REATIONS TO A
NUCLEAR-ARMED
CHINA:
SOUTH ASIA (U)

International Studies Division

Institute for Defense Analyses

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REACTIONS TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED COMMunist CHINA: SOUTH ASIA (U)

The Honorable Loy W. Henderson

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The judgments expressed in this study memorandum are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Defense Analyses or of any agency of the United States Government

International Studies Division
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
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FOREWORD

This paper was written for Study PACIFICA, an analysis of the implications of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power. Study PACIFICA is being prepared by the International Studies Division of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961. Brigadier General Sidney F. Giffin, USAF (Ret.) is the Study Leader.

The author, the Honorable Loy W. Henderson, a consultant to the International Studies Division, has long observed international Communist and Asian affairs. He is a member, now retired, of the Foreign Service of the United States, and has served as Ambassador to India and Minister to Nepal.

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JAMES E. KING, JR.
Associate Director of Research
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SUMMARY

The reactions of South Asia to Communist China's acquisition of nuclear weapons will be greatly influenced by the policies of India, which is by far the most powerful nation in the area.

Indian policy is currently determined by Nehru, whose power over his country approaches that of a dictator. As China develops through various stages into an atomic power, India under Nehru's leadership will endeavor to produce its own atomic weapons and to increase India's general defensive capacity. India would welcome a "friendly understanding" with China that recognized South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence, but would attempt to gain Soviet, American, and United Nations support against a militant China.

A direct Chinese attack would be met with all the military means at India's disposal. These, however, are unlikely to be sufficient.

India without Nehru would follow the same general policy in the face of a militant nuclear-armed China, but would be more pro-Western and less influenced by hopes of a Delhi-Peiping Axis.

Burma, Nepal, and to a lesser extent Ceylon are all most vulnerable to Chinese aggression. Pakistan's policy will be affected by the dispute with India over the Vale of Kashmir.
CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

It is the purpose of this study

a) To assess some of the effects that China's acquisition of nuclear weapons might have on India and the other countries of South Asia—Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Burma—and to outline various policies that these countries might pursue as China progresses through the several stages of becoming an atomic power.1

b) To consider some of the policies that the United States might follow and some of the actions that it might take in order to prevent the progress of China toward the status of an atomic power from weakening the position of the Free World in South Asia.

Developments unfold so rapidly these days that no one can forecast with assurance just what events will take place within the next few years in any area of the world. Natural and man-made catastrophes; discoveries and inventions; the appearance, disappearance, and vagaries of national leaders; the fluctuations of national morale; and a multiplicity of other factors

1. Burma has been included partly because of its geographic position, but also because of India's deep interest in its neighbor's future.
4) China and the Soviet Union will continue in general to cooperate in facing the non-Communist world although their relations with each other may be marked by coolness and suspicion. Their cooperation may not necessarily go so far as to cause one of them to come to the aid of the other in the event the latter should become engaged in a war as the result of activities on its part not approved by the former.

The possibility cannot entirely be dismissed, however, that as China acquires its own nuclear weapons it will come to the sobering realization that a war may not be to its advantage and will consequently adopt a more responsible and restrained attitude in dealing with its neighbors.

The possibility should also not be ignored that at some time prior to 1972 cooperation between China and the Soviet Union will break down completely, leaving them to go divergent ways in their efforts to promote their separate brands of communism.

Brief sections of this study will, therefore, be devoted to discussions as to how developments of this kind might affect the future of South Asia and call for changes in the policies of the United States.
CHAPTER II

INDIA

India is militarily, politically, and economically by far the most powerful nation in South Asia. The reaction of the other powers in this region to a nuclear-armed China will be considerably influenced both by India's lead and by the existing state of relations between these powers and India. That nation's actions are therefore of great importance for all South Asia. Much of our discussion will perforce be devoted to the Indian subcontinent. Is India likely to accept China's development into an atomic power with equanimity? Or will it be stimulated into reconsidering some of its policies and into taking more or less vigorous actions both at home and abroad? Will India, for instance, change its past policies with respect to China? Will it alter its attitude toward the West, and in particular the United States? What policies is it likely to follow with regard to the Soviet Union and its own South Asian neighbors? Will it lose some of its enthusiasm for the doctrine of nonalignment? Might it take the position that in certain circumstances non-Asians can justifiably intervene in Asian affairs?

In determining the policies which it should adopt as China proceeds by stages to attain the position of a full-fledged atomic power, India is almost certain to be influenced by the conduct adopted by other powers--particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--and by the effect such action will have on China's international behavior.
SECTION ONE

INDIA UNDER NEHRU

Although India's scientists, political leaders, and press generally avoid the subject of China's ambition to become an atomic power, it can be taken for granted that all three are quite aware of the fact that Chinese scientists are making intensive efforts to develop nuclear weapons. A year or so ago a story was circulated in India to the effect that China might soon be in a position to produce its own atomic bomb. This report, however, was in general toned down and received little press coverage. The Indian leaders are apparently reluctant to come to grips with the problems that India is likely to face in dealing with a nuclear-armed China. It is believed, however, that when an atomic device is actually detonated both the Indian leaders and the Indian public will be deeply concerned.

This concern will undoubtedly result in a careful review of India's domestic, foreign, and defense policies. It is also likely that, as China proceeds through Stages A, B, and C to develop into an atomic power, whole series of such reviews will take place.

Various Policies that India May Adopt as China Develops into an Atomic Power

Let us review some of the policies that India may adopt or at least consider as a militant China moves in the direction of becoming one of the great atomic powers:

1) It may increase its efforts to produce its own atomic weapons.
2) It may accelerate its efforts to strengthen its general defensive capabilities.
3) It may at the same time intensify its insistence upon the banning of atomic weapons and on general disarmament.
4) It may make urgent and repeated appeals to China to come to a friendly understanding with India on the future of Asia.
5) It may at various stages maneuver to have the United Nations bring pressure to bear on China to refrain from acts of aggression.
6) It may urge the Soviet Union to try to persuade China to come to a friendly understanding with India.
In connection with its efforts to strengthen India's ability to defend itself, the Government of India has until very recently exercised care not to create the impression among the Indian peoples that they might be called upon to fight China. The Indian Government, in fact, appeared to follow a policy of minimizing the possibility of conflict with China. The Indian peoples, in general, have tended to show more alarm at the aggressive attitude of China than has their government.

When the Government of India learns that China is succeeding in its efforts to produce atomic bombs and is developing into an atomic power, it will intensify its endeavors to strengthen India's defense capabilities. It might well, however, continue to be reluctant to admit openly that it regards China as India's most dangerous potential enemy or that it would consider China's possession of nuclear weapons as a danger to India.

Increased Insistence on the Banning of Atomic Weapons and on General Disarmament

Concomitant with its efforts to close the nuclear gap between itself and China and to strengthen India's general defensive capacity, the Government of India would undoubtedly, upon learning that China is beginning to produce nuclear weapons, insist even more loudly than in the past upon general disarmament. It would try to persuade as many nations as possible to join it in bringing pressure to bear upon the Great Powers to come to agreements that would outlaw the use of atomic weapons and result in the reduction of all kinds of armaments.

Employment of the United Nations as an Instrument of Pressure on China

India would probably make what use it could of the United Nations in connection with India's endeavors to bring about the banning of atomic weapons and the abolition or reduction of armaments. India's efforts in this respect would not be directed against China or any other individual nation directly, but against atomic weapons and armament races generally.

The time might well come, however, when India's concern at China's aggressive policy would be so acute that it would welcome United Nations intervention. India would probably try to maneuver a third nation into taking the lead in presenting the issue of Chinese expansionism to the United Nations. India would even try, so far as circumstances would admit, to assume a neutral, detached
India would of course like for the Soviet Union, should it fail to move China through friendly persuasion, to adopt a firmer tone. India would, for instance, like the Soviet Union to inform China that if the latter should become involved in a war with the West as the result of attempts to move into South Asia, China could not expect help from the Soviet Union. It would not be easy for Indian diplomacy to suggest that the Soviets take action of this kind. If India should fully succeed in its efforts to win the confidence of the Soviet Union, however, an Indian leader like Nehru in the course of a frank and friendly exchange with a Soviet leader of the stature of Khrushchev might be able to convey this impression. The cost to India of maintaining the kind of atmosphere in its relations with the Soviet Union that would be conducive to such a frank exchange might be rather high. The Soviet Union might well expect more support from India in the international arena than it has hitherto received. It would not, however, be to the advantage of either India or the Soviet Union for India to go so far in this respect as to create the impression in the West and among the unaligned nations that India had joined the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, important as the support of the Soviet Union might be, India could not afford to obtain it by pursuing policies that would forfeit the friendship of the West and the confidence of the other unaligned nations.

If, therefore, the Soviet Union should decide to inform China that the latter could not expect Soviet assistance if it should become involved in a war with the West as the result of China's aggressive attitude toward the countries of South Asia, the Soviet Union would probably do so in its own interests—not as a result of urging on the part of India.

India's position would become more difficult if the Soviet Union should refuse to try to exert a restraining influence on China. India's subsequent actions in such an eventuality would depend in part on the tone of the refusal. If, for instance, the Soviet Union should display sympathy and understanding and base its refusal upon inability to help, India would probably continue to try to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. If, however, Russia should show a lack of sympathy and advise India to come to an understanding with China on such terms as China might dictate, India might feel constrained to make some basic changes in its foreign policies and to place greater reliance for its security on friendship with the West. If the attitude of the Soviet Union should be such that India would be convinced that it intended to give full support to China if any non-Asian power should attempt to intervene between China and India, India might be faced with a choice which it would like to avoid—that between
technical assistance. It would, however, be prepared to send Indian officers both to the Soviet Union and to the various countries of the West for training in the handling of new weapons and for learning the new tactics demanded by the existence of such weapons. It would also welcome civilian assistance from both the Soviet Union and the West in the erection, maintenance, and operation of defense plants.

If the war clouds over South Asia should deepen, India would be likely at one point or another to go so far as to ask the Soviet Union or the West or both for nuclear weapons, for assistance in speeding up its own production of such weapons, and for aid in learning how most effectively to use them.

Efforts to Persuade the United States to Threaten Intervention Should China Try to Conquer Any South Asian Countries

As China becomes militarily stronger and more aggressive, India would be relieved if the United States would threaten China with attack if it should move against India or any other South Asian country.

If the United States should convey this threat entirely of its own volition, India would probably be inclined to take the attitude that the United States had decided to assume the main burden of the defense of South Asia in America's own interests. For the time being at least, India might, therefore, try to play the role of an unaligned spectator. If the United States should fail to issue such a warning, however, and if the situation should become extremely serious, India might well try through various indirect means to prevail upon the United States. Even in this state of peril, however, India would do its utmost to avoid the appearance of being in any way responsible for the issuance of the warning.

India's Reaction to an Attack by a Nuclear-armed China

If India should be attacked by China with conventional weapons, or with both conventional and nuclear weapons, we are convinced that it would resist with all the means at its disposal and would also call upon all "peace-loving countries" to come to its aid.

In our opinion, India would also come to the assistance of Pakistan and Nepal if either or both of them should be
The Chinese would run into grave difficulties, however, when, after defeating the Indian armed forces, they set out to restore law and order in India. Chinese aggression in South Asia would be almost sure to result in fanning Indian nationalism into a flame with which it would be difficult for the Chinese invaders to deal. Just as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union did more to arouse patriotism and produce a sense of unity in that country than the Communist regime had been able to do over a period of more than twenty years, so Chinese aggression in South Asia could stir India to its very depths. China would not find it easy, therefore, to convert an aroused India with its four hundred million people into a satellite Communist state. India is no longer as Clive found it; the Indians have tasted nationalism.

Summary of Possible Indian Reactions Under the Leadership of Nehru

At the risk of some repetition, we are setting forth below in summary form some of the possible reactions of India under Nehru to various international situations and problems as China goes through the process of acquiring its own nuclear weapons:

1) Confirmation that China is achieving success in the production of an atomic bomb will give rise to deep concern in India—a concern that will be likely to deepen unless at some point China shows itself prepared to come to an acceptable understanding with India.

2) An understanding acceptable to India would include assurances that China considered South Asia, including Burma, to be in the sphere of Indian influence and would not, therefore, attempt any move into that area.

3) India will try to keep the door open for such an understanding with China so long as there is any hope that it might be reached.

4) India, while it would take either diplomatic or military measures for its security in the face of possible Chinese aggression, would try to avoid giving China the kind of offense which might result in the closing of the door.

5) India will continue to make special efforts to retain the respect and friendship of the Soviet Union and might at appropriate times make use of this friendship in endeavors to persuade the Soviet Union to press
has been pursuing ever since the establishment of its independence would of course be bankrupt and it would be compelled to start building new policies on such remnants of the old as remained.

Another possible situation with which we have not as yet dealt is one in which China, feeling more confident as it masters the production and use of nuclear weapons, engages in acts of open aggression or of subversion in Southeast and Northeast Asia, but assumes a friendly attitude toward India. Without making any definite commitments China continually assures India that, if the latter does not interfere with China's activities in other parts of Asia, India need not worry about South Asia. India would be deeply concerned at a development of this kind since it could not be sure that China would not eventually turn also against South Asia. In such a quandary India would probably be relieved if the United States should come to the aid of the victims of Chinese aggression on the other side of the Himalayas. India would try nevertheless to maintain an attitude of detachment and nonalignment. It would even be in keeping with India's general policies to intimate from time to time that if the United States had not continued, despite India's advice, to meddle in Asian affairs China would not have attacked its neighbors. In case a war should break out between the United States and China as a result of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, India, although formally neutral, would probably show sympathy for China whenever occasion offered.

In the absence of an understanding with China that would cause India to be convinced that China, after having absorbed its neighbors to the East, really had no intention of going into South Asia, India would continue to take the steps in the field of diplomacy and military preparedness referred to in early portions of this study to strengthen its security. India would also exercise care to the end that its expressions of sympathy for China and its criticisms of the United States would not be of a character which might result in a cessation of American aid or so alienate American public opinion that help would not be readily forthcoming in case the Chinese should begin to threaten South Asia itself.
to Nehru personally for having attained the positions of responsibility which they now occupy. It would be difficult to predict the extent of support which the members of this group would receive from the Indian electorate in case they should no longer have Nehru to back them. There is always, however, a possibility that one or more of them might capture the popular imagination and be able to assume Nehru's mantle.

The Indian armed forces inherited from the British the tradition that politics was an area reserved for civilians and not to be invaded by the military. Since the end of the British raj the Indian Army has steadfastly adhered to this tradition, although from time to time individual Indian military leaders have displayed an interest in political developments that has given rise to a degree of uneasiness on the part of various politicians. The fact that the Indian armed forces are in general inclined to be pro-Western in their orientation has been displeasing to Nehru; and there can be little doubt that one of the tasks with which Krishna Menon was charged as Minister of Defense was to bring about a change in this orientation by gradually replacing officers in positions of responsibility who were considered pro-Western by men whose views with regard to international affairs might be more in accord with those of Nehru and Menon himself, and by introducing appropriate educational programs. It would seem that Krishna Menon undertook his new duties with so much zeal that the impression was created among the armed forces that he was maneuvering with the purpose of converting them into his personal political instrument. The consequent resentment became so deep that he has found it expedient to move with greater caution and more restraint in the performance of his task.

In our opinion, the Indian armed forces, despite Menon's maneuvers, continue to be pro-Western in their outlook but at the same time remain committed to noninterference in Indian political affairs. The possibility cannot be dismissed, however, that if, following the disappearance of Nehru, the situation in India should become chaotic or the country should be in danger of disintegration, the armed forces as the most disciplined and the strongest unifying force in the country might take over the government, at least on a caretaker basis.

Unless there should be some developments which we are not in a position to anticipate, we are inclined to believe that Nehru will be succeeded by one or several of the veteran
All three types of governments referred to above, or any other kind of government sincerely interested in the maintenance of India's independence, would be concerned at the prospect of China's becoming a nuclear power, and would, we believe, therefore adopt at least some of the measures which we have suggested a Nehru government might take as China advanced by various stages to attain that status.

The foreign policies of these governments, however, would probably vary somewhat with regard to direction and emphasis. Some of these governments would place special emphasis on certain factors and be influenced by considerations in which the others would have little or no interest. There would also be differences with regard to the timing of the measures adopted.

Let us consider briefly some of the developments that might take place following the disappearance of Nehru.

In our opinion Nehru is more likely to be succeeded by one, or a coalition, of the veteran leaders of the Congress Party than by one or several of his present close associates, who have less historic Party stature. We shall not attempt here to go into personalities or to designate the individual or individuals who might assume the responsibilities of the government. We are convinced that a government dominated by senior Party leaders would be inclined to pursue foreign policies somewhat more friendly to the West than those that have been followed by Nehru. We do not believe, however, that such a regime would abandon the policy of nonalignment unless practically forced to do so as the result of Communist bloc hostility. A Congress government, in our opinion, would show more appreciation for the assistance received from the West than shown thus far by Nehru, and would not be so prone as he has been to criticize the West and to gloss over those attitudes and activities of the Communist bloc that are not in keeping with currently accepted standards of international intercourse. In formulating Indian foreign policies a Congress government would not be likely to be influenced by hopes for the establishment of a Delhi-Peiping Axis. On the other hand, it would probably make a special effort to prevent a situation from developing in which it would be squeezed between a hostile China and an unfriendly Soviet Union.

If, following the disappearance of Nehru, the new government should be dominated by one or several of Nehru's present protégés, rather than by veterans of the Congress Party, India would probably try to pursue policies more in keeping with those followed by
the Asian nations on the other side of the Himalayas who are justifiably fearful of Chinese aggression.

We do not believe that we should terminate our discussion of the kind of a government that might succeed Nehru without referring to another possibility that cannot be entirely dismissed. As a result of linguistic, ethnic, cultural, religious, and other differences, sentiments of separatism have developed from time to time in various parts of India. Had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of Patel, India might never have become a unified nation. Nehru has encountered difficulties at various times in keeping these centrifugal tendencies in check. There is a possibility, therefore, that if, following Nehru's disappearance from the political scene, he should be succeeded by a weak or incompetent government, India might begin to break up into a number of states. In case of a development of this kind, the Indian armed forces would probably intervene for the purpose of maintaining the union. If they should fail to do so, or if their intervention should be unsuccessful, India as an entity might disappear; and in its place would emerge several states, one or more of which might be dominated by Communists. These Communist states might enjoy the support of China or of the Soviet Union or of both, depending on the situation. In such circumstances the fragments of the former India might be not only unable to protect a neighbor such as Nepal from Chinese aggression, but also unable to defend themselves.
CHAPTER III

BURMA, CEYLOM, NEPAL, AND PAKISTAN

The realization that China is succeeding in its efforts to become a nuclear power is certain to give rise to concern among India's South Asian neighbors. This anxiety would stem primarily from the fear that a China armed with nuclear weapons might consider itself sufficiently strong to embark upon a course of aggression that would eventually affect the peace of South Asia and these nations' own sovereignty.

Burma and Nepal would not at the present time be able to defend themselves against a China equipped with only conventional weapons. Their security, therefore, depends even now to a large extent upon the restraining influence that other nations either individually or collectively are able to exert on a China ambitious to convert or subdue Asia to communism. In view of their dependent position, it is natural that these nations should have considerable anxiety lest the redistribution of military power in Asia in consequence of the acquisition by China of nuclear weapons result in the weakening of the external restraints that at present hold Chinese aggressiveness in check. If these restraints should be weakened, there would be little that these countries could do on their own behalf, other than to appeal for help to the United Nations and to individual Great Powers. The extensive borders that Burma and Nepal share with China place these states in particularly vulnerable positions. An aggressive China, sensing a relaxation of external restraints, might well,
Although West Pakistan would be less vulnerable to Chinese infiltration or aggression than most areas of South Asia, East Pakistan, which contains more than half of Pakistan's population would be in grave danger, particularly if Burma should succumb. Overpopulated, poverty-stricken, and isolated, East Pakistan could not possibly survive as a part of free Pakistan if India should fall under Communist domination. Although the Pakistanis find India under Nehru an unsatisfactory neighbor, a Communist-dominated India would certainly be a more dangerous one. Pakistan would, therefore, be pursuing an almost suicidal policy if it should enter into an overt or tacit alliance with China against India.

We cannot be sure, however, that Pakistan's foreign policies will always be determined by logic or by self-interest. When the people of a country is thoroughly aroused, when emotions become bitter and deep, and when a sense of complete frustration creeps in, a country may deliberately pursue a course that is not only illogical but also suicidal. Iran under Mossadegh furnishes an example of a nation that in an orgy of deep emotion seemed to prefer suicide to a course that, although logical, was distasteful.

Pakistan at the present time is smarting under what it considers to be the injustice of the Kashmir situation. It is angered at the manner in which the Western powers appear to be currying favor with an India which is cynically flouting the resolutions of the United Nations and is continuously criticizing and ridiculing Pakistan for maintaining its Western alliances. At a certain moment Pakistan's cup of bitterness may overflow and, regardless of the consequences, that country may sever its ties with the West and form some kind of working partnership with China.

At the present time certain elements in India are hinting at a resort to armed force to drive the Pakistanis out of all of Kashmir, just as the Portuguese were driven out of Goa. If India should resort to violence in order to expel the Pakistanis from the fringes of Kashmir and if the reaction in the West should be similar to what it was when India seized Goa, Pakistan might well break off its Western alliances and turn toward China.

About the only benefit that Pakistan would be likely to derive from entering into a working partnership with China
unless it were willing to accept India's solution of the Kashmir problem, would encounter Indian opposition in finding a suitable place for itself in the Afro-Asian camp. Egypt would not be likely to welcome Pakistan's association with the Arab World while the Soviet Union would probably continue in a frigid attitude unless Pakistan were prepared to make certain internal and external concessions that might eventually undermine its integrity.

It would seem therefore that it would be to Pakistan's advantage to continue its Western orientation and to continue to rely primarily on the West for assistance in dealing with its international problems. In our opinion, in spite of the frustrations and bitterness that so many Pakistanis feel, Pakistan will continue to follow this course. It will probably try to maintain as friendly relations with China as the situation permits, and remain aloof from such disputes as may develop between China and India, if China should become more aggressive. If, however, China's aggressiveness should assume a character menacing to the ultimate security of East Pakistan, the Pakistan Government would probably appeal to the West to take such measures as might be necessary to keep China within bounds. Pakistan would not be likely to look either to the Soviet Union or to India for assistance.
CHAPTER IV

POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON SOUTH ASIA IF CHINA SHOULD ASSUME A RESTRAINED AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE AS IT DEVELOPS INTO AN ATOMIC POWER

Our discussion hitherto has been based on the assumption that as China moves in the direction of becoming an atomic power it will probe for weak spots among its neighbors and endeavor, whenever it believes that it can safely do so, to expand its power at their expense. China's purpose would be to establish Communist regimes in neighboring countries and then either to annex them or to reduce them to the status of puppets.

In our opinion such a policy would be in consonance with the views and attitudes of the present Chinese leadership, which to all appearances is determined to spread its particular brand of communism as rapidly and as widely as it safely can.

Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be completely dismissed that the increase in the military might of China resulting from its acquisition of nuclear weapons would have a sobering effect and would be accompanied by a growing sense of international responsibility and a greater restraint in dealing with its neighbors. We are therefore devoting a few paragraphs to what the effects on South Asia might be if as China acquires nuclear weapons it should begin to conduct itself more like a responsible
therefore, that the period of friendly coexistence between Communist China and the countries of South Asia would be of long duration. When that time would come to an end it is probable that these countries would again be faced with a militant nuclear-armed China, and would resort to some of the measures outlined in previous sections of this study to meet Chinese aggressiveness.
CHAPTER V

POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON SOUTH ASIA IF THERE SHOULD BE A COMPLETE BREAK BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND A NUCLEAR-ARMED CHINA

We have based our discussion thus far on the assumption that, although the relations between China and the Soviet Union may at times be marked by coolness and suspicion, these two giant powers will continue generally to cooperate in facing the non-Communist World.

The possibility should not be ignored, however, that at some time during the period of China's development into an atomic power, there will be a complete breakdown in the cooperation between China and the Soviet Union and that each will go entirely its own way in promoting its particular type of communism.

Such a breakdown would be likely to have two distinct effects on the reactions of India and the other South Asian countries to the acquisition by China of nuclear weapons.

In the first place the fear of Chinese aggression would undoubtedly become more acute. There is a general impression in South Asia that the Soviet Union during recent years has been exerting a restraining influence on its partner. A China
the Soviet Union. China might be willing to take a gamble that neither the West nor the Soviet Union would wish to become involved in a war in order to save these two small and geographically vulnerable countries, and India, without assurances of the support of one or more of the Great Powers, would do nothing. If China should establish puppet Communist regimes and military bases in Nepal and Burma, it would be in a better position systematically to weaken India by subversion and penetration accompanied by a rattling of nuclear weapons.

A rupture between the Soviet Union and China would not improve the position of Pakistan, which would feel even more painfully the squeeze of the pincers composed of India on the one side and of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union on the other. The alternatives facing Pakistan would in general be similar to those which we outlined in discussing that nation's problems in the context of cooperation between the Soviet Union and a nuclear-armed China. In our opinion Pakistan's decision would be the same: that is, it would continue to retain its present alliances and to depend on the West for assistance in resisting an aggressive China or Soviet Union.

2. See above, pp. 26-29.
CHAPTER VI

POSSIBLE US ACTIONS AND POLICIES DESIGNED TO PREVENT

A NUCLEAR-ARMED CHINA FROM WEAKENING THE POSITION

OF THE FREE WORLD IN SOUTH ASIA

What should the United States do to soften the impact upon South Asia of the acquisition by China of nuclear weapons and to prevent the consequent military strengthening of China from seriously damaging the position of the Free World in that area? The direction taken by South Asia with its more than half a billion poverty-stricken and, for the most part, illiterate peoples during the next few years will be an important factor in determining the outcome of the present world struggle. The United States, therefore, cannot afford to observe developments as a passive spectator. It should pursue policies and take actions calculated to ensure that these nations do not go over to the enemy camp.

The United States, in considering what it should or should not do in the situation that seems likely to develop in South Asia as China approaches the status of an atomic power, should bear in mind that the peoples of this area, still smarting from the memories of their colonial days, are inclined to be suspicious of the Great Powers of the West and are quick to take offense at moves that can be interpreted as foreign intervention or pressure.
in Pakistan would be bitter and violent. India is important to US security, but a bitterly hostile Pakistan could also do great damage to America's position in South Asia.

Similarly, if Nepal should request military assistance, the United States should remember that India considers that it has the primary responsibility for the defense of Nepal and would probably be resentful if the US should undertake to furnish Nepal military equipment without first consulting India. On the other hand, if Nepal should learn that the United States were consulting India before acting on Nepal's request, Nepal would undoubtedly feel aggrieved at what it would consider as a reflection on its sovereignty.

US diplomatic representatives to these countries should be carefully selected on the basis of personality, sensitivity, and sympathetic understanding; knowledge not only of the problems of the area but also of their relationship to world problems; experience in diplomatic procedures and nuances; and ability to adapt themselves to difficult and rapidly changing situations. The peoples in this area, from the national leaders down to the peasants in the villages, are not impressed by dullness or stodginess on the part of diplomats. A certain amount of style and sparkle is likely to be more effective than the homely approach that is too frequently the refuge of the lazy or inexperienced diplomat.

One of the most effective and speedy ways in which an American diplomat in South Asia can dissipate the prestige and influence of the United States is to try to win the friendship and goodwill of the national leaders of the country to which he is accredited by engaging in a campaign of unadulterated flattery and abject obsequiousness. Although he may make himself useful to the leaders who are the target of such a campaign, he will not win their respect or confidence and he will reduce the prestige and influence of the United States.

Since the officers of the armed forces are among the most discriminating and perceptive elements in these countries, it is particularly important that the military attaches in American embassies be selected with care on the basis of personality, tact, discretion, and professional competence.

It is suggested that instructions be sent without delay, if they have not already been dispatched, to each chief of diplomatic mission in the countries of South Asia, suggesting that he discuss frankly with the president, the prime minister, or the foreign minister--as the envoy's judgment may determine--the possibility
Kashmir issue and resents references to it. Pakistan stoutly maintains that there is very much of a problem and that there will continue to be one so long as India retains possession of the Vale of Kashmir without a plebiscite. It is particularly important that, whenever the United States does engage in discussions with regard to Kashmir, there be no publicity or leaks.

If China should become increasingly aggressive, the United States might find it useful informally and discreetly to discuss Chinese policy with the Soviet Union with emphasis upon the dangers inherent in the situation. The nature of such an approach would depend to some extent upon what the United States conceives to be the state of relations between China and the Soviet Union at the time. Should it be of the opinion that the Soviet Union still had a certain amount of influence over China, the United States might suggest that Russia urge the Chinese to exert more restraint. If in Washington's judgment Russia no longer had such power, the United States might suggest that Russia at least warn China of what the consequences of continued aggression might be.

On any such approach, however, it must be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, should it no longer consider China as an ally, might be pleased if hostilities should develop between the United States and China, just as it was delighted in 1937 when war broke out between China and Japan, and in 1939 when Germany became involved in war with France and Great Britain.

If China's aggressive attitude should seem to afford grounds for United Nations action, the United States should give such assistance as might be desired to any of the South Asian countries that might wish to introduce a resolution, and give it our full support. The United States should also be prepared, should it seem useful, to introduce a motion of its own. In general, the United States should not hesitate to resort to the United Nations whenever occasion offers—not so much because there would be much hope that the United Nations would be able to take effective action as because one should not fail to take advantage of any peace-preserving machinery that might be available.

If China, while acquiring atomic weapons, appears determined on a course of aggression, the United States must decide as soon as possible how far it would be prepared to go in efforts to prevent the various nations of Asia from (a) falling victim to open threats or overt military aggression, and (b) succumbing to veiled threats or infiltration. In making these
the first place such plans must be a coordinated fraction of a general plan for all of Asia. What the United States decides to do with regard to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan has a bearing on what it should do with regard to South Asian countries.

In the second place there are basic questions, unanswerable at this time, as to the kind of weapons to be employed if the United States should decide to defend the countries of South Asia. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to defend Burma and Nepal with conventional weapons. If the Chinese should try to take over these two countries by subversion and infiltration—not by overt threats or warfare—would America's allies support it in resorting to nuclear attacks on China? Would they give the United States such support if China should attempt to take over these countries by warfare conducted by conventional weapons or by nuclear weapons? Should the United States try to protect Nepal and Burma by making a nuclear attack on China without the approval or support of its allies?

It would be a little easier to assist India, Ceylon, and Pakistan, in spite of their distance from United States military establishments, since these countries would be more accessible to US sea and air forces. Even in the event the United States should decide to come to these nations' assistance, the question would arise as to whether the United States should attack China with nuclear or conventional weapons from the Pacific.

If the United States should come to the conclusion that direct or indirect aggression on the part of China against any free Asian country would be a dangerous threat to American security, the simplest approach to the problem would be to make it clear that the United States would attack China with appropriate—possibly, including nuclear—weapons if it should engage in aggression against any of these countries. Such an approach would be reminiscent of the "massive retaliation" policy suggested by Mr. John Foster Dulles a number of years ago, but since largely discarded as unfeasible. Even this policy, however, might involve certain complications. India, for instance, in the absence of a threat from China, might feel called upon to protest against what it would call the taking by the United States of a voluntary and undesired obligation to defend India against an aggression which it did not foresee. Furthermore, it would not be easy for the United States to draw up detailed plans for the defense of the countries of South Asia without the cooperation of these countries, a cooperation which, with the possible exception of Pakistan, they would probably not be willing to give until aggression was almost upon them.
States should also review its informational programs for this area from time to time to make sure that they are adjusted to changes resulting from the development of China as an atomic power.

It is furthermore suggested that the Departments of State and Defense establish a task force composed of members of those two departments and possibly also of the Central Intelligence Agency. This body, aided by consultants (including technicians outside the Government), would devote its full time during the next few years to devising plans for meeting the problems resulting from the emergence of China as an atomic power. Such a task force would be so staffed that it would have the capabilities of assessing the possible effects within the United States and in other world areas of any plans which it might be considering. To make sure that it was not working in a vacuum such a task force should keep in constant touch with the appropriate officers in the Departments of State and Defense.
APPENDIX

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Jawaharlal Nehru (b. 1889) comes from a distinguished Kashmir Brahman family, many generations of which have played important roles in Indian public life. He was the son of one of the most prominent lawyers in India, a man of great wealth and high standing among all elements of the Indian people. Jawaharlal's father had been educated in England and had learned to admire English culture and to respect the English people. He provided his children—Nehru was the only son among several daughters—with carefully selected British nurses and tutors. When Jawaharlal was old enough to go abroad his father sent him to Harrow, thence to Cambridge, and thence to London for the study of law.

While pursuing his studies in England the young Nehru associated with a group of intellectual, liberal fellow-students, most of them young British aristocrats who accepted him as one of their number.

As a result of his British schooling and of the early training of his English nurses and tutors, Nehru conceived a high admiration for British culture, institutions, and manners—a respect that has stayed with him over the years. He also learned to share with his instructors and associates some of their feelings with regard to the United States and to Americans in general.

Nehru returned to India, after completing his education, determined to enter into politics rather than to take up the practice of law or to embark upon a career in the Indian Civil Service. Although he had been treated as an equal by the young intellectuals and aristocrats with whom he had associated in England, he now found himself regarded by the British officials in India as a second-class citizen. He was furthermore deeply shocked by the wretched living conditions of the Indian masses, subject to famine which resulted in starvation by the millions; and he was deeply touched by these peoples' patience and long-suffering.
him the kind of society sought by Marx would be grim and bleak. His preference is for a society in which the individual can enjoy cultural freedom, in which there would be plenty of room for variety.

It would, therefore, be inaccurate to call Nehru a Marxist in spite of his distaste for capitalism and religion and despite the fact that from his youth he has not hesitated to join with Communists in United fronts. In his younger days, for instance, Nehru participated in a number of so-called anti-imperialist movements which were sponsored and supported by international communism. He attended several international anti-imperialist conferences where he met, and formed friendships with, young revolutionaries who subsequently became Communist leaders in their own countries. In those days, as now, the slogan of anti-imperialism was linked with that of anti-colonialism, and Nehru has continued to make energetic use of both slogans up to this day in connection with his efforts first to free India and later to build up a huge coalition of "unaligned" nations in which India and he personally would play a leading role.

Nehru is well suited for the role of leader of an unaligned coalition since he is a non-Communist rather than an anti-communist; since, while not accepting all of the tenets of communism, he does not consider communism necessarily as a wholly evil doctrine which should be completely eradicated; and since he has a tremendous following among the peoples of the so-called Western bloc. As a leader of the unaligned coalition Nehru exercises care to display a certain tolerance for communism. When he must oppose the Communists in India his attitude in general has been that, although he had no quarrel with communism as such, he considers that the Communists in India are following mistaken tactics.

From a pragmatic point of view it is probable that, despite his frequent protests at the existence of the two "power blocs," Nehru finds that the struggle between the Communist bloc and the West is useful to him in connection with his efforts to convert India into a great world power. Again and again he has been able to attain national objectives by playing one bloc off against another.

Nehru's dislike for private enterprise is based both on political theory and on personal convictions. He is convinced that if India is to play the role in world affairs which he plans for it, its economy must be solidly grounded on a foundation of basic industries—transport, trade, and so forth—owned and
Union do not hesitate to adopt strong measures for the purpose of raising the economic and cultural level of the Soviet people, whereas under the American system political leaders are prone to pander to the common denominator of American mediocrity rather than to run the risk of incurring resentment by an endeavor to raise economic and cultural levels. He is inclined to believe that, although there are exceptions, Americans in general are rather ill-mannered, somewhat vulgar middle-class upstarts who place great value upon success in money-making occupations and look with a certain suspicion if not disdain upon intellectual achievement.

Nehru's feeling with regard to the American people in general is reflected in his attitude toward the American government, the judgment of which he distrusts. He considers that American political leaders are naive, too much under the influence of American business leaders, and too likely to give in to popular pressures.

Nehru has come to the conclusion with some reluctance that he needs American financial and technical assistance in connection with the economic development of India. He is, therefore, more restrained than formerly in making comments or assuming attitudes which might unnecessarily offend the American public.

Ever since the establishment of Indian independence Nehru has made special efforts to win the friendship and confidence of the rulers of the Soviet Union. Only since the death of Stalin, however, has he achieved any degree of success in this regard. He clearly values the maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and takes care not to say or do anything which might place a serious strain upon them. In keeping with his policy of nonalignment he endeavors to balance aid agreements between India and the West with similar agreements with the Soviet Union.

There are indications that he is making use of his present friendly relations with Soviet leaders in trying to prevail upon them to persuade China to adopt a more friendly and less aggressive attitude toward India.

China's policy has been a distinct disappointment to Nehru. During the years immediately following the establishment of Indian independence Nehru had hoped to work with China in enhancing the position and prestige of Asia. His plan was to build an Asian edifice resting on foundations prepared by Sino-Indian cooperation which would eventually tower at least as high as the structure of European-American civilization. With this in view he did his utmost to reach an understanding with China. His hope was that
armed forces and, despite his criticism of the use of atomic weapons, there is reason to believe that the deep interest which he has shown during the last ten years in the development of nuclear power has not been stimulated exclusively by India's need of such power for peaceful uses only.

Since the passing of Gandhi, Nehru has been successful in introducing a note of militancy into Indian nationalism. As the old Gandhian disciples drop out of the national scene, less and less is heard of the doctrine of nonviolence. The enthusiastic support which the whole nation gave to the conquest of Goa is evidence that, given the power and the opportunity, India might well develop into a nation quite prepared to satisfy its own ambitions or to meet external pressures with any kind of arms that it can muster.
REATIONS TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED COMMUNIST CHINA:
JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN (U)

August 1962

International Studies Division

Institute for Defense Analyses

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REACTIONS TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED COMMUNIST CHINA:
JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN (U)

Papers by
DONALD B. KEESING
JOHN B. CARY
HAROLD C. HINTON

August 1962

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FOREWORD

The following papers on three US Asian allies were written for Study PACIFICA, an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power. The authors are all members of the International Studies Division.

Donald B. Keesing, who writes on Japan, is an economist and Far Eastern specialist. He gained experience in a variety of analytic studies at the Systems Analysis Office, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, and also taught economics at Harvard, where he served as an associate of the Harvard Economic Research Project. He has a long-standing interest and background in Far Eastern studies. Material for the present paper was partly drawn from interviews in Japan.

John B. Gary, who discusses some aspects of the Korean reaction, has worked closely with the problems of US policy in Korea, both as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces and, most recently, as leader of a Department of Defense Special Study Group on Korea.
Harold C. Hinton, who notes developments in Taiwan, has written and lectured extensively on the Far East. He is currently a visiting lecturer on Communist China at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

The International Studies Division of IDA undertook Study PACIFICA for the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective July 1, 1961. Brigadier General Sidney F. Giffin, USAF (Ret.) was the Study Leader.

JAMES E. KING, JR.
Director
International Studies Division
This paper benefitted in its early stages from the collaborative efforts of Roger Pineau, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
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SUMMARY

Japan is of outstanding importance to the United States position in Asia. The alliance with the United States, although subject to chronic tensions, is at least equally important to Japan.

The first Communist Chinese nuclear test is likely to create a political sensation in Japan. The precise degree and nature of the impact will depend on the circumstances surrounding the first and subsequent tests, notably political and economic conditions in Japan, the state of the Cold War, the staging of nuclear and related displays by the Communist Chinese, and the degree and character of prior preparation in both the United States and Japan.

Chinese nuclear demonstrations will bring to the surface issues on which the Japanese are deeply divided, including emotion-laden questions of rearmament and Japan's role in the World. Both conservatives and left-wing elements will doubtless interpret the event as justification for their contrasting foreign policies. Initial political repercussions are likely to favor the neutralist left wing; the ensuing interaction of events could endanger American military rights in Japan, and consequently the United States position in Asia. In the long run, Japan is likely to maintain
or revert to alliance with the United States unless the latter mis-
handles its relations with Japan; but the Japanese can be expected
to press for closer economic and political relations with Communist
China. Another, perhaps later, outcome could be a Japanese move
toward broader rearmament within the framework of a closer alliance
with the West.

A number of preparatory steps to ameliorate the political impact
of Chinese nuclear tests require initiation as soon as possible.
These measures include orienting Japanese public opinion by covert
and overt means, encouraging the Japanese government to prepare a
suitable response, and persuading Japanese news media to temper
their reactions. Carefully planned US actions, including a suitable
official response to the first Chinese nuclear test and timely mili-
tary measures, will also have a favorable impact. The need in
Japan after the first detonation is for a calm and militarily reas-
suring US reaction. The first test may not be the only crisis.
Continued US attention to Japanese needs and sensitivities, includ-
ing trade and prestige, will be of utmost importance.

An independent Japanese effort to obtain nuclear weapons
appears not to be in the US interest. Expansion of Japanese defense
commitments should be guided so as to take place within a democratic
framework and in close conjunction with US military programs.
I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Limitations

The purpose of this essay is:

1) To assess the effects that Communist China's emergence as a nuclear power might have on Japan, in terms both of present-day Japan and of that country's future.

2) To suggest possible US policies and actions, designed to orient Japanese reactions and relationships in directions favorable to the United States in a world being altered by China's emergence as a nuclear power.

Many of the questions considered are too speculative and involve too many uncertainties to admit of definite answers. Time and new developments may change the picture before China reaches the threshold of nuclear testing.

Basic Assumptions

It is assumed that between mid-1963 and late 1965 Communist China will be successful in detonating a nuclear device and will thereafter rapidly develop a crude regional nuclear capability, followed eventually by a sophisticated regional nuclear
capability; that mainland China will continue to be Communist-dominated; and that there will be neither a general war nor an effective comprehensive arms control agreement.

Order of Presentation

Japan's position in relation to Communist China as a nuclear power will be discussed under five headings:

1) An appreciation of Japan's strategic value to the Free World and to the Communist bloc.

2) Underlying factors affecting the Japanese reaction to China's emergence as a nuclear power.

3) Japanese reactions to the first Chinese nuclear detonation.

4) Japan's long-term requirements and role in a world in which China is a nuclear power.

5) Consequent recommendations for US policy.
II. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC VALUE

For the United States, Japan is strategically the most valuable ally—and in many ways the most important country—in non-Communist Asia, even though her current international political influence is not particularly impressive.

Japan's political importance stems, in part, from her economic position, which, however, incorporates both strengths and weaknesses. She ranks fourth in production among the industrial regions of the world—after the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. As an industrial power Japan is far ahead of Communist China. The Japanese have overtaken the British in steel production, and in this and other respects rival the West Germans. In recent years the rates of growth of Japanese industrial output and gross national product, exceeding 10 per cent in several years, have been setting startling records for a non-Communist country, and have frequently surpassed Soviet performance.

Neighboring Japan are areas with some of the world's most extensive undeveloped and partially developed resources, notably China, Southeast Asia, and the eastern part of the Soviet Union. Japanese skills and industrial capacity could assist any of these regions; for example, by providing economic and technical exchanges. At present, trade with the non-Communist Far East absorbs almost 25 per cent of Japan's exports and supplies about 18 per cent of her imports; these trade relations in turn are major elements in the trade of many of the individual countries. Trade with Communist China is less than one per cent of Japan's total trade. The Japanese are already playing a role in economic development of nearby non-Communist underdeveloped countries and there appear to be important future possibilities.

2. See Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Foreign Trade of Japan 1961 (Tokyo, June 1961), pp. 135-54. For the most part, Japan's trade faces west. The United States supplies about 35% of Japan's imports and buys 27% of her exports (which in turn represent about 7% of US trade). Western European and other US allies are also very important in Japan's trade. Less than 3% is with the Communist bloc, primarily with the Soviet Far East. Cf. United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960 (New York, 1962), p. 329.

3. Trade with Communist China fluctuates from year to year, partly in response to changing political winds. 1960 Japanese exports direct to mainland China were valued at only $2.7 million, but considerably more were shipped via Hong Kong. Japanese imports from the mainland stood at $20.7 million. Cf. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Foreign Trade of Japan 1961 (Tokyo, June 1961), pp. 208-212.
of a closer United States-Japanese partnership for this purpose.

The great weakness of Japan's economic situation is that for raw materials she must rely almost entirely on imports, and must continuously strive to export, to assure a trade balance accommodating this need. Fortunately, as will be brought out in a subsequent section, her raw materials needs can best be supplied by the West.

Japan's close proximity to both China and the Soviet Union is a factor in her strategic importance. A naval and air power which controls the Japanese islands must tend to dominate the northwestern Pacific, and will be in an advantageous position to exert pressure on the nearby Asian mainland. Japan's ports, harbors, maritime tradition, and shipbuilding capacity are unequaled in the Far East.

The United States enjoys treaty rights to a number of air and naval bases, supply depots, and other facilities in the country. These are irreplaceable assets for United States operations in the Korea-Manchuria-Soviet Maritime Territory area. Loss of Japan as a United States ally would eliminate an important intelligence base, impair certain general war strikes, and seriously hamper and perhaps prevent the defense of South Korea.

The islands also represent the natural supply base and communications link for pro-Western forces exerting power further
south. Loss of base rights in Japan would seriously overload Okinawa and weaken the operational capabilities of the Seventh Fleet and the Pacific Air Forces, thereby diminishing United States ability to project power against the Chinese mainland and to assist in the defense of Taiwan. The United States position in Southeast Asia would also suffer unless a major buildup could be achieved in the Philippines. A hostile Japan would make US retention of the formerly Japanese-held, pro-Japanese island of Okinawa politically difficult, adding to the deterioration of the US position.

Agreements implementing the United States-Japan alliance place restrictions on US use of Japanese bases. The United States must consult Japan before any major change in the deployment into Japan of American armed forces, before any major change in their equipment (for example, involving missiles or nuclear weapons), and before using Japan as a base for military combat operations, except in direct defense of Japan itself. There is, however, a secret understanding of January 6, 1960, releasing the United States from the obligation to consult with Japan in the event of

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emergency operations by United Nations forces to repel a renewed armed attack in Korea. In practice, Japanese politics have dictated the denial to US forces of the right to store nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. This means that nuclear weapons must be kept in ships offshore, although in a real emergency approval of their use from Japanese bases might be a formality. The proscription has little effect on naval forces, but is a very real hindrance to the immediate capability of tactical air forces.

For the future there might be real benefits in extending US military rights, but the political prospects for this at present are poor. Some observers have also argued that in the long run there would be advantages in having Japanese forces as allies in roles other than self-defense, but since the early 1950s there has been decreased advocacy of Japanese armament for such purposes, and present Japanese political inclinations militate against such a possibility.

The Communist immediate objective for Japan is to deny it to the United States as an ally. For this purpose Communist propaganda in Japan has been laboring to foster neutralist and anti-American sentiments.

The Japanese Islands, in view of their geographical position and industrial power, would be a valuable acquisition for the
Communist bloc. Communist China would welcome greater access to Japanese skills in the form of technical assistance and difficult-to-produce equipment. A China-Japan alliance would exert formidable economic and political pressure in Asia.

Both the Soviets and the Communist Chinese, however, continue to harbor significant anti-Japanese feelings. Japan—a traditional enemy of Russia—has on occasion had the upper hand in the Far East, while the Chinese had the irritating experience of seeing the Japanese Army pull out intact from China after the Second World War.

The fear of Japan's rising again in alliance with the United States has been a factor in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Article I of the treaty of alliance, signed on February 14, 1950, reads as follows:

Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the

other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

No other publicly revealed contract binds the Soviet Union to come to the aid of Communist China (or vice versa), and the wording of the present treaty is ambiguous enough so that the Soviets could construe it as not covering a wide variety of situations in which China and the United States might become involved in military conflict. Clearly, however, both China and the Soviet Union are anxious to prevent intensified Japanese military cooperation with the United States.
III. UNDERLYING FACTORS AFFECTING A JAPANESE RESPONSE

Japanese reactions to the first Chinese nuclear test and to Communist China's subsequent emergence as a nuclear power will be affected by a number of significant features of the present Japanese scene. These include the US alliance and the strains it induces; Japan's lonely and, from her point of view, insufficiently influential position in the world; the schism between left and right in Japanese politics; Japan's prolonged awakening from the traumatic shock of defeat and occupation; Japanese attitudes toward China, predisposing to a "soft" line; strong but conflicting feelings on militarism and rearmament; and hypersensitivity on nuclear weapons and radiation. A brief evaluation of these factors represents the necessary prelude to a discussion of their possible influence and interaction after the first Chinese test.

Attitudes Toward the United States and the Present Alliance

Japan continues the alliance with the United States as a matter of self-interest; for Japan, the alliance offers military security and economic opportunity.
The initial peace treaty with the United States and accompanying security agreements were signed on September 8, 1951, more than a year after the Sino-Soviet pact. The currently effective United States-Japan treaty, giving greater recognition to Japanese rights and sovereignty than its predecessor, was signed on January 19, 1960. Under it each party "recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." Japan grants bases for United States land, air, and sea forces "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." The parties further agree to work together to develop their defense forces, and to consult from time to time on implementation of the treaty, and also wherever international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. The accompanying agreements on consultation have already been mentioned.


7. See above, pp. 6-7.
Among the evident strains on the alliance the most important are associated with US bases in Japan and the resulting presence of some 45,000 American military personnel. Other irritations include the protectionism of US manufacturers, the prime position of Europe in US policy, differences over the disposition of nuclear weapons, the US position and conduct in Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, and the role of the United States in keeping Japan from closer relations with Communist China. Japanese coolness toward the Republic of Korea is a potential source of strain. Anti-American feeling, where present, may to some degree reflect resentment of Japan's relative political isolation and partial economic and military dependence on the United States.

Despite these irritations and the fact that many Japanese oppose the alliance, most Japanese have a certain admiration and regard for the United States. Even during the 1960 security treaty riots, private polls indicated that the United States was the most popular foreign country with the majority of Japanese and the least popular with very few. The postwar occupation and other contacts have apparently left more friendships than scars to a people quick to learn from abroad. Since 1945 the United States has been Japan's principal model.
Japanese Isolation and Lack of Influence Within the Western Alliance

Japan is in important respects a member of the Western community of nations and follows events in Europe closely and with sympathy, but there is at present no special alliance or agreement, apart from peace settlements, cementing Japanese relations with any NATO country (or for that matter any country) except the United States. This puts Japan in a lonely and dependent position, which is heightened by the small degree of Japanese influence on world opinion and Western policy. The Japanese usually show signs of uneasiness when the United States acts to link itself more closely to Western Europe.

This relative isolation is a threat to Japan's trade. Whenever US negotiations or trade policies permit the blocking off of new areas or types of commerce against Japanese exports, or the raising of existing barriers, Japanese anxiety becomes very real. Japanese and American economic interests frequently coincide but are seldom identical. The reduction of European trade barriers, for example, is of interest to both economies, but US policy favors elimination of tariffs only on the manufactured

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8. Japan participates, however, together with all NATO members except Iceland, in the informal coordinating committee on strategic exports to the Communist bloc /COMINT/. Japan is also a member of the Colombo Plan and a few other Western-sponsored international enterprises.
goods in which the United States and Common Market together produce most of the non-Communist world output. These goods are not Japanese specialties.

Attitude Toward China and the Soviet Union

Past experiences with China tend to predispose the Japanese to a "soft" line. Culturally Japan is greatly in debt to China as the result of continuing contact, although strong differences in culture and language have persisted. Most Japanese respect China's historic achievements and many feel a sense of cultural kinship with the mainland.

A recent set of Japanese experiences connected with China stem from Japanese involvement on the mainland before and during the Second World War. Many Japanese allege that the war left a feeling of remorse for Japanese excesses in China; be this as it may, wartime contacts fostered a sense of Japanese technical superiority compared to Chinese backwardness and ineptitude. Such attitudes are probably strongest in the middle-age groups whose members were personally involved with China.

The younger generation adds still another dimension: a feeling of sympathy toward the "New China." The Japanese post-war education system and the student movements have been dominated by teachers and intellectuals of leftist persuasion.
There is also a strong element of pure projection; an imagined China serves as example of what Japan should become—a society based on enhanced roles for youth, a breakdown of hierarchical and social rigidity, greater occupational opportunity, and a sweeping away of old-fashioned customs and restraints. The ideal picture has been eroded only in part by Chinese economic setbacks.

Another sentiment worth mentioning is a residual feeling for the potential importance of China as a trading partner. Before the war more than 20 per cent of Japan's trade was with the Chinese mainland, including Japanese-held Manchuria. For years after the war many Japanese businessmen were convinced that the Japanese economy could not survive and flourish without a renewal of this trade. A strong pro-Chinese trade sentiment thus cropped out. Experience has proved, however, not only that Japan can "do without" China, but that China at present has little to offer. Profitable Japanese trade relations with Taiwan contribute political leverage against recognizing Communist China for trade purposes.

Most of the sentiments noted above contribute, in one way or another, to a lack of fear or hostility toward China. Cultural ties, "guilt feelings" (if existent), and leftist allegiances

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9. This point will be discussed further below, pp. 51-53.
create sympathetic emotional involvement. Until recently, the Japanese press was conspicuous for its glossing over of Communist China, minimizing the aggressive and oppressive aspects of the regime and its failures and aberrations in "The Great Leap Forward." Of late there has been greater recognition of the menacing aspects of Communist China, and of the hardships being visited on the Chinese people for the sake of enhancing national and Communist power. Japanese public opinion, however, still probably favors recognition of Communist China and an understanding with her as soon as the US relationship permits.

The conviction that China is technically inferior—a conviction that is strong in influential circles connected with the present leadership of Japan—may also have lulled Japanese awareness of China as a possible threat, or even as a major factor in the power balance of the Far East. A Chinese nuclear test might break this mental crust as the first "Sputnik" evaporated comparable US prejudice toward the Soviet Union, and thus may create a sudden new perspective on the Far Eastern situation. This new perspective might include increased revulsion at the oppressive nature and aggressive designs of Chinese communism.

On the part of most Japanese, feelings of friendship for China coexist with hostility toward communism, which in turn is
based largely on anti-Russian emotions. The Russians and Japanese are traditional antagonists in the Far East. Japanese feelings toward the Soviet Union are chiefly those of fear and hatred toward an enemy that, almost sixty years ago, Japan was able to defeat in a well-remembered war, but, rejuvenated by an alien and dangerous doctrine, has since become enormously stronger and more dangerous. It should not be forgotten that Japan incurred Soviet enmity by its Siberian expedition of 1918-1921, that the two countries fought a vigorous undeclared war in the Outer Mongolia-Manchuria border area from 1936 to 1939, and that later they signed a neutrality pact which the USSR in August 1945 chose to violate to get spoils out of Japanese defeat by seizing the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, Manchuria, and part of Korea. Ever since the war the Soviets have expressed and evoked hostility in their relations with the Japanese, although trade relations, still small, have been growing.

The Fundamental Schism Between Left and Right in Japanese Politics

Politically, Japan is a country of "moods," and part of the art of politics there is to understand and guide prevailing

sentiment. The mood of late has been pro-Western and in favor of the existing order. Beneath the resulting fairly calm surface, however, there is a deep internal schism on matters of policy between Japanese of the right and left.

The dominant conservative party, known as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is committed both to the continuation of the US alliance and to the (slightly guided) free enterprise system that has enabled Japan's remarkable postwar economic achievements. The main opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), is the chief locus for critics of the alliance, of the United States, and of Japanese "monopoly capitalism." The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), a more moderate splinter group, seceded from the JSP in early 1960 but has thus far enjoyed little success. There are also extremist groups on both right and left, including the Japan Communist Party (JCP).

Almost two-thirds of the members of the Diet represent the LDP. The party is assisted by the geographical distribution of seats, which favors the predominantly conservative rural areas. The LDP is a coalition covering a spectrum of views from the far right to the moderate left, and is itself rent by factions.

JSP declaratory policies and public positions are further to the left than those of any Western European socialist party.
This extremism may not be an adequate reflection of the Party's real tenets. The Japanese language and political tradition make virtues of ambiguity and vagueness, and the vehement JSP public position disguises a range of views; from those of moderate realists, often with pro-Western attitudes, through those of opportunists and left-wing sentimentalists, to crypto-Communists. JSP public stands include: abrogation of the United States-Japan security treaty and termination of the alliance; elimination of US bases in Japan; neutralism; establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China; elimination of Japan's Self-Defense Forces; signing of a peace treaty and a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union; opposition to all nuclear testing and to US nuclear weapons in Asia; immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan; and the nationalization of specific large industries.

The Japan Socialist Party has the allegiance of many disaffected elements, including workers and intellectuals who feel that the hierarchical tendencies of Japanese society as it is still constituted afford insufficient opportunity for advancement. The party also owes much of its popular support to its adamant opposition to any revival of Japanese militarism and to its initiative in protesting against testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.
The left itself is somewhat split as the result of an internal debate in mid-1961, during which the JSP officially declared the "main enemy" of the Japanese working class to be Japanese "monopoly capitalism" rather than US "imperialism," and the JCP and the far left refused to agree. The left remains loosely united, however, by its opposition to the conservatives and by its quest for power.

There is little prospect of a socialist majority in the Diet, in view of the underrepresentation of the urban centers and lack of socialist strength in rural areas. Parliamentary majorities will more likely be enjoyed either by continued LDP combinations or by conservative-socialist coalitions of the left center, but the resulting policies could vary across a wide spectrum. It is Japanese tradition to make concessions to all voices and interests in a search for a harmonious consensus, and this can lead to strong shifts in policy as the views and strengths of component groups change.

The conservatives tend to benefit from Japanese economic prosperity and well-being. US displays of firmness and strength on the world scene, US respect for Japanese needs and sensitivities--in matters such as trade and treatment of Japan as an equal--and from Soviet truculence. The left wing gains from the converse.
Gradual Emergence from Postwar Trauma

Japan seems to be still in the process of awakening politically from a state of shock or somnolence induced by wartime defeat. There is a renewed sense of nationalism, and Japan's pro-Western allegiance is justified on the grounds that the country is too important to remain neutral. There is a sharpened sensitivity to international respect or lack of respect, and there is growing resentment that Japan's influence is not exerted more strongly in world affairs.

To some degree, the reawakening of a sense of international awareness and responsibility has played into conservative hands, dividing the left by exposing the confusion and irresponsibility behind many of its favorite panaceas and forcing the Japanese to recognize more consciously the advantages of the existing order. Nevertheless, the left may yet be able to turn the reawakening to its advantage. For example, an event or events revealing militarist affiliations of the right could permit the left to gain from the arguments--economic, political, and military--against Japanese rearmament in a world of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Nationalism is a force which might be turned to use by either side.

In any case, Japan is probably due for another period of thorough reappraisal of her policy and position in the world,
extending to such basic matters as military strength, political and economic organization, and international alliances. The first Chinese nuclear test could touch off such a reappraisal. Review of these emotionally charged issues could result in irrational, and certainly unpredictable, action.

**Militarism and Rearmament**

The unpopularity of militarism in Japan--resulting mainly from the tyrannical and heavy-handed military dominance that caused increasing civilian privation before and during the Second World War, only to end in unprecedented defeat--gained official sanction from the MacArthur-imposed constitution, which specifically prohibits all but local police forces. This attitude has been nurtured ever since by pacifist-inclined intellectuals and by prosperity-minded Japanese who do not wish to bear the financial burden of rearmament. By adroit US influence, Japan was persuaded to extend police forces to a Self-Defense Force which is continuing to develop. Recruitment, although improving, is still short of requirements, and military uniforms are only now beginning to command public respect. Political debate centers on the size of the Self-Defense Forces; responsible
advocates of broader Japanese rearmament still remain discreetly quiet.

Students of traditional Japanese culture point out that militarism and the Bushido cult occupy a curious psychological place. These were historically a late imposition, and Japanese culture had a predisposition (from Buddhism and Chinese learning) to look askance at them. Military and antimilitary strains come down in the culture to this day, co-mingled with other aspects of Japanese and imported civilization, and heavily charged with sentiment. The result is ambivalence, and the Japanese are capable of violent changes of mood on the subject.

There are signs that the extreme revulsion against the military is wearing off, but it is unlikely that the advocates of revitalized armed forces will soon be able to find receptive audiences. One of the central planks in the Japan Socialist Party Platform today is the prevention of any re-emergence of Japanese militarism, although at the same time some militarist extremists are out to save Japan from the political left.

Any event or national debate that floodlights the subject of general rearmament and accompanying revision of the Constitution is likely to be politically incendiary.
Nuclear Weapons and Radiation

Much has been made of the Japanese revulsion against nuclear weapons—the almost hysterical fear of radiation that sometimes brings geiger counters to the fish market—and the unique Japanese experience of being the only nation to have borne atomic attack. Whenever the United States undertakes a nuclear test series, the Japanese Government, regardless of the merits of the argument, feels constrained to go through the ritual first of asking the US Government not to conduct any tests and then lodging a protest when the tests take place. This fear can be expected to color Japan's reaction to Chinese nuclear tests also.

This ultrasensitivity may not be as basic as it sometimes appears. People who know the Japanese are inclined to feel that, as a rule, they have remarkably strong stomachs in relation to violence. Hysteria on nuclear matters went undetected for about nine years after Hiroshima, until the radiation incident with a fishing boat during the Bikini hydrogen bomb tests of 1954. To a large extent the subsequent Japanese concern was deliberately manufactured in a series of left-wing campaigns to influence public opinion; and the success of these campaigns probably relates less to genuine Japanese terror on the subject than to a national need to feel abused and wronged. The idea that United
States postwar leniency was in expiation for Hiroshima has helped to salvage Japanese self-respect.

Nevertheless, the Japanese have been made extremely conscious of nuclear weapons in the last few years. Left-wing propaganda has sought to instill fear, and the general press treatment has served to create an awe of the power of nuclear weapons. The Japanese response to nuclear questions is usually amplified by this fascination.

