LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC)
STATUS REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR FOREIGN DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY (OSDC) - PA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has irrevocably changed the bipolar world order of the past 45 years. Global war has become less likely, but the other end of the conflict spectrum—known as low-intensity conflict (LIC)—remains problematic.

We face a combination of helpful and unhelpful trends. On one hand, the waning of Soviet power has removed a source of Third World adventurism and proxy wars. Without the restraining influence of competing superpowers, however, the LICs of the next decade may become more virulent—fueled by a diffusion of global power, nationalism, ethnic-religious grievances, faltering economies, unfavorable demographic trends, and the proliferation of increasingly deadly weapons.

In addition, the overwhelming success of Operation DESERT STORM may channel aggressive acts against the United States and its allies into the lower end of the operational continuum. We cannot rely on future adversaries to repeat Saddam Hussein's mistakes in engaging on a field of conflict that optimizes U.S. and coalition strengths.

At the same time, we should not confuse LIC with technological backwardness. Terrorists, insurgents, and narco-traffickers—to name just a few categories of LIC adversaries—have demonstrated growing sophistication in the use of advanced technology and tactics, communications/psychological skills, and transnational cooperation. The most significant features of the evolving LIC environment are its broad scope, its multiple actors, and its increasing sophistication.

Over time, the Department of Defense has developed a broad range of capabilities to deal with the military dimension of the LIC challenge. The Department is also working to foster an interagency approach and to integrate its combat, support, and organizational skills with those of civilian agencies.

The low-intensity conflict environment of the 1990s will present a diverse array of threats and opportunities for the United States. The broad challenge will be to prevent the gradual and cumulative erosion of American security in an increasingly disorderly and complex world.

This report provides an overview of the LIC threat environment, discusses the challenge posed to US security interests, and describes the DoD role in countering these threats. The report also covers DoD capabilities for conducting military operations in a LIC environment and summarizes ongoing initiatives to improve such capabilities.
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April 23, 1992

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

"[The world], for all our hope, remains a dangerous place—a world of ethnic antagonisms, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism.... In the realm of military strategy, we confront dangers more ambiguous than those we previously faced. What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities?"

President George Bush

"We must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era—a permanent state of what I call violent peace."

Admiral James D. Watkins

FOREWORD

Although regional wars have from time to time punctuated the last half of this century, neither they nor the threat of global war are the only security concerns of the United States. During the same period, worldwide tensions have produced a series of less dramatic struggles known collectively as low-intensity conflict (LIC). Arising from an environment of political, social and economic instability, the cumulative impact of these LICs on U.S. interests is potentially severe. In concert with other Federal agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD) has developed policies and programs to address the multiple security challenges of the LIC environment. The Congress, also recognizing the importance of this threat, has demonstrated a continuing interest in DoD’s efforts. This report describes the nature of the LIC threat to national security and DoD’s response.
SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

"The end of the Soviet Union does not presage the end of low-intensity conflict security concerns for the United States.... As in the past, U.S. forces will be called upon, and must be trained, equipped, and prepared to respond to conflict challenges such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and insurgencies.... As shown by the experience of recent decades, low-intensity conflict is not just a scaled-down version of conventional conflict. Rather, it often requires specially tailored military capabilities as well as a balanced and integrated application of all elements of U.S. national power. The Department is working to foster this interagency approach and ensure forces are trained for employment in low-intensity conflict environment."

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1992

A. PURPOSE

1. During a period in which the major premises of U.S. national security policy are undergoing review, it is appropriate to report on an important but less conspicuous component of the security equation: low-intensity conflict (LIC).

2. With the end of the Cold War, nuclear or general war on the European central front has become less likely. Yet, conflict continues to plague areas of the world of interest to the United States. During the U.S.-Soviet superpower confrontation, many regional and intranational antagonisms were held in check. With the end of the bipolar world, they are now more likely to erupt. For instance, Saddam Hussein might have concluded in early 1990 that, in the face of declining Soviet influence in the Middle East, he had to secure his interests by force. Age-old animosities based on religion, culture, and ethnic rivalries have torn apart Yugoslavia and some of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Insurgencies, emerging troubles over the environment and natural resources, illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration also undermine governments and add to regional instabilities. Some of these conditions characteristic of LIC have the potential to undermine U.S. national interests. The legitimate regard for these potential threats requires steady attention to the LIC environment and its impact on U.S. security.
3. This report will help Members of the Congress, as well as Executive Branch officials, to better appreciate the politico-military environment called LIC and the capabilities within the DoD to address its challenges.

B. SCOPE

This report provides an overview of the LIC environment, discusses the LIC threat to U.S. national security interests, and describes the DoD role in countering these threats. It also discusses capabilities for conducting military operations in a LIC environment and initiatives to improve those capabilities. In the appendix, the report discusses the LIC community, specifically reviewing LIC responsibilities assigned within the DoD; particularly within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands, and several Defense Agencies. The appendix also touches briefly upon the key role of the National Security Council and certain executive departments and agencies most likely to participate in meeting the challenges arising from the LIC environment.

C. METHODOLOGY

At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided information on the staff organizations, capabilities and Service LIC initiatives. Combined with the results of a review of basic LIC documents and doctrine, and recent developments within the National Security Council, this information forms the basis for this report and its appendix.

SECTION II

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

A. DEFINITION

1. The definition of low-intensity conflict contained in National Security Decision Directive 277 and used within the U.S. Government is:

"Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. Operations in LIC are waged by a combination of
means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

B. ANALYSIS AND EXPOSITION

1. Low-intensity conflict is not a term with much currency outside DoD and the Congress. As discussed in the recently completed National Security Review 27, it is a contentious term with which some civilian agencies are uncomfortable. Yet, it defines an environment in which civilian agencies play the principal role and in which DoD traditionally plays an active but supporting part. The definition of LIC covers a wide and disparate collection of activities. Some of these, particularly some contingency operations, appear to be straightforward military business. Nonetheless, in nearly every case, they support diplomatic initiatives and serve political objectives.

2. In recognition of the aversion to the term in international and interagency circles, LIC is rarely used where more specific language is appropriate. For example, if the Department of State requests DoD help in supporting a country development plan, rather than identify the resulting support as being LIC-related, it is considered more precise and less controversial to use the term "nation assistance."

3. There also is a certain ambiguity in the term LIC. As discussed in a recent Rand study by Robert Leicht and Jennifer Taw, LIC may refer to an environment, or to conflicts, or to categories of military operations within that environment. This report, except where another meaning is clear from the context, will speak to the LIC environment.

C. THE LIC ENVIRONMENT

1. Background

a. LIC is not a new phenomenon. History shows that LIC arises from such causes as political differences, lawlessness, social and economic justices, and ethnic and religious animosities. Low-intensity conflict can manifest itself as terrorism, large scale population movements, civil disturbances, drug trafficking, and insurgency.

b. Largely as a result of the Soviet use of insurgency in the Third World as a means to expand influence, LIC has been seen as a Cold War phenomenon. Communist ability to exploit discontent under
the guise of wars of national liberation did pose an effective threat during our long confrontation with the Soviet Union. Proxy wars served to keep conflict with the United States indirect, below both the nuclear threshold and the level of confrontation that China found so costly in Korea. We recognized this indirect flanking of our containment policy as a serious danger. To defend against this indirect strategy, we focused attention on that single critical symptom of the LIC environment: insurgency or revolutionary war.

c. The term "low-intensity conflict" and the policy and doctrine developed to deal with this phenomenon thus were influenced by American counterinsurgency efforts. As articulated in the early 1960s, counterinsurgency theory emphasized that instability and insurgency in developing countries arose because of the difficulties associated with modernization. Modernization, in turn, was understood to be largely a socio-economic problem, amenable to treatment by economic and technical means. Consequently counterinsurgency strategies emphasized that combat capability often was not sufficient for victory. Success could also require social and political reforms designed to undercut support for the insurgents.

d. After Vietnam, our experience in the 1970s with Islamic fundamentalism and in the 1980s with national and ethnic conflict, compelled us to broaden our understanding of LIC beyond counterinsurgency. State-supported terrorists of every political shading became commonplace worldwide. American diplomats were hostage or assassination targets in attempts to undermine U.S. policy and influence. International drug trafficking became an increasingly debilitating attack on the health and moral fabric of the Nation. Peacekeeping and demobilization of combatants became ever more pressing concerns as the Cold War came to an end and the Soviet Union dissolved. At the same time, fueled by a variety of motives, insurgencies, some anti-Soviet and some anti-American, externally supported or indigenous, continued in countries important to us. In short, over the past two decades we learned that a host of factors beyond problems of modernization gave rise to LIC, and that just as our response cannot be solely military, neither can it always rely principally on economic assistance and advice.

2. The World of the 1990s

a. We anticipate that the next decade will see as many regional wars, insurrections, ethnic clashes, bloody religious disputes and general unrest as did the last four combined. As the Soviet empire breaks up and the integrity of individual republics is challenged by secessionist minorities, the frequency of regional clashes is likely to grow. This is especially true in the southern tier of former Soviet republics, a locus of deep-rooted religious and
ethnic animosities. The ongoing disintegration of Yugoslavia is an example of the centrifugal tendencies and capacity for violence latent in such situations. In broader terms, the breakup of the bipolar order means that a greater number of independent actors, each pursuing individual interests, will be active in many international dramas.

b. Trans-national groups such as terrorists and drug traffickers will contribute to the disorder of the post-Cold War world, and find it fertile ground for recruits and patrons. Increasingly, global transport, finance, and communications networks will make it easier for such groups to do their work and to use front companies to cover their activities and diversify their sources of income. The result will be more self-sufficient terrorist, insurgent, and narcotics organizations, requiring greater counter-efforts on the part of the United States and its allies.

c. Finally, certain long-term trends will exacerbate all of these possible sources of conflict and disorder. In many countries, including some of great interest to the United States, population growth is likely to surpass economic growth for the foreseeable future. Combined with possibly adverse environmental trends, this will lead to the increasing immiseration of millions of people. This impoverishment could worsen if efforts to establish freer international trade fail, a few large trading blocs form, and the poorer regions of the world become economically isolated. Such developments would swell the number of refugees seeking shelter from natural disasters and human conflict, contributing to disorder. Finally, as Islamic fundamentalism continues to spread, it will pose increasing challenges to our interests and the security of some of our allies and friends in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

d. In some cases, this unrest will affect U.S. interests. When it does, DoD can respond in a number of ways. Foreign Internal Defense programs, for example, aim to help selected countries protect themselves from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Continued support of the lead agencies in international counterdrug and anti-terrorism operations will seek to minimize the impact of these plagues. In addition, many small DoD programs, such as unit and personnel training exchanges, assist in maintaining those close ties around the world that are invaluable adjuncts to the conduct of contingency or peacekeeping operations.

