Mr. William Burr  
The National Security Archive  
Gelman Library, Suite 701  
2130 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20037  

Dear Mr. Burr:

This responds to your August 4, 1995, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal.

I have reviewed the information at the appellate level and additional information previously withheld may be released. However, I have determined that the deleted portions are still exempt from disclosure. [This information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5 (a), concerning military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (d) foreign relations of the United States, and (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems or plans relating to the national security. This information must be withheld pursuant to Title 5 USC § 552 (b)(1)].

[On three pages of the enclosed documents there are black markings that, due to an administrative copying process used at The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), delete information. Please be assured that this information is not withheld pursuant to the FOIA. NARA advises that on the originals of these documents, a red tape covers some of the text. When the documents were copied, the red tape reproduced as black markings; however, DFOSIR has been able to determine the information that has been blacked-out. On the document identified as JCS 2056/274, 18 August 1961, the black area at the bottom contains classification downgrading instructions. On the documents identified as JCS 2056/285, 26 October 1961, the black areas at the bottom of the first two pages contain information for distribution of the documents.]
You are advised that you have a right to judicial review of this decision in a United States District Court in accordance with Title 5 USC § 552(a)(4)(B).

Sincerely,

Clifford H. Bernath
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Enclosures:
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 16 October 1961, subject as above, and the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with you on 23 October 1961.

2. Attached as an Appendix is the Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This guidance is being issued to appropriate commanders and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, for implementation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment (w/o attachment - Attachment is Appendix to JCS 2056/285)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Guidance for Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

1. In your memorandum of 13 March 1961 on the organization and manning of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff you requested that, in preparation for SIOP-63, the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the guidance and instructions given to the Director, Strategic Target Planning, and consider their suggested revision after discussion with you.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the current SIOP guidance contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (Tab A to JCSM-372-60, dated 22 August 1960) and agree that revised guidance should be promulgated for the preparation of SIOP-63. The Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps agree on the version of the guidance in Appendix A. The Chief of Staff, US Air Force disagrees with the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view in several important respects; his version of the guidance is contained in Appendix C.

3. The rationale supporting the Army-Navy-Marine Corps version of the SIOP guidance is attached as Appendix B, and that in support of the Air Force version is attached as Appendix D.

Attachment
Distr:
Chairman, JCS (2)
CMC (2)
DCSOPS
Secy to CNO (JCS)
Dir/Plans, AF
MarCorps L/O
Dir J/S (2)
J-5
J-3

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by the J-5)
on
GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 25 October 1961, after making amend-
ments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in
paragraph 3 of JCS 2056/285.

2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised
pages 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 13 of the Appendix, incorporating the
amendments, and to return the superseded pages to the Secretary,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its
Appendix, was forwarded as JCSM-756-61, dated 26 October 1961,
to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed the direct concern
of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,
US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached
as the top sheet of JCS 2056/285.

Received pages 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 13 of the Appendix
to JCS 2056/285 for return to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of
Staff. These pages were derived from Copy No. 18 of
JCS 2056/285.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by J-5)

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 20 October 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in paragraph 5 of JCS 2056/235.

2. The memorandum in Enclosure A was forwarded as JCSM 747-61, dated 23 October 1961, to the Secretary of Defense.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 2056/285.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

DISTRIBUTION:
Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)

Gen. Hayes (DC/S-P, MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)
Adm. Wellings (VD/JS)
Gen. Collins (J-2)
Gen. Dean (J-3)
MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
(Staffed by the J-5)

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963, (SIOP-63) (U)

Reference: JCS 2056/284

1. At their meeting with the Secretary of Defense on
23 October 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed a
suggested draft of the Guidance for Preparation of the
Single Integrated Operational Plan and considered certain
changes which have been incorporated in the Appendix.

2. Enclosed is a proposed memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense which forwards a copy of the guidance for the prepara-
tion of SIOP-63 as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is recommended that:

   a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its
Appendix, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

   b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)  Gen. Wieseman (DC/S-P, MC)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)     Adm. Wellings (VD/JS)
Gen. LeMay (CSAP)        Gen. Collins (J-2)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)         Gen. Dean (J-3)
Gen. Hamlett (DC/S, OPS) Adm. Ferrall (J-5)
Adm. Sharp (DONC-P&P)   Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S, P&P) Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum*, dated 16 October 1961, subject as above, and the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with you on 23 October 1961.

2. Attached as an Appendix is the Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This guidance is being issued to appropriate commanders and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, for implementation.

* Attachment to JCS 2056/284

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

ENCLOSURE

TOP SECRET
JCS 2056/285
(Rev. 10/24/61) ... 2305a

Enclosure

NND 93/089 - 1
APPENDIX

NATIONAL TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY FOR GENERAL WAR:
GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE SINGLE
INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (SIOP)

(13 pages)
APPENDIX

DRAFT

National Targeting and Attack Policy For General War: Guidance For the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

I. Purpose

To provide guidance for the annual preparation of capabilities plans for employment of United States nuclear offensive forces in that range of contingencies in which the United States would execute major nuclear attacks against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

II. Scope

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands and for coordination with appropriate external commands, for all preplanned attacks on targets the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the objectives enumerated in Section III, below. It will determine the DGZ's to be attacked, and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces.

III. Objectives.

a. United States plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive operations, the following objectives.

(1) To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.

Appendix

(Revised - 24 October 1961)
(2). To minimize damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events to limit such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

(3) To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the United States and its Allies.

b. SIOP will contribute to the achievement of these objectives by accomplishment, as directed, of the following three tasks:

Task I:

Task I will be accomplished in such a way as to minimize damage (by choice of DGZ and height of burst) to population and industry (including fallout), subject to the requirements of military necessity.

Planning for accomplishment of Task I will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all attacks.
Task II: The destruction or neutralization of other elements of...

Task II will be accomplished in such a way as to minimize damage to population and industry, subject to the requirements of military necessity.

Planning for accomplishment of Task II will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all Task II attacks against...

Task III:

(Page revised by Decision On - 26 October 1961)
IV. National Strategic Target List

a. A National Strategic Target List (NSTL) will be developed and maintained by the Director of Strategic Target Planning. It will include all target installations in Tasks I, II, and III.

b. The NSTL will be developed from the Target Data Inventory, without regard to the magnitude of US and Allied forces available for the execution of nuclear offensive tasks in general war.

c. The NSTL will identify the target installations corresponding to Tasks I through III and indicate those programmed for attack in the SIOP.

d. The NSTL will encompass all of the targets which may require attack under any of the varying circumstances of general war engagement. There is no single combination of targets which will represent the task of nuclear offensive forces under all circumstances. The strike task to be accomplished in initial operations will depend upon the specific circumstances attending initiation.

V. Target Priorities and Expected Damage c/

a. Expected damage, or an expectation of damage, is the average of damage that would be achieved if the attack were run many times.

b. In achieving the damage levels prescribed below, plans will take into account all pertinent operational factors including pre-launch survivability (appropriate assumptions described below), and cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. Expectation of damage against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP's of available weapons, and other

c/ Priorities in this section are to be understood in the sense of allocation of limited forces, not in the sense of time urgency.
factors. The total reduction in enemy strength from all
attacks against the categories of installations listed below
should approximate what would have resulted if the estab-
lished expectation had been achieved against each installation.

c. Available forces will be used to maximize the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the plan. The order of target
categories prescribed in d(1) below are chosen to indicate
relative priorities. The expected damage levels prescribed
below are neither maximum nor minimum limits to the damage
to be inflicted. If programmed capabilities will not permit
the achievement of the prescribed levels of damage, lower
levels will be accepted, with due regard for the indicated
order of priority. If programmed capabilities will permit,
higher expectancies of damage against the prescribed targets
and the destruction or neutralization of other targets will
be achieved in such a way as best to accomplish the strike
tasks.

d. In the programming of forces under all options, priority
will be given to the achievement of damage as follows:

(1) (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

d/ Severe and significant damage as used throughout this docu-
ment is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960.
(2) Programming of forces for (1) above will be done in a manner that will permit assignment of forces to Task III which are adequate to inflict significant damage in the USSR and China. DGZ's for these forces will be selected in such a way as best to achieve Task III. (Floor space as such is introduced only to define the size of the forces to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives).

e. Programming of available and capable forces to other than targets in Tasks I and III will be divided between destruction or neutralization, and assignment to reserve forces, in such a way as best to achieve the objectives and Tasks defined in Section III, above.

\[\text{d/ Severe and significant damage as used throughout this document is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960.}\]
\[\text{e/ Built up area may be used when tract data is not available.}\]
VI. Options and Flexibility

a. USAF will be prepared in consideration of the following alternative circumstances of outbreak of war:

(1) 

(2) Tactical Warning. US response to major Sino-Soviet Bloc surprise attack in which US forces are on normal peacetime alert. Plans for this contingency will be based on the assumption that ZI based alert forces receive timely tactical warning. Using a combination of cross-targeting and assignment of the most survivable systems to the first priority targets, the plans should assure a satisfactory allocation of effort against the first priority targets in the event the US receives inadequate warning.

The following pre-launch survival probabilities are provided to give an approximate quantitative expression to the intent underlying the contingencies defined above for the FY 1963 time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tactical Warning</th>
<th>Inadequate Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Alert Aircraft and Polaris on/near Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman, Titan II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Atlas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Carrier Aircraft (At Sea)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Alert * Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Alert * Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan I; Medium Atlas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Refers to normal peacetime readiness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Pre-emption</th>
<th>Tactical Warning</th>
<th>Inadequate Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft Atlas</td>
<td></td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alert Carrier Aircraft</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alert Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alert Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Director of Strategic Target Planning will evaluate these factors in the light of the changing threat, changing composition and readiness of US forces, and the experience resulting from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff analyses and war gaming, and other sources, and report any changes made, with the reasons therefor, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. SIOP will provide for execution, when directed by competent authority, of the following:

**Attack Option I.** Execute Task I under conditions of US Pre-emption while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

**Attack Option II.** Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of US Pre-emption while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

*Attack Option III.** Execute Task I under conditions of Tactical Warning while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

**Attack Option IV.** Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of Tactical Warning while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

**Attack Option V.** Execute Tasks I, II, and III under conditions of Tactical Warning.

SIOP will also provide for selective withholding of attacks.

