The Defense Department today officially adopted new principles for battlefield coverage of the US military in combat.

The action follows eight months of discussions between the Pentagon and the news media on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. The sessions led to a consensus on nine principles that should guide future reporting from a battle zone. "I have directed that those nine principles be made part of Defense Department policy. They have now been formally incorporated into our directives," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said in announcing the action.

"Both the military and the news media need to work together on such an important issue. I'm pleased that our discussions have resulted in a set of principles that will help us both do our jobs better in the future," said Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, who represented the Defense Department at the discussions.

"The military has taken on the task of improving what it must provide to journalists. The Pentagon is developing new doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field combat exercises now include training on working with journalists," Williams said.

While the Pentagon and the news media agreed on nine principles for combat coverage, they could not agree on a news media proposal for a tenth principle barring review of news material.

"The military believes it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that would endanger troop safety or the success of a military mission. Any review system would be imposed only when operational security was a consideration," Williams said.

Williams also praised Stanley Cloud of Time magazine, Michael Getler of the Washington Post, Clark Hoyt of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, George Watson of ABC News, and Jonathan Wolman of the Associated Press, who represented the news media in the discussions.

- end -
STATEMENT OF DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
GROUND RULES

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.


5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

10. Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JI\ JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
Remarks by Pete Williams  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
New York Bar Association  
November 4, 1991

I've read the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights, which is a valuable contribution to the public debate about the Pentagon press policies during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I had first seen it when it was the subject of discussion at the ABA House of Delegates meeting in Atlanta in August.

The paper is a dispatch from the battlefield -- the one marked by combat between the Pentagon and the press. But what concerns me is that the paper reduces the concerns of the real battlefield, the one where combat takes place between US and enemy forces.

But before I get into the point and counter point, I want to review for a moment the press arrangements the military came up with in the Persian Gulf.

First, I think it must be noted that the military released an unprecedented amount of information while the operation was going on. The military offered two briefings a day in Saudi Arabia and one at the Pentagon. We released casualty information every day. We even released, at the request of news organizations, the videotape out of the gun cameras mounted inside the bomber airplanes.

Even so I realize the point in which this forum is most interested is the arrangements made for battlefield reporting of the operation by the press.
Last August, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, US forces began to arrive in Saudi Arabia. But there were no western reporters there. While the Saudi government studied whether to grant visas to journalists, they agreed to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military could get them in. So we activated the DOD National Media Pool on August 12th, because there was no other way to get western reporters into Saudi Arabia.

This point is often overlooked -- indeed, I read no reference to it in the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights: the first reporters to cover the operation got there only because we persuaded the Saudis to let them in as part of a pool. Once they were there, the number of reporters continued to grow.

We persuaded the Saudis to grant more visas. We intervened on behalf of the American television networks to obtain Saudi permission for them to bring in satellite transmitters. And as Mr. Apple can tell you, we responded to a concern of news organizations that they wouldn't have enough people on hand in the event of hostilities. We arranged a special military transport plane to carry in more journalists when the air war began.

During Desert Shield -- from August until the air war began in January -- reporters visited ships at sea, air bases, Marines up north, and soldiers training in the desert. They went aboard AWACS radar warning planes. They quoted generals who said their forces were ready and privates who said they were not.

There were stories about helicopter pilots crashing into the
sand, because they couldn't judge distances in the flat desert light. And reporters described the remarkable speed with which the US military moved so many men and women to the Gulf with so much of their equipment.

But the number of journalists, and their editors and support personnel, continued to grow throughout the fall and winter months. As we planned for the prospect of hostilities, it was clear that some kind of pool system would be required.

When the air war began in mid-January, reporters in pools were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, where they saw the launching of the first air strikes. They were onboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat. And they were on Saudi air force bases where US and coalition fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock.

Once the ground combat started, American units moved quickly -- some of them by air. To cover the conflict, reporters had to be part of a unit, able to move with it. Each commander had an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. You can't cover an airborne division by driving along so far behind it that you never see it.

While commanders could take care of the reporters they knew were coming, they could not have been expected to keep absorbing those who arrived on their own, unexpectedly, in their own rented four wheel drives -- assuming they could even find the units that moved out west and up north once the war started. And unlike the military that fought in World War Two or Vietnam, today's US
military fights at night, moving at speeds and covering distances unimaginable in both those previous conflicts.

By the time the ground war began, 131 reporters and photographers were out with the Army and Marines on the battlefield. There were reporters with every division and a few others at the two Army corps headquarters.

The pool system allowed us to tell the divisional commanders how many reporters they must accommodate. And the reporters in these pools were allowed to stay with the military units they covered, learning as much as they could about the unit's plans and tactics.

The civil rights committee paper traces the origin of pools to Grenada and says pooling has no deeper roots in our heritage. But of course, that ignores the military's pool arrangement for the major set piece battle of World War Two -- the D-Day landings at Normandy. Just 27 US reporters covered the landing, and not all of them were on the first wave. Reporters did not cover every element of the invasion force.

The four major still photography concerns covering World War Two -- AP, Acme, INS, and Life -- did their wartime work in a pool.

Pools in wartime are nothing new.

For all its drawbacks, the Persian Gulf pool system achieved three objectives: it put journalists on the battlefield and in place when the fighting started, it guaranteed that Americans at home got reports from the scene of the action, and it allowed the
military to accommodate a reasonable number of journalists without overwhelming the units that were fighting the enemy.

Part of the problem that drove us to use pools was the sheer number of journalists to accommodate. Richard Harwood, the Washington Post's ombudsman put it best when he said, "the communications industry, well-endowed financially, dispatched far too many people to cover the war."

As someone who works for the government, I can't decide who goes to cover the war and who doesn't. Maybe it's too much to expect as competitive an institution as the press to limit its numbers in a war, especially when local papers want to provide coverage to the hometowns where the troops come from. But it is a serious questions which news organizations need to address.

And what if reporters had been free to roam the battlefield at will? How many of them would have been killed? I raise that question not to make a rhetorical point. The United States lost 35 of its own troops to friendly fire. On that vast unmarked desert, allied troops sometimes had trouble telling where the line was separating them from the enemy. We mistakenly shot 31 of our own tanks and troop carriers. What if our tank crews also had to watch out for jeeps carrying reporters?

