06 MAR 1997

Ref: 95-F-0742

Mr. Robert Wampler
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Wampler:

This responds to your March 22, 1995, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Our April 6, 1995, interim response refers.

The Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Joint Staff, and Washington Headquarters Services have determined that the enclosed documents are responsive to your request.

There are no fees for this response in this instance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information and Security Review

Enclosures:
As stated
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: SecDef Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister

Japan Participants
Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Deputy Foreign Minister, Keisuke Arita
Director General, American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Minstry, Toshio Yamazaki
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Hiroshi Kitamura
Director, Security Division, American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Shintaro Yamashita
Interpreter, Sadaaki Numata

United States
Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger
US Ambassador to Japan, James D. Hodgson
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Amos Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Morton I. Abramowitz
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, MG John A. Wickham, Jr., USA

Time: 1100, 29 August 1975
Place: Prime Minister's Office

Following introductions, the Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for his reception in the United States. Since the US and Japan account for 46% of the world's GNP, the two countries must work together on a basis of friendship and trust to defend democracy. This theme has been the keynote of his policy. He had wanted his meetings in the United States to be candid and based on such mutual trust. On this score he was very satisfied. He concluded by asking SecDef to relay this to President Ford.

The Secretary responded that he would be delighted to do so. President Ford had welcomed Mr. Miki's August visit and felt a kinship and personal affection for Miki, in part because of the fact that they have similar backgrounds. The August visit was very useful. With both common problems and major resources the two countries need to understand each other and better coordinate their efforts.
Mr. Miki thanked SecDef for his comments and expressed regret that his visit to Japan would be so short. In the past talks on security matters had been too infrequent; he hoped that henceforth there would be annual meetings. The Prime Minister asked for SecDef's views on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, which was Japan's main security concern.

The Secretary agreed that we should institutionalize the security dialogue and go into greater depth. He acknowledged the understandable importance of Korea to Japan but pointed out that Korea was also important to world perceptions. Vietnam let loose many fears, especially in Korea. There was a need for the US to reiterate its commitments. This reiteration had a calming effect.

The Secretary continued by stating we need to maintain the military balance in Korea to deter the North Koreans. The South Koreans are prepared to try to deal on their own with the North Korean threat but need time to reach parity. However, they are not capable of dealing with the Soviets or Chinese; the US must provide them that assurance.

The Koreans are working hard to maintain their military preparedness. ROK equipment had become somewhat obsolete. While this is not of concern while the US remains in Korea, the ROK needs better equipment to be able to deal alone with the North. SecDef again expressed satisfaction with what he found in South Korea.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Miki for the communiqué (with President Ford in August) and its helpful and welcome reference to Korea. He said that Japanese economic assistance to the ROK -- not military assistance -- is a continuing important contribution to stability in the ROK.

Mr. Miki announced that Japan reached the decision today (August 29) to agree to hold its ministerial meeting with the ROK on September 14th. The question of assistance will be discussed then. Mr. Miki agreed that Japan would help in fields other than military. He also felt that the strong US commitment in the SCM communiqué would greatly encourage the ROK.

The Prime Minister believed it most important in Korea both to maintain the military balance and to reduce North-South tensions and fears. While realistically no major conflict is likely, there is always, the danger of miscalculation because of the excessive fears on both sides. We need to take steps to reduce such fears; the Secretary's visit was very significant to the ROK side on this score. It is important to avoid miscalculation.

Mr. Miki continued that to promote greater trust between the US and Japan more consultation was essential. Without such trust the US-Japan security treaty could not function effectively. The Japanese people have complex feelings on security matters, but since Vietnam, people have been thinking more seriously about security problems. This welcome trend is visible in the Diet. Miki said he hoped the Secretary's discussions on security matters would be candid. Miki added that the two countries should not reach hasty conclusions but should have fresh discussions.
The Secretary agreed that we should do this and that the Prime Minister's words were welcome. SecDef assured Mr. Miki that we are well aware of the complex feelings of the Japanese people -- they are understandable -- and of Japan's constitutional restrictions. Because of this complexity it would be up to Japan to determine the appropriate pace of security discussions. He assured Miki that the US would assist in a quiet manner as the Japanese might want.

Mr. Miki raised the post-Vietnam situation in Asia. He understood that the US is reassessing Asian policy and hoped his observations would be useful. Asian countries are feeling the need to strengthen their internal system, stabilize their political situation, and improve the public welfare. Asian countries now recognize that their problems begin at home. Military security is important but cannot be considered in isolation. He does not feel that Asian countries are drifting away from the US and hopes the US would not make rash judgments on where they are going. He added that he hopes the US would encourage Asian countries to strengthen their internal situations. The US and Japan should act in a way to demonstrate support for Asian countries. Our cooperation is vital for Asia.

The Secretary agreed with these comments. Economic growth and public welfare are vital, but so is psychological support from outside. Korea, for example, had greatly prospered in the last 25 years but needs support from Japan and the US. Without such support Korea will be a small power in a hostile environment. This theme also applies for the rest of Asia. SecDef assured Mr. Miki we will not make rash judgments. Vietnam may have had some favorable aspects, since it brought recognition on the part of Asian countries of the need for domestic improvement and internal support. We also need to work toward improved economic conditions in Asian countries.

Mr. Miki said the Korean problem is unique given the nature of confrontation there. He reiterated that the security of the ROK and peace on the Peninsula are important to Japanese security. One can see this clearly from the map. He had pointed that out to the Opposition when they asked if he were going to Washington to reaffirm the Korea clause in the Nixon-Sato communiqué. Mr. Miki added that the geographic evidence is convincing, that "we feel it in our bones."

