SUPPLEMENT THREE

to

EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING

to DISARMSMENT

during the period

1 June 1956 - 30 November 1957

Note: The pages attached hereto are a continuation of the "Extended Chronology of Significant Events Relating to Disarmament," distributed 19 January 1956, and of the Supplements distributed 7 March 1956 and 25 June 1956.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

HISTORICAL SECTION
Joint Chiefs of Staff
7 May 1958

EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5U52552
(b) 88-F01-0862

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TOP SECRET
1 June 1956 -- The US sent an aide-memoire to the USSR concerning the "atoms-for-peace" program. In this note, another step in the negotiations that had followed President Eisenhower's proposal of 8 December 1953 for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US suggested that talks be held to establish standard safeguards against the diversion to military use of fissionable material provided for the "atoms-for-peace" program. The US was particularly desirous of establishing, under the IAEA, safeguards for material provided bilaterally, as well as for material made available through the Agency. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 904 (22 Oct 56), pp. 620, 529.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

6 June 1956 -- In another letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Bulganin proposed that the Great Powers take the initiative in making unilateral cuts in their armed forces without waiting for the conclusion of an international disarmament agreement. Bulganin said unilateral disarmament was necessary because negotiations conducted in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee had not produced "positive results," and, in fact, had retarded progress toward disarmament. He stated that the Soviet troop reduction of 1.2 million men, announced on 14 May 1956, included cuts in East Germany; he called for the US, the UK, and France to reduce their forces in West Germany. Similar letters were sent to the UK, France, West Germany, and Italy. (Ltr, Bulganin to Eisenhower, 6 Jun 56, enc1 to JCS 1731/196, Note by Secys, "Bulganin Letter,"
14 Jun 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 63.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 9 Jun 56, 1:3, 2:3, text, 2:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 June 1956 -- In an aide-memoire to the US, and in similar approaches to France and Canada, the UK proposed a plan for partial disarmament, to be presented by the four powers at
the forthcoming meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission in early July. The UK advanced this plan as "a fresh Western move" to counter the Soviet Union's announcement (14 May 1955) of unilateral reductions in its armed forces.

The objectives of the UK plan were: (1) to reduce the armed forces of the US, USSR, and China to 2.5 million men each, and those of France and the UK to 750,000 each; (2) to increase international confidence so that more extensive disarmament might follow; (3) to give protection against surprise attack; (4) to establish an international control organization to supervise disarmament; (5) to initiate measures "to bring the nuclear threat under control"; and (6) to reduce the armed forces of other states to levels considerably below those of the five Great Powers listed above.

To achieve these ends, all states participating in the program would agree not to increase their armed forces, conventional weapons, and military expenditures, and, upon the establishment of a satisfactory control organization, would begin to reduce the size of their military establishments and budgets. After the five Great Powers had completed their reductions, nuclear test explosions would be limited, and plans would be drawn up for control of the future production of fissionable materials. Control posts would be established and aerial inspection surveys initiated, in order to prevent surprise attacks. When the program was completed, a disarmament conference would be convened to consider implementation of the plans for controlling production of fissionable materials and to study further reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons. (UK aide-memoire, "Disarmament,"
7 Jun 56, attachment to DPC [Pres Spec Cmte on Disarmament Problems] Note No. 78, no subj, 8 Jun 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (SECRET)

12 June 1956 -- The US National Academy of Sciences and the UK Medical Research Council released separate studies on the effects of radiation on man. The two reports were generally similar in content and conclusion. They stressed the dangers of radiation, but stated that the hazards from fall-out resulting from nuclear-weapons tests, if continued at the same rate as previously, were negligible. On 18 July 1956, in commenting on these studies, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Strauss stated that it was not anticipated that the reports would lead to any major change in the US position regarding weapons testing or the Atoms-for-Peace program. (Excerpts from the UK Medical Research Council study, The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations, are filed as DPC Note No. 80, "Report of British Medical Research Council," 25 Jun 53, JCS HS files.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (A published summary of the NAS study, The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, is filed as DPC Note No. 81, same subj, 19 Jul 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Ltr, Strauss to Stassen, 17 Jul 56, encl to DPC Note No. 85, "AEC Analysis of Reports on Radiation," 18 Jul 56, same file.) (SECRET)

15 June 1956 -- The President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems discussed the UK side-memoire of 7 June, and agreed that the US should not concur in the British proposal. In general, the Committee considered that the proposed course of action "cuts across our own continuing policy review, requires considerable changes in our existing policy which would have to be taken on very short notice, and is not really required by the necessities of the Disarmament Commission.

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meetings." (This position was explained to UK representatives on 20 June 1956.) (DPC Note No. 79, "Draft Position Paper on the UK Aide Memoire," 15 June 56, CCS G22 (4-14-45) BP pt 3.) (SECRET) (DPC/RA-31, Summary mns, DPC mtg 15 Jun 56; DPC/RA-32, Summary mns, DPC mtg 20 Jun 56. Both in same file, BP pt 6.) (TOP-SECRET)

29 June 1956 -- In a memorandum prepared for the President, pursuant to NSC Action 1553 (10 May 1956), and submitted to the National Security Council, Mr. Stassen proposed important changes in US disarmament policy. He stated that many factors—world weapons development, the spread of Soviet economic influence, the announced Soviet intention to reduce troop strength, and the trend among the Western Allies to cut their own force levels—combined to make it "timely and mandatory" for the US "to add to and to revise, in an adequate and far reaching manner," the nation's disarmament policy.

Mr. Stassen recommended a dozen major courses of action, some of which he regarded as inseparable from others, and all of which he believed to be essential for effective US leadership in solving the disarmament problem:

(1) The US should propose an international agreement to subject all fissionable materials produced after 1 July 1957 to effective international inspection and supervision, and to use such materials exclusively for "non-weapons purposes."

(2) The US should express willingness to join with other states possessing nuclear arms (USSR and UK) in providing the UN with a small force equipped with nuclear weapons for operation under the Security Council.

(3) The US should consult with other NATO members to establish a small elite NATO force equipped with nuclear weapons.
(4) The US should negotiate with the UK to assure "a reasonable UK posture of nuclear weapons" prior to 1 July 1957.

(5) The US should propose that on 1 July 1957 all states possessing nuclear weapons negotiate an agreement for the equitable transfer to peaceful uses of fissionable materials previously produced. Notwithstanding such an agreement, the US, UK, and USSR would maintain a "very substantial" nuclear-weapons capability.

(6) The US should declare its willingness to join other nations in halting A- and H-Bomb tests after 1 July 1957, and in establishing an effective inspection system to verify the cessation of tests.

(7) The US should propose that research aimed at sending objects through outer space, or at making possible travel in outer space, be devoted solely to peaceful purposes, and that no outer-space tests or long- or medium-range missile tests be conducted without international participation and an effective inspection system.

(8) The US should continue negotiations for the establishment of the Eisenhower "open skies" inspection system. Aerial inspection would be combined with the system of ground control posts proposed by Bulganin, and with financial inspectors.

(9) The US should insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal on one year's written notice and to suspension or partial suspension in case of violation.

(10) The US should be willing to consider favorably the progressive development of an inspection and control system, even if this system were not initially adequate for permanent arms control.

(11) The US should consult with West Germany on the question of establishing limitations on both indigenous and
foreign troops and armament in all of Germany, under effective inspection, as part of a move toward German reunification and freedom.

(12) If the principal measures of these courses of action were accepted by the USSR, the US should consider "the application" of the appropriate ones to China. (Memo, Stassen to NSC, no subj, 29 Jun 56, app to Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Disarmament Policy," 2 Jul 56, encl to JCS 1731/197, Note by Secys, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 63.)

3 July 1956 -- At the opening session of the UN Disarmament Commission in New York, the UK, Canada, France and the US offered a draft resolution urging continuation of the search for agreement on disarmament. The resolution called for observation of the following principles: (1) disarmament by stages; (2) disarmament in both nuclear and conventional arms; (3) disarmament under effective inspection and supervision by a central control organization; and (4) disarmament based on the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems. Mr. Gromyko criticized the Western proposal as merely a declaration of general aims, and said that it did not contain any practical measures. He denounced President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan and the principal of disarmament based on progressive settlement of political problems. He offered, instead, a Soviet draft declaration that called for the renunciation of force, including the use of nuclear weapons. (The opening statements of the US and USSR, and the Western draft resolution and Soviet draft declaration are reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 90, "Disarmament Commission Meeting," 22 Aug 56, pp. 1-7, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
3 July 1956 -- In an aide-memoire replying to the US note of 1 June 1956, the Soviet Union agreed in principle to join the US and other nations in a joint study of the problem of safeguards against the diversion to military uses of fissionable materials made available to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The USSR did not believe, however, that it was necessary to consider extending these safeguards to materials provided bilaterally until after the draft statute for the Agency, adopted 18 April 1956, had been formally approved by an international conference scheduled for September. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 904 (22 Oct 56), p. 629.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 July 1956 -- In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on Mr. Stassen's proposals of 29 June 1956. They viewed these proposals as a departure from the principle, which they had repeatedly stated, that an acceptable and proven procedure for inspection and verification of armaments should be a prerequisite of an international disarmament agreement. They noted that such a safeguard was made "doubly essential" by the fact that the Stassen recommendations could materially limit the US nuclear weapons stockpile and the US freedom to use nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs, in their own words, were, "therefore, unable to concur that '. . . willingness to implement the entire package is considered to be essential for effective U.S. leadership adequate to the circumstances.'"

Commenting specifically on some of these recommended courses of action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that:

(1) The provision for limiting the future production of fissionable material to "non-weapons purposes" should spell out unmistakably that this limitation would go into effect only after a proven system of inspection and control
was in operation. Setting a specific date for the complete and satisfactory installation of this system would be premature and unrealistic.

(2) [ ]

(3) [ ]

(4) Without ample proof that an effective inspection and control system could be implemented, no agreement should be negotiated for the transfer to peaceful uses of fissionable material previously produced.

(5) As long as nuclear weapons stockpiles existed, tests were essential.

(6) Without a comprehensive and effective inspection system, ostensibly peaceful research in outer-space missiles and travel could easily be adapted to the clandestine production of weapons.

(7) The statement on combining the Eisenhower and Bulganin proposals should make it clear that these proposals would require considerable expansion to be effective.

(8) [ ]

(9) [ ]
(10)

(11)

(Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Policy," 7 Jul 56, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/199, Rpt by JSSC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 64.) (TOP SECRET)

9 July 1956 -- Prime Minister Eden rejected Premier Bulganin's disarmament proposal of 6 June 1956. He pointed out that the UK had already made substantial reductions in her armed forces but that such unilateral reductions, while "helpful," were not of themselves sufficient to develop international confidence and security. (New York Times, 10 Jul 56, 1:6, text, 12:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

10 July 1956 -- At the meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission, Yugoslavia introduced a draft resolution calling for "such initial disarmament measures as are now feasible," under appropriate controls. The resolution proposed a reduction of conventional arms and armed forces and a halt in nuclear tests. The Western powers, in an amendment to their resolution of 3 July, called for future limitations on nuclear tests. Discussing President Eisenhower's aerial-inspection proposal, the French representative, Jules Moch, said its advantages were insufficient to warrant risking the future of the whole disarmament plan over the question of adopting the proposal. He suggested, however, a limited test of aerial inspection in sensitive sectors in Europe and the US. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 33, 10 Jul 56, DA IN 236928 (11 Jul 56), JSSC file, "Disarmament Cables 1956.") (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
(The texts of the Western and Yugoslav proposals were reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 90, "Disarmament Commission Meeting," 22 Aug 56, pp. 37, 43, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

12 July 1956 -- The Secretary of Defense forwarded to the National Security Council the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see item of 7 July 1956) on Mr. Stassen's memorandum of 29 June 1956. Mr. Wilson stated that he was in general accord with these views, and added his own feeling that Mr. Stassen's proposed course of action subordinated the requirements for an adequate control and inspection system to the desirability of reaching early agreement. (N/H of JCS 1701/199, "Disarmament Policy," 13 Jul 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 64.) (TOP SECRET)

12 July 1956 -- At the UN Disarmament Commission meeting, Soviet representative Gromyko stated that the USSR would accept, but only as a first step, the levels for armed forces proposed by the West on 22 March in London (2.5 million men each for the US, USSR, and Communist China; 750,000 men each for the UK and France), but added that the armed forces of other countries should be held to 150,000-200,000 men each. At the same time, he attacked Western motives and reiterated his charge that aerial inspection was an espionage scheme. He also proposed the elimination of nuclear-weapons stockpiles, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and a cessation of nuclear tests. The Indian representative, Krishna Menon, urged the suspension of nuclear-weapons tests, a halt in the construction of A-bombs, bilateral US-USSR negotiations, a pledge not to trade in nuclear weapons, an immediate reduction in arms budgets, and a partial dismantling by the US and USSR of atomic weapons. (Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to SecState,
44, 12 Jul 56, DA IN 237#94 (13 Jul 56), JSSC file, "Disarmament Cables 1956.") (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (The text of Gronyko's speech is reproduced in DFC Sect Note No. 90, "Disarmament Commission Meeting," 22 Aug 56, pp. 45-60, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

13 July 1956 -- Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, Deputy US Representative to the UN, told the Disarmament Commission that, in the absence of an agreement to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the continuation of nuclear tests was essential for US national defense and the security of the free world. He was supported in this view by the UK, Australia, and Canada; the USSR supported the Indian proposal to halt tests. (Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to SecState, 48, 13 Jul 56, DA IN 237796 (14 Jul 56), JSSC file, "Disarmament Cables 1956.") (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Ambassador Wadsworth's speech in reproduced in DFC Sect Note No. 90, "Disarmament Commission Meeting," 22 Aug 56, pp. 65-59, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

13 July 1956 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to note a revised plan for an armaments inspection system requiring less than one thousand personnel stationed inside the USSR (see item of 20 March 1956). This plan was designed to implement the Eisenhower aerial-inspection proposal. According to a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the inspection system described in the plan would provide a more accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities and render more difficult the launching of a great surprise attack. It would not, however, provide assurance of advance warning of an imminent great surprise attack, nor insure a continuous flow of all elements of information necessary to provide against surprise attack. (Dec On JCS 1731/198, Rpt by JSPC, "Armaments Inspection System
Requiring Less Than One Thousand Personnel," 13 Jul 56
CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 64.)  (TOP SECRET)

14 July 1956 -- Mr. Stassen asked the Defense Department to reconsider its views concerning his memorandum of 29 June 1956. He asserted that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (7 July 1956) were apparently "based upon a misconception of the recommendations in that Memorandum, or else a preconceived negative view was expressed without any substantive basis for the negation." Mr. Stassen replied as follows to some of the objections raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: (1) He pointed out that the policy he had recommended clearly stated that each disarmament step should be subject to the installation of an effective inspection system.  (2)

(3) He stated that nuclear-weapons tests should be halted after the attainment of "an enforced and inspected agreement" to use nuclear material for peaceful purposes. The US position in world opinion would be adversely affected if it did not specify the circumstances under which it would halt tests. (4) He declared that continued research in the outer-space field under the conditions he had proposed was preferable to any "unsound attempt" to stop all research of this type. (5) He stated that the withdrawal clause he had recommended for disarmament agreements permitted immediate suspension "for cause" as well as termination on a year's notice "without cause". (6) Finally, he said that West Germany should continue to be consulted on dis armament, since it had been consulted regularly heretofore. (Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 14 Jul 56, encl to Memo, Exec Secy NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 16 Jul 56, encl to JCS 1731/202,
Note by Secy, same subj, 18 Jul 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 64. (TOP SECRET)

14 July 1956 -- In reply to Premier Bulganin's letter of 6 June, in which Bulganin had proposed unilateral disarmament by the Great Powers, Premier Segni of Italy wrote that disarmament should be accomplished through the UN. He added that disarmament was impossible without adequate and effective controls. (New York Times, 15 Jul 56, 3:6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 July 1956 -- The UN Disarmament Commission adjourned after adopting a Peruvian compromise resolution that: (1) stated that the Western proposal of 3 July set forth the principles for an effective program of arms control; (2) noted that major difficulties remained to be solved before agreement could be reached on disarmament; (3) recalled the General Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1955, endorsing the Eisenhower aerial inspection plan; and (4) directed the Disarmament Subcommittee to continue its studies. The vote on the resolution was 10-1-1, the USSR opposing the measure and Yugoslavia abstaining. (New York Times, 17 Jul 56, 1:2. Text of the resolution is reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 90, "Disarmament Commission Meeting," 22 Aug 56, p. 85, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 July 1956 -- Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet, declared that the question of halting tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons could be settled independently of agreement on disarmament. He said the Soviet Union was ready to begin negotiations immediately with the US and UK towards a test-ban agreement to be established within the framework of the UN, as part of a tripartite accord, or by means of unilateral pledges by the three nations to halt nuclear tests. After the speech, the Supreme Soviet adopted
a resolution calling on the legislative bodies of other
nations to promote unilateral reductions in their own armed
forces. (The resolution was officially transmitted to the
US Government on 24 July, the Shepilov statement on 25 July.)
(DPC Note No. 68, "Shepilov Statement on Nuclear Tests,"
56, 5:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 July 1956 -- After three days of discussion in Bonn on inter-
national affairs, Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister
Nehru called for a "comprehensive disarmament agreement based
on suitable inspection and control measures." (New York Times,
17 Jul 56, 3:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 July 1956 -- In a letter from French Premier Mollet to Premier
Bulganin, France rejected the Russian proposal (6 June 1956)
for unilateral reductions in armed forces and for withdrawal
of troops from Germany. Mr. Mollet barred disarmament unless
it were accompanied by an adequate system of control. (New
York Times, 18 Jul 56, 5:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

18 July 1956 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended and noted the
conclusions of a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee
and other joint committees on the feasibility of measures
to reduce major types of armaments under an "effective"
inspection system. An "effective" inspection system was
defined as one in which there was "a complete exchange of
military blueprints and the unimpeded right to verify such
blueprints by aerial and ground inspection, thus providing
reasonable assurance against a great surprise attack." The
report was prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use in
developing a US position on measures for arms limitation. It
grew out of the President's decisions (7 Feb, 1 Mar 1955) to
investigate the problem of armament reduction in the light
of the possible acceptance of his "open skies" proposal combined with a ground inspection plan.

As amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the conclusion of the report stated that under an "effective" inspection system four methods to limit and control major types of armament would "warrant consideration": (1) limitation of armaments by type; (2) retention by each state of the arms essential to its defense, as determined by an international body; (3) determination of levels of armaments in accordance with an agreed "atomic destructive capability" limit; and (4) restriction of weapons to a specified maximum effective range. The conclusion also stated, however, that it was not feasible to undertake measures for the reduction of major types of arms without also establishing a comprehensive limitation and control system for all arms. (Dec On JCS 17?1/201, Rpt by JSPC, "Feasibility of Measures for the Reduction of Major Types of Armaments," 16 Jul 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 54.)

18 July 1956 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered acceptable from a military point of view the draft Statute for an International Atomic Energy Agency adopted 18 April 1956. They felt, however, that the Statute provided functions for the Agency that were more comprehensive and less desirable militarily than those previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were also disturbed by the possibility that the US contemplated negotiating a requirement that all bilateral or multilateral agreements in the atomic energy field should be made within the framework of the Agency (1 June 1956). They considered such a requirement undesirable from a military point of view and reiterated their belief that membership in the IAEA should
not preclude making agreements outside it. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to a proposal that, at the international conference on the IAEA scheduled for September, the US should be prepared to announce an initial substantial commitment of fissionable material to the Agency pool. They felt that a large material pool should not be established during the initial period of IAEA operations. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," 18 Jul 56, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/200, Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 64.)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*18 July 1956* -- President Eisenhower, in a message transmitting to Congress the tenth annual report on US participation in the UN, said the West should continue to seek agreement with the Soviet Union on his proposal for aerial inspection, or on some other equally effective program. He felt the Soviets would eventually drop their opposition to the "open skies" plan. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 97 (3 Sep 56), pp. 382-384.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

*19 July 1956* -- Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Strauss announced that current tests in the Pacific had proved it was possible to minimize the hazards of fall-out from nuclear explosions "to an extent not heretofore appreciated." He said that "mass hazard" from fall-out was not a "necessary complement" to the use of large nuclear weapons. (New York Times, 20 Jul 56, 1:3, text, 6:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

*20 July 1956* -- Chancellor Adenauer rejected Premier Bulganin's disarmament proposals of 6 June 1956. He stated that a reduction in conventional armaments would attack only the symptoms instead of the causes of world tensions. (New York Times, 22 Jul 56, 6:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
20 July 1956 -- In a communique issued at the close of a two-day conference at Brioni, Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, Prime Minister Nehru, and President Nasser proposed the suspension of nuclear-weapons tests. The communique also called for "progress towards disarmament . . . in the framework of the United Nations" and for "adequate control" of any arms cuts. (New York Times, 21 Jul 56, 1:3, text 2:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 July 1956 -- Prime Minister Eden stated in the House of Commons that the British Government, while preferring to deal with the question of limiting nuclear-arms tests within the framework of a general disarmament agreement, was now ready to discuss the matter separately. (New York Times, 24 Jul 56, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

2 August 1956 -- The Secretary of Defense informed the Secretary of State that the Defense Department considered the draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency to be "generally acceptable." However, he noted and approved the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see item of 18 July 1956). (Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 56, App "A" to Memo, Asst to SecDef (Atomic Energy) to CJCS, "Draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," 23 Aug 56, encl to JCS 1731/206, Note by Secys, same subj, 30 Aug 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3 August 1956 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed their memorandum of 7 July 1956 concerning Mr. Stassen's recommendations of 29 June. They informed the Secretary of Defense that they still believed that their views on those recommendations were "valid and sound in relation to the national security of the United States." They pointed out that Mr. Stassen's 14 July letter commenting on their views, "adds conclusions heretofore not expressed and interpretations not previously apparent."
Any document, they said, such as the 29 June memorandum, which proposed changes in US policy, should be, "in itself, unmistakably clear as to the policy recommended." The Joint Chiefs denied that their differences with Mr. Stassen were based on any misconception of his recommendations or on "a preconceived negative view." They stated their opinion that their views represented the only acceptable approach to properly safeguarded disarmament. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, 3 Aug 56, "Disarmament Policy," derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/203, Rpt by JSSC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.)

4 August 1956 -- In answer to Premier Bulganin's letter of 6 June 1956, President Eisenhower wrote the Soviet leader that there was an obvious need for "international supervisory mechanisms and controls" to encourage greater arms reduction than could be achieved through the unilateral or bilateral cuts proposed by Bulganin. The President again explained the purpose of his plan for aerial inspection, and repeated his proposal of 1 March 1956 to halt the increase in nuclear-weapons stockpiles. Also, pointing out that the problem of Western and Soviet forces in Germany could not be dealt with as an isolated matter, Mr. Eisenhower deplored the fact that agreements concerning the reunification of Germany, made in July 1955 at Geneva, had not been implemented. (Ltr, Eisenhower to Bulganin, 4 Aug 56, reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 88, "Eisenhower-Bulganin Correspondence," 8 Aug 56, pp. 48-51, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

4 August 1956 -- Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov wrote Hanson Baldwin, New York Times military editor, that economic factors, as well as a desire to reduce world tensions, lay behind the announcement on 14 May 1956 that Soviet armed forces would be cut. (New York Times, 7 Aug 56, 1:6, text, 6:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
15 August 1956 -- In an aide-memoire replying to the Soviet note of 3 July 1956, the US reiterated its desire to discuss means of establishing safeguards against the diversion to military use of fissionable material provided bilaterally, outside the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. The US proposed that talks on establishing safeguards be held in Washington in early September, prior to the scheduled international conference on the proposed IAEA Statute. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 904 (22 Oct 56), pp. 629-631.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

20 August 1956 -- The State Department noted the views of the Department of Defense on the draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (see item of 2 August 1956). Acting Secretary of State Murphy informed the Secretary of Defense that United States policy was aimed not at precluding bilateral or multilateral atomic-energy agreements outside the Agency—as feared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—but rather at avoiding a situation in which a country like the USSR could evade the safeguarding measures of both the United States and the proposed Agency. He explained that the purpose of the exploratory talks proposed by the US (see items of 1 June and 15 August 1956) was to reach agreement "on the application of uniform, non-competitive safeguards to any new bilateral agreements for extending assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy." (Itr, Actg SecState to SecDef, 20 Aug 56, App "B" to Memo, Asst to SecDef (Atomic Energy) to CJCS, "Draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," 23 Aug 56, encl to JCS 1731/206, Note by Secys, same subj, 30 Aug 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

21 August 1956 -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson informed Ambassador Peaslee, Deputy Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, that, after reconsideration, the Department
of Defense still considered its views (see item of 12 July 1956) on Mr. Stassen's memorandum of 29 June 1956 to be valid. Mr. Robertson said he could not accept the contention that the Department's views were based on either a misconception or a preconceived negative attitude. (Ltr, Dep SecDef to Peaslee, 21 Aug 56, encl to JCS 1731/205, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Policy," 23 Aug 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (TOP-SECRET)

24 August 1956 -- The Soviet Union resumed its testing of nuclear weapons by detonating a nuclear device with a yield of less than a megaton at its proving ground in southwest Siberia. Subsequently, similar explosions took place on 30 August, 2 September, and 10 September. On 26 August, President Eisenhower, in announcing the first explosion, again called for "effective international control of atomic energy and such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible." (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 898 (10 Sep 56), p. 424; New York Times, 10 Sep 56, 8:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 and 29 August 1956 -- The President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems held two meetings to discuss the disarmament picture in general and, in particular, the departmental reaction to Mr. Stassen's proposals of 29 June 1956. The Department of Defense (see items of 7 and 12 July), the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department had all disagreed with important portions of these proposals. At the suggestion of Mr. Stassen, therefore, the Committee agreed to seek substantive decisions from President Eisenhower on disarmament questions that had been under interagency consideration. (DPC/RA-35, Summary mins, DPC mtg 27 Aug 56; DPC/RA-36, Summary mins, DPC mtg 29 Aug 56. Both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (TOP-SECRET) (The AEC view is outlined in Ltr,
Strauss to Stassen, 26 Jul 56, encl to Memo, Exec Secy NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 27 Jul 56, encl to JCS 1731/204, Note by Secy, same subj, 31 Jul 55, same file, sec 65. The State Department view is outlined in Ltr, Murphy to Peaslee, 15 Aug 56, encl 1 to Memo, Peaslee to NSC and DFC, no subj, 17 Aug 56, same file, BP pt 6.

(TOP SECRET)---

31 August 1956 -- The State Department proposed to Mr. Stassen that the United States make a unilateral announcement that for a period of one year it would halt tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more. The proposed announcement would also call for a conference of Soviet, UK, and US representatives, to arrange for limiting tests of smaller-yield weapons. The State Department proposal arose from: (1) the growing international opinion in favor of halting tests and the fact that the US was "now virtually isolated in its opposition to any limitation on nuclear weapons tests except in connection with broader disarmament agreements"; (2) the increasing public concern with the effects of radiation; and (3) the political advantages that the US could gain from such an announcement. The State Department believed that the announcement would not adversely affect US security, since the Department understood that plans for tests within the next year did not include weapons with a yield of over 70 kilotons. (Ltr, Murphy to Stassen, 31 Aug 56, App to Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Limitations on Nuclear Testing," 5 Sep 56, encl to JCS 1731/207, Note by Secys, same subj, 11 Sep 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (TOP SECRET)

7 September 1956 -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson wrote the Secretary of State that the State Department's proposal of 31 August 1956 "would mark a distinct change from basic --- - 21 - ---
national security policy" and would have a pronounced effect on nuclear-weapons development, especially on the defensive and retaliatory ICBM and IREBM programs. He also took issue with a statement in the announcement proposed by the State Department that explosions with a yield of 100 kilotons or greater could be detected anywhere in the world. He stated that the existing US detection system did not cover all parts of the world and could not even necessarily detect explosions set off at a very high altitude within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Robertson said he had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on the matter. (Ltr, Dep SecDef to SecState, 7 Sep 56, encl to JCS 1731/208, Note by Secys, "Limitations on Nuclear Testing," 11 Sep 56, CCS 092 (7-14-45) sec 65.)

7 September 1956 -- Mr. Stassen wrote the Secretary of Defense that he was trying to find a way to set permissible levels of armaments in the disarmament program being developed pursuant to NSC Action No. 1513 (7 February 1956) and the Annex to that Action (1 March 1956). Accordingly, he asked the Department of Defense to develop feasible measures "for establishing the relationship between levels of manpower and armaments." He further requested that, if no satisfactory measures could be developed, the Secretary of Defense recommend "any other method of arriving at armaments levels to be allowed under a comprehensive disarmament system." (Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 7 Sep 56, app to Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Control of Armaments," 12 Sep 56, encl to JCS 1731/209, Note by Secys, same subj, 14 Sep 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.)

11 September 1956 -- Premier Bulganin replied to President Eisenhower's letter of 4 August 1956. The Soviet Premier rejected the President's proposal to halt further production of nuclear
weapons, stating that such a step would be useless without forbidding the use of nuclear weapons and eliminating them from arms stockpiles. He called for a ban on nuclear-weapons tests as the first step toward the achievement of at least a limited agreement on disarmament. Bulganin once again criticized the President's aerial inspection plan, declaring that it had no bearing on disarmament and that Western insistence on its acceptance had brought disarmament negotiations to a standstill. (Ltr, Bulganin to Eisenhower, 11 Sep 56, reproduced as DPC Sect Note No. 88, R-1, no subj, 14 Sep 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

11 September 1956 -- President Eisenhower discussed Mr. Stassen's disarmament proposals of 29 June 1956 at a White House conference with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, Admiral Strauss, Mr. Sherman Adams, Mr. Stassen, Ambassador Peaslee, and Mr. William H. Jackson. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President directed that an intensive interdepartmental review of the proposals be undertaken. He stressed the need of making another approach to the problems of limiting to "non-weapons purposes" the production of fissionable materials and of limiting or halting nuclear-weapons tests, both of these limitations conditional on the prior installation of effective reciprocal inspection and detection systems. (Memo, Jackson to SecState et al., "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 15 Sep 56; "Summary of Conference at White House, September 11, 1956," encl to Memo, Jackson to SecState, et al., "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 18 Sep 56; "Working Paper in Relation to Conference with the President at 3:45 p.m., Tuesday, September 11, 1956," n.d. All in CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (TOP-SECRET)
18 September 1956 -- In a memorandum forwarding to the participants in the 11 September White House conference a summary of that meeting, Mr. William H. Jackson stated that, after approving the summary, the President had indicated that on further reflection he had come to the view that the United States could not actually undertake to disarm or to restrict armaments in any major fields, except to join in "test or token disarmament projects," without assured provision for aerial inspection. (Memo, Jackson to SecState et al., "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 18 Sep 56, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (TOP-SECRET)

20 September 1956 -- The conference to discuss adoption of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency opened at UN Headquarters in New York. In a welcoming speech to the delegates of 81 nations, Admiral Strauss pointed out that creation of the IAEA, among other things, would "divert important amounts of fissionable material from atomic bomb arsenals to uses of benefit to mankind." (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 902 (8 Oct 56), pp. 525-537.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

24 September 1956 -- In a major speech at the UN conference on the International Atomic Energy Agency, US Representative James J. Wadsworth warned against weakening the provisions for inspection and control contained in the draft Statute. He also voiced the hope of the US that nations with bilateral agreements on nuclear energy would make such agreements conform to the system of safeguards adopted by the IAEA. In another speech to the conference, Georgi N. Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador to the US, denounced the safeguard provisions of the draft Statute as infringements on the sovereignty of nations receiving aid under the program. (New York Times,

24 September 1956 -- In an aide-memoire replying to the US note of 15 August 1956, the Soviet Union agreed to discuss standardizing safeguards on the use of fissionable material provided for the atoms-for-peace program, but suggested discussing the question in concert with those nations represented at the IAEA conference as well as with other interested states. Moreover, the USSR reiterated its position that the question of extending the IAEA system of safeguards to bilateral agreements should be taken up after the Statute was ratified. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 904 (22 Oct 56), p. 531.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 October 1956 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on the State Department proposal of 31 August 1956 that the US announce unilaterally a one-year halt in tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more. In a letter to the Secretary of Defense, they concurred fully with the comments of the Deputy Secretary (see item of 7 September 1956) and concluded that the State Department proposal was militarily unacceptable. 

SecDef, "Limitations on Nuclear Testing," 3 Oct 56, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/210- Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (TOP-SECRET - RESTRICTED-DATA)
5 October 1956 -- President Eisenhower issued a statement on the question of nuclear-weapons tests in response to growing public interest in this problem. Statements by Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, calling for a halt in nuclear tests, had served to bring the question to the forefront of public interest. The President declared that "the testing of atomic weapons to date has been--and continues--an indispensable part of our defense program," but that the US Government was ready "to restrict and control both the testing and the use of nuclear weapons under specific and supervised international disarmament agreement."
(DPC Sect Note No. 99, "President's October 5 Statement on Tests," 6 Oct 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

12 October 1956 -- Italy concluded four days of aerial reconnaissance tests to demonstrate the effectiveness and value of President Eisenhower's "open-skies" proposal. The Italian Government later declared that the tests, which included aerial photography of Rome and other cities, proved the workability of mutual air inspection. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 906 (5 Nov 56), p. 715; Washington Post and Times-Herald, 24 Oct 55, A2:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 October 1956 -- In another letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Bulganin repeated his proposal of 11 September for an immediate US-Soviet agreement to ban testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons as a "first step toward the solution of the problem of atomic weapons." Bulganin also accused US Government officials, particularly Secretary of State Dulles, of "obvious distortion" in public statements on Soviet disarmament policy. (Ltr, Bulganin to Eisenhower, 17 Oct 56, reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 88, R-2, "Eisenhower-Bulganin Correspondence," 22 Oct 56, pp. 59-61, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
21 October 1956 -- Replying to Marshal Bulganin's letter of 17 October, President Eisenhower wrote the Soviet Premier that halting nuclear-weapons tests, as well as other plans for disarmament, required systems of inspection and control, which the USSR had steadfastly refused to accept. However, the President wrote, the US would "close no doors" and would "entertain and seriously evaluate all [disarmament] proposals from any source which seem to have merit." At the same time the President criticized portions of Premier Bulganin's letter, including his reference to Mr. Dulles. (Ltr, Eisenhower to Bulganin, 21 Oct 56, reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 88, R-2, pp. 63-64, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

22 October 1956 -- In response to Mr. Stassen's request of 7 September 1956 to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. Wilson that "the relationship between armaments and manpower cannot be realistically computed in atomic weaponry."
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that reaching a safeguarded agreement with the Soviet Union on disarmament seemed all but a hopeless cause; they believed that every possible avenue that might preclude a surprise nuclear attack on the US and its allies should be explored. Accordingly, they suggested a possible approach to the disarmament problem, but cautioned that in any disarmament agreement with the USSR, the method of armaments reduction would be much less important than the degree to which reductions could be verified.

