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Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
13 December 1961

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GREECE, 1946-1950

The situation that led to the establishment of an American aid program for Greece had its roots in a complex internal struggle and in the strategically important facts of Greek geography. The liberation of the country from the German and Italian invaders in World War II had released long-standing animosities that had been held in check only by the resistance against a common foe; by December 1944 the domestic conflict had broadened into civil war. British troops, who had landed in October 1944, found themselves engaged principally in restoring order in support of the Royal Greek Government, which had established itself in Cairo when Greece was invaded.

Never entirely suppressed, the civil war flared up again in the spring and summer of 1946. It was a continuation of a conflict that had developed during the 1930's, and which had been postponed by the German and Italian occupation, but there were new elements and new leadership. At one extreme were those (of whom the most radical was the Greek Communist Party) who disavowed the King, sought to establish a republic and to institute thorough-going social reforms. At the other pole were the ultra-conservatives, who wished not merely to return to the old order but to restore it exactly as it always had been. Old issues like Macedonian particularism and Pan-Balkanism were joined by new divisive elements, such as collaboration with the occupation forces. In what appears to be the usual pattern, leadership of the military operations against the government fell under control of the Communist wing. But like the issues, the Communist leaders were of the native-grown variety. Ideological affinities, however, provided them with support from Albania and Yugoslavia. It is impossible to say what and how much external aid they received in the shape of weapons, supplies and volunteers. Probably the amounts were insignificant. By far the greatest help
help was the freedom of movement that was permitted the guerrillas, enabling them to retreat across the frontiers into the neighboring Communist territory for rest and redeployment. By the end of 1946 the country was economically and financially prostrate, and its government apparently unable to deal with the activities of guerrilla bands in the northern mountains. The British Government, which had continued to provide economic and military aid, by this time was beginning to find the burden intolerable.

Early in the year the USSR had charged before the United Nations that the presence of British troops in Greece was a threat against world peace and at the end of August 1946 the USSR raised the complaint that the policy of the Greek Government had created a dangerous situation in the Balkans. Although the UN Security Council declined to accept the charges, they appeared to indicate an approaching crisis. An even more direct object of Soviet pressure at that particular moment was Turkey. At stake was the control of the strategically important Straits of Dardanelles and indeed of the entire eastern Mediterranean. Although the situation called for immediate support of Turkey against the Soviet threat, from the long-range point of view Turkey could not be considered secure if Greece fell into such political chaos and economic bankruptcy as to make it an easy "push-over" should the Soviet Union, or, more likely, its Balkan satellites, exert pressure in that direction.

In response therefore to the general situation in the eastern Mediterranean as evidenced in the Soviet pressure for a new arrangement regarding the Straits, in response also to continued strife in Iran, and to the deteriorating situation in China, the United States Government adopted a new policy governing the transfer of military equipment to friendly foreign nations. The new policy, approved by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, on 25 September 1946, was designed to fit two general
general circumstances: either for maintaining the internal order and security of a nation whose independence and territorial integrity were important to the security of the United States, or for preserving the independence and territorial integrity of such nations in the face of an actual external threat. This policy, some five months later, provided the basis on which the United States assumed the responsibilities towards Greece hitherto borne by the British.

When the British Government, on 24 February 1947, officially informed the United States that Britain could not continue its support of Greece and Turkey after 31 March, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy agreed that the United States must without question assume the burden, if for no other reason than that a joint Anglo-American stand vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had to be preserved. The Secretaries noted the necessity of developing public, and particularly Congressional, support of the action. During the next few days, in meetings with Congressional leaders and news correspondents, the emphasis was placed on the fundamental ideological conflict between Communism and the democratic way of life, although some members of the War Department and State Department (notably Mr. George Kennan) objected to this approach. The subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee charged with preparing the public information program recognized its effectiveness, however. "The only way we can sell the public on our new policy," one of the members stated, "is by emphasizing the necessity of holding the line: Communism vs. democracy should be the major theme." In his message to Congress on 12 March, requesting legislative authority to aid both countries, President Truman further tied the application of the policy to the general, world-wide threat posed by Communism. He did not, however, charge that Greece was faced at that moment with a specific external threat.
As enacted, the bill (PL 75, 22 May 47) specified financial aid and the procurement and transfer of "any articles, services, and information," authorized an appropriation of not more than $400,000,000, and approved the detailing of American government employees for administrative and technical advisory purposes, plus "a limited number" of military and naval personnel "in an advisory capacity only."

On 24 May 1947, two days after the aid bill became law, the first increment of the "US Military Advisory Group for Aid to Greece" arrived in Athens. By the end of the month it consisted of twenty-three officers and men, headed by Colonel Charles R. Lehner, USA, who was succeeded in mid-June by Major General William G. Livesay, USA. It was accompanied by a small Navy Department group and a State Department group as well.

The role of the War Department group was at first limited to supply activities and the training of Greek personnel in the operation of equipment. Colonel Lehner was instructed by a War Department letter dated 19 May to report to the Chief of the U.S. Mission to Greece (the American Ambassador) and to work henceforth under his direction. Within two weeks after his arrival, however, Colonel Lehner had been invited by the Greek Government, and had received authority from the War Department, to attend meetings of the Greek High Military Council, presided over by the Minister of War. Except for incorporating this additional authority, General Livesay's instructions were identical to those originally received by Colonel Lehner. The added provision authorized General Livesay upon official invitation by the Greek Government to attend meetings of the High Military Council "as an observer and in an advisory capacity concerning logistical problems, not as a voting member." In addition to the meetings of the High Military Council, General Livesay also attended, as an observer, the periodic meetings of the Supreme National Defense Council (presided over by the Prime Minister) and the Joint Chiefs
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

During the six months following General Livesay's arrival in Athens and prior to his replacement by Lt. General James A. Van Fleet on 24 February 1948, the role of the Advisory Group was progressively enlarged, until American officers were advising Greek Army units in actual combat with the guerrillas. By mid-August 1947, General Livesay's advice on broader military matters was being sought by the Greek staff and by the commander of the British Military Mission in Greece, but not having authority to go beyond the logistical and technical sphere he refrained from doing so. It was increasingly difficult for him to maintain this position, however, since it was becoming evident that supply and training in the use of equipment were so closely integrated with the strategic, tactical and political aspects of developing the Greek Army into a more effective fighting force that the Advisory Group could not avoid working more closely with the Greek General Staff in operational and organizational planning. By mid-October, General Livesay and the commander of the British Military Mission were both being consulted by the Prime Minister and were giving their views on such matters as the high command of the Greek National Army. Closer association with the Greek General Staff in planning matters was precluded also by the fact that the Advisory Group consisted entirely of technical personnel. As a result of recommendations by the American Ambassador, Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh, and by the Chief of the Aid Mission, Mr. Dwight Griswold, who had been appointed to this separate post during the summer, the War Department in late September approved the assignment of three planning officers to the Advisory Group.

In the meantime, the failure of the Greek Army's summer campaign against the guerrillas had made it clear that more than planning guidance was needed. The possibility of sending an American
American combat force was briefly considered at various levels, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and dismissed in favor of further broadening the role of the Advisory Group. On 19 September, Major General S.J. Chamberlin (Director of Intelligence, War Department) had been instructed to undertake a personal survey of the military situation in Greece and to make recommendations on various matters including (1) the need for broadening General Livesay's authority and reorganizing his staff in order to permit him to operate fully and more effectively as a military advisor, (2) the desirability of sending specially qualified American officers to act as "observers" with Greek Army units during actual field operations. On both items, General Chamberlin recommended that the actions in question be taken by establishing a Joint Advisory and Planning Group, under the nominal control of the Ambassador and reporting directly to the JCS, to advise on and coordinate military matters and to furnish observers with Greek Army units in the field.

In forwarding General Chamberlin's recommendations to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff (General Eisenhower) made his concurrence conditional upon the formulation at the highest level of a broad definition of American objectives in Greece. Unless such a definition indicating a specific commitment to assure the survival of a democratic Greece were formulated, it would be unwise and possibly dangerous, General Eisenhower believed, to assume further military commitments in Greece. The matter was accordingly placed before the National Security Council at an informal meeting on 27 October. The Council agreed and the President approved on 4 November that the Advisory and Planning Group should be established, as part of the American Aid Mission headed by Mr. Griswold, but with direct communication to the JCS on matters concerning military operations. In the field of operational advice, the Chief of the Aid Mission was to leave to the head of the Advisory and Planning Group
military decisions which did "not affect over-all AMAG policies or other AMAG activities."

A proposed directive to this effect was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 2 December.\(^1\) The directive specified that the Director of

\(^1\) See (b) JCS 1798/3, appvd 2 Dec 1947.

the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG) was to be "directly under, and responsible to, the Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, but with direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington in matters concerning military operations." The JUSMAPG was assigned the following functions:

1. To maintain a continuing study and appraisal of the developing situation in Greece from a military point of view.

2. To formulate plans for the employment and coordination of the armed forces of Greece.

3. To furnish advice concerning the military situation in regard to securing and maintaining internal security in Greece, and particularly in regard to the employment of the Greek armed forces to:

   (a) The United States Ambassador to Greece, through the Chief of the American Mission for aid to Greece (AMAG).

   (b) The Chief, American Mission for Aid to Greece.

   (c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. To furnish operational advice, coordinated with the British, to the Greek Government and to the Greek armed forces, upon request of the Greek Government, and render military decisions relative to U.S. military personnel which do not affect overall AMAG policies or other AMAG activities. Military decisions affecting high policy as defined in instructions to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece and to the Chief of the AMAG, will be brought to the attention of the Ambassador by the Director, JUSMAPG through the Chief of AMAG, and no such decisions will be taken without the Ambassador's authority.

5. To establish liaison with the British governmental agencies in Greece.

6. To establish means to monitor requirements of the current situation and to insure that operational

- 7 -
returns are commensurate with the aid furnished.

