PENTAGON ADOPTS COMBAT COVERAGE PRINCIPLES

The Defense Department today officially adopted new principles for battlefield coverage of the US military in combat.

The action follows eight months of discussions between the Pentagon and the news media on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. The sessions led to a consensus on nine principles that should guide future reporting from a battle zone. "I have directed that those nine principles be made part of Defense Department policy. They have now been formally incorporated into our directives," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said in announcing the action.

"Both the military and the news media need to work together on such an important issue. I'm pleased that our discussions have resulted in a set of principles that will help us both do our jobs better in the future," said Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, who represented the Defense Department at the discussions.

"The military has taken on the task of improving what it must provide to journalists. The Pentagon is developing new doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field combat exercises now include training on working with journalists," Williams said.

While the Pentagon and the news media agreed on nine principles for combat coverage, they could not agree on a news media proposal for a tenth principle barring review of news material.

"The military believes it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that would endanger troop safety or the success of a military mission. Any review system would be imposed only when operational security was a consideration," Williams said.

Williams also praised Stanley Cloud of Time magazine, Michael Getler of the Washington Post, Clark Hoyt of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, George Watson of ABC News, and Jonathan Wolman of the Associated Press, who represented the news media in the discussions.

- end -
STATEMENT OF DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
GROUND RULES

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
Remarks by Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
New York Bar Association
November 4, 1991

I've read the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights, which is a valuable contribution to the public debate about the Pentagon press policies during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I had first seen it when it was the subject of discussion at the ABA House of Delegates meeting in Atlanta in August.

The paper is a dispatch from the battlefield -- the one marked by combat between the Pentagon and the press. But what concerns me is that the paper reduces the concerns of the real battlefield, the one where combat takes place between US and enemy forces.

But before I get into the point and counter point, I want to review for a moment the press arrangements the military came up with in the Persian Gulf.

First, I think it must be noted that the military released an unprecedented amount of information while the operation was going on. The military offered two briefings a day in Saudi Arabia and one at the Pentagon. We released casualty information every day. We even released, at the request of news organizations, the videotape out of the gun cameras mounted inside the bomber airplanes.

Even so I realize the point in which this forum is most interested is the arrangements made for battlefield reporting of the operation by the press.
Last August, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, US forces began to arrive in Saudi Arabia. But there were no western reporters there. While the Saudi government studied whether to grant visas to journalists, they agreed to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military could get them in. So we activated the DOD National Media Pool on August 12th, because there was no other way to get western reporters into Saudi Arabia.

This point is often overlooked -- indeed, I read no reference to it in the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights: the first reporters to cover the operation got there only because we persuaded the Saudis to let them in as part of a pool. Once they were there, the number of reporters continued to grow.

We persuaded the Saudis to grant more visas. We intervened on behalf of the American television networks to obtain Saudi permission for them to bring in satellite transmitters. And as Mr. Apple can tell you, we responded to a concern of news organizations that they wouldn't have enough people on hand in the event of hostilities. We arranged a special military transport plane to carry in more journalists when the air war began.

During Desert Shield -- from August until the air war began in January -- reporters visited ships at sea, air bases, Marines up north, and soldiers training in the desert. They went aboard AWACS radar warning planes. They quoted generals who said their forces were ready and privates who said they were not.

There were stories about helicopter pilots crashing into the
sand, because they couldn't judge distances in the flat desert light. And reporters described the remarkable speed with which the US military moved so many men and women to the Gulf with so much of their equipment.

But the number of journalists, and their editors and support personnel, continued to grow throughout the fall and winter months. As we planned for the prospect of hostilities, it was clear that some kind of pool system would be required.

When the air war began in mid-January, reporters in pools were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, where they saw the launching of the first air strikes. They were onboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat. And they were on Saudi air force bases where US and coalition fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock.

Once the ground combat started, American units moved quickly -- some of them by air. To cover the conflict, reporters had to be part of a unit, able to move with it. Each commander had an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. You can't cover an airborne division by driving along so far behind it that you never see it.

While commanders could take care of the reporters they knew were coming, they could not have been expected to keep absorbing those who arrived on their own, unexpectedly, in their own rented four wheel drives -- assuming they could even find the units that moved out west and up north once the war started. And unlike the military that fought in World War Two or Vietnam, today's US
military fights at night, moving at speeds and covering distances unimaginable in both those previous conflicts.

By the time the ground war began, 131 reporters and photographers were out with the Army and Marines on the battlefield. There were reporters with every division and a few others at the two Army corps headquarters.

The pool system allowed us to tell the divisional commanders how many reporters they must accomodate. And the reporters in these pools were allowed to stay with the military units they covered, learning as much as they could about the unit's plans and tactics.

The civil rights committee paper traces the origin of pools to Grenada and says pooling has no deeper roots in our heritage. But of course, that ignores the military's pool arrangement for the major set piece battle of World War Two -- the D-Day landings at Normandy. Just 27 US reporters covered the landing, and not all of them were on the first wave. Reporters did not cover every element of the invasion force.

The four major still photography concerns covering World War Two -- AP, Acme, INS, and Life -- did their wartime work in a pool.

Pools in wartime are nothing new.

For all its drawbacks, the Persian Gulf pool system achieved three objectives: it put journalists on the battlefield and in place when the fighting started, it guaranteed that Americans at home got reports from the scene of the action, and it allowed the
military to accommodate a reasonable number of journalists without overwhelming the units that were fighting the enemy.

Part of the problem that drove us to use pools was the sheer number of journalists to accommodate. Richard Harwood, the Washington Post's ombudsman put it best when he said, "the communications industry, well-endowed financially, dispatched far too many people to cover the war."

As someone who works for the government, I can't decide who goes to cover the war and who doesn't. Maybe it's too much to expect as competitive an institution as the press to limit its numbers in a war, especially when local papers want to provide coverage to the hometowns where the troops come from. But it is a serious questions which news organizations need to address.

And what if reporters had been free to roam the battlefield at will? How many of them would have been killed? I raise that question not to make a rhetorical point. The United States lost 35 of its own troops to friendly fire. On that vast unmarked desert, allied troops sometimes had trouble telling where the line was separating them from the enemy. We mistakenly shot 31 of our own tanks and troop carriers. What if our tank crews also had to watch out for jeeps carrying reporters?

Several bureau chiefs told me last fall that in planning for war coverage, the security of reporters was their concern, not mine. The civil rights committee paper calls this concern "paternalistic." But I couldn't ignore that even if I wanted to.

After the cease fire, a group of US reporters decided to
cross the line from Kuwait into Iraq. They were captured by Iraqi troops. And while they were held, four news industry executives wrote to the President, saying that no US forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved.

