MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Policies for the Conduct of Operations in Southeast Asia over the Next Four Months (U)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on planned and recommended military operations to be conducted in Southeast Asia over the next four months.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the progress and status of military operations in Southeast Asia and conclude that within the current policy guidelines, the single integrated strategy governing military operations in Southeast Asia is sound and will eventually lead to achievement of US national objectives as stated in NSAM 288 and the US military objectives stated in JCSM-307-67, dated 1 June 1967, subject: "Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam (U)."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have reviewed the plans for the coming months and further measures which might be taken in Southeast Asia. They conclude that there are no new programs which can be undertaken under current policy guidelines which would result in a rapid or significantly more visible increase in the rate of progress in the near term. There are some programs which are being intensified or accelerated. These are primarily related to expansion, modernization, and other improvements in the effectiveness of the RVNAF and Revolutionary Development. However, while desirable, such acceleration of these programs cannot be expected to provide substantially greater results within the next four months.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously recommended against a standdown in military operations for any of the forthcoming holidays. They continue in the opinion that any standoff or bombing pause would be disadvantageous to allied forces in proportion to its length. Progress during the next four months is dependent upon the maintenance of pressure upon the enemy. Any action which serves to reduce the pressure will be detrimental to the achievement of our objectives.

5. Operations to support the stated objectives for the next four months will continue to be in consonance with the US national objectives. The various major programs which comprise the strategy involved in the total effort are discussed in the Appendix. While progress toward the military objectives is expected to be sustained during the period under consideration, additional gains could be realized through the modification and expansion of certain current policies as indicated in the Appendix.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered other proposals for operations to be conducted during the four-month period. Among these is Operation York II, which is strongly advocated by COMUSMACV. This operation, directed principally to establish a necessary lodgment in the Ashau Valley in Vietnam during February-March 1968, has as an essential part a raid operation by two to three ARVN battalions against Base Area 607. This base area, though a part of the enemy's Ashau Valley complex, is located principally in Laos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proposal has merit and appears militarily necessary. However, they point out that, while the intent is to mount the operation clandestinely, there is a possibility that it will become public with attendant political problems.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The pressure on the enemy be maintained during the period to sustain allied progress and to prevent any military exploitation resulting from standdowns or truces.

b. The current policies for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia during the next four months be modified and expanded to permit a fuller utilization of our military resources in accomplishing the tasks set forth in the Appendix.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
APPENDIX AND ANNEXES
TO JCSM-663-67
Appendix

Military Operations Planned and Conducted for Kranta
December 1967 - March 1968 (by Major Processes)

TAF/DB

In the I CFR, conduct operations against UIC units of the
"Blue" Task Force in central, southern, and eastern territories
of the compound. The operations will consist of:
1. Conduct harassment, reconnaissance, and attrition operations against UIC units in the
   central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
2. Conduct limited, selective attacks against enemy units in the central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
3. Conduct limited harassment and destruction of enemy targets.
4. Conduct tactical air strikes against enemy targets near the border.

In the II CFR, conduct operations against UIC units of the "Blue" Task Force in central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound. The operations will consist of:
1. Conduct harassment, reconnaissance, and attrition operations against UIC units in the
   central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
2. Conduct limited, selective attacks against enemy units in the central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
3. Conduct limited harassment and destruction of enemy targets.
4. Conduct tactical air strikes against enemy targets near the border.

In the III CFR, conduct operations against UIC units of the "Blue" Task Force in central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound. The operations will consist of:
1. Conduct harassment, reconnaissance, and attrition operations against UIC units in the
   central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
2. Conduct limited, selective attacks against enemy units in the central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
3. Conduct limited harassment and destruction of enemy targets.
4. Conduct tactical air strikes against enemy targets near the border.

In the IV CFR, conduct operations against UIC units of the "Blue" Task Force in central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound. The operations will consist of:
1. Conduct harassment, reconnaissance, and attrition operations against UIC units in the
   central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
2. Conduct limited, selective attacks against enemy units in the central, southern, and eastern territories of the compound.
3. Conduct limited harassment and destruction of enemy targets.
4. Conduct tactical air strikes against enemy targets near the border.

The proposed operation in the V CFR has not yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Current restrictions on the number of personnel, equipment, and supplies that can be transported to the compounds will be enforced.

