Knowing the past and being able to use its lessons are major responsibilities of all military professionals. The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (JMOHC) presents historical events that illustrate Joint Doctrine principles in Joint Force Employment. The selected US joint military operations include historical and modern operations that teach us universal lessons directly applicable to Joint Force Employment.

I want all leaders, action officers, planners, and commanders in the Armed Forces of the United States to know Joint Doctrine and be able to plan and execute operations based on its principles. By knowing how combat and other operations shaped our doctrine, military professionals and students will be able to judge new situations and take proper actions in accordance with Joint Doctrine. I hope that the JMOHC will inspire further study of the evolution of Joint Doctrine.

The military actions covered in the JMOHC helped shape our current Joint Doctrine. By studying, understanding, and practicing this doctrine, we will enhance joint warfighting throughout the Armed Forces of the United States.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE

1. Scope

The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (JMOHC) complements joint doctrine by providing historical military operations that illustrate fundamental principles of joint operations. These historical joint operations teach primary lessons in planning, deploying, and employing joint forces.

2. Purpose

The JMOHC has been developed to help military students, action officers, and planners understand key principles of Joint Force Employment. Joint doctrine is largely developed from the lessons of past operations. The JMOHC distills seven case histories for their relevance to Joint Force Employment and fundamental principles of joint doctrine.

3. Application

a. This document examines general principles of Joint Force Employment to link relevant historical lessons to current planning and joint operations. Each of the historical operations illustrates how fundamental joint doctrine principles were applied in specific circumstances. Military students and practitioners are invited to compare the case histories in this book to today's joint operations and principles to stimulate original thought and effective responses to future military challenges.

b. Great leaders have always studied history. In their study they hope to see not only what happened but why. What were the processes that led to a certain action? Why was one action successful and another a failure? How can these lessons learned be used to help US forces fight as a team?

c. Military personnel should take the time to read, study, and reflect upon thousands of years of recorded military history. Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Napoleon, and others have much to offer today's leaders. While historical case studies can extend the experience base of today's commanders and senior staff officers they should not, however, be viewed as a checklist for future operations. The purpose of the historical study is to stimulate thought, not rote imitation.

d. Joint doctrine consists of many principles and guidelines. Do they work on paper? Probably. Do they work in actual military situations? By studying actual joint operations of the past the answers may be determined. While not an absolute guide to present decision making, history frequently suggests the right questions for action officers, planners, and commanders to consider.

e. In using these case histories, several points should be considered using personal judgement. What decisions could have been different? Could the outcome have been better or worse? Imagine a complicating factor — weather or system breakdown — What would have happened? Finally, how does this relate to the present situation?

f. The JMOHC will aid action officers, planners, and commanders in understanding and using the lessons of joint doctrine and force employment in real world situations. Knowledge is essential to convert today's military students into the leaders of future joint operations. When the warning order comes it is too late to start thinking about how to respond. It takes a robust system of education, teaching, and critical examination to prepare leaders. The JMOHC should serve as a primary reference for today's leaders.
Preface

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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Uses of Historical Study to Understand and Illuminate the Principles of Joint Doctrine
- Outlines the Key Employment Principles Demonstrated by Seven Historical Joint Operations
- Illustrates the Key Aspects of Joint Operations through these Selected Joint Case Histories
- Emphasizes the Importance of Joint Doctrine in Effective Decision Making at All Levels of Conflict
- Synthesizes Common Threads in Historical Joint Operations and Current Requirements

The Role of History in Joint Doctrine

"War is a matter of vital importance to the state, the province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

Sun Tzu
The Art of War, 400-520 B.C.

The challenges inherent in coordinating different military forces arose soon after military forces specialized in ground or naval combat.

Joint doctrine’s roots reach back to the commanders who first dealt with the timeless problems of coordinating military operations among land, sea and, later, air forces. The challenges inherent in coordinating different military forces have existed since armies became distinct from navies. The nation-states of ancient Greece that maintained both armies and navies faced the same challenges of joint coordination that General Grant and Admiral Porter addressed at the battle of Vicksburg.

"It is now accepted with naval and military men who study their profession, that history supplies the raw material from which they are to draw their lessons, and reach their working conclusions. Its teachings are not, indeed, pedantic precedents; but they are the illustrations of living principles."

Rear Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan
Executive Summary

Adding air power to the joint coordination equation made multi-Service coordination more complex. As technological developments added air power to the joint coordination equation, multi-Service coordination became even more complex. The nature of multi-Service coordination seen in World War II convinced Congress in 1947 that a permanent institution was required to control its complexities. The result was legislation that created the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Establishing a permanent structure to coordinate US land, sea, and air forces recognized that multiplying force effectiveness through joint action was critical to military success.

Throughout history, nations that successfully coordinated simultaneous land and sea actions won their battles. Those that did not, lost. Although the ancients coordinated forces on land and sea, modern military planners must also deal with air and space. These new media change the situation quantitatively, not qualitatively. Multi-Service coordination still seeks to solve problems revealed when Pericles balanced his naval and land forces to defend Athens.

"A single unwise tactical move by a soldier on patrol can instantly change the character of an operation and when broadcast by the ever present media pool, can also affect strategic considerations."

Kenneth Allard
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

Modern weapons and communications demand rapid and effective decision making. Since Athens fought Sparta, technological advances have greatly reduced the time available for military decision making. In the age of sail, governments had months to decide how to coordinate land and sea responses to military threats. With modern weapons and communications, the luxury of time has virtually disappeared. The pace of events requires rapid and more effective decision making. Lacking time and facing critical decisions, military planners who know their history can base their choices on useful knowledge.

"It is too late to learn the technique of warfare when military operations are already in progress, especially when the enemy is an expert at it."

General Aleksei A. Brusilov
The Value of Studying History

The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection exists to allow historical military knowledge to support current decisions.

History relates military events to fundamental principles.

While history can not guarantee valid answers to every military question, past events frequently can illuminate present problems. Even though technology has changed the pace and increased the violence of war, many of the problems leaders and planners face today are similar to challenges met in earlier days. Learning the facts of military history, analyzing them in light of enduring principles, and applying them within the context of current military technologies and techniques is critical to success. The fighters who learn, interpret, and correctly apply the lessons of earlier conflicts are known as “victors.” The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection presents historical case studies to allow leaders, joint planners, and action officers to plan and fight by using the experience of historical planners and leaders who faced similar problems and solved them. The value of studying history derives from putting military events in the context of fundamental principles. The seven historical joint operations illustrate specific universal lessons. Each case study demonstrates several general joint employment principles.

"Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future."

—Ardant du Picq

Historical Joint Military Operations

Calculated risks, deception, and expanded operational reach enabled surprise.

The Federal campaign against Vicksburg, as executed by General Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter, showed how joint doctrine principles applied even before the development of modern communications and the internal combustion engine. The Union Army and naval forces jointly used unity of effort, mass, leverage, and seizing the initiative. Headquarters had given General Grant no orders, but he independently recognized that he had to take the offensive and concentrate his forces to preserve his army and use speed to achieve Union strategic goals. He understood the importance of Vicksburg as a major center of gravity. In fact, after the battle of Vicksburg the Confederacy lost the military benefit of its entire western sector. To bring this about Grant took calculated risks and used deception

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Executive Summary

effectively. By boldly casting aside the traditional reliance on lines of communications, he demonstrated his agility, mobility, and flexibility in order to expand operational reach. The opposing forces were unable to react to this operational surprise. However, the key to Grant’s maneuvers and success were consciously coordinated efforts of land and naval forces in a classic joint operation.

“There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war which could not be deviated from without danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has been in almost all time crowned with success.”

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini

The Early Joint Chiefs of Staff Era

At Inchon, UN forces seized the initiative. At Incheon, General Douglas MacArthur seized the initiative. The landing amidst the communist lines of supply allowed asymmetric action through synchronized application of sea, land, and air power. General MacArthur outlined simple objectives and applied unity of effort to achieve them. At the time of the operation, UN forces were desperately defending at the Pusan perimeter; MacArthur’s bold stroke completely reversed this tenuous situation through a rapid transition from defense to offense. He forced a favorable overall combat ratio by taking a calculated risk that protected a friendly center of gravity while striking directly at an enemy center of gravity. His classic example of the joint approach to modern warfare was the first major joint operation after Congress established the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“A great captain can only be formed by long experience and intense study.”

Archduke Charles of Austria

Joint Operations Before Goldwater-Nichols

Grenada required a “coup de main,” a sudden and decisive attack, in which Operations Security (OPSEC) was critical. Operation URGENT FURY, the restoration of democracy in Grenada, was an overall success as a military operation and pointed the way for continued improvements in the US approach to joint military operations. As a coup de main, Grenada demonstrated how to apply simultaneous air-land-sea action to eliminate an untenable political situation. The operation required a forcible entry to rescue the American medical students. As in all forcible entries, operations
security (OPSEC) was a prime concern. Although Cuba had strategic warning, OPSEC and US speed of execution limited Cuban ability to take advantage of foreknowledge. From the beginning of the operation, clear objectives were stated and followed. The US forces knew that their job was to rescue the students, drive out the New Jewel Movement government, and restore the legitimate governor. To do this, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the US and Caribbean nations' forces, used operational surprise to force asymmetric domination of the battlespace. As a result of the operation, the US medical students were released, democracy was restored, and a powerful strategic message was sent. However, this short conflict revealed the need for improvement in both joint doctrine and joint organization. The Goldwater-Nichols act, passed in 1986, rationalized joint organization and paved the way for additional military success by supporting unity of command.

"Nothing is more important than unity of command."  
Napoleon

The Goldwater-Nichols Era


Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama, took advantage of the organizational changes wrought by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and doctrinal lessons from Operation URGENT FURY. In a forcible entry that demanded a long operational reach, the commander, General Maxwell Thurman, coordinated air, sea, and land action to achieve clearly stated, rational objectives. General Thurman planned and executed attacks on centers of gravity. Among these centers of gravity was the person of the Panamanian dictator. Making President Manuel Noriega an objective put the dictator on the run, kept him from coordinating his defense, and established a clearly recognizable criterion for conflict termination. United States Southern Command operations took the offensive throughout the Panamanian area, shocked the Panamanian forces, and reduced their effectiveness. With the multiple US bases on Panamanian territory requiring defense while Thurman's forces attacked Noriega's centers of gravity, economy of force allowed sufficient mass to prevail quickly through coordinated maneuver. General Thurman relied on security, surprise, simplicity, and strengthened unity of command ensured by the Goldwater-Nichols act.
Executive Summary

Major Campaigns at Extreme Operational Reach

**Speed and operational reach deterred Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia.**

**OPSEC, speed, and deception dislocated Iraqi forces.**

**Economy of force was the key to massing against centers of gravity.**

Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated virtually every principle of war and element of joint doctrine in action. At the beginning of the crisis, when it appeared that Saddam Hussein might try to push into Saudi Arabia, speed combined with operational reach to stabilize the US base of operations. Throughout the deployment and employment phases, flexibility and timing were applied with skill to allow maneuver to leverage and multiply mass. By combining OPSEC and deception under unity of command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was able to maneuver coalition forces to surprise, shock, and dislocate Iraqi forces. General Schwarzkopf’s hint of an amphibious landing drew critical Iraqi forces away from the real coalition plan. When Schwarzkopf topped this deception with an attack at blinding speed, Saddam’s battered forces could not react. The coalition used mass to smash Iraqi centers of gravity before the land war began. This mass resulted from reliance on economy of force defense to free selected air and sea assets for massed attacks on priority targets. The principle of objective was honored by coalition forces, who understood what needed to be done and went after it without distraction. The swift conclusion of the land war resulted from superb coordination of air, land, and sea forces to make the 100-hour victory possible. The speed of the ground victory was clear evidence of synergy at work.

**Military Operations Other Than War**

**Military operations other than war (MOOTW) are inherently complex.**

**MOOTW coordination includes outside agencies.**

After the clarity and measurable results of the Gulf War, operations in Somalia demonstrated how complex and demanding military operations other than war can be. Peace enforcement in Somalia relied on economy of force, intelligence, logistics, and coordination with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The objective was clearly established and carried out in Operation RESTORE HOPE, as millions of Somalis were rescued from starvation. US Forces demonstrated operational reach as airlift and sealift, protected by joint force operations, provided critical logistic support to deliver food in time to save hundreds of thousands of lives. Complexity is a defining feature of multinational operations of this type. When NGOs are critical to the mission, coordination is critical to unity of effort.
Restraint reinforces legitimacy.

Restraint by US forces was crucial, and supported the legitimacy of the operation. Despite the chaotic situation and the large numbers of US personnel in Somalia, discipline and dedication minimized incidents which could have damaged the operation. Security of US forces was critical to the mission, particularly as the mission transitioned to UN control with a diminished US role.

Multinational Nation Assistance

Legitimacy and unity of effort were key to achieving objectives in Haiti.

Security reduces casualties and maintains public support.

Perseverance means continuing until the objective is achieved — and no longer.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY achieved its clear objective in Haiti. Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton relied on legitimacy, unity of effort, and flexibility to keep his multinational operation on course. Restraint once again demonstrated its critical relationship to legitimacy both within Haiti and on the international scene. Security ensured that the operation could not be derailed politically by excessive friendly casualties. Democracy restoration missions depend on public support in two places — in the United States and in the operational area. In the case of Haiti, the mission was completed effectively and quickly, so that legitimacy outlasted the operation. US forces displayed perseverance, both in pursuing the objectives and in appropriately reducing forces and efforts once the stated goals had been achieved.

Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.

Major General Carl von Clausewitz

The Complexity of Modern Joint Operations

Joint operations are inherently complex.

The outstanding characteristic of all joint operations is their relative complexity compared to single Service operations. The increasing capability of today’s forces exacerbates the coordination problem, while the lethality and accuracy of modern weaponry demand a higher standard of control. For example, in DESERT STORM coalition forces dropped more bomb tonnage in 100 days than the allies dropped in all of World War II. Coordinating the logistics, maneuver, and timing of huge forces over great distances increases the opportunities for friction, the fog of war, and enemy action
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Modern warfare can require coordination of huge forces over great distances. Experience and applied knowledge lead to military success.

destroy plans. The case histories each show specific actions taken to handle the coordination of large forces. These US joint and multinational operations also demonstrate the efforts required to make operational reach over extreme distances work for, rather than against, US goals. Prosecuting the war on the adversary’s territory is always a good plan, but it requires long term investment, enormous planning capabilities, and the ability to synchronize activities on land, on the sea, and in the air for long periods. Leader, planner, and action officer accomplishments demonstrated in these case histories show how the proper use of experience and applied knowledge leads to military success.

“To triumph strategically it is necessary to survive tactically.”

John Francis Guillmarin, Jr.
Gunpowder and Galleys, 1974
**Military Incident #1:**

**THE IMPORTANCE OF TACTICS:**

**CHAMBERLAIN HOLDS AT GETTYSBURG**

The fate of the Union rested on guarding Meade's left flank.

On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren ordered Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain's 20th Maine Regiment to hold Little Round Top, a critical hill on the left end of the Union line. If Confederate forces took the hill, they could roll up the Union flank, precipitating a general collapse. Then General Robert E. Lee could move toward Washington as he liked, and the war might be lost. Chamberlain was ordered to hold that ground at all costs. The fate of the Union depended on the tactical performance of fewer than 400 men and officers.

Confederate forces attacked up the hill repeatedly. Chamberlain recognized that the more numerous Confederates were spreading to the unprotected left of his force. Under fire, he thinned his ranks to extend his line and bent back (refused) his left flank to prevent being attacked from behind. With each Confederate charge, his force shrank. As the day wore on, the Confederates were near exhaustion, but the 20th Maine was down to 200 men, all short on ammunition.

Chamberlain's men executed fire and movement with skill and determination.

In a tactical inspiration, Colonel Chamberlain ordered bayonets to be fixed, and his entire regiment charged. The men on the refused flank spontaneously raced to straighten the line. Faced with what seemed like two regiments, the Confederates began a retreat, which soon turned into a rout. As the fight ended, the 20th took 400 prisoners. More important, they took from the Confederates all chance of turning the Union's flank.

The 20th Maine held on, finishing the fight with a bold and desperate charge.

Without Colonel Chamberlain's judgment, ability to react, and tactical knowledge, as well as the brave performance of his troops, Union strategic plans would have been meaningless. As planners, action officers, and commanders study joint doctrine, they must remember this military truth: tactical competence is a prerequisite to victory at operational and strategic levels.
Military Incident #2: BUILDING ON EXPERIENCE: GRANT COMMANDS HIS FIRST CIVIL WAR FIGHT

Grant kept his intentions secret even from his own men.

General Grant’s first Civil War action began when Major General John Charles Fremont ordered him to harass Major General Leonidas Polk’s forces headquartered at Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi River. The overall objective was to drive the Confederate forces into Arkansas. Grant told his troops to pack 2 days’ rations, but gave no further information. On the afternoon of 5 November 1861, he personally led 3,000 men onto four river transports, accompanied by two Union river gunboats. The goal was to attack Brigadier General Gideon Johnson Pillow’s Confederate camp at Belmont, Mississippi. Pillow’s and Polk’s camps straddled and controlled the Mississippi at that point.

As Grant marched toward Belmont, the Navy gunboats: bombarded Polk’s forts at Columbus.

The force landed 3 miles upriver from Belmont on the morning of 7 November 1861. Grant had allowed his senior naval officer, Captain Henry Walke, to select the landing point. As Grant disembarked, Walke took the gunboats downstream to exchange fire with Polk’s batteries at Columbus. Despite the thick woods, which hindered command and control, Grant ably coordinated the force, which he had split into two columns. The surprised Confederate camp was quickly overrun.

Lack of discipline among the Union troops nearly led to disaster.

Polk reacted by rushing reinforcements across the river to support Pillow. Additionally, two batteries at Columbus began to bombard the Belmont camp from a range of about 1,000 yards. This support coincided with a total breakdown of discipline within Grant’s inexperienced forces, who were plundering Pillow’s camp. Meanwhile, Pillow landed two regiments a mile upstream, and moved to counterattack. Recognizing that his retreat would be cut off, Grant managed to rally his looting troops just in time. Personally directing the force back to the original landing place, Grant was the last Union soldier to board the waiting transports. Both sides claimed victory.

This account, condensed from *Grant the Commander* by General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, shows that Grant had much to learn about leading military operations. He had maintained no reserve and failed to ensure discipline in his troops. On the other hand, the riverine movement, cloaked in total secrecy, had shocked the opposing forces into quick defeat. At Vicksburg Grant demonstrated how well he had learned the operational and tactical lessons of Belmont.
CHAPTER I
VICKSBURG

1. Introduction

When the Civil War erupted, there was no agreed-upon plan or strategy for restoring the Union. No leader on either side had experience commanding the large bodies of troops that would be the norm during this war. Little if any coordination took place between the Services. Confederate forces bested the Union armies in most early encounters in the East, although the loss of New Orleans and Baton Rouge made their position less secure in the West. The final issue remained very much in doubt in the autumn of 1862.

2. Grant Takes Command

a. This was the situation in late October 1862, when General U. S. Grant took command of the Department of Tennessee (Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River and northern Mississippi) and the roughly 60,000 troops therein. He was replacing General Henry W. Halleck, who had been called to Washington in July to take over as general-in-chief of the Army. From the time Halleck departed, Grant never received more than vague direction on how to employ his force.

b. Grant realized that the military and political situation in the East demanded that he mount offensive operations. To remain on the strategic defensive, as the Department had since the end of May, would result in his army being broken up and used to support further operations by Major General Don Carlos Buell in the Department of the Ohio or to bolster the defenses in front of Washington.

3. The Situation on the Ground

Vicksburg occupied the highest ground on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River between Memphis and New Orleans. This commanding position made it the key point upon which hinged continued Confederate control of the central portion of the Mississippi River. Further, it served as the remaining major link to Confederate supplies and sympathizers in the West. Until Vicksburg was taken, the Mississippi remained closed to Union use. Unless the Confederate forces operating in front of Grant were defeated or diverted, they would be free to attack the flank and rear of any move by Buell toward north Georgia and the strategic rear of General Lee’s forces in northern Virginia.
4. Grant Threatens Vicksburg

a. On 2 November, Grant initiated operations against Vicksburg by moving down the Mississippi Central Railroad from Bolivar, Tennessee, through Grand Junction, and then onward into Mississippi by way of Holly Springs, Oxford, and Grenada (Figure I-1). This advance threatened the land approach to Vicksburg and caused Major General John C. Pemberton, the Confederate commander in Mississippi, to concentrate his forces to oppose it. If successful, Grant would be in an advantageous position, with adequate supplies and communications guaranteed by rail links to Memphis and river links from there to St. Louis. His front and right flank would be protected from attack by the river network south of Grenada.

b. The advance progressed well, and by mid-November Grant was at Holly Springs. Here he ordered Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, then one of his division commanders, to move from Memphis with all the fighting men he could muster and join the move toward Grenada. By the 29th Sherman was 10 miles north of Oxford with three divisions.

5. Grant Changes Plans

a. By early December, Grant recognized that guarding his ever-lengthening supply lines in enemy territory was forcing him to divert too many soldiers from his fighting force to allow him to prudently continue his southern advance. He understood that the fragile Union cause could not sustain another major defeat. This, coupled with the knowledge that the force opposing him was the principal garrison for the defense of Vicksburg, caused him to conclude that another approach would be more effective.

b. On 3 December, Grant suggested to Halleck that, given sufficient forces, the best course of action might be to continue to hold Pemberton’s force in place with his troops and mount a simultaneous attack on Vicksburg along the Mississippi. On the 4th, Grant took command of the Union forces immediately west of the Mississippi. These troops, together with reinforcements arriving from the north, would give him sufficient forces to mount the second approach. Halleck agreed, and on the 5th he directed Grant to concentrate 25,000 troops at Memphis by the 20th for this purpose.

c. On 9 December, Sherman (with one division) departed for Memphis to lead the attack. His orders clearly stated that his approach and attack were to be made in cooperation with Admiral David Porter, the commander of the Union fleet operating on the Mississippi. Grant’s stated intent was to cooperate with Sherman’s advance either by holding Pemberton in place as far north as possible, or to follow him “even to the gates of Vicksburg” if he withdrew toward the city.
JOINT CAMPAIGNING
in the
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1862-1864

UNION FORCES
SPLIT the CONFEDERACY

Figure I-1. Joint Campaigning in the American Civil War 1862-1864
6. Halleck Threatens Unity of Command

As these events transpired, political maneuvering in Washington was about to result in the appointment of Major General John A. McClemand to a separate command independent of the Mississippi River advance on Vicksburg. Although Grant had been assured by Halleck that he was in complete command, when rumor of the appointment first came to his attention, he was ordered to divide his army into four corps, with McClemand to command one of these corps and operate independently against Vicksburg along the Mississippi. Grant considered the appointment of a second commander within the Department a mistake and a sure prescription for failure. Additionally, he was not confident of McClemand’s ability to command. Nonetheless, he issued the necessary orders.

7. Grant Withdraws

a. At almost the same time, Confederate forces under Major General Earl Van Dorn launched a large scale raid behind Grant’s lines, capturing an unprepared garrison at Holly Springs and destroying a large quantity of supplies. This caused Grant to reassess his ability to maintain his force so deep in enemy territory. Deciding that he could not maintain a sufficiently powerful presence, he began to withdraw, without pressure, back up the Mississippi Central Railroad toward Holly Springs, arriving there on 23 December.

b. Sherman put together a force of approximately 30,000 men and, with Porter, moved on Vicksburg. He was unaware of the raid at Holly Springs and Grant’s subsequent retrograde movement. Pemberton, however, was aware of both events. Recognizing that the threat to Vicksburg was now greatest from the river, he repositioned his force, doubling the defenders of Vicksburg to 12,000. He paid particular attention to the high ground around Haines’ Bluff and Walnut Hills, completing his dispositions in time to repulse the initial attacks launched by Sherman and Porter against this high ground on 29 December.

c. On 10 January 1863, aware of the strengthened defenses at Vicksburg and with General McClemand having arrived in the area, Grant shifted his headquarters to Memphis. He realized that once he abandoned the Mississippi Central Railroad approach he could not go back to it. To retreat in the face of the enemy opposite Vicksburg and retry a route that had already failed would demoralize his troops and deal a heavy blow to the Union. Additionally, it would likely result in his removal from command.

d. Shortly thereafter, Grant visited McClemand and then met with Sherman and Porter. He concluded that the Army and the Navy so lacked trust in McClemand that it was necessary to exercise one of the options open to him and assume command himself. He did this on 30 January.

8. Winter Action

a. The task now facing Grant was to somehow get his army across the Mississippi and secure a foothold on the high side of the river that would allow him to bring his forces to bear on Vicksburg. It was winter; the heavy

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"At this time the North had become very discouraged, and strong Union men believed the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the Union ... It was my judgement at the time that to make a backward movement ... would be interpreted as a defeat. There was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory."

Ulysses S. Grant
Personal Memoirs, 1885-1886
rains were causing additional flooding to the area that was already broken up by numerous streams and channels and was, at best, just a few feet above water. Grant recognized that he had to wait until the weather changed and the water levels dropped.

b. Inactivity through the winter would be demoralizing and damaging to the health of his troops. Additionally, stories of the lack of action in the face of the enemy would encourage those who wanted to compromise the Union. Grant therefore initiated several projects to keep his forces employed. While all would offer some degree of advantage in the most optimistic scenario, he did not expect any to provide a solution to the problem of Vicksburg. The first project involved widening and deepening a canal at Young’s Point opposite Vicksburg. This would allow Porter’s ships to avoid a portion of the main channel of the Mississippi and reduce their exposure to the enemy’s batteries. Unfortunately, the Confederates discovered the project and shifted some guns to bring the excavation under fire.

c. The second project attempted to open a new channel for the Mississippi from Lake Providence to the Red River. This would allow Union forces to bypass Vicksburg and navigate the Mississippi freely. The new channel would, however, still be vulnerable to rebel forces operating along its entire length. Grant had no faith in this scheme, but it kept the soldiers busy and, more importantly, “served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success.”

d. The third project was to move down the Yazoo Pass from Moon Lake (opposite Helena, Arkansas) to a position where Haines’ Bluff might be flanked. While initially appearing to offer some chance for success, it was stopped when well entrenched Confederate forces at Ft. Pemberton could not be dislodged. The final
9. A Coordinated Plan Emerges

a. As March ended and the river level began to fall, Grant's real plan began to emerge — "I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate — my recollection was that Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The cooperation of the Navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise."