Several bureau chiefs told me last fall that in planning for war coverage, the security of reporters was their concern, not mine. The civil rights committee paper calls this concern "paternalistic." But I couldn't ignore that even if I wanted to.

After the cease fire, a group of US reporters decided to
cross the line from Kuwait into Iraq. They were captured by Iraqi troops. And while they were held, four news industry executives wrote to the President, saying that no US forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved.

The issue was raised by the US government -- with the Iraqi representative in Washington, with its ambassador at the U-N, with Soviet officials, with the International Red Cross and at two meetings between US and Iraqi military officers in the Gulf.

We thank God they were set free.

But news organizations must drop the pretense that the safety of journalists isn't the government's concern. The Civil Rights Committee may not think it is. But the actions of news organizations send a different message.

Whatever else the press arrangements in the Persian Gulf may have been, they were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene. They were a good faith effort to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war. And they were a good faith effort to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing what we were up to.

This was, after all, an enemy that had virtually as much access to American news reporting as people had here at home.

Once the war was over, Mr. Alter was the first to articulate one of the biggest concerns of the press. "With its quick win," he wrote, "the Pentagon will surely try to repeat its press
policy the next time."

Earlier this year, 17 prominent national news organizations jointed in writing a letter to Secretary Cheney about the pool arrangements used in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They said this: "It is imperative that the Gulf War not serve as a model for future coverage."

Secretary Cheney met with a representative group of the signers of that letter several weeks ago and reassured them that the Gulf rules will not be a blueprint. He said the press arrangements in the Gulf were dictated by the nature of that military operation. And he said whenever the next one happens, it will undoubtedly be different.

At that same meeting, Secretary Cheney also agreed that the Defense Department should work with news organizations on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. I'm now meeting with a group of Washington bureau chiefs on a set of ten principles to guide the military and the news media in the future.

We're making progress, and I'm optimistic that we'll develop a list acceptable to the Pentagon and to journalists. I hope we will. We are trying to resolve a difficult problem.

News organizations feel strongly that stories written and pictures taken on the battlefield should not be subject to military review before they are released. They argue that instead, the military should develop a clear set of reporting guidelines intended to protect US forces and military operations. And, they say, if a reporter violates the rules, the military's recourse is to suspend the reporter's press credentials and expel
the reporter from the combat zone.

Journalists will tell you that this is an extraordinary concession for them to make. After all, they don't give their consent to ground rules for reporting on Congress or the Supreme Court.

But military commanders rightly question the comparability of the kind of arrangement now under discussion between the press and the Pentagon. Those commanders have a duty -- a legal obligation, in fact -- to safeguard the success of a military operation and the lives of their troops. They understand that reporters don't want to jeopardize either.

But what of a reporter who inadvertently reports something that seems innocuous but turns out to be of great value to an enemy? An operation might be compromised. Soldiers could conceivably be at risk. Once a story goes out, it can't be recalled. The commanders ask, where is the parity, when the military's only response would be to pull that reporter's press pass?

What both the news media and the military want most of all is a system they can both trust. We'd have no problem if all reporters were like Ernie Pyle and all commanders were like Dwight Eisenhower. But they're not. Not all reporters go to the battlefield with the background and experience they need to cover combat. Not all commanders understand the needs of the press.

I think the point was understood by Arthur Lubow, writing earlier this year in the New Republic. He said this, "Mutual mistrust is part of the shared heritage of soldiers and
journalists in time of war. So is mutual accommodation."

That is what we all seek, both the Pentagon and the press. We will find it by continued discussion. Forums like this can help. But as the paper of the civil rights committee itself notes, there's no decided case directly addressing military restrictions on combat reporting. The answer to this problem won't be found in case law.

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View From the Pentagon

PENTAGON, From D1

Another part of the reason for the military's high credibility, of course, is that Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the decision to allow the war to unfold as we knew it to be true. We were careful not to get ahead of our successes. We waited for initial flight to be cleared to land and at the

Washington loves to talk about spin control. This was the first government operation I know of that had euphoric control.

The least loved aspect of coverage arrangements in the gulf was undoubtedly the press pools—groups of reporters who represent the rest of their colleagues and file stories for all, rather than just for their own news organizations. But it was just such a pool that got the first reporters to the scene.

After Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. forces began to arrive a few days after Cheney's meeting with King Fahd in Saudi Arabia. While the Saudi government studied whether to grant visas to journalists, they agreed to accept a small number of reporters if the U.S. military could get the planes. So the U.S. created the Defense National Media Pool, to ensure initial coverage of the U.S. buildup. At the time, there was no other way to get Western reporters into Saudi Arabia. The number of journalists grew to nearly 2,000 in December. Those reporters filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

After the president in mid-November announced the beginning of a war, the U.S. military gave reporters covering World War II interviews with their stories and submitted them to military censors. The censors cut anything they felt broke the rules and sent the stories on. The decision of the censors was final. There was no such system of censorship in Operation Desert Storm. There was, instead, a procedure that allowed us to appeal to news organizations, and in those stories would violate the ground rules. But unlike a system of censorship, the Gulf rules left the final decision to publish or broadcast in the hands of journalists, not the military.

While the pools were in existence, 1,351 print pool reporters were written. Of the newspapers, only four were reviewed in Washington. Four of them were cleared within a few hours. The fifth story was cleared in considerable detail with the methods of Intelligence operations in the field. We called the reporter's editor-in-chief, and he agreed that the story should be changed to protect sensitive intelligence procedures. This aspect of the cover story also worked well.

A simple number of troops in the desert grew, so did the number of reporters, starting to over 1,000 on the eve of the war. With hundreds of flaccid independent reporters seeking to jump on with combat units, we concluded we had no choice but to rely on pools once the combat war started.

Before the first phase of the operation began in January, news organizations were afraid that we wouldn't get the pools out to see anything. But we did. Reporters were on an airlift carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of the first air strikes. Our reports would allow the enemy to see the launch, which would allow the enemy to see the launch, which would

Was it just about over, it's time to look back. There are clearly many things we could have done better. Here are some preliminary observations:

We could have done a better job of helping journalists in the field. Judging from the reaction of the reporters who went out in the pools, we had some outstanding excerpts. But we must improve the selection of these excerpts.