No member of the Group was to assume any duties as a result of which he would be responsible to the Greek Government. Nevertheless, the directive continued,

in order to assist and advise the Greek Government in the development of its armed forces, it may be necessary for personnel of JUSMAPG to participate in advisory or observant capacities with many Greek organizations. Contact will be restricted normally to the higher levels. Specific exception to the above may be made when considered necessary to carry out the functions outlined herein, in order to place personnel in any channel in the Greek armed forces to advise and observe operations.

A four-fold increase in the strength of the Advisory Group was authorized and on 31 December General Livesay was designated Director of the JUSMAPG.

On 15 January 1948 General Livesay issued a directive formally establishing the JUSMAPG. After outlining the general functions as set forth in the directive prepared by the Joint Chiefs, General Livesay delineated the relationship between JUSMAPG and the British missions as follows:

(1) All members of JUSMAPG will maintain close coordination and cooperative relationship with the British Missions.

(2) In general, after thorough coordination, the members of JUSMAPG will advise on supply, logistical, and operational matters, and members of the British Missions on organization and training matters.

(3) The British Missions and American Mission will be so closely allied and coordinated in each echelon as to be in effect one advisory body in all matters affecting the GREEK Armed Forces.

The headquarters directive then set forth the specific duties of JUSMAPG echelons in the following terms:

(1) JUSMAPG at Headquarters in Athens will:

(a) Make continuing studies of, and recommendations on, such problems as may be presented or anticipated.
(b) Prepare such reports as may be required by the Director of JUSMAPG.
(c) Keep the Director of JUSMAPG informed of the status of plans and operations in the GREEK Armed Forces.
(d) Keep CG, USAGG and Chief, USMG informed of the adequacy and of the utilization of supplies made available to the GREEK Armed Forces.

(e) Visit
(e) Visit lower JUSMAPG echelons and lower echelons of the GREEK Armed Forces frequently to keep informed of the military situation and to inspire aggressive action.

(f) Take action to insure adequate administration and supply of all echelons of JUSMAPG.

(g) Establish and maintain close coordination with the British Military, Naval, and Air Missions.

(h) Maintain contact with the Commanding General "A" Corps, GNA, and perform in general the duties outlined in paragraph 3 below, with the "A" Corps Commander and Staff.

(2) JUSMAPG with Headquarters First Army, GNA, in Volos, will:

(a) Maintain a continuing study and appraisal of the military situation in the First Army, GNA.

(b) Furnish operational advice, in coordination with the British, to the CG and Staff of First Army, GNA.

(c) Monitor military requirements of the current situation in First Army, GNA, to insure that operational returns are commensurate with the military aid furnished.

(d) Keep the Director, JUSMAPG, informed of the adequacy and of the utilization of supplies made available to First Army, GNA.

(e) Make recommendations direct to JUSMAPG, after conferring with RMM(G) at First Army, GNA, concerning changes in the organization and training of the GREEK Armed Forces that may appear desirable from an operational standpoint.

(f) Keep the Director, JUSMAPG, informed of administrative, supply, and operational matters in the GREEK First Army.

(g) Prepare such reports as may be required by the Director of JUSMAPG.

(h) Maintain personal contacts with lower echelons of JUSMAPG and with subordinate elements of the GREEK First Army in order to keep informed of the military situation.

(i) Take action to insure adequate coordination, administration, and supply of subordinate echelons of JUSMAPG.

(3) JUSMAPG with "B" Corps, GNA (LARISSA), and with "C" Corps, GNA (SALONIKA) will:

(a) Maintain a continuing study and appraisal of the military situation in their respective corps.

(b) Furnish operational advice, in coordination with the British, to the CG and Staff of their respective Corps headquarters.

(c) Monitor
(c) Monitor military requirements in their respective corps to insure that operational returns are commensurate with the military aid furnished.

(d) Keep JUSMAPO at Headquarters First GREEK Army informed of the adequacy and of the utilization of supplies made available to their respective corps.

(e) After conferring with BMM(G) at the respective corps headquarters, make recommendations to JUSMAPO at GREEK First Army relative to organization and training changes that may appear desirable from an operational viewpoint.

(f) Keep JUSMAPO at Headquarters GREEK First Army informed of administrative, supply, and operational matters in the respective corps.

(g) Submit to and through JUSMAPO at Headquarters GREEK First Army, such reports as may be required by JUSMAPO at GREEK First Army Headquarters and Director, JUSMAPO.

(h) Maintain close personal contact with division echelons of JUSMAPO and with field forces of their respective corps in order to keep informed of the military situation.

(i) Insure adequate coordination, administration, and supply of division echelons of JUSMAPO in the respective corps.

(4) JUSMAPO with Division Headquarters of GNA will:

(a) Maintain a continuing study and appraisal of the military situation in their respective divisions.

(b) Furnish operational advice, in coordination with the British, (if present), to the CG and Staffs of their respective divisions.

(c) Maintain close personal contact with lower echelons within the respective divisions in order to keep informed of the military situation and to insure aggressive action in those echelons of the GNA.

(d) Keep JUSMAPO at Corps Headquarters informed of the adequacy and of the utilization of supplies made available to their respective divisions.

(e) After conferring with BMM (G), (if present), at the respective division headquarters, make recommendations through channels to the Director, JUSMAPO, relative to organization and training changes that may appear desirable from an operational standpoint.

(f) Keep JUSMAPO at Corps Headquarters informed of administration, supply, and operations in the respective divisions.

(g) Submit through JUSMAPO channels such reports as may be required by JUSMAPO Headquarters.

Some six weeks later, on 24 February 1948, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet arrived in Athens to take command
of JUSMAPG. His view, as well as that of General Livesay, was that the Greek Army did not need an increase in manpower so much as it needed an infusion of offensive spirit. On the recommendation and advice of General Van Fleet, changes were made in the command of Greek Army units, and extensive spring and summer operations were mapped out. In the course of the spring offensive, which began in the Roumeli area northwest of Athens in April 1948, American advisory teams were assigned to all corps and divisions of the Greek Army, but the American advisors were authorized to, and frequently did, visit the subordinate units of the divisions and corps to which they were assigned. They were unarmed, and were instructed to observe combat without involving themselves in it.

Although the spring campaign succeeded in clearing the Roumeli area, the operations in the Grammos Mountains region during the following summer revealed that the guerrillas merely had exchanged one area of activity for another, and that the closer they drew to the northern frontier the more difficult it was to suppress them. Although the Greek Army had been progressively expanded in size, despite the recommendations of the American mission, and although American supplies were reaching the Army in peak quantities during 1948, the operations against the guerrillas were not an unqualified success until Marshal Tito, after his break with Moscow towards the end of 1948, gradually closed the Yugoslav frontier. Not only were the guerrillas deprived of sanctuary, but the Tito-Stalin controversy itself had its counterpart among the Greek Communist leaders. By espousing a brand of Pan-Balkanism being voiced by the anti-Tito Bulgarian Communists, the Greek guerrilla leaders forfeited a large measure of what popular support they had. The combination of circumstances largely eliminated the military threat of the guerrillas by the beginning of 1950, and the first steps were then taken to reduce the size and scope of the American mission.
KOREA, 1946 - 1955

The armed forces of the Republic of Korea that fought in the Korean War had their origin in a constabulary type of police organization established by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in January, 1946. Essentially an internal security force, the Constabulary was organized to assist the regular police, especially in cases of widespread internal disorders or national emergencies. At the time of its establishment, it apparently was recognized by USAMGIK officers as a possible nucleus for a future Korean Army, although the U.S. Government, for political reasons, rejected a proposal for the organization of regular Korean armed forces at the time.

Under the direction of a Lieutenant Colonel who was named Chief of Constabulary, teams of two U.S. Army lieutenants and one Japanese-speaking Nisei enlisted man, accompanied by Korean graduates of an Army English language school, were sent to each of the eight major provinces of South Korea to set up regimental headquarters and organize regiments by local recruiting. The plan was that one company with 20 percent overstrength would be recruited initially for each regiment. After a brief training period, the company was to enter upon its constabulary duties, while its overstrength became the cadre for organizing and training a second overstrength company. The process was to be continued until the eight regiments were completed and the full strength of 25,000 was reached. By the end of April 1946, the first eight overstrength companies, totaling 2,218 men, had completed their training.

USAMGIK also supervised the formation of a Korean coast guard to control smuggling and piracy. Originally set up and trained by U.S. Army officers, the coast guard made little progress
progress until September 1946, when 15 U.S. Coast Guard advisers arrived from the United States. In the fall of that year 18 vessels of various types were commissioned. The Coast Guard advisers were withdrawn in 1948 and replaced by civilians, who, however, were retired or reserve Coast Guard officers and who were allowed to wear uniforms for prestige.

The first major step in preparing Korea for self-government came in September 1946, when the Korean administrators in the various branches of the American Military Government were given virtual direction of their offices. The American supervisors, including the Director of the Department of Internal Security and the American officers with the Constabulary, now became advisers to the Korean officials, although the new relationship was rather nominal than actual because of inexperience on the part of the Koreans.

By the end of 1946 the Constabulary had a strength of over 1,100 officers and 5,000 men. The number of advisers, however, was growing steadily smaller as U.S. officers were reassigned or separated without replacements. Between September 1946 and April 1948 there was an average of only six advisers on duty with the regiments, while about twenty were assigned to the Department of Internal Security. As a rule, each adviser was responsible for more than one regiment and these were often many miles apart. In such circumstances, training was necessarily deficient, even though conducted on a seven-day week basis.

Training was conducted, for the most part, with Japanese small arms and some light machine guns and ostensibly did not go beyond the use of such arms, basic drill, and "methods of internal security." Nevertheless, the unsettled condition of the country offered some opportunities for tactical training in actual operations. While engaged in quelling civil disorders
orders and guerrilla-like activities of communist elements some units learned such lessons as the necessity for control in military operations and the principles of village fighting.