"It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory."

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini

b. The first requirement of the new plan was to shift the fleet and some civilian steamers, then north of the city, to the south of Vicksburg. Once in place they could protect and transport any troops Grant moved there. To the rebels, who had seen the Union fleet perform similar maneuvers several times over the past year, this would appear as just another running of the batteries. Porter supervised the preparation of the shipping, with extensive effort being made to protect the boilers of the unarmored steamers by layering the decks and hulls with bags of grain and bales of cotton and hay. All three of these commodities would be needed below the city and could not be efficiently transported in another manner.

c. On 29 March, Grant ordered McClemand and his four divisions to move by land south from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage (Figure I-2), hoping he could get sufficient forces in place to take Grand Gulf. The march was exceedingly tough, with water levels still restricting movement, particularly of supplies and artillery. Joining McClemand on 17 April at New Carthage, Grant realized that the route would have to be changed and major improvements made if the rest of the army was to use it. McClemand had found a longer but better route and commenced improving it immediately. This was to prove successful.

d. On the night of 16 April Admiral Porter shifted the fleet to capitalize on the element of surprise and utilize the advantage of darkness. Unfortunately, the movement was detected and each ship in the flotilla was under fire for several hours, with most sustaining several hits. The enemy had been expecting the move, and upon detecting it lit bonfires along the river to provide illumination for their guns. Despite the best efforts of the rebel gunners, the gunboats stood up well and only one steamer was sunk.

e. On 17 April, Colonel Benjamin Grierson and a force of 1,700 Union cavalrmen started out from Grand Junction on a large raid into the interior of Mississippi. Ten days later the raiding column succeeded in reaching Union lines at Baton Rouge. While the actual damage inflicted by this raid was minimal, the consternation and confusion it created was significant. Grant was not aware of the raid until he read about it after the fact — but it was important to his operations because the outcry it caused diverted Pemberton's attention from Grant during a critical 10-day period.

f. On 20 April, Grant ordered the remainder of his army to sequentially and rapidly move to New Carthage. It was evident that the roads could not support the supply of this force and that another run past the batteries would be required. This was carried out on the night of the 22nd, when six steamers and twelve barges, boilers and decks protected as before, headed south. Although all sustained damage, they succeeded in bringing much needed supplies to the force.
Figure I-2. Grant’s Approach to Vicksburg
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Grant's use of local resources to supply the army relieved him of the need for a defensible supply line.

10. The Joint River Crossing

a. On 29 April, Grant launched a truly joint operation designed to get his forces across the river. His plan called for Porter and the fleet to silence the Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf, followed by a rapid landing of McClernand’s Corps to seize the fortifications and secure a foothold for the rest of the army. The plan contained several flexible provisions to allow for alternative actions if the enemy failed to cooperate.

b. After a 5 1/2 hour exchange of fire, all the rebel guns were still in operation. Grant stopped the operation and decided he would have to find a new landing site. In consultation with Porter, he decided to run the gunboats and transports past Grand Gulf while McClernand marched his force past on a recently discovered route that was hidden from Confederate view. By dawn, the Army and Navy were at Bruinsburg, where a local man told them that a crossing was possible. Without hesitation, Grant seized the opportunity. By early morning all of McClernand’s Corps and the lead division of McPherson’s Corps landed safely without opposition on the Vicksburg side of the river.

“...The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.”

Ulysses S. Grant
“When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposure from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.”

Ulysses S. Grant

11. Grant Enhances His Operational Reach

a. At this point Grant had to reevaluate how best to proceed. Initially he pushed McClemand forward toward Port Gibson to keep the enemy from gathering and counterattacking before the main body was over the river, while at the same time pressing his other subordinates to speed their advance. He was inclined to detach McClemand, after the capture of a suitable base at Grand Gulf, and send him south along the east bank to cooperate with General Banks’ move north from Baton Rouge. However, he learned that Banks would not move for several days and felt the advantage would be lost. At this point Grant decided to “cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.”

b. On 3 May after constant fighting (of which Grant sometimes took personal charge), Grand Gulf was secured. Grant then took advantage of the August 1862 authority to seize and use rebel property to support prosecution of the war by ordering all transport to be collected to supply his army. He restricted rations to three days hard bread, coffee, and salt and, confident from earlier experience that it was feasible, ordered that all other needs would be met from the surrounding countryside.

c. By 6 May, more than 33,000 Union troops in three corps were across the Mississippi on dry ground and advancing northward. Grant believed the enemy force opposing him to be around 18,000 (in reality there were more than twice that number), but they were spread out from Haines’ Bluff through Vicksburg to Jackson. Grant also recognized that the enemy could not move against him with overwhelming force, and so he resolved to defeat Pemberton in detail. The first step would be the capture and destruction of Jackson, crushing any hope for aid from the east. Grant would then lay siege to Vicksburg.
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12. The Fall of Vicksburg

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson on 13 May and assumed command of all Confederate forces in Mississippi. Discovering that Grant was between his force and Vicksburg, and seeing a classic opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat, he ordered Pemberton to attack the Union forces from the rear. Pemberton failed to follow this order and instead moved to cut Grant's nonexistent supply lines. This allowed Grant to take Jackson on the 14th and force Johnston to retreat northward up the Mississippi Central. The last real opportunity to defeat Grant had slipped away. Grant turned his army, defeated Pemberton at Champion's Hill on the 16th, and invested the city by the 18th. It was now just a matter of time until Vicksburg fell, finally surrendering on 4 July 1863.

13. Grant and Joint Employment Principles

While circumstances today are much different than those Grant faced before Vicksburg, some aspects of his approach serve to underscore and illuminate key principles of joint military operations.

a. The failure to issue directions or guidance to Grant clearly indicates the lack of a coherent national strategy to restore the Union. General Winfield Scott had proposed a blockade around the rebel areas in order to slowly strangle rebel ability to sustain war. Then he retired. His approach, known as the Anaconda plan, was neither formally adopted nor systematically pursued. Its very nature would require time to work — and Lincoln did not have time. While a blockade of Southern ports was established by the Navy and efforts were made to open the Mississippi, a succession of generals-in-chief, aware of the popular and political press to find a quicker solution, embarked on the equally doomed strategy of seeking the 'one decisive battle' which would end the war. Lincoln still had not devised a national strategy.

b. Grant knew what needed to be done in his Department (seize the geographic objective of Vicksburg), and realized how his success or failure related to operations in the other theaters. His decision to go on the offensive was motivated by a grasp of the realities of the political situation in the East. Going on the offensive would be viewed as a positive act by the supporters of the Union, while remaining on the defensive would be almost equivalent to another Union defeat. Grant's sensitivity to political reality and the impact of his actions on this reality demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of unity of effort at the strategic level.

c. Grant was also aware that if he remained on the defensive, the Confederate forces in Mississippi would have been free to turn on Buell in Ohio, effectively preventing him from attacking the strategic rear of the Army of Northern Virginia. By advancing, Grant showed an understanding of how his operations could support or interfere with the efforts to defeat the enemy in the other Departments.

d. Within the Department, Grant assured operational unity of effort by taking firm action to preclude dissipation of his authority. His decision to assume tactical command himself rather than allow McClemand to operate independently down the Mississippi was not an act of pettiness, but rather a clear understanding of how disruptive two sets of direction would have been in achieving the goal. This was further demonstrated by Grant's repeated efforts to ensure that he and his subordinates capitalized on the advantages Admiral Porter and his fleet provided. From his initial instructions to Sherman until the surrender of the city, the Navy was kept closely involved in all operations. By leading this force from the
front, Grant kept himself aware of the tactical and operational realities that he faced. Although unity of command was not formalized by regulation, Grant worked hard to ensure that good relations, constant communication, and division of labor fostered unity of effort.

e. The operations outside of Vicksburg illustrated Grant’s understanding of how the principle of mass requires attention to economy of force. As he moved down the Mississippi Central Railroad, his assignment of forces to protect lines of communication threatened to dissipate his mass. Further, his advance down the Mississippi Central Railroad had caused the Confederate forces defending the city to mass at Haines Bluff and Walnut Hills. This development required that he quickly secure additional assets for a second maneuver further down the river. This second movement, designed to attack the city before the enemy realized what had happened, resulted from the leverage that Porter’s fleet added to his command.

f. Grant understood the importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative. He provided critical details and emphasized speed in his order for the sequential and rapid movement of the army from Milliken’s Bend toward New Carthage and eventually across the Mississippi. This clearly demonstrated an awareness that, to be successful, Grant had to concentrate and act faster than the enemy reacted.

g. Grant’s grasp of the fundamental considerations of joint operations was demonstrated conclusively by his actions after crossing the Mississippi. He first maximized his fighting strength and concentrated his combat power by eliminating his supply lines (and the need to guard them) and by deciding not to send McClernand’s Corps south toward Baton Rouge. Then, taking the calculated risk of exposing his rear to attack by Pemberton, Grant focused on taking Jackson and defeating Johnston. This victory effectively precluded reinforcements or aid from reaching the city during the siege. Grant was then free to turn and defeat Pemberton at Champion’s Hill and force him back on the city.

h. Several times in this operation Grant displayed a thorough understanding of the fundamental concept of agility. His willingness to deviate from the established plan when opportunity presented itself was evident throughout the campaign. For example, he concluded that his initial advance down the Mississippi Central Railroad would not work and had to be adjusted. Without hesitation, he switched the main effort and launched the second attack because it offered greater prospects for success. His immediate reaction to the failure to carry Grand Gulf by naval gunfire on 29 April was similar. Instead of wasting time over why the original plan failed, Grant and Porter developed and successfully executed an amphibious landing at another site within 24 hours. Once across the river, he recognized that the slow reaction of the enemy presented an opportunity to inflict a major defeat. He quickly recast his plans, kept McClernand’s Corps with him, and moved the army toward Jackson.

i. Grant further demonstrated his command ability in the use of deception to mask the real intent of the Union forces. Knowing that the rebel forces were informed of his moves, Grant actively mounted operations designed to obscure his real intent. The three most visible projects (Young’s Point, Yazoo River, and Steele’s Bayou) were concentrated to the northern side of Vicksburg — the most conventional and predictable direction from which the Union might attack. These joint feints, when seen in the light of the failed joint attack on Haines’ Bluff in late December
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1862, reinforced the enemy’s expectation of the direction of the main effort and effectively screened Grant’s real intent.

j. The simultaneity and depth of Grant’s move south of Vicksburg, Sherman’s strong feint against Haines’ Bluff, and the confusion caused by the Grierson raid expanded the battlefield, paralyzed the enemy, and slowed reaction until it was too late. Vicksburg provided this classic example of the importance of knowing the enemy and seeing the battlefield. Despite operating deep in enemy territory, Grant was able to conceal his real intent. When the best opportunity to defeat Grant arose, Pemberton acted based on his expectations of what Grant would do, rather than knowledge of what Grant was actually doing. This Confederate intelligence failure contributed significantly to the Union victory.

k. Realizing that the enemy would see his lines of communications as his center of gravity and attack accordingly, Grant used this fact to totally deceive the rebels. Grant’s decision to depart from the accepted military logistic norm and live off the land demonstrated his knowledge of his own vulnerabilities and his ability to lessen (or in this case, negate) their effect upon his own campaign.

l. Grant’s logistic coup played a critical role in the operation. He initially intended to move forward from a secure rear base and follow the conventional military doctrine of moving along a secure line of communication. He gradually realized that, while these lines were bringing up the resources necessary to prosecute his advance, protecting them drained his fighting strength. Aware of the many resources available to him in the agricultural heart of Mississippi, he began to see another possibility. When faced by impassable roads on the west side of the Mississippi, Grant turned to Porter to move the required bulk supplies by river, securing the secondary benefit of protection from the fire of the rebel batteries for the shipping.

m. Grant’s approach to solving his logistic problems provided him the additional mobility and flexibility necessary to defeat his more conventionally-led enemy. By eliminating his lines of communications and living off the land, Grant extended his operational reach deep into the rear of the enemy and generated combat power to apply at Jackson and Champion’s Hill. His army was able to move sooner and travel faster, maintaining the momentum gained by the successful crossing of the Mississippi. Finally, his creative solution totally surprised the enemy. Grant learned from his initial approach down the Mississippi Central Railroad that protecting lines of communications diminished mass. In his final move to Vicksburg, he sidestepped the problem with a brilliant logistic inspiration. Grant’s abandonment of conventional means of supply allowed him to concentrate superior force first against Johnston, then Pemberton — and was the key to the success of the operation. In one move, Grant eliminated his principal vulnerability, increased his combat power and endurance, kept the enemy off balance, and maintained the initiative.
Military Incident #3
THE PRICE OF POOR PLANNING: CAESAR LANDS IN BRITAIN

Lack of coordination delayed a critical force component.

Amphibious landing techniques had not been practiced.

Having complete unity of command, Caesar maneuvered naval forces to support the failing ground component assault.

Improvised logistics methods demonstrated Caesar’s flexibility.

Although the short days of winter neared, Julius Caesar was determined to chastise Britain for supporting the Gauls. Seeking intelligence for a full invasion, Caesar decided on a reconnaissance-in-force. While one ship scouted the British coast, Caesar gathered an 80-ship fleet, enough to carry two legions across the narrow Channel. The cavalry, embarking at a separate port, failed to depart on time.

Arriving at the British coast, Caesar rejected the initial landfall because its cliffs allowed descending fire onto the beaches, and anchored offshore to await the cavalry. Meanwhile he assembled his staff and prepared them to react to sketchy orders on short notice. Still lacking cavalry, the force landed on an open and evenly shelved beach. The British chariots and cavalry met the Roman landing force on the sand. Since Caesar’s deep draft ships could not fully beach, his heavily armored troops had to jump into the water and fight their way through the surf. Inexperienced in amphibious operations, most of the Romans were terrified.

In response to the British attack, Caesar maneuvered his warships to bombard the defenders’ right flank with slings, arrows, and (catapult) artillery. The Britons fell back, but on the confused and crowded battlefield, the Romans were unable to assemble cohesive units. The Britons attacked isolated individuals and small groups. Caesar then directed the ships’ boats to be loaded with ground troops and row as needed to reinforce groups in difficulty. This mobile reserve enabled the Legions to assemble their units in fighting order and push the Britons up the beach. Without cavalry, Caesar could not exploit the victory and expand the beachhead. On a stormy night 4 days later the cavalry finally arrived, but the full moon exaggerated the tide and numbers of the beached warships were swamped, while the anchored transports were severely damaged by the surf. Cavalry units, critical to reconnaissance, could not be landed.

With their supply lines cut, Caesar’s troops foraged grain and supplies and salvaged timber and bronze from the wrecked and damaged ships. The force soon repaired all but 12 ships. After a daring and skillful British attack on a foraging expedition required him to ride to the rescue, Caesar determined to enlarge his beachhead to gain security for a
controlled withdrawal. With enough space to form his infantry in classic formation on the beach, and supported by only 30 horses finally brought over from Gaul, Caesar temporarily drove back the defenders. Under cover of darkness, the troops used this interval of security to slip aboard the ships.

This account, condensed from Caesar’s own writings, reveals that his first excursion on British soil was a near disaster redeemed by clever improvisation. Multiple failures in planning and coordination can be identified in the paragraphs above. Readers are invited to observe the differences and similarities between Caesar’s and MacArthur’s approaches to essentially similar problems in planning and execution.
CHAPTER II
OPERATION CHROMITE

"The military student does not seek to learn from history the minutiae of method and technique. In every age these are decisively influenced by the characteristics of weapons currently available and by means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling combat forces. But research does bring to light those fundamental principles and their combinations and applications, which in the past, have been productive of success. These principles have no limitation of time. Consequently the army extends its analytical interest to the dust buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking with the scent of battle."

General Douglas MacArthur

"The vulnerability of the enemy is his supply position."

General Douglas MacArthur

1. Introduction

a. In the predawn darkness of 25 June 1950, forces of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) smashed southward across the border marked by the 38th Parallel to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK). The NKPA was a formidable force of at least 135,000 men. Many had been conscripts of the Chinese and Japanese armies and they were equipped with modern Soviet-supplied tanks, artillery and aircraft. In comparison, the ROK armed forces were trained only as a constabulary force and poorly equipped. Numbering less than 100,000, the army lacked armor, antitank weapons, and heavy artillery. Most soldiers were conscripts, and few units had ever trained above the company level. Air and naval forces were nearly nonexistent.

b. Although an ancient culture, Korea was an underdeveloped nation which had suffered greatly under Japanese occupation. The entire peninsula was extremely mountainous and compartmentalized, while the limited number of north-south and east-west lines of communication constricted mobility. The Korean infrastructure was woefully inadequate; the scarcity of improved roads, airfields and ports in particular would frustrate and complicate the application of US military power (Figure II-1).

c. Within hours, news of the invasion was flashed to General MacArthur in Tokyo. On 25 June 1950, President Truman ordered MacArthur, as Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE), to use his air and sea forces to support the ROK forces south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur personally visited Korea on 29 June to protect evacuation of US personnel, help formulate an appreciation of the situation, and to develop recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the President.

2. Status of US Military Forces

a. American military power available within the theater was unprepared for the struggle it would face in the next few months. Army forces consisted of four understrength divisions equipped with worn-out weapons from WW II. They were manned by young men who, for the most part, lacked combat
Figure II-1. Joint Campaigning in Korea 1950

LEGEN
- North Korean Assaults
- Pusan Perimeter
- Amphibious Landing
seasoning. Focused on occupation duties, training was marginal and most units lacked the heavy weapons called for by their Tables of Organization.

b. The newly independent Air Force was represented in theater by the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF was primarily equipped with jet interceptors, designed for air defense of Japan against the perceived Soviet and Chinese threats. Reconnaissance, transportation and ground attack aircraft were scarce. Despite the shortage of transport aircraft, the Air Force was to play a critical role in delivering supplies and personnel to support ROK and US forces in the early stages of the war.

c. Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE), led a force which consisted of just one cruiser and four old destroyers. However, the US 7th Fleet, with an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, eight destroyers, and three submarines and commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur Struble, would soon be made available and would significantly improve the naval posture.

d. American forces in the rest of the world were just as poorly manned and prepared. This situation was the legacy of the rapid drawdown following the end of WW II and post-war budget cuts, driven partly by the belief that the atomic bomb had made conventional forces less relevant to national defense. The failure to maintain an adequately prepared force would extract a high cost in human suffering over the next few months.

e. MacArthur’s experience and capability as a joint force commander, the experienced Far East Command (FEC) joint planning staff in his headquarters (HQ) in Tokyo, and the leadership abilities of the officers who would serve as his subordinate commanders to some degree offset the disadvantages that faced the United States that gloomy June morning.

3. US Response to the Invasion

a. Half a world away, President Truman and his advisors viewed the invasion from the north as a part of the ongoing communist confrontation with the free world. The President reversed previous US policy (which did not see Korea as vital to US interests) and ordered that actions be taken to evacuate US and United Nations (UN) dependents from Korea and to supply the ROK forces with ammunition and equipment. At the same time, the UN called for the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea to halt its aggression and withdraw north of the 38th Parallel. This resolution was ignored, and the North Korean onslaught continued. While some ROK units resisted heroically, others dissolved in panic.

b. The President placed the US 7th Fleet under MacArthur’s operational control (OPCON) and authorized its movement to the waters off Formosa. This move signalled the Chinese that the United States would not tolerate any widening of the conflict. Concern about expansion of the fighting, both in the Pacific and to other parts of the world, overshadowed all US decisions that followed.

4. United Nations Reaction

On 27 June, with NKPA forces continuing the invasion, the UN passed a milestone resolution calling on member states to furnish military assistance to the ROK to “. . . repel the armed attack.” This was the first time that the UN took such action. On that date Truman expanded his 25 June authorization of air and naval attacks south of the 38th Parallel to include all of Korea. He also authorized the employment of Army forces at the southern port of Pusan. The next day Seoul fell.
5. MacArthur Assesses the Situation in Korea

a. On 29 June, MacArthur arrived in Korea and rapidly assessed the situation. He realized that he was facing a tough opponent and that half measures would not be effective. From the south bank of the Han River, he watched the retreating ROK forces and realized that "only immediate commitment of ground troops" could stem the invasion. Unfortunately, he had few ready forces and only limited transport available to rapidly commit them. Additionally, he had no authority to commit ground forces outside of the southern port of Pusan.

b. MacArthur quickly informed the JCS that he felt the ROK forces would be unable to stop the invasion and that a major commitment of American power was required. His clear understanding of the nature of modern warfare was evident in his words — "...To continue to use the forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element can not be decisive. Unless provisions are made for the full utilization of our Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area, our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst, it might be doomed." The employment of ground forces was authorized within 24 hours of receipt of this message.

c. MacArthur first began to consider an amphibious landing in the enemy rear area while he stood on the south bank of the Han River. He was predisposed to favor this type of an operation; his successful campaigns across the Pacific in the Second World War were based on the concept of applying Allied air, naval, and ground strength against enemy weakness. Amphibious landings in areas where they weren't expected had kept the enemy off balance and allowed the Allies to maintain the initiative. It was only natural that he would consider this type of operation when assessing his options to save the situation in Korea.

6. Communist Forces Advance

a. Unconcerned with UN and US actions, and ignoring significant losses inflicted by the retreating ROK forces, the enemy reinforced its initial success and continued the advance. On 3 July the airfield at Kimpo and the port of Inchon fell. Enemy aircraft began operating out of Kimpo, although US forces soon secured air supremacy and NKPA air played little role in the battles to come. Concurrently, the small northern navy was completely destroyed and a tight blockade of the sea approaches to the peninsula established. By 4 July, the enemy ground advance had reached Suwon, 25 miles south of Seoul. At the same time the lead elements of the 24th Infantry Division, better known to history as Task Force Smith, were landing at Pusan.

b. These unprepared soldiers were committed to buy additional time to bring appropriate forces into the area. MacArthur later characterized his costly piecemeal commitment of these units as an "arrogant display of strength." He and his staff hoped that this desperate rear guard action would stabilize the front by causing the enemy to slow his advance and proceed cautiously when he realized he was up against US troops. It would also boost the morale of the ROK armed forces by showing them they were not alone. Dawn on 5 July found Task Force Smith blocking
the main road between Suwon and Osan. Despite the task force’s heroic efforts, a lack of effective anti-tank weapons led to defeat.

7. The Defense of Pusan

a. While these desperate battles were fought, the United States and UN continued to take the actions necessary to bring their power to bear on the peninsula. On 8 July, at the request of the UN, Truman named MacArthur Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. On the 13th, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth United States Army, assumed command of all ground troops and responsibility for ground operations in Korea. MacArthur’s air and naval component commanders likewise assumed responsibility for their respective areas, with forces of other nations joining them as they arrived in theater.

b. As June gave way to July, NKPA spearheads continued their southward advance. South of Taegu they divided into two separate thrusts, one along the west coast and the second straight for Pusan, but their pace was slowed by logistic difficulties and terrain and by the increasing tempo of air interdiction. The cost of advancing in the face of heavy and effective UN air attacks continued to mount for the NKPA. Air interdiction alone, however, would not suffice. By late July, the US 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions had deployed from Japan and joined the 24th Division in Korea. They were shortly followed by elements of the 5th Marine Regiment, filled out to a provisional brigade by other Marine units. This infusion of fresh manpower, armed with 3.5 inch anti-tank rockets airlifted from the United States along with other US and UN troops deploying from around the world, began to turn the tide. UN forces were slowly pushed back until they reached the Nakdong River. Here Walker and MacArthur decided that they must stand and fight or be ejected from Korea, and the 140 mile long Pusan Perimeter (Figure II-2) was established. The desperate fight to keep this foothold on the peninsula absorbed all reinforcements arriving in theater. Without the strength and resilience these forces provided, it is doubtful that Eighth Army could have held on.

8. MacArthur Plans His Riposte

a. While these events transpired, MacArthur remained focused on regaining the initiative. Already he had intuitively arrived at the solution; now he needed a fleshed-out plan and a force to execute it. Elements of his staff at FEC, led by Major General Edward M. Almond, went to work on the plan as early as 4 July. In his first request for reinforcements sent to the JCS on 7 July, MacArthur stated that his main purpose was to “...fully...exploit our air and sea control and, by amphibious maneuver, strike behind his mass of ground forces.”

b. Preliminary planning called for a late July landing, but the reality of the strength of the enemy and the weakness of the UN forces compelled delaying the operation. The forces which would have conducted the landing were instead being rushed ashore to maintain the defenses around Pusan.

c. Planning for the landings was conducted at FEC HQ in Japan by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). A number of alternatives were developed and considered in great detail. By the 23rd of July, JSPOG came up with three options for consideration. Plans 100B, 100C, and 100D called for landings at Inchon (west coast), Kunson (west coast), or Chumunjin-up (east coast), respectively.

d. On 12 August, MacArthur issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100B, code named Operation CHROMITE, with Inchon as the target to be seized by the amphibious assault.
In recognition of the complex nature of an amphibious operation, ten Marine Corps officers and two Navy officers were attached to the planning staff on 19 August. This would guarantee that their special expertise was immediately available.

e. The plan called for X Corps (to be formed around the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division) to execute a phased amphibious landing at Inchon (Figure II-3), then drive inland to secure Seoul and cut the enemy’s main lines of communications and resupply to his forces committed in the south. The initial assault by the 1st Marine Division was to be followed by the 7th Infantry Division and ROK Marine Forces. Simultaneously, the Eighth Army would launch a major supporting attack, eventually linking up with X Corps forces south of Seoul. MG Almond was named to command the X Corps, with the staff primarily hand selected from the FEC staff. The staff assumed that the landings would end the conflict and they would return to their normal billets in Japan.