The proposed "Armaments Control Plan" consisted of three phases. Phase I would include establishment of the organization required to implement the plan. The Executive Committee of this organization, consisting of the US, USSR, UK, Canada, and France (and later Communist China) and functioning initially outside the UN, would devise an inspection plan. States participating in this plan would
agree to halt transfers of nuclear-weapons delivery systems, or parts of them, to other nations for a three-month period, and would submit a complete set of military blueprints to the Executive Committee. When this Committee had determined that Phase I had been completed satisfactorily, Phase II would begin and continue for about one year. During Phase II, participating States would place 10 per cent of each type of nuclear-weapons delivery system in "operational storage" in the custody of the Executive Committee. Aerial and ground inspection to verify military blueprints would be conducted. During this phase, however, limited modernization of weapons delivery systems would be permitted. When Phase II was completed to the satisfaction of the Executive Committee, the third phase would begin. During Phase III, lasting approximately 18 months, an additional 15 per cent of each type of nuclear-weapons delivery system would be placed in "operational storage." Active military forces would be reduced to 2.5 million men each for the US and USSR, and 750,000 men each for the UK, France, and Canada, and "excess" conventional weapons would also be placed in "operational storage." The Executive Committee would then evaluate progress to this point and determine subsequent procedures or actions. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Control of Armaments," 22 Oct 56, OSS 092 (4-14-45) sec 66, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/211, Rpt by JSPC, same subj, 23 [sic] Oct 56, same file, sec 65.) (TOP SECRETE)

23 October 1956 -- In answer to increasing public agitation in favor of halting nuclear-weapons tests, President Eisenhower issued a "full and explicit review" of US "policies and actions with respect to the development and testing of nuclear weapons, ... our efforts toward world disarmament, and our
quest of a secure and just peace for all nations." Declaring that "the critical issue is not a matter of testing nuclear weapons—but of preventing their use in nuclear war," the President stated that: (1) the US had been unremitting in its efforts for disarmament; (2) effective safeguards and controls were essential to any disarmament program or for halting nuclear-weapons tests, but the USSR had refused to accept any dependable system of safeguards; (3) the US was consequently increasing its stockpile of nuclear weapons and continuing their development as a deterrent to aggression; (4) continuing testing at the present rate did not impair the health of humanity; (5) tests enabled the US to reduce the fallout of nuclear weapons and to develop defensive as well as offensive weapons; (6) limiting testing to small fission weapons would not prevent fallout from tests; (7) it was impossible to be certain that all nuclear-weapons tests were being detected, or, if a test were detected, to determine immediately its size and character; (8) the US could suffer a serious military disadvantage if the Soviet Union violated a test ban, since, even if the US continued research and preparation for testing, it would require at least a year to organize and carry out a major test. The President concluded that the US must continue nuclear-weapons tests while at the same time maintaining its efforts to achieve, "not the illusion, but the reality of world disarmament." (A copy of the President's statement is filed as DFC Sect Note No. 107, "Statement by the President," n.d., CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 October 1956 — The UN conference on the International Atomic Energy Agency voted unanimously to adopt a revised Statute establishing the IAEA. The Agency would begin formal
negotiations after ratification of the Statute by 18 nations, including at least three among the US, USSR, UK, France, and Canada. The IAEA would help to provide fissionable material and technical aid to nations seeking assistance in the nuclear field. It could also assist in establishing factories for the manufacture of fissionable material for peaceful uses, inspect these factories, establish standards of health and safety, and make provisions against the diversion of fissionable material to military uses. (New York Times, 24 Oct 56, 1:1, text, 14:1-8 and State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 908 (19 Nov 56), pp. 820-828.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

26 October 1956 -- Representatives of 70 nations signed the Statute for the IAEA at the conclusion of the UN conference to establish the Agency. In a letter to the conference, President Eisenhower promised US support of the IAEA, including an immediate grant of 5,000 kilograms of U-235 as well as future grants of nuclear materials. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXV, no. 908 (19 Nov 56), pp. 813-815.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

30 October 1956 -- In a letter to Mr. Stassen, the Secretary of Defense concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see item of 22 October) concerning Mr. Stassen's request of 7 September 1956. Mr. Wilson forwarded the Armaments Control Plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs. (N/H of JCS 1731/211, "Control of Armaments," 20 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 65.) (TOP-SECRET)

17 November 1956 -- Premier Bulgain wrote President Eisenhower that, in the light of the attack on Egypt by Israel, France, and the UK, the Soviet Government was calling on the governments of the world to unite their efforts to prevent war, halt the arms race, and solve questions in dispute by peaceful
means. To this end, Marshal Bulganin enclosed a major Soviet disarmament proposal, copies of which he also sent to the UK, France, and India. The Soviet proposal called for:

(1) A reduction over a two-year period of the armed forces of the USSR, the US, and China to 1-1.5 million men, of the UK and France to 750,000 men, and of other states to 150,000-200,000. During the first year, the USSR, US, and China would reduce their forces to 2.5 million men, and the UK and France would cut theirs to 750,000 men. (2) A halt in nuclear-weapons tests, to be followed, during the same two-year period, by a ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. (3) A reduction during 1957 "under appropriate control" of foreign troops stationed in Germany. (4) A reduction during 1957 of US, British, and French troops stationed in NATO countries and of Soviet troops stationed in Warsaw Pact countries. (5) The elimination during the two-year period of foreign military bases on the territories of other states. (6) A curtailment of military expenditures, to correspond with other reductions during the two-year period. (7) The establishment of "a strict and effective international control" over these disarmament measures. This control would include aerial inspection of Europe for 800 kilometers on both sides of the line between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries. (8) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact among NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. (9) A meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, US, UK, France, and India on the problem of disarmament. (New York Times, 18 Nov 56, 1:8, text, 33:1-6, and also DPC Sect Note No. 88, R-3 (rev), "Bulganin Letter of November 17," 20 Nov 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BF pt 6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
17 November 1956 -- The Soviet Union carried out a successful test of a nuclear weapon at a high altitude. The Soviet announcement of the test came only a few hours after the USSR's new disarmament proposal. (New York Times, 18 Nov 56, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

21 November 1956 -- President Eisenhower, at a conference with the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant for Disarmament, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved as national policy the final version of the proposals made by Mr. Stassen on 29 June 1956. These proposals had undergone intensive review by the departments concerned after the President's directive of 11 September 1956. The final version omitted some of Mr. Stassen's original proposals and changed the others in accordance with revisions agreed on by State, Defense, AEC, and Mr. Stassen.

The approved policy provided that:

(1) The US should propose that after 31 December 1957 all new production of fissionable materials should be subject to effective international inspection and, when this inspection had been shown to be effective to the satisfaction of the US, should be used or stockpiled exclusively for "non-weapons purposes" under international supervision.

(2) In studies under way concerning possible extension of US-UK nuclear-weapons cooperation, the US should consider the effect on the UK of UK adherence to an agreement based on US disarmament policies. Any arrangement for further assistance of the UK in the nuclear-weapons field should be specifically approved by the President.

(3) The US should propose that, upon implementation of (1), above, step-by-step, "agreed, equitable, proportionate
transfers" of fissionable materials to "non-weapons purposes" should begin. The US should retain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability in the early phases of this program.

(4) The US should express its willingness, contingent upon agreement on an implementation of (1) and (3), above, to agree to an international limitation or ban on nuclear-weapons tests, under effective inspection. The US should also propose that, pending such an agreement, nations holding tests provide advance notice and permit limited international observations of the tests.

(5) The US should propose international inspection of and participation in all tests of outer-space missiles [corrected, 5 December 1956, to "objects"].

(6) As a means of building international confidence and good will, the US should continue negotiations for a system of aerial inspection to be combined with ground control posts.

(7) The US should insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal upon notice of a major violation, and to complete or partial suspension for lesser violations.

(8) The US should propose the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system, and should be willing to begin minor reductions of arms and armed forces during the installation of this system. Such cuts should not reduce US military strength below 2.5 million men.

(9) If the principal measures of the foregoing were accepted by the USSR, the appropriate ones should be applied to Communist China. The US should reserve the right to terminate its disarmament commitments if this were not done. (Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, 21 Nov 56, app to Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 18 Dec 56, encl to JCS 1731/214, Note by Secys, "Control of Armaments (U)," 31 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 66.)
27 November 1956 -- Norway proposed in the UN that all nations be required to register in advance with the UN any planned nuclear-weapons test expected to cause measurable, worldwide radioactive fallout. This would be the first step toward "early regulation and, if necessary, reduction" of nuclear-weapons tests. (New York Times, 28 Nov 56, 11:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 or 29 November 1956 -- The US presented an "Informal Memorandum" to the UK on the subject of disarmament, in preparation for the UN disarmament debate scheduled for January, 1957. The memorandum, based on the statement of policy approved by the President on 21 November 1956 and embodying many of its points, outlined proposals for further joint action on disarmament negotiations. (Msg, SecState to USUN New York, 413, 7 Dec 56.) (SECRET) (DPC Sect Note No. 123, "U.S.-U.K. Consultation on Disarmament," 21 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (SECRET)

6-7 December 1956 -- Mr. Stassen and members of his committee held informal talks in Washington with UK representatives to discuss the US "Informal Memorandum" (see above item). Mr. Stassen told the British that the US desired to obtain UK, French, and Canadian reaction to its proposals before presenting them to the USSR or making them public. The British objected to the proposed target date of 31 December 1957 for halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons. They felt that this date was too early for the UK to halt such production, but Mr. Stassen said that the US was prepared to "discuss realistically [the] UK nuclear
posture" if the USSR accepted the cut-off date. He pointed out the necessity for setting a date early enough to prevent development of nuclear weapons by states that did not already possess them. (Msg, SecState to USUN New York, 413, 7 Dec 56.)

(SECRET)

7 December 1956 -- A special subcommittee of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Policy completed a draft "Disarmament Treaty" and a draft statute for an international "Armaments Regulation Agency." The draft treaty followed closely the policy statement approved by the President on 21 November 1956. The draft statute, to be incorporated in the treaty, while not a part of the 21 November decision, was also an outgrowth of Mr. Stassen's proposals of 29 June 1956 and had been the subject of interdepartmental discussion. It spelled out the organization and functions of the proposed Armaments Regulation Agency. This Agency was to be "related in some way" to the UN and would include the US, USSR, UK, France, and Canada as original members to set up the Agency. Its primary function would be to establish, control, and direct an effective international inspection system. (Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament," 20 Dec 56, encl to JCS 1731/213, Note by Secys, same subj, 31 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 66.)

(SECRET)

7 December 1956 -- The US presented similar but not identical informal memoranda on the subject of disarmament to the French and Canadians. The memoranda were patterned after the one presented to the UK in late November but did not include a specific date for halting the production of nuclear materials for weapons. (The memorandum presented to Canada is reproduced as DPC Sect Note No. 117, no subj, 7 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (The memorandum
presented to France is reproduced as attachment to DPC Sect
Note No. 126, "U.S.-French Consultation on Disarmament,"
28 Dec 56, same file.) (SECRET)

19 December 1956 -- Mr. Stassen and members of his committee held
an informal meeting in Washington with Canadian representatives
on the subject of disarmament. In response to questions
about the US "Informal Memorandum" of 7 December, Mr. Stassen
said the note indicated matters which the US was "willing to
go forward on in advance of major political settlements."
This country, he stated, would "take any step that moves
toward greater security, toward more assurance against great
surprise attack." On 4 January 1957, Mr. Stassen and Canadian
Ambassador Heeney again discussed the US memorandum. (DPC
Sect Note No. 122, no subj, 19 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP
pt 7; DPC Sect Note No. 131, "U.S.-Canadian Consultation,"
4 Jan 57, same file, BP pt 8; Msg, SecState to USUN New York,
451, 19 Dec 56.) (SECRET)

20 December 1956 -- The UN Disarmament Commission unanimously
adopted the Disarmament Subcommittee report of 4 May 1956.
Ambassador Lodge told the group that the US noted "with some
hope" indications in the Soviet disarmament proposal of
17 November 1956 that the USSR was willing to consider
aerial inspection "as a positive factor in the problem of
armaments." The US, he said, was prepared to renew its
efforts to reach "a sound, safeguarded agreement for the
reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces."
(New York Times, 21 Dec 56, 1:7, 22:3; text, State Department
Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 916 (14 Jan 57), pp. 71-72.)
(UNCLASSIFIED)
21 December 1956 -- At another meeting in Washington between US and UK representatives, the British again questioned the US proposal to set 31 December 1957 as a date for halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons. Mr. Stassen replied that it was necessary to set an early, specific date to prevent nuclear-weapons production by a "fourth" nation as well as to indicate the seriousness of the US intent to break the stalemate on disarmament. He admitted, however, that the date cited was probably impossible of attainment. In further discussion, Mr. Stassen declared that the "prime" US consideration was that of improving the safeguards against great surprise attack. He expressed US willingness to "move in any direction" to promote this end. (DPC Sect Note No. 123, "U.S.-U.K. Consultation on Disarmament," 21 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (SECRET)

28 December 1956 -- In Washington, US and French representatives discussed the US "Informal Memorandum" of 7 December 1956. Mr. Stassen attempted to clarify points on which the French raised questions. The discussion was similar to those held with the British and Canadians. (DPC Sect Note No. 126, "U.S.-French Consultation on Disarmament," 28 Dec 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (SECRET)

31 December 1956 -- In reply to Premier Bulganin's letter of

17 November 1956, President Eisenhower wrote that disarmament negotiations in the UN seemed more likely to produce significant results than the five-power heads-of-government conference proposed by the Soviet Union. The President said that the US was carefully studying the Soviet plan for limited aerial inspection, as well as other disarmament proposals made by the USSR. (Text reproduced in DPC Sect Note No. 112/, Add 1, "Eisenhower Letter to Bulganin, 3 Jan 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
3 January 1957 -- The UK and France replied to Premier Bulganin's disarmament proposals of 17 November 1956. In separate notes reflecting President Eisenhower's answer, Prime Minister Eden and Premier Mollet stated that disarmament negotiations should be continued in the UN rather than attempted at any heads-of-government conference. (NATO, NATO Letter, v. V, no. 2 (1 Feb 57), p. 4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8-9 January 1957 -- At the UN, Mr. Stassen and Ambassador Lodge outlined for the Western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee the US presentation to be given at the pending disarmament talks. The Canadian, French, and UK delegations expressed their satisfaction. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 454, 8 Jan 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 464, 9 Jan 57.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 9 Jan 57, 7:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

10 January 1957 -- Ambassador Lodge discussed with Indian UN representatives the presentation on disarmament planned by the US. The Indians expressed their general agreement with the US position. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 468, 10 Jan 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

10 January 1957 -- In his State of the Union message to Congress, President Eisenhower expressed US willingness to "make any reliable agreement which would reverse the trend toward ever more devastating nuclear weapons; reciprocally provide against the possibility of surprise attack; mutually control the outer space missile and satellite development; and make feasible a lower level of armaments and armed forces and an easier burden of military expenditures." His mention of outer space missiles and satellites in connection with disarmament was the first public reference of this sort by any world statesman. (New York Times, 11 Jan 57, 1:6-7; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 918 (28 Jan 57), pp. 123-125.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
11 January 1957 -- West German Chancellor Adenauer stated at a news conference that Premier Bulganin's proposal of 17 November 1956 to reduce Western and Soviet troop strength in central Europe would help to lessen European tensions. Nevertheless, he said, a "general pacification" would not be possible until thermonuclear weapons were "really eliminated" under adequate and effective control. (New York Times, 12 Jan 57, 1:4, 13 Jan 57, 1:6, 14:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

11 January 1957 -- At the UN, Mr. Stassen and Ambassador Lodge outlined the US position to Soviet representatives. The Soviets declared their willingness to consider "all constructive proposals." (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 484, 11 Jan 57.) (SECRET)

14 January 1957 -- The UN Political and Security Committee met to consider the question of disarmament. A new US five-point disarmament plan was offered by Ambassador Lodge. The US proposed that: (1) Beginning at an early date, all new production of fissionable materials should be used or stock-piled exclusively for "non-weapons purposes," under effective international inspection and supervision. (2) With this achieved, nuclear test explosions should be limited and ultimately banned. Pending this limitation, advance notice and registration of all nuclear tests should be given. (3) Armed forces should be progressively reduced to 2.5 million men for the US and USSR, and 750,000 men for the UK and France. An aerial and ground inspection system should be established concurrently to verify these reductions. (4) Experiments on outer-space objects should be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, under international inspection and participation. (5) A reliable
inspection system should be progressively installed to provide against the possibility of surprise attack.

In response to this, the Soviet representative, Vasily V. Kuznetsov, repeated the Soviet proposals of 17 November 1956 and offered two draft resolutions. The first of these called for an immediate cessation of nuclear-weapons tests; the second was a resolution to call a special General Assembly session on the question of disarmament. (New York Times, 15 Jan 57, 1:8; text, DPC Note No. 108, "Opening Statements at First Committee," 18 Jan 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 January 1957 -- At the UN disarmament talks, Commander Allan Noble of the UK proposed that the Disarmament Subcommittee: (1) study the problem of limiting and controlling conventional weapons, including long-range ballistic missiles and long-range submarines; (2) search for mutually agreeable areas where tests of control and inspection techniques could be undertaken; and (3) investigate the possibility of agreeing on a limitation of nuclear test explosions, either as part of a disarmament plan or separately. (New York Times, 16 Jan 57, 3:1; text, DPC Note No. 109, "Opening Statement at First Committee," 18 Jan 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 January 1957 -- Renzo Sawada, Japanese representative at the UN disarmament talks, declared before the Political and Security Committee that the UN should take direct action toward the prohibition or limitation of nuclear-weapons tests. He said such a move could be made by the General Assembly directly, without prior action by the Disarmament Commission or its subcommittee, since the question of halting or limiting tests was not primarily a disarmament problem. Mr. Sawada
stated that Japanese scientists did not agree with the US and UK reports of 12 June 1956 that radiation from nuclear tests, continued at the same rate as before, was not dangerous to human health. (New York Times, 17 Jan 57, 2:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

18 January 1957 -- At the UN, Canada, Japan, and Norway introduced a joint draft resolution calling for the establishment of a system for the advance registration of nuclear test explosions. (DPC Sect Note No. 148, "Report of the First Committee with Reference Documents," 11 Feb 57, p. 2, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

19 January 1957 -- The Soviet Union set off another nuclear explosion, according to an announcement by AEC Chairman Strauss. (New York Times, 21 Jan 57, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

24 January 1957 -- At the UN Political and Security Committee, the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission by adding Egypt, India, Poland, and a Latin American country to that body, and to invite the Commission to increase the membership of its Subcommittee by adding India and Poland to it. (DPC Sect Note No. 148, "Report of the First Committee with Reference Documents," 1 Feb 56, p. 3, text, p. 109, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 January 1957 -- After two weeks of disarmament talks, interrupted briefly by UN debate on the Middle East situation, the UN Political and Security Committee passed unanimously (77-0-0) a draft resolution proposed on 24 January by twelve nations (Australia, Brazil, Canada, El Salvador, France, India, Japan, Norway, UK, US, USSR and Yugoslavia). This resolution referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee, for "prompt attention," all proposals a
resolutions made during the disarmament talks, as well as all old proposals such as the "open skies" plan and the ground control-posts plan. The resolution also invited the Disarmament Commission to consider recommending a special session of the General Assembly or a general disarmament conference "at the appropriate time." (DPC Sect Note No. 148, "Report of the First Committee with Reference Documents," 11 Feb 57, pp. 2-3, text, pp. 5-6, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8; New York Times, 26 Jan 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

28 January 1957 -- The UN Political and Security Committee submitted to the General Assembly a report on its disarmament talks (14-25 January), and recommended adoption of the draft resolution approved by the Committee on 25 January. (DPC Sect Note No. 148, "Report of the First Committee with Reference Documents," 11 Feb 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

30-31 January 1957 -- In Washington, US and UK representatives again discussed the problem of setting a date on which to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons. Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen restated the US position that it was necessary to set an early date in order to show good faith and to forestall "fourth country" production of nuclear weapons. UK Ambassador Caccia and UK UN representative Noble pointed out that

[They raised the question of US allocation to the UK of fissionable materials, weapons, or designs. Mr. Stassen explained that such allocations would depend on Presidential or Congressional action.]
Tentative agreement was finally reached on a draft proposal which, after approval by the US and UK Governments and discussion with the French and Canadians, could ultimately be offered to the USSR. This proposal called for all future production of fissionable materials to be used exclusively for "non-weapons" purposes beginning one month after establishment of an effective inspection system to verify this use. Technicians from the five nations constituting the UN Disarmament Subcommittee (Canada, France, UK, US, and USSR) would meet on 1 September 1957 to prepare the inspection system, and its installation would begin on 1 March 1958, or as soon as possible thereafter upon ratification of the necessary agreements. Mr. Stassen pointed out that Soviet failure to send technicians to the proposed meeting in September would indicate lack of good faith on this question; if the USSR did allow its representatives to attend, the UK and US would still have time to explore other facets of the problem. (DPC Sect Note No. 139, "U.S.-UK Consultation on Disarmament," 30 Jan 57; DPC Sect Note No. 140, same subj, 1 Feb 57; DPC Note No. 117, "Informal Draft Language," 31 Jan 57. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (SECRET)

1 February 1957 -- In a statement issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the USSR repeated the disarmament proposals advanced by Premier Bulganin on 17 November 1956, and deprecated the replies made to these proposals by President Eisenhower (31 December 1956) and Prime Minister Eden and Premier Mollet (3 January 1957). The USSR accused the West of not desiring to help solve the problem of disarmament. (New York Times, 2 Feb 57, 4:7; NATO, NATO Letter, v. V, no. 3 (1 Mar 57), p. 4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
4 February 1957 -- In response to a request by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views on certain problems that might arise in the preparation of a draft disarmament treaty and statute (see item of 7 December 1956). The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that, in conformity with the already stated US position on weapons control, nuclear and conventional weapons and outer-space objects should be considered together, and their control incorporated into a single treaty. They stated further that establishment of the disarmament organization as a specialized agency of the UN would be acceptable. They declared that the minimum requirements for a comprehensive inspection and control system remained the same as outlined by them on 19 October 1955. The 1955 plan did not consider the question of outer-space objects, and they felt it was still too early to attempt to develop a fool-proof inspection system for this type of weapon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also held that: (1) The proposed military manpower limit of 2.5 million should apply only to those forces in the active military establishment. (2) Attempts should be made to limit forces other than these but, in the absence of good faith, verification of their size, type, and location was impossible. (3) Determination of allowed levels of conventional armaments was secondary to controlling weapons systems capable of delivering surprise nuclear attacks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of 22 October 1955 on determining levels of conventional arms. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament (U)," 4 Feb 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/215, Rpt by JSSC, same subj, 4 Feb 57, same file, sec 66.)
7 February 1957 -- UK UN representative Noble informed Mr. Stassen that his Government had accepted the draft proposal drawn up at the Anglo-American talks on 30-31 January. The British acceptance of this proposal to halt future production of fissionable materials for weapons was made on the understanding that the "implications" for the UK weapons program would be kept in the forefront of American thinking, and that, in the event of Soviet acceptance, the US would negotiate with the UK to ensure that adoption of the proposal would not prejudice the development by the UK of nuclear weapons resources adequate to its needs. (Ltr, Noble to Stassen, 7 Feb 57, attachment to DPC Sect Note No. 144, no subj, 8 Feb 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (TOP SECRET)

7 February 1957 -- The Soviet Union proposed that a meeting of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, tentatively scheduled to be held in London during March, be attended by the Foreign Ministers of the five member nations. (New York Times, 8 Feb 57, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8 February 1957 -- At further disarmament talks in Washington between US and Canadian officials, Mr. Stassen further clarified the US position. Ambassador Heeney presented two Canadian memoranda. The first was a proposed Western statement on disarmament, following generally the five-point plan presented by the US at the UN (see item of 14 January 1957); the second outlined a "first stage" disarmament plan, including an inspection system. (DPC Sect Note No. 145, "U.S.-Canadian Consultation on Disarmament," 8 Feb 57; DPC Sect Note No. 146, "Canadian Memoranda of February 8, 1957," 11 Feb 57. Both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (SECRET)

14 February 1957 -- The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the draft resolution approved by the Political and Security
Committee on 25 January 1957. The General Assembly set 16 March as the date for the London meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee. (New York Times, 15 Feb 57, 2:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

20 February 1957 -- In connection with earlier studies of the question of using military-manpower levels as a basis for establishment of arms limitations (see item of 22 October 1956), Mr. Stassen requested Department of Defense comment on a specific weapons-per-man formula he proposed to use as a basis for consultation with the UK, France, and Canada during the scheduled London disarmament meeting. The formula he described was restricted to conventional weapons and equipment. (Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 20 Feb 57, App to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament (U)," 28 Feb 57, encl to JCS 1731/218, Note by Secys, same subj, 1 Mar 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67.) (SECRET)

23 February 1957 -- Following a brief conversation held earlier in the month between Mr. Stassen and French Ambassador Alphand on the forthcoming London disarmament talks, the French Embassy forwarded two short memoranda to the President's Special Committee on Disarmament. The first of these outlined a possible sequence for implementation of the US disarmament proposals; the second defined areas of study to be examined prior to the establishment of an inspection and control system. (DPC Sect Note No. 147, "U.S.-French Consultation on Disarmament," 11 Feb 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (SECRET) (DPC Sect Note No. 152, no subj, 25 Feb 57, same file, BP pt 8.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

1 March 1957 -- President Eisenhower directed that henceforth the President's Special Committee on Disarmament would be subordinate to policy directives from the Secretary of State. Mr. Stassen continued as Special Assistant to the President.
with Cabinet status. (New York Times, 2 Mar 57, 1:3.)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

5 March 1957 -- Mr. Stassen informed UK UN representative Noble that the US accepted the formula, tentatively adopted at the Anglo-American talks of 30-31 January, for halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons. (Ltr, Stassen to Noble, 5 Mar 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67.) (SECRET)

5 March 1957 -- In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense commenting on Mr. Stassen's memorandum of 20 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their earlier view (see item of 22 October 1956) that, regardless of the method employed to control armaments, "there is no tangible relationship between military manpower and those atomic capable delivery systems which would be used in a massive surprise attack."

They noted that while Mr. Stassen had classified the weapons he listed as conventional, many had a dual conventional/atomic capability. They also pointed out that Mr. Stassen's proposal was contrary to the advice of the Defense Department and was "unsound and dangerous." The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that Mr. Stassen be requested not to use his proposed approach at the London disarmament talks, and that the matter be resolved by the National Security Council at its meeting on 6 March, when Mr. Stassen was scheduled to outline his proposed courses of action for the London meeting. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament (U)," 5 Mar 57, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/219, Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67.) (TOP SECRET)

6 March 1957 -- The National Security Council noted and discussed a presentation by Mr. Stassen on a proposed US position for the forthcoming London disarmament talks. The President stated that: (1) the US position at these talks should be based solely on previously approved national policy; (2) the US
presentation at London should not modify or add to this policy without prior approval of the President; and (3) when material presented at this NSC meeting, concerning inspection systems or disarmament treaties, was used in discussions with other nations, it should be presented on a restricted, personal, and unofficial basis. (NSC Action No. 1676, 6 Mar 57, C&E files.) (TOP SECRET)

8 March 1957 -- The Soviet Union exploded another nuclear bomb, according to an AEC announcement. (New York Times, 10 Mar 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

12 March 1957 -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, replying to Mr. Stassen's letter of 20 February on arms-manpower ratios, stated that the subject was still under consideration within the Defense Department. He requested that, at the London disarmament talks, Mr. Stassen neither advance the figures contained in his letter nor concur in figures proposed by any other delegation. (Ltr, Robertson to Stassen, 12 Mar 57, encl "A" to JCS 173/219, Note by Secys, "Disarmament (U)," 1 Apr 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67.) (TOP SECRET)

18 March 1957 -- At a Western four-power meeting preceding the opening of the London disarmament conference, Mr. Stassen outlined to the British, French, and Canadian delegates an "informal exploration" by the US Government of limited zones of aerial inspection that might be proposed as the first step in a progressive inspection system. He emphasized that he was presenting only a concept, not a firm US position. Mr. Stassen's proposal had been discussed within the State Department and was evidently intended as a counter-proposal to the Soviet aerial inspection offer made initially on 17 November 1957.
The zones of inspection described by Mr. Stassen included areas of Europe and the Far East. The European zone was a cone-shaped area extending from the North Pole to Latitude 45 degrees North, between Longitudes 5 and 30 degrees East. This included Scandinavia; central Europe as far south as northern Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Italy; a slice of eastern France, Belgium, and Holland; and a section of the Soviet Union just west of the Leningrad-Kiev-Odessa line. The Far East zone was another cone-shaped area between Longitudes 150 degrees East and 120 degrees West, bounded on the south by Latitude 45 degrees North. This zone included part of Siberia, all of Alaska, part of Western Canada, and a small portion of the states of Washington and Oregon. These aerial inspection zones did not include Washington, D.C., London, Paris, or Moscow, but, as Mr. Stassen explained, covered major bases of concentration for surprise attack. The other Western delegates showed keen interest in the plan. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 4972, 19 Mar 57, DA IN 5757 (22 Mar 57).) (SECRET)

18 March 1957 -- The UN Disarmament Subcommittee began new discussions in London of the major Western and Soviet proposals. In a general statement of the US position, Mr. Stassen raised several points which he said he was offering for discussion, and not as official US proposals. First, he asked for confirmation of the force-level figures previously discussed as a first-step reduction of armed forces (US and USSR, 2.5 million; UK and France, 750,000) and suggested that these levels be achieved, under effective inspection, within twelve months after the entry into force of a disarmament agreement. Next, he offered three possible approaches to the question of reducing armaments: (1) reduction in the
"major categories of arms" by absolute amounts; (2) reduction on the basis of manpower levels; and (3) reduction by a fixed percentage, perhaps 10 per cent, in each major category of weapons, by every nation within twelve months after ratification of an agreement. Methods of accomplishing arms reduction might include destruction under international observation or delivery to an international inspection depot for storage and preservation. Mr. Stassen also referred to the question of cuts in military budgets and suggested a 10 per cent reduction within one year after ratification of an agreement.

Soviet representative Zorin, in his opening statement, repeated earlier Soviet proposals, including those of 17 November 1956. However, he laid further stress on prohibiting the stationing of "atomic military formations" at foreign bases, and advanced a new proposal for the elimination of guided missiles with nuclear warheads. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 4973, 19 Mar 57, DA IN 5756.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 19 Mar 57, 10:3; text of Zorin's speech, DC/SC.1/49, "USSR: Proposal on the Reduction of Armaments . . . .") 18 Mar 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

20 March 1957 -- The Secretary of Defense replied to Mr. Stassen's memorandum of 20 February 1957 in a letter reflecting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 5 March 1957 as well as their statement of 22 October 1956. He urged that the question of establishing an arms-manpower ratio as a basis for determining armament levels be referred to the National Security Council before Mr. Stassen explained his views on this matter to other Western delegates at the London disarmament conference. (Ltr, SecDef to Stassen, 20 Mar 57, cncl "a" to N/H of JCS 1731/219, 1 Apr 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 67.) (TOP SECRET)
24 March 1957 -- In a communique issued at the close of their conference at Bermuda, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan announced that the US and UK would voluntarily limit nuclear-weapons testing in order to reduce the dangers of radiation. They appealed to the USSR to exercise a similar restraint. Pointing out that there was no sure way of detecting tests, the two leaders offered to register tests in advance and to permit limited international observation of them if the Soviet Union would do the same. The communique also announced that the US would make available to the UK certain guided missiles. (New York Times, 25 Mar 57, 1:8; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 928 (8 Apr 57), pp. 561-562.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

26 March 1957 -- A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated the Soviet proposal for a ban on nuclear-weapons tests, but said that the USSR was prepared to agree to a temporary cessation of tests. His statement, mirroring remarks in the Soviet press, criticized the Bermuda Conference communique and blamed the West for failure to reach agreement on halting tests. (New York Times, 27 Mar 57, 1:6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 March 1957 -- After several days of discussion at the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, the members agreed on a sequence of topics to be discussed. In order to avoid dissolution of the conference over a procedural matter, the Western delegates acceded to Soviet insistence that the question of nuclear tests be taken up first. The agenda, as adopted, was as follows: (1) nuclear tests; (2) conventional-weapons disarmament; (3) nuclear-weapons disarmament; (4) international control organization; (5) missiles; (6) zones of arms limitation and inspection; and (7) other matters. (MssSs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5211, 27 Mar 57, DA IN 7402 (28 Mar 57), and 5213, 27 Mar 57_D& IN 7259 (28 Mar 57).) (SECRET)
23 March 1957 -- The UN Disarmament Subcommittee opened discussions on the problem of nuclear-weapons tests. In a general exposition of US policy on this question, Mr. Stassen said that the US, under appropriate conditions, would be willing to join with other nations to halt, limit, suspend, or register and observe nuclear tests. These "appropriate conditions" included: (1) a disarmament agreement that would decrease the danger of great surprise attack or of the outbreak of war; (2) a halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (3) the solution of technical problems in the detection of nuclear-test explosions. As a means of resolving the question of whether or not tests could always be detected, Mr. Stassen suggested US-USSR technical talks on methods of detection. He asked if the USSR would be willing to provide the Subcommittee with the date and location of all nuclear-weapons tests conducted by the Soviets in the previous two years. Mr. Stassen repeated the statements made in the Bermuda Conference communique (24 March 1957) on limiting and registering tests, and said these would constitute US policy until the "appropriate conditions" he had outlined were fulfilled. He concluded by inviting consideration of the possibility of establishing a control group, under a general disarmament agreement, to consist of the members of the Disarmament Subcommittee and others. This control group, on the unanimous vote of the five Subcommittee members, could determine the proper moment to end or to place a limitation on tests.

