Mr. Michael E. Bentley

Dear Mr. Bentley:


The enclose document has been provided by the Directorate for Strategic and Tactical Systems as responsive to your request.

It has been determined that additional records possibly responsive to your request may be under the cognizance of the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development Center (ARDEC). Accordingly, your request has been referred to ARDEC at the following address for processing and direct response to you:

U.S. Tank Automotive Center/ARDEC
FOIA Officer, Bldg. 3
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

There are no charges for processing this request in this instance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

A. M. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information and Security Review

Enclosure:
As stated
Statement of

The Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
George R. Schieffer

Before the
Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology
of the
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

on

Nonlethal Weapons

March 15, 1996
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to present to you the current status of the Department’s program on nonlethal weapons. I’m accompanied today by Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni, Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force, United States Marine Corps, and Major General Edward G. Anderson III, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development, United States Army. Both the Army and the Marine Corps, as well as the other Services, have a major interest in this area.

At the outset, I want to make clear what we mean by the term nonlethal weapons. We consider nonlethal weapons to be those explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Examples are weapons that would incapacitate, stop, or distract individuals; allow us to seize them or stop their vehicles; permit us to block an area to individuals or vehicles; or enable us to control crowds.

It is equally important to make clear what we do NOT include within the term nonlethal weapons. We do not include psychological operations, electronic countermeasures, precision lethal weapons, or most weapons associated with information warfare.

The foregoing is consistent with a draft DoD nonlethal weapons policy, which is in the final stages of preparation.

My office began to pay particular attention to nonlethal weapons about 2 years ago, when the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) asked the Director, Tactical Warfare Programs (a predecessor of my current organization), to organize and chair a Senior Steering Committee on Nonlethal Weapons. The objective was to examine the ongoing research and development activities in the area, and to recommend changes as appropriate. The committee principally reviewed the R&D activities underway at the Army’s Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, ARDEC, and we developed a program plan for nonlethal weapons, which the Deputy Secretary of Defense recently approved. This action resulted in increased funding for nonlethal weapons R&D in FY96, and in the FY97 and FY98 budgets. The total increase over the three years was $13.3 million, resulting in a total program of $18.9 million.

More recently, in response to the FY96 Authorization Bill, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), asked me to lead a quick, yet comprehensive, review of nonlethal weapons. He directed me to include on the review team from representatives of the military Services, both the acquisition community and the
operations organizations; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict); and the Joint Staff, who represent the warfighting CINCs. The objective of the review was to consider alternative organizations to be assigned centralized responsibility for nonlethal weapons and to recommend a management approach; to draft the report required by the legislation; and to recommend any additional funding to be added to our nonlethal weapons program.

We have essentially completed this review, but we have not yet reported the results to Dr. Kaminski. We are scheduled to do that on March 18. Consequently, no decisions have been made on the items listed above. However, I have discussed our findings and recommendations with Dr. Kaminski, and he has authorized me to present the general findings to you. I will not be able to address specific levels of additional funding, but I will give a general idea of the levels we have in mind.

I will first address requirements, which take the form of Mission Needs Statements, which are general statements of needs, and Operational Requirements Documents, which identify more specific needs. The Services and the CINCs have requirements documents in various stages of completion. Some are validated and approved, some are in draft, and some are awaiting action.

Examples of missions for which needs have been identified include noncombatant evacuation operations in politically unstable areas, humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters or internal political upheavals, and peace enforcement and peacekeeping between opposing forces to prevent outbreak of hostilities. More specific needs identified in Operational Requirements Documents include less-than-lethal 40-millimeter rounds and 5.56-millimeter cartridges, and mid-sized riot control dispensers.

We reviewed nonlethal weapons research and development activities, both unclassified and classified. These included ARDEC work on vehicle stoppers, entanglements, kinetics, and acoustic devices; DARPA activities on eye-safe lasers, dazzlers, pyrotechnics, acoustics, and antipersonnel electric shockers; and work supported by the Physical Security Equipment Action Group on lasers and microwave devices. As I mentioned earlier, we had reviewed many of these programs earlier, and the Department had added funding to the ARDEC work. We again examined these programs to see if additional funding was justified. We concluded that a modest amount of additional funding (on the order of $1 million over FY96 and FY97) would be worthwhile, aimed at reducing development risk in the kinetics, entanglements, and acoustics areas.