When it became apparent during the autumn of 1947 and the following winter that an independent government would emerge in South Korea, the Department of the Army requested General MacArthur's views regarding a defense force for Korea. He recommended that, instead of organizing an Army, the Constabulary be increased to 50,000 men, from its then existing strength of 12,000/20,000 men, which he said could be done in three months and a half. Given the lack of training facilities, the scarcity of competent Korean military leaders, the language problem, and the diminishing resources that the American occupation forces could provide, General MacArthur considered any larger increase to be unfeasible.(1) He

(1) (T) Msg, CINCFE to DEPTAR, CX-58437, 6 Feb 48, CCS 385.2I Korea (3-19-45) sec 15.

apparently contemplated equipping the augmented Constabulary with heavy weapons, including 105-mm. howitzers, but not with artillery.(2) The expansion and equipment recommended by General MacArthur, plus divisional light tanks and armored cars, were authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following month, by which time an intensified recruiting campaign had brought the Constabulary almost to the 50,000 mark.

The approach of independence for South Korea also prompted an accelerated training program by USAMIK, which was given additional U.S. Army officers for this purpose. U.S. occupation forces also set up schools to train Koreans in the use of the American equipment they were to receive.

When
When it came into being in August 1948 the new ROK Government signed an agreement with the U.S. occupation forces providing for a gradual transfer of the security forces to ROK leadership. The United States, under this agreement, was to retain operational control of such forces, continuing to train and equip them until the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. The U.S. command structure was changed to conform to the new status of South Korea. USAMIK was abolished; all advisory personnel were transferred to the Overstrength Detachment, Hq U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), and organized as a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG). During the remainder of 1948 PMAG grew from a strength of 100 men to 241. The increase permitted slightly more than the former inadequate coverage of Korean units by the advisers, but the Korean forces were also expanding at this time and the demands for advisory personnel continued to mount. U.S. advisers were spread thinly throughout a force in excess of five brigades comprising three regiments each.

Organizational changes in the ROK security forces also followed hard on the heels of independence. The Koreans immediately began referring to the Constabulary as the National Defense Army and on 15 December 1948 set up a complete ROK national defense organization, including a Department of National Defense, an Army, and a Navy. (3) At this time the

(3) The U.S. refused to recognize the redesignation of the Coast Guard as the ROK Navy.

Constabulary brigades became Army divisions and fourteen Army branches were founded.

Under this new organization, the security force continued to grow, and by March 1949 the Army numbered 65,000, the Coast Guard 4,000. The U.S. Government had authorized transfer of
of infantry-type weapons for only 50,000 men, but, on deciding in March to withdraw U.S. forces entirely from Korea consented to furnish minimum essential equipment for an additional 15,000. Prior to its departure, the last remaining regimental combat team in Korea provided training in the use of the American equipment.

With the departure of the last U.S. tactical forces at the end of June 1949, KMAG dropped its provisional status. Expanded to a strength of 189 officers and 299 enlisted men, it was redesignated as the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). In considering this measure some months earlier, the Department of the Army had proposed that, when it was organized, KMAG be placed under the administrative direction of the U.S. Ambassador to Korea and under the "operational control" of the Commander in Chief, Far East. General MacArthur, on the other hand, had expressed the view that unless he were authorized to set objectives and missions for the advisory group it should be placed under the direct supervision and control of the Ambassador, but with the right to communicate on military matters with the Joint Chiefs through direct military channels. KMAG was accordingly established as a fourth component of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK), headed by the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. John J. Muccio, and of which the other elements were the Embassy, the Economic Cooperation Administration agency, and a service staff known as the Joint Administrative Services. The latter provided direct logistical services for all components of AMIK, including KMAG, and by virtue of intergovernmental agreement KMAG personnel enjoyed the same diplomatic immunity as Embassy personnel. In what was becoming a general pattern for MAAG's, the advisory group in Korea was thus made part of a "country team" under the overall supervision of the Ambassador, while it was for purposes of administration designated an Army Foreign
Foreign Assignment Activity directly under the Department of the Army. The Far East Command's responsibility was limited to logistical support of KMAG up to dockside in Korea and to the evacuation of U.S. personnel in an emergency. KMAG nevertheless maintained close liaison with General MacArthur's headquarters since FEQCM was the nearest major military command. During periodic visits to Tokyo, KMAG officers coordinated evacuation plans and kept FEQCM headquarters current with Korean political and military developments.

About two-thirds of the personnel assigned to KMAG worked in the area in and around the capital city, since most of the important installations of the ROK Army were grouped in the vicinity. Contact with advisory personnel in the outlying areas was maintained largely through radio communication. At the end of 1949 KMAG had twelve stations established on two separate nets, with a common net control station at the group headquarters. One net served advisers in the interior of the peninsula while the other was used by those with ROK units at Wonju, the Ongjin Peninsula, and posts in the general vicinity of the 38th parallel. All stations worked on a definite schedule, twice a day, while the net control station kept a continuous watch on both nets.

Most KMAG personnel were able to give the bulk of their time to advisory duties, although some had to be assigned to administrative functions within the group while others served in a dual capacity. As time went on, every effort was made to relieve advisory personnel of administrative duties, chiefly by concentrating such functions in a few agencies.

The KMAG Table of Distribution had been devised with the object of providing an American Army officer as an advisor for the chiefs of all ROK Army technical and administrative services, for officers of the general and special staff sections.
sections at ROK Army headquarters, and for each divisional, regimental, and battalion commander. To be of utmost help to their Korean counterparts in the execution of their duties, the American advisors shared their offices and day-to-day problems. Similar assistance was provided for the Korean Coast Guard (Navy) and National Police. The only departure from this physically close relationship took place at the Ministry and Chief of Staff levels. Because of heavy administrative and operating responsibilities, the Chief of KMAG confined his dealings with the Minister of National Defense to exchanges of correspondence and an occasional meeting. For the same reason, the Chief of Staff of KMAG seldom dealt directly with the ROK Army Chief of Staff, but maintained a liaison officer in his counterpart's office. Under this counterpart system, the American advisers were expected to control training and other activities of the ROK Army by influence, suggestion and guidance, since they had no direct authority over ROK officers. Uncooperative ROK officers were reported to the Korean Minister of Defense, at his request, and the results were usually good, but for the most part ROK officers were anxious to learn from their American advisers.

Serious deficiencies in ROK Army training had come to light by the time KMAG was organized. KMAG accordingly devised and put into effect a progressive program of unit training based on the U.S. Army Mobilization Training Program (MTP 7-1) of September 1943. By 15 June 1950 only sixteen ROK battalions had completed the battalion phase, thirty had completed the company phase, and seventeen were still in the platoon phase. A high priority was given to the school system. Seven technical and branch schools and the Korean Military Academy were in operation in June 1949. But the Military Academy was functioning as a short-course Officer Candidates School and the others
others were not producing qualified graduates. KMAG promptly
set about to reorganize the existing schools and to establish
a complete system of branch, technical service, and staff
schools in which the American advisers prepared all the lesson
plans and study materials for Korean instructors. By the
end of 1949 thirteen major schools, including a Command and
General Staff College, were in operation. By the time of
the Communist invasion in June 1950, the schools had gradu-
ated a total of 9,126 officers and 11,112 enlisted men.

Neither the training program nor the school system had
achieved complete success by the time the North Koreans struck
across the 38th parallel. The language problem had continued
to be the biggest obstacle to progress. Guerrilla activities
and incidents along the 38th parallel, which required the
employment of troops that should have been undergoing training
or schooling, disrupted both programs. Finally, KMAG had
been forced to stretch itself to the utmost to accommodate
to the constant expansion of the ROK Army. Based on an Army
strength of 65,000 men, the KMAG Table of Distribution was
inadequate for the demands placed upon it by an Army that had
reached a strength of approximately 95,000 by June 1950. The
counterpart system could not function at its best when
advisers had to parcel out their time and effort among several
ROK units.

South Korea's share of the initial military aid program
authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949
amounted to $10,970,000 in supplies and equipment. The list
of materiel recommended by KMAG in conjunction with the Embassy,
and approved by the ROK government, included spare parts, a
limited number of aircraft, 105-mm. howitzers, machine guns
and mortars. The emphasis of the foreign aid program was
directed on Western Europe and in January 1950 the United
States
States decided to establish its forward defenses in the Pacific on a line running from the Philippines through Okinawa to Japan. Korea was therefore low on the list of priorities for military aid. By June 1950 less than $1,000 worth of equipment had been delivered under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. When the fighting began the ROK forces had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2-in. mortars, no recoilless rifles, and no fighter aircraft or bombers. (4)


The confusion and disorder that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950 cast a cloud of uncertainty over KMAG's role in the emergency. The announcement by General MacArthur on 27 June that he was taking over operational control of all U.S. military activities in Korea, including KMAG, was interpreted by the advisory group as authority to remain in Korea, but in what capacity was not made clear. The American Ambassador withdrew some of the advisors from the Korean units to which they were attached and sent them south to Pusan to help evacuate American nationals and to assist in forwarding whatever supplies and reinforcements should arrive from Japan. Other advisors remained with their counterparts and on many occasions during the retreat to Pusan they assumed roles of command.

With the establishment of 8th Army headquarters in Korea on 13 July, KMAG came under the direct command of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, 8th Army, and was officially assigned to 8th Army on 14 September. Thereafter, for the duration of the hostilities, KMAG was an operational element of 8th Army.
The reconstruction and reorganization of the ROK forces became KMAG's primary task as soon as the front was stabilized on the Pusan perimeter. On the recommendation of KMAG, the surviving ROK divisions were regrouped under two corps headquarters and the activation of five new divisions was started. Five replacement training centers, to which KMAG advisors were attached, were in operation by the end of August, and were turning out under a ten-day training cycle a total of 2,950 trainees each day.

On coming under the control of 8th Army, KMAG had submitted a new Table of Distribution calling for 559 officers and enlisted men and providing for advisors down to regimental level. The increased responsibilities and the need for advisors at battalion level brought an increase to 825 officers and men in September. Although General MacArthur refused to approve permanent increases in KMAG strength, he authorized temporary overstrength, and by 30 September 1951, KMAG had reached a total of 1,308 officers and men. During 1952 KMAG's total strength ranged from a peak of 2,019 to 1,911 at the end of the year.