Mr. Zorin followed with a general statement of Soviet views. His statement was a repetition of earlier Soviet arguments and contained no new elements. (Msg, London
1 April 1957 -- The State Department criticized the suggestion made by Mr. Stassen at the 29 March meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee that the US and USSR hold technical discussions on the means of detecting nuclear-test explosions. The Department pointed out that any such talks, if they were to be meaningful, might risk revealing details of US weapons and intelligence. Furthermore, it explained, the reference in the Bermuda Conference communique to the technical difficulties of detecting test explosions was not intended to imply that these difficulties had the same weight as other policy objections to a test-limitation agreement at this time. Mr. Stassen was cautioned to avoid any discussion of technical data or of a meeting of technicians. (Msg, SecState to London, 6891, 1 Apr 57.) (SECRET)

3 April 1957 -- The UN Disarmament Subcommittee concluded its initial discussion of nuclear-weapons tests. During the week of talks, the Western and Soviet positions had remained substantially unchanged, although the announcement by the USSR (26 March) of Soviet willingness to agree to a temporary cessation of tests represented a slight shift in the Soviet stand. The Western delegates, however, while willing to register tests and allow limited international observation, held to the point that any halt in testing should be linked to a cessation, under effective control, of the production of fissionable material for weapons. Paralleling the talks in the Subcommittee, the Western members held frequent conferences aimed at achieving a unified position.

The Disarmament Subcommittee now turned to a consideration of the next item on its agenda, the question of disarmament.
in the area of conventional weapons. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5793, 24 Apr 57, DA IN 15318 (25 Apr 57), CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.) (SECRET) (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5253, 29 Mar 57, DA IN 7950 (30 Mar 57); 5285, 30 Mar 57, DA IN 8157 (31 Mar 57); 5288, 30 Mar 57, DA IN 8233 (31 Mar 57); 5307, 1 Apr 57, DA IN 8784 (3 Apr 57); 5313, 1 Apr 57, DA IN 8644 (2 Apr 57); 5354, 2 Apr 57, DA IN 9060 (3 Apr 57); 5357, 2 Apr 57, DA IN 8971 (3 Apr 57); 5362, 2 Apr 57, DA IN 8904 (3 Apr 57); 5393, 3 Apr 57, DA IN 9292, (4 Apr 57).) (SECRET) (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5254, 29 Mar 57, DA IN 7845 (30 Mar 57); 5308, 1 Apr 57, DA IN 8700 (2 Apr 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

4 April 1957 -- A British White Paper outlined a new defense policy for the UK. Admitting that there was no longer any means of providing adequate protection for the UK against an attack with nuclear weapons, the White Paper stated that henceforth the nation would rely on the deterrent effect of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles to prevent attack. The nation's armed forces would be sharply reduced until, by the end of 1962, they would total only 375,000 men. Overseas garrisons would be cut and the defense of overseas bases assigned to an airborne strategic reserve force based in the UK. The Royal Navy would also be reduced to a number of small naval groups built around aircraft carriers. Also, the strength of the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command would be decreased, and eventually fighters would be replaced by a ground-to-air guided missile system. Ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads would eventually replace bombers. (New York Times, 5 Apr 57, 1:8; text, DPC Sect Note No. 158, "British White Paper on Defense," 9 Apr 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

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8 April 1957 -- On the third day of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee's discussion of conventional-weapons disarmament, Mr. Stassen presented the US position on the question. He noted that Soviet statements since 18 March indicated an apparent acceptance by the USSR of initial reductions to the 2.5-million-level for armed forces, with a corresponding reduction of "major armaments" and military expenditures. He stated that he was therefore willing to recommend to the US Government that a disarmament treaty should include a provision for an additional cut of 15 percent in "major armaments," to be undertaken if first-step reductions were successfully and satisfactorily carried out. This further cut would be accomplished by placing the weapons in international depots, as suggested in his speech of 18 March. The suggestion that the US might be willing to undertake an additional 15 percent reduction was the first such statement made in the Disarmament Subcommittee by a US representative in the three years the Subcommittee had been in existence. Mr. Stassen's statement, based generally on the Armaments Control Plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1956, had been outlined earlier to the other Western powers and was aimed at answering Soviet questions about what would follow first-step cuts, and at eliciting a Soviet reaction. (Mags, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5470, 8 Apr 57, DA IN 10419 (9 Apr 57); 5475, 8 Apr 57, DA IN 10527 (9 Apr 57.).) (SECRET) (New York Times, 9 Apr 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

9 April 1957 -- Having obtained the support of the UK, France, and Canada, Mr. Stassen informally outlined to Soviet representative Zorin the aerial inspection zones he had described to the Western delegates on 18 March. For the Far East, however, he offered two alternative zones. The first was the one he had
laid before the Western delegates on 18 March; the second was smaller, extending from Longitude 160 degrees East to Longitude 140 degrees West, and did not take in the areas of Canada, Oregon, and Washington included in the first. Mr. Zorin replied by stressing the point that the USSR's aerial inspection proposal of 17 November 1956 was an important concession to the US insistence on aerial inspection, but that this offer had included only central Europe, and that the Soviet Union was not thinking of including areas of Siberia and Alaska. He said, however, that the USSR would study Mr. Stassen's proposal. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5501, 9 Apr 57, DA IN 10928 (10 Apr 57); 5752, 19 Apr 57, 5015, 3 May 57.)

11 April 1957 -- At a luncheon meeting of the US and Soviet delegations in London, the Soviets stated that, in view of US opposition to their earlier proposals (see item of 17 November 1956) for the elimination of foreign military bases on the territory of other states and of all nuclear weapons, the USSR no longer regarded these proposals as essential requirements for a limited agreement on the reduction and control of armaments. The Soviet representatives also stated that, while the idea of complete aerial photography of the USSR was as yet unacceptable, the Soviet Union was ready to agree to the "partial installation" of aerial inspection and photography, under a limited agreement. The Soviet delegation also felt that sufficient progress was being made to render worth while a continuation of the disarmament conference after Easter. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5574, 12 Apr 57, DA IN 11843 (13 Apr 57.).)
12 April 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee turned to the
question of nuclear-weapons disarmament. In a complete
presentation of the US position on this subject, Mr. Stassen
outlined the proposal, drafted at the Anglo-American talks
in Washington on 30-31 January 1957, for halting the pro-
duction of fissionable materials for weapons. He emphasized
the necessity for the establishment of a "satisfactorily
functioning" inspection and control system as a first step
in the implementation of any agreement to cease production.
French representative Moch stated that if no agreement were
reached, France might have to develop her own nuclear weapons.
(Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5593, 12 April 1957.)
(SECRET)

13 April 1957 -- The US Delegation in London recommended to the US
Government that, in order to prevent the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by nations not already possessing them, the
US should agree to a limited suspension of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear tests. The US should take this step only after
adoption of an international treaty that: (1) established, to
US satisfaction, effective international control of atomic
weapons; (2) included the commitment to stop producing
nuclear materials for weapons and to begin transfers to
peaceful purposes "along the lines of U.S. policy";
(3) included the "beginnings" of arms reductions, including
"nuclear delivery capabilities", and of reductions of armed
forces and military expenditures, under inspection "along
the lines of US policy"; and (4) included the "beginnings"
of aerial inspection, a commitment to expand it progressively,
and improved safeguards against surprise attack. The agree-
ment to suspend nuclear tests should be effective on 1 August
1958, or as soon thereafter as the arms-control treaty entered
into force, and should provide for a twelve-month suspension
of tests, to be verified by the control organ. It should also include a provision that during this twelve-month period further agreements on continuing, limiting, or halting the suspension could be reached by a unanimous vote of the members of the control organ. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5510, 13 Apr 57, DA IN 12222 (14 Apr 57), CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68.) *SECRET*

15 April 1957 -- In answer to Soviet questions at the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Stassen stated that, while the US was unwilling to agree to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons or an unconditional ban on their use at this time, the US would go along with some formula limiting the employment of nuclear weapons to uses consistent with the United Nations Charter. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5548, 15 Apr 57.) *SECRET*

16 April 1957 -- The Soviet Union, according to an announcement by the Atomic Energy Commission, set off one of the largest nuclear explosions in its current series. This explosion followed other tests on 3, 6, 10 and 12 April, and was the twenty-third Soviet nuclear test publicized by the United States since September, 1949. (New York Times, 19 Apr 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 April 1957 -- At the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Zorin criticized Mr. Stassen's proposal of 12 April to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons. He asserted that under this proposal nuclear weapons could still be manufactured or modernized from previously manufactured fissionable materials. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5687, 16 Apr 57.) *SECRET*

16 April 1957 -- After the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, the US and Soviet delegations held a lengthy bilateral discussion. Mr. Zorin stated that US overseas bases and the possibility

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that the US might give nuclear weapons to states around the
Soviet Union constituted a threat to the USSR. Mr. Stassen
explained that these bases were defensive, and that US law
prohibited delivery of US nuclear weapons to other states.
Mr. Zorin suggested that the reduction of US and Soviet forces
in Europe could lead to a solution of political problems, but
Mr. Stassen reiterated the US position that these problems
should not be discussed within the Disarmament Subcommittee.

17 April 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee turned to the question
of an international control organization to be set up as part
of a disarmament agreement. Mr. Stassen proposed that the UN
establish a central agency composed of the five members of
the Disarmament Subcommittee and nine additional states to be
elected by the countries signing the disarmament treaty. The
fourteen-member control agency would meet to discuss problems
arising under the treaty, and would supervise the inspection
service set up to insure conformance with the treaty. (Msg,
London (Whitney) to SecState, 5700, 17 Apr 57.)

18 April 1957 -- Soviet representative Zorin stated at the London
disarmament conference that it would be premature to consider
the details of a control system before a general disarmament
agreement was worked out. Otherwise, he said, the control
system might become a cover for espionage. Referring to the
USSR proposal of 17 November 1956 for a European aerial
inspection zone, he said the zone should be limited in the
north to an area within 800 kilometers on either side of the
points of contact between East and West in Germany, and should
extend south into Albania and Italy. Mr. Stassen replied that
the United States regarded this zone as insufficient for the
beginning of aerial inspection, but said that the Soviet pro-
posal had opened the way for further negotiation. At the close
of the day's meeting, the Disarmament Subcommittee recessed until 24 April. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5730, 13 Apr 57.) (SECRET)

20 April 1957 -- Initial staff level views of the Defense Department concerning the proposal of the US Delegation in London (see item of 13 April) were formulated. The Department felt that the proposal represented "a major change from existing U.S. policy" in that it accepted a test limitation in advance of other measures necessary to national security. The Department believed that favorable consideration might be given to US agreement to a limited treaty, provided prior agreement were reached to establish an effective control system, including both air and ground inspection. The limited treaty should contain: (1) a listing of the specifications of the control system as applied to each of the commitments in the treaty; (2) a commitment to halt production of nuclear materials for weapons "in strict accord with U.S. policy stated in the Annex to NSC Action 1553"; (3) a commitment to transfer previously manufactured nuclear materials from weapons stockpiles to "non-weapons" uses, in accordance with the same US policy; (4) a commitment to suspend nuclear tests for a twelve-month period, effective on the date when the stationing of inspection forces and the initiation of their activities indicated that (2) and (3), above, had come into effect; (5) a provision that during the period of test suspension a new agreement on tests would be ratified or the suspension would automatically terminate; and (6) a commitment to reduce armed forces to the levels previously agreed to by the US, and to reduce armaments "on an appropriate and equitable basis." These Defense views were circulated as an addendum to a DPC paper. (DPC Sect Note 139, Add 1, "Defense Position on Test Limitations," 9 May 57, CCS O92 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (SECRET)
20 April 1957 -- In a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, Soviet Premier Bulganin proposed: (1) a ban, even if only temporary, on nuclear-weapons tests, to be adopted independently of any general disarmament agreement; (2) the conclusion of a European collective security treaty, as well as a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations; and (3) discussion of a plan, first proposed by former Prime Minister Eden at the Geneva Conference in July 1955, for the establishment of demilitarized zones in Europe, and for the setting up of areas in which armaments would be limited. (New York Times, 24 Apr 57, 1:1, 25 Apr 57, 1:7, text, 4:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 April 1957 -- The London disarmament conference resumed meeting, a day later than planned, and began a discussion of means of controlling missiles and outer-space objects. In a general restatement of US policy, Mr. Stassen called for international inspection of and participation in all tests of outer-space objects. He emphasized the importance of achieving early control over missiles and rockets. Soviet representative Zorin called for coupling missile control with a ban on nuclear weapons, and said that the general discussion should be expanded to include all missiles, rockets, and atomic artillery. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5816, 25 Apr 57.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 26 Apr 57, 6:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

26 April 1957 -- At a meeting between the Soviet and US delegations to the London disarmament conference, Mr. Zorin stated that while no comprehensive arms agreement seemed to be forthcoming from the arms talks, the USSR was prepared to consider a partial agreement on three basic items: (1) reductions in conventional forces and arms, (2) nuclear
weapons, and (3) an international control organ. He then
handed US representatives a lengthy aide-memoire outlining
the Soviet position. The aide-memoire was for the most part
a summary and repetition of earlier Soviet proposals—a ban
on nuclear weapons, reduction of armed forces in two stages,
and a system of ground control posts for disarmament—but it
also included a new idea for aerial inspection. The new
Soviet proposal, a radical departure from the previous USSR
positions, was offered in answer to Mr. Stassen's informal
proposal of 9 April. It called for aerial inspection of two
large zones, including most of Europe, all of Alaska, a large
segment of the western United States, the western edge of the
USSR, and eastern Siberia. The boundaries of the European
inspection zone were: Longitude 25 degrees East, a line
through western USSR five degrees west of the line proposed
by Mr. Stassen; Latitude 54 degrees North, running along the
north German border and eliminating the Scandinavian and
Arctic portions of Mr. Stassen's proposal; Latitude 39
degrees, 36 minutes North, running through the southernmost
point of Albania, and more than five degrees south of the
Stassen proposal; and the Zero meridian, running through
London and western France, five degrees west of the line
suggested by Mr. Stassen. The other Soviet inspection zone
also excluded the Arctic area proposed by Mr. Stassen, but
included all of the Soviet Far East to the east of Longitude
108 degrees East, all of Alaska, and all of the United States
west of Longitude 90 degrees West, the St. Louis-Memphis line.
To supplement these aerial inspection zones, the Soviet Union
proposed that ground control points be established in the
eastern United States, in the western part of the USSR, and
in all countries that were members of NATO or the Warsaw

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Pact. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5838, 26 April 57; 5847, 27 Apr 57.) (SECRET) (Text, Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5845, 26 Apr 57, DA IN 16077 (27 Apr 57) CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68; and also DPC Note No. 137, "Soviet Aide Memoire of April 26," 29 Apr 57, same file, BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

27 April 1957 -- The heads of the US and USSR disarmament delegations in London discussed the Soviet offer of 26 April. Mr. Stassen, who believed that the USSR's proposal indicated a serious Soviet intent to negotiate a partial agreement, nevertheless raised several U.S. objections, many of which had been expressed before in response to earlier Soviet proposals. He told Mr. Zorin that: (1) the Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons was still unacceptable, since the US refused to commit itself to refrain from using these weapons to counter aggression against its vital interests; (2) the Soviet plan did not contribute to a solution of the "fourth country" problem, but the US proposal to halt production of nuclear weapons might be the answer; (3) such a halt in production should not, as the Soviets proposed, be tied in with a ban on nuclear weapons; (4) the aerial inspection zones proposed by the USSR would give the Soviet Union a great advantage over the West; (5) the question of reducing forces stationed in Germany, as proposed by the USSR, would raise political issues and make a partial agreement more difficult to reach; and (6) the US still could not agree with the Soviet position on halting nuclear-weapons tests. Mr. Zorin replied that further negotiations might solve many of these points at issue. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5838, 26 Apr 57; 5857, 28 Apr 57.) (SECRET) (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5854, 18 sic; 28 April 57; 5856, 28 Apr 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
30 April 1957 -- In a brief reply to Premier Bulganin's note of 20 April, Prime Minister Macmillan expressed appreciation, and said he needed time to make a careful study of the Soviet proposals. Later, he stated in the House of Commons that he would not take any unilateral steps on disarmament that might weaken the UK's world position. (New York Times, 1 May 57, 15:2; Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5902, 30 Apr 57.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

30 April 1957 -- Mr. Zorin formally submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee the proposal he had given the US delegation on 26 April. Commenting on this in an impassioned statement, Mr. Moch declared that France was willing to abstain from manufacturing and testing nuclear weapons only if the USSR, US, and UK would agree to halt tests, stop the production of fissionable materials for weapons, and begin making progressive transfers to peaceful uses of fissionable materials that had been stockpiled. He warned that once France began making nuclear weapons, many other states would follow. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5909, 30 Apr 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5920, 30 Apr 57.) (SECRET) (Doc/SC.1/55, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Memorandum," 30 April 57, COS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (SECRET)

2 May 1957 -- An off-the-record meeting of the five Disarmament Subcommittee members was held after several days of informal discussions between Mr. Stassen and his Western colleagues and between him and Mr. Zorin on the subject of the Soviet proposals of 26 April. At the five-power meeting, Mr. Zorin requested a specific statement of the Western reaction to the Soviet offer. He repeated what he had told Mr. Stassen on 27 April, that many differences could be worked out by further negotiation. French representative Moch again pointed
out that unless some arrangement were reached, France would go ahead with a nuclear-weapons program. After the meeting, Mr. Stassen told the Soviet representative that the US was giving serious consideration to the USSR proposals, but that it would be some time before a reply could be worked out.

Mr. Zorin replied that the Soviet Union desired to press negotiations with all feasible speed. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5888, 5890, 29 Apr 57; 5919, 30 Apr 57; 5952, 5957, 5982, 2 May 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 5964, 2 May 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6 May 1957 -- The UK proposed in the Disarmament Subcommittee a three-step program for ending nuclear-weapons tests. The proposal reflected the views expressed in the Bermuda Conference communique (24 March 1957) as well as the growing world demand for a halt in tests. The UK called for: (1) An agreement between the UK, US, and USSR to register nuclear-weapons tests in advance. This agreement might include a provision for limited international observation of such tests. (2) A committee of technical experts to be established within the framework of the Disarmament Subcommittee to consider possible methods of limiting and controlling tests. (3) A halt in tests following the prohibition, as part of a general disarmament agreement, of the production of fissionable material for weapons. (Report on the Disarmament Talks--1957. Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament (London, 1957), p. 5, text, pp. 10-11, filed as DPC Note No. 163 "Disarmament Talks--1957," 30 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9; New York Times, 7 May 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 May 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee began a consideration of "Other Subjects," the final item on the agenda for the
first round of discussion at the London disarmament talks. Mr. Stassen suggested the adoption of international controls over international arms shipments and troop movements. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6063, 7 May 57.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 8 May 57, 1:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8 May 1957 -- At the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Zorin reviewed the Soviet attitude toward the question of halting or suspending nuclear-weapons tests, and criticized the UK proposal of 6 May on this subject as containing nothing of practical value. He repeated the Soviet view that tests should be banned at once, even if only temporarily, without waiting for any disarmament or control agreement. (Msg, London (Whitney) to Sec State, 6095, 9 May 57.) (SECRET) (Report on the Disarmament Talks--1957, p. 5, filed as DPC Note No. 163, "Disarmament Talks--1957," 30 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9; New York Times, 9 May 57, 2:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

9 May 1957 -- In response to a request from Secretary Dulles that he submit his views on disarmament, in the light of the London talks, Mr. Stassen outlined the kind of limited first-step disarmament agreement that he felt could be negotiated with, and accepted by, the major world powers.

The proposed agreement, in whose formulation the entire US delegation had participated, consisted of twenty-seven provisions:

(1) The disarmament agreement would include specific authority for a signatory nation to suspend or partially suspend its commitments upon written notice to the control organization.

(2) All signatories, except the US, UK, and USSR, would agree not to manufacture or use nuclear weapons.
(3) The US, UK, and USSR would agree to use nuclear weapons only (a) in self-defense, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, if an armed attack could not be repelled without employing nuclear weapons, or (b) if attacked by an enemy using nuclear weapons, or (c) in accordance with a decision of the UN General Assembly or Security Council.

(4) The USSR, UK, and US would agree to cooperate in designing and installing an effective inspection system. After the installation of this system (estimated to take place in July 1959), the three states would devote to "non-weapons purposes" all new production of fissionable material, and would transfer to "non-weapons purposes" any fissionable materials not already contained in nuclear weapons.

(5) After establishing an effective inspection system and halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons, the USSR, UK, and US would begin to make "equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes." Each of the three states, however, would maintain a "very substantial" nuclear-weapons capability.

(6) Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), all states concerned would begin the installation and operation of an aerial inspection system in the following zones: (a) all of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle and all of it east of Longitude 108 degrees East, as well as "an equal geographic area" of Alaska, Canada, and the US; and (b) all of Europe from Longitude 27 1/2 degrees East (a line just west of Minsk) to Longitude 2 1/2 degrees East (a line just east of Paris), bounded in the south by Latitude 42 degrees, 20 minutes North (a line through the southernmost
point in France) and in the north by Latitude 63 degrees North (a line through southern Norway, Sweden, and Finland).

(7) At the same time, ground control posts would be established within these zones.

(8) Ground control posts would also be established in the Soviet Union west of Longitude 35 degrees East (a line through Dnepropetrovsk), in the UK, and at eastern US ports.

(9) Three months after the effective date of the treaty, signatories would furnish blueprints of military forces and conventional armaments.

(10) Within the next nine months, the USSR and US would place in internationally supervised depots 15 percent of the major armaments reported in their blueprints, including arms capable of delivering nuclear weapons, would reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million men, and would decrease their military budgets by 15 percent.

(11) Other signatory nations would make similar reductions under similar inspection systems.

(12) All signatories would recognize the necessity of an effective inspection system, and would help to install and implement such a system.

(13) Upon the announced completion of first-year reductions, mobile inspection teams would have access to each state to verify fulfillment of these reductions.

(14) With the start of aerial inspection and the installation of ground inspector posts, all states would be prohibited from maintaining or stationing nuclear weapons within any part of the European inspection zone described above.

(15) During the first-year reduction of armaments and armed forces by the US and USSR, both states would also reduce by 20 percent their armaments and armed forces in the European inspection zone.
(16) After first-year reductions had been completed (estimated as July 1959), the aerial inspection systems would be progressively expanded into a series of additional zones, culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and, if the political situation permitted, China, as well as the free-world areas, including the US and UK. Ground control posts would also be progressively increased.

(17) During the first-year reductions, there would also be a reduction, by about 10 percent, of air bases within the European inspection zone.

(18) On the effective date of the treaty, all signatories would be committed to a year's temporary suspension of nuclear tests, during which period they would cooperate to design an inspection system to regulate future test limitations. Failure to agree upon and install such an inspection system, or to agree on either a limitation or further suspension of tests, would automatically remove the legal commitments against tests at the end of the year's suspension.

(19) Upon verification of the first-year reductions, a second reduction for the USSR and US would be arranged. This would not lower force levels below two million and would be conditional upon the extension of the inspection system to all "essential, significant military states and areas."

(20) During the second period of reductions (estimated as July 1959 to July 1961), both the US and USSR would cut their armaments and armed forces in the European inspection zone by an additional 20 percent.

(21) Upon verification of the second reductions, the armaments regulation organization would consider further cuts. These would not reduce US and USSR armed forces below 1.5 million men unless and until a supplementary treaty
was negotiated and ratified.

(22) Should further general reductions be carried out, the US and USSR would also make further cuts in arms and armed forces in the European inspection zone, but not by more than 20 percent.

(23) Within three months after the effective date of the treaty, the signatories would establish a technical committee to design and install inspection controls to insure that experiments with outer space objects would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. These controls would also insure that intercontinental ballistic or guided missiles or rockets would not be built or installed.

(24) An armaments regulation organization would be established within the framework of the Security Council, and would operate through a board of control on which the US and the USSR would have a veto on "significant decisions."

(25) The board of control would have authority to establish a system of control over major international troop movements.

(26) The details of the inspection system would be consistent with the studies on inspection and control of the Special Presidential task groups (see item of 20 January 1956).

(27) The armaments regulation organization would be authorized to establish a system for controlling the export and import of arms. (The Stassen proposals are reproduced as Annex to App "A" to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 17 May 57, encl to JCS 1731/223, Note by Secys, same subj, 18 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 63. The date of Mr. Stassen's proposals does not appear on the cited document and is taken from a reproduction of a State Department copy also in this file.) (SECRET) (Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 18 May 57, App to Memo, Dep Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS,
"Transmittal of Letter from Mr. Stassen . . . ," 22 May 57, encl to JCS 1731/225, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 23 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68.) (SECRET)

14 May 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles stated during a news conference that: (1) the US would not accept the creation of a neutralized or demilitarized zone in Europe based upon a divided Germany; (2) it would be better to begin aerial inspection in an Arctic-Alaskan-Siberian zone than in a European zone where political implications and the greater number of countries involved might raise many difficulties; and (3) the critical aspect of the disarmament negotiations continued to be the question of devising and gaining acceptance of a reliable inspection and control system. (New York Times, 15 May 57, 1:1; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 936 (3 Jun 57), pp. 894-901.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 May 1957 -- The UK detonated a hydrogen bomb in the central Pacific, thus becoming the third nation to set off a thermonuclear explosion. The blast was the first in a series of tests begun despite the sharp opposition of the British Labor Party and protests by the USSR and Japan. (New York Times, 16 May 57, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 May 1957 -- The Canadian representative at the London disarmament talks told Mr. Stassen that Canada took "an affirmative view in a preliminary manner" of the inclusion of Canadian territory, either within the Arctic Circle or in the Far West, along with Alaska and the western United States, in any aerial inspection zone that included the Soviet Far East and Arctic areas. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6251, 15 May 57.) (SECRET)

15 May 1957 -- A Norwegian Government spokesman said that Norway was ready to cooperate in any disarmament program--even one
that included aerial inspection of Norwegian territory—that had a reasonable chance of lessening international tension. (New York Times, 16 May 57, 12:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

16 May 1957 -- After three days of final talks, during which the members summed up their progress and generally restated their positions, the Disarmament Subcommittee adjourned until 27 May in order to allow the delegates to confer with their governments. Mr. Stassen left for Washington and Mr. Zorin for Moscow. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6211, 14 May 57; 6250, 15 May 57; 6282, 16 May 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6249, 15 May 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (New York Times, 17 May 57, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 May 1957 -- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told Western newsmen that the USSR would permit aerial inspection of its territory only if it received access to an equal area of the United States. No proportional arrangement—half of the United States, for instance, and half of the Soviet Union—would be acceptable. (New York Times, 18 May 57, 1:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 May 1957 -- In response to a request from the Secretary of State, Secretary Wilson reviewed Mr. Stassen's proposed first-step disarmament agreement (see item of 9 May) and offered Mr. Dulles his preliminary views. The Secretary of Defense stated that: (1) The Stassen proposals went well beyond US disarmament policy, and the Soviet Union had made no significant concessions to justify such a change in US policy. (2) The proposal for a European inspection and arms limitations zone had inherent dangers that might well jeopardize the security if not the continued existence of NATO. (3) It was not in the interest of the US to reduce the armed forces below the 2.5 million level. (4) A year's suspension of
nuclear-weapons tests would make it difficult for the US to resume such tests because of the weight of public opinion and the probable disintegration of the necessary technical staff. (5) It would be a mistake to attempt to undertake any long-range agreement in the absence of mutual confidence and satisfactory relations. Mr. Wilson requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give him their views on Mr. Stassen's proposals. (Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 17 May 57, App "B" to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament Planning (U)," same date, encl to JCS 1731/223, Note by Secys, same subj, 18 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68.) (SECRET)

18 May 1957 -- Mr. Stassen responded to Mr. Wilson's letter of 17 May. He declared that his proposed arms limitation agreement would: (1) prevent aquisition of nuclear weapons by a "fourth country"; (2) provide major assurance against a great surprise attack on the U S ; (3) improve the prospects of a change in the Soviet attitude; and (4) greatly reduce the danger of explosive incidents in Eastern Europe. Measured against these advantages, said Mr. Stassen, the possible disadvantages to the US of the arms agreement seemed to him to be "well within reasonable limits." (Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 18 May 57, App to Memo, Dep Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Transmittal of Letter from Mr. Stassen . . . ," 22 May 57, encl to JCS 1731/225, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 23 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68.) (SECRET)

19 May 1957 -- Commenting to newsmen on the London disarmament talks and the Soviet proposals made during those negotiations, Admiral Radford warned that: "We cannot trust the Russians on this or anything. The Communists have broken their word with every country with which they ever had an agreement." (New York Times, 20 May 57, 1:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
20 May 1957 -- In a letter to Premier Mollet, similar to the one he had sent Prime Minister Macmillan on 20 April, Premier Bulganin proposed that the USSR and France begin bilateral talks on disarmament questions as a preliminary step towards a world agreement on arms limitation. (New York Times, 21 May 57, 1:2, text, 10:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

22 May 1957 -- President Eisenhower stated during a news conference that the US must avoid being "recalcitrant" or "picayunish" in working toward disarmament. Something "just has to be done," he said, to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on step-by-step disarmament under an effective inspection system. Commenting on Mr. Gromyko's statement of 17 May, the President declared that the US could not open its territory for aerial inspection on the basis of a mile-for-mile exchange with the USSR unless a "completely insignificant" area was chosen to be inspected. (New York Times, 23 May 57, 1:5, text, 14:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

22 May 1957 -- In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed strong concurrence with the views of Mr. Wilson (17 May) on Mr. Stassen's proposed agreement of 9 May. Moreover, they expressed concern over the "indefinite nature and inadequacy" of the provisions for an inspection system, and again repeated their view that any disarmament plan must be based on effective step-by-step inspection. Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with the idea, implicit in the plan, that "fourth-country" possession of nuclear weapons would jeopardize the security of the US. Finally, they declared Mr. Stassen's proposal to be inconsistent with national policy in many respects, "vague and general" in others, and "completely unacceptable" in the form presented.
In an appendix to their memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made specific comments on most of the provisions in Mr. Stassen's proposal. Paraphrased in brief, these comments were as follows:

1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that any disarmament treaty signed by the US should have a "right of abrogation" clause. They recognized, however, that, even if such a clause were included, political pressures would render abrogation of the treaty difficult.

2) 

3) 

4) With regard to the provision covering the production and transfer of fissionable material by the US, UK, and USSR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it was impractical to transfer to "non-weapons purposes" all fissionable material not already contained in nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be impossible to verify such transfers.

5) The paragraph concerning the transfer of fissionable material by the US, UK, and USSR to international custody was imprecise.

6) The plan for the establishment of aerial inspection zones, while attractive, did not provide effective inspection and contained several other unacceptable features.

7) The provision dealing with the establishment of ground control and radar posts in the aerial inspection zones
did not specify location of posts, had too short a time schedule, and was otherwise inadequate.

8) The paragraph covering the establishment of these posts in the US, UK, and USSR suffered from the same shortcomings.

9) The provision concerning the furnishing of military blueprints did not provide for initial verification of these blueprints and did not make it clear that the blueprints exchanged should be only for areas subject to inspection.

10) With regard to the provision covering first stage reduction by the US and USSR in arms, armed forces, and military expenditures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that such large reductions could not be carried out under the proposed time schedule with any reasonable degree of safety, that it would be very difficult to verify financial agreements, and that provisions for verification of reductions of arms and armed forces were inadequate.

11) The provision concerning similar reductions for other signatories should include provision for the build-up of West German forces to previously planned manpower levels.

12) The paragraph covering cooperation in establishing and maintaining the inspection system was "not particularly meaningful" in its present context and should be included in the control provisions of the disarmament plan.

13) The paragraph dealing with certification and verification of first phase reductions did not make sufficient provision for verification, and was unacceptable as written.
16) The paragraph covering expansion of the aerial inspection system after completion of first-phase reductions should also provide for a further exchange of blueprints. Furthermore, the time phasing of this paragraph was unacceptable.

17) [ ]

18) [ ]

19) [ ]

20) The concept embodied in the provision covering establishment of the armaments regulation organization needed great expansion, and should include such details of the organization as rights, powers, and functions.

21) The plan for advance notification of major troop movements appeared to depend for success on the ability of the control organ to obtain and verify information.

22) The studies by the Presidential task groups on an inspection system should be used for guidance but not as the exclusive basis for development of national policy.

23) The final provision, covering the regulation of the export and import of arms, could have a serious effect on the
Military Assistance Program. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarma-
ment," 22 May 57, derived fr JCS 1731/226, Note by Secys,
"Disarmament Planning (U)"," same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec
68.) (SECRET)

22 May 1957 -- In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Mr.
Stassen made modifications in and clarifications of his pro-
posal of 9 May on the basis of comments by the State and De-
fense Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. The
following changes were made:

1) The requirement for signatories of the disarmament
treaty to give advance notice of intention to suspend their
commitments was to be optional instead of mandatory.

2) The prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons by
countries other than the US, UK, and USSR now stated that if
these three nations used nuclear weapons, their allies would
also be free to employ them. The three states possessing
nuclear weapons could also maintain such weapons on the soil
of their allies except in a zone where nuclear weapons were
prohibited to all.

3) The restriction on the use of nuclear weapons by the
US, UK, and USSR now stated that these weapons could be
employed only under Article 51 of the UN Charter and against
a nuclear attack or against an attack that could not be re-
pelled without using nuclear weapons.

4) The commitment to design and install an inspection
system would also include a commitment to help maintain this
system. These commitments would be a prerequisite to halting
the production of nuclear materials for weapons.

5) The provision converying transfers of fissionable
material would state that the right of "refabrication" of
weapons would be maintained after the cut-off date.
6) An annex to the treaty would spell out specifically the method of aerial inspection. The US-Canadian zone to be considered within the Far East inspection zone should include Alaska; Canada west of a line from the point Longitude 130 degrees West-Latitude 70 degrees North, through Edmonton, to a point on the US-Canadian border at Longitude 95 degrees West (Lake of the Woods); and the continental US west of Longitude 95 degrees West (a line just west of Kansas City). The European zone would be "for a European decision" in which the US would be willing to join, and might be settled independently of the rest of the agreement.

7) The provision covering the exchange of military blueprints now defined "blueprint" as an inventory of "major designated armaments," other than nuclear weapons, and of armed forces.