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\*\*Refers to normal peacetime readiness.\*\*

\* Chances of using this Attack Option are remote and it is, therefore, to be programmed as a last priority.

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(Page revised by Decision On - 26 October 1961)
under each Attack Option, as indicated in Section III.b, above. (For example, there should be provision under Attack Option II for selective withholding of Task II attacks from...)

c. Any conflicts which arise in force programming for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option V.

VII. Role of Theater Forces

a. Subject to the requirements of contingency plans and other theater requirements, unified and specified commanders will decide on the commitment of their forces, other than SAC and Polaris, to SIOP for attacks against targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. SIOP tasks will be the first priority commitment for SAC and Polaris under all circumstances.

b. Taking into account appropriate operational factors including weather/darkness, the weight of effort of the committed theater forces will be considered in conjunction with the weight of effort of SAC and Polaris in programming the damage levels to Task I and III targets. Those forces other than SAC and Polaris committed to SIOP will be applied alternatively (1) to increase the expected damage level or confidence of target destruction achieved by SAC and Polaris forces against the same targets (including essential defense suppression), (2) to destroy other targets of lower priority or of particular significance to the theater commanders, or (3) to reduce the time from "N" hour to the attack of Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery forces.

c. All forces other than SAC and Polaris will be considered as available for such other missions as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff despite their commitment to SIOP. SIOP tasks are also a first priority commitment for forces other than SAC and Polaris which are committed to SIOP unless they have been directed to other
Tasks by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the result that meeting their SIOP-assigned times over target is not possible.

VIII. Constraints

a. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral, and satellite areas (i.e. all countries except the USSR and China) to the extent that military necessity permits.

b. In attacks to accomplish Tasks I. and II, surface bursts, weapon yields, and damage to population and industry will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.

c. Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in "d", below, are as follows:

d. Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP.
and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following:

First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability \( p \) of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

e. In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see c. above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

IX. Responsibilities
a. Joint Chiefs of Staff
(1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
(2) Review and approve annually the NSTL, the SIOP and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.
(3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

\[ p \] This is the product of prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. Any "dead-man fuzed" weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory.
b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

(1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(3) Resolve differences that occur during the development of SIOP; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

(5) During the effective period of the SIOP, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

(6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP.

c. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

(1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

(2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the SIOP and which should be included therein.

(3) Commit forces to the SIOP, in consonance with this guidance.
(A) Do not attacks against SIOP targets unless provided for by SIOP.

X. Analysis and Review

a. DSTP will perform a set of Monte Carlo damage runs for each Attack Option and selected withholding provisions, using all pertinent operational factors, determining AGZ's, and will report the following:

b. DSTP will prepare an analysis of the impact on penetration and target destruction of the exercise of the option to withhold.

c. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL, SIOP, and their analysis, will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

XI. Effective Period

a. To the extent that there are any conflicts with other guidance, this guidance represents national policy and supersedes all other SIOP guidance.

b. The SIOP will be prepared and reviewed annually, and amended as necessary to keep the plan current.

h/ See footnote e/ on page 6.
24 October 1961

MEMORANDUM

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by J-5)

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

FOURTH CORRIGENDUM

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised
pages 2306 and pages 1, 4, and 5 of the Appendix and to return
the superseded pages to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOVIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received page 2306 and pages 1, 4, and 5 of the Appendix
to JCS 2056/285 for return to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of
Staff. These pages were derived from Copy No. 18 of JCS
2056/285.

JCS Message Center Courier

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT
ATTACHMENTS
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285
A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
on
GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963 (SIOF-53) (U)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

Holders of JCS 2056/285 are requested to substitute the
attached Enclosure B (pages 1-17) and to destroy the superseded
pages in accordance with security regulations.

F. J. BLOUN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

DISTRIBUTION
Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)
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Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&F)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S,F&P)
Gen. Hayes (DC/S-P, MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)
Adm. Wellings (VD/JS)
Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT

TOP SECRET
1st Corrig to JCS 2056/285
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285
A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
on
GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963 (SIOP-53) (U)

SECOND CORRIGENDUM

Holders of JCS 2056/285 are requested to substitute the
attached revised page 5 of Enclosure B and to destroy the
superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENTS
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by J-5)
on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963, (SIOP-63, (U))

THIRD CORRIGENDUM

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised
paper and to return the superseded paper to the Secretary,
Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the pick-up request
distributed this date.

F. J. ELOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

DISTRIBUTION
Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)                  Gen. Wieseman (DC/S-P, MC)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)                    Adm. Wellings (VD/JS)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)                      Gen. Collins (J-2)
G. n. Shoup (CMC)                      Gen. Dean (J-3)
Gen. Hamlett (DC/S, OPS)               Adm. Ferrall (J-5)
Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&P)                  Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S, P&P)               Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)

UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachments

TOP SECRET

3rd Corrig to JCS 2056/285
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by the J-5)

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963, (SIOP-63) (U)

The guidance for the preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963 (SIOP-63), contained in the Appendix to JCS 2056/285 was issued for implementation to the appropriate commanders and to the Director, Strategic Target Planning, by SM-1162-61, dated 27 October 1961, a copy of which is attached.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Anderson (CNO)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)
Gen. Hamlett (DC/S,OPS)
Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&P)
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Gen. Hayes (DC/S-P,MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)
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Gen. Collins (J-2)
Gen. Dean (J-3)
Adm. Ferrall (J-5)
Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET
1st N/H of JCS 2056/285
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST (See Appendix hereto)

Subject: Guidance For Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)


For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

E. J. BLOUIN
RADM, USN
Secretary

Attachment

* Appendix to JCS 2056/285

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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23 October 1961

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2056/285

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by J-5)

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN, 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

Holders of JCS 2056/285 are requested to return to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the following portions of JCS 2056/285 or to provide a certificate of destruction therefor:

a. Enclosure B, pages 1 through 17, which was superseded by the first corrigendum.

b. Page 5 of Enclosure B which was superseded by the second corrigendum.

F. J. BLOUIIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat

-------------------------------------------------------------

Received Enclosure B, pages 1 through 17, which was superseded by the first corrigendum to JCS 2056/285, and page 5 of Enclosure B which was superseded by the second corrigendum to JCS 2056/285 for return to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. These pages were originally part of Copy No. 18 of JCS 2056/285.

JCS Message Center Courier
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINGLE INTEGRATED
OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)
References:  
a. JCS 2056/155
b. JCS 2056/289 - S-75 (30 Aug 60)
c. JCS 2056/273

1. At their meeting on 11 August 1961, after considering
JCS 2056/273, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward to
the Secretary of Defense the memorandum in Enclosure B hereto,
 together with its Appendices A, B, C and D, containing divergent
views.

2. The memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in Enclosure A, CM-332-61, and the memorandum in Enclosure B,
JCSM-547-61, together with its Appendices A, B, C and D,
were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, both dated 18
August 1961.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of
the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,
US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INCELIDO
Joint Secretariat

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED 12/3/75
CLASSIFICATION Continues.

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JCS RAB71 DR HM 20334
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidance for Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

1. Attached hereto are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on "Guidance for Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1963 (SIOP-63)."

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that:
   a. The guidance under which SIOP-62 was developed should be modified to provide greater operational flexibility to the degree practicable for selective withholding of attacks and retention of a secure reserve.
   b. The National Strategic Target List, to be used as a basis for the development of SIOP-63, should include selected elements of the following target objectives in the Sino-Soviet Bloc:
      (1) Strategic nuclear delivery capability.
      (2) Government and military controls.
      (3) War-supporting industrial resources.
      (4) Chemical and biological storage and production sites.
c. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral, and potentially friendly satellite areas to the extent that military necessity permits.

d. In the determination of over-all expected levels of destruction to be achieved, factors of prelaunch survivability for the various forces should be used, in addition to those operational factors used in SIOP-62.

e. The basic objective of this guidance is to establish an essential national task, the accomplishment of which will enable the United States to survive and prevail in general war.

3. The basic divergence in views centers on the important question as to the extent of destruction necessary to enable the United States to survive and prevail in general war. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree as to:

a. The numbers and types of targets which should be included in the essential national task.

b. The damage and expectancy criteria to be used in determining the weight of effort against each target objective.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps consider that the essential national task must and can be finitely dimensioned in terms of its objectives and the weight of effort required against these objectives. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, on the other hand, proposes that strategic offensive plans be calculated to achieve maximum U.S. strategic advantage in any of the circumstances under which deterrence may fail.

4. In my view, a clear distinction should be made between the purpose of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and that of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The NSTL should comprise essential targets which must be destroyed or neutralized if the U.S.
to survive and prevail in general war. It should not be merely a priority list whose length is determined by the number of nuclear delivery forces available. The SIOP, on the other hand, should integrate into a single, flexible operational plan those nuclear delivery forces committed to the destruction or neutralization of all targets in the NSTL. Additionally, it should provide for the withholding of a secure reserve for commitment subsequent to the initial nuclear exchange. To the extent practicable, after the commitment of forces against the NSTL and the withholding of a secure reserve, forces available for SIOP should be assigned targets additional to the NSTL. If these steps are taken, the procedures for the development of SIOP-63 can provide a useful indication of the adequacy of present and programmed strategic nuclear delivery forces.

5. As regards adequacy, I strongly support the majority view that the guidance at Appendix A should provide a level of destruction which is entirely adequate but not excessive. Accordingly, I recommend that the guidance in Appendix A be approved for use in the development of SIOP-63.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to discuss this matter with you prior to your decision.

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
JCSM-547-61
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Guidance for Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

1. In your memorandum of 13 March 1961 on the organization and manning of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff you requested that, in preparation for SIOP-63, the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the guidance and instructions given to the Director, Strategic Target Planning, and consider their suggested revision after discussion with you.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the current SIOP guidance contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (Tab A to JCSM-372-60, dated 22 August 1960) and agree that revised guidance should be promulgated for the preparation of SIOP-63. The Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps agree on the version of the guidance in Appendix A. The Chief of Staff, US Air Force disagrees with the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view in several important respects; his version of the guidance is contained in Appendix C.