Authority required to conduct tactical air strikes against enemy targets near the border.

Appendix
TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL PLANNING</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduce civilian infiltration through the use of non-lethal anti-terrorist measures.</td>
<td>1. Air strike policy as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enhance and expand the network of psychological operations.</td>
<td>1.1. Immediate aerial delivery of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX A

OPERATION YORK II (U)

1. (TS) The A Shau Valley in SVN is extremely important to the enemy. It is in this area that the distance from the SVN/Laos border to the South China Sea is shorter than at any other place along the entire length of the country. The valley lies in the most remote part of SVN, and its relative inaccessibility has provided the enemy a major supply and operating base from which he has launched operations into southern I Corps Zone. Enemy Base Area 607, which lies principally in Laos adjoining the southern end of the A Shau Valley, has been stockpiled with munitions, and the rockets which shelled the Da Nang Air Force Base are considered to have come through that base. COMUSMACV considers it essential to the security of the southern I Corps area that operations be undertaken to move friendly forces into the A Shau Valley, and to retain forces there.

2. (TS) COMUSMACV has planned a series of operations in the southern and western portions of I Corps area over the next several months. Operation YORK I will be conducted against the Do Xa area near the boundary between I and II Corps.

3. (TS) COMUSMACV plans to conduct Operation YORK II in the A Shau Valley during March-April 1968. An essential part of the operation will be a raid into Base Area 607, to destroy enemy supplies and munitions there. SVN forces will be used for this portion of the operation which will require combat operations on Lao territory in order to help accomplish the objective of securing a lodgement of friendly forces in the A Shau Valley in SVN. Two to three ARVN airborne battalions, with about five US advisors each, will be involved. US artillery and air support also will be furnished.

GROUP 1
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4

Annex A

94103-485
4. Authority should be granted to conduct Operation YORK II as planned.
ANNEX II

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS IN THE DMZ NORTH OF THE PML (S)

1. (S) In recent months, a large proportion of the enemy's efforts has been directed toward the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), particularly the northern portion of the zone near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). During August and September, 39.3 percent of all enemy initiated actions in SVN took place in I CTZ. 57 percent of all enemy losses (KIA) and 61 percent of all US losses (KIA) in SVN occurred there.

2. (S) The dominant military problem in this area has been the enemy sanctuary north of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL), and particularly in the northern portion of the DMZ. From this haven, NVN forces have been able to operate with substantial assurance that their rear positions were relatively secure from observed fire. The sanctuary also has had a serious effect on the I Corps logistic situation near the DMZ. The enemy, employing long range artillery and a ground reconnaissance capability in SVN which can locate our installations with relative ease, is able to shell the Dong Ha - Cau Viet logistic areas from north of the Ben Hai River, and has done so repeatedly. The enemy installations which exist in the DMZ also have been largely responsible for the recent increased US casualties in northern I CTZ. The installations, which are prime military targets, include troop concentrations, artillery positions, and storage sites. They have proved difficult to locate with the means available now in MACV, and a major effort is being made to improve target acquisition capabilities for the DMZ area.

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Annex B
3. (TS) Experience both in face and in SVN has proven the effectiveness of long range reconnaissance teams to supplement the intelligence provided by other means, to provide positive target identification, and to call in neutralizing or destroying artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes.

4. (TS) The risks of conducting ground reconnaissance in the high troop density areas of the DMZ are recognized but conduct of such operations would significantly increase MACV's ability to locate and destroy important military targets. The authority for a commander to conduct ground reconnaissance against a hostile force in contact is a prerequisite to meeting his responsibility to defend his command against armed attack with all means at his disposal. Authority to employ either US-advised indigenous reconnaissance teams, or the organic reconnaissance elements of US forces in the DMZ area would provide COMUSMACV with the flexibility to commit the best-suited units to specific operations in this area.

