Nuclear Posture Review
Why We Have Nuclear Weapons

“Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces that are sufficient to deter diverse threats.”

“We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders.”

“A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.”

President William J. Clinton
NSS July 1994
Why Review US Nuclear Posture?

- First comprehensive review in 15 years
- New security environment
  - Reduction in conventional threat in Europe
  - Threat posed by Russia reduced... different
  - Continuing political/economic reform in FSU
  - Regional threats more important than before
- DoD budget constraints
- Substantial reductions underway and planned
  - Stock-taking needed
  - Need to rebalance infrastructure, industrial and technology bases
  - Need to maintain quality people
Effects of the Changing Security Environment

Security Environment

- End of Cold War
  - Conventional threat from FSU especially to Europe decreases
  - Improving relationship with Russia
  - Uncertainty in FSU political and economic changes
  - Continuing large Russian nuclear arsenal
  - Increased prevalence of regional conflicts

Growing WMD Proliferation
- US and Allies face WMD threat
- FSU "loose" nukes

Regional Engagement
- Regional competitors seek high leverage to offset US conventional forces

Impact

- Smaller role for nuclear weapons in US security strategy
- Focus on threat reduction in FSU
- Explore further relaxation in alert posture
- Explore further force reductions
- Improve storage and security
- Nuclear deterrence still important; responsible stewardship of enduring arsenal without underground nuclear tests
- Retain roughly equivalent forces
- Maintain alliance commitments
- Maintain conventional forces capability to win two MRCs (BUR)
- Reinforce policies to prevent proliferation
- Develop conventional capabilities to deter, defeat, defend against WMD proliferation on the battlefield
Overview

- NPR Process
- Perspective
- Strategic Forces
- Non-Strategic Forces
- C3I
- Infrastructure
- Safety, Security, and Use Control
- Initiatives
- Summary
Part I: NPR Process
Part II: Perspective
A Historical Perspective

- Significant reductions in US nuclear forces are underway
  - Weapons (since 1988)
    - Total active stockpile reduced by 59%
    - Strategic warheads reduced by 47%
    - Non-strategic nuclear force warheads reduced by 90%
    - No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces
  - Operations
    - Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert
    - ICBMs and SLBMs detargeted
    - More SSBNs patrolling on “modified alert” rather than “alert”
    - Naval NSNF no longer routinely deployed at sea
    - Reduced airborne command and control operations tempo

- Programmatic (1989-Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Terminations</th>
<th>Program Truncations</th>
<th>Systems Retired; No Replacement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Small ICBM</td>
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<td>C-3 SSBN</td>
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A Historical Perspective

Accountable Strategic Nuclear Weapons

- US
- USSR to Russia

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
(Active and Inactive)

- US
- USSR to Russia

Annual Budget-All Nuclear
(FY-93 $B)

Personnel
(Primary Duty Nuclear)

[Graphs showing historical data for various categories over the years 1965 to 2003]
Adjusted Nuclear Posture

Counterproliferation

Threat Reduction

Nuclear Forces
- Changed role
- Smaller
- Safer

Stewardship
(Without Nuclear Testing)

Declaratory Policy

Stability

Hedge

Alliance Commitments

Direct Deterrence
Force Structure Paths: Protecting Options In An Uncertain World

- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus
- START I Accountable Warhead Limit
- START II Limit
- Faster/Deeper Reductions
- Upload Reconstitution Hedge
- START II Entry Into Effect

Alternative Forces For Post START II Period Reviewed
Military Requirement for US Strategic Nuclear Forces

- Force plans for 2003:
  - Based on projected military requirements
  - Assume implementation of START I and START II

- Capabilities of Former Soviet Union (FSU) remain primary concern
  - Do not target Russia (or anyone else) today, but . . .
  - Must be prepared for possible emergence of hostile government in Russia or failure of arms control process in the FSU
Platform Attributes

- **Submarines**
  - Survivable $\rightarrow$ Stability

- **Bombers**
  - Survivable (when on alert) $\rightarrow$ Stability
  - Hedge against catastrophic failure of SSBN leg
  - Dual capable--can help in conventional contingencies

- **ICBMs**
  - Significant upload hedge
  - Ability to strike selectively
Post-START II
Force Structure 2003

SSBNs
- 14 SSBNs (retire 4)
- All with D-5 missiles

Bombers
- Retain 2 bases (Kings Bay and Bangor)
- 66 B-52s (28 fewer)
- Non-nuclear role for B-1
- No more than 20 B-2s required for nuclear mission

ICBMs
- Maintain three wings of Minuteman ICBMs (500/450 missiles)
<table>
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<th>Options Reviewed to Achieve Faster/Deeper Reductions</th>
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<tr>
<td>□ Accelerate implementation of START I/II levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Seek accelerated FSU warhead removals to START I levels</td>
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<td>□ Early deactivation/acceleration of START II implementation with US assistance</td>
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<td>□ Negotiate new agreement for faster and deeper reductions</td>
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<td>□ Explore sufficiency of US forces below START II levels</td>
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<td>□ Unilateral reduction</td>
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Warhead Upload Hedge

☐ Must preserve options for uploading/reconstituting US nuclear forces should . . .
  ☐ Political relations with Russia change for the worse
  ☐ START I and START II not be fully implemented

☐ NPR strategic force capable of providing necessary hedge through
  ☐ START II declaratory RV loading
  ☐ Where possible in near term, maintenance of platforms
Part IV: Non-Strategic Forces
Non-Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

- USAF Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA)
  - Maintain Alliance commitment
  - Maintain current strength in CONUS and Europe
- USN Carrier DCA and nuclear TOMAHAWK (TLAM/N)
  - Eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability
  - Maintain capability to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs
Part V: Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)
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<td>Reduced command post structure</td>
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<td>Nevertheless, to maintain deterrence, must carry out key missions</td>
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<td>Safe, secure force management</td>
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<td>Threat assessment</td>
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<td>Connectivity to national leadership</td>
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Strategic C3I Requirements

- Continue adequate funding of critical programs
- Correct existing/projected communication system and tactical warning/attack assessment deficiencies
- Support intelligence systems which provide timely information and threat characterization warning indicators
Part VI: Infrastructure
Infrastructure Requirements

☐ Replace guidance system and re-motor Minuteman III
☐ Continue D-5 production past 1995 to maintain missile industrial base
☐ Fund sustainment of guidance systems and maintain reentry vehicle industrial base
☐ No specific bomber infrastructure funding necessary for nuclear mission
DoD requirements to DOE

- Maintain nuclear weapon capability (without underground nuclear testing or fissile material production)
  - Develop stockpile surveillance engineering base
  - Demonstrate capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in enduring stockpile
  - Maintain capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads
  - Maintain science and technology base
- Ensure tritium availability
- No new-design nuclear warhead production
Part VII: Safety, Security, and Use Control
US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control

- No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces
- Naval NSNF no longer deployed at sea
- Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert
- Since 1988, total active stockpile reduced by 59% (79% by 2003)
  - Strategic warheads reduced by 47% (71% by 2003)
  - NSNF warheads cut by 90%
    - NATO stockpile cut by 91%
- Storage locations reduced by over 75%
- Personnel with access to weapons or control cut by 70%
US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control Recommendations

- Upgrade coded control device (CCD) components on the B-52 and Minuteman III
- Retire Minuteman W-62 warhead
- Optimize number of accident/incident teams
- Continue implementation of FARR recommendations by seeking alternatives for those recommendations that test moratorium may preclude
- Complete Trident CCD in 1997 (means system level coded control devices or PALs will be on all US nuclear weapons by 1997)
- Implement a regular and realistic nuclear procedures exercise program with participation by senior DoD civilian and military leadership
Part VII: Initiatives
Counterproliferation Initiatives

