As the attached comments will reveal, however, we differ in how to achieve that objective. I am satisfied that the right route is not the destaffing of the military departments by elimination of two assistant secretaries, the contraction of the staff of a third, and the involvement of the Service Secretary in assignments not related to management of his military department. I am certain that any suggestion which results in reliance on borrowed staff with other loyalties will result in an undercutting of the Service Secretary's role and utility. For other reasons, I believe that management of the Department of Defense would suffer greatly from the elimination of the Service assistant secretaries for manpower and logistics functions, and that rather than suggesting their optional elimination, the Study should have underscored their contributions. The Study may have overlooked the very contributions made at the assistant secretory level which it attributes to the Service Secretary. Yet, in reality they are inseparable.

The task borne by the Ignatius Study group was particularly difficult, because it required the suggestion of improvement in a system which is currently working well. This undoubtedly accounts for the absence therein of recitals of concrete problems which must be solved. Our comments contain some suggestions in the general direction pointed by the Study, but they relate primarily to procedure rather than to organization.

Attachment
As stated

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.
SUBJECT: Detailed Comments Relating to the Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Departmental Headquarters Study

A. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 1:

Use the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), as it was chartered, to offer the Secretary of Defense regular and frequent advice in the formulation of Defense policy.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur. The primary function of the AFPC should be the conduct of discussions leading to the formation of policy, enabling the Service Secretaries and Chief to present and participate in matters of interdepartmental importance. In its expanded form, the council has been used for the convocation of staff and line officers and the dissemination of information. While the Secretary of Defense may find it useful to continue the latter function, we believe that it should be done in a manner which does not confuse the primary purpose of the AFPC or compete with it for time.

B. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 2:

Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with assignments including politico-military long-range planning and contingency planning.

ARMY COMMENT: The recommendation to establish a planning office appears to have merit. Its emphasis, however, should be on policy rather than planning. It should focus on the continuing readjustment of policy to resources and capabilities. It would be counterproductive if the office became involved in detailed planning, slowing processes. Thus appropriate delineation of functions should be placed in its charter.

Such an office would also provide an opportunity for inclusion of Service Secretaries in the flow of information generated by this office so they may more effectively discharge the management responsibilities inherent in their respective statutory duties. The responsibility of the Secretary of the Army, for example, extends to functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness and effectiveness of the Army. 10 U.S.C., paragraph 3012. Thus, for example, absent compelling reasons to the contrary, the Service Secretaries should have access to the briefings on current and future projects undertaken by the Planning Office as proposed by the study (Exhibit II, p. 7) and other similar sources of information. This would enhance the role and capabilities of the Service Secretaries.

It would meet the Study's objective that the Service Secretaries "participate more fully in the deliberations leading to policy objectives of the Department" (Study, p. 51). And it would increase their usefulness in a revitalized AFPC.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: National Military Command Structure Study
and the Departmental Headquarters Study

We have reviewed the National Military Command Structure Study (the "Steadman Study") and the Departmental Headquarters Study (the "Ignatius Study"). Attached are the consolidated comments of the Army Secretariat and military staff on the Ignatius Study, as well as comments by the military staff on the Steadman Study which I forward with approval.

The Steadman Study is for the most part dedicated to the area where the Service Secretaries have diminished responsibilities. There are, however, two points that I wish to address. First, I believe that the Service Secretaries must be kept informed of NMCS activities in order that they may be better able to produce the support necessary for the national defense. Second, General Rogers and I are now evaluating a proposal to reactivate the Army Component Command, US Army Pacific, as a separate matter. Accordingly, I would like to provide my comments on that question at a later date, following completion of our evaluation.

The Ignatius Study offers important insights into the contribution to management made by the civilian Service Secretariats. I specifically refer to its recognition of the role played in managing innovation, in critically examining and then acting as focal spokesman for legitimate service needs, and in providing alternative and augmented perspectives to both the Secretary of Defense and the military chiefs. Accordingly, I appreciate and welcome its announced objective of achieving greater recognition of the Service Secretaries' authority and position and more opportunity to participate in the policy-making process.
As the attached comments will reveal, however, we differ in how to achieve that objective. I am satisfied that the right route is not the destaffing of the military departments by elimination of two assistant secretaries, the contraction of the staff of a third, and the involvement of the Service Secretary in assignments not related to management of his military department. I am certain that any suggestion which results in reliance on borrowed staff with other loyalties will result in an undercutting of the Service Secretary's role and utility. For other reasons, I believe that management of the Department of Defense would suffer greatly from the elimination of the Service assistant secretaries for manpower and logistics functions, and that rather than suggesting their optional elimination, the Study should have underscored their contributions. The Study may have overlooked the very contributions made at the assistant secretary level which it attributes to the Service Secretary. Yet, in reality they are inseparable.