In recent years Japan has undertaken a certain amount of nuclear research focused on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The number of small reactors in Japan will reach seven with the completion of those under construction. The Japanese have already designed and built a reactor with a thermal output of ten megawatts and are importing from Britain a power reactor of 160 MW, large enough to be capable of plutonium production for weapons. There is some awareness that Japan has the potential to become a nuclear power on its own, although no serious pressure for nuclear armament is apparent.
Up to now, serious discussion of Japan's future nuclear role has been deferred. The raising of this issue could bring into the political arena not only Japanese feelings on the subject of nuclear weapons, but also nationalism, the question of Japan's place in the world, and the future role of the Japanese military—an emotion-loaded combination.

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11. There was, however, a flurry on the subject inspired by former Premier Shigeru Yoshida's statement of July 12, 1962, that Japan should stop grumbling about nuclear weapons and be prepared to acquire them itself if necessary. Thereafter, Premier Ikeda assured the Japanese that no plans have been made for Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons.
IV. REACTIONS TO CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTS

General

Experience shows that it is not possible to predict the interaction of future events. Having analyzed the ingredients in a situation, one can speculate on the outcome, but detailed prognostication is worthless. This chapter will accordingly delve a little further into surrounding influences and then discuss outcomes.

Japanese manifestation of interest in Communist Chinese nuclear development was limited, until the past year or so, to speculative articles in a few obscure technical journals. In recent months, however, the subject has been aired in the country's leading newspapers and magazines. Articles have centered around estimates or rumors of when Communist China will succeed in producing its first nuclear explosion. Some of the speculations have suggested an early date, but accompanying technical arguments have been based on small-scale production of plutonium by China. The specter of a major Chinese nuclear capability, with advanced delivery systems, has not been given much attention.
So far the reaction to such articles has been calm, and there has been no speculation on the implications for Japan.

For reasons brought out in the previous chapter, however, many observers believe that the first nuclear test or tests by Communist China could create a sharp change in the political atmosphere—and that Japan's reactions under such an impact cannot be predicted with assurance.

**Attending Circumstances**

As already shown, Chinese nuclear tests are likely to raise basic issues that deeply divide Japanese society, and to drive political parties and factions into sharpened conflict. The degree of impact will depend on conditions at the time. Any events that jar Japanese faith in a moderate, pro-Western orientation, and that emotionally stir and polarize the Japanese people, are likely to amplify the reaction. Such events could stem from US setbacks on the world scene, US mishandling of relations with Japan, a clever "soft" line by the Communist bloc, or serious economic difficulties in Japan. Japan's long-term economic needs will be discussed, together with her basic security needs, in the next chapter, but here it can be pointed out that rapid economic growth within a free-enterprise system makes Japan vulnerable to recessions and structural maladjustments.
Most observers believe that it would take at least two years of seriously troubled economic conditions to make a major difference at the polls, and particularly to give the socialist opposition a strong chance for an election victory; but lesser setbacks could still change the political climate. An adverse economic situation would have particularly grave political implications if international rather than domestic factors appeared responsible, especially if there were discrimination against Japanese exports. The Great Depression with its "beggar-my-neighbor" tariffs had a grim effect on the Japanese political scene in the 1930s. Fortunately, flagrantly discriminatory action to the point of serious damage appears unlikely in view of Western awareness of the danger.

Japan should also be particularly subject to influence by the staging and content of the first and subsequent Chinese nuclear tests, and by displays of delivery systems. The Japanese may be able to discount one test, but repeated exhibitions of more and more sophisticated devices, culminating in a ballistic missile threat against Japan herself, will surely shock the Japanese public.

Much will depend on the reactions, at the time of the first Chinese test and subsequently, by the governments and responsible leaders of the United States and Japan. An alarmed over-reaction on the part of American leadership and the American public would almost surely precipitate a highly emotional, potentially explosive,
response in Japan. On the other hand, a calm, confident, and militarily reassuring position on the part of US leaders would moderate not only US, but also Japanese, reverberations. Ameliorating effects will also result if Japanese leadership is prepared and understands the problem, and if Japanese news media are predisposed to non-inflammatory responses. The Japanese government would probably do well politically to ready its positions on matters such as armaments and policy relating to a nuclear-armed Communist China. Psychological preparation of the Japanese public will also modify the outcome. In all these respects Japanese reaction can be strongly influenced by prior preparation (see recommendations below).

Initial Responses

The first response in Japan is likely to be one of great excitement, and both left and right can be expected to find in a Chinese nuclear test a justification for their positions. The left can say that the achievement calls for recognition and accommodation of China in the world community, and that a situation is in the making where US military protection will be a dangerous liability to Japan. Socialists should be able to rationalize nuclear displays by a supposedly "peaceful" socialist power, despite their propaganda against nuclear weapons and radiation.
Conservatives will cite the protection that the US alliance affords, and may feel a need to strengthen the alliance to meet the Chinese threat.

The conservative government will face perplexing tactical decisions: whether to renew efforts to improve relations with Communist China; whether or how strongly to attack the Communist Chinese decision to build nuclear weapons; and, most important, what stance to take on the armament issue. The extreme right is likely to call independently for rearmament.

In such a confrontation between left and right, immediate political advantage could plausibly belong to the left. The left's direct advantage is likely to be more short-run than long-run in nature except perhaps insofar as Chinese nuclear successes become more impressive with time. The first test should evoke alarm and raise divisive issues, dispelling, should this persist, the recent appearance of harmony and near-complacency. The conservatives are more likely to become split, e.g., over questions of rearmament and on whether the leftist arguments are to be met head-on or by accommodation. Moreover, a policy of recognizing and befriending (even appeasing) an emerging power has the type of superficial appeal that can be swiftly grasped by an emotional public, whereas the allure of such an approach is likely to erode with time and experience. If Japan does move initially to the left, however,
this in turn will set in motion forces, including Western reactions, that could produce—depending again on attending circumstances—either a further move to the left or an ultimate strengthening of the conservative forces.

**Alternative Outcomes**

The basic danger is that Chinese atomic achievements will help to propel Japan on a new political course, involving the weakening or dissolution of the US alliance, reduction or elimination of US base rights (with repercussions in South Korea and Okinawa), accommodation between Japan and Communist China, and possible military and political enfeeblement of Japan.

There are, of course, variants. Japan might conceivably reject her experience of democracy and choose a new opportunist, militarist, path, or she might continue indefinitely in approximately the present political state. The manner in which Japan could move in a leftist (i.e., dangerous) direction is also subject to considerable variation. A socialist victory at the polls, for example, is less likely than a coalition of left and left-center forces under opportunist Liberal Democratic leadership. One unfavorable possibility is that the conservatives will split, paralyzing the government; but of at least equal concern is the already-mentioned Japanese political tendency to accommodate all views in a search for
consensus: this could result in a sharp change in policy because of sudden changes in the views of component political groups.

Some able observers believe that, should an unlikely quirk of political fate thrust the Socialists into power, they would start by trying to enact a number of the measures advocated in the naive Socialist platform, but that a year of power should be sufficient to orient these Socialist leaders to the basic realities of Japan's position, thus disabusing them of many of the notions now publicly espoused. Responsible moderates within the JSP would be thrust to the fore.

The same sort of sequence might follow the emergence of a left-oriented government headed by LDP leaders. The problem in either case, as already suggested, is that accession to power by the left might take place in a drastically changed and emotionally charged atmosphere, in which elements of the Socialist platform would actually be put into effect; and these measures, by releasing new forces, could set off a chain of further undesirable events. The United States, for example, might become publicly indignant and alarmed to the point of taking severe steps to limit Japan's trade. In a highly emotional atmosphere this would be a serious error, driving Japan, however irrationally, toward the arms of the Communists. 12 Severe talk in private by American officials would of

12. The analogy with the impact of US trade sanctions in 1941 will be evident.
course be necessary and proper, but in public US restraint would probably be desirable. Another danger is that a policy of neutrality and appeasement could leave Japan weak and vulnerable to Communist pressures from within and without. Fortunately, as will be clarified in the next chapter, the United States appears to hold the trump cards in relation to Japan's trade and security needs, but for these trumps to be assured of effectiveness the Japanese reaction must be in accordance with the dictates of reasoned calculation.

It is likely in any event that for some time after China's first nuclear test there will be strong pressures in Japan for greater accommodation of Communist China by both Japan and the United States.

To turn to the more favorable possibilities, a trend toward assumption of greater responsibility within the Western alliance is likely to result more from an evolution in Japan toward growing awareness and concern for Japan's international position than from China's emergence as a nuclear power. Growing Chinese strength, however, becomes a strong additional reason for Japan to choose sides decisively and look to its own interests in Asia. The first Chinese nuclear tests could be an important catalyst in this process.

The United States must be concerned, in this connection, that Japan should not abandon democratic institutions and freedoms in a
search for security. The United States may also wish to attempt to discourage tendencies for Japan to want more arms, including nuclear weapons, than either Japanese or American long-term interests would warrant.

The likelihood is that the Japanese can be kept in the Western fold and will increase their acceptance of responsibility within the alliance. This judgment is partly based on the long-term factors that will be scrutinized in the following chapter, and partly on the assumption that the United States will exercise restrained and sound management of its political and military position in the Far East, including relations with Japan. Japan's importance gives high priority to efforts aimed at this outcome.
V. THE LONG-TERM POSITION OF JAPAN

Japan's long-run position, in military and economic terms, will not be greatly altered in a world that includes a nuclear-armed China. This can be shown by considering Japanese requirements.

NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS

Strategic Alternatives

No security arrangement will meet Japan's requirements unless it blunts the threat of nuclear-missile blackmail, provides a defense of Japan's coasts and skies against incursions by hostile forces, and assists the task of internal security against insurgency and subversion. Four alternatives merit consideration in the present context: alliance with the United States, neutrality, alliance with the Soviet Union, and alliance with a Communist China standing more or less apart from the Soviet Union.

From what has been said it is evident that the Japanese are emotionally torn between the first two alternatives, would be totally unenthusiastic about the third, and are not seriously considering the fourth.
For Japan a continued alliance with the United States should remain superior to the other alternatives, so long as American military strength and will power are not severely eroded. This will remain true whether Communist China has a significant nuclear capability or not. Any other security relationship for Japan would be less easily maintained, would require strenuous efforts on Japan's part, and, at least in the case of alliance with the Soviet Union, would represent an unacceptable surrender of sovereignty to a hostile power.

Yet alliance with the Soviet Union, which, given Soviet strength, would mean Soviet domination, would probably be the most stable of the alternatives unless the Japanese were themselves to rise against the Communist yoke. Major Japanese armament efforts would doubtless be exacted by the Soviets; and internal and external enemies of Japan would probably be multiplied.

Neutrality, on the other hand, would be at best a risky course and at worst an illusory hope, a wayplace to calamity. The two greatest powers would each have strong reason to undermine Japanese neutrality once established. Soviet Russia, in view of US discomfort, would at present be delighted to see Japan neutral and would make plausible guarantees and gestures to this end; but such an attitude would doubtless be supplanted by blackmail and subversion as soon as the Soviets considered these politically expedient. The
United States, on the other hand, will have national interests opposing Japanese neutrality for at least as long as Korea is divided into armed camps and probably as long as China remains expansionist and hostile, and Southeast Asia unsettled. In fact, given the Soviet presence in the Far East, it is hard to conceive a political arrangement that would outweigh Japan's value to the United States as a logistic base, communications link, and ally in limited war. How unsettling American pressure would be in the event of Japanese neutrality would depend on US decisions. But, especially if South Korea were given up by the West, the arms requirement and necessary outlay required by a neutral Japan for her own defense would be sharply increased, compared to the present alliance. The risks for Japan would also probably increase; she might even be at the mercy of Communist Chinese blackmail.

Communist China will not be sufficiently powerful for decades, as other PACIFICA papers clearly indicate,\textsuperscript{13} to be a very useful ally to Japan. On the contrary, considering the irritation to the United States and Soviet Union if China is taking a separatist and hostile course, Japan would be increasing her enemies without any corresponding increase in power. China could not, at

least for a very long time, credibly guarantee Japan's security on the strategic level, and could furnish little help in terms of naval and air forces. Japan would have to assume her own defense. Sharply limited in territory and natural resources, she could not independently become a major nuclear power, except possibly through fanatical efforts. On the other hand, Japan could conceivably find herself linked to Communist China if she joined the Communist alliance system or if the Chinese entered an alliance of expediency with the United States. Prospects of this seem remote.

Levels of Armaments

Insofar as China's possession of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of any sort of a nuclear exchange in the Far East, this will reduce Japan's security. Other PACIFICA studies show, however, that the United States will be in a position to act to make Chinese initiation of nuclear hostilities completely irrational and fool-hardy and will, barring Soviet intervention, be able for many years to retain the capacity to escalate to the nuclear level without receiving many, if any, nuclear counterstrikes. Japanese security,

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14. See The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power (U), SECRET, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D.C., 1962), and the substudy on Military Implications cited in the preceding footnote.
in short, will be all the more closely tied to the United States, and will depend on American military preparations to counter the Chinese threat.

**Self-Defense Forces.** Japan's self-defense forces have been increased in recent years; whether they are yet adequate may be a question of what Japan is ready to pay to reduce her risks, and to reduce damage to herself in case of war. Should Japanese self-defense forces be increased further as a result of threats caused by Communist Chinese possession of nuclear weapons? This is in part a technical military question. The answer depends partly on what the United States does to nullify and deter the Chinese threat, and on the resulting estimate of Chinese caution or irrationality. The likelihood of a Chinese ballistic-missile capability in the not-distant future would seem, however, to reduce the utility of any increase in active defenses unless an anti-missile defense can also be developed. This question of requirements deserves, and will undoubtedly receive, detailed expert study by Japanese and American military specialists.

The best Japan can hope for, to bolster the capabilities of her own forces, is the protection of newer American defensive weapons systems.

**Forces for Overseas Deployment.** Military involvement overseas is not at present politically acceptable to the Japanese.
the future, it may be argued that Japanese contributions of military forces in support of the Western position in the Far East would significantly increase the likelihood of collective success, and would enable the Japanese to influence the course of Western policy in Asia in directions favorable to Japan. The Japanese sphere of trade and influence would be enhanced, while key areas would be protected from Communist encroachment. Japanese interests could be secured even where they differed in emphasis from those of the United States.

This argument rests on four assumptions: that American unilateral action will either not suffice or will not be exerted to protect Japanese interests, notably in Southeast Asia; that Japan could in the foreseeable future be persuaded to reverse its position on using military means for national ends other than self-defense; that Japanese military commitments or forces would be acceptable abroad; and that these would be militarily significant.

The first assumption is uncomfortably plausible. The Free World already appears to have given ground to communism in Laos, and might conceivably lose both South Vietnam and Thailand. Neutral Cambodia and Burma might then follow. These losses could lead in turn to a collapse of the situation in Malaya, Indonesia, and nearby British holdings.

The Japanese public is today probably even less concerned with the imminent Southeast Asia danger than is the American public.
There seems little doubt, however, the Japan's interests are deeply and directly involved. Indeed, US interests in Southeast Asia stem in part from the area's potential impact on Japan. Any apparent lack of deep concern on the part of the Japanese Government and its spokesmen is a measure of the degree to which Japan has not yet fully reawakened.

Japanese dislodgment from the present policy of isolation from events in Southeast Asia would probably take a few years, and a force buildup would require still more time. Therefore, there is a question not only of what effect a Japanese policy of military commitment could have, but also of whether it could crystallize in time. As a practical matter Japanese assistance would probably in most cases be acceptable abroad. Hostile sentiments against Japan are not likely to be sufficiently strong to overrule considerations of expediency. To assume that Japanese intervention could materialize in time and turn the tide, however, is to suppose that the Western loss of Southeast Asia will be in process for up to a decade without reaching a point of irreversibility, and that signs of a slow deterioration of the US position will provoke Japan in time to a policy of more active participation on the Western side, rather than toward neutralism.

Two or three years should cast a clearer light on both the Southeast Asia situation and the Japanese reaction to it.
If the Japanese should undertake military commitments outside their homeland, one problem would be the cost, particularly the strain on the Japanese balance of payments.

**Nuclear Weapons.** To a relatively small, populous, exposed, trade-dependent country, having its own nuclear weapons would not seem to afford much protection on the strategic plane. The resulting "deterrent" would scarcely be credible. Japanese feelings on this subject will, of course, eventually be influenced by the outcome of De Gaulle's nuclear policy.

Nuclear weapons might prove useful in Japan's air and anti-submarine defenses, but in that case the United States should probably act to supply them. There might even be counter-invasion uses under certain circumstances, but again, the United States would have an incentive to provide the weapons. The only favorable considerations for an independent effort would appear to be prestige and self-esteem.

It must be concluded tentatively, therefore, that building nuclear weapons in Japan will not be a requirement of Japanese national security in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, a nuclear-weapons production effort may eventually prove attractive to the Japanese because of its effects upon Japan's prestige and international influence, particularly if the number of nuclear powers is multiplying. Such a worldwide development
appears contrary to US interests. Consequently, it may be presumed that the United States would oppose such a turn in Japanese poli-
cies, just as it opposes the addition of other states to the ranks of the nuclear powers.

ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS

Trade

Japanese economic needs center on trade, and trade needs center on the requirement for imported raw materials. Japan's imports, more than those of any other industrial country, are in the rawest, least processed form, so that the last ounce of industrial inputs can be squeezed in trade for exports and other sources of foreign-
exchange earnings. Japanese annual requirements for imported raw materials, simply to maintain industrial production at its present level, approach $4 billion, approximating the value of Japan's present exports. Imports other than raw materials consist mainly of machinery and other capital goods to accelerate the growth of Japan's productive capacity. It is evident that in several ways Japan's ability to sustain a high rate of growth is dependent on trade.

Ten per cent of the national income is earned by export indus-
tries. Japan must increase the absolute value of her exports to buy the additional raw materials needed for further economic
expansion. Because of dependence on the outside world for raw materials, any major contraction of Japan's foreign-exchange earnings, or any major expenditures abroad not offset by a rise in foreign-exchange earnings, would exert pressure on Japanese industry in the direction of unemployment, falling production, and economic distress.

Raw materials requirements in Japan as elsewhere have been growing less rapidly than the gross national product, owing to shifts in demand away from raw-material-intensive commodities and increased economy in the use of natural resources in industry. All the same, it is not correct to say that Japan is growing less dependent on trade. Most of the possibilities for substituting domestic output for imports have already been exploited; at the margin additional raw materials must all be imported. But exports are clearly the key to successful economic expansion.

Export earnings may not be easy to increase, although one should not underestimate the great ingenuity of the Japanese and the absorptive capacity of the Free World. Japan's main specialties have been textiles and other products of light industries. Almost everywhere in the world these goods must hurdle formidable barriers in the form of high tariffs and strict quotas. All the underdeveloped countries are becoming protectionist; India has been transformed from the world's greatest importer of cotton
textiles to the principal exporter, ahead of Japan. This trend in
the underdeveloped countries is somewhat offset by the growing
incomes and expanded tastes for luxury goods of the industrial
countries; but the competition to satisfy these tastes is intense.
Prosperity and stabilized balances of payments in many leading
Western countries have led to some liberalizing of trade; but
wherever Japanese exporters find a new market, protectionist senti-
ments mount.

Another problem of light-industry exports is that the low-wage
labor advantages of Japan are sure to diminish as poor regions
become industrialized and as Japanese wages continue to rise.

The most rapidly expanding international markets for manu-
factured products today are those for heavy industrial goods--
machinery, chemicals, construction materials, transport equipment
--and for technical assistance, sometimes combined with complete
plants. Japan, never before a major exporter of machinery, is now
entering this field. Japanese domestic requirements for capital
goods, however, are so great that for several years at least her
heavy-industry output may not be able to grow fast enough to pro-
vide a large surplus over internal demand without slowing the
internal rate of investment and growth. The Japanese economy is
faced with the further difficulty that the heavy-industry field
is becoming increasingly competitive.
Japan's income level is thus very much dependent upon the world economy's ability and willingness to buy her goods, which is not at all assured. It is quite possible that external economic forces will apply a brake to Japanese economic growth before the present plan for doubling the national income in ten years can become a reality.

A corollary of the situation is that, despite Japan's great and growing industrial capacity, a continuing narrow foreign-exchange balance would make it difficult for Japan to become a major international lender, still less a source of large-scale foreign aid. There is a sharp contrast here to West Germany or other European countries with favorable foreign-exchange positions based in part on more abundant natural resources.

Given Japan's permanent dependence on trade, the US balance-of-payments deficit (leading to gold outflows and possible import restrictions) and the European Economic Community are serious potential threats to the Japanese economy. The trend toward free-trade areas and tariff agreements, not only in Europe but also in Latin America and elsewhere, could work to Japan's disadvantage unless the common tariffs everywhere are kept low.

15. If the prices of Japan's exports must be lowered significantly in order to increase the quantity sold, the total value of sales may, regardless of price changes, be unable to rise significantly.
Present and Prospective Directions of Trade

Most of Japan's imports come from the West. Furthermore, Japan's imperative needs for raw materials could not be satisfied wholly or even in large part by the Communist bloc. Wheat, cotton, wool, certain metals, and possibly other materials needed by Japan are in short supply in the bloc and must come from Western countries. Communist trading partners by reorienting their economies might meet Japan's full requirements for coking coal, iron ore and petroleum, but probably not at a lower cost than the world market. Export markets are correspondingly found mainly in the non-Communist world, although Japan would have much to offer Communist countries if they accepted a division of labor with her.

Communist China is by no means a promising trade partner for Japan--less so than the Soviet Union, because the latter has much to offer in the form of raw materials and capital goods. Japan's pre-1945 trade with China, including Japanese-controlled Manchuria, reached the proportion of 20 per cent of all Japan's trade. But this was when Japanese trade needs were much smaller (output of steel, for example, is now five times the pre-1945 peak), and the Chinese were not using their raw materials output for a big industrialization program of their own. Besides, the Japanese were deeply involved as owners in the Chinese economy. Communist China is today chronically short of foreign-exchange earnings, having to rely
on imports for almost all its advanced machinery and equipment, and for much else including grain and chemical fertilizers to help alleviate the acute food problem. Under the circumstances, China could benefit from any amount of Japanese assistance in the form of industrial goods and technicians, but can prospectively pay for very little.

China can be expected at a maximum to supply Japan with coal, certain non-ferrous metals, possibly some iron ore, and unimposing quantities of agricultural products such as cotton and foodstuffs. There could also, as everywhere, take place an exchange of manufactures—but it will be a long time before Japan stands ready to import products of light industries, in which she has long specialized. Under these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that trade with China could rise to more than ten per cent of Japan's total trade, regardless of the political situation, at least without this association representing an imposed disaster to Japan. Even if China and the Soviet Union controlled Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan and used their maximum combined economic leverage to influence Japan, a sufficiently determined Western alliance could more than offset these pressures with economic counterpressures of their own—even without putting Japan "on the dole." Economically, Japan faces West.

Further, with time and economic development Communist China is likely to become even less complementary to Japan. Instead China
will inevitably become a sharp competitor in world markets, and will be forced to employ much the same industrial export pattern as Japan.

The United States and British Commonwealth between them, on the other hand, are highly complementary to Japan and can supply almost all her import requirements. For a country as economically vulnerable as Japan this represents an enormously important fact.

Japan and Southeast Asia

Japan retains considerable economic interests in nearby areas—Korea, Taiwan, and particularly Southeast Asia—a stake that might become important in relation to Communist expansion in this area. The Southeast Asia region is Japan's major source of rubber and a significant source of petroleum and iron ore; moreover, together with other areas of the Far East, the region buys twenty per cent of Japan's exports. This flow of foreign exchange might be enhanced further if Southeast Asian economic development should be undertaken with Japanese cooperation and support. Through the Southeast Asia area also pass Japanese goods and ships on the way to the Old World. Although the West seems to hold the high trumps if it is willing to use them, expanded areas of Communist domination clearly could be used to influence Japanese trade and politics, especially if these areas reach as far south as Malaya and Indonesia.
Economic Organization and Structure

To complete the picture of Japan's paramount economic ties to the West, and secondary involvement with non-Communist Asia, it is essential to consider the major reasons, inherent in the structure and organization of the Japanese economy itself, why communism in Japan would be an economic disaster for the country.

Japan's economy is carefully and skillfully balanced to make the most out of relatively small physical resources (plus energetic and able people) in the two great spheres of agriculture and foreign trade, not to speak of the distribution and production of consumer goods and of other activities. Communist failures in agriculture are well recognized, and any organizational tampering with Japan's intensive, technically advanced, family-farm agriculture would probably lead to an economic disaster. Less widely recognized is communism's ineptitude in the area of international trade. Communist trade patterns perforce lack the market tests of a free enterprise economy, and are probably as a rule grossly inefficient--one reason for the relative stagnation of the Eastern European satellites and other small Communist countries.

Japan without communism has shown the ability to achieve an extraordinarily high rate of investment and to absorb major changes in economic structure. There seems to be very little that a

16. Japan's present per-acre grain output is about three times that of the United States.
Communist economic system could realistically be expected to do better, even though Japanese economic development under the present system is bound to produce some social maladjustment and uneven growth.

**Possible Economic Alliances**

Japan's lonely position, and the lack of explicit alliances except with the United States, is a source of strain on Japanese sensitivities, of danger to the country's economic interests, and possibly (although this is doubtful) of weakened security. Further, Japan has the potential to contribute much to the favorable development of her Asian neighbors. These considerations suggest the importance of Japan's inclusion in wider political and economic (though not necessarily military) alliances in association with other leaders of the Western Community and with other Asian countries. In relation to any such proposal, however, Japan is subject to conflicting pressures. She is economically in many ways more similar to the North Atlantic powers than to most Asian countries; but she is politically more acceptable in harness with the latter. Smaller Asian countries cannot meet many of her trade needs, and as close allies would not be a source of prestige.

Up to now, Japan has been privately rebuffed in her interest in joining OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is based on European-North American
participation. One reason given is that not only Australia and New Zealand but also a number of underdeveloped countries such as India and Nigeria desire to join, and Japan's entry would open the floodgates. More fundamental reasons, however, are that Japan and Europe are economically competitive and protectionist against each other's consumer goods, and that Europeans are not ready to accept Japan. Associative schemes that would bridge this gap in the Western Community, and that would at the same time tie Japan more closely to her pro-Western Asian neighbors, would seem to be required.

SUMMARY OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

In almost every respect then, Japan's long-term interests and needs incline her toward the West. Yet there is a serious problem, in that a continued commitment to the institutions and alignments that appear to be in Japan's best interests will not in itself spare Japan from sever problems, such as limited export markets, painful and fitful social and economic change, and location in a part of the world in which most of the countries are weak and unstable, strong friends are distant, and Communist powers are near. Under the circumstances, the Japanese may run into troubles and try to wish their way out. It is ever incumbent on the United States and its Western allies to demonstrate visibly to the
Japanese that there are real benefits to be had from association and friendship with the West and to encourage the Japanese to be realistic, while helping to give them reasons, including a closer economic and political alliance, for hope in the future.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Specific US actions should be initiated immediately to offset as much as possible the adverse effects of the first Chinese nuclear tests. For this purpose it will not be enough to reassure Japan the first time a test takes place, because more impressive tests are sure to follow, and Communist China can be expected to attain demonstrable nuclear capabilities against Japan within a few years. The problem will be continuous.

The growth of Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities should increase rather than diminish the value of the alliance between Japan and the United States. For both partners and for the Free World as a whole, the strengthening of existing bonds and the forging of new common enterprises represent high-priority objectives; the outcome of such efforts will play a large role in determining the future of Asia.

The most important actions to be taken in the immediate future in relation to the effect in Japan of Chinese nuclear demonstrations include:

1) Preparation of the Japanese Public. This should include US assistance to carefully planned Japanese covert information
efforts as discussed in the appendix, and any other available stimuli
to public discussion, including statements made outside Japan.

2) Preparation of the Japanese Government. US influence should
be brought to bear on the Japanese Government and on conservative
leaders to induce them to prepare their response to the first
Chinese nuclear test and their position on resulting political
issues. Japanese officials should be given any available US intel-
ligence information capable of assisting their estimates of the
situation; and they should be informed of US preparations on the
military and psychological planes.

3) Preparation of Japanese News Media. Responsible pub-
lishers, editors, commentators, columnists, and reporters should
be apprised of impending developments, and discreetly encouraged
to temper their position.

4) A Thoroughly Planned and Coordinated US Effort to Place
the Event in Proper Perspective Both in the United States and
Abroad. The effect in Japan becomes one important reason for
preparing the American response, which should include military
reassurances to Japan and a unified voice on the subject on the
part of all US representatives to Japan.

5) Close Attention to Japanese Needs and Sensitivities as
China Emerges as a Nuclear Power. Attempts to fulfill Japanese
economic requirements and to lessen the country's political and
psychological isolation through increased associations within the
Free World are desirable in any event, but are lent increased
urgency by the need to moderate the impact on Japan of the
emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power.
APPENDIX

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S "GRAY PUBLIC RELATIONS" CAMPAIGN

Not heretofore mentioned, but behind some of the favorable aspects of the present political situation in Japan, is an undercover effort by the Japanese Government to expose and counter Communist exertions while influencing Japanese public opinion in favor of the government's basic position. This effort is directed through the Office of the Japanese Cabinet Secretary, which also serves various intelligence functions. The operation, which the Japanese call "gray public relations" or "gray PR," was started at US instigation and enjoys US cooperation.

Such a program was not launched in postwar Japan until early in 1960, and the participants are still learning, but the project has already been an astonishing success. Insiders credit its planted revelations of Communist machinations, and its deliberate efforts to "wean away" Japanese intellectuals from the left, with much of the pressure that split the left in 1961.

The successes have demonstrated that anti-Soviet and other strong feelings on the part of the public serve as extremely fertile ground for an anti-Communist public relations offensive not overtly
connected with official sources. Up to now the anti-Communist forces have invested only an insignificant amount of money compared to the impressive sums spent for many years in Communist undercover activities, yet the effort has already helped to undo a large proportion of the Communist work.

"Gray PR" (known elsewhere sometimes as "gray propaganda") is now improved to the point where it could profitably use much larger sums of money, which may be difficult to disguise in the Japanese budget. Under the circumstances the interests of the United States would be well served by lending the program necessary support.

The "gray PR" program is ideal for the purpose of preparing Japan for the first Chinese nuclear explosion, and is probably responsible in part for stories on the subject thus far. Every encouragement should be lent to the use of Japanese Government resources for this purpose. If and as intelligence becomes available enabling the timing of the first Chinese test to be predicted with increased assurance, it should be made the basis for timing a "gray PR" campaign to get maximum preparatory effect.
SOUTH KOREA

JOHN B. CARY

July 1962
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

South Korea's future outlook and external policies will primarily result from its internal political stability, US success in building up its economic well-being, and the continuance of an evident US ability and will to defend South Korea. A Chinese nuclear program, whether used as a threat or as a backdrop for blandishments, will not alone significantly affect the policies of the Republic of Korea [ROK]. It is possible, though unlikely, that a Chinese nuclear detonation and a subsequent nuclear-armed missile build-up, if fortuitously linked in time to other unfavorable events, might cause a deterioration of US-ROK relations and might even create conditions leading to the unification of Korea on (hidden) Communist terms. It is much more likely, however, that South Korea will merely reflect US attitudes and policies, coupled with increased demands for military aid and reassurance of US ability to ensure the security of South Korea.
SOUTH KOREA

THE PRESENT SITUATION

Underlying Attitudes

Korea is a kinship society in which loyalties seldom go higher than the level of the family. Because of the interlinking of families over the centuries, this loyalty is generally extended to encompass all Koreans. On the other hand, Korea has had government of and by Koreans for only seventeen years in recent history, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government is still largely viewed as a remote and foreign agency having little to do with the well-being of the people. The past decade of governmental repression and excesses has done little to alleviate this feeling. Thus, South Korea presents the anomaly of a close-knit ethnic grouping—which in this sense is highly loyal and cohesive—that has no sense of kinship with its governing members. There is little loyalty or affection toward, or even (apart from the intelligentsia) little realization of the existence of, a single nation under a single government seeking allegiance through the usual symbols such as the flag and the "fatherland."
As a result of the family basis for society, as well as of Korea's history of external domination over the last few centuries, the Koreans' attitude toward foreigners is generally one of dislike and distrust. They are completely united in their dislike of the Japanese and the Soviets, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese—although, as demonstrated in North Korea, they can expediently overcome, or at least hide, their dislikes. There have been increasingly frequent indications in South Korea of an underlying resentment, if not dislike, of Americans; the present government of South Korea in particular would very much like to curtail its dependence upon the United States and thus reduce the restraints which the United States can now impose.

Ethnic factors, mutually shared dislikes, and strong economic pressures unite Koreans on both sides of the 38th Parallel in a strong desire for the country's reunification. Although this feeling has been cynically exploited by the North Korean regime, and hence is suspect in many Western eyes, it is deep-rooted and widespread, being based partly on tradition and emotion and partly on hard economic facts.

The South Koreans, fortified by the experience (for the capital of Seoul a repeated one) of occupation, tend to be strongly and fervently opposed to communism. Communist propaganda has, therefore, had little impact in South Korea except
where cleverly disguised in the form of pan-Koreanism, with the Communist flavor submerged. More than ten years have now passed, however, since Communist occupation of any of South Korea, and by 1975 few people under thirty will have any personal memory of life under communism. It is the younger generation—students and young intelligentsia—who are now most receptive to Communist propaganda and are most easily stirred to a rebellious attitude toward the South Korean government. As time goes by, therefore, the present general acutely anti-Communist attitude, based partly on hard and bitter personal experience, will soften and may eventually be largely replaced by the more fundamental and positive longing for reunification.

Other discernable trends largely reflect the emergence of the new younger generation. South Korea has become more and more urbanized, with a commensurate swing away from the conservative outlook of the agrarian population. Political awareness is growing, and with it broader demands for more representative government, responsive to the wishes of the people. Political aspirations of the younger generation have so far been generally naive and unrealistic, but in the long run, as the youth matures, a deeper understanding of and a more responsible attitude toward democracy and the functioning of a democratic government may develop.

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Political Instability

South Korea is in a chronic state of political instability. A continuous flow of reports indicates the deep schisms and factionalism within the current Park government, the development of plots and potential counter-coups against it, and the large elements of the population disaffected with the military regime and its policies. These reports reflect a continuation of the same basic situation that existed during the Rhee and Chang regimes. These conditions are endemic in South Korea, where the people do not identify themselves with the government, where attitudes beyond the family level are based primarily on individual self-interest, and where none of the cultural infrastructure necessary for a modern democratic government--in the sense of a tradition of law, patriotism, and self-government, and the mechanisms necessary to give meaning to these--is firmly established. These unsettling conditions will be intensified in the future as urbanization, semi-industrialization, and growing political awareness and activity further undermine the traditional conservative, agrarian, family-oriented, social and economic orders. Thus, for a long time at least, any regime in South Korea will almost certainly lack broad popular support, cohesion, and security. Any prediction, therefore, of the character and
internal policies of future governments of South Korea would be highly speculative.

It is entirely conceivable that a coup may be carried off by an individual or a group subsequently emerging--like Castro in Cuba--as Communist. Thus South Korea might, under cover of democratic or patriotic motives, be led unwillingly into the Communist bloc. It is more likely, however, and this paper assumes, that South Korea will remain generally anti-Communist, and therefore dependent upon one or more powers of the non-Communist world.

Economic Depression

At present the endemic political instability within South Korea is intensified by the widespread and long-continued economic depression. About 30 per cent of the population is outside of the monetary system altogether. These rural families are getting poorer and poorer as more and more sons try to exist on the family plot of ground. Of the total working force, about 30 per cent is unemployed. The rate of growth of the gross national product $\sqrt{\text{GNP}}$ averaged about 5 per cent per year prior to the politically induced depression resulting from the overthrow

1. Most statistics emanating from South Korea are suspect. Statistics cited herein should therefore be viewed as approximations.
of the Rhee and Chang regimes; it has averaged about 2.5 per cent in the last two years, or less than the average 2.6 per cent annual growth in population. The present regime has established a five-year economic development plan designed to produce a growth in GNP averaging 7.1 per cent a year. This is probably over-optimistic, but with luck and continued assistance from the United States, improvement at least to the earlier growth rate of 5 per cent should be possible. Even this, however, though a respectable achievement, would be inadequate to create a viable economy for a very long time.

Thus, a sluggish economy and widespread poverty are almost certain to characterize South Korea for at least the next ten years. This economic situation not only intensifies the chronic political instability but also makes South Korea much more amenable to enticements from the North (where unemployment is near zero, industrialization has been rapid, and a high growth rate in GNP has been achieved) for the reunification of Korea, even though on terms advantageous only to the Communists.

The maintenance of even a sub-standard economy in South Korea requires major economic assistance from external sources. The United States has already put over $3 billion into the South Korean economy. The present Five Year Plan of the Republic of Korea includes a requirement for some $700 million in foreign
exchange, $450 million of which must take the form of foreign grants, loans, and investments. Even then the South Korean economy will not be self-sustaining, although the balance of payments deficit should be down to about $170 million as compared with the maximum deficit of $387 million in 1957. South Korea will thus surely continue for many years to be dependent upon foreign economic assistance.

Role of the Military

Militarily, South Korea faces the constant threat of large hostile forces, openly committed to the reunification of Korea "along peaceful and democratic lines," and the continuing menace of subversion and potential insurgency. As a result of these and other factors, South Korea maintains armed forces which are very large in proportion to its population, and these are kept in a constant state of readiness for war. The army is the primary stabilizing influence within South Korea--at least in the negative sense that no regime can remain in power, let alone be free to devise and carry out progressive policies, unless it retains control of and support by the army--and the army will support the regime only when it believes that the government is adequately providing for the security of South Korea. But the army itself, as well as the other services, is led by politically
conscious officers, many with political ambitions of their own, and it is divided by internal political factionalism. While the army can be expected to remain loyal and united in the face of an external threat, its acceptance of any political regime—as the aftermath of Rhee's overthrow in 1960 made very clear—cannot be treated as a matter of certainty, and the incipient threat of a military coup increases and continues the climate of inherent political instability.

The Republic of Korea is almost wholly dependent upon the United States for the equipping and support of its military forces. The United States is in South Korea as the agent of, and with the sanction of, the United Nations. In this role, the United States has operational control of all ROK forces and exercises a major, if not controlling, influence over the entire ROK military establishment.

Dependence on the United States

The Republic of Korea is thus to a very high degree the creature of US policy, and is wholly dependent upon the United States for its future existence and well-being. The United States is the only sure source of the economic assistance so essential to its future development; the security of South Korea is wholly dependent upon the United States; and, as discussed below, the
acceptance of South Korea as a member of the world community is largely dependent upon US actions and attitudes. This dependence upon the United States is clearly realized by the present leadership. It is likely that any succeeding regime will be equally cognizant of this dependence. This situation permits the United States to influence strongly, and at times control, the actions and policies of the ROK government.

External Relations

South Korea has been largely isolated, diplomatically and politically, from the remainder of the world. It is at odds with its closest neighbors--Japan and Communist Asia. The government is not now and is not likely soon to become a member of the United Nations. Its only strong diplomatic representation abroad has been in the Washington embassy, and it has had to depend upon the United States to watch over South Korean interests in the rest of the world.

The present military regime is now engaged in an energetic diplomatic offensive, thereby attempting to re-enter the world political scene, and has established relations with about twenty new countries since the May 1961 coup. Negotiations are also under way for a "normalization" of relations with Japan, with some prospect of success. If normal relations could be established
with Japan, substantial benefits would accrue to Korea. In addition to settlement of claims (in the form of grants or "soft" loans) sorely needed for Korean economic development, normalization would open the door for large-scale private assistance in the form of investments, loans, and, particularly, managerial and technical assistance. If these economic ties develop, Japan would then have a political stake in the future of South Korea that would be of great assistance to the ROK in its dealing with the remainder of the world. Important though this development may be, however, it is unlikely that within the foreseeable future Japanese trade or political support can substantially diminish South Korean dependence upon the United States.

The South Koreans face what is to them a monolithic threat from the Communist bloc as epitomized by the treaties for "military and other assistance" signed July 6, 1961, by North Korea and the Soviet Union, and five days later by North Korea and Communist China. Threats from the Communist bloc, whether in the form of North Korean forces along the Demilitarized Zone or events elsewhere in Communist Asia, generally serve only to unify further the South Koreans in their opposition and hostility to communism. The South Koreans are much more susceptible to North Korean blandishments, particularly when the carrot of reunification and prospective prosperity is offered. This was clearly
evidenced during the Chang regime when student mobs, believed by many to have been Communist-led, tried to coerce the government into accepting North Korean attempts to re-establish relations with South Korea.

Conclusion

The two basic attitudes in South Korea are mutually counter-vailing. On the one hand, South Korea is strongly anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, and anti-Chinese; on the other hand, the average Korean strongly desires a unified Korea. The policies of the Republic of Korea Government are most unlikely consciously to involve an accommodation with communism, but it is entirely possible to envisage circumstances that might lead to a closer relationship between North and South Korea. The policies of any South Korean government, however, will be primarily influenced by the positions and attitudes of the United States, and possibly (if "normalization" of relations occurs) to a lesser extent by Japan.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

General

The PACIFICA substudy Military Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability assesses the military significance

2. ISD Study Memorandum No. 14 (IDA, Washington, D.C., 1962), SECRET.
of a Chinese nuclear capability both generally, and specifically with regard to Korea. In summary, this new Communist capability will not, at least during the period when it is only locally significant, reduce US strategic superiority over China, but if local hostilities should develop, they will be more dangerous. If hostilities are resumed in Korea they are likely to result in bilateral nuclear operations in which control, communications, and logistic centers in South Korea, such as Seoul and Pusan, will become prime Communist nuclear targets. The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability will thus significantly increase the likelihood of major devastation in South Korea in the event of a war in or for Korea.

The South Koreans know that the United States is now prepared to conduct nuclear operations in Korea if hostilities are resumed. Rightly or wrongly, the military, and probably much of the policymaking level of the government, believe that any hostilities in Korea would again be instigated and backed by the Soviet Union, and that a decision to initiate Communist nuclear operations in Korea would be a Soviet decision. They will see no difference in results between the implementation of such a decision with Chinese weapons or with Soviet weapons. The South Korean military estimate therefore, contrary to the PACIFICA assessment, is unlikely
to envisage a Chinese nuclear capability as significantly affecting the already very dangerous situation as the South Koreans believe it now exists.

Thus neither the initial Chinese atomic test detonation nor China's subsequent build-up of a locally effective nuclear capability is likely in itself to change South Korea's outlook or policy. However, certain contingencies may materially influence South Korean reaction to Chinese nuclear developments.

The US Posture

With its complete dependence on the United States, South Korea will tend, almost instinctively, to mirror US reactions. If the United States (and particularly its representatives in South Korea) remains unruffled by Chinese nuclear exploits, and imparts the belief that the small, primitive, Chinese nuclear capability will not materially affect the strategic position of the United States in the Far East, there is little likelihood of any significant reaction by South Korea. This situation could change, however, if South Korea should estimate, for any reason, that the United States cannot or will not be able to ensure the security of South Korea. Such an estimate could flow from many events other than statements or actions by the United States. If, for example, Thailand or Taiwan should become Communist, or
pro-Communist neutrals, many Koreans would assess this as a weakening of US military capabilities vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China (PRC), and this assessment would be strengthened by coincident Chinese nuclear exploits.

"Strong" or "Weak" Regime

If a "strong" regime—that is, one that is in effective control of all essential governmental processes in South Korea, and free from public dissension, subversion, or insurgency—is in control, especially if it has given prior thought to the matter, there is very little likelihood that the detonation of an atomic device by the PRC, or the build-up and brandishing of a missile force, would have any real impact on governmental policy or create strong public pressures. South Korea should remain essentially immune to Communist propaganda. Threats—open or tacit—by the PRC would undoubtedly result in stronger pleas for increased military aid and probably for atomic weapons in the hands of ROK forces. If on the other hand a "weak" regime is in office, the demonstration of increased Chinese power might induce governmental timidity that could be exploited by adroit North Korean conciliatory actions, including the holding out of prospects for reunification.
A Neutral Japan

If after the initial Chinese atomic detonation, Japan should adopt a neutral course and expel US forces from Japan, South Korea would undoubtedly feel that the ability of the United States to defend South Korea had been diminished. Had strong economic ties by then been established with Japan, so that the economic dependence of South Korea on the United States were diminished, South Korea might attempt a softer line toward the Communist bloc. The dependence of South Korea on the United States is so great, however, that a "neutral" South Korea is, practically speaking, impossible. Thus even in this case there could hardly be any real change in South Korean actions other than a muting of its hostility toward communism.

Withdrawal of UN Defense Sponsorship

One of Communist China's ambitions is to secure its admission to the United Nations and the expulsion therefrom of Nationalist China. This ambition could be furthered by a Chinese nuclear capability. If the Communists for any reason should succeed in this, and if as a result the United Nations should withdraw its sponsorship of the defense of South Korea (a possible, although

3. And this assessment would be correct, at least in the context of recent US strategic policy for the defense of Korea.
not necessarily likely, further result), this would, as a practical matter, eliminate Japan as a base for support of military operations in defense of South Korea. Present military agreements permitting the use of Japan by UN forces are unlikely to be renewed for purely US purposes. Further, it would remove the legal basis for the retention of a US commander and US control of ROK military forces, thus bringing to the fore Korea's peculiar nationalistic outlook. Such a chain of improbable but possible events might result in a substantial weakening of Korean ties with the United States, greater political and economic dependence upon Japan, and again a softening of the basic anti-Communist policy of South Korea.
TAYWAN

HAROLD C. HINTON

July 1962
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese is likely to decrease the chances of any invasion of the mainland by the Government of the Republic of China [GRC] and may induce the United States to increase its defense commitments to the GRC. Thus there may be a tendency toward further solidification of "Two Chinas," an arrangement unacceptable to the GRC leadership as a permanent solution since it connotes gradual absorption by the Taiwanese majority. A preferable alternative, especially in the eyes of a future GRC leadership perhaps less firmly committed than President Chiang Kai-shek to an anti-Communist crusade, may be some sort of political accommodation with the Communists.
TAIWAN

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the probable effect on the Government of the Republic of China [GRC] of Communist China's acquisition first of a token and then of a locally significant nuclear capability.

BACKGROUND

Demographic

The population of Taiwan is divided sharply into two groups: nine million indigenous Taiwanese, related linguistically and otherwise to the people of Fukien Province across the Taiwan Strait; and two million mainland Chinese, who have come to the island for political reasons since 1945, in most cases since 1949, and not primarily from Fukien.

Economic

The economy of the island is prosperous, and living standards are fairly high. Yet it is a precarious prosperity, heavily dependent on American aid, which supports most of the military budget and is directly accountable for most nonmilitary
capital investment. The population is growing so fast (over 3 percent per annum) that in 1960 the island became, despite high agricultural yields, a rice importer. The high living standard is maintained, for mainly political reasons, by concentrating on consumption and slighting long term investment.

Political

Behind some trappings of constitutional democracy, the mainlander-dominated Kuomintang or Nationalist Party controls both the national and the provincial administrations on Taiwan through authoritarian police methods. Although the GRC is relatively incorrupt and far less oppressive than the Communist regime on the mainland, Taiwan is essentially a garrison state, with little self-government above the local level.

The basic reasons why Taiwan is essentially a garrison state are the authoritarian history and tradition of the Kuomintang, the fact that it is engaged in a civil war with a stronger opponent, and the determination of the dominant minority of mainlanders to head off a challenge to their position and ultimate absorption by the Taiwanese majority. The Taiwanese resent being governed by mainlanders, although they would dislike Communist rule even more, and they would probably prefer a "Two Chinas" situation under which they could gradually absorb the mainlanders on the island through intermarriage.
Ultimate political and military authority on Taiwan is exercised by the GRC's seemingly indestructible President, Chiang Kai-shek (born 1887). Constitutionally speaking, his heir apparent is Vice President Chen Cheng, who is also Premier and Deputy Leader of the Kuomintang and is acceptable to the United States as President Chiang's successor. A man with considerably more power than Vice President Chen, however, is President Chiang's elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who already controls the internal security system, the political apparatus in the armed forces, and the youth corps. The younger Chiang's chances of becoming the real, although not necessarily the nominal, power on the island after his father's death or retirement appear good.

The GRC's Objectives and Alternatives

President Chiang regards a successful "return to the mainland" as his government's most important objective and as the culmination of his long struggle against communism. He envisions the "return to the mainland" as being more political than military, meaning that it will be possible only in a context of partial or complete internal collapse of the Communist regime. He considers massive defections from the Communist armed forces, and apparently also American aid and support, as both necessary and likely conditions of an invasion of the mainland.
Recently President Chiang, and others in the GRC who share his thinking, have revised upward their estimate of both the imminence and urgency of the "return to the mainland." The factors which have led to this revision are the deteriorating economic and political situation on the mainland, President Chiang's advancing age, the GRC's increasingly uncertain position in the United Nations, and possibly the prospect of the Communists' acquiring nuclear weapons.

Apart from a continuation of the current situation, three principal alternatives to a "return to the mainland" confront the GRC. The first is defeat by or surrender to the Communists; this is obviously the least acceptable alternative, and American commitments to the defense of Taiwan make it an unlikely one. The second, only slightly less unacceptable, is a "Two Chinas" situation and eventual Taiwarization, through absorption of the mainlanders by the Taiwanese. The third is an accommodation with the Communists that would presumably leave the Nationalists in control of Taiwan and with at least a nominal share of power on the mainland. Although such an accommodation seems virtually unthinkable while President Chiang remains in power, the idea would not necessarily be so unacceptable to his successors, who may feel less fully committed to the anti-Communist struggle.
THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN

The American military interest in Taiwan is indirect, but considerable. The fact that Taiwan is under Chinese Nationalist control somewhat simplifies American military problems in the Far East, as compared with what they would be if the island were under Communist control, and makes it possible for the United States to obtain valuable military and other intelligence on Communist China. Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands help to deter the Communists from actions, such as an invasion of Southeast Asia, that would be inimical to American interests. Nationalist forces could under certain circumstances make an important contribution to the overthrow of the Communist regime on the mainland.

Apart from these considerations, Taiwan's strategic importance is not very great, as its minor role in the Second World War indicates. Its possession is essential neither to an attack on nor the defense of any other area. It would be useful as a base for an invasion of South China, but the United States neither contemplates such an invasion itself nor (as President Kennedy declared in a press conference on June 27, 1962) intends to support the GRC in an invasion of the mainland.

Without American support, the GRC's chances of making a successful opposed landing on the mainland are very slight.
Realizing American reluctance to give cover or support to offensive operations, the GRC considers its most nearly realistic hope to be an American assumption of full defensive responsibility for the Nationalist-controlled areas, which relief would free the GRC's forces for offensive operations in the event that conditions on the mainland should deteriorate enough to make them possible.

Politically, the importance of Taiwan, or rather of the survival and prosperity of the GRC on Taiwan, to the United States is very great. The GRC is the United States' oldest ally in Asia, and since 1950 the support and defense of the GRC on Taiwan has been one of the main goals of United States Far Eastern policy. The United States is committed by the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of February 1955 and by Congressional joint resolution (the so-called Formosa Resolution of January 1955) to defend Taiwan and the immediately adjacent islands (but not necessarily the offshore islands as well) against Communist attack. Failure to do this, or to give political support and economic aid to the GRC, would seriously if not fatally damage the United States' reputation for consistency and dependability in all countries, the neutrals included. On the other hand, as already indicated, the situation on Taiwan contains serious elements of potential political instability that might make it necessary for the United States to revise its policy in the future.
If the GRC should go so far as to repudiate its alliance with the United States, in order to reach an agreement with the Communists or for some other purpose, the result might be a major political setback for the United States.

Such an eventuality is not quite so unlikely as the obvious fact of the GRC's current military and economic dependence on the United States might make it appear, because this dependence in the military and economic fields is not matched in the political sector. American political leverage on the GRC is limited, and conversely some scope for pressure on the United States is conferred on the GRC, by a number of factors. Among these are American public opinion on the China question, the GRC's status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a long-time ally of the United States, President Chiang's character and stature, and the military utility of the GRC to the United States in the containment of Communist China. An indication of both the extent and the limits of the GRC's ability to exert political pressure on the United States is the fact that, although the GRC has failed to secure an offensive commitment from the United States, it succeeded in 1961 in compelling the United States to refrain from recognizing Outer Mongolia and to refuse a visa to the self-proclaimed leader of the Taiwan independence movement, and
apparently also to give up any serious hope of bringing the GRC to evacuate the offshore islands. Thus the GRC is, at least politically, by no means an American satellite. There is no compelling reason to doubt that, if the GRC thought that changing circumstances rendered a break with the United States and an accommodation with Peiping both possible and advantageous, it would attempt such a step.

THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

One of the most important and potentially explosive aspects of the situation in the Taiwan Strait is the GRC's presence in great force on the offshore islands. According to the GRC's official explanation, the islands serve as forward bases for the "return to the mainland" and as outposts in the defense of Taiwan. Actually, the importance of the offshore islands is more political and psychological than military. They resemble the handkerchief linking two knife fighters. They give the GRC a point of contact with the mainland, and with the regime that controls it. In GRC hands, they are the most effective obstacles to a "Two Chinas" solution (abhorred equally by the Communist and Nationalist Chinese regimes), which would come much closer if the GRC evacuated the islands and placed the entire width of the Taiwan Strait between the two regimes. Thus both parties regard the present situation as temporarily acceptable.
The GRC's presence on the offshore islands gives both it and the Communists scope for pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union by increasing, or seeming to increase, the chances of a war in the Taiwan Strait that both the superpowers are anxious to avoid. An evacuation or loss of the offshore islands would eliminate this leverage, in addition to producing a de facto "Two Chinas" situation and probably enhancing sentiment on Taiwan in favor of an accommodation with the Communists.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR ACQUISITION

The initial overt reaction of the GRC to the first nuclear test and subsequent acquisition of a token nuclear capability by the Communist Chinese is likely to be that it is an event of no importance, since it is the result of Soviet aid. Apart from the reason, this conclusion is not entirely wrong, since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese will probably not make much immediate difference to the GRC. In time and beneath the surface, however, the effect is likely to be significant.

On the one hand, there will be some grounds for encouragement. The GRC may reason that the chances of a Far Eastern war, which would offer it the best and perhaps the only chance of "returning to the mainland," are increased, and that the United
States may be more susceptible to pressure for the stationing of nuclear weapons on Taiwan, training of GRC forces in the use of nuclear weapons, or making a public unambiguous declaration of intent to defend the offshore islands.

On the other hand, there will be still more powerful grounds for discouragement. There is likely to be some, largely unexpressed, pride on Taiwan in the Communist Chinese nuclear achievement, and by the same token the GRC will expect a comparable reaction on the mainland and a possible improvement in the domestic political position of the Communist regime. The GRC will probably also fear an increase in the Communists' chances of entering the United Nations, gaining universal diplomatic recognition, and improving their international position in general. There will be a sense of increased vulnerability, especially with regard to the defense and resupply of the offshore islands, and a fear that unless pressed the United States may decide not to defend them. There will be a sense of increased dependence on the United States. There will be an awareness that an operational Communist Chinese nuclear capability will make the "return to the mainland" even more difficult, and perhaps a feeling that it is now or never.

1. A Communist nuclear ultimatum to the GRC to evacuate these islands would confront both the GRC and the United States Government with a difficult dilemma and would strain their mutual relations.
The GRC's response is likely to be conditioned to a considerable degree by the character of the leadership in power at the time, by that leadership's view of American intentions, and by conditions on the mainland. The more vigorous the leadership and the lower its estimate of American reliability and the political solidity of the Communist regime, the likelier it will be to try a "return to the mainland." If the Communist Chinese nuclear debut occurred at a time when the leadership on Taiwan was in an unstable condition following the death of President Chiang, the chances of an attempt to reach an agreement with the Communists would probably be increased. If the GRC were too weak either to invade or to negotiate with the Communists, or even simply to stand firm, it might decide to evacuate the offshore islands and so create a "Two Chinas" situation. As already indicated, such a step would probably lead in time to an accommodation with the Communists.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF
A COMMUNIST CHINESE
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (U)

JOHN B. CARY
MAJOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
RETIRED

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AUGUST 31, 1992

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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A

COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (U)

John B. Cary

Major General
United States Air Force, Retired

Prepared for IDA in support of a study to be submitted to the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961

The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of IDA or of the Department of Defense

International Studies Division
Institute for Defense Analyses
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

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FOREWORD

This paper was written for Study PACIFICA, an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power. Study PACIFICA is being prepared by the International Studies Division of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961. Brigadier General Sidney F. Giffin, USAF (Ret.) is the Study Leader.

The author, Major General John B. Cary, is a retired officer of the United States Air Force and Deputy Director of the International Studies Division. He has served as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces; Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force; and Director of Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

JAMES E. KING, JR.
Director
International Studies Division
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SUMMARY

The initial nuclear detonations by the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) and the subsequent development of an operational nuclear capability will stimulate pressures generally adverse to US military interests. Reactions in Japan and Thailand will be particularly significant; should these nations swing toward neutralism the US military position in North and Southeast Asia would be severely degraded. The Chinese threat may, however, propel these nations into even closer alignment with the United States. Actual effects will depend on prior actions by the United States in Asia, the nature of the internal US reaction, and estimates by Free Asian nations as to the over-all strategic situation in Asia resulting from a Chinese nuclear capability. All of these factors can be influenced by the United States.

The US alliance system in Asia is considered adequate for military purposes and requires no significant alteration.

A regional nuclear capability for the CPR will not significantly increase Communist capabilities in general war. A Chinese nuclear capability will, however, tend to increase pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese aggression and will increase
the likelihood of circumstances arising requiring, from the Chinese viewpoint, Soviet military support. However, the amount and type of assistance provided will be strongly influenced by the clear Soviet desire to avoid a nuclear war (and certainly general war) at almost any cost.

A locally effective Chinese nuclear capability will frustrate any attempt at invasion of the Chinese mainland, increase the range of Communist military and paramilitary actions that can be conducted without incurring US military response, and permit a nuclear response to US military actions. Present US freedom to decide on nuclear operations in an Asian war, and to impose other ground rules through the threat of nuclear operations, will be lost. The initial military situation in a local war or crisis is likely to be prejudiced, as the threatened Asian ally, reluctant to provoke China and fearful of possible nuclear devastation, procrastinates in requesting US assistance. The United States, too, will be more cautious in committing military forces against Communist forces backed by a local nuclear capability. The resultant delays in a political decision to commit US military forces will require more forces, more effort, and a greater prestige commitment than would otherwise have been necessary.

Wars in specific localities in Asia are examined. Military advantage will as a rule accrue to the CPR only through the existence
of an unused capability, permitting the CPR to employ most effectively its huge ground forces. An unused nuclear capability can give the CPR somewhat greater latitude in the use of force at the lower levels, and may prevent US initiation of nuclear operations in situations in which otherwise the US would consider nuclear operations to be necessary.

The United States can retain a large measure of control over escalation of hostilities in the Far East, and the capability to impose ground rules for limited war, including the determination as to whether hostilities will be nuclear or non-nuclear, through rapid, effective reaction (especially at lower levels of hostilities) and by a suitable deterrent posture. These capabilities should be made adequate to cause the Chinese to estimate that escalation would be ineffective and unprofitable—a result facilitated by China's extreme vulnerability to nuclear attack.

The US deterrent posture for this purpose should consist of Pacific-based nuclear offensive forces likely in any event largely to be required in the Pacific Command [PACOM]. These forces should be assigned to the PACOM, suitably protected, and designed and discreetly advertised as specifically a counter-CPR force. The evident existence and capability of this force should bolster US allies, serve as a strong deterrent to open aggression and particularly to initiation of nuclear operations by China, corrode the Soviet alliance, and minimize the risk of escalation to general war.
The body of the paper is based on a stated rate of nuclear progress by China and on the assumption that Sino-Soviet relations remain approximately as at present. Changes in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, or a modest acceleration in China's nuclear program or in the attainment of a token intercontinental nuclear force, would not result in significant disadvantage for the United States. Delays and stretchouts in Chinese nuclear programs, which are more likely, will be to US advantage.

If and when China becomes a first class intercontinental nuclear power (and this is by no means certain) comparable to the United States and to the Soviet Union, China must also have become a first class industrial power. This combination of military and economic power will permit China to extend its influence over additional areas in Asia, and thus will reduce geographically areas where the projection of US military power may be required. But if war in Asia should occur, it will be more intense, more dangerous, and require larger forces than previously. The projection of Chinese influence on a global basis must be anticipated. Regional deterrent actions hitherto valuable will lose their effectiveness, and US strategic plans must promise response against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental nuclear war occurs.

The specific conclusions of this paper are on pages 131-36. Specific actions are suggested (pages 137-46) to ameliorate adverse military implication of Chinese nuclear developments.

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

INTRODUCTION

The US intelligence community estimates that the People's Republic of China (PRC)\(^1\) will explode an experimental atomic device within the next two or three years; will have a locally effective nuclear capability\(^2\) about three years after the initial atomic detonation; and may, subsequent to 1970, become a major nuclear power with an extensive stockpile of a variety of nuclear weapons and with long-range ballistic missiles and other sophisticated delivery vehicles. This nuclear progress by the CPR will have major political and military repercussions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the military implications of these achievements for the United States and its allies. The body of the paper is limited to consideration of the period ending (presumably about 1972) with the acquisition by the CPR of operational quantities of

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1. The "People's Republic of China" is the official name of the Communist regime that governs mainland China. The term "China," sometimes used in this paper for the sake of brevity, refers to Communist China.

2. A "locally effective nuclear capability" as used in this paper is defined as the ability to deliver one or more nuclear weapons on targets within 1,000 miles of launch sites within Communist China.
thermonuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]. Certain longer-range implications are, however, also discussed.

This paper will examine, in order: the military implications of China's nuclear accomplishments in time of peace, for general war and for Soviet military action, for wars in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and for US deterrence of the CPR; the effects of possible variations in present estimates of CPR nuclear progress and in the state of Sino-Soviet relations; longer-range implications; certain conclusions stemming from these analyses; and, finally, suggested ameliorating actions that the United States might take to offset the military advantages otherwise accruing to the CPR from its nuclear weapons and weapons systems program.