9. Forces for the Landing

a. Putting together the forces to make the landing was a major challenge. The enemy continued to threaten the Pusan perimeter, and MacArthur had no forces to spare. The continued NKPA pressure on Walker at Pusan forced MacArthur to throw units into the fight as they became available. Additionally, MacArthur felt strongly that a successful amphibious operation required a Marine
division. Washington initially balked because a Marine division was not available, the Corps having shrunk to a post war low of less than 80,000. A major reserve callup would be necessary to field a full division; but MacArthur was adamant and his persistent arguments, coupled with his status and reputation, carried the day.

b. Major General Oliver P. Smith assumed command of the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton in late July and was ordered to bring it to full strength (less one regiment) by combining it with the cadre forces of the 2nd Marine Division and recalled reservists. The division was to sail for Korea by 15 August. Trained Marines were so scarce that, in order to fill the division, a battalion was pieced together from various Marine forces in the Mediterranean and sent directly to Korea.

c. One brigade assigned to this newly fleshed out division was already fighting in the Pusan area. The 1st Marine Provisional Brigade had been activated on 5 July at Camp Pendleton. It was composed of the 5th Marine Regiment, a battalion of the 11th Marines, and Marine Air Group 33. It sailed for Japan on the 14th, but the situation at Pusan was so desperate that it was diverted directly to Korea. It landed at Pusan on 2 August and went straight into the battleline. Prior to the Inchon landing, it had to be pulled out of combat, moved back to Pusan, refitted, embarked, and landed as a part of the assault force — all in less than 10 days.

d. The Army's 7th Division was, by August, at less than half strength. Key officers and noncommissioned officers as well as equipment had been diverted to bring the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions up to

Figure 11-3. The Inchon Landing
Chapter II

strength. Between mid-August and early September, the 7th received priority of replacements and was augmented with nearly 8,000 Korean soldiers. By the time of the landings, both the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions were fully manned and equipped.

10. Amphibious Landing Challenges

a. Inchon presented a vast array of challenges to the landing force (Figure II-4). Extremely high tides, narrow channels, high seawalls, extensive mudflats, and enemy resistance would all have to be overcome if the landings were to succeed. Additionally, the harbor approaches to Inchon were guarded by the fortified island of Wolmi-do. While the staff worked to address these problems, MacArthur focused his effort on convincing the JCS that the risks were minimal and that the operation should go ahead.

b. Washington was concerned that the geographic problems at Inchon would cause the landings to flounder and result in a major reverse and heavy loss of life. Conversely, MacArthur was utterly convinced that the landings would succeed, and his confidence won the day. Weighing the risk against the potential gain, MacArthur was certain that a less ambitious amphibious envelopment at a less difficult site, as favored by many in Washington, would not be decisive and would condemn the Eighth Army to a brutal fight north from Pusan.

c. Two weeks prior to the landings, the Navy introduced a three-man team into the Inchon area to pinpoint enemy defenses and verify tide and terrain data. This daring and resourceful team, led by LT E. F. Clark (USN), enlisted the aid of loyal ROK civilians and succeeded in passing a great amount of essential information to the planners. On the night preceding the landings Clark even succeeded in lighting one of the principal navigation lights in the approach channel to guide the attack fleet.

d. Even without the geographic challenges presented by Inchon, MacArthur understood amphibious operations to be highly complex. He established Joint Task Force (JTF) 7, under the command of Admiral Struble, to finalize the plan and execute the landings. The operation plan (OPLAN) directed naval Task Force (TF) 90, RADM J. H. Doyle commanding, to isolate the landing site, conduct the amphibious assault to secure the Inchon area, land the follow-on and reserve forces, provide air and fire support, and provide other support as necessary. The landing was to be preceded and supported by a heavy naval bombardment from US and British ships of the naval Gunfire Support Group (TF 90.6, RADM J. M. Higgins) anchored close offshore.

e. Air Force bombers flying from Japan would help isolate the landing area by...
attacking strategic targets so that the enemy could not move reinforcements by land. While these actions were underway, TF 91 (RADM W.G. Andrews, R.N.) would serve as a blocking and covering force so the landings would be free from interference from the sea.

11. The Amphibious Landing

a. The amphibious objective area was established as an arc extending 30 miles inland from the landing beaches. Priority close air support within this area would be provided by Navy, Marine Corps and British air units of the Fast Carrier Group (TF 77) and the Air Support Group (TF 90.5). Air Force close air support for the landings was not part of the plan. Long flight times from Japan as well as communications and other coordination challenges made such geographic divisions of labor among the components the norm in Korea.

b. Fifth Air Force (Major General Earle E. Partridge) provided general air support for the invasion by isolating the objective area. As part of this effort commencing on D-10, a major, 7-day effort was launched against the rail network north of Seoul. Fifth Air Force was also charged with furnishing air-ground support to the Eighth Army in the south and with the on-order mission of air delivery of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team.

c. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, the lead element of the 1st Marine Division — the Landing Force — made the initial assault on Wolmi-do with the high tide at dawn on 15 September and crushed enemy resistance. The main landings by the rest of the division followed on the next high tide 11 hours later. The enemy was completely surprised. Intelligence estimates prior to the landings put as many as 18,000 troops in the Inchon - Seoul area but, as it turned out, only 5,000
combat troops were there initially to oppose the operation. Although they put up stiff resistance, X Corps’ powerful and unexpected thrust could not be turned back. By the evening of the 16th, MajGen Smith informed Admiral Struble that he was sufficiently established to assume responsibility for operations ashore.

12. A Simultaneous Attack

a. As events unfolded in the north, the second part of the operation was about to kick off in the south. On the morning of 16 September, Eighth Army launched its supporting attack against the more than twelve enemy divisions deployed against it. The enemy had just drained its strength in an unsuccessful 2-week offensive aimed at breaking the UN perimeter. Attacking UN forces still met fierce resistance but, under heavy air attack by Fifth Air Force (over 640 close air support sorties were flown in support of the US I Corps on 18 and 19 September), with its rear area threatened by X Corps, and with its supply lines under increasingly heavy air attack, NKPA resistance began to wane. On 19 September US and British units succeeded in breaking out, and by the 20th were exerting strong pressure as they moved toward Taegon.

b. The two nearly simultaneous attacks were beginning to have the desired effect. Unable to resupply or reinforce, and under constant air and ground attack, the enemy was pushed back along the entire Pusan line more than 70 miles within a week. To help demoralize the enemy, tens of thousands of psychological warfare leaflets were dropped over enemy lines to encourage surrender.
c. By 17 September, the 1st Marine Division had recaptured Kimpo airfield. Kimpo was back in action as a UN air base by the 18th. The Fifth Air Force immediately began an airlift of over 200 tons of supplies a day, which permitted Marine Aviation to move off the carriers. Now ashore, they could fly more, longer, and deeper missions. The next morning, the 7th Division and ROK Marine forces landed at Inchon and moved rapidly inland. The 7th Division turned to block any enemy attack from Suwon and the south, while the ROK Marines joined the 1st Marine Division in the attack to secure Seoul. With its flanks secured, the 1st Marine Division turned north on the morning of the 20th to begin the 6-day battle to clear Seoul. Bitter NKPA resistance ultimately forced commitment of the ROK Marines, 7th Division’s 32nd Infantry Regiment, and 187th Airborne Regimen...
internal lines. Once UN and ROK ground forces were reinforced and re-equipped, the
synergy created by the synchronized application of sea, land, and air power created a
favorable overall combat ratio which secured strategic advantage for MacArthur and allowed his forces to destroy the enemy.

c. From the start, MacArthur demonstrated a clear understanding that to
obtain victory, he needed to seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive joint offensive
operations. From the day he arrived in Korea to assess the situation, he began formulating
a plan to capitalize on UN forces advantages to launch an amphibious landing in the
enemy rear. While taking action to stabilize the situation, he envisioned how he wanted
the battle to be fought and began planning for the future. His initial concept for a landing
in July had to be delayed, but he and the
planning staff never lost sight of the real key
to victory. This vision and determination to
launch an early offensive positioned the
command for a rapid transition between the
defense and the offense when circumstances
in September permitted. Without his
foresight and the hard work of his joint
planning staff, a major operation such as
Inchon could not have been launched in the
short time available, and the final outcome
could have been decidedly different.
Preparation and continuous planning were
the keys to seizing the initiative when the
opportunity presented itself.

d. The rapid assimilation of multinational
forces into an effective fighting command in
this operation should not be overlooked. From the
beginning, Allied forces joined the
command and immediately played critical
roles. Effective coordination of US and ROK
army forces with supporting Australian and
British air and ground forces were essential
factors in stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter.
Part of this effectiveness can be traced to the
World War II combined operations experience of MacArthur and most senior
leaders, but part must be attributed to the
clear purpose and simple objectives of the
force. UN solidarity in condemning NKPA
aggression and the willingness of so many
nations to play an active part in repelling the
invasion provided the unity of effort
necessary for smooth operations on the
battlefield.

e. The demonstrated professional
competence of the total force is another
point worthy of study in Operation CHROMITE.
US forces were able to recover from earlier
unpreparedness to a great extent because of
the residual skills of the reserve forces. Many
recalled troops were seasoned veterans of
World War II who were able to quickly
reestablish their military competence. The
expeditious integration of reserve and active
units into a highly successful fighting force,
able to conduct an extremely complicated
amphibious maneuver in an exceptionally
short time with almost no opportunity for
face-to-face coordination and no chance to
operate together, is unparalleled. While it
could be argued that MacArthur had no
choice but to use this kind of force, there is
no evidence that he or any other leader had
less than total confidence in the ability of
these units to accomplish the mission
regardless of all of these difficulties.

f. Very early in the campaign, MacArthur
perceived that the enemy relied on
overextended lines of communications for its
freedom of action and strength. Accurate
identification of the enemy lines of
communication in the Seoul area as a center
of gravity was a necessary prerequisite for
destroying the enemy force. Similarly,
MacArthur's willingness to pay the high
price of piecemeal commitment of forces as
they became available to slow the NKPA
advance and then to maintain the Pusan
Perimeter is a good example of protecting a
friendly center of gravity. Although this
was a costly decision, he understood that it
would be hard, if not impossible, to recover
from an ejection from the peninsula. MacArthur weighed the risk and cost associated and acted as he did because he realized that the UN forces had to hold on to this foothold in order to maintain their freedom of action.

**g.** The landing at Inchon was a classic **coup de main** that used surprise and an aggressive supporting attack to overload the enemy’s ability to resist. This horizontal escalation of operations exceeded the enemy’s capacity to respond effectively. The enemy’s failure to anticipate MacArthur’s use of his tried and true recipe for success, amphibious assault in an unexpected quarter, allowed UN forces to control the Inchon - Seoul area. This gave the UN control of a **decisive point:** the enemy communication network that emanated from there to the NKPA forces in the south.

**h.** The enemy also failed to realize that it had overextended its offensive operations southward beyond the capabilities of logistic support. Failing to recognize this **culmination point** placed enemy troops in a vulnerable position. When the Inchon landing was followed one day later by the breakout of Eighth Army, the enemy found itself in an untenable position and was routed. Unfortunately, UN forces would commit the same error in the near future when they advanced to the Yalu River.

**i.** MacArthur well understood the complex nature of amphibious operations. He and many of his subordinate leaders and planners had experience with amphibious landings during World War II. During that conflict, amphibious operations had only been mounted after exhaustive planning and rehearsal. In the fall of 1950 these luxuries were simply not available. MacArthur’s tenacious pursuit of a Marine division to spearhead the assault, and the assignment of experienced Marine Corps and Navy officers to the planning team in Tokyo, indicates clearly that all involved understood how difficult the landings would be.

**j.** During the initial planning for Operation CHROMITE, X Corps reported directly to CINCFE, and all naval forces in
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theater reported to MacArthur through COMNAVFE. With the establishment of JTF 7 by MacArthur, X Corps (TF 92) became a subordinate of JTF 7 for the embarkation and assault phase of the operation. During this phase, parallel chains of command for the naval and ground forces operated within JTF 7. This technique is essential to ensure fully integrated and coordinated effort at all levels. The complexity of amphibious operations and the interdependence of the Services makes functioning parallel chains of command a key aspect of success. Once the embarkation and assault phase was completed and the exploitation phase of the operation begun, X Corps (along with its organic supporting air) left JTF 7 and again reported directly to CINCFE.

k. Although Air Force units were not part of JTF 7, elements of the 5th Air Force did operate in support of the amphibious task force. The attacks against the rail lines north of Seoul certainly impeded enemy reaction and contributed to creating the conditions necessary for a successful landing. The synergy orchestrated by MacArthur through his very capable melding of the complimentary facets of ground, air, and naval power led to the success of Operation CHROMITE.

1. JTF 7 established an amphibious objective area around Inchon that clearly defined the area that had to be controlled by the invading force. It was sufficiently deep to ensure that space would be available to accomplish objectives and facilitate future operations. The commander of the landing force established three phase lines to control movement and attack over the approximately 8 miles between the landing beaches and the beachhead line. The number of control measures required underscores the difficulties involved in coordinating amphibious assault forces. These phase lines also served to control ground attack by aircraft. No attack was permitted short of the line without ground permission. Once the beachhead line was secured, the assault phase of the operation was concluded and the exploitation phase begun.

m. The world had greatly changed in the 87 years between the fall of Vicksburg and the outbreak of the Korean War. Economic prosperity had cemented the American military leadership role that emerged from World War II and emboldened the nation to take on a greater role in world affairs. No longer did events far from US shores seem so remote. Two world wars had shown the United States how costly it was to remain uninvolved. The UN offered the promise of resolving problems before they became wars and, along with most other nations of the world, our nation actively embraced this promise.

n. While these economic, political, and social circumstances were unfolding, an explosion of technology placed additional tools in the hands of the commander. These tools were more lethal and allowed a more complete exploitation of the possibilities of three-dimensional warfare. This same technology made the world smaller and quickened the pace of operations. Only 82 days elapsed between the northern invasion of the ROK and the Inchon landing, and only another 15 days passed between the landing and the destruction of the enemy. This operation was engineered by a UN force that had to be manned, equipped, delivered, assembled, supplied, and successfully employed on a remote, undeveloped peninsula. In contrast, it took nearly 9 months to mount the Vicksburg Campaign.

o. The Korean War was the first armed conflict the United States fought after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended in 1949. These legislative actions formalized many concepts and procedures that had informally evolved in our
defense establishment in response to the challenges of World War II. There were many reasons for adopting such changes in the roles and relationships between the Services, JCS, and theater commanders; one of these was the recognition that success on the modern battlefield demanded that we capitalize on the synergy that jointness provides. Modern warfare demands a joint approach. This realization changed forever the way we fight.
Intentionally Blank
Military Incident #4
THE PRICE OF INFLEXIBILITY: VON MOLTKE PROCEEDS WITH HIS PLAN

On the very brink of World War, on 1 August 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II suddenly became aware of the possibility of fighting only Russia. His ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, reported that if Germany did not attack France, Britain would stay out of the war. Additionally, Britain would act to keep France from supporting Russia militarily. Unfortunately, this intelligence came in just one hour before the scheduled German seizure of a railway junction in Luxembourg. This act would inevitably draw both France and the British Empire into full-scale war against Germany.

Turning history around was not going to be simple. The German General Staff had planned full mobilization for war against France for years. With little command guidance, General Helmuth von Moltke’s staff had spent the last 10 years perfecting the plan. The original plan, meticulously developed under General Count Alfred von Schlieffen, was a detailed mobilization, deployment, and employment plan that struck first in the West. The slower reacting Russian army would be held while the German Army enveloped the French Army by moving through Belgium and the Netherlands. After the French Army was crushed, the German Army would be transported east to defeat the Russians. The overall approach to staff work, planning, detailed construction, and expense of this massive plan gave German mobilization, once initiated, a life of its own.

Suddenly, the Kaiser was suggesting to General von Moltke that years of dedication, incredible attention to detail, logistics, virtually a whole culture, and his own life’s work be thrown out the window on an hour’s notice. Von Moltke refused, and the move into Luxembourg proceeded as scheduled. Despite the obvious advantage of making war only on Russia and avoiding battle with the strongest powers of Europe, the plan’s momentum took away the last opportunity to stop the chain of events that drove the world into the nightmare of World War I.

The von Schlieffen plan, this extraordinary incident, and the events which inevitably followed represent one of the greatest tragedies of modern times. Millions of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians died, and western culture itself changed radically as a result of World War I. Possibly history’s most extreme case of a plan guaranteeing its own inflexibility, this incident shows that the events of an era can depend on a staff’s ability and willingness to react to changing military and diplomatic situations. URGENT FURY, a small operation marked by flexibility in planning and execution, demonstrates that effective response requires flexible doctrine and the ability to recognize the need to adapt plans to take advantage of opportunities.
1. Introduction

a. Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada was a hard line communist. His close relationships with the Soviet Union and Cuba had troubled the United States for years. In light of this, it is ironic that his 19 October 1983 murder and the brutal coup that followed triggered the US-led invasion of the tiny Caribbean island. The coup, along with growing concern over Cuban influence and presence on Grenada and the approaching completion of a modern airport usable by military aircraft, made US leaders uncomfortable. The presence of a significant number of US citizens on the island served as the impetus for action.

b. Grenada is a small (133 square miles), lush tropical island located approximately 90 miles northeast of Venezuela, 450 miles southeast of Puerto Rico, and some 1,900 miles southeast of Tampa, Florida. The island is mountainous, with heavy vegetation in the center and broad beaches along the western shore. The north and east coasts present few potential landing sites. Grenada's population was just over 100,000 at the time of the invasion. With an agriculturally-based economy, Grenada also served as the home for a major offshore US medical school — St. George's University School of Medicine. Grenada's only operational airport, Pearls, was too small to accommodate large aircraft. A second airport at Point Salines in the southeast was being built by a Cuban construction team and was close to completion. The road network on the island was minimal. The only major urban area was in the southwest end of the island near the capital, St. George's (Figure III-1).

c. The Grenadan military consisted of 1,200 to 1,500 members of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and some 2,000 to 5,000 members of the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM). At the time of the invasion, approximately 600 Cuban construction workers and 50 military advisors were present on the island. The military efficiency of these forces varied widely; some members of the PRA were highly trained, while most members of the PRM were untrained. Nearly all the Cubans had seen military service at some time. Weapons were for the most part limited to small arms and heavy machine guns. A few mortars and anti-tank weapons were available to the PRA, and a good number of obsolete anti-aircraft guns were deployed to protect key sites around the island. The PRA had only a handful of old armored vehicles and almost no wheeled transport.

d. Initial planning for what would become Operation URGENT FURY commenced on 13 October, as a result of a message from the US Ambassador in Barbados, Milan Bish. The message alerted the State Department to the fact that the political situation on Grenada was deteriorating and recommended that the United States be prepared to evacuate its citizens if conditions worsened. The citizens in question were the over 600 students, faculty, and family members of St. George’s School of Medicine. The situation was quickly brought to the attention of the National Command Authorities because of the possibility that US citizens might become
hostages as they had in Iran. No one wanted a repeat of the circumstance in which the United States appeared powerless to influence events. The depth of this feeling is critical to viewing the context of the decision to invade.

2. Initial US Response

a. On 14 October, as a result of the concerns raised by the message, the State Department-led Interagency Group asked the JCS to review existing plans should an evacuation be deemed necessary. This prompted a call to the US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia, asking how the command would conduct an evacuation of US civilians from the island, located in the LANTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

b. President Reagan was briefed regarding the continuing evolution of events on Grenada on 17 October, and he agreed that the situation warranted the development of contingency evacuation plans. The next day the Crisis Action Team at Norfolk began course-of-action development around JTF 120, to be commanded by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the US Second Fleet. On 19 October, Bishop was murdered by members of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), who then seized power. Later that evening, the JCS sent a Warning Order to LANTCOM requiring that plans for an evacuation be ready within 24 hours.

c. On 20 October, the LANTCOM staff developed several courses of action to accommodate the various combinations of
situations the operation could face. Later that day, they described in detail these courses of action to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr., who was visiting Norfolk. At the same time, the logistic planning to support an evacuation was being arranged in the Pentagon by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics.

d. Later the same day, the approach to the crisis began to shift from evacuation to full scale intervention. The catalyst for the change of approach was a message from Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados to the State Department urging that military action be taken to restore a legitimate government on Grenada. The State Department responded with a message to Ambassador Bish stating that the United States would require a formal written request before such action could be considered.

We knew we had little time and that complete secrecy was vital to ensure both the safety of the young man who would undertake the mission and the Americans they were about to rescue. They had little intelligence about conditions on the island.

President Ronald Reagan
27 October 1983

e. That evening, at a meeting of the Special Situation Group (SSG) chaired by Vice President Bush, it became evident that the United States had very little current information about Grenada. Lack of time and operations security (OPSEC) compartmentalization precluded participation by other intelligence-gathering agencies; none had time to redirect or place assets. The need to maintain secrecy regarding possible US action was stressed, and an amphibious task force en route to Lebanon was diverted to the waters north of Grenada. The initial draft of the decision to evacuate US citizens was finalized and sent to the President for his review and approval.

3. US Forces Receive Orders

a. It was nearly midnight on 20 October when Captain Carl R. Erie, commander of the amphibious task force (Amphibious Squadron 4 with the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit [MAU] embarked) then sailing north of Bermuda, received orders to turn south and take up station 500 miles north of Grenada. The task force immediately adopted an electronic emission control condition and changed course. No reason for the change of orders was given.

b. Early on 21 October, Captain Erie informed MAU Commander Colonel James P. Faulkner and his staff of the diversion. Aware of the trouble on the island they assumed that, at worst, they might be committed in a permissive evacuation situation. The unit had no maps of the island except for a copy of a 1936 British navigation chart, no intelligence on the threat, nor any information regarding the number or location of the potential evacuees. Fortunately, two officers with the task force had some experience with Grenada; one had sailed the waters around it extensively, and the other had recently written a military staff college paper on conducting a theoretical landing there.

c. Late in the afternoon of 21 October, the President concurred with the draft policy decision and plan to use military forces to evacuate US citizens. Later that evening, the National Security Council (NSC) staff, in response to the verbal request by Prime Minister Adams on behalf of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), directed the JCS to develop an alternative option for a full scale military operation to secure the island. As a result, General Vessey alerted LANTCOM as well as the Military Airlift Command (MAC),
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Readiness Command (REDCOM), and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to plan for a potential full scale military intervention. Up to this point, LANTCOM had envisioned and planned for an evacuation operation involving the Navy and Marine Corps only. Earlier that day Vessey had advised McDonald to include Rangers and Airborne division units along with Marines. Uncertainty about size, location, and intent of enemy forces, along with size and diversity of operational terrain, dictated a joint force with airborne, amphibious, and special operations capabilities. This especially applied to a coup de main intended to overwhelm enemy forces before they could take Americans hostage as at Tehran. By late that night, all the units that would participate in the invasion had been alerted; some units received less than 72 hours’ notice. The need and desire for strict OPSEC severely limited those who were told about the upcoming operation. This would have a major impact during execution.

4. Organization of the Invasion Force

The task organization for the invasion is shown in Figure III-2. LANTCOM, the supported commander of a combatant command (CINC), created JTF 120 to lead the operation. JTF 120 was composed of elements from all Services. Close air and naval support would be provided by TG 20-5 (RADM Richard C. Berry) consisting of the carrier Independence and its battle group. TF 121 (MG Edward L. Trobaugh) was initially composed of the three airborne infantry battalions of the Division Ready Force under the command of COL Stephen Silvasy of the 82nd Airborne Division. This would later be reinforced by an additional three airborne infantry battalions. TF 123 (MG Richard A.
Operation URGENT FURY

Scholtes) was composed of elements of the JSOC. These elements included members of SEAL Team 6, Delta Force, and two reduced-strength Army Ranger infantry battalions. TF 124 (Captain Erie) was the Amphibious Task Force that included TF 124.2, a reinforced Marine Corps infantry battalion, and a reinforced Marine medium helicopter squadron. The Air Force provided TF 126 (Brig Gen Richard L. Meyer), consisting of eight F-15s and four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, which operated out of Puerto Rico to monitor Cuban air activity and, if necessary, block any attempted interference with the invasion. MAC provided the airlift and airdrop support as well as AC-130 fire support and aerial refueling. The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF) of about 300 personnel would support JTF 120 by assisting in the restoration of order after the initial landings were completed.

5. Preinvasion Preparations

a. Meanwhile, members of the Barbados Defense Force made two penetrations of Grenada in an attempt to obtain current intelligence. The information they acquired was given to US officials, but never provided to the units tasked with landing on the island. In fact, the American forces at the arrival airfield for the CPF were never told of their participation and were totally surprised by their arrival, initially thinking they might be enemy forces. The CPF was never fully informed of US plans.

b. On 22 October, a planning conference was held at Norfolk, Virginia but, because of the short notice, representatives of some units (notably MAC and JSOC) did not get there in time. Other unit representatives, notably the 82nd Airborne Division, left the conference unsure of their role. Still other units were unaware of the conference (e.g., TF 124, CPF). This lack of preinvasion coordination was complicated by tight OPSEC that surrounded plans to invade a British Commonwealth country that had not yet been formally requested (much less approved) by the President.

c. While the planning conference was underway, the NSC staff alerted the President to the verbal request for intervention from OECS. The President concurred that it would be prudent to expand the planning parameters to include full scale action to restore order. At just before 1700 hours, the JCS issued the Warning Order for Operation URGENT FURY. The mission was to "...conduct military operations to protect and evacuate US and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, to neutralize Grenadan forces, stabilize the internal situation and maintain the peace . . . and with OECS/friendly government participation assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada." The order also set the time for the invasion to be NLT daybreak 25 October 1983. LANTCOM and JTF 120 planners had less than 48 hours to assemble the participating units and execute the ever changing operation.

d. The commanding officers of the two Ranger battalions found out after 1900 hours on the 22nd that they would be invading Grenada. They were facing a situation in which no maps were available and intelligence was very thin. One company of Rangers would have to accompany the special operations forces (SOF), and there was a shortage of night drop-trained air crews. This lack of trained crews would restrict the battalions to about half strength. Their targets were the two airfields and the students at the St. George's campus. While the commanders were learning this information, their units began moving toward what they thought was an exercise.

e. On top of the invasion preparations, an incident occurred in the early morning hours of 23 October that directly affected events
unfolding in the Caribbean. A suicide bomber penetrated the security perimeter at the Beirut, Lebanon airport and detonated a powerful explosion that destroyed the Marine Barracks and killed over 240 Marines. The tragedy may have distracted some who were involved in planning for Grenada and created a resolve in all to keep Grenada from becoming another military disaster.

f. That same morning General Vessey briefed the SSG on the invasion. On Grenada, efforts were undertaken to mobilize the population to repel the invasion. The RMC had been informed of the movement of Caribbean forces, and the Cubans and the RMC knew that invasion plans were being made. Fortunately, the Grenadan people failed to respond and the PRM never really played a role in the coming fights. That afternoon President Reagan authorized the invasion and the first special operations forces took off for Grenada. Their mission was to emplace navigation beacons at the Point Salines Airport to guide the transports carrying the airborne force. Around this time the Rangers received a change in mission: both battalions were to land at Port Salines. Pearls would be handled by the Marines.

g. At 2200 hours on the night of 23 October, the first liaison officers from LANTCOM arrived aboard the USS Guam and briefed TF 124 about its role in the operation. At this point the Marines learned that they were not a backup for the Army, but were tasked to make both an air assault and an amphibious landing to seize Pearls airport and the Grenville area on the eastern side of the island. Simultaneously, Army forces would conduct an air landing assault at the Point Salines airport in the southwest. The rules of engagement (ROE) were issued, clearly stating that disruption of the civilian economy was to be “minimized.” The Marines quickly began planning.

h. Meanwhile, the navigation beacon team had met with unexpected problems. The night drop over water went badly; equipment failed and several men drowned. This mission was considered so essential that VADM Metcalf agreed to a second attempt the following night. This attempt also failed, but the time required to assemble additional personnel and equipment caused H hour to be delayed first from 0200 to 0400 hours, and then to 0500 hours on the 25th. The landing operations would no longer be cloaked in darkness.

i. On 24 October, planning continued at several sites and the troops began assembling and moving toward Grenada. VADM Metcalf held a final planning conference at Norfolk with Admiral Wesley McDonald (Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet) and the Army commanders of his JTF. At 1745 hours that evening, he and his primarily Navy staff arrived by helicopter aboard the command ship, the USS Guam. At 1830 hours the first AC-130s took off for the invasion, followed at 2130 hours by the first of the C-130s carrying the Rangers.