D. THE LIC THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

1. The LIC strategic threat springs from conditions that create tension among groups or states and cause conflict—conflict short of conventional war. Relative economic deprivation, rising popular
expectations, authoritarian or ineffective governments, reactionary elites, religious controversy, ethnic conflict, nationalism, and other deeply felt grievances or aspirations contribute to conditions of instability. In itself, or through manipulation by hostile groups or states, the resulting turmoil can threaten U.S. interests. Hence it is wrong to suggest, as some have, that with the diminution of Soviet competition in the Third World, there is no longer a compelling rationale for U.S. interest in LIC.

2. Even if the threat arising from externally sponsored insurgencies is less acute, there are still significant LIC engendered challenges. There are regional actors who will surely seek exploitation of the LIC environment as an inexpensive and useful way to gain leverage or exert pressure. In fact, the sheer magnitude of our victory in the Iraqi campaign may have an undesirable side-effect of encouraging future adversaries to make greater use of unconventional means when attacking U.S. interests.

3. At the operational level, the LIC military threat is complex, ranging from the primitive to the highly sophisticated. In most insurgencies the prime military threat is lightly armed guerrillas. However, these forces today may carry shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles or other more sophisticated arms. The wide availability of weapons of mass destruction and relatively advanced arms technology has increased the potential lethality of some LIC operations. In some LIC contingencies—which may include operations aimed at potential opponents equipped with a full range of modern arms—the threat parallels that of general war.

E. NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The National Military Objectives specified in the Joint Military Net Assessment describe the primary military concerns of the United States. Each objective merits consideration for its individual relevance to the LIC environment:

1. Deter or Defeat Aggression. Deterrence, including deterrence of international terrorism, is a principal aim of military operations in LIC. Just as the show of force in Saudi Arabia may have restrained Iraqi invasion of that country, quick action by visibly potent forces will often calm a situation or deter a potential aggressor. Deterrence works when the capability and will to take punitive action is credible. With but a small shift of meaning, deterring the maturation of a specific LIC threat is also desirable. Where we can remove or mitigate fundamental causes of instability in the LIC environments of the Third World, we may avoid a resort to force.
2. Ensure Global Access and Influence. The entree gained through the Security Assistance Program, military-to-military contacts, and the maintenance of world-ranging naval and military forces contribute to ensuring access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, and the sea lines of communication.

3. Promote Regional Stability and Cooperation. Forward presence, defense treaties, and security assistance play key roles in this objective by maintaining stable regional military balances and aiding in combatting threats to friendly nations from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, and terrorism.

4. Stem the Flow of Illegal Drugs. This objective is a mission that cuts across many agencies of government. The DoD support of counterdrug operations includes furnishing training, materiel, and services to U.S. drug enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

5. Combat Terrorism. The spread of international terrorist organizations, often state sponsored, is a continuing and insidious threat to the United States and the rest of the civilized world community. Countering this assault will continue to be a prime objective of the military in a LIC environment.

F. THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

LIC doctrine and national policies for engagement in the environment short of war emphasize the importance of coordinating all elements of national power—political, economic, informational, judicial, and military. The need for synchronized use of all resources cannot be overemphasized.

1. The Political Element. The conflicts which spring from the turbulent environment of LIC are ultimately political. Economic inequities, social injustice, or ethnic antipathies may create discontent that fuels an armed struggle. Economic development, propaganda, political reform, negotiation, and violence may be the means by which the struggle is pursued. However, the protagonists in LIC must still organize popular support and methods into a political force capable of achieving basic goals. It is a truism that political solutions are the only solutions in LIC. The United States, because of its diplomatic position, economic wealth, and military strength has substantial political leverage in international affairs. Given the preponderance of U.S. political leverage and its importance in the LIC arena, the U.S. needs to understand its application. Essentially, the other elements, including the military, are supporting players to this political lead.
2. The Judicial Element. Political solutions to many LIC problems, such as terrorism, insurgency and drug-related violence, require more than addressing grievances by promoting representative government. Judicial reform or support often are key elements of a political solution to LICs. The United States, through its various law enforcement agencies, can provide complex, culturally sensitive assistance in promoting the rule of law and curtailing human rights abuses by all parties concerned. Resistance members and the public at large must be confident that suspects will receive humane treatment, a fair trial, and appropriate punishment. Judges, police officers, and military officials must be assured that the system will not indiscriminately release dangerous individuals to exact retribution on government targets. In some countries an overhaul of the prison system also is required to ensure humane treatment and prevent prisons from becoming recruiting grounds for insurgent groups. In addition, all U.S. LIC activity must be carried out in accordance with U.S. law and framed and defined by accepted principles of international law.

3. The Economic Element. Our economic strength provides tools necessary to attack many underlying causes of LIC. If properly focused and coordinated, trade policy, U.S. investment, and U.S. assistance programs can act as catalysts, encouraging the economic development so badly needed to offset human misery and its attendant instability. As with the other tools available, economic capability is not by itself a panacea. To be successful, there is a compelling requirement to ensure supported programs are integral to long range development plans and tailored to specific needs and conditions. Careful coordination with other agencies and cooperating governments is essential.

4. The Informational Element. Since many manifestations of LIC are struggles carried out within a political framework, they are preeminently a struggle of ideas. Informational goals thus are an integral part of the political aim. It is mandatory to win public support for such a struggle both at home and abroad. Inability to convince any constituency of the legitimacy and justice of political goals means eventual failure. Overseas, public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological operations reinforce traditional diplomacy by explaining U.S. policies to foreign citizens and by providing them with information about U.S. society and culture. Additionally, it should be noted that frank explanation of issues and their potential effects are equally necessary domestically. The informational element is thus a vital and integral supporting part of LIC operations.
5. The Military Element

a. While the importance of the military arm should not be underemphasized, the military element is rarely in the lead in LIC scenarios. Military capability and competence are essential components to many LIC activities. Sometimes, as in conducting attacks and raids or in establishing a security shield during counterinsurgency operations, military considerations are crucial. Nonetheless, operations in LIC invariably support political or psychological objectives. Because of this situation, commanders at every echelon may have to adjust conventional military practice to avoid compromising those goals.

b. Indirect application of military power, such as a Security Assistance Program, is often the most effective in LIC. Security assistance supports allies through training, advisory assistance, supplies and services. This effort affords them the chance to overcome materiel, doctrinal and training deficiencies, and provides the basis for influencing systemic changes required by the specific situation.

c. Some situations require the direct involvement of U.S. military forces. Protecting U.S. citizens, conducting shows of force, assisting in the aftermath of natural disasters, and, in some circumstances, combatting terrorism, suppressing drug trafficking and conducting combat operations, are examples where the Armed Forces act directly in the national interest.

G. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Since World War II, the increasing complexity of government and the rapidity of political, technological, and social change has complicated the policy calculus, particularly in dealing with problems characterizing the Third World. A very high level of skill is required in organizing and coordinating complex interagency approaches to the particular problems of the Third World.

1. Although the ability to anticipate and address LIC has improved significantly in the last several years, there continue to be areas open to further improvement. Some advances can be made by the DoD; others require action by the Congress, or other Executive Departments.

2. The single greatest deficiency also may be the one most difficult to change. Properly addressing LIC requires applying tools more usually associated with the civilian agencies of Government than with DoD. Examples include economic assistance, diplomacy, information dissemination, and security assistance. Clearly, civilian
agencies must assume leadership responsibility for strategy and execution, and DoD should commit itself to energetic support. Military action without concomitant economic and political initiatives, particularly in providing support to insurgency, or pre-insurgency activities, should be avoided. Such an approach often does not address the grievances causing the movement. A piecemeal approach in which each agency follows its own planning system and planning cycle, without mutual, integrated effort is unacceptable. The President's recently completed National Security Review of Low-Intensity Conflict addressed problems of just this nature, and changes resulting from this review are expected to improve procedures in interagency management of LIC.

3. The strategy and plans developed in the past focused primarily on the greatest threat—global war with the Soviet Union. Recent world events suggest that, while not ignoring dormant Russian capabilities, we should shift the focus of our planning efforts to that of rapid response to regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. While acknowledging that the absence of regional conflicts is some measure of success for capabilities in a LIC environment, strategic guidance directs the inclusion of LIC considerations throughout the planning process. The intent is to develop an effective program of coordinated political, economic and military actions aimed at counteracting regional violence through deterrence and nation assistance programs. Significant and important progress has been made in incorporating LIC considerations in the planning system over the last three years. The effort must continue if our forces are to be optimally prepared. Strategic guidance currently in development will address LIC contingencies and, as the process is dynamic and continuous, remedy any near-term deficiencies.

4. Another difficult task is identifying specific LIC threats in the incipient phase and arresting them before they become widespread. It is only by prompt concerted interagency and combined action that appropriate responses to LIC developments can be planned and implemented. Again, changes implemented as a result of the National Security Review of LIC may reinforce the operations of the interagency effort in this regard.

H. THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The application of military power in LIC involves four operational categories:

1. Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two sides of the same LIC category. Under some circumstances, it may be in the national interest to provide support to insurgents attempting to overthrow a government that is hostile to
the U.S. In other circumstances, our interests also may lead us to support the government of a country beset by insurgents. Emphasis in both cases is on use of indirect means to help the backed party.

a. The role the U.S. military plays in supporting an insurgency is primarily in training insurgent forces in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of unconventional warfare. The United States also can provide the intelligence and logistic support that is critical to successful insurgent operations.

b. The DoD is more usually involved in supporting efforts of a friendly government to defend itself, i.e., Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The U.S. Armed Forces do not directly engage in these operations, but rather support the efforts of another country to solve its own problems. The primary tool for FID is the Security Assistance Program, which gives the threatened government needed training, materiel, and services for effective internal defense operations. The principal aim is to develop an environment in which the supported government can securely carry out its social, economic and political programs.

c. The ultimate success of U.S. efforts to help another government defeat an insurgency is largely dependent on conditions beyond the scope of FID. The supported government and its leaders must hold a commitment to make changes that address the underlying causes of the unrest. If agreements to change are only made to obtain U.S. aid, success is unlikely. Of equal importance is U.S. public support. Counterinsurgency strategies require patience, persistence, and a flexible continuity of effort. Without public understanding and support, it is nearly impossible to achieve those conditions.

2. Combating Terrorism. The aim of combatting terrorism is to protect individuals and property from attacks or intimidation. Since terrorism can be international in scope and often aided and abetted by state sponsors, it may require a military response. This response can occur at either of two levels: deterring acts of terrorism through active and passive measures (antiterrorism) or employing forces to take direct action against terrorists (counterterrorism).

a. Antiterrorism programs include collecting and distributing threat information, awareness training, security planning, and other defensive measures.

b. Counterterrorism, the offensive part of combatting terrorism, provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. Specially organized, equipped and trained counterterrorist units normally conduct these operations,
but conventional forces also may mount or participate in a supporting role.

3. **Peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping operations directly support diplomatic efforts to gain or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual combat. Such operations are conducted with the consent of the belligerents. Direct superpower participation has customarily been limited to support activities, such as organizing the participating nations and supporting the effort by furnishing transportation, communications, and supplies. Current trends and the emerging entente will require an increasing effort in this vein.

4. **Contingency Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict.** This category demands an exceptionally wide range of military capabilities. They are undertaken to support diplomatic actions, respond to natural emergencies, or protect American lives and property. Included in this category are shows of force, disaster relief, police actions, security assistance surges, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). They also may encompass recovery operations, attacks, raids, protection of shipping and freedom of navigation. Additionally, counterdrug operations are considered a subset of this category. The DoD acts as lead agent for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime drug smuggling into the United States; integrating the antidrug command, control, and communications network; and approving and funding State governors’ plans for using National Guard support for drug interdiction and enforcement operations domestically.

SECTION III

CAPABILITIES AND MEANS

A. **ARMED FORCES CAPABILITIES**

   1. **General.** The primary function of the Armed Forces of the United States is to provide the means for deterring, or when necessary, waging and winning wars. Yet, in fulfilling this charter the Services accrue capabilities useful for more than warfighting. The forces and their skills are largely transferable to operations in the LIC environment as well, although some changes may be in order. A major adjustment in making the transition from war to LIC is psychological. It involves adjusting from an environment in which the major concern is the destruction of enemy Armed Forces, to one in which the major concern is buttressing the legitimacy of a foreign government, or saving lives, or discretely interposing force—or the threat of force—for limited political ends. All Services recognize this difference and are undertaking appropriate education and training adjustments. This training, coupled with the organizational and
planning skills, resources for communications, mobility, logistics, and operations, provides the opportunity to make a major contribution to addressing the military dimension of LIC-engendered problems.

2. Capabilities by LIC Operational Category. Specific forces are not dedicated to LIC or to performance of the four operational categories (except for those units that may be specified for counter-terrorism operations, and which are beyond the scope of this report).

a. Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

Frequently thought of as the most demanding of the operational categories, support of insurgency or counterinsurgency, includes a wide span of military activities. Foreign internal defense (FID), the term used to describe U.S. efforts in support of a foreign government fighting, or trying to prevent, lawlessness, subversion or an insurgency, ranges from nation assistance to, in extreme cases, combat. All U.S. Armed Forces have a role to play; all have the capability to do so. The specific demands of each situation will dictate which combination of capabilities will be used.

(1) All Services are prepared to respond appropriately to direction from the National Command Authority to support an insurgency. Anticipated requirements are likely to fall into five areas: training, logistics, intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and humanitarian assistance.

(a) The Services can provide trainers for the full range of combat support and combat service support skills that might be required to build a tactically and technically proficient military arm. This training normally occurs at neutral training sites or in the United States.

(b) Logistic support is the most frequent form of U.S. military support to an insurgency, e.g., the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. Logistics support may be simply the provisioning of military equipment and supplies or may include transportation, distribution, and sometimes maintenance support of equipment.

(c) Intelligence support also may be given. It may take the form of training on the collection, analysis and distribution of tactical field intelligence; tactical intelligence gathered
through national sources; or dedication of HUMINT, SIGINT, or IMINT assets to support insurgent operations.

(d) Psychological operations are extremely important to successful insurgencies. Advice and technical support, to include PSYOP products, may be provided to supported insurgent forces or governments.

(e) Humanitarian assistance also may sustain the needs of insurgents. Refugee camps sited in neutral countries are not unusual attendants to insurgencies. Medical supplies, food, and clothing are requirements beyond the meager resources of many bordering countries or insurgent forces. Provision of the basic commodities is as important as weapons or ammunition to the sustainment of operations.

(2) The form taken by military support of counterinsurgency stems from U.S. foreign policy goals and the stage of development of the insurgency. The indirect approach, with minimum U.S. in-country presence, rests on two basic premises: the supported government is responsible for developing and implementing the plans required to defeat the insurgency; and the supported government and national elites truly support reform and development. If the FID operation is begun early—during the incipient phase—the emphasis will be on nation assistance support. This will include support to ensure the proper training and equipping of the host nation’s forces for internal security, but also will include support to help the host nation (HN) eliminate the causes of insurgency. If the problem is economic, assistance may be given to improve development. Engineering, medical, or communication projects by either the HN Armed Forces or civil agencies may be aided by training or logistics support. In situations where critical U.S. interests or the lives of U.S. personnel are in jeopardy, direct intervention may be required. Normally, this would only occur to achieve specific, short-term goals.

(a) Advisory and Training Assistance. A usual component to military support to a HN counterinsurgency plan is advisory and training assis-
tance. It may be used at any stage of the insurgency and can be given by all Services. Advisory functions, when authorized, are normally provided under the aegis of a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, or similar organization. Training assistance is conducted primarily as a function of the Security Assistance Program. Combined exercises, deployments for training, cross-training, personnel exchange programs (PEPs) also offer effective training opportunities as well as providing a means for developing cross-cultural understanding and a medium for enhancing foreign language expertise.

(b) Intelligence Support. The United States may also provide intelligence support, to include U.S.-supplied information, assistance in designing an appropriate intelligence architecture, and technical training.

(c) Logistics Support. Host nation security forces, like all other armies, travel on their stomachs. They need the basic wherewithal to survive and operate. This means clothing, rations, ammunition, communications, medical services, transportation, and repair parts to conduct operations suitable to their particular conditions. Frequently, the greatest help the United States can give is meeting these basic HN requirements and contributing to developing a self-sustaining indigenous logistic capability.

(d) Civil Military Operations (CMO). Civil military operations are activities supporting military operations that embrace the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population. They also focus on the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly or hostile groups. These operations increase the efficiency of governmental actions aimed at the root causes of an insurgency. Along with security operations, they are important components of any counterinsurgency campaign and contribute to the psychological isolation of the insurgents. When confronted with a lack of HN civil or civil-military operations planning experience, U.S. CMO capabilities
in this area may provide help. We usually divide CMO into the following categories.

- Civil Affairs. Civil affairs (CA) activities, in a LIC context, encompass military assistance to the agencies of a HN civil government in exercising their functions toward their own population, or in answering the needs of refugees. Where U.S. forces are involved, CA units may assist in liaison with civilian agencies to support the synchronization of their activities.

- Military Civic Action. Military Civic Action (MCA) is action designed to encourage military concern for the people, and to translate the resulting goodwill into popular support for the HN government. Normally done by HN armed forces with U.S. advice and assistance, it usually meets local development needs. It may take the form of infrastructure improvement, medical assistance, transportation support, or any other help within military support capabilities. By the nature of military requirements and deployments, most MCA is of limited scope and duration. To be of lasting benefit, MCA must reflect local needs and must be carefully integrated with continuing local development programs.

- Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian assistance (HA) uses U.S. military personnel to help HN civil authorities alleviate the suffering caused by natural disasters or war. Current doctrine includes disaster relief, a form of HA, as a contingency operation in LIC.

- Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) is a distinct program legislatively authorized under Title 10, U.S. Code, section 401. It is conducted primarily by deployed U.S. forces and is limited to funding specified programs for local populations. It is restricted to providing for limited medical support in outlying areas, construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, fresh water well drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities and simple construction and repair of public facilities.

- Psychological Operations. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are aimed at influencing or altering attitudes of a foreign target audience. The target may be the HN civil population, military or the insurgents. All activity in a counterinsurgency campaign should contribute to the reinforcement of HN government legitimacy. Where needed, U.S. PSYOP personnel may help in PSYOP training and provide advice.

b. Combatting Terrorism

(1) Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism generally describes those defensive measures taken to preclude becoming a victim of terrorism. Antiterrorism measures are undertaken by all Services as a normal responsibility for safeguarding the force and facilities.