- Develop effective theater defenses against ballistic missile and air-breathing threats
- Enhance conventional capabilities to counter the proliferation threat and support funding for principal Deutch Committee report recommendations
  - Improved real-time detection and characterization of BW/CW agents
  - Underground structures detection and characterization
  - Hard underground target defeat, including advanced non-nuclear weapons producing low collateral damage
- Provide DoD capabilities in support of UN and other international non-proliferation efforts
- Fully implement nuclear arms control agreements and support NPT, BWC, and CWC
- Continue assistance to FSU to enhance safety and security of nuclear weapons
Initiatives Considered for Improving Russian Safety, Security, and Use Control

**Forces**
- Further NSNF reductions
- Accelerating removal of warheads down to START II levels
- Further SNF reductions beyond START II
- Removing warheads from all ICBMs

**Operational Practices**
- Cooperative warning and verification of alert status
- Delaying ICBM/SLBM launch ability

**Weapon Stockpile**
- Stockpile data exchange
- Transparency/acceleration of warhead dismantlement
- Stockpile inventory cap
- Storing weapons/material under international custody
Conclusions

☐ Post-Cold War environment requires nuclear deterrent
  ☐ Rebalanced Triad
  ☐ START II levels remain in US interest until START I implementation complete, Russia nears START II levels, and we're confident of Russia's future

☐ Major reductions and cost savings underway
  ☐ US forces will be smaller, safer, more secure and maintained at lower alert rates
  ☐ Reduce infrastructure, but maintain people and technical base

☐ US Nuclear Posture must help shape future
  ☐ Create world in which role of nuclear weapons reduced
  ☐ Stem proliferation
  ☐ Preserve options if reform fails in Russia
  ☐ Maintain good stewardship

☐ Difficult but vital challenge for US Posture is to both lead and hedge
Main Results of the NPR

- **Strategic Forces**
  - No more than 20 B-2 bombers required for nuclear role
  - Reduce B-52 bomber force (94 to 66)
  - Reduce Trident submarine fleet size from 18 to 14; but modernize SLBM force for very long service life by equipping all submarines with D-5 missiles
  - Maintain single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs (500/450)
  - Maintain flexibility to reduce further or reconstitute

- **Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces**
  - Maintain European NSNF commitment at current level (less than 10% of Cold War level)
  - Eliminate nuclear weapons capability from US Navy surface ships
    - Eliminate nuclear DCA capability from aircraft carriers
    - Eliminate nuclear cruise missile capability from surface combatants
  - Retain nuclear cruise missile capability on submarines
  - Retain land-based dual-capable nuclear aircraft capability
Main Results of the NPR (Cont)

- Safety, Security, and Use Control
  - Equip all US nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices or PAL by 1997
  - Upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers
  - Conduct regular NCA procedural exercises

- Infrastructure
  - Stockpile stewardship “customer plan” for DoE
  - Sustain ballistic missile industrial base by Minuteman III sustainment and D-5 production
  - Sustain reentry vehicle and guidance system industrial base

- Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence and Operations
  - Continue adjustments to post-Cold War alert/operational requirements
  - Support selected C3I programs for assured NCA survivability and continuity

- Threat Reduction and Proliferation
  - Support Cooperative Threat Reduction program to promote steps to prevent unauthorized/accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from/within the FSU
  - Support counterproliferation Initiative to provide conventional responses to use of WMD in regional conflict
DOD REVIEW RECOMMENDS REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR FORCE


"In light of the post-Cold War era, President Bill Clinton directed the Defense Department to reexamine its forces," said Secretary Perry. "First, there was the Bottom Up Review of U.S. conventional force structure conducted under Secretary Aspin. Now we have just completed a review of our nuclear forces."

The NPR is the first such review of U.S. nuclear policy in 15 years, and the first study ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety and security and arms control in a single review.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The most important results of the Nuclear Posture Review can be seen in the decisions made to reduce the strategic nuclear force structure the U.S. plans to retain after the START II Treaty is implemented. The NPR recommends the following strategic nuclear force adjustments:

-- Fourteen Trident submarines carrying Trident II (D-5) missiles -- retiring four submarines -- rather than 18 submarines, 10 carrying D-5 and 8 carrying C-4 missiles.

-- Sixty-six B-52 bombers, reduced from the 94 planned a year ago.

-- No requirement for any additional B-2 bombers in a nuclear role.

-- All B-1 bombers will be reoriented to a conventional role.

-- Three wings of Minuteman III missiles carrying single warheads (500-450).

No new strategic systems are under development or planned.

-MORE-
“NPR decisions allow us to put U.S. nuclear programs on a stable footing. But a fundamental underlying judgment of the Review is that we are at the threshold of a decade of planned reductions, and we will continue to reassess the opportunities for further reduction or, if necessary, respond to unanticipated challenges as time goes on. The NPR strategic force provides that needed flexibility,” Secretary Perry said.

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

In the Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF) arena, the NPR makes the following recommendations, including eliminating entirely two of five remaining types of NSNF:

-- Retain our current commitment to NATO of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe (less than 10 percent of Cold War levels).

-- Retain continental U.S.-based dual-capable aircraft.

-- Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based dual-capable aircraft.

-- Eliminate the option to carry nuclear cruise missiles on surface ships.

-- Retain the capability to deploy nuclear cruise missiles on submarines.

The effect of the NSNF recommendations is to eliminate the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on surface naval ships, while maintaining a non-strategic force capability to fulfill our commitments to allies.

NUCLEAR SAFETY, SECURITY AND USE CONTROL

In addition to the reductions on overall numbers of weapons as noted above, since 1988 the U.S. has taken a number of steps to improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons. U.S. bombers no longer stand day-to-day alert and strategic missiles are no longer targeted against any country. The U.S. has reduced the number of nuclear storage locations by over 75 percent and the number of personnel with access to weapons or control by 70 percent. The NPR examined ways to ensure U.S. ability to continue to meet the highest standards of stewardship of its nuclear forces and identified several areas for further improvements in U.S. forces' safety, security and use control. The NPR recommends that:

-- the U.S. equip all its nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices by 1997; and upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers.

-MORE-
COMMAN D, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

While dramatic changes have taken place in the area of command, control, communications and intelligence, the NPR recommendations ensure that our C3I structure will continue to be able to carry out key missions to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capability.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The NPR also made a number of recommendations regarding the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces. The Department will work closely with the Department of Energy, under the aegis of the stockpile stewardship program, to maintain a reliable, safe nuclear stockpile under a comprehensive test ban treaty. The U.S. will maintain selected portions of the defense industrial base that are unique to strategic and other nuclear systems.

THREAT REDUCTION AND PROLIFERATION

The NPR recommended that the U.S. take advantage of the new opportunities for threat reduction through cooperative engagement; supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program to reduce the danger of unauthorized/accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from or within the former Soviet Union. It also supports the U.S. Counterproliferation initiative to enhance conventional responses to the use of weapons of mass destruction in regional conflict.

"The NPR decisions allow us to put our nuclear programs in DoD on a stable footing after several years of rapid changes in our forces and programs. These adjustments reflect the changed political situation at the end of the Cold War and the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security," said Dr. Perry.

"As we make adjustments in our future plans for the U.S. nuclear posture, uppermost in our minds is the fact that the states of the former Soviet Union are yet in the early stages of implementing the agreed reductions called for by the START I and START II agreements," Dr. Perry said. "We are trying to hasten that process through, among other things, our Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. But we kept in mind as we conducted the NPR that START I has not yet entered into force, nor has START II be ratified. For this reason, and because of the uncertain future of the rapid political and economic change still underway in the former Soviet Union, we made two judgments in the NPR.

"First, we concluded that deeper reductions beyond those we made in the NPR would be imprudent at this time; and second, we took several actions to ensure that we could reconstitute our forces as the decade went along, if we needed to," Secretary Perry said.