GENERAL SITUATION

The specific quantitative estimate of Chinese nuclear capabilities used for the body of this paper is reproduced as Appendix A. In summary, this estimate credits the Chinese with an

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3. The accuracy of this estimate is not a critical factor. A moderate acceleration in China's nuclear progress would still provide ample time for almost any countermeasure that the United States may wish to adopt (see Chapter X, below), possibly excepting measures needed to preclude deleterious reactions to China's initial test detonation. Delay of even several years in China's estimated progress (and some delay will probably result from current economic troubles) is unlikely to find the United States in a significantly different political, military, and technological environment. Hence the military implications, and the US countermeasures required, should not be materially different if China's nuclear progress is slower than reflected in this estimate, although requirements in terms of time would of course be eased.
initial aircraft-deliverable nuclear capability of about twelve 20-kiloton $\sqrt{KT}$ weapons by the end of 1964; a warhead inventory passing the fifty mark in 1967; the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles $\sqrt{MREMs}$ in 1966-67 and of thermonuclear weapons in 1969; and an initial operational ICBM capability, possibly in 1972, at which time China's warhead stockpile could be about 550 fission weapons, or 275 thermonuclear weapons, or some combination in between. This estimate is based on a "moderately slow" program (that is, continuing economic difficulties within the CPR). 4 This nuclear capability will be additive to the CPR's conventional military forces, which will remain approximately equal in size to her present forces but moderately improved in quality.

The external objectives of the CPR will almost certainly include:

1) The acquisition of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

2) A measure of control over, and possibly territorial expansion in, Southeast Asia.

3) Regional leadership or hegemony in Asia.

4) The elimination of Western, and particularly US, influence in Asia and the Western Pacific.

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4. The estimate here used is taken from Donald B. Keesing, The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat: Warheads and Delivery Vehicles (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Memorandum No. 17 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.
5) A position of leadership within the Communist bloc and the international Communist movement.

6) The expansion of communism, particularly in the underdeveloped areas.

7) Eventually, world-wide acceptance of China as a superpower at least equal to the United States and to the Soviet Union.\(^5\)

It is also practically certain that the CPR will use its nuclear capability as a lever, or as a backdrop, for intensive propaganda, blackmail, and political warfare to further these aggressively expansionist objectives.

ASSUMPTIONS

For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that:

1) There will be no effective disarmament or arms control agreement accepted by Communist China as binding upon her.

2) The United States will retain readily available forces in the Western Pacific-Far East area on a scale approximating present Service programs.

3) The United States will retain secure, long-range strategic strike forces, over and above those necessary for employment against the Soviet Union, adequate for strategic operations against China.

\(^5\) For a detailed discussion, see Harold C. Hinton, Communist China's External Policy and Behavior, UNCLASSIFIED, ISD Study Memorandum No. 18 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.
4) There will be no war resulting in major dislocation of the economies of the United States, China, or the Soviet Union.

The body of this paper is based on the additional assumption that the state of Sino-Soviet relations remains approximately as at present—that is, these countries remain politically and militarily aligned, and hostile to the West. Stress and strains within this association will, however, result in a degree of friction and mistrust, and in lack of cohesion in foreign policy objectives. The effects of variations in this assumption are discussed in Chapter VII.

In discussing US military capabilities, no attempt has been made to recommend specific employments. Such an endeavor, which would connote specific war planning, is inappropriate for a study such as this, and in any event would necessarily be based on so many assumptions—largely surmise—as to have little if any value. Military requirements are therefore discussed in terms of capabilities which will permit a variety of decisions by the United States. More specifically, discussion of US nuclear forces is based on the clear realization that if employed at all they need not be used to their full capacity nor against any target system postulated herein.

METHODOLOGY: VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS

The analyses and judgments in this paper are based on extensive consultations with US military and diplomatic officials in
the Pacific, the Far East and Europe; on consultations with and
data furnished by representatives of the US Armed Services, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Department of State in Washington; on broad situation gaming to a
degree sufficient to permit assessment of basic military environ-
ments; and on research in official US diplomatic, military, and
intelligence documents as made available to the PACIFICA staff.
Advice and assistance were also received from the civilian con-
sultants of Study PACIFICA.

The analysis employed is considered to be of sufficient depth
to provide a valid basis for the broad conclusions reached and spe-
cific actions suggested. While no specific cost estimates have
been undertaken, suggested actions have been limited to those con-
sidered to be reasonable projections of past and current funding
programs.

The present paper is in accordance with the PACIFICA directive
to determine implications for US policy. While the conclusions are
believed to be well founded, the method of analysis does not have
the precision or detail needed to determine specific force require-
ments or deficiencies; to serve as a basis for judging or recommend-
ing revisions in contingency war plans; to establish the cost of, or
determine priorities between, specific alternative military programs;
or to provide a basis for assessment of alternative tactics or weap-
ons. Specific recommendations of this nature would require extensive
detailed analysis, war gaming, and costing of various alternatives; and would necessarily be based on assumptions largely hypothetical in nature. An extensive research program of this type is beyond the scope of Study PACIFICA.
CHAPTER II

PEACETIME IMPLICATIONS

Other PACIFICA papers examine the possible repercussions in Asian nations and in Europe of China's explosion of an atomic device, and subsequent development of a nuclear capability. The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the direct military implications of these possible political repercussions. This analysis does not constitute a prediction of future events; it is an examination of the military effects of events which may occur. To some degree the United States can control the course of events, encouraging favorable trends and discouraging adverse ones. Actions toward this end, insofar as they pertain to United States and

1. The implications summarized in this chapter are discussed from other points of view in other papers of the PACIFICA study, namely, for Southeast Asia by Tillman Durdin, for South Asia by Loy W. Henderson, for Australasia by Arthur Burns, for Japan by Donald B. Keesing and Roger Pineau, for Korea by John B. Cary, for Taiwan by Harold C. Hinton, for Continental Europe by General "X," for the United Kingdom by Roderick MacFarquhar, and for the Soviet Union by John R. Thomas. Loy W. Henderson, Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: South Asia (U), CONFIDENTIAL, has been issued as IDA/ISD Study Memorandum No. 11, dated May 30, 1962; Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe and the United Kingdom, UNCLASSIFIED, by General "X" and Roderick MacFarquhar, has been issued as IDA/ISD Study Memorandum No. 12, dated September 15, 1962. Other studies will be issued in due course.
allied military activities in the Far East, are discussed in Chapter X.²

The more important peacetime implications of a Chinese nuclear program will in large part depend upon the potential reactions to the initial atomic detonation (as affected one way or the other by Chinese psychological exploitation) and to other Chinese nuclear exploits prior to the time China has, and displays, a locally effective nuclear capability. This chapter therefore is largely devoted to the developments which may be generated during this two- to three-year time period. Certain discernible longer-range trends are also discussed.

³JAPAN³

Japan will be subjected to at least some degree of shock by the initial Chinese atomic demonstration, and to carrot-and-stick pressures from China as its nuclear capabilities develop. Japan's reaction to these influences could range from the extremes of disengagement from the US alliance and accommodation with the People's Republic of China on the one hand, to an intensified cooperation with the United States (to the extent of permitting the

2. See below, pp. 137-46.

³. See also Donald B. Keesing and Roger Pineau, Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Japan (U), SECRET, ISD Study Memorandum No. 15 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.
introduction or storage of nuclear weapons in Japan) and an increased independent defense effort on the other. Either of these extremes could result only from the reinforcing interaction of many critical but largely unpredictable variables, which include Japan's domestic political situation and its external economic relations, the world situation in general, and especially the posture of the United States compared to the postures of Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The initial Chinese test detonation will probably lead to an intense, public, largely emotional reappraisal of Japan's position in the world, its security policy, and its relations with the East and the West. But with forethought and preparation by the Japanese government--hopefully instigated and assisted by the United States--and given no change in the present world general political environment, neither the initial atomic explosion nor subsequent Chinese pressures should cause major change in Japanese policy, because the reactions among the principal opposing factions in Japan will be countervailing. Groups favoring an accommodation with Communist China will gain adherents, but advocates of close ties with the United States and of an increased defense effort will also gain supporters by pointing out the hopeless condition of Japan's military forces under the menace from a nuclear-capable Communist China and Soviet Union. Although a middle-course
reaction is thus anticipated, the extreme reactions must also be considered in terms of their military implications.

A "neutral" or pro-Communist Japan would at best deny to the United States, and at worst provide the Communists with, the only strategic base in the Far East--outside of China and the Soviet Union--presently adequate for the support of major military forces and operations.

Japan's location is the key to operations in the Korea-Manchuria-Maritime Provinces area of Northeast Asia. Japanese bases are irreplaceable for these purposes: possible alternates are either too vulnerable and undeveloped (Korea), too small to serve as an adequate base area (Okinawa and Iwo Jima), or too distant for sustained and general utility (Taiwan, the Philippines, and Guam).

The United States is now dependent upon bases in Japan for:

1) Operational and logistic support of forces in South Korea, and the protection of the sea and air lines of communication to Korea.

4. The term "neutral" in this paper is used in a rather special sense. The word implies both political and ideological avoidance of relationships with the non-Communist West--political neutrality in the sense of shunning military alliances or political obligations (e.g., India); ideological neutrality in the sense of cultural aloofness from the West (e.g., Indonesia).
2) Initial general war strikes against targets in Manchuria and Siberia by all Navy and Marine land-based aircraft in the Pacific Command [FACOM] and a large part of Pacific-based Air Force aircraft.

3) The ready availability for redeployment to a crisis area of all land-based Navy and Marine aircraft, and a portion of Air Force aircraft, based in the Western Pacific.

4) Support of sustained operations in and over the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, and Sea of Okhotsk, and the protection of these operations.

If Japan should become neutral—or worse, pro-Communist—the United States position in Okinawa would be adversely affected. At best, there would be strong political pressures for the return of Okinawa to Japan; at worst, the island could become, in effect, hostile territory occupied by US forces.

A neutral Japan would be highly vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union. US assistance in the defense of Japan would be rendered difficult and probably would be impossible without ultimately carrying operations to the Soviet Union. This strategic weakness of a neutral Japan, while not likely to lead to general war, would make that country most vulnerable to threats and pressures. It could lead to ever-increasing concessions on the part of Japan which in the long run could conceivably give to the
Communists, and deny to the United States, the military position and assets of Japan.

In summary, neutrality for Japan would seriously impair and possibly prevent the defense of South Korea; would impede US military operations against northern China, Siberia, and adjacent areas; and would impair the ability of the United States to project its sea and air power into the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, and adjoining portions of the Asiatic mainland. A pro-Communist Japan—which might succeed a neutral Japan—would give to the Communists, and deny to the United States, all of the advantages of these highly strategic islands and their adjacent sea and air space.

It is possible and even probable, particularly if the United States has prepared the ground, that Chinese nuclear achievements may propel Japan into even closer alliance with the United States, and cause Japan to build up effective defense forces. Japan's adamant stand against atomic weapons may be eliminated, her defense forces permitted to have nuclear defensive weapons, US forces based in Japan openly permitted offensive nuclear armament, and Japanese facilities made openly available as bases for US nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vehicles. While the initial Chinese atomic detonation should not be used as in itself sufficient basis to press the Japanese along these lines, any evolutionary trend in this direction, such as would be normal for the
highly nationalistic Japanese, should be discreetly encouraged to the end, in particular, of affording the United States nuclear freedom.

If a flat prediction were necessary, the safest would be that Chinese nuclear accomplishments alone will have no militarily significant bearing on Japanese policies or actions. The possible, even though not necessarily probable, adverse military implications are so serious, however, and the possible implications favorable to the United States are so advantageous, that it is clearly in the US interest to overinsure, as feasible, against adverse reactions and to encourage favorable ones.

THAILAND

Just as Japan is the military key to the Northeast Asia area, so Thailand is the key to Southeast Asia. It has the only reasonably adequate port in mainland Southeast Asia north of Singapore; it has the best developed and most usable, airfield complex in all of Southeast Asia; it has a road and rail net and communications radiating from Bangkok which, although poor by Western standards, are superior to those elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The country is suitably located to support operations in or against Burma, Laos, North and South Vietnam, and Cambodia. Its facilities will probably be essential for the rapid air transport of US forces to Burma and farther west. As a result of past deployments of US
forces to Thailand, that country has already been partially developed as a base for US forces—the only such prepared base in Southeast Asia.

As the CPR develops its nuclear capability, a reaction in Thailand adverse to US interests is likely only if the Thais should estimate that the United States can no longer be depended upon with certainty to assist effectively in the defense of Thailand. Such an unfavorable estimate may require not only a perceptible raising of over-all Chinese military capabilities through nuclear developments, but also an apparent deterioration in the ability of the United States to assist its Asian allies.

Such an estimate would result in a strong tendency in Thailand to seek an accommodation with the Communists (probably with the Soviets as a curb on Chinese ambitions), particularly if Vietnam should be wholly lost to the West. The United States, if denied Thai facilities because of such an accommodation, would be unable to counter Communist military or para-military moves anywhere in Southeast Asia except under severe handicaps. Even operations in support of South Vietnam would be handicapped if the only land area available were in South Vietnam, itself. Elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia a military solution to Communist aggression of any kind would become virtually impossible.
MALAYA

Malaya (or the Federation of Malaysia) is unlikely to be directly influenced, in a military sense, by Chinese nuclear accomplishments. If the train of events started by a Chinese nuclear detonation should result in substantial change in the position of Thailand, however, Malaya would be directly affected. If aggression clearly attributable to the Communists should occur against Thailand, Malaya would probably feel its own security threatened and call on the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and possibly on the United States, for assistance.\textsuperscript{5} If Thailand should become neutral or oriented toward the Communists as the result of political action or "internal" insurgency, it is unlikely that Malay government policy would be changed. Such events in Thailand, however, would likely presage the revival of Communist insurgency in Malaya. This could result in a pro-Communist government of Malaya; or it might lead to another protracted guerrilla campaign absorbing sizable UK forces, with obvious implications for NATO, and possibly an involvement of the United States.

\textsuperscript{5} Throughout this paper the term "military assistance," is used to describe assistance provided by active military units, combat or support. The term "military aid" is used to describe assistance—in the form of equipment, supplies, and advice—provided under the Military Assistance Program.
As a minimum result of a Chinese capability to attack Malaya with nuclear weapons, bases in Malaya and Singapore will become even less likely to be available for support of British and Commonwealth forces that may be committed to assist nations in Southeast Asia other than Malaya.

BURMA, LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Chinese nuclear developments alone are unlikely to cause significant reaction in these countries. All are subject to direct overland attack which none can counter, and Chinese capabilities to invade these countries will not be appreciably enhanced by a nuclear capability. Laos and Cambodia will continue to be avenues for infiltration of, and possibly bases for attack on, South Vietnam and Thailand. If, however, the new government of Laos avoids actual Communist domination, Cambodia, although potentially unstable, will remain geographically insulated from the Communist bloc and can retain independence of action.

Burma will almost certainly retain its policy of neutrality, probably generally oriented toward the CPR. The latter may, with some likelihood of success, use its developing military capability as a lever to encourage ever closer alignment of Burmese policy with that of China. The CPR would appear to have little more to gain by military threats or actual aggression against Burma.
INDIA, NEPAL AND PAKISTAN

It is not likely that there will be militarily significant reaction in India or Pakistan to an initial Chinese nuclear detonation. India, already afraid of China, might initiate an atomic weapons program of its own, hoping for British assistance in this effort. Unless major assistance is provided by the United States or Great Britain, however, an Indian nuclear-development program would be unlikely to produce a significant delivery capability for many years. While a nuclear program alone might have appreciable political and psychological effects, it would have little effect on the over-all strategic situation in Asia during the present decade. If relations between India and Pakistan remain exacerbated, an Indian nuclear-weapons-development program would be of concern primarily to Pakistan.

India is too self-centered in outlook to undertake preventive countermeasures against Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia, or even to be acutely concerned about actions which Southeast Asian nations might take to accommodate to a nuclear-capable CPR. An open attack by China against Burma (a move which as we have indicated, does not appear to be in China's interest) or the development of a threatening situation in Nepal, would, however, be

6. See also Henderson, Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: South Asia (U).
perceived by India as a direct threat requiring counteraction. Nepal has already shown signs of willingness to reach an accommodation with the CPR. The relatively level southern part of Nepal provides military access to India in much the same way that Laos offers entry across Thailand's northeastern frontier. While Nepal is unlikely to be substantially influenced by a Chinese atomic detonation, previous Chinese penetration of Nepal would greatly intensify Indian alarm and reaction to the event.

India may seek closer relations with the USSR in the hope that the Soviets can and will restrain Chinese military adventures. While these actions could lead to an India more closely aligned with Soviet political, economic, and military policies, such a drift toward communism might be forestalled by timely countermeasures on the part of the United States and (hopefully) Great Britain—particularly actions designed to dampen the initial shock effect of the first Chinese detonation.

It is possible that India and Pakistan, both acutely aware of the Chinese threat, might as a result of a Chinese atomic detonation reach agreement between themselves on their major differences and present a common front against a common enemy. The United States and Great Britain should offer discreet encouragement to this end. A more likely consequence, however, would be the intensification of Indian-Pakistani differences over
Kashmir. Pakistan may seek a closer relationship with the CPR to obtain backing in the dispute with India (supported by the Soviet Union) over Kashmir, and moral support against encroachment by Afghanistan, but probably not to the extent of alienating the West. Any inclination by Pakistan to adopt this approach would be intensified either by an impression of increased Chinese military power stemming from Chinese nuclear feats or by a closer alignment of India with the Soviet Union. The best prospect for offsetting any such tendency on the part of Pakistan appears to lie in convincing the Pakistanis that the United States will retain military superiority over the CPR in spite of the latter's nuclear-weapons program and that the United States is able and willing to assist Pakistan in defense against Communist aggression. But the United States must anticipate demands from Pakistan for increased military aid as the price of continued alignment. 7

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

No militarily significant impact stemming directly from Chinese atomic achievements is foreseen elsewhere in Asia, provided the US reaction is one of strength and confidence. South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines are all strongly anti-Communist,

7. For a more detailed discussion of the alternatives facing Pakistan, see ibid., pp. 26-29.
this posture being a reflection of popular conviction as well as that of the governments; they should therefore remain largely immune to nuclear blackmail. These countries, however, and also South Vietnam, are vulnerable in varying degree to air attack even by the obsolescent aircraft now in the Chinese air force. Increased demands for US military aid, particularly for the provision of adequate air defenses, can be expected. Pressures will probably be generated for developing indigenous nuclear forces.

Neither Ceylon nor Indonesia is likely to be affected significantly, in a military sense, by Chinese nuclear developments. Both are too remote to be immediately threatened by China and too unschooled to understand clearly the significance of a nuclear capability. Indonesia's present neutrality, based on somewhat closer cooperation with the USSR than with the West, and on a sharp distrust of Communist China, is unlikely to be affected solely by the development of a Chinese nuclear capability.

US ALLIANCES AND ALLIES

Occidental Allies. The French apparently are determined to avoid any further military involvement in Southeast Asia. Having suffered a stinging defeat in Indochina, they also appear to be determined to prevent military operations by any other Western power that might, by comparison, further decrease French military
prestige. Great Britain almost surely would assist (within its limited capabilities) a member of the Commonwealth, probably would accede to a request by an ex-colony for military assistance, and probably, although reluctantly, would fulfill military commitments under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in the event of clear Communist aggression. However, the United States should not expect the British either to participate in or to agree to US actions—other than in defense of Commonwealth members—taken either outside the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] or in meeting ambiguous aggression. Other European allies, more concerned with the defense of Europe and mindful of the cost and results of the Korean War, will exert all possible pressure on the United States to prevent or limit US military involvement in the Far East. Of all the Occidental allies, only Australia and New Zealand (and possibly Canada) can be depended upon to support, even morally, any US military action in Asia.

US military plans, therefore, should be based on the premise that there will be no military participation by an Occidental ally; that any French missions in Laos and Cambodia will not assist and may obstruct US military operations; and that no Commonwealth facilities or forces (except Australasian) will be available to assist the United States unless there is a clear threat to a member of the Commonwealth.
US Alliance Systems in Asia. The United States now has bilateral defensive alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The United States is formally aligned with Thailand only through the multilateral arrangement of SEATO, and with Pakistan through SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO]. While the United States is perhaps hampered from entering into formal security arrangements with the nations of former French Indochina by unilateral commitments assumed at the time of the Geneva agreements of 1954 ending the Indochinese War, present US understandings and arrangements with South Vietnam constitute a de facto political and military alliance.

US alliance systems in the Far East are examined in Appendix B in the light of, first, their military utility in a political environment that includes a nuclear-capable China and, second, their political usefulness as a means of assuring US allies of the US determination effectively to assist them in withstanding a nuclear-capable China.

In summary, SEATO appears to have little practical military utility. It should, however, be retained to avoid damage to the

8. See below, pp. 156-57.

9. The United States, though not formally a member of CENTO, is represented at the council meetings by observers and is a full member of the military and counter-subversion committees.
relationships of the United States with its European allies, and also because the existence of this treaty organization might be useful to the United States in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression.

Other possible multilateral arrangements in the Far East would appear to offer little, if any, military advantage. If Thailand should require further or more formal assurance of US commitment, a bilateral agreement would be justified. Improvement on an informal basis in military relationships with Pakistan is desirable. These arrangements with Pakistan should include an expansion in the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Group [MAAG], and, preferably, its placement under the Commander in Chief, Pacific [CINCPAC], thus paving the way for a closer operational relationship between the two countries, while at the same time minimizing the probable adverse effects on US relations with India. A firmer commitment of the United States to the strategic defense of Australia under the ANZUS treaty could result in more effective military support of any operations undertaken by the United States in Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia.

**COUNTERACTIONS**

The possible deleterious effects of the Chinese nuclear program, and particularly the initial test detonation, will flow essentially from one or more of the following:
1) An estimate by Asian nations that the possession of a nuclear capability will give Communist China strategic superiority over the United States in Asia. Such an estimate would stem in the first instance from ignorance of the essential factors underlying the strategic posture of the United States vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China. The likelihood of such an estimate will be intensified if the initial CPR nuclear accomplishment comes as a surprise.

2) A desire by Asian nations to seek closer association with the Soviet Union in the belief that the latter may serve as a restraint on an aggressive, nuclear-capable Communist China; conversely, in the case of Pakistan, a desire to seek the support of a nuclear-capable CPR in furtherance of Pakistan's disputes with India and Afghanistan.

3) Concern over the adequacy of indigenous defenses against a nuclear-capable CPR.

4) Increased reluctance and decreased ability on the part of Occidental allies to support or assist US military operations in Asia.

Whether or not these deleterious influences prevail will depend in large measure on the character of the regimes then in power in non-Communist Asia, on the nature of other world events preceding China's initial test detonation and coinciding with the
subsequent development of a Chinese nuclear capability, and particularly on US actions and attitudes. An apparent deterioration of the US position in Asia, or a reaction in the United States reflecting a lack of confidence in US and allied military capabilities to defend Free World interests in spite of Chinese threats or actual aggression, will significantly increase pressures to reach an early accommodation with China. All of these major factors are subject in varying degrees to US influence.

Actions that the United States can take to alleviate or prevent possible harmful reactions and to encourage beneficial ones, are largely political in nature. However, certain military actions can materially assist these larger efforts; such actions are discussed in subsequent portions of this paper.

Those operations *not necessarily wholly military* that would be undertaken primarily for their psychological effects are discussed in Appendix C, those involving specific military actions of the United States are set forth in Chapter X, "Suggested Actions." 

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CHAPTER III

IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR AND FOR MILITARY ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION

GENERAL WAR

For the purposes of this paper, the term "general war" refers to an armed conflict involving both the United States and the Soviet Union in which the total resources of both powers are employed and the national survival of both is at stake.

Almost irrespective of the number of nuclear weapons one assumes the CPR will be capable of producing, these can constitute only a marginal increment to the nuclear power otherwise available to the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union can already deliver a massive attack against the United States and simultaneously strike all militarily important targets in the Western Pacific and the Far East within range of Communist Chinese forces. The United States is therefore now threatened by a general war capability which will not be significantly increased by the addition of a Chinese regional nuclear capability, and the actions required to insure the availability and effectiveness in general war of

deployed US forces will then still be necessary, and with no appreciable change in form or magnitude.

Possession by the CPR of a nuclear capability may increase the likelihood that local hostilities in the Far East will expand into general war. If general war should stem from these circumstances, US forces in the Pacific theater might be mal-deployed or attrited to an extent that would seriously impede their immediate use for assigned general war tasks. Some diversion of strategic strike forces to the local effort may also have occurred, with a resultant diminution of ability to carry out initial general war tasks. These disadvantages may be offset by a higher state of alert for other US and allied forces as a result of tensions induced by the local hostilities, and by completion of general war offensive strikes against China or the Asian satellites prior to the initiation of operations against the Soviet Union. Further, Communist forces are just as likely to be mal-deployed and attrited, and China’s small stockpile of nuclear weapons destroyed or expended. Escalation from local to general hostilities, therefore, is unlikely to offer military advantage to the Communists.

**General War Through CPR Catalytic Action**

Possession of a nuclear capability will permit Chinese covert use of one or more nuclear weapons, either clandestinely introduced or delivered as mines or at short range by ship or submarine on the
United States or the Soviet Union. The Chinese might be tempted to do exactly this if they believe that they would thereby trigger a thermonuclear exchange between the US and the USSR, leaving China relatively undamaged.

A few nuclear explosions--or even one--occurring within the US or the USSR, not immediately identifiable as domestic in origin, could, and today probably would, result in a thermonuclear exchange. This situation exists now because (1) of a state of tension; (2) the United States and the Soviet Union have only each other as a dangerous, nuclear enemy; and (3) the present reciprocal vulnerability of strike forces requires a hair trigger reaction capability, if with "fail safe" attributes.

With the passage of time and as China and other powers develop a nuclear capability, albeit modest, any tendency toward a reflex response to a few nuclear explosions occurring in the US or USSR should moderate. It is apparent that should one of these last two powers choose to attack the other, attack on a scale which China could mount clandestinely would be foolhardy to the extreme. A minor clandestine attack by China, therefore, could hardly be credibly attributed to one of the two major nuclear powers, and thus should not catalyze an immediate thermonuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the CPR should be given no reason to believe that she might catalyze a thermonuclear exchange with benefit to herself. On the contrary, the United States should assure Communist
China that it is on the target list of any such exchange, and thus has a heavy stake in helping to avert any thermonuclear exchange. The regional deterrent force later recommended in this paper should provide publicly evident assurance that the United States can destroy Communist Chinese political, industrial, and military power at the same time she is engaging in a general war with the USSR. The regional deterrent force can thus play an important role even in the deterrence of covert, as well as overt, action by the CPR for catalytic purposes.

PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS

There are strong ideological and political pressures on the Soviet Union to support any Communist military or paramilitary operations which may occur in Asia. Bloc leadership, cohesion, and prestige will be involved, as will be the loyalties and future effectiveness of Communist parties worldwide. Further, there are compelling ideological reasons, quite apart from the fact that they are allied powers, for the Soviet Union to succor China in military difficulty. These pressures may be increased through the acquisition by China of a nuclear capability. China can be expected to exploit her nuclear achievements for political purposes to the

2. See below, pp. 105-113.

3. The wording of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, however, also permits the Soviets to deny, on legalistic grounds, its applicability under almost any circumstances.
point that considerable damage would be done to her prestige (not
to say that she would lose face) should she be forced to back down
after challenging the United States. Success in developing the
most modern and complex weaponry can be advertised by China as a
triumph of the Communist system, thus implying that a defeat for
the CPR would be a defeat for the Communist system.

The Chinese may be able to obtain Soviet support for some
types of Chinese or Chinese-sponsored non-nuclear military opera-
tions by exploiting Soviet fear that otherwise the Chinese might
resort to nuclear operations or to actions risking a US nuclear
response. Support of the Chinese would retain for the Soviets
more control over the course of local hostilities and give greater
assurance that these would remain non-nuclear--and the Soviets
have clearly demonstrated that they wish to avoid a nuclear war
at almost any cost.

Soviet Assistance in Local War

Unless local hostilities are initiated by China over the
objections of the Soviet Union, some degree of Soviet support of
China must be anticipated. This support will almost surely include
political and psychological support, and the provision of critical
military supplies and advice. Direct Soviet military intervention
might also be involved, probably by "volunteers."
There are severe limitations, however, on the amount of effective military assistance which Soviet forces can provide. Certain specialized military functions such as submarine warfare and air transport, and possibly an increment of offensive air power, could be of great utility to the Chinese. But, generally speaking, Soviet military intervention would be limited by the same logistic factors which severely limit Chinese offensive capabilities, and Soviet forces could only substitute for Chinese forces. Thus effective Soviet assistance, from the Chinese viewpoint, during this mid-term phase, is most likely to consist in the main of strategic cover for Chinese local operations.

Pressures for General War

It must be anticipated that China's possession of non-nuclear weapons will increase her independence in policy and decision, and commensurately impair any Soviet restraining influence. An aggressive, nuclear-armed and possibly reckless China will be

4. If Communist nuclear operations were undertaken now in Asia, they would be undeniably of Soviet origin. A Chinese nuclear capability will permit the Soviets to furnish nuclear weapons, or to conduct "volunteer" nuclear operations, in support of Chinese military moves while denying that the Soviet Union is involved. The Soviets, however, will almost certainly view this situation as a source of danger rather than of profit.

5. The record indicates that the CPR has been reckless only with words and cautious in action. Mao Tse-tung has sometimes been overimpressed by developments of modern technology, however, and acquisition of a few nuclear weapons may lead to his being overconfident. It should not be forgotten that the USSR launched
more likely to miscalculate both its own power and the strength and the will of the United States and its allies to counter Chinese aggression. Nuclear capability obviously will permit China to transform non-nuclear operations swiftly into nuclear war, and to strike at distant targets. As a result, China is more likely to find herself involved in unexpected military difficulties which can be redressed, from the Chinese viewpoint, only by actual or threatened Soviet attack against the United States.

Thus, pressure on the Soviet Union to provide military support for any military operations the Chinese may undertake will continue and may even increase. At the same time, however, a situation is even more likely to arise in which effective assistance to China would require a direct Soviet threat to the United States. The Soviets may therefore find themselves in a difficult position: they must either offer a credible threat to initiate general war, requiring at least an apparent willingness to follow through if necessary, or they must withhold effective support from their ally. The first course would risk destruction of the Soviet Union, possibly through US pre-emptive attack. The second would

the North Koreans into what (rather to Soviet surprise) shortly became a war with the United States at the time when the USSR was first emerging as a nuclear power. But if Soviet experience is a guide, the CPR may rapidly develop a sense of responsibility in respect to hostilities which may develop into a nuclear exchange.
result, at the minimum, in grave embarrassment within the bloc, and it could have far-reaching effects on the cohesion of the bloc and the future of communism.

In the dilemma which the Soviets may face, their decision to intervene, especially a decision involving a willingness to initiate general war, is the less probable. The Soviets have demonstrated that they have no stomach for aggressive moves that might lead to a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The contemporary balance of United States and Soviet strategic strike forces, the state of Sino-Soviet relationships, and the clarity or ambiguity of circumstances of aggression all will have a bearing on the Soviet decision whether to undertake or to withhold strategic operations directly against the United States in support of its ally.

The likelihood of Soviet military response directly against the United States will be increased or minimized by the following considerations:

1) The Soviet Union is unlikely to give support to Chinese Communist aggression undertaken without its prior agreement, and the Soviet Union will be reluctant to agree to overt military moves unless these are instigated and controlled by the Soviet Union. Ambiguous operations that can, if necessary, be called off prior
to a direct confrontation of United States and organized Communist forces will doubtless continue to receive Soviet support. But the Soviets can generally be depended upon to withhold support of unambiguous Communist aggression—they are most unlikely to invite repetition of the Soviet-inspired Korean War.

2) The clarity or ambiguity of responsibility for a situation leading to major hostilities will strongly influence the Soviet decision to honor, or to ignore, its formal alliances, particularly the Sino-Soviet Pact. A clear case of US aggression or the escalation by the United States of a local crisis far beyond the requirements of the situation would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to withhold its support. Contrarily, Chinese military initiatives likely to lead to escalation would permit the Soviets, particularly if forewarned by the United States, to deny, within the bloc, that the mutual defense provisions of the alliance were involved; in these circumstances, Soviet support of the Chinese would be unlikely.

3) The speed and adequacy of the initial US response will be of signal importance. If sufficient US offensive power is brought to bear to obtain an immediate local decision at the outset of hostilities, the Soviets would be faced with a fait accompli. Attack upon the United States could not recoup the local situation but would bring certain devastation to the Soviet Union. In these circumstances the Soviet Union would be most unlikely to attack the
United States. On the other hand, a slowly developing situation, which resulted in a series of threats and counterthreats, could propel the Soviets into a position in which, regardless of rational factors, they might consider themselves forced to attack the United States.

4) The launching of US-based strategic strike forces would alarm and alert Soviet long-range strike forces. It might result in an immediate Soviet strike against the United States if US intentions were misread, or in a similar strike with slight delay if the Soviets should judge that there had been a significant reduction in the US second strike capability. Immediate Soviet counteraction would be far more likely if their own long-range strike forces remain largely in a targetable, soft configuration.

So long as the United States retains immediately available forces adequate in size and power to mount a massive thermonuclear offensive against the Soviet Union, and provided local or regional hostilities in the Far East are not permitted to escalate slowly and on an uncontrolled basis, generating uncontrollable emotional issues, Soviet attack on the United States as the outgrowth of Communist Chinese action would present the Soviet leadership with risks far beyond the stakes involved in the immediate hostilities. Soviet

6. The Soviets stress that a limited war (such as one involving the United States and China) must not be allowed to be transformed into a general war involving the USSR since, in case of Soviet destruction, the Communist cause will suffer a fatal blow. The Soviets thereby imply that if China suffers nuclear damage, however
intervention, therefore, while possible, need not be considered probable.

In fact, a principal Soviet interest in the developing nuclear striking power of China should be to see that it is not used. The United States should be able to count on assistance from the Soviet Union to restrain China from potentially explosive military actions—at least to the extent that Soviet influence can be made effective. In the circumstance of strain in Sino-Soviet relations, this influence could be effectively exerted negatively—no promise of Soviet aid to China in an extremity brought on by the Chinese. Communist China could also be brought to doubt that the Soviet Union would engage the United States in general war in order to succor China.

Nevertheless, while there is little likelihood that Soviet strategic strike forces could be triggered against the United States by unilateral Communist Chinese action, ambiguous Chinese

great, this would not administer a catastrophic blow to the Communist cause and would be tolerable if the alternative was Soviet destruction. It follows from the Soviet position that if the Soviet Union were confronted with the choice between involvement, with the certainty of a fatal blow to the world Communist cause, or abstention in a United States-China conflict (which might inflict partial, but not fatal, damage to world Communism) the Soviet choice would be clear. The implication of the Soviet position was obviously designed for Chinese consumption.
provocations could result in a series of escalations that might cause the USSR to view the situation in a different light. Chinese possession of nuclear weapons, because of the resulting possibility of escalation, must therefore impose restraints upon United States actions in Asia, and it would appear that the United States should employ nuclear weapons in Asia only under conditions in which it is plain to the Soviets that the action is intended to be limited and to fall well short of an invitation to general war.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR
IN THE FAR EAST AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

This section examines the military position of the United States, a nuclear-armed Communist China, and North Korea and North Vietnam in relation to war in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The following chapter will examine wars in specific locations in the light of this analysis.

MILITARY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

General

US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East constitute essentially a light screening force deployed for immediate response in time of crisis, whether major or minor. Except for quite minor operations these forces are dependent on reinforcement from the United States. They now have these general tasks:

1. This chapter parallels Chapter IV, sections on The United States Versus A Nuclear-Armed China and on Implications for the United States, of the Study PACIFICA final report, The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D. C., 1962).
1) Offensive air forces\textsuperscript{2} maintain a general war stance, primarily but not exclusively aimed against the Soviet Union. The commitment of these forces is an integral part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for general war.

2) Ground forces in Korea and air and naval forces in Japan, Okinawa, and adjacent waters are continuously in position for immediate response in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea.

3) Naval forces, a large segment of the Pacific-based air forces, and the Marine and the Army contingents on Okinawa maintain a posture of readiness for immediate deployment to any area of local crisis.\textsuperscript{3}

4) Air defenses, primarily immobile, are deployed for the defense of US forces and installations.

These US forces in general are concentrated (or are dependent for support) on a relatively few, large-scale bases, all within range of light bombers and medium-range missiles based in

\textsuperscript{2} The term "air forces" and similar generic terminology is used, unless otherwise qualified, to include all land- and ship-based air units of the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The term "ground forces" similarly includes both United States Army and Marine Corps forces.

\textsuperscript{3} The terms "local war" and "local crisis" are used in this paper to refer to hostilities or incidents limited to a specific locality such as Korea, Taiwan, or Vietnam. Broader actions over all or large areas of Asia are termed "regional war."
China. In addition to these forward forces, the United States maintains on Hawaii and Guam military forces which serve as an immediate reserve.

In any contingency short of general war, these forces are dependent in varying degrees on allied combat and support capabilities. Present arrangements provide for retention by the United States of command of all US forces, regardless of the area of commitment.

Future Capabilities

By 1970, when the Chinese will probably have a highly significant local nuclear capability, United States forces in the Western Pacific and Far East may, if US authorities so decide, have increased capabilities that will be of major tactical significance in a bilateral nuclear environment.

1) SAMOS and other satellite systems will afford a major improvement in US reconnaissance and targeting capability.

2) The Polaris and, to some degree, the Army Pershing missile system will add a significant increment to US offensive nuclear capabilities. By the late 1960s the United States can also have a medium-range ballistic missile, either land-based and hardened or ship-based.

3) US nuclear capabilities in a local war situation should be significantly increased through the availability of the Davy
Crockett. The nuclear-armed Bullpup will also provide a major capability in local nuclear war.

4) The US defensive posture will be materially enhanced through programmed increases in the Nike-Hercules and Hawk units; through the semi-automation of the air defense ground environment in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and possibly other areas; and possibly through the provision of Mauler and Red Eye to the ground forces. The Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System probably can be available by 1970.

5) US ability to respond in a crisis situation will be materially improved through advances in strategic airlift capabilities, through the provision of "roll-on, roll-off" cargo ships, by floating depots, and by the provision of STOL and possible VTOL aircraft.

Vulnerabilities of US Forces in the Western Pacific4 and Far East

General. US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East are continuously faced with the threat of a surprise, massive,

4. A rough calculation indicates that the CPR would require about 15 accurately delivered weapons (i.e., some 45-60 launched weapons) for a minimum, local, air counterforce role; about 60 accurately delivered weapons (i.e., 180-240 launched weapons) would destroy all major, fixed, soft US military targets in the Western Pacific. Attacks on these scales would not, however, be effective against concealed, hardened, and mobile targets.
nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Many actions have been
taken, and presumably will continue to be taken, to permit the
effective employment of these forces in spite of such an attack.
These actions include concealment (e.g., Polaris), hardening
(e.g., Mace), improvement of communications (e.g., scatter sys-
tem), dispersal (e.g., relocation of stocks from Ascom City),
and particularly the development of a rapid reaction capability
on the part of land- and sea-based aircraft and missiles. While
these measures will also reduce US vulnerability in a nuclear
war with Communist China, they are inadequate in some respects
for this purpose.

**Land-Based Air Forces.** The problem of survivability of
land-based air forces subject to nuclear attack in a regional
war with China differs considerably from that in a war with the
USSR. The means available within economic limits to reduce
vulnerabilities include active air defenses, moderate hardening
of critical facilities, and a degree of dispersal. The only
means now available, however, which promises the survivability
and effective use of a substantial portion of the forces exposed
to nuclear attack, is a rapid reaction capability. While such a
capability may be of great utility in general war, war with
China will almost certainly require an appreciable time for
decision to launch nuclear attacks against the Chinese mainland;
a rapid reaction capability is thus unlikely to be of material assistance in the survivability of exposed forces. Until a decision is taken to launch major offensive strikes against all of China, it must be assumed that a war with the People's Republic of China will be prolonged and therefore require the sustained employment of major US forces based in the Far East. Hence the retention of operational and supporting facilities in the area, in spite of a constant threat of Chinese nuclear attack, is important.

All of these factors indicate that minimizing vulnerabilities of US land-based air forces in the Far East to nuclear attack will be a continuing requirement, becoming more important and more difficult when China obtains a locally effective nuclear capability.

Naval Forces. US naval forces at sea will for a great many years be much less vulnerable to CPR than to Soviet attack. Missiles are relatively ineffective against moving, not easily targetable, surface ships, and practically useless against submarines. Unless the Chinese obtain modern, long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, with sophisticated electronic

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5. This role conceivably may eventually be filled by reconnaissance satellites.
search equipment and air-to-surface missiles, or a modern navy, they will be restricted to small-scale attack on surface forces by obsolete light bombers. This is not to say that there will be no impact on US naval operations stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability. Naval forces operating within range of Chinese delivery vehicles, particularly in close-in, relatively restricted waters such as the Yellow Sea and Taiwan Strait, will incur substantial risk which must be either countered or accepted—the latter probably at some cost in freedom of action. Sustained close-in operations, such as were common during the Korean War, will become high-risk actions unlikely to be undertaken except under compelling circumstances.

Naval ships in port and naval bases will be neither more nor less vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviets. Like ground forces, however (see below), these will be more inviting targets to the CPR than to the USSR, and hence possibly somewhat more likely to be targeted in the initial strike of a surprise attack.

**Ground Forces.** Ground forces concentrated (in normal times) on Okinawa and in a small sector along the Demilitarized Zone (DmZ) of North and South Korea, and their logistic support installations, will be no more vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviet Union. They will, however, be much more
likely to be specifically targeted by the CPR for attack, since these forces offer no immediate threat to the Soviet Union. They do, however, pose a continuous threat of attack against China proper as well as against the Asian satellites, and in local hostilities (actual or potential) they become a primary threat to CPR military operations and hence would constitute a most inviting target.

The vulnerability of these forces and facilities cannot easily be reduced. So long as China possesses a significant air-delivery capability (probably at least through 1970), improvement in the US and allied air defense posture is desirable. The eventual deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System or another forward area anti-ballistic-missile system may reduce vulnerabilities to missile attack. The present extreme vulnerability of the logistic system, however, can be reduced only moderately through additional dispersion; an economical remedy for this Achilles' heel is not now in sight.

Command and Control Facilities. Many of the same considerations that affect the survivability of land-based air forces apply to command and control facilities. In the absence of nearly automatic, pre-planned offensive strikes, survival of these mechanisms is of critical importance. Yet these
facilities must be prepared to operate continuously during hostilities of a non-nuclear nature, when their attractiveness as targets for a Chinese pre-emptive strike would continuously increase.

**Other Vulnerabilities.** Local war in any area of the Far East will require the forward deployment to the area of US forces. The movement of forces of any magnitude, and their subsequent support, will create concentrations of forces, equipment, and supplies. These concentrations will create attractive nuclear targets.

Until or unless China's nuclear capability is destroyed, large-scale airborne and amphibious operations against major organized Chinese forces would entail a very high degree of risk.

**Restraints on US Military Intervention**

A Chinese nuclear capability is likely to prejudice the initial US military position in a local war or crisis situation. Most of our allies in the Far East will be to some extent intimidated by the threat of Chinese nuclear operations, and any natural reluctance they may have to become the scene of nuclear conflict will be heightened by the Chinese capability. There will be a strong tendency, therefore, on the part of threatened
Asian states to hesitate before requesting US military assistance. This can result only in delay in US military intervention and thus a deteriorated situation. In addition, except in clear-cut cases involving vital US interests, it will be more difficult for the United States to agree to commit forces to local operations. In addition, faced with the threat of nuclear attack on its forces, the United States must in major conflicts decide either to initiate nuclear warfare itself and accept the consequent risks and political onus, or face increased risks and difficulties in its military operations. These increased risks may result in some delay in the commitment of US forces even in clear-cut cases. Finally, a nuclear capability in Chinese hands will acutely discourage military participation by allies not directly menaced, and particularly the European powers. This general reluctance will curtail the likelihood of broad or solid political support for US military moves, and thus may induce additional US political reticence to commit US forces.

Any delay in the decision to commit military forces will normally lead to a requirement for more forces (as compared to the force requirements for early intervention) and to greater

6. Particularly Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, and India. Thailand, Pakistan, and South Vietnam may also be included if the prior course of events should lead them to believe that US military capabilities vis-a-vis Communist China had been appreciably reduced.
costs in time and resources, thus considerably raising the
stakes involved on both sides. The increased effort involved,
combined with the deteriorated situation facing United States
and allied forces, will significantly heighten the risks of
escalation, both in scale and in area.

Nuclear or Non-Nuclear Operations

The most obvious implication of a Chinese nuclear capa-
bility for the United States is that the United States cannot
alone decide whether a local war in Asia will involve nuclear
operations. If the United States intervenes in major local
hostilities, it must decide in advance either to initiate the
use of nuclear weapons when and if necessary (and, if needed
at all, the need will be greatest in the early stages) or
refrain from first use of nuclear weapons while taking simul-
taneous action to minimize the advantage to the Chinese of
their first use.

Freedom of US Decision

With its present monopoly on nuclear capability in Asia,
the United States has almost complete freedom of decision on

7. The advantages accruing from a rapid response to an act
of aggression, in terms of reductions in the size of forces
required and in casualties, can be vividly demonstrated. See
Appendix D, below, pp. 173-85. Put simply, delay means auto-
matic escalation.
the ground rules governing a local war not directly involving the Soviet Union. By its own choice the United States can decide to fight with or without nuclear weapons. It can establish ground rules on the area and the scale of hostilities and on the permissible size and character of aggressor forces. Serious Communist breaches of these ground rules would risk invoking escalation completely controlled (at least locally) by the United States, which can at any time or place exercise its option for unilateral nuclear operations. A locally effective nuclear capability at the disposition of the CPR will put an end to this US monopoly in Asia. Even though China's nuclear capability will not be comparable to that of the United States, the Chinese too will be able to initiate nuclear operations, or to expand the area of local hostilities by means of nuclear strikes in other areas. The Chinese can, if they choose, make a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against the forces of the United States and its allies.

The ability of a nuclear-armed CPR to escalate hostilities, either by the initiation of local nuclear operations or by more distant nuclear attack, can be countered by making such escalation unprofitable or ineffective. It may also be made unattractive by the promise of appropriate US counteraction the Chinese cannot match, or ineffective by obtaining a decision in the local
hostilities sufficiently early so that Chinese escalation cannot recoup the local loss. The first avenue requires an adequate and flexible US deterrent posture; the second avenue requires speed and adequacy of initial US response to aggression, particularly at the lower levels.

**Deterrence.** An overriding prerequisite to the commitment of US military forces to non-nuclear war in Asia will be the conscious provision of a military sanction adequate to prevent Chinese first use—a military capability that will insure that the Chinese correctly estimate that their first use of nuclear weapons will surely lead to retaliatory destruction far beyond the possible benefits to be achieved from success in the local operations. The problem of thus deterring a nuclear-capable CPR—a central question in assessing the impact of a nuclear-capable CPR on US military capabilities and requirements—is discussed at length in Chapter VI.

**Speed of Response.** If the initial reaction by the United States and its allies to Communist aggression is sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to obtain early control of a crisis situation, Chinese escalation would be unlikely to affect the outcome of the local hostilities—particularly since an early local decision will keep the scale and intensity of the hostilities, and the degree of great power prestige
involvement therein, at the lowest possible levels. Thus speed of response will become even more important when China becomes a nuclear power. Yet, as indicated above, commitment of military forces to local hostilities by the United States will then tend to be delayed: first, by inhibitions aroused in some threatened states against requesting United States military assistance; and, secondly, by increased caution on the part of the United States in deciding to participate in local hostilities after the United States can no longer alone establish ground rules for their conduct. In an environment that will tend to increase delays in arriving at a political decision for military intervention, it appears important that the military capability for quick response be improved as rapidly as possible. This requirement includes not only the immediate availability of forces and of adequate means of transport, but also prior preparations in potential areas of hostilities to facilitate the reception and support of United States forces that may be needed.

**Force Configuration**

While it is generally held that US forces can fight either a nuclear or non-nuclear war, there are sufficient differences in requirements between the two situations to demand a decision in advance of the commitment of forces on the question whether
US forces will forgo the first use of nuclear weapons and therefore accept the risk that the Chinese may not refrain from first use of nuclear weapons. From a ground force viewpoint, the dispersion requirement of combat forces in a nuclear environment is incompatible with the concentration of both men and conventional firepower required to fight a non-nuclear battle; the degree of tactical mobility needed in two-sided nuclear operations completely transcends the essential needs (and present capabilities) of forces committed to non-nuclear operations. From a land-based air viewpoint, non-nuclear war minimizes the requirements for dispersion and defense, but increases drastically the numbers of offensive sorties needed to obtain a given degree of damage. Thus, in a non-nuclear situation, there can be a much higher concentration of forces on any individual airfield, and a greater proportion of effort can go into offensive resources, but the forces committed must be very significantly increased. From both a ground force and land-based air point of view, major modification is required in logistic support arrangements to permit operations in a nuclear environment.

While the operations of combatant forces of the Navy at sea are less affected in character by foreknowledge that operations will be nuclear or non-nuclear, the total naval force requirements will depend in part on this determination. Navy
capabilities for supplying forces ashore will also need to be designed in light of the decision on use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and the resultant design of the logistic systems ashore. This may require significant changes in the composition of the transport fleet, and possibly in arrangements for its protection. Similarly, in a nuclear environment the Air Force can expect materially increased demands for large-scale air transport operations as a substitute for in-place logistic facilities within a local area of hostilities.

Thus forces committed on the assumption that operations will be non-nuclear are unlikely to be configured to fight a nuclear war effectively; conversely, forces configured for nuclear operations are unlikely to be effective in non-nuclear operations. It is necessary therefore that a decision be made by the United States in advance of the commitment of forces either: (a) to fight effectively on a non-nuclear basis and to accept the risks (minimized through a suitable deterrent posture) that the Chinese may not respect the ground rules established by the United States, or (b) to initiate nuclear operations.
MILITARY POSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH KOREA, AND
NORTH VIETNAM

General

The People's Republic of China will have these basic military capabilities to which a nuclear capability will be additive:

1) Very large and presumably well-equipped ground forces. These, however, can be used outside of China proper only in contiguous areas, and they then face major logistic difficulties. The logistical problem will require either that ground operations (except in Korea) be on a relatively minor scale, or that the Chinese pre-establish forward bases to support larger operations. The establishment of these bases would, of course, provide long lead time strategic warning.

2) Large-scale, but relatively backward, air defenses fixed in China itself.

3) Offensive air forces that will be capable of delivering nuclear weapons as indicated in Appendix A. In addition, the CPR will probably have additional offensive air forces of limited conventional capability.

4) A probable airlift capability for approximately one division and a probable amphibious lift capability of up to

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8. See below, p. 147.
three divisions. Lacking, however, the necessary naval and air combatant forces to make a major, opposed amphibious or airborne landing, these capabilities can be used only in exceptional circumstances where US and allied air and naval strength have been neutralized, against very close-in objectives where the Chinese can gain local air and naval superiority, or, conceivably, in special circumstances permitting the Chinese to achieve complete surprise. Until the CPR develops long-range amphibious or airborne capabilities, she cannot invade such remote areas as Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines.

5) A significant force of long-range submarines. These, however, have in the past apparently been used exclusively for coastal defense purposes. No significant improvement in Chinese naval capabilities is anticipated.\(^9\)

6) The ability to foment and support extensive insurgent and guerrilla operations where the ground is favorable for these. Again, major efforts in this field will be limited to peripheral areas permitting overland or short-range, unopposed air or sea supply of the insurgents.

9. The economically competitive nature of programs to create a valid nuclear capability on the one hand, and on the other of programs to provide strategic mobility, a valid airborne or amphibious capability, or a major naval capability, will probably prevent simultaneous progress down more than one road. This road will almost surely be that leading toward a nuclear capability.
Military Utility of a Nuclear Capability

The primary utility to the CPR of a nuclear capability will lie in the political and psychological fields, in which the military significance of nuclear capabilities seem certain to be exploited.

A locally effective nuclear capability will have potential military significance for the CPR in these respects:

1) Defense of the Chinese Mainland. While to most Westerners an invasion of the Chinese mainland would appear to be beyond the capabilities of any conceivable forces that might be marshalled for the purpose, the Communist Chinese have indicated a high sensitivity in this regard. Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan, and US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces in Korea, have evoked continuous diversions of Chinese military resources and attention. A nuclear capability would provide an almost certain means of defeating any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland.

2) Counterforce Operations Against Pacific-Based US Nuclear Offensive Forces. In time the Chinese can acquire a significant first strike counterforce capability, and presumably thereafter a significant retaliatory capability. A Chinese first strike capability would, at the least, require increased caution on the part of the United States in committing military forces to local action where they might face Chinese forces, in expanding
an area of local conflict, and particularly in initiating nuclear operations during such a local action. A retaliatory capability (when achieved) would provide, in Chinese eyes, an appreciable deterrent to direct US attack upon China, and in any event would permit nuclear response to US nuclear operations. China may also believe that through a nuclear strike on US forces in some circumstances she could require the Soviet Union to engage in operations against the United States. She may further believe that the existence of this capability might cause the United States to refrain from attack on China in the event of a US-USSR war.

It is difficult, though not impossible, to visualize a situation in which a Chinese first strike against US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East would be advantageous to the Chinese--at least until they have achieved near-equality with the United States in long-range strategic striking power. The Chinese may believe, however, that circumstances might arise which would lead the United States to accept the destruction of these forces rather than invite near-certain (as the Chinese

10. The Chinese may or may not realize that the existence of this capability would also invite US first strike, counter-force operations against the Chinese mainland as a prelude to the commitment of US forces to any local operations, and particularly to nuclear operations the United States may decide are necessary.
would hopefully expect) counter-retaliation in the form of a first strike by the USSR. Circumstances might also arise which would lead the Chinese to believe that a Chinese pre-emptive strike could blunt an intended US attack on the mainland.

3) Increased Freedom for Chinese and Communist Military Operations. The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability will increase any reluctance that threatened Asian nations may have to request US military assistance, and will tend to inhibit a US decision to intervene militarily except in cases clearly involving essential US interests. These factors will, at least to some degree, curtail US military intervention in lesser situations, and thus commensurately increase the range of Communist military and paramilitary operations that can be conducted without invoking US military response.

4) Selective Military Use. Certain local war situations might arise in Asia that would permit Communist forces to gain a decisive local advantage by the employment of a few weapons at particular times and places. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter V. 11

11. See below, pp. 69-96.
Vulnerabilities of the People's Republic of China

China's basic social and economic structure is less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of the more industrialized nations, and particularly the United States. People and industry per se as targets would require a very extensive nuclear offensive, the results of which cannot be predicted with certainty. China as a modern governmental and war-making entity, however, is highly vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Chinese nuclear delivery forces during the present decade are expected to be very limited in numbers, unhardened, and highly vulnerable. Other Chinese forces will be largely concentrated on eastern Chinese bases all of which are within range of US Pacific-based strike forces and in quantity well within the destruction capability of those forces.

A critical factor in the feasibility of a counterforce effort against Chinese nuclear strike forces will be the ability of the United States to locate and to target these forces accurately. Until the CPR approaches superpower status, its nuclear forces will be numerically insufficient to retain an appreciable second strike capability after a major attack if they are exposed. Either the United States or the Soviet Union could mount a pre-emptive attack of sufficient weight to destroy

12. See also Appendix E, below, pp. 187-208.
China's total nuclear capability almost regardless of the degree of hardening, dispersal, or active defense which the Chinese can attempt. Survivability of Chinese forces must thus rest primarily upon denying both the United States and the Soviet Union the capability to target these forces, presumably through concealment and mobility of missiles, and through concealment of a nuclear capability in aircraft. For the purpose of this paper, however, it is assumed that US intelligence capabilities are adequate to target at least the bulk of Chinese nuclear delivery forces accurately. This appears to be a wholly reasonable assumption in view of the size of the CPR force in comparison with US forces, in view of the known difficulties of providing concealment for major operational forces, and in view of demonstrated US intelligence capabilities in the past. If the assumption should not be warranted, in the sense that the Chinese were able to hide their entire force successfully (or even most of it), the consequence would be to give them a second strike capacity, which, although limited to near-by targets, would nevertheless add substantially to US problems. In particular such a capacity would impair, though it would not entirely discount, the credibility of the regional deterrent force proposed in Chapter VI of this paper.
Chinese governmental and military controls, communications, and transportation and distribution centers are largely concentrated in or around large metropolitan areas, as are primary military forces. These metropolitan areas also include the preponderance of the governmental, military, scientific, and technical elites, as well as a high proportion of the total heavy industry. A successful nuclear attack on these metropolitan areas would render the CPR incapable of waging modern war; and such an attack, in view of the co-location of vulnerabilities, would need to be on only a comparatively modest scale.\textsuperscript{13}

The projection of Chinese military power beyond the borders of China would cause concentration of troops and materiel and a saturation of inadequate lines of communication, creating additional (and probably critical) vulnerabilities to nuclear attack.

\textbf{Vulnerabilities of North Vietnam and North Korea}

North Vietnam and North Korea have essentially the same socio-economic structure as the CPR, with generally similar, but greater, basic vulnerabilities.

\textsuperscript{13} Calculations comparable to those made for attack on US forces (see above, p. 44 n.) indicate that in 1970 about 25 accurately delivered weapons would be required for a minimum first strike counterforce operation directed against Chinese nuclear delivery vehicles. Some 65 additional accurately delivered weapons should be adequate to destroy the CPR as a modern governmental and war-making entity. See Appendix E, below, pp. 187-208.
North Vietnam has a basically agrarian economy, with all appreciable industry, governmental and military controls, and transportation and distribution centered in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Even agriculture is largely concentrated in this flat, highly vulnerable delta area. Nuclear attack (unless with weapons specifically designed and targeted to cause personnel casualties and ground contamination) could not destroy the basically agrarian way of life in North Vietnam, but a very few weapons in the one metropolitan area could completely destroy the existing government, economic life, and military direction of the country. Further, North Vietnam is at present completely open to such an attack.

North Korea's vulnerabilities are intermediate between those of North Vietnam and the CPR. Government and military controls are centered in Pyongyang; there is some evidence, however, that extensive hardening and passive defense measures have been undertaken to protect these elements. Industry (in the Western sense) is centered mainly in the Pyongyang and Hamhung areas. There are 16 airfields now supporting 485 aircraft. There is an extensive but qualitatively poor air defense system in North Korea.
Asymmetry of Vulnerabilities

US forces in the Far East, and also those of US allies, are now so disposed as to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. There are and will long continue to be, however, glaring asymmetries between the basic vulnerabilities to initial nuclear attack of the United States and the CPR—the great imbalance in numbers and types of nuclear weapons and in delivery vehicles; the capability and invulnerability of US strategic strike forces; the ability of the United States to use the sea for its own purposes; and particularly, the fact that the United States, as a base for war, will for many years be automatically a sanctuary in a war with China as opposed to the accessibility of all of China to US nuclear attacking forces. This great disparity in vulnerability in a bilateral nuclear exchange is too patent to need elaboration.

The East Asian Communist Assessment of Respective Vulnerabilities

An appreciation of both the capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons has developed in each of the present nuclear powers in generally the same sequence. While the CPR may find a way to compress the sequence, it is unlikely that Chinese thinking has yet progressed much beyond the capability of the weapons and delivery means which the Chinese expect to have in the near future. These weapons are "city busters," even though
pygmies as compared to the weapons available to the United States and the Soviet Union. Delivery vehicles will be suitable primarily for use against large, soft targets the destruction of which does not require precise delivery. Weapon scarcity will require that only the most remunerative targets be attacked. The strategic thinking associated with this type of weapon by other nuclear powers has generally been limited to the concept of people and industry as suitable nuclear targets, and it is in these categories that the Chinese are less vulnerable than the more industrialized nations. This might lead the Chinese to underestimate their vulnerability to nuclear attack, particularly if they should estimate that the destruction of opposing forces in the immediate area would cause the United States to accept local defeat rather than accept the risk of Soviet intervention.

It is much more likely, however, that the Chinese leadership, essentially pragmatic and realistic, would more accurately assess the probable results of a bilateral nuclear war involving the United States and Communist China. It is in the US interest to assist the Chinese in all feasible ways to make an accurate assessment, and at the earliest possible time.

Even if North Korea and North Vietnam should correctly assess their own high vulnerability in a nuclear war, it is
entirely possible that they may overestimate the protection afforded them through extended deterrence stemming from the Communist Chinese nuclear capability. Just as the CPR exhibited belief that the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and space vehicle \textit{Sputnik} in 1957 counteracted (at least to some extent) US nuclear superiority, so these two minor states are apt to believe that a token Red Chinese nuclear capability will serve to protect them in their own military adventures. This possibility can be countered by bringing home to them not only their own vulnerability in a war, but also that of the CPR.
CHAPTER V

WAR IN SPECIFIC LOCALITIES

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed over-all considerations applying to a war in the Far East involving a nuclear-capable Communist China. This chapter applies these over-all considerations, plus specific factors pertaining to each area in the Far East and South Asia in which local hostilities are likely, to analyze the basic military environment and evaluate the utility of nuclear armament to the People's Republic of China (CPR).

Assumptions

The discussion of specific limited war situations in this chapter is based on the following assumptions:

1) The nuclear capability of the CPR is generally as stated in Appendix A to this paper.


2. See below, p. 147.
2) The over-all strength of indigenous ground forces, and the extent of Chinese capabilities for invasion, is as projected in Appendix F. 3

3) The Communist Party of China retains control over the people and government of mainland China.

4) The Soviet Union does not openly intervene, at least initially, in local hostilities in the Far East.

5) Laos and Cambodia are neutrals. Burma, while neutral, is oriented toward the CPR.

6) Singapore, Malaya, and North Borneo have federated into the Federation of Malaysia. Commonwealth forces have been largely withdrawn.