5. (TS) CINCPAC has requested authority to employ US and US-advised ground reconnaissance patrols throughout the DMZ. This authority should be granted.
ANNEX C

FRAIRIE FIRE PHASE III

1. (TS) The area of Laos between the Tchepone-Se Kong River line and the Lao/Vietnam border continues to be dominated by North Vietnamese forces and to serve as the principal infiltration route and support area for enemy operations in South Vietnam. The avowed neutrality of Laos and the US desire to conform as closely as possible to the provisions of the Geneva Accords have limited friendly activity in the area to FRAIRIE FIRE reconnaissance and exploitation missions, air operations, and certain CAS activity. Although all of these efforts have gradually increased in scope and effectiveness, they are by no means capable of stemming the infiltration or denying the use of the area. Therefore, the search has continued for new or improved concepts to deal with the problem without a drastic shift in policy toward Laos and without upsetting the country's political and military balance.

2. (TS) During the conduct of FRAIRIE FIRE operations over the past few months, COMUSMACV's Studies and Observations Group (SOG) has identified and assessed a potential in the Kha tribal group which inhabits the area and is being exploited by the enemy. Past experience with Montagnard groups in Southeast Asia has shown that these people will respond to caucasian influence and can be developed into guerrilla forces. Such a program could provide an important supplement to the existing counter-infiltration effort at a low cost in men and material and with a low risk of embarrassing the neutralist Government of Laos.
1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore proposed (JCSM 467, 20 April 1967) that MACV develop and direct a guerrilla program in southeastern Laos. The concept visualized making initial contact with tribal groups through PRAIRIE FIRE reconnaissance teams; infiltrating certain cadre for training in South Vietnam; and eventually recruiting, training, and operating the force under the control of US Special Forces detachments. Initially, these activities would be restricted to the existing PRAIRIE FIRE area; and later expansion beyond those limits would only be considered if the situation dictated and would be fully coordinated to preclude conflict with CAS activities.

4. (TS) The proposal has been referred to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to CIA, who concurred with the proposal on 30 June 1967, but considered that concurrence of Ambassador Sullivan and the Department of State should be obtained. A memorandum requesting State concurrence was forwarded on 5 July 1967 to the Under Secretary of State (CM 2490-67).

5. (TS) The matter was also raised at the SEACORD conference on 1 August 1967, where it was approved in principle.

6. (TS) Ambassador Sullivan has indicated on several occasions and as recently as 9 November 1967 (Vientiane 2655/091247Z Nov 67, JCS IN 98485) that he considers such a program would only be acceptable to the Lao with the US role reduced to that of providing financial and materiel support. Resolution of the divergence between the original MACV concept and Ambassador Sullivan's version has not been achieved, and the Department of State has not yet concurred in the proposal.
OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA (U)

1. (TS) Current DANIEL BOONE operations are limited to ground reconnaissance teams gathering intelligence in a 20 km strip of Cambodian border territory. These activities are further limited in their use of helicopters to 5 missions per month and a depth of 10 km. South of Route 13 all operations must be approved on a case-by-case basis at the Washington level.

2. (TS) Two years experience in PHAIRIK FIRE operations in Laos as well as six months of DANIEL BOONE activity have proven the importance of helicopters in these operations. They are needed to overcome terrain obstacles, bypass enemy concentrations, and to permit reconnaissance of areas otherwise inaccessible. The arbitrary limitation of 5 helicopter-borne missions per month will place a definite restriction on the number of targets of a certain kind that can be investigated during any month.

3. (S) The requirement for case-by-case consideration of reconnaissance team operations at the Washington level is ponderous and time consuming. Often such a system will prevent the exploitation of fleeting collateral intelligence.

4. (TS) As reconnaissance efforts continue, it is inevitable that remunerative and threatening enemy targets will be uncovered in the border areas. In certain cases the teams should be authorized to conduct the limited sabotage and destruction within their means. In other cases where the border is imprecise, the jungle is dense, and the Cambodian presence nonexistent, air strikes against targets

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Annex D
positively identified by the ground teams should be authorized. Since the VC/NVA deny their presence in the Cambodian sanctuary, they are in no position to publicly protest such activity.
ANNEX E

SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS

SEA DRAGON operations include naval gunfire attacks on enemy defenses, land LOC, and interdiction of enemy coastal water traffic, and are now limited to the area south of 20°N latitude. Authority should be extended to include targets further north to 21° 15'N latitude. Expected gains include:

a. Interdiction of the estimated 80 percent of NVN coastal water traffic which currently is north of 20°N and now not subject to interdiction by SEA DRAGON.