(2) Counterterrorism. Counterterrorism (CT) includes those offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. The capabilities for CT operations vary from Service to Service depending on their primary roles and missions. Specifics of CT capabilities are beyond the scope of this report, but it may be said that the Armed Forces can carry out preemptive or retaliatory raids and conduct hostage recovery operations.

c. Peacekeeping Operations

(1) These are military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations are normally conducted by conventional forces interposed between belligerents. U.S. participation may include logistic services, equipment, or assignment of individuals or troop units to observer groups. During the height of Cold War bipolarism, direct superpower provision of ground forces was rare. However, U.S. forces have frequently been called upon to support UN or other international organization peacekeeping activities with logistic and mobility assets. With the demise of the USSR, U.S. ground units have begun to take a more active part in regional peacekeeping operations.
(2) Peacekeeping forces are carefully tailored to the requirements of the specific situation and may involve one or more Services. Air transportation, communications, and intelligence support can be made available for either U.S. or foreign elements. The Services also can provide multi-battalion land elements and naval patrol assets when directed.

d. Contingency Operations in LIC

(1) These operations range from small to massive employment of military forces. They can be short duration events planned in secrecy and boldly executed, sometimes on short notice, or large, highly visible commitments of U.S. military power over an extended period of time. They may call for conventional or special operations forces. With some exceptions, DoD capabilities for contingency operations in LIC stem from organizing, equipping and training forces for general war, rather than from design. This gives the National Command Authority, the CJCS, and the combatant commanders flexibility in how to approach contingency challenges. Since contingencies are by their nature uncertain occurrences, rapidity of planning and action are important. As shown over the years, the Armed Forces can quickly mount disaster relief or noncombatant evacuation operations, conduct maritime quarantines, raids and attacks, or undertake other operations.

(2) Although there are many types of contingency operations in LIC, the Armed Forces are sufficiently flexible to respond quickly to most probable scenarios. The following contingencies are usually considered the most likely in LIC:

(a) Disaster Relief. Conducted in response to hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and tornadoes, these operations include such military responses as evacuation and transportation of people, medical assistance, food distribution, maintenance of civil order, conduct of damage surveys, provision for potable water supplies, and assistance with shelter. The Armed Forces frequently conduct these activities in concert with other non-DoD agencies, HN governments, and the Red Cross or Red Crescent. Recent examples include operations in Iraq, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.
(b) Shows of Force. These operations display U.S. ability to deploy and use military power. The intent is to deter escalation of conflict, back diplomatic approaches, and support friends and allies through an unambiguous show of U.S. resolve. This mission can be carried out by forces afloat, the introduction of strike aircraft or, for the greatest impact, the landing of ground combat forces. Navy and Marine forces provide an over-the-horizon, discrete capability to embolden friends, discourage enemies, influence events and intervene when necessary. Army and Air Forces elements can deploy rapidly and insert highly visible evidence of U.S. will and capabilities to even remote areas. Operation DESERT SHIELD was possibly the largest show of force ever executed.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Joint air, naval, and ground forces routinely train for this mission. In recent years, the Services have carried out successful evacuations in Somalia, Liberia, Lebanon, and Grenada.

(d) Recovery Operations. These include raids to recover personnel or materiel, and the tactical recovery of aircraft. Recovery operations generally include the insertion of a ground combat unit to find personnel or materiel and provide security for their extraction.

(e) Attacks and Raids. These are short duration, offensive operations conducted to further U.S. interests. The capability to conduct such actions worldwide is an important buttress to U.S. diplomacy. The most prominent recent example is the joint Navy-Air Force raid on Libya. All services train to maintain a capability for these rapid reaction operations.

(f) Freedom of Navigation and Protection of Shipping. Given the U.S. historical support of the principle of freedom of the seas, and because most of the world's commerce moves by sea, interference with shipping or freedom of navigation is unacceptable. This mission, a fundamental responsibility of the Naval Services, is coordi-
nated with the Department of State and may have direct applicability in LIC situations.

(g) Operations to Restore Order. These are peacemaking operations, usually undertaken in a hostile environment by a combined or joint force with orders to deter or contain further outbreaks of violence. The 1958 intervention in Lebanon and the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic were undertaken, in part, as operations to restore order.

(h) Security Assistance Surges. Security Assistance is a major tool in the conduct of support to insurgency or counterinsurgency, and to some contingency operations in LIC, such as counterdrug operations. The ability to respond quickly to unforeseen events or to take advantage of dynamic changes is critical. Whether the appropriate assistance is training, materiel or service support, the ability to respond in a timely way is essential.

(i) Support of Counterdrug Operations. Counterdrug operations are an example of contingency operations, normally not military in nature, but now conducted by the Armed Forces. Service resources useful in counterdrug operations include intelligence sharing, meteorological services, aerial photography and mapping, airlift, training host nation forces, communications support, and the detection and monitoring of aircraft, surface vessels, and vehicles suspected of smuggling drugs.

B. MEANS AVAILABLE IN LIC

Although some operations in the LIC environment use the conventional application of military power, in many instances different tools are called for. Security assistance is an important component to the LIC tool inventory, as are a diverse set of other available programs.

1. Security Assistance. The purpose of FID is to establish a secure environment in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political actions directed at removing the causes of unrest. Security assistance (SA) is the principal military instrument for indirect assistance such as is appropriate in FID opera-
tions, including some counterdrug scenarios. This assistance is to help friends and allies train, acquire, maintain, and employ the capabilities for self defense or improved counterdrug operations.

a. General Administration of Security Assistance. Overall responsibility for military and economic SA lies with the Department of State. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for the management of the program (except for economic support funds), but DSAA and the Services administer it on a daily basis. Each Service administers and manages the transfer or provision of defense articles, defense services, and military training for which they have responsibility. (Note: Because the security assistance budget is part of the Department of State foreign assistance budget (Function 150), it may require 2 years of planning time to obtain funding for security assistance initiatives.)

b. Security Assistance Offices. Overseas SA administration and management functions are performed by security assistance offices (SAO), a collective term referring to DoD organizations assigned to embassies to carry out security assistance responsibilities. Primary tasks include equipment and services case management, training management, program monitoring, evaluations and planning of HN capabilities and requirements, administrative support, and liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

c. Foreign Training and Advisory Assistance. Training for foreign nationals is provided under security assistance principally through International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Instruction is provided by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) and Service training institutions, and by other organizations and individuals selected for specific purposes. Training and advice provided to host nation forces overseas is normally executed by teams deployed to accomplish specific duties for a specified period of time.

d. Defense Articles. Defense articles are also provided through the Security Assistance Program. The furnishing of military equipment through the various funding programs under SA is well known and includes a wide range of articles. In the past, we have discovered that some U.S. materiel is unsuitable for use by our friends. Frequently it possesses capabilities in excess of those needed, or is too expensive to operate and maintain. Progress is being made in correcting this deficiency, but the differing level of needs between the United States and developing nations will continue.

e. Defense Services. When it is impossible for the host nation Armed Forces to become self-sufficient in time to counter the threat, the appropriate U.S. Armed Service(s) may be tasked to
provide direct support. Support of this sort normally focuses on nation assistance programs, humanitarian assistance, intelligence collection and analysis, logistic support, and other "standoff" support functions. This support, as with all services, comes through the Security Assistance program. Only in emergencies that threaten U.S. interests, and following constitutional procedures, would the United States commit combat forces.

(1) Intelligence Sharing. At the tactical level, technical search and verification capabilities complement and augment HUMINT and other collection programs of the host nation. Intelligence sharing involves the provision of intelligence products. It does not necessarily transfer collection methods, sources, or technology to the host nation.

(2) Communications Support. Armed Forces ground, sea and airborne communications resources can support host nation security forces by providing critical command, control, communications, and intelligence links and encrypting information traffic. Temporary navigational aids also can be furnished where host resources are lacking.

(3) Psychological Operations. Technical assistance, training, and advice can be given to improve HN capabilities to analyze information requirements and disseminate appropriate products. The inherent psychological effects of U.S. power also can be employed to further FID objectives through shows of force and overt demonstrations of support to friends and allies.

(5) Military Civic Action. With appropriate authorization and direction, the Armed Forces can undertake military civic action as direct-support initiatives independent of joint-combined exercises or other military operations. Military resources also can support HN civic action projects by advisory assistance, airlift, veterinary services, medical treatment programs, and certain construction and repair efforts.

(6) Civil Affairs. The Army and Marine Corps have a limited number of Civil Affairs units to provide lateral support to joint U.S. and combined CA operations through advisory services; logistic support, to include medical, supply, maintenance, engineering,
and airlift, communications backup, and information broadcasting.

(7) Aerial Photography and Mapping. Aerial photography and cartographic services can be employed in joint-combined exercises or operations to support tactical air components and surface maneuver units with accurate, detailed coverage of specific areas of operation.

(8) Weather. Meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation of forecast information can be employed as part of the direct-support effort to enhance HN internal defense and development actions.

2. Non-Security Assistance Means

a. Joint-Combined Exercises. Joint-combined exercises are conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities of United States and foreign coalition partners. The exercises, which are predominantly Service-funded, complement security assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients have expressed a wish to improve. Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, these exercises may include certain training, construction, and humanitarian and civic assistance projects.

b. Exchange Programs. Exchange programs are another form of combined activity that is a useful tool for the combatant commander. Short-term, small-unit reciprocal training exchanges contribute directly to improved interoperability; provide an opportunity to train a foreign unit in tactics, techniques, and procedures; and give the U.S. unit valuable area experience and broadened training. Personnel exchange programs, among other things, place U.S. officers in positions to give a foreign military service insights into U.S. methods and democratic concepts. Both programs foster mutual understanding and familiarize each partner with the organization, administration, and operations of the other's service.

c. Official Visits. Mutual understanding between U.S. Armed Forces personnel and host nation forces can be pursued through orientation tours, conferences, seminars, and joint security consultations.

d. Humanitarian Assistance. If natural disasters occur, humanitarian assistance (HA) also may be provided independently of combined exercises. Capabilities for HA include personnel evacua-
tion, airlift, medical support for disaster victims, and restoration of essential services. Communications help, by ground or airborne equipment, also can support relief activities by broadcasting public information. Temporary replacement or expanded coverage of HN communications may be critical in coordinating the relief effort.

e. Strategic Airlift. Strategic airlift can be used in the direct support role for delivery and resupply of U.S. defense articles and services, or to return SA repair items to the United States. It also can transport host-nation personnel to off-shore training locations, move peacekeeping forces or supplies, and do aeromedical evacuation from main operating bases in the host nation.

f. Tactical Operations. All Services possess impressive capabilities for joint tactical operations in LIC. These are most conspicuously suitable for the conduct of contingency operations, but have applicability to every LIC operational category. When directed by the National Command Authority, combat naval, air and land forces may play a direct role in supporting counterinsurgencies. Tactical airlift assets can provide mobility for both U.S. and host nation forces. Reconnaissance, attack, and forward air control assets provide backup capabilities in support of U.S. and host ground and naval forces. Additionally, U.S. assets can provide communications jamming in both standard and military frequency spectrums.