The issue was raised by the US government -- with the Iraqi representative in Washington, with its ambassador at the U-N, with Soviet officials, with the International Red Cross and at two meetings between US and Iraqi military officers in the Gulf.

We thank God they were set free.

But news organizations must drop the pretense that the safety of journalists isn't the government's concern. The Civil Rights Committee may not think it is. But the actions of news organizations send a different message.

Whatever else the press arrangements in the Persian Gulf may have been, they were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene. They were a good faith effort to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war. And they were a good faith effort to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing what we were up to.

This was, after all, an enemy that had virtually as much access to American news reporting as people had here at home.

Once the war was over, Mr. Alter was the first to articulate one of the biggest concerns of the press. "With its quick win," he wrote, "the Pentagon will surely try to repeat its press
policy the next time."

Earlier this year, 17 prominent national news organizations joined in writing a letter to Secretary Cheney about the pool arrangements used in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They said this: "It is imperative that the Gulf War not serve as a model for future coverage."

Secretary Cheney met with a representative group of the signers of that letter several weeks ago and reassured them that the Gulf rules will not be a blueprint. He said the press arrangements in the Gulf were dictated by the nature of that military operation. And he said whenever the next one happens, it will undoubtedly be different.

At that same meeting, Secretary Cheney also agreed that the Defense Department should work with news organizations on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. I'm now meeting with a group of Washington bureau chiefs on a set of ten principles to guide the military and the news media in the future.

We're making progress, and I'm optimistic that we'll develop a list acceptable to the Pentagon and to journalists. I hope we will. We are trying to resolve a difficult problem.

News organizations feel strongly that stories written and pictures taken on the battlefield should not be subject to military review before they are released. They argue that instead, the military should develop a clear set of reporting guidelines intended to protect US forces and military operations. And, they say, if a reporter violates the rules, the military's recourse is to suspend the reporter's press credentials and expel
the reporter from the combat zone.

Journalists will tell you that this is an extraordinary concession for them to make. After all, they don't give their consent to ground rules for reporting on Congress or the Supreme Court.

But military commanders rightly question the comparability of the kind of arrangement now under discussion between the press and the Pentagon. Those commanders have a duty -- a legal obligation, in fact -- to safeguard the success of a military operation and the lives of their troops. They understand that reporters don't want to jeopardize either.

But what of a reporter who inadvertently reports something that seems innocuous but turns out to be of great value to an enemy? An operation might be compromised. Soldiers could conceivably be at risk. Once a story goes out, it can't be recalled. The commanders ask, where is the parity, when the military's only response would be to pull that reporter's press pass?

What both the news media and the military want most of all is a system they can both trust. We'd have no problem if all reporters were like Ernie Pyle and all commanders were like Dwight Eisenhower. But they're not. Not all reporters go to the battlefield with the background and experience they need to cover combat. Not all commanders understand the needs of the press.

I think the point was understood by Arthur Lubow, writing earlier this year in the New Republic. He said this, "Mutual mistrust is part of the shared heritage of soldiers and
journalists in time of war. So is mutual accommodation."

That is what we all seek, both the Pentagon and the press. We will find it by continued discussion. Forums like this can help. But as the paper of the civil rights committee itself notes, there's no decided case directly addressing military restrictions on combat reporting. The answer to this problem won't be found in case law.

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**View From the Pentagon**

The Pentagon has been the focus of intense media scrutiny, especially after the Gulf War. The Washington Post's coverage provides insights into the military's operations and strategies. This excerpt discusses the role of reporters in covering the war and the impact of their presence on the ground. The article critiques military decisions, such as the use of sinking ships as a backdrop for the start of the military operation. It also highlights the challenges faced by journalists in reporting from the war zone, emphasizing the importance of accurate and timely information in guiding public opinion and policy decisions. The Post's coverage serves as a critical resource for understanding the complexities of warfare and the role of media in shaping public discourse.
View From the Newsroom

The Pentagon's press control on the ground, while it was underway, was described primarily by military brass in the Pentagon and Saudi Arabia, which is what the Pentagon wanted all along; for them, not the press, to control the flow of news. The daily briefings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, led to what one reporter described as "deaths by briefing." These televised briefings helped the Pentagon's general press strategy in other ways. Reporters who regularly cover military matters generally know what to ask. A war, however, brings everyone in the briefing room and the brass know what to answer. So a lot of people get called on who may appear to be a television audience to be informed and pushy and that helps feed the view that those at the podium know best about what the public should know. When the commanding presence of Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin L. Powell or Deputy Desert Storm Commander H. Norman Schwarzkopf were added for good measure, the question-and-answer had the feel of a press conference.

Indeed, when the enemy was revealed, the ground war was presented in such a strategic sense as the air war that depends on technologies and techniques that are high-tech but not necessarily manned. Blanking out the ugly parts. As in Grenada and Panama, that first, potentially ugliest part of the whole war, is what the press can't see and doesn't want anyone to see until it is on its way to doing what it wants to do. When the desert dust settled, the first thing Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did public relations, became a very public issue. That's where the press really kicked in. The Secretary didn't want to be held to the standards of the British or French, whose reporting seemed to be getting more real-time information than the American media.

The Pentagon then publicly released its blackout within 12 hours so that Schwarzkopf could proclaim a "dramatic success" in the early going.

The press system as a whole was the "pool" system itself, in which even somewhat better reporting emerged. But when the press reported and when, and in the case of Desert Storm, the system becomes a tool of total control over what gets reported, then that should be unacceptable for the news media. The system works very badly for the press when the news isn't good.

Some of the best coverage of the war came from those who could see the whole system. Of one, and one of the newest reporters on the war, the New York Times' David W. Hackworth, this country's most decorated living veteran. Writing in Vietnam as a reporter he had more freedom than a civilian, but I was very unhappy with the military's support, that had to be planned, that would go unnoticed by other police who control the press. Although I managed to go on my own, we didn't have the freedom of movement to do an independent assessment of what the military is doing to win the war. We were like animals in a zoo, and the press officers were the keepers who threw us a piece of food once in a while.

David W. Hackworth also had some critical things to say about the press, and some of whom he called "irresponsible and unprofessional" and who were in the interest of the press for their own little trip.

Indeed, Desert Storm and its aftermath confront the press with many tough issues: What kind of news do we want to be part of the total war effort? Should we just write a war report to cover the war? Should we be taken to the war to be part of the total war effort? Should we even cover the war? How could we cover the war? How do we know that the war is over? How do we know that the war is won? How do we know that the war is lost?