b. Prevent NVN from taking advantage of movement of cargoes via coastal waters to clear backlogs which they are unable to get out of Haiphong by other means.

c. Expose fixed coastal military and logistics targets in NVN north of 20°N to attack by naval gunfire.

d. Complicate NVN coastal defense problem, cause diversion of AAA batteries to coastal defense role, and expose air defense along coastline to suppression by naval gunfire.

e. Destroy/damage NVN watercraft capable of carrying military cargoes. Strain production capacity to replace destroyed WBLC.

f. Provide for greater flexibility in use of naval forces by permitting attack on enemy forces now protected by being beyond an arbitrary line.

g. Supplement air operations against NVN military and logistics targets.*

* See Map at Annex F.
ANNEX P

USE OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AGAINST
NVN HOSTILE AIRCRAFT

1. (TS) One additional measure to counter the effective
North Vietnamese air defense system is the use of surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) against airborne hostile combat-
type aircraft. Sea-based missiles, principally the TALOS,
can be used effectively for this purpose. Naval forces
now have authority to use shipborne SAMs to defend US air
and surface units in the Tonkin Gulf. Extension of this
authority to include attack against hostile combat type
aircraft airborne over NVN could result in decreased MIG
inventory and degraded MIG operations, thus compounding the
enemy's air defense problem without additional risk to US
ships or aircraft.

2. (TS) US naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf during the
past year have, through continuous exercises, improved
their capability to positively identify hostile combat
aircraft using radar and other means. Unless the target
is positively identified as a hostile combat type aircraft, the missile would not be fired.

3. (TS) The cruiser-based TALOS missile has an effective
range of up to 100 nautical miles, and from the Tonkin Gulf
can provide coverage of the seven known NVN jet airfields
and much of the essential airspace over northeastern NVN.
Aircraft frequently fly defensive patrols, training flights,
and point-to-point flights within range of the missile and
are vulnerable to destruction by TALOS.

4. (TS) The destruct system, a key element of the TALOS
missile, has proven to be 99 percent reliable. To date,
the successful intercept rate of the missile is 44 percent.
Of the firings, 22 percent were destroyed soon after launch
and 24 percent were destroyed down range, operating under restrictions which will specifically prohibit guiding the missile to an intercept point anywhere within vertical cylinders of airspace ten miles in radius from Hanoi and Haiphong, the possibility of a missile impacting in either city will be minimized. Given the high reliability of the destruct system, and the restriction imposed, the probability of a missile landing in either Hanoi or Haiphong is approximately one in one hundred thousand.

5. (TS) JCSM 514-67, dated 18 September 1967, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that authority be granted for the use of SAMs against hostile aircraft. It is understood that action on this request is awaiting concurrence of the Secretary of State.
ANNEX G

AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN

1. (TS) Listed in the Tab are 24 unauthorized ROLLING
THUNDER targets recommended for approval and attack during
the next four months. These targets are in support of
operations to (1) reduce external assistance to NVN; (2)
restrict the movement of supplies by isolating Hanoi and
Haiphong from each other and from the rest of NVN; and
(3) destroy those military and war-supporting facilities/
materiel in NVN that contribute to the support of aggression
in SVN. As other worthwhile targets are developed in areas
requiring approval of higher authority, they will be
recommended for approval and attack.

2. (TS) Closing the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gal and Cam
Pha is the major action required to reduce and impede the
flow of war-supporting materiel entering NVN. This action
will (1) reduce imports; (2) require the enemy to use less
efficient alternatives of over-the-beach or overland import
routes; (3) contribute materially to the isolation of
Hanoi and Haiphong; and (4) increase the effectiveness of
US air operations. From this action ancillary benefits
will accrue to all other tasks of the air campaign.

3. (TS) Importing through Haiphong is one of the most
stable elements of North Vietnamese military operations.
Because the port has been relatively free from attack,
imports have steadily increased during the course of the
three-year conflict. Sudden disruption of this means of
introducing into NVN approximately 80 percent of its
external support will create serious management problems and
irregular shortages of critical imports. This will, in turn, result in increased manpower requirements and seriously reduce the efficiency of the distribution system. Increased shortages of items, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, together with increased demands for manpower will result in decreased effectiveness of NVN operations.