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C. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 3:

Assign the Under Secretary for Policy, working in close coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to support the Secretary of Defense in the development of Defense Policy Guidance governing the Consolidated Guidance for force structure and resource allocation decisions.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur. Consideration should be given to coordination with the Director, Joint Staff, rather than with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

D. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 4:

Make further improvements in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process to establish more clearly the primary and secondary mission requirements of major weapons systems.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur and note that the recommendation describes the action currently prescribed by OMB A-109 and DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 to be accomplished at DSARC Milestone 1. The earliest milestone in the acquisition cycle is Milestone 0 which includes the approval of the Mission Element Need Statement (MENS). In addition, fiscal constraints should be considered at the first logical milestone.

E. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 5:

Eliminate redundant and repetitive program reviews during the budget development process.

ARMY COMMENT: We concur in efforts to reduce the budget review process to pricing refinements and the program implications that result from pricing changes and "fact-of-life" changes to the extent feasible, thereby eliminating redundant program review by budget analysts in OSD/OMB.

The Defense PPB system provides a framework within which each Service/Defense Agency is to plan, program, and budget resources for the execution of its mission. Yet, numerous isolated decisions are made during budget review with little apparent regard to overall program balance. Thus, policy changes are effected with little or no Service participation. Issues of importance are forced into an environment of crisis, especially in the final days of the budget cycle, with decisions hastily made. Program balance is largely ignored through the budget review, although balance is a specific objective during the program review.

In regard to the suggestion put forward at the bottom of page 62 of the Study, we believe that the present schedule for programming and budgeting is already constrained and should not be reduced. Moreover, only a small portion of the total Navy program and budget is subject to the DSARC process, and adequate time is necessary to assure the most effective application of all other resources.
F. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 6:

Re-examine the decision to link manpower, reserve forces, and installations and logistics responsibilities under a single Assistant Secretary of Defense.

ARMY COMMENT: Any decision to re-examine the ASD(MRA&L) organization should be left to the Secretary of Defense. Although the Army has not experienced any particular difficulty in its relationship with that organization, reserve affairs may have received less attention under the current arrangement than might otherwise have been expected. Some danger lies in the unexamined assumption that the manpower-logistics management organization at OSD level should be copied at the Service level. The "manpower intensive" nature of the Army and the large scope of Army logistics and installations management responsibilities would together pose an unmanageable burden. It is also erroneous to assume that there is special value in having each Service's managerial functions organized in the same way.

G. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 7:

Establish flexibility in the procedures governing rotation of Civil Service executive-level personnel within and outside the Department of Defense.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur. This recommendation comports with the Civil Service Reform Act, which the Army supports. (The present Executive Assignment System, which allows rotation of executive-level personnel, has existed for several years and could result in more rotation except for reluctance of agencies to select candidates who are employed by other Federal agencies.)

H. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 8:

Make multi-service assignments to Service Secretaries from time to time, instead of to Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

ARMY COMMENT: Multiservice assignments should be made to the Service Secretaries when it is believed that the characteristics of a particular assignment make the Service or its Secretary an appropriate manager. Such assignments should not be made on the premise that they will enhance the Service Secretary's role. They are not likely to do so, but to the contrary, may promote role confusion and a dissipation of the Secretary's identification with his Service. Moreover, as this Study and previous ones have expressly recognized (Study p. 21), the challenge of administering each military department is imposing, and a diffusion of attention is not likely to be beneficial.
I. **STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 9:**

Establish a formal role for the Service Under Secretaries oriented to common liaison functions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**ARMY COMMENT:** We do not believe that the Study makes a case for assigning liaison functions to Service Under Secretaries in all cases and under all conditions. In large part the nature of the proposed liaison responsibility is unclear. As a general rule, the designation of responsibility within the Service Secretariats should be left to the managerial discretion of the Service Secretary, although in the Army, the Under Secretary would likely be asked to bear important responsibilities.