SECTION IV

DEFENSE INITIATIVES FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Besides existing capabilities, the DoD is continuously looking to improve its ability to respond to LIC demands. The following initiatives are among those having LIC application.

A. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS has statutory responsibility for the curricula at the various joint service schools. The enhanced emphasis on LIC in these schools should produce planners and operators with a more sophisticated appreciation of the LIC environment. They will better know how to employ military resources in support of the national security objectives.

2. Joint or Multi-Service. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has been established by the Army and Air Force to train units under conditions similar to those met in some contingency operations in LIC. It is unique in that HN government agencies and Country Team participation are played and intelligence, CA, and PSYOP aspects of LIC are emphasized. This program is comparable to the one conducted
for general war with such notable success by the National Training Center (NTC).

3. Army. The individual and collective skills required by the Army in LIC, although similar to those required in general war, are substantially different in nature and purpose. In conventional war, at the tactical and operational level of operations, the commander's primary focus is on the destruction of enemy forces. In LIC, commanders at every level must adjust their actions to the desired political ends. Often this means departing from tactical norms and observing severe restrictions on the use of firepower. This discrete and sometimes dangerous way of dealing with situations requires a mind-set different from that appropriate to general war.

a. Recognizing that this mental shift is primarily dependent on the leader, the Army has integrated LIC education into all leadership education from the officer commissioning programs to the War College. Soon this educational process will be progressive; that is, each successive course during an officer's career will build directly on the preceding course.

b. The Army is continuing its review of LIC education requirements to ensure the program will provide the total Army with a firm foundation for operations in the LIC environment.

c. Following through from leadership responsibilities to collective performance, LIC training is embedded in unit training throughout the Army.

d. Initiation of the Deployment for Training (DFT) program has markedly improved the training of those forces with FID missions calling for an interface with HN organizations. This program supports overseas deployments where units such as Special Forces, engineers, or medical teams can practice the combined operations they would do in FID.

e. The focus of language training is changing from a predominant emphasis on German and East European languages to a better balance with languages of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

4. Navy. The Navy is incorporating LIC into its curricula at several levels.

a. The Naval Postgraduate School is developing a LIC course of study within their National Security Studies program.
b. The Naval War College has a six-day wargame which incorporates LIC elements in its scenario, as well as offering electives in special operations (SO) and LIC.

c. The U.S. Naval Academy now offers an elective in LIC within the Political Science Department.

d. Lesson plans for LIC have been submitted to the Chief, Naval Education and Training, for incorporation into the ROTC program.

5. Air Force. The Air Force has introduced LIC training and education throughout the Air Force school system. Introduction to LIC is present in precommissioning training in the Air Force ROTC and at the Air Force Academy. At all levels of professional training through the Air War College, officers are prepared for assignments of increasing responsibility in the LIC environment. Similarly, professional noncommissioned officer training includes LIC instruction.

6. Marine Corps

a. Marine Corps Professional Military Education. The Marine Corps has had a long history of involvement in LIC during this century. This experience was documented in the late 1930s in the Small Wars Manual (SWM). That LIC operational orientation still persists today. The Marine Corps is providing LIC-related courses in all its formal schools. The Basic School introduces lieutenants to revolutionary warfare. Majors at the Command and Staff College participate in a two week in-depth study of LIC that includes both lecture and independent research. The Marine Corps Institute also provides extension courses available to all Marine and other Service personnel.

b. Marine Corps Language Proficiency. The Marine Corps is reviewing the scope and intent of its language training programs. It has been noted that the success of Army Special Forces units is directly related to their language proficiency. Over the next five years, the Marine Corps will increase its linguist population by 120 billets. Further, selected linguists will participate in the Defense Advanced Language Areas Specialist Program.

c. Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer Program. The Marine Corps has doubled the number of annual Foreign Area Officer (FAO) students. Additionally, more than 125 billets have been identified that would be appropriate duty for FAO-qualified officers.

d. Riverine Warfare. The Marine Corps has also added riverine warfare to the program of instruction at the Amphibious
Warfare School and the Command and Staff College. Riverine operations are important to many LIC situations in regions where rivers serve as the principal avenues of commerce.

B. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

1. Concepts

a. Joint or Multi-Service. Ongoing studies or conferences with Joint implications for LIC include the following:

(1) The LIC Planners Guide, by the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC), identifies tasks that are critical for success in a given LIC operational category or type operation;

(2) The LIC Instability Indicators Study by the A-AF CLIC, will result in a product useful for strategic, operational, and tactical planners and analysts assessing regional LIC threats; and

(3) The ASD(SO/LIC), in coordination with other offices within DoD, is developing a policy for the environment short of war.

b. Army. Until very recently, the Army’s Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), which is used to decide materiel, training, and resource requirements, reflected only warfighting needs. The first steps have now been taken to integrate LIC-distinctive needs into the system. The downstream effect will be to give commanders the assets they need to meet LIC demands. Ongoing studies or conferences with Joint implications to develop further the CBRS, and examine other approaches to LIC include the following:

(1) The LIC Capabilities Requirements Study (LCRS) conducted by the Army Proponency Office for Low-Intensity Conflict (APOLIC); and

(2) The Blueprint of the Battlefield for LIC by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

c. Air Force. High technology weapons have proliferated in the Third World. Although the Air Force has traditionally structured its forces and acquired its weaponry to contend with Soviet/Warsaw Pact threats, these assets have become ever more relevant to LIC. Still, the Air Force’s emphasis remains on the indirect application of air power in LIC environments.
d. Marine Corps. The Marines are developing a program to increase USMC participation in war-gaming with the national war colleges of Latin America. These exercises serve two purposes: to allow the USMC to learn how other nations employ forces in LIC, and to provide a conduit for USMC expertise to participating colleges.

2. Doctrine

a. Joint and Multi-Service

(1) Although the Services have long maintained doctrine for operations in the various environments of LIC, Joint doctrine has only recently been developed. Joint publications within the Joint Doctrine System include Joint doctrine for LIC, special operations, and contingency operations, as well as Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for foreign internal defense, antiterrorism, peacekeeping operations, and counterdrug operations.

(2) The Army and Air Force have co-authored one of the first multi-Service manuals guiding military operations in LIC. This multi-Service effort has become the foundation for Joint and Service doctrine.

b. Army

The Army’s resurgence of interest in LIC doctrine is an outgrowth of the determination of General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1980s, that the Army be prepared for the full range of challenges facing the nation. Succeeding Chiefs of Staff have maintained that momentum. As a result the Army, in partnership with the Air Force, the other Services and the Joint Staff, has been active in the development of LIC doctrine. This doctrine is captured in a series of Army field manuals that are being continually reviewed and refined.

c. Air Force.

The Air Force, in addition to its work in partnership with the Army, has further developed its doctrinal position on LIC with new operational level publications on Special Operations and Foreign Internal Defense.
d. Marine Corps

(1) Service Doctrine and Plans. The Marine Corps is continuously working to incorporate LIC into plans such as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan and the Marine Corps Mid- and Long-Range Plans. The MAGTF Warfighting Center has recently developed an operational concept for Marine Corps employment in LIC.

(2) Navy and Marine Corps Riverine Operations. Riverine operations are part and parcel of LIC. However, since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, our nation's ability to conduct or support a HN in the conduct of riverine operations has greatly diminished. Several studies concerning riverine operations have been completed in recent months, including a major study entitled, 'Concept for a Joint United States Navy and Marine Corps Battalion Size Riverine Assault Operation.' This study examined current Navy and Marine Corps structure, operational capability, training, and funding enhancements. Headed by the Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, it involved many major commands and more than 100 conference participants.

C. ORGANIZATION

1. Interagency, Joint, and Multi-Service

a. Interagency coordination has been enhanced in LIC and several of its subordinate categories through the NSC LIC Board; participation in special operations and counternarcotics interagency task forces and working groups; and through increased communication and action by the combatant commanders and members of the country teams.

b. The Army and Air Force established the Army-Air Force Center for Low-intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) in 1986 to improve their posture for LIC; represent their LIC interests; and facilitate coordination, initiatives, and education in LIC. A Marine officer was added to the staff in 1990.

2. Army. The diverse capabilities of Army units are applicable to a wide range of LIC scenarios in various climates and regions. The Army's focal point for the study of history, tactics, and doctrine is the Army’s Proponency Office for Low Intensity Conflict (APOLIC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
3. **Air Force.** Most Air Force assets, given the appropriate situation, can be employed in LIC. Certain Air Force assets, however, are particularly well suited for some LIC challenges. Through the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the Air Force is concentrating its ability to support FID. Special courses are planned to be available through the Air Force Special Operations School (AFSOS). The Air Force is also developing programs to produce language-trained and area-oriented people with the appropriate operational and support skills. The goal is to establish or enhance the skills and capabilities needed to deliver aviation support to host nation internal defense and development programs.

4. **Marine Corps**

   a. **Marine Corps Sponsorship Program.** The Marine Corps has established sponsorship programs with recognized Latin American Marine Corps. This program serves as an adjunct to exercises that stimulate valuable exchanges on fighting insurgencies and counterdrug operations.

   b. **Intelligence Support.** Three Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence (SRI) Groups have been established to coordinate intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination efforts for Marine Expeditionary Forces. Additionally, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, created partly in recognition of the shortfalls in intelligence for LIC, provides tailored intelligence support for Fleet Marine Forces contingency planning.

D. **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

The DoD and LIC-related research and development (R&D) initiatives include numerous classified as well as unclassified programs and projects being pursued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the Defense Agencies: including the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). These efforts seek to employ state-of-the-art technologies across a broad spectrum of mission applications including: infiltration/exfiltration; intelligence; mine detection; psychological operations; medical; training systems; and communications applications.

