Joint Doctrine
Capstone and Keystone Primer

15 July 1997
The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. That concept is based on joint doctrine and its associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. It provides a common framework and approach to warfighting from which game plans can be developed — and successfully executed through the universal practice of joint doctrine.

This updated primer includes the approved executive summaries from Joint Pubs 3-07 and 3-08. Additionally, it contains an appendix of summaries from the recently developed Joint Force Employment briefing modules.

I renew my past challenge to each of you to use this primer as a springboard for a more detailed examination of the doctrinal principles summarized here. Our effectiveness as a joint team depends on you.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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**Appendix A**  
*Joint Force Employment Considerations*  
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Joint Pub 1
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Guides the Joint Action of the Armed Forces of the United States
- Discusses the Nature of American Military Power
- Addresses Values in Joint Warfare
- Analyzes the Fundamentals of Joint Warfare
- Describes the Joint Campaign

American Military Power

Deterrence is our first line of our national security. If deterrence fails, our objective is winning the nation’s wars.

By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. When we fight, we fight to win.

In military operations other than war, our purpose is to promote national security and protect our national interests.

We also have a long history of military support for national goals short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation (such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote national security and protect our national interests.

The Nature of Modern Warfare

The nature of warfare in the modern era is synonymous with joint warfare.

Members of the Armed Forces of the United States should understand the nature of warfare, both through solid grounding in the tested insights of the finest theorists, historians, and practitioners of war, and by carefully keeping those insights up to date.

Projection of power is essential and is inherently a joint undertaking.

The Armed Forces of the United States face the challenge of mastering multifaceted conditions, unlike nations whose military forces can concentrate on a more limited range of environments. The ability to project and sustain the entire range of military power over vast distances is a basic requirement for the Armed Forces of the United States and
contributes, day in and day out, to the maintenance of stability and deterrence worldwide. This projection of power is inherently a joint undertaking, because of the inter-Service linkages of modern command, control, and communications, the multi-Service structure of the defense transportation system, and the broad range of forces typically involved.

Forces on land, at sea, and in the air now reinforce and complement each other more than ever. The speed of communications and pace of events in the modern world have accelerated. Joint teams must be trained and ready prior to conflict. The demands of fighting both as an industrial and post-industrial power place a premium on well-educated, professional men and women who have mastered the tools of modern warfare while maintaining the traditional fighting spirit of the Armed Forces of the United States. Reserve components play essential roles in assuring that a balanced array of skills is available as needed. All our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen must be adept at working with others, both as fellow members of the Armed Forces of the United States and with allies and other foreign partners.

The Role of Doctrine

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.

Values in Joint Warfare

First and always is integrity. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the Armed Forces that whatever the issue at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean and do what we say.

Competence cements the mutual cohesion between leader and follower.
### Individual fighting spirit and physical courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

Since warfare began, **physical courage** has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare featuring advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

### Moral courage is the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right.

**Moral courage** is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve **risk taking** and **tenacity**: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties.

### The Armed Forces of the United States are a team. Several elements support effective teamwork:

**Teamwork** is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States are a team. Deterring aggression and, if need be, winning our wars are the team’s common goals.

#### Trust and Confidence

**Trust and Confidence.** Trust — defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another — is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams.

#### Delegation

**Delegation.** The delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility is a necessary part of building trust and teamwork. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork.

#### Cooperation

**Cooperation.** This aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition. Both are central human characteristics, but the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation with each other to compete with the enemy.
Fundamentals of Joint Warfare

The principles of war currently adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are:

Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of force
Maneuver
Unity of command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

By applying the principles of war in the specific context of joint warfare, we can derive fundamentals of joint warfare.

Exercise of Command

The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge of what. The importance of an efficient joint force command structure cannot be overstated. Command, control, and communications systems should be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, timely, and secure.

Experience shows liaison is a particularly important part of command, control, and communications in a joint force. Recalling Clausewitz’ analogy of a military force as an intricate machine, ample liaison parties, properly manned and equipped, may be viewed as a lubricant that helps keep that machine working smoothly.
The role of **component commanders** in a joint force merits special attention. Component commanders are first expected to orchestrate the activity of their own forces, branches, and warfare communities. In addition, they must understand how their own pieces fit into the overall design and best support the joint force commander’s plans and goals.

**Training and education**

The role of **training and education** is indispensable to effective command. We fight as we train and exercise. The skills of our leaders rest in large part on the quality of their military training and education.

**Command and control warfare**

Joint forces should be prepared to **degrade or destroy the enemy’s command capability** early in the action. The interaction of air, land, sea, special operations, and space capabilities offers the joint force commander a powerful array of command, control, and communications countermeasures that can dramatically increase shock effect, disorientation, and operational paralysis caused by the joint force’s operations against the enemy. By blinding the enemy and severing enemy command links, the joint force can drastically reduce an opponent’s effectiveness.

**National-Level Considerations**

**Unity of effort is a cooperative effort.**

When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a **national-level effort** involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of federal departments and agencies.

**The Armed Forces of the United States are accountable to the American people.**

We in the Armed Forces of the United States must **account for our actions** with the American people whom we serve by dealing openly and well with the representatives of the nation’s free press. We are also responsible for protecting classified information related to the national security and will be challenged by the news media concerning such information.

**Multinational Endeavors**

**Unity of effort in multinational operations is gained through:**

There is a high probability that any military operation we undertake will have multinational aspects.
**Partnership and respect**

We should always operate from a basis of **partnership and mutual respect**. This is similar to the relationship that prevails among the Armed Forces of the United States, but the situation is more complex because the nature and composition of multinational partnerships may vary greatly from case to case.

**Simplicity and clarity of plan and statement**

Experience shows that **simplicity and clarity of plan and statement** are even more necessary in the combined and coalition environment than in US-only operations. To successfully project American military power, assistance with deployment, arrival, and en route support are critical requirements from our allies and friends.

**Teamwork**

In all multinational endeavors, the **teamwork of the Armed Forces of the United States should set a strong example**. Working together is more difficult in the international arena; operating from a smoothly coordinated, highly cooperative joint force perspective makes relations more productive and beneficial.
The Joint Campaign

Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design to accomplish strategic objectives. The key to the most productive integration of these supporting capabilities, and to the joint campaign as a whole, is attitude. In years past, the sea was a barrier to the Soldier and a highway to the Sailor; the different mediums of air, land, sea, and space were alien to one another. To the joint force team, all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation.

- CAMPAIGNS ARE JOINT; THEY ARE THE UNIFYING FOCUS FOR THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE
- PLANNED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE THEATER ENVIRONMENT
- SUPPORTS NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS AND IS INFLUENCED BY NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- LOGISTICS SET THE CAMPAIGN'S OPERATIONAL LIMITS
- ORIENTED ON THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY
- CAMPAIGN PLAN BASED ON THE COMMANDER’S CONCEPT CONSISTING OF FOUR PARTS:
  - OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
  - LOGISTIC CONCEPT
  - DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT
  - ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT
- ACHIEVES SEQUENCED AND SYNCHRONIZED EMPLOYMENT OF ALL AVAILABLE LAND, SEA, AIR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AND SPACE FORCES
- SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES
  - AIR AND MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND SPACE CONTROL
  - FORCIBLE ENTRY CAPABILITY
  - TRANSPORTATION
  - DIRECT ATTACK OF THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY
  - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
  - EXPLOITING THE INFORMATIONAL DIFFERENTIAL
  - SUSTAINED ACTION ON LAND
  - LEVERAGE AMONG FRIENDLY AND ENEMY FORCES
Joint Pub 0-2

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides Doctrine and Policy Governing
  Unified Direction of Forces

- Discusses the Chain of Command and
  Relationships between Combatant
  Commands and the Military Departments

- Covers Command Relationships and Other
  Authorities

- Provides Doctrine and Policy for
  Establishing Joint Commands

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.

The President is responsible for national strategic unity of effort.

The President of the United States, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for national military unity of effort.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmits missions to combatant commanders.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) functions under the authority, direction, and control of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Combatant commanders accomplish the mission.

Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.
In a foreign country, the **US Ambassador** is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements in the host nation except those under the command of a combatant commander.

### Unified Action

**Unified action describes the broad scope of actions taking place within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force.**

The term “unified action” is a broad generic term referring to the **broad scope of activities taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.** Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. Unified action integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations, in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations operations, into a unity of effort in the theater or joint operations area. Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

**Unified action starts with unified direction.**

Unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the joint force commander with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

### Objectives

**Objectives provide focus for military action.**

Objectives are essential to achieve unity of effort. In the abstract sense, the objective is the **effect desired.** In the concrete sense, the objective may be a **physical object** of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature or asset, the seizure, damage, destruction, or holding of an objective that is essential to the commander’s plan. This is more accurately termed the “physical objective.” The physical objective must not be confused with the aim, or military end state, although occasionally they may overlap.
Roles, Missions, and Functions

Roles, missions, and functions provide direction and establish responsibility.

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were established by Congress in law. Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. Functions are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles.

Chain of Command

The chain of command runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands and from the NCA to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for forces not assigned to a combatant commander.

The NCA exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The first runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to combatant commands, runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, each operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control through the individual Chiefs of the Services of their forces not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

Relationship Between Combatant Commands and Military Departments

All components of the Department of Defense are charged to coordinate on matters of common or overlapping responsibility.

Continuous Coordination. The Joint Staff and Service headquarters play a critical role to ensure that combatant commanders’ concerns and comments are effectively included/advocated during the coordination among all components of the Department of Defense.

Interoperability. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability, which includes collective effort to develop and use joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; the development and use of joint plans; the conduct of joint training; and a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services.
Multinational Relationships

The strategic goal of collective security and the resultant alliances and coalitions into which the United States has entered require that its Armed Forces be prepared for multinational military operations. There is no singular doctrine for multinational warfare; each alliance develops its own protocols and contingency plans. Coalition operations, based on temporary agreements or arrangements, are even less structured than those of an alliance. Much of the information and guidance provided for joint operations is applicable to multinational operations; however, differences in allied doctrine, organization, weapons and equipment, terminology, culture, religion, and language must be taken into account.

Command Relationships (See diagram next page)

**Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.**

**Command.** Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions.

**Command and Staff.** Joint force commanders are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander.

**Levels of Authority.** The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, US Code, section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise over those forces must be specified.

**Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands.**

When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) forces should be reassigned.
When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise operational control or tactical control, as appropriate, over the attached forces.

**Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM)**

*COCOM is vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President and is nontransferable.*

**COCOM** is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

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**COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

**Combatant Command (command authority)**

*(Unique to Combatant Commander)*

- Budget / Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relations with DOD Agencies
- Convene courts-martial
- Directive authority for logistics
- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans / requirements for intelligence activity

*When Operational Control is delegated*

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

*When Tactical Control is delegated*

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

*When SUPPORT relationship is delegated*
Operational Control (OPCON)

**OPCON** is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and is transferable.

**OPCON is inherent in COCOM** and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.

Tactical Control (TACON)

**TACON** is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

**TACON is inherent in OPCON**. TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in OPCON.

Support

**Support is a command authority.** A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command as appropriate to better characterize the support that should be given.

Other Authorities

Administrative Control (ADCON)

**ADCON is authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.** ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.
Coordinating Authority

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement.

Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH)

DIRLAUTH is the authority to directly consult or coordinate an action.

Principles and Policy for Establishing Joint Commands

Joint forces are established at three levels: subordinate commands, unified commands, and joint task forces. In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint task forces can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

Basis for Establishing Joint Forces

Joint forces can be established on either a geographic or functional basis.

The joint force commander (JFC) is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority.

The JFC is assigned a functional area for certain types of continuing operations.

Geographic Area. Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most commonly used method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned areas of responsibility. Subordinate joint force commanders are normally assigned joint operations areas.