8) The paragraph concerning first-stage reduction of armaments and the placing of arms in storage depots now stated that the right to check on cuts in Soviet military expenditures should be sought.

9) The provision dealing with reductions by countries other than the US, UK, and USSR now stated that West Germany would make no reductions, but rather would accept a ceiling for its rearmament.

10) The commitment to cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of an inspection system should apply to both conventional and nuclear weapons.

11) The provision restricting the stationing of nuclear weapons in the European inspection zone now stated that there would be no prohibition on the stationing in that zone of dual-purpose delivery systems or the training there of armed forces in the use of nuclear weapons.
12) First-stage reductions in the European inspection zone would not be large enough to imply a future complete withdrawal of arms from this zone.

13) The commitment to expand progressively the aerial and ground inspection systems would not include precise steps or timing.

14) The provision covering the reduction of air bases in the European zone would indicate that complete elimination of foreign bases was not contemplated in any disarmament agreement acceptable to the US.

15) It would be made clear that the temporary suspension of nuclear tests for twelve months did not preclude the possibility of resuming limited tests at the end of a year.

16) The paragraphs dealing with reductions beyond the first-stage cuts would make clear that a reduction in arms and armed forces "to a point of extreme weakness" or a reduction of internal security forces was not contemplated in US policy.

17) The system of advance notification of major international troop movements would be developed along the lines indicated in the Presidential task group studies, would cover submarines and bombers, and was aimed at adding to the safeguards against a great surprise attack. (Memo, Stassen to SecState, no subj, 22 May 57, encl to JCS 1731/227, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 28 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-49) sec 69.) (SPOTRED)

23 May 1957 -- The National Security Council noted and discussed a progress report by Mr. Stassen on the London disarmament talks. The Council also noted the President's "restatement of the necessity of achieving some kind of halt to the current arms race without incurring serious risks to U.S. security." (NSC Action No. 1722, 23 May 57, C&E files.) (TOP SECRET)
24 May 1957 -- The Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Secretary of State the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (22 May) on Mr. Stassen's proposal of 9 May. The Deputy Secretary, in a covering memorandum, expressed his general approval of the JCS views. (N/H of JCS 1731/226, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 24 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 68.) (SECRET)

24 May 1957 -- Franz Joseph Strauss, West German Defense Minister, stated at a news conference that his country would take no steps toward manufacture of nuclear weapons. (New York Times, 25 May 57, 10:6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 May 1957 -- A special meeting was held at the White House to discuss Mr. Stassen's proposals of 9 May, as modified by him on 22 May, and to provide him with final instructions for the London disarmament talks. Present at the meeting were the President, Secretary Dulles, Mr. Stassen, Admiral Strauss, Admiral Radford, Mr. Quarles, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Mr. Robert Cutler. The group accepted with slight modifications about half of the provisions in the revised Stassen proposal. It directed more extensive changes for the remaining provisions. At the end of the meeting, the President requested the US Delegation to the London meeting to rewrite the basic Stassen paper in the light of decisions reached at the White House conference, in order to provide the President with a complete correct text. This revision was completed and submitted on 31 May. (See item of that date.) ("Memorandum of Conference at White House," 25 May 57, encl to Memo, Cutler to SecState, "Disarmament Conference at White House, May 25, 1957," 27 May 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

27 May 1957 -- The National Security Council adopted a new statement of Basic National Security Policy (approved by the
President on 3 June). This statement called for the US, as part of its national policy, to "actively seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments."

To attain this system, the US "should give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (a) such confidence-building measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual aerial inspection and establishment of ground control posts at strategic centers; (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible; and (c) measures likely to forestall nations not now possessing nuclear weapons from developing a capability to produce them." The statement declared that the "acceptability and character" of any international disarmament system "depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system." (NSC Action No. 1728, 27 May 57, C&E files; NSC 5707/8, Memo, Exec Secy NSC to NSC, "Basic National Security Policy," 3 Jun 57, encl to JCS 2101/266, Note by Secys, "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5708/8) (S)," 5 Jun 57, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 71.) (TOP SECRET)

27 May 1957 -- The UN Disarmament Subcommittee resumed sessions in London. At the first meeting, Mr. Stassen and Mr. Zorin made general statements. In a four-power Western meeting, Mr. Stassen informed his colleagues that significant decisions on disarmament policy had been made in Washington, but that no proposals would be made in the Subcommittee or to the Soviets without ample consultation with the UK, France, and Canada. He also stated that the establishment of a European inspection zone required the full participation of, and consultation with, NATO. The Western delegates agreed
that it would be necessary to consult with the other NATO powers at once. Mr. Stassen also asked the Canadian representative to seek the views of his government on the proposal that all of Canada and the US, including Alaska, be opened for aerial inspection in return for the opening of the entire Soviet Union. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6481, 6494, and 6495, 27 May 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6493, 27 May 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

28 May 1957 -- President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer, in a communique issued at the end of their talks in Washington, called for a first-step disarmament agreement to create "a degree of confidence"; then, a Big Four foreign ministers' conference on German reunification; and, finally, after the achievement of reunification, a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Later, Chancellor Adenauer said at a news conference that the first-step disarmament accord would have to be worked out by the US and USSR without the participation of West Germany or any of the other smaller powers. (New York Times, 29 May 57, 1:8; text of the communique, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 938 (17 Jun 57), pp. 955-956.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

28 May 1957 -- The US exploded a nuclear device at the Las Vegas proving ground, opening the "Plumb Bob" series of tests scheduled by the AEC. The explosive force of the detonation was placed at ten kilotons, half as great as that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. (New York Times, 29 May 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

28 May 1957 -- At the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Stassen made a brief presentation calling for international control of the export and import of arms, and of international troop movements. Speaking to his Western colleagues, both separately and at a four-power meeting, he described in
general terms the new US position, presenting a somewhat detailed outline of US policy on nuclear weapons and materials. In the evening, he left for Paris for a one-day consultation with the NATO Council on the question of a European inspection zone. (Mgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6526, 28 May 57; 6527, 28 May 57; 6706, 4 Jun 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6531, 29 Sic; 25 May 57.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

29 May 1957 -- At the North Atlantic Council meeting, after a presentation by Mr. Stassen, the delegates agreed to obtain the views of their governments on the question of a European inspection zone. Afterwards, Mr. Stassen gave the French a complete outline of the new US disarmament position and stated he would make a general exposition of this position to Soviet representative Zorin in a day or so. (Mgs, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 2859, 29 May 57; London (Whitney) to SecState, 6706, 4 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

29 May 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles stated during a news conference that the US attached a "top priority to getting a substantial inspection zone wherever we can get it quickly," Reflecting his statement of 14 May, he noted that there were far better chances of establishing an Arctic inspection zone than a European one. (New York Times, 30 May 57, 1:1; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVI, no. 938 (17 Jun 57), pp. 961-967.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

31 May 1957 -- The UK detonated a second hydrogen bomb in the mid-Pacific. Like the first bomb, exploded on 15 May, this one was dropped by a jet bomber and detonated at a high altitude to minimize the fall-out of radioactive material. (New York Times, 1 Jun 57, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

31 May 1957 -- In response to the President's request of 25 May, the US Delegation at the London disarmament talks submitted
to the Secretary of State a revised version of the Stassen proposals of 9 and 22 May as modified and supplemented by the decisions of the 25 May White House meeting.

The paper contained the following provisions:

(1) The disarmament agreement would include specific authority for a signatory power to suspend or partially suspend its commitments upon written notice to the control organization. A signatory would have the option of giving advance notice, so that the conditions on which it based its decision to suspend might be corrected in time to prevent actual suspension.

(2) All signatory powers, except the US, UK, and USSR, would agree not to manufacture, acquire, or possess nuclear weapons, but the three nuclear-weapons states might keep these weapons on the territory of other states, except within a zone where nuclear-weapons were specifically prohibited for all. Moreover, non-nuclear-weapons states could train forces in the use of nuclear weapons and equip them with dual-purpose delivery systems, for possible use within the terms of Provision 3, below.

(3) All signatories would use nuclear weapons only (a) in self-defense, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, against a nuclear attack, or (b) against an attack that, in the opinion of the defender, could not be repelled without using nuclear weapons.

(4) The USSR, UK, and US would cooperate in designing, installing, and maintaining an effective inspection system. Beginning one month after the installation of this system (date of installation estimated as July 1959 or later), they would devote all new production of fissionable material to "non-weapons purposes," and would transfer "non-weapons
purposes" any fissionable material not already contained in nuclear weapons. The right of "refabrication" of weapons after the cut-off date should be maintained.

(5) After establishing an effective inspection system and halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons, the USSR, UK, and US would begin to make "equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes." Each of the three states, however, would maintain a very substantial nuclear-weapons capability. "Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio," the transfers could be made on a ratio of US 55 to USSR 45, with the amount transferred by the UK to be in addition to such transfers. Another acceptable method might be to transfer all fissionable material above a certain minimum amount.

(6) Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), all states concerned would begin the installation and operation of an aerial inspection system in one or two zones. One of these was a European zone, to be negotiated separately, with NATO nations and other affected states having a full voice in the negotiations. The US would propose that the other zone include the continental US, Alaska, Canada, and all Soviet territory. If this were unacceptable to the USSR, then the US would accept a limited initial zone, to test the inspection system, that would include roughly the area north of the Arctic Circle (except Swedish and Finnish territory), all of Alaska and the Aleutians, and all of Kamchatka and the Kurils. An annex to the treaty would spell out the precise method of aerial inspection.

(7) At the same time, ground control posts would be established in the zone or zones specified for aerial inspection.
(8) In addition, ground control posts would be promptly established in such areas of the USSR, beyond the initial aerial inspection zone or zones, as might be decided upon by negotiations, with the NATO nations having a full voice in such negotiations.

(9) Three months after the effective date of the treaty, the signatory powers would furnish blueprints of military forces and conventional armaments. These blueprints would cover only forces and conventional arms within the agreed inspection zones, and no blueprint covering the whole USSR would be deemed reliable until an effective inspection system over this area was established and operating. A list of arms prepared by the US and USSR, as a basis for agreeing on armaments reduction, would include definite, substantial quantities of specific types of important arms of post-World War II manufacture.

(10) The following first step was approved: (a) the US and USSR would agree on a US-Canada-USSR zone for aerial and ground inspection; (b) the US and USSR would furnish each other with blueprints of arms, installations, and forces within this zone; (c) the US and USSR would agree to reduce military forces to 2.5 million men and to provide a list of armaments scheduled for reduction, this list bearing a "rough relation" to the reduction in military forces; (d) after the treaty became effective, the US and USSR would each place the designated armaments in internationally supervised depots within their own territories. Military budget cuts would be supplemental to these reductions.

(11) Other signatory powers would make similar reductions under similar inspection systems, except that West Germany and other states that were rearming, such as Japan,
would make no reductions, but would accept instead a ceiling on rearmament.

(12) All signatories would recognize the necessity of an effective inspection system, and would help to install, implement, and maintain such a system.

(13) Upon the announced completion of first-year reductions, mobile inspection teams would have access to each state to verify fulfillment of these reductions.

(14) If a European inspection zone were agreed upon, the US would then determine whether it would agree to the prohibition of all nuclear weapons from this zone.

(15) Any reductions of arms and armed forces within a European inspection zone would be minor, and their extent would be agreed upon in negotiations in which the NATO states participated fully.

(16) At the end of first-year reductions (estimated as July 1959), the aerial inspection system would be progressively expanded into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and, if the political situation permitted, China, as well as the free-world areas, including the US and UK. Ground control posts would also be progressively increased.

(17) During the first-year reductions, a decision would be made, with full NATO participation, on whether or not to reduce air bases in any European inspection zone by 10 percent.

(18) On the effective date of the treaty, all signatories would be committed (a) to cooperate in establishing an international inspection commission to monitor nuclear tests; (b) to refrain from tests for twelve months, with the understanding that in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, the US would resume testing at the end of this period; and (c) if tests were resumed, to give advance notification, allow limited access, and place limitations on the amount of radioactive material to be released.

(19) The US Delegation might state that if first-stage reductions were successful, the US would be prepared to negotiate further.

(20) No tentative discussion of second-stage reductions should include consideration of such reductions in Europe.

(21) A hope might be expressed for a third-stage reduction, but no cuts below the 1.5 million level for armed forces should be indicated.

(22) The initial agreement should not spell out in detail a third phase of reductions.

(23) Within three months after the effective date of the treaty, the signatories would establish a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system that would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space would be exclusively for "peaceful and scientific" purposes.

(24) An armaments regulation organization would be established within the framework of the Security Council, and would operate through a board of control on which the US and the USSR would have a veto on "significant decisions."

(25) The board of control would have authority to establish a system of control over major international troop movements.

(26) The details of an effective and sound inspection system would be consistent with the studies on inspection and control of the special Presidential task groups (see item of 20 January 1956).
(27) The armaments regulation organization would be authorized to establish a system to control the export and import of arms.

(28) Unless otherwise indicated, the specific provisions of this paper were inseparable parts of a whole. This was a new provision. (Memo, U.S. Del to UN Disarmament Subcommittee to SecState, no subj, 31 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.)

31 May 1957 -- Meeting separately with Mr. Zorin in London, Mr. Stassen read him a lengthy "informal memorandum" based on the decisions made at the White House meeting of 25 May. He stated that the memorandum reflected some of the most important decisions taken by the US in a dozen years, but emphasized that his presentation was an informal one, and was not an official US proposal or commitment.

Mr. Stassen's memorandum followed the line of the policy paper just completed for the President by the US Delegation (see previous item). Some of the more important provisions of the memorandum were as follows:

(1) Mr. Stassen indicated US agreement to a first stage reduction of armed forces for the US and USSR to 2.5 million men, with possible subsequent reductions to 2.1 million and 1.7 million.

(2) He said the US would accept a ten-month suspension of nuclear-weapons tests combined with a commitment for an effective inspection system.

(3) In discussing a provision for transferring fissionable materials to "non-weapons purposes," he stated that the US would be willing to make transfers equal to those made by the USSR, but also declared US willingness to make 53 percent of these transfers, with the Soviets making only 47 percent.
percent of them.

Finally, he said that the US was willing to agree to a European inspection zone as well as to a US-Canadian-USSR zone, provided the other states concerned also agreed, but that both of the zones proposed by the Soviets on 26 April were unacceptable. He suggested that the European zone proposed by the USSR be moved east and north, and that the other inspection zone include "a similarity of percentage" of US and Soviet territory in areas of relatively equal importance. Both these zones, he said, could be worked out by negotiation. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6623, 31 May 57.) (SECRET) (Memo, Chairman, US Del, to Chairman, USSR Del, "Informal Memorandum," 31 May 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Prior to his meeting with Mr. Zorin, Mr. Stassen had given copies of the "informal memorandum" to the UK, French, and Canadian delegations. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6706, 4 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

2 June 1957 -- In a filmed interview of the CBS television program "Face The Nation," Soviet Communist Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev said that the USSR was willing to take "some small step" toward disarmament, instead of insisting on a comprehensive agreement at once, "so that that small step might lead to something bigger." He suggested, as a useful first step, the withdrawal of Western troops from Germany and of US troops from elsewhere in Europe, along with a withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. Khrushchev also repeated Soviet views on certain other aspects of the disarmament problem. The interview was filmed and recorded in Moscow on 28 May. (New York Times, 3 Jun 57, 1:8; text, DPC Sect Note No. 163, "Khrushchev Appearance on 'Face The Nation,' Sunday, June 2, 1957," 3 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
3 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen discussed with West German representatives in London the question of a first-step disarmament agreement. The Germans restated their position that no comprehensive disarmament accord should be reached without a prior settlement of the problem of German reunification. They warned against inclusion of "far-reaching" measures, especially any provision for a European inspection zone, in a first-step agreement. If this agreement were not sufficiently limited, they said, the USSR would not be interested in a more comprehensive disarmament agreement, and the question of German reunification would be dropped. Mr. Stassen agreed that it would be necessary to work closely with West Germany during the disarmament talks, and said that the question of how much should be included in a first-step agreement was even then under discussion. He pointed out, however, that, while the US would not propose boundaries for a European inspection zone unless they were acceptable to West Germany, it might be necessary to include a European zone in a first-step agreement in order to insure Soviet acceptance of such an agreement. Mr. Stassen explained that he had told Zorin that the inspection zones proposed by the USSR were unacceptable and that the US would agree to European and Far Eastern inspection zones only if the other states concerned would also agree (see item of 31 May 1957). (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6669, 3 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

3 June 1957 -- The US asked the governments of Norway and Denmark to agree to open parts of their territory for inclusion in an Arctic aerial inspection zone. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 730, 24 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

3-4 June 1957 -- Representatives of the four Western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee held lengthy and detailed discussions of the US "informal memorandum" of 31 May. Although
the Subcommittee also held sessions during the week, and Mr. Stassen met separately with Mr. Zorin, the most important work was done in the four-power conferences, where the US endeavored to establish a unified Western position in support of the 31 May memorandum. Mr. Stassen emphasized that the US memorandum was only a "talking paper," and that it would not be officially submitted to the Subcommittee without changes and without consultation with the West. In answer to strong expressions of disappointment and displeasure by the UK, France, and Canada that they had not been given time to study and comment on the memorandum before it was handed to the Soviets, Mr. Stassen replied that he had not wished to give his "talking paper" the increased status it would have gained had it been officially cleared by the other Western governments. Moreover, he said, such clearance would have taken three to four weeks, with a resultant suspension of East-West negotiations. This would only have given credibility to the Soviet charge that the West was delaying disarmament negotiations. Mr. Stassen added, however, that he would not give Mr. Zorin any more "talking papers" until his Western colleagues agreed that he could do so.

The discussion of the US memorandum was a thorough, point-by-point analysis of the paper, with Mr. Stassen attempting to clarify or answer objections to each point. No conclusions were reached, and it was agreed to hold further meetings on the subject.

The Western representatives agreed to send a weekly report to the North Atlantic Council on the disarmament negotiations. In the first report, a brief one sent on 4 June, the delegates stated that they were still awaiting the views of the NATO governments on the question of a
European inspection zone. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6631, 1 Jun 57; 6641, 6662, 3 Jun 57; 6671, 6676, 6696, 6706, 4 Jun 57; 6713, 5 Jun 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6705, 4 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (SECRET) (DPC Note No. 145, "Four Power Report to North Atlantic Council 7 June 577," 11 Jun 57, same file, BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

4 June 1957 -- Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a special message read for him at the opening session of the annual conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva, urged the ILO to support the program of disarmament proposed by the USSR. The Soviet delegation to the conference submitted a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. (New York Times, 6 Jun 57, 19:1; text of the Bulganin message, DPC Note No. 143, "Statement of N. Bulganin to the ILO, June 4, 1957," 6 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 June 1957 -- President Eisenhower said during his news conference that the US could not agree to halt nuclear weapons testing, as part of a first-step disarmament agreement, unless that agreement also included a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and provision for an effective inspection system. (New York Times, 6 Jun 57, 1:8, text, 14:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 June 1957 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished the Secretary of Defense with their views concerning Mr. Stassen's paper of 31 May on the US disarmament position, as well as his "informal memorandum" of that date to Mr. Zorin. These views were then formally presented to the Secretary in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 June. In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Mr. Stassen's "partial reformulation" of the US position appeared to have remedied
the majority of the objectionable features contained in his earlier proposals. There were, however, certain earlier objections by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Mr. Stassen had not met:

1) The proposed timetable for first-year reductions did not allow sufficient time for an effective inspection system to be installed and placed in operation.

2) If the European inspection zone did not "function properly," the risk of irreparable harm to NATO was so great that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that all proposals concerning this inspection zone should be kept separate and distinct from any other proposals relating to and essential to the success of a partial disarmament agreement. The latter proposals should not be dependent upon achieving a "successful arrangement" for a European inspection zone.

3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the proposed moratorium on nuclear-weapons tests would make it psychologically impossible for the US to resume testing at the end of a year, even if no further agreement to suspend tests were reached. Only irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union was not observing the moratorium would make it possible for the US to resume testing. Provisions for obtaining such evidence by means of an effective inspection system should therefore be agreed to prior to any suspension of tests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended specific changes in the wording of the US position in order to meet these and other lesser objections. (JCS 1731/228, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 6 Jun 57; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj and date, derived from SM-404-57, same subj, 4 June 57. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (TOP SECRET)
5 June 1957 -- The Department of Defense forwarded to the State Department the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see above item) on the Stassen paper of 31 May and the Stassen "informal memorandum" of that date. In a covering letter to Secretary Dulles, the Deputy Secretary of Defense endorsed the JCS views and added comments of his own. Mr. Quarles drew attention to the Stassen proposals for limitations and reductions within the proposed European inspection zone. He stated that the Defense Department considered that it would be counter to US interests to suggest that these limitations and reductions should be included in a statement of the Western position or to imply that they would be acceptable to the US as part of a first-step agreement. He also criticized Mr. Stassen's presentation of his "informal memorandum" to Mr. Zorin before the Stassen paper of 31 May on the new US position had been submitted to US government departments for final review. Mr. Quarles pointed out that although the memorandum presented to Zorin had been labeled "informal," it would be difficult for the US to disassociate itself with the position set forth in that memorandum. (Ltr, Dep SecDef to SecState, 5 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (TOP SECRET)


7 June 1957 -- Mr. Zorin read to Mr. Stassen parts of an aide-memoire that he said the USSR was offering as an answer to the Stassen "informal memorandum" of 31 May. Mr. Stassen
declared that since his memorandum was not an official US proposal, and therefore technically did not exist, he could not accept an official Soviet Government reply to it. He asked Zorin to delay delivery of the Soviet note until the US delegation could receive instructions from Washington. On 8 June, on instructions from the State Department, Mr. Stassen accepted the Soviet aide-memoire. In so doing, he stated that it was his understanding that the USSR would not refer, in the Disarmament Subcommittee or in the press, to either the Stassen "informal memorandum" or the Soviet note until the US and USSR were ready for formal exchanges.

The Soviet aide-memoire was for the most part a restatement of earlier Soviet proposals, combined with comments on the Stassen memorandum. The major Soviet points were:

1) The USSR was willing to agree to a three-stage reduction in force levels, as proposed by the US, but the Soviet Union disagreed with the US view that second- and third-state reductions should take place only if certain conditions were fulfilled. Moreover, the USSR held that cuts in armed forces should be linked with a ban on nuclear weapons.

2) The Soviet Union agreed in principle to an exchange of lists of arms to be put into international storage. However, since the US proposal was "unclear" on how this was to be carried out, the US, UK, and France should submit their lists first and, after studying them, the USSR would submit its own list.

3) The USSR could not accept the US "legalization" of the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it again called for an agreement to ban the use of these weapons, and to eliminate them completely from national stockpiles. Any provision to halt the production of fissionable material for "weapons-purposes," to be acceptable, would have to be linked with such an agreement.
4) The problem of halting nuclear-weapons tests should be separated from that of disarmament. Suspension of tests for ten months, as proposed in the informal memorandum," was meaningless, since preparations for a test required at least that much time, and the ten-month period could be used for the preparation of subsequent tests. The USSR believed that a period of at least two or three years should be set for a halt in testing, and that control posts to monitor the test suspension should be established in the USSR, US, and UK, and in the area of the Pacific Ocean.

5) The USSR rejected the US position on aerial inspection, and stated that the solution to the problem lay in expanding rather than in narrowing zones of aerial inspection.

After accepting the Soviet aide-memoire, US representatives briefed the British, Canadians, and French on its contents. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6820, 7 Jun 57; 6822, 6828, 6830, 6831, 6832, 6833, 8 Jun 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, Actg SecState to London, NIACT 8610, 7 Jun 57.) (SECRET) (Text reproduced in US Del to UN Disarmament Commission, "USSR Aide Memoire of June 7," 8 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

9-13 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen returned to the US for a brief visit during the Whitsundays adjournment of the disarmament conference. Officially, he returned to attend his son's graduation and to discuss "procedural complications" that had developed, in relation to NATO, in the disarmament talks. Newspaper reports stated that Mr. Stassen was reprimanded in Washington for discussing certain disarmament issues with Soviet representative Zorin before the achievement of a unified Western position. Nothing has been found in the
files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to substantiate these reports. Secretary of State Dulles, during a news conference on 11 June, stated that working out disarmament procedures with the NATO states, especially West Germany, was "a matter of some difficulty, of some delicacy," which "justified" a discussion with Mr. Stassen. Secretary Dulles said that the US would not present a program for establishing a European inspection zone or for limiting military strength in central Europe, without the concurrence of the European nations involved. (New York Times, 10 Jun 57, 1:2; 12 Jun 57, 1:8, 14 Jun 57, 1:3. Text of Mr. Dulles' news conference, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 940 (1 Jul 57), pp. 9-16.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6782, 6 Jun 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

11-12 June 1957 -- In Washington, Mr. Stassen conferred with State, Defense, and AEC officials, and briefed them on the Soviet aide-memoire of 7 June. He requested the Department of Defense to prepare a list of armaments, to be furnished by the US under the terms of the proposed first-stage disarmament agreement. (Memo for Rec, Chf, United Nations Affs, OASD (ISA), "Briefing by Governor Stassen on Soviet-June-Aide Memoire," 13 Jun 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCCJS files.) (SECRET) (JCS 1731/231, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 20 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (TOP SECRET)

12 June 1957 -- President Eisenhower approved a new "US Position on First Phase of Disarmament." This was a revision and reorganization of the paper submitted to the Secretary of State on 31 May by the US Delegation at the London disarmament talks. The revised paper had gone through several drafts and, in its final form, dated 11 June, was almost identical
with a draft completed on 8 June by the State Department in collaboration with representatives of the Defense Department, AEC, and CIA, and Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President (NSA). The approved paper was given to Mr. Stassen to take back to London. It contained the following major changes and additions to the 31 May paper:

1) The first-step disarmament agreement would become effective upon ratification by such states as might be agreed upon.

2) Grounds for a signatory power to suspend or partially suspend its commitments were listed as: (a) an important violation by another state, or (b) other action by any state which so endangered the security of the signatory power as to require it to suspend or partially suspend its commitments.

3) The signatory powers would agree that maintenance of commitments would be dependent on the continued effective operation of the agreed inspection system.

4) The provision to devote to "non-weapons purposes" all new production of fissionable material, and to transfer to "non-weapons purposes" all fissionable material not already contained in nuclear weapons was broadened to apply to all signatory powers. The right of "refabrication" of weapons was broadened to include the completion of weapons already being manufactured.

5) All signatory powers would agree not to transfer nuclear weapons out of their control, or to accept transfer of such weapons, except for use in self-defense, as defined by the treaty. Nor could fissionable materials be transferred or accepted, except for peaceful purposes. These provisions did not preclude states that had nuclear weapons
from introducing or keeping these weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapons state, with the consent of that state; nor did they preclude non-nuclear-weapons states from training forces in the use of nuclear weapons or in equipping them with nuclear-weapons delivery systems.

6) The provision to prohibit states other than the US, UK, and USSR from manufacturing nuclear weapons, part of the 31 May paper and included in the version approved by the President on 12 June, was deleted, with Presidential approval, on 19 June.

7) The statement of US intent to resume nuclear tests if no agreement to halt these tests were reached during the proposed twelve-month suspension period was made stronger.

8) The provision for a US-Canada-USSR aerial and ground inspection zone now stated that the US should propose that this zone include the continental US, Alaska, all Soviet territory, and, with its consent, Canada. If this were unacceptable to the USSR, the US would accept a limited initial zone, to test the inspection system. This limited zone would include the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Swedish and Finnish territory), all of Alaska and the Aleutians, Soviet territory east of 160 degrees East Longitude, and all of Kamchatka and the Kurils. This proposal was contingent upon the consent of Canada, Denmark, and Norway.

9) Agreement on a European inspection zone was not a precondition for US agreement to a first-step disarmament accord. The West European nations would have a full voice in negotiating for a European zone and the US would leave to these states the initiative on any provision: (a) concerning the creation, extent, and location of such a zone, or the types of inspection employed in it; (b) restricting states
possessing nuclear weapons from locating such weapons within a European inspection zone; and (c) reducing armaments, armed forces, or air bases in such a zone. If the West European states proposed the adoption of any of these provisions, the US would then decide on what position to take respecting such proposals.

10) If the first-phase agreement did not provide for inspection of the entire USSR, it might provide for such subsequent expansion of the inspection zone or zones as might be agreed upon in conformity with 8) or 9), above.

11) The provision calling for the deposit in international storage depots of certain arms of post-World War II manufacture was broadened to include types of naval vessels in active service, regardless of when they were manufactured.

12) The provision setting forth a veto power by the US and USSR on "significant decisions" of the Armaments Regulation Organization now stated that veto power would be held by the US and such other signatory powers as might be agreed upon.

13) The reference to the studies by the special Presidential task groups on inspection and control was dropped. (JCS 1731/230, Note by Secys, "U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament (U)," 20 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (TOP SECRET de SECRET) (N/H of JCS 1731/230, 21 Jun 57, same file.) (SECRET) (Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament Planning," 20 Jun 57, encl to JCS 1731/231, Note by Secys, same subj and date, same file.) (TOP SECRET) (Memo, Cutler to Bowie, "Comments on Memorandum from U.S. Delegation re Revised Basic Paper on Disarmament dated May 31, 1957," 5 Jun 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (TOP SECRET) (Memo, Cutler to Pres, no subj, 8 Jun 57, same file.) (TOP SECRET) (Memo Capt. P. J. Blouin, USN,
to Radford, "Disarmament," 12 Jun 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Blouin Memos), OCJCS files.) (TOP SECRET)

12 June 1957 -- The Norwegian Foreign Ministry announced that Norway agreed in principle to open parts of its territory to aerial inspection under a disarmament agreement. Norway reserved the right, however, to study the details of any such inspection zone. At the same time, a spokesman for the British Foreign Office said that the UK did not exclude the idea of a European inspection zone, but that establishment of such a zone would require the consent of the European nations affected. (New York Times, 13 Jun 57, 11:1-2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

13 June 1957 -- In a news conference in Helsinki, where Khrushchev and Bulganin were winding up a week's visit to Finland, Khrushchev rejected as 'quite comical' the idea of aerial inspection of Arctic areas. Indeed, he denounced the entire "open skies" plan, as well as other Western disarmament proposals. He did, however, repeat the proposal made in the Soviet aide-memoire of 7 June that inspection posts be established in the USSR, US, and UK to monitor a suspension of nuclear tests. (New York Times, 14 Jun 57, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

14 June 1957 -- The UN Disarmament Subcommittee resumed its meeting in London. Reflecting the Soviet aide-memoire of 7 June and the Khrushchev statement of 13 June, Soviet representative Zorin officially proposed an immediate suspension of nuclear tests for two or three years, an international commission to "supervise" this suspension, and the establishment of control posts in the territory of the US, UK, and USSR and in the Pacific Ocean area. Both Jules Moch, of France, and Mr. Stassen raised the question of linking the
test suspension with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Mr. Zorin, however, declared that linking the question of suspending tests with other problems would only prevent agreement on the basic matter of ending tests.