7) The United States is not allied with, but may respond to requests for military assistance from India or the Malaysian Federation (if they are attacked). These countries are therefore treated in this section as "allies."

8) The alliances among the Soviet Union, the CPR, North Korea, and North Vietnam continue, with no substantial increase in the amount of territory under Communist control. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan, with no substantial changes in their internal political situations, remain aligned with the United States. The United States retains control of Okinawa.


3. See below, p. 209.
Methodology

The assessments contained in this section are based upon general considerations, notably the asymmetry in nuclear capabilities that will exist between the United States and the CPR during the period before China has an effective intercontinental capability. The endeavor has been to examine the basic military environment in order to permit a broad assessment of the utility of a nuclear capability to one side or the other, but particularly to the CPR, in specified contingencies. Detailed war games have not been undertaken and are not considered necessary to substantiate the conclusions reached in this chapter.

Categories of Hostilities

Military conflicts in the Far East and South Asia can be conveniently grouped into five general categories. These are identified below (subsequent discussion of the various contingencies will be in the same order):

First category: a war between the United States and China proper.

Second category: open hostilities in areas on the periphery of China involving opposing major organized forces. These areas include Korea, Taiwan and the offshore islands held by the Nationalist Chinese, Vietnam, and Thailand.
Third category: wars in the Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, and Nepal).

Fourth category: open Chinese aggression against nations unable to provide significant indigenous opposition. These include Burma, Laos, and Cambodia.

Fifth category: Communist subversion and insurgency in areas vulnerable to this type of conflict. Such activity is particularly likely in regions near the Chinese frontiers, but all of non-Communist Asia may eventually be affected. This category also includes (for the purpose of this analysis) relatively minor actions by the Communists, whether with regular or irregular forces, against isolated areas near China's periphery.  

There are some nations that the CPR will have no capability to invade. They include Japan, the Philippines, and (so long as China stays within her present borders) Malaya. These nations may be subject to attack as part of a larger war but should be immune from direct, localized, overt Chinese aggression. The utility of a nuclear capability to the CPR in forwarding its ambitions with regard to these three areas is therefore limited to blackmail and pressures. Thus no discussion of limited war involving these nations is included in this chapter.

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4. A series of such actions might of course significantly change the military geography as well as the internal political situation of the attacked nation.
CHINA

A war between the United States and China should be regarded as a regional war. Such a conflict will extend to all of China, and will involve major US forces and (at least indirectly) most major US allies in the Far East. The war can occur either directly as a result of Chinese attack on US forces or major US allies, through other Chinese provocation, or (more likely) as the outgrowth of hostilities initially limited to a specific area on China's periphery.

The basic strengths and vulnerabilities of China and of the United States in the Far East have been discussed earlier. In summary, China will have a great numerical preponderance over the United States and its allies in ground forces and locally in air forces, greater dispersion of forces, but a comparatively small and initially primitive nuclear capability. China's war-making capability will continue to be highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. The United States and its allies will have supremacy on the seas, qualitative air superiority, and vastly superior nuclear capabilities including, for at least a decade, the entire United States as an inherent sanctuary. US local vulnerability stems primarily from the high concentration of forces and logistic support, and this weakness can be reduced by timely remedial actions.

5. See above, p. 42 n.3.
In a regional war between the CPR and the United States, the Communist Chinese will be unable to invade any area critical to US operations. China can conduct limited ground operations in contiguous land areas, but only insofar as these actions are not impeded by US operations. She can attack those forces of the United States and its allies--as well as the capitals and other major urban areas of principal US allies--that are within range of Chinese delivery vehicles. To be meaningful, these offensive operations, in view of anticipated Chinese capabilities, would necessarily be nuclear.

Unless there is some major political deterioration within Communist China, operations by the United States and its allies would also necessarily be limited, at least initially, to relatively long-range, nuclear offensive strikes against Chinese territory. Non-nuclear offensive operations within the capabilities of the forces estimated to be available to the United States and its allies could not in themselves force a decision. Invasion of the mainland appears to be far beyond the capabilities of any conceivable forces that the United States and its allies could commit except in the aftermath of a major nuclear offensive. Offensive nuclear operations against the mainland will thus be necessary to effect the enemy's defeat.

It is a practical certainty therefore that if a regional war with China occurs, it will involve bilateral nuclear operations, but limited (so long as the USSR abstains) to targets in the Far East, including mainland China, and the Western Pacific.

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The United States will have a variety of targeting options for its nuclear operations. On the assumption that US reconnaissance capabilities will permit accurate targeting of Chinese nuclear delivery forces, China's nuclear capability could be quickly and cheaply destroyed by a pure counterforce operation. The destruction of other Communist forces would be feasible, but targeting difficulties and the greater enemy dispersion would require an increased weight of offensive effort maintained over a longer period than for the counterforce action. Operations against urban centers, exploiting this extreme vulnerability of China, could be undertaken at the discretion of the United States.

Given these basic military factors, the following conclusions are apparent. If the United States strikes first (and this may well happen if hostilities occur as the result of open Communist Chinese aggression on its periphery), the United States, with no serious impairment of its general war capability, can, if it so decides:

1) Eliminate by its first strike the ability of the CPR to launch a second strike of serious consequences.

2) Progressively, if not simultaneously, eliminate all CPR offensive capabilities, all CPR organized military capabilities except in scattered localities, and finally the ability of the CPR to maintain or control effective military forces.

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Even if given the advantage of the first strike, the United States cannot, except at an enormous cost in time and resources:

1) Invade and occupy mainland China.

2) Create by military means alone conditions which will lead to the installation of a government of mainland China friendly to the United States.

If nuclear hostilities were initiated by the Communist Chinese, by means of a surprise attack aimed in the first instance against US forces and bases in the Far East, and assuming adequate prior preparations on the part of the United States in the way of force configuration, control, and survivability, US Pacific-based second strike and subsequent capabilities should be sufficient to permit the United States to accomplish the same results as those just stated with the same limitations on capabilities. In this case, however, the accomplishment of the destruction of Communist Chinese military capabilities might take longer and would, of course, involve much greater damage to US forces and to US allies. It

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6. The disarming or devastation of China through a nuclear offensive is not likely to create immediate conditions which will permit the Nationalist Chinese to "return to the mainland." The destruction and chaos which would result from such an offensive, however, might permit the gradual takeover by the Nationalists of more and more of mainland China. They would not, however, be welcomed back as heroes. They would need to occupy successive small areas, each within their military capabilities, consolidating each successive bite before proceeding.

A contingency at least as likely would be the occupation of parts or all of China by the Soviet Union.

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might involve use of US strategic strike forces, with a possible resultant minor degrading of the capability of the United States for general war.

Such an exchange with China could eliminate once and for all a major potential world adversary, and would have shattering results within the Communist bloc. It would involve some (but probably not catastrophic) destruction in allied lands of US forces and their facilities. Taken alone, however, it would not be likely to provide a final answer to the question posed by China, and it should be assumed that subsequent action by massive military forces on the Chinese mainland will be required. Whether these required military actions would be in the nature of relief and rehabilitation, the occupation of hostile territory, or a confrontation with Soviet forces can be only a matter of conjecture.

KOREA

Korea as an arena of conventional combat requires and can accommodate very large forces on each side, up to 60 or more divisions. Yet, as clearly demonstrated in the Korean War, the terrain and logistic limitations severely curtail mobile offensive or defensive operations. Non-nuclear operations restricted to the Korean Peninsula are thus likely to result in another static situation of stalemate.
The deployment of large forces to Korea and their employment requires on both sides major dependence on operational and support facilities outside of Korea--on the Communist side, in Manchuria and probably the Shantung Peninsula; on the US-Republic of Korea /ROK/ side, in Japan and Okinawa. These extensive supporting facilities provide lucrative nuclear targets, as do force concentrations and logistic facilities in Korea proper. Non-nuclear operations against these targets, on a scale within the capabilities of either side, are most unlikely to provide a decisive advantage.

In a bilateral nuclear-armed environment, it is unlikely that a stalemated, non-nuclear ground situation can be redressed through large-scale amphibious or airborne operations, in view of the very high risks involved. If in such a situation a military solution is to be achieved by either side, therefore, there must be either the massive destruction of opposing forces and their means of support (i.e., employment of nuclear weapons in a manner that directly affects the course of battle in the front lines) or an expansion of the war so that the decisive battle is fought in circumstances more favorable to the side which chooses to expand the area of hostilities. The first course would require the initiation of nuclear operations which probably will need to extend to parts of China for US-ROK operations, or to Japan for Communist operations.
Other than extended nuclear operations, no military means are visible on either side that would permit the opening of a "second front" with decisive effect on operations in Korea.

If hostilities are resumed in Korea, there will thus be strong military reasons on both sides to initiate nuclear operations. The existence of such pressures should not be construed as a prediction that operations must necessarily develop into a nuclear exchange; a stalemate may again be politically acceptable to both sides. It will, however, be to the military advantage of the United States, by permitting flexibility of decision, to take whatever preparations--both military and political--may be necessary to enable the United States to initiate nuclear operations should it choose to do so. Similarly, the United States and the Republic of Korea should take all practical action to minimize vulnerabilities if nuclear operations should be initiated by the Communists. These vulnerabilities are particularly acute in the event of war in Korea.

TAIWAN AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Taiwan. The situation of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands is unique in that an invasion would require a major, but short-range, amphibious or airborne effort; since the critical phase of an invasion would be of very short duration, the defense is wholly dependent on forces in position from the outset.

Using assorted junks and fishing craft in addition to normal amphibious shipping, the Communist Chinese could mount an amphibious
operation of six or possibly more divisions. Such an operation would create a series of critical targets extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack. An amphibious attack could be defeated by a very few nuclear weapons used against the transport force while concentrated in loading areas, while the transport fleet is at sea, while the ships are concentrated off the coast of Taiwan preparatory to a landing, or against the initial bridgeheads before the attacking force has consolidated its positions ashore. While such an attack could thus be easily and cheaply defeated by nuclear means, it would also be highly vulnerable to attack by conventional weapons on a scale within the capabilities of US and Nationalist Chinese forces normally in the area.

An airborne operation against Taiwan, or a combination airborne and amphibious operation, would be even more difficult for the CPF than an amphibious attack. Because of the requirement for a sea-borne follow-up to any airborne operation, many of the same vulnerabilities would exist as for an amphibious attack. Additional vulnerabilities would be created in the launch and drop areas, and the transport aircraft themselves would be highly vulnerable to the air defenses on Taiwan.

It thus appears that a major airborne operation would be most unlikely to be successful under any foreseeable circumstances except as a minor adjunct to an amphibious attack. An amphibious operation
would be more feasible, but would be a formidable task. For one to be successful:

1) The Communists must achieve complete surprise at least until the transport fleet is well at sea. This is not impossible in view of the extended periods of bad weather over the Taiwan Strait and the short sailing time (12 to 24 hours) involved. The Communists would also need to be secure, however, from early detection by electronic maritime reconnaissance over the Strait.

2) US naval and air protection for Taiwan, including specifically the US capability for early nuclear response, would need to be either eliminated or at least greatly reduced. It is conceivable that this might occur through political action. It is more likely, however, that a major diversion of regional US combatant strength to some other threatened area might lead the Communist Chinese to estimate that residual US strength in the area could be substantially neutralized through nuclear attack.

3) The vulnerability of transport concentrated off the coast, and of the initially landed forces, would need to be overcome by preparatory fire directed against both ground and air forces on Taiwan. Adequate preparation for an opposed landing does not

7. If a credible threat of an invulnerable, nuclear offensive capability in the hands of Nationalist Chinese forces were created, it is most unlikely that the Communists would conclude that an invasion of Taiwan could succeed.
appear to be possible by conventional means estimated to be at the disposal of Communist China; a nuclear capability would permit accomplishment of this essential task.

Thus nuclear weapons, under favorable circumstances, may provide the CPR with a military capability that would lead it to believe it could invade Taiwan successfully—a capability which the CPR probably lacks under present circumstances.

On the US-Nationalist Chinese side, an attempted invasion of Taiwan could be countered under normal conditions by either conventional or nuclear weapons. As has been indicated, however, one of the essential conditions that would permit a Communist attack to be successful is a reduction or diversion of US capabilities to oppose an attempt at invasion. In such a circumstance, the defense of Taiwan would require the residual US forces to use nuclear weapons against one or more of the critical vulnerabilities of the attacking force, or else to accept the probability of Communist Chinese success. It follows that, if the United States is determined to defend Taiwan, both the United States and the Government of the Republic of China should be prepared militarily and politically to use nuclear weapons, if needed, and these states should also minimize, as feasible, vulnerabilities to nuclear attack by the Communists. In this connection, it should be noted that the political disadvantages flowing from US first use of nuclear weapons
in Asia would be markedly reduced if these were aimed at Communist forces obviously involved in aggressive action, particularly if such first use were against the aggressor force while at sea.

If an invasion of Taiwan should be attempted, it is thus likely to result in a bilateral nuclear engagement. Such an invasion attempt could lead to a regional war with the CPR. 8

**Offshore Islands.** The offshore islands (notably Quemoy and Matsu) now held by the Nationalist Chinese can be effectively denied to either side by a very few nuclear weapons--by fallout, if not by blast. Such a Communist nuclear attack would, in isolation, be an implausible means toward "liberation" of these islands. Nuclear operations are more likely to result from an attack on Taiwan as well. From a military viewpoint, and considered apart from the defense of Taiwan, the defense of the offshore islands will thus not be materially affected through CPR acquisition of a nuclear capability.

The defense of the offshore islands by conventional means, in view of their proximity to the Chinese mainland, is a difficult task. Their defense through nuclear attack on Communist concentrations on the mainland, prior to and during the early stages of an invasion attempt, would be a simple matter. There

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8. For the nature of such a war, see above, pp. 73-77.
will clearly be severe political restraints on US use of nuclear weapons in the defense of the offshore islands. The Communists are well aware of these restraints and probably consider any conventional action limited to the offshore islands to be immune from nuclear attack by the United States. A credible threat of Nationalist Chinese nuclear operations would, however, provide a major deterrent to Communist aggression against these outposts.

VIETNAM

Open aggression against South Vietnam does not appear to be a profitable course of action for the Communists unless very favorable circumstances exist, which, however, they may be able to create. The total organized ground forces which the Communists can logistically support in an attack against South Vietnam are about equal in size to South Vietnamese regular forces. The terrain and lines of communication prevent major front-line concentrations of either defending or attacking forces, and the initial local Chinese air superiority is not likely to have a major bearing on the course of front line hostilities. Both sides present inviting and highly

9. Estimates used in this paper of Communist ability to support regular forces in an invasion of Vietnam include forces advancing via Laos. Communist control of Laos should not, therefore, substantially improve Communist capability to support an invasion. Communist capabilities to support insurgency would, of course, be significantly improved (see below, pp. 93-95).
vulnerable nuclear targets: in the north, the Hanoi-Haiphong complex; and in the south, Saigon with its port, airfield, communications, and governmental and military control concentrations. Other profitable nuclear targets, except (possibly transitory) force and supply concentrations, would be few in Vietnam proper; attractive nuclear targets would exist, in the form of concentration of forces, supplies, logistic facilities and lines of communication, in adjacent areas within China and, on the United States-South Vietnam side, in the Philippines and probably Thailand.

A direct attack upon South Vietnam alone would be an inviting course of action for the Communists if three conditions exist:

1) Organized South Vietnamese forces are in large part diverted to the struggle against insurgency, affected by widespread disaffection and disloyalty, or otherwise barred from effective employment.

2) The Communists are convinced that insurgency alone will be insufficient, and that open aggression will also be necessary.

3) The Communists believe that the United States cannot or will not be willing to participate effectively in the defense of South Vietnam.

10. If the Chinese should overtly attack Thailand, such an attack would almost certainly progress so as eventually to include South Vietnam. A key element, therefore, in the security of South Vietnam is the security of Thailand. This is discussed beginning on page 88 below.
If these preconditions do, in fact, all exist, nuclear operations by the CPR would be unnecessary.

If the Communists calculate wrongly that the United States lacks the will or capability to assist effectively in the defense of South Vietnam, and, consequently, the United States does react to Communist attack but only with conventional forces limited initially to operations in Vietnam itself, the situation which would emerge would at best be a difficult one for the defending forces. If the first precondition does not then exist (that is, if the present state of insurgency has been brought under control), the South Vietnamese, reinforced by major US forces, should be able to attain a significant numerical superiority over the organized forces that the Communists can support over their tenuous lines of communication. This numerical superiority might permit the United States and South Vietnamese forces eventually to defeat the Communists, but in view of the physical environment such a victory, if possible at all, would take a very long time and would be a very expensive operation. If, on the other hand, major Communist aggression is coupled with widespread insurgency, defeat of the Communists by conventional means would be improbable, but a complete (non-nuclear) Communist victory, requiring the conquest and occupation of the more developed portions of the country as well as the mountain and jungle areas, would be equally improbable. Thus, open Communist aggression in a non-nuclear environment is likely, as in Korea, to lead to stalemate.
Under these circumstances the deployment of US forces and materiel would almost certainly create highly lucrative nuclear targets. Hence it is conceivable that a Chinese nuclear capability might be used to establish a locally decisive advantage, and bilateral nuclear operations, whether initiated by the Communists or the United States, might eventuate. It would be more advantageous to the Communists, however, to de-emphasize (and possibly abandon) operations by organized forces in favor of additional emphasis on insurgency and guerrilla operations, than to invite reprisal, not necessarily localized, by superior US nuclear power. A nuclear capability is therefore unlikely to be used by, or offer any real military advantage to, the Communists in the conquest of South Vietnam, except as it may serve as a restraining influence on the United States.

An evident will and capability of the United States to carry the war, with nuclear weapons if the United States should so desire, into the heart of North Vietnam and if necessary China, should almost certainly preclude open aggression against South Vietnam. This capability should make it evident to the Chinese that their use of nuclear weapons would entail extreme risk; yet, barring catastrophic political developments, they are not likely to be able to invade and conquer South Vietnam without using them. If this US will and capability appeared to China to have been lost
in a military sense, precluded by US political decision, or susceptible to neutralization by a Chinese first strike on US forces, then an invasion of South Vietnam might be attempted. The existence of a visible US regional deterrent (discussed in detail in Chapter VI)\textsuperscript{11} and the political basis for its employment at the discretion of the United States, is thus of primary importance.

**THAILAND**

Under present conditions, the United States and the CPR face almost equal difficulties in supporting and maintaining organized regular forces for conventional military operations in Thailand. While the Chinese can sustain sufficient forces to defeat an unassisted Thailand, their logistic problems would limit the attack in the main to lightly armed forces whose overland progress would be slow. On the United States-Thai side, the deployment of US ground and air forces to Thailand (except for comparatively small forces in readiness in the Western Pacific) would also be relatively slow, and constricted through the single port of Bangkok and, generally, the airfield complex of Bangkok-Takhli-Khorat. The United States could expect to receive at least several days of strategic warning, however, as Chinese forces

\textsuperscript{11} See below, pp. 104-113.
traverse Burma and Laos, and during this time could preposition carrier forces, and air and ground forces within Thailand. US deployments into Thailand, dependent upon the single port and few airfields, would create attractive nuclear targets. However, logistic limitations would make extremely difficult, if not prevent, Chinese exploitation of any nuclear operations, and would create a situation of extreme danger to China if the United States retaliates. Chinese initiation of nuclear warfare is thus not probable, and should be readily deterrable.

The situation will be greatly changed if Laos should become a Communist state. The Communists could build up major military resources in Laos and could infiltrate forces there. This concentration would permit a much heavier weight of attack by well-equipped forces, with some possibility of achieving tactical surprise. Unless there is prior major improvement in Thai forces, or actions are taken to permit the predeployment of US forces to Thailand (and these actions would probably preclude Chinese attack), a non-nuclear defense on the ground would appear to be unpromising. Communist initiation of nuclear warfare would therefore be unnecessary.

Thus a Chinese nuclear capability is not likely materially to affect local hostilities in Thailand. The existence of a credible threat on the part of the United States to carry the war
The situation might be materially changed if Nepal should become in effect or in actuality a Chinese satellite.\textsuperscript{13} If Nepal is available to the Chinese as a base, the CPR should be able to overrun parts of India in a very short time (although the occupation of all of India would be a most difficult and time-consuming task, if possible at all). Any build-up in Nepal would, of course, provide long-term strategic warning which would doubtless be heeded by India—and reasonable preparation by India, aided by the West, should more than offset Chinese advantage accruing from an unimpeded build-up in Nepal.

In either case, Chinese nuclear operations could:

1) Assist in breaching the initial Indian (or Pakistani) defensive position. If, however, China can transport and support forces adequate for a major invasion, an initial nuclear assist would be unnecessary. If she cannot, initial success could not be exploited.

2) Largely destroy (primarily through a counter-city offensive) the ability of the attacked nation to defend itself with organized forces. Destruction of this nature would however destroy the only reward of conquest, and hence almost surely would

to the source of any aggression will be of critical importance in
deterring open aggression, or at a minimum in holding it to a low
level of intensity, as well as deterring Chinese initiation of
nuclear operations. It will, of course, be important to avoid, or
at least to keep to the minimum feasible, any concentration of
forces or resources that would invite Communist nuclear attack.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Despite the persistence of armed conflict between the Chinese
and Indians in border areas claimed by both, neither India nor
Pakistan would appear to be profitable or likely targets of
Chinese military conquest. In the first place, unless there is
a major Chinese effort to develop Tibet or Sinkiang to support
military operations—an effort which owing to the remoteness of
these areas might be expected to require several years—or a very
great improvement in Chinese air transport capabilities, China will
not be able to support major forces in operations against India or
Pakistan. Further, it can be reasonably assumed that the Chinese
would be deterred by the expectation that the United Kingdom would
actively assist the attacked nation, and might be prepared to
respond with nuclear weapons if the Chinese should use them first.¹²

¹² For a discussion of British policy on nuclear weapons in
Asia, see Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe and
the United Kingdom, UNCLASSIFIED, ISD Study Memorandum No. 12 (IDA,
Washington, D. C., 1962), "The United Kingdom," by Roderick Mac-
Farquhar, pp. 8-13.
not be undertaken. Even if nuclear weapons were so used, China would still require very large forces for an extended period to consolidate its gains, and the stringent logistic limitations governing Chinese operations would probably prohibit this.

Thus, it appears that a nuclear capability, under any likely circumstance, would not provide a decisive military advantage to China in an invasion of India or Pakistan.

Yet another situation would exist if India and Pakistan were at war with each other, and the CPR intervened on behalf of one party (presumably Pakistan). Neither India nor Pakistan appears capable of defeating the other under present circumstances. Presumably, open warfare between these two states would be preceded by extensive mobilization on both sides. Whether the increment of force which the Chinese could then provide—either in terms of additional conventional forces or in terms of an initial nuclear assist—would be a decisive advantage to its ally is problematical in a situation with so many unpredictables. However, CPR intervention in such a situation, and particularly CPR use of nuclear weapons, should be deterrable. China cannot afford to dissipate its limited nuclear stocks on a third country, nor even become heavily committed in the West, while facing a major threat by US forces from the East, including the threat of nuclear reprisal for Chinese initiation of nuclear operations.
BURMA, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA

The Communists now have the ability to conquer these countries at will. The primary problem facing the Communists in connection with any military ambitions they may have with regard to these nations is to keep the level of hostilities low enough to preclude a US decision to intervene militarily, and particularly to preclude a US decision to counter Communist aggression by direct attack on China or North Vietnam. The existence of a CPR nuclear capability will affect this situation only if it causes the United States to exercise greater restraint in committing military forces, and thus permits the Communists to use force more openly and at a somewhat higher level of intensity.

SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY

China has the capability of instigating and supporting extensive and widespread insurgency and guerrilla activity (including isolated actions by organized or irregular forces) in all nearby areas and to a lesser degree, elsewhere in Asia, including Indonesia. With the passage of time the political environment in Korea, Pakistan, and possibly the Philippines may deteriorate to an extent that would permit low-grade Communist aggression. This Communist capability will not be directly enhanced by a Chinese nuclear capability, although (as discussed
in Chapter II)\textsuperscript{14} political exploitation of China's nuclear accomplishments may assist the CPR in preparing the climate for low-grade aggression.

The following effects on US and allied military operations to counter insurgency or guerrilla operations are possible, but unlikely:

1) In all threatened areas there is a scarcity of ports, airfields, and communications and support facilities. The concentration of US resources (whether forces committed to the scene, or merely materiel and other support for indigenous forces) can create vulnerabilities inviting Communist Chinese nuclear attack. Such an attack would of course end the "insurgency" phase and introduce open warfare.

2) Unless the will and character of the threatened government is strong, it is conceivable that Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail, if coupled with suitable blandishments, might lead to a capitulation (or "accommodation") by the supported government, at the expense of any US forces already committed to the scene.

The only likely danger attributable to a Chinese nuclear capability, however, is an increase in the level of provocation that would cause the US to intervene with military forces. This political restraint can have serious military implications. The United States is unlikely to be swayed in making an early decision to

\textsuperscript{14} See above, pp. 9-27.
assist such staunch allies as Korea and the Philippines, but a decision for US military intervention in less crucial areas may well be delayed by extensive efforts to find a nonmilitary solution. Further, countries such as Thailand and Malaya, may procrastinate in seeking the assistance of Western powers when there is a chance that such aid might result in nuclear operations on their territories. The military situation may thus have deteriorated significantly before US forces are committed or other significant assistance is provided to the threatened nation.

OVER-ALL ASSESSMENT

While the use of nuclear weapons might be locally advantageous to the Chinese under special circumstances, major gain from a locally effective nuclear capability will accrue to the CPR only through the existence of an unused capability. Its existence will discourage any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland. It will make extremely hazardous, and probably preclude, large-scale US airborne or amphibious operations. It may impede and delay US-allied operations in response to Communist-initiated hostilities.

Communist China's strength will remain in her ground forces and it will be clearly advantageous to her to create situations in which that asset can be exploited. China's real interest therefore must be to avoid a direct US-CPR confrontation if
possible, but if a confrontation should nevertheless occur, then to forestall US employment of its nuclear superiority. At lower ranges of the spectrum of warfare China may succeed in preventing any US military intervention whatever. At upper ranges of the spectrum China's nuclear capability, carrying with it increased risk of an escalation uncontrolled by the United States, is likely to induce greater caution on the part of the United States, and thus enable China to succeed in preventing US initiation of nuclear operations in circumstances which the United States might otherwise consider to require such weapons.
COMMUNIST RISKS

Increased risks for the United States and its allies stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability have been considered in preceding chapters of this study. Just as real, though less apparent, will be the increase in risks for the Chinese—although these may not be initially evident to the Chinese.

The United States will remain far superior to the CPR in nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities and will retain other major military advantages over China. These advantages need not necessarily go unused. If the United States should face significantly increased military difficulties in local hostilities, an incentive would be created for the United States to carry out operations directly against sources of the aggression, and the latter are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. If a situation should arise requiring intervention by major US forces in Asia, a pre-emptive attack on CPR delivery forces would be the most certain way to eliminate the risk of Chinese first use. The risk of general war is a two-edged sword and is as uninviting to the Soviets as to the United States. China will be continuously faced, therefore, with the strong likelihood that full Soviet support will not be forthcoming when it is most needed.
CHAPTER VI

DETERRENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

The acquisition of a nuclear capability by the People's Republic of China \[\text{CPR}\] will create a period of increased military risk for the United States and its allies in the Far East. Some risks will be new; primarily, however, there will be an intensification of risks already existing. An aggressive, expansionist, nuclear-capable CPR will be less subject to external restraints, more likely to miscalculate its military capabilities and the will and capabilities of the United States, and will have somewhat more independence of decision in matters which may lead to military action.

The most certain restraint on Communist Chinese military action, and the surest way to cause a correct calculation of the price required for military aggression, will be the maintenance of a military posture by the Free World, and particularly by the United States, adequate to insure a proper CPR assessment of risks--risks which are at least as great as those facing the United States and its allies.
DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION

General

Deterrence of local aggression depends on a military capability which will cause the Chinese to estimate either that the local aggression is not likely to be successful, or that other dire consequences more than offsetting possible local victory may ensue. In either case, the threat of use of the military capability must be credible.

Military Capabilities to Oppose Local Aggression

Operations within a local area to counter local aggression by a nuclear-capable CPR depend first upon the ability of the United States to reinforce a threatened ally at a rate faster than the Communists can build up their forces. Unless the United States should decide to initiate nuclear operations, success in local operations will also be heavily dependent on deterrence of Chinese first use and on minimizing advantages that would accrue locally to the Chinese through their first use of nuclear weapons.

Total US force availability does not appear to be a problem in this regard now or prospectively, unless one assumes that two or more local wars requiring major US intervention are under way simultaneously. If consideration is limited to Asia, such an assumption would appear to have little validity inasmuch as the limited CPR ability to project power beyond its own borders would
make a two-front war even more uninviting to China than to the United States.

Specific capabilities to permit effective local US military operations, and present and prospective deficiencies in this regard, involve at least these major factors:

1) Rapidity of US military intervention will become even more essential than now, not only to defend allied territory successfully, but also to control escalation. Additional highly mobile, immediately available forces and transport in the Pacific Command may not be essential, but would at least be highly desirable. More importantly, the rate of reinforcement in likely areas of local war is now severely curtailed through inadequacies in ports and airfields. These deficiencies should be ameliorated as a matter of high priority.

2) Indigenous forces must be able, with the assistance of those US forces which can be immediately brought into action, to retard a hostile advance long enough to permit the deployment of additional US forces adequate to repel the invasion. A major deficiency in this regard may arise in the case of Thailand which, if Laos should become a Communist base, would be highly vulnerable to major attack.

3) The United States and its allies must be clearly able to continue to fight in a bilateral nuclear environment, either locally or on a broader basis, even if the CPR is given the advantage of first use of nuclear weapons. This requires the maximum
practical reduction in vulnerability of committed forces and particularly in the vulnerability of supporting logistic facilities; in a broader sense, it requires the capability to carry the war to the heart of China if that should be required.

4) Where strong inducements can be foreseen on both sides to use nuclear weapons (particularly in Korea and Taiwan), US military forces must be prepared to exploit their nuclear capability. This requires first the military capability and a suitable political basis to permit the United States to initiate nuclear operations if it should choose to do so. It requires also that the forces of the United States and its allies be prepared to operate effectively if the Chinese use nuclear weapons, whether on Chinese initiative or in response to US use. The present situation with regard to tactical mobility, dispersion of bases, air defenses, and logistic vulnerability in the two critical areas is inadequate in this respect. These inadequacies, which are clear to a sophisticated opponent, are now probably sufficient to warrant a conclusion by the Communists that the United States cannot fight a bilateral nuclear war, and hence will not employ nuclear weapons locally to oppose aggression by a nuclear-armed power.

US Will to Employ its Military Capability

The United States clearly has the capability to contest any Chinese aggression, and--considering military power solely--the
capability to defeat, one way if not another, any open Chinese attack. Communist estimates, however, of US determination to use this capability if required, will be based largely upon US actions prior to the achievement of a locally effective Communist Chinese nuclear capability. If the United States has earlier failed to support an Asian ally effectively, the CPR leadership may well estimate that the United States will not, except for issues of the gravest concern to the United States, involve itself in military operations against forces supported by a nuclear-capable CPR. The United States already has appeared reluctant to commit forces for the defense of Laos and (until recently) South Vietnam, in spite of its regional nuclear monopoly; its willingness to intervene when it has lost that monopoly locally may appear to Asians to be highly doubtful. The open reluctance of European nations to agree to any Western military action in Asia will be assessed by the CPR as a further brake on US military support of its Asian allies. Thus the credibility of US will to oppose local aggression may well be reduced by the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the CPR.

Nuclear Sharing

A nuclear capability, actual or potential, in the hands of selected Asian allies, might serve as a deterrent to local aggression by a nuclear-armed China.
A rudimentary potential nuclear capability now exists for certain allies, and will be increased in the future, in the form of dual-capable air defense and ground force weapons. A potential offensive nuclear capability also theoretically now exists in the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, through the provision of a low altitude bombing capability in its F-86s; this offensive potential does not in fact exist, however, because of the incompatibility of the airplane with weapons available in the Pacific Command, absence of special weapons wiring and black boxes in the airplane, and the lack of maintenance and test equipment for the LAB installation. The Chinese Nationalists have, however, been practicing LAB maneuvers. Observation of this training, plus the knowledge that the United States has nuclear weapons and nuclear specialists on Taiwan, must lead the Communist Chinese to estimate that, if the Chinese Nationalists do not now have an offensive nuclear capability, the United States intends at some point in time to provide one. These past actions to provide a rudimentary potential nuclear capability to Asian allies have caused no significant Communist reaction.

It appears from previous analysis that any military requirement for a nuclear capability in allied forces in Asia would not exceed:

1) A small but relatively invulnerable offensive capability for Nationalist China and possibly South Korea, as a hedge against
the contingency of diversion of US strength from the immediate area, resulting in a Communist conclusion that a quick conquest might then be possible; and to offer a credible threat of a nuclear defense in areas where it would be politically difficult and probably impossible for the United States to use nuclear weapons—specifically, the offshore islands.

2) An air defense capability against a Chinese air-delivered threat, particularly in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

If the Chinese air delivery capability should significantly exceed that listed in Appendix A,¹ or if for some now unforeseen reason US deployments to the Western Pacific should be greatly reduced, there could be strong military reason for providing a valid potential nuclear capability to some Asian allies. If the future military situation develops as now foreseen, however, there appears to be no overriding military requirement to do this. A decision to provide or withhold a nuclear capability for Asian allies should accordingly be made essentially on political grounds.

REGIONAL DETERRENCE

Control of the scope and intensity of local operations can best be achieved by a military capability which insures that an

1. See below, p. 147.
expansion$^2$ or escalation of hostilities beyond limits openly or
tacitly set by the United States will incur punishment far tran-
scending the possible rewards of success in the local operations.
This requires deterrence that is regional in its scope.

Regional deterrence—that is, the placing of all of Commu-
nist China in the position of a hostage—can deter major overt
military aggression by the CPR, and can reduce the risk of CPR
escalation of local hostilities. As pointed out above, it is
crucial in any situation in which the United States denies itself
first use of nuclear weapons.

The Regional Deterrent Force

**Concept.** Inasmuch as the destruction of Chinese capabilities
to wage war requires no more than perhaps one hundred or so
delivered weapons, it is evident that this task could be carried
out either by US strategic forces or by US forces assigned to the
Pacific Command [/PACOM/].

Highly effective and relatively invulnerable US strategic
forces are and will be needed in any event to restrain the Soviet
Union. Operations against China would not significantly reduce
their total capabilities against the Soviet Union.

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2. Including expansion through CPR intervention in a local
war not initially involving the Communist bloc.
PACOM forces now assigned and prospectively available are of adequate size to carry out the offensive strikes required in a regional war with China. These forces also are and will be required to signify publicly the US commitment to the defense of its Asian allies, to bolster their resistance, and to permit immediate response in local hostilities. Further, these forces will need to be made progressively less vulnerable to Soviet attack and this improvement will in turn make them somewhat less vulnerable to Chinese pre-emptive attack.

Thus the regional deterrent force of the United States, as regards military capability, could be either strategic or theater forces. It is to the advantage of the United States, however, primarily in the political sense, to design and discreetly advertise its forces in the PACOM as a specific counterforce for the CPR. This judgment is offered in light of the following considerations:

1) One key to minimizing the risk of general war is a clear understanding by both the Soviet Union and the CPR that they are considered by the United States to be wholly separate entities. If the United States should indicate that it considers the two

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3. It might be considered that the situations in NATO and the Far East are analogous, and that arguments for and against a NATO regional deterrent apply also to a wholly American regional deterrent in the Pacific-Far East area. This is not regarded as a valid extrapolation. See Appendix G, below, pp. 211-17.
powers to be militarily inseparable, so that an attack on China would have to be considered by the Soviet Union a prelude to attack on itself, then attack on China would almost certainly invoke immediate Soviet response against the United States. The United States must, therefore, as an essential step in minimizing the risk of general war, insure a clear realization on the Communist side that the United States considers the Communist military threat to be separable. The design and publicizing of a counter-CPR force, separate and apart from strategic forces specifically designed and long publicized as an instrument for destruction of the Soviet Union, would assist in making this distinction obvious. The existence of such a force, clearly adequate to devastate China but offering little if any increased threat to the Soviet Union (but also not significantly diminishing the deterrent threat to the Soviet Union), should make clear to the Soviets that a US-CPR war need not and should not involve the USSR. Such a capability, if properly and, to the extent practicable, inflexibly deployed against Communist China, could not be mistaken by the USSR as directed against, or seriously threatening, itself. There could be no question concerning a dilution of the US nuclear threat against the USSR. In a situation requiring US nuclear attack against the CPR, the USSR might be able to conclude prudently that its own destruction in an exchange with the United States was not indicated, and thus might well avoid the ultimate escalation.
2) The chance of CFR miscalculation would be minimized if the Chinese clearly understand that the nuclear offensive forces immediately facing them are designed and intended as a counter-China force. The Communist Chinese are likely to estimate that diversion of long-range strike forces against China would substantially impair US capability against the Soviet Union; they might well consider, therefore, that this force must be reserved for use against the USSR. They should be given no opportunity to act on an underestimation of the power and capabilities of US long-range striking forces to which they have not been exposed, which they cannot see, and which they may understand only imperfectly.

3) If nuclear operations against targets in mainland China should be required, the use of PACOM forces would avoid the significant disadvantages inherent in the use of the United States as a base for nuclear offensive operations. If the United States were to respond to aggression by means of a nuclear attack on China, and if this attack were launched primarily from the United States, Communist counteraction would require Soviet attack on the United States, since only thus could further US operations be impeded. A decision to carry the war into China would thus be made politically more difficult for the United States. This difficulty, which would be clearly recognized by the Communists, would materially weaken the deterrent effect.
4) In the absence of an adequate Pacific-based US deterrent, nuclear escalation by the CPR of local hostilities would require the United States to decide whether to accept local defeat, or alternatively to invoke its long-range strategic strike capability with the possibility of triggering a Soviet first strike against the United States, perhaps partly on the basis of a calculation that the US long-range nuclear strike capability has been diluted, and (especially if these Soviet forces remain vulnerable) partly in the belief that subsequent attack on the USSR is intended. It is far from certain that the United States would decide, in such circumstances, to escalate hostilities to this degree as an alternative to local defeat. The circumstances would be sharply changed by the provision of PACOM forces visibly adapted to the specific task of retaliation against Communist China.

5) The existence of a visible, Pacific-based, US capability to destroy China's ability to wage war would appear to be an important element in bolstering US allies who may well doubt the reliability of depending for their ultimate defense on a US decision to invoke its long-range nuclear strike force.

6) Finally, a Pacific-based US deterrent force aimed specifically at the CPR would develop important political and psychological advantages, in that it could hardly fail to corrode and divide the Sino-Soviet military alliance.
The regional deterrent effort by the United States need not be completely successful to be worthwhile. Chinese initiatives will, in any event, be subject to restraint to the extent that the Chinese suspect that the Soviets may not support them. Moreover, a US regional deterrent force will encourage and tempt the Soviets to defect; even though they may not entirely disassociate themselves from the Chinese, the support they provide for any specific action may well be reduced.

No major reconfiguration of PACOM forces as now programmed will be required to tailor them to satisfy the requirement of a specific counter to a nuclear-armed CFR. Reasonable modernization will be necessary to keep ahead of the Communists in weaponry. Sea-based forces will be an important component because of their invulnerability to Chinese attack. Vulnerability of land-based forces and of command and control systems should be progressively reduced so as to provide with certainty a capability for controlled but delayed response. These preparations must be of a nature to permit participation of these forces in extensive non-nuclear, local hostilities without creating vulnerabilities to a surprise pre-emptive Chinese nuclear attack. Of crucial importance, however, is the conscious although discreet construction of an adequate political and psychological basis to permit these forces to be effective in a deterrent and divisive role.

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A good case can be made politically for the design of PACOM nuclear offensive strike forces inflexibly poised to devastate China but offering no threat to the USSR. To some degree the facts of geography will achieve this result. PACOM forces are, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, limited in any event to operations in Eastern Siberia, far removed from the more critical Soviet military, industrial, and population centers. Terrain and political restrictions will necessarily require that land-based offensive weapons be based largely on Okinawa and southward. Practically, however, the ultimate in divisive effect of these forces cannot be attained within reasonable economic limits, nor is it desirable that these forces be unable to respond rapidly to local crises requiring redeployment. Further, the deterrent posture should rely heavily on sea-based forces, which are practically immune to Chinese surprise attack and which minimize Asian sensitivities to the presence of nuclear armament, but whose mobility suggests the ability to attack Soviet as well as Chinese targets.

It should nonetheless be entirely possible to make it obvious both to the Communists and to our allies that the primary attention of these forces is devoted to the People's Republic of China. In addition to any public statements or similar verbal indications that may be made, many military indications to this effect can be created. Command post CPX/ and other exercises involving the
exclusive use of PACOM forces against China, the elimination or minimization of PACOM play in at least some world-wide (general war) CPXs, the publicized presence in more southerly Pacific waters and ports of Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballistic missiles, and similar devices can make this point clear. To be effective, indicators of this type must, of course, be backed by the reality of assignment of mainland China targets as a high priority to PACOM strike forces.

**Characteristics.** The regional deterrent force should meet the following criteria:

1) It must remain adequate to destroy the essential war-making capability of the CPR without detriment to the general war posture of the United States.

2) It must not materially increase the threat to the USSR. US forces in the Pacific, while basically adequate for a regional war with China, provide only a marginal increase in the total US capability against the USSR. If the regional deterrent force is clearly designed for and considered to be a counter to CPR aggression, it can be used for that purpose with far less risk of bringing on general war than if it were considered, by both the United States and the Communists, as an inseparable, important segment of the US threat to the USSR.

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3) The force must have relative invulnerability, be responsive to control at the highest level after the onset of hostilities, and avoid a "hair trigger" posture. This requires the discreetly publicized presence of concealed weapons, the hardening and dispersal of land-based strike forces, the survivability (through hardening and redundancy) of command and control facilities, and--so long as the Chinese retain a significant bomber threat--the maintenance of effective air defenses for these forces. Any lesser posture will invite attack whenever the Chinese believe they can destroy the local capability of the United States to retaliate effectively.

4) The regional deterrent force should be reinforced in times of local crisis in the Far East. Local hostilities in the Far East will create a strong temptation, whenever the United States and its allies enjoy military success, for the Chinese to expand the scale or area of hostilities. Further, a local crisis will almost surely cause movements and redeployments of forces now in the Far East, focusing on the area of local hostilities. Thus, unless conscious preventive action is taken, the regional deterrent posture is likely to be degraded at the very time when it needs to be strongest.
CHAPTER VII

VARIATIONS

The preceding analysis has been based on the assumption that the development of a Chinese nuclear capability will proceed, within the present Sino-Soviet political framework, along the general lines, and in the approximate scale and time frame, stated in 1 Appendix A. Certain alternative political and technological courses of action are possible, however, which may affect the military situation in the Far East.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Implicit in the body of this paper is the assumption that relations between the People's Republic of China (CPR) and the Soviet Union remain about as they are at present; that is, strains exist while the coalition persists. This is regarded not only as the most likely situation in fact, but also as the contingency most complex in its military aspects.

So long as the USSR-CPR alliance remains in effect, however strained Sino-Soviet relations may be, the Communist Chinese will have considerable independence of decision, and may also be able

1. See below, p. 147.
to "blackmail" the Soviets by threatening to use nuclear weapons in an aggression unless given Soviet support and conventional military aid. The Chinese may therefore be able to induce the Soviets to agree to adventures that the latter would, if firmly in charge, be inclined to veto. The Chinese should thus be in a position to extract military and economic assistance from the Communist bloc hardly available to them in the event of a rupture in relations with the Soviet Union.

A violent rupture of Sino-Soviet relations like that between Stalin and Tito, which must be regarded as a possibility, would leave the CPR isolated from major sources of military aid and economic support, thus probably moderating the rate of her progress toward industrialization and improvement of conventional military forces, and depriving her of any expectation of support for Chinese aggression. While such withdrawal should have little effect on China's progress toward nuclear-weapons capabilities, progress in delivery vehicles would probably be materially delayed. China also would need to divert major military effort and resources to secure herself from Soviet attack. Military measures taken by the United States to cope with a CPR emerging as a nuclear power, under circumstances of strain in her relations with the Soviet Union, appear certain to be fully adequate to deal with the CPR in the situation of a real break in Sino-Soviet relations.

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There remains the possibility that Moscow might establish rigid control over bloc policy and action, including the policy and action of the CPR. In that case, the United States and its allies would continue to face the familiar Soviet threat, enhanced by a considerable addition of territory and a modest addition of resources, but diminished by a reduction in complexity. The combined USSR-CPR military resources would not be significantly increased, although flexibility and coordination in their use might be appreciably enhanced. Thus, in this event, which must be regarded as quite unlikely during the time frame of this paper, some of the military actions suggested might profitably be amended. The necessity would remain, for example, to deal with local wars and guerrilla wars in the Far East, but restraint of major aggression would be imposed by threat of attack on the Soviet Union. A regional deterrent force would lose its significance as a divisive influence on Sino-Soviet relations, but would remain useful as a threat to war-making capabilities within the Communist Chinese sector of the bloc.

It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union might draw closer together (with a relationship roughly similar to that of the United States and the United Kingdom), but to a degree short of total Soviet control. This circumstance could only exist if China significantly moderates its actions and policies, and accepts

2. From the present to c. 1972. See above, p. 1.

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over-all Soviet leadership within and outside the bloc. In these circumstances, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union would be fully committed to support any military action undertaken by the Chinese and that there would thus be somewhat greater likelihood of Soviet use, or threatened use, of its nuclear capabilities when necessary to succor China. A US regional deterrent force might therefore in these circumstances be somewhat less effective. It should still be a worthwhile effort, however, both for whatever direct deterrent value it might have and also as a divisive factor between China and the Soviet Union. Whatever effectiveness the US regional deterrent posture might lose would be more than offset by the increased ability, and desire, of the Soviet Union to restrain Chinese opportunism.

It is conceivable, further, that such an adjustment in Sino-Soviet relations might result in significant Soviet assistance to the Chinese in their nuclear development program. Real acceleration in this program, however, can be achieved only if the Soviet Union provides finished articles (warheads or delivery vehicles) to the Chinese. This is not believed to be a real possibility; the Soviet Union is most unlikely to create a nuclear threat on its periphery that might eventually be used against itself. The Soviets are thus most unlikely to furnish such systems in response to a possibly transitory Chinese accommodation; they must insist on certain and complete Soviet control. A relaxation of Sino-Soviet
strain is therefore not likely significantly to accelerate Chinese nuclear progress.

ACCELERATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Possible variations in Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development and delivery vehicle programs are discussed in another PACIFICA paper, in which it is assumed that little or no further direct Soviet aid will be forthcoming for either the delivery-vehicle or nuclear-weapons programs. Current intelligence estimates are compatible with this assumption.

In the event that Soviet assistance were substantial, advanced Chinese capabilities would be achieved at an earlier date. Unless the Soviets provide fissionable materials outright in large quantities, however, the Chinese stockpile will be a serious limiting factor at least until 1968-69. Because there appears to be little likelihood that the Soviets will give the Chinese a serious capability to attack the heart of the USSR, the improved Chinese capabilities would probably be regional, consisting of medium jet bombers, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and thermonuclear warheads. The acquisition of these vehicles earlier than the Chinese could achieve them by their own efforts, would probably have the net effect of moving the regional threat up in time by as much as two to three years.

The first date for a deliverable Chinese thermonuclear weapon is subject to a wide range of uncertainty. Given good intelligence or some luck with design ideas, the Chinese, after testing their first nuclear device in 1963 or 1964, might attain a thermonuclear missile warhead as early as 1967. Some observers, however, consider that this may not come about until three years later. The date of thermonuclear acquisition is significant because the Chinese are expected to increase their fission yields only slowly, within the 20- to 50-kiloton range for deliverable weapons, until the advent of a thermonuclear weapon.

It is possible that the initial Chinese test operation will involve a series of detonations, either within the time span now estimated for the initial detonation or somewhat later. Such a series might or might not be evidence of a full-blown local nuclear capability from the outset; it would almost certainly be advertised as such by the Chinese. This sudden emergence of the People's Republic of China as a nuclear power with an operational capability (whether real or notional) would intensify the shock effect of the initial detonation and would thus enhance the CPR opportunity to obtain political and psychological advantage from its initial test.

AN EARLY CPR DETERRENT STRATEGY

Another course open to the Communist Chinese would be to concentrate their resources and efforts upon the early acquisition of
a nuclear threat against the continental United States, and to rely on this force for indirect defense against nearby US forces. Starting with the early Chinese nuclear devices, there could be very limited Chinese capabilities for delivery against the United States, especially the Pacific Coast, by submarine, surface ship, and clandestine means, and against Alaska and Hawaii by the above means plus a one-way sneak attack using medium bombers (Bulls). Any such capabilities will be inadequate to threaten major destruction in the United States, and the chance that the CPR might use them in the face of the threat of much greater retaliation would appear remote.

A more serious threat to the continental United States could be made (assuming a rapid recovery from the present economic crisis) by combining a relatively massive program of fissionable materials production (once the processes are established) with an early breakthrough in the thermonuclear field, and relying on the large-scale production of a relatively cheap cruise missile designed to reach the United States. An early cruise missile would probably have such poor accuracy as to require reliance entirely on high yields and fallout, but it would be a low-cost item with few design problems. The earliest date on which the cruise missile and thermonuclear warhead combination could be assembled in quantity would probably be 1967 or 1968, and then only at considerable cost in deferred ballistic missile opportunities. The obvious
inadequacies of such a weapon, and its lack of growth potential, must make this an unattractive course for the Chinese unless the alternative development, that of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), would result in an extended delay.

As another alternative, the Chinese might concentrate on an intercontinental ballistic missile program at the expense of shorter-term capabilities. In this case, the first Chinese ICBMs could be tested as early as 1969. An initial operating capability would then be likely by 1970 or 1971, and a sizable ICBM force could be deployed by 1973 or 1974.

**IMPLICATIONS**

No significant disadvantage to the United States is perceived in any of the likely variations discussed above. Any major change in Sino-Soviet relations will either delay and reduce Chinese capabilities at one extreme (in the event of a complete rift), or, at the other, simplify the political and strategic problem by substituting one potential enemy for two (by creating in effect a single power—in the event of near-complete rapprochement) with no appreciably greater total capability than the sum of the two components taken separately. While the Chinese may be able to accelerate their nuclear program in advance of that envisaged in Appendix A by one, two, or possibly three years, there will still be time for the

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4. See below, p. 147.
United States to complete any significant countermeasures that may be required. Concentration upon acquiring an early, crude intercontinental capability would not permit the Chinese independently to cause great destruction in the United States, and would appreciably delay the Chinese in obtaining more meaningful military weapons.

More likely variations imply delays and increased difficulties in Chinese progress toward achieving a nuclear capability.
CHAPTER VIII

LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS\(^1\)

CHINA AS A CLASS B NUCLEAR POWER

The possession of one hundred--or even of several hundred--thermonuclear-armed intercontinental vehicles will not necessarily make China a Class A nuclear power. To have Class A power, as a matter of political reality, China must be believed to have achieved the ability, in a retaliatory strike, to deliver an effective blow against all nuclear powers likely to combine in a hostile coalition. This means that the CPR will require a very substantial long-range capability that credibly can survive the first strike of all or most of the other nuclear powers.

A significant first strike or other partially effective intercontinental capability, say one hundred missiles, would make China what might be called a Class B nuclear power. Under most circumstances such a Chinese capability would increase restraints on either of the two greater powers against undertaking actions

\(^1\) This chapter parallels Chapter V, section on Military Aspects, of the Study PACIFICA final report, The Emergence of Communist China As A Nuclear Power (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D.C., 1962).
so menacing as to threaten the integrity of China or the survival of the Chinese Communist regime. Restraints on American actions, however, should not be great in practice, because the United States appears unlikely to pursue any objective in relation to China that might charge the Chinese threat with reality. A Class B capability would also improve China's ability to operate under its own nuclear cover, affording it greater freedom of military action, but placing increased strain on the Soviet Union and hence on the Sino-Soviet alliance.

An even greater strain on the Soviet alliance will result from the fact that long-range capabilities against the Soviet Union would be available as an automatic by-product of emplacing such forces against the United States. The Soviet Union could be expected to view the creation of Chinese nuclear offensive forces capable of bringing the entire USSR under threat with extreme unease.

Possession of a Class B capability would place the CPR in an inherently dangerous position. Unless the CPR succeeds in concealing delivery vehicles to an extent that would prevent targeting by either the United States or the Soviet Union, its forces are almost certain to be highly vulnerable and, because they constitute essentially a first strike capability, will invite preemptive attack by a stronger power.

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If for no other reason than this, China may well feel obliged during this period to avoid giving serious provocation to either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Because of the danger of a pre-emption, and because any major use of forces against Communist China must of necessity aim first at destroying its nuclear capabilities, the Chinese can be expected to work in great secrecy, creating stringent requirements for US reconnaissance capabilities. But despite efforts at concealment during the transitional period from regional to Class A nuclear power, China can never be certain of substantial invulnerability to a hostile first strike.

Vulnerability could result in a "hair trigger" Chinese posture materially increasing the likelihood of an ill-conceived launching of the Chinese intercontinental force. Besides inflicting severe damage upon US civilian assets and population, a Chinese first strike might also degrade US strategic capabilities to such a degree as to dangerously weaken the United States relative to Soviet strategic forces.

If the Chinese overestimate the cover their threat affords to local operations endangering the vital interests of the United States, a situation of great danger would ensue. This danger would of course be bilateral, but it would be particularly acute for China, and every effort should be made to assure that China accurately assesses her risks.
During the period when China possesses only small and vulnerable intercontinental striking forces, the basic arrangements already discussed in relation to US regional military problems will remain valid—particularly actions designed to divide the nuclear strength of the Soviet Union and China. The requirement for selective and deliberate direction of US nuclear forces will continue. As China increases its strategic strength, however, operations against China may have to become increasingly dependent on American long-range striking forces.

**CHINA AS A CLASS A NUCLEAR POWER**

China will not be able to attain Class A nuclear status until she has acquired a fully developed modern economic and industrial base. This will not occur for at least a decade, and probably several decades. But in the meantime, the technology and military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union will not remain static. In addition to improved nuclear capabilities, it is entirely possible that scientific and technological developments by these two powers may have rendered intercontinental nuclear attack outmoded as the primary strategic factor by developments in defense against nuclear attack, by military uses of space, or in consequence of concepts and weapons now quite unforeseeable. In the economic and industrial fields, even rapid growth may be insufficient to permit China to approach parity with the
most advanced countries. Finally, intervening events, including wars or arms control measures, could foreclose the possibility of Chinese acquisition of Class A nuclear status.

It is far from certain, therefore, that China will in fact ever approach parity in weaponry with the United States or the Soviet Union. Certainly, if China does so, the process will take a very long time and parity will be attained in an era now unpredictable in its political, military, and technological aspects. But for the purpose of further discussion, it is assumed that China does at some indefinite time in the future attain Class A nuclear capabilities, not outmoded by scientific and technological developments elsewhere.

Once China places the United States under a major second strike nuclear threat, the US deterrent requirement will change. First, inasmuch as a nuclear exchange with China will involve attack on the United States, there will be no special deterrent value in limiting the threat of US nuclear attack against China to forces based in the Far East, or elsewhere outside the United States. Second, the United States could not afford to plan to engage in a thermonuclear exchange with only one of two hostile superpowers, leaving the other relatively undamaged and in a position to achieve world domination. An attack on the United States by either must therefore be expected to cause US response against both, regardless of what use might be made of American
strike forces in the actual event. Prior indication of this intention should minimize any inducement for either China or the Soviet Union to play the game of "Let's you two fight."

US forces in the vicinity of China will retain value, other than for general war purposes, to the extent that a requirement exists to fight actions of a localized or limited nature well below the point of an intercontinental exchange.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The more general military implications of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power can be summed up as follows:

1) A Communist Chinese nuclear capability will increase risks for the United States and its allies, that China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations; for China, that it may misread relative strengths and thus overplay its hand, and that the vulnerability of its nuclear forces may invite US counterforce operations; for the Soviet Union, that it will be subject to increased Chinese pressures and might in some measure be implicated through Chinese initiatives in Sino-American hostilities. These risks will increase as Chinese nuclear capabilities grow.

2) A military advantage for the People's Republic of China will result primarily from restraints on US military intervention at the lower levels, and increased US reluctance to exploit its nuclear capability at the higher levels of hostilities. The Chinese may obtain an advantage from the actual use of nuclear weapons only in special, less likely, circumstances. Nevertheless,
the existence of this capability will require precautionary measures by the United States and its allies.

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More specific implications are:

3) The CPR nuclear weapons program, and particularly the initial detonation, will create political and psychological influences that could materially weaken the military position of the United States and its allies in Asia. While serious adverse reactions are not necessarily inevitable, they are of such potential significance as to require planned and timely US preventive action to reassure the allies of the United States and strengthen their resolution and to discourage the Communists.

4) Any CPR nuclear capability will diminish whatever freedom to decide whether military operations will be nuclear or non-nuclear the United States now enjoys, as well as its present unilateral ability to enforce ground rules for any local hostilities by posing a major nuclear threat. The Chinese capability will:

   a) Permit the CPR to escalate hostilities, in area and intensity, if it should choose to do so.

   b) Decrease foreign political and military support for US military actions in Asia.

   c) Tend to delay and restrain US military intervention, particularly in situations not of vital, immediate importance to the US.
d) Give the Chinese commensurably more latitude for aggressive action without incurring direct US opposition.

e) Increase the likelihood of bilateral nuclear operations in any local war situation that involves major organized CPR and US forces.

f) Permit the Chinese to make a pre-emptive strike against the forces of the United States and its allies in the Far East, or, under favorable circumstances, to gain a decisive local advantage in hostilities initially non-nuclear in character.

5) A highly significant military advantage that will accrue to the CPR from its nuclear capability will be the additional reluctance of the United States to initiate nuclear operations, which will give China commensurably greater freedom to exploit her superior ground force capability.

6) Chinese capabilities to conduct first strike nuclear operations will create a strong likelihood that hostilities in certain areas (particularly Korea and Taiwan) will be nuclear. This circumstance will require: first, the creation of a basic military environment in these areas that will permit prompt and effective US and allied operations in a nuclear war; second, the reduction of political and psychological disadvantages that may result from a US decision to initiate nuclear operations; and finally, the maximum practical reduction of present vulnerabilities of US and allied forces in these areas to nuclear attack.
7) These advantages for the Chinese from their new ability to escalate local hostilities in Asia can be minimized by measures to deter such escalation at the higher levels, and by a US reaction capability sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to make Chinese escalation of lesser hostilities unattractive and ineffective.

8) A deterrent force desigened specifically as a counter to the CPR can generally deter overt aggression by the CPR; permit the United States to impose ground rules, within limits, if aggression occurs; and minimize the risk of escalation uncontrolled by the United States—including escalation to the general war level—while serving as a corrosive influence on the Sino-Soviet alliance and as a fortifier for Asian allies of the United States.

This US deterrent force should consist of the nuclear offensive forces assigned to the Pacific Command, modernized as necessary, and provided with a high degree of survivability that is not dependent upon fast reaction. It should be reinforced in times of crisis, in large part uncommitted to local operations, clearly sufficient to destroy China's ability to wage war, and obviously offering specific threat to the CPR rather than the USSR.

9) More specifically, this US deterrent force, if supported by a firm political base, will enable the United States to retain a large measure of freedom to decide whether local hostilities in Asia will be nuclear or non-nuclear in character.
10) Although a Chinese nuclear capability may exert increased pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese military initiatives, a US-CPR nuclear exchange, whether in a peripheral area or against the Chinese mainland, need not of necessity result in a Soviet attack on the United States. In addition to the Soviet reluctance that will be induced by the existence and readiness of uncommitted US strategic strike forces, Soviet reprisal against the US can be further discouraged by US actions, including particularly the rapidity and effectiveness of the initial US regional action and the separation of the forces used against the CPR from those directly threatening the Soviet Union.

11) The CPR nuclear program may not follow the course now estimated, either because of Soviet assistance or because the CPR selects an alternative course of action. The more likely variations will result in delay in China's nuclear program, but some others are conceivable that might either actually increase the initial political and psychological advantages to be gained by the CPR (by reducing moderately the time available for US counteraction) or that might entail some earlier direct risk to the United States. The counteractions suggested here, if taken in time, should, however, be adequate to cope with these variations. In sum, the countermeasures suggested as being required in the near term will retain validity until and unless the CPR attains superpower status.
12) As China achieves a small but vulnerable intercontinental capability, dangers for both China and the United States will increase. This capability may require US counterforce operations as a prelude to any major military operation in Asia. Force vulnerability is likely to result in a hair trigger Chinese posture that could lead to an ill-conceived launching of the Chinese intercontinental force. These extraordinary risks are likely to induce substantially more cautious action by both China and the United States in any situation that might evolve into a military confrontation.

13) China may eventually possess intercontinental nuclear capabilities approaching equality with the United States and the Soviet Union, but this is far from a certainty. If such is achieved, strategic plans of the United States must promise response against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental war should occur. The regional deterrent posture will then lose its special effectiveness, though the forces committed to it will continue to serve usefully by providing a portion of the general deterrent to military action by the CPR.
CHAPTER X

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

GENERAL

This chapter lists US military actions designed to deny advantages that might otherwise be gained by the People's Republic of China [CPR] as the result of its nuclear-weapons program, and to improve the military situation of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis a nuclear-capable CPR.

Examination of the military situation created by a nuclear-capable CPR reveals no single realistic countermeasure, and no satisfactory package of a few countermeasures, that would offset the CPR advantages completely, though one countermeasure (the regional deterrent) could have dramatic effect. The listing which follows is therefore lengthy. Taken together these actions should have highly significant cumulative effects. Avenues considered to be politically unacceptable or economically infeasible have been excluded. Most of the actions suggested involve little if any additional cost. The total cost involved for all the actions listed is nevertheless high, although these include many actions which would probably be necessary in any case, and total costs, of course, are dependent on the scope and phasing of the actions that
are adopted. But increased costs are inevitable in the increased-risk environment that will result from the emergence of the CPR as a nuclear power.