Eccentric officers shouldn't throw themselves in front of the camera when one of them with a forbears words. We need to teach public affairs personnel how to do their jobs so that reporters won't feel their interview subjects are intimidated.

Our first obligation is to get reporters out with the action, so that journalists are eyewitnesses to history. I've seen some excellent examples of that—some of Molly Moore's stories on the Marines for The Washington Post are a good example.

But we must do better at getting stories back to the press center. Some units did well, using computer modems and tactical telephone fax machines. Others didn't do as well. We've heard from reporters who said their stories were delayed for weeks or even days. While delivery problems would have existed whether the units were worked in pools or not, we need to do better.

But part of the problem was the sheer number of journalists in the gulf. For example, Richard Harwood, The Post's ombudsmen, raised this issue in his column last week and asked where all the journalists are in the industry, well-endowed financially, dispatch from the gulf. The government cannot decide who gets to cover the war or who doesn't. Maybe it's too much to expect as competitive an institution as the press to limit its numbers in a war, especially when local papers want to provide coverage to the hometowns where the troops come from.

It's worth raking.

Soviet bureau chiefs told me last fall that planning for war coverage, the security of reporters was their concern, not mine. But that's not realizable, because we couldn't ignore that even if we wanted to. It's not morally possible.

When a group of U.S. journalists was captured in Iraq after the cease-fire, four news industry executives wrote to the president, saying that no U.S. forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved. That was raised by the U.S. government with the Iraqis, and was the reason for their release. Everyone is relieved they were freed. We must drop the pretense that the safety of journalists isn't the government's concern.

Whatever else the press arrangement in the Persian Gulf may have been, they were a good-faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible about reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible. We need to do much better.

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View From The Newsroom

The Pentagon is concerned that the press may be too complacent about the military's actions in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of Defense Cheney has reportedly told Pentagon officials to "stay in the headlines" so that the press will continue to cover the war. Cheney also reportedly warned that the press may be too complacent about the war and that the Pentagon is concerned that the press may be too complacent about the war.

There were seven major events of the Persian Gulf War that were covered by the press:

1. The ability to control the press
2. The need to control the press
3. The need to control the press
4. The need to control the press
5. The need to control the press
6. The need to control the press
7. The need to control the press

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The Baghdad Story

BAGHDAD, Iraq

- Upon my arrival in Baghdad on the eve of war I saw a repeat of what happened during the fall of Baghdad. After the Allied bombing, the city was left in ruins for various reasons. I watched with wonder as this rich journalistic prize fell into fewer and fewer hands. Four days after the war began, only 17 journalists remained from the hundreds who had covered Baghdad.

Everybody out, the Iraqis said, except CNN. Even CNN isn't sure why they made that decision. Perhaps it is because CNN alone has been seen globally. What the Iraqis told us is that they had found our coverage since August 1990 to be "hate." But later, events showed there was more to their decision than just dislike of our coverage.

Eventually, there was only one ride: the growing intensity of the war. I decided to continue the production of a CNN-produced television series and the newscast that aired daily during the war. The series was called "The Baghdad Story," and the newscast was "Saddam Hussein's War." Each day I would write a story for the series and a camera crew and a technician would follow me around Baghdad and interview me.

The series continued for 10 weeks, during which time I traveled to over 40 locations in Iraq. The series was broadcast daily on CNN and later became a book. The book, "The Baghdad Story," was published by Broadway Books and has been translated into 13 languages.

The series was a major success, with over 100 million viewers watching it daily. It was also a turning point in my career, as I became one of the most well-known journalists in the world. I continued to work with CNN for many years, covering major events around the world, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2004 Democratic National Convention.

In 2004, I left CNN to work for Al Jazeera, where I continued to cover major events around the world. I also began to write books, including "The Baghdad Story," which was published in 2005. The book was a bestseller and was translated into 13 languages.

The Baghdad Story was a turning point in my career, and it continues to be a major part of my legacy as a journalist.
PENTAGON RULES ON MEDIA ACCESS TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FEBRUARY 20, 1991

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-035594-X
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1991
PREFACE

POLICY OVERSIGHT MATERIALS
Operation Desert Shield

GROUND RULES—JANUARY 14, 1991

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water) including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as “company-size,” “multibattalion,” “multidivision,” “naval task force,” and “carrier battle group.” Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as “large,” “small,” or “many.”

2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Nations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the “Persian Gulf,” “Red Sea,” or “North Arabian Sea.” Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined “Eastern Saudi Arabia,” “Near the Kuwaiti border,” etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.


5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

10. Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as “low” or “fast” may be used.

12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as “light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.”

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA—JANUARY 14, 1991

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopard-
ize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rules problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed mate-
rial to JIB Dahran for review by the Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures—January 30, 1991

General

The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dahran for filing—rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be two types of pools: eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, seven-member pools for ground combat and other operations. The pools will be formed and governed by media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-Dahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation

Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, newspaper, magazine, news magazine, newspaper, pook, magazine, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures

Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather than specifically individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil category. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a working list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dahran from their organization to replace them.

Membership ofstanding pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks as the situation permits.

Pool categories and composition:

Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.

Radio: The radio category will be open to those radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.

Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.

News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the eighteen-member pools. One will be open to those major newspapers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as the New York Times, Cox, Knight-Kidd, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Boston Globe. The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of "pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB-Dahran. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

International: The international category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

Sharing of media products within the CENTCOM pools

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

Alert procedures for combat correspondent pool activation

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB-Dahran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool co-
ordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within—but not later than—two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indicators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told if the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert".

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

Final Report to Congress

Pursuant to

APPENDICES A - S

April 1992
APPENDIX S

MEDIA POLICY

"The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1944

INTRODUCTION

As in all previous American conflicts, the rules for news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were driven by the need to balance the requirements of operational security against the public's right to know about ongoing military operations. Department of Defense (DOD) policy calls for making available "timely and accurate information so the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy," withholding information "only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces." The news media feel compelled to report as much information about current newsworthy events as possible.