> “Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.”
> Winston Churchill

6. Invasion Operations

a. The plan (Figure III-3) called for the Ranger battalions in fourteen MC- and C-130s to airdrop or airland on the runway at Port Salines airport. One battalion would secure the area and then evacuate the students from the St. George’s campus. The other would assist in securing the airfield and then move (on foot) to capture the reported Cuban base at Camp Calivigny 12 kilometers away. At the same time, the Marines of TF 124.2
would assault Pearls airport and the town of Grenville. Concurrently SEAL elements of TF 123, reinforced by a company of Rangers, would conduct three operations: seize the radio transmitter at Beausejour, secure Governor General Sir Paul Scoon in his residence at Government House until he could be evacuated, and seize the prison at Richmond Hill to protect all political prisoners who might be there.

b. This was an ambitious plan, considering the lack of intelligence, coordination, and planning time. The night of 24 October and early morning of the 25th were inevitably filled with last minute changes, inabilities to communicate, miscommunications, and mistakes. These actions demonstrated conclusively the existence of Clausewitz’s “fog and friction of war.” At around 0200 hours on the 25th, the Marines learned that an amphibious landing was not possible at Grenville, and so shifted to an air assault plan. Soon thereafter, the second attempt to emplace navigation beacons at Point Salines failed. In the air, the Rangers found that the runway was blocked and that a parachute assault would be required instead of an air landing. Unfortunately, the inability to communicate in the air caused additional confusion. Some units had to re-rig parachutes at the last minute.
d. By 0330 hours, the Marines had launched more than 20 helicopters for their missions. By 0730 hours, they had secured both their objectives at Pearls and the town of Grenville. Their quick success made reemployment to aid the Army and the SOF in the southern part of the island a possibility. This movement would reveal additional problems in the overall operation, such as the failure to appoint a joint force land component commander, the lack of a joint force air component commander on the USS Guam, as well as minimal Air Force and Army representation on the staff. These factors had an adverse impact on tactical operations equivalent to that caused by the lack of maps and the failure to exchange liaison officers and radio frequency information.

e. Much of the detail surrounding the three TF 123 missions remains classified. The first of the three post-Hour missions, securing the radio transmitter, was initially successful. However, a counterattack by a superior force equipped with heavy weapons forced abandonment of the transmitter. The second mission, securing the Governor General in his residence, was also initially successful. But a PRA counterattack with heavy weapons and armored personnel carriers (APCs) surrounded the rescuers and required additional forces to be committed to ensure the mission was successful. The final mission, the seizure of Richmond Hill prison, was a disaster. Aerial photographs proved unreliable, and what had appeared to be a close-in landing zone was unusable. Additionally, the defenders put up strong defensive fire and drove off the assaulting helicopters several times. Finally, the PRA guns at nearby Ft. Frederick joined in and made success impossible. These events, combined with conflicting reports and the problems with slower than anticipated progress in the south, unhinged the plan and caused anxiety aboard the Guam.

7. Change of Plans

a. Around mid-day on 25 October, the invading force learned that, in addition to their other problems, as many as 200 of the American students were located at the Grand Anse annex about 3 kilometers northeast of the main St. George's campus. This was the first time anyone in the invading force knew that there was a second campus. Something would have to be done to ensure the students' safety. Again, lack of intelligence had an operational impact.

b. The more immediate problem was to aid the TF 123 elements at the Governor General's residence. VADM Metcalf, in consultation with his ground operations advisor, Army Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, ordered the uncommitted Marine company still aboard the amphibious vessels to move to the west side of the island to conduct a landing in the vicinity of Grand Mal Bay. The amphibious assault would be accompanied by an airlift of the company at Grenville. Delays and changes in plans intervened, and it was not until 1830 hours that the amphibious landing commenced. The airlift
from Grenville began at 0400 hours on 26 October and went off without a hitch. These two companies then moved south to relieve the pressure on the TF 123 element and the Army. Eventually, accurate fire by the AC-130s and the arrival of reinforcements drove off the PRA and permitted the evacuation of the Governor General.

c. Meanwhile, around Point Salines the AC-130s began to run short of fuel and ammunition. Without air or artillery support, movement slowed. In response, VADM Metcalf directed Marine attack helicopters from TF 124.2 to assist the Army, but there was no exchange of liaison officers or radio frequencies for either the Army or the Air Force gunships. The pilots could not raise anyone on the radio and had to return to the Guam for refueling. At that time the helicopters stumbled on the proper frequency and established contact with the engaged ground force. Then the problem of not having common maps arose. Despite this, two COBRA gunships were able to provide supporting fires and then pass the proper frequencies on to their two ship relief. Unfortunately, one of these ships was shot down as it attacked the PRA elements firing from Ft. Frederick. Later that same evening the Marines, attacking at night from Grand Mal Bay, secured Ft. Frederick without a fight.

d. VADM Metcalf also sent the medium helicopters of TF 124.2 to assist the Army in securing the students at Grande Anse on the 26th. MG Schwarzkopf directed the Marine helicopters to lift Army troops to Grand Anse. At first the Marine commander refused because Schwarzkopf had no official command authority. Metcalf subsequently named Schwarzkopf deputy commander of the joint task force. The helicopter force left the Guam thinking they were going to transport Marines and were surprised upon landing at Point Salines to hear they were to carry Army Rangers. The professionalism exhibited by all involved again saved the day. As it turned out, the Marine helicopter squadron commander and Ranger battalion commander were VMI classmates who sat down, developed a plan, and rescued the students.

8. Concluding Events

a. There were numerous small unit operations still to take place; however, by late afternoon of 26 October, with the Governor General safe, the students protected, and the RMC crushed, all the major objectives of Operation URGENT FURY were met except for the capture of the supposed Cuban camp at Calivigny. Although there had been some exchange of fire with Cubans and a large number of prisoners had been taken, the invading force remained unsure of the Cuban intent and expected a fight. Their slow progress towards taking the camp (it was a D-Day objective) was indicative of this uncertainty. Minimal availability of supporting fires also contributed to the slow advance. Intelligence reported inflated figures and capabilities for the Cubans, with estimates that as many as 1,000 well-armed and highly trained professional soldiers remained on Grenada.

b. At midday, the JCS recommended that Camp Calivigny be taken by nightfall. The camp was situated on a barren peninsula east of the Point Salines airport. It served as the main base for the PRA and had been closed off to civilian visitors for several years. The camp consisted of a few buildings, a rifle range, and an assault course. Few PRA troops were there, as most had been deployed to other sites in preparation for the invasion, or had simply melted into the civilian population after the invasion began.

c. The plan was to lay down a 30 minute artillery preparation (augmented by AC-130s, naval gunfire, and naval air support) that would smash the camp and its defenders,
Chapter III

then conduct a heliborne assault with the Rangers to mop up any remaining resistance. Again, planning time was extremely limited, intelligence was minimal, and maps nonexistent. There was no time for a ground reconnaissance; planning was done from aerial photographs. Things went wrong from the start, with the approximately 500 artillery rounds fired falling harmlessly short of the target. There was no way to communicate between the batteries and the assaulting force to order an adjustment. Naval gunfire was just as ineffective, and was stopped by VADM Metcalf because of the close proximity of friendly troops. On the other hand, air support was very effective, all but completely destroying the camp. However, as the assault began, three helicopters crashed during the attempted landing, killing and seriously wounding several Rangers. All of this effort went to learn that there were no Cubans (or anyone else) in the camp.

d. The Ranger assault was the last significant action of Operation URGENT FURY. Despite numerous problems, the mission of JTF 120 had been accomplished. While restoration of democracy and the protection of American lives were important outcomes, perhaps the most important and lasting effect of the operation was the impetus it gave to improving the joint capabilities of our Armed Forces. The lessons of this operation were significant in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”
—Clausewitz

9. Grenada and Joint Employment Principles

a. With General Vessey’s urging, VADM Metcalf planned a classic and simple coup de main whereby the overwhelming power of the United States could simultaneously attack critical points across the island and paralyze the opposition. Operating in dimensions in which the Cubans and PRA could not compete, his plan was to asymmetrically dominate the battlespace and defeat the enemy. The reality of the invasion was something less. The simple and effective plan unraveled when events didn’t unfold as predicted, and the friction of war made its presence felt.

b. There are five key characteristics of forcible entry operations: OPSEC, speed, SOF, deception, and surprise. These characteristics give the entering force an initial advantage to seize and hold a lodgment area in the face of armed opposition. The ability to execute forcible entry gives JFCs another means to gain the initiative at the start of combat operations.

c. OPSEC is critical to the success of a forcible entry operation because the attacking force is vulnerable during the initial phases. Every potential advantage must be leveraged to ensure success. Poor OPSEC can result in the loss of tactical surprise, which may doom such an operation from the start. Conversely, OPSEC must not be so restrictive as to prevent the exchange of information and planning data between the forces being committed. The desire to limit knowledge of Operation URGENT FURY during the planning stage caused great difficulty for the tactical commanders during execution and affected political, military and public affairs preparation. Forces were unable to coordinate, were unaware of each other’s participation and plans, and often were forced to improvise to get the job done. Some units departed without essential equipment (special operations helicopter crews without flak jackets) because they thought they were going on an exercise. Field artillery units had no aiming circles, so they missed Camp Calivigny. Success, in spite of these obstacles, illustrates the strength that the professionalism of the US soldiers brings to the joint force commander.
d. Speed of execution keeps the enemy force off balance and forces it to react to planned initiatives. Planning must anticipate difficulties and provide for overcoming them so that speed is not compromised. The lack of intelligence, poor communications, and equipment failures frustrated airborne operations on D-Day. These factors caused the assault to be made in daylight and stretched the operation out over 90 minutes. These facts slowed the operation and could easily have compromised its success. If the Cubans or the PRA had decided to defend the Point Salines airport, the potential for US casualties would have greatly increased.

e. Special operations forces were a central element of the URGENT FURY plan. The failure of the first attempt to emplace additional navigation devices at Point Salines caused VADM Metcalf to delay H-Hour from 0200 to 0500 hours. When other complications arose, the result was that much of the initial assault was made in daylight instead of darkness. In the end, the navigation devices were never emplaced, but the Air Force easily found the landing site using the on-board navigation capability of the MC-130s.

f. The other missions of TF 123 also ran into difficulties that can be traced to poor threat intelligence as well as taskings which were inappropriate for this type of force. The lightly armed special forces did not expect and were not prepared to defeat armored vehicles. They were not equipped to handle the ferocious air defense and the lack of a secure landing site at the Richmond Hill prison. The value of SOF is not in launching an air assault in daylight, nor in holding positions against determined attack for long periods. SOF go in quietly, do the job quickly, and depart. Operation URGENT FURY planning largely overlooked these SOF characteristics. The skill and professionalism of the Service members involved prevented operational and political disaster.

g. Surprise allows the assaulting force to establish a foothold with limited enemy interference. Strategic surprise was lost when the Cuban government learned that the OECS had asked the United States to intervene. Nevertheless, tactical surprise remained a possibility. Had the various D-Day operations been launched in the dark, the planned coup de main would have surprised the enemy and opposition would have been nonexistent. Once dawn broke, all chance of surprise was lost. Deception appears to have played no part in the invasion plans. This may be traced to the assumption that, since the operation would be launched in the dark against a less sophisticated enemy and by overwhelming force across the entire island, formal deception planning would not be necessary. Full deception planning includes multiple options that help confound any potential defense.

h. The selection of LANTCOM to lead was appropriate for this operation. Grenada was within its geographic AOR. The opportunity to adapt existing LANTCOM plans to the immediate situation existed. There was an operation plan in concept format on the books for such an operation in the LANTCOM AOR, and a JTF built around the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters could have executed it.

i. Grenada presents a strong lesson on the need for truly integrated joint staffs. Because the LANTCOM and JTF 120 staffs were primarily naval, there was diminished understanding of the requirements for airborne and land operations. When the operation was envisioned as a permissive evacuation to be accomplished by a Navy-Marine Corps team, this lack of joint representation was not a real problem. However, when the mission changed, Army and Air Force representation became critical. Unfortunately, compartmentalization and short reaction time prevented assembly of such a staff. The naming of an Army deputy
commander for JTF 120 was conceptually valid, but the person selected had nothing to do with the units participating or the operational area. To then limit his staff to two majors and restrict his communications made him virtually ineffective. Many of the problems encountered by the executing forces would have been anticipated and perhaps eliminated or reduced by a more representational joint planning staff.
By 2 August, 216 B.C., Hannibal had crossed the Alps and had crushed Roman armies at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. Established in southern Italy, he hoped to win allies in Italy among states discontented with Roman domination. After the battles at Trebia and Lake Trasimene, the newly chosen Roman dictator Fabius Cunctator had studiously avoided battle with Hannibal. The time Fabius gained was critical to rebuilding Roman forces. However, Roman military tradition and doctrine revered the offensive. In October of 217 B.C., Fabius had barely been able to save M. Minucius Rufus, his former subordinate, when Rufus unwisely attacked Hannibal’s forces at Geronium. Rufus learned his lesson, and deferred to Fabius from then on. Rome, unfortunately, did not.

Using the time gained by Fabius’ policy and doctrine, Rome gathered an army of 16 legions, 8 of them Roman and 8 allied. As before, command was divided. The daily alternating commanders were Aemilus Paulus, who agreed with Fabius, and Terentius Varro, who desired an early battle. Hannibal greatly desired a battle, since he knew that delay would only weaken his forces, which had no lines of communications with Carthage. Hoping to force a battle, Hannibal marched at night to Cannae, capturing a Roman supply depot. His position also made the grain fields of southern Apulia available to his army. The Roman army followed him, camping about 6 miles away. Hannibal was aware of the Roman command arrangements, and arrayed his forces for battle on a day on which he knew Terentius Varro was to command.

Aemilus Paulus, knowing delay favored the Romans, counseled Varro to avoid battle, especially at that place and time. Instead, impetuous Varro fell directly into Hannibal’s trap. Varro narrowed his front to match the width of Hannibal’s army, hoping to crush the Carthaginian center by the weight and shock of the attacking legions. Hannibal moved the infantry at his center slightly forward, while his cavalry drove off the horses of Rome’s allies. Hannibal’s heavy cavalry was thus suddenly on the rear of the advancing Roman infantry. To complete his plan, Hannibal’s center infantry retired into a concave line as if under the pressure of virtually all of Varro’s infantry.
Hannibal sprung the trap, ordering his barely engaged wings to circle around the Roman infantry at the same moment his cavalry struck the Roman formations from behind. In an instant the Romans went from an illusory feeling of impending victory to sudden understanding of their plight. Panic ensued and the army became a mob. One contingent of 10,000 Romans managed to fight free, but over 60,000 died. Ironically, Terentius Varro survived, while the wise but unfortunate Aemilianus Paulus died. Hannibal stood as the master of the field, at the height of his career.

No battle in history so clearly illustrates the criticality of unity of command.
CHAPTER IV
OPERATION JUST CAUSE

"They were well trained for the mission, and they fought the way they were trained."
General Carl W. Stiner

1. Introduction

a. Throughout the 1980’s the United States’ relationship with Panama fluctuated between accommodation and condemnation. The need for Panamanian assistance in support of the Nicaraguan Contras created a convenient blind spot to the growing power and excesses of Manuel Antonio Noriega, the head of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF). Efforts to rein him in proved fruitless. Diplomatic overtures to get him to resign and leave Panama were rebuffed. Under Noriega, the self-proclaimed “Maximum Leader,” Panama had become a significant transshipment and financial center for drug exports to the United States. In 1988 he was indicted on Federal drug trafficking charges, making an already tense situation worse. It became clear that Noriega and the PDF were a serious threat to stability in the region. In view of the strategic importance of Panama in the Western Hemisphere and the economic necessity of the Panama Canal, something had to be done.

b. In reflection, it is clear that the military invasion of Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE, was a joint success. The military was able to translate strategic goals into real military objectives. The invasion commenced in the middle of the night with overwhelming forces and attacked numerous military targets across Panama. Heading up the operation, Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, USA, had knowledge of the enemy that suggested the PDF was a centralized force with vulnerable centers of gravity incapable of numerous actions at once without direction from Noriega himself. Operation JUST CAUSE proved him right.

c. Months of harassment of Americans, anti-US demonstrations and barely controlled hostility made Panama a most difficult place to live. By mid-December 1989, there had been a failed coup, rampant-brutality, and increased tension. On 15 December, the National Assembly of Corregimiento representatives declared Panama in a state of war. On the evening of 16 December, four Marines were confronted and fired upon. Two were wounded and First Lieutenant Robert Paz was killed. His death and the beating of a US Navy officer and his wife precipitated the decision to launch a military invasion. The United States was committing forces in Panama in the largest military operation since the Vietnam War to protect US citizens, secure the Panama Canal, support democracy for the people of Panama, and apprehend Manuel Noriega.

2. Planning

a. As early as 5 August 1989, Lieutenant General Stiner, then commanding general of the Army’s premier XVIII Airborne Corps, received a warning that General Maxwell Thurman, the designated Commander of US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), intended Stiner to be his “man in Panama,” to be responsible for all contingency planning and to command any actual combat operations. Stiner had the staff, intelligence assets, and communications to get a Panama contingency plan in shape. Stiner was an aggressive professional who understood “Get Ready!” Additionally, General Thurman’s
choice of Stiner worked well in reducing the friction associated with a complex joint task force; the two had worked together before and shared bonds of familiarity and trust.

b. Even before receiving command, General Thurman made suggestions on the size of the forces to be involved in the invasion. He insisted that sufficient forces be massed and committed in the initial assault to overwhelm the PDF in every operational area. Thurman firmly believed that massing superior forces would save lives and lead to a quick success.

c. The standing overall Panama contingency plan, code named PRAYER BOOK (which included the BLUE SPOON plan for attacking the PDF) was examined and reworked in detail. When Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell reviewed it, he emphasized surprise, speed, and night operations. General Thurman took over USSOUTHCOM on 30 September 1989. On 30 October he approved the BLUE SPOON operation order, and the name was changed to Operation JUST CAUSE. The revised plan was built on maximum surprise, with maximum combat forces using minimum force. Collateral damage was to be kept at a minimum. The forces involved would deploy rapidly and simultaneously from a number of locations, arriving in Panama with overwhelming combat power. This plan was complex, involving both SOF and conventional forces carefully synchronized for maximum disruptive effect. Lieutenant General Stiner and all key staff officers made numerous planning trips to Panama to ensure that all tactical, targeting, and logistics issues were addressed and solved.

  d. Lieutenant General Stiner, as Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) South, was to be in overall command of all US combat forces. Stiner’s plan was for swift, violent, multiple forcible entry operations coupled with the employment of forces previously built up in-county, rather than for a drawn-out, piecemeal operation. By using in-country bases, Stiner ensured powerful operational reach. The synergy created by the synchronization of these operations is a classic example of operational art in action. Command and control would flow from the CJTF to the various component and subordinate task force commanders. Some specialized units remained under the direct control of the CJTF. An OPLAN was developed that strictly regulated everything in the air, with tight control exercised from Howard Air Force Base. The all-important unity of command was protected by new procedures created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The commander's clear, tight intent, an advanced plan, and command and control cells streamlined operations.

e. Using in-country bases made OPSEC a major concern for General Stiner. He and his staff used unmarked aircraft and civilian clothes for repeated trips to Panama. Briefings and operation orders were only given to those with proven needs for the information. Equipment was moved under cover of darkness and concealed. Throughout the planning stage of the operation, only senior commanders and staff knew the actual plan’s link to preparations. Despite planning this operation from Fort Bragg over several months, Stiner was able to maintain tight operations security. PDF intelligence failures contributed significantly to US success in Operation JUST CAUSE. On the other hand, forward-thinking personnel assignment policies, which sent motivated, talented Spanish-speakers on repeated tours with the in-country Army and Marine units, contributed greatly to the success of this operation.

f. On the evening of 19 December, all forces involved were alerted; planning,
rehearsal, buildup, and training were over. In the first minutes of 20 December, President Guillermo Endara and his Vice Presidents, who had been elected in May, were sworn in at Fort Clayton. The United States officially recognized his government and at 0100 hours Operation JUST CAUSE began.

3. Joint Task Force South

a. Joint Task Force South planned to attack with simultaneity and depth by neutralizing, isolating, or protecting twenty seven major targets in its operational area. Major target areas included Panama City, Rio Hato, and the Torrijos Airport. The targets were more than 70 miles apart. In the Panama City area of operations, Stiner was able to concentrate his task force and prevent Noriega and the PDF from taking large numbers of hostages or seizing the initiative even briefly. The forces involved in Operation JUST CAUSE deployed to Panama from six regions across the United States and made a lightning strike into Panama. These forces demonstrated agility, and within hours most military objectives were secured with small-unit operations over an extended operating area. The rapid, overwhelming use of force shortened the invasion and reduced the loss of life. The PDF was not able to respond to multiple attacks.

b. Operation JUST CAUSE illustrated the importance of the commander’s concept and intent. The entire task force was able to focus on accomplishment of USCINCSOUTH’s assigned objectives and directed their major combat efforts towards the PDF’s centers of gravity from the outset of the operation to its speedy conclusion. General Stiner’s concept allowed the sequencing of forces to take advantage of land, naval, air, and special operations forces in concentrating combat power. The joint SOF helped to prepare the battlefield and then reinforced the main effort once the airborne attack was over.

4. Joint Special Operations Task Force

a. Major General Wayne Downing, USA, as Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force, held responsibility for all SOF. These forces included Army Rangers, Navy SEAL units, Army Special Forces, and Air Force Special Operations Forces, totaling 4,150 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. These SOF received very difficult assignments ranging from infiltration, clandestine reconnaissance, and underwater demolition to rescuing Kurt Frederick Muse from the Carcel Modelo prison. Muse, an American, was a clandestine radio operator and focus for Panamanian opposition to Noriega. Special operations elements participated in almost every action in Operation JUST CAUSE.

b. The initial efforts to overwhelm the PDF were conducted by US SOF conducting attacks across the country (Figure IV-1). These skilled units attacked PDF strong points, garrisons, airports, transportation centers, and media locations. However, the primary objective for all special operations forces remained Noriega himself. USSOUTHCOM, aided by intelligence personnel from the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, had been tracking and reporting Noriega’s movements and activities daily. Noriega was a master of deception and disappeared prior to the attack. The dictator was so busy running, however, that he had little hand in directing the battle.

c. Naval Special Warfare Forces had three objectives in Operation JUST CAUSE: deny the PDF use of Balboa Harbor and their patrol boats; isolate certain PDF forces; and put Noriega’s personal jet at Paitilla Airport out of action. SEAL Team 4 of Naval Special Warfare Group-2 was a part of General Downing’s command. The highly trained
Chapter IV

Figure IV-1. Map of Panama
commandos numbered more than 700 sailors, including special boat units and countermine personnel. These sailors became Task Force White under their own commander, Commander Tom McGrath. The attackers left their peacetime base at Rodman Naval Station and disabled the Presidente Porras, Noriega’s yacht, precluding his escape by boat. This was the first time since World War II that US frogmen attacked a pier-side enemy vessel. At the same time, SEAL platoons attacking Paitilla Airport received devastating fire and quickly took multiple casualties. In response, Commander McGrath sent in two additional platoons. Within a few hours the reinforced SEALS silenced the PDF defenders, secured the airport, and disabled Noriega’s personal Lear jet, shutting off the aerial escape route.

d. Intelligence collection was critical to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE. Noriega was watched, listened to, and tracked. The US forces received excellent intelligence on the size and loyalty of the PDF at Rio Hato, Fort Amador, and Fort Cimarron. Noriega supporters and those PDF soldiers friendly to the United States were identified. This was most helpful in making decisions associated with the civil affairs efforts that followed the battle. Senior commanders were also able to conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the operational area prior to combat. All US forces were able to talk with each other. The Joint Communications and Electronics procedures worked. Everyone who needed frequencies and call signs had them. Effective command, control, communications and control support gave the US forces a tactical edge.

“Rapidity is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.”