Following the cessation of hostilities, a new arrangement was needed to replace the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which had been cancelled by the decision to resist the Communist invasion. Because U.S. commanders in Korea continued to exercise operational control over the ROK forces, pending a definitive peace settlement, a provisional military assistance advisory group responsible to CINCPAC was established in lieu of a conventional MAAG responsible to the Ambassador. PROVMAAG-K, as it was known, was established in January 1955 as a joint headquarters with the general mission of performing all joint military aid functions and of coordinating the programming and implementation responsibilities of the separate service
service groups, of which KMAG was the Army group. A new directive was proposed by Chief, PROVMAAG-K, in 1956, which would have made PROVMAAG responsible for overall implementation of the military aid program instead of simply coordination, but as of March 1961 this change had not been made. (5)

IRAN, 1945-1955

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Iran, and its predecessors were the outgrowth of a wartime commitment, which was recognized as a continuing obligation after World War II. At the request of the Iranian Government, two American military missions had been organized in 1942, one to provide technical advice to the Iranian Gendarmerie and the other to reorganize the finance and supply services of the Iranian Army. The status of the two missions and the terms and conditions of their employment rested on contracts with the Iranian Government. All expenses, including salaries extra to the Army pay of the personnel, were borne by Iran. Interference in the political affairs of the country was strictly forbidden. Under the Army contract, the Iranian Minister of War was to appoint the chief of mission as his military adviser with broad investigative powers in the fields of procurement, supply and Army finance. The Gendarmerie contract provided for the chief of mission to be adviser to the Minister of Interior, with functions of command. The Army contract was to remain in effect for the duration of the war and could be extended thereafter by mutual agreement or be terminated by either party on three months' notice. The Gendarmerie contract was limited to a term of two years, beginning October 1942, but it also could be extended by agreement. By the summer of 1944, both Major General Clarence S. Ridley, Chief of the Army Mission, and Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief of the Gendarmerie Mission, believed that little more needed to be done to complete their major tasks. The Iranian Government nevertheless desired both missions to continue. Their contracts were therefore renewed, not because of military necessity
necessity but because of public policy, or what the War
Department generally termed "political considerations."

The unsettled state of affairs in Iran provided a
weighty argument for further continuing the advisory
missions. The open partiality of the then ruler of Iran
towards the Axis cause, the presence of a sizeable German
colony, and the Nazi advance to the Black Sea had, in the
summer of 1941, brought about a joint occupation of the
country by British and Soviet troops. The latter established
themselves in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces, while the
British occupied the region to the south. Notwithstanding
assurances given in a Tripartite Treaty with Iran the
following year that the occupying powers would not interfere
in the internal affairs of the country, the line between the
two occupation zones became a virtual frontier. In a
number of respects the situation was a forerunner of what
was to happen in post-war Germany. The movement of Iranian
officials to and within the Soviet Zone was obstructed,
even prevented, by the Soviet authorities. "Frontier"
incidents multiplied until, in August 1945, rebellion broke
out in Azerbaijan, when armed partisans of the Tudeh (or
"Masses") Party seized the government buildings in Tabriz.
Beginning as a movement of genuine liberal reform, the
Tudeh had openly emerged as a pro-Soviet party in 1944,
when the Iranian Government came under heavy Soviet pressure
for an oil concession. Deserted by liberals and nationalists
because of its stand on the oil question, the Tudeh had then
taken hold in Azerbaijan, where economic misery and political
separatism for nearly two hundred years had provided
fertile ground for Russian expansionism. With Soviet
encouragement and sponsorship, the Tudeh Party thereafter
concentrated on stirring up all the varieties of popular
discontent.
discontent in a design to subvert the authority of the central government.

When, in the midst of these disturbances, the question of a second renewal of the advisory missions' contracts was raised in Washington, the War Department again concurred in the State Department's decision to continue the missions. The Gendarmerie contract was extended for another year, until October 1946; the Army contract was to be permitted to run its full term—i.e., the duration of the war or the declared national emergency—unless extended further by agreement.

The disorders of August 1945 were the prelude to a more serious rebellion that broke out the following November and reached a climax with the proclamation of an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan. The head of the Tudeh Party in northern Iran, an experienced Comintern agent who had lived for twenty years in the Soviet Union, was installed as premier of the rebel government. Efforts of the Iranian Government to suppress the rebellion were blocked by Soviet troops, and in January 1946 Iran placed before the Security Council of the United Nations a formal protest against the Soviet Union. All British forces were withdrawn from the country on 2 March 1946, the deadline set by the Tripartite Treaty, but, except for a token withdrawal, Soviet troops remained until sometime in May. During the remainder of the year, the Iranian Government moved gradually to reassert and consolidate its authority. On 10 December 1946 parts of two Iranian Army divisions, together with Gendarmerie troops, began moving into Azerbaijan and the rebel regime quickly collapsed.

Early in 1945 Colonel Schwarzkopf, Chief of the Gendarmerie Mission, had proposed to the Iranian Government a plan
a plan for reorganizing the Gendarmerie, which had included vesting the force with full authority to handle its own disciplinary, officer selections, training school and retirement systems. But after a year of discussion the program had not been enacted. Opposition to it was closely related to a desire on the part of the Iranian Army to absorb the Gendarmerie, a desire that led to constant military intervention in Gendarmerie affairs. The question of the Gendarmerie's independent status became, and continued to be, a heated domestic issue, in which the American Mission was inevitably caught. Early in 1946 the Iranian commander, through whom Colonel Schwarzkopf exercised his nebulous attributes of command, was removed. The Prime Minister took over personal command of the Gendarmerie and proposed to make Colonel Schwarzkopf his virtual deputy, vested with full authority to issue orders in the name of the Prime Minister, but Colonel Schwarzkopf, concerned over the repercussions that might ensue, convinced the Prime Minister that it would not be desirable for an American adviser to give orders. They agreed that Colonel Schwarzkopf would advise the Prime Minister what should be done and that the latter would then put the advice in the form of an order. Under this procedure a shift of regimental commanders, the establishment of a court of discipline, and other changes were speedily effected.

The promptness with which the Gendarmerie moved into the Caspian provinces after the Soviet withdrawal, produced a vicious newspaper campaign in the Tudeh press against the Gendarmerie, the Advisory Mission and the Chief of the Mission personally. Rumors began to spread that the Mission would be withdrawn. Whether by design or coincidence,
the rumors and press attacks came at a time when negotiations over renewing the Mission contract were about to begin. In the face of such pressure, to withdraw either Mission or to restrict the functions of the Gendarmerie Mission to training would have been a retreat. The contract was renewed, this time for two years—until October 1946.

At the end of 1946, the Iranian Army renewed its efforts to gain control of the Gendarmerie. Both Schwarzkopf, who had in the meantime been promoted to Brigadier General, and the new Chief of the Army Mission, Brigadier General R. W. Grow, were agreed that the Gendarmerie should remain under the Ministry of Interior as a separate organization, but by this time the issue had become entangled in competition between the two Iranian services for American supplies.

Upon his arrival in Iran on 22 October 1946, General Grow had become involved in the matter of reorganizing the Iranian Army and the related questions of the Army Mission's role, until then limited to the fields of finance and supply. The Iranian Minister of War, to whom the Army Mission acted as advisor, had no authority over the General Staff, as the Chief of Staff reported directly to the Shah. The Chief of Staff, on his part, had no authority over the Army's supply and service departments, which were controlled by the Minister of War. It was a cumbersome establishment, lacking in coordination, as everyone recognized. Various proposals for reorganizing the system had been put forward, and in connection with them the Shah was especially interested in getting a Staff College and Army Schools into operation. In his first conversations with Iranian military leaders General Grow was
was sounded out on the question of the Army Mission providing officers to advise on these matters. Although it would mean expanding the scope of the mission and would probably require additional personnel, he was thoroughly in favor of moving into the field of organization and training provided it could be done gradually and unobtrusively. Under General Grow's predecessor, an officer of the mission had been assigned as advisor to each of five Iranian military departments--Quartermaster, Finance, Medical, Transport, and Engineers. A sixth officer acted as advisor to the Signal section of the Engineers Department, and seven others had been assigned to supply depots in the provinces.

The depot system, however, had proved highly unpopular with Iranian unit commanders and neither General Grow nor General Ridley was satisfied with the way it had worked out. Believing at first that its shortcomings were the result of too rapid "Americanization" and inadequate control over the mission officers assigned to the depots, General Grow brought the officers back to Teheran, reassigned them as departmental advisors, and proposed to send them out periodically on brief inspection tours. But the division of responsibility between the General Staff and the Ministry of War was the real source of difficulty, as General Grow soon perceived, and the remedy depended upon reorganization at that level. Eventually, but only after a year of effort, General Grow was able to make some progress towards obtaining the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of War in the coordination and supervision of supply and support activities.

When the matter of advising on the reorganization of the Iranian Army was dropped in his lap, as he reported it to the War Department, General Grow submitted a new Table of
of Organization to the Iranian Ministry of War, which 
would enable the Advisory Mission to discharge the 
additional functions in prospect, and requested the War 
Department in Washington to approve the proposed increases 
in strength and rank. (1) By utilizing the officers 

(1) See Chart on the following page.

previously assigned to the field depots, he was able to hold 
the net increase in the size of the mission to three officers. 
There had been a delay in starting a school system, so that 
instead of providing for two school advisors, as General 
Grow had contemplated, the new Table of Organization 
provided an additional advisor for the Transport Department 
and one for Procurement matters. In Washington, within 
the War Department there had at first been some opposition 
to expanding the Advisory Mission's role, on the ground 
that it would require the negotiation of a new contract. 
General Grow insisted, however, that, on his own part as 
well as at the desire of the Iranian Minister of War, a 
new contract was unnecessary and at the moment undesirable. 
With this, the War Department approved the increase in 
strength, but the increased rank for advisors that the new 
Table of Organization called for was not approved for the 
time being.

A related organizational problem concerned the Iranian 
Army chain of Command. All divisions and separate.. brigades 
were under the direct command of the Chief of Staff, which 
made it seem impossible for the Army to operate effectively 
as a unit. Every effort to create corps and army head-
quarters had failed, largely because the central government 
believed that the reform might create too much power in 
the provinces. The American Mission appears to have been still 
seeking a solution of this problem as late as 1954.