The Secretary replied that there is nothing about a unified Korean state under Northern control -- some 50 million plus people at the height of their revolutionary fervor -- that should enhance Japan's feeling of security. SecDef said there is no question that US forces will remain in Korea and there will not be any Congressional attempts to bring about reductions before 1977. Even in the unlikely event of a change in administration, he did not expect any substantial change in our deployments or US policy. While there may be some minor changes in units, the general level of forces would be roughly the same.

The Secretary continued that Korea may be unique but there also seems to be other changes occurring in Asia. The Thai are becoming sensitive about North Vietnam intentions and appear to be changing their assessments about the
US and US forces. The Philippines were also scared after Vietnam and their reaction has been somewhat of a political balancing act. SecDef said that the Philippines are not now really driven by a feeling of insecurity except for their problems in the South.

Mr. Miki responded that with respect to Korea he does not feel that the North would outright invade the South. The principal concern is to avoid domestic turmoil and dislocation in the South.

The Secretary agreed that as long as the military balance remains satisfactory, North Korea is not likely to miscalculate. The North is trying to foster internal disorder in the ROK. Internal Korean political weakness could be a danger. This is an area where the US and Japan fit in. Perhaps the ROK's greatest internal strength has been its thriving economy. The South Koreans need to prevent economic recession which in turn could affect political stability. Continued external support from Japan would help prevent such a recession.

The Secretary noted that there had been some mention of North-South rapprochement through an international conference. While detente in Korea certainly would be welcome, North Korea did not, however, accept the legitimacy of the South Korean state. As long as the North believes it has the right to take over the South, there seems little chance for improvement in North-South relations. In such circumstances it is doubtful that external forces can help bridge the gap.

Mr. Miki replied that he had discussed this matter with President Ford. He went on to note that the political system in South Korea raises problems for the Japanese Government.

SecDef said that to the extent we provide support to the ROK and reduce South Korean fears of abandonment, the pressures for domestic repression will be alleviated. The US is, like Japan, painfully aware of this problem.

Mr. Miki continued that Japan has had a problem on this score with the Korean CIA and the Kim Tae Chung case. While this had been difficult to cope with, Japan would maintain good relations with the ROK.

The Secretary closed by welcoming Mr. Miki's views and expressing appreciation for his personal welcome. He asked if there were anything specific that Mr. Miki wanted him to pursue in his talks in Japan.

Mr. Miki replied, "Be frank."

Morton I. Abramowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs

Japan Participants

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kichi Miyazawa
Deputy Foreign Minister, Keisuke Arita
Director General, Asian Affairs Bureau, Masuo Takashima
Director General, American Affairs Bureau, Toshio Yamazaki
Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister, Tatsuo Arima
Director, Security Division, American Affairs Bureau, Shintaro Yamashita
Interpreter, Sadaaki Numata

United States

Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger
US Ambassador to Japan, James D. Hodgson
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Amos Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Morton I. Abramowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Owen Zurheilen
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, MG John A. Wickham, Jr., USA

Time: 1145, 30 August 1975

Place: Prime Minister's Residence, likura House

Following an exchange of pleasantries and picture-taking, Foreign Minister Miyazawa asked the Secretary to discuss his visit to Korea.

The Secretary said that after Vietnam there was great trepidation in the ROK. The ROK also saw Vietnam leading to the continued growth of neo-isolationism in the US, which they believed would encourage military aggression by North Korea. SecDef thought that the basic confidence of the ROK had been restored. At the beginning of the Security Consultative Meeting the Koreans seemed a little uneasy, but at the end they became more confident and relatively relaxed.

The ROK is making a major effort to improve their armed forces. Training and morale are fairly good, but equipment is somewhat...
obsolete. The Koreans are trying to upgrade their forces. Although in
the US the ROK is somewhat taken for granted, their self-help efforts
should bring forth a good US response. SecDef concluded that he thought his
trip had helped calm ROK apprehensions.

Mr. Miyazawa commented that the Secretary's statement about the possible
use of tactical nuclear weapons was helpful in quieting ROK fears. When he
visited Seoul in late July the Koreans were visibly relieved. The
Secretary's visit also was a strong shot in the arm to ROK morale. He
did not expect North Korea to take any chances.

The Secretary agreed that North Korea is not likely to start a war; the
problem is that someday they expect to. Political problems in South Korea
generate some loss of confidence. The ROK needs extensive support in the
psychological realm. The ROK feels beleaguered and is worried about the
Vietnam example. However, South Vietnam was never an effective society,
while South Korea has national cohesion and will. Korea is more dynamic
than Vietnam and the Koreans a different people. They should not be so
obsessed about the South Vietnam example. Korea is a remarkable success
story.

Mr. Miyazawa asked if SecDef knew what made Kim Il-sung run to Peking after
Vietnam. The Secretary said that it appeared that Kim perceived a collapse
of will on the part of the US. This generated in him hopes that it would
spread to Korea. If he could receive Chinese support he might foster sub-
version in South Korea. Kim showed a real post-Vietnam euphoria in Peking.

Mr. Miyazawa replied that Kim should know Asians better than that. SecDef
said that was probably doubtful since Kim is so isolated. We are an ogre
to North Korea. North Korea is dominated by ideology and they paint the
picture they would like to see. Kim is a driven Marxist who believed that
after Vietnam his enemies were on the run.

Mr. Miyazawa said that if Kim is that way, this problem could occur again
and we need to expose him to the real world. SecDef agreed this might be
helpful but added that North Korea would not likely change while Kim runs
the country. There is great room for improvement in North Korea perceptions.

Mr. Miyazawa observed that Japan and the ROK are neighbors but not really
good friends. There are strains in the relationship. His visit to Seoul
had some success in improving relations. Japan had moved to break the
impasse between the two countries and is starting anew to try to improve
relations. The ministerial meeting will take place in mid-September.