The challenge to provide full news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was complicated by several factors:

- The host nation, closed to western media before the operation began, was reluctant to permit reporters to enter the country and was concerned about reporting of cultural sensitivities.
- More than 1,600 news media representatives eventually massed in Saudi Arabia to report about the war.
- The combat actions of Operation Desert Storm used high technology, involved long-range weapons, and occurred on and over a distant, vast, open desert and from ships operating in adjacent bodies of water.
- The combined armor and airmobile attacks and drives through Kuwait and Iraq were rapid.
This was the first major American war to be covered by news media able to broadcast reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy.

From the beginning of the crisis, DOD worked closely with Central Command (CENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), the Services, and news media organizations to balance the media’s needs with the military’s ability to support them and its responsibility to preserve US combat forces’ operational security. The goal was to provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel.

When the USS Independence (CV 62) battle group arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August and the first Air Force (USAF) F-15s landed on sovereign Saudi territory on 8 August, approximately one week after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were no western reporters in the Kingdom. The US government urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so reporters could cover the US military’s arrival. On 10 August, the Secretary of Defense called the Saudi ambassador to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. The ambassador said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military would arrange their transportation.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

National Media Pool

The DOD National Media Pool, formed in 1985, was alerted the same day. The pool enables reporters to cover the earliest possible US military action in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American news media, while still protecting the element of surprise – an essential part of operational security.

Starting with those initial 17 press pool members – representing Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Cable News Network, National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal – the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

Joint Information Bureau

To facilitate media coverage of US forces in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM established a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran and, later, another in
Riyadh. Saudi Ministry of Information representatives also were located with the JIB in Dhahran, which let visiting media register with the Saudi government and the JIB at one location. The JIB coordinated with reporters and worked to arrange visits to units the reporters desired to cover. The Saudi government required that a US official escort reporters visiting Saudi bases. The CENTCOM Public Affairs Office (PAO) assumed this responsibility and provided escorts to facilitate coverage on Saudi bases and to US units on the ground and at sea and throughout the theater.

Media Concerns

One of the concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, they asked the Pentagon to provide a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. A USAF C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base, MD, on 17 January, the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. That plane left as offensive operations began, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one cargo airplane to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.

The Pentagon worked closely with the CENTCOM PAO to determine how best to facilitate coverage of potential hostilities in the Persian Gulf. After several meetings at the Pentagon with military and civilian public affairs officials experienced in previous conflicts, and Pentagon press corps bureau chiefs, the Department published on 14 January a one-page list of ground rules and a one-page list of guidelines for the news media covering operations in the Gulf.

Media On The Battlefield

As early as October, it appeared hostilities in the region could result in a large, fast-moving, and deadly battle. The Pentagon sent a joint public affairs team to Saudi Arabia on 6 October to evaluate the public affairs aspects of hostile action and help CENTCOM prepare for media coverage of any such eventuality. The team was convinced that, given the size and distances involved, the probable speed of advance of US forces, the potential for the enemy to use chemical weapons, and the sheer violence of a large scale armor battle would make open coverage of a ground combat operation impractical, at least during its initial phase.
The team, therefore, recommended that pools of reporters be assigned to units to cover activity within those units. These reporters would stay with units to ensure they would be present with military forces at the beginning of any combat operations. Although the plan was initially rejected, the command ultimately implemented a similar plan calling for ground combat news media pools, all of which would be in place before the ground campaign began.

The second contentious issue was the requirement that in the event of hostilities, all pooled media products undergo a security review. Although most reporting from the theater had been unrestricted, the military was concerned that reporters might not realize the sensitivity of certain information and might inadvertently divulge details of military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of US or other Coalition forces. The plan called for all pooled media material to be examined by the public affairs escort officer on scene solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer would discuss ground rule problems he found with the reporter, and, if no agreement could be reached about the disputed material, it would be sent immediately to the JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If they could not agree, the issue would be elevated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication rested with the originating reporter’s news organization, not the government or the military.

While the pools were in existence, only five of more than 1,300 print pool stories were appealed through the stages of the review process to Washington for resolution. Four of those were cleared in Washington within a few hours. The fifth story dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. The reporter’s editor-in-chief chose to change the story to protect sensitive intelligence procedures.

In addition to 27 reporters on ships and at air bases, when the ground offensive began, CENTCOM had 132 reporters in place with the US ground forces to cover their activity. This let reporters accompany every combat division into battle.

Although plans called for expeditious handling of pool reports, much of it moved far too slowly. The JIB Dhahran reviewed 343 pool reports filed during or immediately after the ground war and found approximately 21 percent arrived at the JIB in less than 12 hours, 69 percent arrived in less than two days, and 10 percent arrived in more than three days. Five reports, hampered either by weather or by poor transportation, arrived at the JIB more than six days after they were filed.

The press arrangements in Southwest Asia were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing precisely the nature of Coalition plans.
An unanticipated problem, however, grew out of the security review issue. Reporters were upset with the presence of public affairs escort officers. Although it is a common practice for a public affairs officer to be present during interviews with military personnel, the fact the escort officer had the additional role of reviewing stories for conformance to ground rules led to the public affairs officer being perceived as an impediment. Normally the facilitators of interviews and the media's advocate, public affairs officers now were considered to be inhibiting the flow of information between the troops and the media.

Media Briefings

DOD and CENTCOM conducted extensive briefings on Operation Desert Storm. When the air campaign began, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed the news media. Several hours later, during the morning of 17 January, the Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM, and the CENTCOM Air Forces Commander conducted an extensive briefing in Riyadh. At the Pentagon, during the next 47 days, the JS Directors of Operations and Intelligence – two of the most knowledgeable officials about the operation – along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs conducted 35 televised news briefings. Likewise, in Saudi Arabia, the command provided the Deputy Director of Operations for daily, televised briefings, and also provided background briefings at the news media's request. The command provided 98 briefings (53 on-the-record and 45 on background). Along with the news reports coming from reporters accompanying our forces in the field, these daily news briefings – conducted by the people responsible for planning and carrying out the operation – provided an unprecedented amount of information about the war to the American people.
OBSERVATIONS

Accomplishments

- DOD acted quickly to move reporters into place to cover the early stages of the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia, providing access for the first western reporters to the early stages of the operation. CENTCOM, in conjunction with DOD, established a pool system, enabling the news media to cover Operation Desert Storm through 159 reporters and photographers who were with combat units. In contrast, 27 reporters were with the D-Day invasion force in 1944 when the first wave of troops went ashore.

