation and contaminated the water.

NYT, 8 Mar 58, 34:8.

At the Geneva international conference on the law of the sea Professor Grigori I. Tunkin, chief Soviet delegate, attacked nuclear tests at sea as interfering with freedom of the high seas (see item of 7 March). The Soviets also called for a ban on the establishment of installations for military and naval training on the high seas, citing US installations in the Sea of Japan and UK installations in the English Channel as examples.

NYT, 11 Mar 58, 58:8.

In response to a request by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 1 March 1958, the JCS forwarded their comments on the Rapacki Plan (see item of 14 February). As an approach to the problem of disarmament, they remarked, the plan might serve as a desirable first step politically.

Thus it did not, in the opinion of the JCS, offer an acceptable formula for conducting international negotiations to reduce tensions in Europe.

These views were forwarded to the Secretary of State by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 20 March 1958.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Establishment of a De-nuclearized Zone in Central Europe (C)," 12 Mar 58, derived from (S) JCS 1731/253, 7 Mar 58. (S) N/H of JCS 1731/253, 25 Mar 58. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 75.

The JCS replied to a memorandum of 27 February 1958 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who had requested their views regarding the effect of a total suspension of nuclear tests on the military position of the US as compared with that of the USSR, assuming enforcement of the suspension.
such a moratorium should be considered in any case as part of a comprehensive disarmament program in conjunction with an effective system of inspection and verification. (See item of 21 March 1958.)

(See) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nuclear Testing (U)," 13 Mar 58, derived from (See) JCS 1731/254, 11 Mar 58.
(See) Memo, Dep SecDef to JCS, same subj, 27 Feb 58, Encl to (See) JCS 1731/254, 6 Mar 58. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 75.

15 Mar 58

A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement released by Tass proposed the establishment of a UN agency to assure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, but only on the condition that US military bases on foreign soil were liquidated. (See item of 16 January 1958.)

On the same date the US State Department, while denying any wish to disregard the UN in its efforts to resume disarmament talks, flatly rejected the Soviet proposal as wholly unacceptable.

NYT, 16 Mar 58, 1:8.

17 Mar 58

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the JCS noted the absence of Defense representatives on the Missiles Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee appointed (pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958) to study the problem of inspection systems designed to limit outer space to peaceful uses only. Referring to the letter of 12 February 1958 (see item) in which the Deputy Secretary of Defense had suggested to the Secretary of State that Defense views concerning such inspection systems await completion of the Missiles Panel's study, the JCS stated their opinion that participation in the preparation of the study by all interested agencies, including the Department of Defense, was essential to ensure due consideration of the major national security problems. They therefore requested that the views expressed in their memorandum of 24 January 1958 (see item) be made available to the panel and that the JCS be authorized to collaborate with the panel.

(See) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 17 Mar 58, derived from (See) JCS 1731/252, 6 Mar 58. Both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 75.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation (which had been convened pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958) the Department of Defense views concerning the relative effects of a total suspension of nuclear testing on the US and the USSR.

He added that in any case the US should not become party to any cessation agreement prohibiting the testing of yields of such magnitudes and in such environments that effective monitoring would be impossible.

The memorandum containing these views of the Deputy Secretary and the one containing the views of the JCS were circulated for the information of the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary on 2 April 1958, preparatory to the NSC meeting of the following day.

Memo, Dep SecDef to Chm Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, "The Effects of a Total Suspension on Cessation of Nuclear Testing (S)," 21 Mar 58, Enc1 to N/H of JCS 1731/254, 28 Mar 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 75.


The Soviet Government replied to the US note of 6 March by rehearsing arguments previously advanced for a summit meeting and repeating the agenda proposals contained in the Soviet note of 28 February. It defended its boycott of the UN Disarmament Commission on the ground that the 12th session of the General Assembly had, "under manifest pressure," adopted a resolution giving an absolute majority in the membership of the Disarmament Commission to "proponents of the military alignments of the Western powers." The achievement of fruitful results by that Commission had thus become impossible. As to preparations for a summit meeting, a preliminary foreign ministers' conference should be limited to discussion of the organizational side of such preparations, leaving the substance of the agenda questions to be dealt with by the heads of government. Otherwise, the foreign ministers' meeting would more likely delay than facilitate preparations for the summit meeting. The Soviet Government hoped the US Government would "study with due attention" the considerations advanced in this note about the need to get on with the preparations for a summit meeting.


When asked at a press conference if there was any truth in reports that he might consider separating a nuclear test ban from production of nuclear weapons, President
Eisenhower said he believed "it would be unwise to take a perfectly rigid position in respect to any of these things where any agreement would seem to be a reliable one, and would seem to be opening the door to wider and better negotiations with the Soviet Union."

NYT, 27 Mar 58, 1:1.

Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for consideration of the National Security Council on 3 April 1958 a report on the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range-rocket-test agreement, as called for by NSC Action No. 1840 (see item of 6 January 1958). Dr. Killian noted that the report had been prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreeing that Defense would not nominate any representatives. He further noted that the Group had considered as outside its competence the question whether an agreement prohibiting missile tests could be enforced by inspecting missile production, operational launching sites, or the nuclear aspects of the problem. The report, which was dated 26 March 1958, reached the following conclusions inter alia: (1) The definition of "long range" and "large" rockets would have to be very carefully considered in the drafting of any agreement in this field because of the uncertainty that detection techniques could discriminate between the two in all cases. (2) Though all rocket firings could be monitored, it would be impossible to distinguish confidently between "military" and "peaceful" firings even with monitoring stations inside the Soviet bloc. (3) Because of the inherent similarity of the technical problems involved, it was possible to obtain required military information as a by-product of legitimate scientific experiments. (4) The establishment of a joint US-USSR agency to plan and execute all rocket launchings might have desirable features in developing international cooperation and contributing to a reduction of international rivalry in the missile field. In such an arrangement the US would probably learn more about Soviet missile capabilities than the USSR would learn in return. (5) The agreed prohibition of all nationally conducted large rocket tests would not prevent the USSR from building up an operational military missile force if it had already developed an ICBM capability by the time of such an agreement. (See last item of 3 April 1958.)


The USSR announced that it was discontinuing all types of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests. It saw this action as a "practical beginning to a universal termination of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests" and a "first step in the direction of the final salvation of mankind from the threat of destructive atomic war . . . ." However, if other nations failed to follow this example the Soviets reserved the right to resume testing at will.
In a statement issued the same date the Department of State noted that the Soviet announcement came on the heels of an intensive series of secret Soviet tests. The Department went on to point out the inconsistency between efforts of the Soviet Government to portray itself in official propaganda as peace-loving while it was openly defying the UN with respect to both the substance and the procedure of disarmament. The UN General Assembly had among other things in this regard approved a comprehensive first-stage disarmament proposal and called on nations to begin immediate technical studies on how these proposals might be carried out. The US stood ready to respond instantly, but the USSR had thus far refused to comply. The US again called on the USSR to deal with the problem of disarmament in an orderly way, in accordance with the UN Charter. If that Charter, a solemn agreement, was ignored by the USSR, what confidence could be placed in new Soviet engagements? (See item of 2 April.)

President Eisenhower said at a news conference that the Soviet announcement of a unilateral suspension of nuclear tests was a propaganda move, and admitted that it might have been a mistake not to have anticipated it with our own propaganda. The history of our own policy in this field, he went on to point out, showed a spirit of cooperation, but all our offers—the Baruch Plan, the "open skies" proposal, inspection and control measures, the peaceful use of outer space, etc.—had been turned down by the Soviets. We had discussed the possibility of suspending tests ourselves but had concluded that such a step taken unilaterally "was not good for the United States at this time."

Text in NYT, 3 Apr 58, 1:8.

The National Security Council noted a report by an Ad Hoc Working Group of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840 (see item dated 6 January 1958), on a study of the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket-test agreement to assure that it was carried out for peaceful purposes. (This action was approved by the President on 7 April 1958.)

NSC Action No. 1888, 3 Apr 58, files of Control Div, JCS.

The National Security Council, with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Drs. Kistiakowsky and Bethe of the President's Science Advisory Committee, and others present:

(1) Noted an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the pattern of recent Soviet nuclear tests.

(2) Noted and discussed a report on the technical feasibility of ceasing nuclear tests, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840 (see item of 6 January 1958) by an Ad Hoc Working Group of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) Noted and discussed the views of the Department of Defense and the JCS on the same subject as the report in (2). (This action was approved by the President on 7 April 1958.)

NSC Action No. 1889, 3 Apr 58, files of Control Div, JCS.

Premier Khrushchev formally conveyed in a letter to President Eisenhower the Soviet decision "to discontinue unilaterally, as of March 31, 1958, tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons." He proposed that the US, and also the UK, join with the USSR in discontinuing nuclear tests. If the US would match the action of the USSR in this matter, he said, this would "make possible the discontinuance forever of nuclear weapon tests everywhere." Thus this problem of grave international concern could be resolved before additional nations acquired nuclear capability, as would happen sooner or later if
testing continued. The reaching of an agreement to cease testing later on, he pointed out, would of course be more complicated to the extent that additional nations were involved. He reserved the freedom of the USSR to resume nuclear testing if his proposal was rejected.


Replying to Premier Khrushchev’s letter of 4 April 1958 about cessation of nuclear testing, President Eisenhower stated that the fundamental problem was "not the mere testing of weapons, but the weapons themselves." As long as the Soviet Union continued to reject the concept of an internationally supervised program to end weapons production and to reduce weapons stocks, the US would seek to develop the defensive capabilities of nuclear power and to learn how to minimize the fissionable fallout. These US nuclear activities would be conducted so as not to affect human health appreciably. The President recalled that the US and the UK, in their Joint Declaration at Bermuda on 24 March 1957, had announced measures they would take to minimize the dangers to health in their future nuclear testing and that they had offered to register advance notice of such tests with the UN and permit limited international observation if the Soviet Union would do likewise. But the Soviet Union had never responded to this invitation. Moreover, the USSR had persistently rejected the substance of the President’s "atoms for peace" proposal for the past 5 years and failed to accept his "open skies" proposal of 1955 at Geneva or his proposal in recent correspondence with Bulganin to use outer space only for peaceful purposes. All these proposals remained open. The US hoped and believed that in due course nuclear testing would be suspended or limited, but as part of a comprehensive program of disarmament. Both sides, the President noted, recognized the need for international controls in conjunction with disarmament measures. He therefore proposed that the two sides have their technicians confer on what specific control measures were necessary if there was to be a dependable and agreed disarmament program. Technical disarmament studies of this kind, applying to both nuclear and conventional weapons, had been called for by the UN General Assembly. The US was willing to participate in such studies and hoped the USSR would agree to do so. (See item of 22 April 1958.)


In testimony before the Humphrey subcommittee on disarmament, Dr. Edward Teller repeated the opinion he had advanced earlier in an article in Foreign Affairs (see item following 26 December 1957), in which he had questioned the feasibility of detecting clandestine underground nuclear explosions. There were all kinds of ways of circumventing a test ban, said Teller; the subject was infinite. At any rate it would be extremely dangerous to go into a test moratorium with insufficient knowledge on which to base a reliable inspection system. As it was, he said, we were extrapolating from a single event--the Rainier shot in 1957 (see 2nd item of 6 March 1958). The
one reliable way to check a test ban, Dr. Teller felt, was the "human way": If Russia were opened up—if our people could get into Russia in any numbers, go any place, and talk to anyone—then we could learn about any secret tests. (U) US Sen, "Control and Reduction of Armaments" (Hearings before Disarmament Subcomte of the Cmte on For ReL, 86th Cong, 2nd sess; Washington, 1958), pt 17, pp. 1455-1460.

21 Apr 58

The UN Security Council met at the request of the USSR to consider the question of "urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union." A draft resolution was introduced at the meeting by the Soviet representative, calling upon the US to cease sending its military aircraft on such flights "towards the frontiers of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations." At the close of the debate the Soviet representative withdrew his draft resolution. (See item of 29 April 1958.)


22 Apr 58

In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 8 April 1958 Premier Khrushchev renewed his pressure on the US to join the USSR in suspending nuclear tests. There were already in existence, he asserted, instruments and methods of detection that would ensure discovery of secret testing by any country in violation of a contrary commitment. The Soviet Union had no objection to the establishment of a control system, and indeed had advanced specific proposals in this regard, but these had not been accepted by the West. He found it "entirely impossible" to agree that the cessation of nuclear testing should be part of a comprehensive disarmament program in view of the many years already spent in fruitless negotiations on disarmament whereas the need to stop the nuclear contamination of the atmosphere and relax international tensions become more pressing each day. He rejected the "open skies" proposal with the statement that flights of aircraft of one country over the territory of another would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem of disarmament, indeed might increase international tension and suspicion. He charged that the President's proposal for the peaceful use of outer space would eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles as a Soviet means of retaliation and would thus be unfair unless the West gave up foreign military bases from which the Soviet Union might be attacked. Concerning the "atoms for peace" proposal, he asserted that the Soviet Union had consistently striven in the UN for the prohibition of all kinds of nuclear weapons from the armaments of states. He brushed aside the President's proposal for a conference of technical experts to determine the controls necessary to a dependable disarmament program. Technical experts, he protested, could contribute nothing to the solution of a problem on which governments had not reached agreement. Hundreds of speeches had already been delivered and mountains of documents written on the subject of controls, and further consideration of this subject would
only delay endlessly what was now needed--concrete action. He therefore hoped it would be possible to put an end to polemics, "close the book on the past," and agree that the US and the UK would cease nuclear testing, just as the USSR had already done. (See item of 28 April 1958.)

28 Apr 58

Replying to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 22 April 1958, President Eisenhower insisted that technical studies of the kind proposed in his letter of 8 April 1958 were, despite Khrushchev's negative reaction, the necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions into effect. He re-emphasized that the studies would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the US and the USSR on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament. Stating that the proposal would remain open indefinitely, he expressed the hope that Khrushchev would reconsider and accept it. The President also announced that the US had just asked the Security Council to reconvene in order to consider the establishment of an international inspection system for the Arctic Zone as a measure for allaying fears of massive surprise attack. He urged the Soviet Premier to join the US in supporting a resolution to this end already before the Council. (See items of 29 April and 9 May 1958.)

(U) Ltr, Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 28 Apr 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 76. Also in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXVIII (19 May 58), pp. 811-812.

29 Apr 58

The UN Security Council met to consider the US draft resolution on an Arctic inspection zone and a draft resolution by the USSR approaching the problem in a different way. The US resolution recommended the prompt establishment of a "zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions, that was considered by the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee of Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States during August 1957." The Soviet resolution, besides repeating the demand about flights of US bombers contained in its draft resolution of 21 April (see item), called for referral of other questions concerning the Arctic zone and the question of prohibiting nuclear tests to a summit conference. (See item of 22 May 1958.)