The Soviet proposal represented a significant advance towards the Western position, since this was the first time the USSR had officially shown a willingness to accept controls over the suspension of nuclear tests. Despite the Soviet unwillingness to consider a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes," the Western representatives viewed the new Soviet position as encouraging. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6980, 14 Jun 57; (DPC Note No. 148, "Four Power Report to North Atlantic Council," 24 Jun 57, p. 1, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9; text of the Soviet proposal, DPC Note No. 150, "USSR Proposal of June 14, 1957," 27 Jun 57, same file, BP pt 9.) (SECRET)

14 June 1957 -- Prime Minister Macmillan formally replied to Premier Bulganin's letter of 20 April. In a lengthy letter, delivered to the Soviet Premier on 15 June, Macmillan stated that: 1) The answer to the disarmament problem lay in international agreements on conventional and nuclear disarmament, rather than in unilateral reductions. 2) Any suspension of nuclear tests should be carried out under effective controls, in line with the UK proposal of 6 May 1957 in the UN. 3) Full-scale reductions in armed forces, as opposed to first-step cuts, were contingent on comprehensive settlements in the political field. 4) The Eden proposals on demilitarized zones in Europe, to which Bulganin had referred, had been offered as part of a comprehensive settlement that included the reunification of Germany and the

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establishment of a European security system. Reunifying Germany was basic to this approach, and a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, as proposed by Bulganin, would alone contribute nothing toward European security. (New York Times, 16 Jun 57, 1:4, text, 12:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen gave his Western colleagues at the disarmament talks a "draft working paper" on the newly approved US position on first-step disarmament. With some minor changes, the working paper was the same as the position paper approved by the President on 12 June. The proposals contained in the working paper would be discussed with and approved by the West, and, where appropriate, cleared with NATO, before they were formally presented to the Soviets. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 6992, 15 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

17 June 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the Western delegates described the Soviet proposal of 14 June as an important one, but reemphasized the need to include adequate control provisions in any type of disarmament agreement. Mr. Zorin objected to the Western emphasis on controls and charged that the West was seeking to delay the progress of negotiations. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7033, 17 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

18 June 1957 -- The US Senate, by a vote of 67-19, approved the treaty to establish, and at the same time to make the US a member of, the International Atomic Energy Agency (see items of 23 and 26 October 1956). A move to amend the treaty was defeated, but the opposition succeeded in obtaining Senate approval of an "interpretation and understanding" that the US would withdraw from the IAEA if the Agency's basic charter were changed by an amendment. (New York Times, 19 June 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
18 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen repeated his request for an initial list of armaments, to be furnished by the US under the terms of the proposed first-stage disarmament agreement (see item of 11-12 June). He asked that this list be forwarded to him by 27 June, in order for him to consult with his Western colleagues on the Disarmament Subcommittee, advise NATO of the US position, and maintain the "essential negotiating momentum" to carry out US policy. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7050, 18 Jun 57, DA IN 30469 (19 Jun 57), CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (SECRET)

On 20 June, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a list of armaments that they would propose to put in storage in connection with a force-level reduction to 2.5 million men under the US position on a first-phase disarmament accord. (Memo, Dep SecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament Planning," 20 Jun 57, encl to JCS 1731/231, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (TOP SECRET)

19 June 1957 -- President Eisenhower told reporters at his news conference that the US would be willing to agree to a temporary suspension of nuclear tests, under an international inspection system, as part of a first-step disarmament agreement. He said that he believed that a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" "would not necessarily be part of the whole program." Later, White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty said that the President had not intended to give the impression that the US was prepared to drop its insistence that an agreement to halt such production should be part of an accord on suspending tests (see item of 25 June 1957, below). (New York Times, 20 Jun 57, 1:8; text, 18:2-7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
20 June 1957 -- After several days' discussion with his Western colleagues, Mr. Stassen began an official presentation in the Disarmament Subcommittee of the US position. Referring to the Soviet proposal of 14 June to suspend nuclear tests, he stated that an agreement on nuclear tests should be related to certain other measures of a first-step accord, including reductions in the strength of armed forces. The US was prepared to agree to reduce its armed forces to 2.5 million men, without insisting on any political conditions, as part of a first-step accord in which the temporary cessation of nuclear tests would be another element. The US was also prepared to consider further reductions in force levels, in two successive stages, but would not lower its military strength to the 1.5-1.5 million levels that had been discussed in earlier years. (These levels had originally been proposed by the West and subsequently endorsed by the USSR. See items of 28 May 1952 and 10 May 1955.) Moreover, said Mr. Stassen, any reductions beyond the 2.5 million level would be contingent on the resolution of outstanding political problems. The other western delegates supported Mr. Stassen's proposals, the British and French stating that they would not reduce their armed forces below the level of 750,000 men in a first-stage agreement. Mr. Zorin requested clarification of the US proposals and, in particular, asked to be given the force-level figures contemplated by the US for second- and third-stage reductions. In accordance with his instructions, Mr. Stassen declined to mention at this time any other force-level figures beyond the 2.5 million figure. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7149, 20 Jun 57.) (SOMEWHAT) (DPC Note No. 152, "Fourth Report to NATO, June 25," 2 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
21 June 1957 -- The White House announced that the US would withdraw all American ground forces from Japan. Other US military elements in that country would also be cut as Japanese military strength increased. The announcement was made in a communique issued at the end of a three-day visit to Washington by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. (New York Times, 22 Jun 57, 1:8, text, 4:4-6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

24 June 1957 -- The Danish Ambassador in London informed US representatives that Denmark approved in principal the inclusion in an aerial inspection zone of that part of Greenland north of the Arctic Circle. (Msg, AmEmbassy London to SecState, 7221, 24 Jun 57, quoted in Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 730, 24 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

25 June 1957 -- At a news conference, Secretary of State Dulles explained President Eisenhower's statement of 19 June concerning the relationship between a suspension of nuclear tests and a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Mr. Dulles said that while a suspension of tests was not dependent on a simultaneous cut-off of such production, it was dependent upon an agreement for a future cut-off. Both points would have to be a part of any first-step disarmament accord. This accord, said the Secretary, would also have to include: 1) arrangements for the transfer to "non-weapons purposes" of previously produced fissionable materials; 2) the designation of some areas in which to test inspection techniques; and 3) some reductions in conventional weapons. Discussing the temporary suspension of nuclear tests, Mr. Dulles said that the suspension period should be short enough to prevent the dissolution of US scientific and technical staffs. With these staffs remaining intact, the US would be able to resume testing, if necessary, at the end

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25 June 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee met again. During the period since its last meeting on 20 June, the four Western delegates had consulted with each other and notified the North Atlantic Council of the progress of negotiations and of their further intentions. Mr. Stassen had also met separately with German representatives, while Mr. Moch had dined with Mr. Zorin. At the Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Stassen announced that the US would be willing to cut its armed forces to 2.1 million and 1.7 million men under second- and third-stage disarmament agreements. These cuts would be contingent upon implementation of agreements made in the first-stage accord and upon progress toward political settlements, including a "solution" of the problem of German unification. The UK and French representatives agreed to cut their armed forces to 700,000 and 650,000 in second- and third-stage reductions. They also stressed the link between disarmament and political settlements. Mr. Zorin questioned the emphasis on political settlements, again charged the West with using delaying tactics, and expressed regret that no action had been taken on the Soviet proposal of 14 June to suspend nuclear tests. (DPC Note No. 151, "June 21 Report to NATO on Force Levels," 28 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (SECRET) (DPC Note No. 152, "Fourth Report to NATO, June 25," 2 Jul 57, same file, BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7150, 20 Jun 57; 7209, 23 Jun 57; 7281, 7282, 25 Jun 57.) (SECRET)

26 June 1957 -- At the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Stassen presented the US proposal for reductions in conventional arms. This called for an exchange of lists of
arms, the placing of these arms in international depots, and the eventual disposal of such weapons. The Subcommittee did not discuss the specific items to be included on the list, although it apparently accepted Mr. Stassen's description of these arms--based on the approved US position--as "substantial in amount, significant in kind, of post-World War II manufacture," and including those naval vessels "in current military use." The UK, French, and Canadian representatives supported Mr. Stassen's position. Mr. Zorin agreed in principle, but asked that the US, UK, and France provide provisional lists for study before the submission of the Soviet list.  (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7324, 26 Jun 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7327, 27 Jun 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (DPC Note No. 153, "Fifth Report to NATO, July 4," 8 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

Reporting to the State Department, Mr. Stassen stated that the Subcommittee discussion was concerned with the principle of exchanging lists of arms, and did not at this time involve any actual exchange of lists. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7285, 26 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.) (SECRET)

26 June 1957 -- During a news conference, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the willingness of the US to accept a suspension of nuclear tests as part of a general first-step disarmament agreement. He added, however, that ending tests could impede progress on the production of "clean" nuclear weapons and on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. (New York Times, 26 Jun 57, 1:7; text, 10:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 June 1957 -- The International Labor Organization, at its conference at Geneva, adopted a resolution expressing the
hope that the work of the UN Disarmament Commission might move steadily forward. The resolution was offered by the US, UK, France, and Canada as an amendment to the Soviet resolution proposing a halt in nuclear tests (see item of 4 June). In a speech to the conference on 21 June, US delegate Francis O. Wilcox had pointed out that a cessation of nuclear tests was just one of the many disarmament problems being considered by the UN Disarmament Commission. It would be better, he said, to leave such problems to the Commission. The vote on the Western resolution was 168-0, with 39 abstentions. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 945 (5 Aug 57), pp. 258-259.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen gave the Disarmament Subcommittee a very general description of US views on the type of control organ to be established under a first-step disarmament agreement. His presentation contained nothing essentially different from his statement of 17 April. Mr. Zorin continued to press for speed in the presentation of the US position. Mr. Stassen and Mr. Zorin also met separately for an informal discussion on disarmament. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7389, 7363, 7369, 27 Jun 57.) (SECREТ) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7373, 27 Jun 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

27 June 1957 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a tentative list of armaments that could be placed in storage in connection with a force-level reduction to 2.5 million men under a first-stage disarmament agreement (see items of 18 and 26 June). The Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned the advisability of introducing into the disarmament negotiations any list of arms at that time. They recommended that the matter of determining arms to be stored should not be introduced until the last stages of the
negotiations, dependent upon agreement on other items in the US position on first-stage disarmament. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considerable misgivings concerning the effect of a premature disclosure of a US list of arms. Such a list should first be thoroughly discussed and coordinated with the Western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and not discussed with or given to the Soviets—even on an informal basis—until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the results of consultations with the West.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also strongly urged that when the time came to give the US list to the Soviet delegates, the list should be given only in return for a simultaneous presentation of the Soviet list. Moreover, it should be made clear to the Soviets that the US list was being submitted only for the purpose of negotiating a final list to be incorporated in a disarmament agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the arms on their tentative list bore only a general relation to a reduction in US manpower to 2.5 million, and that the list should be regarded as being only a rough approximation and not a final solution. Any list of arms to be actually placed in storage would have to be based on the actual force structure then in existence, and on consideration of the terms of the disarmament agreement and of the USSR list. In formulating a final list, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would retain for US use those armaments required to insure the maximum capabilities of the forces allowed under the terms of any disarmament agreement. They would expect the USSR to do the same.

In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urged that the provisional list of arms they had prepared be
withheld from Mr. Stassen until such time as was determined propitious by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 27 Jun 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 70, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/232, Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, same file, sec 69.) (TOP SECRET)

28 June 1957 -- At a brief meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Stassen requested clarification of the Soviet views on the establishment of ground control posts under a first-stage disarmament agreement. He stressed the value of such posts as a means of safeguarding against surprise attack. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 7400, 28 Jun 57. (SECRET)
(Msg, London (Whitney), to SecState, 7413, 29 Jun 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

29 June 1957 -- Mr. Stassen and Mr. Moch met with the North Atlantic Council in Paris to report on and discuss the London disarmament talks and to explain Western disarmament proposals. (DPC Note No. 153, "Fifth Report to NATO, July 4," 8 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
(New York Times, 30 Jun 57, 1:1; 2 Jul 57, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

30 June 1957 -- In a speech at Dortmund, Germany, Chancellor Adenauer stated that West Germany was prepared to agree to the inspection of German territory under a disarmament agreement. He denied that his government was hindering the conclusion of an agreement at the London disarmament talks. (New York Times, 1 Jul 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

1 July 1957 -- The Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Secretary of State the list of armaments submitted to the Defense Department on 27 June by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff. In his covering letter, Mr. Wilson expressed his agreement with these views and recommendations. (N/H of JCS 1731/232, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 3 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 69.)

1 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles cautioned Mr. Stassen against any move in the disarmament negotiations that might tie the solution of specific political issues to specific disarmament steps. He said that any such "one-to-one correlation" would probably turn the Disarmament Subcommittee into a forum for the discussion of the substance of political issues, and could delay implementation of a first-step disarmament agreement. On 3 July, Mr. Stassen replied that he had been endeavoring to avoid specific terms when discussing political questions in the disarmament negotiations. The US delegation, he said, had been negotiating along the lines desired by Mr. Dulles. (Msgs, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 16, 1 Jul 57; London (Whitney) to SecState, 81, 3 Jul 57.)

2 July 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd introduced a joint statement of Canada, France, the UK, and the US concerning the temporary suspension of nuclear tests. The joint statement welcomed, as an "essential requirement" for progress on this matter, the Soviet acceptance of inspection posts to control and detect nuclear testing. It stated that a temporary suspension of tests was now possible as part of a first-step disarmament agreement. This suspension would be subject to precise agreement on its duration and timing, on the installation and location of controls and inspection posts, and on its relationship to other provisions of a first-step agreement. These other provisions would include
initial reductions in armed forces and armaments, with accompanying inspection measures, and a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" under conditions to be agreed upon. The joint statement also proposed that a group of experts should meet to design an inspection system to verify the test suspension. The chairman of the five delegations to the Disarmament Subcommittee should consider the necessary relationship of the provision for the temporary suspension of nuclear tests to the other provisions of the first-step disarmament agreement.

After Mr. Lloyd had concluded his presentation, Mr. Moch (France) and Mr. Johnson (Canada) stated their support. Mr. Zorin welcomed the Western move, but asked for clarification of several points. Mr. Stassen then began a detailed exposition of the provisions of the joint statement, in effect the US position on nuclear tests. He stated that the suspension of tests should be initially for ten months, contingent on Soviet agreement to stop the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Both measures should be subject to adequate control, including inspection posts, and be part of a first-step disarmament agreement to be joined by other states. Ten months should be adequate for the installation of an inspection and control system and for other states to sign the treaty. If inspection was adequate and many other states had joined and the situation was "favorable," than a longer period of suspension might be possible. If not, the US would resume tests, Mr. Stassen said that the date for a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons-purposes" might be sometime in 1959, after installation of an adequate inspection system. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 78, 3 Jul 57.) (SECRET) (DPC
Note No. 153, "Fifth Report to NATO, July 4," 8 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Text in DPC Note No. 154, "Joint Statement of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States . . . .," 10 Jul 57, same file, BP pt 9.) (SECRET)

2 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles stated during a news conference that it would be possible to have a disarmament agreement without Communist China being a party to it. The agreement would be negotiated in such a way, however, that if Communist China violated it, the US would be relieved of its obligations under the treaty. The Secretary also pointed out that it might be possible to make a disarmament agreement with the Chinese Communists without extending diplomatic recognition to them. He cited as examples armament-limitation and inspection agreements made in connection with North Korea and Viet-Nam. (New York Times, 3 Jul 57, 1:5; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 943 (22 Jul 57), pp. 139-145), and also DPC Sect Note No 191, "Statements on Communist China," 1 Oct 57, pp. 4-5, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

2 July 1957 -- In a memorandum to the US Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided guidance in the area of disarmament in preparation for a meeting of the Standing Group with the North Atlantic Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the US Representative a copy of the US position on first-phase disarmament, approved by the President on 12 June 1957. In accordance with this position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the US would leave to European initiative matters relating to an inspection zone in Western Europe. (SM-468-57, JCS to US Rep SGN, "Disarmament (U)," 2 Jul 57, derived fr Dec On JCS 2073/1416,
Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, both CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 70. (TOP SECRET)

3 July 1957 -- President Eisenhower, at a news conference, repeated his earlier statements that the US was willing to suspend nuclear tests. If this country should make another test, however, he would invite other nations to make their own measurements of the amount of radioactive fallout that resulted. This would indicate US progress towards making a "clean" bomb. The President said that, looking toward the time when the US could actually produce a "clean" bomb, he had talked with his scientific advisers about the feasibility of sharing this knowledge with other nations. Discussing the disarmament negotiations then in progress, Mr. Eisenhower stated that the US could not act on any program without consulting the other NATO countries. He wanted to avoid a situation in which he would "become like Napoleon and Alexander, on a raft . . . , settling the fate of Europe."

(New York Times, 4 Jul 57, 1:5; text, 13:1-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

The New York Times later reported that Congressional reaction toward the idea of sharing US knowledge of how to produce a "clean" bomb appeared to be "weighted on the unfavorable side." (New York Times, 5 Jul 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 July 1957 -- Mr. Stassen reported to the State Department his belief that it was possible that the USSR was prepared, "in a suitable forum," to initiate serious negotiations concerning political problems such as the reunification of Germany. While admitting that his analysis was based on what might appear to be "slender bits of evidence," he felt there was a good possibility of a shift in the Soviet position. He based this conclusion on a comparison of present with earlier
Soviet attitudes toward a discussion of political conditions in connection with disarmament. A year earlier, the USSR had refused to recognize any relation between the two subjects (see item of 3 July 1956); now the Soviets were at least showing an interest and asking questions about the Western position that these problems were connected. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 82, 3 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

3 July 1957 -- Mr. Stassen continued his exposition, at the Disarmament Subcommittee, of the US position on nuclear tests. He explained that, while the suspension of tests would begin immediately after ratification of the first-stage disarmament treaty, the inspection system needed to check on a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" was more elaborate than that required to monitor a test moratorium, and its installation might take some time. The cut-off in production would take effect one month after this inspection system was installed, possibly in 1959. Mr. Stassen cited a number of statements by Soviet spokesman as well as representatives of other countries, including India, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Poland, that either called for a halt in nuclear weapons production, or that were favorable to the idea. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 125, 4 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

3 July 1957 -- After the Subcommittee meeting, Canadian delegate Johnson informed Mr. Stassen that he had been authorized to join in an informal presentation to the Soviets of the North American and Arctic aerial inspection zones. Ambassador Johnson added that, if the Soviets showed interest, he did not anticipate any difficulty in obtaining formal Canadian approval. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 116, 3 Jul 57.) (SECRET)
3 July 1957 -- The State Department suggested that Mr. Stassen take care not to give the Soviets the impression that the question of limiting or restricting the use of nuclear weapons was in any way negotiable. No new formula could be acceptable if it went beyond the official US position that neither nuclear nor conventional weapons should be used in a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. The Soviet objective was to stigmatize nuclear weapons and their use, and neutralize the US superiority in this area. Nevertheless, the US should not give the world the impression that it intended to use nuclear weapons promiscuously, or that it was insensitive to public opinion on this question. Therefore, since the USSR had not accepted the US position, the Department felt that the Soviets should be asked to suggest a formula concerning nuclear weapons that they thought might be acceptable to the US. Any Soviet "movement" on this point would be an important indication that an agreement might be reached. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 79, 3 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

5 July 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee met twice. At the first meeting, Mr. Stassen concluded his discussion of the Western Joint statement of 2 July. His presentation was an exposition of the US position on transferring previously manufactured fissionable materials to "non-weapons purposes" under international inspection (see items of 31 May and 12 June 1957). At the second meeting, the other Western representatives spoke in support of the Joint statement. Mr. Zorin said the Soviet delegation would study the Western position. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 150,160, 5 Jul 57.) (SECRET)
5 July 1957 -- The Western delegates to the disarmament talks held a four-power meeting to discuss their views on inspection. The UK delegate reported that the North Atlantic Council appeared to be in agreement on three broad principles: 1) the air inspection zone should be as large as possible; 2) the ground inspection zone should also be large and should include mobile inspectors; and 3) inspection of nuclear weapons should be excluded from any inspection arrangement.

Mr. Stassen reiterated the US position that the initiative for a European inspection zone and its inspection requirements would have to come from the European states. French representative Moch emphasized French insistence that air and ground inspection zones must not be identical. He feared that, if they were, a European neutral zone would result. In response to a query from the Canadian delegate, Mr. Stassen stated that the US proposal for inspection of the USSR, Canada, and the US contemplated only aerial overflight, with a proviso that other elements of inspection might be included through subsequent negotiations. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 161, 5 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

8 July 1957 -- In a statement before the Disarmament Subcommittee, Soviet representative Zorin in effect rejected the Western disarmament proposals outlined in the four-power statement of 2 July and in Mr. Stassen's subsequent presentations. Although Zorin stated that the USSR was firmly convinced of the possibility of reaching a first-step disarmament agreement, his speech was largely negative. He rejected, as a waste of time, the Western proposal that a group of experts meet to design an inspection system to verify the suspension of nuclear tests. On the other hand, he reaffirmed the Soviet position in favor of control posts. He declared that a
ten-month suspension of tests was too short, and repeated his call for a two- or three-year halt. He said that the USSR would consider a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" only if this were tied to a general renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, he criticized the US position that nuclear weapons could be employed in self-defense, arguing that it was impossible to define "self-defense" or "aggression." He added, however, that the USSR was ready to cooperate in drawing up a new formula for the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet representative also criticized other aspects of the Western position.

With the exception of Mr. Stassen, the Western delegates found the Zorin speech to be "negative," "disappointing," full of propaganda, and indicating no real desire to reach an agreement. Mr. Stassen felt the speech required study. In his report to the State Department, he said that the USSR had made "no moves backward" and that he saw an "element of flexibility" in Zorin's presentation. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 213, 214, 8 Jul 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 215, 9 Jul 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (New York Times, 9 Jul 57, 1:3-4; 10 Jul 57, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8 July 1957 -- The State Department informed Mr. Stassen that a description of inspection zones that he had requested permission to offer in the disarmament negotiations was not in conformity with approved US policy (see item of 12 June 1957). Mr. Stassen's description would have 1) referred to a European inspection zone, although the European states had not made a decision for or against this zone; 2) included in the initial US-Canada-USSR inspection zone that portion of
Norway and Denmark (Greenland) located north of the Arctic Circle, although this was not in accord with approved US policy; and 3) decreased the amount of Soviet territory to be included in the limited initial zone. Mr. Stassen was directed to correct his proposed description to conform with approved US policy. (Msgs, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 194, 8 Jul 57; London (Whitney) to SecState, 162, 5 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

9 July 1957 -- The State Department sent two messages to Mr. Stassen, questioning his statement to the Canadian delegate, at the four-power meeting on 5 July, that the US contemplated only aerial overflight in its proposal for a USSR-Canada-US inspection zone. The Department pointed out that US policy called for an aerial and ground inspection system (see items of 31 May and 12 June 1957). Moreover, it was the understanding of the Department that the President intended ground and aerial inspection zones to be coterminous, since only by a combination of both elements could an effective safeguard against surprise attack be achieved. It was up to Canada, however, to decide the terms on which it wished to participate in the US inspection proposal. The US would prefer Canadian acceptance of both ground and aerial inspection but if the Canadians would accept only aerial inspection, the US would be prepared to have them join on that basis. (Msgs, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 214, 221, 9 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

10 July 1957 -- Canadian Ambassador Johnson opened the discussion at the Disarmament Subcommittee by formally accepting the US proposal that ten months be set as the period of suspension of nuclear tests. He also expressed disappointment at Zorin's speech of 8 July. French delegate Moch also accepted the ten-month period, and strongly criticized the Zorin speech.
Mr. Stassen then made three points: 1) He denied the ulterior motivations attributed to the US by Zorin, and stressed American devotion to peace and to reaching a sound, safeguarded disarmament agreement. 2) He asked why Zorin, on the one hand, had insisted that the USSR would not delay establishment of a control system for nuclear tests, while, on the other, he had opposed a meeting of experts to establish such a system. 3) Mr. Stassen said the US would not use nuclear weapons for aggression, but that the US would not accept a complete ban on these weapons. He then asked Zorin for any draft formula on the use of nuclear weapons that the Soviets believed would be mutually acceptable (see item of 3 July 1957). UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, speaking for his country's delegation, also expressed disappointment in Zorin's speech. He later told Mr. Stassen that the UK would support the ten-month period of nuclear-test suspension.

Mr. Zorin replied by saying he wanted time to examine the Western statements. He declared that a committee of experts to design a control system could not be set up until agreement was reached on the length of time of the suspension. He also requested the Western powers to explain their reasons for wanting a ten-month suspension, adding that "perhaps you can convince us" that this period should be accepted. On the basis of these remarks and Zorin's statement of 8 July, Mr. Stassen felt that the USSR was "ready to move" toward disarmament, provided there were "movements by others." (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 278, 10 Jul 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 279, 10 Jul 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
10 July 1957 -- In Washington, Secretary of State Dulles explained to Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, that, for military and political reasons, the US felt it might be unwise to include a European inspection zone in the first-step disarmament agreement. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 138, 10 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

11 July 1957 -- Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev, visiting Czechoslovakia, told Prague factory workers that President Eisenhower's reference to a "clean" nuclear bomb (see item of 3 July) were "stupidities." "How can you have a clean bomb to do dirty things?" he asked. Later, a White House statement expressed amazement that Khrushchev should think efforts to eliminate fallout from atomic explosions were stupid. The US, said the statement, would continue efforts to avoid mass human destruction in an atomic war just as it was trying to eliminate the possibility of the war itself. (New York Times, 12 Jul 57, 1:5, 2:5; text of White House statement, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 944 (29 Jul 57), p. 185.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

11 July 1957 -- Mr. Selwyn Lloyd told the members of the Disarmament Subcommittee that the UK supported the US proposal for a ten-month suspension of nuclear tests. Mr. Stassen than spoke at length on this proposal. He stated that the US would not accept a two- or three-year suspension, and insisted on the ten-month period. Earlier in the day, in answer to a question by his Western colleagues, Mr. Stassen had indicated that the US might consider a twelve-month suspension period, if the Soviets proposed it, but that the US would not go beyond that point. He asked the other Western delegates to continue their support of the ten-month period. At the Subcommittee meeting, after Mr. Stassen had finished his explanation of
the US proposal, Soviet representative Zorin criticized his reasoning, but said he would carefully read the transcript of Mr. Stassen's statement. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 286, 312, 11 Jul 57.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 313, 11 Jul 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

12 July 1957 — At the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, Mr. Stassen listed five basic points in the US position on nuclear disarmament in a first-step agreement. The US, he said, would agree: 1) to halt nuclear tests; 2) to stop making nuclear weapons; 3) to begin the transfer to "non-weapons purposes" of fissionable material previously produced; 4) never to use nuclear weapons in aggression; 5) during the implementation of a first-step agreement, to continue its efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament treaty. Mr. Zorin attempted to sway Mr. Stassen from his insistence that a suspension of nuclear tests be limited to ten months. Zorin characterized the US stand as an ultimatum (see above item), and argued that other states would agree to a longer suspension. He stated, finally, that the USSR would be willing to negotiate about the length of the test suspension, but not on the basis of a US ultimatum. Mr. Stassen was optimistic over the Soviet willingness to negotiate, but the other Western delegations, especially the British, were reported as being pessimistic about the chances of agreement in the face of US unwillingness to make concessions. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 355, 12 Jul 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (New York Times, 13 Jul 57, 1:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

12 July 1957 — Mr. Stassen sent the State Department a long "clarifying message," apparently in answer to the Department's messages of 9 July, concerning negotiations on the
question of aerial and ground inspection. He stated that aerial inspection had been a matter of great difficulty to negotiate with the Soviets. The US delegation, he said, had held unwaveringly to the position that aerial inspection was essential to an inspection system, but it had never contemplated or proposed that there be no ground inspection in the aerial inspection zone. He had, however, concentrated on obtaining Soviet acceptance of the necessity of aerial inspection, and on gaining the consent of Western states whose territory would be involved, in order to be able to press the aerial inspection question with the Soviets. The Soviet Union had been willing to accept more ground than aerial inspection, and it had always been clear that ground inspection would be included in a disarmament treaty and that the details of both aerial and ground inspection would be spelled out in an annex to the treaty. Such specific matters as the degree of mobility, and the numbers and location of ground inspectors would all have to be negotiated before a treaty could be drafted, but Mr. Stassen's initial concentration had been on the difficult task of obtaining Soviet acceptance of aerial inspection. It was understood, he said, that any state consenting to a position to be taken in negotiations with the USSR on aerial inspection made this consent conditional on its own subsequent agreement with regard to the extent and detail of ground inspection within its territory, and on its similar agreement with relation to ground inspection in Soviet territory. The tactical situation in London, concluded Mr. Stassen, was that, due to his persistent efforts in support of aerial inspection, the US had obtained a greater opening of Communist territory to aerial inspection than ever before. This had come in the
Soviet proposal of 26 April, formally presented on 30 April. The USSR was now awaiting the response of the West to this proposal. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 322, 12 Jul 57, DA IN 37319, Crystal Team, JSPG, files.) (SECRET)

13 July 1957 -- Canadian delegate Johnson advised Mr. Stassen that his government agreed to the inspection zones proposed by the US: a US-Canada-USSR zone, or the alternate Arctic zone (see item of 12 June 1957). Ambassador Johnson also said that Canada believed that an inspection system should include both aerial and ground components, and that the location and number of ground posts and the mobility of the ground inspectors should be subject to precise agreement. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 363, 13 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

13 July 1957 -- In a message to the Secretary of State, Mr. Stassen commented on Mr. Dulles' statement to Louis Joxe that a European inspection zone might be unwise in a first-step disarmament agreement (see item of 10 July). Mr. Stassen stated that the majority of Western European military leaders felt that a European inspection zone would add to Western European security, would provide greater protection against great surprise attack, and would decrease the danger of war. The people of Western Europe also appeared to favor inclusion of a European inspection zone in a first-step disarmament agreement. Therefore, said Mr. Stassen, if West Europeans believed that the US had shifted from a position of leaving the initiative to them to one of "stopping this initiative," this might lead them to think that the US had a negative attitude toward the general subject of disarmament. Moreover, pro-US Western statesmen and political parties might suffer public disfavor, with serious adverse consequences to NATO and US security. Under these circumstances, there was also
the strong possibility that the UN General Assembly would pass resolutions against nuclear-weapons testing, against the stationing of nuclear weapons on foreign soil, and others contrary to US interests. Mr. Stassen recommended that, if a European inspection zone was no longer acceptable, the West Europeans should be allowed to realize this through their own reasoning or through the Soviet rejection of a reasonable proposal by the West Europeans. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 362, 13 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

15 July 1957 -- Nikita Khrushchev told Czech workers in Pilsen that the West was stalling in the London disarmament negotiations because "the capitalists think it unprofitable to liquidate the cold war." (New York Times, 15 Jul 57, 2:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 July 1957 -- Mr. Stassen opened the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting by calling for patience and persistence in moving towards a first-step disarmament agreement. He said he was presenting the details of the US position as rapidly as could be expected in view of the importance of the problems involved and the number of nations whose vital interests were concerned. Mr. Zorin expressed Soviet regret at delays in negotiations, and again requested a reply to the Soviet proposals of 30 April 1957. Replying to Mr. Stassen's request that the USSR submit an alternative draft formula on the use of nuclear weapons (see item of 10 July 1957), Zorin indicated that the Soviets might be willing to consider a French suggestion that called for a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons except in self-defense. Although he did not develop this point, his remarks appeared to suggest a shift from the previous Soviet position calling for an unqualified renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. (Msg,
16 July 1957 -- After lengthy consultations, the four Western
degradations to the Disarmament Subcommittee forwarded to the
North Atlantic Council the proposals on aerial and ground
inspection and on control of missiles that they planned to
introduce in the disarmament talks. The systems of aerial
and ground inspection were aimed at guarding against surprise
attack, and not at verifying reductions in arms and arma-
ments. The latter would be covered by other provisions. In
a covering letter to the NAC, the Western Four requested
NATO comment in time to allow Subcommittee discussion of the
proposals to begin on 22 July. According to the letter:

(1) The Western Four were prepared to propose the
following US-Canada-USSR aerial inspection zones:

(a) All of the continental US and Alaska, including
the Aleutians, and all of Canada and the USSR, or

(b) All territory north of the Arctic Circle of the
USSR, Canada, US (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and
Norway; all of Canada, the US, and the USSR west of 140
degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East
longitude, and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all
of the remainder of Alaska and Kamchatka; and all of the
Aleutians and Kurils. Denmark and Norway had approved
inclusion of their territory.

(2) The British and French, with the support of Canada
and the US, were prepared to propose the following European
aerial inspection zones:

(a) All of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals
(defined as from 10 degrees West to 60 degrees East
longitude), or
(b) All European territory between 5 and 35 degrees East longitude, and from the Arctic Circle to 40 degrees North latitude.

(3) The Western Four were also prepared to propose a system of ground observation that included inspection posts at principal ports, rail junctions, highways, and airfields, as well as ground teams having an adequate and agreed degree of mobility. These posts and teams would be established by agreement anywhere in the territories of the states concerned, and without regard to the limits of the aerial inspection zones.

(4) Finally, the Western Four were prepared to propose that, within three months after the entry into force of a disarmament treaty, all signatory nations would cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system that would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. (DPC Note No. 156, "Four-Power Proposals on Inspection Zones and Missiles Transmitted to NATO on July 16," 17 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (SECRET)

The proposals on inspection zones were also delivered to the Norwegian and Danish Embassies in London. On 17 July, the Norwegian and Danish ambassadors met with Mr. Stassen and stated their approval. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 509, 18 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

16 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles said, during a news conference, that the US was considering means of establishing nuclear-weapons stockpiles in the NATO area for the use of its allies in case of war. A disarmament agreement to halt the production of nuclear weapons, he said, would make NATO
dependent on the US. These stockpiles—the creation of which might require Congressional action—would assure the NATO states of nuclear weapons if war came. Mr. Dulles added that the stockpiling project would become "academic" if the Soviets continued to oppose the idea of halting the production of nuclear arms. (New York Times, 17 Jul 57, 1:1; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 945, pp. 228-235.)

16 July 1957 -- In response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), based on a request from SACEUR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished the Secretary of Defense with their appraisal of the intelligence advantages to be gained for NATO through aerial inspection of certain areas of the inspection zones proposed by the USSR on 26 and 30 April 1957.
16 July 1957 -- President Eisenhower authorized a cut of 100,000 men in the US armed forces. This reduction in the previously authorized strength of 2.8 million men had been recommended by Secretary of Defense Wilson and was to be carried out by the end of 1957. On 17 July, at a press conference, the President stated that the reduction was not linked with disarmament negotiations, but, rather, was being made in an attempt to achieve as "perfectly balanced" a military program as possible. (New York Times, 17 Jul 57, 1:5, text of Mr. Wilson's recommendation, 8:3; 18 Jul 57, 12:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 July 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd proposed the establishment of four or five working groups to examine the technical details of points on which agreement in principle had already been achieved. These groups could expedite progress towards over-all agreement. They might examine such topics as the levels for military forces and conventional armaments, the details of aerial and ground inspection, and the suspension of nuclear tests. Mr. Zorin, although pressed by French representative Moch, refused to comment on this proposal other than to say he would study it. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 491,17 Jul 57.) (SECRET)
17 July 1957 -- In answer to a question at his press conference, President Eisenhower said that it might be useful for Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov and Secretary of Defense Wilson to exchange visits. On 18 July, the State Department informed US ambassadors at major European capitals that the President's statement was merely "a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question" and that there was no plan to hold bilateral talks with the Soviets on disarmament matters affecting US allies. (New York Times, 18 Jul 57, 12:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 524, 18 Jul 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

17 July 1957 -- In a message to Mr. Stassen, Secretary of State Dulles expressed concern that the proposals transmitted to the North Atlantic Council by the Western Four on 16 July failed to establish the "necessary relationship" between aerial and ground inspection. He stated that US policy clearly implied that there must be a single system having both aerial and ground components capable of working with each other. Mr. Stassen replied that all US proposals, except those concerning establishment of a European inspection zone, had been presented as inseparable parts of a whole. He added that all delegations, including that of the USSR, knew that there was to be an aerial and ground inspection system, to be "knitted together," along with nuclear-weapons inspection, under an over-all inspection organization. The details would be worked out in the annexes to the disarmament treaty, once agreement was reached on the inspection zones themselves. On 18 July, Secretary Dulles replied that Mr. Stassen must stress the US position that aerial and ground inspection zones must be coterminous to be effective. This, he stated, was a different matter from the fact that the US proposals were inseparable. Moreover, he did not think it adequate at this
time to depend upon annexes to assure the principle of aerial and ground inspection zones being "knitted together."
(Msqs, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 487, 17 Jul 57; 555, 18 Jul 57; London (Whitney) to SecState, 484, 17 Jul 57.)

18 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles requested Mr. Stassen's opinion of a proposed change in the US position with regard to aerial and ground inspection zones (see item of 12 June 1957). In view of the reservations held by some Western states concerning a European zone, and considering German apprehensions about ground inspection and its political impact on Germany, Mr. Dulles felt that the US should encourage the NATO states to propose an expansion of the proposed US-USSR-Canada zone to include NATO and satellite Europe. (As approved on 12 June, this zone had included all of the continental US, Alaska, all Soviet territory, and, with its consent, Canada. If this were unacceptable to the USSR, a limited initial zone in the Arctic was to be offered.) The State Department now proposed to amend this to the following: Initially the US would propose a zone to include the continental US, Alaska, all Soviet territory, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and, with the consent of the parties involved, all of Canada and Germany and the European territory of the UK, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, and Iceland. (The Secretary did not include France among the European states listed. But since he had stated that the enlarged zone was to include NATO, and since he did not explain his omission of France, it was probably accidental.) The US would be prepared to accept the inclusion of any other European states (Sweden, Finland,
Yugoslavia, Spain, Austria, and Switzerland) that wished to join. If the USSR rejected this proposal, the US would then fall back on the US-Canada-USSR zone, or the Arctic zone alone, as conceived in the 12 June position. Further consideration of a European zone could then be postponed until after receipt of Soviet reaction to these US proposals, presumably after the forthcoming critical West German elections.