4. (TS) A significant shift to importing by alternate means will be required. This in itself will reduce and impede enemy operations as makeshift facilities and time-consuming lightering methods are employed. Rail lines are already interdicted to some degree and additional tonnage will complicate the problem. This will require increased reliance on the less efficient highway transport system. The use of lighters to offload shipping in open waters and over-the-beach operations will create difficulties in the handling of such heavy items as generators, construction equipment and heavy vehicles. In addition, the continuity of lightering operations will be influenced by the vagaries of weather.

5. (TS) The Government of NVN will be faced with logistic decisions regarding the types, quantity, and import priority of material necessary to continue the war and/or for basic subsistence. Regardless of the decision, the alternate modes are more vulnerable to air attacks. There will be an increase in targets in unrestricted areas and targets of opportunity. Consequently, there should be a degradation of North Vietnamese logistic capabilities with a concurrent increase in the effectiveness of US air operations.
6. (TS) Favorable weather days forecast as available for visual air strikes in Route Package VI during the next four months are as follows: Dec 9, Jan 6, Feb 3, Mar 2, and Apr 4. Air operations conducted during marginal weather periods should increase the number of strike days; however, target selection is limited under these circumstances. More effective use of US air power could be made during the forthcoming bad weather months by mining the major ports to deny external assistance by sea and subsequently applying additional sortie effort to coastal armed reconnaissance and inland LOC interdiction.