3. The rationale supporting the Army-Navy-Marine Corps version of the SIOP guidance is attached as Appendix B, and that in support of the Air Force version is attached as Appendix D.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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* Enclosure A to JCS 2056/229
** Enclosure D to JCS 2056/165

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
APPENDIX A

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Army-Navy-Marine Corps View)

(12 pages)
APPENDIX A

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Army-Navy-Marine Corps View)

1. Intent. To furnish guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63, which will provide for the optimum employment of appropriate US nuclear delivery forces in the initial strategic attack* against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. Objectives. The objectives listed under a below constitute an essential national task, the accomplishment of which will enable the United States to survive and prevail in general war. The objective in b constitutes the other major tasks to be accomplished by nuclear operations.

a. The essential national task to be accomplished by SIOP-63 is as follows:

(1) To destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery forces** posing a threat to the United States and its Allies, and to US and Allied forces overseas.

(2) To destroy or neutralize, as necessary, the following:

(a) Primary government*** and primary military controls of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(b) The primary war supporting resources of the Sino-Soviet Bloc contained in major urban-industrial centers.

(c) Chemical and biological warfare storage and production sites.

* The "initial strategic attack", as used herein refers to the integrated, pre-planned program of attacks which will comprise SIOP-63. It also includes related operations, such as those conducted by air refueling and ECM vehicles in support of the attack. The initial strategic attack will terminate at the time of the last scheduled TOT of SIOP-63. However, the provisions of subparagraph 4c(4) below, prohibiting commanders from striking certain installations in SIOP-63 prior to its expiration, shall continue to apply with respect to attacks withheld per paragraph 5 below until the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct otherwise.

** Heavy, medium and light bomber home bases and known heavy and medium bomber dispersal bases.

Primary staging bases. Known ICBM sites. Known fixed ICBM and ICBM sites. Bases which support missile firing submarines.
b. In conjunction with other operations, the nuclear delivery forces of the unified and specified commands will destroy or neutralize the enemy nuclear delivery capability in order to prevent destruction or seizure of US and Allied territory and in order to retain control of essential sea areas and protect vital sea communications. Plans for these operations may be reflected in SIOP-63 to the extent desired by the commanders of unified and specified commands.

3. Method of Accomplishment.

a. The Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) (see paragraph 4 below) will develop, in conjunction with the commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands, and in coordination with SACEUR, the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-63).

b. The NSTL will consist of those target installations the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the essential national task stated in 2a above. All scheduled attacks on NSTL installations must be included in SIOP-63.

c. SIOP-63 will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands for the attack of a minimum list of targets, the destruction of which will accomplish the objectives stated in 2a above. It will govern the initial attacks on installations listed in the NSTL. It will determine the DGZ's to be attacked and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces. It will also include selected defenses and associated controls that must be destroyed or neutralized in order to insure penetration to the objective targets. In addition SIOP-63 and the SIOP target list may include preplanned strikes pursuant to 2b above. It will give due regard to the requirement that the United States
will emerge from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage. To the extent feasible during the lifetime of the plan, the SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the range of foreseeable forms of thermonuclear war emergency, including the various military and political situations which may obtain.

4. Responsibilities

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) Review and approve the NSTL, SIOP-63 and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

(3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

(1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP-63 in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(3) Resolve differences that occur during the development and maintenance of SIOP-63; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP-63 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP-63 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval not later than 15 February 1962.

(5) After the effective date of SIOP-63, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any temporary inability to achieve the levels of destruction or neutralization prescribed herein.
(6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP-63.

   c. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

   (1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP-63 and for liaison purposes.

   (2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the SIOP and which should be included in the SIOP.

   (3) Commit appropriate forces to the attack of targets in the SIOP and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with SIOP-63. The inclusion of such forces in SIOP-63 constitutes a first priority commitment.

   (4) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by SIOP-63.

   (5) Prepare nuclear annexes to plans in consonance with the guidance herein and submit these annexes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

5. Flexibility

   a. SIOP-63 will provide for total execution when directed by competent authority. In addition SIOP-63 will provide, to the degree practicable, for selective withholding of the following:

   (1)

   (2)

   (3)

4  Appendix A
b. In addition, to the extent forces made available for SIOP-63 permit, and consistent with the objectives and criteria prescribed herein, a secure reserve will be withheld from attack for subsequent commitment as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

6. Damage and Expectancy Criteria

a. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSTL will take into account all pertinent operational factors including cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. The following tabulation lists desired expectancies* for achieving specified levels of damage to NSTL categories of installations. Expectancies programmed against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP's of available weapons, and other factors. The expectancies listed below, therefore, are "average" values. The total reduction in enemy strength from all attacks against the categories of installations listed below should approximate what would have resulted if the established expectancy had been achieved against each installation.

*The term "expectancy" as used herein is the damage, expressed in percentage of achievement of the prescribed damage criteria, which is to be expected on each target or target system. For a single weapon, it is the product of the probability of arrival of the programmed weapon at the BRL, (including the most likely estimate of prelaunch survivability in paragraph 8 below) and the probability that it will achieve the specified damage. In the case of more than one weapon programmed on the same DGZ, it is the mathematical combination of the expected damage from each weapon. Example: Two weapons each have 50% probability of arrival and 90% probability of damage

\[ \text{combined expectancy} = 1 - (1 - 0.5)(1 - 0.9) = 0.6975 \]
(1) Government Control

A [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to the structures)* the national government control centers**

(2) Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to the United States.

(a) Active Long-Range Home Bomber Bases and Primary Staging Bases

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft

(b) Soft ICBM Sites (25 psi)

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to missiles and launchers) the sites.

(c) Primary Submarine Bases

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to structural facilities) the bases.

(d) Airfields Capable of Supporting Attacks against the United States.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft.

(3) Known, Active, and Located Control Centers for Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to the United States not co-located with (2) above.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to the structure) the control centers.

(4) Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to Allies and to US and Allied Forces Overseas.

(a) Active Light Bomber Home Bases.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft.

(b) Known and Fixed MREM and IRBM Sites.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to missiles and launchers) the sites.

* Severe damage as used throughout this Annex is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, dated 1 December 1960 (Volume 1, Part A, Pages A-27 through A-31); on file in Joint Secretariat

**
(5) Known, Active and Located Control Centers for Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present A Threat to Allies and to US and Allied Forces Overseas, not co-located with (4) above.

An average [redacted] of destroying (severe damage to the structure) the control centers.

(6) [Redacted]

(7) Chemical and Biological Warfare Storage and Production Sites

An average of [redacted] of the sites.

(8) Urban-Industrial

A [redacted] of the total floor space or built-up area in major urban-industrial centers in which primary war resources are located. In the achievement of this DGZ's will be selected to maximize damage to the most important installations such as major control centers and key industrial plants.

b. In general, plans for the attack of installations other than those on the NSTL will provide for a lesser weight of effort than prescribed in a, above, for comparable types of NSTL installations; however, variations from this rule are authorized against individual

*Neutralization is any over-all effect of the planned attack which precludes effective use of the installation for the purpose intended for a time period sufficient to achieve national objectives.

**Significant damage as used in the Annex, is the same as "Lesser but Significant Damage" in JCS Publication No. 5, dated 1 December 1960 (Volume 1, Part A, pages A-27 through A-31).
For types of targets not comparable to any of those listed in A above, such as prescribed damage levels in general should be the minimum required in the judgment of the commander for denial of the military usefulness of the target. Expectancies for achieving these damage levels should be commensurate with the target worth as assessed by the commander concerned.

7. Constraints. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral and potentially friendly satellite areas to the extent that military necessity permits. To this end, the following specific instructions will apply to the preparation of SIOP-63.

a. All plans will include provisions for flexible withholding of scheduled strikes by country and by target category as specified in paragraph 5 above.

b. Surface bursts and weapon yields will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity and near friendly neutral and satellite areas.

   (1) Satellite areas are:

   **EUROPEAN**
   - Albania
   - Bulgaria
   - Czechoslovakia
   - German Democratic Republic
   - Hungary
   - Poland
   - Rumania

   **PACIFIC**
   - North Korea
   - North Vietnam
(2) Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in (3) below, are as follows:

(3) Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTOP and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following procedure. First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability* of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

* This is the product of prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. High side estimates for prelaunch survivability (see paragraph 8 below) should be used, and any "dead-man fuzed" weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory.
(4) In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see h(2), above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

8. Prelaunch Survivability. Determination of over-all assurances and expected levels of destruction in order to meet the damage and constraints criteria of paragraphs 6 and 7, above, in general war requires knowledge (or an estimate) of the over-all probability, that each planned strike will accomplish the desired result. This probability is the product of all operational factors and the probability that the delivery system will not be destroyed prior to launch (prelaunch survivability). The prelaunch survivability factor is dependent on a number of variables including the warning time and the magnitude and the degree of simultaneity of the initial Soviet missile attack. A recent WSEG Study analyzed prelaunch survivability and presented estimated fractions of various types of US nuclear delivery forces destroyed as functions of the numbers of strategic missiles available to the USSR. Representative survivability factors for the various types of US delivery systems, which are made in the light of the WSEG study, will be used in the preparation of plans pursuant to this annex. These figures may be altered later based on further information and study.
Type System

Air Alert Aircraft, POLARIS on Station, MINUTEMAN, TITAN II, Hard Atlas.
Alert Carrier Aircraft (at Sea).
Ground Alert (15 minute) Land-Based Aircraft.
TITAN I, Medium ATLAS
Soft ATLAS
Non-Alert Carrier Aircraft (forward area)
Non-alert land based Aircraft

Probability of Not Being Destroyed Prior to Launch

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<tr>
<td>Ground Alert (15 minute) Land-Based Aircraft</td>
<td>0.9 (0.95-0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITAN I, Medium ATLAS</td>
<td>0.8 (0.95-0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft ATLAS</td>
<td>0.6 (0.9-0.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Alert Carrier Aircraft (forward area)</td>
<td>0.7 (0.95-0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-alert land based Aircraft</td>
<td>0.5 (0.8-0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first figures are "most likely" estimates, with upper and lower values shown in parentheses. After making tentative assignments of weapon/delivery systems to D2Z's using the "most likely" estimates, the effects of extreme variations in survivability factors should be studied. The weapon/delivery system assignments should be readjusted as necessary to be effective over a wide range of contingencies. It is not the intent of these instructions to have a separate force application developed for each of three assumed sets of survivability factors.