- The media pool system placed pool members in positions to witness actual combat or interview troops immediately after combat, as evidenced by the fact approximately 300 reports filed during the ground war were filed from forward deployed units on or near the front lines. Of that number, approximately 60 percent appeared to contain eyewitness accounts of the fighting.

- Pool members were permitted to interview front-line troops. Some 362 stories filed from the front included interviews with front-line troops.

- Frequent public briefings were conducted on details of the operation.

Shortcomings

- Command support for the public affairs effort was uneven. Some component commands were highly cooperative while others did not appear to place a priority on getting the story out. In some cases, this meant lack of communication and transportation assets or priorities to get stories back to the Dhahran JIB in a timely manner.

- Because of the scope and sensitive nature of much of the operational planning, a significant number of PAOs were not able to stay fully abreast of daily developments, nor were they trained to conduct security reviews of pool products. Many were therefore unable to judge operational security violations properly.

- The public affairs escort officers displayed a wide range of expertise in performing their duties. While many received praise from the media and unit commanders for having done excellent jobs, others, overzealously performing their duties, made mistakes which sometimes became news items. Occasional, isolated incidents, such as public affairs officers stepping in front of cameras to stop interviews, telling reporters they could not ask questions about certain subjects, and attempting to have some news media reports altered to eliminate
unfavorable information, were reported. Although these incidents were the exception, not the rule, they nonetheless frequently were highlighted in media reports.

Issue

- Media sources have voiced dissatisfaction with some press arrangements, especially with the media pools, the need for military escorts for the news media, and security review of media pool products. DOD is working with news media representatives on ways to improve news coverage of future US military combat operations.
SECTION I OF 8
M:SIG/878. RMM/CPA//

CM:SUBJECT: APPROVED ANNEX F TO OPERATION DESERT SHIELD PUBLIC
AFFAIRS JU///
REP A: USCINCENT 11/15/90 AUG 90// Docket
REP B: USCINCENT 12/21/90 AUG 90// Docket
RE: C/TG/OCPA/1289482 AUG 90//
NARR. JU REP A WAS USCINCENT PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
PA FOR 4TH ARMED FORCES. REP B WAS BEYOND RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO
REP A. REP C WAS OASD (PA) APPROVED CHANGES TO JCS/FJ-16
MANAGING PROPOSED IN REP A BASED ON EVENTUAL CONSOLIDATION OF MAIN-
JIS AND USCINCENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OCPA, PER MR. TAYLOR
(ASD PA).

3. SITUATION.
A. GENERAL. THIS PLAN PROVIDES SPECIFIC PA, PA TASKING AND
OVERALL GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONS FOR IN-THEATER U.S. MILITARY PA
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.
B. ENEMY. THE IRANI GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HOSTILE TO
THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONDUCT
SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DISTORT PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE USG AND USCINCENT. THESE
OPERATIONS CAN INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO: MISREPRESENTATION
OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS, PLANTING INACCURATE DATA
WITH SELECTED MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER
ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO ADVERSELY INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN CONUS
AND ABROAD.
C. FRIENDLY
III USCINCENT WILL PROVIDE OVERALL PA GUIDANCE AND COORDINATE PA
ACTIONS AFFECTING OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS APPROPRIATE.
IV ASC PA WILL ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF
THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, IF ACTIVATED. ASC PA WILL
COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (GOSI) TO OBTAIN HOST
GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND WILL
ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR
USCINCENT REGIONAL MEDIA POOL ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). DETAILED INFORMATION, SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH POOL DEPLOYMENT WILL BE FORWARDED BY
USCINCT TO OASD-GPA FOR APPROVAL.
9. RECEIPT OF INFORMATION AUTHORITY WILL ULTIMATETY BE DELEGATED
BY DEPARTMENT LEVELS TO UBSCINCENT FOR JIP'S AND OTHER
COMMANDS DESIGNATED BY OASD-GPA AND USCINCENT AS REQUIRED. SUBJ\UPON
ACTIVATION OF THE JIP.
10. UBSCINCENT PA WILL ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE ON A
CONTINUING BASIS DURING THIS OPERATION.
11. THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE USIS REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
PAC IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, QATAR, KUWAIT,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, BAHRAIN AND OTHERS AS NEEDED, WILL PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES REGARDING PA
POLICY FOR THIS OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, THESE REPRESENTATIVES
WILL BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY LOCAL U.S. MEDIA, PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING POLICIES REGARDING HOST NATION MEDIA AND
INFORM THE PUBLIC. THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE MADE FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES:
12. THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN IS OF EXTREME HIGH
IMPORTANT INTEREST.
13. THE DOM NATIONAL PUBLIC MEDIA POOL AND/OR REGIONAL PUBLIC MEDIA
POOLS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE AM CONSISTENT WITH HOST NATION
Safa. PUBLIC WILL BE APPROVED.
14. STATEMENTS TO PUBLIC MEDIA AND/OR PUBLIC WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH APPOVED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.
15. THE JFO CHIEFS OF BRACH 1C4F PA RESPONSE FELT WILL BE
ACTIVATED TO ASSIST USCINCENT AND TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL COMMAND
AUTHORITY NCA OF THE PA ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION.
16. THE MAIN JIP INFORMATION BUREAU USIS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN
RIYADH, K.S.A. IT WILL BE COLLOCATED WITH ASSISTING FORCES.
MIXED JOINT INFORMATION CENTER WILL BE MANNED BY COL DON KIRCHOFFNER, USA; CAPT
MIKE SHERMAN, USA; MAJ OLIN SAUNDERS, USA; CAPT KEVIN BAGGOTT,
USA; AND LT COL KEVIN LAROCK, USA; TEMPORARY COMMERCIAL PHONE
NUMBER 91-181-888-1413.
17. SUBORDINATE JIP WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT CTFUME AND MANNED BY
LCCD NON MORSE, PHONE 911-971-720-413. AN ADDITIONAL SUBORDINATE
JIP WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT QATHARTI, OMAN, WITH POTENTIAL JIP'S AT ABU
DHABI, UAE USIS OFFICE; USIS OFFICE MANAMA, BAHRAIN, AND OTHER
LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED.
18. MILITARY SUPPORT OF PUBLIC MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (USIS) WILL BE
E.
19. ALL PA ACTIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DOM, JCS
AND DEPARTMENT SPECIFICALLY STATED OTHERWISE.
3. UBSCINCENT, AS DIRECTED BY OASD-GPA, WILL
EXECUTE AN ACTIVE PA PROGRAM THAT CONVEYS TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
AUDIENCE THE RESOLVE OF THE USG TO PROTECT ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS
AND AFFORDS APPROPRIATE ACCESS TO UNCLASSIFIED, TIMELY AND
ACCURATE ACCOUNTS OF US OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROGRAM
SIGNS TO ILLUSTRATE U.S. FORCES' ABILITIES TO DETER AND DEFEND,
AND IF NECESSARY FIGHT AND DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES. THE FOLLOWING
THEMES SHOULD BE STRESSED DURING MEDIA VISITS TO ALL UNITS:
A. U.S. FORCES ARE ONE PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE ASSEMBLED IN
OPPOSING TERROR TO WORLDWIDE VITAL INTERESTS.
B. U.S. FORCES ARE INTENDED TO GET UP DEFENSIVE
POSITIONS AND THEN TO TRAIN AND WORK WITH THE SAUDI AND OTHER
MILITARY UNITS, AS APPROPRIATE.
C. AMERICA DOES NOT SEEK CONFLICT, NOR DOES IT SEEK TO CHAMP THE
GOAL