30 Apr 58

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the JCS stated that, owing to the recently increased pressures for the cessation of nuclear tests, they considered a reiteration and amplification of the views expressed in their memorandum of 13 March 1958 (see item) on this subject to be necessary.
The JCS therefore emphasized their great concern over the numerous proposals for cessation of weapons tests, especially when such cessation was divorced from a larger disarmament proposal and an effective system of controls. They requested that their views be conveyed to the President.

On 9 May the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded these views to the President, expressing general concurrence.

(3) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nuclear Testing (U)." 30 Apr 58, derived from (2e) JCS 1731/255, 28 Apr 58. (2e) N/H of JCS 1731/255, 15 May 58. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 76.
1 May 58

At a press conference Secretary of State Dulles set forth the rationale of the US resolution before the UN Security Council calling for the establishment of an Arctic inspection zone. Referring to concern expressed by the Soviet Government regarding flights of US aircraft in that area, the Secretary said the keeping of planes aloft was considered necessary by the US as a precaution against the possible launching of a Soviet nuclear attack against the top of the world. If both sides had genuinely peaceful intentions, a natural solution was an inspection zone in the area. With no bomber or missile bases in the northern part of the USSR capable of a surprise attack on the US, the US would find its security problem greatly altered and "perhaps" would then "feel it safe greatly to minimize the flights of which the Soviet Union complains." He emphasized that the US resolution was not a propaganda exercise or a mere maneuver, but an sincere effort to provide a solution to the admitted problems of the Arctic area. If a proposal of this kind could be agreed on, he thought it might mark a real turning point in the cold war. Though not disarmament itself, it could, if accepted, create an atmosphere in which genuine disarmament could take place. (See item of 2 May 1958.)


2 May 58

The US draft resolution calling for an Arctic inspection zone was defeated in the UN Security Council by a Soviet veto though 10 members of the Council voted in favor of it. Following this, the Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution (see item of 29 April) by a vote of 1 to 9, with 1 abstention (Sweden).


3 May 58

Replying to Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's note of 14 February 1958 concerning a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the US stated that the proposals involved were too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. Even if inspection to ensure compliance with the proposed plan were possible, said the US, an isolated agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by the Polish Government would expose the western European countries to the menace of the large, widely deployed, and well-equipped military forces of the Soviet Union. So long as the Soviet Union refused to join in effective arrangements either general or regional in character to promote real security, such as the West had repeatedly proposed, the Western nations had no recourse but to develop the required pattern of defensive military strength in the form of NATO integrated forces using modern developments in weapons and techniques.


3 May 58

In a note addressed to the foreign minister of each country concerned the State Department invited the 11 nations participating with the US in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) activities in Antarctica to a conference to
conclude a treaty with a view to preventing future undesirable political rivalries and other possibilities of international misunderstanding in that area. The US believed the interests of mankind would be well served if these 11 nations and the US joined in concluding a treaty with "the following peaceful purposes": (1) continued cooperation in end freedom of scientific investigation, (2) international agreement to ensure that the region was used for peaceful purposes only, and (3) any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the UN Charter. The treaty should specify that no signatory would renounce any right or claim in the continent and that no new rights would be acquired or new claims made by any country for the duration of the treaty; in short, that the legal status quo in Antarctica "would be frozen."

On 4 June 1958 the Department announced that all 11 nations (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the USSR, and the UK) had accepted the invitation. The details of the conference were yet to be worked out. (See item of 15 October 1959.)

**Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXVIII (2 Jun 58), pp. 910-912. NYT, 5 Jun 58, 1:5.**

**5 May 58**

In a memorandum to the US, the UK, and France the Soviet Government proposed substantially the same disarmament agenda items for a summit conference as had been contained in its note of 28 February and Premier Bulganin's letter of 1 February to President Eisenhower (see items of those dates). A recapitulation of Soviet views on each of the items was included in the memorandum in the hope, the memorandum stated, that this might help to facilitate a prompt completion of preparations for a summit conference.

**Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIX (7 Jul 58), pp. 17-22.**

**7 May 58**

In its final communique following a 3-day meeting at Copenhagen the NATO Ministerial Council announced among other things its views regarding the problem of disarmament. If a summit conference were to take place, the Council said, it should consider certain important questions identified by the heads of government at Geneva in 1955 and one of these was controlled disarmament. The proposals made by the Western nations on 29 August 1957, which had been approved by a large majority of the UN, could afford a reasonable basis for this discussion. The Council hoped it would be possible, despite repeated Soviet refusal, to inaugurate East-West expert technical discussions on detailed measures of control over disarmament, such as measures relating to the prevention of surprise attack or the detection of nuclear explosions. Agreement on such measures might go far toward demonstrating the possibility of disarmament.

**Text of communique in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXVIII (26 May 58), pp. 850-851.**

**9 May 58**

Premier Khrushchev, answering President Eisenhower's letter of 28 April 1958, reluctantly accepted the President's proposal for an East-West conference of technical experts to study methods for detecting possible violations of an
agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. Though willing to "try even this course," Khrushchev feared the conference would only cause delay in the solution of this increasingly urgent problem, and he again appealed to the President to "support the initiative of the Soviet Union" in the matter of nuclear testing "and thus make possible a final solution of this problem." As for the American proposal before the UN regarding an Arctic Zone inspection area, he considered this proposal inadequate and apparently designed to gain a unilateral advantage for the US. Secretary Dulles, he pointed out, had recently spoken merely of a possibility of reducing to a minimum the flights being protested by the USSR (see item of 1 May 1958), and other avenues of attack on the USSR would remain open from American military bases in such places as England, France, West Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Moreover, a majority vote in the Security Council on the American proposal (see item of 2 May) could not be taken seriously because a majority of its members were dependent in some degree on the US. (See item of 24 May 1958.)

Ltr, Khrushchev to Eisenhower, 9 May 58, CCS 092 (4-14-58) sec 75. Also in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXVIII (9 Jun 58), pp. 940-942.

24 May 58

President Eisenhower noted with satisfaction that Premier Khrushchev had in his letter of 9 May accepted ("at least partially") the President's proposal for an East-West conference of technical experts to study methods of detecting clandestine nuclear tests. Experts from the West, the President said, would be prepared to meet with experts from the Soviet side at Geneva (subject to agreement by the Swiss Government) within 3 weeks of the President's learning that these arrangements were acceptable to Khrushchev. He stressed that the experts should be "chosen on the basis of special competence, so as to assure that we get scientific, not political conclusions." He had in mind, he said, experts from the UK and France, and possibly other countries, as well as from the US and the USSR. He thought the experts should make an initial report within 30 days after convening and aim at a final report within 60 days or as soon thereafter as possible. (See item of 30 May 1958.)


28 May 58

In reply to a Soviet note of 5 May 1958 (see item) on an agenda for a summit conference, the US, the UK, and France presented a memorandum to Foreign Minister Gromyko recapitulating the Western position on the proposals for partial disarmament advanced in 1957 by the West and again in President Eisenhower's letter to Premier Bulganin on 12 January 1958 (see item).


28 May 58

In a tripartite aide-memoire to the Soviet Foreign Minister, the US, the UK, and France suggested that the following procedure be followed in preparation for a summit conference: the ambassadors of the three countries and the Soviet Foreign Minister would explore the possibilities of agreement on major issues; when they had made progress in
these talks they would agree on the time, place, and composition of a foreign ministers' meeting; the foreign ministers would review the preparatory studies conducted by the ambassadors and, if satisfied with the prospect for agreements at a summit conference, would set the date, place, and composition of such a meeting.

Three days later the Western powers presented to the Soviet Government a list of general headings for reviewing specific agenda proposals.


30 May 58

Regretting the absence of any "answer to such an urgent problem as that of the immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests," Premier Khrushchev accepted in general the arrangements proposed in President Eisenhower's letter of 24 May for an East-West conference of technical experts on methods of detecting prohibited nuclear tests. Instead of Geneva, however, he proposed Moscow as the site of the conference. He thought the entire work of the conference should be concluded and a final report rendered to governments within 3 or 4 weeks after the date of convening. Since the US proposed the participation of experts from Britain and France and possibly other countries, the USSR proposed that experts from Poland and Czechoslovakia join in the conference. In addition Khrushchev thought it "advisable" that experts from India and possibly some other countries be invited to participate (See item of 10 June 1958.)

Replying to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 30 May about an East-West conference of technical experts, President Eisenhower suggested that the discussions begin on or about 1 July 1958 at Geneva. He appreciated Khrushchev's offer of Moscow for the site but stated that Geneva would be preferable from the Western point of view, noting that the Swiss Government had agreed to this location. The President again made clear that the talks would be undertaken "without commitment as to the final decision on the relationship of nuclear test suspension to other more important disarmament measures I have proposed. He agreed to the participation of Czechoslovakian and Polish experts, and saw no objection in principle to later participation by experts of nationalities not identified with either side if it was agreed during the course of the talks that this was necessary or useful. As to the date for rendering a final report, he favored sufficient flexibility to permit the resolution of any complex technical issues that might require more time than the 3 or 4 weeks suggested by Khrushchev. (See item of 13 June 1958.)


In a long letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev complained about the lack of progress being made in preparations for a summit conference. He repeated the list of items that the USSR felt should be considered at the summit—first and foremost the immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Reiterating arguments previously advanced to emphasize the urgency of a test cessation, he asked why the Western powers insisted upon the "renewal of futile discussions of the problem of disarmament 'as a whole.'" An agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, he again asserted, would be a good beginning and "would pave the way toward solution of all major international problems."


In an aide-memoire delivered to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, the USSR agreed to a conference of experts to be convened in Geneva on 1 July 1958 to study the means of detecting nuclear explosions (see item of 10 June 1958). The note proposed a time limit of 3 to 4 weeks for the deliberations of the conference and listed the delegation of experts from the Soviet Union, headed by Y. K. Pedarov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. (See item of 20 June 1958.)

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIX (7 Jul 58), pp. 11-12.

The UN Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation completed its report after a study lasting 2½ years. In the report the Committee concluded unanimously that any added radiation exposure to which human beings might be subjected in the atmosphere, no matter how slight, might be injurious, and that the explosion of nuclear weapons was resulting in "a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels." The Committee cautioned, however,
that "any present attempt to evaluate the effects of sources of radiation to which the world population is exposed can produce only tentative estimates with wide margins of uncertainty. The Committee's only lapse from unanimity was in the voting on a Soviet proposal calling for "immediate" cessation of nuclear tests. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 10-3-2 (Belgium and India). (The report was made public on 11 August 1958.)


20 Jun 58

Answering the Soviet aide-memoire of 13 June (see item), the State Department noted the Soviet acceptance of a conference of experts to study nuclear test detection, accepted in principle the time limit suggested by the USSR, and presented the panel of experts that would compose the Western delegation. The panel, headed by Dr. James B. Fisk, vice-president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories and member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, included experts from Canada, France, and the UK as well as from the US. (See 1st item of 24 June 1958.)

Servicemen, vol XXXIX (7 Jun 58), p. 11.

22 Jun 58

John W. Finney of the New York Times reported from Washington that 31 of the leading seismologists of the US were in general agreement on the possibility of establishing an international inspection system capable of detecting most underground nuclear explosions. The scientists had warned, however, that such an inspection system would not be infallible, for within a certain range of intensity nuclear explosions could be confused with earthquakes or even heavy conventional explosions. These views had become known as the result of a questionnaire survey conducted by the Humphrey Senate Subcommittee (on Disarmament).

NYT, 23 Jun 58, 1:8.

23 Jun 58

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the JCS on a Department of State position paper setting forth instructions for the US delegation at the Geneva technical talks. The paper stated the broad objectives of the US in the talks as follows. (1) To ascertain the willingness of the USSR to participate fully and with scientific objectivity in the discussion of such technical questions as (a) the determination of the existing technical capabilities for detection and identification of nuclear explosions of various yields in various environments, and (b) the determination of the characteristics and reliability of various systems for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions above a series of minimum yields and regardless of environment; (2) to demonstrate the soundness of the US position regarding the technical aspects of the foregoing questions and the objective and constructive spirit in which the US was approaching the inspection aspects of disarmament; (3) to ascertain the attitude of the Soviet
Union toward acceptance of reasonable inspection and control in disarmament agreements; and (4) to reach agreement on technical capabilities for detection of nuclear explosions and (to the extent possible) on the technical requirements for detection of violations of any agreement to suspend nuclear tests. The paper required the US delegation to avoid discussion of any political questions, such as the conditions under which the US would accept a test suspension or the relationship of test suspension to disarmament measures. (See last item of 25 June 1958.)

(C) Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Department of State Position Paper on Technical Talks on Nuclear Test Detection, Geneva, Switzerland (U)," 23 Jun 58, Encl to (C) JCS 1731/256, 24 Jun 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 76.

In an aide-memoire handed to Ambassador Thompson, the USSR confirmed its agreement to an East-West conference of experts on nuclear test detection and announced the names of the delegates who would represent Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania at the conference. (See item of 28 June 1958.)


25 Jun 58

The JCS informed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), in response to his request of 23 June 1958, that they were in general agreement with the Department of State position paper containing instructions for the US delegation to the technical experts' talks in Geneva. They suggested a few changes and additions, however. The principal one was a caution to the delegation against
disclosing classified information that might reduce the capability of the US to detect Soviet nuclear tests by jeopardizing existing sources of intelligence and impairing future prospects for intelligence collection in this field.

On 26 June the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the views of the JCS to the Department of State, expressing the concurrence of the Defense Department and recommending that the amendments suggested by the JCS be incorporated in the US position paper. The Deputy Under Secretary of State replied on 11 July that changes in the position paper had been made along the lines suggested by the JCS.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Department of State Position Paper on Technical Talks on Nuclear Test Detection, Geneva, Switzerland (U)," 25 Jun 58, derived from N/H of JCS 1731/257, 24 Jun 58. N/H of JCS 1731/257, 27 Jun 58. (C) N/H of JCS 1731/257, 15 Jul 53. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 76.

25 Jun 53

In an aide-memoire delivered to Ambassador Thompson, the USSR expressed alarm at the position taken by Secretary of State Dulles in reply to a news-conference question on 17 June about the relationship of the Geneva conference of experts to a ban on nuclear tests. Mr. Dulles, had reaffirmed the US view that the work of the conference must be carried out without deciding the question beforehand whether or not tests would be temporarily terminated (see item of 28 April 1958). The Soviet note questioned the motivation of the US in proposing the conference and asked for a declaration by the US that the meeting of the experts was "subordinate to the resolution of the problem of the universal and immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons."

On the next day the US replied by letter that it stood by the procedure agreed to in the correspondence up to that time and that its experts were already en route to Geneva. (See items of 28 and 30 June 1958.)


28 Jun 58

In a note delivered to Ambassador Thompson the USSR prodded the US for an unequivocal statement to the effect that the Geneva conference of experts was tied to "the main task"--immediate, universal cessation of nuclear experiments. Without such an understanding, said the Soviet note, the conference would be an empty waste of time and could only lead to "deception of peoples."

(See item of 30 June 1958.)