9. Content and Format for NSTL and SIOP-63

a. The NSTL shall consist of those installations the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the essential national task delineated in 2a above, grouped together by Target Data Inventory (TDI) major reference number. The format for SIOP-63 will be such that, within the over-all SIOP, the installations on the NSTL which are attacked, the weapons programmed against them and the resultant damage can be readily identified.
b. SIOP-63 will include the following:

(1) List of DGZ's, and the weapons, delivery and commands furnishing those forces for each DGZ, i.e., representative assumed conditions for initiation of war ranging from full strategic warning to minimal tactical warning.

(2) Installations under attack by weapons assigned to each DGZ. This list may also serve to designate (with an asterisk, for example) which installations in the SIOP target list are on the NSTL.

(3) Over-all damage assessment summary by the USSR, China and Satellites for each TDI military target category attacked, and additionally for each essential industrial category for USSR and China, and separately for each JWRA target group. In addition, the assessment will include expected damage against each of the classes of installations* listed in paragraph 6 above and casualty estimates under both favorable and unfavorable initial conditions. (See paragraph 8 above.)

c. The formats employed for lists of installations and for DGZ/weapon lists in the NSTL and SIOP-63 shall be compatible with the formats specified for corresponding lists in the nuclear annexes of the commanders' plans.

10. Analysis and Review - All data used in the preparation of the NSTL and SIOP-63 will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* The percentage of all such installations which, on the average will 'suffer the level of damage specified.
APPENDIX B

GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1963 (SIOP-63)

(3 pages)
APPENDIX B

VIEWS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY; THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1963 (SIOP-63)

1. The Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps strongly support the proposed guidance labeled "Army-Navy-Marine Corps View" contained in Appendix A. They consider it an order of magnitude improvement over existing guidance for the following reasons:
   a. The objectives have been more definitively restated.
   b. The distinction between the objectives NSTL and the entire SIOP target list is clarified.
   c. Damage criteria and expectancies have been made more realistic and definitive.
   d. It includes guidance in areas not previously covered.

   These are: Flexibility and pre-launch survivability.

2. The issue among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quite simply, is that of the dimensions of a central, essential general war task, the assured capability of execution of which is a keystone of national security. The majority consider that this essential task must and can be finitely dimensioned in terms of its objectives and the weight of effort required against these objectives.

3. It is our view that there is no military requirement more pressing upon us than that of rendering a thermonuclear exchange ever less probable. This obligation to our nation is best met by an evident and assured strategic attack capability coupled with flexible and versatile forces suitable for response to aggression in all its diverse forms. The resources of our nation are not without limit. It is for this reason that we feel it incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define the essential national
task for strategic nuclear delivery forces in the initial attack in general war in its finite dimensions, and thus to avoid over-commitment of our resources to any one facet of the total military requirements.

4. US military planning must be predicated on a suitable, selective, swift and effective response to a threat which may be made manifest in a variety of ways. For general war, we must provide plans, which on the one hand can be executed from a threshold of a large limited but nuclear war, and on the other can be executed from a peacetime posture in which we are taken by surprise. In our view, guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for SIOP-63 must provide a common basis for the separate plans of the several commands under the variety of circumstances which may occur and the more specific guidance necessary for the common execution of the integrated initial strategic nuclear attack peculiar to general war. SIOP-63 must provide for the optimum employment of all the committed forces. At the same time, within the over-all SIOP target list, the NSTL, satisfying the objectives comprising the essential national task for SIOP forces, must be clearly identified. The additional targets, which may in some circumstances be concurrently attacked, should not obscure the identity of the NSTL.

5. The draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63 provides a finite statement of objectives against which an "objectives" NSTL may be drawn. The validity of these objectives is attested to by the independent development by the NSC* of a composite list of targets comparable to that satisfying our recommended objectives. The target list satisfying the objectives should be determined by the basic requirements of the initial strategic nuclear attack which, in conjunction with other operations by other forces of the unified and specified commanders, will enable the United States to prevail in general war. The basic requirements are clearly stated in the draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63. The assured capability to meet these requirements is the central element of deterrence and of a general war-winning posture.

* DOD Project 12, A Study of US Requirements for Strategic Delivery Systems.
6. The second necessary dimension of the essential national task to be accomplished in the initial strategic nuclear attack in general war is the weight of effort to be committed against the objectives. The issue among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this case is whether there shall be specified a level of damage expectancy which will require programming automatically large numbers of weapons for each target to be attacked, or whether there must be committed initially and automatically a number of weapons related in each case to the significance of the individual targets under attack. We favor the latter course. The level of expectancy established in the draft guidance for the preparation of SIOF-63, weighted to the target system, exceeds that prescribed in current NSTAP, approaches the upper level considered by the NESC in the initial report on DOD Project 12, and approximates the average level attained in SIOF-62. It is entirely adequate without being excessive.
APENDIX C

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Air Force View)

(7 pages)
APPENDIX C

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Air Force View)

1. Intent. To provide guidance for the optimum employment of appropriate United States atomic offensive forces in the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. Objective. The basic objective of this policy is to establish an essential national task, the accomplishment of which will enable the United States to survive and prevail in general war. Strategic offensive plans will be calculated to achieve maximum US strategic advantage in any of the circumstances under which deterrence may fail. This requires plans for destruction or neutralization of the following attack objectives:
   b. [Redacted] the destruction or neutralization of which is essential to the attainment of United States military objectives.
   c. Major government controls of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
   d. [Redacted] important elements of the enemy industrial and technological war-supporting structure.

3. Method Accomplishment. In planning the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-waging capabilities, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) shall be developed.
   a. NSTL. The NSTL will consist of those targets which require attack to achieve the essential national task through destruction of the attack objectives listed in paragraph 2 above.
   b. SIOP. The SIOP will be developed to achieve, through maximum
integration of effort, the maximum effectiveness against the attack objectives which can be attained by the forces committed to its execution, with due regard to the requirement that the United States will emerge from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage. To the extent feasible during the lifetime of the plan, the SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the range of foreseeable forms of thermonuclear war emergency, including the various military and political situations which may obtain, and will:

(1) Govern initial attacks on all target installations listed in the NSTL.

(2) Determine the DOZs to be attacked, based on the capabilities and limitations of committed forces.

(3) Determine the effort against each target consistent with the worth of the target and damage and assurance criteria specified in paragraph 4.

(4) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, ECM, etc.

(5) Include selected defenses and associated controls that must be destroyed or neutralized in order to insure penetration to the objective targets.

h. Damage and Assurance Criteria. Damage and assurance criteria will be combined, along with pre and post launch attrition and other operational factors, into a single criterion of expectancy of achieving desired levels of damage, in order that attack programming may be based upon an Over-all Probability of Target Success (OPTS). The following OPTS factors will be employed as objectives in attack planning:

a. An average of [percent] percent assurance of destroying or neutralizing, based upon severe damage, those targets categorized by paragraph 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d above.
b. For enemy war supporting resources: ______ of achieving severe damage to the Bloc output capacity of selected critical industries.

c. It is realized that forces available may not permit programming which will give the desired assurance. In this case, available strategic forces will be utilized to achieve the maximum over-all effect.

5. **Flexibility**

a. The SIOP will provide for total execution when directed by competent authority. In addition the SIOP will provide, to the degree practicable, for selective withholding for the following:

1. ______

2. ______

3. ______

4. ______

b. In addition, to the extent forces made available for the SIOP permit, and consistent with the objective and criteria prescribed herein, a secure reserve will be withheld from attack for subsequent commitment as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

6. **Constraints.** All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral and potentially friendly satellite areas to the extent that military necessity permits. To this end, the following specific instructions will apply to the preparation of the SIOP.

a. All plans will include provisions for flexible withholding of scheduled strikes by country and by target category as specified in paragraph 5 above.
b. Surface bursts and weapon yields will be held to a minimum, consistent with military necessity, and near friendly neutral and satellite areas.

(1) Satellite areas are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUROPEAN</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Democratic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in (3) below, are as follows:
(3) Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following procedure. First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

(4) In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see b(2), above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

7. Prelaunch Survivability: In determining over-all assurances and expected levels of destruction in order to meet the damage and constraints criteria above, the probability that the delivery systems will not be destroyed prior to launch (prelaunch survivability) will be considered. A recent WSEG study was the first of a series of studies on this subject to be received. It analyzed prelaunch survivability and presented estimated fractions of various types of US nuclear delivery forces destroyed as functions of the numbers of strategic missiles available to the USSR. Survivability factors for the various types of U.S. delivery systems developed by the DSTP in the light of the WSEG study, a related
study by the Director for Operations, Joint Staff, and the forthcoming report of the war game of SIOP-62 being conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, will be used in the preparation of plans pursuant to this guidance.

8. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, and of the Director of Strategic Target Planning are as follows:

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

   (1) Be responsible for guidance for preparation of SIOP-63.

   (2) Review and approve the NSTL and the SIOP.

   (3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group at the headquarters of the DSTP.

b. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The Commanders of appropriate Unified and Specified Commands shall:

   (1) Provide permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the Director of Strategic Target Planning for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

   (2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the NSTL and which should be included in the SIOP.

   (3) Commit appropriate forces and/or weapons to the attack of targets of the NSTL and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with the SIOP. The SIOP constitutes the first priority task for forces committed to its execution.

   (4) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by the SIOP.
(5) Provide expert advice on the technical matters in their areas of responsibility to DSTP.

(6) Provide operational intelligence information affecting the NSTL and SIOP.

c. **Director of Strategic Target Planning.**

(1) As agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Strategic Target Planning shall:

(a) Direct the efforts of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions.

(b) Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL.

(c) Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. Resolve differences that occur during the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and the SIOP and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(d) During the effective period of the SIOP advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

9. **Analysis and Review.** All data used in the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDIX D

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF THE
SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (U)

(7 pages)
1. It is doubtful that any single issue will be considered within the Department of Defense this year having a greater impact on the security of this Nation than that of Guidance for SIOP-63. Inadequate guidance can mean more than just an inadequate plan; it could mean the difference between a credibly deterrent strategic posture, or should deterrence fail, the difference between the destruction of the U. S. or its survival as a viable entity. I know of no issue which merits more careful consideration by the Secretary of Defense, including exploration of all expert views on the subject in formulating a decision so vital to our security.