A new
NOTE: United States Army personnel shown on the chart constituted the American Military Mission to the Transjordan Army. The indicated rank, except of headquarters shown in parentheses, is that of the Table of Organization recommended by General Grew. Actual strength at the Mission shown in the recapitulation, inclusive of officers and enlisted men in the pipeline.

SOURCE: Table of organization, submitted to the Transjordan Ministry of War, 21 Dec 46, by Col. Gen. Grew to Director, MOA, 11 Jan 47 (for H.G. to Sec. Grew, 14 Feb 47, all to Transjordan Army [A]).
A new Army contract, replacing the 1943 contract, was negotiated during 1947 after prolonged discussion. The biggest stumbling-block was the desire of the Iranian Government to eliminate the clause providing that Iran would not admit a military mission of any other nation while the American contract was in force. But the Iranian Air Force had been equipped with British-built aircraft, which made necessary the employment of a few British technicians and resulted in some pressure on the Iranian Government for the establishment of a British air mission. The American advisory mission took the position that although the British technicians were necessary, no mission should be admitted except on terms agreed to by the American Government and that any mission so admitted should remain under control of the American mission. The Iranian Government finally agreed (Art. 24) not to engage the services of any personnel of any other foreign government "for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army, except by mutual agreement" between the United States and Iran. The new contract also recognized the expanded role of the advisory mission (Art. 8), but specifically excluded "tactical and strategical plans or operations against a foreign enemy" from the advisory functions of the mission. (2)

(2) The text of the contract, dated 5 Oct 1947, is in Dept of State Publication 2997, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1666.

The question of renewing the Gendarmerie contract became a bitter issue early in 1948, as it had two years before. By this time, however, the Chief of the Army Mission, General Grow, had become concerned that in the interest of efficient operations and concerted policy the
two missions should be merged into one. This was likewise the position of the Iranian War Minister and of the Chief of Staff, whom General Schwarzkopf had alienated by his vigorous opposition to their efforts to bring the Gendarmerie under Army control. Also at issue was General Schwarzkopf's command authority, which in February 1948 the Iranian Government in effect nullified by an administrative reshuffling. The Department of State was unwilling to approve the consolidation of the two missions so long as the status of the Gendarmerie was a political issue in Iran and was equally unwilling to concur in the relief of General Schwarzkopf, although he had been in Iran for six years, if such action could be interpreted as the product of political pressure. However, a detailed plan for reorganization of the Gendarmerie, designed to maintain its independent identity, which General Schwarzkopf presented to the Shah in April as "the culmination of the mission's efforts," provided a basis for considering his assignment completed. The intention of the Iranian Government to abrogate General Schwarzkopf's command authority was tacitly recognized by the United States in the designation of a colonel, USA, as his replacement. The matter was settled by an exchange of notes in September 1948, in which the two Governments agreed that the services of the Chief of the Gendarmerie would thereafter be "purely of an advisory nature." (3) The future of the

(3) The text of the agreement is in Dept of State Publication 3583, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1941.

mission was again threatened in June 1949, when 15,000 of the Gendarmerie were transferred to Army control along
with the internal security functions previously exercised by the Ministry of Interior. The latter retained only a police force of 5,000 men. It was nevertheless decided not to withdraw the Gendarmerie Mission, although the scope of its activities was perforce sharply reduced.

Following the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1949, which authorized a military aid program for Iran, a survey party was dispatched in January 1950 to consider and recommend an aid program. Since the Army Mission was technically in the pay of the Iranian Government, the survey team recommended that a separate military assistance advisory group be established within the American Embassy to implement an aid program. After the Iranian Government concluded a bilateral aid agreement on 23 May, a separate MAAG was accordingly established in Teheran. But the Chief of the Army Mission was, in addition, designated Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and a measure of administrative consolidation was introduced.

In 1954, the Iranian Government made known its desire to participate in the defense agreement that had been concluded between Turkey and Pakistan in February of that year, provided the Iranian military capacity was increased beforehand. To this end, the Chief of MAAG, Iran, on 2 September 1954 submitted to the Defense Department a plan for reorganizing and enlarging the Iranian Army. Although the Department of State was prepared to support an expanded military aid program, the Department of Defense, on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided against an increase. An intensified training program was, however, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 5 October. This program was to involve the establishment
establishment in the first six months of 1955 of five
U.S. Army training teams totalling 190 officers and men.

The decision to expand the training functions of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group prompted the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to draft new instructions for MAAG, Iran,
to replace the Department of Army letter of instructions of
5 January 1953, under which the Chief, ARMI$H/MAAG, was
then operating. As approved by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (1$A) on 12 May 1955, the new terms of
reference authorized the informal consolidation of the
Army Mission and Advisory Group headquarters, but required
that the governmental agreements, tables of distribution
and tables of allowance for the two organizations be
maintained separately.(4) The MAAG was to be attached to

(4) The text of the instructions is in (C) Enc to
N/H of JCS 2099/456, 19 May 55, CCS 092 (5-22-46) (2)
Sec. 3.

the U.S. Embassy, and the Chief, MAAG, was placed under
the direction of the Ambassador, "with respect to over-all
Mutual Security Program (MSP) policy." The Ambassador,
the Chief of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission,
and the Chief of the MAAG were constituted a "Country
Team under the leadership of the Ambassador." Although
in military assistance matters for the MSP channels of the
State Department the Chief of the MAAG was responsible
directly to the Ambassador, he was authorized to make
recommendations on programming matters through military
channels. For guidance on military matters, he was
authorized to consult directly with the Department of the
Army (the Executive Agency for the Secretary of Defense),
but was instructed to keep the Ambassador and the American
Defense
Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas (DEPREPAMA), fully informed in each such case. In addition to his numerous functions specifically related to the preparation and implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iran, the Chief of the MAAG was responsible for advising the Ambassador on military matters, for providing advice to the Iranian armed forces "on technical, organizational, training, administrative, and logistical matters in accordance with U.S. doctrine," for directing the activities of U.S. personnel temporarily assigned to assist in military aid matters, and for assisting the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNEILM) in the preparation of emergency plans. Requests by Iranian authorities for advice on matters of strategy were to be referred to the Department of the Army, as the Executive Agency, for guidance, and to the extent that American or British plans for the defense of the Middle East were involved, such guidance would be provided by CINCNEILM through the Executive Agency. No member of the MAAG was to assume or be assigned any duty that would make him responsible to the Iranian Government. In the discharge of his responsibilities, the Chief of the MAAG was specifically enjoined against committing the United States directly or indirectly to any future course of action.

The foregoing instructions were still in effect at the end of 1960. At the current time of writing (30 November 1961) they are in process of being revised. (5)

(5) See (✓) JCS 2315/121, 27 Nov 61.
I. Introduction.

Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who in 1944 succeeded Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell as one of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's chiefs of staff, worked for the remainder of the war to train Chinese ground forces in the use of modern weapons. In September 1945, Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong discussed with President Harry S. Truman the possibility of postwar American military assistance. Although President Truman agreed to provide such aid, no United States military mission was established until 20 February 1946.

On that date, the President directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to form a U.S. Military Advisory Group in China. Composed of an Army and a Navy Advisory Group, this organization was to "assist and advise the Chinese government in the development of modern armed forces for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China under her international agreements, including the United Nations Organization, for the establishment of adequate control over liberated areas in China, including Manchuria and Formosa, and for the maintenance of internal peace and security." (1) In November 1947,


the Secretary of State further empowered the head of the Army Advisory Group to advise Chiang Kai-shek on military matters on an "informal and confidential basis." The United States, however, was unwilling to accept responsibility for the operations and strategic plans of the Chinese Nationalists, for the Military Advisory Group lacked the authority to direct operations or compel the execution of plans. (2)
The Army and Navy Advisory Groups were succeeded on 1
November 1948 by the Joint United States Military Advisory
Group--China. By the end of the year, however, the Joint
Group was recalled. Chinese Communist forces were mauling
the Nationalists so severely that Major General David Barr,
who had led the Army Advisory Group, now maintained that "only
the active participation of United States troops could effect
a remedy." (3)

(3) Ibid., p. 358.

II. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan. (4)

(4) The following section is based largely on (C) "History
of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, 1951-1955," in OCMH files.

The inactivation of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group--
China and the retreat of Nationalist forces to the island of
Taiwan temporarily ended the American program of military
aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government. Instead,
the Chinese hired a small group of retired American officers
to assist them. Official United States aid, however, was
soon restored.

The outbreak on 25 June 1950 of the Korean War emphasized
the danger to America's Pacific outpost line if Taiwan should
fall to the Communists. President Truman ordered the 7th
Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan, while simultaneously
halting Nationalist air and sea operations against the
Communist-held Chinese mainland. Shortly afterward, both
Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, commanding the 7th Fleet, and
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East,
visited Taiwan. Between 5 and 26 August, a joint survey group headed by Army Major General Alonzo Fox studied the state of Chiang's military forces to arrive at a list of equipment and technical support that should be provided to Free China. As a result of the Fox Report, a military assistance advisory group was dispatched to Taiwan.

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, commanded by Army Major General William C. Chase, was authorized 67 Army, 4 Navy, and 63 Air Force personnel. Under the group's joint headquarters were Army, Navy, and Air Force sections. General Chase arrived at Taipei, Taiwan, on 1 May 1951 to begin carrying out his duties as the military member of a team, which was charged with insuring that all assistance granted the Chinese Nationalists was in furtherance of United States foreign policy.

Senior member of the team was the American Ambassador, who coordinated the activities of the other members, provided them with political advice, and conducted negotiations with the Nationalist government. The task of coordinating economic affairs fell to the chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration mission. The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group was responsible for directing and coordinating the military aid program and for making appropriate recommendations.

In executing this rather broad directive, the group chief was called upon to perform many tasks, not all of them purely military. Among these were such tasks as coordinating with the Economic Cooperation Administration mission to insure that the Nationalists did not demand materiel available locally, determining the military needs of the Taiwan government, and assisting it in requesting, storing, maintaining, distributing and using the military equipment provided by the United States. The group chief's military duties included the standardization
standardization of equipment, training methods, and doctrine, cooperation in the development of training programs, the establishment of any necessary American training detachments, and the filing of reports on the Nationalist forces' progress, status of training, and ability to use American equipment.

