CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM OF POLICY NO. 30
(Issued--17 July 1990)
(1st Revision--8 March 1993)

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

1. Circulation. The Enclosure is circulated as a current statement of policy.

2. Supersession. This memorandum of policy supersedes CJCS MOP 30, 17 July 1990.


4. Summary of Changes. This revision:

   a. Changes the title of CJCS MOP 30 from "Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures" to "Command and Control Warfare" and replaces "counter-C3" and "C3-protection" with "counter-C2" and "C2-protection." New definitions for these terms will be forwarded to J-7 for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 upon final coordination and approval of this MOP's revision.

   b. Incorporates terminology changes promulgated in draft CJCS MOP 5, "Electronic Warfare."

   c. Integrates Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as one of the five principal military actions supporting Command and Control Warfare (C2W).

   d. Focuses C2W on warfighting and significantly reduces document size by eliminating C3CM philosophy, general information, and definitions included in other MOPs.
e. Changes in responsibilities:

(1) Eliminates a number of responsibilities for clarification.

(2) Adds responsibilities for joint coordination of C2W evaluation and support.

(3) Adds a requirement for CINC to integrate C2W into exercise and operations plans and orders.

(4) Adds a requirement for CINC to ensure that C2W portions of plans and orders address both the counter-C2 aspects of C2W (the integration of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence) as well as the C2-protection aspects (e.g., protecting our C2 from C2W efforts of the enemy).

(5) Adds a requirement for the Director, DIA to establish and maintain a DOD-wide plan and architecture for integrated intelligence support to C2W, and ensure that the Military Integrated Intelligence Data Base System/Integrated Data Base (MIIDS/IDB) is the DOD standard data base for C2W intelligence support.

f. Updates existing references in the enclosure and Appendix B.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

R. C. MACKE
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
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ENCLOSURE

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

1. Purpose. To provide joint policy and guidance for command and control warfare (C2W).

2. Applicability. The provisions of this MOP apply to the Joint Staff, Services, unified and specified commands, Defense agencies, and joint and combined activities.

3. Objective. To maximize US and allied military effectiveness by integrating C2W into military strategy, plans, operations, exercises, training, communications architectures, computer processing, systems development, and professional education. The key to successful C2W is its integration throughout the planning, execution and termination phases of all operations.

4. Terminology. The following terminology applies:

   (Definitions are from Joint Pub 1-02 unless otherwise annotated; definitions from other than Joint Pub 1-02 are for purposes of this MOP only.)

   a. Command and Control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

b. **Command and Control Warfare.** The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. Command and Control Warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. (Proposed by draft CJCS MOP 30 for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 as a replacement for Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures.)

C2W is both offensive and defensive:

1. **Counter-C2.** To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the adversary C2 system.

2. **C2-Protection.** To maintain effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system.
c. For additional terminology see Appendix A.

5. **References.** See Appendix B.

6. **General Information.** C2W is the military strategy that implements Information Warfare (DOD Directive TS-3600.1, 21 December 1992, "Information Warfare") on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction. Its objective is to decapitate the enemy's command structure from its body of combat forces. Commanders will integrate C2W strategy as an integral component of their overall warfighting concept. The underlying rationale for C2W evolves from the following:

   a. Modern military forces are highly dependent upon timely and accurate information conveyed through a resilient C2 system for effective application of combat power. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities, and procedures. Successful C2 depends upon a rapid flow of accurate information through the arrangement of these components. Each of these is vulnerable, in varying degrees, to OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and destruction (hard kill and weapons effects). Actions that degrade one or more of these component elements degrade the
entire C2 network and introduce elements of doubt as to the
effectiveness of the command and leadership structure.
b. Effective C2 is required if a force is to be agile.
Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces,"
identifies agility as one of the fundamentals of joint
warfare. It states "Agility is relative. The aim is to be
more agile than the foe. Agility is not primarily concerned
with speed itself, but about timeliness: thinking,
planning, communicating, and acting faster than the enemy
can effectively react." C2W provides the commander with the
means to achieve agility by focusing attacks on the
adversary's ability to control his forces while
simultaneously protecting friendly C2. If adversary forces
cannot act or react cohesively, friendly forces gain a
comparable measure of agility.
c. The speed and pace of battle and the agility of forces
is continually increasing. The commander with the greater
ability to evaluate the battlefield and expose and exploit
an adversary's vulnerabilities will have the greater chance
to prevail.
d. Effective C2W enables the commander to seize the
initiative by forcing the enemy into a reactive mode, while
maintaining, protecting and/or enhancing the effectiveness of friendly C2. It combines the denial and influence of information, deception, disruption, and destruction to counter adversary C2 while simultaneously protecting friendly C2. The five principal military actions used to achieve these results are OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, and destruction (hard kill and weapons effects).