Mr. Dulles stated that the proposed expansion of the US-Canada-USSR zone would have the following advantages:
(1) It would help the European states to resolve their uncertainty about the desirability of a smaller European zone, since it would provide them with the assurance they desired that the USSR would also be open to inspection and that they would not be singled out for separate treatment.
(2) The US would not be accused of backing down on its proposal for a European zone and on the idea of the "open skies" proposal in general. (3) Disarmament negotiations could be concentrated more quickly on the more important areas dividing the USSR and the West, such as the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Should the Soviets reject Western proposals in these areas, there would be no need to proceed any further into the delicate question of a European zone, and world opinion would then favor the West. (4) Since the USSR would probably not at this time agree to open all of its territory to inspection, the new proposal could give the US a "graceful way" of falling back on its proposal for an Arctic inspection zone. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 552, 18 Jul 57, OICGS files.) (SECRET)

18 July 1957 -- A UK White Paper on disarmament, in the form of a Government report to Parliament, stated that the prospects for partial disarmament had "materially improved" during the
preceding four months. The White Paper summarized the 1957 disarmament talks and spoke of "substantial advances" having been made, but pointed out that many obstacles remained to be overcome before a disarmament treaty could be signed.


19 July 1957 -- The London disarmament talks entered their fifth month. At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Zorin gave a long speech in which he: (1) accepted the second- and third-stage force level figures, proposed by the US, of 2.1 and 1.7 million men, provided they were not tied in with unacceptable political conditions; (2) indicated that the Soviets were prepared to negotiate on a period between ten months and two or three years for the suspension of nuclear tests, provided this period was long enough to inhibit substantially any test programs that might follow; and (3) stated that the USSR was prepared to proceed with technical committees, as proposed by the UK on 17 July, as soon as agreement was reached in principle on the main issues between East and West. Mr. Stassen, in his first official reaction to the UK proposal, accepted the technical committees under three conditions: (1) specific terms of reference would have to be agreed to; (2) negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the principal remaining East-West differences would have to continue simultaneously in the Subcommittee; and (3) the number of committees could not be so great as to impede the progress of the Subcommittee. (Msg, London (Whitney) to
SecState, 575, 19 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

19 July 1957 -- The four Western delegations to the Disarmament Subcommittee answered questions raised by the North Atlantic Council concerning the proposals transmitted to NATO by the Western Four on 16 July. In a message to the NAC, the Western Four stated, among other things, that:

(1) The "5-35" inspection zone for Europe (between 5 degrees and 35 degrees East longitude) was the minimum they would accept without further consultation with the NAC. The southern boundary of this zone would be 42 degrees North latitude, a line that excluded Greece and Turkey.

(2) The southern boundary of the larger European zone (from the Atlantic to the Urals) would be 40 degrees North latitude, since this would open the Caucasus to inspection. This zone was intended to include all European countries that consented to inspection, but inclusion of nations not belonging to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, while desirable, was not necessary for the success of the system.

(3) A ground inspection system, as well as air inspection zones, would be essential to inspection under a first-step agreement. It was the firm position of the Western Four that the inspection provisions would not be permitted to lead to the creation of a demilitarized zone. (DPC Note No. 159, "North Atlantic Council Questions on Inspection and Western Four-Power Replies," 24 Jul 57, COS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (SECRET)

19 July 1957 -- In response to Secretary Dulles' proposal of 18 July concerning inspection zones, Mr. Stassen gave his opinion that the US should proceed according to the position approved on 12 June, and not make a major change at this time. He stated that the West had given its approval to the
US-Canada-USSR and Arctic inspection zones as outlined in the 12 June position paper. A major change now would cause much confusion and further delay. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 572, 19 Jul 57, OCCJS files.) (SECRET)

From NATO, meanwhile, US Ambassador Perkins gave his general approval of the Dulles proposal, but warned that it might take some time for it to be accepted by the West. (Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 195, 19 Jul 57, OCCJS files.) (SECRET)

19 July 1957 -- The State Department forwarded to Mr. Stassen a departmental intelligence analysis of Soviet disarmament policy that stated that there existed no evidence of Soviet intent to strive for rapid progress in disarmament negotiations. Moreover, the Soviets might even be preparing to try to arrange a recess in the disarmament talks before an agreement could be reached. In this case, they would seek to have the record indicate that the West was to blame.

Secretary Dulles felt that this interpretation was too strong, and that there were indications that the Soviets might be even more inclined toward making an agreement than they had been previously. If a recess occurred for any cause, he said, the Soviets would not allow a major break in the "main thread" of negotiations. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 597, 19 Jul 57; 659, 22 Jul 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

20 July 1957 -- Mr. Stassen continued his discussion with Secretary of State Dulles of the relationship between aerial and ground inspection zones (see item of 17 July). In a message to the Secretary, Mr. Stassen pointed out that the draft working paper on the US position that he had transmitted to his Western colleagues on 15 June had used the precise language with regard to inspection zones that had been employed in the
US policy paper approved by the President on 12 June. He also stated that the 12 June paper had not used the word "coterminal," subsequently employed by Mr. Dulles to describe the relationship between aerial and ground inspection zones.

Mr. Stassen went on to explain the views of his Western colleagues on aerial and ground inspection zones. France, he said, did not wish these zones to be coterminal in Europe, for fear that this might lead to the establishment of a demilitarized zone within the area. The French therefore favored ground inspection within the USSR and in western Europe beyond the boundaries of the aerial inspection zone. On the other hand, if only an Arctic zone were agreed upon, Canada did not at this time wish to agree to open all of Canada to ground inspection. Furthermore, Mr. Stassen felt that the Canadians did not wish to agree, in a first-step accord, to more ground inspection in Canada than the US would accept for US territory. The British, finally, would not consent to complete ground inspection of the UK under the first-step agreement, even if it were counter-balanced by deeper ground inspection of the USSR, if no US continental territory were subject to ground inspection. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 579, 20 Jul 57.)

20 July 1957 -- In a lengthy note to British Prime Minister Macmillan, in reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 14 June, Soviet Premier Bulganin strongly criticized the Western disarmament position. His letter repeated familiar Soviet views and proposals on disarmament, and the UK Foreign Office later informed the US Embassy that the note was without any "constructive significance." (New York Times, 23 Jul 57, 7:3; 25 Jul 57, 1:1, text excerpts, 4:3-8.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 746, 26 Jul 57, OCCJS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
22 July 1957 -- At a brief meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the negotiators discussed the relation between a suspension of nuclear tests and a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Nothing new or significant was said. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 619, 22 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

22 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles, in a reply to Mr. Stassen's message of 20 July, repeated his view that, according to the US position on disarmament, aerial and ground inspection zones must be combined, and one without the other was inadequate. He stated that the Defense Department and CIA strongly supported this interpretation, and that the State Department agreed. The US, said Mr. Dulles, did not wish to impose its views on its allies, but neither these allies nor the USSR should doubt that the US considered coterminous ground and air inspection "a related whole" and that, with relation to reciprocal US and Soviet inspection zones, the US would insist upon this point. He added, however, that, as he had already indicated (see item of 9 July), if the Canadians would accept only aerial inspection, the US would be willing to have them sign a disarmament agreement on this basis. The US would also consider the views of any other of its allies concerning any inspection zone in which they were involved. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 662, 22 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

22 July 1957 -- In a radio and television speech, explaining US disarmament policy, Secretary of State Dulles called on the Soviet Union to provide "convincing proof" of its seriousness about reaching a disarmament agreement. Without such proof, he said, the US would continue to test nuclear weapons and to strengthen its security alliances. Mr. Dulles stated that
"some slight progress" had been made in the London disarmament talks, but that East and West were still divided on fundamental issues. He called for a first-step disarmament agreement that would: (1) reduce the risk of surprise attack by establishing a system of inspection and control; (2) halt the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes"; (3) suspend nuclear tests for "about" ten months; (4) limit the size of military forces and lower the level of conventional arms; (5) begin the transfer of fissionable materials from weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses; and (6) control the development of outer-space missiles. These US proposals, he said, represented "a beginning and not an end." (New York Times, 23 Jul 57, 1:8; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 946 (12 Aug 57), pp. 267-272; copy also filed as DPC Note No. 158, "Disarmament and Peace; Report to the Nation by Secretary Dulles, July 22, 1957," 23 Jul 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

24 July 1957 -- After a lengthy discussion on 23 July of the latest disarmament proposals of the Western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee (see items of 16 and 19 July), the North Atlantic Council forwarded its views to the Western Four. The NAC stated that:

(1) It did not object to the US-Canada-USSR or Arctic zones proposed by the Western Four, and agreed to the proposed area of the European zones.

(2) A European inspection zone should not be established without also establishing an Arctic or US-Soviet zone. On the other hand, the NAC could "envisage" a proposal for an Arctic or US-Soviet zone that did not provide for a European zone.
(3) The NAC agreed to aerial inspection and to ground control posts within a European zone. It warned, however, against the installation of mobile inspectors, since this might lead first to demilitarization and then to neutralization of this zone. The question of mobile inspectors should, therefore, be considered at a later date. (Msgs, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 226, 23 Jul 57; POLTO 233, 24 Jul 57; DPC Note No. 156, Rev. 1, "Four-Power Proposals . . . and the Secretary General's Reply . . . .", 21 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (SECRET)

25 July 1957 -- The Western Four met to discuss tactics for presenting to the Disarmament Subcommittee the Western proposals on inspection zones. The British and French strongly opposed any separation of the four proposed zones. They stated that these should be presented in a single package, with Four-Power support, although the US and Canada could present the US-Canada-USSR and Arctic zones, and the UK and France the European zones. In a message to the State Department, Mr. Stassen supported this approach. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 711, 712, 25 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

25 July 1957 -- Representatives of the State Department, headed by Secretary Dulles, conferred with Defense Department representatives, headed by Lt. Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, on the problem of a European inspection zone. Mr. Dulles was particularly disturbed over the reaction of the North Atlantic Council to the Western-Four proposals on this subject. He felt that the position of the NATO countries fell considerably short of the desired West European "initiative" for a European zone, and that, in fact, the West European continental states did not wish to commit themselves to
inspection until the nature of such inspection was further developed and proved politically and militarily acceptable. The Secretary believed that, under these circumstances, a discussion in the Disarmament Subcommittee of a European zone would give the Soviets an excellent opportunity to exploit Western differences and to win a great political victory.

Accordingly, with the concurrence of the Defense Department, Mr. Dulles forwarded to Mr. Stassen and the US Ambassadors to NATO and West Germany, for comment, the following proposed new US position on inspection zones:

(1) The US and, it was hoped, Canada would, on behalf of the Western Four, propose the continental US-Canada-Alaska-USSR zone.

(2) The UK and France, on behalf of the Western Four, would state that the European members of NATO would agree to the establishment, in conjunction with the above zone, of a European zone extending from the Soviet Union to the Atlantic. The UK and France would also state, however, that, because of the complicated political and military problems involved, they did not wish to define precisely the scope of this zone or the character of aerial and ground inspection until after the matter of inspection had been realistically worked out in an area free of such special problems.

(3) If the US-Canada-Alaska-USSR zone, with or without the European zone, were rejected by the Soviet Union, then the US and Canada, on behalf of the Western Four, would propose the Arctic zone.

(4) This position would be cleared with NATO. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 798, 25 Jul 57; Memo, Capt. P. J. Blouin, USN, to Adm. Radford, "Disarmament," 26 Jul 57, CCJCS file, Disarmament (Blouin Memos); (Memo, Fox to
DepSecDef, "Report of State Defense Meeting on European Inspection Zone," 26 Jul 57, OCOJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs). All in OCOJCS files. (SECRET)

25 July 1957 — At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Stassen introduced a US proposal for control of missiles. The proposal, part of the US disarmament position of 25 May, and unchanged by the new position of 12 June, had been cleared with NATO and had the support of the Western members of the Subcommittee. Mr. Stassen proposed that, within three months after the effective date of a first-stage disarmament agreement, the signatory states cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to design an inspection system to ensure that outer-space missiles would be used only for peaceful and scientific purposes. The other Western representatives also spoke in favor of this proposal. Mr. Zorin said the USSR would consider it. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 710, 25 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

25 July 1957 — In a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State Dulles requested that the Defense Department study and make recommendations on an air and ground inspection system to serve as a safeguard against surprise attack— as opposed to a more comprehensive system involving a combination of purposes. Mr. Dulles was particularly concerned with the ground component of such a system, and the questions of mobility and right of access to be accorded ground inspection teams. He also felt it important to review existing inspection plans from the standpoint of economy, consistent with military security, in both cost and numbers of personnel. He requested an outline plan of the inspection system by 15 August, in order to meet the schedule for the introduction into the disarmament talks of proposals on inspection zones.
(Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 25 Jul 57, app to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 30 Jul 57, encl to JCS 1731/235, Note by Secys, same subj, 1 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 71.) (SECRET)

26 July 1957 -- The Western Four met to discuss further the question of presenting to the Disarmament Subcommittee the matter of inspection zones. The UK, France, and Canada favored the following procedures:

(1) The US, with the support of the others, would state that if the USSR would open all of its territory to inspection, each of the Western Four would open its territory, and, in addition, propose, subject to the consent of the states concerned, opening up the remainder of the larger European zone already approved by NATO.

(2) The Western Four would further state that if the USSR were not prepared for such a complete opening, the West would accept an Arctic zone, as defined in the US 12 June position paper and subsequently approved by NATO.

(3) In this presentation, the West would not present the "5-35" European zone, or any other specifically defined European zone. The Western Four would await Soviet reaction, and then consult each other, before presenting any European zone.

Reporting this meeting to the State Department, Mr. Stassen commented that this approach would seem to fit with the State-Defense proposal of 25 July, as well as with the views of the West Germans. He added, however, that should the Soviet Union reject or delay its response to this approach, the UK and France would probably desire strongly to present the "5-35" European zone. The British and French had misgivings about a first-step treaty without a European
zone, and there was some feeling that the US and West Germany were trying to stop a European zone. On the other hand, if the Soviets would accept the Arctic zone, public opinion in favor of making a start on inspection might bring about British, French, and general NATO acquiescence in a first-step treaty without a European inspection zone. This situation, counseled Mr. Stassen, should be permitted to develop gradually. The US and/or West Germany should not give the appearance of trying to impose their position on NATO.

(Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 726, 26 Jul 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

26 July 1957 -- At the Western Four Power meeting, the delegates also discussed the French proposal for a formula, to be incorporated into the disarmament treaty, on the use of nuclear weapons. Soviet representative Zorin had indicated that the USSR might be willing to accept this formula (see item of 15 July). The French proposal, dubbed the "double negative formula," was as follows: "Each of the parties assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against a state which has not made an armed attack putting the party in a situation of individual or collective self defense." Mr. Stassen attempted to gain Four-Power approval of the US formula on the use of nuclear weapons (see item of 31 May). The French and British, however, opposed this. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 750, 756, 26 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

26 July 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the UK and France supported the US proposal, introduced by Mr. Stassen on 25 July, for control of missiles. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 753, 26 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

26 July 1957 -- The US Ambassador at NATO commented at length on the Anglo-French and State-Defense proposals of 25 July and
on the UK-French-Canadian proposal reported by Mr. Stassen earlier on 26 July. Ambassador Perkins felt that the latter was preferable to any approach so far suggested. He warned that any proposal in the Disarmament Subcommittee for a European inspection zone might have dangerous effects on the forthcoming German elections and on Chancellor Adenauer's position. (Msgs, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 255, POLTO 263, 26 Jul 57, CCJCS files.) (SECRET)

26 July 1957 --- President Eisenhower directed Secretary of State Dulles to go to London and participate in the disarmament negotiations. The President acted in hopes of achieving a prompt agreement on a Western position on inspection zones. Mr. Stassen was directed to take no new or fixed positions on any of the matters under discussion until the arrival of the Secretary on 29 July. Ambassadors Perkins (NATO) and Bruce (Bonn) were directed to meet Mr. Dulles in London at that time. (Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy London, 838, 26 Jul 57, CCJCS files.) (SECRET)

28 July 1957 --- Mr. Stassen commented adversely on the State-Defense proposal of 25 July. In a message to Secretary Dulles, he emphasized what he described as the "firm opposition" of the UK and France to seeking an agreement that did not contain provision for a European inspection zone. He also warned that any new proposal to the NAC would be interpreted as an attempt by the US and/or Germany to over-rule the rest of NATO. He recommended development of a procedure that did not require any new action by the NAC and that met with the approval of the UK, France, and West Germany.

Mr. Stassen estimated that a first-step disarmament agreement, favorable to the US, could be reached through persistent negotiation in the next few months. Such a first-step accord might not include a European zone, but it was very
important that omission of a European zone, or its deferral
to a second stage, should come about through a gradual real-
ization by the West European states and by the USSR that it
would not be practical to include this zone in the first-step
agreement. (Mag, London (Whitney) to SecState, 774, 28 Jul
57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

29 July 1957 -- The US, UK, France, and West Germany issued a joint
"Berlin Declaration" that called for reunification of Germany
through free elections. Among other things, the declaration
stated that any European disarmament measures must have the
consent of the nations involved and must take into account
the link between European security and German reunification.
(New York Times, 30 Jul 57, 1:4; text, State Department
(UNCLASSIFIED)

29 July 1957 -- President Eisenhower signed the treaty establishing
the International Atomic Energy Agency (see item of 18 June
1957). The US, UK, France, and Canada deposited their
ratifications, bringing the treaty into force. (State Depart-
(UNCLASSIFIED)

29 July 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles arrived in London. In a
statement issued on his arrival, he said that progress on
disarmament and on a solution of East-West political problems
hinged on reducing the danger of surprise attack. This re-
duction, he stated, could come about through adoption of
President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. Every month that
passed without agreement magnified the problem of disarmament.
Later in the evening, Mr. Dulles conferred with British
Foreign Secretary Lloyd. (New York Times, 30 Jul 57, 1:8.)
(UNCLASSIFIED)

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30 July 1957 -- Secretary Dulles headed the US disarmament delega-
tion at a meeting of the Western Four. This was the first
of several meetings aimed at achieving a unified Western dis-
armament position. At this meeting, the principal matters
discussed were:

(1) Inspection zones. French representative Mouch warned
again that linking aerial and ground inspection might lead
to a neutralized zone in Europe. He also favored fixed con-


control posts, rather than mobile inspectors, in a ground in-
spection zone. Mr. Dulles explained that aerial and ground
inspection zones would be coterminous for the larger inspec-
tion zones contemplated, but that, for the limited zones, the
US was proposing ground inspection only in areas involving the
US. The Secretary also stated that aerial inspection without
mobile ground inspection would be inadequate. Selwyn Lloyd
called for an aerial inspection zone for all of Europe, from
the Atlantic to the Urals. Mr. Dulles pointed out the
political dangers of a European zone. He suggested that if
the Soviets rejected a zone that included all of the USSR, all
of the US and Canada, and all of Europe, then the West should
propose an aerial inspection zone in an area free of political
problems, for example, the Arctic.

(2) A formula on the use of nuclear weapons. The British
and French expressed reservations about the US formula (see
item of 31 May), and Mr. Mouch supported the "double negative"
formula (see item of 26 July). Mr. Dulles recommended dro-
pping the entire topic from the Western proposals, since, he
said, the Soviets had apparently rejected it anyway.

(3) Inventories of military installations and forces to
be exchanged under a disarmament agreement. Mr. Dulles said
that the US was unwilling to make such exchanges without means of verifying the accuracy of Soviet inventories. The US could not agree to an exchange unless the entire US and USSR were open to inspection. (Msg, London (Dulles) to SecState, Secto 7, 30 Jul 57.) (SECRET)

31 July 1957.-- The Western Four held two long meetings on the question of inspection zones and other disarmament matters. Secretary Dulles proposed a formula on zones which, after lengthy discussion, was accepted with minor changes. The approved formula, a copy of which was sent to the NAC, included the following proposals:

(1) An inspection zone should be established for all of the continental US and Alaska, including the Aleutians, all of Canada, and all of the USSR. If the USSR rejected this proposal, an Arctic zone should be established to include:
a) all territory north of the Arctic Circle of the USSR, Canada, the US (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway;
b) all territory of Canada, the US, and the USSR west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude, and north of 50 degrees North latitude; c) all the remainder of Alaska and Kamchatka; and d) all of the Aleutians and Kurilis.

(2) A European inspection zone should be established—providing the USSR agreed to one of the above zones and subject to the consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions—to include all of Europe north of 40 degrees North latitude and between 10 degrees West and 60 degrees East longitude. If the USSR rejected this, a more limited European inspection zone could be discussed, but only under the same proviso as the larger European zone and on the understanding that the smaller zone would include...
a significant part of the Soviet Union as well as other
countries of Eastern Europe.

(3) Inspection would include aerial inspection, ground
observation posts, mobile ground teams, and all necessary
means of communication. Ground posts might be established by
agreement anywhere in the territories of the states concerned
without being restricted to the limits of the zones of in-
sp ection. The mobility of ground inspector teams would be
specifically defined.

(4) A working group of technicians should be established
at once to examine the technical problems of an inspection
system.

(5) The initial inspection zone might be extended by
agreement of all concerned.

(DPC Note No. 164, "Report to North Atlantic Council on
Msgs, London (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 9, 31 Jul 57;
ChMAAG London to OSD, C 40 GAD, 311545Z Jul 57, DA IN 42665;
both same file, sec 71. Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState,
845, 31 Jul 57. Msgs, London (Dulles to SecState, SECTO 13,
31 Jul 57; SECTO 14, 1 Aug 57.) (SECRET)

31 July 1957 -- At their two meetings, the Western Four also dis-
cussed several other disarmament questions:

(1) A formula on the use of nuclear weapons (see item of
30 July). Secretary Dulles suggested a new version, which, after a short discussion, was adopted ad referendum (i.e., subject to the approval of the respective governments) with a minor change. In its final form, it was a variation of the French "double negative" formula, and read as follows: "Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense."
(2) A formula on the transfer of fissionable materials. The French and British strongly opposed any wording that would restrict UK-French bilateral arrangements to exchange these materials for peaceful uses. After further consideration, a formula was adopted ad referendum that required each signatory state to agree that, after the cessation of production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes," it would not: (a) transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or accept transfer of nuclear weapons, except through arrangements to ensure that these weapons would not be used in violation of the disarmament agreement; or (b) transfer out of its control, or accept transfer of, any fissionable material except for "non-weapons purposes."

(3) Exchange of military inventories (see item of 30 July). Secretary Dulles explained that the proposed exchange was aimed more at giving protection against surprise attack than at reducing arms levels. The French, however, strongly opposed this measure in a first-step agreement, fearing it would lead to demilitarization and neutralization of the inspection zone.

(4) Control of the international movement of armaments and armed forces through advance notification of their movements. The French, supported by the British, asserted that this provision would help the USSR and hinder the West. The Soviets, said Mr. Moch, were operating on land and could concentrate their forces without crossing frontiers, whereas the West would have to cross frontiers and international waters, and would have to give advance notice of such movements. Moreover, the Soviets would be given details of NATO arms exchanges, while NATO would be uninformed of any movements within the USSR. Mr. Dulles pointed out that if the
Soviets gave advance notification of large-scale movements of submarines or bombers, it could be assumed that these movements had a legitimate purpose. If movements were made without prior warning, the West could expect an attack. It should not be assumed, he said, that the Soviets could carry out large movements without their being detected. (Msgs, London (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 12, SECTO 13, 31 Jul 57; SECTO 14, 1 Aug 57.) (SECRET)

31 July 1957 -- Secretary Dulles and Soviet representative Zorin held an informal conversation on disarmament. Mr. Dulles broadly outlined the inspection zones he hoped to present formally in the Disarmament Subcommittee. Mr. Zorin indicated interest, but also expressed Soviet concern about the rebirth of a militarily strong Germany, and spoke of an East-West collective security system as a means of averting German resurgence. Mr. Dulles said that Soviet proposals tended to perpetuate the partition of Germany, and reminded Zorin of the 1955 Geneva Conference declaration in favor of German reunification. In answer to a question by Zorin on nuclear-test suspension, Mr. Dulles stated that the US still held to its position that suspension of tests must be accompanied by the cessation of production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." Replying to another question, the Secretary denied that his presence in London indicated that the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting was to be raised to the foreign-ministers level. He added, however, that a foreign-ministers meeting might be possible if the results of the Subcommittee meeting warranted one. (Msg, London (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 15, 1 Aug 57.) (SECRET)

31 July 1957 -- At the recommendation of Admiral Radford, Secretary of Defense Wilson sent a message to Secretary Dulles
objecting to one sentence in the position on inspection
approved earlier in the day by the Western Four in London.
The sentence in question stated that ground posts might be
established by agreement anywhere in the territories of the
states concerned without being restricted to the limits of
the zones of inspection. Mr. Wilson stated that this would
allow the establishment of ground posts throughout the US
and USSR, and that it deviated widely from the approved US
position that air and ground inspection must be coterminous.
He added that ground posts alone would not provide effective
inspection and that acceptance of this arrangement would set
an undesirable precedent by putting the US on record as being
willing to accept an inadequate inspection system. The
Secretary urged that the sentence in question be dropped from
the inspection zone proposal. (Msg, OSD to US Ambassador
London (Wilson for Dulles), DEF 927362, 3123462 Jul 57, OCJCS
files.) (SECRET)

1 August 1957 -- In response to Secretary Wilson's message (see
above item), Secretary Dulles stated that the French had
insisted that there might possibly be value in having a
ground inspection post in some port, for example, outside of
the zones of aerial inspection. Mr. Dulles, himself, thought
this might be considered as a possibility. Also, he pointed
out, since the proposed wording stated that ground posts
were to be established by agreement, if the US did not wish
to have these posts, it had only to refuse to agree to their
establishment. (Msg, London (Dulles) to SecState (for Wilson),
DULTE 9, 011228Z Aug 57, DA IN 42881, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

1 August 1957 -- The Western Four again held two meetings to
continue discussion of the various proposals under con-
consideration for presentation to the Disarmament Subcommittee.
The UK and French foreign ministers, as well as Secretary of State Dulles, were present.

(1) Inspection zones. After considering the views of West Germany, and further general discussion, the group accepted a proposal by Secretary Dulles for a change in the formula on ground inspection posts. The new version, apparently drafted with the Defense Department's objections in mind (see above two items), now stated that ground posts might be established by agreement in the territories of the states concerned without being restricted to the limits of the aerial inspection zones, but the areas open to ground inspection should not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. At the recommendation of Canadian delegate Johnson, the proposal on inspection was changed to include a statement that the proposed inspection was intended to provide safeguards against surprise attack. It was agreed to present the Western proposal on inspection zones to the Disarmament Subcommittee on 2 August, prior to Mr. Dulles' departure.

(2) Force levels. The French stressed their view that reservists should not be included in force-level figures. The UK accepted this position, but all agreed to establish a military-experts group to work out a definition of armed forces for this proposal.

(3) A formula on the use of nuclear weapons. The UK and French Governments agreed to the formula adopted ad referendum on 31 July. The Canadian Government was still to be heard from.

(4) Exchange of military inventories (see item of 31 July). The French agreed to an exchange of lists of forces and arms
in the inspection zones provided these zones would be as large as the area contemplated in the Western proposals.

(5) Other disarmament subjects were discussed without final agreement being reached on them. (Msgs, London (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 17, SECTO 18, SECTO 19, 1 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

2 August 1957 -- Having obtained complete Western support, Secretary Dulles presented to the Disarmament Subcommittee the Western proposals for inspection zones and methods under a first-step disarmament agreement. These proposals were those approved by the Western Four on 31 July and subsequently amended slightly on 1 August. Soviet representative Zorin said that the USSR would study the proposals, but noted that they did not cover US bases in Africa, the Near East, Turkey, Pakistan, and Japan. The remainder of his speech was a repetition of previous Soviet opposition to Western positions, stressing the Soviet call for an unconditional suspension of nuclear tests. (Msg, London (Morris) to SecState, 904, 2 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Msg, London (Morris) to SecState, 905, 2 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Text of the proposal, and Secretary Dulles' comments, in Msg, London (Morris) to SecState, 901, 2 Aug 57, OCJCS files; DPC Note No. 166, "Working Paper on Inspection Zones . . .", 5 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BF pt 9.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 August 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles returned from London. In a statement issued on his arrival in Washington, he said that the success of the disarmament negotiations was up to the Soviets. Mr. Dulles predicted that the danger of general war would be lessened if the USSR accepted the Western plan for aerial and ground inspection to guard against surprise attack. (New York Times, 4 Aug 57, 1:6; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 947 (19 Aug 57), p. 304.) (UNCLASSIFIED)
6 August 1957 -- Mr. Stassen discussed disarmament matters separately with the Western Four and with Mr. Zorin. Then, at the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting, he elaborated on the Western inspection zone proposals. Mr. Stassen, Mr. Moch, and Mr. Johnson replied to Soviet queries, as follows:

(1) Why did not the proposed inspection zones include areas, such as North Africa, the Near East, Turkey, Pakistan, and elsewhere, where US bases were located? Mr. Zorin was told that the southern boundaries of the proposed zones were practically the same as those suggested earlier by the USSR (see item of 26 April 1957); moreover, large areas of Asia "associated with" the USSR were not covered either. The Western proposals, however, anticipated an expansion of the inspection zones consistent with the settlement of political issues. Meanwhile, the most important areas where forces were stationed were covered.

(2) Why was establishment of the European zone made contingent on Soviet acceptance of either a US-Canada-USSR or an Arctic zone? The Western delegates replied that the European nations held that any inspection zone under a first-step agreement must directly involve the territory of the US and USSR.

(3) Did the proposal on zones envisage implementation of the inspection system prior to, simultaneous with, or after the entry into force of the first-step agreement? Mr. Zorin was told that inspection would begin immediately upon the entry into force of the agreement. It was therefore of great importance to begin work at once to resolve the technical difficulties of inspection. Technical groups, as proposed by Mr. Lloyd on 17 July, should be formed immediately. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 943, 949, 950, 6 Aug 57, OGCJS files.)

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6 August 1957 -- At a press conference, Secretary of State Dulles again emphasized the value of preventing surprise attack in eliminating the possibility of war (see item of 3 August). He used this as his main argument in calling for Soviet acceptance of the Western inspection plan. (New York Times, 7 Aug 57, 1:8; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 948 (26 Aug 57), pp. 344-350.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

6 August 1957 -- At a meeting of State and Defense Department representatives, the State Department presented its views on certain of the disarmament issues under discussion by the Western Four in London. The State Department proposed the following changes in the "US Position on First Phase of Disarmament" adopted on 12 June 1957:

(1) The paragraph on halting nuclear tests for twelve months should include a provision for a subsequent agreement for a further suspension of tests for six or twelve months more, if the first suspension proved satisfactory.

(2) The provision concerning the international transfer of nuclear weapons should be effective on the date of the halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes."

(3) The formula for the use of nuclear weapons adopted ad referendum on 31 July by the Western Four in London should be adopted.

(4) The provision for advance notification of international troop movements should be dropped.

(5) The provision for the regulation of the import and export of arms should call for a study, rather than the establishment, of a system for such regulation. (Memo, no signer, no adee, "State Staff Recommendations on Remaining Issues in Draft Four-Power Proposals," no date, Encl "A" to JCS 1731/236, Memo, Dir JS to JCS, "Disarmament Planning," 7 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 71.) (SECRET)
6 August 1957 -- The Department of State asked the Defense Department for an appropriate definition of the term "force levels" as employed in US proposals for a first-step disarmament agreement. This request arose from the decision of the Western Four in London to work out such a definition for use in presenting the Western disarmament proposals (see item of 1 August). The State Department planned to use the Defense recommendations as the basis for developing a US position on this question. (Ltr, Spec Asst to SecState for Atomic Energy Matters to Asst SecDef (ISA), 6 Aug 57, App "A" to encl to JCS 1731/239, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 20 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6 August 1957 -- In answer to a request from Mr. Stassen, the State Department authorized him to begin consultations with the Western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee on the list of arms to be placed in storage under a first-step disarmament agreement (see item of 1 July 1957). Mr. Stassen was not to discuss or give this list to the Soviets, even on an informal basis, without further authorization. While in London, Secretary of State Dulles had concluded that the time had come to begin consultations with the West on this question. He had obtained Secretary of Defense Wilson's concurrence in his decision to authorize this consultation. (Mags, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1077, 6 Aug 57; London (Morris) to SecState, 924, 4 Aug 57; both in OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Mrg, London (Dulles) to SecState, DULTE 12, 1 Aug 57, and attached Memo, Capt. F.J. Blooin to Radford, "Disarmament," 5 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (TOP SECRET)

7 August 1957 -- The Western Four met and reached agreement ad referendum on most of the disarmament items that they hoped to present in the Subcommittee. Mr. Stassen also met
separately with Canadian Ambassador Johnson. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 969, 982, 7 Aug 57, OCJCS files.)

7 August 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee continued its dis-
cussion of the Western inspection zone proposals. In answer
to a question by Mr. Zorin, Mr. Stassen repeated the Western
position that a halt in nuclear tests could only be agreed to
as part of a larger agreement that included adoption of the
proposal on inspection zones. (Msg, London (Barbour) to Sec-
State, 984, 7 Aug 57, OCJCS files.)

7 August 1957 -- In response to a question at his weekly news con-
ference, President Eisenhower set forth three reasons why the
Western inspection proposals had not covered all bases from
which a surprise attack could be launched. First of all, he
pointed to the difficulty of arranging for this with the
"dozens and dozens" of countries in which the US has bases.
Then, he said, the course of the disarmament negotiations
might be complicated by trying to bring in Communist bases in
Red China. Finally, the President emphasized that one of the
desired goals of the inspection program was to get people
used to working together and to build up mutual confidence;
thus, the omission of some bases in the first-step agreement
would not be critical. (New York Times, 8 Aug 57, 1:4, text,
6:1-8.)