"The results of the NPR strike an appropriate balance between showing U.S. leadership in responding to the changed international environment and hedging against an uncertain future," he said.

-MORE-
BACKGROUND: REDUCTIONS IN U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES UNDERWAY

Since 1989, the U.S. has made a number of significant changes in its nuclear posture:

The total U.S. active nuclear stockpile has been reduced 59 percent and will be
reduced a total of 79 percent by 2003.

Strategic warheads have been reduced 47 percent to date and will be reduced a
total of 71 percent by 2003 with the implementation of START I and START II.

Strategic bombers have been taken off alert.

Nuclear weapons storage locations have been reduced by over 75 percent.

THREAT REDUCTION AND PROTECTION

We have eliminated the nuclear roles of the Army and the Marines. The Navy no
longer routinely deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the Air Force has dramatically cut its
tactical nuclear stockpile.

We have terminated almost all of our nuclear modernization programs.

-END-

The NFR decisions show us to our nuclear programs in DoD a stable footing
without the restraining hand of a large force structure. Free from the pressures of a large force structure, we
are building a force that is capable of meeting the requirements of the 21st Century.

As we continue our transformation to a global power, we must constantly adapt to
new technologies and new threats. The NFR will ensure that our national security efforts remain as
modern and effective as possible.

The NFR decisions will allow us to:
- Reduce the size of the force structure
- Reduce the number of nuclear weapons
- Reduce the number of nuclear weapons-storage locations
- Reduce the number of nuclear weapons production facilities

In the future, we will face new challenges that require new solutions. We must
continue to adapt to these challenges and ensure that our nuclear forces remain
strong and effective.

MORE...
IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 20, 1994

REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY TO THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 20 SEPTEMBER 1994

All our adult lives, we have lived with the threat of nuclear holocaust hanging over our heads like a dark cloud, threatening the extinction of all mankind. All of my 18 predecessors as Secretary of Defense have had to accept the existence of this cloud and to deal with it by temporizing measures designed to keep a cloudburst from occurring. For example, our nuclear policies during the Cold War did not presume to solve the nuclear problem, but only to keep it from exploding.

Politicians and nuclear scientists in both the U.S. and Soviet Union were consumed by this task of “reducing the risk.” The spirit of these times was captured by Andrei Sakharov, who said, “Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.”

Now, with the end of the Cold War, that dark nuclear cloud has drifted away, and the whole world breathes easier in the sunlight. My task as the Secretary of Defense is to take what action I can to keep that cloud from drifting back to threaten the world again. The threat today is not as immediate as it was to Sakharov during the Cold War, but the consequences of failure are no less dangerous. Therefore, I have to believe along with Sakharov that this is an “absolute priority” for me.

Of course, the drifting away of the cloud was not the result of any of our Cold War nuclear policies. Rather, the dramatic reduction in the threat of nuclear war is a result of the radically changed security situation today, including a democratic, non-hostile Russia, with whom we have a new political relationship, and drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals underway.

In light of this new situation, we recently conducted a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces and policies.

-MORE-
But in contrast to the U.S., Russia has deactivated just over half of the ballistic missiles required under START agreements. Its non-strategic nuclear warhead stockpile greatly exceeds ours. And each of the Russian armed services continues to retain a nuclear role.

This lag is partly due to internal turmoil and old thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in military security. But more importantly, denuclearization is costly and complex.

There are two ways to deal with Russia’s lag.

First, the Nuclear Posture Review indicated that the United States could make further reductions in its non-strategic nuclear arsenal and, assuming START I and II are implemented fully, further reductions in our strategic force structure. I believe that if Russia rethinks its security needs and budget realities, it too will revise its plans downward, especially in the area of non-strategic forces. We would like to see Russia consolidate these non-strategic weapons in the smallest possible number of storage sites; store them under stricter safeguards and inventory control; and dismantle its older and excess weapons sooner.

A direct way to speed up the dismantling of Russia’s nuclear weapons is through the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program.

The Nunn-Lugar program provides funds to help dismantle the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, convert the Soviet weapons industry to civilian production, and generally help reduce the former Soviet force structure. It’s defense by other means.

However, over the past few months, a number of questions have come up in Congress about the Nunn-Lugar program — questions about whether it’s an appropriate use of defense resources, and the rate at which we’ve put these funds to work. Well, let me tell you how much this program has already accomplished:

- It has helped remove more than 1,600 strategic nuclear warheads — roughly half — from delivery systems in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

- It has helped withdraw strategic systems from those nations. SS-18s are coming out of Kazakhstan and SS-25s from Belarus. Ukraine has deactivated 40 SS-19s and 37 SS-24s.

- And 3,000 former weapon scientists are being re-employed on civilian projects.

Six months ago, when I was in Ukraine, I went down, underground, 12 stories, into the former Soviet ICBM launch control center at Pervomaysk. Two young officers went through the sequence that would have been used to launch 86 missiles, carrying 700 warheads aimed at the United States. And I saw, first hand, the terror of the Cold War.

-MORE-
Then we went above ground to look into one of the missile silos. It contained a huge missile, an SS-24 ICBM. But the warheads were gone. They had been removed and prepared for shipment to Russia to be dismantled. And I saw, first hand, the benefits of the end of the Cold War.

That was the Nunn-Lugar program in action. Reducing the nuclear threat does not get any more immediate, or more direct than this.

By the end of the year 2003, the Nunn-Lugar program will have helped dismantle strategic systems carrying some 8,000 nuclear warheads, bringing the Soviet nuclear arsenal down to START I and II levels.

But the benefits of Nunn-Lugar go beyond that. It also serves as a good-faith sign that the United States is willing to help these nations confront the massive task of reorienting the military establishments left behind by the Soviet Union.

The pace of Nunn-Lugar expenditures is on the fastest track possible. It takes time to negotiate the legal agreements with the recipient governments, offer bids and let contracts. The program did begin slowly, and I’m personally disappointed that it took this administration so much time to get it moving.

But a year of hard work has changed that situation dramatically, and now the program is moving quickly. Thirty-eight agreements have been reached with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. They commit more than $900 million for assistance projects. And over the past nine months, the rate of obligations has increased five-fold.

Because the program is speeding up, I’ve just established a dedicated program office at the Pentagon to take charge of the Nunn-Lugar program in our acquisition system.

A lack of funds now threatens to derail this progress. Indeed, because of a congressionally imposed funding crunch, nuclear missile dismantlement equipment bound for Russia is just sitting on American docks, awaiting transportation funds.

Dollar for dollar, there is no better way to spend national security resources than to help destroy a former enemy’s nuclear weapons and industry. It’s a small investment with an enormous payoff. There would be nothing more penny wise and pound foolish than for the United States to fail to seize this investment opportunity.

That brings me to the third concern we have with Russia: the potential loss of control of former Soviet nuclear weapons, components and materials.

I’m talking not just about the danger that fissile materials will fall into the wrong hands, which was dramatized by the interception of small amounts of nuclear material on the European black market. I’m also concerned about the danger of loose tactical nuclear weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells, land mines and others. Some of these are small enough to fit in the trunk of a car.

-MORE-
This effort, called the Nuclear Posture Review, looked at policy, doctrine, force structure, operations, safety and security, and arms control. The Review confirmed that, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons will play a greatly changed role in our national security strategy. But in the course of the review, we also identified three problems that we must deal with as we reshape our nuclear posture:

• First, the small but real danger that reform in Russia might fail and a new government arise hostile to the United States, still armed with 25,000 nuclear weapons requires us to retain a nuclear hedge.

• Second, even with a friendly Russia, we are concerned that its overall drawdown of nuclear weapons is going more slowly than ours.

• And third, because of instabilities attendant to the drastic social, political and economic reforms underway in Russia and the other new states, we must be especially concerned with the security of nuclear components and materials in the nuclear nations of the former Soviet Union.