4. This is a joint U.S. and multi-national effort as personnel from all U.S. services, Saudi Arabia, and other countries are assembled providing the expertise of their service to the common defense of Saudi Arabia.

A) Execution

A1) Concept of Operations. USCENTCOM, with the guidance of DOD, will be responsible for all PA operations of USCENTCOM Hosts supporting and component commands, and other participating units for this operation. USCENTCOM will authorize the USCENTCOM PAO to conduct routine PA matters on his behalf. USCENTCOM PAO will plan, coordinate, and direct military PA activities for this operation. PA activities will be conducted in coordination with the Senior DOS representatives in the area. Supporting and component commands and commanders of participating units should provide PA personnel augmentation to the J18/SUS-188 in support of the PA plan.

A2) News media pool operations. If the OOD National News Media pool or a Regional OOD news media pool are on-scene, they will receive, at a minimum, the following: Chairman Joint Chief of Staff

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

DIRECTED SUPPORT

B) Daily, comprehensive, and unclassified operational briefings.

B1) To perform its mission of enabling pool members to provide in-depth coverage of the event, the pool requires access to the actual areas of combat. The media realize and accept the element of risk inherent in accompanying military forces into combat. Their personal safety is not a reason for excluding them from an area of ongoing operations. A reporter should be treated as a member of the unit and allowed to move with it. At the same time, commanders must ensure the unarmored, untrained reporters are not recklessly put in exposed situations. They must be allowed to cover the action from positions of reasonable safety.

B2) Reasonable access to key command and staff personnel. All information provided by these personnel will be unclassified and on the record.

B3) Once they have received the arrival briefing, pool members should be deployed in small elements of from one to three persons throughout the combat area in order to provide balanced coverage of operations. Once the pool members have observed the initial event, they will need be reassembled so they can compile notes and file a consolidated pool story. Pool members should then be returned to the operational area and this cycle repeated as often as necessary until pool operations are terminated.

B4) When considering activities for the media pool to cover and planning their itinerary, it is advisable to consult with pool members. If well briefed on the day’s operational events, they will probably have a good idea of the type of coverage they feel is desirable. Maximum flexibility should be built into the itinerary to allow for potential minor delays. Pool escorts should look for targets of opportunity for additional coverage, such as civilian evacuees, DOS personnel, etc.

C) Cooperation from all forces participating, on a not-to-interfere basis, is essential.

C1) Upon arrival, the pool will be met by the unit commander or designated representative. The commander or designated
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SECTION 5 OF 5

I. DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN PAOS AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND.

II. PERSONNEL WHO DEPLOY TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL NOTIFY USCINCENT PAO OR JIB ON LOCATION AND COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY. WHETHER COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY IS CLASSIFIED/UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONE OR RADIO.

III. INCIDENTS/INCIDENTS WILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO USCINCENT PAO OR JIB BY FAX/TELEPHONE.

IV. VERBATIM RECORDS OF RELEASES, NEWS CONFERENCES AND RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED.
MCOXCAL
• FACILITIES.
TRAVEL INFORMATION
• TRANSPORTATION.

FOB UTAH UICINCCENT.
PPIMIONNIL. FOLLOWING:

A. NAME WILL BE PROVIDED A COPY OF THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC
GROUND RULES IN EFFECT AND MUST AGREE TO ABIDE BY THEM IN RETURN
FOR MILITARY INFORMATION.
B. PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION WILL BE SENT
TO THE NEAREST US EMBASSY TO OBTAIN A LETTER OF IDENTIFICATION.
C. ACCREDITATION MAY BE WITHDRAWN BY OASD-PA, UINCENT, THE
ON-SITE COMMANDER OR THE PAO IN CHARGE OF THE JIB FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS: PERSONAL MISCONDUCT, VIOLATION OF THE GROUND
RULES, OR FAILURE TO MEET FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE USA.
D. UPI FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP, NOT APPLICABLE.
E. UPI ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.
A. FACILITIES. FACILITIES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO VISITING NAME LAW
REF P. ALSO SEE PARAGRAPH 3.A. (II U) THROUGH (V).
B. INOCULATIONS. NAME PREPARING FORCES TO THE AREA OF
OPERATIONS AS PART OF THE OASD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL WILL BE
REQUIRED TO HAVE THE SAME INOCULATIONS AS MILITARY PERSONNEL.
C. ACCREDITATION. WHEN NO COMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE,
MESSING AND BILLETING WILL BE PROVIDED TO NAME ON A REIMBURSABLE
BASIS.
D. SIMULATED RANK. NAME WILL BE APPRAISED THE PRIVILEGES OF AN
OFFICER IN THE RANK OF O-4 FOR MESSING, BILLETING, AND
TRANSPORTATION.
E. DAILY BRIEFINGS. A REQUIREMENT FOR DAILY BRIEFINGS FOR NAME
WILL BE DETERMINED BY UINCENT IN CONSULTATION WITH OASD-PA.
F. COMMUNICATIONS. IF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ARE
NOT AVAILABLE, THE USE OF OASD MILITARY FACILITIES (TO INCLUDE
TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH AND CABLE SERVICE) WILL BE USED TO FILE
STORIES ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF CRITICAL
OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS. MEDIA TRAFFIC WILL BE PROCESSED AS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE.
G. FIGHTS. IF CARRIER FLIGHTS ARE AVAILABLE, SUCH
FLIGHTS WILL BE USED FOR TRANSPORTING FILM AND VIDEO TAPES TO/FROM
UINCENT/PAO JIB AND OTHER LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED.
H. TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZED NAME WILL BE PROVIDED WITH
MILITARY TRAVEL INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WHEN SUCH
TRAVEL IS IN CONNECTION WITH ASSIGNMENTS TO COVER THE OPERATION
AND WHEN COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION INTO THE AREA IS RESTRICTED OR
UNAVAILABLE. THIS REQUIREMENT IS A HIGH PRIORITY OASD REQUIREMENT
AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED UNLESS GRANTING IT WOULD COMPROMISE
CRITICALLY NEEDED OPERATIONAL TRANSPORTATION.
I. TRAVEL ORDERS. CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ISSUED TRAVEL ORDERS,
IF REQUIRED. AUTHORITY TO ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR NAME FOR A
SPECIFIC PHASE OF THIS OPERATION MAY BE DELEGATED UPON REQUEST
FROM COMPONENT COMMAND.
J. EQUIPMENT. OASD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND UINCENT REGIONAL
MEDIA POOL MEMBER WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT
CONSISTENT WITH THE SITUATION (E.G., HELMETS, CHEMICAL
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, BODY ARMOR, ETC.1
K. MEDICAL SUPPORT. MEDICAL SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED AS
REQUIRED.
L. EJ SECURITY OF OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL.
A. OPERATIONS.
(1) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE GOVERNS THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION IS
THAT AT INFORMATION THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL SECURITY
AND DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE SAFETY OF US OR FRIENDLY NATION

UNCLASSIFIED
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PERSONNEL WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO CLASSIFIED AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE POLICY.
1) NO NAME COVERING THE OPERATION HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE AND
2) Statements made to the name will be "ON THE RECORD." "OFF
THE RECORD" STATEMENTS WILL NOT BE MADE IN BRIEFINGS OR
DISCUSSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA.
PUBLIC OR MEDIA KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CLASSIFIED ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH AN OPERATION DOES NOT
SUBSTANTIATE THAT THE INFORMATION IS DECLASSIFIED OR THAT IT MAY BE
RELEASED OR CONFIRMED.
4) MILITARY SUPPORTED ACCESS OF NAME TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
IS SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT TO ADHERE TO ALL GROUND RULES
EACHED BY OBO-PA) OR U.S. INTELLIGENCE.
5) PERSONNEL SECURITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
NAME.

6) OPERATIONS SECURITY. NAME WILL BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO
ALL UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY OPERATIONAL OR
PERSONNEL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.
7) AN AUDIOVISUAL (AV) AND
VISUAL INFORMATION WILL BE REQUIRED FOR DISSEMINATION TO NEWS
MEDIA THAT MAY NOT BE IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OR TO NEWS MEDIA
THAT HAVE NOT BEEN DELAYED IN RELATED TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.
ADDITIONALLY, AV AND VI PRODUCTS WILL BE REQUIRED FOR DEPARTMENT
INFORMATION PRODUCTS.
8) COMPONENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL
PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL ARE PROPERLY BRIEFED WITH THIS INFORMATION
INCLUDING INFORMATION IN REF. F.
9) HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL AFTER
OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETE OR U.S. INTELLIGENCE PAD NOTIFIES PARTICIPANTS.

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RELEASES MUST ADHERE TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND BE CAREFULLY
FORMULATED TO ENSURE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL AND MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, MENTION SPECIFIC
COUNTRIES WHERE DEPLOYED. DATE LINES WILL BE IN THE "PERSIAN GULF
AREA," "MIDDLE EAST AREA," ETC.

STORIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX V TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT
SECRET AND WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE
OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR JIBS AND SUB-JIBS
1) PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL VARY FOR EACH JIBS/ SUB-JIB WITH
THE SITUATION AND ASSETS AVAILABLE. MAIN JIBS SHOULD BE MANNED FOR
24 HOURS-A-DAY OPERATION TO PROVIDE THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER PA
SUPPORT IN MEDIA RELATIONS, SECURITY REVIEW, AUDIOVISUAL
MANAGEMENT, PA TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION COORDINATION,
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY.
2) SUB-JIBS AND SUB-JIBS, WHERE POSSIBLE, SHOULD BE LOCATED WITH
THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS OR OTHER MAJOR MILITARY
HEADQUARTERS OR MEDIA FILING POINT, TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO
COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.
3) COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL AUGMENT THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE MAIN JIB
AND SUB-JIBS AS FOLLOWS:

MAIN JIB -- RIVACOM

RANK SERVICE POS. CLR NAME
66 U.S. ARMY DIR 5/5 WILDERMUTH-CENTCOM
67 U.S. ARMY OPR 5/5 OLSEN-CENTCOM
68 U.S. AIR FORCE OPR 5/5 DOUBLEDAY-CHINPO
69 U.S. ARMY OPR 5/5 TIEDEMANN-TAC
70 U.S. ARMY INTERNAL 5 OAKLEY-6TH ARMY
71 U.S. MARINES OPR 5 RHOX-NAVINFO
72 U.S. MARINES MEDIA TS SANTANA-CENTCOM