8 August 1957 -- At a meeting of the Western Four in London, Mr.
Stassen distributed to the other delegates, solely for study
and consultation, the US list of arms to be placed in storage
under a first-step disarmament agreement (see item of 6
August). This group also approved ad referendum a draft working
paper of proposals to be offered in the Disarmament Sub-
committee. This paper reflected the agreements of the
preceding ten days. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1008, 1010, 1012, 8 Aug 57, OCJCS files.)(SECRET)

8 August 1957 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Defense Department views of the State Department recommendations of 6 August. The Defense Department concurred, in general, with the State Department recommendations, but proposed the following changes:

(1) Nuclear tests should not be suspended for more than a total of eighteen months.

(2) Provision should be made to establish a system for the advance notification of troop movements into or out of agreed inspection zones and of major troop movements within inspection zones.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their agreement with the Defense Department views. With reference to the question of a formula for the use of nuclear weapons, however, they stated that they preferred a positive statement, rather than the proposed "double negative" formula. They recommended the following wording: "The parties will not use nuclear weapons, except in individual, or collective self-defense against an armed attack." If this were not acceptable, the "double negative" formula could be used as a fall-back position. ("Department of Defense Position on State Staff Recommendations on Remaining Issues in Draft Four Power Proposals," Encl "B" to JCS 1731/235, Memo, Dir JS to JCS, "Disarmament Planning," 7 Aug 57; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 8 Aug 57, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/236, same subj and date. All in CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 71.) (SECRET)

8 August 1957 -- At another meeting of State and Defense Department representatives, the Defense Department presented its views
(see above item) on the State Department recommendation of 6 August. During the discussion of the question of suspending nuclear tests, the State Department presented the AEC view of this matter. The AEC believed that suspension for longer than ten months would impair US weapons-testing capabilities, but, if political factors required it, tests might be suspended for a maximum of eighteen months. The State Department representatives also stated that Secretary Dulles preferred not to refer to an extension of the suspension of nuclear tests in specific terms, other than to indicate that testing would be resumed not later than eighteen months after the effective date of the agreement if the prescribed conditions for suspending tests had not been met. Accordingly, the final version of the provision on suspending nuclear tests, as approved at the State-Defense meeting, was worded in conformance with this view. (Memo, Fox to DepSecDef, "Disarmament Planning," 8 Aug 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

9 August 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles discussed with President Eisenhower the recommendations approved at the State-Defense meeting of 8 August. The President concluded that the period for the suspension of nuclear tests should be extended to twenty-four, rather than eighteen, months. (Memo, Blouin to Radford, "Disarmament," 12 Aug 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (TOP SECRET) (Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1277, 14 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

10-19 August 1957 -- During this period the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC held frequent inter- and intra-departmental meetings to reach final agreement on the disarmament proposals to be offered in the Disarmament Subcommittee.
Working with the draft approved in London on 8 August, the conferees made modifications, additions, and deletions to satisfy the objections or desires of all concerned. As changes in the various provisions were made or considered, the US delegation in London was informed. The US delegation, in turn, consulted with the other Western delegations and forwarded suggestions or comments to the groups working in Washington. These were considered and either rejected or worked into the draft of the disarmament proposals, and again forwarded to London. (Msgs, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1199, 10 Aug 57; 1218, 1221, 12 Aug 57; 1258, 1264, 14 Aug 57; 1328, 1329, 15 Aug 57; 1349, 16 Aug 57. Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1413, 19 Aug 57. Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1055, 1056, 1057, 11 Aug 57; 1060, 12 Aug 57; 1103, 1110, 1111, 1113, 13 Aug 57; 1146, 14 Aug 57; 1174, 1176, 1180, 15 Aug 57; 1189, 1191, 16 Aug 57; 1223, 17 Aug 57; 1231, 18 Aug 57; 1238, 19 Aug 57. All in OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1144, 14 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1227, 18 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (TOP SECRET) (Memo, no signer, to Spec Asst to SecDef, "Draft Four-Power Working Group Proposal Revision #12, Aug 8, 1957," 13 Aug 57, CJCS file, Disarmament (Misc Memos and Ltrs), OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Memo, Blouin to Radford, "Disarmament," 13 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 71.) (SECRET)

During this period, the Disarmament Subcommittee met twice, on 13 and 15 August, and Mr. Stassen talked with Soviet representative Zorin on 14 and 16 August. Nothing new was introduced at these meetings. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1112, 13 Aug 57; 1162, 1184, 15 Aug 57. All in OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1213, 17 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
14 August 1957 -- President Eisenhower, on the recommendation of Secretary of State Dulles, gave his formal approval to the changes in the "US Position on First Phase Disarmament" (12 June 1957) proposed by the State and Defense Departments (see items of 6 and 8 August). Mr. Eisenhower had discussed these matters with Mr. Dulles on 9 August. The most important change was in the US position on the suspension of nuclear tests. This now stated that the US would announce that it would exert every effort towards the implementation of the first-step disarmament agreement by 1 November 1958, and that it would continue nuclear tests until the effective date of that agreement. As part of the first-step agreement, all signatory states would agree:

(1) To halt nuclear tests for 12 months, beginning with the effective date of the agreement.

(2) To cooperate, during the 12-month period, or earlier, in establishing an effective international inspection system to monitor the test suspension.

(3) To refrain, beyond the 12-month period, from further tests, if the inspection system proved satisfactory and if satisfactory progress was being made on the installation of an inspection system to monitor a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes." This extension of the test suspension would be made only with the understanding that testing might be resumed 24 months after the effective date of the disarmament agreement if the inspection system for the halt in production had not been installed by that time, and if production had not been halted.

(4) To give advance notification, if tests were resumed, of the dates and expected yields of these tests, to provide
limited access to tests, and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere. (Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1277, 14 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

14 August 1957 -- In response to a request by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Department of Defense with an outline plan of an aerial and ground inspection system to serve as a safeguard against surprise attack (see item of 25 July 1957). In their covering memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that this system should provide an improved estimate of Soviet capabilities and make it more difficult for the USSR to launch a surprise attack. They warned, however, that it would not provide definite assurance of warning against a surprise attack on the US or its European allies. A positive safeguard against surprise attack, they stated, was unobtainable, regardless of the numbers of personnel, within a reasonable limit, employed in inspection activities.

The plan included a general estimate of the number of installations in Soviet or Communist-dominated areas to be kept under surveillance, and the number of observers and mobile teams required. It described areas of inspection, the organization of inspecting teams, and the methods of operation to be employed in the inspection system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the view that the three components of the inspection system--aerial, ground, and communications--were complementary and inseparable. They pointed out that the plan was presented as general guidance for the US members of any working group that might be established by the Disarmament Subcommittee to work out the technical details of an inspection system. When the specific details of a disarmament
agreement were agreed upon, the plan might require considerable refinement. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 14 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/237, same subj and date, same file, sec 71.) (S/E/L/T)

On 17 August, the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the plan and its covering memorandum to the Secretary of State, who, in turn, transmitted this material to Mr. Stassen on 23 August. (N/H of JCS 1731/237, same file; Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1539, 23 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (S/E/L/T)

14 August 1957 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the State-Defense discussions of disarmament proposals for the Disarmament Subcommittee (see item of 10-19 August 1957). On 15 August, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, they stated that they concurred in certain modifications proposed by the Defense Department. They added these comments, however:

(1) They preferred that the section of the disarmament proposals covering military expenditures be dropped in its entirety. If this could not be accomplished, a statement should be included to the effect that the first stage of disarmament might cause increased rather than decreased expenditures.

(2) They warned that a long suspension of nuclear tests might result in the disintegration of the US research-and-development organization and the loss of key personnel. They urged that special efforts be made to maintain this organization intact during the suspension period. Commenting on the President's decision to extend the suspension period to two years (see first item of 14 August), they stated that (a) the US should be free to judge for itself whether or not satisfactory progress was being made toward installing an
inspection system; (b) this progress should be substantial, if the US were to continue to abstain from tests after the first twelve months; and (c) failure to make satisfactory progress because of the obvious recalcitrant attitude of any state should be sufficient reason for suspending the basic agreement. (JCS 1731/238, Note by Secys, "Disarmament (U)," 15 Aug 57, source of Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (SECRET)

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposals covering military expenditures were informally passed on to the State Department. On 23 August, the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the complete comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to both the State Department and Atomic Energy Commission. (N/H of JCS 1731/238, 27 Aug 57, same file.) (SECRET)

15 August 1957 -- The Department of Defense sent an interim reply to the State Department, in answer to its request for a definition of the term "force levels" (see item of 6 August). In a letter to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) suggested that a definition of "armed forces" would be of more practical value to the US delegation to the disarmament talks than would a definition of "force levels." Accordingly, the Department of Defense was requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a detailed study of the categories of military personnel that should be included in and excluded from a disarmament agreement. This request was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time.

In the meantime, however, the Defense Department offered the following definition: The term "armed forces" included all military personnel who were regular members of the
military establishment, and reserves—both Reserve and National Guard personnel—on extended active duty. Military personnel on temporary active duty for reserve training, such as two-week or six-month trainees, were not included in this definition, nor were members of the Coast Guard, since in peacetime they were not under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. (JCS 1731/239, Note by Secys, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 20 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

This definition was forwarded to Mr. Stassen by the State Department on 20 August. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1431, 20 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

20 August 1957 -- At a meeting of State and Defense Department representatives the conferees reached final agreement on the remaining disarmament proposals under consideration for presentation to the Disarmament Subcommittee. Final instructions were then sent to Mr. Stassen. It was hoped to obtain full agreement from the NATO governments on these proposals within a few days. (For a full text of the Western disarmament proposals in their final form, see item of 29 August, below) (CM-4-57, CICS to Gen Taylor, et al., "Disarmament," 21 Aug 57, encl to JCS 1731/240, Note by Secys, "Disarmament (U)," 27 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (SECRET)

21 August 1957 -- On receipt of final instructions from Washington on the wording of the planned disarmament proposals, Mr. Stassen immediately began seeking the concurrence of his Western colleagues in London. The Western Four agreed on the final text of a working paper to be sent to NATO. This was dispatched to Paris, with a request for NATO approval by 27 August. In their covering letter, the Western Four pointed out that the paper was in the main a summary of the views
already expressed by the Western delegates, and that many of the disarmament proposals had already been approved by the North Atlantic Council. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1294, 1302, 21 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1297, 21 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1301, 21 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Text reproduced in DPC Note No. 167, "Four Power Working Paper," 22 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

21 August 1957 -- President Eisenhower announced that the US, supported by Canada, France, and the UK, was willing to suspend nuclear-weapons tests for a period of up to two years, provided that the USSR would agree to the initiation, within that period, of a permanent halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes," and of the installation of inspection systems to monitor the cessation of tests and production. This announcement was a result of the President's decision of 14 August.

In London, meanwhile, having obtained the approval of his Western colleagues, Mr. Stassen met separately with Soviet representative Zorin and informed him of the new US proposal. He said it formed part of the total Western position, which would be presented in the near future. (New York Times, 22 Aug 57, 1:8; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 950 (9 Sep 57), pp. 418-419.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1312, 21 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

21 August 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Zorin called for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests. He declared that the new Western proposal on this matter required too many conditions, and was therefore inadequate. Mr. Stassen made a detailed statement of the Western proposal,
describing it as a major move toward agreement on disarmament.
(Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1311, 21 Aug 57, OJCJS files.) (SECRET)

22 August 1957 -- Mr. Stassen discussed with Mr. Zorin the Western proposal on nuclear tests. The Soviet representative asked several questions about the details of the proposal, but, in Mr. Stassen's words, made no "negative attacks" on it. Meanwhile, however, an English-language broadcast by Moscow Radio stated that the proposal added nothing to "the former unreconstructive attitude" of the West, and served only to confuse the disarmament picture. The broadcast called for an unconditional halt in tests. (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1351, 22 Aug 57, OJCJS files.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 23 Aug 57, 4:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

22 August 1957 -- The USSR resumed nuclear testing with a detonation of substantial size, according to an announcement by the Atomic Energy Commission. This was the first Soviet nuclear explosion reported by the AEC in four months (see item of 16 April 1957). On 23 August, meanwhile, the US set off the thirteenth nuclear explosion in its own series of tests that had begun late in May (see item of 28 May 1957). The latest US explosion, like earlier ones in this series, was of relatively low force. (New York Times, 24 Aug 57, 1:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 August 1957 -- A working group of the Western Four in London completed a draft of a "definition of Armed Forces" (see item of 15 August), to be used in connection with the first-step disarmament agreement being developed. This draft defined "armed forces" as all full-time, fully paid, uniformed personnel maintained by a national government, including: (1) regular or career personnel of the active armed forces and personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts; (2) conscripts performing full-time active duty for a period fixed by national law; and (3) personnel
of militarily organized police forces and of other forces or organizations equipped to perform a combat role. This definition excluded reserves not on full-time and/or fully paid duty. (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1362, 23 Aug 57, DA IN 48610, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 72.) (SECRET)

23 August 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee discussed the Western proposals of 21 August concerning nuclear tests. Soviet representative Zorin asked several questions, and made a special point of stating that the USSR was still studying these proposals. (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1396, 23 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

24 August 1957 -- All major Soviet newspapers published for the first time and simultaneously denounced the Western proposals of 21 August for halting nuclear tests. The newspapers charged that the new proposals did not alter the Western position, and that the continued stipulation of conditions was aimed at preventing an immediate halt in tests. The Soviets also renewed the charge that the West was negotiating in bad faith at London. (New York Times, 25 Aug 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

26 August 1957 -- After several days' consultation, the North Atlantic Council gave general approval to the working paper on disarmament submitted to it by the Western Four on 21 August. West Germany, however, objected strongly to the wording of one provision which, it felt, might leave the way open for the recognition of East Germany and Red China. The NAC also had other, lesser objections. (DPC Note No. 168, "NATO Eleventh Telegram on Western Working Paper," 27 Aug 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10; Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1399, 23 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Msgs, Paris (Nolting) to SecState POLTO 433, POLTO 438, 26 Aug 57; POLTO 448, 27 Aug 57; London (Barbour) to SecState, 1404, 24 Aug 57, All in OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

26 August 1957 -- The Soviet Union announced the successful testing, several days earlier, of an intercontinental multi-stage ballistic missile. The missile, said the announcement,
travelled a "huge" distance, at a very high, "unprecedented" altitude, and landed in the target area, showing that it was possible to direct rockets "into any part of the world." On 30 August, according to the New York Times, Defense Department officials stated that the USSR had tested at least four, and probably six, intercontinental ballistic missiles in the spring of 1957. (New York Times, 27 Aug 57, 1:8, text, 6:5; 31 Aug 57, 1:2-3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

27 August 1957 -- The Western Four agreed on modifications in the working paper on disarmament to meet the suggestions made by the North Atlantic Council on 26 August. With the approval of the State Department, these were forwarded to NATO. (Msgs, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1443, 27 Aug 57; SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1624, 27 Aug 57. Both in OCCS files.) (SECRET)

27 August 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Soviet representative Zorin read a ninety-minute speech denouncing the Western disarmament position and repeating earlier Soviet proposals. He charged that the West was impeding the progress of disarmament negotiations and declared that the Soviet Union was doing everything in its power to achieve success in these negotiations. Referring particularly to the inspection proposals made by Secretary Dulles to the Subcommittee on 2 August, Zorin asserted that the Western plans for a US-Canada-USSR and a European inspection zone were aimed at gathering intelligence information, and did not include many Western bases that could be used against the Soviet Union. He also spoke disparagingly of the proposed Arctic Zone. Turning to the question of nuclear tests, he strongly criticized the Western proposal of 21 August. Such "unreal" proposals, he charged, proved that the West did not actually desire a disarmament agreement. The whole tone of his speech was denunciatory and scornful of Western motives and proposals. He concluded with a summary of the Soviet position, including a call for: (1) immediate cessation of nuclear tests, or a suspension for at least two years, under "appropriate" controls; (2) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; (3) reduction of arms,
armed forces, and military budgets; (4) "abolition" of mil-
tary bases on foreign soil; (5) reduction of foreign military
forces in Germany; (6) establishment of international control
over these measures; and (7) discussion of disarmament problems
by the UN as a whole, with the participation of all interested
states.

Mr. Stassen and his Western colleagues replied to Zorin
in a restrained manner, again explaining some of the points in
the Western position, and asking the Soviet representative for
an interpretation of several points in his speech. Zorin re-
plied that the meaning of his statement was clear. He again
called for the immediate unconditional cessation of nuclear
tests. (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1458, 27 Aug 57,
OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Text of Zorin's statement reproduced
as DPC Note No. 169, "USSR Statement," 4 Sep 57, CCS 092
(4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

28 August 1957 -- Prime Minister Macmillan, in a reply to Premier
Bulganin's letter of 20 July, declared that "real progress" in
world disarmament depended on the Soviet Union. He praised
the proposals being made by the West at the disarmament talks,
and asked Bulganin to give them his favorable consideration.
(New York Times, 3 Sep 57, 1:8, text, 10:3-6.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

28 August 1957 -- At a brief meeting of the Disarmament Subcommit-
tee, Mr. Zorin again criticized the Western proposal of 21
August on nuclear testing, and repeated his call for the un-
conditional suspension of tests. (Msg, London (Barbour) to
SecState, 1486, 28 Aug 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

28 August 1957 -- The North Atlantic Council concurred in the
changes made in the Western working paper on disarmament, and
approved introduction of the paper in the Disarmament Sub-
committee. (Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 458,
28 Aug 57, OCJCS files; DPC Note No. 170, "Twelfth Telegram
from NATO," 9 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (SECRET)
29 August 1957 -- President Eisenhower issued a special statement expressing deep disappointment at the Soviet presentation in the Disarmament Subcommittee on 27 August. He noted that the Soviet attack on the Western position coincided with the "boastful" statement of the USSR that it had successfully tested an ICBM. The President called on the Soviet Union not to reject, without complete and serious study, the proposals being made by the West at London. These proposals, he said, were fraught with significance for the peace of the world, and would: (1) provide a measure of protection against surprise attack; (2) suspend nuclear tests for two years; (3) seek to restrict the use of outer space solely to peaceful purposes; (4) provide for a halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" and for the reduction of nuclear-weapons stockpiles; and (5) begin a reduction in arms and armed forces. (New York Times, 29 Aug 57, 1:8; text, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 951 (16 Sep 57), p. 455.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

29 August 1957 -- With the approval of all Western governments concerned, the Western Four submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee the "working paper" containing the complete Western proposals for a first-step disarmament agreement. The text of this paper, based on more than five months of inter- and intra-governmental deliberations, was as follows:

Working Paper--Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament

I. The limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments:

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following states will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

- France--750,000
- United Kingdom--750,000
- Soviet Union--2,500,000
- United States--2,500,000
The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, these states will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other states to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The states listed in Paragraph I.A. will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.
2. There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.
3. Other essential states have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in Paragraphs A. and B. above.

E. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

F. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

G. Upon the conditions cited in D. above, these states will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to the armed forces determined in Paragraphs E. and F. above and will be completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

H. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in Paragraphs A. and B. above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

II. Military expenditures:

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of Paragraph I., and looking forward to the
reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the international control organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

III. Nuclear Weapons:

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.

IV. The Control of Fissileable Material:

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1. That all future production of fissilable materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after the international board of control described in Paragraph VIII. has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.

2. That they will cooperate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.

3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five governments represented on the subcommittee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a progress report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.

B. The parties which are producers of fissilable material for weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissilable material for [from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connection]

1. To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissilable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and

2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for production of fissilable materials for weapons purposes.

C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissilable material for weapons purposes provided in Paragraph IV.A.1:

1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with Paragraph III.

2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissilable material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.
V. Nuclear Weapons Testing:

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five governments represented on the subcommittee will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international inspection.

D. If the inspection system referred to in Paragraph V.A. is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes agreed to under Paragraph IV.A.1. above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total energy to be released therein; to provide for limited observation of them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

VI. The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space:

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack:

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.
B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five governments represented on the subcommittee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following:

1. That all the territory of the Continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.

2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in Paragraph D. below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees west longitude, east of 150 degrees east longitude and north of 50 degrees north latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees north and in the west by 10 degrees west longitude and in the east by 60 degrees east longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the states concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described in Paragraphs C.1 and 2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas...
of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement with, in all cases, the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the board of control inventories of their fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.

I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

VIII. The International Control Organization:

A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.

B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an international control organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a board of control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the governments represented on the subcommittee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.

D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.

E. Other matters relating to the organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities and prerogatives.

IX. Movement of Armaments:

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.
X. Suspension of the Convention:

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfill any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the request of any party.

(State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 951 (16 Sep 57), pp. 451-455; Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1514, 29 Aug 57, OCS files.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

29 August 1957 -- After submitting the Western "working paper" on disarmament, the chairmen of the four Western delegations to the Disarmament Subcommittee spoke in support of the paper. Mr. Zorin made a lengthy reply, disparaging the Western proposals and declaring that they contained nothing new. (Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 1528, 29 Aug 57, OCS files.)

(SECRET)

30 August 1957 -- Pravda accused the West of "double dealing" on disarmament, and charged that the US, UK, France, and Canada were participating in the London disarmament talks only to "camouflage their frenzied war preparations." The West, it declared, was fully responsible for the failure of the disarmament negotiations to achieve success. (New York Times, 31 Aug 57, 2:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 September 1957 -- At a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Stassen reviewed at length the Western "working paper" of 29 August, and called on the Soviets for a precise statement of their reaction to this paper. It was essential that the Soviet position be known, he said, if negotiations were

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to proceed satisfactorily. Mr. Zorin declined to reply other
than to state that he was prepared to meet again with the
Western delegates on the next day. (Msg, London (Whitney)
to SecState, 1593, 3 Sep 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (Text
of Mr. Stassen's statement filed as DFC Note No. 172,
"Stassen Statement of September 3, 1957," 9 Sep 57, CCS 092
(4-14-45) BF pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 September 1957 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense a definition of the term "Armed Forces,"
to be used in connection with a first-stage disarmament agree-
ment (see items of 15 and 23 August 1957). In a memorandum
to the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the
objectives of a definition of forces to be limited in any
dismament agreement must be: (1) to establish categories
that would include all types of forces capable of effective
combat action immediately upon, or within a reasonably short
period of time after, the commencement of hostilities; and
(2) to provide means of insuring that limitations were not
circumvented through failure to include any of the active
forces within one of these categories.

The primary emphasis, in a first-stage agreement, would
be on active duty forces; reserves would remain available
during this phase, and would be affected only in later phases
of disarmament. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the fact
that the Western position (see item of 29 August 1957) did
not provide for verification by inspection during this phase
even of active strengths, so it would be valueless to set up
elaborate rules for reserve forces. The definition forwarded
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was essentially the same as that
agreed upon by the Western Four working group in London on
23 August. There were, however, these differences: (1) The

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definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not include the term "fully paid," with reference to military personnel; and (2) it specifically excluded civilian employees of the national military establishment, and personnel serving in units maintained primarily for humanitarian missions, even if these personnel were full-time and uniformed.

Referring to the differences in the national military establishments of the US, USSR, UK, and France, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the West should make every effort to see that Soviet military security forces (MVD) were included in the total of USSR armed forces to be limited under a first-phase agreement. The organized reserves of the Western powers, including the US National Guard, should be excluded from any limitations. The US could not support, however, the French desire to exclude reservists called up for an indefinite period to maintain order in Algeria. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally, pointed out that the Soviet view that civilian employees of the armed forces should be included was obviously unacceptable. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 3 Sep 57, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/242, Rpt by JSPC, same subj and date, CCS 092 (4-1^4-45) sec 72.) (TOP SECRET)

+ September 1957 -- Soviet representative Zorin, in a speech to the Disarmament Subcommittee, charged that the West had failed to submit realistic disarmament proposals and had obstructed agreement on halting nuclear tests. An agreement to cease tests, without connecting this with other issues, was of primary urgency, he said. He stated that the Soviet position had been fully explained in his speech of 27 August. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 1625, 4 Sep 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)
5 September 1957 -- At an informal five-power meeting, and at a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the five delegations considered the question of recessing the Subcommittee. All agreed on a recess, but the West insisted on reconvening on 1 October or following the end of general debate at the forthcoming twelfth annual session of the UN General Assembly, whichever was later, while the Soviets refused to fix a date. At the Subcommittee meeting, also, Mr. Zorin delivered an hour's attack on the Western paper of 29 August. He repeated his previous statements of the Soviet position, emphasized the necessity for an unconditional suspension of nuclear tests, and rejected the major provisions of the 29 August paper. (Msgs, London (Whitney) to SecState, 1653, 1660, 5 Sep 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

5 September 1957 -- The State Department forwarded to Mr. Stassen the Defense Department definition of the term "Armed Forces" (see item of 3 September). The Department concurred in this definition, but cautioned Mr. Stassen to defer further consideration of the question pending sufficient indications of an affirmative Soviet response to the entire Western proposal of 29 August to justify an examination of detailed technical considerations. (Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 1876, 5 Sep 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET)

6 September 1957 -- The Disarmament Subcommittee recessed without setting a date for reconvening, as the Soviets continued to refuse to agree to fix a date. Later, Western representatives told newspapermen that they felt considerable progress toward a first-step disarmament treaty had been made in the five-and-one-half month session. Zorin, however, said at a news conference that the Subcommittee had failed to reach agreement
on a single issue. (Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 1635, 6 Sep 57, OCJCS files.) (SECRET) (New York Times, 7 Sep 57, 1:4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

9 September 1957 -- India's UN representative, Arthur S. Lall, in a letter to the Secretary General, proposed that the agenda for the forthcoming General Assembly meeting include an item on the subject of expanding the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee. Mr. Lall stated that neither the Commission nor its Subcommittee appeared able to achieve tangible progress or agreement. He called for the inclusion of additional countries in the membership of these groups in order to assist and intensify the search for a solution to the disarmament problem. (DPC Note No. 171, "Indian Proposal for Expanding U.N. Disarmament Commission and Its Subcommittee," 10 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 September 1957 -- The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense announced that a new series of US nuclear-weapons tests would begin at the Eniwetok proving area in April, 1958. Among the tests' objectives would be the development of weapons for defense and weapons with reduced radioactive fall-out. The tests, said the announcement, would be governed by the terms of the US-UK Bermuda agreement of 24 March 1957 to conduct tests in a manner designed to keep the level of world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of an amount that might be hazardous. (New York Times, 16 Sep 57, 1:3-4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 September 1957 -- Belgium proposed that the agenda of the UN General Assembly meeting include an item on the subject of "Collective Action to Inform and Enlighten the Peoples of the World as to the Dangers of the Armaments Race, and Particularly as to the Destructive Effects of Modern Weapons."
The Belgian proposal also included a draft resolution request-
ing the Disarmament Commission to make recommendations con-
cerning the nature of the information to be disseminated under
the proposed action, and requesting the Secretary General to
report to the Disarmament Commission on the means available
for dissemination. (DPC Sect Note No. 179, R-1, "Text of
Draft Resolution on the Dangers of an Armaments Race, Proposed
by Belgium for the 12th U.N. General Assembly," 19 Sep 57,
CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

19 September 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles, addressing the UN
General Assembly, called for adoption of the Western disarma-
ment proposals of 29 August. He described the US nuclear
testing program as an effort to develop "clean" weapons.
This program, he stated could not be halted so long as the
Soviet Union rejected inspection to prevent surprise attack,
an end to the production of fissionable materials for "weapons
purposes," cooperation to prevent the "promiscuous" spread
of nuclear arms, and a reduction in weapons stockpiles.
Reflecting President Eisenhower's statement of 3 July 1957,
Mr. Dulles said that the US would invite UN observers to the
next US test. (New York Times, 20 Sep 57, 1:1; text, State
Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 954 (7 Oct 57), pp. 555-
559.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

19 September 1957 -- Secretary of Defense Wilson ordered a cut of
100,000 men in the strength of the armed forces, to be
implemented, except for 8,000 men, by June, 1958. This
reduction, combined with a similar one authorized on 16 July
1957, would cut the strength of US armed forces to 2.6 million
men. At a press conference, Mr. Wilson said that a third cut
of 100,000 men was also being contemplated. He denied that
these cuts would affect the US negotiating position on

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disarmament, since the Western proposal for a first-step disarmament agreement called for the US and USSR to reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million men. (New York Times, 20 Sep 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

20 September 1957 -- In a ninety-minute speech to the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko attacked Western policy in the Middle East, reviewed Soviet disarmament policy, and introduced two new disarmament proposals. The first of these called for all states possessing nuclear weapons to renounce the use of these weapons for a period of five years, at the end of which time the question should again be considered by the UN. The second proposal called for a two- to three-year suspension of nuclear-weapons tests, beginning on 1 January 1958. This suspension would be supervised by an International Commission, responsible to the UN, which would establish control posts within the territories of the US, USSR and UK, and in the Pacific area, including Australia. Mr. Gromyko offered two draft resolutions in support of these proposals, and submitted a lengthy memorandum describing the Soviet views concerning a first-step disarmament agreement.

(New York Times, 21 Sep 57, 1:1, text of speech, 6:2-7. DPC Note No. 174, "Draft Resolutions Submitted by USSR," 23 Sep 57; DPC Note No. 177, "Soviet September 20 Memorandum on Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament," 24 Sep 57; both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BF pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 September 1957 -- In a speech to the General Assembly in support of the Western proposals of 29 August, Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada said that his country would support any suggestion to enlarge the Disarmament Commission, if this would lead to a quicker solution of the disarmament problem. Canada, he said, would even be willing to withdraw from the
23 September 1957 -- Japan submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Subcommittee by 1 January 1958, and calling for a suspension of nuclear tests. The resolution requested the Subcommittee to concentrate on reaching agreement on an inspection system to (1) ensure the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the devotion of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, and (2) to prevent surprise attack. The Subcommittee was to report on its progress within four months after it had resumed meeting. The Japanese resolution also called for a suspension of nuclear tests from the time an agreement was reached in principle on a supervision and inspection system to verify the test suspension until the conclusion of discussions on the report of the Disarmament Commission at the next regular General Assembly. Immediately after the beginning of the test suspension, negotiations were to be opened to reach agreement on the prompt installation of the supervision and inspection system.

The Japanese representatives had informed US delegates that Japan had decided to submit this resolution in the hope that it would have a "calming influence" on Japanese public opinion. Japan also felt this resolution was necessary in order to make clear the differences between the Japanese and Soviet positions on nuclear testing. (DPC Note No. 176, "Japanese Draft Resolution on Disarmament," 24 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 41, 23 Sep 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
23 September 1957 -- In an informal memorandum to the Secretary of State, Mr. Stassen proposed a new disarmament approach to the Soviet Union. This new approach, he said, was aimed at preventing the wide and irreversible spread of nuclear weapons, with a consequent increase in the danger of war and decrease in the security of the US. He recommended that the US make a separate proposal for a halt in nuclear tests, separating this proposal from the comprehensive Western position of 29 August. He believed that an agreement on these terms with the USSR and all other essential states could be reached promptly and implemented by 1 August 1958, before France could begin testing nuclear weapons. This agreement would include these provisions:

(1) The immediate installation of eight or ten monitoring inspection stations in the USSR, a like number in the US, and suitable numbers in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary locations.

(2) A 24-month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on 1 August 1958, subject to the satisfactory installation of the inspection stations and to the right to end the test suspension, for cause or upon notice of a violation, before the expiration of the 24-month period.

(3) The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization, under the aegis of the Security Council, to supervise the test suspension and to prepare to supervise further disarmament measures.

(4) An undertaking by all signatory states to make a sustained effort during the 24-month period to agree upon and begin to implement additional disarmament steps, including the remaining measures of the Western proposals of 29 August.
This agreement might also, but not necessarily, include the establishment in initial zones of initial systems of air and ground inspection to provide against surprise attack. Other provisions of the Western disarmament proposals might also be added, but they were neither as important nor as crucial as the foregoing. Finally, Mr. Stassen believed that the best method of achieving success in his proposed new approach was to carry out informal bilateral talks with the Soviets, while keeping the West advised of progress.

("Informal Memorandum," Stassen to SecState, no subj, 23 Sep 57, App to Encl "G" to JCS 1731/243, Memo, Dir JS to JCS, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 30 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.) (SECRET)

24 September 1957 -- Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, in a message to President Eisenhower, urged the President to make a thorough study of the draft resolution proposed by Japan on 23 September. Mr. Kishi declared that, from the "standpoint of humanity," nuclear tests should be suspended without waiting for the conclusion of disarmament negotiations. He felt that a halt in tests would pave the way for the achievement of a disarmament agreement. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 956 (21 Oct 57), p. 636.)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

24 September 1957 -- After several days of discussion at the UN among themselves and with the Japanese delegates, representatives of the Western Four agreed on the draft of a disarmament resolution to be presented to the General Assembly. They also agreed to discuss this draft with the other members of the UN Disarmament Commission, except the USSR, in hope of obtaining additional sponsors. The draft resolution in effect summed up the Western proposals of 29 August and further called on
the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Subcommittee as soon as possible, with the Subcommittee to report by 30 April 1958 on its progress towards disarmament. (DPC Note No. 173, R-1, "Draft Western Disarmament Resolution for 12th U.N. General Assembly," 25 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10. Msgs, New York (Dulles) to SecState, DELGA 21, 19 Sep 57; DELGA 29, 20 Sep 57. Msgs, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 41, 23 Sep 57; DELGA 47, 24 Sep 57. Msg, SecState to USUN, New York, 245, 13 Sep 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

24 September 1957 -- India proposed to the General Assembly a draft resolution calling for an immediate unconditional suspension of nuclear-weapons tests, and calling on UN members to report any evidence of continued testing. (DPC Note No. 179, "Indian Draft Resolution on Suspension of Tests," 26 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 September 1957 -- India submitted to the General Assembly a revised version of the draft resolution on nuclear tests that it had submitted on 24 September. The revised resolution called on the states concerned to inform the UN Secretary General that they were willing to suspend tests, and requested them to agree to the nomination of a five-man scientific and technical commission consisting of two scientists from "each side" and a "scientific chairman" to be picked by agreement. The new version retained that portion of the original resolution calling on UN members to report any evidence of continued testing. (DPC Note No. 179, R-1, "Indian Draft Resolution on Suspension of Tests," 26 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 57, 15 [sic; 25] Sep 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
25 September 1957 -- Another Indian draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly called for the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee (see item of 9 September 1957). This was a revision of a draft proposal on this subject that the Indian representatives had shown to US delegates on 23 September, but had not submitted to the General Assembly. The earlier version had suggested that Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, India, Poland, and Yugoslavia be added to the Commission, and that Brazil, India, and Sweden (already a member of the Commission) be added to the Subcommittee. The draft resolution actually submitted did not include either the names of these countries nor the number of members to be added to the disarmament groups. (DFC Note No. 175, R-1, "Indian Draft Resolution on Expansion of the Disarmament Commission and the Subcommittee," 27 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (DFC Note No. 175, "Indian Draft Resolution on Expansion of the Disarmament Commission," 24 Sep 57, same file.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Mags, New York (Lodge) DELGA 41, 23 Sep 57; DELGA 57, 15 [sic; 25] Sep 57.)