Function. Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable in order to fix responsibility for
certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority.

Organizing Joint Forces

The JFC organizes forces to accomplish the mission. JFCs have the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on their concept of operations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan.

All joint forces contain Service components because of administrative and logistic requirements. The composition of the JFC’s staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations.

Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, through Service force commanders.

Functional components may be established by JFCs when forces of two or more Services must operate in the same dimension. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Functional component commands do not constitute a joint force.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities.

Unified Command

A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two or more Military Departments and which is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options: 1) Subordinate Unified Command, 2) Joint Task Force, 3) Functional Component, 4) Service Component, 5) Single-Service Force (normally the combatant commander assigns
operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service Component), 6) Specific operational forces that, because of mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander. These options do not in any way limit the commanders’ authority to organize their forces as they see fit.

The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions.

**Specified Command**

A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department but it may include units and staff representation from other Services.

**Subordinate Unified Command**

Subordinate unified commands are established by commanders of unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

When authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis.

**Joint Task Force**

A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.
CONCLUSION

This publication links joint doctrine to national security strategy and national military strategy. It sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action for joint operations. It outlines the nature of joint operations and the comprehensive exercise of command authority in their conduct.
Joint Pub 1-0
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

NOTE: This publication is under development, and is not yet approved doctrine. The information is based on its current state of development.

- Provides the Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) Mission and Organization
- Identifies Essential Elements of Personnel Support
- Covers Authorities and Responsibilities for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
- Addresses J-1 Responsibilities by Functional Area
- Addresses Planning for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
- Addresses Considerations for Establishment of a Subordinate Joint Force Headquarters

General Overview

People are the most important asset.

The Manpower and Personnel Directorate's (J-1's) mission is to coordinate timely and effective personnel support for joint force commanders (JFCs) to enhance the readiness and operational capabilities of the total force and ensure success across the full range of military operations. The primary objectives which support the accomplishment of this mission include: identifying personnel requirements, sourcing the requirements, accounting for the force, sustaining the force, and meeting the needs of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilian employees who comprise the force. Effective personnel support is an art which includes detailed planning and coordinating efforts to provide and sustain people so that the JFC may be optimally prepared to accomplish the mission. This publication provides guidelines concerning responsibilities and procedures for the exercise.
of authority by combatant commanders in conducting personnel support for joint forces. By establishing joint doctrine and operating procedures, this publication will also assist the Services in preparing their respective plans supporting the combatant commanders, other JFCs, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan taskings.

**Responsibilities**

Forces assigned to combatant commands must be careful to distinguish between the authority of the Military Departments and Services and the authority of combatant commanders. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and continue to support those forces even when assigned to a combatant command. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over their assigned forces. Service component commanders are responsible to the JFC and the combatant commander to which assigned, and to the Services for matters over which the Services have primary responsibility.

Although the Services have primary responsibility for the personnel support of their forces, the combatant command J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the combatant commander for manpower and personnel management. The J-1 is responsible for identifying and documenting personnel requirements, procuring the appropriate number of personnel with the necessary skills, accounting for these people, coordinating for replacements, and keeping the commander informed. The combatant command J-1 coordinates and integrates, whenever possible, the actions of the Service component personnel support systems to optimize support to the joint force in the accomplishment of its mission.

**J-1 Responsibilities**

This publication identifies primary and supporting responsibilities for all J-1s. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for most of these functional areas are addressed in the appendixes of this publication. Their content is based on current legislation, existing policy, and the experience and recommendations from the combatant commands and Services. J-1 responsibilities are shown in the following figure.
Planning for Personnel Support

Effective planning for personnel support to joint operations can leverage the joint force commander’s ability to accomplish the mission.

As a principal staff director, the J-1 will be deeply involved in both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. The J-1 addresses personnel support issues impacting the commander’s estimate through preparation of the personnel estimate. Additionally, the J-1 prepares Annex E, “Personnel,” for all operation plans using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System II format.

Establishing a Joint Force Headquarters

A variety of options are available to the combatant commander for establishing the joint force headquarters.

In many cases, planning for a joint operation will necessitate the establishment of a subordinate joint force to accomplish the mission or task. The combatant command J-1 plays a major role in determining manpower requirements and sourcing personnel for the joint force headquarters. The composition of a joint force staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations.
CONCLUSION

People are the most important asset. Getting the right types of people, in the appropriate quantity, at the right place and time will significantly increase the opportunity for mission success. This publication provides a common doctrine to be shared by all elements of a joint force and supporting organizations, which will increase the probability that personnel support is provided in a synchronized, timely, and effective manner.
NOTE: This publication is under revision. Information reflects approved joint doctrine at the time of primer publication.

- Discusses the Nature of Intelligence
- Covers the Purposes of Intelligence
- Provides Joint Intelligence Principles and Assigns Joint Intelligence Responsibilities
- Discusses Intelligence Functions for Joint Operations
- Explains the Joint Intelligence Architecture
- Provides Guidance Concerning Intelligence for Multinational Operations

**General**

Intelligence support is critical to operational success.

All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operational security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) flexibility by opening additional operational options.

**Sources of Intelligence and the Intelligence Cycle**

There are three levels of intelligence support—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Strategic intelligence is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational intelligence is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Tactical intelligence is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.
There are seven primary intelligence source types: imagery intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence.

The US intelligence cycle has the following five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. It is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.

Intelligence Role

Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to gather and analyze information on the environment of operations and the adversary. During peacetime operations, intelligence helps commanders make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force. During military operations other than war, intelligence helps the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. At the strategic level, the efforts of strategic intelligence operations should be focused in wartime to make intelligence available to the operational and tactical levels, providing continuity and depth of coverage even while units are deploying.

Supporting the Campaign

J-2s at all command levels focus on identifying adversary centers of gravity and providing timely, accurate intelligence to the JFC necessary to execute the plan. The J-2 and intelligence organizations should be guided by fundamental intelligence purposes. The J-2 should:

Support the commander with complete and objective views of situations for timely and relevant decision making.

Assist in identifying and determining objectives.

Provide intelligence for planning and conducting operations.
Secure operations by avoiding deception and surprise.

Secure operations through use of deception against the enemy.

Assist in evaluating the effects of operations and reorienting forces or terminating operations.

**CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE**

**KNOW THE ADVERSARY**

**BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE**

Joint Force Commander is responsible for intelligence support to operations

Synchronize intelligence with operations

Use the same approach for support of operations other than war and war

J-2 should participate from the outset

Ensure unity of intelligence effort

Recognize counterintelligence as a source of information

Prioritize component intelligence requirements

**ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY**

Timeliness

Objectivity

Usability

Readiness

Completeness

Accuracy

Relevance
Joint Intelligence Responsibilities

National-level intelligence agencies and organizations that can support military operations should make that support available. Additionally, they should assist in identifying other potential intelligence requirements that may be addressable through their capabilities.

Commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint force commanders define intelligence support needs.

The JFC is responsible for identifying intelligence resources and establishing intelligence support procedures. The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. The combatant command’s joint intelligence center (JIC) ensures the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate joint force commands are satisfied.

Service component commanders provide intelligence support.

Service component commanders develop component intelligence plans based on the plans of the joint force; plan reconnaissance operations for the component operations, consistent with joint force plans; ensure that feedback is provided to the JFC on Service-related issues affecting the joint command; and plan and develop implementing instructions for wartime intelligence support including augmentation of joint forces.

Targeting

Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander’s guidance, objectives, commander’s preparation of the battlespace and scenario, and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle concludes with combat assessment (battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and reattack recommendation), which determines the effectiveness of operations in meeting combat or battle objectives and is the start of the retasking cycle.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force by operations and intelligence personnel. Targeting is sometimes complicated by the need to deconflict or synchronize targeting by different units within the joint force. Targeting should be based on campaign goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, the Law of Armed Conflict, and a thorough understanding of how the adversary state functions.
The J-2 provides critical support throughout the six-step targeting cycle: 1) National Command Authorities/Commander's guidance and objectives, 2) target development, 3) weaponeering assessment, 4) force application, 5) execution planning and force execution, and 6) combat assessment.

**Joint Intelligence Architecture**

The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network with interoperable systems that link the theater JICs, joint task force (JTF) joint intelligence support elements (JISEs), deployed intelligence elements, Service intelligence, and national intelligence organizations in a global grid.

**Joint Intelligence Organizations**

The joint intelligence center (JIC) and the joint intelligence support element (JISE) are the primary intelligence organizations providing support to joint warfighting at all levels.

The JIC can be used at the:

- **National level**
  
  The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a one stop shopping center for intelligence support. While in reality, a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every request for information, it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon.

  At the national level, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations and allows for efficient access to the entire DOD intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations. The NMJIC serves the Washington, D.C. community, combatant commands, Services, and coalition partners and allies.

- **Theater/Regional level**
  
  At the theater/regional level, the JIC is the principal element for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders and theater forces.

- **The JISE supports the Joint Task Force level**
  
  At the joint task force level, the JTF JISE manages collection, analysis, and fusion of intelligence and dissemination up and down the echelon of intelligence and products for the joint operations area (JOA). The JISE is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing the JTF commander, JTF staff, and JTF components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by
integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commanders' intelligence organization.

**Multinational Intelligence Principles**

*For multinational doctrines, differences in cultural and national perspectives must be understood in order to adapt doctrines or forge new ones.*

The principles used in multinational intelligence are: adjust national differences among nations, effort against the common threat, determine and plan requirements for intelligence special arrangements, coordinate intelligence sharing, provide for complementary intelligence operations, operate a combined intelligence center, and conduct intelligence liaison exchange activities.

**CONCLUSION**

The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved. The JIC and JISE are the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint warfighting at all levels.
Joint Pub 3-0
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Strategic Environment Within Which Joint Operations Take Place
- Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations
- Covers Planning Guidelines for War and Military Operations Other Than War
- Describes the Considerations for the Conduct of Joint Operations During War
- Provides Principles for Military Operations Other Than War
- Discusses Considerations for Multinational Operations

Range of Military Operations

*The range of military operations stretches from war to military operations other than war.*

War. When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may employ the military instrument of national power to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

Military Operations Other Than War. Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace.

Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general
goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

National Strategic Direction

Combatant commanders are a vital link in the chain of command.

National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plan for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations.

The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

In both war and military operations other than war, proper conflict termination criteria ensure that victories endure.

National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war.

Levels of War

The three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to war and to military operations other than war. The levels are defined based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
Joint Warfare

To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

Organization of an Operational Area

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas that consist of:

Joint Operations Areas

Joint Operations Area. An area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC conducts military operations.

Joint Special Operations Areas

Joint Special Operations Area. An area of land, sea, and airspace for use by a joint special operations component or Joint Special Operations Task Force for the conduct of special operations.

Joint Rear Areas

Joint Rear Area. Facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations.

Amphibious Objective Areas

Amphibious Objective Area. An area that includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations.

Areas of Operations

Area of Operations (AOs). JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. These areas do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Areas of Interest

Area of Interest. JFCs designate areas of interest to monitor enemy activities outside the operational area.
Theaters of war and subordinate theaters of operations.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones.

Combatant Command Strategic Planning

JFCs develop concepts of operations and issue mission-type orders.

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved). JFCs issue prioritized mission-type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations.

The Campaign

A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose.

Campaigns are joint. They must synchronize operations, remain simple, and be focused on the objective.

Campaigns serve as the focus for the conduct of war and often in military operations other than war. A wartime campaign is the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations—as well as interagency and multinational operations—in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives. Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives.

Operational Art

Operational art is characterized by:

Synergy. Integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.

Simultaneity and Depth. Bring force to bear on the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the enemy’s will to resist.

Anticipation. Remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.
**Balance**

**Balance.** Refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force, as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted to disrupt an enemy’s balance.