Russia has made tremendous strides toward reform. Political stability has increased markedly in Moscow since the siege of the Russian White House one year ago next month. Even more impressively, Russian economic reform is moving full speed ahead, with privatization as its centerpiece. In the security domain, Russia is cooperating on many fronts, from denuclearization, to joint exercises, diplomatic efforts in Bosnia and the Mideast, and membership in the Partnership for Peace.

Just to highlight one area of cooperation, two weeks ago, in Totskoye, American forces of the 3rd Infantry Division conducted joint peacekeeping training with the Russian 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division. The exercise was a sharp contrast with the past. It took place on a remote training field where the Soviets conducted above-ground nuclear tests in the 1950s. These very divisions once faced off across the Fulda Gap, and trained to fight one another in war. Now, they’ve trained to work together for peace.

This is all good news.

But as I noted in a speech last spring to George Washington University, we have built a pragmatic partnership with Russia because we need to lock in these gains and successes.

There is still plenty of uncertainty. The Russian people have been trying, in a few short years, to change from an authoritarian government to a democratic government; from a state-controlled economy to a market economy. While Russia has succeeded in dismantling the controls of the previous system, the new institutions are still being created. Ukraine is experiencing similar successes and uncertainties. In short, Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union are struggling, and will continue to struggle, with the historic changes underway.
Therefore, we cannot be complacent about unforeseen outcomes of the second Soviet revolution. We must be prepared for them. Reversal of reform in Russia could jeopardize the move toward democracy, economic development, the sovereignty of its newly independent neighbors, and the prospects for global cooperation.

But the most important reason to be concerned about the future is that Russia still has about 25,000 nuclear weapons — many more than enough to threaten our national survival.

In light of the uncertain future, and the continuing existence of this large Cold War legacy, the Nuclear Posture Review recommended that we maintain our flexibility — a hedge — in the following ways:

• First, we will maintain selected portions of the defense industrial base that are unique to strategic and other nuclear systems.

• Second, the U.S. Department of Defense also will maintain a strong working partnership with the Department of Energy, to ensure the soundest stewardship for our deterrent stockpile, without nuclear testing.

• And third, we will ensure, as we draw down our nuclear forces, that we have the ability to reconstitute these forces if we need to.

A second issue the Nuclear Posture Review highlighted is that we must work with Russia to speed up its lagging nuclear reduction and dismantlement.

Over the past six years, the United States has made dramatic reductions in our nuclear forces. For example:

• Our total active nuclear stockpile has been reduced by almost 60 percent, with strategic warheads cut in half and non-strategic weapons down 90 percent.

• Our long-range, strategic nuclear weapons are now down to START I levels. We have deactivated, retired or begun to dismantle all 450 Minuteman II ICBMs, Poseidon-class nuclear submarines, and the C-3 ballistic missiles based on them.

• We’ve terminated almost all of our nuclear modernization programs.

• We’ve substantially reduced our spending on strategic forces, from $47 billion in 1984, or 13.6 percent of the overall defense budget; to $12.4 billion today, or 5 percent of the budget.

• The Army and Marines have completely given up their nuclear roles; the Navy no longer deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons; the Air Force has dramatically cut its tactical nuclear stockpile.

This process will continue when Ukraine signs the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and START I enters into force. Then we look forward to ratification of START II.
The Soviet and Russian military custodians have an excellent record of control extending over half a century. But Russia's stockpiles are more numerous and varied than ours. Russia's strategic and non-strategic forces are scattered over more than 100 sites. Moreover, many of these weapons have antiquated safety and locking devices. It is critical that excess weapons be dismantled quickly, and that remaining weapons be stored in the smallest number of locations and under the strictest physical and inventory control.

Under President Clinton's leadership and Vice President Gore's work with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, we have created several programs to improve control over fissile materials and to improve our cooperative law enforcement efforts. These cover four basic areas:

- First, ceasing production of fissile materials. The United States and Russia signed an agreement in June to shut down the remaining plutonium-producing reactors by the year 2000, and to ban the use of plutonium in weapons. We have also contracted to buy 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russian weapons for conversion to civil reactor fuel.

- Second, safer storage. We want to work with the Russians to construct a new storage facility for fissile material from dismantled weapons.

- Third, more cooperation. We're expanding a number of U.S.-Russian cooperative programs that ensure nuclear control and accountability -- for example, between our weapons labs. And we're working together at the highest levels, all the way up to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Russian Defense Minister.

- And fourth, better inventories. Our countries will continue to work toward a regime to confirm the inventories of excess nuclear warheads and nuclear materials from dismantled warheads.

These are great steps, but we should go farther. In particular, we should extend our cooperative efforts to control fissile materials, and cover the weapons themselves. The Nuclear Posture Review recommends that the United States set the standard for the world by setting up the most stringent safety and security standards for our own nuclear forces. This means equipping our nuclear weapons and systems with the most modern control devices, or retiring older ones that don't incorporate the most modern features.

Once again, we would encourage Russia to take this opportunity to strengthen its own nuclear safety, security and use control methods.

In addition, consistent with U.S. legislation, we propose to share, on a reciprocal and confidential basis, data on our stockpile of nuclear warheads. These include numbers, locations, and dismantlement schedules. This would serve to encourage transparency, trust, and inventory control.

Finally, we should embark on a new cooperative initiative under the Nunn-Lugar program directed at strengthening the Russian "chain of custody" over nuclear weapons and hastening their dismantlement. But this will be possible only if Congress provides the Nunn-Lugar funds to do it.

-MORE-
All these initiatives recognize one unfortunate truth about the post-Cold War era: Even though the superpower nuclear standoff is over, the nuclear age is not. We can't shut the lid on the nuclear Pandora's box, but we can — and must — limit and control the dangers it has released.

Let me close today with my vision for the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship.

During the Cold War era, we lived under a doctrine with an acronym that perfectly captured the insanity of the superpower nuclear standoff: Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD. For many years, it seemed that we would be locked forever in this MAD struggle. And arms control was a high-stakes chess game played by bitter enemies with a nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over our heads.

Those days are behind us.

We now have the opportunity to create a new relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.

What I've talked about in my speech today is nothing less than a new form of arms control, with a completely new emphasis and style. It takes advantage of the radically changed security situation with Russia and the former Soviet states. The new arms control I've outlined has four new approaches:

- It emphasizes nuclear safety, in addition to stability.
- It emphasizes cooperation to reach shared objectives, rather than pressure to make concessions.
- It focuses on carrying out existing agreements, actually eliminating the weapons we've agreed to eliminate.
- And it focuses on the real issue of nuclear safety, stability, and proliferation: bombs and bomb materials, in addition to missiles, silos, bombers and submarines.

Nearly half a century ago, Secretary of War Henry Stimson grappled with the early days of MAD. Today, as Secretary of Defense, my number-one priority is to put MAD behind us for good, to replace it with Mutual Assured Safety. We must seize the opportunity that Stimson, in his time, was denied: the opportunity to make the world a safer place.

Thank you very much.

-END-
Mr. Bacon: Good afternoon. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will open with comments, then Secretary Deutch will answer your questions. Unfortunately, Secretary Perry and General Shali will not be able to because they have an appointment at 4 o'clock.

Q: Any chance for a quick dump on Haiti before you begin, Mr. Secretary, since the time is short?
A: No.

Secretary Perry: Nuclear weapons were the most vivid and significant symbol of the Cold War. They were characterized by four principle factors. First of all, an application of enormous resources. During the peak of our spending we were spending about $50 billion a year on our strategic nuclear programs. And of course they occupied some of our most talented scientists and engineers.

Secondly, it was characterized by an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, an arms race which was dangerous to both countries, and indeed, dangerous to the world.

Third, it was characterized by a unique web of treaties which were intended to try to control that arms race and reduce the danger.