e. Each of these actions taken independently can have a measurable effect. Combat power is maximized, however, through the synergistic application of all five actions taken together. It is this integrated employment that is the essence of C2W strategy: an efficient, effective, coordinated application of different capabilities, processes, techniques, and weapons across the spectrum of an adversary’s C2.

f. The advent of modern C2 systems and concepts contributes to our ability to achieve success in C2W while simultaneously creating vulnerabilities in our own C2 which must be defended. C2W offers the commander the potential to deliver a KNOCKOUT PUNCH before the outbreak of traditional hostilities. A successful C2W strategy will contribute to the security of friendly forces, bring the adversary to
battle on our terms, seize and maintain the initiative, 
ensure agility, contribute to surprise, decapitate enemy 
forces from their leadership and create opportunities for a 
systematic exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities.

7. **C2W Applicability.** Although C2W is discussed herein as 
comprising five military actions, all warfighting capabilities 
potentially may be employed in C2W operations, the level of 
applicability of each being conditioned by the circumstances and 
the resources available. Similarly, C2W strategy is required in 
all aspects of military operations as an integral part of the 
overall theater campaign plan.

8. **Integrated Intelligence Support.** Integrated intelligence 
and counterintelligence support is absolutely critical to C2W as 
in every warfare area. This support requires the fusion of 
all-source intelligence and is fully dependent upon interagency 
cooperation. Planning, execution, and evaluation of both 
counter-C2 and C2-protection is necessary by commanders at all 
ehchelons from the inception of plans through implementation and 
evaluation. Precise intelligence is essential for operational 
planning and execution of C2W; the operational commander must 
have the best available intelligence on enemy situations, 
intentions and capabilities. Only with this information can the
commander weigh the potential advantage of specific actions, 
assess the potential loss of intelligence from exploitation, and 
weigh the need to employ counterintelligence to protect 
intelligence sources and methods against the benefits of 
disrupting or destroying enemy C2.

a. Intelligence and counterintelligence activities must 
support the development of scenarios and simulations that 
represent realistic wartime threats. Emphasis should be on 
critical node analysis and target development. This 
analysis will be the basis upon which tactics, techniques, 
and the identification of resources to support C2W plans 
will be developed based upon the commander's intent for each 
proposed scenario. C2W plans and operations must be 
coordinated with affected intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities as they are developed to 
ensure adequate intelligence support.

b. Intelligence and counterintelligence to support C2W 
activities is the result of the collection, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of all available information 
that concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or 
areas. In response to Service and CINC validated 
requirements, intelligence and counterintelligence
activities are responsible for the collection, analysis, production, and rapid dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence in support of C2W as required by the user. Intelligence support generally includes:

1. Developing and maintaining data bases of sufficient detail to support C2W in geographic areas of potential conflict.

2. Identifying critical C2 nodes, links and sensors of potentially hostile nations. Identification should include general target types with specific detailed information on key targets and the critical times of vulnerability associated with each specific set. Particularly required is an understanding of potential enemy C2, communications, and sensor systems, including both peacetime and wartime operating modes, organizational structure and netting, procedures, and deployment. This intelligence must be sufficiently detailed and accurate to support effective employment of precision guided munitions and EW.

3. Assessing the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of potential C2 targets. This information allows planners to identify and counter
those C2 entities that, if disrupted, deceived, destroyed, or masked, would provide the greatest advantage to US or friendly forces.

(4) Identifying the key political and military leaders in potentially hostile nations. Address both formal and informal power structures. Provide biographical data and, when available, psychological profiles of leaders to support (as a minimum) the PSYOP element of C2W.


(6) Providing timely and reliable indications and warning information to operational commanders.

(7) Providing timely information to persons and systems during engagement of an actual adversary force.

(8) Providing accurate direction finding (or geopositional, if available) information on pulsed and continuous wave signals from A through K band.