The newspapers, as we know, are the "pool" system itself, in which even somewhat better reporting emerged. But when the press reported and when, and in the case of Desert Storm, the system becomes a tool of total control over what gets reported, then that should be unacceptable for the news media. The system works very badly for the press when the news isn't good. Some of the best coverage of the war came from those who could see the whole system. Of one, and one of the newest reporters on the war, the New York Times' David W. Hackworth, this country's most decorated living veteran. Writing in Vietnam as a reporter he had more freedom than a civilian, but I was very unhappy with the military's support, that had to be planned, that would go unnoticed by other police who control the press. Although I managed to go on my own, we didn't have the freedom of movement to do an independent assessment of what the military is doing to win the war. We were like animals in a zoo, and the press officers were the keepers who threw us a piece of food once in a while.
The Baghdad Story

BAGHDAD, FROM D.C.

...Upon my arrival in Baghdad on the eve of the war, I saw a repeat of what happened during the fall of Baghdad in 1990. Reporters were rushing out for various reasons. I watched with wonder as this rich journalistic prize fell into fewer and fewer hands. Four days after the war began, only 17 journalists remained from the hundreds who had covered Baghdad.

Everybody out, the Iraqis told me, except CNN. Even CNN isn't sure why they made that decision. Perhaps it is because CNN alone is seen globally. What the Iraqis told us is that they had found our coverage since August to have been "false." Eventually, there was only one: the growing intensity of the war made the continued presence of a CNN producer and technician dangerous. Also, the Al Rashid Hotel was a Palestinian team that provided a flood of video sent over to Amman, Jordan.

My focus of communication was the "Bosnian" phone, a satellite-linked but with the world that I'd drag out each evening and sit at the base, while walking into the International Desk at CNN Atlanta. At my end, there was an upper floor in a building, 'new' being myself and at least the only one of the three or four others who was not taking advantage of the view. And that was the only one who was.

Perhaps the most crucial concerns surrounding any story I did in Baghdad involved my interview with Saddam Hussein, conducted in the second week of the war. The problem with such an interview had kept Saddam from talking during the war's opening days, and CNN president Tom Johnson had urged me not to pursue it.

I emphasized to officials from the American military and information the need for a coherent explanation of Iraqi policy at this stage of the war. I had been dependent on the patriotic tunes of Radio Baghdad, heard in the daily press, for a sense of government direction.

Late one afternoon I was one of the darkened recesses of the Al Rashid hotel. I was told I had an "important" interview. I presumed it was with the information minister, Latif Jasim, until a man in a military uniform escorted me to a room on the second floor, asked me to remove my camera, and began rehearsing me in the pocket and seaw of my clothing. My watch was on. An "outside" bodyguard and comrade were put into a plastic bag and taken away. They were even taken through to return my trousers belt until I objected.

Now fully dressed, I was taken to the bathroom and my hands were immersed in a disinfector carried by one of the group. This was either an extreme form of security, or else, I assumed, Saddam Hussein has a love/hate relationship with cameras. Then I was escorted back to the lobby, and instructed not to talk to anyone.

As I waited in the gloom, my CNN colleagues arrived later a three-day overland trip from Amman with a portable satellite video transmitter and four of other gear. As they joyfully descended on me. I had to shout, "Don't touch me."

When they later asked me if I had an "important" interview, I told them that maybe I wouldn't be there for the war.

I was taken to a site model, black box and sat inside the back seat as the July 14 Bridge and drove into the darkened city. I think he was being followed, taking elaborately to throw off any I should do. The boxed was three hours, four days, wearing in and out of poor neighborhoods.

At the hour of the interview, we pulled up at a comfortable bungalow on a prosperous street. The house looked the same. A single attendant came to the car and took me inside. The house has been transformed into a makeshift presidential suite, with broadened chairs, office chairs, tables with video cameras—all brightly lit by power from a burning generator. Saddam's closest aides were there, chief of staff, a nervous, obsessive young man; his personal secretary, who wore a hairpiece; his young interpreter, who was familiar from the previous TV interviews Saddam had given the Western press.

While we waited for the president, the group discussed in English recent programming; they'd seen on CNN during the government's inability in Baghdad, laughing at pictures they'd seen of Saddam operating the satellite phone in the garden of the hotel. The information minister knew my name. Saddam's secretary asked me to spell it twice before introducing me to the president who, when I entered, Saddam shook my disembodied hand. I think that all he knew about me was that I was the man from CNN.

I was seated on the sofa. I recall being asked if I had "any questions" for Saddam Hussein, who was seated facing me. I think the last time we talked was the day before the interview. We spoke for about 10 minutes, mainly about the war.

I was taken to the interview room. I have an argument over the videotape. There were three angles photographed by Iraq's TV camera, and Saddam's secretary wanted to let me have them the following day. I wanted to take them with me immediately, because I was concerned they might be censorship. And I had been "censored" before.

We planned to transmit the interview as our first video feed from Baghdad, and our two technologists scrambled to get the equipment. But by late morning, it was clear that the CNN officials had changed their minds about using the uplink for the interview, and I was told, "you're out."

I was sitting against the wall, staring at the pictures from Saddam's home in Baghdad, when I was asked if I was interested in seeing pictures from the last time I visited Baghdad. The next day, I was supposed to be interviewing Saddam. The next day, I was supposed to be interviewing Saddam.

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PREFACE

POLICY OVERSIGHT MATERIALS
Operation Desert Shield

GROUND RULES—JANUARY 14, 1991

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2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Nations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the “Persian Gulf,” “Red Sea,” or “North Arabian Sea.” Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined “Eastern Saudi Arabia,” “Near the Kuwaiti border,” etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.


5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

10. Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as “low” or “fast” may be used.

12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as “light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.”

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA—JANUARY 14, 1991

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopard-
ize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformity to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhaaran for review by the Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD/PA for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES—JANUARY 30, 1991

General
The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media’s desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM’s responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate against media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dhaaran for filings—rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible.

There will be two types of pools: eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, seven-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. The U.S. military will be formed and governed by those organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-Dhaaran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation
Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as “Saudi” or “international.” Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, photographer, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures
Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather than specific individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil category. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dhaaran from their organization to replace them.

Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks to cover the situation permits.

Pool categories and composition:
Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.
Radio: The radio category will be open to those radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.
Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.
News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the eighteen-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as the New York Times, Cox, Knight-Kiddner, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Boston Globe. The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of “pencil” (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into the four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB-Dhaaran. They must speak and write Arabic and must file their reports in Arabic.

International: The international category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

ALER TV PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL ACTIVATION

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB-Dhaaran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool co-
ordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within—but not later than—two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indicators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told if the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert."