2. The draft guidance proposed in the majority view does not, in my judgment, provide for development of an operational plan that would adequately insure either a credibly deterrent strategic posture or the survival of this Nation. I know of no study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Director of Strategic Target Planning or by any other responsible group which would validate a conclusion that we can effect substantial reductions in our strategic nuclear offensive operations without incurring a concomitant -- and in my view unacceptable -- increase
in the risk. On the contrary, the Hickey study of U. S. requirements for strategic delivery systems clearly supports this view when the most realistic range of assumptions for 1962-63 are considered, i.e., attack of a composite target structure with reasonable assurance of success on the basis of reasonable estimates of enemy strength.

3. The basic difference between the majority view as expressed by the Chief of Staff, Army, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on one hand, and the view of the Chief of Staff, Air Force, on the other, lies in the numbers and types of threats to U. S. and allied security -- and to ultimate attainment of U. S. objectives -- which are left uncovered by the draft proposed Planning Guidance for SIOP-63. Specifically, the following elements of Sino-Soviet strength would not be included in the National Strategic Target List as proposed:

   a. 

   b. 

   c. 

   d.
d. Essential elements of the enemy war supporting structure

f. Military controls and strengths (including necessary defenses)

4. The draft guidance proposed in the majority view would call for

Such guidance presupposes a rigid, inflexible and wholly predictable Soviet attack plan which will
enable us to determine with precision the exact location of Soviet is a real possibility. Under such circumstances there is a strong possibility the enemy would emerge from the initial nuclear exchange with a formidable attack capability intact. Further, while the majority view would stipulate the achievement of damage requiring depot repair to enemy aircraft on certain bases it would avoid attacks on the facilities that could effect these repairs. This would permit the enemy to reconstitute significant portions of his strategic delivery forces in a minimum period of time and enable him to continue his attacks on the U. S. and its allies.

5. In my judgment, U. S. strategic nuclear operations conducted under such artificial and unrealistic guidance would result in an exchange in which the USSR would emerge force could be brought to bear in subsequent operations to effect systematic destruction of the U. S. We can expect no comparable generosity from the enemy in his planning for attacks on the U. S. The nature of the targets to which the NSTL would be confined by the draft guidance for SIOP-63 and the weight of
effort prescribed are such as to afford the enemy a substantial opportunity to absorb our initial strikes while continuing to assault the United States and its Allies and reconstituting such of his forces as may have been damaged by our attacks.

6. I cannot agree with the damage and expectancy criteria in the draft guidance. As mentioned earlier, this guidance would preclude [REDACTED].

There is a possibility that residual forces would remain after the execution of any war plan, but I cannot agree to planning factors which result in such residual force levels. The expectancy criteria for those elements of enemy strength which can be brought to bear directly against the U. S. should be increased to [REDACTED] at a minimum.

7. Additionally, and of great importance, is the nature of the attack on urban centers. The criteria for attack of such centers proposed in the guidance favored by the majority is to achieve [REDACTED].

In my view, this is an indiscriminate, hit or miss generalization of unacceptable proportions. My counter proposal is to select the critical elements of the Sino-Soviet war economy, and to conduct an attack which will achieve [REDACTED].
APPENDIX A

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Army-Navy-Marine Corps View)

1. Intent. To furnish guidance for the preparation of
SIOP-63, which will provide for the optimum employment of appro-
priate US nuclear delivery forces in the initial strategic
attack* against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. Objectives. The objectives listed under a below consti-
tute an essential national task, the accomplishment of which
will enable the United States to survive and prevail in general
war. The objective in b constitutes the other major tasks to
be accomplished by nuclear operations.

   a. The essential national task to be accomplished by
   SIOP-63 is as follows:

      (1) To destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc stra-
tegic nuclear delivery forces** posing a threat to the
United States and its Allies, and to US and Allied forces
overseas.

      (2) To destroy or neutralize, as necessary, the
following:

         (a) Primary government*** and primary military con-
             trols of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

         (b) The primary war supporting resources of the Sino-
             Soviet Bloc contained in major urban-industrial centers.

         (c) Chemical and biological warfare storage and pro-
            duction sites.

* The "initial strategic attack", as used herein refers to the
integrated, pre-planned program of attacks which will comprise
SIOP-63. It also includes related operations, such as those
conducted by air refueling and ECM vehicles in support of the
attack. The initial strategic attack will terminate at the
time of the last scheduled TOT of SIOP-63. However, the pro-
visions of subparagraph 4c(4) below, prohibiting commanders
from striking certain installations in SIOP-63 prior to its
expiration, shall continue to apply with respect to attacks
withheld per paragraph 5 below until the Joint Chiefs of Staff
direct otherwise.

** Heavy, medium and light bomber home bases and known heavy and
medium bomber dispersal bases.

Primary staging bases
Known ICBM sites.
Known fixed MREM and IRBM sites.
Bases which support missile firing support ops.

TOP SECRET
b. In conjunction with other operations, the nuclear delivery forces of the unified and specified commands will destroy or neutralize the enemy nuclear delivery capability in order to prevent destruction or seizure of US and Allied territory and in order to retain control of essential sea areas and protect vital sea communications. Plans for these operations may be reflected in SIOP-63 to the extent desired by the commanders of unified and specified commands.

3. Method of Accomplishment.

a. The Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) (see paragraph 4 below) will develop, in conjunction with the commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands, and in coordination with SACEUR, the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-63).

b. The NSTL will consist of those target installations the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the essential national task stated in 2a above. All scheduled attacks on NSTL installations must be included in SIOP-63.

c. SIOP-63 will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands for the attack of a minimum list of targets, the destruction of which will accomplish the objectives stated in 2a above. It will govern the initial attacks on installations listed in the NSTL. It will determine the DGZ's to be attacked and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces. It will also include selected defenses and associated controls that must be destroyed or neutralized in order to insure penetration to the objective targets. In addition SIOP-63 and the SIOP target list may include preplanned strikes pursuant to 2b above. It will give due regard to the requirement that the United States
will emerge from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage. To the extent feasible during the lifetime of the plan, the SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the range of foreseeable forms of thermonuclear war emergency, including the various military and political situations which may obtain.

4. Responsibilities

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) Review and approve the NSTL, SIOP-63 and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

(3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

(1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP-63 in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(3) Resolve differences that occur during the development and maintenance of SIOP-63; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP-63 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP-63 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval not later than 15 February 1962.

(5) After the effective date of SIOP-63, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any temporary inability to achieve the levels of destruction or neutralization prescribed herein.
(6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP-63.

C. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

(1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP-63 and for liaison purposes.

(2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the SIOP and which should be included in the SIOP.

(3) Commit appropriate forces to the attack of targets in the SIOP and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with SIOP-63. The inclusion of such forces in SIOP-63 constitutes a first priority commitment.

(4) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by SIOP-63.

(5) Prepare nuclear annexes to plans in consonance with the guidance herein and submit these annexes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

5. Flexibility

a. SIOP-63 will provide for total execution when directed by competent authority. In addition SIOP-63 will provide, to the degree practicable, for selective withholding of the following:

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

*
b. In addition, to the extent forces made available for SIOP-63 permit, and consistent with the objectives and criteria prescribed herein, a secure reserve will be withheld from attack for subsequent commitment as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

6. Damage and Expectancy Criteria

a. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSTL will take into account all pertinent operational factors including cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. The following tabulation lists desired expectancies* for achieving specified levels of damage to NSTL categories of installations. Expectancies programmed against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP's of available weapons, and other factors. The expectancies listed below, therefore, are "average" values. The total reduction in enemy strength from all attacks against the categories of installations listed below should approximate what would have resulted if the established expectancy had been achieved against each installation.

*The term "expectancy" as used herein is the damage, expressed in percentage of achievement of the prescribed damage criteria, which is to be expected on each target or target system. For a single weapon, it is the product of the probability of arrival of the programmed weapon at the BRL, (including the most likely estimate of prelaunch survivability in paragraph 8 below) and the probability that it will achieve the specified damage. In the case of more than one weapon programmed on the same DGZ, it is the mathematical combination of the expected damage from each weapon. Example: Two weapons each have 50% probability of arrival and 90% probability of damage

.50 X .90 = .45 (expected damage from first weapon)
.50 X .90 = .45 (expected damage from second weapon)
combined expectancy = 1 - (1 - .45) (1 - .45) = 69.75%
(1) Government Control

A [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to the structures)* the national government control centers**

(2) Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to the United States.

(a) Active Long-Range Home Bomber Bases and Primary Staging Bases

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft.

(b) Soft ICFM Sites (25 psi)

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to missiles and launchers) the sites.

(c) Primary Submarine Bases

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to structural facilities) the bases.

(d) Airfields Capable of Supporting Attacks against the United States.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft.

(3) Known, Active, and Located Control Centers for Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to the United States not co-located with (2) above.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to the structure) the control centers.

...(4) Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present a Threat to Allies and to US and Allied Forces Overseas.

(a) Active Light Bomber Home Bases.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage requiring depot repair) the aircraft.

(b) Known and Fixed MREM and IRBM Sites.

An average of [REDACTED] of destroying (severe damage to missiles and launchers) the sites.

* Severe damage as used throughout this Annex is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, dated 1 December 1960 (Volume 1, Part A Pages A-27 through A-31); on file in Joint Secretariat

** [REDACTED]
(5) Known, Active and Located Control Centers for Nuclear Delivery Forces Which Present A Threat to Allies and to US and Allied Forces Overseas, not co-located with (4) above.

An average of destroying (severe damage to the structure) the control centers.

(6) __________

(7) Chemical and Biological Warfare Storage and Production Sites

An average of __________ of the sites.

(8) Urban-Industrial

A __________ of the total floor space or built-up area in major urban-industrial centers in which primary war resources are located. In the achievement of this DGZ's will be selected to maximize damage to the most important installations such as major control centers and key industrial plants.

b. In general, plans for the attack of installations other than those on the NSTL will provide for a lesser weight of effort than prescribed in a, above, for comparable types of NSTL installations; however, variations from this rule are authorized against individual

*Neutralization is any over-all effect of the planned attack which precludes effective use of the installation for the purpose intended for a time period sufficient to achieve national objectives. For example, in the case of nuclear storage sites, this could be inactivation by the cratering effects or by radioactive contamination of surface burst weapons in the area.