Fourth, it was characterized by a unique military strategy called mutual assured destruction, or MAD. I would liken MAD to two men holding revolvers and standing about ten yards away and pointing their revolvers at each other's heads. The revolvers are loaded, cocked, their fingers are on the
trigger. To make matters worse, they’re shouting insults at each other. That characterized MAD, which was what we had to control this arms race, this nuclear terror, during all the periods of the Cold War.

Now with an end to the Cold War there have been fundamental changes. We have had a dramatic reduction in resources, from $50 billion a year heading down to $15 billion a year, and a corresponding reduction in personnel working on this program. Now instead of competition and build-up of weapons, we have cooperation and build-down. We have about a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons and about a 90 percent reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. Now we have much less dependence on treaties and much greater dependence on unilateral and bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons. But even with those dramatic changes, the strategy remains the same. That is, to quote a famous nuclear scientist, "We have changed everything except the way we think."

Now it's time to change the way we think about nuclear weapons, and the Nuclear Posture Review was conceived to do just that. The Nuclear Posture Review dealt with two great issues. The first issue was how to achieve the proper balance between what I would call leading and hedging. By leading I mean providing the leadership for further and continuing reductions in nuclear weapons, so that we can get the benefit of the savings that would be achieved by that. At the same time, we also want to hedge, hedge against the reversal of reform in Russia. A return to an authoritative military regime hostile to the United States and still armed with 25,000 nuclear weapons. We do not believe that reversal is likely, and we are working with Russia to minimize the risk of it occurring. Nevertheless, we still feel it is prudent to provide some hedge against that happening.

Therefore, we have tried to achieve a balance between those two objectives, and I believe this Nuclear Posture Review may be judged and should be judged by how successful we were in achieving the balance between leading on the one hand and hedging on the other.

The second big issue in the Nuclear Posture Review was how to achieve the benefit of improved safety and security for the residual force of nuclear weapons. Inherent in the reduction of nuclear forces and inherent in the improved technology is the potential for achieving very great improvement in safety and security. Therefore, the Nuclear Posture Review focused on what actions, what programs we could undertake to fully achieve those benefits - both in the United States and in Russia.

Therefore, the new posture which we are seeking responds to those two great issues and therefore, almost by definition, it is no longer based on
mutual assured destruction, no longer based on MAD. We have coined a new term for our new posture which we call mutual assured safety, or MAS.

This press briefing will describe the results of the ten month study we've conducted on these issues, and will describe to you the blueprints we have put together for our nuclear posture on into the next century. This blueprint will determine the programs we have for force structure, for infrastructure, for safety-and security, for command, control, communications and intelligence programs, all associated with our nuclear program.

This Nuclear Posture Review, like the Bottom-Up Review, was conducted by a joint civilian/military team in this building. The team was headed by Dr. Carter on the civilian side, Vice Admiral Owens on the military side. The study was an in-depth study, and it was a no-holds-barred study.

Last week we presented the results of the study to President Clinton, who gave us his full approval to proceed on this program. Today I wanted to introduce the study to you, ask General Shali to join me in the introduction, and then our Deputy Secretary, John Deutch, will give you a detailed report on our findings in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Let me now introduce General Shalikashvili.

General Shalikashvili: Before I relinquish this podium to Dr. Deutch, let me reemphasize the point that Secretary Perry made, and that is that this nuclear review is the product of a very close and collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services, and the commanders of our unified commands. The conclusions of this review are, in my judgment, a very prudent balance between our arms control accord, our current and anticipated deterrent requirements, and our conviction that we need to protect the inherent advantages of our triad structure. And I think equally importantly, the results also provide us with the necessary hedges in the event that some of our more optimistic anticipations don't materialize.

I think there is one other point that is important to emphasize, and that is that our commitments to our allies are neither changed nor in any way diminished by this review. The United States will retain all of the capabilities we need to sustain our commitments overseas. To this end, even though we are removing the capability to place non-strategic nuclear weapons in our surface ships and our carrier-based aircraft, we will retain our ability to place nuclear Tomahawk missiles on board our attack submarines and to deploy these forward. And of course, our dual purpose aircraft, those capable of performing conventional and nuclear missions, will
retain the ability to deploy when and if the situation may require to support our allies and important interests abroad.

Finally, the Chiefs and I are in full agreement that this review strikes a prudent balance between leading the way to a safer world and hedging against the unexpected. When it is fully implemented, the results will certainly protect America and its interests.

With that, let me turn it over to Dr. Deutch.

Q: General Shali, can we just ask you a quick question about Bosnia?

Dr. Deutch: I am going to try and tell you a little bit about this Nuclear Posture Review. I think you have available a set of these viewgraphs. What I’ll do is I’ll try... I’m going to go through it very quickly, and I know you want to ask questions about other subjects of others. So let me begin by telling you about the Nuclear Posture Review.

Bill Clinton is clear on the fact that nuclear weapons remain part of the post Cold War world that we have to deal with. It’s important that we retain the nuclear forces necessary to deter any possible outcome. Our problem here in the Nuclear Posture Review, a 10 month study, jointly undertaken by the civilian and military of this Department, was to chart the course of our nuclear posture.

This is the first comprehensive look in a number of years. It does lean very heavily on the new security environment, both with respect to strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. We tried to be sensitive to the fact that we were under resource constraints, and we are very sensitive to the changes which have taken place in the past. The one area where one wants to have continuity in policies and programs is the nuclear programs of this country. We’re not looking for abrupt changes, we are looking for adaptions for change. What I think this study will show you is we are on a consistent path in this country on reducing our nuclear arsenal, improving the safety of the world, and yet maintaining our security.

This is the prospectus, all the different subjects that were undertaken in the Nuclear Posture Review. Strategic forces is one which usually gets the headlines. Let me say that there are incredibly important aspects we’re undergoing in the command and control of our nuclear forces, in ways of improving the safety and the security and the use of these weapons. In this ten month study all elements, including infrastructure, were looked upon in the Bottom-Up Review. I’m going to try and briefly spend time on each one of them.
The structure of this review is described here. What you see is all the different pieces that have to be taken into account in arriving at a nuclear posture, in arriving at a policy for the role of nuclear weapons in our national security. There are a whole set of complicated considerations that have to be taken into account.

The effort that was undertaken by the Department, as Bill Perry and General Shalikashvili mentioned, included working groups from both the Joint Staff, Strike Com and our civilian parts of the Department of Defense. It was under the heading of Ash Carter and General Wes Clark. Bill Owens and myself served as head of the steering committee. But the important point here is the collaborative effort which involves all elements of the Department.

The most important part which I can talk to you about to begin this discussion has to do with perspective. If I can ask you to recall, since the height of the Cold War there have been significant reductions in our nuclear arsenal, there have been significant reductions in operations, and there have been many program terminations, and many of you here are well aware of the history that's led to such things as cancellation, first introduction and then cancellation of the small ICBM, the reduction in the size of the B-2 program. All these steps are things that have taken place as this country has responded to the changed strategic circumstances that have existed at the end of the Cold War.

Perhaps it's important to get a quantitative sense here. This may be one of the most important charts that I present to you. First of all, I would like you to note that the number of accountable strategic nuclear warheads as a result of our arms control efforts have dropped considerably from the beginning, from the height of the Cold War in 1965, but there has been a significant reduction. So today, the situation we have now, START I has been ratified but has not yet entered into force; START II has yet to be ratified or entered into force. Currently there is a major disparity in the countable nuclear warheads. But at 2003, the end of the time period under consideration by the Nuclear Posture Review, we expect that there will have been a sharp reduction for both Russia and the United States in terms of their accountable strategic nuclear weapons.

It's very important, one of the most important parts of the Nuclear Posture Review, is the decline which we anticipate will take place in non-strategic nuclear forces is not happening. Currently today Russia has between 6,000 and 13,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. We have a much reduced number from that. We are anticipating going significantly lower in non-strategic nuclear forces, and we have to encourage the Russians--there
are no treaties requiring that we reduce the non-strategic nuclear forces in the outcoming years. Non-strategic nuclear forces remain one of the central problems we will be facing in managing our nuclear relationships during the coming year.