J. **STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 10:**

Authorize the Service Secretaries, if they desire, to eliminate their Assistant Secretaries for the Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics functions, with the Service Secretaries carrying out their responsibilities through the military heads of the respective functions and with the assistance of the civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**ARMY COMMENT:** Nonconcur. Although the recommendation to eliminate the M&RA and I&L offices at the Service Assistant Secretary level is proposed merely as an option for the Service Secretary, we cannot concur in the implicit challenge to the value of those positions. Instead of being viewed as ripe for experimental elimination, they should properly be recognized as providing major managerial benefits at low cost, with small staff.

Three bases are advanced for the recommendation as it affects the OASA(M&RA). First is the alleged difficulty of finding "fully qualified" appointees, who are contrasted with "professionally qualified" senior military officers. To the extent that this view purports to characterize those who have held the office, we believe that there is no support for a comprehensive evaluation in the Study, just as there is no evidence of difficulty in recruiting qualified appointees. Moreover, the staff paper underlying the 1976 Defense Manpower Commission ("DMC") Report, upon which the Study relies in other areas, criticizes equally the "professional qualifications" of those at the OSD level and does not agree that military personnel assigned to manpower management have superior credentials (DMC Staff Studies, Vol. 1, Study C, p. 22). Fundamentally, it is inappropriate to speak in authoritative terms about the qualifications of manpower managers, when the proper qualifications for such positions are not agreed upon and are obviously harder to measure than those for, say, finance and engineering. Because of this, genuine differences of opinion as to the choice of an appointee and his qualifications may allow for greater differences in view as to his performance. If the implicit suggestions of the Study were accurate, Service Secretaries might be expected to have increasingly by-passed their manpower offices, depending disproportionately on military advice, and with respect to the Army this has not been the case.
Putting to one side subjective disputes over the qualifications of individual Assistant Secretaries, the OASA(M&RA) otherwise serves as an important repository of expert staff responsible to the civilian Secretariat. Valuable, long-term, senior managerial continuity is provided in the staff of the OASA(M&RA) which would be lost if the office were eliminated. Without denigrating the important contribution made by senior military manpower officers, it should be noted that military officers are often rotated out of manpower positions in accordance with military personnel procedures.

Second, it is suggested that the Service Secretary could rely directly upon the military staffs and call upon the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as staff assistants. This, it is said, would have the effect of increasing team work and enhancing the positions and prestige of the Service Secretaries. Forcing the Service Secretaries to rely upon other peoples’ staffs would have precisely the opposite effect and could result in a significant reduction of the Service Secretary's role in what may be the most vital issue in his department.

Third, the study refers to the 1976 DMC Report's recommendation that the Service Secretariat layers of manpower management be eliminated, "provided, that other functions such as logistics are treated similarly". We believe that the study appreciates that neither the DMC Report nor the staff papers underlying it contain analysis sufficient to support such a recommendation. The DMC Report, in our view, simply failed to grasp the function of the Service level manpower management, finding, in effect, that policy was made at OSD level and that differences were resolved directly between OSD and the Service staffs, with only a sporadic "communication" role accorded to the civilian service level.

Manpower issues are of great concern to the Service Secretariats and are paramount in the Army. A disproportionate number of issues arising in manpower management are important, controversial and sensitive. Examples are hardly necessary, but include affirmative action programs; women-in-the-Army initiatives; questions of personnel bonuses and entitlements, etc.

The OASA(M&RA) has been a continuous source of important contributions to Army manpower management. It has been responsible for both initiating and managing innovations in ways that complement, and do not duplicate, the services rendered by the military staff. Specific examples can be provided to the study group. Moreover, as with other major offices within the Service Secretariat, it performs an induplicable role in policy intermedation between OSD and the military staffs, acting to refine and reformulate proposals for greater acceptance at DOD level and more certain implementation at the military level. Its staff is small. If the Service Secretariat's role were eliminated, additional staff would have to be added at the OSD level without saving of manpower or expense, but with important disadvantages. Major differences in manpower problems among the services require individualized attention. There are so many particular
characteristics of Army manpower problems that there is no substitute for the day-to-day relationship that the civilian Army Secretariat enjoys. Long-distance management from the DOD level would not be an advantage.

The organizational consequences of depriving the Service Secretary of his own staff to help both formulate and execute policy in these areas are highly significant, and would have radical adverse effects on his role as a resource manager and principal spokesman for the military department.