(9) Supporting battle damage assessments.

c. Intelligence and counterintelligence support to C2W planning and operations includes all levels of effort
(national, theater, and tactical) and all collection disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT, IMINT, MASINT, CI, etc.); analysis centers; Defense agencies; and scientific and technical intelligence and counterintelligence production centers. C2W must be closely coordinated with information-gathering functions.

d. When necessary, and when approved by proper authority, compartmented intelligence information should be released for use at noncompartmented levels in support of operational planners and commanders. If an intelligence organization finds that a commander requires compartmented intelligence data that cannot be released at noncompartmented levels, action should be taken to provide necessary accesses to persons designated by the commander.

9. **Communications Support.** Effective communications support is also absolutely essential to the success of C2W.

   a. C2 facilities, adequate connectivity, automated data processing (ADP) support, and interoperable data bases are required.

   b. Communications requirements in support of C2W can vary widely, both within and among headquarters elements, due to
the continued use of existing unique or specially installed communications systems.
c. Secure communications and data transfer must be incorporated at all C2W facilities.

10. Joint Spectrum Management Joint spectrum management (CJCS MOP 64) plays a key role in the successful planning, engagement and analysis phases of C2W. Although principally affecting communications, intelligence collection, jamming and the resolution of electromagnetic interference, aggressive management of the electromagnetic spectrum can impact OPSEC military deception and PSYOP as well. This function is performed for the commander by the Joint Frequency Management Office, typically under the cognizance of the J-6, to support joint planning, coordination, and control of the spectrum for assigned forces. The supported joint force commanders are the ultimate authority for resolving spectrum use conflicts in their areas of responsibility.

11. Planning and Execution. The success of C2W depends on a coordinated plan. The most critical elements in effective C2W planning are staff organization and planning skills. The appropriate mix of planners from operations (and its various subfunctions), intelligence, information and/or ADP, and
communications with clearly defined authorities and responsibilities will greatly facilitate the planning and execution of C2W. Options for organization range from identification of points of contact in applicable staff elements to establishing a permanent staff office. In any organization, the key to successful C2W is its integration throughout the planning and execution phase of all operations.

12. **Testing.** Equipment, techniques, and tactics supporting C2W will be exercised and tested in an environment representative of friendly, neutral, and adversary C2W capabilities. These tests and exercises will be protected by appropriate security measures and OPSEC, consistent with current directives, including protection of intelligence on which the testing is based. Test and exercise plans will clearly indicate the potential for mutual interference with other US and allied systems.

13. **Training.** C2W training in a realistic threat environment will be an objective in all simulated and actual joint exercises. Additionally, appropriate C2-protéction measures will be used to protect the C2W tactics, techniques, and procedures used.

14. **Coordination with Allies.** The development of capabilities, plans, programs, tactics, employment concepts, intelligence, and
communications support applicable to C2W strategy requires coordination with responsible DOD components and allied nations. Coordination with allies will normally be effected within existing defense arrangements; however, the use of bilateral arrangements is not precluded. The Joint Staff will coordinate US positions on all C2W matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding combined and coalition operations in a specific theater are the responsibility of the theater CINC.

15. Authority. Actions and means used to execute C2W strategies must conform to domestic laws, treaties, the law of armed conflict, and SM-846-88, 28 October 1988, "Peacetime Rules of Engagement for US Forces," or other pertinent ROE.

   a. For planning purposes, use Joint Pub 5-03.1 (proposed final publication, September 1992) "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures."

   b. Refer to DOD Directive 3222.4, 31 July 1992, "Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control, Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)" and DOD Directive TS-3600.1,
21 December 1992, "Information Warfare" in addition to the applicable other joint and Service warfare publications listed in Appendix A.
c. As a minimum, the following doctrine, policy and guidance will be used to plan and conduct C2W:

(1) Doctrine
   (a) Joint Test Pub 2-0, 21 June 1991, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"
   (b) Joint Pub 5-03.1, 6 March 1992, "Joint Operations Planning, and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 1 (OPLAN Formats and Guidance)"
   (c) Joint Pub 3-13, 10 September 1987, "C3CM in Joint Military Operations"
   (d) Joint Pub 3-51, 30 June 1991, "Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations"
   (e) Joint Pub 3-53, 1 February 1987, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine"

(2) Policy
   (a) CJCS MOP 6, 19 January 1990, "Electronic Warfare"
(b) CJCS MOP 24 (1st Revision), 10 January 1992, "Tactical Employment of Directed-Energy Warfare Systems"

(c) CJCS MOP 25, 13 July 1990, "Wartime Reserve Modes"

(d) CJCS MOP 29, 24 August 1990, "Joint Operations Security"

(e) CJCS MOP 54, 20 November 1990, "Joint and Combined Communications Security"