Sun Tzu

e. Elsewhere in the city, specially trained and equipped Army Delta Force personnel approached the Carcel Modelo prison to rescue Kurt Muse. Major General Gary Luck, who had previously commanded the JSOC, had planned this phase of the operation. He and his staff developed a well-rehearsed, detailed, minute by minute plan. In a matter of minutes, Muse was rescued and whisked away by helicopter. Before reaching safety, the helicopter was hit by ground fire. A flexible plan allowed the rescue to be completed by an APC.

f. The Rio Hato Airfield lies some 60 miles southwest of Panama City. Like many airfields, it has both commercial and military facilities. At H-hour, the 75th Ranger Regiment commanded by Colonel William F. Kernan parachuted into Rio Hato. Its missions were to capture the airfield, neutralize the PDF, and clear and isolate the military facilities. All of this was to be accomplished with minimum casualties. While collateral damage considerations denied the Rangers full use of US Air Force F-117A fighters, some offset “stun grenade” bombing was allowed. While it was reasonably successful, important Air Force training decisions regarding F-117A precision bombing resulted. These changes later proved critical in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The Rangers secured the airfield, and in less than 2 hours US Air Force planes were landing essential equipment for the operation.

g. Operation JUST CAUSE revealed the need for increased technology in order to avoid fratricide. In two cases, soldiers received friendly fire. At Rio Hato in a night operation, a helicopter fired on an Army squad and two soldiers were killed. On D-Day near La Comandancia, a Spectre, or AC-130 gunship, wounded a number of soldiers while they were attacking one of their objectives in the PDF complex. The
improvements in technology sought as a result of these incidents would assist US operations in the Gulf War.

5. Task Force Bayonet

a. Task Force Bayonet, commanded by Colonel Mike Snell of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, was the major fighting force of the task force already stationed in Panama. The task force's operations were planned with the objective of capturing and neutralizing La Comandancia, Fort Amador, and smaller PDF garrisons within Panama City. The 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry (M) from Fort Polk, Louisiana, provided reinforcements. Snell divided Task Force Bayonet into elements built around mechanized and airborne units in order to seize and secure the compound at La Comandancia. The complex was the main headquarters and command center of the PDF. The buildings were reinforced with concrete and in the center of the downtown area, a mere 600 yards from USSOUTHCOM headquarters. La Comandancia housed numerous weapons, Soviet-made grenade launchers, and small arms. Other military equipment, vehicles, armored cars, and anti-aircraft weapons were also garrisoned there. As the command post of the PDF, the facility was high on the target list, and US troops called it “Bravo One.” Other companies moved against Fort Amador, Ancon Hill, and Balboa. The APCs of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry, with four Sheridan tanks and four Marine light armored vehicles (LAVs), protected the soldiers moving through the built-up urban areas of Panama City.

b. The element of surprise had been compromised by early special operations and general observations of troop movement. The PDF knew the Americans were leaving their assembly areas, and were on alert. As a result, Task Force Bayonet faced roadblocks and barricades. The PDF had established firing positions around the compound and made excellent use of cars and large commercial garbage trucks. These positions were also covered by heavy weapons and RPG grenade launchers.

c. The fighting at La Comandancia was fierce and the firepower of the M-113s had been an excellent addition by the planners. US Air Force AC-130s also supported the attack with good effect. Once past the roadblocks, the troops in the final charge faced increased fire from the apartment buildings near La Comandancia. The M-113s had difficulty defending themselves from sniper fire in the taller buildings. Pockets of PDF resistance continued throughout the night. By daybreak on 20 December, La Comandancia was still not secure. The soldiers had broken through initial PDF defenses and established a perimeter around the headquarters complex. Brutal fighting continued for the rest of the morning, but resistance waned by mid-afternoon. Rangers, having secured the Omar Torrijos International Airport, joined Colonel Snell and the 193rd Infantry Brigade in subduing the PDF still holding La Comandancia and the PDF intelligence headquarters nearby. By early evening, Task Force Bayonet's mission was accomplished and Noriega's headquarters was secured.

6. Task Force Semper Fidelis

a. The US Marines of Task Force Semper Fidelis were given a number of blocking missions that included the Bridge of the Americas and portions of Howard Air Force Base. For more than a year, elements of the 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion had been deployed as a part of Marine Forces Panama to exercise contingency plans and provide security and surveillance of the PDF forces.

b. Company D arrived in Panama in late October 1989 to relieve Company B. They brought replacement LAV's plus additional mortar and TOW personnel. The in-country
Marines trained with Army and Air Force units using the ROUGH RIDER concept of protecting convoys by interspersing armed troops in LAV's among trucks of normal cargo. The LAV units were joined with other Marine forces to include several companies of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, Security Force Company, and a platoon of the First Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team. Later Task Force Semper Fidelis was augmented by Army MPs, engineers, and artillery troops of D Battery, 320th Field Artillery.

c. During their routine training exercises, the Marines had become acquainted with the tactics of the PDF and had patrolled around the Arraijan tank farm. As a result they were ideally suited to ensure that PDF mortar men remained beyond the range of Howard Air Force Base. The Marines performed maintenance on the evening of 19 December. Prior to the attack, Task Force Commander Colonel Charles E. Richardson detached a platoon to Task Force Bayonet to assist the Sheridan tanks in their attack on La Comandancia. The Marines of D Company attacked along Thatcher Highway towards Arraijan, securing key positions and road intersections. Near the Traffic and Transportation Station, the column was hit by small arms fire. Scouts dismounted and cleared the building. As the remainder of the column continued towards Arraijan, it engaged the PDF and captured five prisoners. The Marines gained control of Arraijan. The speed and mobility of the LAV's on the Panamanian roads, combined with the highly trained, dismounted Marine infantry, paid good dividends for the task force.

8. Task Force Atlantic

a. The Third Brigade of 7th Infantry Division (Light) under the command of Colonel Keith Kellogg made up Task Force Atlantic. He was responsible for neutralizing the threat to the Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal. His units had used treaty-sanctioned “freedom of movement” drills to rehearse their contingency plan and were ready to switch to combat.

b. Colonel Kellogg’s operational area stretched from Paraiso near USSOUTHCOM headquarters to Colon, more than 50 miles away. At H-hour, his forces attacked nine different targets, including five PDF installations and the Madden Dam. The dam was important because it provided the electrical power to operate the Canal. More than 1,000 Americans lived in this sector and required protection. “If you lose an American — a civilian — I don’t care how good you’ve done, you’ve lost the battle,” General Maxwell Thurman told Kellogg.

c. By surrounding the PDF and using measured application of combat power, Task Force Atlantic was able to rescue civilians, capture the Coco Solo Naval Infantry Company, and block the city of Colon. In several places, especially Fort Espinar, considerable resistance was encountered. After capturing 400 prisoners and 1,600 weapons, the Americans were welcomed with flags and cheers by the citizens of Colon. Task Force Atlantic made equally short work of Madden Dam, Cerro Tigre, and Renacer Prison. “Training paid off . . . it reduced casualties,” Colonel Jack Nix reported.

d. When 3rd Battalion, 504th Infantry secured Renacer prison, all prisoners, including two American journalists, were unharmed and in US hands. The PDF had resisted, and getting in had not been easy. During the assault on Renacer Prison, the soldiers of 3/504 PIR engaged targets with a multitude of weapons and encountered many unfamiliar obstacles. In addition to concertina wire, there were 8- and 10-ft-high chain link fences. There were steel doors and concrete walls along with iron bars and heavy-duty padlocks. Pressed for time and under heavy fire, soldiers used their organic weapons against these obstacles.
9. Task Force Pacific

a. At 2130 hours on 19 December, the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under the command of Major General James Johnson, took off for Panama. The December weather caused some take off delays, but General Johnson had excellent communications and the late departing aircraft caught up en route. Air Force C-141s, staging out of Charleston, South Carolina, air dropped the division’s heavy equipment and containerized cargo on schedule at 0145 hours. The equipment drop commenced the 82nd Airborne Division’s combat operations.

b. General Johnson was the first jumper in a 60-man stick. Their objective was the Torrijos Airfield. The Rangers had not yet secured the drop zone and resistance was expected. The soldiers showed the discipline instilled by training as they moved slowly over swampy, unfamiliar terrain to their assembly areas. More than 2,100 paratroopers made the combat jump into Panama. The link-up with the Rangers occurred at 0500 hours and the ground attack started. Small unit leadership excelled as Task Force Pacific secured its three objectives, Panama Viejo, the Marriott Hotel, and Tinajitas. More than 100 unanticipated hostages were recovered and General Johnson’s soldiers quickly proved that they could handle the unexpected. The isolated battles of Operation JUST CAUSE were fought as small unit actions across the former Canal Zone. US soldiers handled these actions with skill and determined professionalism.

"The best plans of the best generals can turn to zip if you don’t have the right kinds of people to execute.”
General Colin Powell

10. Supporting Democracy

a. As the PDF forces were neutralized, widespread looting and general lawlessness reduced Panama to a state of anarchy. The units of the task force had to quickly bring some sort of order to both the cities and countryside. Everything from providing medical care and emergency food and water to selecting and training local police was required. On 22 December, President Bush sent in 2,000 more troops to support the 22,500 already there in the stability operations. While the military had achieved its initial objectives, Bush declared that the mission was not over until stability had been established. Over 200 civil affairs (CA) and 250 psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel bolstered the newly installed government of President Endara. As the situation became more stable and the democratic process began to take hold, Operation JUST CAUSE ended on 31 January 1990. The troops were pulled out and the military presence in Panama returned to its pre-invasion strength of about 13,500.

11. Finding Noriega

During the days following the invasion, US forces continued to search for Noriega. On Christmas Eve, Noriega presented himself to the Papal Nuncio and requested political asylum. Soon, Joint Task Force South had the Vatican representative’s house surrounded. On the evening of 3 January 1990, Manuel Noriega surrendered to Delta Force soldiers outside the embassy. In just over 40 minutes, Noriega was on his way to Miami on Federal drug charges. USSOUTHCOM had now accomplished all its objectives. General Thurman could be pleased.
12. Panama and Joint Employment Principles

a. Beyond question, “Joint Warfare is Team Warfare.” Team Warfare was essential to success in Operation JUST CAUSE. As the operation unfolded, US forces demonstrated their advanced training and readiness prior to receiving the alert order. Many of the troops had lived through the steadily deteriorating conditions and were well aware that the situation would likely be relieved by force. Out of country assets had gained much by the US military buildup and lessons learned that followed Operation URGENT FURY. Moreover, better educated troops and constant news stories out of Panama helped ensure that US forces were mentally prepared for action on short notice. Each part of the Joint Task Force was organized, trained, and equipped to fight skillfully and effectively under better prepared leadership. By the time of Operation JUST CAUSE, the concept of “come as you are” war had been accepted throughout the US military and had been reflected in training, readiness levels, and conceptual thought. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines had worked hard at learning to cooperate with other Services. As the battle unfolded in JUST CAUSE, neither weather, swamps, hostile action, nor unexpected events altered the desired outcome. Each commander had the advantage of detailed knowledge of the enemy through continuing intelligence collection and modern technology. The forces had developed specific responses to reduce the “fog of war.” Attention had specifically been paid to new developments in communications, intelligence, planning, and coordination.

b. The hard work, training, and professionalism of the troops, planners, and commanders paid off in Operation JUST CAUSE. This operation was one of the largest and most complex joint airborne and ground contingency operations in recent history. JUST CAUSE melded all US Services, branches, and SOF together for one enhanced, limited, and successful operation. As a whole, however, JUST CAUSE was also a demonstration of improvements in doctrine and organization.

c. Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrated that critical principles of war—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, surprise, and simplicity—bring victory today just as they did on ancient battlefields. Aware that local bases can be a two edge sword in a forcible entry, General Thurman used the advantages of a foothold in the country to support the long operational reach provided by modern airdrop, logistics, and communications. At the same time he and General Stiner realized that the use of local bases increased enemy operational intelligence. US commanders in JUST CAUSE paid extraordinary attention to OPSEC considerations, and were rewarded for their diligence by lower casualties and a shorter conflict. Local bases also need protection, particularly if dependents are present. While USSOUTHCOM had an obvious advantage in the amount of force it could bring to bear, it ensured economy of force by selecting critical centers of gravity to strike. Regardless of the relative size of forces, economy of force, achieved by prioritizing objectives, is required to enable mass to overwhelm critical points. In JUST CAUSE, US commanders followed sound doctrine to ensure mass was applied against centers of gravity. Moreover, by defining the person of the enemy commander as a critical center of gravity and forcing him to run, US commanders nullified any ability of Noriega’s forces to fight a cohesive, coordinated battle.

d. Unity of command was a critical key to preventing operational dispersion when planning and executing the coordinated land, sea, and air action needed for victory in Panama. Operation JUST CAUSE was the first major use of large US combat forces after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Throughout Operation JUST CAUSE, this legislation supported major improvements
Chapter IV

in US combat power by establishing command arrangements that reinforced singularity of concept, effort, and command. General Thurman and his subordinate commanders, leaders, and action officers used the tools the Goldwater-Nichols Act had given them with skill and success. These new procedures were soon to be coupled with bold operational concepts, multi-national cooperation, and modern military technology in Operation DESERT STORM.
Military Incident #6
FORCE WITHOUT CONCEPT: RAWLINSON ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

To relieve pressure on Verdun, the French requested British action in another sector.

The preparatory bombardment destroyed surprise, but not the German defenses.

Despite the death toll, the attack continued.

The best of Britain’s army died for a gain of about eight miles.

As the Battle of Verdun continued in its mutual attrition, the French command requested that the British relieve some of the pressure on the fortress by attacking at another point on the line. The chosen point was the River Somme. The battle was to begin on 1 July 1916.

The battle was preceded by a 7 day bombardment. More than 1.6 million shells were fired, capped by the explosion of two enormous tunnel mines. Two hundred thousand tons of explosives went off under the German lines, tearing huge gaps in the trenches. In general, the defenses remained intact, while the ground between the forces became a broken morass of shell holes which quickly turned into a swamp; the bombardment had destroyed the centuries-old drainage system that kept the low-lying land dry. To the surprise of the attackers, most of the Germans were not only still alive, but they also maintained effective, cohesive fighting units. Moreover, the massive bombardment failed a critical task, which had been to destroy barbed wire entanglements. As the final barrage lifted, the Germans set up their machine guns in the still existing prepared positions. The British came over the top in parade formation.

The British bravely advanced, although the soldiers fell not as individuals, but by regiments. Their commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, proposed ending the attack. His superior, General Sir Douglas Haig, decided to keep his promise to the French.

The price was almost beyond belief. By the end of the first day, the British had suffered 60,000 casualties, including 19,000 killed in action. By the time the entire operation had ended, four and one half months later, the British had lost 420,000, the French 195,000, and the Germans; 650,000 men. Other than the mutual slaughter, the primary result was a slight reduction in the pressure on Verdun.

The battle of the Somme consisted of charging straight into the prepared positions of a competent enemy. Strategically, operationally, and tactically it typified the bankruptcy of military conceptual thought that made World War I a slaughterhouse. The technology available was as conducive to mobile warfare with low casualties as it was to static warfare. The problem was military concepts—doctrine. Operation DESERT STORM showed that military success derives from matching technology and doctrine to produce breakthrough concepts and battles.
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

"This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."

President George Bush

1. Introduction

a. Each of the US Military Services has unique capabilities which must be fully exploited during specific phases of combat operations. Combined, these capabilities provide the synergistic combat power which enables the United States to exert its full might against an opponent. Where the opportunity exists, the most effective means of conducting war is with the combined mass and force of the joint force and, when possible, with coalition support. In Operation DESERT STORM, almost 50 countries joined their forces and national resources to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and severely cripple Saddam Hussein’s warmaking capabilities for the future.

b. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM succeeded because available time was effectively used to create a broad base of support. Coalition building helped to isolate Iraq and to deter Saddam Hussein from an invasion of Saudi Arabia. The UN, the United States, and its coalition partners acted effectively against Iraq. There was widespread support to get Iraq troops out of Kuwait using whatever means necessary. This coalition was highly successful in limiting the number of friendly casualties and shortening the war.

2. Kuwait Invaded

a. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the UN was faced with an act of naked aggression against one of its member states. Iraq had made a claim on the oil-rich territory of its neighbor, sending Iraqi Republican Guard Forces across the Iraqi-Kuwait border. These armored units were accompanied by mechanized infantry and support units. A second armored division crossed the frontier farther west. Within the first hour, Iraqi special operations units attacked Kuwait City, conducting helicopter assaults against government buildings and palaces.

b. By evening of the first full day of the invasion, Sheik Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, had fled to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait City was under Iraq’s control. Iraqi military units occupied key port facilities and established strong positions on the Kuwait-Saudi border. Within several days, Saddam Hussein had more than 200,000 soldiers and 2,000 tanks in Kuwait. He then advised the world that he had annexed Kuwait, declaring it a province of Iraq. In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam’s military machine was a formidable, battle-tested force, the largest in the Persian Gulf area. Despite the demands of other Arab countries and the world community, Saddam refused to withdraw. He intended to strike all who would interfere “with stones . . . and with all the missiles, bombs and other means at our disposal.” The UN condemned the invasion and called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraq.

c. President Bush also condemned the invasion, stating that “If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms.” He directed a buildup of the US forces in the region. Within one hour of the 2 August attack, naval battle groups spearheaded by the USS Independence and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower were ordered
Chapter V

from the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea into the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea.

d. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had reacted angrily to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. As the United States responded to Kuwait’s request for assistance, the GCC countries committed forces and offered access and logistic support. Egypt took a leadership role in forming the coalition. Syria offered assistance and began the deployment of one of its divisions, as did Morocco. Each of the member countries contributed to and remained solidly committed to the coalition. Saddam did not expect the coalition to hold together, but it never wavered.

3. Operation DESERT SHIELD Begins

a. Under the direction of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the force buildup, code-named Operation DESERT SHIELD, began. With the operational area halfway around the world from the United States and thousands of Iraqi troops sitting on the Kuwait-Saudi border, speed in the buildup was critical. The President’s intent was to deploy enough forces to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Diplomatic efforts would allow time to build an effective military coalition to fight a war.

b. It should be noted that the US command organization during this time was simpler and had more unity of command than those of previous wars. According to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT), “Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force in the Gulf. The lines of authority were clear, and we just did not have any problem in that area — none whatsoever.” President Bush contributed to the success of USCINCCENT by providing clear direction and letting his field commander fight the war. Following his lead, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell did not micro-manage the war. These three men focused instead on helping to build the coalition and winning the necessary public support.

4. Force Composition

a. The buildup of Operation DESERT SHIELD took on a solid joint character from the very beginning. General Schwarzkopf named competent component commanders. The Ninth Air Force under Lieutenant General Charles Horner became US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF). Third Army under Lieutenant General John Yeosock became US Army Forces, Central Command (USARCENT). Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, the Commanding General of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), became commander of the US Marine Component, US Central Command (USMARFORCENT), and the Seventh Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Henry Mauz (later replaced by Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur), commanded US Naval Forces, US Central Command (USNAVCENT). Lieutenant General Horner commanded all USAF units in theater and was also designated by USCINCCENT to be the joint force air component commander (JFACC), responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations based upon the USCINCCENT’s concept of operations and air apportionment decisions, to include air defense. Special Operations Component, US Central Command, under the command of Colonel Jesse Johnson, retained OPCON of all SOF. Supporting CINCs from every area provided whatever was needed. The chain of command was
clear. This team prosecuted the war against Iraq.

b. The various Services performed their roles as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This act streamlined and made more efficient the entire warfighting efforts of the Department of Defense. With this legislation, Congress had given the unified and specified commanders the full range of authority needed to meet their responsibilities. USCENTCOM was the command authority for all US forces assigned to the theater. Each Service staff supported its own units, seeing that they were manned, trained, and equipped. The deployment of combat forces to the Gulf started on 7 August 1990.

c. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the United States deployed to the Persian Gulf more than five hundred thousand members of the Armed Forces. Most of the Third Army was in the desert. Two corps and numerous support forces were on the ground. The Navy had more than 120 warships and over 400 combat aircraft. Two-thirds of the Fleet Marine Force were in theater or afloat. The Ninth Air Force was represented with 1,200 combat aircraft. Combat power was massed and the right forces were concentrated at the decisive place to achieve victory. The overall strategic situation required the United States to maintain forces worldwide, but judicious redeployment from selected units ensured that no other major threat erupted.

d. In order to ensure that US forces in Saudi Arabia could immediately deter an Iraqi attack and defend the arrival ports and airfields, all combat units had to be ready to fight on arrival. General Schwarzkopf required ground combat power to arrive quickly, followed by their logistics forces. The first units had to rely on their own organic supplies and equipment. With inter-Service support, USCENTCENT had his well-organized force in place during the critical first month.

e. Strategic mobility assets, including the reserve fleets, strategic airlift, fast sealift and pre-positioned ships, were ready to move forces to the Persian Gulf. Forces were moved five times faster than the first big buildup in Vietnam. MAC flew 91 strategic airlift missions in the first 2 days. The first pre-positioned ship arrived in 8 days. By the end of Operation DESERT SHIELD, 3.5 million tons of fuel and 1.2 million tons of general cargo had been delivered. The challenge was to maintain and increase strategic lift capability in order to respond rapidly for global power projection.

5. US Army Forces

a. The first Army unit to deploy was the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. With its light antitank weapons and Sheridan tanks, the 2nd Brigade established perimeter defenses around Dhahran airfield and the port at Al Jubayl. By 24 August, the 1st and 3rd Brigades had completed their deployment to Saudi Arabia. The XVIII Airborne Corps (commanded by Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck) arrived by air, with most of its equipment coming by sea.

b. Additional Army units also arrived in August, including the 7th Transportation Group, the 11th Signal Brigade, and the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. Until heavier armored and mechanized equipment could arrive, this was still a very vulnerable force. Iraq maintained the quantitative edge, with its six divisions in Kuwait all capable of conducting combat operations without warning. Shortfalls of sufficient fast sealift to move armor meant that heavy forces took longer to arrive. Ships were loaded simultaneously at multiple ports on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico to speed supplies to the Gulf area. Massive support of deployed Army forces was required. General Yeosock moved quickly to expand the support system by getting Major General
William G. Pagonis appointed as USARCENT’s deputy commander for logistics. Pagonis used the REFORGER model for his logistics plan. “REturn of FORces to GERmany” was an annual exercise perfected during the Cold War by the Army to provide support for a war in Europe. It proved to be an exceptional plan for the reception and onward movement of troops and supplies. Pagonis put together a theater support organization using borrowed soldiers and Reserves. The organization he built was tailored to meet the daily demands of a changing and growing force.

c. The Army provided in-theater support for other Services and arranged contracting and other required host-nation support, including water, subsistence, fuel, transportation, and sanitary support. As September reached midpoint, the 82nd Airborne Division was fully deployed and the 24th Infantry Division was arriving with the 101st Airborne Division on the way. Cooperation with Services and allies was increasing; the logistics organizations were maturing. USARCENT was growing fast.

d. Over the next several months USARCENT forces expanded dramatically. Three additional combat divisions arrived, along with the VII Corps under Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. A large number of Reserve component units, the complete 3rd Armored Cavalry, Patriot batteries, and the 12th Aviation Brigade filled out the force. Training continued and, as the number of units increased, Iraq was losing its numerical advantage. By the start of Operation DESERT STORM, over 253,000 soldiers of the US Army were in the theater.

6. US Marine Corps Forces

a. From the beginning of the crisis, US Marine Corps forces moved to counter and deter any invasion of Saudi Arabia. Eventually, more than 92,000 Marines deployed to the Saudi theater of operations with tanks, artillery and aircraft. Much of the equipment had been pre-positioned years before as part of overall national security strategy.

![Image](Until heavier armored and mechanized equipment arrived in Saudi Arabia, Iraq maintained the military edge over the coalition forces.)
b. US military strategy requires that heavy equipment be pre-positioned in areas of national interest to reduce the time required to deploy capable heavy combat forces. In Europe, land based storage areas are readily available. In the Pacific and Southwest Asia, only shipboard storage can provide the means to ensure that this heavy equipment will be available when and where needed. These Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) were crucial to Marine deployment. The MPS provided the Marines with immediate seaborne combat service support. They offered important POL storage and transfer platforms, as well as significant water-making capability. The combat equipment and supplies with which these squadrons arrived would each sustain a force of 16,500 Marines for 30 days of combat operations. The first MPS Squadron began unloading in Saudi Arabia on 15 August. The second arrived on 24 August. The 1st and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) flew from Hawaii and California to join their combat equipment. In the meantime, the 4th MEB had sailed from the East Coast on 17 August aboard 13 US Navy amphibious ships.

c. USMARFORCENT’s initial mission was to “defend in-sector to protect vital facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl; on order, conduct passage of lines with Royal Saudi Land Forces and Gulf Cooperation Council forces.” Marine forces ashore were under Lieutenant General Boomer’s command. Marine forces afloat were under the command of the Seventh Fleet.

d. From the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD, Iraq was required to focus its attention toward the sea rather than its own western desert. While forces were building ashore, two MEBs were providing an important strategic distraction for the Iraqi forces. By threatening an amphibious landing, coalition commanders forced Saddam Hussein to prepare to defend against a powerful thrust across his coastline.

e. To Saddam, this amphibious threat was very serious. A major part of the maritime activity was dedicated to keeping this issue alive in Saddam’s mind. In the weeks prior to the ground offensive, Seventh Fleet planners recommended actions ranging from a MEF amphibious assault to feints and raids. Practice landings in Oman and on the eastern Saudi coast ensured that the Iraqis did not forget the threat. Although the coalition did not mount a major amphibious operation, the threat of one was crucial to the overall ground plan. This deception plan for a brigade-sized amphibious landing tied down seven to eleven Iraqi combat divisions and precluded the use of these forces in the land battle.

f. The I MEF consisted of the 1st Marine Division, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 1st Force Service Support Group. In early November, USMARFORCENT was reinforced with additional combat forces. This reinforcement committed the 2nd Marine Division along with aviation and support elements. More than 75 percent of Marine Corps combat units were in the Gulf area. The USMARFORCENT part of Operation DESERT SHIELD was in place.