Finally, optional elimination of the ASA(M&RA) would seem to require Congressional action. In 1967, section 3013 of Title 10 was amended to provide a mandatory term for the ASA(M&RA): "One of the assistant secretaries shall be the assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs. He shall have as his principal duties the overall supervision of manpower and reserve component affairs of the Department of the Army". In addition, one of the underlying reasons for this amendment was Congress's concern with what it believed to be an under-representation of the reserves. It is not likely that the abolition of the office could be accomplished without reprovoking those concerned about the resources available for Reserve affairs. Moreover, the OASA(M&RA) exercises the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of the Army in respect of certain important boards, for example, the Board for the Correction of Military Records and the Discharge Review Board. These boards are of particular concern to Congress inasmuch as they were designed to avoid large number of private bills. By law this function must be in the Service Secretariat, as it was designed to correct alleged inequities arising in the military administration.

The Study offers no substantive basis for the elimination of the logistics office in each Service, which is combined in the Department of the Army with financial management in the ASA(IL&FM). It does not address the merits of that office's performance or its function in the organizational chain. To the contrary, the only apparent reason why optional elimination is suggested is that the DMC Report qualified its own proposal for elimination of the manpower office by making it dependent on the elimination of other offices, "such as logistics". This qualification was based upon the DMC's apprehension that (a) if only manpower were eliminated, the area might receive reduced attention, and (b) that piecemeal elimination would create confusion.

Plainly, there is no good reason to consider weakening the Service Secretariats' role in logistics management. There is no claim made of difficulty in finding fully qualified appointees, and there is no suggestion that the civilian logistics staffs are less than expert managers. The logistics function is an area of high political sensitivity, involving frequent and direct dealings with the Congress. As past departmental studies have acknowledged, a presidential appointee plays a major role in such an area effectuating and defending policy while relieving the Service Secretary and OSD officials of near equal rank of major burdens in intra-governmental relations. In short, the Army believes it undeniable
that the role played by this efficient office in the oversight of realignment, restationing and land acquisition problems is extremely important and of great benefit to the administration of the Department of Defense.

K. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 11:

Integrate, in each Military Department, the Research and Engineering Staffs now separately reporting to the Assistant Service Secretary and Service Chief, and concurrently, increase the number of development and acquisition programs assigned for primary management authority to the Military Departments.

ARMY COMMENT: Nonconcur. We support the principle of increasing the number of development and acquisition programs assigned to Military Departments for primary management authority. We do not support the concept of merging the Army research and engineering staffs. Consolidating the two agencies, ASA(RDA) and DCSRDA, would provide inconsequential savings at the expense of independent reviews and the operational efficiency which is promoted by the expectation of such reviews. In short, the present arrangement does not represent redundancy, but a vehicle for sounder decision and administration.

In large part, the ASA(RDA) and DCSRDA have integrated naturally and efficiently. Programs and budgets are developed and defended jointly, management reviews are conducted jointly, operating policies and procedures are conducted jointly, operating policies and procedures are issued jointly and directives on a particular subject are issued by only one principal. However, the staff of the ASA(RDA) performs independent review and advisory functions, which are largely made effective by its independent base and source of authority. Sometimes approaching an adversary role, these functions provide significant benefits - sharpened arguments, resolution of issues, better decisions and more efficient development of acquisition programs. In addition, the OASA(RDA) is responsible for procurement policies and procedures, and the Army Science Board - two major functions not performed by the Army Staff.

The demonstrated cohesive operation of the Secretariat and Army Staffs in research, engineering, and acquisition provide for effective and efficient management that could be degraded by consolidation. It has proven successful, and there is little reason for altering it.

L. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 12:

Provide common access for both the Service Secretary and the Service Chief to the Military Departments' Systems Analysis, Inspector General, and Audit Service capabilities.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur. The Army is currently operating in this manner.
M. STUDY RECOMMENDATION NO 13:

Continue the effort to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area.

ARMY COMMENT: Proposals for further reductions in headquarters staff must be critically examined for overall impact and possible degradation of functional capability and responsiveness. Requirements for responsiveness, in particular, should be an element in the decision to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands. The military staff at HQDA has been reduced significantly, and the Army believes that it is at or near the practical limits of staff reduction. The Study points out that each of the military departments has a materiel command, and both the Army and Navy have these commands in the Washington area. Recent reorganization of Headquarters, DARCOM, and realignments of the field materiel commands resulted in significant manpower reduction and a near-zero capacity to absorb additional staff functions. Additional comment may be appropriate upon completion of the Resource Management study.
SUBJECT: Detailed Comments Relating to the Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure

A. Organization for Warfighting

1. GENERAL: The Army is supportive of required periodic re-examination and study of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) relationships and the delineation of responsibilities under the UCP.

2. DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Unified Command Plan Organization and Functions

   (1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The UCP should be reviewed by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense at intervals not to exceed two years.

   ARMY COMMENT: We agree that a periodic substantive review of the UCP, in more depth than the current procedures, is needed; specifically addressing those relationships that might change because of changing political and military realities.

   (2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Unified Commands are joint commands by definition and as such selection of the CINC should be on the basis of the best available qualified officer with consideration given to mission and forces assigned rather than strictly to Service affiliation.

   ARMY COMMENT: Flexibility already exists in the selection of CINCs on the best qualified basis. Normally, when consideration is given to mission and forces assigned, the same individual would be selected as is under current selection procedures.

   (3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: A CINC's "military-diplomacy" role should be an important consideration.

   ARMY COMMENT: We believe that in selecting the best available officer the "total person" should be evaluated, including an assessment of his capabilities to perform all tasks and functions, including the military-diplomatic one.

   (4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: There is no need for Unified Commands to cover all areas of the world.

   ARMY COMMENT: Concur.

   (5) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: A special study should examine the component commands with a view toward identifying redundancies in functions and personnel and recommending which of these redundancies are necessary and which should be eliminated.
ARMY COMMENT: We support identification and examination of all redundancies. We do not support changes that would result in a loss of operational capability for planning, command and control, equipping, supporting, or transitioning from peace to war. The CINCs currently have the capability to monitor areas of mutual support through inter-service agreements.

b. US European Command

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Middle East should remain a EUCOM area of responsibility.

ARMY COMMENT: Area responsibility for the Middle East should be a matter of continuing evaluation with such responsibility remaining with EUOM until a satisfactory alternative arrangement can be found. Ideally the EUOM area of responsibility would more nearly coincide with SACEUR's area of responsibility which does not include the Middle East.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: EUOM should continue to plan for, and execute when directed, all contingency operations in the Middle East.

ARMY COMMENT: EUOM should continue to plan for all foreseeable contingency operations in the Middle East so long as that area remains a part of the EUOM area of responsibility. While such plans should provide for EUOM execution when directed, command arrangements used in an actual contingency should be determined in the light of then prevailing circumstances. The following recommendation cites two possible alternatives.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: There should be sufficient flexibility in the Middle East planning to permit a contingency to be run directly from Washington, with EUOM in a supporting role and/or to permit establishment of an on-scene Unified Command reporting either to EUOM or direct to Washington.

ARMY COMMENT: These and other alternatives should be considered in the planning process.

(4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The JCS should examine the concept of a subunified command for the Middle East, reporting to EUOM, and then provide their advice on the proposal to the Secretary of Defense.

ARMY COMMENT: This concept as well as other possible alternatives should be examined as proposed.

(5) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Africa south of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUOM.
ARMY COMMENT: We support assignment of Africa south of the Sahara to REDCOM. This issue is currently under consideration by the Services and the Joint Staff and any final determination should be deferred to the JCS.

c. US Atlantic Command

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: LANTCOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The JCS should review the command arrangements for US Maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and determine whether these achieve optimum effectiveness for US and NATO defense postures.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur.

d. US Pacific Command

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: PACOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis/wartime command arrangements for US Forces, Korea should retain maximum flexibility to permit alternative arrangements to include: the present command organization, direct command by Washington of US Forces, Korea or a combination of the two. Where organizational decisions cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, they should be made in favor of an assumption that there will be a Unified Command reporting directly to Washington.

ARMY COMMENT: Contingency planning on command arrangements in Korea should examine the alternatives provided with emphasis on retaining flexibility; flexibility should not be so great so as to lessen control or to lose the capability to respond in a decisive manner.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Army Component Command should not be reinstated unless a convincing argument is made that this would be demonstrably more effective than present arrangements.

ARMY COMMENTS: The re-establishment of the Army Component Command is being intensively studied and will be commented on separately.
e. US Readiness Command

(1) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** REDCOM should be designated as the focal point for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly as they pertain to lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.

**ARMY COMMENT:** We strongly support designation of REDCOM as the focal point for initial mobilization/deployment planning.

(2) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** REDCOM should have greater Naval and Marine forces participation in its joint training exercises.