30 Jun 58

The State Department replied to the Soviet aide-memoire of 28 June (see item) in a note that repeated the US position on the experts' conference. The conference, said the Department's aide-memoire, was to study the practical problems of supervision and control necessary to dependable disarmament agreements; but, as the President had stated in his letter of 28 April 1958 (see item), "these studies are without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament."

1 Jul 58

The Geneva conference of technical experts convened and agreed on an agenda (see inter alia items of 10 and 13 June 1958). The conference would first examine the various means of detecting nuclear explosions, after which it would consider the required characteristics of a detection network. The conference also decided that the official name of the meeting should be Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests. (See item of 21 August 1958.)

NYT, 2 Jul 58, 1:2.

2 Jul 58

Premier Khrushchev proposed in a letter to President Eisenhower that in the near future the US and the USSR, and possibly some other countries, designate representatives to make a joint study of the "practical aspects" of the problem of surprise attack. This problem had become especially acute, he said, because of the "dangerous practice of flights by American military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of a number of West European states and in Arctic areas in the direction of the Soviet borders." All that was required to reduce greatly the danger of atomic war inherent in these flights was an order from the US Government. As for an inspection area against surprise attack, the Soviet Union was prepared to reach agreement, as previously, on reciprocal aerial photography in the zone of concentration of the main armed forces in Europe to a distance of 800 kilometers both east and west of the line of demarcation between the two groupings of European states. In addition, the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a Far Eastern zone of aerial inspection that would include corresponding portions of the territory of the USSR and that of the US. Unlike the proposals transmitted to the USSR by the three Western powers on 28 May (see item), Khrushchev asserted, the Soviet proposals gave equal consideration to the security interests of all the nations involved, and he therefore thought they might constitute a suitable basis for agreement. Unfortunately, however, they had not been favorably received by the US in the past. But the USSR and the US were agreed on the basis of past correspondence that the subject of surprise attack was important enough to be on the agenda of a summit meeting. The joint study now being proposed by the USSR -- at which each country's delegation should include military representatives, "e.g., at the level of experts"-- could develop recommendations regarding measures for the prevention of surprise attack, and these recommendations would "undoubtedly" facilitate the adoption of a decision on this subject at a subsequent summit meeting. (See item of 31 July 1958.)


2 Jul 58

In reply to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 11 June (see item), President Eisenhower expressed his surprise and disappointment over the Soviet Union's allegation that the US was impeding progress toward a summit meeting. The President asked Khrushchev for an answer to Western
agenda suggestions as well as a reply to the procedural proposals advanced by the West. (See 2d item of 28 May 1958.)


3 Jul 58

Referring to Premier Khrushchev's proposal of 2 July (see 1st item) for a conference of experts to discuss the problem of surprise attack, the Secretary of State asked Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, to make a preliminary analysis of the technical questions involved. He hoped the study would among other things indicate the most important objects and means of inspection and control in any inspection system designed to prevent surprise attack, comment on the reliability of the various proposals for surprise-attack inspection advanced in previous disarmament negotiations, and propose for further study any appropriate measures that had not already been considered in past proposals made by the US.

Ltr, SecState to Spec Aast to Pres for Science and Technology, 3 Jul 58, App A to JCS 1731/260, 5 Aug 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 77.

9 Jul 58

In a note handed to US Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called on the US to commit itself to a suspension of nuclear weapons tests in advance of any agreement by the technical experts meeting at Geneva to study methods of detecting clandestine nuclear explosions (see item of 1 July 1958). In reporting this information New York Times correspondent William J. Jorden noted that this was the third time in 2 weeks that the Soviet Government had pressed this matter. (See 2d item of 25 June and item of 28 June 1958.)

Nyt, 10 Jul 58, 1:6.

10 Jul 58

Dr. Killian replied to the Secretary of State's letter of 3 July requesting him to make a preliminary study of the technical questions involved in the surprise-attack problem. Discussion of the matter in the Science Advisory Committee, Dr. Killian said, had led to the conclusion that technical questions were inextricably inter-twined with political and military considerations, e.g., in such problems as controls applying to weapons or to deployments. He therefore believed the Science Advisory Committee should join with representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other government agencies if it was to make an effective study of the kind desired. (See item of 14 July 1958.)

Ltr, Killian to SecState, 10 Jul 58, App B to JCS 1731/260, 5 Aug 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 77.

14 Jul 58

The President requested the Secretary of Defense to join with the Secretary of State and Dr. Killian in having a careful study of the surprise-attack problem made, with appropriate consultation between governmental agencies and officials. He hoped the working group actually charged with the study would take full advantage of pertinent technical analyses and studies being developed
within the Science Advisory Committee.
(The two secretaries and Dr. Killian were sub-
sequently referred to as the "committee of three." The

group charged with the study was called the Inter-Agency

Working Group.) (See 2d item of 3 September 1958.)

Memo, Pres to SecDef, 14 Jul 58, App C to

JCS 1731/260, 5 Aug 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 77.

The USSR enclosed with a note to the US a draft treaty

embodying most of the agenda items on disarmament pro-

posed in its note of 5 May 1958 (see item). The proposed
treaty was a nonaggression pact designed to foster

friendship and cooperation between the NATO and Warsaw

Treaty nations. The disarmament items were incorporated

in the treaty, the Soviet note said, because of (1) the

"significant difficulties" in the way of achieving an

agreement or even any progress in negotiations on dis-

armament per se, and (2) the steady worsening of the

explosive situation in Europe, with the prospect of a

war using nuclear and ballistic means of annihilation

unless "special prohibitive or, at least, delimiting

measures" were taken. (See 3d item of 22 August.)


462-465.

The US replied by diplomatic note to Premier Khrushchev's

letters of 9 May and 2 July to President Eisenhower (see

items) insofar as those letters related to the problem

of preventing surprise attack. The US proposed that

qualified persons from each side meet during the first

week of October for a study of the technical aspects

of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack.

On the basis of Khrushchev's letter of 2 July the US

assumed Soviet agreement that these discussions would

take place "without prejudice to the respective positions

of the two Governments as to the delimitation of areas

within which safeguards would be established, or as to

the timing or interdependence of various aspects of dis-

armament." The US explicitly did not agree that the

areas to be supervised against the possibility of sur-

prise attack should be those mentioned in Khrushchev's

letter of 2 July. Further in this regard the US noted

that the suggested base line for determining the extent

of the eastern and western portions of Khrushchev's

proposed European inspection zone had apparently been

selected with a view to crystallizing the existing

division of Europe, since this line was the line of
demarcation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As for

Khrushchev's remarks about flights of US military air-
craft in the Arctic area, the US wished to point out that

(1) the greater portion of the Arctic Zone air space was

internationally free, and (2) the US had never dispatched
aircraft armed with nuclear bombs toward the borders of
the USSR as the result of a misinterpreted radar blip or

other false alert, as the Soviet Government seemed to

think. Moreover, if dependable safeguards against sur-

prise attack in that area were established, US aircraft

would conform to the agreed control measures. The US

believed that technical discussions of measures to reduce
the possibility of surprise attack, even though made
without reference to particular areas, would produce a
fuller realization of the value of an Arctic inspection
zone and pave the way for agreement on safeguards there and in other areas, and also would be helpful in determining whether a summit meeting might be useful. (See 1st item of 8 September 1958.)

The JCS replied to a memorandum of 15 August 1958 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting as a matter of urgency their views concerning a State Department revision of the nuclear provisions of the US position on the first phase of disarmament and an alternative revision formulated by the Department of Defense. (Both revisions provided for separate negotiation of a safeguarded agreement to suspend nuclear testing and both made continuation of otherwise satisfactory suspension beyond a stated period contingent upon the completion of a safeguarded agreement to stop producing fissionable materials for weapon purposes.)

A strong adherence to the existing US position on nuclear testing, they concluded, seemed plainly indicated. They requested that these views be conveyed to the President.

On 18 August the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded, with his comments, the foregoing views of the JCS to the President.

The conference of technical experts convened at Geneva on 1 July 1958 (see item) completed its work with the adoption of a final report for consideration by governments. The experts concluded in the report that it was technically feasible with methods available to establish a "workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests." The methods of detecting nuclear explosions, believed to be effective even for those of low yield (1-5 KT), were listed as the method of collecting samples of radioactive debris, the methods of recording seismic, acoustic and hydroacoustic waves, and the radio-signal...
method—all in conjunction with on-site inspection of unidentified events that could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. The report set forth the requirements of a control system considered adequate to identify 90 per cent of continental earthquakes equivalent to a 5-KT explosion and a small percentage of those equivalent to a 1-KT explosion. The remaining earthquakes, estimates as numbering 20 to 100 per year, would be detected by the system but their identification as earthquakes (i.e., not nuclear explosions) would have to be accomplished by on-site inspections. The control system would inter alia embrace 160 to 170 land-based control posts (equipped as specified in the report) and about 10 ships. The land-based control posts would have approximately the following distribution: North America, 24; Europe, 6; Asia, 37; Australia, 7; South America, 16; Africa, 16; Antarctica, 4; and various islands, about 60.


President Eisenhower announced that the US was prepared to begin negotiations promptly with the other nuclear powers toward an agreement to cease testing nuclear weapons. His announcement resulted from the conclusion of the Geneva conference of experts (see item of 21 August) that it was technically possible to supervise and enforce such an agreement, and specified that the agreement should include establishment of an international control system like the one described in the experts' report. If this offer was accepted in principle and the USSR did not resume testing, the US would refrain from nuclear testing for one year from the date of the beginning of negotiations. Further, as part of the treaty to be negotiated and on a basis of reciprocity, the US would be prepared to continue the suspension on a year-by-year basis after assurance at the beginning of each year that (1) the agreed inspection system was installed and working effectively, and (2) satisfactory progress was being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms-control measures such as the US had long sought. The US negotiators would be ready to meet with those of other nations by 31 October 1958.

On the same date the State Department transmitted a copy of the President's statement to the Soviet Government with a note proposing that the negotiations referred to by the President begin on 31 October in New York and be reported through the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Also on the same date the UK announced its readiness to begin negotiations under conditions similar to those proposed by the US. (See item of 30 August for the Soviet reply. Negotiations began and the test suspension went into effect on 31 October 1958.)

In anticipation of a possible East-West conference on surprise attack the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their recommendations on the composition and membership of the US delegation and their suggested terms of reference. They believed the delegation should be limited to three principal members, plus a technical staff, a back-up staff in Washington, and a political adviser. Since the assessment of safeguards against surprise attack was primarily a military function, they considered that the head of the delegation should be a knowledgeable military officer of international stature, such as Admiral Radford or General Gruner. In addition, one of the remaining two principal members should have a military background. The third principal member should have a scientific background. In their suggested terms of reference they included the principle that the US delegation should make clear to the Soviets, as the need might arise, that it considered any purely political questions to be outside its terms of reference.

On 30 August the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded these views to the Secretary of State for appropriate consideration, noting that the recommendations of the JCS regarding the principal members of the delegation had already been met in the appointment of General John E. Hull as the head and General James E. Doolittle and Dr. George Kistiakowsky as the other two principal members. (Generals Hull and Doolittle did not serve. The head of the delegation when it went to Geneva for the conference, which opened on 10 November 1958, was William C. Foster. The other two principal members were General Otto F. Weyland, USAF, and Dr. Kistiakowsky, of the President's Science Advisory Committee. (See 1st item of 7 November 1958.)

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preparations of Possible Negotiations on Measures to Detect and Discourage Surprise Attack," 22 Aug 58, derived from (JCS 1731/262, 15 Aug 58. N/H of JCS 1731/262, 3 Sep 58. All in CCS 092 (4-14-46) sec 78.

In reply to the Soviet note of 15 July 1958 (see item) proposing a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the State Department said that it was making no comment on the substance of either the note or the draft treaty since they merely reflected the contents of the Soviet note of 5 May 1958 (see item). The first step toward resolving the question of an agenda at a summit conference, the Department said, would have to be a breaking of the impasse in the preparatory discussions at Moscow. (See 2d item of 28 May and 2d item of 2 July 1958.)


The National Security Council noted and discussed an oral report concerning the Geneva technical conference on nuclear testing by Dr. James E. Fisk, the chairman of the US delegation. (See item of 21 August 1958.)

NSC Action No. 1979, 27 Aug 58, files of Control Div, JCS.

In response to the US note transmitting President Eisenhower's offer of 22 August to begin negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government
announced by return note its readiness to begin such negotiations with the US and the UK on 31 October. The aim of the Soviet Government in these negotiations, the note stated, would be to conclude "agreement on the cessation forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states with establishment of appropriate control for fulfillment of such agreement." Suggesting Geneva as the most convenient place for the conference, the USSR proposed a limitation on its duration of 2 to 3 weeks.

Dept of State Bulletin; vol XXXIX (29 Sep 58), pp. 503-504.
The second UN International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy met in Geneva. The conference was attended by more than 5,000 delegates and observers from 67 countries. Premier Khrushchev, in a message to the conference, again called for an end to atomic tests and weapons.

NYT, 2 Sep 58, 1:6.

In a diplomatic note to the Soviet Government, the US Government requested a reply to its note of 31 July regarding a study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. The US Government suggested that because of the delay and the need for careful preparations the meeting originally proposed for the first week of October should be scheduled to take place about two months following receipt of the Soviet reply.

(See item of 15 September 1958.)


The JCS replied to a memorandum of 22 August 1958 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting their views on the suitability of the final report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on the surprise-attack problem. (This report, not a position paper and containing no specific recommendations, dealt with the general problems involved in developing safeguards against surprise attack. It was submitted to the "committee of three" [Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Killian] on 15 August. See item of 14 July 1958.) The JCS considered the paper more suitable for providing background information than as a primary basis for developing the specific US positions for use in the technical discussions. They noted the emphasis placed throughout the report on the point that certain other aspects of disarmament, such as limitations on the disposition and readiness or the sizes and types of forces, were prerequisites to the development of safeguards against surprise attack. These aspects of over-all disarmament measures were in the view of the JCS inappropriate for discussion at the forthcoming technical talks. The JCS thought that designated technicians would be able to reach a common understanding regarding the feasibility of detecting surprise attack, or methods of inspecting against it. They agreed with the conclusion of the report that a great deal of further study was necessary to develop the US national position.

Memo, Dep SecDef to CJCS, "Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Surprise Attack (S)," 22 Aug 58, Encl to Memo, JCS 175/263, 22 Aug 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 78.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Sep 58, same file, sec 79, derived from Memo, JCS 1731/254, same file, sec 78. N/H of JCS 1731/264, 24 Sep 58, same file, sec 78.

The Secretary of Defense requested the JCS to establish direct liaison with the US delegation to the forthcoming Geneva surprise-attack talks for the purpose of providing the delegation with such information, studies, and other assistance as might be needed in the course of the delegation's preparations.

Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Measures to Reduce the Possibility of Surprise Attack (U)," 10 Sep 58, Encl A to Memo, JCS 1731/267, 11 Sep 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 79.
Sep 53  Replying to the US note of 31 July concerning a surprise-attack conference of experts, the Soviet Government stated that what it had had in mind in its letter of 2 July from Premier Khrushchev to President Eisenhower was a meeting devoted to "the working out of practical recommendations concerning measures to prevent surprise attack in combination with definite steps in the field of disarmament." The US assumption of agreement by the Soviet Government that these talks should not predetermine the positions of the two governments in connection with the timing and inter-dependence of the different aspects of disarmament was therefore without foundation. The Soviet Government had no objection to the time and place proposed in the US note of 31 July, but in view of the US note of 8 September (see 1st item of that date) it proposed that the meeting of experts convene in Geneva on 10 November. It further proposed that the meeting conclude its work in the shortest possible time, "for example in the course of four to five weeks." The principle of equal representation from the Atlantic and Warsaw Facts should obtain, the Soviet Government continued; hence it proposed that representatives attend from the US, the UK, France, Belgium, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. It agreed that the UN should be kept informed concerning the work of the conference. (See item of 10 October 1958.)


Sep 58  Representatives of State, Defense, CIA, AEC, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the office of Mr. Gordon Gray (the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs) met to discuss a State Department draft of objectives and terms of reference for the US delegation to the approaching Geneva talks on surprise-attack safeguards. The conferees having split on whether or not limitations and restrictions on armaments and forces should be discussed at the forthcoming talks, it was decided to submit this question to the President's "committee of three" appointed on 14 July 1958 (see item).

On 22 September the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the JCS on this question for the guidance of the Secretary of Defense at a meeting of the committee of three scheduled for 20 September 1958. (See item of 24 September.)


Sep 58  The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the three military secretaries and the Chairman of the JCS providing guidance concerning the effect on the Defense Department if the conditions of the President's offer of 22 August 1958 to suspend nuclear testing for a year should be accepted by the USSR. The Military Departments and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project should continue the necessary research, laboratory, planning, and budgetary activities on the assumptions that limited test operations might be initiated by, but not earlier than, February 1960, and that extensive test operations might be initiated by, but not earlier than, mid-1960.
The JCS replied to the memorandum of 22 September 1958 from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requesting their views on whether or not limitations and restrictions on armaments and forces should be discussed at the forthcoming surprise-attack conference at Geneva. They adhered, they said, to the position taken in their memorandum of 6 September 1958 to the Secretary of Defense—that is, these subjects should not be discussed at the conference. Inclusion of these subjects, they pointed out, would expand the scope of the talks beyond the terms of the US proposal for the talks, with resultant disadvantages and no compensating advantages to the US and its allies.

These views were transmitted on 26 September to the State Department by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who expressed the concurrence of the Defense Department. (See item of 16 October 1958.)
The Soviet Union confirmed that it had resumed the testing of nuclear weapons. It stated it had been forced to do so because of US refusal to suspend tests during the past 6 months.

On 7 October, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced at a UN news conference that the Soviet Union would continue nuclear tests until the number equaled the total reached by the US and the UK since 31 March 1958. (See item of 31 October 1958.)

\textbf{NVT, 3 Oct 58, 1:2.}

The US Government replied to the Soviet note of 15 September regarding a meeting of technical experts at Geneva to study the practical aspects of minimizing the possibility of surprise attack. In its opinion, the US Government said, the primary purpose of the meeting should be "to examine the methods and means of control and to assess the results that might be obtained from the adoption of those methods in lessening the danger of surprise military attack." The conference should undertake its study with a view to preparing a technical report for the consideration of governments. Such a report would be useful in the subsequent examination of the problem by governments "at an appropriate level." As stated in its note of 31 July, the US considered that the discussions should take place without prejudice to the respective positions of the two governments in regard to the delimitation of areas within which measures might be established, or in regard to the timing or interdependence of various aspects of disarmament. With this understanding the US agreed to the commencement of the meeting on 10 November and proposed that the West should be represented by experts from the US, the UK, France, Canada, Italy, and "possibly other countries." (See 1st item of 1 November 1958.)


A conference of 17 principals, headed by Under Secretary of State Herter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, met to consider the possibility of broadening the agenda to be offered by the US delegation for discussion at the Geneva conference on the surprise-attack problem, proposed to open on 10 November 1958. Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., the President's Assistant for Science and Technology, emphasized the necessity for the Geneva conference to obtain outstanding results and stated his opinion that such results would be impossible without consideration of disarmament. He added, however, that a proper understanding would have to be reached through agreement on the earlier, technical paragraphs before discussion of the disarmament aspects would be appropriate. Mr. Quarles insisted that he could not agree to a departure from the technical aspects by authorizing the delegation to advance to the discussion of disarmament measures, though he felt that consideration of hypothetical examples or variables at several different levels might be acceptable if the language were carefully checked. He admitted that certain testimony given by General LeMay before the Inter-Agency Working Group on Surprise Attack and read to the meeting by Dr. Killian provided excellent reasons for abandoning the conference. But he pointed out that if the object of the conference was
a new approach to the disarmament problem, then it should be organized in an entirely different fashion. On the other hand, he stressed that the free world had much to gain by undertaking the conference within the limitations he was urging. Mr. Herter expressed his agreement with Mr. Quarles on these last two points. (See 1st item of 21 October 1958.)

Memorandum for Record by Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, M11 Adviser to Asst SecDef (ISA), "Meeting of Principals to Consider Possibility of Broadening Agenda for U. S. Delegation to the Surprise Attack Safeguard Conference," 16 Oct 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 61.

20 Oct 58

Jules Moch, French delegate to the UN, told the Political Committee of the General Assembly that France would not consider herself bound, at least at the outset, by any agreement between the US, the UK, and the USSR to halt tests of nuclear weapons. He reminded the Committee that France would not be represented when the three nuclear powers began negotiations in Geneva on 31 October. Though mentioning De Gaulle's statement of 9 October that France "ardently hopes never to possess a single atomic or thermonuclear bomb," he made it clear that France would not renounce a weapon "which other countries already possess and the number of which they would increase." France's attitude toward any agreement reached to halt nuclear weapons tests would depend upon circumstances, he said, but he indicated the French attitude by suggesting the amendment of a 17-power Western resolution calling for suspension of tests while the Geneva negotiations continued. The French amendment would add to this resolution "precise clauses on cessation, under international control, of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and on gradual reconversion to peaceful ends, likewise under international control, of the existing stockpile."


21 Oct 58

Under Secretary of State Herter, Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, and Dr. Killian agreed on the objectives and terms of reference for the US delegation to the surprise-attack conference at Geneva. Among other things it was explicitly stated that discussion at the conference should be limited to technical-military factors and that no political commitments on behalf of the US could be made. The US delegation was to refrain from discussion any general disarmament measures that the Soviet-bloc delegation might propose. But if that delegation had demonstrated willingness to make progress in the substantive discussion of objects and means of control and it seemed desirable to discuss the effect that hypothetical limitations on instruments of surprise attack might have on the problem of reducing the danger of surprise attack, the US delegation was to request authorization to enter into such discussions.

A version of these objectives and terms of reference omitting reference to this last point was presented to the NATO Council, which gave approval on 28 October 1958.

JCS 1731/285 (Objectives and Terms of Reference for the U.S. Delegation to the Technical-Military Experts' Talks on Surprise Attack Safeguards), 28 Oct 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 82.
The JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a list of elements considered by them essential to any agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests if the security of the US was to be safeguarded. The principal ones were: (1) retention of the right to use nuclear weapons in warfare; (2) limitation of the suspension so that it would apply only to explosion of nuclear weapons and devices and would last only 1 year but be subject to extension on a year-to-year basis, (3) prompt establishment of an effective international control system for monitoring the suspension, (4) establishment of an international organization, unhampered by veto or delaying tactics, to administer the control system; (5) acceptance by the nuclear powers of a specified time and date for ceasing nuclear tests, rather than some time and date to be determined later by the international control organization; (6) adequate notice if one of the nuclear powers decided not to renew the obligations of any completed treaty beyond the year in effect at such time; (7) automatic release from all obligations if a nuclear device should be exploded by a nonsignatory nation. It was of paramount importance, the JCS insisted, that the US delegation to the Geneva talks beginning on 31 October 1958 negotiate from a position embracing all the foregoing elements. They therefore requested that this list be made available to the Defense representatives participating with the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament Policy and the State Department in preparing a draft US treaty on the suspension of nuclear test explosions. They further requested that they be permitted to review and comment on the final US draft treaty before the departure of the US delegation for Geneva. (See 2d item of 1 November 1958.)

JCS 1731/285 (Objectives and Terms of Reference for the U.S. Delegation to the Technical-Military Experts' Talks on Surprise Attack Safeguards), 28 Oct 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 82.

22 Oct 58

India and Yugoslavia introduced a resolution at the UN proposing that the UN General Assembly enlarge the Disarmament Commission to include all 81 UN member nations. (This was a revival of the Soviet proposal of a year previously. Its rejection at that time caused the Soviets to boycott the Disarmament Commission.)

NYT, 23 Oct 58, 12:1.

31 Oct 58

The US-British-Soviet conference on the suspension of nuclear tests opened in Geneva. All three delegations reiterated their countries' previous stand. The Soviet Union continued to call for three-power agreement for the cessation of tests for all time and the establishment of a control system proposed by experts. (The Soviets also called for a program of test for test until the actual test ban went into effect. This meant, according to their figures, that they still had to conduct 50 tests to catch up with the West.) The US and Britain still pressed for an initial suspension of tests on a year-to-year basis, the establishment of an effective inspection system, and progress toward an over-all disarmament and a permanent suspension of tests.

NYT, 31 Oct 58, 1:7 and 1:8.
In reply to the US note of 10 October 1958, the Soviet Foreign Ministry noted the agreement to Geneva as the place and 10 November as the time for a conference on the prevention of surprise attack. The Soviet note reported that since the principle of equal representation has been set as a basis for carrying out the conference, representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Albania, and perhaps other states would take part. It also repeated the Soviet position (see item of 15 September 1958) that the efforts of the conference "should be directed to working out practical recommendations on measures for prevention of surprise attack in conjunction with definite steps in the field of disarmament."


Referring to the memorandum of 21 October 1958 by the JCS, in which they had expressed the desire to review the final US draft treaty on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests before departure of the US delegation for Geneva, the Secretary of Defense stated that the delegation had departed without having formulated a final version of the draft treaty. He enclosed a draft dated 23 October, which he said was subject to further refinement after coordination with the British before and during the Geneva negotiations. He added that both this draft and the "Basic U. S. Position for Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations with the USSR" dated 27 October 1958, a copy of which was also enclosed, were considered to be in substantial agreement with the essential treaty elements listed in the JCS memorandum of 21 October.

Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Reference Documents for Negotiation on Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)," 1 Nov 58, circulated in JCS 1731/288, 4 Nov 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 83.

The Political Committee of the UN General Assembly approved a compromise resolution under which membership of the Disarmament Commission would be broadened in 1959 to include all 81 members of the UN (Guinea became the eighty-second member of the UN on 12 December 1958). Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, told the Committee that the Soviet Union would end its boycott of the UN Disarmament Commission (see item of 19 December 1957) if the resolution was approved.

On the following day the resolution passed the General Assembly by a vote of 78-0-2 with one absentee.


The UN General Assembly passed a resolution urging the US, the UK, and the USSR to make every effort to reach an early agreement on suspension of nuclear weapons tests "under effective international control." The resolution also urged the three nuclear powers not to conduct tests during the Geneva negotiations and called attention to the need for agreement in the forthcoming surprise-attack discussions. It was adopted by a vote of 49-9 (Soviet bloc)-22. The Assembly then rejected
by a vote of 41-27-13 an Asian-African proposal calling for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests until an agreement on controls was reached between the nuclear powers.


7 Nov 58

Acknowledging the Soviet note of 1 November (see 1st item of that date), the US presented the list of experts who would represent the Western powers at the Geneva surprise-attack conference. The US experts were William C. Foster, Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, and General Otto P. Weyland. The US emphasized that participation in the conference should be based on ability to contribute to the achievement of its objectives and not on the notion of "equal representation," which the US considered to be neither a "principle" nor a relevant basis for organizing the conference. Referring to the Soviet statement linking the work of the conference with "definite steps in the field of disarmament," the US again clarified its position. The US assumed, it said, that decisions regarding measures that might accompany measures designed to reduce the possibility of surprise attack were political and therefore outside the scope of the conference, "which would be held without prejudice to the respective positions of the Governments concerned as to the timing and interdependence of such measures."


7 Nov 58

Following an announcement by the Atomic Energy Commission disclosing that Soviet atomic explosions had occurred on 1 and 3 November, President Eisenhower warned that the US would have to reconsider its own nuclear test suspension (see item of 22 August 1958) if the Soviet Union did not stop atomic testing. The President's statement said that the Soviet action, taken in the face of a UN resolution urging suspension of testing during the Geneva negotiations on the subject, had relieved the US of any obligation to continue its suspension of nuclear weapon tests; however, the US would continue suspension of such tests for the time being and hoped that the Soviet Union would do the same.


10 Nov 58


16 Nov 58

Secretary of State Dulles informed the head of the US delegation negotiating at Geneva on cessation of nuclear testing about the results of a review of these negotiations at a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the President's Assistant for Science and
Technology, and others. Agreement had been reached on inter alia the following propositions: (1) It was unnecessary to adhere precisely to the 22 August 1958 Presidential formula concerning renewal of any treaty on a "year-by-year basis" (such renewal being contingent upon satisfactory progress in the establishment of an efficacious control system). This provision could be expressed in reverse terms, namely, that there would be a right to withdraw from treaty obligation whenever the controls contemplated by the treaty were not being established or were being violated. (2) The link between discontinuance of testing and progress in disarmament in such a case could be effected in a preambular statement of the purposes of the treaty that would include a reference to disarmament, and in an operative clause that would among other things state that the parties could withdraw if the purposes of the treaty were not being achieved.

Mag, SecState to Geneva for Wadsworth, NUSUP 63, 16 Nov 58, OCJCS file '388.3 Disarmament.'

13 Nov 58

The USSR submitted to the UN Political Committee a plan for the international control of outer space in which it dropped its demand, hitherto a standard component of its position, that as a condition of agreement on this subject the US must withdraw all its bases from foreign territory. The plan called for the establishment of a preparatory group empowered to draft rules and programs for a later international commission. As suggested in the plan, the membership of this preparatory group was to consist of the US, the UK, the USSR, France, India, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, and Argentina. The Soviet delegate stated, however, that this was no more than a suggestion regarding the membership of the group, which, he said, would be "subject to negotiation." He stressed at a news conference explaining the proposal that its submission did not mean the Soviet Union was willing to separate the question of outer space permanently from the general issue of disarmament.

NYT, 19 Nov 58, 1:8, 19:1-5.