The Secretary said South Korea is a small, beleaguered country which needs
external support. Its internal stability is dependent on the continuation
of rapid rates of economic growth. It would be exceedingly helpful if the
Japanese Government would continue to help the ROK economically and politically. Conceivably, because of their unique relationship, Japan might give
special preferences to the ROK as the Europeans had done in Africa.
The Foreign Minister said that Japan would like to spend more on Korean infrastructure needs, but the Korean economy had already taken off. Concessional aid is not possible. Rather Korea needs business-type relationships and commercial loans. Japan would probably give Korea some official loans but economic relations will be pursued through normal commercial channels.

Mr. Schlesinger said that a stable relationship between Japan and the ROK is highly desirable in fostering political stability in South Korea. A reduction in Korean exports to Japan, leading to a fall-off in economic performance, could have repercussions on ROK political stability. Stability in the ROK is important to Japan because of obvious security considerations.

Mr. Miyazawa said the Opposition was opposed to the GOJ helping the ROK. They always asked how the GOJ could aid such a dictatorial government. Miyazawa’s invariable reply was that the GOJ was trying to help the Korean people. He added that there is much confusion in Japan on this subject.

SecDef observed that this is perhaps natural and understandable but not necessarily correct. If the ROK Government lacks external support, it would be less inclined to reduce the degree of authoritarianism. If we and Japan deny external support to the Koreans, it would seriously affect the ROK’s internal political situation.

Mr. Miyazawa said that depended on whether one was thinking short or long range.

The Secretary said that despite the absence of civil liberties as we knew them, South Korea still had many elements of a free society. His press conference in Seoul was pretty open, not like ones in Yugoslavia, Spain or East Germany. Korea had achieved much in a very brief time and under difficult conditions. The situation in the South is not too bad, although obviously not what we desire. Certainly conditions are not bad if we compare them with the North.

Mr. Miyazawa agreed that there is no question about greater North Korean repression.

SecDef observed that at present Japan is now the only real democracy in Asia. We need to better convey to the press realistic yardsticks in measuring Asian countries. One of America’s problems in Vietnam was that the US press was looking at the situation not in the light of realistic alternatives but in abstract concepts. There was a high degree of personal freedom in South Vietnam. The press needed to be more politically realistic on this point.

Mr. Miyazawa stated that we need to avoid the collapse of the Pak government. There was no such danger (of collapse) in the North where the concept of freedom does not exist.

The Secretary said there were dilemmas in the democratic process. We need to maintain our goals but we have to be judicious in attaining them.
Mr. Miyazawa thought that President Pak could be endangered either by a recession or prosperity. Kim Il-sung's policies, however, have certainly been a help to Pak.

The Secretary replied that it is necessary to maintain a high rate of economic growth in South Korea. He was impressed with the Korean standard of living, adding they are indeed in the takeoff period.

Mr. Miyazawa agreed that the ROK had taken off. Despite the oil crisis he was sure that economic growth would again pick up.

The Secretary observed that the threat from the North is politically helpful to Pak. The strength and imminence of the threat is exaggerated by the ROK Government. However, the ROK has day-to-day pressures we do not feel such as infiltration and tunneling, which are symptomatic and indicative of a continuing threat. Given all these things, as well as the personal tragedies he had suffered because of the North, it is no wonder that President Pak is concerned about security.

Mr. Miyazawa asked for the Secretary's thoughts on the reasons for the tunnels.

The Secretary replied that they would allow regimental size forces to get behind the ROK lines in an outright conflict. He said Korea probably exaggerates the number of men that can go through the tunnels, but units the size of regiments would certainly be disruptive to ROK defenses.

Mr. Miyazawa thought that Pak had changed from early days. He had become a victim of his own power and had grown isolated. Few dared to tell him the truth. Noting that Pak saw some US Congressmen who spoke their minds, he asked if people could get through to Pak to give him a better sense of reality.

The Secretary asked Mr. Miyazawa if he had any suggestions on this point. He noted that in this case truth would probably come largely from abroad. But Pak must have confidence in any nation telling him unpalatable things.

Mr. Miyazawa asked how the ROK compared to the North in air power.

The Secretary replied that the ROK is inferior. South Korean equipment is somewhat obsolete. The ROK also has a small defense industry, while North Korea has a substantial one which could build tanks and submarines. He cautioned, however, not to exaggerate ROK vulnerabilities although the ROK is somewhat inferior in air and naval forces. He added that if the ROK were not able to rely on the US, perhaps some of these deficiencies might be significant. At the SCM the Secretary had stressed the complementarity of US-ROK forces.

Mr. Miyazawa then turned the talk to UN resolutions, adding that the resolutions of both sides seem to have some common points: they both need Security Council approval and call for talks between the US, North Korea and other parties. Perhaps some way could be found of bringing them together, although the North Korean resolution is unrealistic.
The Secretary noted that the Japanese Government would like to promote a better dialogue between North and South. South Korea has made serious efforts to that end but with no response. North Korea claims it is the only legitimate government on the Peninsula. As long as the North maintains that attitude, there is not much chance for a genuine dialogue between the two. The Secretary suggested that direct talks between the US and North Korea would only be interpreted as undermining South Korea. Clearly we do not want this. North Korea must be willing to accept the legitimacy of South Korea or there is no basis for detente. North Korea apparently has a different notion of what detente means.

Mr. Miyazawa said that in the Military Armistice Commission there is no place for the ROK per se, the ROK not being a signatory to the Armistice. While North Korea did recognize the ROK in the 1972 talks, North Korea is the only Korean party to the Armistice. That appears to be a basis for their logic.

The Secretary continued that the logic of their position is to carefully select those points that buttress them as the only legal government in Korea. We should obviously not support them in such an effort.