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

Final Report to Congress

Pursuant to

APPENDICES A - S

April 1992
APPENDIX S

MEDIA POLICY

"The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1944

INTRODUCTION

As in all previous American conflicts, the rules for news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were driven by the need to balance the requirements of operational security against the public's right to know about ongoing military operations. Department of Defense (DOD) policy calls for making available "timely and accurate information so the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy," withholding information "only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces." The news media feel compelled to report as much information about current newsworthy events as possible.

The challenge to provide full news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was complicated by several factors:

- The host nation, closed to western media before the operation began, was reluctant to permit reporters to enter the country and was concerned about reporting of cultural sensitivities.

- More than 1,600 news media representatives eventually massed in Saudi Arabia to report about the war.

- The combat actions of Operation Desert Storm used high technology, involved long-range weapons, and occurred on and over a distant, vast, open desert and from ships operating in adjacent bodies of water.

- The combined armor and airmobile attacks and drives through Kuwait and Iraq were rapid.
- This was the first major American war to be covered by news media able to broadcast reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy.

From the beginning of the crisis, DOD worked closely with Central Command (CENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), the Services, and news media organizations to balance the media’s needs with the military's ability to support them and its responsibility to preserve US combat forces’ operational security. The goal was to provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel.

When the USS Independence (CV 62) battle group arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August and the first Air Force (USAF) F-15s landed on sovereign Saudi territory on 8 August, approximately one week after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were no western reporters in the Kingdom. The US government urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so reporters could cover the US military's arrival. On 10 August, the Secretary of Defense called the Saudi ambassador to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. The ambassador said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military would arrange their transportation.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

National Media Pool

The DOD National Media Pool, formed in 1985, was alerted the same day. The pool enables reporters to cover the earliest possible US military action in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American news media, while still protecting the element of surprise – an essential part of operational security.

Starting with those initial 17 press pool members – representing Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Cable News Network, National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal – the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

Joint Information Bureau

To facilitate media coverage of US forces in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM established a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran and, later, another in
Riyadh. Saudi Ministry of Information representatives also were located with the JIB in Dhahran, which let visiting media register with the Saudi government and the JIB at one location. The JIB coordinated with reporters and worked to arrange visits to units the reporters desired to cover. The Saudi government required that a US official escort reporters visiting Saudi bases. The CENTCOM Public Affairs Office (PAO) assumed this responsibility and provided escorts to facilitate coverage on Saudi bases and to US units on the ground and at sea and throughout the theater.

Media Concerns

One of the concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, they asked the Pentagon to provide a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. A USAF C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base, MD, on 17 January, the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. That plane left as offensive operations began, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one cargo airplane to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.

The Pentagon worked closely with the CENTCOM PAO to determine how best to facilitate coverage of potential hostilities in the Persian Gulf. After several meetings at the Pentagon with military and civilian public affairs officials experienced in previous conflicts, and Pentagon press corps bureau chiefs, the Department published on 14 January a one-page list of ground rules and a one-page list of guidelines for the news media covering operations in the Gulf.

Media On The Battlefield

As early as October, it appeared hostilities in the region could result in a large, fast-moving, and deadly battle. The Pentagon sent a joint public affairs team to Saudi Arabia on 6 October to evaluate the public affairs aspects of hostile action and help CENTCOM prepare for media coverage of any such eventuality. The team was convinced that, given the size and distances involved, the probable speed of advance of US forces, the potential for the enemy to use chemical weapons, and the sheer violence of a large scale armor battle would make open coverage of a ground combat operation impractical, at least during its initial phase.
The team, therefore, recommended that pools of reporters be assigned to units to cover activity within those units. These reporters would stay with units to ensure they would be present with military forces at the beginning of any combat operations. Although the plan was initially rejected, the command ultimately implemented a similar plan calling for ground combat news media pools, all of which would be in place before the ground campaign began.

The second contentious issue was the requirement that in the event of hostilities, all pooled media products undergo a security review. Although most reporting from the theater had been unrestricted, the military was concerned that reporters might not realize the sensitivity of certain information and might inadvertently divulge details of military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of US or other Coalition forces. The plan called for all pooled media material to be examined by the public affairs escort officer on scene solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer would discuss ground rule problems he found with the reporter, and, if no agreement could be reached about the disputed material, it would be sent immediately to the JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If they could not agree, the issue would be elevated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication rested with the originating reporter's news organization, not the government or the military.

While the pools were in existence, only five of more than 1,300 print pool stories were appealed through the stages of the review process to Washington for resolution. Four of those were cleared in Washington within a few hours. The fifth story dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. The reporter's editor-in-chief chose to change the story to protect sensitive intelligence procedures.

In addition to 27 reporters on ships and at air bases, when the ground offensive began, CENTCOM had 132 reporters in place with the US ground forces to cover their activity. This let reporters accompany every combat division into battle.

Although plans called for expeditious handling of pool reports, much of it moved far too slowly. The JIB Dhahran reviewed 343 pool reports filed during or immediately after the ground war and found approximately 21 percent arrived at the JIB in less than 12 hours, 69 percent arrived in less than two days, and 10 percent arrived in more than three days. Five reports, hampered either by weather or by poor transportation, arrived at the JIB more than six days after they were filed.

The press arrangements in Southwest Asia were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing precisely the nature of Coalition plans.
An unanticipated problem, however, grew out of the security review issue. Reporters were upset with the presence of public affairs escort officers. Although it is a common practice for a public affairs officer to be present during interviews with military personnel, the fact the escort officer had the additional role of reviewing stories for conformance to ground rules led to the public affairs officer being perceived as an impediment. Normally the facilitators of interviews and the media's advocate, public affairs officers now were considered to be inhibiting the flow of information between the troops and the media.

**Media Briefings**

DOD and CENTCOM conducted extensive briefings on Operation Desert Storm. When the air campaign began, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed the news media. Several hours later, during the morning of 17 January, the Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM, and the CENTCOM Air Forces Commander conducted an extensive briefing in Riyadh. At the Pentagon, during the next 47 days, the JS Directors of Operations and Intelligence – two of the most knowledgeable officials about the operation – along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs conducted 35 televised news briefings. Likewise, in Saudi Arabia, the command provided the Deputy Director of Operations for daily, televised briefings, and also provided background briefings at the news media's request. The command provided 98 briefings (53 on-the-record and 45 on background). Along with the news reports coming from reporters accompanying our forces in the field, these daily news briefings – conducted by the people responsible for planning and carrying out the operation – provided an unprecedented amount of information about the war to the American people.
OBSERVATIONS

Accomplishments

- DOD acted quickly to move reporters into place to cover the early stages of the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia, providing access for the first western reporters to the early stages of the operation. CENTCOM, in conjunction with DOD, established a pool system, enabling the news media to cover Operation Desert Storm through 159 reporters and photographers who were with combat units. In contrast, 27 reporters were with the D-Day invasion force in 1944 when the first wave of troops went ashore.