(f) CJCS MOP 64, "Management of the Electromagnetic Spectrum"

(g) JCS MOP 116 (5th Revision), 24 March 1987, "Military Deception"

(3) Planning Guidance is found in the following Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Annexes:

(a) JSCP Annex A Intelligence

(b) JSCP Annex D Psychological Operations

(c) JSCP Annex H Counter-C3

(d) JSCP Annex I C4 Systems

(e) JSCP Annex M Electronic Warfare

(f) JSCP Annex K Military Deception

(g) JSCP Annex X Special Access Programs
(4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support for C2W
(a) MJCS-158-89, 17 August 1989, "Procedures for Requesting Tailored Analytic Intelligence Support to Individual EW and C3CM Projects (TASIP)"
(b) MCM-149-92, 26 October 1992, "Counterintelligence Support"

16. Responsibilities

a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to the NCA for providing recommendations concerning the joint and combined employment of C2W and will:

(1) Provide joint and combined policy and amplifying guidance for the employment of C2W.

(2) Make recommendations to the Director, DIA, other intelligence agencies, and/or the Secretary of Defense, as necessary, to improve the responsiveness of intelligence support to C2W.

(3) Coordinate (with the Services, Defense agencies, and other appropriate organizations) requirements of the unified and specified commands and the Services for technical assistance or assessments of the effectiveness of planned C2W.
(4) Monitor and coordinate the development of joint C2W concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Ensure that, where appropriate, this development includes evaluation and testing of joint C2W concepts and doctrine during CJCS-directed exercises.

(5) Respond to requests from the unified and specified commands for employment of C2W.

(6) Conduct assessments of the effectiveness of C2W planning with appropriate organizations and agencies, the unified and specified commands, and the Services.

(7) Ensure that the unified and specified commands provide for operations and exercises and develop appropriate joint and combined C2W concepts and procedures.

(8) Develop and provide guidance for:

(a) Joint C2W doctrine.

(b) C2W planning in support of US foreign policy and JSCP strategy.

(c) Classification and disclosure of joint C2W information.

(d) Special technical operations.
(9) Provide guidance for instruction in C2W in military educational institutions under the cognizance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(10) Evaluate the capabilities of the unified and specified commands and DISA and other national agencies to operate in C2W environments representative of the expected threat. Recommend appropriate corrective actions to the Secretary of Defense and the CINCs.

(11) Provide for C2W planning within JOPES.

(12) Ensure the development and review of joint and combined C2W in appropriate operations plans (OPLANs), exercise plans (EXPLANs), and/or concept plans (CONPLANs).

(13) Ensure the development, maintenance, and dissemination of information essential for the identification and protection of critical US and allied C2 nodes and equipment by appropriate agencies.

(14) Participate in the Tailored Analytic Intelligence Support to Individual EW and C3CM Projects (TASIP) process (see MJCS-158-89).
(15) Review joint C2W plans for consistency with policies and guidance provided in this MOP and make corrective recommendations, as necessary.

(16) Ensure the incorporation of C2W operations in CJCS-directed or sponsored operations and exercises.

(17) Evaluate and integrate C2W deficiencies identified in the CINCs' Preparedness and Assessment Reports (CSPARs) for incorporation, as applicable, into the CJCS Preparedness Assessment Report.

(18) Ensure the incorporation of C2W operations in CJCS-directed or sponsored exercises.

b. The Combatant Commanders will:

(1) Designate a single staff component to be responsible for C2W, designate specific points of contact for counter-C2 and C2-protection where feasible, and ensure that subordinate commands assign responsibilities for C2W as necessary.

(2) Conduct direct discussions regarding combined and coalition C2W concerns with applicable allies.

(3) Plan for the integration of joint and combined C2W operations into overall military operations in
accordance with guidance found in Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-03.2 (JOPES). Pending formal change, the following expansion of JOPES guidance will assist in planning this integration:

(a) Consolidate reference to C2W efforts (OPSEC, EW, PSYOP, military deception and destruction) in Appendix 10 to Annex C, the "Counter Command, Control, and Communications" Appendix of OPLANS detailed in Joint Pub 5-03.2. Refer to this Appendix as "Command and Control Warfare."

(b) Cross-reference Annex B (Intelligence), Appendix 3 to Annex C (EW Operations), Appendix 4 to Annex C (PSYOP Operations), Appendix 7 to Annex C (Military Deception), Annex K (C3 Systems), and Annex L (Operations Security) in preparation of Appendix 10 to Annex C.