1. **Office of the Secretary of Defense.** ASD(SO/LIC) is conducting an annual review of LIC programs to focus high-level attention on such efforts and ensure the Military Departments and Defense Agencies comply with the Defense Planning Guidance objectives for LIC.
ASD(SO/LIC) also is concluding a study, in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which will provide a consolidated, comprehensive review of technologies applicable to a wide range of LIC scenarios, assess their relative impact in each case, and recommend DoD funding requirements. The scope of scenarios will include intelligence, security assistance, counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, counternarcotics, special operations and conventional force programs in LIC.

Since FY 1990 OSD has been directing an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD)—LIC program which focuses on rapid prototyping equipment to address explosive and other hazards encountered in LIC situations. The program is funded at $5M per year; directed by a coordination group with representatives from ASD(SO/LIC), EOD and C3I; executed by C3I; and receives requirements from CINCs, and all elements within DoD.

2. Other DoD LIC Research and Development Projects. As noted above, DoD research projects with a LIC application are extensive and varied. CN efforts are an illustrative example, and include: drug/contraband detection; maritime craft/aircraft location/detection; effluent detection; specialized communications projects; intelligence processing and forecasting; modeling; ground sensors; tunnel detection; riverine craft/detection systems; and airfield monitors.

E. PLANNING

1. Joint Staff. In the past 3 years, initiatives in focusing plans for LIC have significantly improved the strategic direction provided to CINCs and Services. The overarching strategy has always been sound, but now reflects greater emphasis and detail. Through these actions, the combatant commander’s plans now reflect actions to address and counter the forms of LIC most threatening in their geographic area— one example being the counternarcotics campaign plans of U.S. Southern Command.

2. Army. A recent innovation in the Army’s planning process impacting on LIC activities has been initiation of the Army International Activities Plan (AIAP). The AIAP, FY 92-96, establishes guidance, methods, and means for the conduct of activities involving Army interactions with the Armed Forces, governments, and peoples of foreign nations. International activities support U.S. foreign policy goals, the national security strategy of the United States, and the National Military Strategy. The cumulative effect of Army international activities is to strengthen Army-to-Army relations, and promote allied and friendly support for U.S. objectives. It also
will affect U.S. force requirements for regional contingencies. The ALAP coordinates Army participation in all peacetime activities that bring Army personnel into contact with foreign peoples, governments, and Armed Forces. The ALAP establishes an integrated statement of Army international activities requirements. As a companion to The Army Plan (TAP), the ALAP reflects the peacetime contribution of Army international activities in attaining wartime objectives stated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). It considers the Army Long-range Planning Guidance to ensure that near and mid-term planning of activities will strengthen and improve long-term allied and friendly Army-to-Army relations.

F. PROGRAMMING AND MATERIEL ACQUISITION

1. Air Force. Air Force funded programs that have LIC as a mission include:

   a. The C-27. A light utility, STOL aircraft purchased in response to a USCINCSOUTH Required Operation Capability (ROC) that identified the need for a light duty transport aircraft to provide intra-theater tactical mobility to fill the void between helicopters and C-130s.

   b. Antiterrorism Presidential Determination Program. Begun in 1985, this program includes hardening of facilities and base entry point, thermal imagery devices, fencing, and lighting.

2. Navy and Marine Corps. Enhanced Riverine capability to provide operational forces with a riverine command and control direct fire support, escort, SIGINT and emergency medical evacuation platform, the Marine Corps has procured, after extensive testing, seven 35-foot Riverine Assault Craft (RAC). An additional 25 craft will be acquired in the next three years.
SECTION VI

CONCLUSION

The low-intensity conflict environment of the 1990s will present a diverse array of threats and opportunities for the United States. The broad challenge will be to prevent the gradual and cumulative erosion of American security in an increasingly disorderly and complex world.

We face a combination of helpful and unhelpful trends. On one hand, the waning of Soviet power has removed a source of Third World adventurism and proxy wars. Without the restraining influence of competing superpowers, however, the LICs of the next decade may become more virulent—fueled by a diffusion of global power, nationalism, ethnic-religious grievances, faltering economies, unfavorable demographic trends, and the proliferation of increasingly deadly weapons.

In addition, the overwhelming success of Operation DESERT STORM may channel aggressive acts against the United States and its allies into the lower end of the operational continuum. We cannot rely on future adversaries to repeat Saddam Hussein's mistakes in engaging on a field of conflict that optimizes U.S. and coalition strengths.

At the same time, we should not confuse LIC with technological backwardness. Terrorists, insurgents, and narco-traffickers—to name just a few categories of LIC adversaries—have demonstrated growing sophistication in the use of advanced technology and tactics, communications/psychological skills, and transnational cooperation. The most significant features of the evolving LIC environment are its broad scope, its multiple actors, and its increasing sophistication.

Over time, the Department of Defense has developed a broad range of capabilities to cope with the military dimension of the LIC challenge. Specialized education and training in each of the Armed Forces is producing an officer corps with an increasing grasp of LIC complexities. At the same time, the Department is working to foster an interagency approach and integrate its combat, support, and organizational skills with those of civilian agencies. In order to keep pace with the evolving military aspect of LIC, the Department is also taking steps to improve its capacity in the following areas:

• adjusting intelligence systems to better focus on threats in the developing world

• improving military language skills and regional orientation
• training and equipping selected civil affairs, psychological operations, and medical and engineering combat service support units for missions in the developing world

• increasing the attention of the research, development and acquisition system to the specialized needs of missions in the developing world.

Our strategic emphasis on regional contingencies requires that U.S. forces be at the right place at the right time, and with the right training under widely varied circumstances. Modest but prudent investment in our LIC capability may pay a large dividend by permitting us to defuse nascent crises and head off a number of costly mid-intensity conflict eruptions during the rest of the century.
APPENDIX

THE LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY

A. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. General

Low-intensity conflict encompasses a complex range of activities. To coordinate policies and actions involving the application of all elements of national power by the combined civilian and military agencies of government is a daunting task. In those cases involving a second country, the integration web becomes more formidable. Not only is vertical coordination within the DoD required, but also lateral coordination among the full range of U.S. Government organizations and friendly or allied governmental entities as well. Yet, a system is in place which with minor adjustments can do the job.

2. The Principal Department of Defense LIC Players

a. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The Secretary of Defense is a statutory member of the National Security Council (NSC) and its Principals Committee (See the discussion of the NSC organization below.) The Secretary of Defense establishes DoD policy for military support of LIC operations. He communicates orders effecting control of military participation through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commanders.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for the integration of DoD plans and policies into national security objectives. He represents the DoD, as directed, in matters involving the National Security Council, Department of State, and other departments, agencies, and interagency groups within the national security area. Of particular significance, the USD(P) develops policies and coordinates implementation of DoD politico-military affairs, including special operations and low-intensity conflict. He provides policy direction for defense security assistance matters, and monitors Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other missions pertaining to security assistance. He also negotiates and monitors security assistance agreements with foreign governments. He has direction, authority, and control over, among others, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) (ASD(ISP)); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)); and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)).
c. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)). The ASD(ISA) is the chief staff assistant and advisor to the USD(P) for policy and planning related to general purpose forces, and security and humanitarian assistance to developing nations. He also is the primary advisor on politico-military and international economic matters involving foreign countries except for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Europe, and the former Soviet bloc. As a consequence, he is an important contributor to developing and executing LIC strategies in the Third World. Specifically, he:

(1) Develops policies, plans, and programs related to general purpose forces and humanitarian assistance.

(2) Provides DoD policy guidance and recommendations regarding economic security relations with foreign countries, and other politico-military matters in assigned geographic areas of responsibility.

(3) Develops DoD positions and recommendations, coordinates policy matters concerning security assistance, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and other missions pertaining to security assistance.

d. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for the supervision of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities within the DoD. The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for policy guidance and oversight to govern the planning, programming, provision of resources, and execution of special operations and LIC activities. In performing these responsibilities, the ASD (SO/LIC):

(1) Formulates policies and programs for plans and resources, and oversees the implementation of these policies and programs.

(2) Translates national security objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable by designated LIC activities.

(3) Conducts studies and analyses that support the exercise of assigned responsibilities and functions.

(4) Oversees the development and refinement of doctrines, strategies, and processes for LIC; prepares LIC plans and implementation guidance.
(5) Provides policy guidance and recommendations, incorporates LIC mission options in contingency planning; coordinates and reviews LIC aspects of contingency plans; and evaluates the fit between policy, strategic guidance, planning, and capabilities.

(6) Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates the various policies, processes, and programs of DoD components that affect the capability to plan, resource, prepare forces, and execute LIC operations; and initiate and coordinate actions or tasks that enhance the readiness, capabilities, and effective use of SO and LIC forces.

(7) Supervises, with the advice and assistance of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), the preparation and justification of program recommendations and budget proposals for SO activities in the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP). USCINCSOC has program authority over Major Force Program 11 resources, and he exercises this authority under the oversight of ASD(SO/LIC).

(8) Advises the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) on acquisition priorities and requirements for LIC-related material and equipment; participates in the Defense Acquisition Board and other appropriate boards and committees as the proponent for SO and LIC issues; and maintains liaison to monitor progress in meeting milestones.

(9) Oversees the issue and review of regulations for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) activities, as required by Section 167(h) of Title 10, U.S. Code; reviews, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and USCINCSOC, the procedures by which USCINCSOC receives, plans, and executes tasks of the National Command Authorities.

(10) Provides, with the CJCS and USCINCSOC, DoD oversight of the readiness of the unified combatant commands to conduct SO.

(11) Advises the Secretary of Defense on assigning SO and other forces to USSOCOM.

(12) Finds out where intelligence shortfalls exist and confers with USCINCSOC; the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)); and others in the intelligence community to recommend activities that support the capability and plans of the DoD to conduct SO and LIC missions.

(13) Monitors the development of crises through options for separate or integrated, military or non-military, actions using SO capabilities; monitor SO actions during the planning and execution phases of the Crisis Action System; reports to the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the CJCS, any significant change in the relationship between the SO actions, targets, level of forces and risks, and the political objectives.

(14) Following established procedures, including General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD) consultation and DoD Directive 5-5210.36, advises the USD(P) on interagency support requests for use of forces or resources in SO and LIC activities; monitors interagency use of DoD forces or resources in SO and LIC activities; reports to the USD(P) when it appears that questions of legality or propriety may arise.