- The media pool system placed pool members in positions to witness actual combat or interview troops immediately after combat, as evidenced by the fact approximately 300 reports filed during the ground war were filed from forward deployed units on or near the front lines. Of that number, approximately 60 percent appeared to contain eyewitness accounts of the fighting.

- Pool members were permitted to interview front-line troops. Some 362 stories filed from the front included interviews with front-line troops.

- Frequent public briefings were conducted on details of the operation.

Shortcomings

- Command support for the public affairs effort was uneven. Some component commands were highly cooperative while others did not appear to place a priority on getting the story out. In some cases, this meant lack of communication and transportation assets or priorities to get stories back to the Dhahran JIB in a timely manner.

- Because of the scope and sensitive nature of much of the operational planning, a significant number of PAOs were not able to stay fully abreast of daily developments, nor were they trained to conduct security reviews of pool products. Many were therefore unable to judge operational security violations properly.

- The public affairs escort officers displayed a wide range of expertise in performing their duties. While many received praise from the media and unit commanders for having done excellent jobs, others, overzealously performing their duties, made mistakes which sometimes became news items. Occasional, isolated incidents, such as public affairs officers stepping in front of cameras to stop interviews, telling reporters they could not ask questions about certain subjects, and attempting to have some news media reports altered to eliminate...
unfavorable information, were reported. Although these incidents were the exception, not the rule, they nonetheless frequently were highlighted in media reports.

Issue

- Media sources have voiced dissatisfaction with some press arrangements, especially with the media pools, the need for military escorts for the news media, and security review of media pool products. DOD is working with news media representatives on ways to improve news coverage of future US military combat operations.
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DECLASSIFIED BY:
R.E. WRIGHT
CAPT, USN
22 MAY 1991
SECTION I OF 2

SUBJECT: APPROVED ANNUAL F TO OPERATION DESERT SHIELD PUBLIC AFFAIRS 87

REF A/USCINCENT 111815Z AUG 88

RE R/CPA/135551Z AUG 88

4. GENERAL. THIS PLAN PROVIDES SPECIFIC PAG, PA TASKING AND OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR IN-THEATER U.S. MILITARY PA ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

5. ENEMY. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HOSTILE TO THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONDUCT SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DISTORT PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE USG AND USCINCENT. THESE OPERATIONS CAN INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, MISREPRESENTATION OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS. PLANTING INACCURATE DATA WITH SELECTED MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO ADVERSELY INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN CONUS AND ABROAD.

6. FRIENDLY.

7. USCINCENT WILL PROVIDE OVERALL PA GUIDANCE AND COORDINATE PA ACTIONS AFFECTING OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS APPROPRIATE.

8. ASC PA WILL ASSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, IF ACTIVATED. ASC PA WILL COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) TO OBTAIN HOST GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND WILL ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR USCINCENT REGIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). DETAILED INFORMATION, SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR EACH POOL DEPLOYMENT WILL BE FORWARD BY UCBINCENT TO OASD-PAI FOR APPROVAL.

1. UCICENT OF INFORMATION AUTHORITY WILL ULTIMATELY BE DELEGATED TO JB-11 AT ROI AND OTHER COMMAND DESIGNATED BY OASD-PAI AND UCICENT-AS REQUIRED UPON ACTIVATION OF THE JEB.

2. OASD-PAI WILL ASSIST UCICENT PA AS APPROPRIATELY ON A CONTINUING BASIS DURING THIS OPERATION.

3. THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PPO ARE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR, OMAN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, BAHRAIN AND OTHERS AS NEEDED, WILL PROVIDE ABILITY IN IDENTIFYING HOST NATION INTELLIGENCE REGARDING PA POLICIES FOR THIS OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, THESE REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY CAPABILITIES OF THE MEDIA, PROVIDE ABILITY IN DEVELOPING POLICIES REGARDING HOST-NATION MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS.

4. SUPPORTING UNIFIED COMMAND WILL COMMEND IN AGREEMENT WITH UCICENT'S PROPOSED CHANGES TO PA GUIDANCE RELATING TO OPERATION AS DESIRE.

5. US AMBASSADORS, USIA REPRESENTATIVES AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF MILITARY PA ACTIONS IMPACTING THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH APPROPRIATE PA CHANNELS.

6. POLICY. OASD-PAI, IN THIS OPERATION, REQUIRE TAKING AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO INFORMING THE AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO DISSEMINATE ACCURATE, COMPLETE AND TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE MEDIA TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, PERSONNEL SAFETY, AND HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES. THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE MADE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

(i) THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN IS OF EXTREMELY HIGH, WORLDWIDE MEDIA INTEREST.

(ii) THE OASD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL AND/OR REGIONAL MEDIA POOLS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE AME CONSISTENT WITH HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES AND APPROVAL.

(iii) STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA AND/OR PUBLIC WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

(iv) THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UCICENT PA RESPONSE CELL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO AS STANDUP FORWARD;

(v) THE MAIN JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (MJIB) WILL BE ACTIVATED IN JORDAN;

(vi) IT WILL BE COLLOCATED WITH UCICENT FORWARD;

(vii) IT WILL BE HANDLING BY COL DON KIRCHOFFNER, USA; CAPT

(viii) MAJ OLIN BAUNER, USA; CAPT KEVIN BAGGETT, USAF; AND CAPT TIM LAROCK, USAF. TEMPORARY COMMERCIAL PHONE NUMBER: 011-962-1-475-1354.

(viii) SUBORDINATE JIB WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT CFSBS AND MANNED BY LGEN DON MORSE, PHONE 611-473-729-413. AN ADDITIONAL SUBORDINATE JIB WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT DUBAI, UAE, WITH POTENTIAL JIBS AT ABU DHABI, UAE; US EMBASSY, Doha, Qatar; and other locations AS REQUIRED.

(viii) MIlitary SUPPORT OF NEW MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (MJIB) WILL BE DEFINED IN PARA 3.3.1 OF JS 6000 AUG 84, JS 10004, JS 2000, AND JS 5800 AUG 84.

(viii) ALL PA ACTIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE OASD, JCS, AND USES DIRECTIVES UNLESS SPECIFICALLY STATED OTHERWISE.

