INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT

RB-50 Loss
29 July 1953

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HQ AFMPC/DPMC
RANDOLPH AFB TX 78150
Dear Mr. Forsythe:

This responds to your inquiry in behalf of Mr. Raymond G. Goulet concerning the status of his brother, Airman First Class Roland E. Goulet, who was declared missing in action during the Korean War.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is aware of Reverend Lindstrom and the articles released by him concerning members who were unaccounted for during the Korean War. While we do not believe his integrity is in question, we have continued to make clear the official United States Government position regarding our missing servicemen. No information or intelligence reports from any source have been received to indicate that any of these men are alive and held captive in any foreign country. Regrettably, however, Reverend Lindstrom, with his public statements, continues to generate false hopes and increase the anxiety of those families concerned.

During August 1953, the Department of State issued a series of protests to the Soviet Government concerning the shooting down of the RB-50 aircraft on which Airman Goulet was a crew member, and requested that it undertake an investigation regarding any surviving members. The response to these representations was a denial that the Soviet Government rescued any survivors or had any knowledge of their whereabouts. The United States Government, in a subsequent note delivered on October 9, 1954, presented a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government concerning the shooting down of this aircraft. In reply, the Soviet Government, on December 31, 1954, again stated that no information was available concerning the fate of this crew or the aircraft.

As a result of continued reports from persons freed from Soviet imprisonment, our government again (on July 16, 1956) specifically requested information from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the possibility of their holding members of air crews or any other Americans. The Soviet Government replied on August 13, 1956, stating that a careful investigation revealed no American from the Air Force or Naval Air Force was on Soviet territory.

The feelings and concern of Mr. Goulet for his brother are understandable, particularly, since no remains were recovered; however, the family was kept fully informed of all
Known circumstances from the time Airman Goulet was reported missing on July 29, 1953 until the presumptive finding of death was made and his status was changed on November 15, 1955.

Mr. Goulet may be assured that the government continued to be alert to any possible new information, investigating all leads and suggestions, and seeking information through all available channels; however, neither the Department of State nor the DOD, to date, has ever received any reliable information or intelligence to indicate that any of these crew members are alive and held prisoner by the Soviet Union. We regret that we cannot provide hope by way of additional information.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. FARR, Lt Colonel, USAF
Congressional Inquiry Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

CONST CORRES

Attachment

Honorable Edwin D. Forsythe

House of Representatives
DISTRIBUTION:
AFHPC/DPMSC Coord Cy
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AFHPC/DPMSC Stryk Cy
The Honorable John L. McLucas  
Secretary of the Air Force  
Washington, D. C. 20330  

Re: HILL, Donald George, S/Sgt USAF (Deceased)  

My dear Mr. Secretary:  

Recently Mrs. Harrie Hill, mother of the above serviceman, requested that I assist her in trying to determine if the Air Force has obtained any additional information regarding her son who was lost (when his plane was shot down over the Sea of Japan on 29 July 1953) and subsequently declared dead in accordance with existing statutes.  

Her request was precipitated by a letter from a Mrs. Betty Woods whose son was also a crewmember on the aircraft, and the enclosed newspaper clipping sent by Mrs. Woods, which apparently appeared in a number of newspapers in the southeastern part of the United States sometime in February of this year.  

Undoubtedly your Department is aware of Rev. Lindstrom's work and statements and I know his allegations have been made previously. I am also aware that the Air Force and the State Department have conducted exhaustive investigations of this incident, and the sensitive nature of the subject; however, I know too, your concern in assisting people like Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Woods in their efforts to find a conclusive answer to their dilemma over the status of their sons.  

Please convey to me any information or observations you have which can be released at this time and I will discuss this with Mrs. Hill, who is now nearly 80 years of age (Don was raised by Mr. and Mrs. Hill and later adopted by them.)  

Thank you for your assistance in this matter, I remain  

Sincerely yours  

[Signature]

H. H. Hayes  
CDR, OIC, USN, RET.
PARIS (AP) — An American pastor said Saturday he has documents purporting to show that a number of U.S. servicemen are being held in slave labor camps in eastern Russia.

The Rev. Paul Lindstrom, executive director of the Illinois-based Christian Defense League, said the servicemen were crewmen of a U.S. bomber shot down by Russian jets in July 1953 over the Sea of Japan.

The information on the Americans came from "an individual within a Communist embassy in Algiers" who had access to "files and correspondence concerning prisoner affairs," Lindstrom said.

The pastor did not specify what documents he himself had or disclose identities of the Americans.

The Pentagon confirmed the plane was shot down and said one person was rescued and the other 16 crew members were presumed dead.

Lindstrom, in a telephone interview, said: "We know some of them are still alive and working in a coal mining operation." The exact number and the identities of the survivors were not known, he said.

The servicemen were being held in a cluster of five camps near the Sea of Japan where Hungarians, East Germans and Russian Jews also are imprisoned, he said. Lindstrom named the camps as Bogosh, Ust-Kamchatsk, Ganad and Vakh.

The Americans, as far as he knows, had never been put on trial, Lindstrom said.

"There are other Americans at a concentration camp... between Elgen and Dubin on the Kolyma river," Lindstrom said. "They apparently have been sentenced and then State Department knows about them."

The Christian Defense League has been involved in tracking down prisoners since 1966 and has spent "considerable sums of money" obtaining information on U.S. prisoners in Russia and Southeast Asia, Lindstrom said.

He returned to Paris from Algiers on Friday to go to the United States Sunday. He said his organization will ask Illinois congressman to begin a campaign of pressure to get the Nixon administration to do something about getting the prisoners released.

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**Service Record**

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<th>Active Duty</th>
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<td>353</td>
<td>For the purpose stated in said November 1955</td>
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**Address**

Home address at time of enlistment: 18 March 1924, Great Falls, Montana. Last duty organization: 6920th Security Group, APO 994, San Francisco, California. Attached to 91st Strategic Reconnaissance (See Reverse Side)

Mr. Harry E. Hill
Room 1, Funk Bldg
Olympia, Wash.

**Authentication**

J. J. TARR
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services
Dear Mr. Burke:

On February 19, 1974, you again inquired in behalf of Mrs. Colleen Hinker relative to the status of Airman James H. Woods, (Deceased).

There has been no further information concerning Airman Woods since our letter to you of April 4, 1973. As previously stated, he was reportedly missing and subsequently declared deceased over 20 years ago, and it is extremely doubtful that any more information will be received pertaining to him. While we are unable to determine the Reverend Lindstrom's reasons for publicly stating his views, or on what information his remarks may be based, we consider his claim to be unfounded. Regrettably, his declaration has had a tendency to generate false hopes or to increase the anxiety of those families concerned.

Your concern for our Air Force families is appreciated.

Sincerely,

E. ARCHIE NessMITH, JR., Colonel, USAF
Congressional Inquiry Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

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Attachment

Honorable J. Herbert Burke
House of Representatives
1. Reference is made to correspondence dated 8 February 1974 addressed to Congressman Burke from his constituent, Mrs Colleen Winker, sister of Airman Woods. Your suspense: 7 March 1974.

2. Proposed reply:
   a. There has been no further information concerning Airman Woods since Colonel NeSmith wrote to you on 4 April 1973. As previously stated, since Airman Woods was reported missing and subsequently declared deceased over 20 years ago, it is extremely doubtful that any more information will be received pertaining to him.

   b. While we are unable to determine Reverend Lindstrom's reasons for publicly stating his views, or on what information his remarks may be based, we consider his claim to be unfounded. Regrettably, his declaration has had a tendency to generate false hopes or to increase the anxiety of those families concerned.

   c. Your concern for our Air Force families is appreciated.

3. FOR SAF/LL INFORMATION ONLY: Airman Woods was the left gunner aboard an RB-50 aircraft on a routine navigational training mission over the Sea of Japan when he was reported missing on 29 July 1953. The aircraft, with a crew of 17, was shot down by a Russian MiG-15 approximately 40 miles east of the Siberian coast. Search efforts recovered one survivor and the remains of two other crew members. The survivor stated that one member did not leave the RB-50 and died in the crash. The Soviets denied any knowledge of the fate of any crew member. On 15 November 1955, the missing status of Airman Woods and the other missing crew members was terminated by a presumptive
Airman James E. Woods cont'

finding of death.

3. To the extent required, this paper has been coordinated with interested DCS/Personnel Staff agencies. No further coordination is required.