7. US Air Force

a. Prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD, two USAF KC-135 aircraft and a mobile operations center were deployed to Abu Dhabi at the request of the United Arab Emirates. During the initial portion of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the USAF provided the only shore-based secure satellite communications. During the early days of the critical buildup period, communications among the various components, still scattered throughout the world, were essential. The Air Force was able to provide
communications for tactical warning, intelligence, missile warning, and command and control.

b. On 7 August, USAF fighters began air deployment to the Persian Gulf. With 24 hours' notice, the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, departed for Saudi Arabia. These F-15C aircraft deployed themselves, using seven aerial refuelings to reach the theater of operations. By 9 August, the wing was flying combat air patrols on the Saudi-Iraq border. Numerous US Air Force support aircraft, including RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance platforms and E-3 AWACS aircraft, were on station and providing invaluable information. The Strategic Air Command dispatched B-52G bombers to within striking range of the theater with a full range of weapons available. A C-130 squadron arrived in-country to assist in intratheater airlift needs. When the initial deployment was completed in early September, the Air Force had more than 600 combat and support aircraft in Saudi Arabia. These numbers included at least 48 F-15C Interceptors.

c. The rapid buildup would have been impossible without strategic airlift. The US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) component, MAC, flew 91 missions the first 2 days and then averaged 70 missions a day through August. The USAF proved capable of sustained combat support. Fuel was the only limiting factor, as the Saudis had no jet fuel refining capability and the fuel had to be shipped in from Singapore.

d. When the President doubled the size of the ground force, he increased air assets by 30 percent. President Bush believed "you have to assemble the force to make certain that in the final analysis, we can prevail at the lowest possible cost." The air crews used the buildup period to become familiar with the desert, bare bases, and strange airfields. Procedures for airspace management required practice and training. The refueling challenge was daunting and required tight coordination because of the numbers of aircraft and the difficulty of the missions. The air forces of 14 nations and Service components trained and worked with the JFACC to ensure air superiority. The overarching campaign plan was ready. US and coalition forces would attack Saddam's centers of gravity, paralyzing the Iraqi leadership's ability to command and control, destroying enemy weapons of mass destruction, and making Iraqi forces ineffective.

e. One of the most serious joint issues to arise in Operation DESERT SHIELD was the control of air power. Lieutenant General Horner, Commander of USCENTAF, proposed that all aviation come under a single commander, and he requested that the JFACC control the air effort. Given the large number of US and allied aircraft, it was clear that some control was necessary. None of the components wanted to give up control of their aircraft, yet innovative solutions were worked out on the scene. For example, the Marine Corps did not want their unique air-ground task forces to be broken up. USMARFORCENT worked out an agreement prior to execution of the air operation plan. USMARFORCENT would support its organic forces and provide an agreed-upon number of fixed-wing sorties to USCENTCOM for its use.

8. US Navy Forces

a. Familiar with the Gulf and the surrounding seas, the US Navy played a major role in establishing a naval blockade and enforcing the trade embargo that had been imposed by the UN Security Council on 6 August. These sanctions would have been ineffective without the Maritime Intervention Operations of 19 coalition navies. More than 7,500 challenges to merchant ships resulted in 964 boardings and cargo inspections.
Fifty-one ships were diverted, carrying more than a million tons of cargo in violation of the sanctions. While some materials were smuggled in by air and across the borders, import of most war materials and equipment was completely stopped. The operation demonstrated that effective coalition sea control can isolate an enemy from basic warfighting material and supplies. Iraq was prevented from replacing combat losses.

b. During the extended time the Iraqis were in Kuwait, their engineers built elaborate defensive systems along the coast. Their pre-invasion mining efforts affected all of the operations conducted by naval forces. The USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine and the USS Princeton triggered the explosion of a bottom mine. Both ships experienced damage, but only the Princeton required major repairs.

c. The US Navy and the coalition navies quickly neutralized Iraq’s navy and established near-total control of the northern Gulf. Iraq was unable to lay additional mines, attack offshore targets, or even disrupt amphibious operations. Naval forces provided a protected flank for ground forces and facilities on the Arabian Peninsula. Iraq could not interfere at sea or get into a position to strike friendly forces. USNAVCENT provided the all-important force protection that permitted Operation DESERT STORM to begin.

9. US Reserve Forces

On 8 November, President Bush announced a 200,000 personnel call-up of reserve units. These forces reinforced all Services. Many of the reserves deployed as units, capable of assuming any combat mission assigned. The flexibility these reserves provided USCINCENT gave them a role in total force deployment. These reserve forces were critical to multiple combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. Moreover, their performance validated the total force concept. Additionally, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (using civilian transport aircraft and crews as a logistic adjunct) was used for the first time, and proved to be successful.

10. Operation DESERT STORM: The Air War

a. Early in planning, USCINCENT identified Iraq’s major centers of gravity, three of which are discussed below. First, plans were made to strike command and control nodes and Iraqi leadership. Without orders from the top, there could be no military direction or political control. Weapons of mass destruction were also targeted, as was the Republican Guard. Eliminating these forces as effective units would dramatically shorten the war. In all categories USCINCENT identified and struck enemy vulnerabilities with carefully planned air attacks.

b. At 0130 hours on 17 January 1991, US warships launched Tomahawk attack missiles towards Baghdad. Operation DESERT STORM had begun. Hours before, B-52 bombers had taken off from Louisiana carrying cruise missiles to their targets. Fighters were en route to targets in Baghdad and Western Iraq. Other aircraft attacked early warning radar sites. Heavy air strikes occurred across Iraq. Within hours, key nodes of command and control, air defense networks, and other centers of gravity were severely jolted.

c. Air operations were theoretically divided into three Phases. Phase I was the strategic attack against Iraq. While air operations continued throughout the war, the number of missions had dropped significantly by day 13. Phase II was a concentrated effort to establish air supremacy in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Like Phase I, this effort continued throughout air operations. Phase
III was the longest and most intense, and was designed to prepare the battlefield. By day 13, most of the air attacks supported this objective.

d. By the end of Phase I, successful air assaults had substantially reduced the combat effectiveness of the aggressor by crippling his communication, command, and control ability and destroying his strategic air defenses. During Phase II, considerable effort was directed toward enemy surface-to-air missile systems and large caliber anti-aircraft artillery threatening coalition aircraft. With the success of these efforts, friendly aircraft operated freely in Kuwait and USCINCENT declared air supremacy on D+10. Direct air attacks against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait continued until the end of the war. Coalition air strikes interdicted the major supply lines and transportation centers in the operational area, resulting in major food shortages for all Iraqi forces.

e. In the final Phase III of the air offensive, air power began battlefield preparation in earnest. Roads were rendered impassable; tanks and equipment were destroyed; the ability of commanders to communicate with their troops was battered. Delivery of food and supplies was severely disrupted and morale of the Iraqi troops broken. The success of the ground offensive, the rapid conclusion of the war, and the few casualties sustained were in no small measure due to the combined efforts of the coalition air forces. USCINCENT required that at least 50 percent of all enemy armor and heavy artillery be destroyed as a condition for the ground offensive to start. More than 112,000 combat and support sorties were flown and 288 Tomahawk land-attack missiles and 35 air launched cruise missiles were used against Saddam’s forces and centers of gravity. These air operations successfully isolated his leadership and seriously impeded the ability of forces to conduct offensive operations. While his forces remained in Kuwait, they were in no condition to wage a major offensive; in fact, their ability to coordinate an effective defense had also been degraded.

f. While air operations were in progress, one of the largest and longest movements of combat forces in history was taking place, unknown to the Iraqis. Shifting west from its original location near the coast, the VII Corps maneuvered 150 miles in formation and the XVIII Airborne Corps was airlifted 260 miles as they moved into position. Using transportation assets on a 24-hour basis, 270,000 coalition troops were moved in a 3 week period. C-130s, also flying day and night, moved supplies, equipment, logistics bases, and fuel. Miles of trucks supported the unprecedented logistics effort.
If an Iraqi pilot had managed to penetrate the air space over the border area during the great shift west, he would have been stunned by the panorama below. It was “mile after mile of tank transporters, gasoline tankers, troop and ammunition carriers,” while “overhead was the continuous clatter of C-130 transport planes and cargo helicopters.” Occasionally, a truck pulled into one of the rest stops along the twelve- to fourteen-hour ride from the ports to the assembly areas. If any proof of allied air supremacy were necessary, this was it: “I shudder to think,” an American observer wrote, “what a couple of Iraqi planes could have done.”

The Whirlwind War, Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, General Editors

h. PSYOP forces dropped twenty-nine million leaflets in the Kuwait theater. According to senior Iraqi commanders, these leaflets were second only to the air attacks in increasing desertions and lowering morale. Electronic warfare and the jamming effort contributed significantly to the destabilization of the Iraqi forces. After 38 days, Phase IV, ground operations, could commence.

i. Early in the war, coalition air power had taken out the Iraqi Air Force. This kept Saddam from realizing that a massive combat buildup was occurring in the west. Because it did not know in time, the Republican Guard was unable to react.

j. PSYOP, the electronic warfare effort, and the jamming effort contributed to the destabilization of the Iraqi forces. USCINCCENT used tactical surprise as a “force multiplier.” Deception also played a crucial role in these ground operations, giving the US forces the surprise needed to win. Throughout the war, General Schwarzkopf was able to deceive Iraqi forces of his intentions, the location and identities of his units, and the sectors assigned.

“[Battle] is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration . . . for it is toward the disintegration of human groups that battle is directed.”

Herbert Butterfield, Man On His Past

11. Operation DESERT STORM: The Ground War

a. The ground war started 24 February, after 6 months of preparation, maritime interception, and aerial bombardment. The objectives were to destroy the Republican Guard Forces in Kuwait, eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and assist in restoring the government of Kuwait.

b. To accomplish these objectives, the coalition forces would fix and hold the Iraqi forward divisions in place. To the east, I MEF would conduct a supporting attack along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. In the west, the main attack had two US Army Corps and
a French and a British division sweeping around Iraqi defenses, striking deep into Iraq, cutting lines of communications, and destroying enemy forces in Kuwait. In reserve, the 4th and 5th MEBs still threatened a seaborne invasion, ensuring a mistaken focus by the Iraqi defenses. US and coalition air action had completely removed the possibility of redeploying Iraqi forces in response to the unexpected flank attack.

12. 24 February 1991

See Figure V-1.

a. The French 6th Light Armored Division and US 82nd Airborne Division led the western sweep to protect the left flank and provide forward bases deep in Iraqi territory. Simultaneously, the 101st Air Assault Division mounted a large helicopter-borne assault and secured its objective of forward operating base Cobra, half-way to the Euphrates River. The Iraqi forces, taken by surprise, offered only disorganized resistance. The XVIII Airborne Corps was some 179 miles into Iraq and had closed the first of several key roads. This long reach by helicopters allowed US forces to cut major lines of communications between Kuwait and Iraq. Badly hammered by air attacks and totally surprised by this envelopment, the Iraqi forces offered only light resistance. The success of this maneuver enabled the US VII Corps to commence the main attack on the Republican Guard positions 15 hours early. Facing a denser concentration of a more highly skilled enemy, it moved more slowly than the wide flanking force, but nonetheless the day’s end found it 20 miles into Iraq holding about 1,300 prisoners.

b. In the east, I MEF, with the Army’s Tiger Brigade and Joint Forces Command-North (JFC-N) and Joint Forces Command-East, the coalition forces under command of Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan, attacked Kuwait. Both the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions breached the Iraqi minefields and attacked 20 miles into Kuwait. Shortly after first light, the Marine Divisions were through the second defensive obstacle belt with little Iraqi resistance. The advance met with sporadic enemy fire and some skirmishing. Conditions on the battlefield included thick smoke from burning oil wells, indirect
Figure V-1. Ground War: Situation 24 February 1991
artillery fire, and thousands of Iraqi soldiers streaming southward to surrender. The result of the first day’s fighting in the Marine sector included 56 enemy tanks destroyed, over 9,000 prisoners of war, and an entire tank battalion with 35 intact T-55 tanks captured. 3rd Marine Air Wing flew 671 sorties in support of USMARFORCENT. It flew strikes against six Iraqi divisions and destroying an additional 40 tanks and numerous miscellaneous vehicles. Faced with major attacks along a 300 mile front, Iraq was unable to mount a counterattack.

13. 25 February 1991

a. On 25 February, the XVIII Airborne Corps continued to drive into Iraq. By the end of the day, all divisions had advanced, securing assigned objectives, and establishing an important forward operating base and brigade-blocking positions on the Euphrates River. Crossing the mine breach, the attack slowed in VII Corps’ area. Conditions were right for an armored counter attack. General Franks was working through these problems at the same time he faced difficulties in the JFC-N area. Syrian and Egyptian forces were slow moving forward and a major gap was opening in the line. US units were shifted to cover the gap, and by late morning, JFC-N was making progress. VII Corps continued its advance.

b. On the 2nd day of combat, I MEF continued its attack in the face of moderate resistance. The 1st Marine Division began the day forward of the Burgan oil field. After a daytime battle at close quarters, by nightfall Al Jaber Airfield was cleared. The Division had destroyed 80 enemy tanks and captured 2,000 prisoners. The 2nd Marine Division started the day south of Al Abdallya. It soon faced the stiffest counterattack it would encounter. After a day of fierce fighting, the Iraqis were repulsed. The division captured 4,500 prisoners and destroyed 248 enemy tanks. As the ground assault continued, the

5th MEB, afloat in the Gulf, landed at Al Mishab, serving both as a feint and as USMARFORCENT’s reserve.

14. 26 February 1991

a. XVIII Airborne Corps turned northeast and attacked into the Euphrates River Valley. In the course of the attack, the 24th Division hit the heaviest resistance of the war from divisions of the Republican Guard. The action also involved an artillery exchange which eliminated Iraqi artillery by battalions. Meanwhile, XVIII Airborne Corps continued to cross important phase lines, pushing out to An Nasiriyah and Jalibah. Two Iraqi armored divisions put up a stiff fight in the VII Corps sector and, in a most remarkable encounter, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment engaged the Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guard. In 6 minutes, the 2nd destroyed all 37 enemy T-72’s in an action subsequently named the Battle of 73 Easting. The 1st Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry and continued the attack.

b. To the east, I MEF continued ground combat operations. The 1st Marine Division advanced on the Kuwait International Airport. Despite resistance by armored units, the Marines continued forward until enemy forces surrendered northwest of the airport. In seizing the airport, the 1st Marine Division destroyed 300 enemy tanks. The 2nd Marine Division advanced to the city of Al Jahra with moderate opposition. By late afternoon, it had reached Mutla Ridge northwest of Al Jahra, blocking the Iraqi escape route into Basra. The Tiger Brigade cleared the police post on the ridge and held the highest ground in either direction. The day ended with hundreds of air strikes by USAF and Navy aircraft hitting Iraqi vehicles fleeing west on the only escape route, Highway 8.
15. 27 February 1991

a. Once the 24th Division secured its position and occupied two nearby airfields, the XVIII Airborne Corps could continue its advance towards Al Basrah. On 27 February, hundreds of enemy vehicles were destroyed along Highways 8 and across the desert. Coalition combat equipment losses were negligible. VII Corps continued to move east, engaging any Republican Guard units trying to flee. Its divisions were making outstanding progress pushing into Kuwait. Five combat divisions hit the Iraqi forces with the most powerful armored force since 1945. VII Corps’ advance proceeded unimpeded, and Iraqi military power in this sector dissolved. The attack continued until the cease-fire went into effect.

b. In I MEF’s sector, the battle continued. The 1st Marine Division finished taking Kuwait International Airport by early morning. It coordinated passage of lines for the Arab forces to enter Kuwait City. The 2nd Marine Division remained in the vicinity of its Al Jahra blocking positions and began clearing its zone of action. The Tiger Brigade continued to play a key part in the 2nd Marine Division sector, engaging Iraqi tanks and artillery pieces and capturing additional prisoners.

16. Concluding Events

When President Bush ordered the cease-fire on 28 February, US and coalition ground forces had won a major victory in the desert. After 4 days, the Iraqi Army, including the elite Republican Guards, were routed and incapable of any organized resistance. Large numbers of Iraqis were surrendering, and most of the remainder were retreating. After 43 days of air operations that involved 2,700 coalition aircraft, the coalition force had defeated the fourth largest standing army in the world in 100 hours. The ground attack never stalled. All enemy forces were hit hard and destroyed or forced into retreat. Coalition forces captured or destroyed 3,847 tanks, 1,450 personnel carriers, and almost 3,000 artillery pieces. Some 86,000 prisoners had been captured; more than 74 percent of these were captured by US forces. Iraq had been forcibly ejected from Kuwait and Kuwait City was once again free.

17. Operation DESERT STORM and Joint Employment Principles

a. Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the competence of US military forces and the effectiveness of their doctrinal approach. While maintaining the coalition was complex, the coalition itself set clear, simple objectives, and pursued them without distraction. Coalition resolve and cohesion showed that neither the United States nor its partners would tolerate armed aggression.

b. US operations and command relationships during DESERT STORM once again showed the criticality of unity of command. The clear lines of authority given to military commanders by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation supported success in this
massive multi-national operation. General Schwarzkopf’s ability to make and enforce critical decisions was reinforced by the confidence shown in him by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Allowed to do his job, General Schwarzkopf did it well. Meanwhile, his superiors carried out the critical tasks of maintaining multinational cooperation, cohesiveness, coordination, and resolve in pursuit of unity of effort.

c. Operation DESERT STORM confounded pundits who believed that the end of the Cold War meant that the United States no longer had to maintain large forces capable of major operations at extreme operational reach. With the conflict area thousands of miles from the United States, strategic speed was of the essence. Moving combat-capable forces quickly was instrumental in deterring Saddam Hussein from invading Saudi Arabia. US doctrine and procedures, using massive strategic airlift and pre-positioned war material, proved their worth in the first few weeks of the conflict. Once the situation was stabilized, attention could then be turned to achieving primary coalition objectives. These objectives were stated clearly, and forces were sized to achieve them. At both the strategic and tactical level the principle of economy of force was honored. For example, in Korea deterrence required that forces be maintained at full strength. Other areas, such as Europe, were able to serve as sources of troops and material. Reduced Cold War tensions permitted drawdowns in areas of minimal perceived threat. At the tactical level, attrition of Iraqi capabilities in the early stages of the war freed coalition defensive assets for offensive missions.

d. Combat power during Operation DESERT STORM was enhanced by clever use of deception. Throughout the action, coalition forces took action to give a credible impression that US Marine forces would mount an amphibious attack from the east. These operations pinned Iraqi defense forces in the wrong area, as General Schwarzkopf’s “Hail Mary” play put the main attack in the west. Coordinated air, sea, and land attacks ensured that Iraqi forces could not redeploy even after the true nature of the coalition thrust was obvious.

e. In Operation DESERT STORM, commanders and planners identified critical Iraqi centers of gravity and attacked them in mass by coordinating available air, land, and sea assets. These centers of gravity included Iraqi leadership and its command and control system, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam’s most effective combat units, the Republican Guard. Air supremacy was sought from the outset, and ensured that all later actions could proceed unimpaired. While strategic speed brought distant forces to the operation, tactical speed ensured destruction of enemy forces. The move of forces toward the west and coalition tactics released the full capabilities of coalition high speed armor and air assault units. With the Iraqi command and control and logistics systems disrupted by air, sea, and land bombardment, rapid enemy redeployment became impossible. Destruction of Iraqi forces meant more than mere killing, as effective use of PSYOP took Iraqi units out of the fight through desertion, thus reducing casualties for both sides. Other nonlethal means, such as electronic warfare and electronic jamming, multiplied combat power to shorten the war.

f. Surprise also contributed to lower combat losses. Coalition air supremacy severely restricted Iraqi reconnaissance ability. Deception, inadequate Iraqi intelligence, and inability to understand how quickly coalition forces could deploy multiplied the shock of the flank attack from the west. Iraqi commanders were unable to rally effective defense in the face of the combination of speed, combat power, and rapid deployment and employment devised
by General Schwarzkopf and his planners, action officers, and commanders. This effect was multiplied by highly effective coalition OPSEC; thousands of troops of a multinational force were shifted hundreds of miles to the west without Iraqi response. Coalition tactical maneuvers leveraged combat power by combining joint force actions to lead to the coalition military victory.

g. The swiftness and totality of the ground war victory made the outcome look inevitable in retrospect. Military professionals need to understand the specific concepts and execution that made the results inescapable. The commanders, planners, action officers, leaders, and fighting troops of all services and coalition partners put together a textbook demonstration of combining effective doctrine with modern technology. Nor was the enemy a pushover. Many of Saddam's troops were battle-hardened veterans who had endured conditions similar to World War I in a long, bloody, and inconclusive war with Iran. Applying proven US doctrinal concepts enabled professional, courageous execution using technologically superior combat equipment in lightning tactical applications. The size of the forces, the distances covered, and the speeds were unprecedented. Planning and coordination requirements were enormous, yet were executed with a completeness and professionalism that produced an overwhelming victory at minimum cost.
Military Incident #7
FACING THE UNEXPECTED AND UNTHINKABLE: REVULSION, REACTION, AND RESTRAINT

The essence of war is surprise.

Tactical maneuver may lead to one form of surprise.

Inability to understand a situation can cause another form of surprise.

In the Korean War and in Somalia, adversaries used human shields.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart pointed out that, "War is the realm of the unexpected." In the cases of Korea and Somalia, American soldiers have been confronted by surprises that reach beyond the ordinary.

Ordinarily, military surprise refers to failure to anticipate tactical maneuvers that are clever manipulations of the tools of war. As illustrated in Military Incident #5, Hannibal surprised the Roman legions by having his troops back up under pressure. The Romans, thinking that they were defeating the Carthaginians, were shocked to the point of collapse when this apparent retreat turned out to be an ideal use of terrain and movement to set up a classic double envelopment. This surprise was within the context of the rules of war familiar to both the Romans and Carthaginians at the time.

Napoléon said, "War is composed of nothing but surprises." Often the root of surprise is faulty perception: And perception too often derives from expectation, not observation. For example, Union troops discovered the complete Confederate plan before the battle of Antietam. Yet the outcome showed that the Union commander took no advantage of his foreknowledge. Among the reasons for this failure may have been the way the plan was found; accidentally, on a roadside, handwritten on a paper wrapped around some cigars. The "key to victory" is not normally one's first thought when encountering a crumpled wrapper protecting a bunch of cheap ciggies, and having found it so easily may have led to the mistaken conclusion that such plans were a deliberate counterintelligence move on the part of the Confederates.

Moral and cultural expectations can also delay and distort perception, sometimes with fatal results. In the Korean War and in Somalia, incidents occurred that were fundamentally foreign to the American perception of morality and war. Credible reports indicate situations in which US troops were confronted with armed enemies who attacked from behind civilian human shields. In Korea the enemy would be preceded by a group of refugees, who would step aside at the last moment to reveal the "North Korean infantrymen" among them. In Somalia, gunmen placed themselves amongst civilian mobs that provided cover during exchanges of fire.
Understanding the situation is key to survival and success. To Americans this practice is morally revolting. But soldiers, Marines, and airmen confronting this situation have no time to reorganize their expectations, but must see, understand, and react correctly in seconds. In both situations, the problem is not deciding, since there is but one choice — to fire. The real problem is in understanding the situation despite preconceptions, moral expectations, and the fog of war.

In Korea, once the troops had become aware of the Communists using human shields, the shock of the tactic wore off. The shock of using human shields, however, is multiplied in peace enforcement operations. In these operations, virtually anything can happen, and troops and commanders must not only be prepared for unexpected events, but be able to react to them at the proper level of force under the principle of restraint.
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."

Dag Hammarskjöld

1. Introduction

a. Since the cold war ended, the frequency of peace operations has been on the rise. As the preeminent global power, the United States will be asked in nearly every incident to assist the world community in managing these crises effectively. The following is an account of Operation RESTORE HOPE, an example of a military operation other than war (MOOTW) that involved US forces.

b. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a peace enforcement operation in Somalia, where military force was applied, with UN authorization, to restore peace and order so that humanitarian assistance could be provided. The consent of the numerous clans who had divided Somalia up into warring factions was not obtained. While not required, this lack of clan acquiescence would cause problems before the US troops were withdrawn.

2. Background

a. The summer of 1991 found Somalia in chaos. The government of dictator Siad Barre had fallen in January 1991. Civil war and a long-standing drought destroyed farms and livestock, and brought famine throughout the land. Local warlords controlled the country. Muhammad Farah Aidid was the most powerful of these warlords and controlled the central part of Somalia. Muhammad Ali Mahdi controlled Mogadishu, Muhammad Omar Jess controlled the port city of Kismayu in southwestern Somalia, and Muhammad Siad Hersi controlled the rest of the southwest. Constant fighting among their militias (in most cases little more than gangs) as well as violence and intimidation of the civilian population created a situation which world and US public opinion found intolerable. This situation caused the UN and United States to act.

b. Fighting between gangs often made it impossible to unload the ships that were arriving in the port city of Mogadishu. Supplies and food that were unloaded were stolen at dockside. Only 20 percent of the food entering Somalia reached the people who needed it. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 25 percent of Somalia's 6 million people were dying, either of starvation or disease. The evening news brought pictures of starving women and children into the living rooms of Americans, pushing the United States to become involved. The world community responded to this crisis with relief efforts organized by various humanitarian organizations. In April the UN had authorized 50 unarmed observers, but the gesture had no perceptible effect. The poorly coordinated international aid effort could not overcome the chaotic local conditions.

c. Throughout the summer, the White House pressed the UN Security Council for a resolution authorizing “additional measures to ensure that humanitarian relief can be delivered.” The UN Security Council reacted with a resolution authorizing 500 armed peacekeepers to safeguard both the humanitarian workers and UN observers already in Somalia. This battalion's primary mission was to supervise the unloading of ships and to keep the convoys safe from thieves. This operation was designated United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I).
3. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF

a. On 14 August 1992, President George Bush ordered an emergency airlift of food to Somalia. The airlift was intended to help alleviate the suffering brought on by the famine and to give East Africans an opportunity to recover from drought and war. The Bush administration planned to furnish food and other relief supplies to southern and central Somalia and to parts of northern Kenya to which more than a million Somalis had fled seeking refuge. To facilitate this action, USCENTCOM was ordered to activate Joint Task Force-Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. The objectives were to send in a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team to assess the relief requirements, activate the JTF to conduct the emergency airlift, and deploy the aircraft necessary to operate during daylight into safe and permissive locations. This was a very small task force with no combat mission.

b. By mid-September, 500 armed Pakistani peacekeepers sent by the UN had reached Mogadishu via US sealift and airlift. Amphibious Ready Group Tarawa arrived offshore to provide support to the Pakistani Security Battalion. The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was on board the USS Tarawa for use in Somalia if a change in mission required its use.