**Significant damage as used in the Annex, is the same as "Lesser but Significant Damage" in JCS Publication No. 5, dated 1 December 1960 (Volume I, Part A, pages A-27 through A-31).
For types of targets not comparable to any of those listed in a above, such as prescribed damage levels in general should be the minimum required in the judgment of the commander for denial of the military usefulness of the target. Expectancies for achieving these damage levels should be commensurate with the target worth as assessed by the commander concerned.

7. Constraints. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral and potentially friendly satellite areas to the extent that military necessity permits. To this end, the following specific instructions will apply to the preparation of SIOP-63.

a. All plans will include provisions for flexible withholding of scheduled strikes by country and by target category as specified in paragraph 5 above.

b. Surface bursts and weapon yields will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity and near friendly neutral and satellite areas.

(1) Satellite areas are:

**EUROPEAN**
- Albania
- Bulgaria
- Czechoslovakia
- German Democratic Republic
- Hungary
- Poland
- Rumania

**PACIFIC**
- North Korea
- North Vietnam
(2) Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in (3) below, are as follow:

(3) Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following procedure. First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability* of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

* This is the product of prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. High side estimates for prelaunch survivability (see paragraph 8 below) should be used, and any "dead-man fuzed" weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory.
(4) In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see b(2), above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

8. Prelaunch Survivability. Determination of over-all assurances and expected levels of destruction in order to meet the damage and constraints criteria of paragraphs 6 and 7, above, in general war requires knowledge (or an estimate) of the over-all probability, that each planned strike will accomplish the desired result. This probability is the product of all operational factors and the probability that the delivery system will not be destroyed prior to launch (prelaunch survivability). The prelaunch survivability factor is dependent on a number of variables— including the warning time and the magnitude and the degree of simultaneity of the initial Soviet missile attack. A recent WSEG Study analyzed prelaunch survivability and presented estimated fractions of various types of US nuclear delivery forces destroyed as functions of the numbers of strategic missiles available to the USSR. Representative survivability factors for the various types of US delivery systems, which are made in the light of the WSEG study, will be used in the preparation of plans pursuant to this annex. These figures may be altered later based on further information and study.
Type System

Air Alert Aircraft, POLARIS on Station, MINUTEMAN, TITAN II, Hard Atlas.
Alert Carrier Aircraft (at Sea). 0.95 (1-0.7)
Ground Alert (15 minute) Land-Based Aircraft.
TITAN I, Medium ATLAS 0.8 (0.95-0.4)
Soft ATLAS 0.6 (0.9-0.1)
Non-Alert Carrier 0.7 (0.95-0.3)
Aircraft (forward area)
Non-alert land based Aircraft 0.5 (0.8-0.05)

The first figures are "most likely" estimates, with upper and lower values shown in parentheses. After making tentative assignments of weapon/delivery systems to DGZ's using the "most likely" estimates, the effects of extreme variations in survivability factors should be studied. The weapon/delivery system assignments should be readjusted as necessary to be effective over a wide range of contingencies. It is not the intent of these instructions to have a separate force application developed for each of three assumed sets of survivability factors.

9. Content and Format for NSTL and SIOP-63
   a. The NSTL shall consist of those installations the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the essential national task delineated in 2a above, grouped together by Target Data Inventory (TDI) major reference number. The format for SIOP-63 will be such that, within the over-all SIOP, the installations on the NSTL which are attacked, the weapons programmed against them and the resultant damage can be readily identified.
b. SIOP-63 will include the following:

(1) List of DGZ's, and the weapons, delivery forces and commands furnishing those forces for each DGZ, for representative assumed conditions for initiation of war ranging from full strategic warning to minimal tactical warning.

(2) Installations under attack by weapons assigned to each DGZ. This list may also serve to designate (with an asterisk, for example) which installations in the SIOP target list are on the NSTL.

(3) Over-all damage assessment summary by the USSR, China and Satellites for each TDI military target category attacked, and additionally for each essential industrial category for USSR and China, and separately for each JWRA target group. In addition, the assessment will include expected damage against each of the classes of installations* listed in paragraph 6 above and casualty estimates under both favorable and unfavorable initial conditions. (See paragraph 8 above.)

c. The formats employed for lists of installations and for DGZ/weapons lists in the NSTL and SIOP-63 shall be compatible with the formats specified for corresponding lists in the nuclear annexes of the commanders' plans.

10. Analysis and Review - All data used in the preparation of the NSTL and SIOP-63 will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* The percentage of all such installations which, on the average will suffer the level of damage specified.
APPENDIX B

VIEWS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY; THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1963 (SIOP-63)

1. The Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps strongly support the proposed guidance labeled "Army-Navy-Marine Corps View" contained in Appendix A. They consider it an order of magnitude improvement over existing guidance for the following reasons:

a. The objectives have been more definitively restated.

b. The distinction between the objectives NSTL and the entire SIOP target list is clarified.

c. Damage criteria and expectancies have been made more realistic and definitive.

d. It includes guidance in areas not previously covered.

These are: Flexibility and pre-launch survivability.

2. The issue among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quite simply, is that of the dimensions of a central, essential general war task, the assured capability of execution of which is a keystone of national security. The majority consider that this essential task must and can be finitely dimensioned in terms of its objectives and the weight of effort required against these objectives.

3. It is our view that there is no military requirement more pressing upon us than that of rendering a thermonuclear exchange ever less probable. This obligation to our nation is best met by an evident and assured strategic attack capability coupled with flexible and versatile forces suitable for response to aggression in all its diverse forms. The resources of our nation are not without limit. It is for this reason that we feel it incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define the essential national
task for strategic nuclear delivery forces in the initial attack in general war in its finite dimensions, and thus to avoid over-commitment of our resources to any one facet of the total military requirements.

4. US military planning must be predicated on a suitable, selective, swift and effective response to a threat which may be made manifest in a variety of ways. For general war, we must provide plans, which on the one hand can be executed from a threshold of a large limited but nuclear war, and on the other can be executed from a peacetime posture in which we are taken by surprise. In our view, guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for SIOP-63 must provide a common basis for the separate plans of the several commands under the variety of circumstances which may occur and the more specific guidance necessary for the common execution of the integrated initial strategic nuclear attack peculiar to general war. SIOP-63 must provide for the optimum employment of all the committed forces. At the same time, within the over-all SIOP target list, the NSTL, satisfying the objectives comprising the essential national task for SIOP forces, must be clearly identified. The additional targets, which may in some circumstances be concurrently attacked, should not obscure the identity of the NSTL.

5. The draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63 provides a finite statement of objectives against which an "objectives" NSTL may be drawn. The validity of these objectives is attested to by the independent development by the NESC* of a composite list of targets comparable to that satisfying our recommended objectives. The target list satisfying the objectives should be determined by the basic requirements of the initial strategic nuclear attack which, in conjunction with other operations by other forces of the unified and specified commanders, will enable the United States to prevail in general war. The basic requirements are clearly stated in the draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63. The assured capability to meet these requirements is the central element of deterrence and of a general war-winning posture.

* DOD Project 12, A Study of US Requirements for Strategic Delivery Systems.
6. The second necessary dimension of the essential national task to be accomplished in the initial strategic nuclear attack in general war is the weight of effort to be committed against the objectives. The issue among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this case is whether there shall be specified a level of damage expectancy which will require programming automatically large numbers of weapons for each target to be attacked, or whether there must be committed initially and automatically a number of weapons related in each case to the significance of the individual targets under attack. We favor the latter course. The level of expectancy established in the draft guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63, weighted to the target system, exceeds that prescribed in current NSTAP, approaches the upper level considered by the NESC in the initial report on DOD Project 12, and approximates the average level attained in SIOP-62. It is entirely adequate without being excessive.
APPENDIX C

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
(Air Force View)

1. **Intent.** To provide guidance for the optimum employment of appropriate United States atomic offensive forces in the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. **Objective.** The basic objective of this policy is to establish an essential national task, the accomplishment of which will enable the United States to survive and prevail in general war. Strategic offensive plans will be calculated to achieve maximum US strategic advantage in any of the circumstances under which deterrence may fail. This requires plans for destruction or neutralization of the following attack objectives:
   b. The destruction or neutralization of which is essential to the attainment of United States military objectives.
   c. Major government controls of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
   d. Important elements of the enemy industrial and technological war-supporting structure.

3. **Method Accomplishment.** In planning the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-waging capabilities, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) shall be developed.
   a. NSTL. The NSTL will consist of those targets which require attack to achieve the essential national task through destruction of the attack objectives listed in paragraph 2 above.
   b. SIOP. The SIOP will be developed to achieve, through maximum
integration of effort, the maximum effectiveness against the attack objectives which can be attained by the forces committed to its execution, with due regard to the requirement that the United States will emerge from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage. To the extent feasible during the lifetime of the plan, the SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the range of foreseeable forms of thermonuclear war emergency, including the various military and political situations which may obtain, and will:

(1) Govern initial attacks on all target installations listed in the NSSL.

(2) Determine the DGZs to be attacked, based on the capabilities and limitations of committed forces.

(3) Determine the effort against each target consistent with the worth of the target and damage and assurance criteria specified in paragraph 1.

(4) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, EON, etc.

(5) Include selected defenses and associated controls that must be destroyed or neutralized in order to insure penetration to the objective targets.

1. Damage and Assurance Criteria. Damage and assurance criteria will be combined, along with pre and post launch attrition and other operational factors, into a single criterion of expectancy of achieving desired levels of damage, in order that attack programming may be based upon an Over-all Probability of Target Success (OPTS). The following OPTS factors will be employed as objectives in attack planning:

a. An average of \[ \text{percent} \] assurance of destroying or neutralizing, based upon severe damage, those targets categorized by paragraph 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d above.
b. For enemy war supporting resources: \_\_\_\_\_ of achieving severe damage to the Bloc output capacity of selected critical industries.

c. It is realized that forces available may not permit programming which will give the desired assurance. In this case, available strategic forces will be utilized to achieve the maximum over-all effect.