Mr. Miyazawa said that he had instructed the Japanese Ambassador at the UN to find out the real intent of the North Korean resolution, adding that perhaps there is an opportunity for a genuine dialogue.

The Secretary said the Japanese could sound them out, but he would not be too surprised if they find that the North really intends what it professes. What the North apparently is now aiming for is to undermine our legitimacy. While that will not affect our deployments in Korea, the North hopes it will weaken our underpinnings. That seems to be their simple and straightforward objective.

The group then went to lunch.

Morton I. Abramowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Visit by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Delegation

(C) The visit of the JSP official delegation is billed as an effort to open a dialogue with US leaders. The six-man delegation, the first in 18 years, will be here through 22 September. The delegation is led by Saburo Eda, the leader of the JSP's moderate wing. The JSP has asked for appointments with the Vice President (unlikely), Secretary Kissinger, and yourself, as well as appropriate subordinates.

(C) State and Embassy Tokyo view the visit as an opportunity to promote understanding and strengthen moderate elements of the party. Prime Minister Miki has urged us to give the group high level attention.

(C) Other positive aspects (for us) of the visit include: a clear indication that we are willing to have a dialogue with the major Japanese opposition party; an opportunity to encourage what may be a JSP reassessment of its fundamental stance; and a good opportunity to more clearly enunciate our security policy to a generally hostile political party.

(C) While the courtesy call on you will also serve political purposes back home, the group will ask some substantive questions and there is the possibility that one or two of the delegation may indicate the JSP's usual opposition to the Mutual Security Treaty and the US-Japan security relationship (they wish to eliminate the treaty and replace it with a "peace and friendship" treaty).

(U) We expect discussion to include:

1. Korea. Use of US bases in Japan to support a Korean fight (Japanese bases would be used primarily for logistical support); prior consultation before launching combat forces (we would consult with GOJ); use of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea (part of deterrence, but we do not need them and do not anticipate use).

2. Japan. Are nuclear weapons brought into Japan (we have said many times that we respect the sensitivity of this issue in Japan, and we believe the Eisenhower-Kishi communique covers...
the subject); need and longevity of US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (treaty very important to both countries for the foreseeable future); long-range security relationships (of great importance for security and peace in Asia).


4. One member of the group, Mr. Ueda, may raise the point that your recent defense cooperation agreement with Mr. Sakata will inevitably lead Japan to a regional defense role -- which the JSP opposes. We suggest you reply, as you did in Japan, that we are interested in Japan doing the self-defense task well, and that we respect Japan's constitutional constraints.

(U) At a meeting between the JSP and Mr. Habib on 18 September, the substantive discussion wholly concerned Korea. The discussion was lively and polite, and both sides agreed on the need to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula but disagreed as to the means. The JSP delegation also asked to discuss nuclear issues, but Mr. Habib declined and the matter was dropped.

(U) As of possible use, we have attached the transcripts of your Tokyo press conferences and the "Dirty Questions" book for Japan. Attached also is a meeting information sheet and biographies.

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Attachments
Transcript of Press Conferences
Meeting Information Sheet
Biographies
"Dirty Questions" Book

Amos A. Jordan
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
NEWS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
IMPERIAL HOTEL, TOKYO, JAPAN
FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1975

Secretary Schlesinger: Thank you very much, Mr. Takeyama (Director, Japanese National Press Club). It's a pleasure to be here at the Japan National Press Club, meeting here in the room of Mt. Fuji; and I must say at no press conference have I had so eloquent a backdrop as is represented behind me.

We have only one purpose in this visit to Japan, and that is to underscore the security partnership which is represented by the association between Japan and the United States. We, on the American side, regard Japan as our indispensable partner and ally in the Pacific, and I believe in accordance with the security agreement between Japan and the United States that Japan regards the United States as an equally indispensable partner. We therefore, welcome what we see in Japan, which is a growing awareness of security problems, and associated with a serious interest in matters of national security. As a result of this growing awareness and a need for strengthening the partnership, in accordance with what the Prime Minister described this morning as mutual confidence and trust, we are going to establish an institutional mechanism for closer consultative arrangements between Japan and the United States on our common security problems.

We welcome this further consultation because we do not wish our partner, Japan, to be a passive partner. Nonetheless, we clearly understand, and will support, the existing constitutional constraints with regard to the role of Japan's military forces which are designed to be self-defense forces. These constitutional constraints are ones of which we are continuously aware, and there is no change in the role envisioned in the relationship. Japan's forces will continue to fulfill their self-defense role, but we believe that through consultation we can improve the mutuality of the relationship.

For the security of Japan and for the security of Northeast Asia, stability in the Western Pacific, there is required adequate strength so that any possibility of aggression or conflict can be deterred. In the case of Japan, we also recognize that the development of adequate strength depends upon continued public support, and for that reason the growing appreciation of security problems is welcome to us. I think in this way, through these changing institutions, we will make the security partnership between the United States and Japan an ever more viable entity. Thank you.

Mr. Takeyama: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Before entertaining questions from the floor, I would like to put to the Secretary three questions which are the result of the work of the Planning Committee of the Japan National Press Club summarizing the many questions brought by the members of the press, both Japanese and foreign, and we, at our responsibility, summarized them and condensed them into the following three basic questions:

Do you still entertain the idea of preemptive use of nuclear weapons in the event of a military clash on the Korean Peninsula? Are you confident of being able to keep a limited nuclear war, in which tactical nuclear weapons are being used, from developing into an all-out nuclear war? This is our first question.
With respect to the percentage of the gross national product, Japan's Self Defense Forces need to be capable of fulfilling the mission assigned to them. These forces can be small, but they should be high quality. One cannot ascertain over the longer haul whether such requirements can be fully funded on one percent of the gross national product, but that is a question that the Japanese authorities will have to assess as they analyze the relationship between force requirements, the mission and total funding.