(c) Plan for specialized (e.g., PSYOP) forces. Note that these forces used in C2W are, in most cases, the same forces used to conduct other aspects of warfare, and unless they represent some unique capability, will move in the same flow as the units to which they are organic.
(d) Identify any unique requirements for intelligence and communications support for C2W operations in appropriate annexes and appendixes.
(f) Identify and direct the use of C2-protection required to counter the threat.
(g) Ensure maximum coordination among C2W planning, intelligence, information and/or ADP, and communications support activities.
(h) Ensure C2W policies, concepts, plans, capabilities, doctrine, employment procedures, tactics, techniques, exercises, and training for joint and combined operations are effective, mutually supporting, and noninterfering.
(i) Establish realistic C2W objectives to exercise and evaluate in a realistic wartime C2W environment for joint and combined exercises.
(j) Include command joint and combined C2W capabilities and deficiencies (including
intelligence and key communications support) in the CINC's CSPAR to the Joint Staff. Reporting of matters requiring special access will be done concurrently in a separate report.

(k) Submit mission needs statements (MNS) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to correct critical C2W deficiencies.

(l) Ensure designated C2W officers at the unified and specified commands and component commands attend, as required, the Joint C2W, EW, and Command, Control and Communications Officers' courses at the Armed Forces Staff College.

(m) Review and incorporate the intelligence requirements of C2W into the CIAP.

(n) Participate in the TASIP process (see MJCS-158-89, 17 August 1989, "Procedures for Requesting Tailored Analytical Intelligence Support to Individual EW and C3CM Projects (TASIP)").

(o) Report joint universal lessons learned (JULLs) as directed in CJCS MOP 53 and Joint Pub 1-03.30.

(p) Maintain an Integrated Priority List (IPL) for C2W activities and requirements.
c. **The Chiefs of the Services and USCINCSOC will:**

(1) Designate a staff component to act as the single working-level point of contact for C2W as the military strategy which implements Information Warfare; require designation of staff components for C2W in subordinate commands as necessary; and assign, or require assignment of, specific staff component responsibilities for counter-C2 and C2-protection as feasible.

(2) Develop C2W objectives, techniques, and security guidance.

(3) Establish operational requirements for Service and USCINCSOC capabilities applicable to C2W strategies, coordinating with other Services and Defense agencies to minimize duplication of effort in C2W programs and equipment development and to achieve standardization, interoperability, and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements, including use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

(4) Conduct research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement of existing and proposed systems applicable to C2W strategies of the Services and the
unified and specified commands, coordinating with other Services and Defense agencies where common interests exist.

(5) Keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and other Service components informed of actions taken to correct identified C2W deficiencies.

(6) Maintain the capability to react rapidly to foreign technical achievements that could degrade US C2.

(7) Maintain liaison with Services, Defense agencies, other appropriate organizations, and allied governments to minimize duplication of effort in C2W programs and equipment development and to achieve standardization, interoperability, and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements.

(8) Maintain a capability, in coordination with other Services, to evaluate C2W system performance and operational employment tactics, techniques, and procedures in combat operations, operational tests, and training exercises.

(9) Exercise capabilities applicable to C2W strategies and conduct training, exercises, and tests in a C2W environment representative of that expected in wartime.
(10) Identify intelligence and counterintelligence requirements in support of C2W and request C2W project support using established TASIP procedures. DIA is the CJCS administrator and office of primary responsibility.

(11) Identify training requirements and qualifications for personnel who perform C2W-related activities, provide for C2W orientation of personnel, and provide appropriately trained personnel to operational commands and intelligence agencies (including Reserve forces).

(12) Plan for and employ C2W to support operations, exercises, tests, evaluations, and other activities in accordance with this MOP and appropriate directives.

(13) Ensure that C2 capabilities are adequate to support unified and specified command requirements for the planning and conduct of C2W, including the CIAP.

(14) Assess the vulnerabilities of Service-provided C2 facilities to sabotage and other forms of attack. Assess abilities to maintain personnel and physical security programs to protect such facilities.

(15) Train commanders and other decisionmakers, operating elements, and staffs to understand, detect,
and combat hostile counter-C2 and to effectively plan for, make, and implement decisions despite an adversary's use of counter-C2.

(16) Train commanders and other decisionmakers, operating elements, and staffs to plan for and conduct effective integrated counter-C2 actions.

d. The Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Services (CSS), will:

(1) Designate a staff component to act as the single working-level point of contact for support to C2W.