The actions suggested below are grouped for convenience into categories according to their primary purpose. This device is not intended to indicate that the purpose or effect of a specific action can be wholly catalogued under a single heading. All of the actions listed will have some general effect.

TO FORESTALL INITIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS

These measures are covered in Appendix C.\(^1\) Those of a specifically military nature include such measures as the provision of schooling in the realities of nuclear warfare for Asian elites, and combined military planning with Asian allies.

TO BOLSTER ALLIED WILL AND CAPABILITIES

Air Defense Improvements

For at least the next several years any Chinese nuclear offensive delivery capability must to a significant extent include aircraft. Present programs envisage substantial improvements in air defense capabilities in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan, and these are the areas most likely to be subject to CPR nuclear attack.

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In addition to some improvements in the air defenses for the Philippines, rudimentary air defenses, presently US-manned and on a non-permanent basis, have been provided in Thailand and South Vietnam. All major allies should have some assurance of self-protection at least from a primitive Chinese offensive nuclear strike. If the estimate in Appendix A approximates actual Chinese progress, present programs should suffice provided those for Thailand and South Vietnam are put on a permanent basis and manned by indigenous personnel. The United States should be prepared, however, to accelerate and enlarge current programs if subsequent events should indicate the development of a larger-scale or more sophisticated Chinese aircraft delivery capability.

**Visible Presence of US Forces**

Until recently, when the US reacted to Communist threats in South Vietnam and Thailand, exercises of mobile US forces (particularly those deployed from within the United States) were infrequent, of small scale, and limited in locale. Provision should be made for frequent demonstration of the mobile character of US forces, in areas not immediately threatened as well as in areas that are.

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2. See below, p. 147.
Bilateral Arrangements with Thailand

Further action may be desirable. Details are given in Appendix B. 3

Improved Military Relationship with Pakistan

This also appears to be desirable. Details are given in Appendix B. 4

TO IMPROVE THE US DETERRENT POSTURE

Establishment of an Effective Regional Deterrent Force

No single US countermeasure to CPR acquisition of nuclear weapons will be as significant as the constitution of an effective regional deterrent force, plainly capable of devastating the CPR, but posing relatively little threat to the Soviet Union. Some actions to the end of improving the survivability and responsiveness to control of what are, in effect, already elements of a US regional deterrent force are now under way or are planned. Insofar as land-based elements are concerned, however, these measures are devoted largely to insuring short-term survivability in the event of a Soviet first strike. Long-term survivability and responsiveness to control are necessary in the face of a nuclear-capable CPR.

3. See below, pp. 156-57.

4. Ibid.
This requires additional effort in the way of hardening and concealment of forces and of command and control facilities, dispersion of logistic facilities, and possibly improvement of the air defenses for US forces and facilities.

A missile capability afloat, including both Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), is a highly desirable element of the regional deterrent force because of the comparative invulnerability of these elements to CPR attack and because political complications will be minimized by their use.

Deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System, or some counterpart, should be accelerated. Hardened land-based MRBMs would also make a significant contribution to the regional deterrent posture; early deployment rather than magnitude of numbers is the critical element.

Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of USSR Intentions

This can be an important psychological and political by-product of US military posture and policy. Details are given in Appendix C.5

5. See below, pp. 161-71, and particularly 166-67, 171.
Vulnerability Studies on East Asian Communist States

Such studies should be initiated by the Department of Defense. Details are given in Appendix C.  

TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF US FORCES DEPLOYED TO FORWARD AREAS

Ground Forces

The ability of ground forces to fight in a nuclear environment requires a high degree of tactical mobility in all committed forces. Present US forces in or available to the Far East do not have this mobility and some improvement is called for.

Land-Based Air Forces

As feasible, additional base facilities suitable for use by US combat units should be made available to permit additional deployments and dispersion, particularly in Korea and Southeast Asia. These facilities can be provided least expensively either by a program to expand indigenous civil aviation capabilities or through funding in part by the Military Aid Program (MAP) to support indigenous air force operations. In either case, the facilities provided should of course be compatible with the requirements for support of US forces.

Logistics

The most apparent and dangerous vulnerability of US forces that may be committed to potentially nuclear operations in forward areas lies in present logistic facilities and practices. A detailed survey should be made to determine specific actions that can be taken to eliminate or to reduce these vulnerabilities.

TO IMPROVE US FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR QUICK LOCAL RESPONSE

Strategic Mobility

Rapid US local response will be essential in order to control escalation by a nuclear-capable China and to minimize pressures for active Soviet support of Chinese military operations. This capability requires a high degree of strategic mobility both for forces stationed in the Far East and for forces in the United States that may be called upon to reinforce the Pacific Command (PACOM). Significant improvements in the immediate availability of highly mobile forces within PACOM, and in strategic mobility through improvements in strategic airlift, "roll-on-roll-off" transports, and floating stockpiles, are included in present programs. A further increase in locally available air transport in PACOM may be desirable. Further significant increases in the mobility of US forces will require primarily improvement in the forward-base environment of likely areas of hostility. 7

7. See below, pp. 144-45.
Thai Defenses

If future events should lead to the development of a Communist forward base in Laos, Thai force requirements should be carefully re-examined in the light of actual developments to insure that the Thais can retard hostile operations sufficiently to permit the introduction of US forces. Preparations to improve the Thai base structure to permit the accelerated deployment of US forces will be particularly important through provision of dispersion and redundancy. Any such improvements should also reduce vulnerability to a minimum-scale nuclear attack.

Forward Base Environment

The generally primitive logistical environment in Korea and Southeast Asia militates strongly against prompt, effective, military operations whether by allied or US forces, and entails excessive concentration of deployed military resources. In view of the heavy current interest and emphasis on this question of environment, specific recommendations are not offered other than to note that any improvement in ports, roads, railroads, airfields, and communications—or local availability of petroleum products and transport and heavy engineering equipment—would directly assist any US military deployments, operations, or support that may be required. Economic and military aid programs should be carefully
coordinated to insure that any effort subsidized by the United States contributes to the over-all US-allied military capability.

**Bilateral Planning.**

Present bilateral planning with US allies in the Far East is generally limited to broad concepts and the basic elements affecting combined control or coordination of operations. Such generalized planning requires our allies to draw their own conclusions on the actual capabilities of US forces to assist them in defense of their territory. More specific planning, which would carry at least a connotation of US force commitment, would permit these nations to assess US capabilities more correctly, and thus provide a much better basis for timely and realistic requests for US assistance when and if a threat arises. This planning should specifically include the allocation of tasks, arrangements for the reception and forward movement of US forces, the provision of locally available supplies and services, and similar matters on which the rate of build-up of US forces depends.

**TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ALLIES**

**Australia**

Australia can reasonably be expected to support US military operations in Asia, and in particular in Southeast Asia both morally and, within its capabilities, in action. Australian
capabilities for effective military support are severely limited by distance, lack of suitable forces, and inadequate transport—and these difficulties will be intensified if Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo federate. Active encouragement and assistance should be given Australia to maintain a significant mobile ground and air force capability together with the means for the rapid forward movement of these units when required. Improvement in air and sea transport capabilities, and logistic support capabilities, should have first priority.

The United Kingdom

The creation of the Malaysian Federation will probably lead to the substitution of a "British presence," in the form of a small naval force, for present Commonwealth forces now based on Singapore and Malaya. While little assistance can be expected from UK forces for US military operations, the retention of some British capability in the area can reduce the probability of attack on, or US involvement in, Malaya, India, and Pakistan. The United Kingdom should be discreetly encouraged to retain existing base facilities in Singapore, Malaya, and the Indian Ocean in usable condition (even though largely in standby status). This retention will at least conserve some British capability to commit forces to the area.
APPENDIX A

UNCLASSIFIED

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>WARHEADS</th>
<th>DELIVERY VEHICLES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units$^1$</td>
<td>$^2$ Max. Yield</td>
<td>A/C$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>115</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
<td>185$^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>165$^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1 MT</td>
<td>150$^4$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. One unit represents fissionable material sufficient to produce a fission weapon of approximately nominal yield (20KT). Two units would be necessary to produce a thermonuclear weapon, regardless of yield. Thus, beginning in 1969, the Chinese could have either the stated number of fission weapons, or half as many fusion weapons, or a combination in between.

2. Assumed to be a basic weapon of about 2500 pounds, which would be compatible both with the Beagle and with MRBMs. If Badgers are available, greater weights and hence greater yields could be used.

3. Assumed to be Beagle. Badgers might be available if furnished by the USSR, or possibly by the late 1960s through Chinese production. Alternatively, a new fighter bomber, nuclear-capable, might be available by the end of the decade.

4. Manned aircraft may no longer be essential at this time in view of ratio of missiles to warheads if China has solved the targeting problem. If not, Beagles probably will have been replaced by newer types.

This estimate is based upon Donald B. Keeseing, The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat--Warheads and Delivery Vehicles (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Memorandum No. 17 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly. The numbers of warheads follow the "Moderately Slow" production program described in that paper, on the assumption that a plutonium-producing reactor came into operation in 1961.
APPENDIX B

US ALLIANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FAR EAST

Proposals have been made to deal with US security problems in the Asian-Pacific area by the revamping of present US alliances or by unilateral US guarantees. A variety of alternatives has been suggested, among them: a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, which, at a minimum, would include the United States, Japan, and South Korea; a Pacific Treaty Organization including South Vietnam, the Republic of China, South Korea, the United States, and possibly the Philippines; the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] and its replacement by an organization from which the United Kingdom and France (especially) would be excluded; and a new "Eisenhower Doctrine" covering some uncommitted nations of Asia (presumably India, Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon).

It is believed that none of these proposals is attractive. The prime question that has to be answered in each case is: does a new, formal arrangement improve on existing agreements?

A second question—is the proposed arrangement practicable?—rules out such suggestions as might call for an Asian-Pacific structure similar to NATO, because the conditions are sharply
different. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces a single source of danger in one principal geographic area (when a secondary defense area was introduced with the accession of Greece and Turkey, considerable strain was placed on the alliance). In Asia, the United States, along with assorted allies, faces several sources of danger in several geographic areas. With Japan, the United States faces threats from the Soviet Union and, ultimately, from the People's Republic of China. With South Korea, the United States faces threats from North Korea, the CPR, and the USSR. The threat to South Vietnam comes from within and from North Vietnam, and perhaps ultimately from the CPR, but the South Koreans may consider that it does not seriously affect them. The Filipinos may likewise consider that threats against South Korea or Japan do not necessarily constitute a danger to the Philippines. In fact, among Asians allied with the United States, the only common factor in their resistance to external Communist threats is the existence of this alliance. The Asian allies, unlike--under certain circumstances--the European allies, appear to be incapable of agreeing on the direction of forces held in common. The major forces, and certainly the swing forces--naval, air, and mobile ground elements--must be US forces under US control.

1. For further discussion of this point, see Appendix G, below, pp. 211-17.
The United States now has bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. It is allied with Thailand and Pakistan in SEATO. With South Vietnam, which is also covered by a SEATO protocol, special arrangements for satisfactory cooperation exist through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) agreement.

In the North Pacific, any effort to achieve a trilateral alliance of Japan and South Korea with the United States would almost certainly result in a worsening of military cooperation in the area. The two Asian countries dislike and distrust each other. As matters now stand, the air defense of both is joined under a single US command, an arrangement that could not be improved upon and that would probably only deteriorate as the result of a formal alliance agreement. A secret protocol to the bilateral agreement with Japan assures that the United States can use Japan without prior consultation as an operational base for emergency UN operations that might again have to be conducted to defend South Korea. As for South Korea itself, the United States has greater de facto military control under UN auspices than could be confirmed politically by any agreement stemming from a new alliance system, and to formalize the situation further even by a status-of-forces agreement could only reduce the latitude of US military action.
With respect to Japan, important restrictions exist at present, but these are not likely to be relaxed under the terms of a widened and formalized alliance system. The requirement is that the United States consult with the Government of Japan on movements of missiles or nuclear weapons into Japan, and before conducting combat operations directly from Japan. Transit and logistic rights are not thereby affected, and consultation requirements in an emergency should prove to be hardly more than a formality. The restriction making it formally impossible to store nuclear weapons in Japan is a very real hindrance to the immediate capability of US forces (primarily tactical air forces) stationed in Japan. In an emergency requiring such action, a way could probably be found for moving nuclear weapons expeditiously in spite of this restriction, if time permits. In view of the present Japanese attitude toward nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons, it would be unwise to raise the question with the Japanese Government now, and hence for the time being at least the situation should be accepted as it is.  

No reason is seen to abandon the system of bilateral agreements between the United States and South Korea and the United States and Japan in favor of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.  

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2. But the situation should be mended if and when circumstances become favorable, as of course they may when Communist China acquires nuclear weapons. US aircraft based in Japan might then be afforded the opportunity to make a more certain contribution in the event of general war.
On the contrary, military considerations argue against an enlarged security treaty.

Without US insistence and participation, there is no present possibility that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines could unite in a defensive alliance. Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea can in no real sense reinforce each other, and for them such an alliance would be wholly political—and probably both impracticable and unmanageable. Except in the event either of a general war or a regional war between China and the United States, both Taiwan and the Philippines are likely to be involved in quite different situations of limited warfare than are South Korea and Japan, taken singly or together. From the military point of view a widened alliance of the United States with these four countries is unnatural and unnecessary. Bilateral agreements are better and more flexible in every case.

A bilateral agreement with Taiwan is necessary so long as the United States is committed to that island's defense. The agreement is militarily useful for intelligence purposes as well as for providing a military base. The Republic of China has several times in the past offered to make forces available (supported, of course, from US resources) for anti-Communist operations elsewhere in Asia. Inclusion of Taiwan in a multilateral arrangement might facilitate the use of Nationalist Chinese forces outside of Taiwan, but cannot be considered as a requirement for this purpose.

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So long as the Nationalist Chinese are willing to provide the troops, the United States to support them, and the host nation to receive them, formal multilateral treaty arrangements would appear to be unnecessary. If this combined willingness does not exist, multilateral alliance arrangements could hardly be effective.

The bilateral agreement with the Philippines is desirable as providing a military base, despite restrictions placed upon the United States by the exigencies of Philippine nationalism. While a stronger guarantee that Philippine bases would be available for operational use by US forces, especially for use in the defense of Taiwan, would be desirable, it is unlikely that stronger guarantees than now exist could be obtained through any alternative arrangement.

Turning to Southeast Asia, we witness there a SEATO organization that may, as regards originative action, be viewed as little better than moribund. Chinese Communist (and Indian) propaganda has contributed to making this treaty organization, in the eyes of many neutrals, a symbol of vestigial colonialism in Asia. Nevertheless, in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, the provisions of the SEATO treaty may become effective, membership in the organization may then compel the United Kingdom and even France to acquiesce in counteraction, and broader political support, both in Asia and in Europe, for military action may be forthcoming. Further, membership in SEATO probably
played a role in the past, and may again in the future, in influencing individual states (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines in particular) to offer token military forces for military action to oppose low-level Communist aggression. Finally, the inherent uncertainties on when and if SEATO might agree to concerted military action can serve to discourage Chinese military opportunism.

No multilateral alternative to SEATO, more advantageous to the United States, appears to be practical. No Asian nation not now aligned with the United States would be likely to join in such military alliance regardless of its name of membership, unless the United States were excluded--an arrangement certainly not facilitating US support of a threatened area. Exclusion of Britain and France from membership would eliminate all possibility of practical assistance by those nations and reduce the likelihood of obtaining their political support, and the attempt to exclude them might damage US relationships with European allies of great importance to the United States. Communist claims that any new alliance is a colonial device to exploit Asian nations would not diminish; this propaganda would merely focus even more than before on the United States.

Although SEATO as an organization has proven ineffective in the face of past ambiguous Communist aggression, a weakness that has undoubtedly tended to degrade the alliance in Asian eyes, the possibility remains that overt Communist aggression could evoke a concerted response.
In sum, weak and imperfect though it may be, SEATO is a useful device unlikely for the time being to be bettered by any practicable alternative multilateral arrangement. An effective substitute for SEATO might be an alliance against Communist China in which both India and Pakistan would participate. Such an alliance would not be likely, however, unless a way could be found for composing Indian-Pakistani differences and unless India should be prepared to alter its attitude with regard to alignments.

The US relationship with SEATO nations is weakened by the special situations of Thailand and Pakistan. These nations have no formal security arrangements with the United States except through regional security organizations: SEATO in the case of Thailand; SEATO and, more indirectly, CENTO in the case of Pakistan. Neither Thailand nor Pakistan has real confidence in guarantees offered by the United States solely through regional security arrangements.

In the case of Pakistan, the problem is complicated by the suspicion with which India would view any obvious new link between the United States and Pakistan. It might be possible, without entering into a bilateral security agreement with Pakistan, to improve this situation in Pakistani eyes by placing the Military Assistance Advisory Group there under Commander in Chief, Pacific \( \text{CINCPAC} \) rather than under the United States Commander in Chief, Europe \( \text{CINCEUR} \), and enlarging the scope of the MAAG's activities.
to include a measure of bilateral planning. This change would place US military responsibilities for Pakistan under the commander with operational responsibilities in the area. The continuing exchange of operational and intelligence views, combined with US advice and assistance in Pakistani operational planning (even though necessarily on a highly selective basis), would constitute a significant commitment of US assistance and support beyond that stemming from the less-certain coalition arrangements, and without providing undue alarm to the Government of India. Pakistan would presumably remain a member of the Central Treaty Organization, retention of which is required partly because it associates Iran with the West, and partly to provide coalition means of dealing with Soviet-Afghan threats to Pakistan. Threats to Pakistan from India may be more real than any of these factors, but can hardly evoke US military reassurance at any time when the United States is also attempting to buttress India.

As respects Thailand, it would appear that the real change in relationships that has been required may have been accomplished as the result of recent executive assurance of US commitment to the defense of Thailand. The Thais should consider that they have thus received assurance that inaction by SEATO will not prevent action by the United States in event Thai security is threatened. If the Thais require further, or more formal, assurance from the United States, it should be provided.

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South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could be considered for formal bilateral security arrangements with the United States only by violation of the Geneva agreements of 1954, which the United States unilaterally agreed not to disturb. Cambodia and Laos, as confirmed neutrals, are at least for the time being excluded from consideration as security partners. With South Vietnam, the United States possesses military agreements and arrangements capable of being expanded de facto to satisfy the requirements of any likely situation, and any attempt to formalize the situation further would probably only make it worse from the military point of view.

As respects the possibility of covering a reluctant India, Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon with a new "Eisenhower Doctrine," the lack of a specific US military commitment appears preferable until such time as circumstances arise to make a commitment desirable, and desired by the beneficiaries of the guarantees. In any event the United States should not gratuitously offer to enter into such commitments. It is important that these Asian countries do not receive them in the spirit of conferring a favor on the United States.

More real and useful benefits ought to be obtainable from the ANZUS Treaty than are obtained at present. An understanding might be reached by which the United States undertakes the "strategic" defense of Australia and New Zealand against threats of nuclear attack or invasion, thus relieving those countries of insupportable burdens they apparently are striving to assume. This should

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involve no additional cost to the United States, inasmuch as forces otherwise available can assume this largely political commitment without reinforcement. In return, Australia (assisted by New Zealand) could reconstitute its existing military establishment so as to provide a substantial mobile combat force, along with the necessary transport to make it readily employable in Southeast Asia in response not only to SEATO decisions, but also to those reached within ANZUS.

It is concluded that, except as respects Pakistan, Australia, and possibly Thailand, existing security arrangements are adequate and, from the military point of view, unlikely to be improved. Consideration should be given to placing the MAAG, Pakistan, under CINCPAC rather than US CINCEUR. The possibility of a more fruitful military collaboration with Australia and New Zealand should be explored. Finally, a more formal bilateral arrangement may be desirable with Thailand, if the Thai government wants it.
APPENDIX C

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A "psychological operation" may be defined as any planned action or series of actions a major objective of which is the creation of a desired state of mind, or mental reaction, in the target audience. All suggested actions listed elsewhere in this paper therefore fall broadly within the field of psychological operations, particularly those actions dealing with alliances, improvements in US and allied military forces, the maintenance of deterrent forces, and educational measures.

More narrowly, psychological operations can be limited to the communication of ideas by measures adapted solely to creating a desired psychological reaction. These measures may be employed continuously, or may be designed specifically to take advantage of a single action or situation and completed within a definite time span. In the first category lie such activities as propaganda (white, gray, and black) and education. This appendix concerns itself primarily with those psychological operations designed for a specific situation; it is also limited to measures that affect the military situation and that require some degree of implementation by US military forces.
Among the many criteria necessary for effective psychological operations, two are considered to be of overriding importance:

1) The thought conveyed must be essentially truthful and grounded in reality.

2) The United States must speak with a common voice in order to communicate the desired thought and induce the desired reaction.

OBJECTIVES

General objectives of psychological operations that the United States may undertake to counter a nuclear-capable China include:

A. Minimization of any tendency toward neutralism or accommodation on the part of non-Communist Asian nations, and maximization of tendencies toward closer relations with the United States. This objective applies particularly to Japan, Thailand, and India.

B. Assurance that both the Communists and US allies understand that the United States has, and will continue to have, both the will and the capability to:

1) Oppose local Communist aggression of whatever nature.

2) Take decisive military action in the event of open provocation, including a breach by the Communists of any ground rules established by the United States in a situation of local crisis.

3) Exploit US nuclear and other military superiority, as required.
C. Minimization of the likelihood of open Soviet support of Chinese Communist military adventures, and the inspiration of doubt in the minds of the Chinese leadership on Soviet intentions in this regard.

These general objectives suggest the following specific objectives for psychological operations:

1) Elimination of the "shock effect" in large segments of the Free World (including the United States) that is likely to result if the initial Chinese test detonation comes as a general surprise.

2) Minimization of the likelihood of an estimate by our Asian allies, and by the Communists, that the emergence of the People's Republic of China (CPR) as a nuclear power will materially affect in the foreseeable future the over-all strategic situation, and particularly the military balance in the Far East, between the Free World and the Communist bloc.

3) Assurance that both US allies and the Communists correctly estimate the will and capability of the United States to counter effectively and promptly, and to defeat Communist aggression regardless of a locally effective Chinese nuclear capability.

4) Assurance of a proper appreciation by the Asian Communist bloc states of their vulnerability in a nuclear war involving the United States.

5) An increase in the doubts (which must exist in any case) of the Communist Chinese leadership that the USSR will in fact
employ, or even credibly threaten to employ, Soviet long-range striking forces in support of Chinese military operations.

6) An increase in any existing element of mutual suspicion between the Communist Chinese and the Soviets as regards the other's intentions in areas of competition.

7) Minimization of any tendency on the part of non-Communist Asian states to seek either closer relations with the USSR as a restraining influence on an aggressive, nuclear-capable CPR, or (as in the case of Pakistan) with the CPR itself in an effort to achieve local objectives.

**SUGGESTED ACTIONS**

The following psychological operations, primarily military in character, are suggested:

1) **Nuclear Education for Asian Elites.**¹ The primary objective--through education of Asian elites in the nuclear facts of life--is to convey an understanding of the overwhelming US military and economic might compared to that of Communist China, and to convey belief in the ability and determination of the United States to protect its allies against any threats from Communist China.

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¹ A detailed proposal for such schooling is presented in the PACIFICA Report on the Nuclear Orientation of Asians, dated March 27, 1962.
2) **Combined Military Planning.** For at least several years Chinese nuclear capabilities will be small and relatively primitive, and the asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and vulnerabilities will greatly favor the United States and its allies. US allies can be made fully aware of these facts by the early initiation of combined planning for the defense of allied territories, conducted on the assumption that China will, for the next few years, have only a small locally effective nuclear capability. The United States is already engaged in coordinated planning with all Asian allies either bilaterally or—with Thailand and Pakistan—through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]. Direct bilateral combined planning can emphasize the limitations of Chinese capabilities, and, at the same time, inure the military and political leaders of our allies to the Chinese nuclear threat. An Asian version of the command post exercises [CPXs] as originally conceived for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe [SHAPE], to be conducted by Commander in Chief, Pacific [CINCPAC], should also be a useful device for these purposes.

3) **Vulnerability Studies of Far Eastern Communist States.** Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam are all highly vulnerable to nuclear offensive operations. This vulnerability may be underestimated by the Communists with the result that they may be tempted to initiate aggressive operations. If this vulnerability is not recognized by our allies, it may weaken their
adherence to the West or cause them to delay a request for US military assistance unnecessarily. A detailed study of the vulnerability of the Far Eastern Communist bloc would clearly indicate, in terms such as personnel casualties and percentage of industry destroyed, the extreme vulnerability of those states and, properly publicized, should give cause for caution to the Communists and comfort to our friends. Such a study, preferably accomplished through detailed, computerized wargaming, should be supplemented by unequivocal and pointed but low-key statements or other indicators designed to insure that the CPR correctly estimates that it would be the target for major nuclear offensive strikes in the event of substantial provocation or of a general war.

4) Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of Soviet Intentions. In spite of possible increased pressures on the USSR (engendered by a CPR nuclear capability) to cover Chinese military actions strategically, there will always be some element of uncertainty on the part of the CPR leadership as regards Soviet willingness to accept the grave risks of a serious US-USSR engagement solely to assist China. These doubts can be nourished in the first instance by the publication of austerely objective analyses of the disproportionate nature of USSR risk as compared to USSR possible advantage. Such articles could set the stage for more sophisticated divisive action, particularly action employing covert means. The establishment of a separate, obviously effective, regional deterrent to CPR nuclear
aggression should prove highly exploitable for corrosive and divisive purposes.

5) **Common US Voice on Use of Nuclear Weapons.** If there is reasonable probability that the United States may decide to use nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities in specific areas, it is essential that the point be brought home to the Communists that US response will be prompt, of adequate weight, and, if necessary, nuclear. This can be done only if all US official representation in, or visiting, these areas speaks with unanimity on US determination to use nuclear weapons if they should be required. Such a common voice would not of course commit the United States to employment of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities; it would, however, assist in ensuring that the Communists are unambiguously aware of US will and capability to resist aggression by whatever means may be necessary.

6) **Selective Release of Intelligence on Chinese Nuclear Capabilities.** While there apparently is general recognition, as reflected by the many rumors which have appeared in the world press, that the CPR will eventually achieve a nuclear capability, it is also apparent that preponderant opinion considers this capability as a vague event which may happen only at some distant time in the indefinite future. If the initial shock effect both in Asia and in the United States is to be minimized, action should be taken progressively to alert the Free World to the reality of
the Chinese nuclear program and to the imminence of the initial test detonation. As evidence becomes available on the developing Chinese nuclear program, this intelligence should be released for public consumption. This would then provide a factual backdrop for other actual and psychological operations that may be adopted. It is particularly important that the Free World be alerted to an imminent CPR test detonation when available intelligence is sufficient to make a reasonably certain prediction of the event.

COVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Most psychological warfare operations must necessarily be of an overt nature. The psychological impact of overt actions can, however, be reinforced, exaggerated, or toned down through covert means.

The term "covert operation" as used in this appendix is limited to actions intended to cause the intelligence activities of the target governments to arrive at conclusions desired by the US. These operations consist of providing intelligence, of a real or notional nature, in a manner which will provide "hard evidence" specifically designed to cause the target government to arrive at conclusions predetermined by the United States. This type of operation is analogous to strategic deception; it involves the same methods, entails the same organization, and requires the same tight, centralized control as a strategic deception effort.
Covert psychological operations to be successful must meet the following primary criteria:

1) They must be based on real actions or circumstances, and must be specifically designed to capitalize on those realities.

2) They must provide a number of intelligence indicators that are mutually reinforcing and confirming.

3) The organization and assets must be available prior to the initiation of the operation.

4) The intelligence provided must be consistent regardless of the governmental departments or agencies involved. Close, centralized control, on an interdepartmental basis, is thus essential.

The design of a covert psychological operation depends on the assets available, on the occurrence of specific real activities, and on timing. It is thus not feasible to devise any specific covert psychological operation apart from its context. Attached for purely illustrative purposes is a statement of two types of psychological operations which might be undertaken: one, almost wholly military, devised to meet the requirements of a specific, potentially military, situation; the second, primarily non-military, which might be implemented over a longer time, depending on the occurrence of fortuitous events.
ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX C

TWO ILLUSTRATIVE COVERT OPERATIONS

1. PURPOSE: To reinforce estimates by the Communists and by US allies of the intentions and capability of the United States to use military force in a specific situation.

Possible Indicators:

Alerts and exercises of forces that might be committed

Stand-down of air transport

A marked increase (some of which may be deceptive) in communications traffic between pertinent headquarters, units, and activities in the crisis area

Carefully timed visits to the area of Very Important Persons, particularly of military VIPs, both openly and pseudo-clandestinely

Negotiations for supplies and services with the threatened government

Aircraft movements to and from nuclear storage sites in the Pacific, and movements of aircraft already tagged by the Communists as associated with movement of atomic weapons to the crisis area

The sudden imposition of new communications security and other security measures, both within the crisis area and by forces elsewhere which may be involved
Communications manipulation to exaggerate all of the above measures, with particular regard to the numbers of military units and headquarters that may be involved

2. **PURPOSE:** To encourage mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the CPR, and in particular to encourage CPR doubts of Soviet intentions with regard to the use of, or to the posing of a credible threat to use, Soviet long-range strategic forces.

   **Possible Indicators:**

   Minor adjustments in US aid programs to give the impression of pertinent United States-Soviet accord and coordination (such as obtained fortuitously in India)

   High-level diplomatic consultation with USSR representatives, appropriately timed, succeeded by leaks (diplomatic or military) of notional intelligence on the nature of the subject discussed and the amount of agreement reached

   Covert reinforcement, to both the USSR and the CPR, of the US intention to employ PACOM forces, in the event of war with the CPR, solely against the CPR, reserving strategic forces to counter Soviet involvement

   Exploitation of any real or notional act that would indicate Soviet dissimulation with regard to the CPR, particularly exploitation of any US-USSR agreement (notionally embroidered)
APPENDIX D

A LANCHESTER EQUATION ANALYSIS OF INVASION AND RESPONSE

Seymour J. Deitchman
Research and Engineering Support Division
Institute for Defense Analyses

The Lanchester equations are applied to invasion and response in a circumscribed area. The parameters of timeliness in response and total effort required to win are explored.

INTRODUCTION

The Lanchester equations, describing certain types of military engagement, were published in 1916.(1) Lanchester treated two types of modern combat:

Let $x_1$ and $x_2$ be the strengths of odd and even sides, respectively, and $x_{10}$ and $x_{20}$ their initial strengths; $a$ and $A$ the average effectiveness of even men in killing odd men; $b$ and $B$ the average effectiveness of odd men in killing even men; and assume that men put out of action are "dead" and all men in action are firing.* Then,

* $a$ and $b$ are defined as rate of fire times the kill probability of an aimed weapon, $rp$, while $A$ and $B$ are defined as the kill probability of random shots from an individual weapon, or rate of fire times the ratio of effective area of the weapon to area occupied by the enemy, $r \frac{Ae}{A}$.  

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a) When each side is visible to the other side, and every man on each side is able to fire on any opposing individual, the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of opponents firing, and \( \dot{x}_1 = -ax_2 \); \( \dot{x}_2 = -bx_1 \). This leads to the "square law" for "equality of fighting strength" (i.e., the condition under which neither side wins), \( x_{20}^2 = b x_{10}^2 \).

b) When each side is invisible to the other, and each fires into the area the other occupies, the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of men on the other side and to the number of men occupying the area under fire, so that \( \dot{x}_1 = -A x_2 x_1 \); \( \dot{x}_2 = -B x_1 x_2 \). This leads to the "linear law" for "equality of fighting strength,"
\[ A x_{20} = B x_{10}. \]

Since the inception of the Lanchester equations, there has been a proliferation of equations of this type, applied to analysis of many situations of warfare (e.g., (2) and (3)). It has, however, been difficult to show that the equations are valid. It is virtually impossible to choose values of the constants or casualty rates a priori to forecast how a battle will turn out; nor do the equations account for all the vagaries of

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*Actually, each fires into the area he believes the other to occupy, which may be different from that which he does occupy. In this case, the two are assumed to be the same.*
a real battle. The few attempts (e.g., (4)) at testing the
validity of the equations for situations consistent with the
assumptions have had to rely on historical data, peculiar to
each situation, for evaluation of the casualty rates; and so
even in cases where validity has been examined, this has been
done on an a posteriori basis, without generality. Despite
these limitations of the Lanchester equations, they do, in
their original form, represent a simple and elegant description
of certain types of military exchange. Even though they cannot
ordinarily be used to predict quantitatively the course of a
military engagement, they have proved useful in elucidating
some general principles regarding the situations to which they
can be addressed.

With this in mind, the Lanchester equations have been
used to explore some parameters of invasion and response in a
circumscribed area.

ANALYSIS

The equations for open combat with constant input of
resources by both sides (neglecting operational attrition) are\(^{(2)}\).

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{x}_1 &= P - a x_2 \\
\dot{x}_2 &= Q - b x_1
\end{align*}
\] (1)
where $P$ and $Q$ are constant rates of input of men or units by odd or even respectively. The solution to these equations, when $a = b = k^*$, is

$$x_1 = \frac{Q}{k} + E e^{kt_c} + F e^{-kt_c}$$

$$x_2 = \frac{P}{k} - E e^{kt_c} + F e^{-kt_c}$$

where:

$$E = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left( x_{10} + \frac{P}{k} \right) - \left( x_{20} + \frac{Q}{k} \right) \right\}$$

$$F = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left( x_{10} - \frac{P}{k} \right) + \left( x_{20} - \frac{Q}{k} \right) \right\}$$

and $t_c$ is time from the start of combat. The value of $E$ determines which way the battle goes; if $E$ is negative, even wins, and if $E$ is positive, odd wins.

Consider now the situation in which odd invades a single, bounded area with a force of $x_{10}$, and maintains a constant build-up of forces ($P$) during his invasion with negligible opposition until time, $t_a$, when even enters from outside with a force of $x_{20}$.

*It is assumed throughout this section that both sides remain equal in capability regardless of any differences in detail of tactics or weapons. The situation in which only one side uses nuclear weapons is thus excluded.
and starts the battle to oppose the invasion. Then at time
\[0 < t < t_a,\]
\[
\begin{align*}
x_1 &= x_{10} + Pt \\
x_2 &= 0
\end{align*}
\]  
(3a)

at \[t = t_a,\]
\[
\begin{align*}
x_1 &= x_{10} + P t_a \\
x_2 &= x_{20}
\end{align*}
\]  
(3b)

and this is the point where \[t_c = 0\], so that for any \[t_c = t - t_a,\]
\([t_c > 0]\), eq's (2), with
\[
E = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left[ x_{10} + P \left( t_a + \frac{1}{k} \right) \right] - \left[ x_{20} + \frac{Q}{k} \right] \right\}
\]
\[
F = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left[ x_{10} + P \left( t_a - \frac{1}{k} \right) \right] + \left[ x_{20} - \frac{Q}{k} \right] \right\}
\]
give the values of \[x_1\] and \[x_2\]. The buildup required by even just to break even is given by
\[
Q_B = k \left[ (x_{10} - x_{20}) + P \left( t_a + \frac{1}{k} \right) \right]
\]  
(4)

The total effort required by even to win, assuming \[Q > Q_B\], can be measured by even's total input to the battle,
\[ \varepsilon_T = x_{20} + Q t_{cw} \quad (5) \]

where \( t_{cw} \) is \( t_c \) when odd is destroyed or gives up.*

Values of \( Q_B \) are shown in Fig. 1 for \( x_{10} = 1, P = 1, k = 1, \) and various values of \( x_{20} \), as a function of \( t_a \). The values chosen for the variables are consistent with measurement of relative force in terms of divisions or corps, and time in terms of days or weeks. Fig. 2 shows the course of the battle for a few cases, computed using eq's 2. Fig. 3 shows values of \( \varepsilon_T \) for even, for the conditions given. These have been determined by selecting initial values of \( x_{20} \) arbitrarily, and arbitrarily choosing values of \( Q > Q_B \) appropriate to given values of \( t_a \), with the aid of Fig. 1. Corresponding values of \( t_{cw} \), for use in eq. 5, were obtained from curves like those in Fig. 2.

The penalty for delay is very great; when even's input rate, \( Q \), is slightly greater than that needed to win, the total input, \( \varepsilon_T \), required increases by a factor of approximately five

*The battle could be defined as ending when even has a preponderance of force, or odd is reduced to some fraction of his greatest force, or odd goes to zero. In this qualitative analysis, the last has been selected; the nature of the results is not affected by this assumption. Further, if odd stops his buildup at some time \( t_a' \) and even does not enter until \( t_a > t_a' \), the effect of delay beyond \( t_a' \) disappears. In the real situation, even though the odd buildup stops, odd would continue to consolidate his position, thereby making the battle more difficult for even as his delay increases. The equations as given do not describe this situation, and the analysis applies only to the case where \( t_a < t_a' \).
as delay increases over the range 0-5. An input rate double that required to break even reduces the penalty, particularly for larger values of $t_a$. The effect of input rate is much greater than that of initial force. These results are consistent with what is known about the advantage of applying overwhelming force in a military situation. But it should be noted that the break-even input rate itself increases rapidly with $t_a$. Thus as delay in responding increases, available resources will be strained ever more severely, and these resources will approach the point where they first become inadequate for application of overwhelming force and then for winning at all. Looked at another way, if response is sufficiently rapid, not only is the total input (and therefore cost in casualties) required to win smaller than if there is substantial delay, but the resources required and available are more likely to be consistent with each other.

There is evidently a tradeoff between allocation of resources to large forces if response capability is slow, and allocation of resources to the provision of a rapid response capability for a relatively small force (which may nevertheless be substantial in absolute terms). Airlift, sealift, and maintenance of foreign bases are all expensive, but so, too, are the equipment and support of the large forces that would obviously be required to win if the logistic system is not
adequate for a rapid response by even to an invasion of an allied country. While the need for such tradeoff analysis is intuitively obvious, this very crude application of the Lanchester equations to the problem poses the issue very clearly as a critical one, and indicates a direction for quantitative definition of "fast" and "slow" reaction. It may become possible to say precisely what is meant by "too little and too late."

Another question, posed implicitly and related to the previous one (although it cannot be treated by this approach), is that of the effect of response time on enemy actions. There is probably some $t_a$ which, if sufficiently small, is very likely to discourage odd and lead him to abort his invasion plans. For some larger $t_a$, particularly if even's initial force is small and his potential buildup capability is not obvious, odd will be encouraged to continue. This consideration, too, favors a capability for early and massive response, and must be taken into account (however intangible it is) in the effort balance sheet.

* * * *

CONCLUSIONS

The Lanchester equations have been applied to analysis of invasion in a single, bounded area followed by a response from outside the area. The analysis shows that there is a great premium on reacting quickly with adequate strength to win the opening battle, and that far less total resources are needed to
win if the available resources can be brought to bear quickly. It is not so much the size of the initial countering force which matters, as the rate of buildup of forces which can be thrown into the conflict. Planning to win clearly requires study of the tradeoff between provision of expensive means of high mobility for a relatively small part of the potential defending force, and provision of the very much larger force that will be needed to win in the event of long delay in responding to attack.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX E

VULNERABILITIES OF COMMunist CHINA TO NUCLEAR ATTACK

This appendix is based primarily upon present CPR vulnerabilities, projected to 1972. While a very large-scale CPR effort, continued over a long period of time and pursued in spite of the severe economic penalties involved, could moderately reduce China's present vulnerabilities, it does not appear possible for the People's Republic of China to change radically its basic socio-economic and military environment within one decade. Action to reduce specific vulnerabilities (such as passive protection for selected military forces and military and governmental control elements, minimal civil defenses, and improved air defenses) is feasible within limits. The following discussion anticipates that actions taken to this end will not be allowed to compete substantially with general Chinese economic programs.

PEOPLE

Mainland China's social and economic structure is relatively less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of more highly industrialized countries. There are about 500 cities in China with 25,000 or more population. The prevailing type of building
construction makes these cities very vulnerable to atomic blast and heat, and in the more densely populated areas radiation casualties would be high. But it would require an extensive nuclear campaign directed specifically against people to cause casualties proportionate to those that would result from nuclear strikes at the United States or the Soviet Union, even though these strikes were directed primarily against objectives other than people.

Even though relatively less vulnerable, it is obvious that densely populated China would suffer many millions of casualties as the result of a nuclear offensive almost without regard to the primary objective of the offensive operations.

There are some fourteen cities in China of over one million population, and by 1972 there should be sixteen or possibly more. Attack on these cities would require few weapons and would cause heavy casualties. Further, and most importantly, the governmental, party, military, industrial, and intellectual elites are heavily concentrated in these cities, as are skilled technicians and engineers. It is these people whom the CPR can least afford to lose.

**INDUSTRY**

Modern industry is relatively new in China, for the most part established since 1950. The Chinese industrial base has
two distinctive characteristics:

1) Modern industry is concentrated to a high degree in approximately thirty metropolitan areas, some of which have been wholly developed by the Communist regime.

2) Unlike most industrialized nations, China has very few complexes that contribute enough of a specific sector of the economy to be identifiable as a profitable target in a campaign devoted to the destruction of selected elements of the industrial base.

As a result of these two factors, the industrial capability of China is extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack, and such a campaign would not require great selectivity in targeting. It is also true, however, that the large number and diversification of the industrial plants within most metropolitan areas would make confident prediction of the specific effects of such a campaign on the Chinese economy difficult—although it is clear that it would largely destroy modern industry within China.

MILITARY

Counterforce

Predictions on the future positioning and configuration of Chinese nuclear delivery forces must necessarily be largely surmise. Measures to improve the survivability of aircraft, however, except possibly some small measure of ground alert
capability, appear to be most unlikely. There is no evidence of the introduction of sophisticated air defenses except for some obsolescent surface-to-air missile defenses provided by the Soviet Union for metropolitan areas. Work on the one such system that has been started (at Peiping) apparently has not been completed, and there is no evidence of any further effort along this line. It is possible, though unlikely so long as the present state of Sino-Soviet relations persists, that additional Soviet assistance may be given to improve these defenses. The state of the Chinese economy and other military demands upon it would appear to preclude independent development by the CPR of a significant modernized air defense capability. It is practically certain that China will not develop defenses, or even warning means, against ballistic missile attack during this decade. With regard to China's own ballistic missiles, those of up to medium range (1,100 nautical miles) probably will be mobile, and basically patterned after USSR designs. Early intercontinental ballistic missiles will most likely be in a generally soft configuration, probably dispersed, and possibly given some shielding through siting in appropriate terrain north and west of the densely populated areas of China.\footnote{A less likely case, but one to which some attention should be given, is that the Chinese, learning from US and USSR experience, will delay the establishment of their ICBM system until the weapons can at least be given some concealment.}
Assuming:

1) A nuclear delivery capability for 1968-70 as stated in Appendix A;²
2) Airplanes disposed with approximately one regiment (30 airplanes) per base;
3) Missiles in a mobile, soft configuration, disposed in clusters of ten; and
4) A US intelligence capability to target these delivery forces accurately;³

a minimum counterforce operation against the CPR would require approximately 25 accurately delivered weapons.

Other Forces

China's enormous ground forces (115 line divisions) are dispersed throughout the country (but mainly in the east) and as an initial object of nuclear attack would appear to be unprofitable. Attack on transportation, distribution facilities, support elements (particularly petroleum products), communications, and control should, however, render these forces practically unusable except

2. See above, p. 147.
3. This is a critical but highly uncertain assumption. See above, pp. 62-64.
internally within China, and then only as in-place forces.

Ground forces committed outside the borders of China are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. In areas where major forces would be required (Korea and Taiwan), the forces themselves will be massed and vulnerable. The conduct of ground operations, large or small, by organized forces, would require Chinese dependence on supply and support facilities in nearby China and on inadequate communications to and within the forward area. While there is a trade-off between size of force and quality of logistic support, organized forces depending upon substantial quantities of modern equipment such as ordnance, armored vehicles, and motorized transportation, will be heavily dependent on the survivability of these concentrated logistical facilities.

The minor Chinese naval capability could be denied by the destruction of China's three principal bases.

Chinese air defenses depend upon fighter aircraft, centralized control, and inadequate communications, and can be neutralized by attack on any of these highly vulnerable elements.

**TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION**

Support of both air and ground operations is dependent upon a primitive transportation system, the inadequacies of which are clearly evident even in peacetime, particularly in the distribution of petroleum and agricultural products during the past few years.
These transportation means (both surface and air) radiate weblike from major metropolitan areas. In spite of recent major Communist Chinese efforts to improve the transportation situation (particularly railroads), present estimates indicate that a transportation system of adequate capacity, eliminating the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities now presented by the focusing of these facilities on major population centers, cannot be achieved within a decade. The transportation system is and will continue to be further handicapped by inadequate resources critical in modern war, including particularly POL. Lacking appreciable reserves, and dependent upon many distribution points (the larger of which are concentrated in the major cities), the CPR's supply of combatant forces (and the civilian economy as well) can be readily disrupted by a relatively small-scale nuclear attack on key points.

CONTROL ECHELONS

Medium and higher echelons of CPR control, whether of the government, the Communist party, or the military, are almost without exception located in the larger metropolitan areas. These control echelons are essential elements for the continuing conduct of a war and its support, are vital to effective recuperation after nuclear attack and, indeed, are probably indispensable to the survival of the Communist regime itself. These control elements—in terms of facilities, people, and communications—are
highly vulnerable to carefully planned nuclear attack on a relatively small number of metropolitan areas.

**CO-LOCATION OF VULNERABILITIES**

The most striking aspect of the CPR vulnerability to nuclear attack is the co-location in metropolitan areas of the individual vulnerabilities. Even an attack of relatively small weight on, say, Peiping, would destroy essential military and governmental control capability; would destroy important military targets in the form of air and ground forces and facilities; would seriously disrupt communications and transportation with effects far beyond the area of Peiping; would destroy a significant portion of the national industry; and would cause a very large number of casualties of a nature most detrimental to the Communist Chinese war-making and recuperative ability.

**AN ILLUSTRATIVE ATTACK**

A hypothetical attack on China has been sketched for illustrative purposes. It is delineated in an addendum to this appendix. This illustrative attack would involve 90 weapons on target.\(^4\) The most distant target is less than 800 nautical miles from the coast. A rough calculation indicates that such an attack would

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4. The numbers of launched or programmed weapons required would vary widely (possibly up to 300 weapons programmed), depending on the assumptions used as to types and configuration of delivery vehicles, reliability, attrition, and so forth.
not only destroy China's nuclear delivery capability (under the estimates used for this study), but also would kill about 40 to 50 million people by direct blast and thermal effects alone, and would destroy a very large proportion of that country's modern industry. It should also destroy China's capability to control governmental and military actions, thereby jeopardizing the hold of the Communist regime on the people of China, as well as cause extensive damage to her inadequate transportation and communications systems.

SUMMARY

Although the CPR, as a social and economic entity, is somewhat less vulnerable than the United States to nuclear attack, her specific vulnerabilities are nevertheless of a nature that would permit a nuclear offensive to be highly effective in terms of rendering the CPR incapable of continuing to fight. Due to the co-location of vulnerabilities, the nuclear offensive would, comparatively speaking, need to be on only a modest scale.
ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

This addendum is a summary of a hypothetical attack on all of China.

Part 1 is a listing of metropolitan areas of over one million population each (by 1972), showing the number of designated ground zeros (DGZs) and the objectives within each area. Part 2 is a similar listing of industrially important cities of fewer than one million population. Part 3 sets forth the minimum requirements for delivered weapons for a counterforce effort under the assumptions set forth in the body of this appendix.

Designated ground zeros have been selected that primarily affect military targets, but distributed (together with weapon selection) so as to maximize damage to industry, logistic, and similar targets.

In view of the uncertainties in such projections far into the future, no attempt has been made to devise more than an illustrative attack.

In summary:

1) The attack would require 65 delivered weapons on metropolitan areas.

2) An additional 25 delivered weapons would be needed for
a minimum counterforce effort.

3) About 40 to 50 million casualties would result from the blast and thermal effects. There would also be a large number of casualties from residual nuclear radiation, including fallout.
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

**PART 1**

**MAINLAND CHINA--CITIES OVER ONE MILLION POPULATION (BY 1972)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name (Pinyin)</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Primary war resource center of China-shipbuilding, petroleum refining and storage, steel, chemicals, and all military and industrial products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peiping (Peking)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National control and communication center with important new industries such as electronics, machine tools, chemicals, drugs, military depots, and scientific research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tien-chin (Tientsin)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major, nationally important, industrial complex specializing in vehicles, steel, chemicals, rubber, and medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chung-ching (Chungking)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outstanding industrial city in Southwest China producing steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, and military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shen-yang (Mukden)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National strategic source of aircraft, heavy machinery, nonferrous metals, railroad stock, ordnance, and chemicals. Also a provincial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kuang-chou (Canton)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Primary industrial base of South China with petroleum storage, air force storage, steel and chemicals, and regional civil, naval, and air force control centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

#### PART 1 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, air force control and repair center, military equipment production and storage. Second largest steel mill in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ha-erh-pin (Harbin)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, key railroad center, military storage, aircraft production, air force storage, and heavy electrical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nan-ching (Nanking)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, military control center, arsenals and military depots, electrical equipment, and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hsi-an (Sian)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, atomic and scientific research, electrical equipment, and nearby aircraft plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provincial capital; new major industrial center specializing in steel, chemicals, aluminum, explosives, heavy machinery, and military weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lanchou (Lanchow)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, West China transportation center. Key plants include isotope separation, aluminum, petroleum, and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chengtu</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, aircraft plant, electronics equipment and regional industrial center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

### PART 1 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Changchun</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, air force storage, railroad stock, and China's largest vehicle plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ta-lien (Dairen)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nationally important in chemicals, shipbuilding, railroad equipment, petroleum port, and military storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ching-tao (Tsingtao)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National naval and naval air force headquarters; submarine base, port, railroad equipment, chemicals and magnesium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

#### PART 2

**CHINA--OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Complex Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anshan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>One third of China's steel, nationally important in coke and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Petroleum, aluminum, magnesium, coke, chemicals, and explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pao-tou (Paotow)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major heavy weapons and tank manufacturing center, also twelfth largest steel mill in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chi-nan (Tsinan)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, military region headquarters; steel, chemicals, and machine tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hang-chou (Hangchow)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Transportation center, provincial capital, and developing industry with a steel mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Supplies Southwest China with chemicals, steel, machine tools, military weapons, and optics. Regional military and civil control center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cheng-hsien (Chengchow)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provincial capital, main transportation center for East China, and third largest POL storage in China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

**PART 2 (Cont'd.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Complex Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chi-chi-ha-erh (Tsitsihar)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Heavy industry such as steel, machine tools, and military weapons; also supply center for North Manchuria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fu-chou (Foochow, Minhow)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Regional civil, military, and air control centers, and regional industrial complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Changsha</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, many medium-sized regional industries (steel, metals, vehicles, chemicals, and POL storage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Loyang</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>New industrial city producing most of China's heavy-duty tractors and ball bearings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shih-men (Shihkiaochuang)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coke, chemicals, iron, steel, ammunition, textiles, and fifth largest railroad yard in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tangshan</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sixth largest steel mill, a major railroad manufacturing and repair facility, and a major aluminum plant under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chi-lin (Kirin)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Largest chemical combine in China, other heavy industries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

PART 3

CHINA--COUNTERFORCE OPERATIONS, 1970

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<th>Objectives</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 airfields (150 aircraft)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 missile sites (200 missiles)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If US intelligence capabilities are less effective than assumed, additional weapons would of course need to be allocated for counterforce operations to compensate for uncertainties.
## APPENDIX F

COMPARATIVE GROUND FORCES—LATE 1960s

(ASSUMED CAPABILITIES)

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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Available for Defense (Indigenous)</th>
<th>Chinese Invasion Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>19+2 US</td>
<td>46³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4-7⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Division equivalents estimated to be available.
2. Estimated initial threat that can be employed in view of logistic factors.
3. Includes North Korean forces.
4. Includes North Vietnamese forces.
APPENDIX G

THE NATO ANALOGY

It has been suggested that the situation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as it has developed over the past twelve years is comparable to the situation in the Far East as it will develop as a result of Chinese nuclear progress, and that US policy must be consistent between Europe and the Far East. The purpose of this appendix is to examine this analogy in light of present US nuclear policy for NATO.

US POLICY FOR EUROPE

In Europe, NATO faces essentially a single enemy—the Soviet Union. Any major military operations in Europe would involve the forces both of the United States and of the Soviet Union. If these operations become nuclear, NATO nuclear objectives would thus include Soviet nuclear forces. These forces must be considered an indivisible target, and if nuclear operations are involved, NATO must therefore attack all Soviet nuclear forces. Since the target system is indivisible, NATO nuclear forces must also be indivisible—that is, capable of being used as a single instrument against a single, indivisible, target system.
NATO nuclear forces include US and some allied tactical air forces and intermediate-range ballistic missile units under NATO operational command. They include British forces and will include (more loosely) French forces, both under national command. But these NATO nuclear forces also include US strategic strike forces, which comprise by far the largest part of the nuclear capability available to NATO. Backed by the certain intervention of this massive nuclear power when it is needed, forces positioned in Europe can contribute only marginally to the total nuclear power available, and can accept great risks if necessary to permit them to operate effectively in a non-nuclear role.

Thus forces in Europe should be designed primarily for non-nuclear operations with a secondary capability for "battlefield" nuclear operations if the latter should become necessary. The survivability of these forces should be secured through the deterrent effectiveness of centrally controlled strategic forces. These strategic forces will consist essentially of forces under US command, but should also include British strategic forces and also any other strategic strike forces that may be created in Europe. In view of the capability of US strategic forces, however, and the inability of other forces to contribute significantly to the over-all NATO capability, additional strategic forces in Europe, whether under national or NATO command, are unnecessary and would be counterproductive. It is of course a major objective of the Soviet Union to separate the

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United States from its allies in NATO and the existence of other strategic nuclear forces would be used by the Soviet Union to forward this objective.

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

When China attains a nuclear capability, there will be two separate major Communist centers of nuclear power in Asia, which, unless there is a sharp reversal of the trend in Sino-Soviet relations, will not be in complete harmony. By reason of this disharmony, and in the absence of Soviet force and other commitments to China, if hostilities occur in the Far East, the USSR will not be automatically involved (and in fact is likely to remain on the sidelines if the United States acts with adroitness). Thus, if bilateral nuclear operations involving the People's Republic of China \( \text{CPR} \) should occur, these need not entail nuclear strikes against the indivisible Soviet nuclear forces. In sharp contrast to Europe, where Communist nuclear power has been, until now at least, under unified control, in Asia Communist nuclear power will be divided; and it is strongly to the advantage of the United States to take all possible action to see that this nuclear power remains divided.

Free World nuclear power in the Far East is now and will continue to be exclusively a US capability. There is no practical possibility that any non-Communist Asian state will create an
effective nuclear capability within the next decade or so. There is no single Free World operational command. Free World nuclear strength in the Far East is wholly under US unilateral control, and will remain so unless the United States decides to share this responsibility with one or more allies. There is thus no dual nuclear control that the Communists can exploit. No pressures now exist to dilute US control of these forces; there is no apparent benefit to be secured by, nor is there any significant influence to cause, a division of responsibility for nuclear operations against China between the United States and its many disparate allies in the Far East.

If consideration is limited to those Free World forces in the Pacific and Far East that face a nuclear-capable Communist China, the situation then becomes more nearly analogous to that in NATO, although with major differences. In such a situation, the United States and its allies face a single major enemy (the CPR), whose nuclear forces must be considered as a single indivisible target. If an effective US regional nuclear strike force exists, it then provides a single instrument under central US control for destruction of the indivisible nuclear force facing it. With this US force in being, forces deployed to forward areas can also accept risks as necessary to permit them to fight effectively in the local action. The regional deterrent force would thus correspond roughly to the position of the entire US strategic force as related
to Europe; forces committed to local areas of hostilities in Asia would correspond roughly to forces positioned in Europe.

There remain major differences, in this limited context, between the situation in NATO and that in the Far East:

a) All non-Communist nuclear power in the Far East is (and should remain) under complete US control.

b) The United States will have, and can use if needed, its long-range strategic capability against the CPR. It thus has a "super SAC" as an additional enforcement agency directed at the CPR. Conversely, US nuclear power in the Pacific will not be exclusively committed to operations against China--it will be available to augment US strategic forces or perform other tasks, as the United States may decide. It will remain an integral part of the total US nuclear strength. For the purpose of Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) operations, the US regional deterrent force will be no more divided from other US nuclear forces than any other element (e.g., Polaris) of US nuclear strength.

c) Until the CPR approaches superpower status, it can be anticipated that its technology will be five to ten years behind that of the United States and the USSR. Thus, the problem of deterrence of, or nuclear engagement with, the CPR will be technically less difficult than the problem facing NATO.
d) US long-range strike forces have been designed basically for attack on the USSR, and their participation in lesser hostilities, particularly non-nuclear hostilities, is unlikely on a significant scale. US nuclear-capable forces in the Pacific Command thus, though considered the primary threat to and deterrent of the CPR, may also be called upon to participate in large-scale, non-nuclear operations. Thus, nuclear-capable forces in the PACOM must in large part be designed so that they can be effective in a non-nuclear role without destroying their nuclear capability and hence their deterrent effect on the CPR. It should be possible to harmonize these conflicting requirements by the conscious design of forces to that end—an objective simplified by China's relatively primitive capabilities.

SUMMATION

In Europe, the nuclear threat stems solely from the Soviet Union. This monolithic threat is opposed by nuclear forces unified (in spite of internal differences within the NATO alliance, which the Soviets have tried, unsuccessfully to date, to exploit) by an uncompromising commitment by the United States, the stationing of US forces in Europe, and the creation of a unified command for forces in Europe. In the Far East the Communists face a single nuclear threat (the United States), but Communist power is divided because of strong Sino-Soviet differences, the absence of a clear guarantee from the
Soviets (who speak of "volunteers" to aid their Asian allies), and the lack of force commitments or other military unity between the two major Far Eastern Communist powers. In the Pacific there is a genuine opportunity to exploit the differences that already exist in the adversary's camp.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (U)

JOHN B. CARY
MAJOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
RETIRED

AUG 6 1996

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED PER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, S&I0

International Studies Division

Study Memorandum 14

Institute for Defense Analyses
WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUGUST 31, 1962

COPY: 75

PACIFICA 304
IDA-MG-62-709

UNCLASSIFIED
Study Memorandum No. 14

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A
COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (U)

John B. Cary
Major General
United States Air Force, Retired

Prepared for IDA in support of a study to be submitted to the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961

AUG 6 1966

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED PER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, S&IO

The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of IDA or of the Department of Defense

International Studies Division
Institute for Defense Analyses
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

August 31, 1962

UNCLASSIFIED
FOREWORD

This paper was written for Study PACIFICA, an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power. Study PACIFICA is being prepared by the International Studies Division of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961. Brigadier General Sidney F. Giffin, USAF (Ret.) is the Study Leader.

The author, Major General John B. Cary, is a retired officer of the United States Air Force and Deputy Director of the International Studies Division. He has served as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces; Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force; and Director of Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

JAMES E. KING, JR.
Director
International Studies Division
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SUMMARY

The initial nuclear detonations by the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) and the subsequent development of an operational nuclear capability will stimulate pressures generally adverse to US military interests. Reactions in Japan and Thailand will be particularly significant; should these nations swing toward neutralism the US military position in North and Southeast Asia would be severely degraded. The Chinese threat may, however, propel these nations into even closer alignment with the United States. Actual effects will depend on prior actions by the United States in Asia, the nature of the internal US reaction, and estimates by Free Asian nations as to the over-all strategic situation in Asia resulting from a Chinese nuclear capability. All of these factors can be influenced by the United States.

The US alliance system in Asia is considered adequate for military purposes and requires no significant alteration.

A regional nuclear capability for the CPR will not significantly increase Communist capabilities in general war. A Chinese nuclear capability will, however, tend to increase pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese aggression and will increase
the likelihood of circumstances arising requiring, from the Chinese viewpoint, Soviet military support. However, the amount and type of assistance provided will be strongly influenced by the clear Soviet desire to avoid a nuclear war (and certainly general war) at almost any cost.

A locally effective Chinese nuclear capability will frustrate any attempt at invasion of the Chinese mainland, increase the range of Communist military and paramilitary actions that can be conducted without incurring US military response, and permit a nuclear response to US military actions. Present US freedom to decide on nuclear operations in an Asian war, and to impose other ground rules through the threat of nuclear operations, will be lost. The initial military situation in a local war or crisis is likely to be prejudiced, as the threatened Asian ally, reluctant to provoke China and fearful of possible nuclear devastation, procrastinates in requesting US assistance. The United States, too, will be more cautious in committing military forces against Communist forces backed by a local nuclear capability. The resultant delays in a political decision to commit US military forces will require more forces, more effort, and a greater prestige commitment than would otherwise have been necessary.

Wars in specific localities in Asia are examined. Military advantage will as a rule accrue to the CPR only through the existence
of an unused capability, permitting the CPR to employ most effectively its huge ground forces. An unused nuclear capability can give the CPR somewhat greater latitude in the use of force at the lower levels, and may prevent US initiation of nuclear operations in situations in which otherwise the US would consider nuclear operations to be necessary.

The United States can retain a large measure of control over escalation of hostilities in the Far East, and the capability to impose ground rules for limited war, including the determination as to whether hostilities will be nuclear or non-nuclear, through rapid, effective reaction (especially at lower levels of hostilities) and by a suitable deterrent posture. These capabilities should be made adequate to cause the Chinese to estimate that escalation would be ineffective and unprofitable—a result facilitated by China's extreme vulnerability to nuclear attack.