**Leverage**

**Leverage.** Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions.

**Timing and Tempo**

**Timing and Tempo.** Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy.

**Operational Reach and Approach**

**Operational Reach and Approach.** Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States, directly affects operational reach. In particular, advanced bases underwrite the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity.

**Forces and Functions**

**Forces and Functions.** Campaigns and operations can focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both.

**Arranging Operations**

**Arranging Operations.** The best arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources.

**Centers of Gravity**

**Centers of Gravity.** The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them.

**Direct versus Indirect Approach**

**Direct versus Indirect.** To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength, seek an indirect approach.

**Decisive Points**

**Decisive Points.** (Usually geographic in nature) Correctly identifying and controlling decisive points can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action.

**Culmination**

**Culmination.** Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations.

**Termination**

**Termination.** Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the National Command Authorities intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure.
Planning Considerations

Control and Coordinating Measures

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations to include:

**Boundaries**

Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space.

**Fire Support Coordination Line**

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is a permissive fire control measure, established and adjusted by the land force commander, in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. It is not a boundary; synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land force boundary. It applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. Short of the FSCL, all fires are controlled by the land force commander. Beyond the FSCL, coordination and restrictive measures are used to avoid...
conflicting or redundant operations. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affected commanders to allow necessary reaction to avoid fraticide.

**Joint Operations in War**

Land and naval force commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. These priorities, along with the JFC’s theater-wide interdiction priorities are reflected in the air apportionment decision. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater-wide interdiction effort.

The JFACC is normally the supported commander for air interdiction and counterair and may be the supported commander for strategic attack.

The joint force maritime component commander or Navy component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations.

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**JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR**

### CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE COMBAT

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### CONSIDERATIONS AT THE OUTSET OF COMBAT

| Force Projection     | Special Operations |
| Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity | Protection |

### SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS

| Relationship Between Offense and Defense | Joint Fire Support |
| Linear and Nonlinear Operations |            |
| Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity |        |
| Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction |    |
| Interdiction | |
| Combat Assessment |   |
Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.

Although military operations other than war are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

PRINCIPLES

Objective
Unity of Effort
Security
Restraint
Perseverance
Legitimacy

PLANNING

Interagency Operations
Command & Control
Information Gathering
Constraints & Restraints
Training & Education
Postconflict Operations

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

Arms Control
Combating Terrorism
Counterdrug Operations
Nation Assistance
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Civil Support Operations
Peace Operations
Support to Insurgencies
Multinational Operations

US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives.

Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
CONCLUSION

This publication describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting joint and multinational operations, as well as interagency operations, across the range of military operations (war and military operations other than war). It guides the planning and execution of combatant command strategy, campaigns, and joint operations.
Joint Pub 3-07
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Compares Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with War
- Explains the Relationship Between MOOTW and Political Objectives
- Discusses MOOTW Principles
- Outlines Types of MOOTW Operations
- Describes Planning Considerations

General

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player. More restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed. MOOTW are initiated by the National Command Authorities and are usually, but not always, conducted outside of the United States.

Political Objectives

All military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also in changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. One goal of MOOTW is to deter war through intervention to secure US interests. Overseas presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Crisis
response may include employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

Range of MOOTW

When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability. This is a risk that may result in a combat situation. Should deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance in the form of strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants. The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreign internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Noncombat MOOTW often can be a simultaneous operation with combat MOOTW.

Basic Principles

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Application of these principles helps ensure success and minimize losses by focusing on aspects of MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are as follows: 1. Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. 2. Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. 3. Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. 4. MOOTW may require restraint in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently. 5. Perseverance allows for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. 6. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, where applicable.
Types of MOOTW

These operations include: arms control; combatting terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency.

Planning Considerations

The mission analysis and command estimate are vital in MOOTW. Of particular importance in the planning process is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats. Commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. Unit integrity allows for quick deployment and continued operations. Intelligence and information gathering needs to be multi-disciplined and utilize fused intelligence from all sources within the military including spaced-based intelligence, human intelligence, counterintelligence, and mapping, charting and geodesy. Multinational operations need special attention and require increased liaisons and advisors. Command and control are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates and should remain flexible to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Public affairs, including media reporting, influences public opinion and may ultimately be a principle factor in the success or failure of the operation. Civil affairs may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various outside groups. Psychological operations provide a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to, and influencing selected target groups. Coordination with nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations and interagency operations allows the JFC to gain greater understanding of the situation and the society involved. MOOTW may present unique legal issues. The logistics element may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Medical operations support MOOTW to protect US personnel and enhance mission capability. MOOTW may require reserve units and individuals not found
in the active component or may require deployment of more units or individuals possessing a capability than are available in the active component forces. A commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW to ensure that desired political objectives continue. The termination of operations includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. Such actions encompass transitioning to civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, redeploying forces and numerous other actions depending on the specific operation.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services and combatant commands to prepare for and conduct MOOTW. It describes those military operations and provides general guidance for military forces in the conduct of joint MOOTW.
Joint Pub 3-08
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Outlines the Interagency Process and Participants
- Explains the Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process
- Describes Interagency Coordination
- Explains the Role of the National Security Council System
- Discusses Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level
- Outlines Joint Task Force Roles and Responsibilities

The Interagency Process and Participants

Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.

Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase in situations — primarily overseas — in which civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. Many organizations are drawn closer to military forces because their missions may fail without military support or protection.

Interagency Coordination

Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation is critical to success.

The security challenges facing the nation today are increasingly complex, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. These include USG agencies, partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), regional and international organizations, and the agencies of the
host country. **Efforts must be coordinated** despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies.

**Unity of effort** is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision making techniques. To be successful, the interagency process should **bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations**. This is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations viewed in isolation. When the other instruments of national power — economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational — are applied, the dimensions of the effort and the number and types of interactions expand significantly.

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**Basic Steps to Building and Maintaining Coordination**

- Define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms agreed to by all participants.
- Define the objective.
- Establish a common frame of reference.
- Develop courses of action / options.
- Capitalize on experience.
- Establish responsibility.
- Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions.
- Direct all means toward unity of effort.

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**Interagency Process at the National Level**

**Coordinating the activities of the various government agencies is fundamental to the efficient use of national resources.**

The **interagency process at the national level** is grounded within the **Constitution** and established by law in the **National Security Act of 1947** (NSA 47). The National Security Council (NSC) is a product of NSA 47.

**The National Security Council System is the principal forum for consideration of issues of national security requiring Presidential decisions.**

The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic. Together with supporting interagency working groups, high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the **National Security Council System provides the foundation for interagency**
coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC staff is the President's personal and principal staff for national security issues. It tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President.

Interagency Coordination for Domestic Operations

Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, may include military support to civil authorities, which is Department of Defense (DOD) support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies that result from natural or manmade causes, or military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). MSCLEA also includes, but is not limited to military assistance to civil disturbances; Key Asset Protection Program; and interagency assistance, to include training support to law enforcement agencies, support to counterdrug operations, support for combatting terrorism, and improvised device response.

In all of these efforts, the military brings unique and very useful capabilities to the interagency forum that have value in domestic support. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all bear on the employment of the military in domestic operations. Considering the increased emphasis on domestic roles for the Department of Defense, a balance must be defined during the planning phase between the military capabilities and resources that can be applied to a situation and the constraints of law.

Interagency Coordination for Foreign Operations

Operations in foreign areas arise as a result of the United States' external relationships and how they bear on the national interest. For the Department of Defense, in the politico-military domain, this involves bilateral and multilateral military relationships, treaties involving DOD interests, technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, and humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. Coordination between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies may occur through a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the United
Nations Secretary-General may be involved. The US interagency structure within foreign countries involves the Ambassador, country team system (which includes the Defense Attaché Office and the Security Assistance Organization), the American Embassy public affairs officer, United States Information Service, and geographic combatant commands.

**Command Relationships**

The National Command Authorities establish supported and supporting command relationships between combatant commanders when deployment and execution orders are issued. The commanders of the geographic combatant commands, supported by the functional combatant commands or other geographic combatant commanders, provide forces and resources to accomplish the mission. This command relationship among the combatant commanders lends itself to the interagency process.

NGOs and PVOs do not operate within either the military or the governmental hierarchy. Therefore, the relationship between Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

**Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations**

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs and PVOs are frequently on the scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs and PVOs are diverse, flexible, independent, and grassroots-focused and are primary relief providers. NGOs and PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGO and PVO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community.

Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crisis, NGOs and PVOs can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action. Their extensive
involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations make these organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments as well as civilian attitudes toward the operation.

Regional and International Organizations

Regional and international organizations possess area or global influence. Regional and international organizations have well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities and are usually equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency operations. Regional examples include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Western European Union, and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. International examples include the United Nations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level

Steps for combatant commands that support effective interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives include: (1) identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation; (2) establish an interagency hierarchy and define the objectives of the response effort; (3) define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities; (4) solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays; (5) identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities; (6) identify the resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort; (7) define the desired end state and exit criteria; (8) maximize the mission's assets to support the longer term goals of the enterprise; and (9) establish interagency assessment teams.

For interagency crisis response for operations within the United States and its territories (other than for acts of terrorism), the Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense Executive Agent for execution and management of military support to civil authorities. The Secretary of Defense retains the authority to approve the deployment of combatant command resources and to authorize DOD involvement in operations that may include the use of lethal force (e.g., civil disturbances). The Secretary of the Army executes and manages domestic operations through the Director of Military Support and the supported geographic.
combatant commander. When the Department of Defense responds to acts of terrorism, the Secretary of Defense personally oversees the operation. Early in crisis action planning for operations outside the continental United States and its territories, the geographic combatant commander communicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s) as part of crisis assessment. The Ambassador and country team are often aware of factors and considerations that the geographic combatant commander might apply to develop courses of action, and they are key to bringing together US national resources within the host country.

**Joint Task Force Interagency Operations**

A combatant commander may designate a joint task force to conduct the military portion of interagency operations.

The unique aspects of the interagency process require the joint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF’s components, but other agencies as well. When designating a JTF, the combatant commander will select a commander of the joint task force, assign a joint operations area, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, and either allocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command or request forces from supporting combatant commands. In contrast to the established command structure of a combatant command or joint task force, NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities. Upon identifying organizational or operational mismatches between organizations, the staff of the combatant command or JTF should designate points in the NGO and PVO organizations at which liaison and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate. These may include the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, the Logistics Operations Center, and a liaison section.

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected joint operations area. The assessment team may help clarify the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of force is required, the proper sequence for deployment of the force, availability of state and local or in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by organizations other than military forces. The JTF commander should consider the establishment of an executive steering group, civil-military operations center, and liaison teams. Other JTF interagency considerations are intelligence support and control, logistic support, legal support, media affairs, and space support.
CONCLUSION

This publication discusses the interagency environment; describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commanders and agencies of the USG, NGOs and PVOs, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations; and provides potential methodologies to conduct successful interagency operations. It also describes the key USG departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship (or potential relationship) with the Armed Forces of the United States.
Joint Pub 3-16
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

NOTE: This publication is under development and is not yet approved doctrine. The information is based on its current state of development.