After its arrival at Taiwan, the advisory group was reorganized and expanded. The original three Service sections proved inadequate, so a joint technical service section was created as a counterpart to, and for advising, the Nationalist Army's Combined Service Force, which comprised the medical, signal, engineer, ordnance, transportation, chemical, and quartermaster services. A Headquarters Commandant, on the same level as the four section chiefs, was made responsible for the routine tasks necessary to support the group. Military Assistance Advisory Group officers assisted their counterparts within the Nationalist Ministry of National Defense and the general headquarters. Special teams were created as needed to provide aid at service schools and in tactical units.

III. United States Taiwan Defense Command.

As early as October 1952, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, had established a Formosa Liaison Center which was responsible for the coordination and liaison needed to plan, prepare for, and execute any possible operations, including combined training, that might involve the use of Sino-American forces in defense of the island. The Liaison Center was subordinate to MAAG, Taiwan, until April 1955, when CINCPAC (who had acquired responsibility for the defense of Formosa) directed the commander of the newly created Formosa Defense Command (U.S.) to take over responsibility for the Formosa Liaison Center. The latter designation was retained as a cover title for the defense command until 1 November 1955.
when it was abandoned in favor of the more appropriate
designation, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command. By the end of 1955,
CINCPAC had converted the former Liaison Center of the advisory
group into a joint headquarters that had direct access to the
highest military and administrative councils of the Nationalist
government. (5)

(5) (TS) Appendix 2 to Enclosure A to (TS) JCS 1259/436,
Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on Command Structure on
Taiwan (U), dt. 9 Jan 59; (S) CINCPAC msg to CSM TDC (US),
232242Z Apr 58 (381 Formosa, 11-8-48; Section 23).

IV. The Consolidation of the Military Assistance Advisory
Group with the Taiwan Defense Command.

By the end of 1957, in keeping with the current views
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense,
CINCPAC began planning the eventual merger of all American
commands on Taiwan into a single headquarters under the
Taiwan Defense Command. As the Nationalists became better
able to defend the island, the advisory group, it was believed,
would gradually shift from offering guidance on the technical
and tactical levels to providing advice at higher echelons
and instruction in managerial techniques. CINCPAC became
convinced that a consolidated joint staff would be better
able to provide the Chinese the assistance that they would
need. (6)

(6) (TS) Enclosure A to (TS) JCS 1259/436.

The first CINCPAC directives concerning the consolidation
were issued in March 1958. These directives, based upon
decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense, marked the beginning of a two-phase program.
Effective that month, CINCPAC redesignated the Commander,

Taiwan
Taiwan Defense Command, as Commander, Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group. The Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, who retained his old title, was also to serve as Deputy Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, while the former deputy commander assumed a new role as deputy commander and chief of the consolidated joint staff. Since the senior Army officer had just reached Taiwan and a new senior naval officer was about to report, CINCPAC did not anticipate a further merging of the command until February 1959. (7)

(7) Enclosure A to (76) JCS 1259/436.

During the first few months following its consolidation, the combined Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group found itself in something of an ambiguous position, for the only American military organization officially recognized by the Nationalist Government was the advisory group, which was now a subordinate element of the defense command and not the echelon for dealing with the higher authorities of the Nationalist Government. This problem seemed capable of solution, however. In January 1959, CINCPAC reported to the JCS that "an interim agreement recognizing non-MAAG units on Taiwan and giving them status parallel to that of the MAAG is in the mill and should be signed shortly." (8)

(8) CINCPAC msg to JCS, 1022432 Jan 59 (JMP 5166, 9 Jan 59, Group No. 1).

The program of consolidation was temporarily suspended after the Chinese Communists, in August 1958, began an intensive bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Because of the immediate threat, the separate defense command and advisory group staffs were re-established, so that both could operate at top speed. The combined title, however, was retained. (9)
Enclosure A to (TS) JCS 1259/436.

On 5 September 1958, as Communist pressure against the offshore islands continued to mount, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he must have a single commander in the Taiwan area who was directly responsible to him. CINCPAC then noted the proposed command relationships set forth in his plan to counter Chinese aggression in the vicinity of Taiwan without American use of nuclear weapons. Under this arrangement, the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, would exercise operational control over the forces allocated for the execution of his assigned task. He was to exercise this control through the chief of the advisory group, the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, and the Commander, 13th Air Task Force (Provisional). The commander of the defense command also would coordinate the activities of American forces assigned to support his efforts. Finally, he was to coordinate the actions of American and Chinese Nationalist forces.

CINCPAC msg to JCS, 050330Z Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-45, Section 38A).

Three days later, in a message to the Chief of Naval Operations, CINCPAC elaborated upon his proposed system of command relationships. The Air Force subordinate commander, he pointed out, would be assigned the responsibilities of Air Defense Commander. Should the JCS prefer to establish a joint task force to deal with the current emergency, CINCPAC would be equally satisfied. If such a task force were created, however, he would propose the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, as its commander, with the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, as Navy task group commander, the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, as Army task group commander, and the Commander 13th
13th Air Task Force as Air Force task group and air defense commander. Whatever the arrangement, the chief of the advisory group would remain responsible for the functions of that organization. (11)

(11) (TS) CINCPAC msg to CNO, 082010Z Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 33A).

At their meeting on 9 September 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the CINCPAC recommendation that the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, become the commander of a unified subordinate command comprising all force assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. The JCS message sent on the following day designated the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, as subordinate Army commander, the Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force, as subordinate Navy commander, and the Commander, 13th Air Task Force, as subordinate Air Force commander with responsibility as air defense commander. Advisory group personnel were excluded from the Army forces under the operational control of the Taiwan Defense Command. (12)

(12) (TS) JCS 2118/114, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on the Establishment of U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, with enclosure, dtd 10 Sep 58; (TS) JCS msg to ComNavPhil, JCS 947808, dtd 10 Sep 58 (CCS 381 Formosa, 11-8-48, Section 39).

While the American forces, except for the advisory group, were being brought under the operational control of the Taiwan Defense Command, the separation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and defense command staffs continued. On 24 September, the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group directed the continuation on an interim basis of the organizational plan used during the recent emergency. (13) CINCPAC, however, continued to urge completion
(13) (U) CoUSSDC/MAAG Coordinating Authority Instruction 5400.4, dtg 24 Sep 58, Appendix 5 to (TS) Enclosure A to (TS) JCS 1259/436.

completion of the consolidation begun in March 1958.(14)

(14) (TS) Enclosure A to (TS) JCS 1259/436.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unable to agree on the completion of the merger, on 8 May 1959 forwarded their views to the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, objected to the consolidation because the two commands involved had radically different duties. Although they agreed that an operational command which excluded advisory personnel had been necessary during the 1958 crisis, they recommended that the Taiwan Defense Command be replaced by a planning and liaison group as soon as the existing tensions had eased. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended the approval of the CINCPAC plan of consolidation, provided that, when the advisory group's duties were divided along functional staff lines, the separate service sections be retained as major subordinate staff components. Those who favored the proposal believed that its acceptance would simplify the military structure on Taiwan and of the Pacific unified command, establish a single headquarters to deal with the Chinese, simplify command lines and insure unity of effort, and reduce facilities as well as the number of Americans needed on Taiwan.(15)

(15) (TS) JCSM 175-59 to SecDef, with appendices, dtg 8 May 59 (JMP 5166, 9 Jan 59).

The Secretary of Defense, after studying the divergent views and holding additional discussions with the Joint Chiefs of
of Staff, informed the Chairman on 15 June that consolidation
did not appear desirable. On 8 July, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff informed CINCPAC that the Taiwan Defense Command and
the Military Assistance Advisory Group were to remain separate
but that this decision did not affect CINCPAC's authority to
select a senior officer at Taiwan as his representative. (15)

(16) (S) JCS 1259/477, Note by the Secretaries to the
JCS on Consolidation of Command Structure on Taiwan (U), with
enclosure, dtd 26 Jun 59; (S) Decision on JCS 1259/477, dtd
8 Jul 59; JCS msg to CINCPAC, JCS 962043, dtd 8 Jul 59 (JMF 5166
9 Jan 59).

The decision to abandon the uncompleted program of con-
solidation had, in the opinion of CINCPAC, no effect on the
existing Military Assistance Advisory Group agreement with
the Nationalist Government. The principal change was the
separation of military assistance activities from the Taiwan
Defense Command, a planning and operational headquarters.
The status of the defense command also was unchanged, save
that its commander would have no additional responsibility
toward the advisory group. (17)

(17) (S) CINCPAC msg to AsstSecDef (Public Affairs),
0101542 Aug 59 (JMF 5166, 9 Jan 59).

V. Summary

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, encountered
some opposition from Nationalist authority. The reorganization
of the Chinese logistical effort, the decreasing of the author-
ity of political commissars, and the attempt to convince
higher echelons not to interfere in the conduct of their
subordinates were elements of the American program that held
little appeal for the Generalissimo. The advisors, however,
did succeed in vastly increasing the Nationalist combat
capability. (18)
Because of the need to coordinate Chinese and American efforts in defense of the island, the advisory group formed a liaison center, which was expanded by CINCPAC into the Taiwan Defense Command. The defense command provided CINCPAC with direct access to the Chinese high command and enabled him to keep abreast of Nationalist plans. Since it dealt primarily with planning for the Sino-American defense of Taiwan, attempts to enlarge the scope of the defense command to include the advisory group's duties of providing military assistance met with no success. The crisis of September 1958 emphasized the essential differences between the Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Advisory Group, and in the following year the Secretary of Defense decided that the two organizations should not be consolidated.
THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, 1935-1941

I. Introduction.

Preparations for American military assistance to the Philippines began in 1934, while the United States Congress was considering legislation to grant the islands commonwealth status and eventually complete independence. Manuel Quezon, a Filipino political leader who had come to Washington to discuss the proposed law with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, approached Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and sought his help in organizing the defenses of the islands. General MacArthur, who had known Quezon in the Philippines, agreed to accept the task, Secretary of War George H. Dern approved, and the existing law governing the assignment to foreign nations of American military men was modified to permit MacArthur's assignment.\(^{(1)}\)


The Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law, designed to prepare the islands for complete independence on 4 July 1946, was passed in March 1934. In addition to calling for the drafting of a commonwealth constitution, the Independence Law reserved certain rights to the United States and proposed the eventual neutralization of the islands. The resultant Philippine constitutional convention established a government for the commonwealth, a republic which, until 1946, would be under the general supervision of a United States High Commissioner. The first elections held under the new constitution brought Manuel Quezon to the presidency. Taking office in November 1935, Quezon immediately turned his attention to building a military establishment capable of protecting the Philippines after complete independence had been gained.\(^{(2)}\)

II. General
II. General MacArthur's Mission to the Philippines.

Effective 15 December 1935, General MacArthur was relieved of his duties as chief of staff and appointed military adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth with the mission of establishing an adequate national defense for the islands. To accomplish this goal, MacArthur was granted "the greatest latitude and general authorities." His orders read: "Your mission must be accomplished -- ways and means are left largely to you."(3)

(3) (S regraded U) Acting Adjutant General Ltr to Gen Douglas MacArthur, dtd 18 Sep 35 (W) 399-31 Phil, RG 115-47-30, Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.).