There is general agreement that we do not have adequate inventories of existing nonlethal weapons. Accordingly, we asked the Services to identify immediate procurement needs: what were their current requirements for existing nonlethal weapons, what quantity did they have on hand, what was the cost of the shortfall, and what were additional needs for training? Based on the Services’ responses to these questions, we identified on the order of $5 million of needed items that should be procured immediately to meet inventory deficits. We will recommend funding of these items.
We considered whether it made sense to initiate an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration for nonlethal weapons. We observed that two potential new-start ACTDs already plan to incorporate nonlethal weapons: an Army ACTD, Military Operations in Urban Terrain; and a Marine Corps ACTD, Sea Dragon. We concluded that an ACTD exclusively for nonlethal weapons was not appropriate at this time, although we did not rule this out for the future.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we considered the management structure for nonlethal weapons in the Department. We made the following observations:

- The Marine Corps and the Army play leading roles in the use of nonlethal weapons, they are developing a memorandum of agreement on nonlethal weapons, they believe that a Service should be executive agent for nonlethal weapons, and the Army is willing for the Marine Corps to be executive agent, although the Army is willing to assume that role as well.

- The principal ongoing research and development activities in this area, funded by the Army at ARDEC, are well structured and are being thoroughly coordinated with the various using communities. That program has successfully provided a conduit for rapidly fielding nonlethal weapons at times of urgent need. We could see no reason to make changes to this activity, but rather desire to support it and keep it strong.

- The development and purchase of nonlethal weapons is best done by each Military Department and by the Special Operations Command (for equipment peculiar to Special Operations Forces), to meet their individual needs. However, an executive agent for nonlethal weapons is needed to carry out the following responsibilities:
  
  -- Serve as the primary DoD point of contact for nonlethal weapons.
  -- Ensure coordination between the materiel and combat development communities.
  -- Provide program guidance to include ensuring that appropriate user testing and evaluation are conducted.
  -- Coordinate joint requirements, training, and doctrine efforts.
  -- Recommend funding levels of 6.1 through 6.4 projects, as well as for training and procurement.

- The existing Senior Steering Committee has played an important role in providing oversight and fostering a broad-based level of support for the nonlethal weapons program and its funding. A flaw in its earlier membership was the absence of direct participation by the operational community; this has been remedied. The Committee’s working group has been essential in laying the groundwork for the SSG’s activities. Finally, both the SSG and the working group have relied on an existing Joint Program Office, housed within the Navy, for technology evaluation and for ensuring coordination with relevant classified activities.
Taking the above factors into account, we will recommend the following management structure:

- The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, should be the DoD Nonlethal Weapons Executive Agent, with the Director, Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory, as action agent. The executive agent would coordinate the activities of the Services and USSOCOM, but would exercise direct control of only the Marine Corps activities. The Marine Corps would chair, and the Army would be vice chair of, a Joint Nonlethal Weapons Integrated Product Team. This IPT would have as members all interested DoD offices; it would be the mechanism for their interests to be represented. The IPT would also ensure coordination with the Departments of Justice, Energy, and Transportation, who would be observers on the IPT. The Joint Program Office would support the IPT as a Nonlethal Technologies Coordination Cell.

- As is the case for all acquisition matters, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) would exercise oversight and direction of nonlethal weapons research, development, and procurement. The Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, OUSD(A&T), will support the USD(A&T) and chair the Nonlethal Weapons Senior Steering Committee, augmented as described above.

We believe this management structure will best serve the Department's work in this important area. My hope is that this structure will be implemented soon. The steps recommended by our review group are only the first that need to be taken. The lead must now shift to the Executive Agent. Among the things that we believe the Executive Agent should focus on include the following:

- Developing in the next few months a proposed program, for FY97 and beyond, for research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement activities.

- Recommending to the ACTD sponsor ways to enhance the role of nonlethal weapons in ACTDs, including ensuring adequate use of nonlethal weapons in the Military Operations in Urban Terrain and Sea Dragon ACTDs.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to address the questions of the Committee. Thank you.