- Describes the Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
- Reviews Multinational Command Relationships
- Discusses the Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations
- Covers Operational Considerations

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

*Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations.*

The United States (US) has often shared common security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Typically, multinational operations are performed within the structure of a coalition or alliance. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. An alliance is the result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. Normally each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action. Multinational operations may include combat and are conducted both during war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). War is the extreme case for conducting multinational operations and the goal is to win quickly and with as few casualties as possible while achieving the objectives. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace. During multinational operations, respect, rapport, knowledge of the partners and patience must be considered during all activities to ensure a unity of force. Achieving and implementing international rationalization, standardization, and interoperability is also key to the success of multinational operations.
Command Relationships

The National Security Council is the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decisions. Its membership includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The National Command Authorities consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense and may employ military power and personnel to respond to situations affecting vital US interests. The Department of State is organized to provide foreign policy advice to the President, nation-to-nation representation throughout the world, US interagency coordination in the various nations with whom the US has relations, and worldwide information services. The President retains command authority over US forces yet sometimes it is prudent to place appropriate US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. Foreign operational control, tactical control, and support relationships may all be advantageous to multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. Coalition command relationships often are either a parallel command structure, a lead nation command structure or a combination of the two.
Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

One of the most important tasks when planning multinational operations is to conduct a detailed mission analysis.

A mission analysis should result in a mission statement for the multinational force as a whole and a restated mission for the US element of the force. This analysis should include the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the multinational force components. Once determining the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives, the multinational force commander (MFC) should assign a specific task to the element of the multinational force most capable of completing that task. Every phase of the intelligence cycle including planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production and dissemination, is substantively affected by multinational operations. Effective logistics support is fundamental to operational success and must be sustained and synchronized for execution. During the commander’s assessment, the overall objectives also need to include criteria for termination and transition, communications, force protection, the laws of war and sea, rules of engagement, doctrine, education and training, media relations, health service support, religious ministry support, meteorology and oceanography as well as many cultural and linguistic needs.

Operational Considerations

Operational considerations include land, maritime, air, and special operations.

Land operations occur across the range of military operations, during war, and MOOTW. Land forces during war and MOOTW possess the unique capability to physically control land areas. Challenges of land forces include operational mobility, multinationality, sustainability, and versatility. Maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken, in peacetime or in war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. The qualities that characterize maritime forces include readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Air operations gain control and exploit the use of the air from complex, wartime air superiority efforts to routine airdrops for humanitarian assistance to achieve the MFC’s objectives. Unity of air effort is best achieved with centralized control of air forces. Special operations forces (SOF) may conduct multinational operations independent of or in support of other components. While not a specifically assigned mission area, SOF are uniquely trained to provide liaison to multinational maneuver units taking advantage of their language and cultural capabilities.
CONCLUSION

Multinational operations include alliances or coalitions between two or more nations in order to best achieve their common interests. The National Command Authorities will oversee military power and personnel for the United States but often employ the aid of foreign command and additional support relationships in order to achieve specified military objectives. Detailed mission analysis and organized objectives help provide a successful multinational operation through the use of land, maritime, air, and special operations.
Joint Pub 3-33
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Note: This publication is under development.

- An Overarching Publication That Will Describe the Capabilities the Individual Components Provide the Joint Force Commander

- Will Also Summarize the Components’ Key Responsibilities in Supporting the Joint Force Commander’s Operation or Campaign Plan

NOTE: This publication is under development
General Logistics Overview

Logistics is the foundation of combat power. Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces. It is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.

Logistic functions include: Supply systems acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel required by the operating forces. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition or to upgrade its capability. Transportation is the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to the final destination. General engineering provides the construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or logistic enhancements. Health services include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, and dental services. For each of the above functional areas, the combatant commander should consider the four elements of the logistics process: acquisition, distribution, sustainment, and disposition.
Responsibilities

Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue to subordinate commanders directives, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of operation, and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

Services and Service components implement. Implementation and execution of logistic functions remain the responsibility of the Services and the Service component commanders.

Services provide own logistic support. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing.

Combatant commanders establish priorities. The combatant commander will review requirements of the Service component commands and establish priorities through the deliberate planning process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively.
Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

Subordinate joint forces will normally follow single-service logistic support channels.

Logistic responsibilities for subordinate forces to the combatant command will follow single-Service command channels, except when specifically directed otherwise either by the authority assigning those subordinate forces to the combatant command or by the Secretary of Defense; when common, joint, or cross-servicing agreements and procedures provide other responsibilities; or the geographic combatant commander may give the commander of a subordinate joint force directive authority for a common support capability within that subordinate commander’s joint operations area.

Supply

Combatant commanders coordinate supply support between Service components.

Combatant commanders are responsible for allocating critical resources, coordinating supply support between the Service components, establishing supply buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels.

Commanders of Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces.

Subject to combatant commanders’ responsibility and authority, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces and direct communication with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters.

Allied forces are normally self-sufficient.

Allied nations design their logistic systems to facilitate self-sufficiency within their fiscal capabilities. Although the sustainment of its forces is each nation’s own responsibility, varying degrees of mutual logistic support among nations can be expected.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for supplies for civilians.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for provision of supplies to civilians in occupied areas in accordance with current directives, obligations, and treaties the United States recognizes.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for a distribution network, maintenance and salvage, facilities engineering and base development, coordinating health services, and field services.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for maintaining an effective distribution network that is consistent with the Services’ intertheater policy and procedures; they are responsible for coordinating maintenance and salvage; establishing bases; coordinating real estate requirements; and planning, programming and constructing roads, bridges, and facilities. The Services are normally responsible for facility acquisition funding and support. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating and integrating health service support and the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within their theaters.
The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCIN CTRANS) has the mission to provide strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives throughout the range of military operations. Combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCIN CTRANS.

**Joint Logistic Planning**

Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment problem at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign.

Logistic planning should be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater. Tactical planning is done primarily by the Service components.

Special logistic planning considerations include demands of an expanding force, critical items, bottlenecks, movement control, and civilian supply sources.

Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force; critical supply items; constricting bottlenecks; control of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies and host nations); and the sourcing of supplies and services from coalition sources.

**Joint Theater Logistics**

Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities. The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistics gap.

The logistic system integrates intertheater and intratheater transportation.

Key elements of the logistic system include lines of communications, theater transportation network, specialized units, and host-nation support. Considerations in developing a logistic system include geography, transportation, logistic capability, logistic enhancements, logistic infrastructure protection, echelon of support, assignment of responsibility, and availability of wartime host-nation support.
The theater strategic logistic concept is derived from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more of the courses of action.

The theater logistic concept should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action. It is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the combatant commanders components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering services.

CONCLUSION

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation's economy to a nation's warfighting forces. It is the foundation of combat power. Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics. This includes the authority to issue to subordinate commanders directives, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of operation, and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. The combatant commanders' operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels.
Joint Pub 5-0

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Covers Joint Operation Planning Processes and Concepts
- Discusses Strategic Direction and Integration
- Addresses both Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning
- Covers the Relationship Between Joint Operation Planning and Assessment

Joint Planning Overview

Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of operation plans (OPLANs), OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders by joint force commanders, as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these plans and orders. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Scope of Joint Operation Planning

Planning for joint operations includes:

Joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

Mobilization Planning

Mobilization Planning. Primarily the responsibility of the Services, mobilization planning is directed toward assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in times of war and for military operations other than war.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployment Planning</strong></td>
<td>Deployment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with US Transportation Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment Planning</strong></td>
<td>Employment planning prescribes how to apply force to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by the combatant commanders through their component commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainment Planning</strong></td>
<td>Sustainment planning is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned type of combat activity for the appropriate duration and at the desired level of intensity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redeployment Planning</strong></td>
<td>Redeployment planning is directed towards the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Planning Concepts**

The joint operation planning employs an **integrated process** entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for **orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making**. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. **In crisis, the process is shortened**, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities.

**Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations.** The activities of the entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for **uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures** supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). **JOPES is first and foremost policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts.**
Types of Planning Processes

**Joint operation planning** is categorized as:

- **Campaign planning**
  - Campaign Planning. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan **embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision** of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. **Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.** If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

- **Deliberate planning**
  - Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). **It relies heavily on assumptions** regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is
Conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents.

### Crisis Action Planning

Crisis Action Planning (CAP). CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Crisis action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow prescribed CAP procedures that parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events.

### Types of Deliberate Plans

**Deliberate Plans are prepared as:**

| Operation Plans (OPLANs) | Types of Deliberate Plans. Deliberate plans are prepared under joint procedures and in prescribed formats as either an OPLAN, CONPLAN with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), or functional plan. |

| OPLANs in Concept Format Without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data | OPLANs. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an operation order (OPORD). |

| OPLANs in Concept Format With Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data | CONPLAN Without TPFDD. A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes either required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. |

| CONPLAN With TPFDD. A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. |
Functional Plans. Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or continuity of operations) but may also be developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations.

Supporting Plans

Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commanders in support of their deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, component commanders, or other agencies.

Campaign Plans and Operation Orders

Campaign Plans. Campaign planning can be started prior to or during deliberate planning but is not completed until crisis action planning. Campaign planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander.

Operation Order. OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Assigned, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces and Resources

The categories of force and resource availability are:

Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces For Unified Commands” memo. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

Apportioned forces and resources are those made available for deliberate planning as of a certain date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning.
Allocated

Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning.

Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Consistency with Joint Doctrine

Joint operation plans should be consistent with joint doctrine and are developed in conformance with the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.

Adequacy determines whether the scope and the concept of planned operations as contained in the CINC's Strategic Concept satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission. Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the expected cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Operation plans will be consistent with joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System.

Organizing for Joint Planning

For every operation, supported and supporting command relationships must be established between the combatant commands.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizes the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant commands. The supported commander is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. Supporting commanders provide augmentation forces or other support to a designated supported commander or commanders or develop supporting plans. Such support is provided in accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," and may include the preparation of plans that support the joint operation plan of the supported commander.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides the strategic direction required to focus the deliberate planning efforts of the combatant commanders.

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the JPEC. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning and joint operation planning. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation
plans. The JSCP initiates deliberate joint operation planning by assigning planning tasks to the combatant commanders, apportioning major combat forces and resources, and issuing planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

**Joint Mobilization Planning**

Joint mobilization planning is the planning for moving systematically and selectively from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to an appropriate warfighting posture.

Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Depending on the threat to be countered, mobilization may range from manpower augmentation of the active force to widespread involvement of the nation’s economic, political, and industrial resources. Planning and executing mobilization activities are accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and Services. However, operation planning for major contingencies relies heavily on timely mobilization of the necessary forces and capabilities.

**Employment Planning**

Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to obtain objectives.

Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces within an operational area. Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, devising and selecting courses of action (COAs), and positioning forces and resources; to create advantages in combat and exploit resulting opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance.

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**KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS**

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

- Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus
- Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat
- Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity
- Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander's intent for each phase
Campaign Planning

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaign planning is conducted during both deliberate and crisis action planning. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. It orients on the enemy’s centers of gravity; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

Theater campaigns are conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and their subordinate operations or campaigns into a coherent whole. Subordinate campaign plans can be created by joint task forces or subunified commands if required. All other planning is for operations supporting the campaign. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs or OPORDs and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the NCA selects the COA during CAP. Deliberate plans
may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution.

Multinational Planning

Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in **national and international channels**. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined operation plans are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels but in accordance with US doctrine and procedures. Coordination of these separate planning channels is accomplished at the national level through established coalition bodies and at the theater and operational levels by commanders of combatant commands or other subordinate joint US commands who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

**JOPES consists of five basic planning functions and the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.**

The JOPES is the **principal system** within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into operation plans and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. To accomplish this task, JOPES consists of a **deliberate and a crisis action planning process.**

Assessment

Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. Assessments derived through joint operation planning provide insight into the strengths and deficiencies of the nation’s existing military capabilities. Consequently, they can be an invaluable source of information for force development planning and the development of national military strategy.
CONCLUSION

This publication establishes responsibilities for planning for joint operations. It promulgates doctrine, principles, and concepts that govern: (1) planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces for joint operations; (2) development and execution of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation orders; (3) integration of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System with other joint systems and processes; (4) integration of joint operation planning with the administrative and logistic functions of the Military Departments and Services; and (5) use of joint operation planning to support functions of capability assessment and force development.
Joint Pub 6-0
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Describes the Role of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
- Outlines Objectives and Components
- Provides Basic C4 Systems Principles
- Explains C4 Systems Configuration and Infrastructure
- Discusses the Planning Process and Employment Responsibilities
- Outlines Joint and Multinational Standardization and Procedures
- Covers the Global C4 Infrastructure

Roles of C4 Systems

Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems include both the communications and computer systems required to implement the command and control process.