While serving in the Philippines, the general and his assistants could accept the military ranks and offices, as well as the pay, that had been previously suggested by President Quezon and approved by the War Department. The military advisers were loaned to the Philippine Commonwealth, with the understanding that the Quezon government would pay the cost of their operations(4)


General MacArthur elected to accept from the Commonwealth the title of field marshal.

The Commanding General, Philippine Department, who commanded American Army units stationed in the islands, received orders to assist the MacArthur mission. Specifically, the department was to provide the military adviser with buildings, assistance in maintaining his headquarters, instructors, and training facilities. Any materiel required by MacArthur and available from departmental reserve
reserve stocks could be loaned him on memorandum receipt. (5)

(5) (S regraded U) Acting Adjutant General memo to CG, Philippine Department, dtd 18 Sep 35, Subj: Instructions (WPD 3389-31 Phil, RG 115-47-30, FRC, Alexandria).


Immediately before taking office, President Quezon confirmed his previous offer to General MacArthur. Since his departure for the Philippines was imminent, the general assembled a four-man staff to accompany him. Two of the staff officers, Majors James B. Ord and Dwight D. Eisenhower, prepared, with the aid of a committee from the Army War College, a program for the creation within 10 years of a force capable of defending the Philippines. The keystone of the program was suggested legislation that would establish and perpetuate the commonwealth defense force. (6)


As presented by President Quezon and approved by the Philippine legislature, this military program was based on universal training. Conscription, it was believed, would provide a large, partially trained reserve and thus enable the Commonwealth to maintain a comparatively small and inexpensive regular military establishment. Since the Commonwealth lacked both shipyards and arms factories, President Quezon had no choice but to rely on ground forces using imported equipment. Even though command of the sea was conceded to a potential invader, the Philippine Government and its military adviser were confident that the strong citizen army could deter attack by making an invasion seem too costly in lives and money to be worthwhile. General MacArthur addressed himself to the task of building such an army by the time independence was achieved, and in January 1940, he
he announced that by 1946 some 300,000 Filipinos would receive
the training required by the Commonwealth's National Defense Act.(7)

(7) Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 737-739.

The Quezon government enthusiastically attacked the problems
of building the military establishment contemplated in the
National Defense Act. By September 1936, the War Department had
sold the Commonwealth a total of 75,000 surplus Enfield rifles.
An additional 25,000 of these weapons were scheduled for delivery
before the end of that year. The Philippines also had contracted
to purchase some 700 automatic rifles from the Colt company and
had approached the Remington company concerning the purchase of
11 million rounds of small-arms ammunition. By the end of the
year, Filipino officials were investigating the possibility of
manufacturing ammunition in the islands.(8)

(8) (U) Acting Secretary of War memo for Marvin H. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President, dtd 11 Sep 36, Subj: Order of Colt
Automatic Machine Rifles for the Philippine Army; (G) F.J.
Monaghan ltr to Gen Creed F. Cox, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs,

This zeal to fulfill the aims of the Philippine National
Defense Act caused concern in both the State and War Departments.
The existence of large stockpiles of armaments might possibly
encourage an attempt to overthrow President Quezon and put an end
to American rule before the agreed date. To avoid contributing
to this potential danger, the War Department directed the Com-
manding General, Philippine Department to loan rather than transfer
weapons to the Commonwealth Government. He could sell ammunition
at a nominal cost, but only in the quantity necessary for training.
While the War Department imposed these restrictions, the State
Department was discouraging the purchase of armaments from
private firms. This change in policy required an increase in the
weapons and ammunition stockpiles maintained by the Philippine
Department.
Department until enough materiel was available to arm and equip 20,000 Filipinos. (9)


IV. Activities of the MacArthur Mission.

Thanks to the cooperation of the Philippine Department, General MacArthur was able to borrow whatever additional instructors or materiel he needed. This flexible arrangement worked quite well, for the mission was able to accomplish a great deal, even though its program was cut short by the Japanese invasion of the islands. Among the mission's accomplishments were the training by 1941 of some 132,000 Filipino reservists, the formation of a 7,500-man Philippine regular division, the founding of a military academy, the establishment of an Air Corps that by 1940 boasted 75-100 trained pilots, and the organization of a Philippine general staff. The American mission, however, had difficulty in developing a cadre of effective Filipino instructors, primarily because of language difficulties.

Because the war in Europe had prevented the delivery by British firms of patrol craft, the Philippine Marine Forces (a coastal patrol) made little headway. American sailors, however, trained some Filipinos as specialists of various kinds. (10)


V. Summary.

The greatest asset of the MacArthur mission was that it operated on territory over which the United States maintained ultimate sovereignty. The United States High Commissioner was on hand to represent the views of President Roosevelt and, in general,
to supervise the operations of the Commonwealth Government. An American military organization, the Philippine Department, was present to support MacArthur, and a number of American military and naval installations were available for use by Commonwealth forces. Thus, the general encountered little of the friction usually generated by dealings between sovereign powers. The purchase of arms by the Philippine Government, for example, a potentially dangerous enterprise, was easily controlled.

The lack of training and equipment that hampered Philippine troops during the Japanese conquest of the islands is understandable, for the target date of the defense program was 1946 rather than 1941. Efforts to speed the tempo of training as the war became imminent were not especially successful. Americans or Filipinos from the Philippine Scouts, a part of the United States Regular Army, were assigned as instructors to the citizen army divisions when these Commonwealth units were mobilized. Misunderstandings concerning the authority of the instructors and their difficulty in understanding all of the various dialects spoken by the reservists prevented efficient and intensive training.\(^{(11)}\)


Had its test in combat been delayed until 1946, and had better equipment been available, the Philippine military establishment would have proved far more effective.
CHINA, 1941-1944

I. Introduction.

American aid to China, originally comparatively small loans for the purchase of civilian goods, was expanded both in scope and quantity during 1940 and 1941. The United States on 1 December 1940 extended an additional $100 million credit, one-quarter of which could be used for the purchase of arms. In March of the following year, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act, which enabled the United States to loan or lease military equipment to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government.

Although the War Department promptly approved the transfer to the Chinese of arms and other equipment, deliveries under the lend-lease program proved uncertain. Shortages in equipment, conflicting priorities, misunderstandings, and a Chinese insistence on the latest and best of weapons made the processing of requests a difficult task. A coordinating agency obviously was needed. To resolve the problems surrounding lend-lease aid to China, the G-4, War Department General Staff, on 16 June 1941 recommended sending a mission to China.

II. The American Military Mission to China.

General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, promptly approved the recommendation, and Brigadier General John Magruder was appointed to head the lend-lease mission, with the understanding that in the event of war his group would provide liaison for strategic planning and cooperation with the Chinese government. Specifically, the American Military Mission to China was, by dealing directly with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to: (1) Advise and assist the Chinese government in all phases of procurement, transport, and maintenance of materials, equipment, and munitions requisite to the prosecution of its military effort. (2) Advise and assist the Chinese government in the training of Chinese
Chinese personnel in the use and maintenance of materials and equipment supplied by the United States. (3) When requested, assist personnel of other Departments of the United States Government in carrying out their duties in the furtherance of the objectives of the Lend-Lease Act. (4) Assist the Chinese government in obtaining prompt and coordinated administrative action by the United States authorities necessary to insure the orderly flow of materials and munitions from lend-lease agencies to Chinese military forces. (5) Explore the vital port, road, and railroad facilities with a view to the establishment of an adequate line of communication. (1)


To accomplish the tasks in this directive, the military mission was divided into two functional subgroups. One was to operate in China and along the line of communication from Rangoon, while the other remained in Washington to coordinate among the various interested agencies. General Magruder also was empowered to form in China such teams of specialists as he might find necessary.

On 10 October 1941, General Magruder reached Chungking to begin carrying out the directives that had been handed him. He soon confirmed the existing opinion that the decentralized and ill-coordinated Chinese military establishment was incapable of placing in the field an effective, trained, and disciplined army. No sooner had he completed his analysis of conditions in China than he found himself catapulted by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor into the role of liaison officer. His was the task of maintaining coordination between American planners and Chiang Kai-shek.

Since
Since President Roosevelt had requested regional war councils to formulate preliminary plans that could be studied at an Anglo-American conference to convene at Washington late in December, Magruder and a British delegate met with Chiang Kai-shek. Out of this conference evolved a three-man council, with representatives of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As a member of this staff, Magruder’s principal task was the soothing of quarrels that broke out over the British seizure of China-bound lend-lease supplies that glutted the docks at Rangoon. Through the efforts of the American general, quantities of these supplies were rushed toward China before the advancing Japanese were able to sever the Burma Road.