A. W. GRATCH, Colonel, USAF
Casualty Services
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers
Data Sought
On U. S. Flyer

MOSCOW, Aug. 31.—A California member of Congress discussed with a high Soviet official yesterday the shooting down of American planes near the Soviet borders. He was told:

"It is doubtful if you need worry about such incidents in the future."

Representative Hillings, Republican of California, asked Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin specifically for any information on United States Air Force Maj. Francisco J. Tejeda of Pomona, California, one of 13 crewmen of a B-24, missing since the plane was shot down over the Sea of Japan July 29, 1953. Three others who were aboard the plane died, and one was rescued from the water near the Siberian coast.

Maj. Tejeda's wife lives in Pomona. There have been reports Maj. Tejeda and other survivors were picked up by Soviet rescue workers and are being held.

Mr. Zorin told Mr. Hillings all information the Soviet government had on the incident has been given to the United States. Mr. Zorin added, however, he would make further inquiries and report if any new information had turned up.

Mr. Zorin and Mr. Hillings also discussed further expansion of tours of the Soviet Union by Americans. The Soviet official said Russia expects to open a tourist office in the United States soon. He explained a housing shortage is one of the things holding up the tourist business in Russia, since priority is given to building apartments for Soviet citizens rather than hotels for tourists.
Mrs. Stanley O'Kelley

Dear Mrs. O'Kelley,

Your recent letter to the President regarding the crew of the EB-50 aircraft shot down in the Sea of Japan on 29 July 1953, has been referred to me for reply.

Your interest in the welfare of the relatives of the other crew members of your husband's crew is admirable and understandable. The death of a loved one is always difficult to accept, particularly in this type of case where details of the events are not completely known.

I wish it were possible to alleviate some of the anxieties of these kin by furnishing information which would clearly establish the manner in which their loved one met his fate. Unfortunately, in the past five years since the termination of the missing status of these men, the investigative agencies of the United States Government have received no additional information regarding this crew. No positive intelligence has ever developed which would support a belief that any one of the 13 presumed dead crew members survived the crash of the EB-50, was rescued, or has ever held prisoner by the government of the USSR. Under these circumstances it would be unfair for me to encourage you, and the relatives of the other crew members, to hope that a basis exists for their survival.

Sincerely,

A. P. Clark
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

Copy to:

APMP-3-1
Col Scurlock
Major Luther
Capt Parker
May 20, 1961

Dear President Kennedy,

I am writing this letter regarding the fate of a B-50 bomber crew that was shot down off the coast of Russia July 29, 1953.

Early in February I contacted Mr. Salinger and do appreciate his efforts in checking with the Air Force on this matter. I do not expect them to change their minds on the fact they list my husband Capt. Stanley O’Kelley as dead. But I, as the rest of the crew members’ wives, have felt that during these past seven years nothing was done to determine the fate of the crew. We feel that every effort should be made for whomever survived.

No doubt Mr. Salinger showed you the enclosed copy from the United Nations but in case he didn’t I will send it on—it is our best way of telling our story. I do not wish to burden you unnecessarily but when I ask Mr. Salinger to check it was for the whole crew, not just my husband.

Any effort you can make on their behalf would mean so very much to us all. We feel that much about this entire incident was not cleared up to anyone satisfaction.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Mrs. Stanley O’Kelley
I have the honor to refer to the Security-Council proceedings of 10 September 1954 in which the Council considered the United States complaint of an unprovoked attack by Soviet military aircraft against a United States Navy airplane over high seas on 9 September 1954. I wish to refer also to Document S/3095 which relates to another attack of this type and which was circulated to Council members at my request.

In my statement before the Council on September 10 I affirmed the determination of the United States Government to seek a negotiated settlement of claims arising out of incidents of this type and, in absence of such settlements, to submit them to impartial adjudication by the International Court of Justice.

The United States Government, in a note delivered to the Soviet Government on 9 October 1954, has now presented a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government on account of the destruction by Soviet aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 aircraft in the international air space over the Sea of Japan on 29 July 1955 and has invited the Soviet Government, if it denies liability, to join in submitting this matter to the International Court of Justice. In this note, the United States Government also reiterates its demand for the release of any survivors of the destroyed American aircraft. The note, based on a thorough investigation, follows an earlier interchange of notes on this subject. It deals with another of the series of hostile attacks against the United States aircraft to which I referred in my statement before the Council.

May I ask you, Mr. President, to circulate a copy of the attached text of this note to the Members of the Council.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Text of note presenting formal diplomatic claim by the United States Government against the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the case of USAF B-50 aircraft shot down over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953.
Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit, upon the instruction of my Government, the following communication from my Government to your Government:

The Government of the United States of America refers again to the destruction on July 29, 1953 by Soviet military aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 type aircraft off Cape Pavorotny in the international air space over the Sea of Japan. On January 25, 1954, following an intensive investigation and study of the incident, the United States Government delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a note requesting certain detailed information with respect to the incident and with respect to the various allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes of July 30, 1953, August 4, 1953 and August 26, 1953. The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government, through its Embassy at Moscow, transmitted another note on May 25, 1954 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgment whatever to either note, although far more than sufficient time has elapsed to enable the Soviet Government to make a reply or to state its intentions with respect to such reply. The United States Government must conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Government is fully aware that it is not in a position to make a responsive or adequate reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954.

This circumstance, the United States Government concludes, reinforces and confirms the essential accuracy of the findings of fact resulting from the United States Government's own investigation and study, as well as of the statements made in the various communications of the United States Government to the Soviet Government on this subject, particularly the United States Government's note of August 4, 1953.

The United States Government therefore takes this opportunity to place solemnly upon the record the facts relevant to the Soviet Government's liability and to preface against the Soviet Government a formal international diplomatic claim for damages as set forth below.
The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum, and it charges, the following:

1. Early in the morning of July 29, 1953 a four-engine aircraft of the United States Air Force, of the B-50 type, was duly dispatched from its base in Japan by United States Air Force authorities to perform a routine navigational mission in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan, returning to base in Japan upon completion of the mission. The officers and crew were instructed prior to departure that under no circumstances was the aircraft to fly closer to the Soviet-held land mass than twelve nautical miles.

Upon its departure the B-50 type aircraft had on board a crew of seventeen persons, all members of the United States Air Force and all nationals of the United States. They were, as the Soviet Government was informed in the United States Government's note on August 4, 1953, the following:

- Stanley Keith O'Kelley - Captain - Serial No. AO 776602
- John Ernst Roche - Captain - Serial No. AO 2029868
- Edmund Joseph Czyz - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2012656
- Lloyd Clayton Wiggins - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 694999
- James Gordon Keith - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2092926
- Warren John Sanderson - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2066184
- Robert Elbon Stalnaker - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 761337
- John Cyrus Ward - Captain - Serial No. AO 865270
- Francisco Joseph Tejeda - Major - Serial No. AO 765704
- Frank Ernest Boyer - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2003936
- Francis Luther Brown - Master Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 053497
- Donald Wayne Gabrose - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 333767
- Roland Edgar Goullet - A/1C - Serial No. AF 12 327933
- James Edwin Woods - A/2C - Serial No. AF 24412122
- Charles Joseph Russell - A/2C - Serial No. AF 13 351658
- Donald George Hill - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19, 353976
- Earl Wilbur Rudelin, Jr. - A/2C - Serial No. AF 14 370732
The B-50 aircraft proceeded on a course of approximately 315 degrees from the Japanese Island of Honshu. When it arrived in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan at a point approximately 50 miles from the coastline, the aircraft turned to the right and proceeded on an easterly heading, flying at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet, the crew carrying out the instructions given them as above stated.

The aircraft had reached a point in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Pavorotny, flying on a heading of approximately 45 degrees at an altitude of 20,000 feet when suddenly, at approximately 0:15 in the morning local time and without any prior warning whatever, Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft intercepted and fired upon the United States aircraft. One MIG-15 type aircraft commenced the interception and firing by coming up from below and to the left of the B-50 and shooting the No. 1 engine, rendering it inoperative. One or more additional MIG-15 type aircraft thereupon appeared behind the B-50, directed fire on the No. 4 engine and upon the right wing and other portions of the aircraft, and set the No. 4 engine on fire. When the Soviet MIG-15 aircraft appeared from behind, shooting at the B-50, one or more of the personnel on board the B-50 aircraft opened fire in self-defense against the oncoming attacking MIG-15 aircraft, but to no avail.