(2) Assist the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Defense agencies in the development of principles and techniques applicable to C2W.

(3) Assess US C2 vulnerability to, and evidence of actual exploitation by, adversary SIGINT.

(4) Upon request, provide SIGINT in a format as outlined in United States Signals Intelligence Directive 328 and acceptable for use by CINCs in planning and execution of C2W operations and training.
(5) Maintain SIGINT watch over counter-C2 activities in order to monitor and assess target reactions and protect sensitive sources.

(6) Provide SIGINT advice and assistance to appropriate planners to enable them to:
   
   (a) Determine the appropriate C2W actions for inclusion in plans.
   
   (b) Develop appropriate equipment to support C2W strategies.

(7) Provide Information Security (INFOSEC) measures and advice to help protect against hostile SIGINT and C2W efforts.

(8) Plan for, approve as authorized, and employ C2-protection in support of agency operations.

   The Director, DIA will:

(1) Designate a staff component to act as the single DOD focal point for joint policy on integrated intelligence production support to warfighting, including C2W.

(2) Establish and maintain a DOD-wide plan and architecture for integrated and prioritized intelligence support to C2W.
(3) Provide all-source intelligence and counterintelligence to the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, Defense agencies, and the Services in response to validated intelligence and counterintelligence requirements that support the preparation, evaluation, and execution of counter-C2 and C2-protection strategies in operational and exercise plans and orders.

(4) In conjunction with NSA, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the unified and specified commands, lead in the improvement of integrated analytical intelligence support at each stage of C2W activities (under the TASIP program), particularly those projects with unusual and long-term intelligence requirements.

(5) Provide threat assessments and validation of potential enemy C2 and counter-C2 capabilities.

(6) Provide indicators of developments in adversary C2 that could be exploited to enhance US and allied counter-C2 capabilities.

(7) Include instruction in foreign C2 and counter-C2 capabilities in the curricula of the Defense Intelligence College.
(8) Review Joint Doctrine Publications, including TTPS for intelligence support to Joint Operations, for intelligence and counterintelligence support to C2W and make recommendations for improvements.

(9) Coordinate and provide integrated intelligence support to C2W in theater exercises.

(10) Ensure the Military Intelligence Integrated Data Systems/Integrated Data Base (MIIDS/IDB) and its successors are maintained, or caused to be maintained, as the DOD standard for C2W intelligence support data bases.

(11) Validate all Service-produced system-specific System Threat Assessment Reports (STARS) for programs subject to Defense Acquisition Board review; develop, with the components, uniform procedures for performing threat assessments for all acquisition category programs.

f. The Director, DISA will:

(1) Designate a single staff component to act as the single working-level point of contact for support to C2W.

(2) Ensure that DISA policies and programs support operational concepts and objectives for C2W.
(3) Assess the vulnerabilities of the Defense Satellite Communications System and other defense information systems to adversary counter-C2 and report the results of such assessments annually to the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commands.

(4) Maintain procedures to ensure a capability to respond to identified threats and assessed vulnerabilities.

g. The Director, DNA will:

(1) Designate a staff component to act as the single working-level point of contact for support to C2W.
(2) Provide support to the development of capabilities applicable to C2W strategies in consonance with DNA's mission and responsibilities.

h. The Director, Joint Electronic Warfare Center will provide, as part of the JEWC PROUD FLAME predictive analysis, C2W analysis products for the CINC-prioritized country(ies) of concern to support planning, execution, and evaluation of EW operations that support C2W (see CJCS MOP 6, MCM-117-91, and JDP 1-90).

i. The Director, DOD Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center will provide, upon request, electromagnetic spectrum
management support to planning, execution, training, and evaluation of C2W operations (see CJCS MOP 64).

j. The Heads of other Defense Components will develop capabilities applicable to C2W strategies and employ C2W, as appropriate, in support of military operations and their individual agency functions.
APPENDIX A
TERMINOLOGY

1. **Electronic Warfare.** Military action involving: (1) the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack an enemy's combat capability, (2) protection of friendly combat capability against undesirable effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare or, (3) surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum for immediate threat recognition in support of electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called EW. (Proposed by CJCS MOP 6 for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 as a change to the current definition.)

2. **Force.** An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles and necessary support, or combination thereof.

3. **Military Deception.** Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives.

4. **Operations Security (OPSEC).** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions...
attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (CJCS MOP 29)

5. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

6. Strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.
APPENDIX B

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