(viii) MISSION. UCICENT, AS DIRECTED BY OASD-PAI, WILL EXECUTE AN ACTIVE PA PROGRAM THAT CONVEYS TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL AUDIENCE THE RESOLVE OF THE USG TO PROTECT ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS AND AFFORDS AN APPROPRIATE ACCESS TO UNCLASSIFIED, TIMELY AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTS OF OASD-PAI, PROGRAMS ADDITIONALLY, THE PROGRAM SEeks TO ILLUSTRATE U.S. FORCES' ABILITIES TO FIGHT AND DEFEND, AND IF NECESSARY, TO DIRECT AND DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES. THE FOLLOWING THEMES SHOULD BE STRESSED DURING MEDIA VISITS TO ALL UNITS:

A. U.S. FORCES ARE ONE PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE ASSEMBLED IN DEFENSE OF INTERESTS TO WORLDWIDE VITAL INTERESTS.

B. U.S. FORCES ARE PRESENT IN SAUDI ARABIA TO SET UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND THEN TO TRAIN AND WORK WITH THE SAUDI AND OTHER MILITARY UNITS, AS APPROPRIATE.

C. AMERICA DOES NOT SEEK CONFLICT, NOR DOES IT SEEK TO CHANT THE

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SECTION 2 OF 5

GOAL

2. THIS IS A JOINT U.S. AND MULTI-NATIONAL EFFORT AS PERSONNEL FROM ALL U.S. SERVICES, SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ASSEMBLED PROVIDING THE EXPERTISE OF THEIR SERVICE TO THE COMMON DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA.

4. U.S. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. USCINCENT, WITH THE GUIDANCE OF OASIS RAA, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL PA OPERATIONS OF USCINCENT HOST SUPPORTING AND COMPONENT COMMAND AND OTHER PARTICIPATING UNITS FOR THIS OPERATION. USCINCENT WILL AUTHORIZE THE USCINCENT RAO TO CONDUCT ROUTINE PA LEGISLATION ON HIS BEHALF.

USCINCENT RAO WILL PLAN, COORDINATE, AND DIRECT MILITARY PA ACTIVITIES FOR THIS OPERATION. PA ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONDUCTED IN COORDINATION WITH THE SENIOR DOD REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA. SUPPORTING AND COMPONENT COMMAND AND COMMANDER OF PARTICIPATING UNITS SHOULD PROVIDE PA PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE JIB/SUB-JIB SUPPORT OF THE PA PLAN.

II. NEWS MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS. IF THE DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL OR A REGIONAL DOD NEWS MEDIA POOL ARE ON-SCENE, THEY WILL RECEIVE, AT A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF MINIMIZED CONSIDERED

DIRECTED SUPPORT:

1. DAILY, COMPREHENSIVE, AND UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL BRIEFINGS.

2. TO PERFORM ITS MISSION OF ENABLING POOL MEMBERS TO PROVIDE IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF THE EVENT, THE POOL REQUIRE ACCESS TO ACTUAL AREAS OF COMBAT. THE MEDIA REALIZE AND ACCEPT THE ELEMENT OF RISK INHERENT IN ACCEPPING MILITARY FORCES INTO COMBAT. THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY IS NOT A REASON FOR EXCLUDING THEM FROM AN AREA OF ON-GOING OPERATIONS. REPORTERS SHOULD TREAT AS A MEMBER OF THE UNIT AND ALLOWED TO MOVE WITH IT. AT THE SAME TIME, COMMANDER MUST ENSURE THE UNARMED, UNTRAINED REPORTERS ARE NOT UNREASONABLY PUT IN EXPOSED SITUATION. THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO COVER THE ACTION FROM POSITIONS OF REASONABLE SAFETY.

3. REASONABLE ACCESS TO KEY COMMAND AND STAFF PERSONNEL. ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO PERSONNEL WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED AND ON THE RECORD.

4. ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE ARRIVAL BRIEFING, POOL MEMBERS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN SMALL ELEMENTS OF FROM ONE TO THREE PERSONS THROUGHOUT THE COMBAT AREA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BALANCED COVERAGE AND OPERATIONS. ONCE THE POOL MEMBERS HAVE OBTAINED THE INITIAL EVENT, THEY WILL NEED TO BE REASSEMBLED SO THEY CAN COMPARE NOTES AND FILE A CONSOLIDATED POOL STORY. POOL MEMBERS SHOULD THEN BE RETURNED TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA AND THIS CYCLE REPEATED AS OFTEN AS NECESSARY UNTIL POOL OPERATIONS ARE TERMINATED. WHEN CONSIDERING ACTIVITIES FOR THE MEDIA POOL TO COVER AND PLANNING THEIR ITINERARY, IT IS ADVISABLE TO CONSULT WITH POOL MEMBERS. IF WISHT TO BRIEF ON THE DAY'S OPERATIONAL EVENTS, THEY WILL PROBABLY HAVE AN IDEAL TIME TO COVER THE EVENT THEY FEEL IS DESIRABLE. MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE BUILT INTO THE ITINERARY TO ALLOW FOR POTENTIAL MINOR DELAYS. POOL ESCORTS SHOULD LOOK FOR TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY TO ADDITIONAL COVERAGE, SUCH AS CIVILIAN EVACUATIONS, DOD PERSONNEL, ETC.

5. COOPERATION FROM ALL FORCES PARTICIPATING, ON A NOT-TO-INTERFERE BASIS, IS ESSENTIAL.

6. UPON ARRIVAL, THE POOL WILL BE MET BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE COMMANDER OR DESIGNATED

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Representative will give the pool members an updated operational briefing. The PA escort or JIB representative will give the pool members a PA briefing on communications capabilities, billeting arrangements, transportation, and the escort system, etc.

2. News media representatives "NURS"

(a) NURS will be escorted at all times, repeat at all times, by PA staff members or USCINCENT. Military escorts supporting the PA staff. NURS will not be granted access to classified materials or secure areas.

(b) At no time will NURS be detained or their film/equipment/notes confiscated.

(c) All interviews with NURS will be "on the record." All media requests for interviews with military personnel involved in this operation will be coordinated through PA pool escorts. JIB PA personnel is "SUB-JIB, USCINCENT PAO or DOD PA as appropriate.

3. Tasks

(a) USCINCENT public affairs officer;

(b) Advise USCINCENT on all PA matters for this operation.

(c) Serve as the on-scene DOD PA representative, as required.

(d) Assist DOD to obtain most government approval for access of DOD National Media pool, and provide military escort support to news media pools.

(e) Coordinate PA activities with the senior military representative on the US country team, when appropriate.

(f) Implement PA policy guidance issued by USCINCENT or higher authority.

(g) As appropriate, supervise the establishment of a joint information center (JIC) or subordinate JIB, as required.

(h) Clear proposed PAO, news releases and audiovisual releases from assigned forces.

(i) Direct and coordinate on-scene PA efforts, consistent with DOD/PAO policy guidance.

(j) USCINCENT component commanders and supporting commanders of forces assigned to USCINCENT.

(k) Submit to USCINCENT PAO any material or information proposed for internal or external release. USCINCENT PAO will coordinate release of all such material with DOD/PAO.