Immediately upon being hit, the B-50 aircraft dived sharply, losing altitude rapidly. The shots from the rear attack tore off the right wing and the tail section and caused the aircraft to disintegrate. The component parts of the B-50 then hit the water, at approximately the same position at which the interception and attack took place. The total time which elapsed between the commencement of the attack until the component parts of the aircraft hit the water was approximately two minutes.

Upon the B-50's first becoming disabled, in consequence of the actions of the MIG-15 aircraft against it, the members of the crew of the B-50 were directed by the aircraft commander, Captain Stanley F. O'Kelley, to abandon the aircraft and to seek safety by bailing out of the aircraft. The United States Government is informed and believes that, apart from First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, all members of the crew above named bailed out of the aircraft, or parachuted, into the Sea of Japan, all coming down at points within the area of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Pavorotny.
The United States Government finds, and charges, that all the actions of the MIG-15 type aircraft above described were taken upon the deliberate and willful orders of competent Soviet authorities.

When the B-50 failed to return to its base at the time required for its return, and could not be otherwise accounted for, the competent United States authorities commenced and conducted a meticulous and thorough search of the area by aircraft and by surface vessels of the United States Government and with the assistance of a naval vessel of the Australian Government in the area. The search of the Sea of Japan off Cape Pavorotuy succeeded in the sighting in the international waters of several survivors and disclosed the active presence in the same area of Soviet PI-type boats, trawlers and aircraft. One of the search aircraft dropped a lifeboat to a group of survivors but only Captain John E. Roche, the co-pilot, was able to reach the lifeboat and get into it. Intermittent fog hampered the rescue efforts and no other personnel could be rescued by the United States and Australian surface vessels. When the weather in the area cleared up, by dawn of July 30, 1953, no evidence of survivors, other than Captain Roche, could be seen in the international waters of the Sea of Japan by the air or surface rescue craft.

2. The United States Government finds, and charges, that in direct consequence of the Soviet Government's actions above described, the following took place:

a. The B-50 aircraft was totally destroyed.

b. First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, navigator situated in the nose of the aircraft, was thrown from his position and mortally wounded, so that he was unable to bail out from the aircraft, and died.

c. Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and shock and of exposure for approximately twenty hours in the Sea of Japan.

d. Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, flight engineer, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and shock and of long exposure in the Sea of Japan.
a. Captain John Ernst Roche, the co-pilot, was thrown headlong into the body of the aircraft, suffering numerous bodily injuries and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MiG-15 aircraft but he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft. He suffered further shock and exposure in the Sea of Japan from approximately 0:17 in the morning local time July 29, 1953, to approximately 4:20 in the morning local time July 30, 1953. He was rescued from the waters of the Sea of Japan by a search vessel of the United States Navy.

b. The remaining thirteen members of the crew have not so far been accounted for. The United States Government finds, however, that all of them suffered bodily injury and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MiG-15 aircraft. It finds further that a number, if not all, of them successfully parachuted to the surface of the Sea of Japan in the area above described in which the attack and destruction of the B-50 took place. It must conclude that these persons were either picked up alive by surface vessels of the Soviet Government in the area in which they hit the water, or that in due course, dead or alive, they were carried by the prevailing currents to Soviet-held territory and into the Soviet Government's custody. Those dead, the United States Government finds and charges, were brought to their death by the injuries caused in the course of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, by shock and by exposure in the waters of the Sea of Japan. Those that were alive when they came into the custody of the Soviet Government, the United States Government finds and charges, suffered in addition injuries and anguish caused by their long detention by the Soviet Government, by the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government with respect to their whereabouts and their condition or to permit them to communicate with United States Government authorities.

These conclusions are based on the following considerations:

(1) As the United States Government has previously indicated, personnel on board search craft of the United States Government observed at least twelve Soviet P2-type boats, at least one armed trawler-type Soviet naval vessel, and Soviet aircraft, proceeding at high speed to and from the area of the scene of the incident. Other surface vessels of Soviet nationality were in the vicinity.
These observations were made as late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon local time July 29, 1953. In view of the failure of the Soviet Government to make responsive reply to questions of the United States Government in its note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government is confirmed in its conclusion, and it charges, that these Soviet craft picked up survivors and portions of the disabled B-50 aircraft.

(ii) The prevailing currents of the Sea of Japan at the positions above mentioned and at the date of the incident, which are well known to the Soviet Government, move toward the coast, in a northerly and northwesterly direction at a rate of approximately 0.7 to 1.1 knots. Even if the Soviet Government did not have these crew members in custody, dead or alive, earlier, it must have become aware of their arrival in Soviet territorial waters or on Soviet soil by August 1, 1953.

3. The B-50 aircraft at the time of the attack upon it and its destruction, and the navigational and flying equipment thereon, were in efficient and good working order. Each member of the crew was efficient and experienced in the performance of his task. In particular, Captain O'alley, the aircraft commander, was an efficient and experienced pilot; Captain Roche was an efficient and experienced co-pilot; First Lieutenant Cey, First Lieutenant Wiggins and First Lieutenant Keith were efficient and experienced navigators.

II.

The United States Government finds as a result of its investigation that in its notes above mentioned, the Soviet Government willfully and knowingly made material misstatements of fact for the purpose of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States Government. These misstatements of fact are most explicitly made in the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953 on this subject, which substantially reiterates the misstatements contained in the Soviet Government's earlier notes on the same subject:

1. The Soviet Government states that the B-50 aircraft at about 5 a.m. local time "violated the state boundary of the USSR, at first in the region of Cape Gamov, and continued the flight over the territory of the USSR at Askold Island not far from Vladivostok". But the Soviet Government has refused, although
fully requested, to state where the boundary, which it claims, runs in this region. The United States Government must therefore conclude, as it has found, that the B-50 aircraft at no time crossed into territory of the Soviet Union in this area but, on the contrary, flew entirely in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

2. The Soviet Government states that two Soviet fighter aircraft approached the B-50 with the intention of showing the B-50 that it was within the boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with the intention of suggesting that the B-50 leave the air space of the Soviet Union. This statement must be characterized as false, as well as misleading, since the first intimation which the crew of the B-50 had of the approach of any aircraft was the destruction of the No. 1 engine on the B-50 by fire directed from one of the Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft, which had appeared without any warning whatever to the left and from below the B-50 aircraft. This fact and the shooting which immediately followed directed by MIG-15 type aircraft coming up without warning from behind the B-50 aircraft conclusively demonstrates that it was the intention of the MIG-15 interceptors, and of the competent Soviet authorities who dispatched them and controlled their actions, to give the crew of the B-50 aircraft no warning whatever but, on the contrary, to effect the B-50's destruction without any warning or opportunity to the crew to disengage or to defend themselves.

3. The Soviet Government's statement permits the implication that the interception of the B-50 by Soviet aircraft took place within the air space over Soviet territory. This statement is false also. As has been stated above, the interception as well as the attack took place approximately forty miles south of Cape Pavorotny and in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

4. The Soviet Government states that fire was first opened by the B-50, being directed against the intercepting Soviet aircraft. This statement is false. As the United States Government has stated above, the B-50 aircraft did not open fire until after two firing passes had been made by the Soviet intercepting aircraft. The first MIG-15 type aircraft, which as stated above without warning destroyed the No. 1 engine, flew away unscathed. When immediately thereafter one or more MIG-15 type aircraft appeared from behind, the MIG aircraft were firing and the gunners on board the B-50 were compelled in self-defense to open fire against the MIG aircraft so firing upon the B-50.
5. The Soviet Government states that the attack took place at 6:12 in the morning local time. The United States Government charges that this statement is untrue and is known by the Soviet Government to be untrue. The United States Government has found that the interception and attack took place not earlier than 6:15 in the morning local time, if not later. By this time the B-50 aircraft, as the Soviet authorities well know, had reached a point approximately forty miles off the Soviet land mass at its closest proximity.

6. The Soviet Government states that one of the Soviet aircraft was seriously damaged by fire from the B-50 in consequence of which the Soviet aircraft was compelled to fire upon the B-50. This statement is misleading as well as false. Even if, contrary to fact, the B-50 gunners had opened fire on the MiG aircraft appearing from the rear, the destruction of the No. 1 engine by the MiG aircraft which appeared first and the hostile attitude of the MiG aircraft appearing in the rear would have justified the B-50 gunners in opening fire on the MiG aircraft.