A command and control support (C2S) system, which includes supporting command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems, is the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) principal tool used to collect, transport, process, disseminate and protect data and information. **C4 systems are the information exchange and decision support subsystems within the total force C2S system.** C4 systems are based upon the continuous need for information to support the JFC’s operations. **The JFC controls the C2S system to ensure that data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients and generates appropriate actions.** In this regard, C4 systems play a critical role in the processing, flow, and quality of data supporting information requirements throughout the joint force.
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF C4 SYSTEMS

- Produce Unity of Effort
- Exploit Total Force Capabilities
- Properly Position Critical Information
- Information Fusion

C4 Systems Objectives

The fundamental objective of C4 systems is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place at the right time.

C4 systems must provide authorities at all levels and functions with timely and adequate data and information to plan, direct, and control their activities, including operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel, and administration. Specific objectives include:

Produce Unity of Effort. C4 systems should help a military force and its supporting elements to combine the thoughts and impressions of multiple commanders and key warfighters to allow the views of many experts to be brought to bear on any given task.

Exploit Total Force Capabilities. C4 systems must be planned as extensions of human senses and processes to help the commanders form perceptions, make decisions, and react. This allows commanders to be effective during high-tempo operations.

Properly Position Critical Information. C4 systems must be able to respond quickly to requests for information and to place and maintain that information where it is needed.

Information Fusion. Fusing of information produces a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. If they have concise, relevant, accurate, and timely information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced. This enables the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.
C4 Systems and Networks

C4 systems include the following major components:

**Terminal Devices:**
Terminal devices such as telephones, fax machines, and computers are the most recognizable components of most C4 systems. Generally speaking, terminal devices transform information from forms comprehensible to the warfighter into a format for electronic transmission, or vice-versa.

**Transmission Media:**
Transmission media connect terminal devices. There are three basic electronic transmission media: radio (including space based systems), metallic wire, and fiber-optic cable. Paths may be point-to-point if established between just two users, or they may be point-to-multipoint if the same path serves a community of subscribers.

**Switches:**
Switches route traffic through a network of transmission media. Switching may be manual or automatic; it may serve local subscribers or perform area network functions. There are basically two types of switches: circuit and message. Circuit switches generally support telephone traffic while message switches process data transmission.

**and Control.**
There are two basic levels of control: network and nodal. Network control provides management of area, regional, theater, or global networks. Its principle focus is in the management and configuration of long haul transmission media and switching centers transporting and routing bulk data between nodal facilities. Nodal control is concerned with the management of local C4 systems. Its principal focus is in the switching systems and terminal devices supporting warriors at locations such as command centers or C2 facilities.

The C4 systems components provide access to Networks.

Networks are formed when terminal devices and transmission media are interconnected with switching equipment to ensure that information (voice, imagery, data, or message) is transported to appropriate locations. The networks that result from open systems architectures are called information grids. They allow warriors to gain access to, process, and transport information in near real time to anyone else on the network. Information grids are computer controlled networks that provide virtual connectivity on the demand of the warrior; they support local and area network operations. They are
also the basic components of larger grid networks that support regional, theater, and ultimately a global grid that is also referred to as the **infosphere**.

### C4 Principles

The foundation for C4 is the continuous, uninterrupted flow and processing of information in support of warrior planning, decision, and execution. Warfighters must have C4 systems that are interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. Information must be made accessible. In general, the value of information increases with the number of users.

C4 principles for joint and multinational operations are complex and bring together diverse military organizations to operate as one force. **Specific principles for joint and multinational operations are** (1) establish liaison early, (2) leverage limited C4 resources, (3) standardize operating principles, (4) agree on policy in advance of war, (5) use US interpreters, and (6) use common cryptographic systems.

### Employment

The most important guiding principle for C4 systems in support of employment is that **they be designed to support wartime scenarios**. C4 systems planners must continually prioritize and choose from among the individual joint and Service system capabilities that support different needs in different conflict levels (across the range of military operations). However, the joint environment calls for designated joint systems. Conflict levels impose different, and sometimes contentious, requirements on the C4 systems that support them. Various conflict levels can occur simultaneously over a wide geographic area, each requiring different options and responses.
The **C4 systems of the combatant commands** are configured and operated generally to meet the requirements of interoperability and the command being served; however, the priority requirement will be to support the National Military Command System (NMCS). These systems provide the means through which the commanders send and receive information and exercise command and control over their forces.

The **C4 systems of the Service component commands** are configured and operated generally to meet the requirement of interoperability and the command being served; however, the priority requirement will be to support the NMCS. These systems provide the means through which the commanders send and receive information and support their forces.
The C4 systems of the Military Departments and Services are configured and operated generally to meet the requirements of interoperability and of individual Service commands and the requirement to provide serviceable wartime capabilities that can support existing forces logistically, generate new forces, establish force readiness levels adequate to deal with existing threats, and provide support for the NMCS. These systems facilitate coordination of the means by which US forces are sustained across the range of military operations.

The C4 support systems of Department of Defense (DOD) agencies are configured generally to meet the requirements of interoperability and the agency being served; however, the priority requirement will be to support the NMCS. These systems provide the means through which the directors control the automated flow and processing of information needed to accomplish the missions of their agencies.

C4 Systems Planning Process

The combatant commanders provide broad guidance for employment requirements of C4 systems that affect their communications posture and capabilities.

The combatant commanders review, coordinate, and, when appropriate, validate command initiated requirements for systems, networks, projects, and related resources, including those of the component commands and combat and support forces. The combatant commanders determine C4 system deficiencies through operations and exercises, assess C4 system capabilities to support combatant commander missions, and compare current needs with current capabilities and planned needs with planned capabilities. C4 systems support of joint operations is planned and operationally assessed within the chain of command that extends from the President to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the combatant commanders.
C4 Systems Employment Responsibilities

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the combatant commanders the orders of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Combatant commander responsibilities include submitting C4 system requirements, reporting incompatibilities among C4 systems, and planning for C4 systems. Each Military Department or Military Service provides interoperable and compatible C4 systems including personnel training and equipment maintenance. DOD agency responsibilities are carried out by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the National Security Agency. The DISA liaison officer serves as the interface between exercise or joint operation participants and DISA and also provides staff advice to the joint task force (JTF) Director of C4 Systems (J-6) on Defense Information Systems Network matters. The JTF establishing authority ensures that C4 systems requirements are supported; coordinates C4 activities; prepares C4 policy and guidance; and ensures compatibility of JTF C4 systems. The Commander, Joint Task Force provides overall management of all C4 systems. The Joint Communications Support Element possesses a wide range of tactical communications capabilities and provides tactical communications support to JTFs and Joint Special Operations Task Forces.

Joint and Multinational C4 Systems Standardization and Procedures

Joint and multinational C4 systems require standardization and procedures to enhance compatibility and interoperability.

Standardization among allied nations and the United States is achieved by documented policy which covers all aspects of interoperability. Areas of particular concern for compatibility and commonality include automated information systems, battlefield surveillance systems, target designation systems, target acquisition systems, and communications security hardware and software systems.

The Military Communication-Electronics Board is a decision making instrument of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense for determining corporate C4 strategy to support the warfighter. Communications methods and procedures for joint and multinational communications-electronics matters appear in Allied Communications Publications (ACPs) and Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Publications and supplements to ACPs.
Global C4 Infrastructure

The global C4 infrastructure enables the US to accomplish missions efficiently by leveraging sophisticated information technologies. **The following organizations are part of the global C4 infrastructure:**

**The National Communications System** is an interagency group that coordinates the telecommunications assets of 23 Federal departments and agencies to ensure compatibility and interoperability during emergencies without compromising day-to-day operations.

**The Defense Information Systems Network** (DISN) is a composite of certain DOD information transport systems and networks under the management control of DISA. DISN significantly advances the way information is transported and shared.

**The Global Command and Control System** (GCCS) is the cornerstone of the C4I For The Warrior concept; it establishes interoperability among forces with a focus on providing a common operational picture to support situations awareness to the joint warfighter. GCCS will be a highly mobile, deployable command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system that will provide automated decision support for joint force commanders and key warfighters across the range of military operations. GCCS will employ compatible, interoperable, and integrated C4I systems with information exchange connectivity via the DISN to support the planning, deployment, sustainment, employment and redeployment of joint forces worldwide. GCCS will also allow civilian and military authorities to respond to natural emergencies or manmade disasters to which military support may be appropriate.

**The National Military Command System** is designed to support the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the Secretary of Defense can receive warning and intelligence so that accurate and timely decisions can be made, and direction can be communicated to combatant commanders or the commanders of other commands established by the NCA.
CONCLUSION

This publication identifies approved doctrine for C4 systems support to joint operations and outlines the responsibilities of Services, agencies, and combatant commands to ensure effective C4 support to commanders. It addresses how C4 systems support the commanders of joint forces in the conduct of joint operations, including, in general terms, how systems are to be configured, deployed, and employed.
The Joint Doctrine Story

Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.

- Joint Pub 1

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought about several important changes in joint doctrine development. The key among these changes was vesting overall responsibility for the development of joint doctrine with a single individual, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff was reorganized to improve efficiency.

In order to carry out his new responsibilities and to improve efficiency, the Chairman reorganized the Joint Staff in early 1987. Responsibilities for joint plans, training, exercises, evaluation, doctrine, education, and interoperability were brought together by establishing the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7. To specifically focus on joint doctrine development, a separate Joint Doctrine Division was formed within the J-7 Directorate. Because of the importance of terminology in the development of joint doctrine, the responsibility for maintaining the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms was also transferred to the Joint Doctrine Division.

A Joint Warfighting Center has been established to focus on joint simulation, training, and doctrine.

During this same timeframe, a Joint Doctrine Center was formed under the control of the Director, J-7, as a joint activity. The primary missions and functions of the Joint Doctrine Center were to oversee draft doctrine during the initial stages of the development process, identify and resolve key doctrinal issues, and evaluate and validate doctrine once it was developed to ensure that it actually worked. Recently, the Joint Doctrine Center became a separate division of the Joint Warfighting Center. The Joint Warfighting Center has greatly expanded functions and responsibilities including joint simulations and training as well as joint doctrine.
The current joint doctrine development system evolved from a J-7 initiative known as the Joint Doctrine Master Plan. The Joint Doctrine Master Plan was the most comprehensive assessment of joint doctrine ever undertaken and was the result of a series of meetings and worldwide conferences involving representatives from every Service, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff.

**The Joint Doctrine Master Plan was established to:**

- **Identify voids**
  - Identifying critical warfighting doctrine voids and initiate projects to fill those voids;

- **Revise the joint publications system**
  - Revising the joint publication system to separate doctrine from administrative publications and organize a hierarchy of publications clearly linking related doctrine and supporting joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP);

- **Establish the doctrine development process**
  - Establishing a new joint doctrine development process directly involving the combatant commands.

In approving the Joint Doctrine Master Plan as Joint Pub 1-01 in February 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the initiation of all recommended projects, an entirely new joint publication hierarchy, a joint doctrine terms of reference, and a new joint doctrine development process.
THE JOINT DOCTRINE PROCESS: Making a Joint Pub

**STEP #1**
**Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCS
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2**
**Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3**
**Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4**
**CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCS
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5**
**Assessments/Revision**
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 16 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7 will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

**JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION**

**CJCS Approval**

**Program Directive**

**Two Drafts**

**Assessments/Revision**

**Project Proposal**
To provide greater access to the most current joint publications available and expedite staffing of drafts of pubs under development, an electronic library has been developed and is accessible from the Joint Doctrine Web Site on the Internet. The Joint Electronic Library is a full text search and retrieval on-line system managed by the Joint Staff Joint Doctrine Division/J-7. It contains all unclassified approved and draft joint doctrine publications, key Service and combined doctrine publications, and all approved and emerging terminology. For the first time, action officers, planners, researchers, academicians, doctrine developers, and operators everywhere can access this vital information through their desk top computers using commercial telephone lines.