5. Flexibility

a. The SIOP will provide for total execution when directed by competent authority. In addition the SIOP will provide, to the degree practicable, for selective withholding for the following:

(1) \_\_\_\_\_\_

(2) \_\_\_\_\_\_

(3) \_\_\_\_\_\_

(h) \_\_\_\_\_\_

b. In addition, to the extent forces made available for the SIOP permit, and consistent with the objective and criteria prescribed herein, a secure reserve will be withheld from attack for subsequent commitment as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

6. Constraints. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral and potentially friendly satellite areas to the extent that military necessity permits. To this end, the following specific instructions will apply to the preparation of the SIOP.

a. All plans will include provisions for flexible withholding of scheduled strikes by country and by target category as specified in paragraph 5 above.
b. Surface bursts and weapon yields will be held to a minimum, consistent with military necessity, and near friendly neutral and satellite areas.

(1) Satellite areas are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUROPEAN</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in (3) below, are as follows:
(3) Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be
determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46
and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been
forwarded separately to DSTP and the commanders of unified and specified
commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined
by the following procedure. First obtain the expected dose from each
programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates
referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability
of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability
weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted
expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

(4) In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary
to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This
knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been
prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP
forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see b(2), above)
and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed
dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

7. Prelaunch Survivability: In determining over-all assurances and
expected levels of destruction in order to meet the damage and constraints
criteria above, the probability that the delivery systems will not be
destroyed prior to launch (prelaunch survivability) will be considered.
A recent WSEG study was the first of a series of studies on this subject
to be received. It analyzed prelaunch survivability and presented
estimated fractions of various types of US nuclear delivery forces
destroyed as functions of the numbers of strategic missiles available
to the USSR. Survivability factors for the various types of U.S. delivery
systems developed by the DSTP in the light of the WSEG study, a related
study by the Director for Operations, Joint Staff, and the forthcoming report of the war game of SIOP-62 being conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, will be used in the preparation of plans pursuant to this guidance.

8. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, and of the Director of Strategic Target Planning are as follows:

   a. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

   (1) Be responsible for guidance for preparation of SIOP-63.

   (2) Review and approve the NSTL and the SIOP.

   (3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group at the headquarters of the DSTP.

   b. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The Commanders of appropriate Unified and Specified Commands shall:

   (1) Provide permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the Director of Strategic Target Planning for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

   (2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the NSTL and which should be included in the SIOP.

   (3) Commit appropriate forces and/or weapons to the attack of targets of the NSTL and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with the SIOP. The SIOP constitutes the first priority task for forces committed to its execution.

   (4) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by the SIOP.
(5) Provide expert advice on the technical matters in their areas of responsibility to DCTP.

(6) Provide operational intelligence information affecting the NSTL and SIOP.

c. Director of Strategic Target Planning.

(1) As agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Strategic Target Planning shall:

(a) Direct the efforts of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions.

(b) Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL.

(c) Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. Resolve differences that occur during the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and the SIOP and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(d) During the effective period of the SIOP advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

9. Analysis and Review. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDIX D

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. AIR FORCE

on

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF THE

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (U)

1. It is doubtful that any single issue will be considered within the Department of Defense this year having a greater impact on the security of this Nation than that of Guidance for SIOP-63. Inadequate guidance can mean more than just an inadequate plan; it could mean the difference between a credibly deterrent strategic posture, or should deterrence fail, the difference between the destruction of the U. S. or its survival as a viable entity. I know of no issue which merits more careful consideration by the Secretary of Defense, including exploration of all expert views on the subject in formulating a decision so vital to our security.

2. The draft guidance proposed in the majority view does not, in my judgment, provide for development of an operational plan that would adequately insure either a credibly deterrent strategic posture or the survival of this Nation. I know of no study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Director of Strategic Target Planning or by any other responsible group which would validate a conclusion that we can effect substantial reductions in our strategic nuclear offensive operations without incurring a concomitant -- and in my view unacceptable -- increase
in the risk. On the contrary, the Hickey study of U. S. requirements for strategic delivery systems clearly supports this view when the most realistic range of assumptions for 1962-63 are considered, i.e., attack of a composite target structure with reasonable assurance of success on the basis of reasonable estimates of enemy strength.

3. The basic difference between the majority view as expressed by the Chief of Staff, Army, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on one hand, and the view of the Chief of Staff, Air Force, on the other, lies in the numbers and types of threats to U. S. and allied security -- and to ultimate attainment of U. S. objectives -- which are left uncovered by the draft proposed Planning Guidance for SIOP-63. Specifically, the following elements of Sino-Soviet strength would not be included in the National Strategic Target List as proposed:

a. 

b. 

c. 

TOP SECRET
d. Essential elements of the enemy war supporting structure

f. Military controls and strengths (including necessary defenses)

4. The draft guidance proposed in the majority view would call for

Such guidance presupposes a rigid, inflexible and wholly predictable Soviet attack plan which will
enable us to determine with precision the exact location of Soviet is a real possibility. Under such circumstances there is a strong possibility the enemy would emerge from the initial nuclear exchange with a formidable attack capability intact. Furthermore, while the majority view would stipulate the achievement of damage requiring depot repair to enemy aircraft on certain bases it would avoid attacks on the facilities that could effect these repairs. This would permit the enemy to reconstitute significant portions of his strategic delivery forces in a minimum period of time and enable him to continue his attacks on the U.S. and its allies.

5. In my judgment, U.S. strategic nuclear operations conducted under such artificial and unrealistic guidance would result in an exchange in which the USSR would emerge force could be brought to bear in subsequent operations to effect systematic destruction of the U.S. We can expect no comparable generosity from the enemy in his planning for attacks on the U.S. The nature of the targets to which the NSTL would be confined by the draft guidance for SIOP-63 and the weight of
effort prescribed are such as to afford the enemy a substantial opportunity to absorb our initial strikes while continuing to assault the United States and its Allies and reconstituting such of his forces as may have been damaged by our attacks.

6. I cannot agree with the damage and expectancy criteria in the draft guidance. As mentioned earlier, this guidance would preclude

There is a possibility that residual forces would remain after the execution of any war plan, but I cannot agree to planning factors which result in such residual force levels. The expectancy criteria for those elements of enemy strength which can be brought to bear directly against the U. S. should be increased to ** at a minimum.

7. Additionally, and of great importance, is the nature of the attack on urban centers. The criteria for attack of such centers proposed in the guidance favored by the majority is to achieve

In my view, this is an indiscriminate, hit or miss generalization of unacceptable proportions. My counter proposal is to select the critical elements of the Sino-Soviet war economy, and to conduct an attack which will achieve **
expectancy of severe damage to these selected elements of the Sino-Soviet war economy. By such an attack, I feel that we can reasonably insure destruction of his war sustaining and recuperative power, rather than risk its preservation for subsequent use against us.

8. I am also concerned with the inconsistency between this proposed draft guidance for SIOP operations and that intended for operations by the Unified Commanders against non-NSTL targets. While SIOP guidance is replete with rigid delimitations of targets and damage criteria, the latter guidance leaves to the commander concerned the determination of targets and weight of attack necessary to achieve his military objectives. This results in an unsound distribution of military effort with the most vital targets limited as to the weight of effort to be directed against them while targets of lesser importance may be programmed for attack to the limit of the commanders' capability.

9. The selection of prelaunch survival factors to be employed in the development of SIOP-63 is a matter which bears directly on the size and nature of the forces required for commitment to the SIOP. The prelaunch survival factors included in the draft guidance proposed by the majority view have been arbitrarily selected from a range of alternatives contained in one study by WSEG which has yet to be examined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other studies of these factors, as well as a comprehensive war-game of SIOP-62, are underway and should provide more definitive planning figures at an early date. It is premature, therefore, to specify such factors in the guidance for planning purposes; if they are included at all, they should be illustrative only.
10. The deficiencies and omissions noted above are serious; I have grave doubts that an operational plan drawn up in response to the proposed draft guidance would make the most effective use of the forces and weapons available to us. I therefore recommend that:

a. The Director of Strategic Target Planning be asked to meet with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss guidance for SIOP-63 prior to its approval.

b. That the guidance for SIOP-63 in Appendix C, containing the view of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, be approved as the basis for discussions with the DSTP and JCS, and for any further development required prior to its promulgation as Guidance for SIOP-63.
Briefing Sheet for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1963 (SIOP-63) (U)

Background:

a. On 2 December 1960, at a meeting held in Omaha, Nebraska between the SECDEF, JCS, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, the JCS approved SIOP-62 and the NSTL. A review of NSTL/SIOP-62 was directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP.

b. A comprehensive program for action toward improving the next NSTL/SIOP was implemented by the JCS and resulted in a large number of studies, reports, analyses, comments, and recommendations by the Services, the DSSP, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, the Joint Staff, DASA, and WSEG. All of these items have been reviewed in detail and have been considered in the preparation of the proposed guidance for the preparation of SIOP-63.

Current Memorandum: The JCS were unable to reach agreement on guidance for SIOP-63. Two versions of the guidance have been prepared, one by the Army, Navy and Marine Corps and the other by the Air Force. These two versions differ in the following important areas: the objectives which would comprise the essential national task; the damage criteria and assurance or expectancy of attaining the prescribed damage levels; and, the guidance relating to pre-launch survivability.

VIEWS OF CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

It is incumbent upon the JCS to define the essential national task for strategic nuclear delivery forces in the initial attack in general war in its finite dimensions, and thus avoid overcommitment of our resources to any one facet of the total military planning.

The validity of the objectives proposed by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is attested to by the independent development by the NESG (DOD Project 12, A Study of US Requirements for Strategic Delivery Systems) of a composite list of targets comparable to that satisfying our recommended objectives. The target list satisfying the objectives should be determined by the basic requirements of the initial strategic nuclear attack which, in conjunction with other operations by other forces of the unified and specified commanders, will enable the US to prevail in general war.

Relative to weight of effort against objectives, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps propose programming weapons for individual targets related in each case to their significance, rather than programming to a specified level of damage which requires automatically large numbers of weapons for each target. The level of expectancy proposed by the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, weighted to the target system, exceeds that prescribed in current NSTP, approaches the upper level considered by the NESG in the initial report on DOD Project 12, and approximates the average level attained in SIOP-62. It is entirely adequate without being excessive.
The draft guidance proposed by the majority view (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) does not provide for the development of an operational plan that would adequately insure either a credibly deterrent strategic posture or the survival of this Nation.

The basic difference between the majority view and the Air Force view lies in the numbers and types of threats to US and allied security -- and to the ultimate attainment of US objectives -- which are left uncovered by the majority view guidance.