7. The Soviet Government states that after the Soviet aircraft fired on the B-50 the B-50 "departed in the direction of the sea" and that the Soviet authorities have no further information regarding the American military aircraft. This statement must be characterized as false as well as misleading. As stated above, within seconds after the Soviet aircraft hit the right wing and fuselage the B-50 disintegrated and fell into the sea. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft could not but have seen the consequence of their actions and reported it to the competent Soviet authorities. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government admits that the pilots upon returning to base, if not earlier, reported what they had done and what had happened.

8. The Soviet Government indicates that it has "verified data", presumably including reports of ground observers as well as the testimony of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved, and that these data "refute the statement that the American airplane B-50 did not violate the boundary of the USSR and was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan." The Soviet Government, although duly requested in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, has failed and refused to produce these supporting data. The United States Government is compelled to conclude that such data as exist do not support the Soviet Government's conclusion and that these statements are therefore false.
9. The Soviet Government states that, contrary to the allegations contained in the United States Government's notes, there were no Soviet surface ships on July 29, 1953 in the area of the Sea of Japan in which the shooting incident took place, and it further implies that the weather conditions of fog and darkness were such that the observations of the crew of search craft reported in the United States Government's notes were not in fact made. These statements as above indicated, are false and misleading. The weather, during the hours of daylight, was in fact foggy but at the low altitudes at which the search aircraft flew, and on the surface of the sea at which the naval craft proceeded, there was the Soviet Government well aware intermittent visibility permitting the observations which were made and which were reported by the United States Government.

10. The Soviet Government states that as a result of investigation, it has been confirmed that the Soviet authorities have no information concerning the crew of the American bomber B-50. For the reasons above stated this statement must be characterized as false and misleading.

III.

The United States Government finds and it charges that the foregoing action of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft and of the competent Soviet authorities made the Soviet Government guilty of deliberate and willful violations of international law, on account of which it has become liable to the United States Government for damages and other awards.

1. Since the Soviet Government has evaded the questions in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government declares that the limit of the territory of the Soviet Government in the area of the incident extends no further than three nautical miles from the mean low water mark of the shore line of the Soviet-held land mass in this area, following the sinuosities of the coast and the sinuosities of each of the Soviet-held islands. While the United States Government in instructions to its personnel has prohibited any overflying aircraft or seagoing craft from coming closer than twelve miles to Soviet-held territory in traversing the international waters of the Sea of Japan or the air space above, the United States Government takes this opportunity
again to inform the Soviet Government that it does not recognize the claim of the
Soviet Government to territorial waters in excess of three miles from its coast.
In the opinion of the United States Government there is no obligation under
international law to recognize claims to territorial waters in excess of three
miles from the coast.

2. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the Soviet Government
to make every effort, following the wrongful destruction of the B-50 aircraft,
to search for and pick up members of the crew, dead or alive, to cooperate with
all other searching aircraft and surface craft in such search and rescue
operations and promptly to turn over to authorities of the United States
Government rescued personnel, the bodies of any dead personnel picked up and any
portions of the aircraft salvaged, or to make arrangements for their prompt
delivery to the United States Government. The failure of the Soviet Government
to do so constitutes violation of international obligations.

3. It was the duty of the Soviet Government to make truthful statements
to the United States Government in the notes above mentioned which the Soviet
Government delivered to the United States Government in connection with this
incident. The willful making of false or misleading statements in these
circumstances constitutes a violation of international obligation.

4. The continued detention of survivors by the Soviet Government, and the
failure of the Soviet Government immediately upon receipt of information at any
time from its own sources of the observation of bodies of any of the crew members
constitute violations on the part of the Soviet Government of international
obligation.

5. Any shooting by the crew of the B-50 at the MIG aircraft, in the
circumstances of the case, was lawful as an exercise of the right of self-defense.
The B-50 having been fired upon and hit without prior warning, the crew of the
B-50 were justified in the exercise of self-defense in shooting at the approachin
MIG aircraft.
The United States has suffered the following items of damage in direct consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty and international legal obligations, for which the Soviet Government is liable, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet Government pay the following sums on account thereof:

1. United States Air Force airplane B-50 type No. 47-145A and equipment thereon, amounting in total to $1,468,908.66.
2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government: $491,569.73.
3. Damages to Captain John Ernst Roche, a national of the United States, for injuries to him, $25,000.00.
4. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, for the deaths of Captain Stanley Keith O'Kelley, Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, $150,000.00.
5. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, of the remaining thirteen crew members for all injuries resulting from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government, including the wrongful deaths of such crew members or the wrongful and unlawful detention by the Soviet Government of such members of the crew as survived, $690,000.00.

The United States Government declares that its demand for compensation on account of the members of the crew who survived does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the withholding of those crew members from return to the United States, or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding their whereabouts or welfare, or the making of false statements by the Soviet Government with respect thereto. The United States takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government forthwith provide the information in this regard which the United States Government has already requested, and make provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide such crew members with the maximum degree of care and comfort and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States.
Government. The United States Government further declares that such demand for compensation with respect to members of the crew whose bodies came into custody of Soviet authorities but who were no longer alive does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of such facts or to turn over such bodies to the United States Government. The United States Government further reserves the right to make additional demand upon the Soviet Government for awards or other actions on account of its conduct on or since July 29, 1953 with respect to such survivors or such dead crew members.

Furthermore, the United States Government has not included in its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the United States Government and to the American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government. In this regard, the United States Government had determined to defer to a future date the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Government and against the American people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this communication.

Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the United States Government deems an international dispute to exist falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government invites the
Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules to determine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth herein.

The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
For Record

E-mail dated 20 May 61 from Mrs. Stanley O'Kelley to President Kennedy was received from SAFLL by suspense Case #175034 for direct reply - 6 Jun 61 suspense date. Mrs. O'Kelley is the wife of Capt Stanley O'Kelley, aircraft commander of the KB-50 which was shot down by MIG-15's off the coast of Russia in the Sea of Japan on 22 July 1953. Capt O'Kelley gave the bailout order. His remains were recovered from the water near Japan. (1 crew member survived - 2 remains washed ashore - 1 determined dead in the crash of the aircraft and 13 presumed dead). It appears that Mrs. O'Kelley apparently had written Mr. Salinger in February and had not received a complete reply regarding the remainder of the crew. SAFLL, Col Stoddard, was contacted 2 Jun and states they have no knowledge of the previous answer to the alleged letter and we should formulate reply without it. Mrs. O'Kelley intimates nothing is being done by the Air Force to determine fate of crew. It appears Mrs. O'Kelley, because of her husband's status aboard the aircraft, sees herself as being responsible for the welfare of the next of kin of his crew members. Letter prepared inferring that, under the conditions, it would be unjust for us or her to encourage the other next of kin to believe a possibility of survival exists for this crew. Colonel Stoddard indicated SAFLL prepares Presidential referral letters to begin as in paragraph 1.

J. C. LUTHER
Major, USAF
CONFIDENTIAL LETTER FROM DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS - IG

# INV 24-5824 dated 30 Aug 1956 HAS BEEN DESTROYED.
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, DCS/P
ATTN: CHIEF, CASUALTY BRANCH, SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP

SUBJECT: Unofficial Information Regarding the Status of Major Francisco J. Tejeda, AO 726 704 and Others

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 20 June 1956.

2. This Directorate has referred this matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation since it does not appear at this time that bona fide military personnel are involved. The possibility exists that "Lt ARNOLD" is an individual impersonating a military officer, which would also bring the investigation within the jurisdiction of the FBI.

3. Your Directorate will be advised of the developments as the investigation proceeds.

GILBERT R. LEVY
Chief, Counter Intelligence Div.
Dir of Special Investigations, IG
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, SPECIAL ACTIVITY BRANCH:
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION
DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, ARCIG

SUBJECT: Unofficial Information Regarding the Status of Major Francisco J. Tejeda, AO 726 704 and Others

1. Reference is made to telephone conversation between Captain J. R. Gibbs of your office and Major H. Z. Hawkins, pertaining to unofficial information received by Mrs. Ses Tejeda, regarding the status of her husband, Major Francisco J. Tejeda.

2. Cal 11 June 1956, Major Daniel J. Boyle, B66 481A, APPM-9, a friend of Mrs. Tejeda, informed this office that Mrs. Tejeda had received a letter from Mrs. Hill, mother of Staff Sergeant Donald Hill who was aboard the plane with Major Tejeda when it was lost. Mrs. Hill informed her that on 6 June 1956, she had been visited by a Lieutenant Arnold, presumably from Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, and that he had showed her a letter from the Adjutant General which alleged that Major Tejeda, Sergeant Hill and one of the other crew members were prisoners of the USSR. It was also indicated that Lieutenant Arnold sought additional information from Mrs. Hill regarding the loss of her son. Mrs. Tejeda thought it strange that the communication was from the Adjutant General since all prior information she had received came from the Director of Military Personnel.