The entire electronic library has also been transferred to CD-ROM for worldwide distribution. This provides the combatant commands, military schools, and appropriate military libraries and organizations even greater accessibility to this easy to use, full text search and retrieval, high-speed joint electronic library.
Appendix A

JOINT FORCE EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

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Appendix A

JOINT FORCE EMPLOYMENT

Joint Force Employment
In order to achieve our goals of deterrence, winning wars when necessary, promoting security, and protecting national interests, we must maintain unity of effort, starting with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

Almost all Service forces are assigned to combatant commands. Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

Organizing Forces
The key individual in the chain of command is the JFC, who is given the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan.

JFC Organizes Forces

JFCs Organize Forces to Accomplish the Mission Based on the JFC's Vision and Concept of Operations

- Determines the Command Relationship Between Components & Their Forces
- May Establish Functional Components
- Makes Capabilities/Forces Available to Functional Components
- Normally Appoints a JFACC

JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" and JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations"
Operational Art
JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

Campaign Planning
The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives.

Intelligence Support
Intelligence, logistics, and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems support are all critical to the successful accomplishment of the joint force’s mission. Key to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. Gaining and maintaining intelligence dominance enhances the JFC’s flexibility by opening additional operational options. Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC’s guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander’s requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products.
C4 Systems Support

In order to employ these forces, JFCs must have the ability to effectively exercise command and control (C2) of assigned, attached, and supporting forces. Command is as much a problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and complex warfighting tasks. The fundamental objective of C4 systems is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize the opportunity and meet the objectives across the range of military operations.

Logistics

The JFC’s concept for logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements.

Operational Areas

One of the ways that JFCs shape the battlefield is by the use of operational areas. JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. JFCs at all levels can designate areas of interest (AOIs) to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AOI is usually larger than the operational area.
and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

**Key Responsibilities**

It is important to discuss the key responsibilities and relationships within a joint force that will be functioning in these operational areas. Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force areas of operations (AOs) will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges.

Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. The joint force air component commander functions as the supported commander for 1) counterair operations; 2) strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to
directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity; 3) theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance; and 4) the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort.

Theater Missile Defense
Another responsibility of the JFC is theater missile defense (TMD), which is inherently a joint mission. It is necessary for joint force components, supporting combatant commanders, and multinational force TMD capabilities to be integrated toward the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy’s theater missile capability.

Joint theater missile defense (JTMD) is composed of four operational elements: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and TMD command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). This threat can only be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations.

Joint Air Operations
The potential for force enhancement represented by joint air operations requires that the JFC integrate the efforts of all components. Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air capabilities and/or forces made available by components in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself.

Military Operations Other Than War
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can become just as crucial as operations during wartime, for they support our primary goal of deterrence. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities.

Conclusion
Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issues of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The use of this doctrine is guided by our values of joint warfare. Our military service is based on these values, those experiences that have proven to be the bedrock of our combat success. These values are common to all Services and represent the essence of our professionalism.

Doctrine provides the distilled insights of wisdom that have been gained through our collective experience of warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander’s obligation to determine the correct course of action under the circumstances that were present at the time of the decision.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT

Considerations at the Outset of Combat
As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible. The major considerations are as follows:

**Force Projection.** Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical. The projection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity (COG) during early entry operations. JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force.

**Dimensional Superiority.** JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. JFCs also seek to achieve superiority immediately in C4I — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority.

**Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity.** As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities.

**Special Operations.** Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy COGs that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. Special operations forces (SOF) frequently require support from other forces, but can also support other forces in operations.

**Force Protection.** JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force by protecting various aspects of the joint force. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.
Employment Considerations: Sustained Combat Operations

Joint force commanders seek to extend operations throughout the operational area, and conduct sustained operations when a coup de main is not possible. During sustained operations, joint force commanders simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF.

**Sustained Combat Operations**

JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. JFCs conduct sustained operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF. Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action.

**The Relationship Between Offense and Defense**

Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Joint operations will normally include elements of both offense and defense. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.
**Linear and Nonlinear Operations**

Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward line of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. In nonlinear operations, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear.

**Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity**

JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs' objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

**Maneuver**

The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy COGs in order to control or destroy those COGs. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC's campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum.
Appendix A

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needed to be articulated in the JFC’s concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

Forcible Entry
Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept.

Interdiction
Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real- and near-real-time intelligence. Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, space, and SOF can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission.

Synchronizing Interdiction and Maneuver
Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater and/or joint operations area (JOA) air assets. Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

Other Techniques Used During Sustained Combat Operations
JFCs have at their disposal a wide range of joint operational tactics, techniques, and procedures to influence the conduct of actions. Three additional techniques are joint precision interdiction, joint fire support, and combat assessment.

Joint Precision Interdiction. JFCs may elect to use the technique of joint precision interdiction, which orients on establishing an advantageous mobility differential over a hostile force. The major aspects of joint precision interdiction (locating the enemy deep, blinding enemy sensors, adversely affecting enemy mobility, and preparing the enemy for closure and attack by friendly forces) seek to protect the JFC’s freedom of maneuver while attacking the hostile mobility-producing potential.
**Joint Fire Support.** Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters.

**Combat Assessment.** Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

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**Employment Considerations:**

*Interdiction (2)*

Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used against friendly forces. Interdiction can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects.
Operational Art
JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.

Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces (SOF).
Operational art is characterized by the following fundamental elements:

**Synergy**
The first element of operational art, synergy, involves integrating and synchronizing operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war. JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities, but also the enemy’s morale and will. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations.

**Simultaneity and Depth**
The intent of simultaneity and depth is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that is within the decision making cycle of the opponent. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist.

Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization. Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. It also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Like simultaneity, depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions. The concept of depth applies to time as well as space. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potential before its capabilities can be realized and employed. Simultaneity and depth place a premium on situational awareness at the operational level.

**Anticipation**
Anticipation is the key to effective planning. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. JFCs continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational area, and allies and coalition members. JFCs avoid surprise by monitoring operations as they unfold and signaling to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. JFCs also realize the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces.

Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. It should be noted, however, that anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider the information upon which decisions are being based.
Appendix A

Balance
Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight.

Leverage
Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” describes achieving leverage (that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions) among the forces available to JFCs as “the centerpiece of joint operational art.” JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative. Dimensional superiority, isolation of the enemy, and attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity can all contribute to joint force leverage.

**Operational Art: Leverage**

Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions. Leverage allows joint force commanders to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

![Image of Operational Art: Leverage](image)

Timing and Tempo
The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react.

The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both
friendly and enemy forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace.

Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose.

**Operational Reach and Approach**
Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating force, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapon systems, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States (CONUS), directly effects operational reach.

**Forces and Functions**
Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently in order to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities.

**Arranging Operations**
JFCs must determine the best arrangement of major operations. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space. The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations, however, the arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

**Centers of Gravity**
COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. At the strategic level, COGs might include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. The COGs concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations, to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It is important to note that analysis of COGs, both enemy and friendly, is a continuous process throughout an operation. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy COGs is the most direct path to victory. However, COGs can change during the course of an operation and, at any given time, COGs may not be apparent or readily discernible.
Appendix A

Direct versus Indirect
To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy COGs directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. When vulnerable, the enemy force can be attacked directly by appropriate elements of the joint force.

Decisive Points
By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base. Decisive points are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking protected COGs.

Culmination
Culmination has both an offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted available resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

Termination
Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the National Command Authorities (NCA) intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. The underlying causes of a particular war — such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic — must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict. Ideally, national and allied or coalition decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations.
Before forces are committed, the joint force commanders must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level.
Appendix A

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.

When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.

On the other hand, MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal of MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

Strategic Aspect

MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response options.

In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains.

Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.

Crisis response is when US forces are able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort.
MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response options. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims.

Range of MOOTW
MOOTW provides the NCA with a wide range of possible response options ranging from noncombat operations such as humanitarian assistance (HA) to combat operations such as peace enforcement and strikes and raids. The following are three specific types of MOOTW:

**MOOTW involving the use or threat of force.** When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of natural power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives — to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace.

**MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force.** Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands.

**Simultaneous Operations.** Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with peace enforcement operations (PEO).

**Duration of Operations**
Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state.
Six Basic Principles of MOOTW

Following are the six MOOTW principles:

Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved.

Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose.

Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. Operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW.

Restraint. Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure that their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of the changes.
**Perseverance.** The purpose of perseverance is to prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results.

**Legitimacy.** Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions.

**Types of MOOTW**
The following are some examples of types of MOOTW:

**Arms Control.** This connotes any plan, arrangement, or process resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems; and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties.

**Combatting Terrorism.** This involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism).

**Humanitarian Assistance.** HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration, and is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies.

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).** These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

**Peace Operations (PO).** PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are categorized as peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation, and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

**Strikes and Raids.** Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes and may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
Appendix A

Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but may not conduct combat operations.

Planning Considerations of MOOTW
Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats. Moreover, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment package, and commanders should plan to have the right mix of forces available to transition to combat operations or evacuate.

Unit Integrity
Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained and operated together.

Intelligence and Information Gathering
Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source approach cannot support all requirements. Communications systems using space-based resources can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there is little or no existing communications infrastructure.

In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence (HUMINT) may provide the most useful source of information. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. Intelligence collection in MOOTW often requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. It will demand a depth of expertise in all aspects of the operational environment, including the people, their cultures, politics, religion, and economics.

Multinational Operations
Multinational operations planning should take into account the following considerations: political climates, language barriers, cultural backgrounds, military capabilities and training, equipment interoperability, and logistic support system coordination.

When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions based on each multinational partner’s capabilities. Each nation’s political considerations will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Early determination and resolution of these considerations with partner nations during the planning process is critical. JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners.
MOOTW Command and Control Options
No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided. Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation. In US unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign operations. C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies.

Logistics
In MOOTW, logistic elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks. Logistic elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistic personnel may be deployed to a foreign nation to support either US or multinational forces. These forces must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreement or legal, regulatory, or political restraints to which the United States is a party.

Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW
A commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Commanders plan for this transition at the very outset of hostilities. This ensures desired political objectives continue to be pursued after the cessation of wartime operations. JFCs may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations. Military forces may largely be in support of other US and international agency efforts. Typical postconflict activities include transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government, psychological operations to foster continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and transportation units.

Termination of Operations
As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions may include transition to civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, and redeploying forces. It is important to note that the manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations.
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Transition From Wartime Operations to MOOTW

A commander's campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Joint force commanders may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations.

Activities include:
- Transition to civil authorities
- Support to truce negotiations
- Civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government
- Psychological operations to foster continued peaceful relations
- Continuing logistic support from engineering and transportation units

JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War"
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

Introduction to Intelligence
Intelligence support is critical to operational success and joint intelligence doctrine offers two perspectives. The first is the JFC's perspective of the uses of intelligence, the responsibilities and capabilities of Intelligence Staff (J-2) and supporting intelligence organizations. Second is the J-2's perspective of the end toward which intelligence must work. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operations security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.

Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products.

The Role of Intelligence
The role intelligence plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs to clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved. Intelligence's most important role is assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace.

During peacetime operations, intelligence helps commanders make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force.