RIOT CONTROL AGENT IN AIRCREW RECOVERY

7. (S) By JCSM-480-67, dated 26 August 1967, the use of riot control agent CS in aircrew recovery operations in Laos and North Vietnam was recommended to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The use of CS to assist in recovery of downed aircrews would provide a better suppressive capability than present strafing methods alone and would significantly increase the probability of recovering aircrews. The use of CS as proposed would improve the survivability of aircraft participating in search and recovery operations by more effectively suppressing ground fire; the potential hazard to nearby civilian noncombatants may be significantly diminished in those situations where this temporarily disabling agent is used in conjunction with or in lieu of lethal munitions. To date, the authority requested has not been granted.
### ROLLING THUNDER TARGETS FOR FOUR-MONTH PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
<th>STK</th>
<th>AAA DEF</th>
<th>U.S. DEF</th>
<th>CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Hanoi RR Yd/Shp</td>
<td>&quot;% natl mil cargo handling/&quot;% RR rolling stock repair capacity. Main structures: 16 sidings, turntable, 3 locomotive/RR car repair shops, 26 warehouse/support. Major locomotive repair shop. On main rail line in NW Hanoi.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Hanoi Supply Dpo S</td>
<td>500,000 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 14 storage, 16 warehouses, 11 admin, 17 support. Major supply depot. 2 NM S of Hanoi.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Hanoi Supply Dpo N</td>
<td>385,000 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 81 storage, 57 warehouses, 16 admin, 318 support. Just W of Red River, 1 NM N of Hanoi.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>Hanoi Radcom Rcvr</td>
<td>DF control station. Main structures: operations, antenna field, 22 support. Receives DF data on US transmissions. 10 NW S of Hanoi.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-0004</td>
<td>Haiphong Naval Base (Area D)</td>
<td>100% natl naval support capacity. Main structures: graving dock, 2 piers, 3 marine railways, 40 support. Main naval repair base. On S bank of Cam Estuary in NW Haiphong.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-0051</td>
<td>Haiphong Shipyard 3 (Area B)</td>
<td>Monthly production: 5-6 barges, 5% natl ship construction/13% ship repair capacity. Main structures: 4 graving docks, 3 building ways, 40 support. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>616-0672</td>
<td>Haiphong Shipyard 1 (Area E)</td>
<td>5% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: side launchways, marine railways, 34 support. On S bank of Cam Estuary in NW Haiphong.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>616-2140</td>
<td>Haiphong Shipyard N (Area G)</td>
<td>13% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: 2 graving docks, 3 support. On N bank of Cam Estuary in NW Haiphong.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>Haiphong Approaches (Mining)</td>
<td>3 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.5 to 2.8 NM, include 13.7 NM of channel. Haiphong port w/48% natl cargo handling capacity, handles 80% of ocean shipping and extensive naval, coasting, barge. and small craft traffic. In main and alternate NW/SE channels of Trieu Estuary, 10 NM ESE of Haiphong.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANCE</td>
<td>STK</td>
<td>AAA DPR</td>
<td>CV</td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Hanoi Port (Areas A, C, D, E)</td>
<td>16.000 STG. Main structures: small craft repair yard, repair shops, crane, 6 conveyors, 2 wharves, 156 warehouses. Important transshipment point. On W bank of Red River in SE Hanoi.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Hanoi Trg (electric)</td>
<td>3,740 KW, 15% natl capacity (prestrike). Main structures: generator hall, transformer, boilerhouse, 5 support. Largest in NVN; serves natl mil control cnsrs/key mil installations in Hanoi area. Over separate 35 kv transmission line, provides alternate power to Haiphong Port, JCS Tgt #70. (Target was struck five times; currently operating at 50% capacity.)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-0030</td>
<td>Haiphong RR Yd/Shops</td>
<td>3% natl rail mil cargo handling/5% RR rolling stock repair capacity. Main structures: 8 sidings, 4 spurs, turntable, turning wye, locomotive/RR car repair shops, warehouses. Main transshipment point. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-0038</td>
<td>Hanoi 1ks/Supply Dpo</td>
<td>230,000 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 3 admin, 19 storage, 6 veh repair shops, motor pool, 36 support. 5 NW E of Hanoi.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>616-0901</td>
<td>Haiphong Warehouse Port</td>
<td>105,000 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 28 warehouses, 31 support. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-1033</td>
<td>Haiphong Warehouse</td>
<td>205,000 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 22 storage/support. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-1295</td>
<td>Hanoi Vehicle Maint</td>
<td>98,400 sq ft, 5% natl capacity. Main structures: 4 maint, storage. Major radar repair shop. 5 NW W Hanoi.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-2431</td>
<td>Van Dien RR Siding</td>
<td>3,580' of track. Main structures: spur, 2 sidings. On Hanoi-Vinh rail line, 4 NM S of Hanoi.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-2706</td>
<td>Hanoi Vehicle Repair SW</td>
<td>75,000 sq ft, 10% natl capacity. Main structures: 4 maint, 12 support. Major veh repair shop. 2 NM SSW of Hanoi.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-3373</td>
<td>Haiphong Shipyard Vinh</td>
<td>Monthly production: 3-4 barges, 3% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: 4 building cradles, 6 support. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-3775</td>
<td>Don Ncia POL Tank Fab</td>
<td>Annual capacity: unknown. Main structures: 2 fabrication/assembly, 5 storage. In Haiphong.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate 3%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab A to Annex G
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T&amp;T #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
<th>STK</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>AAA DEP</th>
<th>ELR</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>616-3951</td>
<td>Lang Son Ster</td>
<td>51,100 sq ft, 0.5% natl capacity. Main structures: veh maint, 8 storage, 2 warehouses, 2 admin. Rail transshipment point. On Hanoi-Dong Dang (NE) rail line, 7 NM from China.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616-4022</td>
<td>Phu Yen RR Spur</td>
<td>2,000’ of track. Main structures: spur. Transshipment point. On Hanoi-Haiphong rail line, 7 NM E of Hanoi.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

67.1 Hon Gai Approaches (Mining)

- Minable areas, varying in width from 0.3 to 0.9 NM, include 0.3 NM of dredged channel 12' - 60' deep. Hon Gai Port with 15% natl cargo handling/17% naval support capacity, handles principally coal exports; closest alternate to Haiphong Port. In Ray D'Along 3 and SE of entrance to Hon Gai Port, 25 NM E of Haiphong, 70 NM E of Hanoi.