(15) Develops mechanisms for integrating LIC programs into other DoD Component research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and procurement efforts.

(16) Serves, in association with USCINCSOC, as the chief DoD official responsible for presenting the SO and LIC programs to the Congress.

(17) Serves as the DoD point of contact and spokesman regarding SO and LIC matters, and represents the Secretary of Defense with other governmental agencies with respect to those matters.

(18) Studies the methodologies of foreign governmental SO and LIC organizations to improve DoD capability in peace and war.

(19) Recommends to the Secretary of Defense the legislative initiatives to enhance SO and LIC capabilities.
(20) Clears all related public affairs releases with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

e. Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is a separate agency under the ASD(ISA). The Director is responsible for administering and supervising the Security Assistance (SA) Program as developed by the Department of State. The administration of sales programs may be delegated in whole or in part to the Military Departments, but under the direction and supervision of the DSAA. The Director is also responsible, among other things, to:

(1) Supervise formulation of detailed SA programs;

(2) Coordinate the formulation and execution of SA programs with other governmental agencies;

(3) Review evaluations of SA program administration, including responsibility with respect to GAO and other audits;

(4) Maintain liaison with Congress on SA legislation and related matters, provide support to the ASD(ISA) for the presentation of the annual SA program before the Congress; and,

(5) Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands fully informed of SA matters.

f. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(1) The CJCS is the key military officer in the development of joint LIC policy, doctrine, and strategy. He is responsible for the following functions:

(a) Performs net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

(b) Prepares and reviews LIC contingency plans to ensure conformance with policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

(c) Prepares joint logistic and mobility plans to support contingency plans.
(d) Informs the Secretary of Defense of critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities, and assesses the effect on national security objectives, policies, and contingency plans.

(e) Establishes and maintains, after consultation with the combatant commanders, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of the commands to carry out assigned missions.

(f) Advises the Secretary of Defense, under section 163(b)(2) of Title 10, on the priorities of requirements identified by the commanders of the combatant commands.

(g) Informs the Secretary of Defense of the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and the requirements of the combatant commands.

(h) Submits to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to get greater conformance with established priorities.

(i) Assesses military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

(j) Develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

(k) Formulates policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.

(2) The CJCS manages LIC policy by a number of means including the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS provides the means, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to review the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to meet those national security objectives.
Specific strategic guidance for LIC is derived from the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CJCS then issues guidance to the CINCs in the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), which is the overarching strategy document providing guidance for development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP gives specific LIC environment guidance to the CINCs. It also apportions resources to them based on military capabilities existing at the start of the planning period.

Low-intensity conflict doctrine is disseminated through publications such as the series of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures publications dealing with operations in support of LIC, and CJCS memoranda of policy. LIC policy is also promulgated on a case-by-case basis since it must often be tailored to a specific country and situation.

**g. The Combatant Commands.**

The combatant commanders assigned to a theater of operations outside U.S. national boundaries are the field managers of military operations in LIC. All have the capability to engage in LIC. Their roles; to plan, train for, and conduct LIC operations; have all been substantiated. For example, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterdrug operations, shows-of-force, and humanitarian/civic assistance operations have been repeatedly conducted within the last five years. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) conducted a show of force to support our national interests in the Philippines; and mounted disaster relief operations in Samoa, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT) conducted a NEO in Liberia. European Command (USCINCEUR) recently concluded humanitarian missions in Iraq and Turkey. Central Command (USCINCENT) led a show of force as a prelude to DESERT STORM, and conducted a NEO in Somalia. Southern Command (USCINCSO) conducted Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. For the regional combat commanders these functions require close coordination with pertinent diplomatic missions to ensure that military objectives and operations complement and support the specific country team goals. All theater
CINCs have participated actively in the LIC environment over the last five years.

(2) These theater CINCs rely on supporting CINCs and the Services to provide equipment and forces trained and equipped for operations in the LIC environment. The supporting CINCs (Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT), Forces Command (CINCFOR), Space Command (USCINCSPACE), and Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC)) provide support to theater CINCs based on their planning requirements.

(3) USCINCSOC has global responsibility for providing combat ready Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces (SOF) to the five theater CINCs. In addition, when directed by the NCA, USCINCSOC acts as a supported commander and is responsible for planning and conducting selected special operations.

(a) The roles and functions of USCINCSOC are defined by law and include proponency for psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces. In addition, he provides SOF support and advice to theater combatant commanders in counterdrug operations. PSYOP and CA forces are predominantly Army forces, a large portion of which are Reserves. The other three Services have limited PSYOP and CA forces and depend on the Army assets for the bulk of their support. The early employment of PSYOP and CA forces in a potential conflict environment could preclude the need for combat forces. By convincing the indigenous population to eschew violence as a political answer, PSYOP missions have the potential to reduce or eliminate combat involvement of U.S. and friendly forces. The early deployment of CA forces in a potential conflict environment helps to address the root causes of discontent through nation assistance programs. These two capabilities have not had the historical support of a unified commander, until proponency for them was assigned to USSOCOM by law. Recent use of PSYOP and CA forces in Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated their effectiveness. As shown in these operations, PSYOP forces can contribute to the success of missions across the operational continuum, and CA forces make significant contributions, partic-
ularly in the aftermath of these conflicts. In Panama, CA forces and military police units restored social order. Similarly, CA personnel and Army Engineers assisted Kuwait in rebuilding its infrastructure.

(b) PSYOP and CA forces identified to support a theater CINC must train for operations across the operational spectrum, even though the potential for avoiding violent escalation lies in their early employment in a LIC environment.

(c) All U.S. forces can engage in LIC operations, and such operations are not unique to SOF units.

(d) All unified and specified commanders have a role in the budget process through their recommendations of budget priorities. Uniquely, as a supporting unified command, USCINCSOC is charged by law with a mandate of budgetary authority, executed through Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11). Although each Service has a requirement for supporting its SOF, acquiring SOF-unique equipment and managing research and development (R&D) efforts of the SOF community are two of the primary responsibilities of USCINCSOC. In this area, USCINCSOC directly responds to theater requests for unique solutions to regional problems by programming R&D resources against the requirements of the combatant commander, as well as giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces, including direction for military operations, joint training and logistics.

h. The Armed Forces. Common to all Armed Forces is the responsibility to raise, train, and equip forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment and supplies for the prosecution of war and military operations short of war. The specification of operations short of war makes the Services major players in LIC. Generally, except for the Marine Corps, the Services do not maintain specialized organizations, staffs or procedures for LIC. The Services do give special attention to forces for service in LIC through training, education, and equipment, as described later.
(1) The Army

(a) It is the responsibility of the Army to organize, train, and equip forces capable of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. As the U.S. national security strategy changes to cope with the evolving international environment, the Army adjusts accordingly, making certain that its forces can fulfill the following strategic roles:

- Maintain combat-ready ground forces -- heavy, light, and special operations--for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide;

- Provide forward presence with units based abroad in areas of vital interest to the United States;

- Maintain forces able to reinforce forward-deployed and contingency forces;

- Participate in disaster relief, emergency assistance, and interdiction of illicit drugs; and

- Provide support to allied and friendly nations through peacekeeping, security assistance, and army-to-army initiatives.

(b) The requirement to address operations in the LIC environment is embedded throughout the Army’s strategic roles. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) functions as the integrator for all actions to accomplish assigned missions, including those that are LIC related.

(c) Although all subsections within the Army Staff are sensitive to the need for ensuring that the LIC environment is considered in all actions, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has primary staff responsibility.

(d) Supporting HQDA in its integrating functions are a number of Major Army Commands (MACOMS), three of which are key to the Army mission in LIC.
- Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for combat developments, training requirements, and doctrine. It also integrates doctrine, combat developments and training throughout the Army.

- Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for R&D and materiel acquisition; readiness; conventional ammunition and special weapons acquisition; and acts as Army executive agent for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

- Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the Army component command (for planning) for the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). It is responsible to organize, train and support assigned Army forces; plan for employing and supporting Army forces in USLANTCOM operational plans; improve readiness of deployable forces (Active and Reserve Component); and support DoD counterdrug efforts.

(e) Traditionally, the Army has not identified any particular force structure as being LIC-specific in its missions and functions. Instead, it has adhered to a policy of tailoring units to meet an assigned mission with an identified threat. This tailoring of units, both Active and Reserve, includes:

- Special Operations Forces (Rangers, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, CA, and PSYOP units); - Contingency Corps (XVIII Airborne Corps, (heavy/light force mix));

- Light forces (airborne, air assault and light divisions);

- Reinforcing heavy forces (mechanized and armored divisions);

- Combat support and combat service support units.
The Navy

(a) The primary function of the Navy is to organize, train, equip, and provide Navy forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. This includes operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components. In furnishing forces to the warfighting combatant commanders of the unified or specified commands, the Navy has the responsibility to guarantee these forces are ready to operate in any environment. As such, there is no LIC branch for the Navy; the entire organization has LIC as a mission. The Chief of Naval Operations point of contact for LIC and other JCS and NSC matters is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations), OP-06. The Navy’s Operations Deputy, OP-06, is responsible for the assignment, review, coordination and supervision of joint matters within OPNAV to include LIC. LIC issues are staffed in the same manner as other joint matters.

(b) In peacetime, the Navy can provide a general deterrent to aggression and demonstrate the U.S. Government stance in a restrained manner short of deploying forces ashore or constructing installations in friendly nations, either of which may offend national feelings. If conflict cannot be prevented, the relevant naval commands can provide a rapid U.S. response and sustain it while national policy makers determine what additional measures are required. Specifically, the Navy meets its responsibilities by ensuring that its forces can fulfill the following missions:

- project and supply land forces ashore;
- evacuate civilians and U.S. citizens;
- support counterdrug operations;
- maintain forward presence in unstable areas;
- conduct maritime or riverine interdiction;
- assist in civic action and nation assistance endeavors;
- provide aerial reconnaissance and electronic surveillance from deployed aircraft carriers;

- furnish limited airlift to outlying areas; and,

- train Service personnel of friendly nations.