I want to also emphasize there has been a 70 percent reduction in the amount of money we're spending on nuclear weapons from the height of the Cold War to the program period we're talking about here—as well as a 70 percent reduction in the personnel who are concerned with nuclear weapons. The point is, you have a context here for the Nuclear Posture Review: this country has been adjusting over time in both its programs and its policies and its arms control agreements due to changed political circumstances at the end of the Cold War, and we have further steps that we are describing here today along that path. It is no longer the mutually assured destruction situation that Bill Perry mentioned of the Cold War.

In arriving at our nuclear posture, we had many different considerations. Some of them quite qualitative, like counterproliferation—the declaratory policy we might have with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Some very quantitative, such as the stability of our forces—the ability of our forces to withstand a postulated first attack so that we know we would be able to retaliate. And thereby, that ability to retaliate deters the probability of a first strike initially hedges—quantitative ways we can rebuild our forces if Russia does not develop in the peaceful way that we hope in the future.

All of these different considerations go into arriving at the policy and the force structure that we have recommended to the President—we decided upon last week. This is a changed role for nuclear forces. You'll see smaller nuclear forces, and very importantly, it means safer and more controllable nuclear forces.

Because of the uncertainty, I would next talk to you about strategic forces. Because of the uncertainty in the way the force structure will change in Russia, whether the path they will take to comply with START I and START II, we face the following situation. The actual number of warheads that are possessed by the states of the former Soviet Union is coming down much more slowly than the warheads that are in our active military stockpiles. We are on a path to reducing and have reduced these very significantly. And out through the end of the START II period—2003 when START II comes into force—we intend to have our force structure down to 3500. But you see that there is a question. Already the Russians are reducing their warheads more slowly than us, and there's a question about what might happen in the future. There's a possibility that as we go through this period of time there will be additional reductions and our force structure that we are proposing today is sufficiently flexible to lead in a direction of
additional reduction; but it is also possible that Russia will not develop as we hope, and therefore, it is also necessary for us to maintain a hedge to return to a more robust nuclear posture should that be necessary.

Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure that they had at the height of the Cold War due to the collapse of their economy and the change in their political situation. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. If something does go wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge. It is for this reason that we must keep the possibility both of hedging the need to increase these forces that we are planning to reduce down to the level of 3500, and at the same time, if matters go as we hope, towards a more democratic, more peaceful Russia, that we will be able to reduce the warheads even further. So this is a posture which allows us both to lead, lead in terms of the reductions we're taking, and to hedge in case we have to make adjustments in the future.

The way we arrived at requirements for U.S. nuclear force structure for this period of time through START II was to assess the capabilities of the former Soviet Union—the targets that are there—and we looked at the kind of targeting and kinds of attack plans we might have, and also are prepared to deal with hostile governments not only in Russia, but in other countries.

The central elements of our strategic posture are submarines, bombers and ICBMs. Each of these different platforms have important attributes, especially submarines, which have the virtue of contributing stability, too, because they are so difficult to target and impossible to track when they are deployed at sea. So each one of these elements was considered in the Nuclear Posture Review.

We looked at a variety of different targets—target sets that had to be required, that might be required. We looked at a variety of different force structures. What I would like to do is report to you now on the force structure decisions that have been made.

First, we will reduce the number of ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14. We will retire four submarines.

Second, we proposed to retrofit all 14 of these submarines with D-5 Trident missiles. That means we will take four of the boats that currently have D-4 missiles and retrofit them with D-5 missiles.

Third, we plan to maintain two bases for this Trident force on both the East and West Coast[s].
Secondly, with respect to bombers, we propose to maintain a force of 66 B-52 bombers which are dual-capable for both conventional and nuclear role[s]. The B-1 bomber will no longer have a nuclear role. And we believe that the 20 B-2s, no more than the 20 B-2s that are currently programmed, are required to be dual capable for the nuclear mission.

With respect to ICBMs, we will retain the 500 Minuteman ICBMs in three wings located in the Western part of the United States.

I want to emphasize that this force structure permits options for deeper reductions to accelerate both the implementation of START II and to go to even larger and more far-reaching reductions, should the political circumstances warrant. One part of this strategy is to lead into deeper reductions if the political circumstances should allow. Alternatively, the structure, as I've indicated as a hedge possibility, we preserve the option for uploading additional warheads on the Trident missiles, additional weapons on the bombers, additional loadings on the ICBMs—in case it should be necessary in an adverse and unexpected situation to require more robust nuclear forces.

May I next turn to the non-strategic nuclear force. There are some central decisions here that General Shalikashvili mentioned. First, we will maintain United States Air Force dual-capable aircraft. That is aircraft that is capable to carry either conventional or nuclear ordnance. We will maintain those in the United States, and we will maintain them in Europe as part of our commitment to the Alliance. We will cease to maintain the capability for nuclear weapons on our surface ships—that is, both our carriers and our other surface combatants. For some years we have not had nuclear weapons on these ships, and today we are beginning the process of removing the capability both in terms of the training of the individuals and the facilities on the ships themselves to deal with nuclear weapons on the surface vessels. However, our attack submarines will maintain the capability to launch nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles or so-called T-LAM missiles.

The headlines are usually given to the force structure changes. An important part of this has been to improve also the command, control and communications of these weapons systems. It is both C3—command, control and communications—which makes the forces capable, and therefore contributes to their deterrent value, and which maintains the controllability of these forces which assures that we have a more secure and a safer nuclear arsenal.
Here are some of the modifications that have been made, and are proposed to be made in order to improve the command, control and communications of our nuclear forces.

We will continue to work on, although at a lower level from what was the case in the Cold War—to work on improving the command, control, and communications of these nuclear forces and especially to correct and improve the communications systems and attack warning systems for the nuclear systems.

Let me next turn to infrastructure. Consistent with the Bottom-Up Review we looked at the infrastructure. And I will just briefly report to you on some of the conclusions of our look at the industrial infrastructure—technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons. On this chart perhaps the most important point is our view that the D-5 production will not only serve a low cost way of providing for the missile systems with a reduced ballistic missile fleet, but it also preserve an industrial base for strategic missiles in this country.

Another aspect of our infrastructure concerns our relationship with the Department of Energy to assure that the Department of Energy has the capability in nuclear weapons that we need to arm our systems, and we have a mechanism in place through the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide our requirements to the Department of Energy. We think this is working very well. These are at the top levels, the requirements that we are placing into the Department of Energy. There is an issue about providing for tritium over the longer term which we are working with them. I want to stress that at the present time we do not see the need for new nuclear warheads to be added to our arsenal. No new designed nuclear warhead is required as a result of this review.

Connected with the command, control, and communications—which is such an important element of controlling forces—are the safety and security of the weapons themselves. This is an area where enormous effort has been taken by this Administration. Over a period of time, as a result of the reductions that we’ve had in our nuclear forces, we have a more controlled and a safer posture for our nuclear weapons. In addition to these changes in posture, we have a number of technical changes. Again, they’re not very glamorous, but they are important to improving the controllability and the safety and reliability of these nuclear weapons. All of these permissive action links and safety improvements will be introduced over the next five-year period. We have the funds programmed to do it, and we will include these funds in the FY96 budget.
I want to touch on a related and important matter with our nuclear posture. We are very conscious of the fact that the way we conduct ourselves with our nuclear weapons will influence the way the Russians comport themselves with respect to their nuclear weapons. We have a whole series of operational practices, changes in the way we manage our forces, that we hope that—working together with the Russians—will bring them to have a smaller, more secure and stabler nuclear posture themselves. It is in our interest to encourage the Russians to move in this direction. Counterproliferation is an important part of that feature, and our efforts on cooperative threat reduction with the Russians are an essential feature of the way we view our nuclear force structure. It's not only how our forces are maintained, but our ability to influence the Russians in the way they take steps for a smaller, more secure, safer stockpile.