3. Inquiry at Fairchild Air Force Base by this office reveals no Lieutenant Arnold assigned at either Fairchild Air Force Base or Geiger Field, Washington. No information is available in Headquarters USAF to indicate that subject officer or his two mentioned crew members are prisoners of the USSR.

4. Request your office take investigative action to determine the identity of the alleged Lieutenant Arnold, the source of his information, and the motive of Lieutenant Arnold, or other source, in transmitting this information to the next of kin. Further request this office be advised of results of investigative action.

Richard A. Steele
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chief, Casualty Branch
Special Activities Group
Directorate of Military Personnel

APPMP-9-1
Lt Col Steele
Lt Col Davison
Major Hawkins
Memo for the Records:

Captain Wengel, Magazine and Books Branch, SAFIS 3-B was called reference a previous coordination with him relative to allegations made against Captain John E. Roche by Mrs. Elizabeth M. Woods, concerning conflicting information reference the incident in which Captain Roche and her son and others on the crew of the B-50, which was attacked by MIG-15's, and which Captain Roche was the only survivor. Captain Wengel had expressed interest in this matter and Captain Roche was sent around for interview. Captain Roche in his statement reference magazine articles allegedly appearing in "SIR" and Peoples Magazines, denied authorship, interview or remuneration for these articles.

Captain Wengel offered to make an informal check with Sir Magazine to verify Captain Roche's version. The Editor of the magazine stated to Captain Roche Wengel that Captain Roche did not author the article. Captain Roche did not give the information via interview to the author. Captain Roche received no remuneration from the magazine.

It appears therefore that the allegation made by Mrs. Woods was without foundation as to conflicting statements, given survivors.

Lt. Colonel Monroe, DOD Prisoner Officer was also advised.

19 April 56

[Signature]

H.E. Hawkins
Major, USAF

TO: Commander, 137th Lot Mapping and Charting Squadron, Palm Beach Air Force Base, West Palm Beach, Florida

1. Attention is invited to basic communication. Captain John R. Rocha, AG 2 002 263, presently assigned your organization, was the only survivor of an RB-50 aircraft which was attacked by MiG-15 type airplanes over the Sea of Japan, and crashed approximately 40 miles east of the Siberian coast. The deaths of three crew members have been definitely established. The missing status of the other crew members was terminated by a presumptive finding of death effective 15 November 1955, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 590, 77th Congress, as amended.

2. It is requested that this basic letter be brought to the attention of Captain Rocha. A statement should be obtained from him concerning the allegations set forth in the letter, and returned to this Headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

RICHARD A. STEELE
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chief, Casualty Branch
Special Activities Group
Directorate of Military Personnel

cc: 54th Ftr Qr (Air Def)
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, Pa.

M/R: Ind coordinated w/ Capt Wengel, SAFIS-3-D, Magazines and Books Branch, ext 72291 - Col Monroe, AFORD, DOD POW officer, ext 53345.
HEADQUARTERS
54TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEFENSE)
Greater Pittsburgh Airport
Coraopolis, Pennsylvania

PS

3 March 1956

SUBJECT: Casualty Assistance

TO: Director of Military Personnel
   Headquarters USAF
   ATTN: Casualty Branch
   Washington 25, D. C.

1. This office is rendering casualty assistance to Mrs. Elizabeth M. Woods, of 51 College Avenue, Buckhannon, West Virginia, mother of A/2c James Edwin Woods, AF2M13122, whose death occurred on 15 November 1955. Airman Woods was formerly listed as missing in action as of 29 July 1953.

2. The following information is offered for your information. Captain John E. Roche now stationed at Palm Beach Air Force Base was the only man rescued by Allied Forces from the B-50 accident on 29 July 1953 in which Airman Woods was presumed to have been killed.

3. In statements made by Captain Roche to the press and released from Tokyo on 1 August 1953 and 2 August 1953, he said, "That he saw only Captain O'Kelly drown and that the rest of the crew may be alive."

4. In the September 1954 issue of "Sir" magazine an article written by Captain Roche stated that the rest of the crew may be alive. An article in the 19 October 1955 issue of "People" by Captain Roche stated the same thing.

5. A letter dated 15 September 1953 to Mrs. Woods from General Joe E. Kelly states that Captain Roche was unable to furnish any information on the fate of the rest of the crew.

6. Previous attempts by the families of the crew to contact Captain Roche have been ignored or refused by him.

7. In the first week of February 1956, Mrs. Lula Wilkinson, mother of Captain Robert Stainaker, who was a member of the crew, called Captain Roche at his home. Mrs. Wilkinson was in Florida on vacation. Captain Roche stated curtly over the phone that all the rest of the crew had drowned.

8. These actions and conflicting statements of Captain Roche have left the families of the crew with a bad impression of the Air Force and suspicion as to the actual circumstances surrounding the accident. The families of our
EQ 54TH FTRGRU (AIR DEF), PS, Subject: Casualty Assistance

Servicemen who gave their lives for this country deserve the greatest respect and consideration. They should not be misinformed or ignored.

Robert B. Stephens
ROBERT B. STEPHENS
2nd Lt., USAF
Personal Affairs Officer
3d Ind

137th Mapping and Charting Squadron, MATS, Palm Beach Air Force Base, Florida.

O: Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, ATTN: Casualty Branch, Special Activities Group, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following information is furnished in regard to allegations set forth in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of basic letter:

Paragraph 3. In regards to quotation, "that he saw only Captain O'Kelly drown and that the rest of the crew may be alive," these exact words were not stated by me in the press release, 1 and 2 August 1953.

Paragraph 4. I did not write an article for "Sir" magazine or "People." All information in these magazines is of their own volition.

Paragraph 5. Upon arrival back to the states after the incident, I saw many of the wives and families of my fellow crew members who were still stationed at Topeka, Kansas. I have also seen the next of kin in other states, i.e., in Kansas, Washington and Florida. All correspondence received from people concerned has been answered with the exception of one letter from a wife from whom I have received many letters.

Paragraph 7. Mrs. Lula Wilkinson, mother of Captain Robert Stainaker did contact me in February 1956, in regards to what I thought of the Air Force Times announcement that all men were dead. She also inquired at this time if she could come down and visit me. I stated that I would be very happy to have her come down and see me. When she asked me what I thought happened to the rest of the crew, I stated that the Air Force may have presumed that the men did drown. This statement should have been modified to say, "or killed in the explosion of the airplane in flight." Mrs. Lula Wilkinson did not come to see me which could have left her in a more understanding frame of mind.

Paragraph 8. Since I did not write the articles in the magazines referred to, I do not feel that I have furnished conflicting information regarding the accident. I also do not feel that I have been discourteous to any family of my former crew members.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

John E. Roche
Captain, USAF
AIRP-1-100, James E. (Assm) 1st Lt, USAF.

Headquarters, HQ USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding, 371st Mapping and Charting Squadrons, Palm Beach Air Force Base, West Palm Beach, Florida

1. Attention is invited to basic communication. Captain John E. Woods, AS 3 002 252, presently assigned your organization, was the only survivor of an 115-90 aircraft which was attacked by A26-15 type airplanes over the Sea of Japan, and crashed approximately 40 miles east of the Siberian coast. The status of the other crew members have been definitely established. The missing status of the other crew members was terminated by a prescriptive finding of death effective 15 November 1955, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 450, 77th Congress, as amended.

2. It is requested that the basic letter be brought to the attention of Captain Woods. A statement should be obtained from him concerning the allegations set forth in the letter, and returned to this Headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Lt: 34th Div Cp (Air Daf)
C. S. C. Librarians
Airport, Pa

M/R: Ind coordinated v/Capt Wendal, SAFIS-3-D, Magazines and Books Branch, ext 72291 - Col Monroe, APOED, DOD POW officer, ext 53345.
HEADQUARTERS
6TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEFENSE)
Greater Pittsburgh Airport
Coraopolis, Pennsylvania

3 March 1956

SUBJECT: Casualty Assistance

To: Director of Military Personnel
   Headquarters USAF
   ATTN: Casualty Branch
   Washington 25, D. C.