(3) The Air Force

(a) The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war. This entails organizing, training, and equipping forces for use by the unified and specified command combatant commanders, as designated by the National Command Authority. Recognizing that the low-intensity conflict threat is not necessarily a low technology threat, the Air Force uses its wide range of assets to support the overall LIC effort. Recently, the Air Force has established a small unit within its Special Operations Command specifically to assist friendly countries with the aviation component of their foreign internal defense efforts.

(b) Although LIC actions are handled by appropriate staff agency within the Air Staff rather than by LIC exclusive staff elements, the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations has staff oversight of military operations in support of LIC.

(c) Among the Air Force missions listed below, the first two of the following missions are particularly apt for use in all operational categories of LIC. The third and fourth listed missions are applicable to some, but not all, operational categories.

- Reconnaissance and surveillance. Air power supports various forms of intelligence collection for all aspects of security and neutralization. This support may be conducted in support of civilian law enforcement agencies or military and paramilitary units. Air platforms equipped with signals intelligence (SIG-INT) capabilities may be used to penetrate the infrastructures of insurgents, terrorists, and
drug agents. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to protect isolated friendly enclaves, lines of communications, civilian populations, or to collect intelligence on the enemy. Air power can help the collection process reaching otherwise inaccessible sites, and by speeding the collection and recovery of time-sensitive data.

- Airlift. Airlift increases government capacity to administer and mobilize in outlying areas extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Additionally, airlift provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas of operation.

- Close Air Support and Interdiction. In LIC, the Air Force can provide close air support, when authorized. This is useful only if hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack against friendly positions or when they expose their command and control centers and logistic elements. Counterinsurgency operations, and some contingencies such as non-combatant evacuation operations, may rely on air-delivered munitions for close air support in site defense, convoy escort, offensive tactical maneuvers, and other troops-in-contact situations. Close air support in such situations assists surface forces in accomplishing their mission. In countering other forms of lawlessness (illicit drug production and civil disorders, for instance), surface operations are often aimed at controlling, arresting, and seizing rather than inflicting casualties.

- Psychological Operations. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are critical to successful LIC operations. Air assets are integral to PSYOP programs, furnishing broadcast platforms, leaflet distribution, and communications capabilities not available through other means.
(4) The Marine Corps

(a) The primary function of the Marine Corps is to organize, train, equip and provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations with the fleet: specifically, expeditionary forces for the seizure and defense of advance naval bases, and the conduct of land, air and space operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In fulfilling its primary and collateral functional obligations, the Marine Corps has capabilities important to the full range of LIC.

(b) The Marine Corps task organizes for operational employment from its statutory Division/Air Wing structure by forming its forces into integrated, combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). They are specifically tailored to accomplish an assigned mission and for rapid deployment by air or sea. Combining air, ground, and logistics forces under a single commander, they may be weighted towards ground, air, or logistics action, and they can be any size appropriate for the mission. The MAGTF provides the combatant commander unique flexibility for a range of options from forcible entry amphibious operations to a wide variety of operations in the LIC environment.

(c) Primary staff responsibility for LIC within the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps lies with the Plans, Policies, and Operations Department. The Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Branch of the Operations Division (HQMC(SO/LIC)) executes these responsibilities.

(d) The HQMC(SO/LIC) furnishes the staff assistance to formulate and coordinate special operations and LIC policy with the Joint Staff, and other agencies and Services. It coordinates policy concerning Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Special Operations Capable) (MAGTF(SOC)), the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training assistance program.
There is also a SO/LIC Branch within the Marine Corps Warfighting Center in Quantico, VA, which assists with the development of concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures unique to low-intensity conflict environments.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

The National Security Council and Interagency Coordination. All agencies of government, and at times, many non-governmental agencies may be called on to contribute to the efforts of the United States in the LIC environment. It is axiomatic that problems arising from the LIC environment require interagency solutions. The means of achieving coordinated interagency action is embedded in the National Security Council and its supporting interagency system. The following paragraphs outline the organization of the NSC and indicate some of the principal non-DoD departments and agencies active in LIC-related undertakings.


a. The National Security Council (NSC) is the apex of the nation’s politico-military policy, planning, and coordinating mechanism. It serves as both a national policy advisory organization to the President, and as the senior interagency coordinating element. Internally, the NSC has a four-level structure. The Council proper consists of the President, the Vice-President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) are statutory advisers to the Council and they may be augmented by others as desired by the President. Subordinate to and supporting the Council are three levels of committees: the Principals Committee (NSC/PC), the Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), and the Policy Coordinating Committees (NSC/PCCs).

(1) The NSC’s membership includes the Secretaries of State and Defense, the CJCS, the Director CIA, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as chairman, and others as directed.

(2) The NSC/DC consists of the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as chairman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others appropriate to the issues under consideration.
b. The Low-Intensity Conflict Board. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 directed the creation of a designated LIC board for the centralized management of LIC issues within the NSC system. By so doing, the Congress and the President highlighted their recognition of the importance and complexity of the challenges to national security arising from the LIC environment. The members of the NSC/DC serve also on the Low-Intensity Conflict Board. In that role they develop national LIC policy and coordinate interagency operations in LIC.

(1) Given the scope of the NSC/DC's global responsibilities, its members require support in the detailed examination of individual LIC events. The findings of the National Security Review of Low-Intensity Conflict (NSR 27) recognized that the current hierarchy of NSC organizations is generally well suited for developing and coordinating policies and strategies, but there are methods of improving the way in which they relate to LIC. As a consequence, a sub-group for LIC will serve to advise the Deputies Committee/LIC Board on this important topic.

2. Principal Non-Defense Interagency Players.

a. The Department of State. The Department of State (DOS) is usually the lead department in developing and executing U.S. LIC policy, plans and programs. As previously stated, even where there is significant military contribution to an effort, the goals in LIC are political. The DOS is, therefore, best suited to frame the objectives and act as conductor in harmonizing the interagency response.

(1) At the national and regional level this is done through DOS participation at all levels of the NSC. At the country level, planning and supervising operations, other than combat operations, are the responsibility of the U.S. ambassador.

(2) Within the DOS, responsibility for LIC-related activities is divided among several offices. The
regional bureaus are responsible for counterinsurgency. Counterdrugs come under the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, who operates under the supervision of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Counterterrorism is the responsibility of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who reports to the Deputy Secretary. Primary responsibility for the Security Assistance Program is under the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs.

b. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A preemptive approach to LIC problems relies heavily on understanding the causes of instability within countries important to the United States. Sometimes economic difficulties, lagging or inappropriate development, contribute to the problem. When such is the case, the Agency for International Development is a major player in U.S. efforts to correct those difficulties. It manages all economic assistance programs, to include Economic Support Funds (ESF) of the Security Assistance Program. It also can help DoD planning efforts in nation assistance programs, and act as liaison with appropriate host nation civil planning and development ministries. This is done through membership in PCCs and U.S. embassies' country teams.

c. The United States Information Agency (USIA). The proper use of information, as previously discussed, is an essential element in operations in the LIC environment. The USIA is a chief source of expertise on how to use information in an effective way. Its mission is to assist in forming foreign public opinion. In support of U.S. foreign policy, it conducts information programs designed to explain U.S. objectives and activities to foreign audiences. Through its overseas cultural and exchange programs, it also provides a window for U.S. values and contributes to an understanding of democracy. The agency provides advice on the potential impact of contemplated U.S. programs and policies on foreign opinion.

d. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There is no single function more important to LIC than intelligence. The CIA supports LIC activities in both a national advisory role and at the regional and country level. The CIA informs the NSC about matters concerning the coordination and execution of intelligence operations in support of LIC undertakings. On the regional level, the CIA provides foreign intelligence in support of threat assessments and supports the ambassador and country team with country-specific intelligence. Recent initiatives have helped reorient the national intelligence agencies on the type of information required by LIC
scenarios. Coordination with military intelligence activities is essential and ensures a continuing exchange of information as demanded for effective operations. A much-expanded program of open source collection with an emphasis on sociological, cultural, demographic, and geographic intelligence, together with a commensurate evolution of our ability to furnish early identification of potential "instabilities," is needed if we are to meet our LIC-related intelligence requirements.

e. The Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ plays a key role in the attack on drug trafficking and related criminal activities both at home and abroad. It also performs a number of other functions related to LIC activities. It drafts legal opinions on matters concerning foreign assistance and support to friends and allies facing LIC threats. The DOJ serves as a central point of contact for the U.S. Government on legal matters for foreign justice and police ministers and their departments. In this role it bolsters our concern with the rule of law through advocating judicial reform. It prepares and files all applications for surveillance under the Surveillance Act of 1978 and provides legal advice on matters of national security law and policy and participates in a variety of interagency committees such as the National Foreign Intelligence Council. With the assignment of a counterdrug mission to the DoD, the cooperation and coordination between the two departments has markedly increased.

f. The Department of Transportation (DOT).

(1) The Coast Guard, operating in its peacetime role under the DOT, is heavily involved in LIC activities. As an armed force with unique law enforcement skills, the Coast Guard can and does act as a source of advice and training. Additionally, as the primary maritime law enforcement agency for the United States, it is at the center of the effort to suppress illicit drug trafficking. In both of these areas, a high degree of coordination with the DoD has been achieved in order to complement their respective capabilities.

(2) The DOT Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Coast Guard, and the Office of the Secretary also are active in antiterrorism programs. The Department, acting through the FAA, is lead agency for the security of civil aviation. They have principal responsibility over such issues as air piracy, sabotage, and criminal activity within U.S. jurisdiction.
g. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury).

(1) Treasury has primary responsibility for formulating and recommending monetary, financial, commercial, energy, and trade policy including those matters impacting Third World countries involved with LIC. It also oversees U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks and coordinates U.S. policies and operations relating to bilateral and multilateral lending programs important to Third World development.

(2) In the campaign against terrorism and drug trafficking, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Customs Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the Internal Revenue Service also play important supporting roles.

h. The Department of Commerce (DOC). In the application of the Nation’s economic element of power, the DOC is potentially a major player in national resistance programs. Its expertise on trade policy, technology exchange, and free enterprise systems, provides a basis for the sound economic planning and policy advice needed by countries attempting to develop free market economies.