Let me summarize the results of this posture review, and I'm sorry I'm going on so long. We believe that we have continued a trend that has been going on in response to a very changed security environment. We've rebalanced, as you've seen, our triad by reducing our forces. We believe that we are continuing to plan for START II totals, requirements for 3500 weapons in 2003—the time period when START II should enter into force. But very importantly, we are leading towards the possibility for further reduction, but we are hedging in case there are needs for additional forces.

We believe that this posture commits us to a safer future, and that it is an important one in the continuing process this nation has had for the safe, secure, and responsible customs of these nuclear weapons.

In order to summarize, let me give you two panels that summarize the changes that have been included in this Bottom-Up Review of the nuclear posture. First, strategic forces; secondly, non-strategic forces. These are the changes that are included in the Nuclear Posture Review. And finally, the changes that are proposed in the safety, security, and use of nuclear weapons, in the command and control improvements required for better stewardship of those weapons; the infrastructure changes that have been proposed, and finally the related areas of threat reduction and counterproliferation which are so important in our activities with the Russians.

Let me just end with a personal note. I have the greatest regard for Ash Carter, for General Foss, for Admiral Owens and what they've done to give leadership to this effort. We believe that it provides an excellent, sensible, balanced lead and hedge posture for our nuclear forces over the coming next decade, and we are very proud of this accomplishment from the Department.
I'll be happy to take any questions you have. I'm sorry this went on so long.

Q: Two questions, one on numbers, one on policy. First on numbers.

You had a chart up there that said post START II force structure, 2003. The one where you talk about reducing 18 to 14 submarines and all of that. I was unclear from your chart. Are you meaning that that's what you want to initiate in 2003, or post START II? I just didn't understand...

A: That is where we will be at START II on its entry into force.

Q: Are you making any recommendations at this point to go below START II levels?

A: No, we are not. This is a study that I said stays within the framework of START II until it enters into force, and we are prepared at any time to consider reductions below that. Let me just point out to you that not only within strategic forces, we're also very interested in these non-strategic forces. That imbalance to us is of greater concern than small changes in the strategic totals.

Q: In May, you issued a report with your name on it that said we needed to spend $400 million a year on counterproliferation.

A: Yes.

Q: You outlined it here today. Why is your office then coming up with a plan which they publicly say will only spend $80 million at the most?

A: The $80 million which I hope the appropriations conference will put in, is an incremental amount of money. In our base we have put in additional changes, as well. I believe we've gone a significant way to funding the initiatives and counterproliferation that were in the report that we submitted to Congress in May.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the hedge part of the strategy. It seems as though the review came to the conclusion that the former Soviet Union was not that stable enough for you to reduce below the START II levels. Was that a central element of your review?

A: Given the pace at which the Russians are bringing down their actual warheads, we think at this time, before START I has entered into force, before START II has been ratified, we who have to run programs believe that it would not be prudent to commit now for a reduction below those levels. We think it is enormously responsible to be in a posture to respond to a further reduction, but we don't think it would be responsible or prudent to commit now before START II has been ratified, much less entered into force.
Q: What are the prospects for a reversal of reform in the former Soviet Union? What are the prospects of that?
A: We all read the newspapers and know all the moments of uncertainty in Russia. I think there is certainly some possibility of reversal in Russia. We're not predicting that, but we have to be prepared for that eventuality.

Q: I don't know whether I was reading too much into the way the chart was drawn, but it seems that that line of reduction was continuing as is until about 1997, and then you faced a decision point whether to reconstitute or go down further. Is that the way it works?
A: We could make changes anywhere. That's a schematic. The flexibility maintained in this program, at any time, we can make an adjustment up or down. Now how difficult it is depends on the particular circumstances. But planned into this, for example, the pace at which we take these four submarines—18 submarines down to 14. We're going to do it quickly and rapidly. How we handle those submarines in the interim period until 2003. All of that has an impact about whether you want to go faster or slower, and that we're going to do on a year-by-year basis as we appraise the progress that's been made.

Q: How do you think this set of decisions is going to play at the Non-Proliferation Review Conference the beginning of the next year when renewal of the treaty is A, difficult; and B, the Administration's high priority?

Second question, what's the logic? You say you're worried about a reversal in the Soviet Union. Isn't the logic that you should push them to go faster in removing nuclear weapons rather than a standstill policy?
A: First of all, I think that our posture in the NPT Review Conference is unbelievably strong. We have taken step after step over the past five years to show our interest in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. This continues that trend. We no longer have any tests. We have taken a whole series of steps which are reduction in the size of the arsenal, a much more stable arsenal. All of these are steps which would make the credibility of the United States at the NPT Review Conference much, much stronger than it has been in past years, and I'm confident that we will be successful there.

Q: And the logic of...
A: I hope that I've left you with the message that we are extremely eager to work with the Russians on reducing the number of weapons that they have as rapidly as possible, down to the levels that we've already reduced to, especially in the area of non-strategic nuclear forces. We will do anything we can to encourage them in that regard, and we believe we have been doing so.
Q: Do we know the rate of the Russian destruction of their weapons? And if so, how do we know?
A: We, of course, don't know with all precision. They do report to us, and we do have intelligence to estimate further. But we believe we have a pretty good fix on the rate at which they are bringing down their weapons and the state they are in different levels of dismantlement and the like. While it's obviously not 100 percent precise, we think we have certainly much better knowledge than we had five years ago about what is going on in the Russian nuclear program.

Q: It's not clear to me when the Administration would start negotiating a START III. Would it be only after START II is fully implemented, or would it be after the Russian Duma ratifies START II?
A: I don't think that decision has been made. Mr. Yeltsin is coming here next week, and initiatives could forward from that. Not every initiative with the Russians has to be in the context of a post START strategic nuclear agreement. There could be another kind of agreement which had to do with security of forces, including their controllability which we think is so important; improving the pace at which they dismantle their nuclear weapons; it could have to do with non-strategic nuclear weapons. So the possibilities here of improving stability in the world are vast. They don't only have to be with respect to START III, although that could be introduced at any time.

Q: You've announced a unilateral reduction in launching platforms. Will we be asking the Russians to make similar unilateral cuts?
A: That's the kind of issue that can be discussed in the Summit, and certainly the way we want to go is to point out steps that we are taking to lower the dependence on nuclear weapons, to improve their controllability, their safety, and their security, and we would hope that besides taking unilateral steps, we'll also improve the stability of the world.

Q: When you talk about the reconstitution capability, I assume you mean that warheads that are taken out of active service will be kept in some kind of a reserve so that you could re-arm if you wanted to. Is that the case? And also, do you expect that the Russian government would do a similar thing?
A: Yes, I think that both countries have warheads in reserve, warheads out of the military stockpiles. Then they have absolutely demilitarized warheads which with some time and effort and cost could be made into warheads again. But all of this has to look back against the management of the entire stockpile. But both of us keep some warheads in reserve.

Q: Did the review at all look at the question of the SIOP targetry developed in the Cold War and how much that's going to be reduced by?
A: Yes. We certainly did that, with great diligence. I should report to you that that target base has gone down vastly since the height of the Cold War. Extraordinarily. A great deal of that reduction was taken in the past Administration. Secretary Cheney did an extensive review of the targeting of these missiles, and additional reductions that occur in the target base, as the force structure comes down, you comply with the START II and START I treaty. As that happens, the target base comes down to significantly lower numbers than have been assessed.

Q: ...50 percent less than five years ago?
A: Much more than 50 percent reduction, yes.