This office is rendering casualty assistance to Mrs. Elizabeth M. Woods, 51 College Avenue, Buckhannon, West Virginia, mother of 1/Lt. James Edwin Woods, AF2LL13122, whose death occurred on 15 November 1955. Airman Woods was formerly listed as missing in action as of 29 July 1953.

2. The following information is offered for your information. Captain John E. Roche, now stationed at Palm Beach Air Force Base, was the only man rescued by Allied forces from the B-50 accident on 29 July 1953 in which Airman Woods was presumed to have been killed.

3. In statements made by Captain Roche to the press and released from Tokyo on 1 August 1953 and 2 August 1953, he said, "That he saw only Captain O’Kelly drown and that the rest of the crew may be alive."

4. In the September 1953 issue of "Sir" magazine an article written by Captain Roche stated that the rest of the crew may be alive. An article in the 19 October 1953 issue of "People" by Captain Roche stated the same thing.

5. A letter dated 15 September 1953 to Mrs. Woods from General Joe E. Kelly states that Captain Roche was unable to furnish any information on the fate of the rest of the crew.

6. Previous attempts by the families of the crew to contact Captain Roche have been ignored or refused by him.

7. In the first week of February 1956, Mrs. Lula Wilkinson, mother of Captain Robert Stalnaker, who was a member of the crew, called Captain Roche at his home. Mrs. Wilkinson was in Florida on vacation. Captain Roche stated curtly over the phone that all the rest of the crew had drowned.

8. These actions and conflicting statements of Captain Roche have left the families of the crew with a bad impression of the Air Force and suspicion as to the actual circumstances surrounding the accident.

The families of our brave men.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
servicemen who gave their lives for this country deserve the greatest respect and consideration. They should not be misinformed or ignored.

ROBERT B. STEPHENS
2nd Lt, USAF
Personal Affairs Officer
February 8, 1955

Dear Mrs. Ward:

I wish to express my deep regret that a reply to your letter of October 26, 1955 has been so long delayed. Your letter arrived while I was attending the Geneva Conference and, through administrative inadvertence, has just been brought to my attention.

There have been a series of communications between our Government and the Soviet Government in an effort to obtain information concerning the fate of the crew of the United States aircraft B-40, which was shot down by Soviet aircraft on July 29, 1955. The subject was taken up orally in August 1955 with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zaras by a United States Congressman who was visiting the Soviet Union. On December 7, 1955 we reopened the subject with the Soviet Government and in a formal diplomatic note requested that Government to review all the information available with a view to informing the U.S. Government concerning the fate of the crew of this lost aircraft. On December 20, 1955 the Soviet Government informed us that renewed inquiries had brought to light no information concerning the members of the crew.

I wish that I could be more encouraging. I can assure you, however, that we will take every measure which might result in our obtaining information concerning your husband and the other crew members. I shall inform you should there be any developments in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Walter J. Scoot, Jr.
Officer in Charge,
ECA Affairs

[Signature]

[Address]

[Date: 2/8/56]

CC: Mr. R.C. Ochortes
Casualty Branch, HQ, USAFE
In reply to your letter of November 17, 1955, I have received your letter of November 27, 1955, in which you ask to be advised whether the Department has received any information from the Soviet Government relative to the whereabouts of Major Francisco J. Tafta subsequent to your conversation with Acting Soviet Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin last August. You also inquire if, in the absence of such information, it would be in order for our Government to make a new formal representation to the Soviet Government in this matter.

The Department has not received any information from the Soviet Government in this regard since your meeting with Mr. Zorin. The Department believes that it would be desirable to approach the Soviet Government again in our continuing effort to obtain information concerning Major Tafta and other members of the crew of the USAF B-50 aircraft which was shot down by Soviet fighter planes over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1955. It is contemplated that such an approach will be made in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

Thurston S. Morton
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
Patrick J. Hillings
House of Representatives.

Copy to: H
There follows a translation of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note No. 129/OSA:

"No. 129/OSA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and in connection with Embassy note No. 381 of December 7 this year has the honor to state that according to renewed inquiries conducted by the Ministry, Soviet authorities have no information concerning the members of the crew of the American aircraft "R-50."

Moscow, December 26, 1955

To the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow."

For the Ambassador:

John C. Guthrie
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Russian text of Soviet Note No. 129/OSA
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: Finding of Death, SR&D Case #543 (29 July 1953)

FACTS

1. a. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," the following personnel were continued in a missing status at the expiration of their 12 months' period of absence. Circumstances and the lapse of more than 27 months since the missing incident occurred now warrants a reconsideration of their status pursuant to Section 5 of the Act.

Major Francisco J. Tejeda A0 726 704
Captain Robert E. Stalnaker A0 751 337
Captain John C. Ward A0 865 270
Captain Edmund J. Czyz A0 2 072 656
Captain Lloyd C. Wiggins A0 695 999
Captain Frank E. Beyer A0 2 093 286
Captain Warren J. Sanderson A0 2 066 184
Staff Sergeant Donald W. Gabree AF 19 333 787
Staff Sergeant Donald G. Hill AF 19 353 976
Airman First Class Roland E. Goulet AF 12 323 933
Airman Second Class Earl W. Radlein, Jr. AF 14 370 732
Airman Second Class Charles J. Russell, Jr. AF 13 391 656
Airman Second Class James E. Woods AF 24 413 122

b. Of the four additional members of this crew, the remains of Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, AO 776 002, and Master Sergeant Francis L. Brown, AF 19 053 497, were recovered along the coast of Japan; Captain John E. Rocha, AO 2 029 268, was rescued and returned to military control and Captain James G. Keith, AO 2 092 266, has been determined dead under the provisions of Section 9 of the Missing Persons Act. Therefore, their status is not being considered herein.

2. a. Circumstances: The above listed personnel comprised the crew of an RB-50 aircraft which departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, at 0307, 29 July 1953, to perform a routine navigational training mission over the Sea of Japan. Approximately 40 miles east of the Siberian coast, the RB-50 was attacked from the rear, without warning, by MIG-15 type aircraft. Immediately a state of emergency was declared and following a second attack by the fighters, which extensively damaged the RB-50, visual and audio signals were given to abandon the aircraft. Later that afternoon search efforts located a group of four survivors...
and further sighted within a radius of a mile and a half what appeared to be aircraft wreckage and survivors in two additional groups. An A-3 life raft was dropped, but, due to the closing fog and darkness, survivors were not seen to board the raft. Observations were also made of twelve unidentified small surface craft, presumably Russian, in the area, nine of which appeared to be heading toward the location where wreckage and possible survivors had been sighted. At 0400, 30 July 1953, a United States naval vessel located the A-3 life raft and rescued its occupant, Captain John E. Roche. No further leads as to the fate of the crew were developed by the organized search and it was suspended 31 July 1953, when it became apparent that further efforts would be unavailing.

b. Statements of Captain Roche reveal that on the morning of the accident the water was smooth, but became extremely rough with rolling waves by the time the A-3 life raft was dropped. The water temperature was 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit and, by the time he reached the raft, he was extremely ill from cramps and from swallowing salt water. Captain Roche has no other information pertinent to the fate of the crew members under consideration in this review.

c. During August 1953, the United States Department of State issued a series of protests to the Soviet Government concerning the shooting down of this aircraft and requested them to undertake an investigation regarding any surviving members of this crew. The Soviet response to these representations was a denial that the Soviet Government picked up any survivors or had any knowledge of their whereabouts.

d. At the expiration of the 12 months' period of absence of the above listed personnel, a review of their missing status was made and they were continued missing on the basis that survivors were observed and that there was a remote possibility that they had been rescued by the small surface craft. The denials of the Russian Government of any knowledge of surviving crew members of this aircraft were considered insufficient at that time to overcome such a possibility.

3. Subsequent Information: On 9 October 1954, the United States Government transmitted its latest note of protest to the Soviet Government concerning the shooting down of the RB-50. In reply, the Soviet Government on 31 December 1954 again stated that no information was available concerning the fate of this crew or the aircraft and that it saw no basis for referring the incident to the International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands. Information received from the State Department reveals they do not anticipate submitting a claim to the Court. There has been no information from any source, either official or unofficial, to substantiate that any crew member was rescued and has been in the custody of a foreign country. A recent message received from the Commander,
Memo for DCS/P, subj: Finding or Death, R&D Case #543 (29 Jul 53)

Far East Air Forces, reveals they have no additional information pertaining to the status of the crew of this aircraft.