The US deterrent posture for this purpose should consist of Pacific-based nuclear offensive forces likely in any event largely to be required in the Pacific Command /PACOM/. These forces should be assigned to the PACOM, suitably protected, and designed and discreetly advertised as specifically a counter-CPR force. The evident existence and capability of this force should bolster US allies, serve as a strong deterrent to open aggression and particularly to initiation of nuclear operations by China, corrode the Soviet alliance, and minimize the risk of escalation to general war.
The body of the paper is based on a stated rate of nuclear progress by China and on the assumption that Sino-Soviet relations remain approximately as at present. Changes in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, or a modest acceleration in China's nuclear program or in the attainment of a token intercontinental nuclear force, would not result in significant disadvantage for the United States. Delays and stretchouts in Chinese nuclear programs, which are more likely, will be to US advantage.

If and when China becomes a first class intercontinental nuclear power (and this is by no means certain) comparable to the United States and to the Soviet Union, China must also have become a first class industrial power. This combination of military and economic power will permit China to extend its influence over additional areas in Asia, and thus will reduce geographically areas where the projection of US military power may be required. But if war in Asia should occur, it will be more intense, more dangerous, and require larger forces than previously. The projection of Chinese influence on a global basis must be anticipated. Regional deterrent actions hitherto valuable will lose their effectiveness, and US strategic plans must promise response against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental nuclear war occurs.

The specific conclusions of this paper are on pages 131-36. Specific actions are suggested (pages 137-46) to ameliorate adverse military implication of Chinese nuclear developments.
CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

INTRODUCTION

The US intelligence community estimates that the People's Republic of China \(^1\) will explode an experimental atomic device within the next two or three years; will have a locally effective nuclear capability \(^2\) about three years after the initial atomic detonation; and may, subsequent to 1970, become a major nuclear power with an extensive stockpile of a variety of nuclear weapons and with long-range ballistic missiles and other sophisticated delivery vehicles. This nuclear progress by the CPR will have major political and military repercussions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the military implications of these achievements for the United States and its allies. The body of the paper is limited to consideration of the period ending (presumably about 1972) with the acquisition by the CPR of operational quantities of

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1. The "People's Republic of China" is the official name of the Communist regime that governs mainland China. The term "China," sometimes used in this paper for the sake of brevity, refers to Communist China.

2. A "locally effective nuclear capability" as used in this paper is defined as the ability to deliver one or more nuclear weapons on targets within 1,000 miles of launch sites within Communist China.
thermonuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Certain longer-range implications are, however, also discussed.

This paper will examine, in order: the military implications of China's nuclear accomplishments in time of peace, for general war and for Soviet military action, for wars in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and for US deterrence of the CPR; the effects of possible variations in present estimates of CPR nuclear progress and in the state of Sino-Soviet relations; longer-range implications; certain conclusions stemming from these analyses; and, finally, suggested ameliorating actions that the United States might take to offset the military advantages otherwise accruing to the CPR from its nuclear weapons and weapons systems program.

GENERAL SITUATION

The specific quantitative estimate of Chinese nuclear capabilities used for the body of this paper is reproduced as Appendix A.3 In summary, this estimate credits the Chinese with an

3. The accuracy of this estimate is not a critical factor. A moderate acceleration in China's nuclear progress would still provide ample time for almost any countermeasure that the United States may wish to adopt (see Chapter X, below), possibly excepting measures needed to preclude deleterious reactions to China's initial test detonation. Delay of even several years in China's estimated progress (and some delay will probably result from current economic troubles) is unlikely to find the United States in a significantly different political, military, and technological environment. Hence the military implications, and the US countermeasures required, should not be materially different if China's nuclear progress is slower than reflected in this estimate, although requirements in terms of time would of course be eased.
initial aircraft-deliverable nuclear capability of about twelve 20-kiloton \( ^{9F}T \) weapons by the end of 1964; a warhead inventory passing the fifty mark in 1967; the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles \( ^{M}RM \)s in 1966-67 and of thermonuclear weapons in 1969; and an initial operational ICBM capability, possibly in 1972, at which time China's warhead stockpile could be about 550 fission weapons, or 275 thermonuclear weapons, or some combination in between. This estimate is based on a "moderately slow" program (that is, continuing economic difficulties within the CPR).\(^4\)

This nuclear capability will be additive to the CPR's conventional military forces, which will remain approximately equal in size to her present forces but moderately improved in quality.

The external objectives of the CPR will almost certainly include:

1) The acquisition of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

2) A measure of control over, and possibly territorial expansion in, Southeast Asia.

3) Regional leadership or hegemony in Asia.

4) The elimination of Western, and particularly US, influence in Asia and the Western Pacific.

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\(^{4}\) The estimate here used is taken from Donald B. Keesing, *The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat: Warheads and Delivery Vehicles (U)*, SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Memorandum No. 17 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.
5) A position of leadership within the Communist bloc and the international Communist movement.

6) The expansion of communism, particularly in the under-developed areas.

7) Eventually, world-wide acceptance of China as a superpower at least equal to the United States and to the Soviet Union. 5

It is also practically certain that the CPR will use its nuclear capability as a lever, or as a backdrop, for intensive propaganda, blackmail, and political warfare to further these aggressively expansionist objectives.

ASSUMPTIONS

For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that:

1) There will be no effective disarmament or arms control agreement accepted by Communist China as binding upon her.

2) The United States will retain readily available forces in the Western Pacific-Far East area on a scale approximating present Service programs.

3) The United States will retain secure, long-range strategic strike forces, over and above those necessary for employment against the Soviet Union, adequate for strategic operations against China.

5. For a detailed discussion, see Harold C. Hinton, Communist China's External Policy and Behavior, UNCLASSIFIED, ISD Study Memorandum No. 18 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.
4) There will be no war resulting in major dislocation of the economies of the United States, China, or the Soviet Union.

The body of this paper is based on the additional assumption that the state of Sino-Soviet relations remains approximately as at present—that is, these countries remain politically and militarily aligned, and hostile to the West. Stress and strains within this association will, however, result in a degree of friction and mistrust, and in lack of cohesion in foreign policy objectives. The effects of variations in this assumption are discussed in Chapter VII.

In discussing US military capabilities, no attempt has been made to recommend specific employments. Such an endeavor, which would connote specific war planning, is inappropriate for a study such as this, and in any event would necessarily be based on so many assumptions—largely surmise—as to have little if any value. Military requirements are therefore discussed in terms of capabilities which will permit a variety of decisions by the United States. More specifically, discussion of US nuclear forces is based on the clear realization that if employed at all they need not be used to their full capacity nor against any target system postulated herein.

METHODOLOGY: VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS

The analyses and judgments in this paper are based on extensive consultations with US military and diplomatic officials in
the Pacific, the Far East and Europe; on consultations with and data furnished by representatives of the US Armed Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State in Washington; on broad situation gaming to a degree sufficient to permit assessment of basic military environments; and on research in official US diplomatic, military, and intelligence documents as made available to the PACIFICA staff. Advice and assistance were also received from the civilian consultants of Study PACIFICA.

The analysis employed is considered to be of sufficient depth to provide a valid basis for the broad conclusions reached and specific actions suggested. While no specific cost estimates have been undertaken, suggested actions have been limited to those considered to be reasonable projections of past and current funding programs.

The present paper is in accordance with the PACIFICA directive to determine implications for US policy. While the conclusions are believed to be well founded, the method of analysis does not have the precision or detail needed to determine specific force requirements or deficiencies; to serve as a basis for judging or recommending revisions in contingency war plans; to establish the cost of, or determine priorities between, specific alternative military programs; or to provide a basis for assessment of alternative tactics or weapons. Specific recommendations of this nature would require extensive
detailed analysis, war gaming, and costing of various alternatives; and would necessarily be based on assumptions largely hypothetical in nature. An extensive research program of this type is beyond the scope of Study PACIFICA.
CHAPTER II

PEACETIME IMPLICATIONS

Other PACIFICA papers examine the possible repercussions in Asian nations and in Europe of China's explosion of an atomic device, and subsequent development of a nuclear capability.¹ The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the direct military implications of these possible political repercussions. This analysis does not constitute a prediction of future events; it is an examination of the military effects of events which may occur. To some degree the United States can control the course of events, encouraging favorable trends and discouraging adverse ones. Actions toward this end, insofar as they pertain to United States and

¹ The implications summarized in this chapter are discussed from other points of view in other papers of the PACIFICA study, namely, for Southeast Asia by Tillman Durdin, for South Asia by Loy W. Henderson, for Australasia by Arthur Burns, for Japan by Donald B. Keesing and Roger Pineau, for Korea by John B. Cary, for Taiwan by Harold C. Hinton, for Continental Europe by General "X," for the United Kingdom by Roderick MacFarquhar, and for the Soviet Union by John R. Thomas. Loy W. Henderson, Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: South Asia (U), CONFIDENTIAL, has been issued as IDA/ISD Study Memorandum No. 11, dated May 30, 1962; Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe and the United Kingdom, UNCLASSIFIED, by General "X" and Roderick MacFarquhar, has been issued as IDA/ISD Study Memorandum No. 12, dated September 15, 1962. Other studies will be issued in due course.
allied military activities in the Far East, are discussed in Chapter X.\(^2\)

The more important peacetime implications of a Chinese nuclear program will in large part depend upon the potential reactions to the initial atomic detonation (as affected one way or the other by Chinese psychological exploitation) and to other Chinese nuclear exploits prior to the time China has, and displays, a locally effective nuclear capability. This chapter therefore is largely devoted to the developments which may be generated during this two- to three-year time period. Certain discernible longer-range trends are also discussed.

\textbf{JAPAN}^3

Japan will be subjected to at least some degree of shock by the initial Chinese atomic demonstration, and to carrot-and-stick pressures from China as its nuclear capabilities develop. Japan's reaction to these influences could range from the extremes of disengagement from the US alliance and accommodation with the People's Republic of China \(^7\) on the one hand, to an intensified cooperation with the United States (to the extent of permitting the

\underline{2. See below, pp. 137-46.}

\underline{3. See also Donald B. Keesing and Roger Pineau, Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Japan (U), SECRET, ISD Study Memorandum No. 15 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly.}
introduction or storage of nuclear weapons in Japan) and an increased independent defense effort on the other. Either of these extremes could result only from the reinforcing interaction of many critical but largely unpredictable variables, which include Japan's domestic political situation and its external economic relations, the world situation in general, and especially the posture of the United States compared to the postures of Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The initial Chinese test detonation will probably lead to an intense, public, largely emotional reappraisal of Japan's position in the world, its security policy, and its relations with the East and the West. But with forethought and preparation by the Japanese government—hopefully instigated and assisted by the United States—and given no change in the present world general political environment, neither the initial atomic explosion nor subsequent Chinese pressures should cause major change in Japanese policy, because the reactions among the principal opposing factions in Japan will be countervailing. Groups favoring an accommodation with Communist China will gain adherents, but advocates of close ties with the United States and of an increased defense effort will also gain supporters by pointing out the hopeless condition of Japan's military forces under the menace from a nuclear-capable Communist China and Soviet Union. Although a middle-course
reaction is thus anticipated, the extreme reactions must also be considered in terms of their military implications.

A "neutral"4 or pro-Communist Japan would at best deny to the United States, and at worst provide the Communists with, the only strategic base in the Far East--outside of China and the Soviet Union--presently adequate for the support of major military forces and operations.

Japan's location is the key to operations in the Korea-Manchuria-Maritime Provinces area of Northeast Asia. Japanese bases are irreplaceable for these purposes: possible alternates are either too vulnerable and undeveloped (Korea), too small to serve as an adequate base area (Okinawa and Iwo Jima), or too distant for sustained and general utility (Taiwan, the Philippines, and Guam).

The United States is now dependent upon bases in Japan for:

1) Operational and logistic support of forces in South Korea, and the protection of the sea and air lines of communication to Korea.

4. The term "neutral" in this paper is used in a rather special sense. The word implies both political and ideological avoidance of relationships with the non-Communist West--political neutrality in the sense of shunning military alliances or political obligations (e.g., India); ideological neutrality in the sense of cultural aloofness from the West (e.g., Indonesia).
2) Initial general war strikes against targets in Manchuria and Siberia by all Navy and Marine land-based aircraft in the Pacific Command (PACOM) and a large part of Pacific-based Air Force aircraft.

3) The ready availability for redeployment to a crisis area of all land-based Navy and Marine aircraft, and a portion of Air Force aircraft, based in the Western Pacific.

4) Support of sustained operations in and over the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, and Sea of Okhotsk, and the protection of these operations.

If Japan should become neutral—or worse, pro-Communist—the United States position in Okinawa would be adversely affected. At best, there would be strong political pressures for the return of Okinawa to Japan; at worst, the island could become, in effect, hostile territory occupied by US forces.

A neutral Japan would be highly vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union. US assistance in the defense of Japan would be rendered difficult and probably would be impossible without ultimately carrying operations to the Soviet Union. This strategic weakness of a neutral Japan, while not likely to lead to general war, would make that country most vulnerable to threats and pressures. It could lead to ever-increasing concessions on the part of Japan which in the long run could conceivably give to the
Communists, and deny to the United States, the military position and assets of Japan.

In summary, neutrality for Japan would seriously impair and possibly prevent the defense of South Korea; would impede US military operations against northern China, Siberia, and adjacent areas; and would impair the ability of the United States to project its sea and air power into the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, and adjoining portions of the Asiatic mainland. A pro-Communist Japan—which might succeed a neutral Japan—would give to the Communists, and deny to the United States, all of the advantages of these highly strategic islands and their adjacent sea and air space.

It is possible and even probable, particularly if the United States has prepared the ground, that Chinese nuclear achievements may propel Japan into even closer alliance with the United States, and cause Japan to build up effective defense forces. Japan's adamant stand against atomic weapons may be eliminated, her defense forces permitted to have nuclear defensive weapons, US forces based in Japan openly permitted offensive nuclear armament, and Japanese facilities made openly available as bases for US nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vehicles. While the initial Chinese atomic detonation should not be used as in itself sufficient basis to press the Japanese along these lines, any evolutionary trend in this direction, such as would be normal for the
highly nationalistic Japanese, should be discreetly encouraged to
the end, in particular, of affording the United States nuclear
freedom.

If a flat prediction were necessary, the safest would be
that Chinese nuclear accomplishments alone will have no militarily
significant bearing on Japanese policies or actions. The possible,
even though not necessarily probable, adverse military implications
are so serious, however, and the possible implications favorable to
the United States are so advantageous, that it is clearly in the US
interest to overinsure, as feasible, against adverse reactions and
to encourage favorable ones.

THAILAND

Just as Japan is the military key to the Northeast Asia area,
so Thailand is the key to Southeast Asia. It has the only reason-
ably adequate port in mainland Southeast Asia north of Singapore;
it has the best developed and most usable, airfield complex in all
of Southeast Asia; it has a road and rail net and communications
radiating from Bangkok which, although poor by Western standards,
are superior to those elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The country is
suitably located to support operations in or against Burma, Laos,
North and South Vietnam, and Cambodia. Its facilities will prob-
ably be essential for the rapid air transport of US forces to
Burma and farther west. As a result of past deployments of US
forces to Thailand, that country has already been partially developed as a base for US forces--the only such prepared base in Southeast Asia.

As the CPR develops its nuclear capability, a reaction in Thailand adverse to US interests is likely only if the Thais should estimate that the United States can no longer be depended upon with certainty to assist effectively in the defense of Thailand. Such an unfavorable estimate may require not only a perceptible raising of over-all Chinese military capabilities through nuclear developments, but also an apparent deterioration in the ability of the United States to assist its Asian allies.

Such an estimate would result in a strong tendency in Thailand to seek an accommodation with the Communists (probably with the Soviets as a curb on Chinese ambitions), particularly if Vietnam should be wholly lost to the West. The United States, if denied Thai facilities because of such an accommodation, would be unable to counter Communist military or para-military moves anywhere in Southeast Asia except under severe handicaps. Even operations in support of South Vietnam would be handicapped if the only land area available were in South Vietnam, itself. Elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia a military solution to Communist aggression of any kind would become virtually impossible.
MALAYA

Malaya (or the Federation of Malaysia) is unlikely to be directly influenced, in a military sense, by Chinese nuclear accomplishments. If the train of events started by a Chinese nuclear detonation should result in substantial change in the position of Thailand, however, Malaya would be directly affected. If aggression clearly attributable to the Communists should occur against Thailand, Malaya would probably feel its own security threatened and call on the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and possibly on the United States, for assistance. If Thailand should become neutral or oriented toward the Communists as the result of political action or "internal" insurgency, it is unlikely that Malay government policy would be changed. Such events in Thailand, however, would likely presage the revival of Communist insurgency in Malaya. This could result in a pro-Communist government of Malaya; or it might lead to another protracted guerrilla campaign absorbing sizable UK forces, with obvious implications for NATO, and possibly an involvement of the United States.

5. Throughout this paper the term "military assistance," is used to describe assistance provided by active military units, combat or support. The term "military aid" is used to describe assistance--in the form of equipment, supplies, and advice--provided under the Military Assistance Program.
As a minimum result of a Chinese capability to attack Malaya with nuclear weapons, bases in Malaya and Singapore will become even less likely to be available for support of British and Common-wealth forces that may be committed to assist nations in Southeast Asia other than Malaya.

**BURMA, LAOS AND CAMBODIA**

Chinese nuclear developments alone are unlikely to cause sig-nificant reaction in these countries. All are subject to direct overland attack which none can counter, and Chinese capabilities to invade these countries will not be appreciably enhanced by a nuclear capability. Laos and Cambodia will continue to be avenues for infiltration of, and possibly bases for attack on, South Vietnam and Thailand. If, however, the new government of Laos avoids actual Communist domination, Cambodia, although potentially unstable, will remain geographically insulated from the Communist bloc and can retain independence of action.

Burma will almost certainly retain its policy of neutrality, probably generally oriented toward the CPR. The latter may, with some likelihood of success, use its developing military capability as a lever to encourage ever closer alignment of Burmese policy with that of China. The CPR would appear to have little more to gain by military threats or actual aggression against Burma.
INDIA, NEPAL AND PAKISTAN

It is not likely that there will be militarily significant reaction in India or Pakistan to an initial Chinese nuclear detonation. India, already afraid of China, might initiate an atomic weapons program of its own, hoping for British assistance in this effort. Unless major assistance is provided by the United States or Great Britain, however, an Indian nuclear-development program would be unlikely to produce a significant delivery capability for many years. While a nuclear program alone might have appreciable political and psychological effects, it would have little effect on the over-all strategic situation in Asia during the present decade. If relations between India and Pakistan remain exacerbated, an Indian nuclear-weapons-development program would be of concern primarily to Pakistan.

India is too self-centered in outlook to undertake preventive countermeasures against Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia, or even to be acutely concerned about actions which Southeast Asian nations might take to accommodate to a nuclear-capable CPR. An open attack by China against Burma (a move which as we have indicated, does not appear to be in China's interest) or the development of a threatening situation in Nepal, would, however, be

6. See also Henderson, Reacts to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: South Asia (U).
perceived by India as a direct threat requiring counteraction. Nepal has already shown signs of willingness to reach an accommodation with the CPR. The relatively level southern part of Nepal provides military access to India in much the same way that Laos offers entry across Thailand's northeastern frontier. While Nepal is unlikely to be substantially influenced by a Chinese atomic detonation, previous Chinese penetration of Nepal would greatly intensify Indian alarm and reaction to the event.

India may seek closer relations with the USSR in the hope that the Soviets can and will restrain Chinese military adventures. While these actions could lead to an India more closely aligned with Soviet political, economic, and military policies, such a drift toward communism might be forestalled by timely countermeasures on the part of the United States and (hopefully) Great Britain—particularly actions designed to dampen the initial shock effect of the first Chinese detonation.

It is possible that India and Pakistan, both acutely aware of the Chinese threat, might as a result of a Chinese atomic detonation reach agreement between themselves on their major differences and present a common front against a common enemy. The United States and Great Britain should offer discreet encouragement to this end. A more likely consequence, however, would be the intensification of Indian-Pakistani differences over
Kashmir. Pakistan may seek a closer relationship with the CPR to obtain backing in the dispute with India (supported by the Soviet Union) over Kashmir, and moral support against encroachment by Afghanistan, but probably not to the extent of alienating the West. Any inclination by Pakistan to adopt this approach would be intensified either by an impression of increased Chinese military power stemming from Chinese nuclear feats or by a closer alignment of India with the Soviet Union. The best prospect for offsetting any such tendency on the part of Pakistan appears to lie in convincing the Pakistani that the United States will retain military superiority over the CPR in spite of the latter's nuclear-weapons program and that the United States is able and willing to assist Pakistan in defense against Communist aggression. But the United States must anticipate demands from Pakistan for increased military aid as the price of continued alignment.7

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

No militarly significant impact stemming directly from Chinese atomic achievements is foreseen elsewhere in Asia, provided the US reaction is one of strength and confidence. South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines are all strongly anti-Communist,

7. For a more detailed discussion of the alternatives facing Pakistan, see ibid., pp. 26-29.
this posture being a reflection of popular conviction as well as that of the governments; they should therefore remain largely immune to nuclear blackmail. These countries, however, and also South Vietnam, are vulnerable in varying degree to air attack even by the obsolescent aircraft now in the Chinese air force. Increased demands for US military aid, particularly for the provision of adequate air defenses, can be expected. Pressures will probably be generated for developing indigenous nuclear forces.

Neither Ceylon nor Indonesia is likely to be affected significantly, in a military sense, by Chinese nuclear developments. Both are too remote to be immediately threatened by China and too unschooled to understand clearly the significance of a nuclear capability. Indonesia's present neutrality, based on somewhat closer cooperation with the USSR than with the West, and on a sharp distrust of Communist China, is unlikely to be affected solely by the development of a Chinese nuclear capability.

US ALLIANCES AND ALLIES

Occidental Allies. The French apparently are determined to avoid any further military involvement in Southeast Asia. Having suffered a stinging defeat in Indochina, they also appear to be determined to prevent military operations by any other Western power that might, by comparison, further decrease French military
prestige. Great Britain almost surely would assist (within its limited capabilities) a member of the Commonwealth, probably would accede to a request by an ex-colony for military assistance, and probably, although reluctantly, would fulfill military commitments under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in the event of clear Communist aggression. However, the United States should not expect the British either to participate in or to agree to US actions—other than in defense of Commonwealth members—taken either outside the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or in meeting ambiguous aggression. Other European allies, more concerned with the defense of Europe and mindful of the cost and results of the Korean War, will exert all possible pressure on the United States to prevent or limit US military involvement in the Far East. Of all the Occidental allies, only Australia and New Zealand (and possibly Canada) can be depended upon to support, even morally, any US military action in Asia.

US military plans, therefore, should be based on the premise that there will be no military participation by an Occidental ally; that any French missions in Laos and Cambodia will not assist and may obstruct US military operations; and that no Commonwealth facilities or forces (except Australasian) will be available to assist the United States unless there is a clear threat to a member of the Commonwealth.
US Alliance Systems in Asia. The United States now has bilateral defensive alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The United States is formally aligned with Thailand only through the multilateral arrangement of SEATO, and with Pakistan through SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). While the United States is perhaps hampered from entering into formal security arrangements with the nations of former French Indochina by unilateral commitments assumed at the time of the Geneva agreements of 1954 ending the Indochinese War, present US understandings and arrangements with South Vietnam constitute a de facto political and military alliance.

US alliance systems in the Far East are examined in Appendix B in the light of, first, their military utility in a political environment that includes a nuclear-capable China and, second, their political usefulness as a means of assuring US allies of the US determination effectively to assist them in withstanding a nuclear-capable China.

In summary, SEATO appears to have little practical military utility. It should, however, be retained to avoid damage to the

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8. See below, pp. 156-57.

9. The United States, though not formally a member of CENTO, is represented at the council meetings by observers and is a full member of the military and counter-subversion committees.
relationships of the United States with its European allies, and also because the existence of this treaty organization might be useful to the United States in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression.

Other possible multilateral arrangements in the Far East would appear to offer little, if any, military advantage. If Thailand should require further or more formal assurance of US commitment, a bilateral agreement would be justified. Improvement on an informal basis in military relationships with Pakistan is desirable. These arrangements with Pakistan should include an expansion in the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Group /MAAG/, and, preferably, its placement under the Commander in Chief, Pacific /CINCPAC/, thus paving the way for a closer operational relationship between the two countries, while at the same time minimizing the probable adverse effects on US relations with India. A firmer commitment of the United States to the strategic defense of Australia under the ANZUS treaty could result in more effective military support of any operations undertaken by the United States in Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia.

COUNTERACTIONS

The possible deleterious effects of the Chinese nuclear program, and particularly the initial test detonation, will flow essentially from one or more of the following:
1) An estimate by Asian nations that the possession of a nuclear capability will give Communist China strategic superiority over the United States in Asia. Such an estimate would stem in the first instance from ignorance of the essential factors underlying the strategic posture of the United States vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China. The likelihood of such an estimate will be intensified if the initial CPR nuclear accomplishment comes as a surprise.

2) A desire by Asian nations to seek closer association with the Soviet Union in the belief that the latter may serve as a restraint on an aggressive, nuclear-capable Communist China; conversely, in the case of Pakistan, a desire to seek the support of a nuclear-capable CPR in furtherance of Pakistan's disputes with India and Afghanistan.

3) Concern over the adequacy of indigenous defenses against a nuclear-capable CPR.

4) Increased reluctance and decreased ability on the part of Occidental allies to support or assist US military operations in Asia.

Whether or not these deleterious influences prevail will depend in large measure on the character of the regimes then in power in non-Communist Asia, on the nature of other world events preceding China's initial test detonation and coinciding with the
subsequent development of a Chinese nuclear capability, and particularly on US actions and attitudes. An apparent deterioration of the US position in Asia, or a reaction in the United States reflecting a lack of confidence in US and allied military capabilities to defend Free World interests in spite of Chinese threats or actual aggression, will significantly increase pressures to reach an early accommodation with China. All of these major factors are subject in varying degrees to US influence.

Actions that the United States can take to alleviate or prevent possible harmful reactions and to encourage beneficial ones, are largely political in nature. However, certain military actions can materially assist these larger efforts; such actions are discussed in subsequent portions of this paper. Those operations \[\text{not necessarily wholly military}\] that would be undertaken primarily for their psychological effects are discussed in Appendix C,\(^{10}\) those involving specific military actions of the United States are set forth in Chapter X, "Suggested Actions."\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) See below, pp. 161-71.

\(^{11}\) See below, pp. 137-46.
CHAPTER III

IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR AND FOR MILITARY ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION

GENERAL WAR

For the purposes of this paper, the term "general war" refers to an armed conflict involving both the United States and the Soviet Union in which the total resources of both powers are employed and the national survival of both is at stake.

Almost irrespective of the number of nuclear weapons one assumes the CPR will be capable of producing, these can constitute only a marginal increment to the nuclear power otherwise available to the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union can already deliver a massive attack against the United States and simultaneously strike all militarily important targets in the Western Pacific and the Far East within range of Communist Chinese forces. The United States is therefore now threatened by a general war capability which will not be significantly increased by the addition of a Chinese regional nuclear capability, and the actions required to insure the availability and effectiveness in general war of

deployed US forces will then still be necessary, and with no appreciable change in form or magnitude.

Possession by the CPR of a nuclear capability may increase the likelihood that local hostilities in the Far East will expand into general war. If general war should stem from these circumstances, US forces in the Pacific theater might be mal-deployed or attrited to an extent that would seriously impede their immediate use for assigned general war tasks. Some diversion of strategic strike forces to the local effort may also have occurred, with a resultant diminution of ability to carry out initial general war tasks. These disadvantages may be offset by a higher state of alert for other US and allied forces as a result of tensions induced by the local hostilities, and by completion of general war offensive strikes against China or the Asian satellites prior to the initiation of operations against the Soviet Union. Further, Communist forces are just as likely to be mal-deployed and attrited, and China's small stockpile of nuclear weapons destroyed or expended. Escalation from local to general hostilities, therefore, is unlikely to offer military advantage to the Communists.

General War Through CPR Catalytic Action

Possession of a nuclear capability will permit Chinese covert use of one or more nuclear weapons, either clandestinely introduced or delivered as mines or at short range by ship or submarine on the
United States or the Soviet Union. The Chinese might be tempted to do exactly this if they believe that they would thereby trigger a thermonuclear exchange between the US and the USSR, leaving China relatively undamaged.

A few nuclear explosions—or even one—occurring within the US or the USSR, not immediately identifiable as domestic in origin, could, and today probably would, result in a thermonuclear exchange. This situation exists now because (1) of a state of tension; (2) the United States and the Soviet Union have only each other as a dangerous, nuclear enemy; and (3) the present reciprocal vulnerability of strike forces requires a hair trigger reaction capability, if with "fail safe" attributes.

With the passage of time and as China and other powers develop a nuclear capability, albeit modest, any tendency toward a reflex response to a few nuclear explosions occurring in the US or USSR should moderate. It is apparent that should one of these last two powers choose to attack the other, attack on a scale which China could mount clandestinely would be foolhardy to the extreme. A minor clandestine attack by China, therefore, could hardly be credibly attributed to one of the two major nuclear powers, and thus should not catalyze an immediate thermonuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the CPR should be given no reason to believe that she might catalyze a thermonuclear exchange with benefit to herself. On the contrary, the United States should assure Communist
China that it is on the target list of any such exchange, and thus has a heavy stake in helping to avert any thermonuclear exchange. The regional deterrent force later recommended in this paper should provide publicly evident assurance that the United States can destroy Communist Chinese political, industrial, and military power at the same time she is engaging in a general war with the USSR. The regional deterrent force can thus play an important role even in the deterrence of covert, as well as overt, action by the CPR for catalytic purposes.

PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS

There are strong ideological and political pressures on the Soviet Union to support any Communist military or paramilitary operations which may occur in Asia. Bloc leadership, cohesion, and prestige will be involved, as will be the loyalties and future effectiveness of Communist parties worldwide. Further, there are compelling ideological reasons, quite apart from the fact that they are allied powers, for the Soviet Union to succor China in military difficulty. These pressures may be increased through the acquisition by China of a nuclear capability. China can be expected to exploit her nuclear achievements for political purposes to the

2. See below, pp. 105-113.

3. The wording of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, however, also permits the Soviets to deny, on legalistic grounds, its applicability under almost any circumstances.
point that considerable damage would be done to her prestige (not to say that she would lose face) should she be forced to back down after challenging the United States. Success in developing the most modern and complex weaponry can be advertised by China as a triumph of the Communist system, thus implying that a defeat for the CPR would be a defeat for the Communist system.

The Chinese may be able to obtain Soviet support for some types of Chinese or Chinese-sponsored non-nuclear military operations by exploiting Soviet fear that otherwise the Chinese might resort to nuclear operations or to actions risking a US nuclear response. Support of the Chinese would retain for the Soviets more control over the course of local hostilities and give greater assurance that these would remain non-nuclear—and the Soviets have clearly demonstrated that they wish to avoid a nuclear war at almost any cost.

Soviet Assistance in Local War

Unless local hostilities are initiated by China over the objections of the Soviet Union, some degree of Soviet support of China must be anticipated. This support will almost surely include political and psychological support, and the provision of critical military supplies and advice. Direct Soviet military intervention might also be involved, probably by "volunteers."
There are severe limitations, however, on the amount of effective military assistance which Soviet forces can provide.  Certain specialized military functions such as submarine warfare and air transport, and possibly an increment of offensive air power, could be of great utility to the Chinese. But, generally speaking, Soviet military intervention would be limited by the same logistic factors which severely limit Chinese offensive capabilities, and Soviet forces could only substitute for Chinese forces. Thus effective Soviet assistance, from the Chinese viewpoint, during this mid-term phase, is most likely to consist in the main of strategic cover for Chinese local operations.

Pressures for General War

It must be anticipated that China's possession of non-nuclear weapons will increase her independence in policy and decision, and commensurately impair any Soviet restraining influence. An aggressive, nuclear-armed and possibly reckless\(^5\) China will be

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4. If Communist nuclear operations were undertaken now in Asia, they would be undeniably of Soviet origin. A Chinese nuclear capability will permit the Soviets to furnish nuclear weapons, or to conduct "volunteer" nuclear operations, in support of Chinese military moves while denying that the Soviet Union is involved. The Soviets, however, will almost certainly view this situation as a source of danger rather than of profit.

5. The record indicates that the CPR has been reckless only with words and cautious in action. Mao Tse-tung has sometimes been overimpressed by developments of modern technology, however, and acquisition of a few nuclear weapons may lead to his being overconfident. It should not be forgotten that the USSR launched
more likely to miscalculate both its own power and the strength and the will of the United States and its allies to counter Chinese aggression. Nuclear capability obviously will permit China to transform non-nuclear operations swiftly into nuclear war, and to strike at distant targets. As a result, China is more likely to find herself involved in unexpected military difficulties which can be redressed, from the Chinese viewpoint, only by actual or threatened Soviet attack against the United States.

Thus, pressure on the Soviet Union to provide military support for any military operations the Chinese may undertake will continue and may even increase. At the same time, however, a situation is even more likely to arise in which effective assistance to China would require a direct Soviet threat to the United States. The Soviets may therefore find themselves in a difficult position: they must either offer a credible threat to initiate general war, requiring at least an apparent willingness to follow through if necessary, or they must withhold effective support from their ally. The first course would risk destruction of the Soviet Union, possibly through US pre-emptive attack. The second would

the North Koreans into what (rather to Soviet surprise) shortly became a war with the United States at the time when the USSR was first emerging as a nuclear power. But if Soviet experience is a guide, the CPR may rapidly develop a sense of responsibility in respect to hostilities which may develop into a nuclear exchange.
result, at the minimum, in grave embarrassment within the bloc, and it could have far-reaching effects on the cohesion of the bloc and the future of communism.

In the dilemma which the Soviets may face, their decision to intervene, especially a decision involving a willingness to initiate general war, is the less probable. The Soviets have demonstrated that they have no stomach for aggressive moves that might lead to a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The contemporary balance of United States and Soviet strategic strike forces, the state of Sino-Soviet relationships, and the clarity or ambiguity of circumstances of aggression all will have a bearing on the Soviet decision whether to undertake or to withhold strategic operations directly against the United States in support of its ally.

The likelihood of Soviet military response directly against the United States will be increased or minimized by the following considerations:

1) The Soviet Union is unlikely to give support to Chinese Communist aggression undertaken without its prior agreement, and the Soviet Union will be reluctant to agree to overt military moves unless these are instigated and controlled by the Soviet Union. Ambiguous operations that can, if necessary, be called off prior
to a direct confrontation of United States and organized Communist forces will doubtless continue to receive Soviet support. But the Soviets can generally be depended upon to withhold support of unambiguous Communist aggression—they are most unlikely to invite repetition of the Soviet-inspired Korean War.

2) The clarity or ambiguity of responsibility for a situation leading to major hostilities will strongly influence the Soviet decision to honor, or to ignore, its formal alliances, particularly the Sino-Soviet Pact. A clear case of US aggression or the escalation by the United States of a local crisis far beyond the requirements of the situation would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to withhold its support. Contrarily, Chinese military initiatives likely to lead to escalation would permit the Soviets, particularly if forewarned by the United States, to deny, within the bloc, that the mutual defense provisions of the alliance were involved; in these circumstances, Soviet support of the Chinese would be unlikely.

3) The speed and adequacy of the initial US response will be of signal importance. If sufficient US offensive power is brought to bear to obtain an immediate local decision at the outset of hostilities, the Soviets would be faced with a fait accompli. Attack upon the United States could not recoup the local situation but would bring certain devastation to the Soviet Union. In these circumstances the Soviet Union would be most unlikely to attack the
United States. On the other hand, a slowly developing situation, which resulted in a series of threats and counterthreats, could propel the Soviets into a position in which, regardless of rational factors, they might consider themselves forced to attack the United States.

4) The launching of US-based strategic strike forces would alarm and alert Soviet long-range strike forces. It might result in an immediate Soviet strike against the United States if US intentions were misread, or in a similar strike with slight delay if the Soviets should judge that there had been a significant reduction in the US second strike capability. Immediate Soviet counteraction would be far more likely if their own long-range strike forces remain largely in a targetable, soft configuration.

So long as the United States retains immediately available forces adequate in size and power to mount a massive thermonuclear offensive against the Soviet Union, and provided local or regional hostilities in the Far East are not permitted to escalate slowly and on an uncontrolled basis, generating uncontrollable emotional issues, Soviet attack on the United States as the outgrowth of Communist Chinese action would present the Soviet leadership with risks far beyond the stakes involved in the immediate hostilities.6

6. The Soviets stress that a limited war (such as one involving the United States and China) must not be allowed to be transformed into a general war involving the USSR since, in case of Soviet destruction, the Communist cause will suffer a fatal blow. The Soviets thereby imply that if China suffers nuclear damage, however
intervention, therefore, while possible, need not be considered probable.

In fact, a principal Soviet interest in the developing nuclear striking power of China should be to see that it is not used. The United States should be able to count on assistance from the Soviet Union to restrain China from potentially explosive military actions—at least to the extent that Soviet influence can be made effective. In the circumstance of strain in Sino-Soviet relations, this influence could be effectively exerted negatively—no promise of Soviet aid to China in an extremity brought on by the Chinese. Communist China could also be brought to doubt that the Soviet Union would engage the United States in general war in order to succor China.

Nevertheless, while there is little likelihood that Soviet strategic strike forces could be triggered against the United States by unilateral Communist Chinese action, ambiguous Chinese great, this would not administer a catastrophic blow to the Communist cause and would be tolerable if the alternative was Soviet destruction. It follows from the Soviet position that if the Soviet Union were confronted with the choice between involvement, with the certainty of a fatal blow to the world Communist cause, or abstention in a United States-China conflict (which might inflict partial, but not fatal, damage to world Communism) the Soviet choice would be clear. The implication of the Soviet position was obviously designed for Chinese consumption.
provocations could result in a series of escalations that might cause the USSR to view the situation in a different light. Chinese possession of nuclear weapons, because of the resulting possibility of escalation, must therefore impose restraints upon United States actions in Asia, and it would appear that the United States should employ nuclear weapons in Asia only under conditions in which it is plain to the Soviets that the action is intended to be limited and to fall well short of an invitation to general war.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR
IN THE FAR EAST AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

This section examines the military position of the United States, a nuclear-armed Communist China, and North Korea and North Vietnam in relation to war in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The following chapter will examine wars in specific locations in the light of this analysis.

MILITARY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

General

US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East constitute essentially a light screening force deployed for immediate response in time of crisis, whether major or minor. Except for quite minor operations these forces are dependent on reinforcement from the United States. They now have these general tasks:

1. This chapter parallels Chapter IV, sections on The United States Versus A Nuclear-Armed China and on Implications for the United States, of the Study PACIFICA final report, The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D. C., 1962).
1) Offensive air forces\(^2\) maintain a general war stance, primarily but not exclusively aimed against the Soviet Union. The commitment of these forces is an integral part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for general war.

2) Ground forces in Korea and air and naval forces in Japan, Okinawa, and adjacent waters are continuously in position for immediate response in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea.

3) Naval forces, a large segment of the Pacific-based air forces, and the Marine and the Army contingents on Okinawa maintain a posture of readiness for immediate deployment to any area of local crisis.\(^3\)

4) Air defenses, primarily immobile, are deployed for the defense of US forces and installations.

These US forces in general are concentrated (or are dependent for support) on a relatively few, large-scale bases, all within range of light bombers and medium-range missiles based in

\(^2\) The term "air forces" and similar generic terminology is used, unless otherwise qualified, to include all land- and ship-based air units of the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The term "ground forces" similarly includes both United States Army and Marine Corps forces.

\(^3\) The terms "local war" and "local crisis" are used in this paper to refer to hostilities or incidents limited to a specific locality such as Korea, Taiwan, or Vietnam. Broader actions over all or large areas of Asia are termed "regional war."
China. In addition to these forward forces, the United States maintains on Hawaii and Guam military forces which serve as an immediate reserve.

In any contingency short of general war, these forces are dependent in varying degrees on allied combat and support capabilities. Present arrangements provide for retention by the United States of command of all US forces, regardless of the area of commitment.

Future Capabilities

By 1970, when the Chinese will probably have a highly significant local nuclear capability, United States forces in the Western Pacific and Far East may, if US authorities so decide, have increased capabilities that will be of major tactical significance in a bilateral nuclear environment.

1) SAMOS and other satellite systems will afford a major improvement in US reconnaissance and targeting capability.

2) The Polaris and, to some degree, the Army Pershing missile system will add a significant increment to US offensive nuclear capabilities. By the late 1960s the United States can also have a medium-range ballistic missile, either land-based and hardened or ship-based.

3) US nuclear capabilities in a local war situation should be significantly increased through the availability of the Davy
Crockett. The nuclear-armed Bullpup will also provide a major capability in local nuclear war.

4) The US defensive posture will be materially enhanced through programmed increases in the Nike-Hercules and Hawk units; through the semi-automation of the air defense ground environment in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and possibly other areas; and possibly through the provision of Mauler and Red Eye to the ground forces. The Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System probably can be available by 1970.

5) US ability to respond in a crisis situation will be materially improved through advances in strategic airlift capabilities, through the provision of "roll-on, roll-off" cargo ships, by floating depots, and by the provision of STOL and possible VTOL aircraft.

Vulnerabilities of US Forces in the Western Pacific\(^4\) and Far East

General. US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East are continuously faced with the threat of a surprise, massive,

4. A rough calculation indicates that the CPR would require about 15 accurately delivered weapons (i.e., some 45-60 launched weapons) for a minimum, local, air counterforce role; about 60 accurately delivered weapons (i.e., 180-240 launched weapons) would destroy all major, fixed, soft US military targets in the Western Pacific. Attacks on these scales would not, however, be effective against concealed, hardened, and mobile targets.
nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Many actions have been taken, and presumably will continue to be taken, to permit the effective employment of these forces in spite of such an attack. These actions include concealment (e.g., Polaris), hardening (e.g., Mace), improvement of communications (e.g., scatter system), dispersal (e.g., relocation of stocks from Ascom City), and particularly the development of a rapid reaction capability on the part of land- and sea-based aircraft and missiles. While these measures will also reduce US vulnerability in a nuclear war with Communist China, they are inadequate in some respects for this purpose.

Land-Based Air Forces. The problem of survivability of land-based air forces subject to nuclear attack in a regional war with China differs considerably from that in a war with the USSR. The means available within economic limits to reduce vulnerabilities include active air defenses, moderate hardening of critical facilities, and a degree of dispersal. The only means now available, however, which promises the survivability and effective use of a substantial portion of the forces exposed to nuclear attack, is a rapid reaction capability. While such a capability may be of great utility in general war, war with China will almost certainly require an appreciable time for decision to launch nuclear attacks against the Chinese mainland;
a rapid reaction capability is thus unlikely to be of material assistance in the survivability of exposed forces. Until a decision is taken to launch major offensive strikes against all of China, it must be assumed that a war with the People's Republic of China will be prolonged and therefore require the sustained employment of major US forces based in the Far East. Hence the retention of operational and supporting facilities in the area, in spite of a constant threat of Chinese nuclear attack, is important.

All of these factors indicate that minimizing vulnerabilities of US land-based air forces in the Far East to nuclear attack will be a continuing requirement, becoming more important and more difficult when China obtains a locally effective nuclear capability.

Naval Forces. US naval forces at sea will for a great many years be much less vulnerable to CPR than to Soviet attack. Missiles are relatively ineffective against moving, not easily targetable, surface ships, and practically useless against submarines. Unless the Chinese obtain modern, long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, with sophisticated electronic

5. This role conceivably may eventually be filled by reconnaissance satellites.
search equipment and air-to-surface missiles, or a modern navy, they will be restricted to small-scale attack on surface forces by obsolete light bombers. This is not to say that there will be no impact on US naval operations stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability. Naval forces operating within range of Chinese delivery vehicles, particularly in close-in, relatively restricted waters such as the Yellow Sea and Taiwan Strait, will incur substantial risk which must be either countered or accepted--the latter probably at some cost in freedom of action. Sustained close-in operations, such as were common during the Korean War, will become high-risk actions unlikely to be undertaken except under compelling circumstances.

Naval ships in port and naval bases will be neither more nor less vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviets. Like ground forces, however (see below), these will be more inviting targets to the CPR than to the USSR, and hence possibly somewhat more likely to be targeted in the initial strike of a surprise attack.

**Ground Forces.** Ground forces concentrated (in normal times) on Okinawa and in a small sector along the Demilitarized Zone (DmZ) of North and South Korea, and their logistic support installations, will be no more vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviet Union. They will, however, be much more
likely to be specifically targeted by the CPR for attack, since these forces offer no immediate threat to the Soviet Union. They do, however, pose a continuous threat of attack against China proper as well as against the Asian satellites, and in local hostilities (actual or potential) they become a primary threat to CPR military operations and hence would constitute a most inviting target.

The vulnerability of these forces and facilities cannot easily be reduced. So long as China possesses a significant air-delivery capability (probably at least through 1970), improvement in the US and allied air defense posture is desirable. The eventual deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System or another forward area anti-ballistic-missile system may reduce vulnerabilities to missile attack. The present extreme vulnerability of the logistic system, however, can be reduced only moderately through additional dispersion; an economical remedy for this Achilles' heel is not now in sight.

**Command and Control Facilities.** Many of the same considerations that affect the survivability of land-based air forces apply to command and control facilities. In the absence of nearly automatic, pre-planned offensive strikes, survival of these mechanisms is of critical importance. Yet these
facilities must be prepared to operate continuously during hostilities of a non-nuclear nature, when their attractiveness as targets for a Chinese pre-emptive strike would continuously increase.

Other Vulnerabilities. Local war in any area of the Far East will require the forward deployment to the area of US forces. The movement of forces of any magnitude, and their subsequent support, will create concentrations of forces, equipment, and supplies. These concentrations will create attractive nuclear targets.

Until or unless China's nuclear capability is destroyed, large-scale airborne and amphibious operations against major organized Chinese forces would entail a very high degree of risk.

Restraints on US Military Intervention

A Chinese nuclear capability is likely to prejudice the initial US military position in a local war or crisis situation. Most of our allies in the Far East will be to some extent intimidated by the threat of Chinese nuclear operations, and any natural reluctance they may have to become the scene of nuclear conflict will be heightened by the Chinese capability. There will be a strong tendency, therefore, on the part of threatened
Asian states⁶ to hesitate before requesting US military assistance. This can result only in delay in US military intervention and thus a deteriorated situation. In addition, except in clear-cut cases involving vital US interests, it will be more difficult for the United States to agree to commit forces to local operations. In addition, faced with the threat of nuclear attack on its forces, the United States must in major conflicts decide either to initiate nuclear warfare itself and accept the consequent risks and political onus, or face increased risks and difficulties in its military operations. These increased risks may result in some delay in the commitment of US forces even in clear-cut cases. Finally, a nuclear capability in Chinese hands will acutely discourage military participation by allies not directly menaced, and particularly the European powers. This general reluctance will curtail the likelihood of broad or solid political support for US military moves, and thus may induce additional US political reticence to commit US forces.

Any delay in the decision to commit military forces will normally lead to a requirement for more forces (as compared to the force requirements for early intervention) and to greater

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6. Particularly Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, and India. Thailand, Pakistan, and South Vietnam may also be included if the prior course of events should lead them to believe that US military capabilities vis-a-vis Communist China had been appreciably reduced.
costs in time and resources, thus considerably raising the stakes involved on both sides. The increased effort involved, combined with the deteriorated situation facing United States and allied forces, will significantly heighten the risks of escalation, both in scale and in area.

Nuclear or Non-Nuclear Operations

The most obvious implication of a Chinese nuclear capability for the United States is that the United States cannot alone decide whether a local war in Asia will involve nuclear operations. If the United States intervenes in major local hostilities, it must decide in advance either to initiate the use of nuclear weapons when and if necessary (and, if needed at all, the need will be greatest in the early stages) or refrain from first use of nuclear weapons while taking simultaneous action to minimize the advantage to the Chinese of their first use.

Freedom of US Decision

With its present monopoly on nuclear capability in Asia, the United States has almost complete freedom of decision on

7. The advantages accruing from a rapid response to an act of aggression, in terms of reductions in the size of forces required and in casualties, can be vividly demonstrated. See Appendix D, below, pp. 173-85. Put simply, delay means automatic escalation.
the ground rules governing a local war not directly involving the Soviet Union. By its own choice the United States can decide to fight with or without nuclear weapons. It can establish ground rules on the area and the scale of hostilities and on the permissible size and character of aggressor forces. Serious Communist breaches of these ground rules would risk invoking escalation completely controlled (at least locally) by the United States, which can at any time or place exercise its option for unilateral nuclear operations. A locally effective nuclear capability at the disposition of the CPR will put an end to this US monopoly in Asia. Even though China's nuclear capability will not be comparable to that of the United States, the Chinese too will be able to initiate nuclear operations, or to expand the area of local hostilities by means of nuclear strikes in other areas. The Chinese can, if they choose, make a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against the forces of the United States and its allies.

The ability of a nuclear-armed CPR to escalate hostilities, either by the initiation of local nuclear operations or by more distant nuclear attack, can be countered by making such escalation unprofitable or ineffective. It may also be made unattractive by the promise of appropriate US counteraction the Chinese cannot match, or ineffective by obtaining a decision in the local
hostilities sufficiently early so that Chinese escalation cannot recoup the local loss. The first avenue requires an adequate and flexible US deterrent posture; the second avenue requires speed and adequacy of initial US response to aggression, particularly at the lower levels.

Deterrence. An overriding prerequisite to the commitment of US military forces to non-nuclear war in Asia will be the conscious provision of a military sanction adequate to prevent Chinese first use—a military capability that will insure that the Chinese correctly estimate that their first use of nuclear weapons will surely lead to retaliatory destruction far beyond the possible benefits to be achieved from success in the local operations. The problem of thus deterring a nuclear-capable CPR—a central question in assessing the impact of a nuclear-capable CPR on US military capabilities and requirements—is discussed at length in Chapter VI.

Speed of Response. If the initial reaction by the United States and its allies to Communist aggression is sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to obtain early control of a crisis situation, Chinese escalation would be unlikely to affect the outcome of the local hostilities—particularly since an early local decision will keep the scale and intensity of the hostilities, and the degree of great power prestige
involvement therein, at the lowest possible levels. Thus speed of response will become even more important when China becomes a nuclear power. Yet, as indicated above, commitment of military forces to local hostilities by the United States will then tend to be delayed: first, by inhibitions aroused in some threatened states against requesting United States military assistance; and, secondly, by increased caution on the part of the United States in deciding to participate in local hostilities after the United States can no longer alone establish ground rules for their conduct. In an environment that will tend to increase delays in arriving at a political decision for military intervention, it appears important that the military capability for quick response be improved as rapidly as possible. This requirement includes not only the immediate availability of forces and of adequate means of transport, but also prior preparations in potential areas of hostilities to facilitate the reception and support of United States forces that may be needed.

**Force Configuration**

While it is generally held that US forces can fight either a nuclear or non-nuclear war, there are sufficient differences in requirements between the two situations to demand a decision in advance of the commitment of forces on the question whether
US forces will forgo the first use of nuclear weapons and therefore accept the risk that the Chinese may not refrain from first use of nuclear weapons. From a ground force viewpoint, the dispersion requirement of combat forces in a nuclear environment is incompatible with the concentration of both men and conventional firepower required to fight a non-nuclear battle; the degree of tactical mobility needed in two-sided nuclear operations completely transcends the essential needs (and present capabilities) of forces committed to non-nuclear operations. From a land-based air viewpoint, non-nuclear war minimizes the requirements for dispersion and defense, but increases drastically the numbers of offensive sorties needed to obtain a given degree of damage. Thus, in a non-nuclear situation, there can be a much higher concentration of forces on any individual airfield, and a greater proportion of effort can go into offensive resources, but the forces committed must be very significantly increased. From both a ground force and land-based air point of view, major modification is required in logistic support arrangements to permit operations in a nuclear environment.

While the operations of combatant forces of the Navy at sea are less affected in character by foreknowledge that operations will be nuclear or non-nuclear, the total naval force requirements will depend in part on this determination. Navy
capabilities for supplying forces ashore will also need to be designed in light of the decision on use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and the resultant design of the logistic systems ashore. This may require significant changes in the composition of the transport fleet, and possibly in arrangements for its protection. Similarly, in a nuclear environment the Air Force can expect materially increased demands for large-scale air transport operations as a substitute for in-place logistic facilities within a local area of hostilities.

Thus forces committed on the assumption that operations will be non-nuclear are unlikely to be configured to fight a nuclear war effectively; conversely, forces configured for nuclear operations are unlikely to be effective in non-nuclear operations. It is necessary therefore that a decision be made by the United States in advance of the commitment of forces either: (a) to fight effectively on a non-nuclear basis and to accept the risks (minimized through a suitable deterrent posture) that the Chinese may not respect the ground rules established by the United States, or (b) to initiate nuclear operations.
MILITARY POSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH KOREA, AND NORTH VIETNAM

General

The People's Republic of China will have these basic military capabilities to which a nuclear capability will be additive:

1) Very large and presumably well-equipped ground forces. These, however, can be used outside of China proper only in contiguous areas, and they then face major logistic difficulties. The logistical problem will require either that ground operations (except in Korea) be on a relatively minor scale, or that the Chinese pre-establish forward bases to support larger operations. The establishment of these bases would, of course, provide long lead time strategic warning.

2) Large-scale, but relatively backward, air defenses fixed in China itself.

3) Offensive air forces that will be capable of delivering nuclear weapons as indicated in Appendix A. In addition, the CPR will probably have additional offensive air forces of limited conventional capability.

4) A probable airlift capability for approximately one division and a probable amphibious lift capability of up to

8. See below, p. 147.

57
three divisions. Lacking, however, the necessary naval and air combatant forces to make a major, opposed amphibious or airborne landing, these capabilities can be used only in exceptional circumstances where US and allied air and naval strength have been neutralized, against very close-in objectives where the Chinese can gain local air and naval superiority, or, conceivably, in special circumstances permitting the Chinese to achieve complete surprise. Until the CPR develops long-range amphibious or airborne capabilities, she cannot invade such remote areas as Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines.

5) A significant force of long-range submarines. These, however, have in the past apparently been used exclusively for coastal defense purposes. No significant improvement in Chinese naval capabilities is anticipated.9

6) The ability to foment and support extensive insurgent and guerrilla operations where the ground is favorable for these. Again, major efforts in this field will be limited to peripheral areas permitting overland or short-range, unopposed air or sea supply of the insurgents.

9. The economically competitive nature of programs to create a valid nuclear capability on the one hand, and on the other of programs to provide strategic mobility, a valid airborne or amphibious capability, or a major naval capability, will probably prevent simultaneous progress down more than one road. This road will almost surely be that leading toward a nuclear capability.
Military Utility of a Nuclear Capability

The primary utility to the CPR of a nuclear capability will lie in the political and psychological fields, in which the military significance of nuclear capabilities seem certain to be exploited.

A locally effective nuclear capability will have potential military significance for the CPR in these respects:

1) Defense of the Chinese Mainland. While to most Westerners an invasion of the Chinese mainland would appear to be beyond the capabilities of any conceivable forces that might be marshalled for the purpose, the Communist Chinese have indicated a high sensitivity in this regard. Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan, and US and Republic of Korea forces in Korea, have evoked continuous diversions of Chinese military resources and attention. A nuclear capability would provide an almost certain means of defeating any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland.

2) Counterforce Operations Against Pacific-Based US Nuclear Offensive Forces. In time the Chinese can acquire a significant first strike counterforce capability, and presumably thereafter a significant retaliatory capability. A Chinese first strike capability would, at the least, require increased caution on the part of the United States in committing military forces to local action where they might face Chinese forces, in expanding
an area of local conflict, and particularly in initiating nuclear operations during such a local action.\textsuperscript{10} A retaliatory capability (when achieved) would provide, in Chinese eyes, an appreciable deterrent to direct US attack upon China, and in any event would permit nuclear response to US nuclear operations. China may also believe that through a nuclear strike on US forces in some circumstances she could require the Soviet Union to engage in operations against the United States. She may further believe that the existence of this capability might cause the United States to refrain from attack on China in the event of a US-USSR war.

It is difficult, though not impossible, to visualize a situation in which a Chinese first strike against US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East would be advantageous to the Chinese--at least until they have achieved near-equality with the United States in long-range strategic striking power. The Chinese may believe, however, that circumstances might arise which would lead the United States to accept the destruction of these forces rather than invite near-certain (as the Chinese

\textsuperscript{10} The Chinese may or may not realize that the existence of this capability would also invite US first strike, counterforce operations against the Chinese mainland as a prelude to the commitment of US forces to any local operations, and particularly to nuclear operations the United States may decide are necessary.
would hopefully expect) counter-retaliation in the form of a first strike by the USSR. Circumstances might also arise which would lead the Chinese to believe that a Chinese preemptive strike could blunt an intended US attack on the mainland.

3) Increased Freedom for Chinese and Communist Military Operations. The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability will increase any reluctance that threatened Asian nations may have to request US military assistance, and will tend to inhibit a US decision to intervene militarily except in cases clearly involving essential US interests. These factors will, at least to some degree, curtail US military intervention in lesser situations, and thus commensurately increase the range of Communist military and paramilitary operations that can be conducted without invoking US military response.

4) Selective Military Use. Certain local war situations might arise in Asia that would permit Communist forces to gain a decisive local advantage by the employment of a few weapons at particular times and places. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter V.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} See below, pp. 69-96.
Vulnerabilities of the People's Republic of China

China's basic social and economic structure is less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of the more industrialized nations, and particularly the United States. People and industry per se as targets would require a very extensive nuclear offensive, the results of which cannot be predicted with certainty. China as a modern governmental and war-making entity, however, is highly vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Chinese nuclear delivery forces during the present decade are expected to be very limited in numbers, unhardened, and highly vulnerable. Other Chinese forces will be largely concentrated on eastern Chinese bases all of which are within range of US Pacific-based strike forces and in quantity well within the destruction capability of those forces.

A critical factor in the feasibility of a counterforce effort against Chinese nuclear strike forces will be the ability of the United States to locate and to target these forces accurately. Until the CPR approaches superpower status, its nuclear forces will be numerically insufficient to retain an appreciable second strike capability after a major attack if they are exposed. Either the United States or the Soviet Union could mount a pre-emptive attack of sufficient weight to destroy

12. See also Appendix E, below, pp. 187-208.
China's total nuclear capability almost regardless of the degree of hardening, dispersal, or active defense which the Chinese can attempt. Survivability of Chinese forces must thus rest primarily upon denying both the United States and the Soviet Union the capability to target these forces, presumably through concealment and mobility of missiles, and through concealment of a nuclear capability in aircraft. For the purpose of this paper, however, it is assumed that US intelligence capabilities are adequate to target at least the bulk of Chinese nuclear delivery forces accurately. This appears to be a wholly reasonable assumption in view of the size of the CPR force in comparison with US forces, in view of the known difficulties of providing concealment for major operational forces, and in view of demonstrated US intelligence capabilities in the past. If the assumption should not be warranted, in the sense that the Chinese were able to hide their entire force successfully (or even most of it), the consequence would be to give them a second strike capacity, which, although limited to near-by targets, would nevertheless add substantially to US problems. In particular such a capacity would impair, though it would not entirely discount, the credibility of the regional deterrent force proposed in Chapter VI of this paper.

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Chinese governmental and military controls, communications, and transportation and distribution centers are largely concentrated in or around large metropolitan areas, as are primary military forces. These metropolitan areas also include the preponderance of the governmental, military, scientific, and technical elites, as well as a high proportion of the total heavy industry. A successful nuclear attack on these metropolitan areas would render the CPR incapable of waging modern war; and such an attack, in view of the co-location of vulnerabilities, would need to be on only a comparatively modest scale.  

The projection of Chinese military power beyond the borders of China would cause concentration of troops and materiel and a saturation of inadequate lines of communication, creating additional (and probably critical) vulnerabilities to nuclear attack.

Vulnerabilities of North Vietnam and North Korea

North Vietnam and North Korea have essentially the same socio-economic structure as the CPR, with generally similar, but greater, basic vulnerabilities.

13. Calculations comparable to those made for attack on US forces (see above, p. 44 n.) indicate that in 1970 about 25 accurately delivered weapons would be required for a minimum first strike counterforce operation directed against Chinese nuclear delivery vehicles. Some 65 additional accurately delivered weapons should be adequate to destroy the CPR as a modern governmental and war-making entity. See Appendix E, below, pp. 187-208.
North Vietnam has a basically agrarian economy, with all appreciable industry, governmental and military controls, and transportation and distribution centered in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Even agriculture is largely concentrated in this flat, highly vulnerable delta area. Nuclear attack (unless with weapons specifically designed and targeted to cause personnel casualties and ground contamination) could not destroy the basically agrarian way of life in North Vietnam, but a very few weapons in the one metropolitan area could completely destroy the existing government, economic life, and military direction of the country. Further, North Vietnam is at present completely open to such an attack.

North Korea's vulnerabilities are intermediate between those of North Vietnam and the CPR. Government and military controls are centered in Pyongyang; there is some evidence, however, that extensive hardening and passive defense measures have been undertaken to protect these elements. Industry (in the Western sense) is centered mainly in the Pyongyang and Hamhung areas. There are 16 airfields now supporting 485 aircraft. There is an extensive but qualitatively poor air defense system in North Korea.
Asymmetry of Vulnerabilities

US forces in the Far East, and also those of US allies, are now so disposed as to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. There are and will long continue to be, however, glaring asymmetries between the basic vulnerabilities to initial nuclear attack of the United States and the CPR—the great imbalance in numbers and types of nuclear weapons and in delivery vehicles; the capability and invulnerability of US strategic strike forces; the ability of the United States to use the sea for its own purposes; and particularly, the fact that the United States, as a base for war, will for many years be automatically a sanctuary in a war with China as opposed to the accessibility of all of China to US nuclear attacking forces. This great disparity in vulnerability in a bilateral nuclear exchange is too patent to need elaboration.