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCINC OPPLAN DESERT SHIELD XI

GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR THE MEDIA XI

1. XI GENERAL. THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM INFORMATION FLOW TO THE PUBLIC IS TO BE FOLLOWED, CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY OF THE FORCE AND SECURITY. THE SITUATION IN ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS IS SUCH THAT CORRESPONDENTS MAY COME INTO POSSESSION OF INFORMATION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED OFFICIALLY UNDER GROUND RULES SET FORTH IN THIS ANNEX. NEWS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION AND ASKED NOT TO RELEASE IT. U.S. MILITARY ACCOMMODATION IS ISSUED BASED ON HOURS OBSERVANCE OF THE EMBARKED GROUND RULES. CORRESPONDENTS MAY FIND THAT, AT TIMES, THEIR MOVEMENTS MAY BE RESTRICTED IN CERTAIN MARSHALLING, STAGING, AND MANEUVER AREAS. THEIR RESTRICTIONS WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM BUT MAY BE APPLIED BY A COMMANDING OFFICER WHEN THE SECURITY OF AN OPERATIONS DEMANDS SUCH ACTION. CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ADVISED OF RESTRICTIONS BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR PAGE OF THE UNIT.
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FINAL SECTION OF

HEADQUARTERS, OR ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INFORMATION. ALL
DATELINES MUST BE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. OR "ABOARD THE USS WILL
IN NAME OF SHIP) IN THE PERSIAN GULF," THERE CAN BE NO MENTION OF
COUNTRY OF EMBASSY IN REPORTING.

DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS, NAMES OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
OTHER THAN THE TASK FORCE COMMANDERS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS OF
THE UNITS WILL NOT BE RELEASED.

D. ANY INFORMATION GENERAL, IMPLIED, OR SPECIFIC, REGARDING ANY
ASPECT OF ACTUAL, CONCEPTUAL, OR HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE MILITARY
PLANS, ACTIVITIES, OR OPERATIONS. INCLUDES ALL DETAILED
INFORMATION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH COMBAT, COMBAT
SUPPORT, OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ENDEAVORS (I.E., OPERATIONS,
LOGISTICS, ADMINISTRATION, POLITICAL-MILITARY, CIVIL AFFAIRS, ETC.).

D. DETAILED INFORMATION ON ANY COMMAND, CONTROL, PERSONNEL,
OPERATIONAL, OR SUPPORT VULNERABILITIES, WEAKNESSES, OR
SHORTFALLS.

D. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DETAILS.

D. DETAILED INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY UNIT/COMMAND STRATEGIES,
ON-HAND EQUIPMENT, OR SUPPLIES. THE PRESENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND
METHODS OF OPERATION OF SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED UNITS OR
EQUIPMENT.

D. INFORMATION OF FRIENDLY FORCE SECURITY AND DECEPTION
MEASURES/COUNTERMEASURES.

D. SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE CURRENT
OPERATIONS/MOVEMENTS, DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS.

D. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE
TARGETS, METHODS, AND RESULTS.

D. INFORMATION ON IN-PROGRESS OPERATIONS AGAINST HOSTILE
TARGETS.

D. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION AIRCRAFT POINTS OF ORIGIN OTHER
THAN GENERIC (I.E., LAND OR CARRIER BASED).

D. INFORMATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS/INEFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY
CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT/INDIRECT FIRE,
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.

D. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS WHILE SAME
OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED OR IN PROGRESS.

D. INFORMATION ON UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGICAL/TACTICAL AIR
OPS ANGLES OF ATTACK, SPEEDS, ETC.; NAVAL TACTICAL/EVASIVE
MANEUVERS, ETC. .

D. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELLED OPERATIONS.

D. INFORMATION ON UNCONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL PURPOSE
OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES.

D. CATEGORIES OF RELEASABLE INFORMATION FOLLOWING INITIAL
OFFICIAL RELEASE

D. GENERAL.

D. ARRIVAL OF MAJOR US UNITS IN AO WHEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY
US SPOKESMAN.

D. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES, AFTER APPROVAL
BY HNG.

D. FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND KIA FIGURES, BY SERVICE, FURNISHED BY
G3/OSI-PAI.

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10. ENEMY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES FOR EACH ACTION, OPERATION, OR
CAMPAIGN, DAILY OR CUMULATIVE AS FURNISHED BY DADB PAT.
11. US, AIR, GROUND, SEA OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT.
  a) FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES BY COMMAND IN AN ANNOUNCED
     OPERATION IN GENERAL TERMS OF "LIGHT," "MODERATE," OR "HEAVY" IAW
     THE FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN THAT ACTION OR OPERATION. MAJOR END
     ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT DAMAGED OR LOST DUE TO ENEMY ACTION.
  b) FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION USING GENERAL
     TERMS (MULTI-BATTALION," NAVAL TASK FORCE," ETC.). SPECIFIC
     FORCE/UNIT IDENTIFICATION THAT HASBecome PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND NO
     LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION, MAY BE RELEASED.
  c) NON-SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONS DETAILS.
  d) IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND
     OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.
  e) GENERIC ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS (U.S., LAND OR CARRIER
     BASED).
  f) DATE/TIME/LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY
     MISSIONS/ACTIVITIES.
  g) PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MISSION RESULTS.
  h) TYPES OF GROUND/SEA EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS VICE AMOUNTS.
  i) NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT/RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS/SORTIES FLOWN
     IN THEATER OR OPERATIONAL AREA.
  j) TYPE FORCES INVOLVED (INFANTRY, ARMOR, MARINES, CARRIER
     TASK FORCE, INTERCEPTORS, FIGHTER-BOMBER, ETC.).
  k) WEATHER/CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.
  l) ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE AFTER APPROVAL OF USA.
  m) CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS NICKNAMES.

E. PRIOR TO ARRIVAL, ALL AMERICAN SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE ADVISED
THAT PARTICIPATION IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS IS VOLUNTARY. SERVICEMEN
AND LEADERS, WHEN INTERVIEWED SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON EVENTS IN
GENERAL AND RESTRICT COMMENTS TO AREAS OF THEIR DIRECT
PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE.

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