Q: Can you talk about the internal workings of coming up with a final review, and where all the uniformed services and agreements with the civilian side, was there any disagreement on reaching this point?
A: There was no serious disagreement. We had a very significant review group which I chaired with Admiral Owens. Admiral Owens and I went out to STRATCOM together. But there was really no matter of major disagreement.

Philosophically, the structure of this review went forward, hand in hand and step by step so there were no surprises here, no moments of great controversy. There was one adjustment made at the end which neither Bill Perry nor I thought was especially consequential.

Q: What's your assessment of the reason for the relatively slow Russian forces? Is it political, financial or...
A: You can get that as well as I can. I would say all of the above.

Q: Was there consideration given to discussing numerical targets below 3500? Was there consideration given to discussing, eliminating a leg of the triad? Some of the more radical things that Les Aspin was originally at least kicking around hypothetically.
A: We certainly debated at length eliminating a leg of the triad. That, it seems, was a very important question to consider. We looked at that with great detail, and discussed at some length eliminating the ICBM leg of the triad. It's a sensible thing to think about. On balance, we judged it not to be something to be done today. So, we did look at that.

The second point I want answered is, "Did we consider reductions below 2,500?" When a matter of that kind of political importance comes up, it has to be carried out in an inter-agency environment, and indeed, that is taking place now. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council are, indeed, involved in an inter-agency effort to gauge and pace the level at
which we want to go for further arms control, arms reduction efforts. Again, I want to tell you that this should not only be restrictive to strategic nuclear forces, but also to these non-strategic nuclear forces which are troublesome.

Q: ... review of all of these things, and what you're doing is you're saying you've sort of eliminated them and pushed them off...
A: No, I think that as we went through our no-holds-barred analysis we saw that for the Department of Defense, the key issue was to arrive at a posture that was both leaning forward and a hedge for this START II period. This is from now to the year 2003. Here, we have to deal with the programs that have to be in place throughout this period. We have to have a structure that can flexibly respond to new political circumstances. All principle responsibility is to run those programs, design and run them properly. It is not to undertake large scale changes in the possible treaty end point that would come to a broader discussion between the United States and Russia. But our posture permits us to respond to them.

The way I would answer, the dramatic difference here is that we don't have an inflexible posture. We have one that can move this way or that way as circumstances require.

Q: Concerning the ICBM leg of the triad, you're saying that it will remain at 500 land-based missiles?
A: That's correct.

Q: Some Administration officials have said over the past 24 hours that the Administration plans to go down to 300.
A: They're wrong. [Laughter]

Q: Why the confusion?
A: I don't understand it, but I can tell you, this is it. I'm sorry, I've seen that speculation myself. The answer is 500, 450.

Q: There are some programs that have been ongoing where some of the platforms are increasing their conventional capability. Will this have any impact on that, or will those programs remain pretty much the same—such as the conventional capabilities on the B-1s, B-2s, that sort of thing?
A: Those are absolutely important. The conventional capabilities on the B-52, on the B-2, and the upgrades on the B-1 are very important, because that is central to the conventional capability of those bombers relating to our two major regional conflict strategies. So the principal purpose of these bombers is their conventional role, but they will maintain a nuclear role for the deterrent value they contribute.
Q: Could you elaborate a little bit more on the permissive action links and relate it to submarines? Did you tighten up somehow the U.S. control over those...
A: Yes, we have. What I would prefer to do is to do that offline. There are a series of actions we've taken there which will be put into force over a period of time for bombers and submarines.

Q: What was the minor adjustment at the end that you and the SecDef deemed insignificant?
A: I said not significant. I didn't say insignificant.

Q: What was it? [Laughter]
Q: What's the purpose of nuclear Tomahawks? Nuclear weapons on Tomahawk missiles?
A: Because in a hypothetical situation where you have an exchange or reach of nuclear weapons that do not involve the homeland of either the United States or of Russia, or which involve--you can argue how realistic this is today, historically--the security of NATO. The way you deter that from happening is to have an ability to respond on a regional basis.

Q: Such as deterring chemical weapons use?
A: No one is suggesting that if chemical or biological weapons were used that you would deter with nuclear weapons. Certainly a country who is considering using them would have to take that into account. That's how we contribute to deterrence.

Q: Would the final size of the ICBM force get that not "significant change" that you and the Secretary made at the end?
Q: Why did you do so?
A: Because we thought there was ample time to adjust the ICBMs in the future if political circumstances warranted.

Q: Why not now?
A: That was our judgment.

Q: What was calculation?
A: The calculation was of the ability of these weapons uniquely to be collectively used. The additional stability that they provided for the triad. And a sense that there was no reason to give them up now. They aren't very costly to maintain and they contribute to our security.

Q: Will we continue to deploy our air-launched nuclear weapons forward in Europe and outside the United States?
A: Yes.
Q: I'd like your assessment of military progress. Is it fast enough in Haiti to allow the return of exiled Parliamentarians so that they can participate in the vote by the recognized Parliament on the question of amnesty?

A: The first answer is that I am extremely pleased with the progress of the military buildup in Haiti, and principally its safety. No U.S. soldier has been harmed. No bullets have been fired. So I would say rather than swiftness, it is that aspect of the operation which is most gratifying to Bill Perry, to myself, and to General Shalikashvili.

With respect to the timing of the return of Parliamentarians, that's something that Aristide is going to have to consider. We are prepared to accommodate to that. It will be an issue which President Aristide will have to decide.

Q: Is it your understanding that that vote which Cedras is moving to call requires a so-called legitimate Parliament in Haiti, a recognized Parliament to be in place in order for a meaningful amnesty vote to occur?

A: I'm not really sufficiently on top of that issue to give you an absolutely accurate answer. I would guess that it would certainly require the legitimate Parliament to do the voting, yes. They've done so in the past, of course.

Q: The current military leader, Cedras, has told CBS he does not plan to leave Haiti. If he's not posturing and does not, in effect, leave, aren't you concerned that we are up against another Somalia revisited, right in the center of a coming civil war between Cedras and Aristide?

A: I would assume that there are many, many things which are on General Cedras' mind, and he may change his position three or four times between now and the date of the 15th. So I don't think we've heard the last word about where General Cedras or the other de factos may be when President Aristide returns.

Q: That's not answering the question, sir. If he does stay are we not caught, in effect, in a similar situation to what we were caught in in Somalia?

A: Not necessarily. I don't believe so. We have a legitimate government returning there, for one.

Q: How soon would you like to see Aristide get in? Is the expectation that he'll go sooner rather than closer to the 15th? Is that a priority, to get him in as quickly as possible?

A: I think the priority there is to first of all, introduce our troops in there safely, without casualties. The second thing is to establish public
order. And the third thing is to have the de factos step down, and then to bring back General Aristide. All of that will happen before the 15th.

Q: The Aristide camp has asked the United States to stay in touch—or to get in touch—with Aristide's Defense Minister, General Beliyat. Were there contacts today between the American military and Beliyat?
A: I don't know whether they happened, but I know that they were planned. I don't know that they happened, but I know that they were planned.

Q: Have there been documented instances of retribution against the pro-Aristide people by the de facto government? And what is the role of the U.S. military now in protecting people who seek it?
A: Let me say that there has not been, to my knowledge, certainly not in the 48 hours—any documented cases actually against Aristide followers.

Q: Can you talk about the strike in Bosnia today? Are any more strikes like that planned?
A: I don't believe that any other strikes are planned. We are just now getting the results of those strikes in Bosnia. It seems to me that we've said for a long time that if these heavy weapons stayed in these areas--these sanctuary areas--eventually we would go after them. I believe that there was at least one, and, perhaps more tanks destroyed today. One I noticed was—at least one I believe—was also destroyed by a British fighter. That's very welcome.

Q: No BDA yet?
A: We'll get you BDA on it.

Q: We can expect more of these in the future if there are more incidents like that?
A: I think we're committed the way we stated it, [about] what happens to these army units that go into sanctuary areas.