The nature of the targets to which the NSTL would be confined by the majority view guidance and the weight of effort prescribed are such as to afford the enemy a substantial opportunity to absorb an initial strike while continuing to assault the US and its allies and reconstituting such of his forces as may have been damaged by our attacks. The expectancy criteria for those elements of enemy strength which can be brought to bear directly against the US should be increased to 90% at a minimum. The attack against critical elements of the SINO-Soviet war economy should achieve of severe damage to selected elements of the economy.

It is premature to specify pre-launch survival factors in the guidance for SIOP-63 for planning purposes. The factors included in the majority view guidance have been arbitrarily selected from a range of alternatives in one WSEG study. More definitive factors should be available at an early date from other studies and the comprehensive wargame of SIOP-62, now underway.

The DSTP should be asked to meet with SECDEF and the JCS to discuss guidance for SIOP-63. Guidance as proposed by the CSAF should be used as a basis for the discussion.

VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

A clear distinction should be made between the purpose of the NSTL and that of the SIOP. The NSTL should comprise essential targets which must be destroyed or neutralized if the US is to survive and prevail in general war. It should not be merely a priority list whose length is determined by the number of nuclear forces available. The SIOP, on the other hand, should integrate the attacks against targets on the NSTL into a single flexible plan, provide for withholding of a secure reserve and assign such additional forces as are available for SIOP to targets additional to the NSTL.

As regards adequacy, I strongly support the view of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps that their version of the guidance should provide a level of destruction which is entirely adequate but not excessive. Accordingly, I recommend that this version of the guidance be approved for use in the development of SIOP-63.

Briefing Sheet Prepared by: Captain W. D. Houser, USN
Colonel T. J. E. Shanley, USA
Colonel Roy C. Crompton, USAF
AE&FM Branch, J-5
Extensions: 53838 and 56011

Approved by: [Signature] Director, Joint Staff

TOP SECRET
APPENDIX

DRAFT

National Targeting and Attack Policy For General War:
Guidance For the Preparation of the Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

I. Purpose

To provide guidance for the annual preparation of capabilities plans for employment of United States nuclear offensive forces in that range of contingencies in which the United States would execute major nuclear attacks against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

II. Scope

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands and for coordination with appropriate external commands, for all preplanned attacks on targets the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the objectives enumerated in Section III, below. It will determine the DGZ's to be attacked, and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces.

III. Objectives.

a. United States plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive operations, the following objectives.

(1) To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.
(2) To minimize damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events to limit such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

(3) To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the United States and its Allies.

b. SIOP will contribute to the achievement of these objectives by accomplishment, as directed, of the following three tasks:

Task I:

Task I will be accomplished in such a way as to minimize damage (by choice of DGZ and height of burst) to population and industry (including fallout), subject to the requirements of military necessity.

Planning for accomplishment of Task I will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all attacks.
Task II: The destruction or neutralization of other elements of

Task II will be accomplished in such a way as to minimize damage to population and industry, subject to the requirements of military necessity.

Planning for accomplishment of Task II will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all Task II attacks against

Task III:

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3 Appendix
IV. National Strategic Target List

1. A National Strategic Target List (NSTL) will be developed and maintained by the Director of Strategic Target Planning. It will include all target installations in Tasks I, II and III.

b. The NSTL will be developed from the Target Data Inventory without regard to the magnitude of US and Allied forces available for the execution of nuclear offensive tasks in general war.

c. The NSTL will identify the target installations corresponding to Tasks I through III and indicate those programmed for attack in the SIOP.

d. The NSTL will encompass all of the targets which may require attack under any of the varying circumstances of general war engagement. There is no single combination of targets which will represent the task of nuclear offensive forces under all circumstances. The strike task to be accomplished in initial operations will depend upon the specific circumstances attending initiation.

V. Target Priorities and Expected Damage c/

a. Expected damage, or an expectation of damage, is the average of damage that would be achieved if the attack were run many times.

b. In achieving the damage levels prescribed below, plans will take into account all pertinent operational factors including pre-launch survivability (appropriate assumptions described below), and cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. Expectation of damage against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP's of available weapons, and other

---

c/ Priorities in this section are to be understood in the sense of allocation of limited forces, not in the sense of time urgency.
factors. The total reduction in enemy strength from all
attacks against the categories of installations listed below
should approximate what would have resulted if the estab-
lished expectation had been achieved against each installation.

c. Available forces will be used to maximize the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the plan. The order of target
categories prescribed in d(1) below are chosen to indicate
relative priorities. The expected damage levels prescribed
below are neither maximum nor minimum limits to the damage
to be inflicted. If programmed capabilities will not permit
the achievement of the prescribed levels of damage, lower
levels will be accepted, with due regard for the indicated
order of priority. If programmed capabilities will permit,
higher expectancies of damage against the prescribed targets
and the destruction or neutralization of other targets will
be achieved in such a way as best to accomplish the strike
tasks.

d. In the programming of forces under all options, priority
will be given to the achievement of damage as follows:

   (1) (a)                                           
   (b)                                             
   (c)                                             
   (d)                                             

   d/ Severe and significant damage as used throughout this docu-
   ment is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960.
(2) Programming of forces for (1) above will be done in a manner that will permit assignment of forces to Task III which are adequate to inflict significant damage \(d/\) to 70 per cent of the floor space \(e/\) selected in such a way as best to achieve Task III. (Floor space as such is introduced only to define the size of the forces to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives).

e. Programming of available and capable forces to other than targets in Tasks I and III will be divided between destruction or neutralization of \(\text{[redacted]}\) and assignment to reserve forces, in such a way as best to achieve the objectives and Tasks defined in Section III, above.

\(d/\) Severe and significant damage as used throughout this document is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960.

\(e/\) Built up area may be used when tract data is not available.
VI. Options and Flexibility

a. OIP will be prepared in consideration of the following alternative circumstances of outbreak of war:

(1) US Pre-emption.

(2) Tactical Warning. US response to major Sino-Soviet Bloc surprise attack in which US forces are on normal peacetime alert. Plans for this contingency will be based on the assumption that ZI based alert forces receive timely tactical warning. Using a combination of cross-targeting and assignment of the most survivable systems to the first priority targets, the plans should assure a satisfactory allocation of effort against the first priority targets in the event the US receives inadequate warning.

The following pre-launch survival probabilities are provided to give an approximate quantitative expression to the intent underlying the contingencies defined above for the FY 1963 time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Alert Aircraft and Polaris on/near Station</th>
<th>US Pre-emption</th>
<th>Tactical Warning</th>
<th>Inadequate Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman, Titan II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Atlas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Carrier Aircraft (At Sea)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Alert/ Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Alert/ Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan I, Medium Atlas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Refers to normal peacetime readiness.

Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Pre-emption</th>
<th>Tactical Warning</th>
<th>Inadequate Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft Atlas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alertf/ Carrier Aircraft</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alertf/ Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alertf/ Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Director of Strategic Target Planning will evaluate these factors in the light of the changing threat, changing composition and readiness of US forces, and the experience resulting from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff analyses and war gaming, and other sources, and report any changes made, with the reasons therefor, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. SIOP will provide for execution, when directed by competent authority, of the following:

**Attack Option I.** Execute Task I under conditions of US Pre-emption while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

**Attack Option II.** Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of US Pre-emption while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

* **Attack Option III.** Execute Task I under conditions of Tactical Warning while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

**Attack Option IV.** Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of Tactical Warning while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

**Attack Option V.** Execute Tasks I, II, and III under conditions of Tactical Warning.

SIOP will also provide for selective withholding of attacks

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f/Refers to normal peacetime readiness.

# Chances of using this Attack Option are remote and it is, therefore, to be programmed as a last priority.
under each Attack Option, as indicated in Section III.b, above. For example, there should be provision under Attack Option II for selective withholding of Task II attacks from

c. Any conflicts which arise in force programming for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option V.

VII. Role of Theater Forces

a. Subject to the requirements of contingency plans and other theater requirements, unified and specified commanders will decide on the commitment of their forces, other than SAC and Polaris, to SIOP for attacks against targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. SIOP tasks will be the first priority commitment for SAC and Polaris under all circumstances.

b. Taking into account appropriate operational factors including weather/darkness, the weight of effort of the committed theater forces will be considered in conjunction with the weight of effort of SAC and Polaris in programming the damage levels to Task I and III targets. Those forces other than SAC and Polaris committed to SIOP will be applied alternatively (1) to increase the expected damage level or confidence of target destruction achieved by SAC and Polaris forces against the same targets (including essential defense suppression), (2) to destroy other targets of lower priority or of particular significance to the theater commanders, or (3) to reduce the time from "P" hour to the attack of Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery forces.

c. All forces other than SAC and Polaris will be considered as available for such other missions as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff despite their commitment to SIOP. SIOP tasks are also a first priority commitment for forces other than SAC and Polaris which are committed to SIOP unless they have been directed to other
tasks by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the result that meeting their SIOP-assigned times over target is not possible.

VIII. Constraints

a. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral, and satellite areas (i.e. all countries except the USSR and China) to the extent that military necessity permits.

b. In attacks to accomplish Tasks I and II, surface bursts, weapon yields and damage to population and industry will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.

c. Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in "d" below are as follows:

d. Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP
and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following:

First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability£ of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

e. In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see c. above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

IX. Responsibilities

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) Review and approve annually the NSTL, the SIOP and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

(3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

£ This is the product of prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. Any "dead-man fused" weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory.
b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

(1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(3) Resolve differences that occur during the development of SIOP; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

(5) During the effective period of the SIOP, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

(6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP.

c. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

(1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

(2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the SIOP and which should be included therein.

(3) Commit forces to the SIOP, in consonance with this guidance.
(4) Program no attacks against SIOP targets unless provided for by SIOP.

X. Analysis and Review

a. DSTP will perform a set of Monte Carlo damage runs for each Attack Option and selected withholding provisions, using all pertinent operational factors, determining AGZ’s, and will report the following:

b. DSTP will prepare an analysis of the impact on penetration and target destruction of the exercise of the option to withhold.

c. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL, SIOP, and their analysis, will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

XI. Effective Period

a. To the extent that there are any conflicts with other guidance, this guidance represents national policy and supersedes all other SIOP guidance.

b. The SIOP will be prepared and reviewed annually, and amended as necessary to keep the plan current.

h/ See footnote e/ on page 6.