As I indicated, we understand the constitutional constraints and we heartily endorse those constraints. Japan's forces should not be large enough so that anyone can regard them as a threat to their countries, but they should be qualitatively strong enough so that they can serve their self defense purpose.

Now, you raise the question: What do you expect of Japan in the U.S. post-Vietnam Far Eastern strategy? I should like to rephrase that. We have a mutual security relationship. The question of the security in the Far East is not a question of U.S. strategy pre-Vietnam or post-Vietnam. It depends upon a perception of common interests and consultative arrangements so that each nation does its share. What we would like to see Japan do is to fulfill the very mission that it has assigned to its forces. Quality forces capable of self defense of the Japanese islands — that is what you want. We want no less and no more.

Mr. Takeyama: Our third question is: There are many ships in the U.S. Seventh Fleet capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Do these ships unload their nuclear weapons before entering Japanese ports? In connection with this same question, is Japan guaranteed security under the so-called "nuclear umbrella" if nuclear weapons are not brought in?

Secretary Schlesinger: The United States has committed itself to providing the nuclear umbrella for its allies. It is, I believe, incumbent upon the United States to fulfill its obligations in this connection for many reasons, including a very important reason: without confidence in that guarantee, the incentives for the spread of nuclear weapons will be enhanced, and the spread of nuclear weapons will be of no benefit to mankind. Consequently, the United States intends to live up to its guarantee. Its forces are deployed on a worldwide basis, and there is no place and no mission that cannot be adequately supplied in the nuclear field by the deployed U.S. forces outside of Japan.

With regard to the question about the 7th Fleet, I would make the following observations. First, it has been continuing United States policy not to confirm nor deny the deployment of nuclear weapons in any location. There has been a departure from this policy with regard to forward deployed U.S. forces either in Europe or Korea where they face an opponent, a potential opponent, across a land frontier. Aside from that, we have not made any comments on the deployment or the non-deployment of nuclear weapons.
We do not here in Japan face conventional forces that can overwhelm Japan. In the Korean Peninsula itself there is a fair balance between the forces of South Korea and North Korea taken by themselves. There are no forward deployed forces of superpowers in North Korea, and consequently the deterrent strategy can be somewhat different. The emphasis here is indeed on the same elements but in different proportions. The strategic forces are necessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella over Japan, but our stress in Korea, and of course in Japan, remains on the conventional forces, and in the case of the Japanese home islands, to the extent that the strategic forces successfully provide an umbrella, the only danger that one perceives would be conventional. Tactical nuclear weapons have a relatively small role to play here in the Far East because the threat is smaller, the logistical problems of the opponent are much greater, and consequently they play a relatively small role in comparison to European or NATO strategy.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as an economist, non-malthusian I presume, what do you think about Japan's example to the crowded world to keep the family with 2.4, at most 3, children per family? That's the first question.

The second one is what do you think about the limits for Japan as a potential buyer of latest weapons without becoming a borrower in the international monetary field or world?

Secretary Schlesinger: I am somewhat inhibited in offering gratuitous advice with regard to the number of children on the basis that some might suggest that one practices what one preaches. Nonetheless, we should all recognize, that we have a very serious worldwide population problem, and that population restraint is necessary, and I think that Japan has demonstrated more effectively than any other nation in the world the ability to control population in relation to resources.

With respect to the impact of the purchase of weapons on the Japanese balance of payments, which I took to be the second issue, I would think that any such impact would be relatively trivial. Japan has produced most of its own weapons or can produce most of its own weapons, if it so desires for balance of payments reasons. Moreover, in relation to the Japanese economy, even if the ratio of investment were as high as 35 or 40 percent of the Japanese military budget, that would represent only about one percent of total Japanese out-payments, assuming that the preponderance of those weapons were acquired from abroad. A matter that affects the balance of trade or the balance of payments, at the maximum one percent, is unlikely to be very influential in determining policy towards military self defense forces.

Q: In your visit to South Korea, you issued a joint communique with the South Korean Government in which you expressed your agreement to the existence of the threat from North Korea. In this connection, since security relations or the security consequence of the relations between South Korea and Japan is very important, I would like to raise three questions.
Subsequent to the fall of South Vietnam, there was a state of euphoria that set in in Pyongyang which led to concern on the part of American authorities as well as South Korean authorities. North Korea has refused to negotiate with the Government of South Korea. It has today before the United Nations a proposal to dissolve the United Nations Command, which is understandable and is matched by an American-Japanese proposal. However, the North Korean proposal requires the withdrawal of all foreign forces under the United Nations Command, and one can ascertain from that that this proposal is not without an entirely self-serving purpose and association with the expressed intent.

The second part of the question dealt with the discussions with the Japanese authorities and whether there was an agreement of the Japanese authorities, particularly as to the threat. I think that the communiqué issued by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki some weeks ago indicated that the Japanese authorities fully concur that the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula is important to Japan, and I doubt, although I will allow the Japanese authorities to speak for themselves on this matter, I doubt whether any threat to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula is principally a problem emanating from the South. However, there was no agreement as to the threat, I think that one recognized that there is a capability and that there has been the intention, and if I may judge the opinion of Japanese leaders, it is important that peace be maintained in the Korean Peninsula by the maintenance of an appropriate military balance.

The third aspect dealt with the question of bases, Japanese bases, notably Okinawa, in the posture statement, and emphasized the support function in that statement. As I believe is recognized, there is under the Mutual Security Agreement prior consultations required in the event of any operations conducted from Japan. It has not been the understanding that prior consultations are required with regard to normal logistical operations.

With regard to the specific question raised, we sought no assurance on this question and no assurance was given.