**ARMY COMMENT:** Greater participation of Naval and Marine forces is desirable.

(3) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** REDCOM should be given a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces.

**ARMY COMMENT:** A full review of current joint doctrine responsibilities assigned to the Services should precede any expansion of REDCOM's role.

(4) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** Navy and Marine participation on the REDCOM staff should be increased to achieve these objectives.

**ARMY COMMENT:** Concur.

f. US Southern Command

(1) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** Retain SOUTHCOM as presently constituted for at least the period of negotiations and transfer of responsibilities and facilities resulting from the Panama Canal treaties.

**ARMY COMMENT:** Concur. Retention of SOUTHCOM in the present period of negotiation enhances stability.

(2) **STUDY RECOMMENDATION:** When the transition period is over, review the future of SOUTHCOM in light of the then prevailing military/political environment.
ARMY COMMENT: The review of the future of SOUTHCOM should be instituted prior to the end of the transition period and continue through the transition period.

g. Strategic Air Command

STUDY RECOMMENDATION: None.

ARMY COMMENT: None.

h. Military Airlift Command

STUDY RECOMMENDATION: None.

ARMY COMMENT: None.

i. Aerospace Defense Command

STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Defers to ongoing Air Force Study.

ARMY COMMENT: Await the results of review of the study in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

j. Wartime/Crisis Management

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The chain of command to be used in any particular crisis should be clearly enunciated at the outset. If any element is to be by-passed, it should remain fully informed of developments. There should be no confusion as to the proper flow of communications and the locus of responsibility.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur with the objectives of clear lines of communications. The role of the Ambassador should be clearly defined.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: NCA decisions during crisis should be written and verified whenever possible. Even oral decisions required during emergencies should be followed up immediately in writing. In addition, feedback mechanisms should be established to insure that decision-makers know the status of implementation.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur with the objective that NCA decisions be communicated by means which minimize the chance of misinterpretation and provide feedback on the status of implementation to the extent permitted by the tactical situation.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: A variety of NMCS-centered command post exercises responding to realistic hypothetical crises should be undertaken to test the ability of the NMCS to support the NCA. Senior level policy-making personnel should be encouraged to participate.
ARMS COMMENT: Participation of senior policymaking personnel would provide a more comprehensive test of the ability of the NMCS to support the NCA.

k. The Role of the CINCs/Role of the Chairman, JCS

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of the forces under their command.

ARMS COMMENT: The CINCs already have a voice through the relationship to the SECDEF and submission of quarterly reports to him. We agree that the CINCs and the CJCS should have an expanded role in any decisions which affect the readiness capability of assigned forces.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs and that to facilitate this he amend present directives to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders to the CINCs through the Chairman who will act in consultation with the JCS when time permits. The JCS would remain as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.

ARMS COMMENT: Designation of the Chairman as the Secretary's agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs would formalize the manner in which the system currently operates.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the Services/JCS/OSD conduct an in-depth review of readiness/capabilities reporting with a view toward developing a system which will provide the Secretary with detailed, thorough, and well-articulated information on readiness and force deficiency correction.

ARMS COMMENT: We strongly agree that there is a void in our readiness reporting which prevents the Joint Chiefs of Staff from describing accurately the readiness of the Total Force. A common joint Total Force readiness measurement system is essential. The Ignatius Report also addresses the deficiencies in the Readiness Reporting System and views the establishment of the DOD Readiness Management Steering Group by the SECDEF as a positive step toward correction of existing deficiencies.

(4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the Chairman, supported by the CINCs be given a formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions.

ARMS COMMENT: Concur in principle. The Chairman should, however, also be supported in this role by the JCS. The Chairman's role should focus on: (1) isolating key areas of risk associated with current and projected force capabilities to execute the
national military strategy, (2) establishing the degree and relative importance of those key areas of risk, and (3) recommending prioritized resource allocation in light thereof. Any formalization of the Chairman's role should ensure preservation of the ability of the JCS (including the Chairman) to carry out their statutory responsibility for providing military advice — responsible but unfettered.

B. Policy, Plans and Advice

1. GENERAL: We are supportive of improving the internal operations and attractiveness of duty on the Joint Staff. We support the objective of improved policy guidance.

2. DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

   a. Policy Direction

   (1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided to the JCS but without undue detail about how they are to be attained.

   ARM CALLS: Concur.

   (2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning.