During MOOTW, intelligence helps the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost.
During wartime, intelligence tells the JFC what the adversary’s information capabilities are and where and when the information differential can be exploited.

**Tenets of Intelligence**

The tenets of intelligence are the fundamental standards against which performance of intelligence personnel and organizations must be judged.

**Timeliness.** Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it to enable the commander to anticipate events in the operational area.

**Accuracy.** To be accurate, intelligence must be objective and free from any political or other constraint.

**Usability.** Intelligence must be tailored to the specific needs of the commander and provided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension so that it may be quickly applied to the task at hand.

**Completeness.** Complete intelligence answers the commander’s questions about the adversary to the fullest degree possible and tells the commander what remains unknown.

**Relevance.** Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the operation at hand and aid the commander in the accomplishment of the command’s mission.
Levels of Intelligence
There are three levels of intelligence which mirror the three levels of war. These levels assist commanders in visualizing a logical flow of operations, allocating resources, and assigning tasks.

Strategic intelligence is used to create national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations.

Operational intelligence focuses on the military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries. It keeps JFCs abreast of events within their areas of responsibility and determines when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations.

Tactical intelligence locates the adversary’s forces and weapon systems, enhancing the tactical commander’s ability to shape the battlespace with maneuver, fires, and obstacles. Accurate, timely intelligence allows tactical units to achieve positional advantage over their adversaries.

The Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. It has the following six steps: planning and direction, when the direction for current and future intelligence operations is established by the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and by the J-2’s supporting information requirements;
collection, when those intelligence sources identified in the collection plan collect information about the adversary; processing and exploitation, when raw information is converted to forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in the production phase; production, the most critical phase of the intelligence cycle, when all available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted to create products that will satisfy the commander’s PIR; dissemination and integration, when the intelligence is delivered to and used by the consumer; and evaluation, when intelligence personnel at all levels assess how well each phase is being performed.

Joint Intelligence Architecture
In intelligence operations, a JFC must be capable of coordinating the actions of people, organizations, and resources at a great distance; therefore, the joint intelligence architecture is critical. This intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure capable of providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. It is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the earth and to provide the baseline data needed to support JFCs at all levels. The joint intelligence architecture is integral to each phase of the intelligence cycle. The architecture supports intelligence functions over a distributed global network employing communications systems, computers, space-based C4I support systems, and their associated resources and technologies.

Intelligence Planning
The essence of effective intelligence planning is the full definition of the mission, expression of the commander’s intent, completion of the commander’s estimate, and development of a concept of operations. Elements of intelligence planning include: operation plans (OPLANs),
operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) with or without time-phased force and deployment data, functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). The different processes involved in this planning are interrelated. They include deliberate planning, crisis action planning (CAP), and campaign planning.

Conducted primarily in peacetime, the deliberate planning process engages the entire joint planning community in the methodical development of plans for all contingencies, and the transition to and from war. The five phases it cycles through are initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. The basic planning process is adapted to execute joint operations in crisis situations. CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning military operations to actual execution. CAP and execution are accomplished within a framework of six phases: situation development, crisis assessment, course of action (COA) development, COA selection, execution planning, and execution.

The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s vision of related major operations required to attain strategic objectives. Campaign planning is appropriate when military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. It encompasses both the deliberate and CAP processes. Intelligence supports all aspects of the campaign plan and these plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs and OPORDs.

**Target Intelligence**
Since targeting is an important part of joint operations, target intelligence is essential to successful operations. Target intelligence describes components of a target or target system and indicates their vulnerability and relative importance. Intelligence support to targeting includes target system analysis, target development, target selection and nomination, weaponization, combat assessment, and target material production. Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander’s guidance, objectives, commander’s preparation of the battlespace, and scenario and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities.

**Multinational Intelligence**
Frequently, national interests require the US to act in concert with other nations. In many situations, Armed Forces of the United States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct MOOTW. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. Because each multinational operation will be unique, there is no fixed set of rules or policies for conducting joint intelligence operations as part of multinational operations. These general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures: maintain unity of effort; make adjustments; plan early and plan concurrently; share all necessary information; and conduct complementary operations.

**Conclusion**
The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved, which is essential in successful joint military operations.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Definition and Art of Logistics
Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations.

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.

Levels of Logistic Support
Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply in war and in operations other than war. The Joint Staff and Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The Services and the subordinate commanders deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.
Principles of Logistics
The following are logistic principles for analytical thinking and prudent planning:

**Responsiveness.** Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time. This is the keystone of the logistic principles.

**Simplicity.** Simplicity is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations.

**Flexibility.** Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation.

**Economy.** Economy is the provision of support at the least cost.

**Attainability.** Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations.

**Sustainability.** Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation.

**Survivability.** Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction.
Appendix A

Joint and Multinational Support Responsibilities and Requirements
Logistics is a function of command. To have control over the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, one must also have control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics. For multinational commands, formal arrangements for C2 may not be feasible, but joint command relationships and procedures give US combatant commanders an entry position on which to base multinational relationships. Although the sustainment of its forces is each nation’s own responsibility, varying degrees of mutual logistic support among nations can be expected. The exchange of logistic support among members of alliances or coalitions can result in significant economies of effort.

Combatant Commander’s Logistic Concept
Joint theater logistics is applying logistic resources to generate and support theater combat power. Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities. The key elements of the logistic system are: Lines of Communications, Theater Transportation Network, Specified Units, and Host-Nation Support.

Logistic Considerations
Depending on the theater operation and logistic concepts a geographic combatant commander employs in a campaign, logistic factors will almost always affect a theater campaign and exert different constraints. Strategically, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), or combatant commanders. Operationally, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate of strategic buildup or theater onward movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance.

The impetus of logistic support is from CONUS into the theater and forward. A system of continuous replenishment may take the form of either automatic (push) replenishment or requisitioning (pull) replenishment.

Apportionment and allocations play important roles in logistic planning. Apportionment is distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements, whereas allocation is distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment.

Applied Operational Logistics
An important concept in logistic planning is operational reach, the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. At the strategic level, the combatant commanders focus primarily on defeating the enemy’s strategy and will and on gaining strategic depth, initiative, and advantage by proper strategic concentration of forces and logistics. Operational reach is influenced by the length, efficiency, and security of the lines of communications. Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment.

When talking about logistics we must consider its potential power. Logistics can act as a force multiplier. Correlations of combat power between opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive.
Logistics can also be a deterrent. Logistic forces and the activation of logistic Reserve forces play a key role in deterrence, a major element of the Nation's military strategy. Adequate logistic resources and capabilities convey a national will to fight a protracted conflict.

Finally, logistics can contribute to the goal of flexibility. To remain flexible, the logistic plan should anticipate and provide for the next step in case of operational success or failure, partial success, or change in the situation and intent of the enemy.

**Logistic Planning**
Joint logistics is a complex, interdependent concept that can apply leverage to a combatant commander's combat power. An understanding of the combatant commander's concept of operations and early involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities. The combatant commanders' campaign and operations plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels: international, national, Service and functional component, and supporting command.

**Logistic Planning Considerations**
It is critical that planners identify key issues unique to a specific joint operation plan they must support.

To anticipate campaign priorities, planners should: (1) provide instructions or guidance for redistributing assets from low- to high-priority organizations within the command; (2) obtain assets from external sources with lower priority needs; (3) control the allocation of new assets in short supply; and (4) provide efficient means to retrograde, repair, and reissue damaged or unserviceable critical items.

Critical supplies and materiel should be identified early in the planning process.

Logistic planners must understand the constraining factors affecting all phases of the deployment and sustainment plans. Intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movements can encounter bottlenecks that limit or degrade the ability to support a campaign or operation plan. Logistic planners must anticipate congestion and seek solutions to bottlenecks.

**Mobilization and National Security**
Knowledge of mobilization and demobilization is a key ingredient to success in logistic planning and execution.

Mobilization is the process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

The national process of graduated response (GR) provides the framework for achieving the desired mobilization capability and is a model for coordinating resources and plans for military and national mobilization. GR is the process by which the United States responds
to early ambiguous or explicit warning of an emerging national security emergency. Mobilization is a function of the joint command and control process, which together with the Department of Defense Total Force Policy provides the basis for joint military mobilization planning and execution.

**The Defense Transportation System**
An integral part to any mobilization efforts in logistic planning is the Defense Transportation System (DTS) and its role in supporting worldwide national security objectives.

The DTS is multi-faceted, resulting in a versatility which can support the entire continuum of movement requirements, ranging from peacetime cargo and passenger movement and MOOTW through reinforcement and sustainment operations in general war.

The DTS is an integral part of the total US transportation system and involves procedures, resources, and interrelationships of a number of Department of Defense (DOD), federal, commercial, and non-US activities that support DOD transportation needs. It includes intertheater airlift and sealift capabilities and the supporting CONUS airlift and surface transportation infrastructure to support ports of embarkation and debarkation and movements within CONUS. The DTS also includes common-user theater transportation, which is characterized by intratheater land, rail, waterway, pipeline, and air transportation as well as common-user theater ports.
Health Service Support Mission
The health service support mission in joint operations is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, and disease on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. One measure of this system's effectiveness is in its ability to save life and limb, to reduce the disease and non-battle injury rate, and to return patients to duty quickly and as far forward in the theater as possible. Another measure is in the system's ability to evacuate patients to the communications zone or out of the theater as appropriate, within the operational evacuation policy and with a minimum delay.
JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

Joint Operation Planning
Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At the strategic level, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish these tasks. At the operational level, this planning links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. At the tactical level of planning, tactics is the employment of units in combat.

Joint operation planning is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It includes the preparation of OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, campaign plans, and OPORDs by JFCs as well as those planning activities that support the development of plans and orders.

Scope of Joint Operation Planning
Joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. The activities include the following:

Mobilization Planning is assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives during times of war and for MOOTW.

Deployment Planning is planning used to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan.

Employment Planning prescribes how to apply force or forces to attain specified military objectives and provides the foundation and determines the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

Sustainment Planning is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

Redeployment Planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to CONUS for the purpose of further employment.
Planning Concepts
Joint operation planning employs a single integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and MOOTW, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities.

Joint Planning and Execution Community
In conducting joint operation planning, it is important to understand who in the community will be charged with planning and execution. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning are collectively termed the joint planning and execution community (JPEC).

Joint Strategic Planning System
The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out CJCS statutory responsibilities for strategic planning, providing military advice to the NCA, and formal input to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The four products of the JSPS are the National Military Strategy, Joint Planning Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Chairman’s Program Assessment.
Appendix A

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the JPEC.

Multinational Planning
Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANs are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels in accordance with US doctrine and procedures.

There are three main factors in planning for multinational operations:

**Strategic integration** is developed when a hierarchical organization of bilateral or multilateral bodies is established to define objectives and strategy and to coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing multinational operations.

**Theater integration** occurs when joint operation planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater or operational level by the commander of US national forces dedicated to the alliance or coalition military organization.

**Bilateral planning** involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency.

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into OPLANs and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. It provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated execution planning and implementation. To achieve this it integrates the entire JPEC, providing for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communication and computer systems.

JOPES has five basic planning functions. Threat Identification and Assessment, Strategy Determination, COA Development, Detailed Planning, and Implementation.
**Campaign Planning**

Joint operation plans are proposed under different processes depending on the focus of a specific plan. One type of planning process is campaign planning. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting operation plans or orders and facilitate national levels of coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocation.

Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war.
Deliberate Planning

Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning. This planning is conducted principally in peacetime and relies heavily on assumptions regarding political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. It is a highly structured process that engages the commanders and staffs of the entire JPEC in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for all contingencies and the transition to and from war. Deliberate planning is accomplished in five phases based on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s JOPES policies and guidance. The phases are initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.

Types of Deliberate Plans

There are several types of deliberate plans that are prepared under joint procedures. They are as follows:

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations.