Mr. Takeyama: The last question.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you give us some details on this consultative mechanism that you described as being worked out. At what level will this be carried out? Will this be like the meetings, the annual meetings, from which you just came in Korea? Will it be at a ministerial level, or will it be at a working level? Will it be civilian, or will it be between high level military personnel, and how often will these take place? We would like some details on the structure of this.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, the underlying premise is that these meetings should be at the political level and at the ministerial level and that the meetings should occur once a year. They would be more akin to the consultative meetings that have taken place in Korea of late than they would be, for example, to the semi-annual DPC meetings in NATO. Below the ministerial level, there would be extended consultations within the framework of the Security Consultative Committee which already exists and is led on the American side by Ambassador Hodgson. The consultative mechanism would be designed to bring together MORE
NEWS BRIEFING

BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE
TOKYO, JAPAN
FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1975

Secretary: As the Ambassador has said there may be little meat left on this carcass, but you're welcome to pluck at it. Go at it.

Q: Five years ago in September of 1970 the Japanese Defense Agency Director proposed to the Secretary of Defense that annual meetings at the Ministerial Level be held. Why was the United States not interested in that proposal then but is now?

A: I think that's probably a good question. I did not realize that that indeed had been proposed, I think that it might well have been a good idea at that time. I think that we are long overdue in establishing the appropriate framework of a consultative relationship in which both parties treat the substantive issues of security in the western Pacific seriously. Japan has been too much a passive partner. I think that the attitude of the Japanese has changed, and similarly there is perhaps a greater appreciation on the part of the United States that this more balanced role within the security partnerships is appropriate. Also, of course, in 1970 there were difficulties stemming from the strain in the relations that had come from the Vietnamese war, but you would probably recall that.

Q: President Park of Korea said that because the United States has a treaty with Korea, and the United States has a treaty with Japan -- it has security treaties with both -- that he thinks it would be a good idea if Japan and Korea had a special relationship in the security field. What do you think about that? Do you think it's possible?

A: I think that would be stretching the self defense forces concept that the Japanese are indeed restricted under the constitution, and I think that it is important that they neither develop defense capabilities which would be involved save exclusively in the defense of Japan or be perceived having military power sufficient to be involved abroad. The Japanese can indeed make a contribution to the security of Korea indirectly, because the logistical support represented by the American base structure quite obviously would be useful if there were a further outbreak in Korea, and the existence of Japanese self defense forces, and the like have a spill-over benefit that adds security in the general area. But I think that under foreseeable circumstances a direct Japanese military participation would be going well beyond what the Japanese public would expect and what the Japanese constitution as interpreted at the present would permit. Now Japanese contribution to the strength of Korea, South Korea, can come in other forms. I've mentioned spill-over benefits of the military posture in Japan, but in addition there is a possible contribution to the economy of South Korea, and the economy represents in a sense the base of South Korea's indigenous efforts, indigenous defense efforts, is that satisfactory?

Q: Yes, sir.

MORE
Q: If Japan were to share a larger burden of the defense... In Asia, would that be stretching the interpretation of the constitution?
A: I'm not sure precisely what you mean, that's a fairly general statement at the outset, sharing a larger percentage.

Q: Having a larger share of the defense burden for Asia within the framework of the U.S. - Japan mutual security pact plus what it means or interpreted for the rest of Asia. Would that be stretching the interpretation of the constitution?
A: No, I think that the question here is whether the Japanese forces are able to effectively perform the mission assigned.

Q: Not the Japanese forces, military and economic, let us say.
A: I'm sorry, would you repeat it?

Q: By larger share of the burden, I mean, say, capital expenditures, military equipment, stuff like that.
A: And providing this to other countries out here?

Q: Right, right.
A: I'm not really in a position to judge. I think that the underlying thrust of your question, that if Japan were to become the arsenal of Democracy in the far east, with the notion that it was funding the programs of other states out here, that that probably would be a reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution which Japanese understandably would be reluctant to make, yes, sir.

Q: Mr. Secretary, since the fall of Vietnam concerning the lack of joint planning by the American and Japanese defense commands, with particular reference to possible (inaudible). Could you comment on the status of this sort of possibility in the future?
A: Well, I think that as the emphasis on greater consultation and improved defense cooperation suggests, there is room for improvement, and there has not been adequate discussion between the United States and Japan with regard to the combined capabilities to protect the Japanese line of communications, for example, and that is part of the naval plan. And I think that in relation to the Japanese situation, the protection of the line of communication, primarily anti-submarine warfare, is the appropriate vehicle for Japan in relation to their self defense role, and then of course that role must require American support.

Q: What is the status of this now?
A: I think that as U.S. naval capabilities have declined, and as the potential submarine threat has expanded, that one might well conclude that we are living with a higher level of risk than we would prefer to live with. I would not use your phrase "the job is not being done," but one is living with a higher or lower level of risk, and the level of risk with regard to the military capacity to interfere with that line of communication has risen, and probably we would all feel somewhat better if that level of risk were reduced.

Once again, the burden has been primarily on the United States to the extent that the Japanese define an expanded function in terms of making a contribution to anti-submarine warfare. In protection of their line of communication, that burden would shift.
but I would mention at the outset the political pressures, we probably are not at this minimum level, as you would define it; on the other hand, it is plain that the U.S. base structure is becoming thinner and has a potential for becoming uncomfortably thin; this is partly due to the fact that the United States entered into these matters primarily after World War II and did not have an extended period of picking up convenient overseas territories as did some of the nations in Europe, and has meant that we are dependent upon the continuing cooperation of other nations as host governments as opposed to having sovereign base areas. I don't know whether I covered your entire point on that.

Q: You have, and I would like to ask a more precise question in regard to the Philippines. How important are our two main bases there, Subic and Clark, or, twisting it around are there viable alternatives to those two bases?