"When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the case is quite different."

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini

c. The Air Force used eight C-130s and four C-141s to fly supplies into Mombassa, Kenya, where they were then transported to two distribution centers in the Somali famine belts. The international relief community distributed the food from there. The largest and most difficult problem was security for the food once it arrived in Somalia. Armed looters and thieves made it difficult to get the food to the hungry. The danger increased as the violence escalated.

d. In late November a UN ship, attempting to deliver 10,000 tons of food to Mogadishu, was fired on and driven away from port. A day later, a Pakistani peacekeeper was shot when his car was hijacked. Faced with these events and a security situation rapidly spiraling out of control, the UN Security Council called for immediate military action in Somalia.

e. After following the crisis for several weeks, President Bush decided that more aggressive action was required for Operation PROVIDE RELIEF to reopen the flow of food
to the most needy. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger offered US forces to the UN on 26 November.

4. Operation RESTORE HOPE

a. On 3 December, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794, which took a tougher line towards Somalia. The UN established an objective by authorizing the soldiers to “use all necessary means” to ensure that foodstuffs reached the starving. Further, the resolution demanded that “all factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities.” While the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali preferred that the troops be used to pacify the country, the United States insisted that force would only be used as a defensive measure. The United States would command the multinational force to be known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF). To address the concerns of a number of African countries about perceived colonialism, the Secretary General was given oversight of the operation. The Security Council required that the soldiers be withdrawn once order was restored, and the resolution made no provision for nation building. No exit strategy was stated.

b. The United States formed JTF Somalia to carry out Operation RESTORE HOPE as part of UNITAF. Its mission was to secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organizations; and to assist UN and nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

c. The UN encouraged all its members to provide troops for this mission. On 4 December, France announced it would send aircraft and 2,000 soldiers from neighboring Djibouti. Italy, former colonial ruler of Southern Somalia, agreed to provide troops, and other nations joined in as plans progressed. The multinational character of the operation added a number of complicating factors, including political, language, and cultural barriers, as well as varying military capabilities and logistic support.

d. Tremendous demands were put on the United States for logistic support in Operation RESTORE HOPE. All the basics were requested: fuel, water, food, and transportation. Liaison and advisory teams started from day one to work through these problems and reach agreements for cooperation. Pre-positioning ships and the Army Corps Support Group fulfilled all demands placed upon them, making the operation possible.

e. With over thirty humanitarian relief organizations active in Somalia, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) became necessary. The CMOC served as the clearing house for all information to and from the humanitarian agencies, providing information on operations through daily briefings, responding to emergency requests in a timely manner, and keeping track of other activities as required. In addition, the CMOC helped establish a food logistics system which factored in everything from dates of arrival of shipments, to road repair work, to creating a framework in which the relief efforts could function.

f. Although intelligence gathering was not its function, the CMOC proved to be an invaluable source of situational intelligence. While the normal sources of intelligence gathering are valuable in a MOOTW situation, the lack of a sophisticated infrastructure can increase the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT). Using HUMINT as a resource, all patrols were debriefed and the combat intelligence team (CIT) was involved from the start. In one case, a reconnaissance platoon’s commander arranged CIT meetings with local elders. In sum, HUMINT proved to be a useful source
of information. The use of unexpected local intelligence was critical in providing up-to-the-minute assessments. Experience provided UNITAF with a good understanding of how to use these organizations to complement its mission.

The CJTF emphasized unity of effort, or the need for all coalition forces to work together in the common relief effort. This was difficult with forces of various sizes representing different national interests. A plan was devised that allowed the larger brigade-size forces to operate as units and organized the smaller units under the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, depending on their specialty. The CJTF was then able to construct the right mix of forces needed and to build on the unit integrity that the forces brought with them.

In the weeks that followed, additional US forces arrived. Equipment was drawn from afloat pre-positioning assets of Maritime Pre-positioning Squadron 2, based at Diego Garcia. The USS Ranger Carrier Battle Group was redirected from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean off Somalia to support the buildup of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Eventually, about 25,000 Americans were assigned to Somalia. Other countries contributed 13,000 servicemen to the effort.

Military intervention was necessary to see that foodstuffs reached the starving.

h. Shortly after midnight on 9 December, the first Marines and Navy SEALS crossed the beach near the Mogadishu airport. Their mission was to establish positions to help secure the beach. A force of 1,800 Marines followed the landing craft and helicopters, and quickly secured the harbor and airport. The Marine Expeditionary Unit moved into the city and set up headquarters in the US embassy, which had been closed during the fighting in January 1991. In the weeks that followed, additional US forces arrived. Equipment was drawn from afloat pre-positioning assets of Maritime Pre-positioning Squadron 2, based at Diego Garcia. The USS Ranger Carrier Battle Group was redirected from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean off Somalia to support the buildup of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Eventually, about 25,000 Americans were assigned to Somalia. Other countries contributed 13,000 servicemen to the effort.

i. The Marines were hampered by Somalia’s extremely limited infrastructure, and had to establish a temporary base of operations. Major improvements in roads, warehousing, and other facilities were undertaken by more than 1,000 Seabees from Naval Construction Regiment 30.

This important engineering work improved the reception sites and enabled more forces and their equipment to join the relief effort. Follow-on forces included units from the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division and small contingents from twenty different countries. US and coalition troops moved to the outlying areas to begin the task of restoring order.
j. On 11 December, the two main warlords in Mogadishu signed a peace accord that went into effect at once. The warlords agreed to have their soldiers withdraw their weapons from the capital city within 48 hours, remove military checkpoints on the “green line” that divided their territories, and cease all propaganda against each other. Almost immediately the treaty was broken, with sporadic fighting between the two factions and attacks on lesser groups. Within weeks the violence included attacking coalition forces.

k. A convoy of almost 700 US and French troops reached the town of Baidoa on 16 December. This town was one of the hardest hit by famine, and was the object of robberies committed by armed gangs. The criminal activity continued until the protected convoy arrived. As was the case with the landing the prior week in Mogadishu, the multinational force met no resistance. Upon arrival, Somali gunmen were disarmed and food for children was handed out in the town orphanage.

l. By Christmas, UNITAF forces secured several key Somali towns, ensuring that foodstuffs would be delivered to famine-stricken areas in southern Somalia. US Marines and Belgian paratroopers made an additional landing at Kismayu on 20 December, to wrest control of the port city from its chief warlord, Omar Jess. In the several days and nights prior to this landing, more than 100 residents had been murdered by Jess’s followers, apparently to eliminate intellectuals able to assist UNITAF.

m. Baidoa also received a large Christmas convoy. More than 300 metric tons reached Baidoa in the first major shipment of food since November. Meanwhile, a 600-man US Marine force pushed on to Bardera. This southwestern town was an important feeding center for refugees who had fled to the countryside to escape the drought and civil war. Other task force members took over the northwestern city of Hoddur and started clearing mines. Hoddur was not involved in the civil war, but the thousands of mines in the area made it too dangerous for the relief trucks to deliver food there. At the same time, two companies of Italian troops occupied Gailalassi. Finally, 200 US soldiers of the 87th Infantry Regiment established a firm hold at Belet Uen. At that point, commanders believed the mission was ahead of schedule. After three weeks in Somalia, UNITAF had secured the famine belt of central and southern Somalia and was effectively providing relief supplies.

n. The UNITAF forces adhered to strict ROE and showed great restraint in dealing with the Somali people. While commanders were authorized to use “all force necessary” to protect themselves, in general the show of force, coupled with the good will of the bulk of the civilian population, resulted in few incidents. It was soon evident that a different approach had to be used with the clan leaders’ armed retainers. Political concerns dictated the use of minimum force. However, when the clan leaders’ actions demanded it, the JTF had the flexibility to increase the force immediately and decisively.

o. In response to persistent sniper fire from a clansmen’s camp, 400 Marines raided a compound in Mogadishu belonging to the faction headed by Mohammed Farah Aidid on 7 January 1993. This was the largest raid to that point in Operation RESTORE HOPE. The Mogadishu compound was one of several that Aidid used to store arms and outfit his militia. One of Aidid’s rivals, Mohammed Ali Mahdi, had also hidden arms in Mogadishu prior to the arrival of UNITAF. Using loudspeakers, the Marines warned the Somalis to give themselves up. The response was gunfire. The Marines attacked with tanks and artillery, while helicopters provided covering fire. The Somalis returned fire with heavy machine guns prior to fleeing their positions. Some surrendered, but a number...
were killed or captured. The Marines sustained no casualties.

p. These skirmishes produced a decided shift in tactics from peace operations to a combat posture. US commanders declared that the warlords and their clansmen were no longer allowed to run free through the capital. The Marines began seeking out the armed fighters and disarming them. These orders reflected a policy change resulting from the need for basic security in Mogadishu to prevent renewed fighting and looting. The clan fighters were not given the opportunity to gain the upper hand.

q. On 3 March, the UN proposed that US forces in the Operation RESTORE HOPE mission be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force. The Secretary General suggested a replacement force of 28,000. The UN praised the US-led international force and its effort to confiscate the arms of warring parties, but noted that, while progress was being made, much needed to be done to pacify the entire country.

r. A firefight in Kismayu in late February delayed the relief of the US-led force. Warriors loyal to Siad Hersi (Morgan) slipped into the city under cover of darkness and took supplies and arms held by Jess’s forces. Twenty-four Somalis were killed in street fighting before Morgan’s men retreated. Following the Morgan incident, rioting broke out in Mogadishu. At this point Aidid erroneously believed that coalition forces were siding with Morgan, a misconception which was to have serious consequences later. The rioting temporarily halted the flow of relief supplies. During the fighting, four Americans and two Nigerians were wounded. For a time, it looked as if these events would make it more difficult to depart.

s. The mission of Operation RESTORE HOPE was completed. The countryside had been stabilized and relief supplies were flowing; the grip of the famine had been broken. In Mogadishu, the “technicals” (vehicles with mounted automatic weapons) that terrorized the streets were disarmed; the ports and other key installations were open. The UN and USCENTCOM objectives were achieved. This operation was clearly a success.

t. In sum, Operation RESTORE HOPE had achieved President Bush’s objectives. The major installations were secured and open, and free passage of relief supplies was established. Humanitarian relief was provided and a larger disaster was averted. Based on the death toll in
1992, this effort saved 250,000 Somali lives. The clans were fighting among themselves less than they had prior to the arrival of US forces, and the danger of mass starvation had abated. Between December 1992 and April 1993, elements of the basic political process were restarted, but political reconciliation made little headway.

u. In part this success was a result of planning considerations. The mission analysis and command estimate process, so critical to a solid plan, were used. The CJTF received the right mix of forces for Operation RESTORE HOPE. By dividing Somalia into operational areas, he was able to use forces that had trained together and could keep them intact. This enabled UNITAF to avoid provisional or ad hoc forces which can result in reduced effectiveness.

5. Operation CONTINUED HOPE

a. The UN took over the multinational force on 4 May 1993, bringing to an end Operation RESTORE HOPE.

b. The UNOSOM II force under Lieutenant General Cevik Bir's command totaled 18,000 soldiers, including 5,000 Americans. While the majority of the US forces were designated for logistics support, 1,100 members of the 10th Mountain Division remained as a Quick Reaction Force. These UN troops patrolled with ROE that gave them the authority to defend themselves and to use force to disarm the clans and restore order. US forces now referred to the deployment as Operation CONTINUED HOPE.

c. UN Security Council Resolution 814 in March 1993, which directed the formation of UNOSOM II, established the peacekeeping force under enforcement provisions of the Charter and directed the disarmament of the Somali clans. It permitted the re-establishment of political and economic structure and called for building a secure environment for the entire country. The mission of the US forces was, when directed, to conduct "military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance and political reconciliation of Somalia."

d. In a series of ambushes on 5 June, Aidid gunmen attacked members of the Pakistani peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, killing 23 soldiers and wounding 55. Aidid ordered the
ambushes to test the UN troops and their commanders and to shore up his sagging support.

e. A week later, UN forces launched attacks against Aidid, his home, and his command center. The UN had issued a warrant for his arrest, but he escaped and went into hiding. Less than a month later, a US helicopter attacked an Aidid stronghold, killing more than 13 Somalis. Mobs retaliated for this armed action. Tensions increased when three journalists were killed. Some believed Mogadishu was more violent than when American forces first arrived in December, 1992.

"[The inhabitant] acquires a military sagacity and the skill in the use of such weapons as he has at his command which the trained soldier never can aspire to."

Charles Callwell
Small Wars — Their Principles and Practice

f. A contingent of 400 US Army Rangers trained in urban warfare arrived in Somalia on 26 August 1993. Raids, covert operations, assaults, and rescue operations were their specialty. The Rangers were to assist the 10th Mountain Division units in maintaining the peace and to aid in the UN efforts to arrest Aidid and neutralize his followers.

g. On 3 and 4 October, 18 US Army soldiers were killed in a 15-hour battle against supporters of Aidid. Nearly 100 Rangers had taken part in the battle, which had started as a raid to capture some of Aidid’s closest supporters. When one of the accompanying helicopters was shot down, the Rangers were surrounded. Additional helicopters were shot down and reinforcements were repulsed. It was 10 hours before a relief force was able to break through and rescue the Rangers. Major General Thomas Montgomery, the deputy commander of the UN forces in Somalia, had requested additional tanks or APCs earlier, but they had not been provided. During the battle, Pakistani and Malaysian armored forces had to be “borrowed” to relieve the Rangers. These US deaths as well as vivid television scenes of the mutilation of some of the soldiers’ bodies increased calls to Congress for the withdrawal of American servicemen from the UN-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

h. This public debate caused a reassessment of the mission of US forces in Somalia. It was becoming obvious that troops were being used more for political reconciliation in Somalia than in the advancement of humanitarian aid. The forces committed were insufficient to provide proper security for such operations. The President ordered reinforcements to protect the US forces, and the forces began a phased withdrawal with a 31 March 1994 deadline. The last US peacekeeping contingent sailed from Mogadishu on 25 March 1994, ending the United States’ mission in Somalia.

i. In hindsight, UNOSOM II, the tragic loss of 18 US Army Rangers, and the breakdown of peace agreements tested our national will, but the United States stayed with the UN force until the humanitarian mission, as originally defined, was completed. In future MOOTW, the United States must consider that long-term commitments, mission expansion, and the operational control of Americans by a foreign commander are likely to cause intense national debate. Political considerations will always influence the course of action.

6. Somalia and Joint Employment Principles

a. The Principles of MOOTW share critical elements with the Principles of War. The basics of objective, unity of effort, and security are common to both. The objective of Operation RESTORE HOPE was clearly defined and attained. By contrast, the changing mission of Operation CONTINUED HOPE to include vague “nation building” and other political
objectives, as well as retaliatory military action against Aidid forces, caused the United States to abandon UNOSOM II as unachievable.

b. The legitimacy of the operation was initially not questioned. The UN Security Council resolution authorized the assistance and directed the task force to “use all necessary means” to ensure that food reached the starving. US public opinion supported this goal, particularly during the humanitarian assistance phase. The Somali population welcomed the aid. The soldiers and Marines perceived humanitarian aid as an important, worthwhile task. As one young pilot said, “It is not our usual job, but we feel pretty good about it. We’re helping people stay alive instead of killing them.” As the mission changed during UNOSOM II to nation building and other political objectives, the United States was perceived as having lost its neutral position among the clans, a perception shared by key clan leaders. This led to a loss of legitimacy in Somalia and endangered US forces, requiring the President to set a deadline for withdrawal. Unity of effort was possible during Operation RESTORE HOPE and was achieved by the CJTF. With the concentrated effort of the commanders, the utilization of forces that had trained together, the establishment of CMOC, and well coordinated logistics support, the CJTF possessed the elements necessary to apply this principle. During UNOSOM II, Major General Montgomery had a more difficult task in exercising his authority through an unusual assortment of command relationships that made unity of effort difficult.

c. The UNITAF rules of engagement protected the JTF’s inherent right of self-defense. All Service personnel stayed alert and handled perceived risk well. The clan fighters were never permitted to acquire a military or political advantage. As a result, security was achieved. US and coalition forces provided area security in the several sectors, both north and south, and relief supplies were distributed by a multinational team.

d. In assisting the UN, much will be asked of the United States. In turn, US leaders must demand mandates that are precise and clear and that prescribe entry and exit strategies. The UN changed the objective of the mission in Somalia, and learned that arresting and disarming warring factions are not tasks that should be taken lightly.
Chapter VI

"In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is both a statesman and a soldier, to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interest."

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini

— Application of the MOOTW principles in Somalia helped ensure success in Operation RESTORE HOPE and minimize losses. Where American lives are at stake, these principles cannot be overlooked. There is a clear doctrinal understanding that MOOTW can involve combat. This was demonstrated in very stark terms in UNOSOM II.
Military Incident #8
NEW MISSIONS, EARLY STRATEGIES: LYAUTEY FIGHTS IN LIMITED WARS

General Hubert Lyautey was perhaps the most successful French military colonial administrator. Lyautey combined political and military actions to pacify local residents. By the standards of the time and place, Lyautey’s methods were enlightened.

In the late 19th century, the French Army produced a “limited war” strategist whose concepts and character enabled him to support early development in northern Africa. General Hubert Lyautey was a pioneer of French military thought who began his colonial career in what was then called French Indochina.

Lyautey was among the first military men to recognize that resistance by colonial peoples could only be handled by a combination of political and military actions. Under the tutelage of General Joseph Gallieni, who later saved Paris at the opening of World War I, Lyautey developed the military and civil skills he exhibited in northern Africa. Lyautey combined light and mobile military forces with economic development to suppress nationalism.

Late in his career, Lyautey was assigned to suppress a revolt in the Oran area. Promoted to brigadier general at the advanced age of 59, he forced his superiors to allow him free rein in applying his theories to the problem. He demanded and got command of all military activity and control of all French political activity. Lyautey won different tribes over by protecting them under the French flag and providing social services ranging from medical care to marketplaces. Although he used military force when necessary, he looked beyond combat and focused on administration of territory under his control.

In 1911, at nearly 70 years of age, he was again sent to French Morocco. As before, Lyautey allowed all local customs to be followed. His troops taught modern agricultural methods, dug water holes, and built hospitals, markets, railroads, highways, and schools. General Lyautey fostered economic activity that brought jobs to local residents. Despite his emphasis on civil development, he never forgot the importance of the military arm, but was careful to use it with restraint.

The best defense of democratic states such as the United States is the continued spread of democracy. Although the colonial system has been discredited today, the methods developed by General Lyautey may still be used by peacekeeping operations to help troubled nations establish and maintain viable governments chosen by and responding to the needs of their people. Doctrine and objectives for peacekeeping operations reflect a new and important mission for military forces. US military operations in Haiti reflected this new reality.
CHAPTER VII
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

"I think, right up front, the success of any operation lies in the ability to execute what you've been given to do."

Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton

1. Introduction

a. MOOTW support a variety of purposes. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti allowed the United States to use its influence and military force to peacefully return President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. The mission succeeded because the CJTF understood the aims of the United States and set appropriate objectives.

b. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was conceived as a peace enforcement mission and became a peacekeeping mission. The operation demonstrated the flexibility of the JTF, showing an ability to adjust successfully to the rapid change in mission.

c. Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, Commander, JTF 180 went to Haiti prepared for war. He was able to adjust his mission from an invasion to a permissive entry. By working and training with all the component forces from the onset of the planning, he achieved unity of effort and maintained it throughout the operation as the situation and rules of engagement changed.

2. Background

a. Since its independence from France in 1804, Haiti has been plagued by violent political upheaval. From 1843 to 1915 there were 22 heads of state, with all but one being deposed. In 1915, the United States sent in Marines to protect US lives and property; they remained until 1934. In 1950, under a new constitution, popular elections began. However, from 1950 to 1957 five regimes were overthrown. In 1957, Francois Duvalier (nicknamed Papa Doc) was elected, but soon established a dictatorship marked by violence and terror. The terror was carried out by the Tontons Macoutes, a paramilitary corps of secret police that eliminated any political opposition. Duvalier was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude (Baby Doc), who continued the dictatorship until he was overthrown in 1986. From then on, the political situation remained chaotic and brutal. A military coup overthrew the elected President in 1988. In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president.

b. By September 1991 Aristide was deposed by a bloody military coup, and Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Commander in Chief of the Haitian armed forces, ushered in a period of violence and economic chaos expressed in the massive and dangerous exodus of Haitians via hastily constructed and unseaworthy boats. In July 1993, forced by a UN economic embargo and extreme pressure from the international community, Cedras signed the Governors Island Accord with President Aristide. The accord included a multi-step plan to reestablish democratic rule in Haiti and return President Aristide to power by mid-October. The accords were never honored by Cedras and by October 1993, with the turning back of the USS Harlan County due to violent demonstrations in the Port-au-Prince harbor and the subsequent removal of various UN forces, Haiti was once again an outcast in the international community.
3. UN Involvement

a. The UN began to negotiate for the peaceful return of Aristide and democratic rule in Haiti. In January 1994 the Clinton administration established Joint Task Force 180, and a Joint Planning Group convened to begin invasion planning. The XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina served as JTF headquarters. The objectives of the mission were to:

- Ensure that Haitian armed forces and police comply with stated accords;
- Protect US citizens and interests, designated Haitians and third country nationals;
- Restore civil order;
- Assist in the reorganization of Haitian armed forces and police; and
- Assist in transition to a democratic government.

b. Lieutenant General Shelton wasted no time in using his staff and outside experts as required to evaluate current operation plans. Joint command and control and intelligence systems were established. As a result, the JTF was fully functional as a joint headquarters for months prior to deployment.

c. Between 8 January and 18 September, major communications exercises were conducted and planning continued. Fourteen rehearsals of various aspects of the plan were done. Under JTF direction, the Coast Guard, Navy, Air Force, and Marines participated fully with the Army in three “Big Rock” (major rehearsal) drills. Shelton also used an Atlantic Command-sponsored exercise, AGILE PROVIDER, to provide training that would closely simulate the requirements for an invasion in Haiti. After 8 months of intensive training, preparation, and rehearsals, the JTF was ready for deployment.

d. The complex deployment included special operations, an airborne assault, an amphibious landing, and movement of a force of 34,000 US servicemen and women, 21,000 of whom landed in Haiti. In late June and early July, joint US military exercises simulated an invasion of Haiti. On 7 July, the United States ordered 1,900 Marines of the 24th MEU aboard US Navy ships to take up positions off the coast of Haiti in case it became necessary to evacuate the 3,000 Americans and other friendly nationals from Haiti.

e. Meanwhile, the United States had encouraged a broad international commitment to Haitian stability prior to any invasion, and pressed Britain and Argentina to provide soldiers. Argentina promised to support peacekeeping but declined to participate in an invasion. Britain offered naval support and a military training team. During the summer, Jamaica, Barbados, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago sent 266 soldiers to Puerto Rico for training.

f. On 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 940 passed by a vote of 12 to 0, marking the first time the UN had approved an invasion of a country in the Western Hemisphere. Phase One of the resolution authorized “a multinational force under unified command and control . . . to use all necessary means” to oust the Cedras regime, but it did not specify a deadline. A UN 60-person team would monitor the eventual invasion. The group would be the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and would have an important role to play after Aristide was restored to power. The resolution required the UN multinational force to cease operations as soon as “a secure and stable environment” had been established and Aristide was reinstated. The UN mission
would then oversee the remainder of the transition. During Phase Two, UNMIH was to ensure that the Haitian armed forces and police received professional training. The resolution extended UNMIH’s original mandate by 6 months and required the countries participating in Phase One to pay their own way.

4. US Involvement

a. On 30 August, the Secretary General announced that he was abandoning future mediation efforts aimed at convincing Haiti’s military government to step down peacefully. The United States also moved toward a tougher public position. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch concluded that the trade embargo imposed on 21 May was unlikely to cause the military junta in Haiti to turn over power peacefully. Deutch, speaking to the Caribbean Community Common Market in Jamaica on 30 August, stressed, “The time for action has arrived.” The multinational force was going to Haiti.

b. The Joint Staff J-2 and J-3 supported USACOM intelligence needs by setting up the Haiti Intelligence Joint Task Force on 7 September. The CJTF utilized all available resources, drawing on the experience of his J-2 and other sources, such as the State Department, to gain a deep understanding of the main personalities in Haiti as well as local leaders. By the time of the operation, the commanders had a good understanding of the people they were to deal with.

c. In MOOTW, intelligence is as critical as in combat. All available systems were incorporated into the planning. Exercises familiarized all commands with use of equipment. When D-Day arrived, the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System proved to be the glue that held intelligence together, from the maneuver brigade to the national intelligence agencies. Strategic intelligence flowed seamlessly down to the tactical level, and tactical intelligence in turn flowed back to all levels of command.

d. JTF 180 built its forces around the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, and included SOF, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, and a Special Purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF) of 1,900 Marines. Coast Guard and Navy Sea Air Rescue helicopters were fully integrated into the plan. A joint medical capability was established. The force was supported by more than 15 Navy ships ranging from the aircraft carriers Eisenhower and America to the command ship Mount Whitney and a hospital ship. Twelve roll on/roll off ships were provided by the Military Sealift Command to carry equipment and supplies for the operation. The Air Force provided massive airlift capability.

e. SOF Forces and the 10th Mountain Division deployed in a unique manner. Admiral Paul D. Miller, Commander-in-Chief of US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), assembled the forces assigned to JTF 180. Miller, who had long experimented with adaptive joint force packaging, ordered the JTF to use US Navy aircraft carriers for this deployment. The carriers were cleared of fixed-wing aircraft. The fighters were replaced by Army helicopters and soldiers. While Army Rangers had conducted exercises off carriers before, this was the first time that carriers had been used to deploy Army combat units. More than 3,800 soldiers and 116 helicopters were embarked for Haiti.

f. Lieutenant General Shelton and JTF 180 headquarters sailed on the command ship USS Mount Whitney. The ship made an ideal platform from which to conduct the operation. OPSEC and communications were assured, and the CJTF was able to be in constant contact with both the CINCUSACOM and his operational forces.
Chapter VII

5. Diplomatic Negotiations

a. As the invasion forces headed for Haiti, President Clinton made a last minute diplomatic initiative to Haiti. Former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, and General Colin Powell, who had recently retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised the delegation. While President Carter pressed Washington for deadline extensions, General Powell pressed the military leaders to keep their commitment to depart. He reminded them that turning over power was the honorable thing to do. The discussions were intense and ran late into the night and next day. On 18 September, Haiti's military government, faced with US invasion forces en route to Haiti, agreed to relinquish power. More than 60 planes were airborne when the accord was signed by former President Jimmy Carter and Emile Jonassaint, Haiti's provisional President. Lieutenant General Cedras and Brigadier General Philippe Biambry agreed to resign no later than 15 October in exchange for amnesty. In return, the UN-imposed economic sanctions were lifted. The Haitian military promised to cooperate with the US-led multinational force in establishing a stable political climate so that Aristide could be reinstated. The deal struck between the delegation and Cedras transformed the mission from an invasion to one of tentative cooperation between JTF 180 and the Haitian military.

b. Countries around the world praised the Carter accord and proclaimed it a better option than military intervention and economic sanctions. Soon, more countries agreed to participate. The British Foreign Ministry stated that the results “show that the force of international opinion and persistence by the United States can produce a highly satisfactory resolution.” Other countries were now willing to help restore democracy in Haiti. The Organization of American States were very pleased over the arrangement. Canadian officials welcomed the peaceful and safe arrival of the multinational force and promised assistance. (Canada had declined to participate in Phase One for fear it would compromise neutrality in Phase Two.) Only Venezuela condemned the United States for actions in Haiti.