The East Asian Communist Assessment of Respective Vulnerabilities

An appreciation of both the capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons has developed in each of the present nuclear powers in generally the same sequence. While the CPR may find a way to compress the sequence, it is unlikely that Chinese thinking has yet progressed much beyond the capability of the weapons and delivery means which the Chinese expect to have in the near future. These weapons are "city busters," even though
pygmies as compared to the weapons available to the United States and the Soviet Union. Delivery vehicles will be suitable primarily for use against large, soft targets the destruction of which does not require precise delivery. Weapon scarcity will require that only the most remunerative targets be attacked. The strategic thinking associated with this type of weapon by other nuclear powers has generally been limited to the concept of people and industry as suitable nuclear targets, and it is in these categories that the Chinese are less vulnerable than the more industrialized nations. This might lead the Chinese to underestimate their vulnerability to nuclear attack, particularly if they should estimate that the destruction of opposing forces in the immediate area would cause the United States to accept local defeat rather than accept the risk of Soviet intervention.

It is much more likely, however, that the Chinese leadership, essentially pragmatic and realistic, would more accurately assess the probable results of a bilateral nuclear war involving the United States and Communist China. It is in the US interest to assist the Chinese in all feasible ways to make an accurate assessment, and at the earliest possible time.

Even if North Korea and North Vietnam should correctly assess their own high vulnerability in a nuclear war, it is
entirely possible that they may overestimate the protection afforded them through extended deterrence stemming from the Communist Chinese nuclear capability. Just as the CPR exhibited belief that the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and space vehicle [Sputnik] in 1957 counteracted (at least to some extent) US nuclear superiority, so these two minor states are apt to believe that a token Red Chinese nuclear capability will serve to protect them in their own military adventures. This possibility can be countered by bringing home to them not only their own vulnerability in a war, but also that of the CPR.
CHAPTER V

WAR IN SPECIFIC LOCALITIES¹

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed over-all considerations applying to a war in the Far East involving a nuclear-capable Communist China. This chapter applies these over-all considerations, plus specific factors pertaining to each area in the Far East and South Asia in which local hostilities are likely, to analyze the basic military environment and evaluate the utility of nuclear armament to the People's Republic of China [CPR].²

Assumptions

The discussion of specific limited war situations in this chapter is based on the following assumptions:

1) The nuclear capability of the CPR is generally as stated in Appendix A to this paper.²

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¹ This chapter parallels Chapter IV, section on Utility of A Chinese Nuclear Capability In Hostilities In Asia, of the Study PACIFICA final report, The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power (U) SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D. C., 1962).

² See below, p. 147.
2) The over-all strength of indigenous ground forces, and the extent of Chinese capabilities for invasion, is as projected in Appendix F.3

3) The Communist Party of China retains control over the people and government of mainland China.

4) The Soviet Union does not openly intervene, at least initially, in local hostilities in the Far East.

5) Laos and Cambodia are neutrals. Burma, while neutral, is oriented toward the CPR.

6) Singapore, Malaya, and North Borneo have federated into the Federation of Malaysia. Commonwealth forces have been largely withdrawn.

7) The United States is not allied with, but may respond to requests for military assistance from India or the Malaysian Federation (if they are attacked). These countries are therefore treated in this section as "allies."

8) The alliances among the Soviet Union, the CPR, North Korea, and North Vietnam continue, with no substantial increase in the amount of territory under Communist control. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan, with no substantial changes in their internal political situations, remain aligned with the United States. The United States retains control of Okinawa.

3. See below, p. 209.
Methodology

The assessments contained in this section are based upon general considerations, notably the asymmetry in nuclear capabilities that will exist between the United States and the CPR during the period before China has an effective intercontinental capability. The endeavor has been to examine the basic military environment in order to permit a broad assessment of the utility of a nuclear capability to one side or the other, but particularly to the CPR, in specified contingencies. Detailed war games have not been undertaken and are not considered necessary to substantiate the conclusions reached in this chapter.

Categories of Hostilities

Military conflicts in the Far East and South Asia can be conveniently grouped into five general categories. These are identified below (subsequent discussion of the various contingencies will be in the same order):

First category: a war between the United States and China proper.

Second category: open hostilities in areas on the periphery of China involving opposing major organized forces. These areas include Korea, Taiwan and the offshore islands held by the Nationalist Chinese, Vietnam, and Thailand.
Third category: wars in the Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, and Nepal).

Fourth category: open Chinese aggression against nations unable to provide significant indigenous opposition. These include Burma, Laos, and Cambodia.

Fifth category: Communist subversion and insurgency in areas vulnerable to this type of conflict. Such activity is particularly likely in regions near the Chinese frontiers, but all of non-Communist Asia may eventually be affected. This category also includes (for the purpose of this analysis) relatively minor actions by the Communists, whether with regular or irregular forces, against isolated areas near China's periphery.  

There are some nations that the CPR will have no capability to invade. They include Japan, the Philippines, and (so long as China stays within her present borders) Malaya. These nations may be subject to attack as part of a larger war but should be immune from direct, localized, overt Chinese aggression. The utility of a nuclear capability to the CPR in forwarding its ambitions with regard to these three areas is therefore limited to blackmail and pressures. Thus no discussion of limited war involving these nations is included in this chapter.

4. A series of such actions might of course significantly change the military geography as well as the internal political situation of the attacked nation.
CHINA

A war between the United States and China should be regarded as a regional war. Such a conflict will extend to all of China, and will involve major US forces and (at least indirectly) most major US allies in the Far East. The war can occur either directly as a result of Chinese attack on US forces or major US allies, through other Chinese provocation, or (more likely) as the outgrowth of hostilities initially limited to a specific area on China's periphery.

The basic strengths and vulnerabilities of China and of the United States in the Far East have been discussed earlier. In summary, China will have a great numerical preponderance over the United States and its allies in ground forces and locally in air forces, greater dispersion of forces, but a comparatively small and initially primitive nuclear capability. China's war-making capability will continue to be highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. The United States and its allies will have supremacy on the seas, qualitative air superiority, and vastly superior nuclear capabilities including, for at least a decade, the entire United States as an inherent sanctuary. US local vulnerability stems primarily from the high concentration of forces and logistic support, and this weakness can be reduced by timely remedial actions.

5. See above, p. 42 n.3.
In a regional war between the CPR and the United States, the Communist Chinese will be unable to invade any area critical to US operations. China can conduct limited ground operations in contiguous land areas, but only insofar as these actions are not impeded by US operations. She can attack those forces of the United States and its allies—as well as the capitals and other major urban areas of principal US allies—that are within range of Chinese delivery vehicles. To be meaningful, these offensive operations, in view of anticipated Chinese capabilities, would necessarily be nuclear.

Unless there is some major political deterioration within Communist China, operations by the United States and its allies would also necessarily be limited, at least initially, to relatively long-range, nuclear offensive strikes against Chinese territory. Non-nuclear offensive operations within the capabilities of the forces estimated to be available to the United States and its allies could not in themselves force a decision. Invasion of the mainland appears to be far beyond the capabilities of any conceivable forces that the United States and its allies could commit except in the aftermath of a major nuclear offensive. Offensive nuclear operations against the mainland will thus be necessary to effect the enemy's defeat.

It is a practical certainty therefore that if a regional war with China occurs, it will involve bilateral nuclear operations, but limited (so long as the USSR abstains) to targets in the Far East, including mainland China, and the Western Pacific.
The United States will have a variety of targeting options for its nuclear operations. On the assumption that US reconnaissance capabilities will permit accurate targeting of Chinese nuclear delivery forces, China's nuclear capability could be quickly and cheaply destroyed by a pure counterforce operation. The destruction of other Communist forces would be feasible, but targeting difficulties and the greater enemy dispersion would require an increased weight of offensive effort maintained over a longer period than for the counterforce action. Operations against urban centers, exploiting this extreme vulnerability of China, could be undertaken at the discretion of the United States.

Given these basic military factors, the following conclusions are apparent. If the United States strikes first (and this may well happen if hostilities occur as the result of open Communist Chinese aggression on its periphery), the United States, with no serious impairment of its general war capability, can, if it so decides:

1) Eliminate by its first strike the ability of the CPR to launch a second strike of serious consequences.

2) Progressively, if not simultaneously, eliminate all CPR offensive capabilities, all CPR organized military capabilities except in scattered localities, and finally the ability of the CPR to maintain or control effective military forces.
Even if given the advantage of the first strike, the United States cannot, except at an enormous cost in time and resources:

1) Invade and occupy mainland China.

2) Create by military means alone conditions which will lead to the installation of a government of mainland China friendly to the United States.

If nuclear hostilities were initiated by the Communist Chinese, by means of a surprise attack aimed in the first instance against US forces and bases in the Far East, and assuming adequate prior preparations on the part of the United States in the way of force configuration, control, and survivability, US Pacific-based second strike and subsequent capabilities should be sufficient to permit the United States to accomplish the same results as those just stated with the same limitations on capabilities. In this case, however, the accomplishment of the destruction of Communist Chinese military capabilities might take longer and would, of course, involve much greater damage to US forces and to US allies. It

6. The disarming or devastation of China through a nuclear offensive is not likely to create immediate conditions which will permit the Nationalist Chinese to "return to the mainland." The destruction and chaos which would result from such an offensive, however, might permit the gradual takeover by the Nationalists of more and more of mainland China. They would not, however, be welcomed back as heroes. They would need to occupy successive small areas, each within their military capabilities, consolidating each successive bite before proceeding.

A contingency at least as likely would be the occupation of parts or all of China by the Soviet Union.
might involve use of US strategic strike forces, with a possible resultant minor degrading of the capability of the United States for general war.

Such an exchange with China could eliminate once and for all a major potential world adversary, and would have shattering results within the Communist bloc. It would involve some (but probably not catastrophic) destruction in allied lands of US forces and their facilities. Taken alone, however, it would not be likely to provide a final answer to the question posed by China, and it should be assumed that subsequent action by massive military forces on the Chinese mainland will be required. Whether these required military actions would be in the nature of relief and rehabilitation, the occupation of hostile territory, or a confrontation with Soviet forces can be only a matter of conjecture.

KOREA

Korea as an arena of conventional combat requires and can accommodate very large forces on each side, up to 60 or more divisions. Yet, as clearly demonstrated in the Korean War, the terrain and logistic limitations severely curtail mobile offensive or defensive operations. Non-nuclear operations restricted to the Korean Peninsula are thus likely to result in another static situation of stalemate.
The deployment of large forces to Korea and their employment requires on both sides major dependence on operational and support facilities outside of Korea—on the Communist side, in Manchuria and probably the Shantung Peninsula; on the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) side, in Japan and Okinawa. These extensive supporting facilities provide lucrative nuclear targets, as do force concentrations and logistic facilities in Korea proper. Non-nuclear operations against these targets, on a scale within the capabilities of either side, are most unlikely to provide a decisive advantage.

In a bilateral nuclear-armed environment, it is unlikely that a stalemated, non-nuclear ground situation can be redressed through large-scale amphibious or airborne operations, in view of the very high risks involved. If in such a situation a military solution is to be achieved by either side, therefore, there must be either the massive destruction of opposing forces and their means of support (i.e., employment of nuclear weapons in a manner that directly affects the course of battle in the front lines) or an expansion of the war so that the decisive battle is fought in circumstances more favorable to the side which chooses to expand the area of hostilities. The first course would require the initiation of nuclear operations which probably will need to extend to parts of China for US-ROK operations, or to Japan for Communist operations.
Other than extended nuclear operations, no military means are visible on either side that would permit the opening of a "second front" with decisive effect on operations in Korea.

If hostilities are resumed in Korea, there will thus be strong military reasons on both sides to initiate nuclear operations. The existence of such pressures should not be construed as a prediction that operations must necessarily develop into a nuclear exchange; a stalemate may again be politically acceptable to both sides. It will, however, be to the military advantage of the United States, by permitting flexibility of decision, to take whatever preparations--both military and political--may be necessary to enable the United States to initiate nuclear operations should it choose to do so. Similarly, the United States and the Republic of Korea should take all practical action to minimize vulnerabilities if nuclear operations should be initiated by the Communists. These vulnerabilities are particularly acute in the event of war in Korea.

TAIWAN AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Taiwan. The situation of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands is unique in that an invasion would require a major, but short-range, amphibious or airborne effort; since the critical phase of an invasion would be of very short duration, the defense is wholly dependent on forces in position from the outset.

Using assorted junks and fishing craft in addition to normal amphibious shipping, the Communist Chinese could mount an amphibious
operation of six or possibly more divisions. Such an operation would create a series of critical targets extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack. An amphibious attack could be defeated by a very few nuclear weapons used against the transport force while concentrated in loading areas, while the transport fleet is at sea, while the ships are concentrated off the coast of Taiwan preparatory to a landing, or against the initial bridgeheads before the attacking force has consolidated its positions ashore. While such an attack could thus be easily and cheaply defeated by nuclear means, it would also be highly vulnerable to attack by conventional weapons on a scale within the capabilities of US and Nationalist Chinese forces normally in the area.

An airborne operation against Taiwan, or a combination airborne and amphibious operation, would be even more difficult for the CPF than an amphibious attack. Because of the requirement for a sea-borne follow-up to any airborne operation, many of the same vulnerabilities would exist as for an amphibious attack. Additional vulnerabilities would be created in the launch and drop areas, and the transport aircraft themselves would be highly vulnerable to the air defenses on Taiwan.

It thus appears that a major airborne operation would be most unlikely to be successful under any foreseeable circumstances except as a minor adjunct to an amphibious attack. An amphibious operation
would be more feasible, but would be a formidable task. For one to be successful:

1) The Communists must achieve complete surprise at least until the transport fleet is well at sea. This is not impossible in view of the extended periods of bad weather over the Taiwan Strait and the short sailing time (12 to 24 hours) involved. The Communists would also need to be secure, however, from early detection by electronic maritime reconnaissance over the Strait.

2) US naval and air protection for Taiwan, including specifically the US capability for early nuclear response, would need to be either eliminated or at least greatly reduced. It is conceivable that this might occur through political action. It is more likely, however, that a major diversion of regional US combatant strength to some other threatened area might lead the Communist Chinese to estimate that residual US strength in the area could be substantially neutralized through nuclear attack.

3) The vulnerability of transport concentrated off the coast, and of the initially landed forces, would need to be overcome by preparatory fire directed against both ground and air forces on Taiwan. Adequate preparation for an opposed landing does not

7. If a credible threat of an invulnerable, nuclear offensive capability in the hands of Nationalist Chinese forces were created, it is most unlikely that the Communists would conclude that an invasion of Taiwan could succeed.
appear to be possible by conventional means estimated to be at the
disposal of Communist China; a nuclear capability would permit
accomplishment of this essential task.

Thus nuclear weapons, under favorable circumstances, may pro-
vide the CPR with a military capability that would lead it to
believe it could invade Taiwan successfully—a capability which
the CPR probably lacks under present circumstances.

On the US-Nationalist Chinese side, an attempted invasion of
Taiwan could be countered under normal conditions by either con-
ventional or nuclear weapons. As has been indicated, however, one
of the essential conditions that would permit a Communist attack
to be successful is a reduction or diversion of US capabilities to
oppose an attempt at invasion. In such a circumstance, the defense
of Taiwan would require the residual US forces to use nuclear weap-
ons against one or more of the critical vulnerabilities of the
attacking force, or else to accept the probability of Communist
Chinese success. It follows that, if the United States is deter-
mined to defend Taiwan, both the United States and the Government of
the Republic of China should be prepared militarily and politically
to use nuclear weapons, if needed, and these states should also
minimize, as feasible, vulnerabilities to nuclear attack by the
Communists. In this connection, it should be noted that the
political disadvantages flowing from US first use of nuclear weapons
in Asia would be markedly reduced if these were aimed at Communist forces obviously involved in aggressive action, particularly if such first use were against the aggressor force while at sea.

If an invasion of Taiwan should be attempted, it is thus likely to result in a bilateral nuclear engagement. Such an invasion attempt could lead to a regional war with the CPR. 8

**Offshore Islands.** The offshore islands (notably Quemoy and Matsu) now held by the Nationalist Chinese can be effectively denied to either side by a very few nuclear weapons—by fallout, if not by blast. Such a Communist nuclear attack would, in isolation, be an implausible means toward "liberation" of these islands. Nuclear operations are more likely to result from an attack on Taiwan as well. From a military viewpoint, and considered apart from the defense of Taiwan, the defense of the offshore islands will thus not be materially affected through CPR acquisition of a nuclear capability.

The defense of the offshore islands by conventional means, in view of their proximity to the Chinese mainland, is a difficult task. Their defense through nuclear attack on Communist concentrations on the mainland, prior to and during the early stages of an invasion attempt, would be a simple matter. There

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8. For the nature of such a war, see above, pp. 73-77.
will clearly be severe political restraints on US use of nuclear weapons in the defense of the offshore islands. The Communists are well aware of these restraints and probably consider any conventional action limited to the offshore islands to be immune from nuclear attack by the United States. A credible threat of Nationalist Chinese nuclear operations would, however, provide a major deterrent to Communist aggression against these outposts.

VIETNAM

Open aggression against South Vietnam does not appear to be a profitable course of action for the Communists unless very favorable circumstances exist, which, however, they may be able to create. The total organized ground forces which the Communists can logistically support in an attack against South Vietnam are about equal in size to South Vietnamese regular forces. The terrain and lines of communication prevent major front-line concentrations of either defending or attacking forces, and the initial local Chinese air superiority is not likely to have a major bearing on the course of front line hostilities. Both sides present inviting and highly

9. Estimates used in this paper of Communist ability to support regular forces in an invasion of Vietnam include forces advancing via Laos. Communist control of Laos should not, therefore, substantially improve Communist capability to support an invasion. Communist capabilities to support insurgency would, of course, be significantly improved (see below, pp. 93-95).
vulnerable nuclear targets: in the north, the Hanoi-Haiphong complex; and in the south, Saigon with its port, airfield, communications, and governmental and military control concentrations. Other profitable nuclear targets, except (possibly transitory) force and supply concentrations, would be few in Vietnam proper; attractive nuclear targets would exist, in the form of concentration of forces, supplies, logistic facilities and lines of communication, in adjacent areas within China and, on the United States-South Vietnam side, in the Philippines and probably Thailand.

A direct attack upon South Vietnam alone\(^{10}\) would be an inviting course of action for the Communists if three conditions exist:

1) Organized South Vietnamese forces are in large part diverted to the struggle against insurgency, affected by widespread disaffection and disloyalty, or otherwise barred from effective employment.

2) The Communists are convinced that insurgency alone will be insufficient, and that open aggression will also be necessary.

3) The Communists believe that the United States cannot or will not be willing to participate effectively in the defense of South Vietnam.

\(^{10}\) If the Chinese should overtly attack Thailand, such an attack would almost certainly progress so as eventually to include South Vietnam. A key element, therefore, in the security of South Vietnam is the security of Thailand. This is discussed beginning on page 88 below.
If these preconditions do, in fact, all exist, nuclear operations by the CPR would be unnecessary.

If the Communists calculate wrongly that the United States lacks the will or capability to assist effectively in the defense of South Vietnam, and, consequently, the United States does react to Communist attack but only with conventional forces limited initially to operations in Vietnam itself, the situation which would emerge would at best be a difficult one for the defending forces. If the first precondition does not then exist (that is, if the present state of insurgency has been brought under control), the South Vietnamese, reinforced by major US forces, should be able to attain a significant numerical superiority over the organized forces that the Communists can support over their tenuous lines of communication. This numerical superiority might permit the United States and South Vietnamese forces eventually to defeat the Communists, but in view of the physical environment such a victory, if possible at all, would take a very long time and would be a very expensive operation. If, on the other hand, major Communist aggression is coupled with widespread insurgency, defeat of the Communists by conventional means would be improbable, but a complete (non-nuclear) Communist victory, requiring the conquest and occupation of the more developed portions of the country as well as the mountain and jungle areas, would be equally improbable. Thus, open Communist aggression in a non-nuclear environment is likely, as in Korea, to lead to stalemate.
Under these circumstances the deployment of US forces and materiel would almost certainly create highly lucrative nuclear targets. Hence it is conceivable that a Chinese nuclear capability might be used to establish a locally decisive advantage, and bilateral nuclear operations, whether initiated by the Communists or the United States, might eventuate. It would be more advantageous to the Communists, however, to de-emphasize (and possibly abandon) operations by organized forces in favor of additional emphasis on insurgency and guerrilla operations, than to invite reprisal, not necessarily localized, by superior US nuclear power. A nuclear capability is therefore unlikely to be used by, or offer any real military advantage to, the Communists in the conquest of South Vietnam, except as it may serve as a restraining influence on the United States.

An evident will and capability of the United States to carry the war, with nuclear weapons if the United States should so desire, into the heart of North Vietnam and if necessary China, should almost certainly preclude open aggression against South Vietnam. This capability should make it evident to the Chinese that their use of nuclear weapons would entail extreme risk; yet, barring catastrophic political developments, they are not likely to be able to invade and conquer South Vietnam without using them. If this US will and capability appeared to China to have been lost
in a military sense, precluded by US political decision, or susceptible to neutralization by a Chinese first strike on US forces, then an invasion of South Vietnam might be attempted. The existence of a visible US regional deterrent (discussed in detail in Chapter VI)\textsuperscript{11} and the political basis for its employment at the discretion of the United States, is thus of primary importance.

**THAILAND**

Under present conditions, the United States and the CPR face almost equal difficulties in supporting and maintaining organized regular forces for conventional military operations in Thailand. While the Chinese can sustain sufficient forces to defeat an unassisted Thailand, their logistic problems would limit the attack in the main to lightly armed forces whose overland progress would be slow. On the United States-Thai side, the deployment of US ground and air forces to Thailand (except for comparatively small forces in readiness in the Western Pacific) would also be relatively slow, and constricted through the single port of Bangkok and, generally, the airfield complex of Bangkok-Takhli-Khorat. The United States could expect to receive at least several days of strategic warning, however, as Chinese forces

\textsuperscript{11} See below, pp. 104-113.
traverse Burma and Laos, and during this time could preposition carrier forces, and air and ground forces within Thailand. US deployments into Thailand, dependent upon the single port and few airfields, would create attractive nuclear targets. However, logistic limitations would make extremely difficult, if not prevent, Chinese exploitation of any nuclear operations, and would create a situation of extreme danger to China if the United States retaliates. Chinese initiation of nuclear warfare is thus not probable, and should be readily deterrable.

The situation will be greatly changed if Laos should become a Communist state. The Communists could build up major military resources in Laos and could infiltrate forces there. This concentration would permit a much heavier weight of attack by well-equipped forces, with some possibility of achieving tactical surprise. Unless there is prior major improvement in Thai forces, or actions are taken to permit the predeployment of US forces to Thailand (and these actions would probably preclude Chinese attack), a non-nuclear defense on the ground would appear to be unpromising. Communist initiation of nuclear warfare would therefore be unnecessary.

Thus a Chinese nuclear capability is not likely materially to affect local hostilities in Thailand. The existence of a credible threat on the part of the United States to carry the war
The situation might be materially changed if Nepal should become in effect or in actuality a Chinese satellite.\textsuperscript{13} If Nepal is available to the Chinese as a base, the CPR should be able to overrun parts of India in a very short time (although the occupation of all of India would be a most difficult and time-consuming task, if possible at all). Any build-up in Nepal would, of course, provide long-term strategic warning which would doubtless be heeded by India--and reasonable preparation by India, aided by the West, should more than offset Chinese advantage accruing from an unimpeded build-up in Nepal.

In either case, Chinese nuclear operations could:

1) Assist in breaching the initial Indian (or Pakistani) defensive position. If, however, China can transport and support forces adequate for a major invasion, an initial nuclear assist would be unnecessary. If she cannot, initial success could not be exploited.

2) Largely destroy (primarily through a counter-city offensive) the ability of the attacked nation to defend itself with organized forces. Destruction of this nature would however destroy the only reward of conquest, and hence almost surely would

to the source of any aggression will be of critical importance in
deterring open aggression, or at a minimum in holding it to a low
level of intensity, as well as deterring Chinese initiation of
nuclear operations. It will, of course, be important to avoid, or
at least to keep to the minimum feasible, any concentration of
forces or resources that would invite Communist nuclear attack.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Despite the persistence of armed conflict between the Chinese
and Indians in border areas claimed by both, neither India nor
Pakistan would appear to be profitable or likely targets of
Chinese military conquest. In the first place, unless there is
a major Chinese effort to develop Tibet or Sinkiang to support
military operations—an effort which owing to the remoteness of
these areas might be expected to require several years—or a very
great improvement in Chinese air transport capabilities, China will
not be able to support major forces in operations against India or
Pakistan. Further, it can be reasonably assumed that the Chinese
would be deterred by the expectation that the United Kingdom would
actively assist the attacked nation, and might be prepared to
respond with nuclear weapons if the Chinese should use them first.12

12. For a discussion of British policy on nuclear weapons in
Asia, see Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe and
the United Kingdom, UNCLASSIFIED, ISD Study Memorandum No. 12 (IDA,
Washington, D.C., 1962), "The United Kingdom," by Roderick Mac-
Farquhar, pp. 8-13.
not be undertaken. Even if nuclear weapons were so used, China would still require very large forces for an extended period to consolidate its gains, and the stringent logistic limitations governing Chinese operations would probably prohibit this.

Thus, it appears that a nuclear capability, under any likely circumstance, would not provide a decisive military advantage to China in an invasion of India or Pakistan.

Yet another situation would exist if India and Pakistan were at war with each other, and the CPR intervened on behalf of one party (presumably Pakistan). Neither India nor Pakistan appears capable of defeating the other under present circumstances. Presumably, open warfare between these two states would be preceded by extensive mobilization on both sides. Whether the increment of force which the Chinese could then provide—either in terms of additional conventional forces or in terms of an initial nuclear assist—would be a decisive advantage to its ally is problematical in a situation with so many unpredictable factors. However, CPR intervention in such a situation, and particularly CPR use of nuclear weapons, should be deterrable. China cannot afford to dissipate its limited nuclear stocks on a third country, nor even become heavily committed in the West, while facing a major threat by US forces from the East, including the threat of nuclear reprisal for Chinese initiation of nuclear operations.
BURMA, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA

The Communists now have the ability to conquer these countries at will. The primary problem facing the Communists in connection with any military ambitions they may have with regard to these nations is to keep the level of hostilities low enough to preclude a US decision to intervene militarily, and particularly to preclude a US decision to counter Communist aggression by direct attack on China or North Vietnam. The existence of a CPR nuclear capability will affect this situation only if it causes the United States to exercise greater restraint in committing military forces, and thus permits the Communists to use force more openly and at a somewhat higher level of intensity.

SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY

China has the capability of instigating and supporting extensive and widespread insurgency and guerrilla activity (including isolated actions by organized or irregular forces) in all nearby areas and to a lesser degree, elsewhere in Asia, including Indonesia. With the passage of time the political environment in Korea, Pakistan, and possibly the Philippines may deteriorate to an extent that would permit low-grade Communist aggression. This Communist capability will not be directly enhanced by a Chinese nuclear capability, although (as discussed
in Chapter II) political exploitation of China's nuclear accomplishments may assist the CPR in preparing the climate for low-grade aggression.

The following effects on US and allied military operations to counter insurgency or guerrilla operations are possible, but unlikely:

1) In all threatened areas there is a scarcity of ports, airfields, and communications and support facilities. The concentration of US resources (whether forces committed to the scene, or merely materiel and other support for indigenous forces) can create vulnerabilities inviting Communist Chinese nuclear attack. Such an attack would of course end the "insurgency" phase and introduce open warfare.

2) Unless the will and character of the threatened government is strong, it is conceivable that Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail, if coupled with suitable blandishments, might lead to a capitulation (or "accommodation") by the supported government, at the expense of any US forces already committed to the scene.

The only likely danger attributable to a Chinese nuclear capability, however, is an increase in the level of provocation that would cause the US to intervene with military forces. This political restraint can have serious military implications. The United States is unlikely to be swayed in making an early decision to

assist such staunch allies as Korea and the Philippines, but a
decision for US military intervention in less crucial areas may
well be delayed by extensive efforts to find a nonmilitary solu-
tion. Further, countries such as Thailand and Malaya, may pro-
crastinate in seeking the assistance of Western powers when there
is a chance that such aid might result in nuclear operations on
their territories. The military situation may thus have deteri-
orated significantly before US forces are committed or other
significant assistance is provided to the threatened nation.

OVER-ALL ASSESSMENT

While the use of nuclear weapons might be locally advanta-
geous to the Chinese under special circumstances, major gain from
a locally effective nuclear capability will accrue to the CPR
only through the existence of an unused capability. Its exist-
ence will discourage any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland.
It will make extremely hazardous, and probably preclude, large-
scale US airborne or amphibious operations. It may impede and
delay US-allied operations in response to Communist-initiated
hostilities.

Communist China's strength will remain in her ground forces
and it will be clearly advantageous to her to create situations
in which that asset can be exploited. China's real interest
therefore must be to avoid a direct US-CPR confrontation if
possible, but if a confrontation should nevertheless occur, then to forestall US employment of its nuclear superiority. At lower ranges of the spectrum of warfare China may succeed in preventing any US military intervention whatever. At upper ranges of the spectrum China's nuclear capability, carrying with it increased risk of an escalation uncontrolled by the United States, is likely to induce greater caution on the part of the United States, and thus enable China to succeed in preventing US initiation of nuclear operations in circumstances which the United States might otherwise consider to require such weapons.
COMMUNIST RISKS

Increased risks for the United States and its allies stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability have been considered in preceding chapters of this study. Just as real, though less apparent, will be the increase in risks for the Chinese—although these may not be initially evident to the Chinese.

The United States will remain far superior to the CPR in nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities and will retain other major military advantages over China. These advantages need not necessarily go unused. If the United States should face significantly increased military difficulties in local hostilities, an incentive would be created for the United States to carry out operations directly against sources of the aggression, and the latter are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. If a situation should arise requiring intervention by major US forces in Asia, a pre-emptive attack on CPR delivery forces would be the most certain way to eliminate the risk of Chinese first use. The risk of general war is a two-edged sword and is as uninviting to the Soviets as to the United States. China will be continuously faced, therefore, with the strong likelihood that full Soviet support will not be forthcoming when it is most needed.
CHAPTER VI

DETERRENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

The acquisition of a nuclear capability by the People's Republic of China will create a period of increased military risk for the United States and its allies in the Far East. Some risks will be new; primarily, however, there will be an intensification of risks already existing. An aggressive, expansionist, nuclear-capable CPR will be less subject to external restraints, more likely to miscalculate its military capabilities and the will and capabilities of the United States, and will have somewhat more independence of decision in matters which may lead to military action.

The most certain restraint on Communist Chinese military action, and the surest way to cause a correct calculation of the price required for military aggression, will be the maintenance of a military posture by the Free World, and particularly by the United States, adequate to insure a proper CPR assessment of risks—risks which are at least as great as those facing the United States and its allies.

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DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION

General

Deterrence of local aggression depends on a military capability which will cause the Chinese to estimate either that the local aggression is not likely to be successful, or that other dire consequences more than offsetting possible local victory may ensue. In either case, the threat of use of the military capability must be credible.

Military Capabilities to Oppose Local Aggression

Operations within a local area to counter local aggression by a nuclear-capable CPR depend first upon the ability of the United States to reinforce a threatened ally at a rate faster than the Communists can build up their forces. Unless the United States should decide to initiate nuclear operations, success in local operations will also be heavily dependent on deterrence of Chinese first use and on minimizing advantages that would accrue locally to the Chinese through their first use of nuclear weapons.

Total US force availability does not appear to be a problem in this regard now or prospectively, unless one assumes that two or more local wars requiring major US intervention are under way simultaneously. If consideration is limited to Asia, such an assumption would appear to have little validity inasmuch as the limited CPR ability to project power beyond its own borders would
make a two-front war even more uninviting to China than to the United States.

Specific capabilities to permit effective local US military operations, and present and prospective deficiencies in this regard, involve at least these major factors:

1) Rapidity of US military intervention will become even more essential than now, not only to defend allied territory successfully, but also to control escalation. Additional highly mobile, immediately available forces and transport in the Pacific Command may not be essential, but would at least be highly desirable. More importantly, the rate of reinforcement in likely areas of local war is now severely curtailed through inadequacies in ports and airfields. These deficiencies should be ameliorated as a matter of high priority.

2) Indigenous forces must be able, with the assistance of those US forces which can be immediately brought into action, to retard a hostile advance long enough to permit the deployment of additional US forces adequate to repel the invasion. A major deficiency in this regard may arise in the case of Thailand which, if Laos should become a Communist base, would be highly vulnerable to major attack.

3) The United States and its allies must be clearly able to continue to fight in a bilateral nuclear environment, either locally or on a broader basis, even if the CPR is given the advantage of first use of nuclear weapons. This requires the maximum
practical reduction in vulnerability of committed forces and particularly in the vulnerability of supporting logistic facilities; in a broader sense, it requires the capability to carry the war to the heart of China if that should be required.

4) Where strong inducements can be foreseen on both sides to use nuclear weapons (particularly in Korea and Taiwan), US military forces must be prepared to exploit their nuclear capability. This requires first the military capability and a suitable political basis to permit the United States to initiate nuclear operations if it should choose to do so. It requires also that the forces of the United States and its allies be prepared to operate effectively if the Chinese use nuclear weapons, whether on Chinese initiative or in response to US use. The present situation with regard to tactical mobility, dispersion of bases, air defenses, and logistic vulnerability in the two critical areas is inadequate in this respect. These inadequacies, which are clear to a sophisticated opponent, are now probably sufficient to warrant a conclusion by the Communists that the United States cannot fight a bilateral nuclear war, and hence will not employ nuclear weapons locally to oppose aggression by a nuclear-armed power.

US Will to Employ its Military Capability

The United States clearly has the capability to contest any Chinese aggression, and--considering military power solely--the
capability to defeat, one way if not another, any open Chinese attack. Communist estimates, however, of US determination to use this capability if required, will be based largely upon US actions prior to the achievement of a locally effective Communist Chinese nuclear capability. If the United States has earlier failed to support an Asian ally effectively, the CPR leadership may well estimate that the United States will not, except for issues of the gravest concern to the United States, involve itself in military operations against forces supported by a nuclear-capable CPR. The United States already has appeared reluctant to commit forces for the defense of Laos and (until recently) South Vietnam, in spite of its regional nuclear monopoly; its willingness to intervene when it has lost that monopoly locally may appear to Asians to be highly doubtful. The open reluctance of European nations to agree to any Western military action in Asia will be assessed by the CPR as a further brake on US military support of its Asian allies. Thus the credibility of US will to oppose local aggression may well be reduced by the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the CPR.

Nuclear Sharing

A nuclear capability, actual or potential, in the hands of selected Asian allies, might serve as a deterrent to local aggression by a nuclear-armed China.
A rudimentary potential nuclear capability now exists for certain allies, and will be increased in the future, in the form of dual-capable air defense and ground force weapons. A potential offensive nuclear capability also theoretically now exists in the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, through the provision of a low altitude bombing /LAB/ capability in its F-86s; this offensive potential does not in fact exist, however, because of the incompatibility of the airplane with weapons available in the Pacific Command, absence of special weapons wiring and black boxes in the airplane, and the lack of maintenance and test equipment for the LAB installation. The Chinese Nationalists have, however, been practicing LAB maneuvers. Observation of this training, plus the knowledge that the United States has nuclear weapons and nuclear specialists on Taiwan, must lead the Communist Chinese to estimate that, if the Chinese Nationalists do not now have an offensive nuclear capability, the United States intends at some point in time to provide one. These past actions to provide a rudimentary potential nuclear capability to Asian allies have caused no significant Communist reaction.

It appears from previous analysis that any military requirement for a nuclear capability in allied forces in Asia would not exceed:

1) A small but relatively invulnerable offensive capability for Nationalist China and possibly South Korea, as a hedge against
the contingency of diversion of US strength from the immediate area, resulting in a Communist conclusion that a quick conquest might then be possible; and to offer a credible threat of a nuclear defense in areas where it would be politically difficult and probably impossible for the United States to use nuclear weapons—specifically, the offshore islands.

2) An air defense capability against a Chinese air-delivered threat, particularly in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

If the Chinese air delivery capability should significantly exceed that listed in Appendix A,¹ or if for some now unforeseen reason US deployments to the Western Pacific should be greatly reduced, there could be strong military reason for providing a valid potential nuclear capability to some Asian allies. If the future military situation develops as now foreseen, however, there appears to be no overriding military requirement to do this. A decision to provide or withhold a nuclear capability for Asian allies should accordingly be made essentially on political grounds.

REGIONAL DETERRENCE

Control of the scope and intensity of local operations can best be achieved by a military capability which insures that an

¹. See below, p. 147.
expansion\(^2\) or escalation of hostilities beyond limits openly or tacitly set by the United States will incur punishment far transcending the possible rewards of success in the local operations. This requires deterrence that is regional in its scope.

Regional deterrence—that is, the placing of all of Communist China in the position of a hostage—can deter major overt military aggression by the CPR, and can reduce the risk of CPR escalation of local hostilities. As pointed out above, it is crucial in any situation in which the United States denies itself first use of nuclear weapons.

The Regional Deterrent Force

**Concept.** Inasmuch as the destruction of Chinese capabilities to wage war requires no more than perhaps one hundred or so delivered weapons, it is evident that this task could be carried out either by US strategic forces or by US forces assigned to the Pacific Command /FACOM/.

Highly effective and relatively invulnerable US strategic forces are and will be needed in any event to restrain the Soviet Union. Operations against China would not significantly reduce their total capabilities against the Soviet Union.

2. Including expansion through CPR intervention in a local war not initially involving the Communist bloc.
PACOM forces now assigned and prospectively available are of adequate size to carry out the offensive strikes required in a regional war with China. These forces also are and will be required to signify publicly the US commitment to the defense of its Asian allies, to bolster their resistance, and to permit immediate response in local hostilities. Further, these forces will need to be made progressively less vulnerable to Soviet attack and this improvement will in turn make them somewhat less vulnerable to Chinese pre-emptive attack.

Thus the regional deterrent force of the United States, as regards military capability, could be either strategic or theater forces. It is to the advantage of the United States, however, primarily in the political sense, to design and discreetly advertise its forces in the PACOM as a specific counterforce for the CPR. This judgment is offered in light of the following considerations:

1) One key to minimizing the risk of general war is a clear understanding by both the Soviet Union and the CPR that they are considered by the United States to be wholly separate entities. If the United States should indicate that it considers the two

3. It might be considered that the situations in NATO and the Far East are analogous, and that arguments for and against a NATO regional deterrent apply also to a wholly American regional deterrent in the Pacific-Far East area. This is not regarded as a valid extrapolation. See Appendix G, below, pp. 211-17.
powers to be militarily inseparable, so that an attack on China would have to be considered by the Soviet Union a prelude to attack on itself, then attack on China would almost certainly invoke immediate Soviet response against the United States. The United States must, therefore, as an essential step in minimizing the risk of general war, insure a clear realization on the Communist side that the United States considers the Communist military threat to be separable. The design and publicizing of a counter-CPR force, separate and apart from strategic forces specifically designed and long publicized as an instrument for destruction of the Soviet Union, would assist in making this distinction obvious. The existence of such a force, clearly adequate to devastate China but offering little if any increased threat to the Soviet Union (but also not significantly diminishing the deterrent threat to the Soviet Union), should make clear to the Soviets that a US-CPR war need not and should not involve the USSR. Such a capability, if properly and, to the extent practicable, inflexibly deployed against Communist China, could not be mistaken by the USSR as directed against, or seriously threatening, itself. There could be no question concerning a dilution of the US nuclear threat against the USSR. In a situation requiring US nuclear attack against the CPR, the USSR might be able to conclude prudently that its own destruction in an exchange with the United States was not indicated, and thus might well avoid the ultimate escalation.

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2) The chance of CPR miscalculation would be minimized if the Chinese clearly understand that the nuclear offensive forces immediately facing them are designed and intended as a counter-China force. The Communist Chinese are likely to estimate that diversion of long-range strike forces against China would substantially impair US capability against the Soviet Union; they might well consider, therefore, that this force must be reserved for use against the USSR. They should be given no opportunity to act on an underestimation of the power and capabilities of US long-range striking forces to which they have not been exposed, which they cannot see, and which they may understand only imperfectly.

3) If nuclear operations against targets in mainland China should be required, the use of PACOM forces would avoid the significant disadvantages inherent in the use of the United States as a base for nuclear offensive operations. If the United States were to respond to aggression by means of a nuclear attack on China, and if this attack were launched primarily from the United States, Communist counteraction would require Soviet attack on the United States, since only thus could further US operations be impeded. A decision to carry the war into China would thus be made politically more difficult for the United States. This difficulty, which would be clearly recognized by the Communists, would materially weaken the deterrent effect.
4) In the absence of an adequate Pacific-based US deterrent, nuclear escalation by the CPR of local hostilities would require the United States to decide whether to accept local defeat, or alternatively to invoke its long-range strategic strike capability with the possibility of triggering a Soviet first strike against the United States, perhaps partly on the basis of a calculation that the US long-range nuclear strike capability has been diluted, and (especially if these Soviet forces remain vulnerable) partly in the belief that subsequent attack on the USSR is intended. It is far from certain that the United States would decide, in such circumstances, to escalate hostilities to this degree as an alternative to local defeat. The circumstances would be sharply changed by the provision of PACOM forces visibly adapted to the specific task of retaliation against Communist China.

5) The existence of a visible, Pacific-based, US capability to destroy China's ability to wage war would appear to be an important element in bolstering US allies who may well doubt the reliability of depending for their ultimate defense on a US decision to invoke its long-range nuclear strike force.

6) Finally, a Pacific-based US deterrent force aimed specifically at the CPR would develop important political and psychological advantages, in that it could hardly fail to corrode and divide the Sino-Soviet military alliance.
The regional deterrent effort by the United States need not be completely successful to be worthwhile. Chinese initiatives will, in any event, be subject to restraint to the extent that the Chinese suspect that the Soviets may not support them. Moreover, a US regional deterrent force will encourage and tempt the Soviets to defect; even though they may not entirely disassociate themselves from the Chinese, the support they provide for any specific action may well be reduced.

No major reconfiguration of PACOM forces as now programmed will be required to tailor them to satisfy the requirement of a specific counter to a nuclear-armed CPR. Reasonable modernization will be necessary to keep ahead of the Communists in weaponry. Sea-based forces will be an important component because of their invulnerability to Chinese attack. Vulnerability of land-based forces and of command and control systems should be progressively reduced so as to provide with certainty a capability for controlled but delayed response. These preparations must be of a nature to permit participation of these forces in extensive non-nuclear, local hostilities without creating vulnerabilities to a surprise pre-emptive Chinese nuclear attack. Of crucial importance, however, is the conscious although discreet construction of an adequate political and psychological basis to permit these forces to be effective in a deterrent and divisive role.
A good case can be made politically for the design of PACOM nuclear offensive strike forces in flexibly poised to devastate China but offering no threat to the USSR. To some degree the facts of geography will achieve this result. PACOM forces are, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, limited in any event to operations in Eastern Siberia, far removed from the more critical Soviet military, industrial, and population centers. Terrain and political restrictions will necessarily require that land-based offensive weapons be based largely on Okinawa and southward. Practically, however, the ultimate in divisive effect of these forces cannot be attained within reasonable economic limits, nor is it desirable that these forces be unable to respond rapidly to local crises requiring redeployment. Further, the deterrent posture should rely heavily on sea-based forces, which are practically immune to Chinese surprise attack and which minimize Asian sensitivities to the presence of nuclear armament, but whose mobility suggests the ability to attack Soviet as well as Chinese targets.

It should nonetheless be entirely possible to make it obvious both to the Communists and to our allies that the primary attention of these forces is devoted to the People's Republic of China. In addition to any public statements or similar verbal indications that may be made, many military indications to this effect can be created. Command post CPX and other exercises involving the
exclusive use of PACOM forces against China, the elimination or minimization of PACOM play in at least some world-wide (general war) CPXs, the publicized presence in more southerly Pacific waters and ports of Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballistic missiles, and similar devices can make this point clear. To be effective, indicators of this type must, of course, be backed by the reality of assignment of mainland China targets as a high priority to PACOM strike forces.

**Characteristics.** The regional deterrent force should meet the following criteria:

1) It must remain adequate to destroy the essential war-making capability of the CPR without detriment to the general war posture of the United States.

2) It must not materially increase the threat to the USSR. US forces in the Pacific, while basically adequate for a regional war with China, provide only a marginal increase in the total US capability against the USSR. If the regional deterrent force is clearly designed for and considered to be a counter to CPR aggression, it can be used for that purpose with far less risk of bringing on general war than if it were considered, by both the United States and the Communists, as an inseparable, important segment of the US threat to the USSR.

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3) The force must have relative invulnerability, be responsive to control at the highest level after the onset of hostilities, and avoid a "hair trigger" posture. This requires the discreetly publicized presence of concealed weapons, the hardening and dispersal of land-based strike forces, the survivability (through hardening and redundancy) of command and control facilities, and--so long as the Chinese retain a significant bomber threat--the maintenance of effective air defenses for these forces. Any lesser posture will invite attack whenever the Chinese believe they can destroy the local capability of the United States to retaliate effectively.

4) The regional deterrent force should be reinforced in times of local crisis in the Far East. Local hostilities in the Far East will create a strong temptation, whenever the United States and its allies enjoy military success, for the Chinese to expand the scale or area of hostilities. Further, a local crisis will almost surely cause movements and redeployments of forces now in the Far East, focusing on the area of local hostilities. Thus, unless conscious preventive action is taken, the regional deterrent posture is likely to be degraded at the very time when it needs to be strongest.
CHAPTER VII

VARIATIONS

The preceding analysis has been based on the assumption that the development of a Chinese nuclear capability will proceed, within the present Sino-Soviet political framework, along the general lines, and in the approximate scale and time frame, stated in Appendix A. Certain alternative political and technological courses of action are possible, however, which may affect the military situation in the Far East.

SINO-SOViet RELATIONS

Implicit in the body of this paper is the assumption that relations between the People's Republic of China [CPR] and the Soviet Union remain about as they are at present; that is, strains exist while the coalition persists. This is regarded not only as the most likely situation in fact, but also as the contingency most complex in its military aspects.

So long as the USSR-CPR alliance remains in effect, however strained Sino-Soviet relations may be, the Communist Chinese will have considerable independence of decision, and may also be able

1. See below, p. 147.

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to "blackmail" the Soviets by threatening to use nuclear weapons in an aggression unless given Soviet support and conventional military aid. The Chinese may therefore be able to induce the Soviets to agree to adventures that the latter would, if firmly in charge, be inclined to veto. The Chinese should thus be in a position to extract military and economic assistance from the Communist bloc hardly available to them in the event of a rupture in relations with the Soviet Union.

A violent rupture of Sino-Soviet relations like that between Stalin and Tito, which must be regarded as a possibility, would leave the CPR isolated from major sources of military aid and economic support, thus probably moderating the rate of her progress toward industrialization and improvement of conventional military forces, and depriving her of any expectation of support for Chinese aggression. While such withdrawal should have little effect on China's progress toward nuclear-weapons capabilities, progress in delivery vehicles would probably be materially delayed. China also would need to divert major military effort and resources to secure herself from Soviet attack. Military measures taken by the United States to cope with a CPR emerging as a nuclear power, under circumstances of strain in her relations with the Soviet Union, appear certain to be fully adequate to deal with the CPR in the situation of a real break in Sino-Soviet relations.
There remains the possibility that Moscow might establish rigid control over bloc policy and action, including the policy and action of the CPR. In that case, the United States and its allies would continue to face the familiar Soviet threat, enhanced by a considerable addition of territory and a modest addition of resources, but diminished by a reduction in complexity. The combined USSR-CPR military resources would not be significantly increased, although flexibility and coordination in their use might be appreciably enhanced. Thus, in this event, which must be regarded as quite unlikely during the time frame of this paper, some of the military actions suggested might profitably be amended. The necessity would remain, for example, to deal with local wars and guerrilla wars in the Far East, but restraint of major aggression would be imposed by threat of attack on the Soviet Union. A regional deterrent force would lose its significance as a divisive influence on Sino-Soviet relations, but would remain useful as a threat to war-making capabilities within the Communist Chinese sector of the bloc.

It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union might draw closer together (with a relationship roughly similar to that of the United States and the United Kingdom), but to a degree short of total Soviet control. This circumstance could only exist if China significantly moderates its actions and policies, and accepts

2. From the present to c. 1972. See above, p. 1.
over-all Soviet leadership within and outside the bloc. In these circumstances, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union would be fully committed to support any military action undertaken by the Chinese and that there would thus be somewhat greater likelihood of Soviet use, or threatened use, of its nuclear capabilities when necessary to succor China. A US regional deterrent force might therefore in these circumstances be somewhat less effective. It should still be a worthwhile effort, however, both for whatever direct deterrent value it might have and also as a divisive factor between China and the Soviet Union. Whatever effectiveness the US regional deterrent posture might lose would be more than offset by the increased ability, and desire, of the Soviet Union to restrain Chinese opportunism.

It is conceivable, further, that such an adjustment in Sino-Soviet relations might result in significant Soviet assistance to the Chinese in their nuclear development program. Real acceleration in this program, however, can be achieved only if the Soviet Union provides finished articles (warheads or delivery vehicles) to the Chinese. This is not believed to be a real possibility; the Soviet Union is most unlikely to create a nuclear threat on its periphery that might eventually be used against itself. The Soviets are thus most unlikely to furnish such systems in response to a possibly transitory Chinese accommodation; they must insist on certain and complete Soviet control. A relaxation of Sino-Soviet
strain is therefore not likely significantly to accelerate Chinese nuclear progress.

**ACCELERATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT**

Possible variations in Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development and delivery vehicle programs are discussed in another PACIFICA paper, in which it is assumed that little or no further direct Soviet aid will be forthcoming for either the delivery-vehicle or nuclear-weapons programs. Current intelligence estimates are compatible with this assumption.

In the event that Soviet assistance were substantial, advanced Chinese capabilities would be achieved at an earlier date. Unless the Soviets provide fissionable materials outright in large quantities, however, the Chinese stockpile will be a serious limiting factor at least until 1968-69. Because there appears to be little likelihood that the Soviets will give the Chinese a serious capability to attack the heart of the USSR, the improved Chinese capabilities would probably be regional, consisting of medium jet bombers, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and thermonuclear warheads. The acquisition of these vehicles earlier than the Chinese could achieve them by their own efforts, would probably have the net effect of moving the regional threat up in time by as much as two to three years.

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The first date for a deliverable Chinese thermonuclear weapon is subject to a wide range of uncertainty. Given good intelligence or some luck with design ideas, the Chinese, after testing their first nuclear device in 1963 or 1964, might attain a thermonuclear missile warhead as early as 1967. Some observers, however, consider that this may not come about until three years later. The date of thermonuclear acquisition is significant because the Chinese are expected to increase their fission yields only slowly, within the 20- to 50-kiloton range for deliverable weapons, until the advent of a thermonuclear weapon.

It is possible that the initial Chinese test operation will involve a series of detonations, either within the time span now estimated for the initial detonation or somewhat later. Such a series might or might not be evidence of a full-blown local nuclear capability from the outset; it would almost certainly be advertised as such by the Chinese. This sudden emergence of the People's Republic of China as a nuclear power with an operational capability (whether real or notional) would intensify the shock effect of the initial detonation and would thus enhance the CPR opportunity to obtain political and psychological advantage from its initial test.

AN EARLY CPR DETERRENT STRATEGY

Another course open to the Communist Chinese would be to concentrate their resources and efforts upon the early acquisition of
a nuclear threat against the continental United States, and to rely on this force for indirect defense against nearby US forces. Starting with the early Chinese nuclear devices, there could be very limited Chinese capabilities for delivery against the United States, especially the Pacific Coast, by submarine, surface ship, and clandestine means, and against Alaska and Hawaii by the above means plus a one-way sneak attack using medium bombers (Bulls). Any such capabilities will be inadequate to threaten major destruction in the United States, and the chance that the CPR might use them in the face of the threat of much greater retaliation would appear remote.

A more serious threat to the continental United States could be made (assuming a rapid recovery from the present economic crisis) by combining a relatively massive program of fissionable materials production (once the processes are established) with an early breakthrough in the thermonuclear field, and relying on the large-scale production of a relatively cheap cruise missile designed to reach the United States. An early cruise missile would probably have such poor accuracy as to require reliance entirely on high yields and fallout, but it would be a low-cost item with few design problems. The earliest date on which the cruise missile and thermonuclear warhead combination could be assembled in quantity would probably be 1967 or 1968, and then only at considerable cost in deferred ballistic missile opportunities. The obvious
inadequacies of such a weapon, and its lack of growth potential, must make this an unattractive course for the Chinese unless the alternative development, that of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), would result in an extended delay.

As another alternative, the Chinese might concentrate on an intercontinental ballistic missile program at the expense of shorter-term capabilities. In this case, the first Chinese ICBMs could be tested as early as 1969. An initial operating capability would then be likely by 1970 or 1971, and a sizable ICBM force could be deployed by 1973 or 1974.

**IMPLICATIONS**

No significant disadvantage to the United States is perceived in any of the likely variations discussed above. Any major change in Sino-Soviet relations will either delay and reduce Chinese capabilities at one extreme (in the event of a complete rift), or, at the other, simplify the political and strategic problem by substituting one potential enemy for two (by creating in effect a single power--in the event of near-complete rapprochement) with no appreciably greater total capability than the sum of the two components taken separately. While the Chinese may be able to accelerate their nuclear program in advance of that envisaged in Appendix A by one, two, or possibly three years, there will still be time for the

4. See below, p. 147.
United States to complete any significant countermeasures that may be required. Concentration upon acquiring an early, crude intercontinental capability would not permit the Chinese independently to cause great destruction in the United States, and would appreciably delay the Chinese in obtaining more meaningful military weapons.

More likely variations imply delays and increased difficulties in Chinese progress toward achieving a nuclear capability.
CHAPTER VIII
LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS

CHINA AS A CLASS B NUCLEAR POWER

The possession of one hundred—or even of several hundred—thermonuclear-armed intercontinental vehicles will not necessarily make China a Class A nuclear power. To have Class A power, as a matter of political reality, China must be believed to have achieved the ability, in a retaliatory strike, to deliver an effective blow against all nuclear powers likely to combine in a hostile coalition. This means that the CPR will require a very substantial long-range capability that credibly can survive the first strike of all or most of the other nuclear powers.

A significant first strike or other partially effective intercontinental capability, say one hundred missiles, would make China what might be called a Class B nuclear power. Under most circumstances such a Chinese capability would increase restraints on either of the two greater powers against undertaking actions

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1. This chapter parallels Chapter V, section on Military Aspects, of the Study PACIFICA final report, The Emergence of Communist China As A Nuclear Power (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Report Two (IDA, Washington, D.C., 1962).
so menacing as to threaten the integrity of China or the survival of the Chinese Communist regime. Restraints on American actions, however, should not be great in practice, because the United States appears unlikely to pursue any objective in relation to China that might charge the Chinese threat with reality. A Class B capability would also improve China's ability to operate under its own nuclear cover, affording it greater freedom of military action, but placing increased strain on the Soviet Union and hence on the Sino-Soviet alliance.

An even greater strain on the Soviet alliance will result from the fact that long-range capabilities against the Soviet Union would be available as an automatic by-product of emplacing such forces against the United States. The Soviet Union could be expected to view the creation of Chinese nuclear offensive forces capable of bringing the entire USSR under threat with extreme unease.

Possession of a Class B capability would place the CPR in an inherently dangerous position. Unless the CPR succeeds in concealing delivery vehicles to an extent that would prevent targeting by either the United States or the Soviet Union, its forces are almost certain to be highly vulnerable and, because they constitute essentially a first strike capability, will invite preemptive attack by a stronger power.

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If for no other reason than this, China may well feel obliged during this period to avoid giving serious provocation to either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Because of the danger of a pre-emption, and because any major use of forces against Communist China must of necessity aim first at destroying its nuclear capabilities, the Chinese can be expected to work in great secrecy, creating stringent requirements for US reconnaissance capabilities. But despite efforts at concealment during the transitional period from regional to Class A nuclear power, China can never be certain of substantial invulnerability to a hostile first strike.

Vulnerability could result in a "hair trigger" Chinese posture materially increasing the likelihood of an ill-conceived launching of the Chinese intercontinental force. Besides inflicting severe damage upon US civilian assets and population, a Chinese first strike might also degrade US strategic capabilities to such a degree as to dangerously weaken the United States relative to Soviet strategic forces.

If the Chinese overestimate the cover their threat affords to local operations endangering the vital interests of the United States, a situation of great danger would ensue. This danger would of course be bilateral, but it would be particularly acute for China, and every effort should be made to assure that China accurately assesses her risks.
During the period when China possesses only small and vulnerable intercontinental striking forces, the basic arrangements already discussed in relation to US regional military problems will remain valid—particularly actions designed to divide the nuclear strength of the Soviet Union and China. The requirement for selective and deliberate direction of US nuclear forces will continue. As China increases its strategic strength, however, operations against China may have to become increasingly dependent on American long-range striking forces.

CHINA AS A CLASS A NUCLEAR POWER

China will not be able to attain Class A nuclear status until she has acquired a fully developed modern economic and industrial base. This will not occur for at least a decade, and probably several decades. But in the meantime, the technology and military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union will not remain static. In addition to improved nuclear capabilities, it is entirely possible that scientific and technological developments by these two powers may have rendered intercontinental nuclear attack outdated as the primary strategic factor by developments in defense against nuclear attack, by military uses of space, or in consequence of concepts and weapons now quite unforeseeable. In the economic and industrial fields, even rapid growth may be insufficient to permit China to approach parity with the
most advanced countries. Finally, intervening events, including wars or arms control measures, could foreclose the possibility of Chinese acquisition of Class A nuclear status.

It is far from certain, therefore, that China will in fact ever approach parity in weaponry with the United States or the Soviet Union. Certainly, if China does so, the process will take a very long time and parity will be attained in an era now unpredictable in its political, military, and technological aspects. But for the purpose of further discussion, it is assumed that China does at some indefinite time in the future attain Class A nuclear capabilities, not outmoded by scientific and technological developments elsewhere.

Once China places the United States under a major second strike nuclear threat, the US deterrent requirement will change. First, inasmuch as a nuclear exchange with China will involve attack on the United States, there will be no special deterrent value in limiting the threat of US nuclear attack against China to forces based in the Far East, or elsewhere outside the United States. Second, the United States could not afford to plan to engage in a thermonuclear exchange with only one of two hostile superpowers, leaving the other relatively undamaged and in a position to achieve world domination. An attack on the United States by either must therefore be expected to cause US response against both, regardless of what use might be made of American
strike forces in the actual event. Prior indication of this intention should minimize any inducement for either China or the Soviet Union to play the game of "Let's you two fight."

US forces in the vicinity of China will retain value, other than for general war purposes, to the extent that a requirement exists to fight actions of a localized or limited nature well below the point of an intercontinental exchange.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The more general military implications of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power can be summed up as follows:

1) A Communist Chinese nuclear capability will increase risks --for the United States and its allies, that China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations; for China, that it may misread relative strengths and thus overplay its hand, and that the vulnerability of its nuclear forces may invite US counterforce operations; for the Soviet Union, that it will be subject to increased Chinese pressures and might in some measure be implicated through Chinese initiatives in Sino-American hostilities. These risks will increase as Chinese nuclear capabilities grow.

2) A military advantage for the People's Republic of China (CPR) will result primarily from restraints on US military intervention at the lower levels, and increased US reluctance to exploit its nuclear capability at the higher levels of hostilities. The Chinese may obtain an advantage from the actual use of nuclear weapons only in special, less likely, circumstances. Nevertheless,
the existence of this capability will require precautionary measures by the United States and its allies.

* * *

More specific implications are:

3) The CPR nuclear weapons program, and particularly the initial detonation, will create political and psychological influences that could materially weaken the military position of the United States and its allies in Asia. While serious adverse reactions are not necessarily inevitable, they are of such potential significance as to require planned and timely US preventive action to reassure the allies of the United States and strengthen their resolution and to discourage the Communists.

4) Any CPR nuclear capability will diminish whatever freedom to decide whether military operations will be nuclear or non-nuclear the United States now enjoys, as well as its present unilateral ability to enforce ground rules for any local hostilities by posing a major nuclear threat. The Chinese capability will:

a) Permit the CPR to escalate hostilities, in area and intensity, if it should choose to do so.

b) Decrease foreign political and military support for US military actions in Asia.

c) Tend to delay and restrain US military intervention, particularly in situations not of vital, immediate importance to the US.
d) Give the Chinese commensurably more latitude for aggressive action without incurring direct US opposition.

e) Increase the likelihood of bilateral nuclear operations in any local war situation that involves major organized CPR and US forces.

f) Permit the Chinese to make a pre-emptive strike against the forces of the United States and its allies in the Far East, or, under favorable circumstances, to gain a decisive local advantage in hostilities initially non-nuclear in character.

5) A highly significant military advantage that will accrue to the CPR from its nuclear capability will be the additional reluctance of the United States to initiate nuclear operations, which will give China commensurably greater freedom to exploit her superior ground force capability.

6) Chinese capabilities to conduct first strike nuclear operations will create a strong likelihood that hostilities in certain areas (particularly Korea and Taiwan) will be nuclear. This circumstance will require: first, the creation of a basic military environment in these areas that will permit prompt and effective US and allied operations in a nuclear war; second, the reduction of political and psychological disadvantages that may result from a US decision to initiate nuclear operations; and finally, the maximum practical reduction of present vulnerabilities of US and allied forces in these areas to nuclear attack.
7) These advantages for the Chinese from their new ability to escalate local hostilities in Asia can be minimized by measures to deter such escalation at the higher levels, and by a US reaction capability sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to make Chinese escalation of lesser hostilities unattractive and ineffective.

8) A deterrent force designed specifically as a counter to the CPR can generally deter overt aggression by the CPR; permit the United States to impose ground rules, within limits, if aggression occurs; and minimize the risk of escalation uncontrolled by the United States—including escalation to the general war level—while serving as a corrosive influence on the Sino-Soviet alliance and as a fortifier for Asian allies of the United States.