   ARMY COMMENT: We support the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy regularly reviewing, in broad terms, the concepts, objectives and general scenarios involved in operational planning. Care should be exercised in determining where broad review ends and involvement in detailed planning and execution begins. Review of operational plans by OSD should be limited to the minimum number of people who have a need to know. Which key assistants will be involved should be clarified before the proposal is instituted.

   (3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The role of the Under Secretary for Policy should include: Assuring that national security policy and objectives are provided to and reflected in JCS/JS plans for contingencies/wars; developing long-range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA; assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other PPBS documents; coordinating DOD input to national intelligence matters; coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by DOD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.
ARemy comment: The role of the Under Secretary for Policy has potential for positive interaction with the Joint Staff; early guidance and clarification of long-range policy are desirable.

(4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the Director for Net Assessment, and the DOD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and coordinating responsibility for those offices, while they would retain responsibility and control over the substantive judgments and evaluation of their offices.

ARemy comment: The role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in intelligence matters needs further study in view of the current responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary (C3I), Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Deputy Assistant Secretary (Admin), Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in intelligence matters.

b. The Joint Chief of Staff and the Joint Staff

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The JCS should revise their procedures to make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of JCS papers.

ARMY COMMENT: The system presently holds the Joint Staff responsible for authorship; the fact that input is received from the Services does not change that. Alternatives can be prepared under the current system; alternatives should be submitted when there are differing views. We do not agree with the idea of making the Joint Staff alone responsible in any manner which would decrease Service participation in the development of papers. The Services must retain a strong voice in the joint decision process.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: Present comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.

ARMY COMMENT: The present system provides the opportunity for consideration of alternatives and differing views.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: JCS should provide initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate.

ARMY COMMENT: Concur. Initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff could potentially speed up the planning process.

(4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Secretary of Defense should reissue the Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to the Chairman, JCS.
ARMY COMMENT: DOD Directive 1320.5, 26 Jul 78, Subject: Assignment to Joint Tours of Duty, reissues the Gates Memorandum. Service Secretaries are granted waiver authority. This authority should be utilized to prevent potential injustices to outstanding and highly qualified officers who have no direct control over their assignments.

(5) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Service Chiefs should commit their most outstanding and highly qualified officers for assignment to the Joint Staff.

ARMY COMMENT: This problem should be solved between the Chairman and the Service Chiefs through alternative means such as movement of outstanding officers from Service Staff to Joint Staff.

(6) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff on any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.

ARMY COMMENT: The Chairman should not get involved in the business of assignment of individual officers. Service Chiefs should continue to be responsible for providing officers to Joint Staff who are outstanding and highly qualified.

c. Increasing the Responsibilities of the CJCS

(1) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense designate the Chairman, JCS as responsible for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues.

ARMY COMMENT: The Army supports the idea of making the Chairman more influential in high level decisions that affect the readiness and fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces. The Chairman should not be involved in routine program and budget management.

(2) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the CJCS be established as a voting member of the DSARC.

ARMY COMMENT: The Army does not agree that the chairman should become involved as a voting member of DSARC. Over involvement and interaction by the Chairman at a level lower than the SECDEF, and involvement in individual programs which are Service oriented, would tend to diminish his influence rather then expand it.

(3) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. It should be designated to clarify or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.
ARMY COMMENT: A loosely structured coordination of the current studies programs would not be objectionable. Care should be taken so as to not inhibit Service oriented inquiry.

(4) STUDY RECOMMENDATION: That the Chairman be given appropriate Joint Staff support to make broad program and budget judgments.

ARMY COMMENT: The Joint Staff should investigate means, within their own resources, of providing the Chairman with the information necessary for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues. Continued detailed input from the Services should remain an essential part of developing the national viewpoint on program and budget issues.

d. National Military Advisers

STUDY RECOMMENDATION: For the present ... recommend taking now the steps previously outlined to enhance the role of the Joint Staff while changing the format and approach in presenting JCS advice to the Secretary of Defense, and to increase the responsibility of the Chairman, particularly in providing national advice on program/budget and constrained force structure issues. In the event that these measures are not implemented, or if they should not prove effective in resolving the basic problems of improving the professional military advice to the NCA and insuring that their voice is more adequately heard in decisions or important national security issues, the President should consider the formation of a group of National Military Advisers.

ARMY COMMENT: The recommendations presented by Mr. Steadman and Mr. Ignatius offer potential for resolution of problem areas presented. The full spectrum of their suggestions should be considered prior to any further consideration of a group of National Advisers.