A: I think that one can always generate alternatives, and particularly if one is interested in providing sufficient funds. Quite obviously one needs no base structure at all if one is prepared to have the underway replenishment ships, the oilers, etc., so that the fleets can operate at long distance from American ports, operating out of Guam or Honolulu; but that becomes a very costly process, and the amount that you have invested in those underway replenishment ships and oilers is substantial, and if we had to make a quick adjustment we are not in a position immediately to create those additional capabilities, but there are always alternatives. So one should not assume that the loss of bases is necessarily the end of the world, but one is placed under much greater pressure at the point that one loses those bases, and I would describe the bases in the Philippines as representing a major investment and from an historic point of view as well as a strategic location, no one can suggest that they are not extremely important.

Q: Just to follow that question up one more time, you mentioned other alternatives and then you mentioned Guam and Honolulu, at great expense of the ships, the position of the U.S. Navy...

A: One other thin, excuse me, and that also means that you have to keep your crews at sea for much longer periods of time, it has an impact on the readiness of the forces, etc., so that you can live with all those problems, but it becomes quite difficult, quite obviously in the period of the All-Volunteer Force, the ability to keep crews at sea for six or nine months at a time is not necessarily consistent with the success of the All-Volunteer Force.

Q: You just said that the one alternative of using Honolulu and Guam and the Navy is not feasible because it's too expensive and the U.S. Navy is not at that sufficient level right now to provide that alternative; are there any other alternatives that you might have in mind?

A: There are other alternatives, but I don't think it's necessary to specify them; let me just simply say all of the alternatives other than a preservation of much of our existing base structure are quite unpalatable; is that enough?

Q: Yes.

Q: In any way in which (impossible) contribution would be of interest to Congress; that is to say, do you see any way in which it would take a form that would result in reducing the American defense expenditures?
Q: Turning back to the Korean question again for a minute, we learned via an interview with Park Chung Hee that he believes South Korea could become militarily independent within five years — self-sufficient would be a better word, do you agree with that assessment? The second part of the question, the figure of three million dollars is banded about, would you specify some areas in which we have agreed to aid them in terms of armaments ..(inaudible)...

A: Let me take the second part of that first. You should understand that the expansion, the modernization program, the force improvement program, of the Koreans represents their determination as to what they must spend irrespective of the degree of funding support that they may get externally, and this represents their commitment of their resources. That is partially related to the level of available credit that might come from the United States, and I think that one is talking about sums probably more modest than were contemplated under the five-year modernization plan, a billion and a half dollars over a five-year period, 300 million dollars a year, approximately, some of it in credit, but much of it in grant. I think what is contemplated here is a lower sum, a somewhat lower sum, primarily credit rather than grant.

And having answered the second part of your question, would you remind me of the first part.

Q: Do you agree with President Park's assumption?
A: I think that one must recognize that in a number of key categories, the Koreans have been dependent upon the United States, in the more distant past, the rationale was that the Koreans could not deal with that external attack. In the past, the standard threat used to be a PRC-reinforced North Korean attack, and quite obviously the South Koreans were not expected to cope with that possibility by themselves. There has been some change in the configuration of politics out here and, therefore, that standard threat seems to be a much lower probability event and one can contemplate as far more likely a North Korean attack on South Korea without the direct assistance of one of the Major communist states. That is probably a doable job for the South Koreans once they have adjusted their force structure, and what the South Koreans are talking about is to adjust their force structure and adjust their spending in such a way that they themselves, without direct American participation, can handle a North Korean attack, and that is doable, the resources, the population base of Korea is such that if they have the appropriate equipment that they probably can handle such an attack by themselves.

Now, note what is being said that after a period of years and a successful development of their forces, they could handle a solitary attack by North Korea alone, that does not mean that there will be an elimination of the necessity for the United States to hold the ring, as it were, if there were the possibility of the involvement of one of the communist super powers.

END
APPOINTMENTS WITH OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS:
   Senator Mansfield
   Senator Scott
   Secretary Kissinger
   Mr. Habib
   Mr. Ikle, ACDA

PREVIOUS MEETINGS (WITH PRINCIPAL): None
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

Japanese Participants

Diet Member, Lower House, JSP Vice-Chairman, Shuma Eda
Diet Member, Upper House, Deputy Delegation Leader, Tetsu Ueda
Diet Member, Lower House, Susumu Kobayashi
Diet Member, Lower House, Tamio Kawakami
DSJ, Shozo Sugiyama
Diet Member, Upper House, Hideo Den
Interpreter, Japan Center for International Exchange, Mr. Kamura

United States

Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Amos Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Morton Abramowitz
Military Assistant to SecDef, LTC Howard Graves
Assistant for Japan, LTC William Barrett

Time: 1135-1220, 22 September 1975

Place: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon

Following opening pleasantries, Secretary Schlesinger remarked that he had greatly enjoyed his trip to Japan and hoped it had been helpful to U.S.-Japanese relations. He added that he was glad the dialogue was continuing with visits such as today's. This dialogue is important for our relations.

Mr. Eda expressed his thanks for the Secretary seeing the delegation. This was the first official JSP visit in 18 years. The delegation was initially concerned that practical political differences would keep the trip from being very useful. Mr. Eda was pleased, however, that the
delegation was everywhere warmly received. This was a good indication of the open and democratic nature of U.S. society. The Japanese Constitution, which he and his party were committed to safeguard, was based on U.S. documents and ideals, and with this background the two countries could seek agreement through dialogue. Mr. Eda then said that there were two matters of substance he wished to discuss: First, that the Socialist Party was committed to maintain Japan's three Non-Nuclear Principles (no manufacture, no possession, no introduction of nuclear weapons) and he was concerned that the U.S. was going to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. The second matter was the situation in Korea, and the fears that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons there.