21 Nov 58

The US delegation to the Geneva talks on suspension of nuclear tests proposed to the Secretary of State that President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan issue a joint declaration stating that the US and the UK would agree to stop the testing of nuclear weapons permanently provided that (1) agreement was reached on an effective international system of control, (2) the agreed control system was to come into operation by agreed stages, and (3) the agreed control system operated satisfactorily in accordance with agreed standards. In a separate message to the Department of Defense the Defense member of the US delegation at Geneva stated that the US could agree to the proposed US-UK declaration without detriment to the US's basic interests and with a resultant enhancement of its negotiating and public position.

(see last item of 9 December 1958.)

The UN General Assembly's Political Committee adopted by a vote of 54-9-18 a resolution recommending the establishment of an 18-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Committee was to be composed of representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the UK, and the US. New York Times correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton reported that the USSR was decidedly against the composition of the committee as too Western-oriented. The Soviets had originally proposed an 11-member committee composed of the four great powers, three Soviet-satellite nations (Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania), three neutrals (India, United Arab Republic, Sweden), and one Latin American nation (Argentina). India, Burma, and the United Arab Republic made last-minute efforts to get the Soviet Union and the US together, for, as V. K. Krishna Menon of India said, there was "no point in setting up a committee which will not function." But each side felt the other too "rigid" in its outlook even to attempt further negotiations. (See 2d item of 13 December 1958.)


Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), recommended by memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense that (1) any revision of the basic US position on nuclear testing should be thoroughly staffed in an orderly fashion for approval by the President and not developed piece-meal; (2) the US delegation at Geneva should adhere to the basic US position as enunciated by the President on 22 August 1958 until approval of a change by the President; (3) a key element in any proposed revision, from the Department of Defense's point of view, must be the specific provision for annual determination that the control system was being installed and was working effectively in accordance with whatever international agreement had been concluded. (See 1st item of 9 December 1958.)

(Unk, prob S) Mil Adv to Asst SecDef (ISA) to Dep SecDef, 25 Nov 58, as cited and summarized in CM-247-58 to SecDef, "Proposed Revision of U.S. Position on Nuclear Testing (U)," 9 Dec 58, Encl to JCS 1731/294, 11 Dec 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 84.
6 Dec 58  At the Geneva conference on nuclear tests the delegates of the US, Britain, and the USSR issued a brief communique announcing their agreement on the first article of a proposed treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons tests. (The text was not made public, but the New York Times reported that it was understood to have provided for accession by any nation to the completed treaty.)

NYT, 7 Dec 58, 1:1.

8 Dec 58  The US, the UK, and the USSR announced at Geneva agreement on the second article of a proposed treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons tests. (Though it was not made public, the New York Times learned that it stressed the need for a control system to police any ban on tests of nuclear weapons.)

NYT, 9 Dec 58, 1:7.

9 Dec 58  The Chairman of the JCS objected, on behalf of the JCS, to the proposal of the US delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear testing to revise the US position on that subject (see item of 21 November 1958). The JCS, the Chairman said, endorsed the views already expressed by General Byers except for his third point (see item of 25 November 1958). This third point fell short of the previously stated position of the JCS in that the suspension of nuclear weapons tests should not be contingent merely upon annual determination that the control system was being installed and was working effectively. The suspension should be limited to 1 year, with provision for annual extension, and this annual extension should be contingent upon satisfactory progress in reaching agreement on and implementing arms-control measures.

(From CM-247-58 to SecDef, "Proposed Revision of U.S. Position on Nuclear Testing (U)," 9 Dec 58, Encl to JCS 1731/294, 11 Dec 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 84.

9 Dec 58  Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., the President's Assistant for Science and Technology, reported to Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles that the conclusions on underground tests in the report of the Geneva conference of experts might have to be substantially revised. A preliminary analysis of seismic data from the HARDTACK II series by the Air Force Office for Atomic Energy-1 (AFOAT-1) indicated that it would be much more difficult than previously thought to identify a seismic event as a natural earthquake; moreover, it appeared that the number of earthquakes equivalent to a given low yield of atomic energy was considerably higher than previously estimated. Thus in the control system proposed by the Geneva experts the number of seismic events above the threshold yield of the system that could not be identified by the system and would therefore require on-site inspection would be substantially increased. The practical result would be that the threshold yield would have to be revised upward (in order to reduce the number of inspections required). (Dr. Hans Bethe of the President's Science Advisory Committee testified on 2 February 1959 (see item) before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
that the required revision would be from the threshold yield of 5 KT on which the Geneva experts had predicated their system to a yield of 20 KT. In other words, the new data indicated 20 KT as the minimum yield (or yield equivalent) the system could be confidently expected to identify as a nuclear explosion (or an earthquake). See item of 21 August 1958. On behalf of himself and Chairman John A. Mccone of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr. Killian requested Mr. Quales to ask the AFOAT-1 to organize a board of seismologists to assess the validity of the new conclusions in time for development of a firm position on this question prior to the reconvening on 5 January of the Geneva conference on cessation of nuclear testing, now in Christmas recess. He included a list of scientists on whom he and Mr. Mccone had agreed as suitable for service on the proposed board.

On 12 December 1958 the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) passed Dr. Killian's request to the Chief, AFOAT-1. On 18 December Mr. Quales, informing Dr. Killian of this fact, stated that the Department of Defense would wish to consider formally any recommendations that might result from the board's review of the seismic data. (See item of 28 December 1958.)

Memo, Asst to Pres for Science and Technology to Dep SecDef, "Review of HARDTACK II Seismic Data," 9 Dec 58, App to (C) JCS 1731/295, 17 Dec 58, CCS 092 (4.1t-45) sec 54. (C) Memo, Asst to SecDef for Atomic Energy to Chief AFOAT-1, same subj (C), 12 Dec 58, Encl to same paper. [H/H of same paper, 23 Dec 58, same file. (U) US Sen, "Disarmament and Foreign Policy" (Hearings before the Disarmament Subcmte of the Cmte on For Rel, 28 and 30 Jan and 2 Feb 59, 86th Cong, 1st sess. Washington, 1959) pt 1, pp. 173-174, 177.

9 Dec 58

Semyon K. Tsarapkin, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva conference on nuclear tests, called for an inspection system based on "the principle of mutual consent" and described a control system whereby the US, the UK, or the USSR could block any decision to send inspectors to the sites of suspected violations of a nuclear test ban. He said that the USSR was "for inspection, but not automatic inspection."

NYT, 10 Dec 58, 1:6.

12 Dec 58

The US, the UK, and the USSR announced agreement at Geneva on a third article of a proposed treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons tests. (As in the case of the first two articles, the text was not made public, but the New York Times reported that this third article called for a four-part control organization with unspecified powers and functions to police a ban on testing of nuclear weapons.


13 Dec 58

The Western experts at the Geneva conference on surprise-attack problems reported on the situation at the conference to a Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. No progress had been made because the Western side had insisted on excluding political questions from the various proposals tabled at the conference whereas
the Soviet bloc had as firmly contended that such questions must be discussed. At an informal review of the situation on 9 December between the heads of the US and Soviet delegations, Mr. Kuznetsov had flatly rejected a proposal by Mr. Foster that there be a technical discussion of ground and aerial inspection dissociated from the political provisions of the Soviet-bloc proposal on this subject introduced at the conference. Since the differences on the terms of reference now seemed irreconcilable, the two heads of delegation had agreed ad referendum that the conference should be suspended during the latter part of the week of 15 December. The Western experts were agreed, however, that despite the East-West impasse the conference had served a useful purpose, for the following reasons: (1) It had exposed Soviet policy makers in a way never before possible to the technical-military considerations underlying the Western attitude toward the problem of surprise attack. As a result the Western experts were hopeful that the Soviet delegation, like themselves, now had a clearer understanding of the complex problem with which the conference was dealing. (2) The conference had resulted in a clarifying of Soviet intentions in the following respects: (a) the Soviet Union appeared to regard discussions of surprise attack primarily as a means of discussing zones of inspection and control together with limitations of forces and demilitarization of Central Europe, discussions it very much wanted to continue; (b) the problem of guarding against ballistic-missile surprise attack did not appear for the time being to be causing the USSR major concern; (c) though Soviet experts probably would engage in technical discussions of measures against surprise attack if these were related to measures of disarmament or inspection in a European zone, there was no sign at present that the Soviet Union would agree to separate technical discussions from political matters.

"Report to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting from the Western Experts at the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments," 13 Dec 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 84.

The UN General Assembly, by a vote of 53-9-19, established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space consisting of 18 members as recommended by the Political Committee (see item of 24 November 1958). The new committee was requested to report to the Fourteenth General Assembly on the following: (1) the activities and resources of the UN and its specialized agencies and of other international bodies relating to the peaceful use of outer space; (2) the area of international cooperation and programs in the peaceful use of outer space that could appropriately be undertaken under UN auspices to the benefit of states irrespective of the condition of their economic or scientific development; (3) the future organizational arrangements to facilitate international cooperation in this field within the framework of the UN; and (4) the nature of
legal problems that might arise in the carrying out of programs to explore outer space.


17 Dec 58

The US, the UK, and the USSR announced agreement at Geneva on a fourth article of a proposed treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons tests. (Again the text was not made public, but the New York Times reported that the article called for a seven-nation commission to direct the policing of the ban on nuclear tests. The three nuclear powers would each hold a permanent seat on the commission, while the other four vacancies were to be filled for set periods of time from among other nations according to the treaty later.

NYT, 18 Dec 58, 10:7.

18 Dec 58

The surprise-attack conference at Geneva adjourned. The Western side had wanted a resumption of the talks to be conditioned on a new intergovernmental agreement on terms of reference; but Kuznetsov, the head of the Soviet-bloc delegation, had sought, following instructions from Moscow, to have the conference agree to resume on 5 January 1959. After a stormy session the last day, the following statement was agreed on by both sides for incorporation in the final communiqué: "The participants at the conference agreed to suspend the meetings of the conference in view of the Christmas and New Years holidays and to report to governments on the work of the conference. The participants express the hope that discussion on the problem of preventing surprise attack will be resumed as early as possible." (See items of 23 December 1958, and 16 and 21 January 1959.)

(S) Msg, Gen Weyland (at Geneva) to Gen Twining, Gen 87, 18 Dec 58, O\O\CS file "388.3 Disarmament."

18 Dec 58

The three members of the Military Advisory Panel in support of the US delegation at the Geneva surprise-attack conference (Lt Gen Edward T. Williams, USA, Vice Adm Stuart H. Ingersoll, USN, and Lt Gen Francis H. Griswold, USAF) wrote their personal observations on the conference to the Chairman of the JCS. In their view it was "unsound and impractical" to make a joint technical assessment of the surprise-attack problem in the abstract, "as was contemplated for this conference." They believed such an assessment should take account of the existing and predictable world situation. This had been the Soviet view and there was much to be said for it. Though the subject matter of the conference had been almost exclusively military there had been scientific advisers in key positions, and some of these had emphasized the scientific approach to the neglect of practical and military implications. Taking a broader view, the three officers saw "a basic anomaly in the creation and maintenance of powerful forces for the purpose of successful defense and simultaneously planning for complex machinery to prevent those forces from doing the thing for which they are created." There was, they said, "a real contradiction in aggressively training forces to be ready to perform the mission for which they are created, and at the same time developing means and
methods to shackle and destroy their readiness." Their conclusion was that the US should emphasize acceptable phased reduction of armaments rather than prevention of surprise attack by control and inspection.

Ltr, Mil Adv Panel in support of US delegn at Geneva surprise-attack conference to CGCS, 17 Dec 58, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 84. Internal evidence indicates the letter was written after the conference had adjourned, which was on 18 December 1958.

19 Dec 58

The Geneva conference on suspension of nuclear tests, which had begun its sessions on 31 October 1958, recessed for the holiday season after agreeing to resume sessions on 5 January 1959. During the first 4 weeks the negotiations had been deadlocked, with the Soviets insisting on an unconditional agreement for a permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests before a control system could be discussed whereas the US and UK delegations had adhered to the basic position that an agreement to discontinue tests must include agreement on establishing and operating an effective control system. In December, however, the Soviets had agreed by stages to discuss a control system as a part of a comprehensive agreement, and by the date of the recess four articles of a draft treaty had been adopted by the conference (see items of 6, 8, 12, and 17 December 1958). Five additional articles had been tabled by the US and UK delegations but had not yet been agreed on by the conference. The US draft treaty contained 11 additional articles, which were intended for early tabling after resumption of the conference.


23 Dec 58

The National Security Council (1) noted and discussed an oral report by Mr. William C. Foster, United States Representative to the Conference of Experts For The Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful In Preventing Surprise Attack and For The Preparation Of A Report Thereon To Governments; (2) noted the President's directive that the Department of State should continue to take the lead in developing the US position for further meetings of the Conference referred to item (1) above (see item of 21 January 1959); (3) noted and discussed an oral report by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, US Representative to the Conference On The Discontinuance Of Nuclear Weapon Tests. (These actions were approved by the President on 30 December 1958.)

NSC Action No. 2028, 23 Dec 58, file of Control Div, JCS.

28 Dec 58

Dr. Killian appointed a Panel on Seismic Improvement to study the questions raised by the HARDTACK II series of nuclear tests concerning the feasibility of detecting and identifying underground explosions. The chairman of the Panel was Dr. Lloyd Berkner. (See item of 16 March 1959.)

5 Jan 59  At the first session of the reconvened conference on nuclear testing in Geneva the US brought up the results of the HARDTACK II underground tests and the question raised by these results concerning the threshold sensitivity of the monitoring system to detect clandestine nuclear testing agreed on by the Geneva experts in the summer of 1958 (see items of 21 August and 9 December 1958; also item of 2 February 1959). The new information indicated, the US pointed out, that a burdensome number of on-site inspections would be needed to investigate events the system would register but could not identify as either an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. Therefore the US proposed that the new data be studied carefully by scientists of both sides with a view to such revisions of the inspection system as might be found necessary.

(U) US Sen, "Geneva Test Ban Negotiations" (Hearings before the Disarmament Subcmte of the Cmte on For Rel, 86th Cong, 1st sess; Washington, 1959), p. 3. NYT, 6 Jan 59, 1:7.

7 Jan 59  The Soviet delegate to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing, Semyon Tarasipkin, called the US technical paper on the difficulty of distinguishing underground nuclear explosions from earthquakes a step backward and refused to consider it germane to the work of the conference. At the same time he reverted to a Soviet demand that the West clarify its position on the duration of the treaty under negotiation for a ban on nuclear weapons testing. (The Western position had been that the treaty should be on a year-by-year basis; see item of 15 November 1958.)

NYT, 8 Jan 59, 7:4.