DISCUSSION

4. Although the factors involved and the information now of record concerning the listed crew members of the RB-50 appear unfavorable for their continued survival, they are insufficient to conclusively establish their ultimate fate. These men were previously continued in a missing status because there was a slight possibility that survivors might have been rescued by personnel of small foreign surface craft, presumably Russian. In view of the lapse of 27 months since these persons became missing and the consistent denials of the USSR that they have any knowledge of the fate and whereabouts of the personnel of this aircraft, this possibility may no longer be considered. This premise is substantiated by the fact that during the period no word or hint of their being detained in a foreign country has been forthcoming, and sufficient time has now elapsed for such information to have been received through official or unofficial channels, if any personnel had survived and were detained. Consideration of these factors and the initial circumstances of missing lead to no other conclusion than that the subject Air Force personnel may no longer reasonably be presumed to be living and, under the provisions of Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, a presumptive finding of death is now warranted.

RECOMMENDATION

5. It is recommended that, pursuant to the authority contained in Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, official casualty reports be issued stating that the missing status of the Air Force personnel listed in paragraph 1a, above, has been terminated by a presumptive finding of death. Further, that the casualty reports include a statement that the presumptive finding was made following a subsequent review of all available information and, as provided by and for the purpose of the cited law, the date of the presumed death has been established as 15 November 1955. Death is held to have occurred while in pay and duty status, in flying pay status, in line of duty and not the result of misconduct.

1 Attachment
List of Source Material
Memo for DCS/P, subj: Finding of Death, SMD Case #543 (29 Jul 53)

Under the authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

EMMETT O'DONNELL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Dear Mr. Bayer,

It is with deep regret that I must officially notify you of the termination of the missing status of your son, Captain Frank E. Bayer, Jr., since he can no longer reasonably be presumed to be alive.

This Headquarters has just completed a full review of the facts and circumstances pertaining to the status of your son and his crew members. As you know, Captain Bayer was continued in a missing status because a remote possibility appeared to exist that survivors of the crash may have been rescued by personnel of some foreign surface craft, presumably Soviet, operating in the area. However, the government of the USSR has consistently denied having any knowledge of the fate of any of the crew. During the 27 months that your son has been missing, no further information has been uncovered or received from official or unofficial sources which would substantiate this possibility. Also, sufficient time has elapsed during which it is reasonable to assume that, had any crew member survived and been detained by a foreign country, some word of his fate would have been received. Therefore, in view of this lapse of over 27 months without receipt of any information which would support a continued presumption of Captain Bayer's survival, it can only be concluded that he may no longer reasonably be presumed to be alive.

Consequently, it has become necessary under the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act" to terminate Captain Bayer's missing status by a presumptive finding of death, the presumed date of death being recorded as 15 November 1957. This is not considered to be the actual or probable date of death, but it is established in accordance with the cited Act for the purpose of terminating pay and settling accounts. An official report of the change in his status has been issued by the Department of the Air Force.

I realize how distressing it is to receive so little information about his fate. While we can offer no assurance of further particulars, I do want you to know that the termination of his missing status will
We offer our efforts to obtain more complete details. You may be certain that you will be notified immediately if additional information is received concerning him or his crew members.

Within a short time a Personal Affairs Officer from an Air Force installation will communicate with you. This officer is prepared to assist you in obtaining government benefits allowable as the result of the death of your loved one and will help in any other way that he can.

I am extremely sorry that this message does not lighten the grief in your mind. Please accept my deepest sympathy in your bereavement.

Sincerely yours,

R. J. Scobey
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel
In reply refer to
AIR-62

Dear Miss Messenger:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1955 in which you inquire as to action being taken to obtain more information about the members of the crew of the Air Force B-50 airplane which was shot down by Soviet aircraft over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. You also ask to be advised of our assessment of the possibility that the crewmen in general and Major Francisco J. Tajada and Lieutenant Edmund J. Guay in particular may be released by the Soviet Government now that Soviet-American relations appear to be less tense.

Our Government is continuing through all means at its disposal to obtain information about American citizens who may be detained in the Soviet Union and every lead, no matter how small, is investigated. However, I regret to inform you that our investigation has not thus far been successful in bringing to light any reliable evidence whatever which would indicate that surviving members of the B-50 crew are being held in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government has reportedly denied any knowledge of their fate, doing so most recently in December 1954.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Blake
Acting Officer in Charge
USIA Affairs

Miss Elizabeth Messenger,
Leverett Road,
Shutesbury, Massachusetts.

Copies to:

CSS

SSS

L - Mr. Claus
Chief Casualty Branch -
Department of the Air Force

Date: 9/2/55
First Lieutenant James G. Keith, A0 2 092 926, Navigator, was sitting between Captain O'Kelley's instrument panel and my panel. Forward of me was the bomb stabilizer. At the time the wing gave way, Lieutenant Keith snapped forward in his seat, the same as I, and he hit into the framework which supports the nose plexiglass. I was jammed to his left, head first and to the left of where Lieutenant Keith was lying with his head on the window frame and on the right side top of the bomb stabilizer. I finally got myself organized and started to climb back to bail out. I looked back at Lieutenant Keith and he had not moved, his head was in the same position and there was quite a bit of blood, both his and mine, all over the front end of the nose section. His eyes were open and he just lay there, glassy-eyed; there was no sign of life. I bailed out about 200 or 300 feet above the water. I do not believe that, from his position when I bailed out, Lieutenant Keith could have got out of the nose section of the airplane before it crashed into the water.

At the time the right wing gave way, I looked at First Lieutenant Llyod C. Wiggins, A0 695 999 (desk navigator) and he had on his parachute harness (chest type), but he did not have the chute pack attached. I ended up in the nose and never saw Lieutenant Wiggins again. Upon reaching the hatch during the fall, I looked into his position and he was gone; Master Sergeant Francis L. Brown, AF 19 053 497, the flight engineer, was also gone and I did not see anyone else again, other than Lieutenant Keith.

From the time the plane was hit until the wing fell off, about 45 seconds elapsed; there was about 60-45 seconds between the time the wing fell off until it crashed into the water. When the wing dropped off, it hit the rear of the fuselage and pitched the nose up. The whole aircraft was on fire - there was a flash fire in the nose section when the wing broke loose. The engines had snapped off, the nose broke off, the right wing gave way and the tail section was by itself; the left wing and center section was by itself.

I was by myself in the water for an hour or two and then I located Captain O'Kelley. Later on, after Captain O'Kelley and I got together, we heard someone shouting but could not understand who he was calling or what he was saying. We yelled back and forth for about 20 minutes and then he stopped calling. Due to the fog, which limited visibility to about 20 feet, there was no chance of locating whoever it was. My assumption is that it was Sergeant Brown. The fog started with the mountains on the land and continued to a distance of about 200 miles out into the Sea of Japan, at which time it was broken clouds.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major Harvey J. Hawkins

SUBJECT: State Department (Mr. Klaus' role in the three aircraft missing in the Sea of Japan).

1. On 9 September 1956, I talked with Mr. Klaus of State Department with reference to new information on the B-29 (English crew) missing 7 October 1952.

2. From our conversation, I learned that his function is legal in nature - working on the presentation and submission of claims to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. It appears that both countries involved in a dispute must consent to air their dispute before any action is taken by the Court.

3. a. In the case of the B-29 (English crew) missing 7 October 1952, the State Department has presented a claim to the International Court of Justice. The USSR has formally refused to go into court in this case. Our claim still is on record and still open for possible future action along these lines by our State Department.

b. In the case of the RB-50 (Tejeda crew) missing 29 July 1953, Mr. Klaus has prepared a claim for submission to the international Court, but action has been suspended because the Department of the Air Force does not sanction its presentation to the International Court of Justice.

c. In the case of the B-29 (Russch crew) missing 13 June 1952, no claim has been prepared by Mr. Klaus. No report from the Department of the Air Force received that the aircraft was shot down. Informed them that we had a report that on 16 June 1952 radio Moscow broadcast that one survivor picked up by a Russian vessel about two days before. Mr. Klaus stated he did not have this information and requested it be sent to him.

Raymond C. Obertone
Req issued with to downgrade to Secret the following case or justification for their higher classification:

(1) PEAHlog at VC 515 FLG, at 29 Jul 53 (2) PEAHlog at VC 0510 FLG at 29 Jul 53 (3) 31st Street Recon Sq log at CB 106 FLG at 29 Jul 53.