This US deterrent force should consist of the nuclear offensive forces assigned to the Pacific Command, modernized as necessary, and provided with a high degree of survivability that is not dependent upon fast reaction. It should be reinforced in times of crisis, in large part uncommitted to local operations, clearly sufficient to destroy China's ability to wage war, and obviously offering specific threat to the CPR rather than the USSR.

9) More specifically, this US deterrent force, if supported by a firm political base, will enable the United States to retain a large measure of freedom to decide whether local hostilities in Asia will be nuclear or non-nuclear in character.
10) Although a Chinese nuclear capability may exert increased pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese military initiatives, a US-CPR nuclear exchange, whether in a peripheral area or against the Chinese mainland, need not of necessity result in a Soviet attack on the United States. In addition to the Soviet reluctance that will be induced by the existence and readiness of uncommitted US strategic strike forces, Soviet reprisal against the US can be further discouraged by US actions, including particularly the rapidity and effectiveness of the initial US regional action and the separation of the forces used against the CPR from those directly threatening the Soviet Union.

11) The CPR nuclear program may not follow the course now estimated, either because of Soviet assistance or because the CPR selects an alternative course of action. The more likely variations will result in delay in China's nuclear program, but some others are conceivable that might either actually increase the initial political and psychological advantages to be gained by the CPR (by reducing moderately the time available for US counteraction) or that might entail some earlier direct risk to the United States. The counteractions suggested here, if taken in time, should, however, be adequate to cope with these variations. In sum, the countermeasures suggested as being required in the near term will retain validity until and unless the CPR attains superpower status.
12) As China achieves a small but vulnerable intercontinental capability, dangers for both China and the United States will increase. This capability may require US counterforce operations as a prelude to any major military operation in Asia. Force vulnerability is likely to result in a hair trigger Chinese posture that could lead to an ill-conceived launching of the Chinese intercontinental force. These extraordinary risks are likely to induce substantially more cautious action by both China and the United States in any situation that might evolve into a military confrontation.

13) China may eventually possess intercontinental nuclear capabilities approaching equality with the United States and the Soviet Union, but this is far from a certainty. If such is achieved, strategic plans of the United States must promise response against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental war should occur. The regional deterrent posture will then lose its special effectiveness, though the forces committed to it will continue to serve usefully by providing a portion of the general deterrent to military action by the CPR.
CHAPTER X

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

GENERAL

This chapter lists US military actions designed to deny advantages that might otherwise be gained by the People's Republic of China as the result of its nuclear-weapons program, and to improve the military situation of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis a nuclear-capable CPR.

Examination of the military situation created by a nuclear-capable CPR reveals no single realistic countermeasure, and no satisfactory package of a few countermeasures, that would offset the CPR advantages completely, though one countermeasure (the regional deterrent) could have dramatic effect. The listing which follows is therefore lengthy. Taken together these actions should have highly significant cumulative effects. Avenues considered to be politically unacceptable or economically infeasible have been excluded. Most of the actions suggested involve little if any additional cost. The total cost involved for all the actions listed is nevertheless high, although these include many actions which would probably be necessary in any case, and total costs, of course, are dependent on the scope and phasing of the actions that
are adopted. But increased costs are inevitable in the increased-risk environment that will result from the emergence of the CPR as a nuclear power.

The actions suggested below are grouped for convenience into categories according to their primary purpose. This device is not intended to indicate that the purpose or effect of a specific action can be wholly catalogued under a single heading. All of the actions listed will have some general effect.

TO FORESTALL INITIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS

These measures are covered in Appendix C.¹ Those of a specifically military nature include such measures as the provision of schooling in the realities of nuclear warfare for Asian elites, and combined military planning with Asian allies.

TO BOLSTER ALLIED WILL AND CAPABILITIES

Air Defense Improvements

For at least the next several years any Chinese nuclear offensive delivery capability must to a significant extent include aircraft. Present programs envisage substantial improvements in air defense capabilities in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan, and these are the areas most likely to be subject to CPR nuclear attack.

¹. See below, pp. 161-71.
In addition to some improvements in the air defenses for the Philippines, rudimentary air defenses, presently US-manned and on a non-permanent basis, have been provided in Thailand and South Vietnam. All major allies should have some assurance of self-protection at least from a primitive Chinese offensive nuclear strike. If the estimate in Appendix A approximates actual Chinese progress, present programs should suffice provided those for Thailand and South Vietnam are put on a permanent basis and manned by indigenous personnel. The United States should be prepared, however, to accelerate and enlarge current programs if subsequent events should indicate the development of a larger-scale or more sophisticated Chinese aircraft delivery capability.

**Visible Presence of US Forces**

Until recently, when the US reacted to Communist threats in South Vietnam and Thailand, exercises of mobile US forces (particularly those deployed from within the United States) were infrequent, of small scale, and limited in locale. Provision should be made for frequent demonstration of the mobile character of US forces, in areas not immediately threatened as well as in areas that are.

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2. See below, p. 147.
Bilateral Arrangements with Thailand

Further action may be desirable. Details are given in Appendix B.³

Improved Military Relationship with Pakistan

This also appears to be desirable. Details are given in Appendix B.⁴

TO IMPROVE THE US DETERRENT POSTURE

Establishment of an Effective Regional Deterrent Force

No single US countermeasure to CPR acquisition of nuclear weapons will be as significant as the constitution of an effective regional deterrent force, plainly capable of devastating the CPR, but posing relatively little threat to the Soviet Union. Some actions to the end of improving the survivability and responsiveness to control of what are, in effect, already elements of a US regional deterrent force are now under way or are planned. Insofar as land-based elements are concerned, however, these measures are devoted largely to insuring short-term survivability in the event of a Soviet first strike. Long-term survivability and responsiveness to control are necessary in the face of a nuclear-capable CPR.

³. See below, pp. 156-57.
⁴. Ibid.
This requires additional effort in the way of hardening and concealment of forces and of command and control facilities, dispersion of logistic facilities, and possibly improvement of the air defenses for US forces and facilities.

A missile capability afloat, including both Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), is a highly desirable element of the regional deterrent force because of the comparative invulnerability of these elements to CPR attack and because political complications will be minimized by their use.

Deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System, or some counterpart, should be accelerated. Hardened land-based MRBMs would also make a significant contribution to the regional deterrent posture; early deployment rather than magnitude of numbers is the critical element.

Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of USSR Intentions

This can be an important psychological and political byproduct of US military posture and policy. Details are given in Appendix C.  

5. See below, pp. 161-71, and particularly 166-67, 171.
Such studies should be initiated by the Department of Defense. Details are given in Appendix C.  

TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF US FORCES DEPLOYED TO FORWARD AREAS

Ground Forces

The ability of ground forces to fight in a nuclear environment requires a high degree of tactical mobility in all committed forces. Present US forces in or available to the Far East do not have this mobility and some improvement is called for.

Land-Based Air Forces

As feasible, additional base facilities suitable for use by US combat units should be made available to permit additional deployments and dispersion, particularly in Korea and Southeast Asia. These facilities can be provided least expensively either by a program to expand indigenous civil aviation capabilities or through funding in part by the Military Aid Program to support indigenous air force operations. In either case, the facilities provided should of course be compatible with the requirements for support of US forces.

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Logistics

The most apparent and dangerous vulnerability of US forces that may be committed to potentially nuclear operations in forward areas lies in present logistic facilities and practices. A detailed survey should be made to determine specific actions that can be taken to eliminate or to reduce these vulnerabilities.

TO IMPROVE US FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR QUICK LOCAL RESPONSE

Strategic Mobility

Rapid US local response will be essential in order to control escalation by a nuclear-capable China and to minimize pressures for active Soviet support of Chinese military operations. This capability requires a high degree of strategic mobility both for forces stationed in the Far East and for forces in the United States that may be called upon to reinforce the Pacific Command /PACOM/. Significant improvements in the immediate availability of highly mobile forces within PACOM, and in strategic mobility through improvements in strategic airlift, "roll-on-roll-off" transports, and floating stockpiles, are included in present programs. A further increase in locally available air transport in PACOM may be desirable. Further significant increases in the mobility of US forces will require primarily improvement in the forward-base environment of likely areas of hostility. 7

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7. See below, pp. 144-45.
Thai Defenses

If future events should lead to the development of a Communist forward base in Laos, Thai force requirements should be carefully re-examined in the light of actual developments to ensure that the Thais can retard hostile operations sufficiently to permit the introduction of US forces. Preparations to improve the Thai base structure to permit the accelerated deployment of US forces will be particularly important through provision of dispersion and redundancy. Any such improvements should also reduce vulnerability to a minimum-scale nuclear attack.

Forward Base Environment

The generally primitive logistical environment in Korea and Southeast Asia militates strongly against prompt, effective, military operations whether by allied or US forces, and entails excessive concentration of deployed military resources. In view of the heavy current interest and emphasis on this question of environment, specific recommendations are not offered other than to note that any improvement in ports, roads, railroads, airfields, and communications—or local availability of petroleum products and transport and heavy engineering equipment—would directly assist any US military deployments, operations, or support that may be required. Economic and military aid programs should be carefully
coordinated to insure that any effort subsidized by the United States contributes to the over-all US-allied military capability.

**Bilateral Planning**

Present bilateral planning with US allies in the Far East is generally limited to broad concepts and the basic elements affecting combined control or coordination of operations. Such generalized planning requires our allies to draw their own conclusions on the actual capabilities of US forces to assist them in defense of their territory. More specific planning, which would carry at least a connotation of US force commitment, would permit these nations to assess US capabilities more correctly, and thus provide a much better basis for timely and realistic requests for US assistance when and if a threat arises. This planning should specifically include the allocation of tasks, arrangements for the reception and forward movement of US forces, the provision of locally available supplies and services, and similar matters on which the rate of build-up of US forces depends.

**TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ALLIES**

**Australia**

Australia can reasonably be expected to support US military operations in Asia, and in particular in Southeast Asia both morally and, within its capabilities, in action. Australian
capabilities for effective military support are severely limited by distance, lack of suitable forces, and inadequate transport--and these difficulties will be intensified if Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo federate. Active encouragement and assistance should be given Australia to maintain a significant mobile ground and air force capability together with the means for the rapid forward movement of these units when required. Improvement in air and sea transport capabilities, and logistic support capabilities, should have first priority.

The United Kingdom

The creation of the Malaysian Federation will probably lead to the substitution of a "British presence," in the form of a small naval force, for present Commonwealth forces now based on Singapore and Malaya. While little assistance can be expected from UK forces for US military operations, the retention of some British capability in the area can reduce the probability of attack on, or US involvement in, Malaya, India, and Pakistan. The United Kingdom should be discreetly encouraged to retain existing base facilities in Singapore, Malaya, and the Indian Ocean in usable condition (even though largely in standby status). This retention will at least conserve some British capability to commit forces to the area.
## APPENDIX A

### ESTIMATED COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>END OF YEAR</th>
<th>WARHEADS</th>
<th>DELIVERY VEHICLES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units$^1$</td>
<td>Max. Yield$^2$</td>
<td>A/C$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>30 KT</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
<td>185$^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>165$^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1 MT</td>
<td>150$^4$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. One unit represents fissionable material sufficient to produce a fission weapon of approximately nominal yield (20KT). Two units would be necessary to produce a thermonuclear weapon, regardless of yield. Thus, beginning in 1969, the Chinese could have either the stated number of fission weapons, or half as many fusion weapons, or a combination in between.

2. Assumed to be a basic weapon of about 2500 pounds, which would be compatible both with the Beagle and with MRBMs. If Badgers are available, greater weights and hence greater yields could be used.

3. Assumed to be Beagle. Badgers might be available if furnished by the USSR, or possibly by the late 1960s through Chinese production. Alternatively, a new fighter bomber, nuclear-capable, might be available by the end of the decade.

4. Manned aircraft may no longer be essential at this time in view of ratio of missiles to warheads if China has solved the targeting problem. If not, Beagles probably will have been replaced by newer types.

This estimate is based upon Donald B. Keesing, The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat--Warheads and Delivery Vehicles (U), SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA, ISD Study Memorandum No. 17 (IDA, Washington, D. C.). This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly. The numbers of warheads follow the "Moderately Slow" production program described in that paper, on the assumption that a plutonium-producing reactor came into operation in 1961.

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APPENDIX B

US ALLIANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FAR EAST

Proposals have been made to deal with US security problems in the Asian-Pacific area by the revamping of present US alliances or by unilateral US guarantees. A variety of alternatives has been suggested, among them: a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, which, at a minimum, would include the United States, Japan, and South Korea; a Pacific Treaty Organization including South Vietnam, the Republic of China, South Korea, the United States, and possibly the Philippines; the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] and its replacement by an organization from which the United Kingdom and France (especially) would be excluded; and a new "Eisenhower Doctrine" covering some uncommitted nations of Asia (presumably India, Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon).

It is believed that none of these proposals is attractive. The prime question that has to be answered in each case is: does a new, formal arrangement improve on existing agreements?

A second question--is the proposed arrangement practicable?--rules out such suggestions as might call for an Asian-Pacific structure similar to NATO, because the conditions are sharply
different. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces a single source of danger in one principal geographic area (when a secondary defense area was introduced with the accession of Greece and Turkey, considerable strain was placed on the alliance). In Asia, the United States, along with assorted allies, faces several sources of danger in several geographic areas. With Japan, the United States faces threats from the Soviet Union and, ultimately, from the People's Republic of China. With South Korea, the United States faces threats from North Korea, the CPR, and the USSR. The threat to South Vietnam comes from within and from North Vietnam, and perhaps ultimately from the CPR, but the South Koreans may consider that it does not seriously affect them. The Filipinos may likewise consider that threats against South Korea or Japan do not necessarily constitute a danger to the Philippines. In fact, among Asians allied with the United States, the only common factor in their resistance to external Communist threats is the existence of this alliance. The Asian allies, unlike--under certain circumstances--the European allies, appear to be incapable of agreeing on the direction of forces held in common. The major forces, and certainly the swing forces--naval, air, and mobile ground elements--must be US forces under US control.

1. For further discussion of this point, see Appendix G, below, pp. 211-17.

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The United States now has bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. It is allied with Thailand and Pakistan in SEATO. With South Vietnam, which is also covered by a SEATO protocol, special arrangements for satisfactory cooperation exist through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) agreement.

In the North Pacific, any effort to achieve a trilateral alliance of Japan and South Korea with the United States would almost certainly result in a worsening of military cooperation in the area. The two Asian countries dislike and distrust each other. As matters now stand, the air defense of both is joined under a single US command, an arrangement that could not be improved upon and that would probably only deteriorate as the result of a formal alliance agreement. A secret protocol to the bilateral agreement with Japan assures that the United States can use Japan without prior consultation as an operational base for emergency UN operations that might again have to be conducted to defend South Korea. As for South Korea itself, the United States has greater de facto military control under UN auspices than could be confirmed politically by any agreement stemming from a new alliance system, and to formalize the situation further even by a status-of-forces agreement could only reduce the latitude of US military action.
With respect to Japan, important restrictions exist at present, but these are not likely to be relaxed under the terms of a widened and formalized alliance system. The requirement is that the United States consult with the Government of Japan on movements of missiles or nuclear weapons into Japan, and before conducting combat operations directly from Japan. Transit and logistic rights are not thereby affected, and consultation requirements in an emergency should prove to be hardly more than a formality. The restriction making it formally impossible to store nuclear weapons in Japan is a very real hindrance to the immediate capability of US forces (primarily tactical air forces) stationed in Japan. In an emergency requiring such action, a way could probably be found for moving nuclear weapons expeditiously in spite of this restriction, if time permits. In view of the present Japanese attitude toward nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons, it would be unwise to raise the question with the Japanese Government now, and hence for the time being at least the situation should be accepted as it is.\(^2\)

No reason is seen to abandon the system of bilateral agreements between the United States and South Korea and the United States and Japan in favor of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.

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\(^2\) But the situation should be mended if and when circumstances become favorable, as of course they may when Communist China acquires nuclear weapons. US aircraft based in Japan might then be afforded the opportunity to make a more certain contribution in the event of general war.
On the contrary, military considerations argue against an enlarged security treaty.

Without US insistence and participation, there is no present possibility that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines could unite in a defensive alliance. Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea can in no real sense reinforce each other, and for them such an alliance would be wholly political—and probably both impracticable and unmanageable. Except in the event either of a general war or a regional war between China and the United States, both Taiwan and the Philippines are likely to be involved in quite different situations of limited warfare than are South Korea and Japan, taken singly or together. From the military point of view a widened alliance of the United States with these four countries is unnatural and unnecessary. Bilateral agreements are better and more flexible in every case.

A bilateral agreement with Taiwan is necessary so long as the United States is committed to that island's defense. The agreement is militarily useful for intelligence purposes as well as for providing a military base. The Republic of China has several times in the past offered to make forces available (supported, of course, from US resources) for anti-Communist operations elsewhere in Asia. Inclusion of Taiwan in a multilateral arrangement might facilitate the use of Nationalist Chinese forces outside of Taiwan, but cannot be considered as a requirement for this purpose.
So long as the Nationalist Chinese are willing to provide the troops, the United States to support them, and the host nation to receive them, formal multilateral treaty arrangements would appear to be unnecessary. If this combined willingness does not exist, multilateral alliance arrangements could hardly be effective.

The bilateral agreement with the Philippines is desirable as providing a military base, despite restrictions placed upon the United States by the exigencies of Philippine nationalism. While a stronger guarantee that Philippine bases would be available for operational use by US forces, especially for use in the defense of Taiwan, would be desirable, it is unlikely that stronger guarantees than now exist could be obtained through any alternative arrangement.

Turning to Southeast Asia, we witness there a SEATO organization that may, as regards originative action, be viewed as little better than moribund. Chinese Communist (and Indian) propaganda has contributed to making this treaty organization, in the eyes of many neutrals, a symbol of vestigial colonialism in Asia. Nevertheless, in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, the provisions of the SEATO treaty may become effective, membership in the organization may then compel the United Kingdom and even France to acquiesce in counteraction, and broader political support, both in Asia and in Europe, for military action may be forthcoming. Further, membership in SEATO probably
played a role in the past, and may again in the future, in influencing individual states (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines in particular) to offer token military forces for military action to oppose low-level Communist aggression. Finally, the inherent uncertainties on when and if SEATO might agree to concerted military action can serve to discourage Chinese military opportunism.

No multilateral alternative to SEATO, more advantageous to the United States, appears to be practical. No Asian nation not now aligned with the United States would be likely to join in such military alliance regardless of its name of membership, unless the United States were excluded—an arrangement certainly not facilitating US support of a threatened area. Exclusion of Britain and France from membership would eliminate all possibility of practical assistance by those nations and reduce the likelihood of obtaining their political support, and the attempt to exclude them might damage US relationships with European allies of great importance to the United States. Communist claims that any new alliance is a colonial device to exploit Asian nations would not diminish; this propaganda would merely focus even more than before on the United States.

Although SEATO as an organization has proven ineffective in the face of past ambiguous Communist aggression, a weakness that has undoubtedly tended to degrade the alliance in Asian eyes, the possibility remains that overt Communist aggression could evoke a concerted response.
In sum, weak and imperfect though it may be, SEATO is a useful device unlikely for the time being to be bettered by any practicable alternative multilateral arrangement. An effective substitute for SEATO might be an alliance against Communist China in which both India and Pakistan would participate. Such an alliance would not be likely, however, unless a way could be found for composing Indian-Pakistani differences and unless India should be prepared to alter its attitude with regard to alignments.

The US relationship with SEATO nations is weakened by the special situations of Thailand and Pakistan. These nations have no formal security arrangements with the United States except through regional security organizations: SEATO in the case of Thailand; SEATO and, more indirectly, CENTO in the case of Pakistan. Neither Thailand nor Pakistan has real confidence in guarantees offered by the United States solely through regional security arrangements.

In the case of Pakistan, the problem is complicated by the suspicion with which India would view any obvious new link between the United States and Pakistan. It might be possible, without entering into a bilateral security agreement with Pakistan, to improve this situation in Pakistani eyes by placing the Military Assistance Advisory Group there under Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) rather than under the United States Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), and enlarging the scope of the MAAG's activities.
to include a measure of bilateral planning. This change would place US military responsibilities for Pakistan under the commander with operational responsibilities in the area. The continuing exchange of operational and intelligence views, combined with US advice and assistance in Pakistani operational planning (even though necessarily on a highly selective basis), would constitute a significant commitment of US assistance and support beyond that stemming from the less-certain coalition arrangements, and without providing undue alarm to the Government of India. Pakistan would presumably remain a member of the Central Treaty Organization, retention of which is required partly because it associates Iran with the West, and partly to provide coalition means of dealing with Soviet-Afghan threats to Pakistan. Threats to Pakistan from India may be more real than any of these factors, but can hardly evoke US military reassurance at any time when the United States is also attempting to buttress India.

As respects Thailand, it would appear that the real change in relationships that has been required may have been accomplished as the result of recent executive assurance of US commitment to the defense of Thailand. The Thais should consider that they have thus received assurance that inaction by SEATO will not prevent action by the United States in event Thai security is threatened. If the Thais require further, or more formal, assurance from the United States, it should be provided.
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could be considered for formal bilateral security arrangements with the United States only by violation of the Geneva agreements of 1954, which the United States unilaterally agreed not to disturb. Cambodia and Laos, as confirmed neutrals, are at least for the time being excluded from consideration as security partners. With South Vietnam, the United States possesses military agreements and arrangements capable of being expanded de facto to satisfy the requirements of any likely situation, and any attempt to formalize the situation further would probably only make it worse from the military point of view.

As respects the possibility of covering a reluctant India, Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon with a new "Eisenhower Doctrine," the lack of a specific US military commitment appears preferable until such time as circumstances arise to make a commitment desirable, and desired by the beneficiaries of the guarantees. In any event the United States should not gratuitously offer to enter into such commitments. It is important that these Asian countries do not receive them in the spirit of conferring a favor on the United States.

More real and useful benefits ought to be obtainable from the ANZUS Treaty than are obtained at present. An understanding might be reached by which the United States undertakes the "strategic" defense of Australia and New Zealand against threats of nuclear attack or invasion, thus relieving those countries of insupportable burdens they apparently are striving to assume. This should
involve no additional cost to the United States, inasmuch as forces otherwise available can assume this largely political commitment without reinforcement. In return, Australia (assisted by New Zealand) could reconstitute its existing military establishment so as to provide a substantial mobile combat force, along with the necessary transport to make it readily employable in Southeast Asia in response not only to SEATO decisions, but also to those reached within ANZUS.

It is concluded that, except as respects Pakistan, Australasia, and possibly Thailand, existing security arrangements are adequate and, from the military point of view, unlikely to be improved. Consideration should be given to placing the MAAG, Pakistan, under CINCPAC rather than US CINCEUR. The possibility of a more fruitful military collaboration with Australia and New Zealand should be explored. Finally, a more formal bilateral arrangement may be desirable with Thailand, if the Thai government wants it.
APPENDIX C

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A "psychological operation" may be defined as any planned action or series of actions a major objective of which is the creation of a desired state of mind, or mental reaction, in the target audience. All suggested actions listed elsewhere in this paper therefore fall broadly within the field of psychological operations, particularly those actions dealing with alliances, improvements in US and allied military forces, the maintenance of deterrent forces, and educational measures.

More narrowly, psychological operations can be limited to the communication of ideas by measures adapted solely to creating a desired psychological reaction. These measures may be employed continuously, or may be designed specifically to take advantage of a single action or situation and completed within a definite time span. In the first category lie such activities as propaganda (white, gray, and black) and education. This appendix concerns itself primarily with those psychological operations designed for a specific situation; it is also limited to measures that affect the military situation and that require some degree of implementation by US military forces.

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Among the many criteria necessary for effective psychological operations, two are considered to be of overriding importance:

1) The thought conveyed must be essentially truthful and grounded in reality.

2) The United States must speak with a common voice in order to communicate the desired thought and induce the desired reaction.

OBJECTIVES

General objectives of psychological operations that the United States may undertake to counter a nuclear-capable China include:

A. Minimization of any tendency toward neutralism or accommodation on the part of non-Communist Asian nations, and maximization of tendencies toward closer relations with the United States. This objective applies particularly to Japan, Thailand, and India.

B. Assurance that both the Communists and US allies understand that the United States has, and will continue to have, both the will and the capability to:

1) Oppose local Communist aggression of whatever nature.

2) Take decisive military action in the event of open provocation, including a breach by the Communists of any ground rules established by the United States in a situation of local crisis.

3) Exploit US nuclear and other military superiority, as required.
C. Minimization of the likelihood of open Soviet support of Chinese Communist military adventures, and the inspiration of doubt in the minds of the Chinese leadership on Soviet intentions in this regard.

These general objectives suggest the following specific objectives for psychological operations:

1) Elimination of the "shock effect" in large segments of the Free World (including the United States) that is likely to result if the initial Chinese test detonation comes as a general surprise.

2) Minimization of the likelihood of an estimate by our Asian allies, and by the Communists, that the emergence of the People's Republic of China \(^\text{PR}^\) as a nuclear power will materially affect in the foreseeable future the over-all strategic situation, and particularly the military balance in the Far East, between the Free World and the Communist bloc.

3) Assurance that both US allies and the Communists correctly estimate the will and capability of the United States to counter effectively and promptly, and to defeat Communist aggression regardless of a locally effective Chinese nuclear capability.

4) Assurance of a proper appreciation by the Asian Communist bloc states of their vulnerability in a nuclear war involving the United States.

5) An increase in the doubts (which must exist in any case) of the Communist Chinese leadership that the USSR will in fact
employ, or even credibly threaten to employ, Soviet long-range striking forces in support of Chinese military operations.

6) An increase in any existing element of mutual suspicion between the Communist Chinese and the Soviets as regards the other's intentions in areas of competition.

7) Minimization of any tendency on the part of non-Communist Asian states to seek either closer relations with the USSR as a restraining influence on an aggressive, nuclear-capable CPR, or (as in the case of Pakistan) with the CPR itself in an effort to achieve local objectives.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

The following psychological operations, primarily military in character, are suggested:

1) Nuclear Education for Asian Elites.¹ The primary objec-
tive--through education of Asian elites in the nuclear facts of life--is to convey an understanding of the overwhelming US milit-
tary and economic might compared to that of Communist China, and to convey belief in the ability and determination of the United States to protect its allies against any threats from Communist China.

¹ A detailed proposal for such schooling is presented in the PACIFICA Report on the Nuclear Orientation of Asians, dated March 27, 1962.
2) **Combined Military Planning.** For at least several years Chinese nuclear capabilities will be small and relatively primitive, and the asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and vulnerabilities will greatly favor the United States and its allies. US allies can be made fully aware of these facts by the early initiation of combined planning for the defense of allied territories, conducted on the assumption that China will, for the next few years, have only a small locally effective nuclear capability. The United States is already engaged in coordinated planning with all Asian allies either bilaterally or--with Thailand and Pakistan--through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Direct bilateral combined planning can emphasize the limitations of Chinese capabilities, and, at the same time, inure the military and political leaders of our allies to the Chinese nuclear threat. An Asian version of the command post exercises (CPXs) as originally conceived for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), to be conducted by Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), should also be a useful device for these purposes.

3) **Vulnerability Studies of Far Eastern Communist States.** Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam are all highly vulnerable to nuclear offensive operations. This vulnerability may be underestimated by the Communists with the result that they may be tempted to initiate aggressive operations. If this vulnerability is not recognized by our allies, it may weaken their

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adherence to the West or cause them to delay a request for US military assistance unnecessarily. A detailed study of the vulnerability of the Far Eastern Communist bloc would clearly indicate, in terms such as personnel casualties and percentage of industry destroyed, the extreme vulnerability of those states and, properly publicized, should give cause for caution to the Communists and comfort to our friends. Such a study, preferably accomplished through detailed, computerized wargaming, should be supplemented by unequivocal and pointed but low key statements or other indicators designed to insure that the CPR correctly estimates that it would be the target for major nuclear offensive strikes in the event of substantial provocation or of a general war.

4) Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of Soviet Intentions. In spite of possible increased pressures on the USSR (engendered by a CPR nuclear capability) to cover Chinese military actions strategically, there will always be some element of uncertainty on the part of the CPR leadership as regards Soviet willingness to accept the grave risks of a serious US-USSR engagement solely to assist China. These doubts can be nourished in the first instance by the publication of austerely objective analyses of the disproportionate nature of USSR risk as compared to USSR possible advantage. Such articles could set the stage for more sophisticated divisive action, particularly action employing covert means. The establishment of a separate, obviously effective, regional deterrent to CPR nuclear
aggression should prove highly exploitable for corrosive and divisive purposes.

5) **Common US Voice on Use of Nuclear Weapons.** If there is reasonable probability that the United States may decide to use nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities in specific areas, it is essential that the point be brought home to the Communists that US response will be prompt, of adequate weight, and, if necessary, nuclear. This can be done only if all US official representation in, or visiting, these areas speaks with unanimity on US determination to use nuclear weapons if they should be required. Such a common voice would not of course commit the United States to employment of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities; it would, however, assist in ensuring that the Communists are unambiguously aware of US will and capability to resist aggression by whatever means may be necessary.

6) **Selective Release of Intelligence on Chinese Nuclear Capabilities.** While there apparently is general recognition, as reflected by the many rumors which have appeared in the world press, that the CPR will eventually achieve a nuclear capability, it is also apparent that preponderant opinion considers this capability as a vague event which may happen only at some distant time in the indefinite future. If the initial shock effect both in Asia and in the United States is to be minimized, action should be taken progressively to alert the Free World to the reality of
the Chinese nuclear program and to the imminence of the initial
test detonation. As evidence becomes available on the developing
Chinese nuclear program, this intelligence should be released for
public consumption. This would then provide a factual backdrop
for other actual and psychological operations that may be adopted.
It is particularly important that the Free World be alerted to an
imminent CPR test detonation when available intelligence is suffi-
cient to make a reasonably certain prediction of the event.

**COVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

Most psychological warfare operations must necessarily be of
an overt nature. The psychological impact of overt actions can,
however, be reinforced, exaggerated, or toned down through covert
means.

The term "covert operation" as used in this appendix is lim-
ited to actions intended to cause the intelligence activities of
the target governments to arrive at conclusions desired by the US.
These operations consist of providing intelligence, of a real or
notional nature, in a manner which will provide "hard evidence"
specifically designed to cause the target government to arrive at
conclusions predetermined by the United States. This type of op-
eration is analogous to strategic deception; it involves the same
methods, entails the same organization, and requires the same
tight, centralized control as a strategic deception effort.
Covert psychological operations to be successful must meet the following primary criteria:

1) They must be based on real actions or circumstances, and must be specifically designed to capitalize on those realities.

2) They must provide a number of intelligence indicators that are mutually reinforcing and confirming.

3) The organization and assets must be available prior to the initiation of the operation.

4) The intelligence provided must be consistent regardless of the governmental departments or agencies involved. Close, centralized control, on an interdepartmental basis, is thus essential.

The design of a covert psychological operation depends on the assets available, on the occurrence of specific real activities, and on timing. It is thus not feasible to devise any specific covert psychological operation apart from its context. Attached for purely illustrative purposes is a statement of two types of psychological operations which might be undertaken: one, almost wholly military, devised to meet the requirements of a specific, potentially military, situation; the second, primarily non-military, which might be implemented over a longer time, depending on the occurrence of fortuitous events.
ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX C

TWO ILLUSTRATIVE COVERT OPERATIONS

1. PURPOSE: To reinforce estimates by the Communists and by US allies of the intentions and capability of the United States to use military force in a specific situation.

   Possible Indicators:
   
   Alerts and exercises of forces that might be committed
   
   Stand-down of air transport
   
   A marked increase (some of which may be deceptive) in communications traffic between pertinent headquarters, units, and activities in the crisis area
   
   Carefully timed visits to the area of Very Important Persons, particularly of military VIPs, both openly and pseudo-clandestinely
   
   Negotiations for supplies and services with the threatened government
   
   Aircraft movements to and from nuclear storage sites in the Pacific, and movements of aircraft already tagged by the Communists as associated with movement of atomic weapons to the crisis area
   
   The sudden imposition of new communications security and other security measures, both within the crisis area and by forces elsewhere which may be involved
Communications manipulation to exaggerate all of the above measures, with particular regard to the numbers of military units and headquarters that may be involved

2. **PURPOSE:** To encourage mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the CPR, and in particular to encourage CPR doubts of Soviet intentions with regard to the use of, or to the posing of a credible threat to use, Soviet long-range strategic forces.

**Possible Indicators:**

Minor adjustments in US aid programs to give the impression of pertinent United States-Soviet accord and coordination (such as obtained fortuitously in India)

High-level diplomatic consultation with USSR representatives, appropriately timed, succeeded by leaks (diplomatic or military) of notional intelligence on the nature of the subject discussed and the amount of agreement reached

Covert reinforcement, to both the USSR and the CPR, of the US intention to employ PACOM forces, in the event of war with the CPR, solely against the CPR, reserving strategic forces to counter Soviet involvement

Exploitation of any real or notional act that would indicate Soviet dissimulation with regard to the CPR, particularly exploitation of any US-USSR agreement (notionally embroidered)

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APPENDIX D

A LANCHESTER EQUATION ANALYSIS OF INVASION AND RESPONSE

Seymour J. Deitchman
Research and Engineering Support Division
Institute for Defense Analyses

The Lanchester equations are applied to invasion and response in a circumscribed area. The parameters of timeliness in response and total effort required to win are explored.

INTRODUCTION

The Lanchester equations, describing certain types of military engagement, were published in 1916.(1) Lanchester treated two types of modern combat:

Let \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) be the strengths of odd and even sides, respectively, and \( x_{10} \) and \( x_{20} \) their initial strengths; \( a \) and \( A \) the average effectiveness of even men in killing odd men; \( b \) and \( B \) the average effectiveness of odd men in killing even men; and assume that men put out of action are "dead" and all men in action are firing.* Then,

\[ *a \text{ and } b \text{ are defined as rate of fire times the kill probability of an aimed weapon, } r_p, \text{ while } A \text{ and } B \text{ are defined as the kill probability of random shots from an individual weapon, or rate of fire times the ratio of effective area of the weapon to area occupied by the enemy, } r \frac{Ae}{e}. \]

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a) When each side is visible to the other side, and every man on each side is able to fire on any opposing individual, the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of opponents firing, and \( \dot{x}_1 = -ax_2 \); \( \dot{x}_2 = -bx_1 \). This leads to the "square law" for "equality of fighting strength" (i.e., the condition under which neither side wins), a \( x_{20}^2 = b x_{10}^2 \).

b) When each side is invisible to the other, and each fires into the area the other occupies,* the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of men on the other and to the number of men occupying the area under fire, so that \( \dot{x}_1 = -A x_2 x_1 \); \( \dot{x}_2 = -B x_1 x_2 \). This leads to the "linear law" for "equality of fighting strength,"

\[ A x_{20} = B x_{10} \]

Since the inception of the Lanchester equations, there has been a proliferation of equations of this type, applied to analysis of many situations of warfare (e.g., (2) and (3)). It has, however, been difficult to show that the equations are valid. It is virtually impossible to choose values of the constants or casualty rates a priori to forecast how a battle will turn out; nor do the equations account for all the vagaries of

*Actually, each fires into the area he believes the other to occupy, which may be different from that which he does occupy. In this case, the two are assumed to be the same.
a real battle. The few attempts (e.g., (4)) at testing the validity of the equations for situations consistent with the assumptions have had to rely on historical data, peculiar to each situation, for evaluation of the casualty rates; and so even in cases where validity has been examined, this has been done on an a posteriori basis, without generality. Despite these limitations of the Lanchester equations, they do, in their original form, represent a simple and elegant description of certain types of military exchange. Even though they cannot ordinarily be used to predict quantitatively the course of a military engagement, they have proved useful in elucidating some general principles regarding the situations to which they can be addressed.

With this in mind, the Lanchester equations have been used to explore some parameters of invasion and response in a circumscribed area.

**ANALYSIS**

The equations for open combat with constant input of resources by both sides (neglecting operational attrition) are\(^{(2)}\).

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{x}_1 &= P - a x_2 \\
\dot{x}_2 &= Q - b x_1
\end{align*}
\]

(1)
where $P$ and $Q$ are constant rates of input of men or units by odd or even respectively. The solution to these equations, when $a = b = k^*$, is

$$
x_1 = \frac{Q}{k} + E \ e^{kt_c} + F \ e^{-kt_c}
$$

$$
x_2 = \frac{P}{k} - E \ e^{kt_c} + F \ e^{-kt_c}
$$

where:

$$
E = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left( x_{10} + \frac{P}{k} \right) - \left( x_{20} + \frac{Q}{k} \right) \right\}
$$

$$
F = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left( x_{10} - \frac{P}{k} \right) + \left( x_{20} - \frac{Q}{k} \right) \right\}
$$

and $t_c$ is time from the start of combat. The value of $E$ determines which way the battle goes; if $E$ is negative, even wins, and if $E$ is positive, odd wins.

Consider now the situation in which odd invades a single, bounded area with a force of $x_{10}$, and maintains a constant build-up of forces ($P$) during his invasion with negligible opposition until time, $t_a$, when even enters from outside with a force of $x_{20}$

*It is assumed throughout this section that both sides remain equal in capability regardless of any differences in detail of tactics or weapons. The situation in which only one side uses nuclear weapons is thus excluded.
and starts the battle to oppose the invasion. Then at time

\[ 0 < t < t_a, \]

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_1 &= x_{10} + Pt \\
  x_2 &= 0
\end{align*}
\]

(3a)

at \( t = t_a \),

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_1 &= x_{10} + P t_a \\
  x_2 &= x_{20}
\end{align*}
\]

(3b)

and this is the point where \( t_c = 0 \), so that for any \( t_c = t - t_a \), \((t_c > 0)\), eq's (2), with

\[
E = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left[ x_{10} + P \left( t_a + \frac{1}{k} \right) \right] - \left[ x_{20} + \frac{Q}{k} \right] \right\}
\]

\[
F = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left[ x_{10} + P \left( t_a - \frac{1}{k} \right) \right] + \left[ x_{20} - \frac{Q}{k} \right] \right\}
\]

give the values of \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \). The buildup required by even just to break even is given by

\[
Q_B = k \left[ (x_{10} - x_{20}) + P \left( t_a + \frac{1}{k} \right) \right]
\]

(4)

The total effort required by even to win, assuming \( Q > Q_B \), can be measured by even's total input to the battle,
$$\epsilon_T = x_{20} + Q \ t_{cw}$$

(5)

where \( t_{cw} \) is \( t_c \) when odd is destroyed or gives up.*

Values of \( Q_B \) are shown in Fig. 1 for \( x_{10} = 1, P = 1, k = 1, \) and various values of \( x_{20} \), as a function of \( t_a \). The values chosen for the variables are consistent with measurement of relative force in terms of divisions or corps, and time in terms of days or weeks. Fig. 2 shows the course of the battle for a few cases, computed using eq's 2. Fig. 3 shows values of \( \epsilon_T \) for \( even \), for the conditions given. These have been determined by selecting initial values of \( x_{20} \) arbitrarily, and arbitrarily choosing values of \( Q > Q_B \) appropriate to given values of \( t_a' \), with the aid of Fig. 1. Corresponding values of \( t_{cw} \), for use in eq. 5, were obtained from curves like those in Fig. 2.

The penalty for delay is very great; when \( even's \) input rate, \( Q \), is slightly greater than that needed to win, the total input, \( \epsilon_T \), required increases by a factor of approximately five

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*The battle could be defined as ending when even has a preponderance of force, or odd is reduced to some fraction of his greatest force, or odd goes to zero. In this qualitative analysis, the last has been selected; the nature of the results is not affected by this assumption. Further, if odd stops his buildup at some time \( t_a' \) and even does not enter until \( t_a > t_a' \), the effect of delay beyond \( t_a' \) disappears. In the real situation, even though the odd buildup stops, odd would continue to consolidate his position, thereby making the battle more difficult for even as his delay increases. The equations as given do not describe this situation, and the analysis applies only to the case where \( t_a < t_a' \).
as delay increases over the range 0-5. An input rate double that required to break even reduces the penalty, particularly for larger values of $t_a$. The effect of input rate is much greater than that of initial force. These results are consistent with what is known about the advantage of applying overwhelming force in a military situation. But it should be noted that the break-even input rate itself increases rapidly with $t_a$. Thus as delay in responding increases, available resources will be strained ever more severely, and these resources will approach the point where they first become inadequate for application of overwhelming force and then for winning at all. Looked at another way, if response is sufficiently rapid, not only is the total input (and therefore cost in casualties) required to win smaller than if there is substantial delay, but the resources required and available are more likely to be consistent with each other.

There is evidently a tradeoff between allocation of resources to large forces if response capability is slow, and allocation of resources to the provision of a rapid response capability for a relatively small force (which may nevertheless be substantial in absolute terms). Airlift, sealift, and maintenance of foreign bases are all expensive, but so, too, are the equipment and support of the large forces that would obviously be required to win if the logistic system is not
adequate for a rapid response by even to an invasion of an allied country. While the need for such tradeoff analysis is intuitively obvious, this very crude application of the Lancaster equations to the problem poses the issue very clearly as a critical one, and indicates a direction for quantitative definition of "fast" and "slow" reaction. It may become possible to say precisely what is meant by "too little and too late."

Another question, posed implicitly and related to the previous one (although it cannot be treated by this approach), is that of the effect of response time on enemy actions. There is probably some $t_a$ which, if sufficiently small, is very likely to discourage odd and lead him to abort his invasion plans. For some larger $t_a$, particularly if even's initial force is small and his potential buildup capability is not obvious, odd will be encouraged to continue. This consideration, too, favors a capability for early and massive response, and must be taken into account (however intangible it is) in the effort balance sheet.

* * * *

CONCLUSIONS

The Lancaster equations have been applied to analysis of invasion in a single, bounded area followed by a response from outside the area. The analysis shows that there is a great premium on reacting quickly with adequate strength to win the opening battle, and that far less total resources are needed to
win if the available resources can be brought to bear quickly. It is not so much the size of the initial countering force which matters, as the rate of buildup of forces which can be thrown into the conflict. Planning to win clearly requires study of the tradeoff between provision of expensive means of high mobility for a relatively small part of the potential defending force, and provision of the very much larger force that will be needed to win in the event of long delay in responding to attack.
BREAK-EVEN BUILDUP FOR EVEN

EFFORT IN FIGHTING UNITS REQUIRED BY EVEN TO WIN

COURSE OF THE BATTLE \(-Q = Q + .25; x_{20} = .25\)

\(t_a = 0\)

\(t_a = 1\)

\(t_a = 2\)

\(t_a = 5\)

Figure 1

Figure 3

Figure 2

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REFERENCES


APPENDIX E

VULNERABILITIES OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO NUCLEAR ATTACK

This appendix is based primarily upon present CPR vulnerabilities, projected to 1972. While a very large-scale CPR effort, continued over a long period of time and pursued in spite of the severe economic penalties involved, could moderately reduce China's present vulnerabilities, it does not appear possible for the People's Republic of China to change radically its basic socio-economic and military environment within one decade. Action to reduce specific vulnerabilities (such as passive protection for selected military forces and military and governmental control elements, minimal civil defenses, and improved air defenses) is feasible within limits. The following discussion anticipates that actions taken to this end will not be allowed to compete substantially with general Chinese economic programs.

PEOPLE

Mainland China's social and economic structure is relatively less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of more highly industrialized countries. There are about 500 cities in China with 25,000 or more population. The prevailing type of building
construction makes these cities very vulnerable to atomic blast and heat, and in the more densely populated areas radiation casualties would be high. But it would require an extensive nuclear campaign directed specifically against people to cause casualties proportionate to those that would result from nuclear strikes at the United States or the Soviet Union, even though these strikes were directed primarily against objectives other than people.

Even though relatively less vulnerable, it is obvious that densely populated China would suffer many millions of casualties as the result of a nuclear offensive almost without regard to the primary objective of the offensive operations.

There are some fourteen cities in China of over one million population, and by 1972 there should be sixteen or possibly more. Attack on these cities would require few weapons and would cause heavy casualties. Further, and most importantly, the governmental, party, military, industrial, and intellectual elites are heavily concentrated in these cities, as are skilled technicians and engineers. It is these people whom the CPR can least afford to lose.

**INDUSTRY**

Modern industry is relatively new in China, for the most part established since 1950. The Chinese industrial base has
two distinctive characteristics:

1) Modern industry is concentrated to a high degree in approximately thirty metropolitan areas, some of which have been wholly developed by the Communist regime.

2) Unlike most industrialized nations, China has very few complexes that contribute enough of a specific sector of the economy to be identifiable as a profitable target in a campaign devoted to the destruction of selected elements of the industrial base.

As a result of these two factors, the industrial capability of China is extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack, and such a campaign would not require great selectivity in targeting. It is also true, however, that the large number and diversification of the industrial plants within most metropolitan areas would make confident prediction of the specific effects of such a campaign on the Chinese economy difficult—although it is clear that it would largely destroy modern industry within China.

MILITARY

Counterforce

Predictions on the future positioning and configuration of Chinese nuclear delivery forces must necessarily be largely surmise. Measures to improve the survivability of aircraft, however, except possibly some small measure of ground alert
capability, appear to be most unlikely. There is no evidence of
the introduction of sophisticated air defenses except for some
obsolete surface-to-air missile defenses provided by the Soviet
Union for metropolitan areas. Work on the one such system that
has been started (at Peiping) apparently has not been completed,
and there is no evidence of any further effort along this line.
It is possible, though unlikely so long as the present state of
Sino-Soviet relations persists, that additional Soviet assistance
may be given to improve these defenses. The state of the Chinese
economy and other military demands upon it would appear to
preclude independent development by the CPR of a significant
modernized air defense capability. It is practically certain
that China will not develop defenses, or even warning means,
against ballistic missile attack during this decade. With regard
to China's own ballistic missiles, those of up to medium range
(1,100 nautical miles) probably will be mobile, and basically
patterned after USSR designs. Early intercontinental ballistic
missiles will most likely be in a generally soft configuration,
probably dispersed, and possibly given some shielding through
siting in appropriate terrain north and west of the densely
populated areas of China. ¹

¹. A less likely case, but one to which some attention
should be given, is that the Chinese, learning from US and USSR
experience, will delay the establishment of their ICBM system until
the weapons can at least be given some concealment.
Assuming:

1) A nuclear delivery capability for 1968-70 as stated in Appendix A;²

2) Airplanes disposed with approximately one regiment (30 airplanes) per base;

3) Missiles in a mobile, soft configuration, disposed in clusters of ten; and

4) A US intelligence capability to target these delivery forces accurately;³

a minimum counterforce operation against the CPR would require approximately 25 accurately delivered weapons.

Other Forces

China's enormous ground forces (115 line divisions) are dispersed throughout the country (but mainly in the east) and as an initial object of nuclear attack would appear to be unprofitable. Attack on transportation, distribution facilities, support elements (particularly petroleum products), communications, and control should, however, render these forces practically unusable except

² See above, p. 147.

³ This is a critical but highly uncertain assumption. See above, pp. 62-64.
internally within China, and then only as in-place forces.

Ground forces committed outside the borders of China are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. In areas where major forces would be required (Korea and Taiwan), the forces themselves will be massed and vulnerable. The conduct of ground operations, large or small, by organized forces, would require Chinese dependence on supply and support facilities in nearby China and on inadequate communications to and within the forward area. While there is a trade-off between size of force and quality of logistic support, organized forces depending upon substantial quantities of modern equipment such as ordnance, armored vehicles, and motorized transportation, will be heavily dependent on the survivability of these concentrated logistical facilities.

The minor Chinese naval capability could be denied by the destruction of China's three principal bases.

Chinese air defenses depend upon fighter aircraft, centralized control, and inadequate communications, and can be neutralized by attack on any of these highly vulnerable elements.

**TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION**

Support of both air and ground operations is dependent upon a primitive transportation system, the inadequacies of which are clearly evident even in peacetime, particularly in the distribution of petroleum and agricultural products during the past few years.
These transportation means (both surface and air) radiate weebike from major metropolitan areas. In spite of recent major Communist Chinese efforts to improve the transportation situation (particularly railroads), present estimates indicate that a transportation system of adequate capacity, eliminating the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities now presented by the focusing of these facilities on major population centers, cannot be achieved within a decade. The transportation system is and will continue to be further handicapped by inadequate resources critical in modern war, including particularly POL. Lacking appreciable reserves, and dependent upon many distribution points (the larger of which are concentrated in the major cities), the CPR's supply of combatant forces (and the civilian economy as well) can be readily disrupted by a relatively small-scale nuclear attack on key points.

CONTROL ECHELONS

Medium and higher echelons of CPR control, whether of the government, the Communist party, or the military, are almost without exception located in the larger metropolitan areas. These control echelons are essential elements for the continuing conduct of a war and its support, are vital to effective recuperation after nuclear attack and, indeed, are probably indispensable to the survival of the Communist regime itself. These control elements—in terms of facilities, people, and communications—are
highly vulnerable to carefully planned nuclear attack on a relatively small number of metropolitan areas.

CO-LOCATION OF VULNERABILITIES

The most striking aspect of the CPR vulnerability to nuclear attack is the co-location in metropolitan areas of the individual vulnerabilities. Even an attack of relatively small weight on, say, Peiping, would destroy essential military and governmental control capability; would destroy important military targets in the form of air and ground forces and facilities; would seriously disrupt communications and transportation with effects far beyond the area of Peiping; would destroy a significant portion of the national industry; and would cause a very large number of casualties of a nature most detrimental to the Communist Chinese war-making and recuperative ability.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE ATTACK

A hypothetical attack on China has been sketched for illustrative purposes. It is delineated in an addendum to this appendix. This illustrative attack would involve 90 weapons on target. This is the most distant target is less than 800 nautical miles from the coast. A rough calculation indicates that such an attack would

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4. The numbers of launched or programmed weapons required would vary widely (possibly up to 300 weapons programmed), depending on the assumptions used as to types and configuration of delivery vehicles, reliability, attrition, and so forth.
not only destroy China's nuclear delivery capability (under the estimates used for this study), but also would kill about 40 to 50 million people by direct blast and thermal effects alone, and would destroy a very large proportion of that country's modern industry. It should also destroy China's capability to control governmental and military actions, thereby jeopardizing the hold of the Communist regime on the people of China, as well as cause extensive damage to her inadequate transportation and communications systems.

**SUMMARY**

Although the CPR, as a social and economic entity, is somewhat less vulnerable than the United States to nuclear attack, her specific vulnerabilities are nevertheless of a nature that would permit a nuclear offensive to be highly effective in terms of rendering the CPR incapable of continuing to fight. Due to the co-location of vulnerabilities, the nuclear offensive would, comparatively speaking, need to be on only a modest scale.
ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

This addendum is a summary of a hypothetical attack on all of China.

Part 1 is a listing of metropolitan areas of over one million population each (by 1972), showing the number of designated ground zeros (DGZs) and the objectives within each area. Part 2 is a similar listing of industrially important cities of fewer than one million population. Part 3 sets forth the minimum requirements for delivered weapons for a counterforce effort under the assumptions set forth in the body of this appendix.

Designated ground zeros have been selected that primarily affect military targets, but distributed (together with weapon selection) so as to maximize damage to industry, logistic, and similar targets.

In view of the uncertainties in such projections far into the future, no attempt has been made to devise more than an illustrative attack.

In summary:

1) The attack would require 65 delivered weapons on metropolitan areas.

2) An additional 25 delivered weapons would be needed for
a minimum counterforce effort.

3) About 40 to 50 million casualties would result from the blast and thermal effects. There would also be a large number of casualties from residual nuclear radiation, including fallout.
# ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

## PART 1

### MAINLAND CHINA--CITIES OVER ONE MILLION POPULATION (BY 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Primary war resource center of China–shipbuilding, petroleum refining and storage, steel, chemicals, and all military and industrial products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peiping (Peking)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National control and communication center with important new industries such as electronics, machine tools, chemicals, drugs, military depots, and scientific research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tien-chin (Tientsin)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major, nationally important, industrial complex specializing in vehicles, steel, chemicals, rubber, and medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chung-ching (Chungking)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outstanding industrial city in Southwest China producing steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, and military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shen-yang (Mukden)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National strategic source of aircraft, heavy machinery, nonferrous metals, railroad stock, ordnance, and chemicals. Also a provincial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kuang-chou (Canton)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Primary industrial base of South China with petroleum storage, air force storage, steel and chemicals, and regional civil, naval, and air force control centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

#### PART 1 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, air force control and repair center, military equipment production and storage. Second largest steel mill in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ha-erh-pin (Harbin)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, key railroad center, military storage, aircraft production, air force storage, and heavy electrical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nan-ching (Nanking)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, military control center, arsenals and military depots, electrical equipment, and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hsi-an (Sian)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, atomic and scientific research, electrical equipment, and nearby aircraft plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provincial capital; new major industrial center specializing in steel, chemicals, aluminum, explosives, heavy machinery, and military weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lanchou (Lanchow)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, West China transportation center. Key plants include isotope separation, aluminum, petroleum, and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chengtu</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, aircraft plant, electronics equipment and regional industrial center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

### PART 1 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Changchun</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, air force storage, railroad stock, and China's largest vehicle plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ta-lien</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nationally important in chemicals, shipbuilding, railroad equipment, petroleum port, and military storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Dairen)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ching-tao</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National naval and naval air force headquarters; submarine base, port, railroad equipment, chemicals and magnesium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tsingtao)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Addendum to Appendix E

### Part 2

#### China—Other Major Industrial Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Complex Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anshan</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>One third of China's steel, nationally important in coke and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Petroleum, aluminum, magnesium, coke, chemicals, and explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pao-tou (Paotow)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major heavy weapons and tank manufacturing center, also twelfth largest steel mill in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chi-nan (Tsinan)</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, military region headquarters; steel, chemicals, and machine tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hang-chou (Hangchow)</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Transportation center, provincial capital, and developing industry with a steel mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Supplies Southwest China with chemicals, steel, machine tools, military weapons, and optics. Regional military and civil control center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cheng-hsien (Chengchow)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provincial capital, main transportation center for East China, and third largest POL storage in China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

#### PART 2 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Complex Name</th>
<th>1962 Pop. Est. (Millions)</th>
<th>DGZs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chi-chi-ha-erh (Tsitsihar)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Heavy industry such as steel, machine tools, and military weapons; also supply center for North Manchuria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fu-chou (Foochow, Minhow)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Regional civil, military, and air control centers, and regional industrial complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Changsha</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provincial capital, many medium-sized regional industries (steel, metals, vehicles, chemicals, and POL storage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Loyang</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>New industrial city producing most of China's heavy-duty tractors and ball bearings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shih-men (Shihkiachuang)</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coke, chemicals, iron, steel, ammunition, textiles, and fifth largest railroad yard in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tangshan</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sixth largest steel mill, a major railroad manufacturing and repair facility, and a major aluminum plant under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chi-lin (Kirin)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Largest chemical combine in China, other heavy industries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX E

PART 3

CHINA--COUNTERFORCE OPERATIONS, 1970

Objectives	DGZs
5 airfields (150 aircraft)	5
20 missile sites (200 missiles)	20

If US intelligence capabilities are less effective than assumed, additional weapons would of course need to be allocated for counterforce operations to compensate for uncertainties.

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APPENDIX F

COMPARATIVE GROUND FORCES--LATE 1960s

(ASSUMED CAPABILITIES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Available for Defense (Indigenous)</th>
<th>Chinese Invasion Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>19+2 US</td>
<td>46^3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4-7^4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9^4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Division equivalents estimated to be available.
2. Estimated initial threat that can be employed in view of logistic factors.
3. Includes North Korean forces.
4. Includes North Vietnamese forces.

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APPENDIX G

THE NATO ANALOGY

It has been suggested that the situation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization \( \text{NATO} \) as it has developed over the past twelve years is comparable to the situation in the Far East as it will develop as a result of Chinese nuclear progress, and that US policy must be consistent between Europe and the Far East. The purpose of this appendix is to examine this analogy in light of present US nuclear policy for NATO.

US POLICY FOR EUROPE

In Europe, NATO faces essentially a single enemy--the Soviet Union. Any major military operations in Europe would involve the forces both of the United States and of the Soviet Union. If these operations become nuclear, NATO nuclear objectives would thus include Soviet nuclear forces. These forces must be considered an indivisible target, and if nuclear operations are involved, NATO must therefore attack all Soviet nuclear forces. Since the target system is indivisible, NATO nuclear forces must also be indivisible--that is, capable of being used as a single instrument against a single, indivisible, target system.

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NATO nuclear forces include US and some allied tactical air forces and intermediate-range ballistic missile units under NATO operational command. They include British forces and will include (more loosely) French forces, both under national command. But these NATO nuclear forces also include US strategic strike forces, which comprise by far the largest part of the nuclear capability available to NATO. Backed by the certain intervention of this massive nuclear power when it is needed, forces positioned in Europe can contribute only marginally to the total nuclear power available, and can accept great risks if necessary to permit them to operate effectively in a non-nuclear role.

Thus forces in Europe should be designed primarily for non-nuclear operations with a secondary capability for "battlefield" nuclear operations if the latter should become necessary. The survivability of these forces should be secured through the deterrent effectiveness of centrally controlled strategic forces. These strategic forces will consist essentially of forces under US command, but should also include British strategic forces and also any other strategic strike forces that may be created in Europe. In view of the capability of US strategic forces, however, and the inability of other forces to contribute significantly to the over-all NATO capability, additional strategic forces in Europe, whether under national or NATO command, are unnecessary and would be counterproductive. It is of course a major objective of the Soviet Union to separate the
United States from its allies in NATO and the existence of other strategic nuclear forces would be used by the Soviet Union to forward this objective.

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

When China attains a nuclear capability, there will be two separate major Communist centers of nuclear power in Asia, which, unless there is a sharp reversal of the trend in Sino-Soviet relations, will not be in complete harmony. By reason of this disharmony, and in the absence of Soviet force and other commitments to China, if hostilities occur in the Far East, the USSR will not be automatically involved (and in fact is likely to remain on the sidelines if the United States acts with adroitness). Thus, if bilateral nuclear operations involving the People's Republic of China should occur, these need not entail nuclear strikes against the indivisible Soviet nuclear forces. In sharp contrast to Europe, where Communist nuclear power has been, until now at least, under unified control, in Asia Communist nuclear power will be divided; and it is strongly to the advantage of the United States to take all possible action to see that this nuclear power remains divided.

Free World nuclear power in the Far East is now and will continue to be exclusively a US capability. There is no practical possibility that any non-Communist Asian state will create an
effective nuclear capability within the next decade or so. There is no single Free World operational command. Free World nuclear strength in the Far East is wholly under US unilateral control, and will remain so unless the United States decides to share this responsibility with one or more allies. There is thus no dual nuclear control that the Communists can exploit. No pressures now exist to dilute US control of these forces; there is no apparent benefit to be secured by, nor is there any significant influence to cause, a division of responsibility for nuclear operations against China between the United States and its many disparate allies in the Far East.

If consideration is limited to those Free World forces in the Pacific and Far East that face a nuclear-capable Communist China, the situation then becomes more nearly analogous to that in NATO, although with major differences. In such a situation, the United States and its allies face a single major enemy (the CPR), whose nuclear forces must be considered as a single indivisible target. If an effective US regional nuclear strike force exists, it then provides a single instrument under central US control for destruction of the indivisible nuclear force facing it. With this US force in being, forces deployed to forward areas can also accept risks as necessary to permit them to fight effectively in the local action. The regional deterrent force would thus correspond roughly to the position of the entire US strategic force as related
nuclearly less difficult than the problem facing NATO.

deterrence of, or nuclear engagement with, the CPR will be tech-

tical to the United States and the USSR. Thus, the problem of

antecedents that its technology will be five to ten years behind

(c) until the CPR approaches superpower status, it can be

strength.

forces than any other element (e.g., portars) of US nuclear

deterrent force will be no more dextrous from other US nuclear

Integrated Operational Plan. For the purpose of single

of the total US nuclear strength. For the purpose of single

as the United States may decide. It will remain an integral part

available to augment US strategic forces or perform other tasks.

exclusively committed to operations against China -- it will be

CPR. Conversely, US nuclear power in the Pacific will not be

"super SCR" as an additional enforcement agency directed at the

long-range strategic capability against the CPR. It thus has a

(b) the United States will have, and can use if needed, its

should remain (under complete US control).

a) All non-communist nuclear power in the Far East is (and

between the situation in NATO and that in the Far East:

There remain major differences, in this limited context,

would correspond roughly to forces positioned in Europe.

to Europe: forces committed to local areas of hostilities in Asia
d) US long-range strike forces have been designed basically for attack on the USSR, and their participation in lesser hostilities, particularly non-nuclear hostilities, is unlikely on a significant scale. US nuclear-capable forces in the Pacific Command /PACOM/ on the contrary, though considered the primary threat to and deterrent of the CPR, may also be called upon to participate in large-scale, non-nuclear operations. Thus, nuclear-capable forces in the PACOM must in large part be designed so that they can be effective in a non-nuclear role without destroying their nuclear capability and hence their deterrent effect on the CPR. It should be possible to harmonize these conflicting requirements by the conscious design of forces to that end—an objective simplified by China's relatively primitive capabilities.

SUMMATION

In Europe, the nuclear threat stems solely from the Soviet Union. This monolithic threat is opposed by nuclear forces unified (in spite of internal differences within the NATO alliance, which the Soviets have tried, unsuccessfully to date, to exploit) by an uncompromising commitment by the United States, the stationing of US forces in Europe, and the creation of a unified command for forces in Europe. In the Far East the Communists face a single nuclear threat (the United States), but Communist power is divided because of strong Sino-Soviet differences, the absence of a clear guarantee from the
Soviets (who speak of "volunteers" to aid their Asian allies), and the lack of force commitments or other military unity between the two major Far Eastern Communist powers. In the Pacific there is a genuine opportunity to exploit the differences that already exist in the adversary's camp.