12 Jan 59  In an exclusive article for Life magazine describing his 1 December 1958 talk with Premier Khrushchev, Senator Hubert Humphrey reported that Khrushchev had emphasized three points concerning disarmament: (1) the Soviet capability in bombs and missiles, (2) the Soviet desire for a suspension of nuclear tests, and (3) the Soviet determination to maintain ability to deliver surprise attacks. Khrushchev had derided the US proposal for a voluntary test suspension of 1 year. Everyone was aware, the Premier had assured Senator Humphrey, that it took that long to prepare for a new test series. Nevertheless, despite this apparent skepticism concerning American sincerity, he had instructed his delegation at Geneva that a single document could cover both the permanent agreement to suspend tests in principle and the controls adopted to enforce suspension—an important concession in the Senator's view. Throughout the discussion on disarmament, said Humphrey, Khrushchev had stressed the need for equality among the Great Powers, and it was clear that he considered one of these to be the USSR.


16 Jan 59  The State Department made public a note in which it rejected a Soviet note of 10 January requesting a resumption of the surprise-attack conference. The US position, representing the views of the Western powers, was that further discussions would be fruitless until agreement had been reached on the terms of reference of the conference. (See items of 18 December 1958 and 21 January 1959.)

NYT, 17 Jan 59, 1:7.
19 Jan 59
At the Geneva conference on nuclear testing the US and Britain abandoned their demand that the duration of the proposed treaty for banning nuclear tests be dependent on progress in other fields of disarmament. This new position, considered by the West a significant concession to the USSR, still included, of course, the provision that an agreed inspection system be installed and working effectively. The Soviet delegate, Semyon Tsarapkin, said he was pleased with the Western announcement and was prepared to go on to discuss the four draft articles on the working of the control organization. They dealt with a control commission, a conference of parties to the treaty, an international administrator, and the detection system itself, including staff. Tsarapkin also urged consideration of a Soviet draft article on the obligation of nations signing the treaty to accept control posts on their territory.
NYT, 20 Jan 59, 1:2-3.

21 Jan 59
The Secretary of State in a letter to the Secretary of Defense proposed the appointment by the President of an ad hoc study group, headed by William C. Foster, to make an expert examination of disarmament measures that might affect the surprise-attack problem, including arms-limitation measures that might be in the interest of the US. The Secretary of State noted that the recent Geneva conference of experts on surprise-attack safeguards had suspended its meetings without setting a date for reconvening (see 1st item of 18 December 1958). He noted also that the Western representatives at the conference believed it should not be resumed until governments had resolved the differences between the two sides on the scope and nature of the talks, and, further, that they believed the Western side's terms of reference in any resumption of the conference should not be limited to studying methods of inspection and observation that might be useful against surprise attack. A study by the proposed group to be headed by Mr. Foster, the Secretary continued, could facilitate the preparation of the US for discussion of the surprise-attack problem within the context of arms-control measures. He considered it inevitable that the US would have to be prepared for such discussion at the next series of meetings dealing with surprise attack, regardless of the scope and forum of such meetings. The proposed study group would report to the group asked by the President to co-ordinate future preparations in the fields of test suspension and surprise attack: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. He enclosed a draft memorandum to the President on the above proposal and draft terms of reference for the proposed study.

On 23 January 1959 the Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded the Secretary of State's memorandum and its two enclosures to the JCS with the request that they evaluate as a matter of urgency the proposal contained in these documents. (See items for 23 December 1958 and 2 March 1959.)

JCS 1731/298, 26 Jan 59, JMF 3050 (27 Feb 59).
In a statement released in Moscow, the Soviet Government charged that the US, in submitting to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing new data questioning the effectiveness of the proposed control system, was "obviously looking for an excuse to torpedo the Geneva talks." (See item of 5 January and 1st item of 24 January.)


In a press release the State Department denied the Soviet charge of 22 January that the US was trying to torpedo the Geneva talks on nuclear testing. The Department's statement then went on to clarify the outstanding issues of the negotiations by posing the following questions:

(1) Will the Soviet Union be able to veto and obstruct every action of the Control Commission as it now demands, or will it be possible for the control organization to act without this obstacle? The United States believes that any control system which could be frustrated in its day-to-day operations by the veto power in the hands of a single party would be worse than useless.

(2) Will the control posts be manned by an international staff or, as the Soviet demands, by nationals of the government on whose territory the control posts are located, with only one or two outside observers? The Soviet position would amount to self-inspection and as such cannot be the basis for an agreement in which all parties can have confidence.

(3) Will international inspection groups be organized and ready to move quickly to the site of an event which could be suspected of being an explosion? Or will sending of such a group be subject to weeks of debate and a veto? The Soviet approach would entangle this key provision in miles of red tape.


At the Geneva nuclear-test negotiations the US and UK offered a plan for staffing the control posts of an international inspection system the fairness of which, according to Western sources, shocked Soviet delegate Tsarapkin to such an extent that he was unable to deliver his usual immediate riposte. The plan provided that Soviet nationals would fill the key technical and supervisory positions (about one-third of the complement) of posts on US and UK territory; US and UK personnel would staff the key technical and supervisory positions on the posts in Soviet territory; international civil servants would fill another one-third of the positions; and host-country nationals, mainly in a service capacity, would fill the remaining positions. Tsarapkin promised to study the Western proposal and report back to the conference. As a counter-proposal the Soviet delegate offered to increase the number of foreign controllers from one or two to four or five in his own plan, previously characterized by the West as
amounting to self-inspection despite the presence of these foreign controllers.

The following day Tsarapkin rejected the Western plan on the grounds that it discriminated against the citizens of the host country and failed to safeguard the security of the state. He also returned to his earlier charge that the conference was making no progress because of the controversy in the US over the advisability of having a test ban.

(U) US Sen, "Geneva Test Ban Negotiations" (Hearings before Disarmament Subcmte of the Cmte on For Rel, 86th Cong, 1st sess; Washington, 1959), pp. 4-8. NYT, 27 Jan 59, 1:2-3; ibid, 28 Jan, 4:3.
Testifying before the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee, Dr. Hans Bethe, a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, explained the significance of the HARDTACK II tests, especially in their relation to the conclusions of the Geneva conference of experts. We needed more underground tests, conducted either unilaterally or under international auspices, Dr. Bethe said, to learn just what we could do in the way of test detection. In the meantime, however, we should not be discouraged by the faults of the system outlined at the Geneva experts' conference. The main revelation of the HARDTACK II series, said Dr. Bethe, was the reduced force of the first-motion signals registered on seismographs at various stations—the best evidence for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions—to about 40 per cent of what had been expected on the basis of the Rainier shot (see item of 6 March 1958). It had been proved more difficult, therefore, to identify nuclear events in the 5- to 20-KT range. But there were theoretically many possible ways of improving the Geneva system. Some of those he mentioned were: the installation of seismographs in deep holes, the establishment of a supplementary network of unmanned seismograph stations, and the addition of more seismographs at each presently planned station. Finally, Dr. Bethe testified that since the US was then ahead of the USSR in the number, quality, design, and variety of nuclear weapons, it would definitely be in the national interest to secure an enforceable agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests.

(U) US Sen, "Disarmament and Foreign Policy" (Hearings before the Disarmament Subcmte of the Cmte on For Rel, 86th Cong, 1st sess; Washington, 1959), pt. 1, pp. 177-186.

At the Geneva conference on nuclear testing, the US and the UK rejected a Soviet formula for the use of the veto on the policing of a nuclear-weapons ban. The Soviet delegate had presented a list, which he said was still incomplete, of categories of issues that would be subject to a veto by any one of the three nuclear powers. The following items were included: amendments to the treaty, all matters relating to treaty violations, the dispatch of inspection teams to suspected nuclear events, the findings of such teams, improvements to the control system, location of control posts, establishment of inspection flight routes, and all fiscal, administrative, logistic, and personnel questions.

(U) US Sen, "Geneva Test Ban Negotiations" (Hearings before Disarmament Subcmte of the Cmte on For Rel, 86th Cong, 1st sess; Washington, 1959), pp. 4-8. NYT, 3 Feb 59, 5:1.

In a London discussion of Western tactics for use at the Geneva conference on nuclear testing Secretary of State Dulles, Prime Minister Macmillan, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd agreed that the issue of a control system should now be concentrated on. Introduction of the article concerning the duration of any agreement eventually reached could be deferred until it was seen whether the Soviets would change their position on controls and the veto in the
control organization. Meanwhile the draft of the duration article would be re-examined. It was agreed that there might be no need to specify the right of withdrawal in the duration article since the right to withdraw from an agreement in case of its violation was inherent in any agreement; possibly article one, already agreed at Geneva (see item of 6 December 1958), would be found to cover this point adequately.

† Mag, London (sgd Dulles) to State Dept, SECTO 9, 5 Feb 59, OCJCS file "388.3 Disarmament."
The JCS, submitting their comments on the proposal by the Secretary of State concerning the formation of a study group to examine the problems of surprise attack and related disarmament proposals (see item of 21 January 1959), expressed views diverging considerably from those of the Secretary of State. As a first step preparatory to a new and less restricted conference, they believed, it was necessary that a US review of disarmament matters from a broader viewpoint than that of surprise attack alone be undertaken. Such a review would provide a basis for evaluating the surprise-attack threat in terms of other threats to US security and for determining what effort the attainment of safeguards against surprise attack would have upon the over-all US defense posture. Because of the separation of the Arctic Zone proposal, outer-space considerations, suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and technical discussions on surprise attack from the Four Power disarmament package of 29 August 1957, there was urgent need to review existing US disarmament policy for consistency with these actions and national-security requirements. Such a review had been initiated on 7 April 1958 by the Disarmament Policy Review Work Group (see 3d item of 3 April 1958); it should be completed and accompanied by the proposal of necessary revisions in US disarmament policy. Within the framework of this revised policy the study group proposed by the Secretary of State could then develop US positions on disarmament measures, including safeguards against surprise attack. If the overall review and revision of policy could not be accomplished within the apparent time limitations, then US positions might have to be developed within the framework of existing disarmament policy. In short, the objective of the study group proposed by the Secretary of State should be limited to the development of recommended US positions on disarmament measures within the-current US disarmament policy. The study group should limit its consideration of measures that might place limitations on the combat readiness of US forces to the development of data necessary to counter proposals of this nature that might be advanced by other parties. The JCS enclosed, with their memorandum, draft terms of reference for a Study Group on Disarmament Measures, which, they stated, should be substituted for the Secretary of State's terms of reference for a Study Group on Increasing Protection Against Surprise Attack. They were agreeable to the designation of Mr. William C. Foster or some other individual of similar stature as chairman of the study group, but in such case they desired the appointment of a senior US military officer as director of the group. In case of the unavailability of Mr. Foster or a comparable person, they recommended the designation of a senior military officer as chairman. (See item for 10 March 1959.)

The Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Acting Secretary of State the views of the JCS on the Secretary of State's proposal for a study group to examine the problems of surprise attack and related disarmament proposals. Stating the general agreement of the Department
of Defense with the views of the JCS, the Deputy Secretary of Defense proposed the following sequence of actions as the best approach to the problem to which the Secretary of State had addressed himself in his letter of 21 January 1959 to the Secretary of Defense: (1) The review of US disarmament policy initiated by the Disarmament Policy Review Working Group on 9 [7] April 1958 should be completed as expeditiously as possible. (2) The US position in regard to the purpose, scope, and forum for the resumption of the surprise-attack talks should be formulated prior to the initiation of the preparatory work for this meeting. (3) An ad hoc working group should be established to undertake preparations for disarmament discussion, including the resumption of the surprise-attack conference, in accordance with the terms of reference proposed by the JCS as a substitute for those drafted by the Secretary of State (see item of 2 March 1959). The Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred in the qualifications of Mr. William C. Foster to head the study but suggested that the actual selection of the chairman of the study group be deferred until the State and Defense Departments had agreed on and more precisely defined the area of study. He suggested that the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group meet to discuss possible alternative approaches to this problem and to consider the proposed revised terms of reference. (See item of 29 July 1959.)

16 Mar 59

The Panel on Seismic Improvement, chairmained by Dr. Berkner (see item of 28 December 1958), submitted its report on the feasibility of improving the detection system adopted by the Geneva conference of experts in the summer of 1958. The panel concluded, on the basis of the HARDTACK II data, that the system devised by the Geneva experts would be less effective than originally estimated, and, in addition, that there were twice as many natural earthquakes that would have to be taken into consideration. This meant that there would be a substantial increase in the number of natural earthquakes indistinguishable from nuclear explosions of a given yield. Also, the panel reported the existence of decoupling techniques that could be used in clandestine testing to reduce the seismic signal and hence the effectiveness of the Geneva system by a factor of 10 or more. In line with these conclusions the panel recommended the following improvements to the Geneva system: (1) technical improvements in the seismic equipment of the presently planned stations, (2) the addition of an auxiliary network of unmanned seismic stations, (3) construction of a complete prototype experimental station, and (4) a vigorous program of seismic research, including nuclear explosions. (See item of 9 June 1959.)

The US released the Berkner report and presented it to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing on 12 June 1959.

19 Mar 59

The New York Times revealed that the US had conducted in space the previous September a series of nuclear test explosions that had apparently gone undetected by other nations. On the basis of these tests, code-named Project ARGUS, it was expected that the US would demand a space detection system as part of any agreement on a cessation of nuclear testing (see item of 8 June 1959). In Geneva the conference on nuclear testing recessed until 13 April after agreeing on three new draft articles: (1) indefinite duration of the treaty, (2) a review of the effectiveness of the treaty after the first 2 years, and (3) registration of the treaty with the UN.

NYT, 19 Mar 59, 1:8; ibid, 20 Mar 59, 1:6-7, 12:1.

26 Mar 59

The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, emphasized in a letter to the Chairman of the JCS that maintenance of US military strength depended on continued nuclear testing. Nuclear weapons and proven delivery systems were the two elements of this strength, he said, and missiles were undoubtedly the delivery system of the future. For the potential associated with missile systems to be realized, increased yields and lighter weights for warheads would have to be achieved, and these results were possible only through a continued aggressive and imaginative testing program. Though he was aware that the JCS had expressed grave concern about a test moratorium and that for the moment political considerations outweighed military implications in this regard, CINCSAC nevertheless felt that the penalty for failing in nuclear-weapon progress must be continually emphasized. A detailed discussion of the problem was enclosed with his letter. CINCSAC recommended that (1) the Secretary of Defense be apprised of the military necessity of continued tests, especially in relation to the capability of SAC; (2) the Secretary of State be advised of the severe penalty imposed on our national strength by a test moratorium and reminded of the benefit to the US negotiating position provided by continued nuclear know-how and effective retaliatory capability; (3) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs be requested to foster a public information campaign comparing the hazard of continuing nuclear tests as "negligible" alongside that of maintaining only a second-rate deterrent force. (See item of 2 June 1959.)