(l) Provide support for the news media as detailed in this annex and as directed by higher authority.

(m) Provide experienced public affairs personnel to the JIB/SUBJIB. Once established, coordinate with public officers and liaison officers with other forces, services, and DOD representatives.

(n) Coordinate with and inform USCINCENT PAO and JIB on all significant PA actions and problems.

(o) Once operations commence, immediately provide unclassified audiovisual (AV) and visual information (VJ) to DOD PAO or USCINCENT PAO for release to news media representatives and for internal information programs.

4. Coordinating instructions

(a) Where the presence of troops, aircraft or equipment is plainly visible to NURS, such presence may be confirmed to NURS who request confirmation.

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(a) Direct liaison is authorized between PAOs at all levels of command.

(b) Once in place, personnel who deploy to Saudi Arabia will notify USCINCENT PAO or Riyadh JIB of unit's location and communications capability, and whether communications capability is classified/unclassified telephone or radio.

(c) Accidents/incidents will be reported immediately to USCINCENT PAO by fastest means.

(d) Verbally records of releases, news conferences and responses

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A. Security of Operations and Personnel

1. Operations

(a) The basic principle governing the release of information is that all information that is consistent with operational security and does not compromise the safety of US or friendly nation.
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PERSONNEL WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NAM'S AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE POLICY.

1) NO NEWS RELEASES INVOLVING THIS OPERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED UNLESS THEY ARE APPROVED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

2) ALL STATEMENTS MADE TO THE NEWS MEDIA WILL BE "OFF THE RECORD."" "OFF THE RECORD" STATEMENTS WILL NOT BE MADE IN BRIEFS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA. PUBLIC OR MEDIA KNowledge OF ANY CLASSIFIED ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH AN OPERATION DOES NOT SUPPLY THAT THE INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED OR THAT IT MAY BE RELEASED OR CONFIRMED.

3) MILITARY SUPPORTED ACCESS OF NAM'S TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS IS CONTINGENT UPON THEIR AGREEMENT TO ADHERE TO ALL GROUND RULES ESTABLISHED BY OASD-PAI OR USCINCENT.

4) PERSONNEL SECURITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAM.

5) VI OPERATIONS SECURITY. PERSONNEL WILL BE ALLOWED FREE ACCESS TO ALL UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY OPERATIONAL AND PERSONNEL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.

6) VISUAL INFORMATION. VI VISUAL INFORMATION WILL BE REQUIRED FOR DISSEMINATION TO NEWS MEDIA THAT MAY NOT BE IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OR TO NEWS MEDIA THAT HAVE BEEN DELAYED IN REACHING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, AV AND VI PRODUCTS WILL BE REQUIRED FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION PRODUCTS.

7) COMPONENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL ARE PROPERLY BRIEFS ON THIS OPERATION INCLUDING INFORMATION IN REP F.

8) HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED UNIL AFTER OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETE OR USCINCENT PAM NOTIFIES PARTICIPANTS.

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RELEASES MUST ADHERE TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND FORMULATED TO ENSURE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL AND MEANS OF COMPLETION AND WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, MENTION SPECIFIC COUNTRIES WHERE DEPLOYED. DATES WILL BE IN THE "PERSIAN GULF AREA," "MIDDLE EAST AREA," ETC. HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE MAJOR STORIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW BY USCINCENT PAM.

APPENDIX A TO USCINCENT OPLAN DESERT SHIELD VI PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR JIBS AND SUB-JIBS

1) VI PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL VARY FOR EACH JIB/SUB-JIB WITH THE SITUATION AND ASSETS AVAILABLE. MAIN JIB SHOULD BE MANNED FOR 24-HOUR-DAY OPERATION TO PROVIDE THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER PA SUPPORT IN MEDIA RELATIONS, SECURITY REVIEW, AUDIOVISUAL MANAGEMENT, TA TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION COORDINATION, ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY.

2) VI JIBS AND SUB-JIBS, WHERE POSSIBLE, SHOULD BE LOCATED WITH THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS OR OTHER MAJOR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OR MEDIA FILING POINTS, TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.

3) VI COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL AUGMENT THE USCINCENT MAIN JIB AND SUB-JIBS AS FOLLOWS:

MAIN JIB -- RITCOM

RANK SERVICE PDS CLR NAME
66 USN DIR S/TS WILDERMUTH-CENTCOM
66 USAP DIR S/TS OLSEN-CENTCOM
66 USAF DOP S/TS DOUGLASS-DCHQF
64 USAF MEDIA S/TS GUTTMANN-TAC
64 USAF ODS S OAKLEY-6TH ARMY
64 USMC DOP S KNIGHT-HAVINPO
64 USMC MEDIA S SANTANA-CENTCOM
65 USMC MEDIA TS GIVINO-CENTCOM

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TAGBAT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL PROVIDED BY JCEE.

SUB-JIB -- DHAHRAN

64 USN DIR S SHERMAN-NANINO LA
64 USN OBP S VACANT-NEEDS FILL
64 USN GROCE S GOLDE-4TH ARMY
64 USN OBP S SCHMIDT-SAPA
64 USN JOUR VACANT-NEEDS FILL

SUB-JIB -- CJTFM/SARAHAIN

64 USN MEDS S VACANT-NEEDS FILL
64 USN MEDS VACANT-NEEDS FILL
64 USN JOUR VACANT-NEEDS FILL

SUB-JIB DUBAI

64 USN MEDS S VACANT-NEEDS FILL

NOTE. IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES, PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
WILL BE DOUBLED AT ALL LOCATIONS DUE TO INCREASED REQUIREMENTS.

TO BE ACTIVATED ON CALL.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO U.S. INCENT ORAL DESERT SHIELD UJ
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR JIBS/SUB-JIBS

1. UJ EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SUPPORT JIBS AND SUB-JIBS SHOULD BE
IDENTIFIED IN LOGISTIC REQUIREMENT TABLES. SUCH EQUIPMENT WILL
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY COMPONENT
COMMANDERS:

COMMANDERS: FILL ITEM AMOUNT
DESKTOP COMPUTER WITH MONITOR 2
LAPTOP COMPUTER 2
PRINTER WITH CABLE 2
FAX MACHINE 2
TYPEWRITER (COURIER AND OCR) 2
TELEPHONES 2
CASSETTE TAPE RECORDERS 2
CHAIRS 2
FIELD DESK 2
TELEVISION 2
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER (3/4 PMY) 2
PORTABLE COPIER 2
TACBAT WITH OPERATOR (JIB PROVIDE) 2
35MM CAMERA KIT 2