6. US Forces

a. The last minute negotiations precluded the need for an invasion, but not the need for US ground forces. Word of the agreement reached General Shelton 4 hours before the troops were to go in. He then had 11 hours before he sent in the 10th Mountain Division. JTF 180 responded with a textbook example of flexibility. It shifted gears from forced entry to permissive entry without losing momentum. The resulting plan still included SOF insertion and a Marine assault, but the element of surprise was not necessary for Army entry into Port-au-Prince. The overwhelming forces were not cut back.

b. The first US servicemen arrived in Port-au-Prince on 19 September and encountered no resistance. The US Army's 10th Mountain Division immediately secured the port, the civilian airport, key roads, and the US Embassy. They established control of the city of Port-au-Prince, and were quickly followed by CA, PSYOP, medical, engineer, military police, and armored forces.

c. Simultaneously, SOF arrived at 27 locations throughout the country. The Special Forces teams were at times accompanied by other troops, CA personnel, and PSYOP specialists. Their mission was to rebuild or create local government institutions and to form a network to monitor conditions and developments. By 28 September, 1,240 Special Forces personnel were in-country working out of 20 locations. PSYOP activities were fully integrated into the operation. They were effective in deterring
the spread of violence while enlisting the support and cooperation of the Haitians. A total of 3,764 SOF personnel took part in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

d. Thousands of Haitians rushed to the port in Port-au-Prince to witness and welcome the arrival of the US forces. US troops looked on as the Haitian police forcefully dispersed the crowds. US servicemen were under orders not to intervene with the police. Under the conditions of the Carter accord, the Haitian military retained authority until 15 October, and maintaining law and order was their responsibility. The intention was to avoid a power vacuum in which chaos could grow. Unfortunately, Haitian police and former “attaches” (latter-day Tontons Macoutes) beat pro-Aristide demonstrators and killed at least one. As a result of this incident and similar events, civilian police monitoring and training programs had to be accelerated.

e. Logistic support was available immediately. Sealift in the first 30 days delivered 7.2 million gallons of fuel, 1,854 containers, 5,600 vehicles, and 2 million square feet of cargo. This effort required seven ships, four barges, and a tanker. Airlift provided 566 C-141 equivalents of supplies.

f. On 20 September, US Marines landed without opposition at Cap-Haitien in the North, gaining control of the airfield and securing the port. The Marines began the task of returning stability and order to the city. The SPMAGTF sent out highly visible patrols to reduce the opportunity for violence. The tenuous relationship between the Haitian police and the SPMAGTF flared into violence on 24 September when a Marine patrol, feeling threatened and observing police violence against civilians, fired on the Haitian police. The ensuing firefight left 10 Haitians dead and a Navy interpreter slightly wounded. The clash followed a rising tide of violent incidents and a lack of cooperation by the local police, who were for the most part tied to the Cedras regime. This incident sent a clear signal to the Haitian police and military that if they challenged US forces, they would do so at their own peril. Following this incident, crowds in the city went on a rampage, looting Haitian military barracks and police stations. Hundreds of weapons were turned over to the Marines in the next 48 hours.
7. Concluding Events

a. By 26 September, calm had returned to Cap-Haitien. With the assistance of Army engineers, electricity and clean drinking water were restored to the city. The engineers delivered food and medical supplies and restarted efforts to clean up mountains of garbage that had collected. In 12 days, the SPMAGTF re-emerged its 1,900 Marines and 29 helicopters aboard the Wasp and were relieved by the 10th Mountain Division.

b. By 21 September, the United States concluded an agreement with the Haitian military to dismantle the heavy weapons unit located at Camp d’Application a few miles outside the capital. US forces took Bradley Fighting Vehicles out to the camp, attached the V-150s and howitzers, and carried them back through the city to the airport. This action was a severe psychological blow to the FAD’H (Haitian Armed Forces), for it proved that the United States was in control. When coupled with the incident at Cap-Haitien a few days later, the FAD’H understood in no uncertain terms that cooperation was their only course of action.

c. By 22 September, approximately 300 members of the 16th Military Police Brigade entered Haiti. 1,100 US military police eventually arrived in Haiti authorized “to moderate the conduct of Haitian security forces without assuming their responsibilities.” General Cedras also took measures to ensure that the Haitian soldiers and police exercised more self-control towards the pro-democracy protesters. Public opinion and media coverage had forced a change in the initial US policy of noninterference.

d. The US forces began a buy-back program for small arms and heavy weapons. Pistols were bought at $50, rifles at $100 and automatic weapons at $200. This helped to reduce the large number of firearms in circulation.

e. Meanwhile, President Clinton eased sanctions on 26 September, allowing Haiti to import food. He also allowed commercial flights to resume operation to and from Port-au-Prince. The eased embargo allowed Haitians to receive early relief assistance.
f. On 3 October, US soldiers in Port-au-Prince raided four sites, looking for weapons and cracking down on violence initiated by paramilitary “attaches” and militia linked to de facto government. These raids signaled a change in US policy to deal more aggressively with government forces and to ensure that unarmed Haitians were protected. In the meantime, President Aristide was making plans to return to Haiti by 15 October and begin the process to rebuild the nation and its economy and restore democracy.

g. By 4 October, 1,150 troops from Bangladesh were in Haiti, along with 270 from Caribbean nations. Multinational forces raided the headquarters of the Front for Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a paramilitary group headed by Emmanuel Constance, the Chief of Police in Port-au-Prince. FRAPH was responsible for much of the violence initiated earlier by the “attaches.” Numerous people were detained by this raid and others in Cap-Haitien. More than 110 FRAPH members were held, and a substantial number of weapons were seized. The detainees were to be turned over to the Aristide government once it was in place. The raids increased US involvement in day-to-day Haitian affairs and helped to disarm and curb the power of such groups.

h. The Haitian police situation became critical when François fled to the Dominican Republic on 4 October. Earlier, Raymond W. Kelly, former New York City Police Commissioner, had been appointed to lead a civilian operation to overhaul the Haitian police force. The leadership vacuum created by François’ departure required that Kelly accelerate implementation of the planned program. He rapidly gathered 1,000 police monitors from 27 countries to observe Haitian police behavior. Meanwhile, the French, Canadian, and US governments quickly instituted a program to develop a new police force. For 6 months, experienced civilian public safety officers instructed new police recruits in programs in Haiti and at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The project emphasized constitutioanal procedures, respect for human rights, and proven law enforcement practices. Simultaneously, Kelly’s international monitors accompanied police patrols in Haiti. As a result military forces were able to continue their prime

The success of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY depended on the cooperation of the US forces and Haitian government.
missions, while the civilian government maintained public order and a new police force with no ties to the old regime came into being.

i. Public affairs had been synchronized between the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the JTF. Training of commanders and developing spokespersons prior to the operation proved successful. The CJTF held a major media event each day. He never lost the initiative and was able to aggressively counter inaccurate information. He made certain that he told the factual story of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and coast guardsmen.

j. The multinational forces continued to quell minor skirmishes, confiscate weapons, and provide extensive humanitarian assistance. They seized control of the state-run radio and television stations to ensure that they were not used by the pro-military force to incite discontent. Within several weeks, these stations were turned over to Aristide’s followers.

k. Lieutenant General Cedras resigned on 10 October, and departed with his family on 13 October for asylum in Panama. He called on Haitians to work with the US military “to create a new nation.”

l. President Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October and assumed his duties amid the cheers of tens of thousands of his supporters. It was clear that the military de facto leaders were out of power. Aristide’s return marked the high point of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

m. On 24 October, JTF 180 turned Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY over to JTF 190, which was primarily made up of the 10th Mountain Division, multinational forces, and support forces. On 6 November, President Clinton announced a partial pullout, stating that 6,000 of 15,200 US troops would leave Haiti by 30 November. President Clinton and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali joined a ceremony in Port-au-Prince on 31 March 1995 to formally transfer peacekeeping responsibilities in Haiti from US led forces to UNMIH. This was the end of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

8. Haiti and Joint Employment Principles

a. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, security was achieved on all fronts. The use of the USS Mount Whitney provided the OPSEC needed.
Through the use of **PSYOP**, public displays such as the moving of the heavy weapons from Camp d’Application, and the overwhelming presence of forces, the Cedras regime was unable to gain any political, military, or informational advantage. The ROE were **flexible** enough to provide the forces with their inherent right of self-defense.

b. The strict ROE prevented excessive use of force that could have antagonized the Haitian people. The **restraint** used was appropriate for the operation at hand, and was readily revised as the situation fluctuated.

c. JTF 180 went into Haiti with the determination to accomplish its objectives no matter how long it took. This demonstrated **perseverance**, reinforced by the handing off of the operation to JTF 190 to remain in Haiti until the UN was prepared to assume authority with the UNMIH, was obvious to all.

d. The **legitimacy** of the operation was assured by the UN resolution and by the fairness with which the CJTF dealt with the Haitians who were being removed. The permissive entry, complying with the Carter accords, gained the support not only of the international community but of the Haitian people and the American public.
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APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

The following references were used in the preparation of the Joint Military Operations Historical Collection.


Appendix A


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Appendix A


Appendix A

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Questions regarding availability of these publications should be directed to the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, JCS, 1B707 Pentagon, Washington, D.C.  20318-9999, (703) 695-2114 (DSN 225-2114).


Matthews, James K. and Cora J. Holt.  *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.*  1995. (Published jointly with the Research Center, United States Transportation Command.)


## GLOSSARY

### PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander of a combatant command</td>
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<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
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<td>CINCUSACOM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>CIT</td>
<td>combat intelligence team</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<td>COMNAVFE</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces Far East</td>
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<td>CPF</td>
<td>Caribbean Peacekeeping Force</td>
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<td>FAD'H</td>
<td>Haitian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Front for Advancement and Progress of Haiti</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
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<td>JFC-N</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command - North</td>
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<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>JSPOG</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>United States Atlantic Command (now USACOM)</td>
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<td>LAV</td>
<td>light armored vehicle</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>MAU</td>
<td>Marine amphibious unit</td>
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<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary brigade</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>maritime prepositioning ships</td>
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<td>NKPA</td>
<td>North Korean People's Army</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Panama Defense Forces</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
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<td>SPMAGTF</td>
<td>special purpose Marine air-ground task force</td>
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air superiority — That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air support — All forms of support given by air forces on land or sea. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air supremacy — That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious operation — An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. As an entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases: a. planning — The period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. b. embarkation — The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping. c. rehearsal — The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. d. movement — The period during which various components of the amphibious task force move from points of embarkation to the objective area. e. assault — The period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations — An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility — 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

armored personnel carrier — A lightly armored, highly mobile, full-tracked vehicle, amphibious and air-droppable, used primarily for transporting personnel and their individual equipment during tactical operations. Production modifications or application of special kits permit use as a mortar carrier, command post, flame thrower, antiaircraft artillery chassis, or limited recovery vehicle. (Joint Pub 1-02)

beachhead — A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (Joint Pub 1-02)

bottom mine — A mine with negative buoyancy which remains on the seabed. Also called ground mine. See also mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)
GLOSSARY

**Camp** — A group of tents, huts, or other shelter set up temporarily for troops, and more permanent than a bivouac. A military post, temporary or permanent, may be called a camp. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Campaign** — A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Casualty** — Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status - whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Centers of Gravity** — Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called **Command Channel**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Chain of Command** — The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called **Command Channel**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Civil Affairs** — The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Civil-Military Operations** — Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Civil Reserve Air Fleet** — A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a US entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense (DOD). These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as Long-Range International (cargo and passenger), Short-Range International, Domestic, Alaskan, Aeromedical, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) can be incrementally activated by the Department of Defense in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft are under the mission control of the Department of Defense while remaining a civil resource under the operational control of the responsible US entity or citizen. Also called **CRAF**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Close Air Support** — Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called **CAS**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Coalition** — An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (Joint Pub 1-02)
coalition force — A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command — A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander — A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. See also combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command — 1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. See also combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command, control, communications, and computer systems — Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications — A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept plan — An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coup de main — A offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception — Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment — 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment
encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

diversion — 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons. A diversion order will not constitute a change of destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate destination. (Joint Pub 1-02)

division — 1. A tactical unit/formation as follows: a. A major administrative and tactical unit/formation which combines in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat, larger than a regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps. b. A number of naval vessels of similar type grouped together for operational and administrative command, or a tactical unit of a naval aircraft squadron, consisting of two or more sections. c. An air division is an air combat organization normally consisting of two or more wings with appropriate service units. The combat wings of an air division will normally contain similar type units. 2. An organizational part of a headquarters that handles military matters of a particular nature, such as personnel, intelligence, plans, and training, or supply and evacuation. 3. A number of personnel of a ship's complement grouped together for operational and administrative command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine — Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

drop zone — A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. (Joint Pub 1-02)

economy of force theater — Theater in which risk is accepted to allow a concentration of sufficient force in the theater of focus. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare — Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of
intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence, and electronics intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**embarkation** — The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**employment** — The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**emission control** — The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b. minimize mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. execute a military deception plan. Also called EMCON. See also **electronic warfare**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**envelopment** — An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**first light** — The beginning of morning nautical twilight; i.e., when the center of the morning sun is 12 degrees below the horizon. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**fleet** — An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities all under the command of a commander or commander in chief who may exercise operational as well as administrative control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**flexible response** — The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force** — 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force multiplier** — A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Forces Armées d’Haiti** — Armed Forces of Haiti. Also called FAD’H. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

**friendly fire** — In casualty reporting, a casualty circumstance applicable to persons killed in action or wounded in action mistakenly or accidentally by friendly forces actively engaged with the enemy, who are directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. See also **casualty**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**front** — 1. The lateral space occupied by an element measured from the extremity of one flank to the extremity of the other flank. 2. The direction of the enemy. 3. The line of contact of two opposing forces. 4. When a combat situation does not exist or is not assumed, the direction toward which the command is faced. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**H-hour** — See **times**.
Glossary

hostage — A person held as a pledge that certain terms or agreements will be kept. (The taking of hostages is forbidden under the Geneva Conventions, 1949.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence — A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance — Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance — Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

infiltration — 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal). (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence — 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine — Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force — A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander — The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in
the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander — A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force land component commander — The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operations — A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations task force — A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint staff — 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint

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**Glossary**

**JFACC.** Joint Functional Air Component Commander

**JFC.** Joint Force Commander

**JFLCC.** Joint Force Land Component Commander

**JSOTF.** Joint Special Operations Task Force

**Joint Pub 1-02.** A publication by the U.S. Department of Defense that defines joint operations and other joint military concepts.
Glossary

Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint task force** — A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**landing craft** — A craft employed in amphibious operations, specifically designed for carrying troops and equipment and for beaching, unloading, and retracting. Also used for logistic cargo resupply operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**leveraging** — In information warfare, the effective use of information, information systems, and technology to increase the means and synergy in accomplishing information warfare strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**lines of communications** — All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**logistics** — The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**main attack** — The principal attack or effort into which the commander throws the full weight of the offensive power at his disposal. An attack directed against the chief objective of the campaign or battle. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**maneuver** — 1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Marine air-ground task force** — A task organization of Marine forces (division, aircraft wing, and service support groups) under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) components will normally include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy Support Elements). Three types of Marine air-ground task forces which can be task organized are the Marine expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade, and Marine expeditionary force. The four elements of a Marine air-ground task force are: a. **command element (CE)** — The MAGTF headquarters. The CE is a permanent organization composed of the commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications and service support facilities. The CE provides command, control, and coordination essential for effective planning and execution of operations by the other three elements of the MAGTF. There is only one CE in a MAGTF. b. **aviation combat element (ACE)** — The MAGTF element
that is task organized to provide all or a portion of the functions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and the MAGTF mission and size. These functions are air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is organized around an aviation headquarters and varies in size from a reinforced helicopter squadron to one or more Marine aircraft wing(s). It includes those aviation command (including air control agencies), combat, combat support, and combat service support units required by the situation. Normally, there is only one ACE in a MAGTF.  

c. ground combat element (GCE) — The GCE element that is task organized to conduct ground operations. The GCE is constructed around an infantry unit and varies in size from a reinforced infantry battalion to one or more reinforced Marine division(s). The GCE also includes appropriate combat support and combat service support units. Normally, there is only one GCE in a MAGTF.  

d. combat service support element (CSSE) — The MAGTF element that is task organized to provide the full range of combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. CSSE can provide supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineer, health, postal, disbursing, enemy prisoner of war, automated information systems, exchange, utilities, legal, and graves registration services. The CSSE varies in size from a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) service support group (MSSG) to a force service support group (FSSG). Normally, there is only one combat service support element in a MAGTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine expeditionary brigade — A task organization which is normally built around a regimental landing team, a provisional Marine aircraft group, and a logistics support group. It is capable of conducting amphibious assault operations of a limited scope. During potential crisis situations, a Marine expeditionary brigade may be forward deployed afloat for an extended period in order to provide an immediate combat response. Also called MEB. See also Marine air-ground task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine expeditionary force — The Marine expeditionary force, the largest of the Marine air-ground task forces, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. Also called MEF. See also Marine air-ground task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine expeditionary unit — A task organization which is normally built around a battalion landing team, reinforced helicopter squadron, and logistic support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis situations, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations. Also called MEU. See also Marine air-ground task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

maritime prepositioning ships — Civilian-crowed, Military Sealift Command-chartered ships which are organized into three squadrons and are usually forward-deployed. These ships are loaded with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support three Marine expeditionary brigades. Also called MPS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mass — 1. The concentration of combat power. (Joint Pub 1-02)
military operations other than war — Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Service — A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and which operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The Military Services are: the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mine — 1. In land mine warfare, an explosive or other material, normally encased, designed to destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled means. 2. In naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in the water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from entering an area. The term does not include devices attached to the bottoms of ships or to harbor installations by personnel operating underwater, nor does it include devices which explode immediately on expiration of a predetermined time after laying. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minesfield — 1. In land warfare, an area of ground containing mines laid with or without a pattern. 2. In naval warfare, an area of water containing mines laid with or without a pattern. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission — 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobility — A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization — 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national
emergency involving an external threat to the national security. 

**c. full mobilization** — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

**d. total mobilization** — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**multinational operations** — A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**National Command Authorities** — The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national security** — A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. See also **security**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**neutralize** — As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations** — Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**objective** — The physical object of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature, the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation** — A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. Also called **OPORD**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation order** — A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called **OPORD**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation plan** — Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander.
Joint military operations are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANS will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called CONPLAN.

b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN.

c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Art — The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Control — Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Reach — The distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

Operations Security — A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that
can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**order** — A communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. (DOD) In a broad sense, the terms “order” and “command” are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution whereas a command does not. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**pace** — For ground forces, the speed of a column or element regulated to maintain a prescribed average speed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**parallel chains of command** — In amphibious operations, a parallel system of command, responding to the interrelationship of Navy, landing force, Air Force, and other major forces assigned, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**passage of lines** — An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**patrol** — A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**peace enforcement** — Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace operations; peacekeeping. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**peace operations** — A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**peacekeeping** — Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace enforcement; peace operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**penetration** — In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy’s defense and disrupt the defensive system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**port** — A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term “ports” should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**preposition** — To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force during
initial phases of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**psychological operations** — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Rangers** — Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**readiness** — The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: **a. unit readiness** — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. **b. joint readiness** — The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**real time** — Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed only by the time required for electronic communication. This implies that there are no noticeable delays. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**reconnaissance** — A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**redeployment** — The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**refugee** — A civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**resources** — The forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**road block** — A barrier or obstacle (usually covered by fire) used to block, or limit the movement of, hostile vehicles along a route. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**rules of engagement** — Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sea-air-land team** — A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called **SEAL team**. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**security** — 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**small arms** — Man portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or unarmored equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special forces** — US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special operations** — Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically, sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**special operations forces** — Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**strategy** — The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supplies** — In logistics, all materiel and items used in the equipment, support, and maintenance of military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supply** — The procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies.  

a. **producer phase** — That phase of military supply which extends from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the military Services.  
b. **consumer phase** — That phase of military supply which extends from receipt of finished supplies by the Military Services through issue for use or consumption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**support** — 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as
Glossary

a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical — A surface-launched guided missile for use against air targets. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactics — 1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target — 1. A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the target. (Joint Pub 1-02)

task force — 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. Semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. 3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02)

task group — A component of a naval task force organized by the commander of a task force or higher authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater — The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater of operations — A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

times — (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter “C” will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The
unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.  
c. **F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense 
to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.  d. **H-hour.** The 
specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.  e. **L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which 
a deployment operation commences or is to commence.  f. **M-day.** The term used 
to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to 
commence.  g. **N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for 
deployment or redeployment.  h. **R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which 
redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces 
begins in an operation.  i. **S-day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve 
callup (not more than 200,000).  j. **T-day.** The effective day coincident with 
Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial 
mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).  
k. **W-day.** Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated 
with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).  
(Joint Pub 1-02)

**Tomahawk —** An air-, land-, ship-, or submarine-launched cruise missile with 
three variants: land attack with conventional or nuclear capability, and 
tactical anti-ship with conventional warhead.  (Joint Pub !-02)

**transport aircraft —** Aircraft designed primarily for the carriage of personnel 
and/or cargo. Transport aircraft may be classed according to range, as follows:  
**a. Short-range —** Not to exceed 1200 nautical miles at normal cruising 
conditions (2222 Km).  **b. Medium-range —** Between 1200 and 3500 
nautical miles at normal cruising conditions (2222 and 6482 Km).  **c. Long-range —** Exceeds 3500 nautical miles at normal cruising conditions 
(6482 Km).  (Joint Pub 1-02)

**troops —** A collective term for uniformed military personnel (usually not applicable 
to naval personnel afloat).  (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unified command —** A command with a 
broad continuing mission under a single 
commander and composed of significant 
assigned components of two or more 
Military Departments, and which is 
established and so designated by the 
President, through the Secretary of Defense 
with the advice and assistance of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also 
called united combatant command.  See also combatant command.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unit —** 1. Any military element whose 
structure is prescribed by competent 
authority, such as a table of organization 
and equipment; specifically, part of an 
organization.  2. An organization title of 
a subdivision of a group in a task force.  3. 
A standard or basic quantity into which 
an item of supply is divided, issued, or used.  
In this meaning, also called unit of issue.  
4. With regard to reserve components of 
the Armed Forces, denotes a Selected 
Reserve unit organized, equipped and 
trained for mobilization to serve on active 
duty as a unit or to augment or be 
augmented by another unit. Headquarters 
and support functions without wartime 
missions are not considered units.  (Joint 
Pub 1-02)

**United Nations Operations in Somalia —** 
Forces and operations authorized by United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions to 
conduct operations in Somalia. Also 
known as UNOSOM.  (This term and its

**range —** Between 1200 and 3500 
nautical miles at normal cruising 
conditions (2222 and 6482 Km).  c. Long-range — Exceeds 3500 nautical miles at normal cruising conditions (6482 Km).  (Joint Pub 1-02)

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**unified command —** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. See also combatant command.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unit —** 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment; specifically, part of an organization.  2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force.  3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. In this meaning, also called unit of issue.  4. With regard to reserve components of the Armed Forces, denotes a Selected Reserve unit organized, equipped and trained for mobilization to serve on active duty as a unit or to augment or be augmented by another unit. Headquarters and support functions without wartime missions are not considered units.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

**United Nations Operations in Somalia —** Forces and operations authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions to conduct operations in Somalia. Also known as UNOSOM.  (This term and its

**range —** Between 1200 and 3500 nautical miles at normal cruising conditions (2222 and 6482 Km).  c. Long-range — Exceeds 3500 nautical miles at normal cruising conditions (6482 Km).  (Joint Pub 1-02)
unity of effort — Coordination of strategies, integration of the elements of national power, and unified actions of armed forces to achieve a defined policy, goal, or objective in the most effective and efficient manner regardless of positions within the international community, branches of government, or command structure. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of LTC Edward E. Greene, USA (Ret) and MGEN Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret), Chief Executive Officer of the Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum, New York City, New York, without whom this publication could not have been produced.

Thanks to Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Department of History, Ohio State University, and Dr. Frank N. Schubert, Joint History Office, OCJCS, for their gracious reviews and suggestions for improving the publication.

Thanks to Ms. Cynthia L. Hayden, XVIII Airborne Corps Historian, for providing extensive access to vital oral history interviews.

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