Secretary Schlesinger replied that he agreed with Mr. Eda on the importance of those documents. The harmony of our views on the fundamentals of government was more important than practical or tactical differences. Where similarities on these basics do not exist, a good dialogue is not possible. We could have a good dialogue with Japan.

Secretary Schlesinger continued that the two areas of substance Mr. Eda mentioned were interfaced. Concerning nuclear weapons, U.S. policy in this administration, and to some extent in previous administrations, was to move away from nuclear deterrence. The thrust of our policy is to improve conventional capability so there would not have to be a recourse to nuclear weapons. As far as nuclear weapons in Korea, Secretary Schlesinger said it was generally known that where our ground forces were forward-deployed, nuclear weapons were in place. However, the U.S. does not anticipate the need to use them. He said that on the recent trip to Korea he de-emphasized the need to use nuclear weapons there and elsewhere. Following the fall of Vietnam, when the North Korean statements became bold, the Secretary replied to a press question that the nuclear option in Korea was open to the President. Even then he emphasized that the conventional balance in Korea was not unreasonable. At this time, with a quieting of the situation, there was no need to publicly emphasize nuclear weapons. In Korea, the nuclear aspect contributed to deterrence, and we would not weaken deterrence.

As for Japan's three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Secretary said they could be readily dealt with. The U.S. understands Japanese sensitivities on nuclear matters. We have reiterated our adherence to the Eisenhower-Kishi statement. We appreciate Japan's three principles and the consensus lying behind them. We have constantly repeated that we do not intend to act contrary to Japan's wishes concerning matters involving prior consultation. The Secretary hoped that this was a full response to Mr. Eda's questions.

Mr. Ueda said that he was encouraged with the Secretary's de-emphasis of nuclear matters, and wished to confirm that the U.S. had ruled out first use of nuclear weapons.
Secretary Schlesinger replied "No". U.S. policy was to move away from nuclear deterrence and the 1950's doctrine of massive retaliation. However, by agreement with our European allies, our NATO doctrine was to employ nuclear weapons if major conventional aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces were to succeed in threatening the survival of Europe. Even in Europe, however, the emphasis was on building conventional forces. In the Far East, the prospect of hostilities was very small, and the probability of employing nuclear weapons, exceedingly low. Since there was no overwhelming power opposing us and our allies there, such as the Warsaw Pact forces, use of nuclear weapons was not deemed likely to resist aggression. He concluded by stating we do not expect a North Korean invasion at this time.

Mr. Ueda then asked if the August Miki-Ford statement on Korea was the same as the earlier Nixon-Sato statement. Secretary Schlesinger replied that he thought they were substantially the same.

Mr. Ueda said he believed Miki was saying that the U.S. could have free use of Japanese bases in support of Korea, and that the prior consultation formula was dead.

Secretary Schlesinger replied that, on the contrary, prior consultation was not dead. Free use of bases in Japan for logistic support did not require prior consultation. On the other hand, U.S. combat operations from Japanese bases was different and would involve prior consultation. The Secretary reiterated that prior consultation was not dead, being contingent on whether the situation required use of bases for combat purposes.

Mr. Ueda said that he was concerned about the Secretary's proposing a build-up of Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and especially about JSDF naval build-up. In view of the state of Japan's economy and the shortage of manpower, he thought an increase in the next Defense plan was impossible.

Secretary Schlesinger replied that he would like to address this by moving from the general to the specific. Three general points were important. First, there was the similarity of U.S.-Japanese attitudes toward democratic government. Second was our mutual desire to avoid circumstances requiring the use of nuclear weapons. If we want to maintain the strength of our democracy and avoid nuclear first-use, then, thirdly, we must have forces adequate to defend ourselves and provide deterrence.

While Japan's Constitution put restraints on military forces, it did permit a defense force capable of fulfilling its mission of self-defense. This implies adequate supplies and ammunition, among other things, so that the forces would be perceived capable by an opponent. The Secretary recognized that the mission of Japan's military forces was exclusively self-defense. There should be no naval construction except for defense purposes,
which includes anti-submarine warfare capability to lessen Japan's vulnerability. The U.S. did not want Japan to have a force that would threaten her neighbors. However, ASW could not by any chance be construed as threatening. It was clearly protective and defensive. The Secretary added parenthetically that as far as financial problems, Europe and the U.S. also have them. Many of these countries were clearly financially more constrained than Japan. At this time, unemployment, resulting from the world-wide recession, alleviated the manpower shortage.

Mr. Ueda added that his party's view was not to avoid increasing the defense forces, and that the JDA Defense Advisory Group recommended limiting expenditures to 1% of GNP. In this case, Japan could not afford a high-low mix of weaponry.

Secretary Schlesinger replied that, indeed, under these circumstances Japan would be dealing with the low end of the mix, with cheaper weapons. He reiterated that we were not asking for an expansion of Japan's forces, but an improvement of their defensive capability, nothing more.

Mr. Den asked if nuclear first-use were not anticipated in Korea in view of a less-ambitious North Korea, had the U.S. concluded that North Korea was no longer a threat?

Secretary Schlesinger replied certainly not. The threat was certainly there but its imminence is less than we feared immediately after the fall of Vietnam. Mr. Jordan added that perhaps we helped diminish the threat with our reassurances to South Korea. The Secretary added that the major point was that the situation in Europe and Korea were so different. In Europe, the Warsaw Pact can commit 90 divisions to combat—the allies only 30 divisions. We have to rely heavily on our nuclear capability as a major element of deterrence. In Korea, where South Korea has more armed manpower, the conventional balance was much better and the nuclear aspect far less important.

The meeting adjourned at 1220.