(Ltr, CINCSAC to JCS, 26 Mar 59, Encl to JCS 1731/306, 6 Apr 59, JMF 4613 (2 Jun 59).)
At the reopening of the Geneva conference on nuclear testing following a 3-week recess, Ambassador Wadsworth presented on behalf of the US a proposal designed to enable the negotiators to define an initial limited area of agreement even though the impasse on the three state-mated issues—voting in the control commission, on-site inspections, and staffing of inspection posts—were to continue. The US, he said, would be willing to negotiate a phased agreement beginning with a ban on tests in the atmosphere and, if the Soviets wished, under water. The word "atmosphere" was used here, he said, "in terms of the detection capabilities of the system proposed by the Geneva conference of experts." (The Geneva experts had said in their report of 21 August 1958 that "for explosions taking place up to an altitude of about 50 kilometres there should not be a great change in the detectability of the acoustic wave.") Ambassador Wadsworth pointed out that the question of on-site inspections, one of the three principal stumbling blocks of the conference, would not arise in regard to atmospheric tests. Such a preliminary limited agreement could later be extended to cover testing in other environments as control measures were agreed on for those environments. To make these later agreements possible the conference should expeditiously pursue joint studies toward solution of the technical problems of test detection and negotiations toward resolution of the political issues involved.


In a personal letter President Eisenhower informed Premier Khrushchev of the US proposal being made the same date by Ambassador Wadsworth at the Geneva conference on nuclear testing (see preceding item). If the Soviet Government was ready to change its position on the veto in the control commission, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high-altitude detection, said the President, prompt progress would of course be possible toward concluding a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. But if the Soviet Government was not ready to go that far, then the US proposed as a "first and readily attainable step" an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers while the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer-space tests were being resolved. (See both items of 23 April 1959.)


The Special Assistant for Disarmament in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Deputy Secretary of Defense by memorandum that the following specific changes recommended by the JCS had been incorporated in the text of the statement for presentation by Ambassador Wadsworth at the reopening of the Geneva
conference on nuclear testing (see 1st item of 13 April): (1) instead of offering at the outset to accept a staffing patte
of up to one-third of the control personnel from the host
country the statement was to ask the USSR for clarification
on this point that might give effect to the principle of
impartial and effective control; (2) the word "atmosphere"
was defined (see 1st item of April 13); and (3) provision
was made for the resolution of remaining technical and
political problems either in the control commission "or
otherwise" if they were not resolved at the conference.
The following changes recommended by the JCS were not
adopted: (1) deletion of under-water tests from the pro-
posed first phase of the plan offered in the statement;
(2) substitution of "subsurface" for "underground" where
appearing (rejected because the Geneva experts had con-
sidered under-water and underground tests separately); and
(3) deletion of the following sentence from the second
paragraph: "Success here would open the way to further
agreement on substantial disarmament measures." This
sentence was retained because it was considered consistent
with the President's statement of 22 August 1958 leading
to the negotiations.

42d N/H of JCS 1731/305 (Draft Statement for Use by
Ambassador Wadsworth at the Geneva Conference on Discon-
tinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests) (U), 17 Apr 59, JMF
4613 (6 Apr 59).

14 Apr 59

The parties to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing
agreed on a method of amending the proposed treaty on
suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This made the eighth
draft article on which agreement had been reached. Under
the article the amendment process would be initiated by
a two-thirds vote of the members of the executive committee
and become effective when ratified by two-thirds of the
treaty members, including the Big Three, i.e., the US, the
UK, and the USSR.

_NYT_, 15 Apr 59, 8:5.

16 Apr 59

The three nuclear powers agreed on another article, the
ninth since the conference had begun, for the proposed
treaty banning nuclear tests. The new draft article would
permit the treaty's control commission to establish an
appropriate relationship with the UN and other international
organizations and with any international organization that
might be established to supervise disarmament or arms-
control measures among any of the treaty's member states.

_NYT_, 17 Apr 59, 22:1.

17 Apr 59

In an eight-paragraph preamble to the proposed treaty
for the cessation of nuclear testing, the three nuclear
powers invited all nations to join them in banning the
testing of nuclear weapons for all time under effective
international controls. But though the Big Three had
already agreed on nine articles of the treaty, the basic
issue—how an effective inspection system could be made to
work—still remained unsolved.

_NYT_, 18 Apr 59, 2:8.
21 Apr 59
The Geneva conference on nuclear testing agreed on a tenth draft article for the treaty under negotiation. The article specified that all annexes to the treaty would be integral parts of it and would have the same validity as all the other sections of the document.

NVT, 22 Apr 59, 11:3.

Apr 59
Before departing for Paris the Secretary of State drafted a memorandum to the President reporting on action taken in response to the President's order of 11 April that interested agencies give urgent consideration to Prime Minister Macmillan's recent proposal regarding test suspension. The Prime Minister had proposed that the US and the UK offer to accompany a controlled agreement on suspension of atmospheric tests with a temporary moratorium on other nuclear tests if the Soviet Union would do likewise. State had carefully examined this question with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The conclusion reached was that the proposal of an extended uncontrolled moratorium on high-altitude, outer-space, and underground tests, even if the Soviets agreed to negotiate a controlled suspension of atmospheric tests, would be an undesirable course of action for at least the time being; such a proposal would undercut the US's basic principle of effective control and would be unlikely to increase Soviet interest in serious negotiations. Consideration of this question had drawn attention to the urgent need for decisions on US nuclear-testing policy, as soon as possible and in any case well in advance of the expiration of the one-year voluntary suspension of nuclear testing (see item of 22 August 1958), in the event negotiations were unsuccess-ful or an agreement was reached only on controlled suspension of atmospheric tests. State was working out arrangements with Defense, AEC, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology for studies embracing future requirements for nuclear weapons testing, improvement of methods of detection, fallout considerations, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space.

Draft memo, SecState to Pres, "Voluntary Temporary Moratorium on Underground and High Altitude Tests (U)," 1 May 59, App A to JCS 1732/306, 8 May 59, JMF 4613 (59).

3 Apr 59
Replying to President Eisenhower's letter of 13 April, Premier Khrushchev rejected the President's proposal of a phased nuclear test ban beginning with a ban on atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometers. Since nuclear testing would continue underground and at altitudes above 50 kilometers, he pointed out, this proposal would not achieve "the aim before us," i.e., an end to the production of new and ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons. Moreover, explosions above 50 kilometers would continue to contaminate the atmosphere. Because of these considerations, said Khrushchev, people would have a right to condemn agreement on the President's proposal as a "dishonest deal." Any agreement reached should ban all kinds of nuclear tests, he asserted. He noted that the most serious difference
between the two sides seemed to be on the sending of inspection teams into a country to investigate phenomena suspected of being nuclear explosions. In this connection he recalled the opinion expressed by Prime Minister Macmillan during his Moscow visit, namely, that agreement would be possible on a certain previously determined number of inspections each year. It was understood, said Khrushchev, "that such inspections would not be numerous." He added, "I consider that, strictly speaking, it would not be necessary for many trips to be made to each country. Without accepting the Macmillan proposal any more explicit than that, he pledged his government to make every effort to achieve an agreement banning nuclear tests. Even without a control system the Soviet Union would faithfully carry out its obligations under such an agreement, he averred, "because for the Soviet Union public opinion and the opinion of nations is dearer than anything else."

(See item of 27 April 1959.)


27 Apr 59

The Soviet delegate to the Geneva test-ban conference adopted officially the position taken by Premier Khrushchev in his letter to President Eisenhower of 23 April. The USSR rejected a US proposal for a gradual approach to a total cessation of tests but accepted a proposal, first advanced by Macmillan in Moscow in February, to limit in advance the number of inspections of suspected violations to be permitted each year. Both the US and UK delegations asked for a more detailed explanation of the Soviet proposition. Meanwhile the conference adopted another draft article (the thirteenth), this one prescribing the cooperation that the member nations would be obliged to give the control system.

Nyt, 28 Apr 59, 1:8.

30 Apr 59

The Senate passed a resolution supporting the efforts of the US to seek an international agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. The resolution emphatically endorsed the principle that an adequate inspection and control system must be part of any such agreement. The results of an effective agreement, the resolution said in part, would be to reduce the hazard from radioactive fallout, to ease world tensions, and to realize a small but significant first step toward the goal of the control and reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments and armed forces.

4 May 59

At a short session of the Geneva conference on nuclear testing, the delegates approved a routine draft article covering the procedures for the signature, ratification, and entry into force of the proposed treaty.  

_NYT_, 5 May 59, 5:3.

6 May 59

Five nations—the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, and India—boycotted the 18-member UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: the Communists because of the Committee's pro-Western majority, and the neutralists on the grounds that the Committee could accomplish no useful purpose in the absence of one of the principals in outer-space research. Henry Cabot Lodge, addressing the first meeting of the Committee, urged it to take a businesslike approach to the practical, technical, nonpolitical job assigned to it. He did not mention the boycott.  

_NYT_, 7 May 59, 1:2.

6 May 59

The US, the UK, and the USSR agreed upon another draft article for their proposed treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. The noncontroversial article obliged the treaty states to grant the treaty organization and its staff the legal status and diplomatic privileges and immunities necessary for the unhindered exercise of their functions.  

_NYT_, 7 May 59, 38:8.

8 May 59

The Geneva conference on nuclear testing adopted two more routine draft articles, the sixteenth and seventeenth since the conference had begun. One obliged all parties to allow the necessary components of the control system to operate on their territory; the other prescribed organizational arrangements for the assembly of the treaty powers.  

_NYT_, 9 May 59, 2:8.

11 May 59

The Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, France, and the USSR met at Geneva to discuss the German problem, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. The Western powers considered the problems of general disarmament, German reunification, European security, and political settlement so closely interrelated that they presented them as an inseparable whole in the four-stage peace plan submitted to the conference on 14 May. The disarmament provisions of the plan were to be coordinated with the first three stages of the plan as follows: (1) discussion of possible disarmament measures; (2) limitation of forces, storage under international supervision of specific quantities of designated types of armament, and agreement on surprise-attack measures; and (3) determination of ceilings for indigenous and nonindigenous forces on either side of a given line, Four Power security arrangements, and further limitation of forces. The fourth stage provided for the actual conclusion of the treaty of peace with a reunified Germany.  


12 May 59

The Geneva conference on nuclear testing decided to recess until not later than 8 June rather than sit concurrently with the foreign ministers' conference (see item of 11 May).  

_NYT_, 13 May 59, 18:1.
(2) JCSM-201-59 to SecDef, "Military Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Effects Information (U)." 27 May 59, derived from JCS 1731/309, 15 May 59, JMF 4613 (26 May 59).
2 Jun 59

The JCS replied to CINCSAC's letter of 25 March 1959 concerning the implications of a moratorium on nuclear testing. The JCS shared CINCSAC's concern in this regard, the reply stated, and had repeatedly advised the Secretary of Defense that the cessation of nuclear testing should not be agreed to apart from a larger disarmament proposal that would include the termination of the production of nuclear weapons and weapon materials and be tied to an effective operational inspection and monitoring system. These views had been endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and had been taken into consideration by the President in reaching his decision for the US to seek an agreement for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. The JCS agreed with CINCSAC's recommendation concerning a public-information campaign about the comparative hazards of nuclear weapons testing and the consequences of ceasing such tests. To initiate such a program immediately, however, might cast doubt on US intentions at the Geneva conference on cessation of nuclear testing. The JCS would recommend such a program when it appeared that national policy might be modified in favor of continued nuclear weapons tests.

[SM-566-59 to CINCSAC, "Implications of Weapons Testing (U)", 2 Jun 59, derived from JCS 1731/310, 26 May 59, JMF 4613 (2 Jun 59).]

8 Jun 59

As the Geneva talks on nuclear testing resumed after a month's recess, the US and UK delegations proposed a meeting of experts of the three nuclear powers to study and report on the problem of detecting high-altitude nuclear tests (see item of 19 March 1959). James J. Wadsworth, US delegate, emphasized that the proposal was not a departure from the US position that underground-test-detection problems would have to be revaluated in the light of US data submitted to the conference in January (see item of 5 January 1959).

NYT, 9 Jun 59, 1:3; ibid., 13 Jun 59, 10:3.

9 Jun 59

The Chief of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) requested the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to approve a proposed Department of Defense technical program to be associated with detonation of a 5-KT nuclear event underground in granite at the Nevada test site on or about 1 February 1960. The explosion was to be detonated by the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at the direction of the Division of Military Application of the Atomic Energy Committee. The purpose, growing out of the findings of the Berliner Panel on Seismic Improvement (see item of 16 March 1959), was to study seismic detection of underground nuclear explosions. The Chief of DASA pointed out particularly that (1) the event was specifically for the study of detection and therefore had the highest priority regardless of whether the moratorium on testing continued; (2) it would represent, in case the moratorium continued, "the major source of base hardening data from full scale tests in the foreseeable future"; and (3) it would be of well-known yield because of detection requirements. Though an underground environment was not regarded as an alternate to the land-surface environment of programs like Operation WILLOW
(see items of 27 May and 27 August 1959), certain problems based on known Service requirements could be profitably examined in an underground environment, the Chief of DASA continued. The program he was proposing for Department of Defense participation in the nuclear event had been prepared for this purpose.

On 16 July the Director of Defense Research and Engineering approved the foregoing proposal subject to the following understandings: (1) national policy might at any time require that the operation and data be subjected to international inspection and therefore that the program be declassified, and (2) funds for the DOD blast-effects program outlined in the Chief of DASA's memorandum were to be provided by DASA. (See item of 9 September 1959.)


22 Jun 59

The special committee of scientific experts proposed by the US and the UK on 9 June (see item) met prior to the regular session of the Geneva conference on nuclear tests to begin its study of nuclear testing in outer space.

NYT, 23 Jun 59, 1:2.
10 Jul 59 The committee of scientific experts appointed to study the detection of nuclear tests in outer space for the Geneva conference on nuclear testing (see item of 22 June 1959) submitted its report to the conference. The committee recommended a satellite surveillance system, including the special instrumentation to be installed in the satellites as well as the ground equipment used to check reports from space. The experts offered three alternative plans for patrolling. Their first choice despite its considerable expense was a system of five or six satellites orbiting at altitudes of 18,000 miles.


16 Jul 59 The JCS forwarded their views and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the military requirements for nuclear weapons effects information after a briefing presented to them by the Chief of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering on Operation WILLOW (planning for future nuclear weapons effects tests in case the existing suspension of such tests should not be extended).

JCSM-274-59 to Secretary, "Military Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Effects Information (U)," 16 Jul 59, derived from JCS 1731/316, 6 Jul 59. Both in JMF 4613 (6 Jul 59).

21 Jul 59 Deputy Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates commented in a letter to the Under Secretary of State on a possible organizational arrangement for the UN Disarmament Commission involving the participation of neutral nations, as proposed by UN Secretary General
Hammarskjold and set forth in a cable to the Department of State on 14 July 1959 by Secretary of State Herter. Mr. Gates stated that the US should not agree to such an arrangement without having thoroughly explored the implications. Such an arrangement, he said, would inevitably expose the US to pressures for compromise solutions deeply involving US security interests, and the US would be more susceptible to this kind of neutralist pressure than would be the Soviet Union. He therefore requested that the subject be further explored in departmental discussions before the making of a final decision.

(4) Ltr. Dep SecDef to Under SecState, 21 Jul 59, Encl to (4) JCS 1731/318, 27 Jul 59, JMF 3050 (14 Jul 59).