68.1 Cam Pha Approaches (Mining)

- Minable area 0.7 NM wide x 3.3 NM long, 36' deep. Cam Pha Port with 16% natl cargo handling capacity, handles 90% coal exports. At intersection of 3 deep water approaches, 2 NM S of Cam Pha, 50 NM by sea SW of China border.
HANOI RESTRICTED AREA

(Note) 3 NM CIRCLE ON SOUTH, WEST AND NORTHWEST.
(CENTER COORDINATE) 21 01 37 N/105 51 21 E
HAIPHONG RESTRICTED AREA

(NOTE) 1. 5 NM CIRCLE ON EAST, SOUTH AND WEST.
(CENTER COORDINATE) 20 51 22 N/106 41 10 E
ANNEX H

B-52 OPERATIONS (ARC LIGHT)

SUSTAINED 1200 SORTIE RATE

1. (S) By a 10 November 1967 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense approved a 1200 sortie surge rate to be achieved when directed by CINCPAC, in coordination with CINCSAC, based on the requirements of the operational situation.

2. (S) On 11 November 1967, COMUSMACV reaffirmed the requirement for a sustained ARC LIGHT sortie rate of 1200 per month to keep pressure on the enemy throughout his supply and infiltration system and, at the same time, spoil any efforts to concentrate forces and supplies along the DMZ and western borders.

3. (S) On 20 November 1967, CINCPAC reaffirmed his previous recommendations that the ARC LIGHT sortie rate be increased to a sustained 1200 per month. In addition, it was stated that after-action assessments indicate the concentrated ARC LIGHT bombing pressure against the DMZ targets was a major contributing factor in denying the enemy the success he sought in that area.

4. (S) On 21 November 1967, the Secretary of Defense orally approved a sustained 1200 per month sortie rate.

5. (S) Continuing enemy activity in the DMZ and major supply concentrations in other areas, provide targets that should be struck by B-52s on a continuing basis. Considering the overall target development picture, an ARC LIGHT capability well in excess of the current sustained 800 sorties per month is needed and can be used to great advantage.

6. (S) The key requirement for a sustained 1200 per month sortie rate is munitions availability. A 1200 sortie rate can be attained from bases in Guam and Thailand. Base facilities are now adequate to support such an increase. Plans have been developed to enable a surge to 1200 per month. Approval

[Signature]
.26
Annex H
of Secretary of Defense for increased MK-82 and M-117 bomb production is required to sustain a 1200 rate for more than 60 days.

RESTRICTIONS ON B-52 OPERATIONS IN LAOS

7. (S) The recent decision by the Secretary of Defense to accommodate the total 800 sorties now approved for ARC LIGHT operations in SEAsia by basing an additional ten aircraft at U Tapao, Thailand, will provide greater responsiveness, flexibility and economy. However, the full potential of U Tapao basing cannot be realized until the following restrictions in Laos imposed by American Embassy, Vientiane, are removed:
   a. B-52s are not permitted to fly from Thailand bases across Laos to or from assigned targets in Vietnam or Laos.
   b. A cover strike in SVN is required for all strikes in Laos.
   c. As a general rule, daylight bombing attacks are not permitted in Laos.

8. (S) The flying time from U Tapao to targets in the DMZ area now requires approximately five hours. Approval to overfly Laos from the western border to the DMZ area would permit accomplishing the same results in approximately half the flying time. Once the 800 sortie rate from U Tapao is achieved, overflight of Laos will result in a monthly dollar saving in operational costs alone of approximately 1.2 million dollars. In addition, the decreased flying time will extend the life of the aircraft.

9. (S) Overflight of Laos will reduce the exposure of ARC LIGHT forces to the NVN surface-to-air missile threat by permitting a variation in approach routes to targets.
in the SAM threat zone. It will also permit striking  
certain targets located in Laos and the area of Vietnam  
close to the border of Laos along the optimum axis of  
attack.

10. (S) The requirement for cover strikes was originally  
established to provide a basis for denying that strikes  
were being conducted against targets in Laos. Cover  
strikes are frequently inefficient and sometimes wasteful.  
The strikes now being conducted at a rate of four or five  
per day throughout Vietnam negate the need for continuing  
this requirement. The practice of no public announcement  
of strikes in Laos, would, of course, continue.

11. (S) Approval for daylight strikes in southeastern  
Laos will improve scheduling flexibility and assure more  
efficient use of the force. This is particularly important  
in the event that a cover strike in SVN must continue to  
be scheduled in conjunction with each strike in Laos. The  
limitations imposed by scheduling these missions in pairs  
and during the hours of darkness significantly reduce  
options available in target selection. The current NVA  
practice of "bedding-down" at first light creates lucrative  
daylight truck park and storage area targets in Laos.