The arrival on 4 March 1942 of Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, who had been given authority over the lend-lease program, diminished the importance of the Magruder mission. Even though he no longer controlled the flow of war materials, Magruder and his group continued, sometimes successfully to try to aid the Chinese. A program to organize Sino-American guerrilla units was abandoned, a plan to reorganize the Chinese air force was approved by Chiang but never implemented, and an attempt to absorb into American forces the pilots who had volunteered to fight for the Chinese also failed. The American Military Mission to China did, however, succeed in training Chinese troops to use lend-lease howitzers. In the judgment of the Army’s official history, the mission “might have acted as an energizing and unifying force but, though it had been given very broad powers, it never had a clear indication as to what the War Department wanted done with those powers.”

In March 1942, the War

(2) (U) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, p. 90.

Department superseded Magruder’s directive, and placed his personnel at the disposal of General Stilwell.
III. The Stilwell Mission.

By January 1942, President Roosevelt had become convinced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should hold supreme Allied command in China, but the President also realized that Chiang would require the assistance of an Allied staff. Within the War Department, there was divided opinion concerning American contribution to that staff. Some believed that an American theater commander would be required, while others maintained that the Army should dispatch a mission, similar to the one already at Chungking, but possessing greater powers. Chiang himself desired an American chief of staff, apparently to insure the rapid delivery of lend-lease aid.

Finally selected for the new mission to China was General Stilwell, who believed that he was to "coordinate and smooth out and run the [Burma] road, and get the various factions together and grab command and in general give 'em the works."(3) Chiang agreed on 21 January 1942 to accept Stilwell as chief of staff of a joint staff and to permit him to hold executive control over Chinese, as well as British and American troops. The American general would be one of two chiefs of staff, the other being General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army. In addition, Stilwell was to supervise and control all United States defense-aid affairs for China, command all United States ground forces in China and such Chinese forces as might be assigned him, represent the United States on any international war council in China, and to improve and maintain control over the Burma Road in China.(4)


(4) (U) U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China: with Special Reference to the Period 1941-1949
Although he would initially be concerned primarily with affairs in China, Stilwell also had to maintain close liaison with the British, for his troops would be operating in Burma and India, both of which were under British control. Although free to support his operations from Burma and to build and operate air bases there, he could not order his Chinese troops into Burma without having them pass under British control. (5)


General Stilwell on 23 January 1942 formally took over the mission to China. He then assembled his staff and named his headquarters The United States Task Force, China. Although the United States could provide little in the way of weapons, Stilwell was promised lend-lease support for a highway from Assam to China and was directed to use aerial transport to augment the flow of supplies over the Burma Road.

Upon reaching Chungking in March 1942, Stilwell found that no joint staff had been organized. Instead there were five distinct elements within the command structure: the Generalissimo himself, the Chinese Army staff, the three-man war council of which Magruder was a member, the military mission, and finally Stilwell. As Chiang’s chief of staff, Stilwell was serving a theater commander whose views did not always coincide with Allied strategy. Yet, he could not champion these dissenting opinions when he also served as military representative of the President of the United States, Commanding General of American forces in the area, and dispenser of lend-lease material.

In spite of his difficult position and resentment by General Ho of his efforts to reorganize the Chinese Army, Stilwell was able to win some concessions from the Generalissimo. Although Chiang
Chiang had been keeping control of the volunteer pilots in order to bargain for increased military aid. Stilwell, working through Brigadier General Claire L. Chennault, obtained their release to American control. The Chinese leader also abandoned his effort to restrict Stilwell's command to Anglo-American forces by agreeing that the American officer should command Chinese troops in Burma.

Meanwhile, the War Department had brought some degree of order to the command structure by disbanding the American Military Mission to China. The mission's personnel were placed at Stilwell's disposal, and on 4 March 1942 he formed Headquarters, American Army Forces, China, Burma, and India.

Although Chiang had entrusted Chinese troops to Stilwell's command, the Generalissimo did not refrain from placing restrictions on their employment. During the Burma fighting, Stilwell found his freedom of action so limited that he decided to ask Chiang to either relieve him or give him an independent command. The Chinese leader endorsed the request of the American commander and visited the Chinese generals involved in the operation to insure their cooperation. The restoration of harmony, however, did not prevent the Japanese from conquering Burma.

General Stilwell now turned his attention to reforming the armed coalition that passed for a Chinese Army. On 3 June 1942, he proposed that Chiang form more compact and better equipped divisions, purge inefficient high commanders, give one man responsibility for the conduct of a campaign, and refrain from interfering in the operations of his subordinates. The Generalissimo refused, stating the all China needed was better equipment. No progress was made toward the creation of a joint staff.
The equipment promised the Chinese was proving difficult to deliver. Air transport proved less successful than anticipated, and great stockpiles of war material continued to collect in India. The Munitions Assignment Board, which was reviewing the allocation of lend-lease equipment, began diverting to other theaters supplies earmarked for China.

Annoyed at the sluggish flow of lend-lease aid, Chiang on 29 June 1942 demanded American combat troops, additional warplanes, and increased air transport, if China was to remain in the war. Stilwell thereupon urged that the United States make increased Chinese participation in the war a condition for additional aid. The Generalissimo, however, modified his demands and agreed to take part in a campaign to recapture Burma. Stilwell was placed in command of the Chinese troops assigned to the offensive.

In spite of Chiang's promise, Stilwell had by no means imposed his will on the Chinese leader. The Generalissimo countered requests that he form the proposed 30 ground divisions with pleas for additional transport planes. Instead of a large-scale ground campaign, Chiang pressed for an aerial offensive by General Chennault's China Air Task Force. Stilwell intended that Chennault's pilots defend the lines of communication which would support the proposed land offensive. The basic issue, however, was Chiang's desire for more equipment. Since Stilwell was in charge of the lend-lease program in China, the Generalissimo found it convenient to blame him for any delays or shortages.

During
During the summer of 1942, Stilwell devoted his energies to increasing the amount of supplies that reached China and to training Chinese troops in India. While the General was in the midst of these preparations for an advance into Burma, Chiang was becoming convinced that airpower alone held the key to success. The theory advanced by General Chennault that aerial attacks could defeat the Japanese coincided with the Generalissimo's views that China needed better equipment rather than a reorganized Army. On 8 January 1943, the Chinese withdrew from the proposed Burma offensive, an operation about which the British were entertaining increasing doubt.

The issue was resolved in March, when President Roosevelt overruled his military advisors by deciding that nothing should be asked of the Chinese in return for continued American aid and that General Chennault should be allowed to test his plan. These decisions put an end to the reform of the Chinese Army and temporarily dashed any hopes Stilwell might have had that he could use lend-lease to bargain for greater Chinese participation in the war. Stilwell, however, continued to urge Foreign Minister Soong that the Nationalist Government exert a stronger effort against Japan.

In May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff scheduled for 1944 a campaign to regain northern Burma, and Chiang on 12 July agreed to participate. The decision to mount this offensive led to the creation of the Southeast Asia Command, encompassing Burma, Ceylon, Sumatra, and Malaya, and under the direction of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. China remained the province of Generalissimo Chiang
Chiang Kai-shek, while General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck held over-all command in India. The task of maintaining liaison among these officers fell to Stilwell, now the Deputy Allied Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The American general also commanded his own nation's contingents in all three areas along with the Chinese forces in India that were training for the Burma campaign.

At this point, Foreign Minister Soong offered a suggestion that the China Theater be brought directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Stilwell was to be replaced by a Chinese officer. Chiang, however, disagreed, and ordered Soong into temporary retirement as a gesture of confidence in the American general. In spite of the Generalissimo's action, Stilwell, by the end of October, had concluded that the Chinese Army would not be reformed. He now turned his attention to the Burma offensive, which began on 30 October 1943.

In November, Stilwell accompanied the Generalissimo to Cairo for a conference of Allied leaders. Here the general asked President Roosevelt for more power and executive authority over Chinese troops in order to insure their full participation in the war. The President, during the course of the conference, lost some of his previous enthusiasm for the Chinese cause, since Chiang, while pleading for aid to survive the Japanese blockade, seemed unwilling to make any strenuous effort to break the cordon. When the discussions ended, Stilwell returned to Burma to direct operations in the field.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1944, Stilwell attacked into Burma, while a reorganized and enlarged Service of Supply improved the logistical situation in India. Unfortunately, few supplies reached China. Because of
of the vast stockpiles in India, the Munitions Assignment Board in April 1944 ordered that all lend-lease items, except for non-standard trucks and their spare parts, beyond those needed by the Chinese forces in India and Burma should be repossessed by the United States.

Stilwell's successes in Burma with a small force provided a sharp contrast to Chiang's inactivity. On 3 April 1944, President Roosevelt informed the Generalissimo that a major effort in Burma was necessary to justify American aid. The Chinese Government complied, but no sooner had the expedition crossed the border than the Japanese launched an offensive in Central China.

Japanese victories in Central China and the slowing of the Chinese thrust into Burma caused President Roosevelt to propose that Chiang give Stilwell command over all American and Chinese forces in the China Theater. The Generalissimo agreed in principle but insisted upon an unspecified period of adjustment before taking action. This expansion of Stilwell's authority was still under discussion in September 1944, when a reverse in Burma caused Chiang to threaten to abandon the campaign. President Roosevelt responded with a demand for a powerful effort in Burma if American aid was to continue. He also insisted that unrestricted command of all forces in China be given Stilwell. The Generalissimo, however, now refused to accept the American general.

Major General Patrick Hurley, the President's special representative to China, arrived at Chungking on 6 September and promptly reversed the recent trend in Sino-American military relations. Hurley came to believe that the Chinese Army could be reformed through Chiang and that to force the acceptance of Stilwell would alienate the
in authority generals who were loyal to him, rather than choose them purely on the basis of military ability. Stilwell believed that he could accomplish his reform if he were given command of Chiang's forces in China. The Generalissimo objected, and when the United States Government refused to use military aid as a weapon to force the Chinese to comply, Stilwell failed to accomplish his goal. The United States Naval Group, China, complicated Stilwell's tasks in that it offered the Chinese a direct line of communication with Washington over which the Army general had no control. Yet, some sort of naval mission was inevitable, for no naval officers had accompanied either Magruder or Stilwell. SACO, as long as it was commanded by a Chinese, posed no problems in Sino-American cooperation.