A CONPLAN without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD.

A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.
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A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.
A functional plan involves the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment.

**Crisis Action Planning**
CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. It is based on actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. CAP parallels deliberate planning, but is more flexible and responsive to changing events. The products of the CAP process are campaign plans and OPORDs.


**Key Employment Planning Concepts**
To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key employment planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander’s strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander’s theater objectives. Plans should incorporate the following key concepts of joint operation planning doctrine.

- Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus
- Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat
- Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity
- Phasing of operations
Joint Air Operations Fundamentals

Joint air operations are defined as those operations performed with air capabilities and/or forces made available by components in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. They do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself.

The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is a functional component commander that the JFC will normally designate to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operation plan for centralized planning and a responsive and integrated control system for decentralized execution.

Though missions vary widely across the range of military operations from war to MOOTW, the framework and processes for joint air operations are consistent. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are as important in MOOTW as in war.
**JFACC Responsibilities**
The authority and command of the JFACC typically include exercising operational control over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities and/or forces made available for tasking.

The responsibilities of the JFACC, airspace control authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC) are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC's campaign.

The JFACC’s operations center will often be designated a joint air operations center (JAOC). The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all of the JFACC’s responsibilities.

**Joint Air Operations Planning Process**
Normally, there are five phases in the joint air operations planning process, and each phase produces a desired product. While presented in a sequential order, the phases are not all required to be completed in order. Work on the various phases may be concurrent or sequential as long as they are integrated and the products are checked and verified for coherence. The phases consist of Operational Environment Research, Objective Determination, Strategy Identification, Center(s) of Gravity Identification and Joint Air Operations Plan Development.

**Targeting Cycle Phases and Responsibilities**
Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them. It takes into account strategic and operational requirements and capabilities and the threat to friendly forces imposed by the adversary. An effective and efficient target development process and air tasking cycle are essential for the JFACC and/or JFC staff to plan and execute joint air operations. This joint targeting process should integrate capabilities and efforts of national, unified, joint force, and component commands, all of which possess varying capabilities and different requirements. The process is the same in war and MOOTW.

The targeting process is a cyclical one, which begins with guidance and priorities issued by the JFC and continues with identification of requirements by components; the prioritization of these requirements; the acquisition of targets or target sets; the attack of targets by components; component and JFC assessment of the attacks; and continuing guidance from the JFC on future attacks.

**Joint Air Tasking Cycle and Joint Air Tasking Order Phases**
A joint air tasking cycle is used to provide for the efficient and effective employment of the joint air capabilities made available. The cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air missions, within the guidance of the JFC. It accommodates changing tactical situations or JFC guidance, as well as requests for support from other component commanders. It is important to note that a timely joint air tasking order (ATO) is critical as other joint force components conduct their planning and operations based on a prompt, executable joint ATO and are dependent on its information.
Appendix A

The joint ATO phases are related to the targeting cycle. The approach is the same; a systematic process that matches available capabilities and forces with targets to achieve operational objectives. The number of ATO phases may vary based on theater and contingency requirements.

Airspace Control Plan — Principles and Methods
The airspace control plan (ACP) is approved by the JFC to establish procedures for the airspace control system in the joint force area of responsibility (AOR) and/or JOA. The ACP must be tied to the area air defense plan and coordinated with the other joint OPLANs because these documents together allow for the conduct of operations along the range from fully capable and operating C2 systems to greatly degraded C2 systems. It is imperative that the ACP support an orderly transition from peacetime operations to combat operations. Such a transition could occur during a period of increasing tensions or suddenly without much warning.
Fundamentals of Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

There are fundamental issues that must be addressed with regard to joint airspace control in the combat zone. Combat zone airspace control increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed upon the friendly airspace users. The primary objective of combat zone airspace control is to maximize the effectiveness of combat operations without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any Service or functional component.

Joint Theater Missile Defense

The main objectives of joint theater missile defense are to demonstrate US resolve to deter aggression, to protect US-deployed and multinational forces as well as critical assets and areas of vital interest or political importance from attack, to detect and target theater missile systems, to reduce the probability of and/or minimize the effects of damage caused by a theater missile attack, and to ensure that the JFC has the freedom to conduct joint operations without undue interference from theater missile operations conducted by the enemy. The four operational elements that make up TMD are passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and TMD C4I. It is crucial to coordinate and integrate all four of these elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations in order to counter theater missiles.

Types of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Operations

The three categories of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Operations are as follows:

AOR and/or JOA air defense system suppression is conducted in support of joint operation or campaign objectives; it consists of AOR and/or JOA-wide operations
conducted against specific enemy air defense systems to degrade or destroy their effectiveness.

**Localized suppression** operations are normally confined to geographical areas associated with specified ground targets or friendly transit routes. These operations contribute to local air superiority, facilitating joint operations in the area.

Many air defense threats are not identified in enough time for planned suppression. **Opportune suppression** is usually unplanned and includes aircrew self-defense and attack against targets of opportunity.

**Interdiction**

Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

Air interdiction is interdiction conducted by means of air operations with the intent of destroying, neutralizing, or delaying the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.

Synchronization is defined as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” Interdiction and maneuver are complementary operations that can, and should, be synchronized to create dilemmas for the enemy.

The following are the elements which are normally required to successfully prosecute interdiction operations: Air Superiority; Sustained and Concentrated Pressure; Accurate and Timely Intelligence; Appropriate Munitions and/or Assets; and Synchronization with Surface Maneuver.

**Close Air Support**

Close Air Support (CAS) is defined as air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Joint CAS is conducted through joint air operations or in the case of rotary-wing aircraft, through the establishment of a command relationship between components.

The conditions required for effective CAS include air superiority; suppression of enemy air defenses; target marking; favorable weather; prompt response; aircrews and terminal controller skill; appropriate ordnance; communications; and C2.

**Theater Airlift**

Theater airlift consists of aircraft and ground assets assigned to a combatant commander to provide common-user airlift in support of joint operations. Theater airlift forces exist to support the plans, operations, and priorities of the geographic combatant commander by operating air transport aircraft and ground support assets for all theater forces.
Theater airlift operations are categorized in different ways for different purposes. Theater airlift is usually divided between channel and special assignment airlift missions (SAAMs). Channel missions provide common-user general airlift service, usually on relatively fixed schedules and route structures over an extended period of time, or they can be event-driven. SAAMs provide dedicated airlift for specific requirements, usually at times, places, and in load configurations requested by a specific user.

For operational planning purposes, most theater airlift missions perform one of six basic tasks: deployment, employment, routine sustainment, combat sustainment, redeployment, and force extraction.
MILITARY ASPECTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Introduction
One of the most important aspects of information warfare (IW) is how modern technological developments in electronics, communications, electro-optics, and computer systems offer improved capabilities to accomplish the combatant commander’s missions.

An “information system” is defined as the organized collection, processing, transmission, and dissemination of information, in accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. In IW, this includes the entire infrastructure, organization, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, and disseminate information.

Today, information systems are part of larger information infrastructures. The information infrastructure has been assigned three categories — global information infrastructure (GII), the worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, data bases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users; national information infrastructure (NII); and defense information infrastructure (DII), an interconnected system of computers, communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structures serving DOD local, national and worldwide information needs. It is important to note that the DII, NII, and GII are inextricably intertwined.

Fundamentals of Information Warfare
IW is defined as actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, while defending one’s own information. While the word “warfare” is used in the term IW, it should not be construed as limiting IW to a military conflict, declared or otherwise.

Fundamentals of Command and Control Warfare
Command and control warfare (C2W) is an application of IW in military operations and employs various techniques and technologies to attack or protect a specific target set — C2.

While the objective of C2W in many situations may be to “decapitate the enemy’s command structure from its body of combat forces,” this is not always the case. There will be situations where it is more advantageous to leave adversary commanders, who are known to be vulnerable to being influenced by deception operations, in complete control of their forces. In these situations, deception may be the main thrust of the C2W operation, while the other C2W tools would be used to control the adversary commander’s ability to see the battlefield.

C2W applies across the range of military operations and at all levels of conflict and is both offensive and defensive. C2W is planned and executed by combatant commanders, subunified commanders, and joint task force commanders. A successful C2W effort will contribute to the security of friendly forces, bring the adversary to battle at a disadvantage, help seize and maintain the initiative, enhance freedom of maneuver, contribute to surprise, isolate adversary forces from their leadership, and create opportunities for a systematic exploitation of adversary vulnerabilities. More importantly, effective C2W operations influence, disrupt or delay the adversary’s decision cycle.
However, no matter how competent a C2W organization is, it is inevitable that without planning the organization would fail. All elements of C2W must be carefully planned. The key to building a successful C2W plan is the integration of the elements of C2W, both offense and defense. Detailed C2W planning and integration is accomplished by organizations and personnel charged with planning the five elements of C2W using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning process and other key staff and support personnel.

**Multinational C2W**

Planning C2W operations to support multinational operations is more difficult because of complex security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers. The development of capabilities, plans, programs, tactics, employment concepts, intelligence, and communications support applicable to C2W as a part of military strategy requires coordination with responsible DOD components and allied or coalition nations in multinational operations.

**Elements of C2W**

Each of the elements of C2W — operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, plays a role in the overall C2W effort. The purpose of using two or more of these elements in a coordinated C2W effort is to achieve a synergistic effect that would not normally be achieved from the single or uncoordinated application of these elements in a military operation. The synergistic application of the five C2W tools magnifies their combat power.
Appendix A

Operations Security
OPSEC is defined as a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions related to military operations and other activities in order to: identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

OPSEC's most important characteristic is that it is a process. OPSEC is not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation. It is a methodology that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to an adversary.

Military Aspects of Information Warfare
The OPSEC Process

The OPSEC process provides the information required to write the OPSEC section of any plan or order. OPSEC planning is done in close coordination with the overall C2W planning effort and with the planning of the other C2W components.

Psychological Operation
The second element of C2W is PSYOP. PSYOP are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Military PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment the national effort. PSYOP are
used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve.

**Military Deception**

The third element is military deception and is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Military deception as an element of C2W should focus on causing the adversary commander to estimate incorrectly the situation in the operational area with respect to friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. There are six principles of military deception that provide guidance for the planning and execution of deception operations. They are: focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.

**Electronic Warfare**

All three aspects of EW, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), contribute to the C2W effort. EA is concerned with denying an adversary commander use of the electronic spectrum to effectively command and control operating forces. EP is involved with guaranteeing use of the electronic spectrum for the JFC to command and control friendly forces. ES contributes to the JFC’s accurate estimate of the situation in the operational area.
Appendix A

Physical Destruction
Physical destruction refers to the use of "hard kill" weapons against designated targets as an element of an integrated C2W effort. Although the word "destruction" is used in the term, "hard kill" weapons may be used in C2W for a purpose other than the actual "destruction" of a specific target. Normally, physical destruction would target identified C2 nodes. However, physical destruction may also be against targets other than adversary C2 nodes in support of one or more of the other elements of C2W. Physical destruction may support both C2-attack and C2-protect operations.

Intelligence Support
In C2W, as in any military operation, intelligence support is critical to the planning, executing, and assessing of the operation. The joint staff intelligence representative(s) assigned to support C2W should be the liaison for intelligence support for all C2W planning. Intelligence products support C2W operations preplanning, provide analysis of adversary C2 systems, and determine adversary C2W capabilities. These are accomplished to assist the C2W cell in developing plans for both C2-attack and C2-protect operations. Finally, intelligence may provide indicators on the effectiveness of the execution of these plans.

In addition, CI support to C2W includes investigations, operations, collection, analysis, and production of foreign intelligence and security service (FISS) and terrorist data. CI provides assessments of adversary vulnerabilities to friendly military deception efforts and nominates FISS collection targets for exploitation, neutralization, or destruction.