26 September 1957 -- As a follow-up to its resolutions calling for a halt in nuclear tests and an enlargement of the Disarmament Commission, India submitted to the General Assembly a comprehensive disarmament resolution to be adopted after passage of the other two resolutions. The latest Indian proposal called for: (1) prohibition of the further use of fissionable material for military purposes; (2) prohibition of the transfer of fissionable material from civilian to military stocks; (3) prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; (4) prohibition of the manufacture, use, and transfer of "so-called tactical" nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons; (5) progressive dismantling of existing stocks of nuclear weapons; (6) prohibition of the export of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; (7) submission of military budgets to the UN Secretary General; (8) drafting of a disarmament convention; and (9) progressive establishment, as required, of measures of land, air, or sea inspection control. The Indian resolution also requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the advisability of recommending the convening of a special disarmament session of the General Assembly. (DPC Note No. 182, "Indian Draft Resolution on a Comprehensive Disarmament Program," 27 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BF pt 10.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

A member of the Indian UN delegation informed US representatives that India hoped, by means of this and its earlier proposals, to force both sides to make a serious effort to reach agreement on disarmament. India had concluded that neither the West nor the USSR could support any substantive resolution put forward by the other. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 68, 26 Sep 57.) (SECRET)

27 September 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles forwarded to Secretary of Defense Wilson a copy of Mr. Stassen's proposal of 25 September. Mr. Dulles stated that he had told Mr. Stassen that there were very serious difficulties, from a political viewpoint, in the way of the proposal. The Secretary of State requested Mr. Wilson to provide him with the views of the Defense Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 27 Sep 57, Encl "C" to JCS 1731/243, Memo, Dir JS to JCS, "Disarmament Planning (U)," 30 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.) (SECRET)

30 September 1957 -- The Disarmament Commission met to consider the results of the London disarmament talks. US representatives Lodge reviewed the Western proposals, and Soviet representatives
Sobolev confirmed the USSR's refusal to accept them. The Disarmament Commission made no attempt to draw up recommendations, and merely agreed to refer to the General Assembly the transcript of the proceedings of the London talks. (New York Times, 1 Oct 57, 1:6; text of the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission filed as DPC Note No. 183, "Disarmament Commission Meetings," 30 Sep 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

30 September 1957 -- At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to the Secretary of Defense their comments on Mr. Stassen's proposal of 23 September concerning a suspension of nuclear tests (see item of 27 September). The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this proposal was inconsistent with US security interests. They opposed its adoption, and recommended continued adherence to the Western proposals of 29 August, for the following reasons:

(1) By separating the nuclear-testing provisions of the 29 August proposals from the rest of the Western position, Mr. Stassen was abandoning the requirement for Soviet agreement to that position as a whole. This was unwarranted from a security point of view, especially since only the presentation of the 29 August proposals as "inseparable" had made them acceptable for national and Western security.

(2) Only the Western proposal for a halt in the production of fissionable material for "weapons purposes," and not the cessation of nuclear testing per se, would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear warfare.

(3) Mr. Stassen's proposal was in consonance with the Soviet UN resolution of 20 September. Acceding to the Soviet
position of separately considering a test suspension as a prerequisite to a disarmament agreement would weaken the US bargaining position in future negotiations.

(4) It was questionable that France could develop a capability to test nuclear weapons by late 1958 or early 1959--and thus open the way for the widespread of nuclear weapons--as Mr. Stassen assumed. And even if France did have this capability, it might well be in the best interest of the US and NATO.

(5) The ground posts in the USSR proposed by Mr. Stassen would only slightly improve Western intelligence. This gain would be more than offset by the risk that the Soviets might claim that fixed ground inspection posts, because of their success in verifying a test suspension, would be adequate for inspection in a first-phase disarmament agreement. This would jeopardize the Western position that the inspection system in a first-phase agreement must consist of coterminous aerial and ground components, with freedom of access to all objects of control. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament (U)," 30 Sep 57, derived fr Dec On JCS 1731/245, Memo, Dir JS to JCS, 1 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.) (stamped)

30 September 1957 -- The Department of Defense forwarded to the Secretary of State the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see above item) on Mr. Stassen's proposal of 23 September. In his covering letter, the Deputy Secretary of Defense strongly endorsed these views. He pointed out that the Stassen proposal was essentially the same as that submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee by the Soviet Union in June (see item of 7 June 1957), which the West had consistently opposed. He added that the Western position on disarmament had been adopted only after prolonged study and deliberation,
and was a single, interrelated program. The Soviet position on suspending tests was a cynical propaganda attempt, and cast grave doubts upon the sincerity of the USSR concerning disarmament as a whole. The Department of Defense recommended against adoption of the Stassen proposal. (N/H of JCS 1731/243, 2 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.) (SECRET)

1 October 1957 -- The first conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency opened in Vienna (see item of 29 July 1957). AEC Chairman Strauss, the chief US delegate, described the efforts of the US to establish the IAEA, and read a message from President Eisenhower containing expressions of hope for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet delegate read a message from Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, deploring the fact that the West had turned down the Soviet proposal for the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. (New York Times, 2 Oct 57, 5:1; text of Strauss and Eisenhower messages, State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 956 (21 Oct 57), pp. 637-638.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

2 October 1957 -- At the UN General Assembly, Poland and Czechoslovakia offered to prohibit the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on their territory if East and West Germany would agree to do the same. (New York Times, 3 Oct 57, 4:3; text of Polish and Czech statements, DPC Note No. 185, "Polish and Czech Statements on Production and Stockpiling of Atomic Weapons," 7 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

2 October 1957 -- The Western Four agreed informally to introduce their UN disarmament resolution (see item of 24 September) as soon as possible. So far more than a dozen other countries had agreed to co-sponsor the measure, and several more were favorably considering co-sponsorship. More than half a dozen
nations, however, including Japan, had declined to join in sponsoring the resolution. It was estimated that 40 to 45 or more members of the General Assembly would support the resolution when it was introduced. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 98, 2 Oct 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3 October 1957 -- In answer to Prime Minister Kishi's message of 24 September, President Eisenhower wrote Mr. Kishi that the security of the US and that of the free world depended upon continued testing of nuclear weapons. The US, however, was willing to halt tests provided there was international agreement to the other disarmament measures it had proposed. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 956 (21 Oct 57), pp. 635-536.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3 October 1957 -- Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Padilla Nervo proposed in the General Assembly that a UN Commissioner for Disarmament be appointed to help break the disarmament deadlock. Dr. Nervo recalled other instances in which a UN mediator or commissioner had proved useful in handling international problems. He also suggested the establishment of a General Assembly Subcommission, composed of the members of the Disarmament Subcommittee and the General Assembly President, to study disarmament. This Subcommission would be similar to the Committee of Twelve, which had recommended establishment of the UN Disarmament Commission (see item of 13 December 1950 and 11 January 1952). (New York Times, 4 Oct 57, 4:1; DPC Note No. 186, "Mexican Proposals on Disarmament Negotiations," 7 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) Bpt pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

4 October 1957 -- The Soviet Union successfully launched the first earth satellite. The satellite, circling the earth at an altitude of about 560 miles and a speed of approximately

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13,000 miles per hour, was twenty-two inches in diameter, weighed 184 pounds, and carried radio equipment sending signals to ground stations. The Soviet announcement of the launching stated that the USSR would launch more satellites in the future. (New York Times, 5 Oct 57, 1:8; text of the Soviet announcement, 3:3-4.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

4 October 1957 -- The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency elected an American, W. Sterling Cole, to be Director General of the IAEA. Mr. Cole, a member of the House of Representatives, had served on the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy since its establishment in 1946, and was chairman of that group in 1953-1954. Representative Cole had also served as a member of the US delegation to the conference that drafted the statute of the IAEA (see item of 23 October 1955). (New York Times, 5 Oct 57, 3:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 October 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko talked for several hours about major topics of international concern, including disarmament. The meeting was held at the invitation of Mr. Dulles, who felt that advantage should be taken of the fact that Gromyko was in the US for the General Assembly session. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 956 (21 Oct 57), p. 635.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 October 1957 -- In an interview with New York Times writer James Reston, Nikita Khrushchev said the USSR was willing to put earth satellites and all pilotless missiles under international control as part of a general agreement on peaceful coexistence. The Soviet transcript of the interview, released on 9 October, referred to an agreement on disarmament, rather than on peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union, said Khrushchev, strongly desired a disarmament agreement, but
could not accept one under the conditions proposed by the US. (*New York Times*, 3 Oct 57, 1:6; 11 Oct 57, 3:2. Text filed as DPC Sect Note No. 198, "Khrushchev Interview with James Reston," 10 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 October 1957 -- The US fired the last nuclear device in its 1957 atomic test series. At the same time, the Soviet Government announced it had tested a new and powerful hydrogen weapon. (*New York Times*, 3 Oct 57, 1:5-6, 10:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8 October 1957 -- After a meeting with the President and Mr. Stassen, Secretary of State Dulles told reporters that the US might be willing to discuss with the USSR the initiation of a study of the control of outer-space objects, as mentioned by Nikita Khrushchev on 7 October. The State Department later issued a statement pointing out that control of outer-space objects had been part of the Western proposal of 29 August 1957. The US, said the statement, was adhering to this proposal, but, if its allies agreed, it would be willing to initiate a study on outer-space control without awaiting the conclusion of an agreement on other substantive features of the 29 August proposal. (*New York Times*, 9 Oct 57, 1:8.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (DPC Sect Note No. 196, "Background News Conference on Outer Space Objects," 9 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

9 October 1957 -- India submitted to the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly another revised version of its draft resolution on the suspension of nuclear tests (see item of 25 September). This version included a request for the proposed scientific and technical commission to recommend an adequate system of inspection to supervise and control the suspension of tests. (DPC Note 179, R-3,
"Indian Draft Resolution on Suspension of Tests," 16 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

9 October 1957 -- Still another Indian draft resolution, submitted to the Political and Security Committee, called for establishment of a Disarmament Commission consisting of equal numbers of representatives of states supporting the Western disarmament position and states supporting the Soviet position, as well as representatives of other states to be chosen by agreement. This Commission should consider and make recommendations on the questions of: (1) a halt in the production of fissionable materials for other than peaceful purposes; (2) a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; (3) the dismantling of nuclear-weapons stockpiles and the conversion to peaceful uses of the fissionable materials thus released; and (4) arrangements for inspection and control required to implement agreements on conventional arms. The Commission should also select a group of technical experts to work out an inspection system to ensure compliance with any recommendations the Commission might make on the subjects outlined above. (DPC Note No. 187, R-2, "Indian Draft Resolution on Nuclear Weapons," 16 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

10 October 1957 -- The General Assembly's Political and Security Committee began consideration of the disarmament question. US Ambassador Lodge made a conciliatory speech summing up the Western proposals and optimistically describing the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London. In his discussion of the control of outer-space objects, he stated that the US was willing to join in a multilateral study of this problem without awaiting the conclusion of negotiations on the other substantive proposals made by the West on 29 August. Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his speech, repeated the Soviet accusations that the West did not actually desire a disarmament agreement. (New York Times, 11 Oct 57, 1:2. Texts, DPC Note No. 189, "Lodge and Matsudaira Statements in the First Committee Meeting, October 10, 1957," 17 Oct 57; DPC Note No. 190, "Gromyko Statement in the First Committee Meeting, October 10, 1957," 18 Oct 57; both in CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

11 October 1957 -- A Western disarmament draft resolution, with twenty-three co-sponsors, was introduced in the Political and Security Committee (see items of 24 September and 2 October). The resolution, differing in only one important respect from that agreed upon by the Western Four on 24 September, called for a disarmament agreement that would provide for:

1. Immediate suspension of nuclear testing, with prompt installation of effective international control, including inspection posts in the US, USSR, UK, Pacific Ocean areas, and elsewhere.

2. A halt in the production of fissionable materials for "weapons purposes" and the complete devotion of all fissionable materials produced in the future to "non-weapons purposes" under effective international control.

3. Reduction of nuclear-weapons stockpiles by transferring fissionable material from weapons to "non-weapons" uses.

4. Reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguarded arrangements.

5. Progressive establishment of ground and aerial inspection to guard against the possibility of surprise attack.

6. Joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space would
be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. This was a provision not included in the earlier version of the draft resolution.

The resolution further requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Subcommittee as soon as possible to achieve the agreement described above, and requested the Subcommittee to report on its progress by 30 April 1958.

This resolution was sponsored by the Western Four and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Italy, Laos, Liberia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, and Tunisia. (DPC Note No. 173, R-2, "Western Disarmament Resolution for 12th U.N. General Assembly," 14 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BF pt 10; Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 155, 11 Oct 57, DA IN 873382 (12 Oct 57).) (UNCLASSIFIED)

On 16 October, Belgium joined the list of cosponsors, bringing the total to twenty-four. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 189, 16 Oct 57, DA IN 63179 (17 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

13 October 1957 -- In Tokyo, a joint communique issued by Prime Minister Kishi and Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared, among other things, that the suspension of nuclear tests must be the first step toward the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, and toward other types of disarmament. The communique was issued at the end of a ten-day state visit by Nehru. (New York Times, 14 Oct 57, 1:1.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

14 October 1957 -- Commander Alan Noble, speaking for the UK in the Political and Security Committee, made the first formal speech in support of the Western disarmament resolution.
introduced on 11 October. He said that the UK, like the US, was willing to begin a study for the control of outer-space objects without waiting for agreement on other phases of disarmament (see item of 10 October). He also declared that a separate, unconditional ban on nuclear tests would endanger the balance of security and would not, as had been claimed, increase confidence and facilitate agreement on other disarmament measures. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 169, 14 Oct 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

15 October 1957 -- At a meeting of the Political and Security Committee, Yugoslavia endorsed an immediate ban on nuclear tests, the Soviet proposal for a five-year renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons (see item of 20 September), and the Indian proposal for an expansion of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee (see item of 25 September). Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic called for compromise, as the only way to achieve a disarmament agreement. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 175, 15 Oct 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

16 October 1957 -- Australia’s UN representative, in a speech to the Political and Security Committee, said that any international disarmament agreement must also include Communist China. At the same session of the Committee, V. K. Krishna Menon of India called for a ban on nuclear tests. "There is no such thing as a clean bomb," he asserted. (New York Times, 17 Oct 57, 15:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

17 October 1957 -- In an address to the Political and Security Committee, the Chinese Nationalist representative charged that the USSR had consistently blocked world moves towards disarmament. Supporting the 11 October Western resolution, he opposed halting nuclear tests and expanding the Disarmament
Commission or its Subcommittee. (New York Times, 18 Oct 57, 1:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 197, 17 Oct 57, DA IN 63529 (18 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

18 October 1957 -- The disarmament debate continued in the Political and Security Committee. Poland attacked the Western resolution of 11 October; the Philippines and the Netherlands criticized the Soviet disarmament position. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 210, 18 Oct 57, DA IN 63883 (19 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

21 October 1957 -- The Japanese resolution on suspending nuclear tests (see item of 23 September) was criticized by Rumania in the Political and Security Committee. The Rumanian speaker also echoed Soviet arguments on other aspects of the disarmament question. In another speech, the Afghan representative called for a halt in nuclear tests as soon as possible. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 230, 21 Oct 57, DA IN 64400 (22 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

22 October 1957 -- French representative Moch, speaking before the Political and Security Committee, urged adoption of the Western resolution introduced on 11 October. He opposed an unconditional suspension of nuclear tests and the expansion of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee. Later, at a news conference, he said that France was preparing fissionable materials for military purposes and that it would push ahead with atomic bomb development unless an international disarmament agreement could be reached. (New York Times, 23 Oct 57, 15:1; text of UN speech, DPC Note No. 193, "Moch Statement in the First Committee Meeting, October 22, 1957," CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 October 1957 -- The first conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency ended. During the three-weeks session the
Soviets had tried on a number of occasions to gain admission for Chinese Communist delegates, but each time had been voted down. (New York Times, 25 Oct 57, 13:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 October 1957 -- As the disarmament debate continued in the Political and Security Committee, Canada and Italy supported the Western resolution of 11 October; Albania and the Ukrainian SSR opposed it; Greece called for establishment of control machinery to supervise a test suspension; and Cambodia announced it would support all resolutions aimed at reducing armaments and halting nuclear tests. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 255, 23 Oct 57, DA IN 65197 (24 Oct 57.).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

24 October 1957 -- At the Political and Security Committee meeting, Brazil, Cuba, Portugal, and Nepal supported the 11 October Western resolution; Pakistan also supported it, but called for an immediate agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments; Bulgaria and the Byelorussian SSR opposed the resolution; Indonesia urged an immediate end to nuclear tests; and Ireland advocated private discussions among the great powers, particularly the US and USSR, at the highest possible level, as a means of reducing world tensions. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 270, 24 Oct 57, DA IN 65572 (25 Oct 57.).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

24 October 1957 -- Yugoslavia introduced a disarmament resolution in the Political and Security Committee. The resolution called for an early meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee to seek agreement on:

1. A reduction of armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures.

2. Measures contributing to a halt in the nuclear arms race. These would include:
(a) an agreement not to transfer to other countries nuclear weapons or fissionable materials for military uses; (b) a halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons; and (c) arrangements for the gradual transfer to "non-weapons purposes" of fissionable materials stockpiled for military use.

(3) Measures to restrict the use of ICBM's and all other devices for "outer-space motion" to peaceful and scientific purposes.

(4) An agreement to halt nuclear tests immediately.

(5) Adequate and effective measures of control and inspection for all of the above.

The Disarmament Subcommittee was to report to the Disarmament Commission by 1 May 1958 on the progress achieved. The Secretary General would then inform UN members of this progress and consult with them on the advisability of convening a special session of the General Assembly to consider the disarmament problem. (New York Times, 25 Oct 57, 6:3; text, DPC Note No. 192, "Yugoslav Draft Resolution on a Comprehensive Disarmament Program," 29 Oct 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 October 1957 -- President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, in a communiqué issued at the end of a three-day meeting in Washington, reaffirmed their support of the Western disarmament proposal of 29 August. In the absence of disarmament, they said, the Free World would continue to work together and would take steps for increased scientific cooperation. To this end, President Eisenhower would ask Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act to permit "close and fruitful collaboration" of scientists and engineers of the UK, the US, and other friendly nations. Increased cooperation
among Free World nations would be given particular con-
sideration at the forthcoming December meeting of the North
Atlantic Council. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII,
no. 959 (11 Nov 57), pp. 739-741.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

25 October 1957 -- Ecuador, supported by Panama, suggested in the
Political and Security Committee the establishment of a
working group to make a "supreme effort" to draft a disarm-
ament resolution. This working group would consist of the
five members of the Disarmament Subcommittee, plus Japan,
India, and Mexico. (Ms5, New York (Lodge) to SecState,
DELGA 286, 25 Oct 57.) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

28 October 1957 -- US UN Ambassador Lodge reported a growing
feeling at the UN that the passage of the 11 October Western
resolution would only serve to harden the disarmament dead-
lock. This feeling, he stated, would render problematic
the passage of the resolution by a two-thirds vote, as
desired by the US. He suggested that the best method of
securing the desired vote and also of obtaining a strong
rejection by the General Assembly of the proposed nuclear-
test ban was to indicate Western flexibility on the disarm-
ament question. To this end he recommended amending the
11 October resolution by calling for the establishment of
a group of technical experts to design an inspection system,
this group to include three experts from states outside the
Disarmament Subcommittee, probably Japan, India, and Sweden.
The amendment could be offered at an appropriate time by a
state, not already a co-sponsor of the resolution, such as
Mexico or Burma. Mr. Lodge requested State Department
permission to discuss the proposed amendment with the UK,
France, and Canada. (Ms5s, New York (Lodge) to SecState,
DELGA 291, DELGA 292, 28 Oct 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

28 October 1957 -- Argentina, Israel, and Uruguay supported the Western 11 October disarmament resolution in the Political and Security Committee. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 305, DA IN 66603 (29 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

29 October 1957 -- Continuing the general disarmament debate in the Political and Security Committee, Mexico called for support of its resolution of 3 October; Austria advocated a resumption of disarmament negotiations; Norway supported the 11 October Western resolution; Sweden warned against an "all or nothing" attitude toward disarmament, and said a separate agreement on certain points would have a positive value; and Egypt supported a separate test ban and an enlargement of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 309, 29 Oct 57, DA IN 66876 (30 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

30 October 1957 -- The Political and Security Committee completed general debate on disarmament with statements by the USSR, India, France, and Japan. The Soviet statement was a lengthy attack on the Western disarmament position and a criticism of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee. India's V. K. Krishna Menon reiterated the call for a suspension of nuclear tests, and warned that adoption of resolutions, such as the 11 October Western resolution, that did not represent
the views of all could only lead to a tightening of the disarmament deadlock. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 325, 30 Oct 57, DA IN 57261 (11 Oct 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)
(New York Times, 31 Oct 57, 15:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

31 October 1957 -- With the approval of the State Department, US UN Ambassador Lodge obtained the agreement of the UK, France, and Canada to his proposed change in the 11 October Western resolution (see item of 28 October). It was hoped that Mexico, Norway, Sweden, and Pakistan would agree to introduce the amendment. (Msgs, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 330, 31 Oct 57, DA IN 67529 (1 Nov 57); SecState to USUN New York, GADEL 70, 30 Oct 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3 November 1957 -- The Soviet Union successfully launched a second earth satellite. The second satellite, much larger than the first, weighed 1,120 pounds, circled the earth at 17,840 miles per hour and at a maximum altitude of 1,056 miles, contained measuring instruments and two radios, and carried a small dog. (New York Times, 3 Nov 57, 1:8; text of two Soviet announcements, 8:1-3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

4 November 1957 -- As the Political and Security Committee completed final consideration of the various disarmament proposals before it, the Soviet Union announced that it would not continue to participate in the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee as long as the composition of those groups remained unchanged. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, in a speech to the Political and Security Committee, charged that the Western resolution of 11 October was an ultimatum, and that it offered further proof that the chances of reaching agreement through the Disarmament Subcommittee had been "entirely exhausted." He called for adoption of the Soviet proposal of 28 October to establish
a new, permanent Disarmament Commission that included all members of the General Assembly.

The initial reaction of the Western Four delegations was that the USSR was bluffing. They agreed to proceed on their planned course, pressing for a vote as soon as possible on the various resolutions before the Political and Security Committee. (Msgs, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 362, 4 Nov 57, DA IN 68449 (5 Nov 57); DELGA 363, 4 Nov 57, DA IN 68600 (5 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL) (New York Times, 5 Nov 57, 1:5.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 November 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles, during his press conference, discussed the Soviet threat to boycott the UN Disarmament Commission as it was then composed, and the USSR resolution to enlarge the Commission to include all 82 members of the General Assembly (see above item). Mr. Dulles pointed out that disarmament negotiations in a body of 82 would be "quite impossible," and that successful negotiations could only be carried out between the principal parties involved in the disarmament question. He added that the talks in the Disarmament Subcommittee had narrowed the differences between the USSR and the West and had developed the acceptance in principle of certain ideas. (State Department Bulletin, v. XXXVII, no. 961 (25 Nov 57), pp. 824-825.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

5 November 1957 -- At a luncheon meeting of US and Soviet delegates to the UN, the Soviets strongly indicated that their reason for favoring an 82-nation Disarmament Commission was that they felt that such an organization would be more conducive to US-Soviet bilateral negotiations. The Soviets said that an expansion of the Disarmament Subcommittee by only two or three states would do no good. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to
November 1957 -- Nikita S. Khrushchev called for a top-level meeting of the Communist and capitalist countries to reach an agreement that would stop the cold war and the armaments race and establish international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. He made his proposal in a speech before a special session of the Supreme Soviet, meeting to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. (New York Times, 7 Nov 57, 1:5; text excerpts, 10:1-8.)

November 1957 -- The Political and Security Committee voted on the various disarmament resolutions before it. It adopted the Western 11 October resolution, with amendments acceptable to its sponsors, and the Belgian resolution on informing the world of the dangers of the arms race (see item of 17 September 1957). All other resolutions were rejected. The vote on the Western resolution was 57 to nine, with 15 abstentions. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the resolution, while the states abstaining were Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. The vote on the Belgian resolution was 70-9-2, the Soviet bloc opposing passage, and Syria and Yemen abstaining. The vote rejecting the Soviet resolution to reorganize the Disarmament Commission with all the members of the General Assembly was 9-51-21. Only the Soviet bloc supported the resolution; Austria, Finland, Mexico, Yugoslavia, and many of the Afro-Asian states abstained.

The Western resolution, as amended,

(1) Emphasized the urgency of achieving international agreement on the reduction, limitation, and open inspection
of arms and armed forces.

(2) Welcomed the narrowing of differences resulting from the talks in the Disarmament Subcommittee.

(3) Stated that careful steps could be taken for partial disarmament, which in turn would facilitate further disarmament.

(4) Urged achievement of a disarmament agreement that would provide for:

(a) The immediate suspension of nuclear tests, with prompt installation of effective international control, including inspection posts in the territories of the US, USSR, and UK, the Pacific Ocean areas, and elsewhere as required.

(b) A halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the complete devotion of the future production of fissionable materials to "non-weapons purposes" under effective international control.

(c) The reduction of nuclear-weapons stocks through the internationally supervised transfer of fissionable material from weapons to "non-weapons uses."

(d) The reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguarded arrangements.

(e) Ground and aerial inspection to provide against surprise attack.

(f) Joint study of an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

(5) Requested a meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee as soon as possible to draw up the above agreement.
(5) Requested the Subcommittee to establish, as one of its first tasks, a group or groups of technical experts to study inspection systems.

(7) Recommended that any technical group or groups be composed of one expert from each of the member states of the Subcommittee and one from each of three other UN member states, to be designated by the Secretary General in consultation with the Subcommittee.

(8) Invited the states concerned to consider the possibility of devoting, out of the funds made available through disarmament, additional resources to the improvement of world living conditions.

(9) Requested the Subcommittee to report to the Disarmament Committee by 30 April 1958 on its progress. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 378, 5 Nov 57, DA IN 59231 (7 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL) (Text and details of voting on the Western resolution, DPC Note No. 196, "Draft Resolution on Disarmament Adopted by First Committee," 15 Nov 57; text of Belgian resolution, DPC Note No. 197, "Draft Resolution on the Dangers of the Armaments Race Adopted by First Committee," 18 Nov 57. Both in CCS ORG (4-14-45) BP pt 10.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 November 1957 -- In a statement commenting on Nikita Khrushchev's proposal of 6 November for a high-level meeting between Communist and capitalist nations, the State Department declared that such meetings were desirable only if there were reasonable grounds for expecting that they would bring beneficial results. Statements by Secretary Dulles and Department press officer Lincoln White also indicated a lack of interest in the Khrushchev proposal. Mr. Dulles, for instance, told newspaper reporters that international
agreements, if properly enforced, were already adequate to prevent the use of force. In Canada, however, Prime Minister Diefenbaker said in the House of Commons that he thought NATO ought to give careful consideration to the Soviet proposal. *(New York Times, 8 Nov 57, 1:6, 8:5.)* (UNCLASSIFIED)

7 November 1957 -- The Political and Security Committee considered a Czech proposal to call a world scientific conference, under the auspices of the UN, to study the effects of atomic radiation. The Czechoslovakian draft resolution was opposed by James J. Wadsworth, alternate US representative, who pointed out that the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had been considering this subject for two years, and was scheduled to report its findings in 1958. Until then, he said, any other steps along these lines should be deferred. *(New York Times, 8 Nov 57, 5:1; text, DPC Note No. 195, "Czechoslovakian Draft Resolution on the Effects of Atomic Radiation," 7 Nov 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 10.)* (UNCLASSIFIED) *(Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 385, 7 Nov 57, DA IN 69555 (8 Nov 57).)* (CONFIDENTIAL)

8 November 1957 -- The Political and Security Committee discussed the Czech proposal for an international conference on the effects of atomic radiation (see above item). A US proposal, co-sponsored by seven others and offered as a substitute for the Czech resolution, simply called on all concerned to continue to cooperate in making available to the Scientific Committee all information on the subject. India and Japan offered suggestions aimed at reaching a compromise. *(Msgs, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 392, 8 Nov 57, DA IN 69878 (9 Nov 57); DELGA 393, 8 Nov 57, DA IN 69915 (9 Nov 57); DELGA 395, 8 Nov 57, DA IN 69894 (9 Nov 57).)* (CONFIDENTIAL)
11 November 1957 — A sixteen-power compromise resolution on the subject of the effects of atomic radiation (see items of 7 and 8 November) was unanimously approved by the Political and Security Committee. The Czech and US proposals were not pressed to a vote. The compromise resolution, which listed the Western Four, India, Japan, and Yugoslavia among its sponsors, called for the General Assembly to:

(1) Call on all concerned to continue cooperating with the UN Scientific Committee.

(2) Request the Scientific Committee to complete its report as soon as possible.

(3) Request the Secretary General and the Scientific Committee to consider the question of strengthening and widening scientific activities in this field.

(4) Include in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly (1958) the report of the Scientific Committee.

(5) Transmit to the Scientific Committee the record of discussion of this question in the Political and Security Committee. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 397, 11 Nov 57, DA IN 888208 (12 Nov 57).) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 403, 11 Nov 57, DA IN 70270 (12 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

12 November 1957 — As a result of growing opinion in the UN in favor of enlarging the Disarmament Commission, the Western Four agreed to introduce a resolution in the General Assembly enlarging the Commission by the addition of five more nations. For the first year, these were to be Brazil, India, Italy, Poland, and Tunisia. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 406, 12 Nov 57, DA IN 70557 (13 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)
13 November 1957 -- In the light of suggestions by India, Yugoslavia, and other interested states, and after discussion among themselves, the Western Four agreed to change their resolution on enlarging the Disarmament Commission (see above item). They agreed that ten, rather than five, new members should be added to the Commission. The ten members would be Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, India, Italy, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. (Msgs, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 420, 13 Nov 57, DA IN 70937 (14 Nov 57); DELGA 424, 13 Nov 57.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

14 November 1957 -- The General Assembly adopted the two disarmament resolutions approved by the Political and Security Committee on 6 November. The vote on the Western resolution was 56-9-15, the same as it had been in the Committee except that Costa Rica, which had supported the measure, was absent from the General Assembly vote. The vote on the Belgian resolution was 71-9-1, also the same as in Committee, except that Yemen, which had abstained, now supported the resolution. The General Assembly also unanimously approved the resolution adopted in the Political and Security Committee on the subject of the effects of atomic radiation (see item of 11 November).

After Canada and Japan had offered the Western-Four resolution on enlarging the Disarmament Commission (see above item), the General Assembly voted to defer action on this question in order to permit further talks among the delegates. (Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 431, 14 Nov 57, DA IN 71230 (15 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL) (New York Times, 15 Nov 57, 1:2.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

15 November 1957 -- India, Yugoslavia, and Sweden submitted in the General Assembly an amendment to the proposed resolution for enlarging the Disarmament Commission (see above item).
This amendment provided for the addition to the Commission of Egypt, Mexico, Norway, and Poland, as well as the ten nations listed in the original resolution. (Mss, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 433, 15 Nov 57, DA IN 71511 (16 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL)

18 November 1957 -- Secretary of State Dulles requested the Department of Defense to develop a preliminary statement of principles and an outline of an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space would be for exclusively peaceful and scientific purposes. This system was to be in line with the proposal on this subject made in London on 29 August as part of the comprehensive Western disarmament proposal. Since the US Government had announced it might be willing to begin a study of this problem without awaiting the conclusion of an overall disarmament agreement (see item of 8 October), Mr. Dulles felt that the US should have a coordinated position on this matter as soon as possible.

On 20 November, the Secretary's request was forwarded for action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JCS 1731/245, Note by Secys, "Disarmament (U)," 4 Dec 57, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 73.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

18 November 1957 -- The Western Four agreed to the inclusion in the Disarmament Commission of the additional four states proposed on 15 November by India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Then Canada, India, Japan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia (with Paraguay joining later as a co-sponsor) submitted in the General Assembly a revised resolution listing the fourteen states to be added to the Commission. Soviet representative Kuznetsov, however, told US Ambassador Lodge, and later reporters, that the proposal was "totally unacceptable" to the USSR. (Mss, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 439,
19 November 1957 -- The General Assembly accepted, by a vote of 50-9-11, the proposal to include fourteen additional members in the Disarmament Commission (see above item). Before the vote, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland announced they would not participate in the Commission's activities unless the General Assembly accepted a new amendment offered by Albania. This amendment called for seven more states—Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Rumania, and Sudan—to be added to the fourteen other additions to the Commission. This amendment was voted down, 19-38-19. Then the Soviet resolution to enlarge the Commission to include all members of the General Assembly was also defeated, 9-46-24. The vote adding fourteen members to the Disarmament Commission followed next. The General Assembly then defeated, 24-34-20, another Indian proposal to suspend nuclear tests. (Msg, New York (Lodge to SecState, DELGA 449, 19 Nov 57, DA IN 72526 (20 Nov 57).) (CONFIDENTIAL) (New York Times, 20 Nov 57, 12:3.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

23 November 1957 -- The Soviet delegation at the UN issued a formal statement that the Soviet Union would not participate in the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission so long as the majority of its members were "at the same time participants of the aggressive military blocs." The enlargement of the Disarmament Commission (see above item) did not change the Soviet intent to boycott that body (see item of 4 November), and the USSR was not "merely pretending." A Soviet spokesman told reporters that the USSR would still consider a "serious approach" by the West on disarmament, but that the next move
was up to the UK, the US, and France. He indicated that any further disarmament talks would have to include a discussion of a ban on the use or testing of nuclear weapons. (New York Times, 24 Nov 57, 1:7.) (UNCLASSIFIED)