23 Jul 59

The Depty Secretary of Defense informed the JCS that the President had approved a State-AEC-Defense paper on future procedure regarding the nuclear-testing negotiations at Geneva. Ambassador Wadsworth was to present a full analysis of the technical situation, introduce a draft treaty for a phased approach to a test ban, including a ban on high-altitude testing, and propose a joint program of research on detection of underground tests. At the foreign ministers' conference Secretary Herter was to inform Mr. Gromyko that the US must insist upon a reconsideration of the technical aspects of test detection. If the USSR rejected such a reconsideration, President Eisenhower was to recall Ambassador Wadsworth and his delegation from Geneva temporarily and announce the intention of the US to conduct a unilateral experimental program to test inspection methods. At the same time, with a minimum of publicity, the US would resume a "modest and restricted" program of underground weapons tests. At this same meeting, the Deputy Secretary also said, the President had directed Dr. George Kistiakowsky to head a study, participated in by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, on the resumption of nuclear tests.

(4) Memo, Dep SecDef to CJCS and Dir Def R&E, 23 Jul 59, Encl to (4) JCS 2179/162 (Study on Nuclear Tests (U)), 27 Jul 59. State-AEC-Defense paper, Encl to SM-754-59, 29 Jul 59. Both in JMF 4613 (23 Jul 59).

24 Jul 59

The Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, reported Senate Concurrent Resolution 48, concerning peace through the reduction of armaments, to the Senate and recommended that it pass. The resolution called for the Congress to reaffirm that the US was prepared, upon the conclusion of an agreement to reduce armaments, to join with other signatories of the agreement in devoting a substantial portion of any resultant savings to the expansion of "works of peace throughout the world"—as in economic and technical assistance to less-developed nations, the construction of essential facilities like schools and hospitals, and the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
This concurrent resolution passed the Senate on 6 August 1959. The same resolution (as House Concurrent Resolution 393) was favorably reported on without amendment by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 31 August 1959.


A White House press release announced the appointment by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, of Charles A. Coolidge to head a joint review of disarmament policy on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense (see item of 10 March 1959). A small staff drawn from these two departments "and other appropriate agencies of the Government" was to assist Mr. Coolidge. His study, drawing on experience gained from previous and current efforts to negotiate disarmament agreements, was to cover comprehensive and partial measures of arms control and reduction that, if internationally agreed, would "contribute to the achievement of U.S. national security objectives." Mr. Coolidge was to report his conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary of State.

5 Aug 59  The Secretary of Defense rescinded the portions of his memorandum of 19 September 1958 referring to specific dates assumed for the conduct of limited and extensive test operations (February 1960 and mid-1960, respectively) and substituted the following guidance: Test planning was to be maintained in a current status at all times, but for funding purposes it was to be assumed that (1) one or more underground tests might be authorized during CY 1960 and might be conducted on 5 to 6 months' notice, and (2) an extensive weapons effects series of tests involving overseas operations, and in environments other than underground, was not to be conducted prior to the spring of 1961.

Memo, SecDef to CJCS and MilSecs, "Guidance Covering Nuclear Effects Experiment Phasing During Test Suspension," 5 Aug 59, Encl to (6) JCS 2179/187, 10 Aug 59, JMF 4613 (5 Aug 59).

5 Aug 59  The Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, the USSR, and France issued a declaration stating that they had had "a useful exchange of views with regard to the method by which further negotiations on the question of disarmament could be most effectively advanced." As soon as appropriate consultations were completed, the declaration concluded, the results would be announced. (See item of 10 August.)


10 Aug 59  The Big Four Foreign Ministers announced agreement at Geneva that a new group should be formed to deal with the subject of disarmament. The new group was to be composed of equal delegations from East and West, and though nominally independent it was to report to the UN Disarmament Commission. (See item of 10 September 1959.)

NYT, 11 Aug 59, 1:8.

11 Aug 59  The three-power Geneva conference on nuclear testing formally confirmed its decision to make Vienna the headquarters of an organization to supervise a ban on nuclear tests.

NYT, 12 Aug 59, 2:1.

14 Aug 59  Responding to the oral request of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS forwarded their views on the effects of a possible extension of the existing suspension of nuclear weapons testing beyond the termination date of 31 October 1959 (see item of 22 August 1958). A short-term extension, they said, would not be of vital consequence. Only actual testing could resolve the question involved, though it might be possible to conduct this testing without
The JCS requested that their views on this subject be made known to the President. (See item of 21 August 1959.)


21 Aug 59

Referring to the memorandum of 23 July 1959 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering on the resumption of nuclear tests, the JCS stated to the Secretary of Defense their belief that the resumption of nuclear testing was so vital to the security of the US as to make reiteration of their past positions timely in view of the study under preparation by Dr. Kistiakowsky (see item of 23 July 1959).

They considered that the over-all long-range effects of a test cessation would be to the distinct disadvantage of the US, and that the suspension of the production of weapons and weapons material would be equally disadvantageous in causing deterioration of the stockpile, besides having immediate effect on it. In order to assure adequate consideration of the military aspects involved, the JCS offered the services of their representatives to assist in the preparation of the study under Dr. Kistiakowsky's direction. They recommended that their memorandum be forwarded to the President. (See item of 14 September 1959.)


26 Aug 59

The Geneva conference on nuclear testing, after its 127th meeting, announced a 6-week recess to await the outcome of the forthcoming Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks. At the same time the State Department announced that the US would extend to the end of the year its unilateral suspension of testing, due to expire on 31 October. In continuing its voluntary test suspension, the State Department said, the US wished to allow a reasonable period
of time for the negotiations to proceed following their resumption on 12 October 1959.

Two days later the USSR announced a resolution not to conduct nuclear weapons tests as long as the Western powers did not do so. The wording of the Soviet announcement, the New York Times commented in reporting it, was evidently designed to include France, which at that time was going ahead with plans for her first atomic test in the Sahara.

NYT, 27 Aug 59, 1:5, 12:5; ibid., 29 Aug, 1:3.

Referring to their memorandum of 16 July 1959, in which they had furnished their views on the importance of Operation WILLOW, the JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that they had now reviewed the Defense Atomic Support Agency's technical program for carrying out the land-surface weapons-effects portion of Operation WILLOW and recommended that approval be granted.

On 4 September the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, acknowledging receipt of the JCS memorandum of 27 August 1959, informed the CJCS that, in view of the uncertainty of any future nuclear tests, particularly those conducted on or near the surface, he felt the spending of funds for surface-test preparations beyond the paper planning stage would not be justified "at this time."

9 Sep 59  The JCS recommended by memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approve the program for Department of Defense participation in an underground nuclear event proposed by the Chief of DASA on 9 June 1959 (see item) in a memorandum to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.


10 Sep 59  A new forum for the discussion of disarmament problems was approved by the UN Disarmament Commission despite the misgivings of some of the smaller countries. The new body, a 10-nation group outside the UN, incorporated for the first time the principle of East-West parity long demanded by the Communists. Announced by the Big Four 3 days earlier, the committee included the US, the UK, France, Canada, and Italy representing the West, plus the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania representing the East. The Big Four declared their intention to keep the UN Disarmament Commission appropriately informed of the progress of their deliberations and to operate under the general responsibility of the UN. The committee was to begin negotiations early in 1960.

NYT, 11 Sep 59, 5:3; ibid., 8 Sep 59, 3:1.
14 Sep 59

The Secretary of Defense forwarded to the President the views of the JCS concerning the study on nuclear tests being conducted under Dr. Kistiakowsky, as expressed in the memorandum of the JCS dated 21 August 1959. The Secretary of Defense stated that he could not support a position favoring the resumption of relatively unlimited testing in view of world opinion and public concern regarding the hazards of atmospheric testing. But he did feel that continued development of nuclear weapons was of such far-reaching importance to the US that the country should (1) adopt a negotiating position with respect to a possible agreement on the suspension of testing under which underground testing would be permissible, and (2) resume underground testing after 31 December 1959 unless by that time a comprehensive test-suspension agreement had been concluded.

On the same date the Secretary of Defense informed the JCS of this action. He stated that before the JCS memorandum of 21 August 1959 had reached him the panel convened by Dr. Kistiakowsky had completed the study directed by the President, but that it was his understanding that the decision to extend the US moratorium on weapons testing until 31 December 1959 had been made prior to the completion of the study and that the results of the study had not been presented to the President.

In reply to the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of 14 September the White House Staff Secretary stated that the President was making both the Defense Secretary's memorandum of 14 September and that of the JCS of 21 August (enclosed with it) available, for use in its deliberations, to the "committee of principals" considering questions relating to any resumption of nuclear testing. (For composition of the "committee of principals" see item of 21 January 1959.)

N/H of JCS 2179/183 (Study on Nuclear Tests (U)), 17 Sep 59. (U) N/H of JCS 2179/183, 22 Sep 59. Both in JMF 4613 (23 Jul 59).

17 Sep 59

In a speech to the fourteenth General Assembly British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd unfolded a three-stage disarmament plan incorporating the two principles Mr. Lloyd called essential to progress in that field: (1) disarmament must maintain at all stages a balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament, and (2) control was the test of progress. The British plan visualized a gradual decrease in the level of national armaments and forces, with a corresponding gradual increase in the strength and maturity of an international control organ. The first stage of the Lloyd plan would comprise (1) study and negotiation of the various problems connected with disarmament--nuclear testing, "cut-off" of fissionable material, surprise attack, outer space, and control; (2) the beginning of a limitation on armed forces; and (3) stockpiling of arms for the control organ. The second stage would consist of implementing the agreements made in the first stage. The final stage would complete the processes of eliminating the means of waging war and equipping the control organ with its full capacity for keeping peace.

(U) Lloyd speech on disarmament, circulated as App B to (U) JCS 1731/319, "Disarmament (U)." 12 Oct 59, JMF 3050 (6 Oct 59).
In a speech to the General Assembly Premier Khrushchev laid before the UN a Soviet proposal for total world disarmament. The plan called for a 3-stage program, to be completed in 4 years, leaving the nations of the world at the end of that period with only security forces. The principal provisions were as follows. **First stage:** Reduction of conventional armed forces to 1.7 million each for the USSR, the US, and Communist China, and to 650,000 each for the UK and France; reduction of other states' forces to levels agreed on at the UN or a world conference; reduction of armaments and military equipment to accord with the foregoing reduction of armed forces. **Second stage:** Completion of disbanding of armed forces retained by states; elimination of all military bases in the territories of foreign states. **Third stage:** Destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles; destruction of air-force equipment; destruction of all stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the prohibition of further production of such weapons; prohibition of scientific research for military purposes and of all forms of military education and training. To supervise the timely implementation of these disarmament measures in all stages, an international control organ composed of all members was to be established. The staff of the control organ was to be recruited on an international basis "with due regard to the principle of equitable geographic distribution." The general-disarmament agreement would provide that any question of a violation would be submitted for immediate consideration by the UN Security Council or General Assembly, as appropriate.

Anticipating that the Western powers might not be ready for general disarmament, and protesting the wish of the USSR to approach the situation "realistically," Khrushchev presented the partial disarmament measures considered the most important by his government. These, all familiar because of previous Soviet proposals, were (1) establishment of a control and inspection zone and reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the western European countries concerned; (2) establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe; (3) withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European states and abolition of military bases in the territories of foreign states; (4) conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the member states of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty; (5) conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack.

Some Western sources, the New York Times reported, called the Khrushchev speech "platitudinous" and "the same old story." Secretary Herter promised careful consideration of the plan but observed that previous proposals for disarmament had foundered on the Soviet Government's refusal to agree to effective controls.

In a letter to the Under Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense presented the Defense Department's view that the US delegation to the conference on nuclear testing should be instructed to seek a phased agreement providing for a ban only on nuclear weapons tests in the earth's sensible atmosphere. The Defense Department, he said, was opposed to (1) any ban on underground tests; (2) any agreement, even in principle, to a quota system of inspections, which (he warned) would involve us in a dangerous numbers game; and (3) any agreement to a ban on testing in outer space without further exploration of the problem. Finally, the Defense Department urged the continuation of a regular program of underground nuclear testing until a fully enforceable agreement was concluded.

(Ltr, Actg SecDef to Under SecState, 29 Sep 59, Encl to JCS 2179/195, "Nuclear Weapons Test Cessation Negotiations," 5 Oct 59, JMF 4613 (7 Aug 59).
8 Oct 59

The USSR won its fight in the UN to have Premier Khrushchev's total-disarmament proposal placed at the top of the Political Committee's agenda. The Committee also agreed to a Soviet request that the proposal receive separate consideration instead of being discussed togethe with other disarmament items. The Soviet delegate opened the debate on 9 October by saying that if Khrushchev's proposals were first accepted in principle, questions of inspection and control and other 'details' could be disposed of more easily.

NYT, 9 Oct 59, 1:7; ibid., 10 Oct 59, 1:2.

12 Oct 59

In a letter to the Under Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense concurred, in general, with a State Department draft of instructions to the US nuclear-test delegation and added the suggestions of the Defense Department. The US objective, according to the State Department draft, was to gain a favorable position from which to present a phased opening of the Presidential decision of 23 July (see item). The tactics needed to accomplish this were outlined as follows: (1) The delegation would demonstrate the difficulties of effective control, dramatize the Soviet unwillingness to face the problem, and attempt to expose the inconsistency of the Soviet claim to favor effective control while accepting only 'a few' annual on-site inspections. (2) The delegation would also attack from time to time the Soviet position on veto, freedom of access, and staffing, although the major emphasis would be placed on the aspect of control, i.e., on (1), above. The Defense Department pointed out the embarrassment that would result should the Soviets unexpectedly agree to discuss the new technical data or offer a larger number of inspections. The US should anticipate such a switch, said the Defense Department, by being prepared to demonstrate the difficulty of underground detection regardless of the number of on-site inspections. Finally, the Acting Secretary of Defense advised that the US should stick to its position in forthcoming talks with the British despite their possible objections.


14 Oct 59

In a speech to the UN Political Committee US delegate Henry Cabot Lodge cautioned against adopting an "all-or-nothing" disarmament policy. Progress on two limited programs, prohibition of nuclear testing and prevention of surprise attack, should not be delayed by the debate over total disarmament, Lodge said. He criticized the Soviet delegation's opening speech of 9 October for slighting the importance of controls, but offered a concession on the issue of surprise attack: The US, he said, would now be willing to discuss political issues (which it had previously refused to do), along with technical issues (see items of 13 and 18 December 1958) preferably in the new 10-nation committee that was to meet in Geneva in 1960.

15 Oct 59  Secretary Herter, in a welcoming address, opened a twelve-nation conference called to negotiate a treaty on Antarctica. The Secretary of State said that the US Government was dedicated to the principles of continuing the cooperation obtained during the International Geophysical Year and assuring that Antarctica would be used for peaceful purposes only. (See 2d item of 3 May 1958.)