OFFICE SUPPLIES

LIST IS ASSUMING STEADY ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY.
IN THE EVENT OF FULL-Scale HOSTILITIES, EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
WILL BE DOUBLED.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO U.S. INCENT ORAL DESERT SHIELD UJ
GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR THE MEDIA UJ

1. UJ GENERAL. THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM INFORMATION FLOW TO THE
PUBLIC IS TO BE FOLLOWED, CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY OF THE FORCE AND
SECURITY. THE SITUATION IN ANY MILITARY OPERATION IS SUCH THAT
CORRESPONDENTS MAY COME INTO POSSESSION OF INFORMATION WHICH HAS
NOT BEEN RELEASED OFFICIALLY UNDER GROUND RULES SET FORTH IN THIS
ANNEX. HAPR SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE
INFORMATION AND ASKED NOT TO RELEASE IT. U.S. MILITARY
ACCREDITATION IS ISSUED BASED ON HAPR OBSERVANCE OF THE
ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. CORRESPONDENTS MAY FIND THAT, AT TIMES,
THEIR MOVEMENTS MAY BE RESTRICTED IN CERTAIN MARSHALLING, STAGING,
AND MANEUVER AREAS. THESE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM
BUT MAY BE APPLIED BY A COMMANDING OFFICER WHEN THE SECURITY OF AN
OPERATION, PLANS, OR ACTION. CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ADVISED OF
RESTRICTIONS BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR PAGE OF THE UNIT

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1. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH MAR valide BE "ON THE RECORD.”
2. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE POLICY.
3. CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION NOT RELEASABLE
   (1) GENERAL
   (a) ALL STORIES BY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN REPORTERS COVERING THIS
       OPERATION WILL NOT DISCLOSE LOCATIONS/DESIGNATIONS OF UNITS.

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ACQUISITIONS. OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INFORMATION. ALL
DATELINE MUST BE "IN THE PERSIAN GULF" OR "ABROAD THE USS. WILL
IN GONS OF SHIP). IN THE PERSIAN GULF." THERE CAN BE NO MENTION OF
COUNTRY OF EMARK IN REPRENTING.

DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS. NAMES OR PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
OTHER THAN THE TASK FORCE COMMANDERS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS OF
THE UNITS WILL NOT BE RELEASED.

(1) ANY INFORMATION GENERAL: IMPLIED, OR SPECIFIC, REGARDING ANY
ASPECT OF ACTUAL, CONCEPTUAL OR HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE MILITARY
PLANS, ACTIVITIES, OR OPERATIONS. INCLUDES ALL DETAILED
INFORMATION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH COMBAT, COMBAT
SUPPORT, OR CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT ENDEAVORS (E.G., ELECTRONICS,
LOGISTICS, ADMINISTRATION, POLITICAL-MILITARY, CIVIL AFFAIRS, ETC.).

(2) DETAILED INFORMATION ON ANY COMMAND, CONTROL, PERSONNEL,
OPERATIONAL, OR SUPPORT VULNERABILITIES, WEAKNESSES, OR
SHORTCOMINGS.

(3) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DETAILS.

(4) DETAILED INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY UNIT/COMMAND STRENGTHS,
ON-HAND EQUIPMENT, OR SUPPLIES. THE PRESENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND
METHODS OF OPERATION OF SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED UNITS OR
EQUIPMENT.

(5) INFORMATION OF FRIENDLY FORCE SECURITY AND DECEPTION
MEASURES/CONTAMINATION.

(6) SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE CURRENT
OPERATIONS/MOVEMENTS, DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS.

(7) INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE
TARGETS, METHODS, AND RESULTS.

(8) INFORMATION ON IN-PROGRESS OPERATIONS AGAINST HOSTILE
TARGETS.

(9) IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION AIRCRAFT POINTS OF ORIGIN OTHER
THAN GENERIC (E.G., LAND OR CARRIER BASED).

(10) INFORMATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS/INEFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY
CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT/INDIRECT FIRE,
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.

(11) INFORMATION ON MISSION OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS WHILE EN
OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED OR IN PROGRESS.

(12) INFORMATION ON UNIQUE OPERATIONS: METHODOLOGY/TACTICAL AIM
OR ANGLES OF ATTACK, SPEEDS, ETC.; NAVAL TACTICAL/EVASIVE
MANEUVERS, ETC.

(13) INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELLED OPERATIONS.

(14) INFORMATION ON UNCONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL PURPOSE
OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES.

CATEGORIES OF RELEASABLE INFORMATION FOLLOWING INITIAL
OFFICIAL RELEASE

(1) GENERAL

(a) ARRIVAL OF MAJOR US UNITS IN AREA WHEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY
US SPOKESMAN.
(b) APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES, AFTER APPROVAL
BY HING.
(c) FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES, BY SERVICE, FURNISHED BY
CASINO/PAI.

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(1) ENEMY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES FOR EACH ACTION, OPERATION, OR CAMPAIGN, DAILY OR CUMULATIVE AS FURNISHED BY DADDI.
(2) US AIR, GROUND, SEA OPERATIONS (PAST AND PRESENT)
(a) FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES BY COMMAND IN AN ANNOUNCED OPERATION IN GENERAL TERMS OF "LIGHT," "MODERATE," OR "HEAVY." IAW THE FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN THAT ACTION OR OPERATION. MAJOR END ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT DAMAGED OR LOST DUE TO ENEMY ACTION.
(b) FRIENDLY FORCES SIZE IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION USING GENERAL TERMS "MULTI-BATTALION," "NAVAL TASK FORCE," ETC. SPECIFIC FORCE/UNIT IDENTIFICATION THAT HAS BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND NO LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION, MAY BE RELEASED.
(c) NON-SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONS DETAILS.
(d) IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.
(e) GENERIC ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS (I.E., LAND OR CARRIER BASED).
(f) DATE/TIME/LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS/ACTIVITIES.
(g) PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MISSION RESULTS.
(h) TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS VICE AMOUNTS.
(i) NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT/RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS/BORTIES FLODN IN THEATER OR OPERATIONAL AREA.
(j) TYPE FORCES INVOLVED (INFANTRY, ARMOED, MARINES, CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, INTERCEPTORS, FIGHTER-BOMBERS, ETC.).
(k) WEATHER/CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.
(l) ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE AFTER APPROVAL OF HNS.
(m) CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS NICKNAMES.

5. PRIOR TO ARRIVAL, ALL AMERICAN SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT PARTICIPATION IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS IS VOLUNTARY. SERVICEMEN INTERVIEWED SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON EVENTS IN GENERAL AND RESTRICT COMMENTS TO AREAS OF THEIR DIRECT PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE.

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