N/R: Msg ref to RE-50 msg 29 Jul 53, still cont in mis status. Req made for downgrade so that ref msg can be filed with case and used.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: Report of Death, Determination Case #203 (29 Jul 53)

FACTS

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," consideration has been given to the facts and circumstances set forth herein in determining the status of First Lieutenant James G. Keith, AO 2 092 926, 343d Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, who was reported missing on 29 July 1953, over the Sea of Japan.

2. a. Circumstances: Lieutenant Keith was one of two navigators of the crew aboard a RB-50 aircraft which departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, at 0307 hours, 29 July 1953, to perform a routine navigational training mission over the Sea of Japan. At 0615 hours the aircraft was attacked without warning from the rear by MIG-15 aircraft, about 40 miles east of the Siberian coast. Organized search efforts were successful in rescuing only one crew member of this aircraft. The statement of the rescued crew member, Captain John E. Roche, reveals that the aircraft became disabled as a result of the fighter attacks and shortly thereafter crashed into the sea. An area of burning gas and oil on the surface of the water was thus created at the point of impact.

b. Subsequent Information: A further statement obtained from Captain Roche on 17 May 1954, revealed that he and First Lieutenant James G. Keith were sitting beside each other in the forward compartment of the B-50 at the time of the emergency. The aircraft's wing broke off and apparently hit the rear of the fuselage causing the forward section to suddenly lunge upward. Lieutenant Keith and Captain Roche were both forcefully thrown forward head first and Lieutenant Keith struck his head against the window framework of the nose section. With considerable difficulty, Captain Roche was able to climb back to the escape hatch and, just before leaving the aircraft, observed that Lieutenant Keith had not moved from the position into which he had been thrown. His head was covered with blood, his eyes were open and glassy and there was no sign that Lieutenant Keith was alive. Captain Roche parachuted from an altitude of between 200 and 300 feet above the water, a few seconds before the aircraft crashed. It was his opinion that there was insufficient time for Lieutenant Keith to have recovered sufficiently to get out of the nose section of the B-50 prior to the time it crashed into the water.

DISCUSSION

3. An examination of the facts and circumstances in this case compels the conclusion that Lieutenant Keith did not survive the loss of the aircraft.
Memo for DCS/P. Report of Death, Det Case #203 (29 Jul 53)

This conclusion is based upon a series of circumstances so unfavorable as to preclude any reasonable possibility of his survival. The observations of the surviving crew member strongly suggest that Lieutenant Keith received a fatal injury prior to the crash. However, had he only been rendered unconscious from the blow on the head, the experience of the survivor establishes that Lieutenant Keith would not have had sufficient time to recover and leave the aircraft before it crashed. Further, the crash and the resulting fire of floating gas and oil surrounding the point of impact were so severe that the likelihood of human survival under such adverse conditions could not reasonably be considered. In light of the recorded evidence it is conclusively established that Lieutenant Keith died on 29 July 1953, when his aircraft crashed into the Sea of Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. a. It is recommended that, pursuant to the authority contained in Section 9, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, 7 March 1942, as amended (Missing Persons Act), the foregoing information be accepted as an official report of death and that a casualty report be initiated stating that James G. Keith, A0 2 092 926, died (Non-battle) on 29 July 1953, as the result of an aircraft accident in the waters of the Sea of Japan. Death occurred while he was in pay and duty status, in line of duty, in flying pay status, and was not the result of his own misconduct. Evidence of death will be considered to have been received in the Department of the Air Force on the date this recommendation is approved.

b. It is further recommended that the casualty report include a statement that, for the purpose of the Missing Persons Act, James G. Keith, A0 2 092 926, is held to be entitled to benefits as a captain from 13 May 1954, the date of Special Orders #93, issued by the Department of the Air Force announcing his promotion, to the date on which evidence of death is considered to have been received. Action is being taken by Promotions and Separations Division, DCS/P to effect the posthumous promotion of the above officer under the provisions of Public Law 680, 77th Congress, as amended.

1 Attachment
List of Source Material

22 JUN 1954

Under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendations are approved.

JOHN S. MILLS
Major General, USAF
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
For and in the name of
EUGENE M. O'CONNELL, JR.
Pilot 2d Class, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Mr. and Mrs. William W. Keith

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Keith:

It is with the deepest regret that I must officially notify you of the termination of the missing status of your son, James G. Keith, whose survival is no longer considered possible in light of the evidence evolved from an extensive review of his case by the Department of the Air Force.

The review just completed was initiated upon receipt of a recent report from Captain John E. Bocko, the only crew member aboard your son's aircraft who was rescued. His statement reveals that in the early morning hours of 29 July 1953, the B-50 was attacked from the rear without warning by fighter type aircraft approximately 45 miles east of the Liberian coast. During the subsequent fighter attacks, a wing of the B-50 was torn off and approximately one minute later the aircraft crashed and sank into the sea leaving an area of burning gas and oil at the point of impact.

Captain Bocko further revealed that he and your son were sitting beside each other in the forward compartment of the aircraft at the time of the attack. As the aircraft's wing broke off, it apparently hit the rear of the fuselage causing the forward section to suddenly lunge upward. Both officers were forcefully thrown forward headfirst and your son appeared to have suffered a fatal injury when his head struck the window framework of the nose section. With considerable difficulty, Captain Bocko was able to climb back to the escape hatch and, just before leaving the rapidly descending B-50, he observed that your son had not moved from the position into which he had been thrown. Captain Bocko parachuted from an altitude of between 200 and 300 feet above the water, the minimum altitude for a successful parachute jump. It was his opinion that, even if Lieutenant Keith had been conscious, there was insufficient time remaining for him to have escaped from the aircraft before it crashed into the sea.

Consideration of these facts and circumstances compels the regrettable conclusion that your son died as the result of this aircraft accident in the Sea of Japan off the coast of Siberia. Accordingly, under the provisions of Public Law 492, 77th Congress, as amended, "Missing Persons Act," a final determination has been made that he died on 29 July 1953, and an official report announcing his untimely death has been issued by the Department of the Air Force.
You will be interested to learn that your son was promoted while in a missing status to the grade of captain on 13 May 1954. This promotion was subject to later withdrawal, as required by law, should conclusive evidence be received that he died prior to the date of this promotion. Since it has been determined that your son did not die on 29 July 1953, it has been necessary to withdraw this promotion. Nevertheless, the "Missing Persons Act" provides that pay benefits of the higher grade will accrue to the individual's account from the date of promotion to the date that the determination of death is made. Public Law 800, 77th Congress authorizes posthumous promotions to such persons recommended for a higher grade while in a missing status, but does not authorize any increases in pay due to such action. In accordance with this law, the Headquarters of the Air Force has posthumously promoted your son to the grade of captain, effective 13 May 1954. Copies of orders concerning these actions are enclosed.

I am extremely sorry that this message does not lighten the grief in your home. Please accept my deepest sympathy in your bereavement.

Sincerely yours,

[Name]

2 Incis
1. Cy Race Orders
2. Cy Ltr Orders

[Name]

Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel
FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1017, December 31, 11 p.m.

PRIORITY

Following is summary of Soviet note number 115/OSA dated December 31 regarding shooting down of American B-50 off Siberian coast July 29, 1953. Extract of Soviet report was attached to note (Embassy telegram 1016, December 31).

Note reiterates that American bomber first opened fire, that encounter took place at latitude 42 degrees 38 minutes 3 seconds longitude 132 degrees 20 minutes 9 seconds near Soviet island Askold not (repeat not) far from Vladivostok and that no information available concerning fate or airplane or crew. Claims in US note of October 9, 1954 rejected and Soviet Government sees no basis for referring question to International Court.

Note also rejects US assertion that according international law territorial waters limited to three nautical miles, saying there are not generally recognized norms concerning limits which are established by littoral states on basis of national interests and interests international navigation, citing that at present more than thirty governments have territorial waters limits greater than three miles. Note states that US claim that Soviet 12 mile limit in contradiction international law does not (repeat not) have any foundation.

Translation and Russian text being forwarded.

BOHLEN

JW/3

NOTE: Mr. Stoessel (EE) notified 12/31/6:45 pm JAW.
INCOMING UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

TO:

HQ. USAF

RECEIVED 5/59

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM:

JUFFB JUPM JUMB 555
AFRB 46N

RE: STRATEGIC NINE ONE YOKOTA AB JAPAN

USAF/COPS USAF WASH TTO FIVE DC

USAF SCDY GP SIX NINE UO ZERO JOHNSON AFB JAPAN

USAF FEAF DMCOM PROV YOKOTA AB JAPAN

USAF SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

USAF F F FIVE MARCH AFB CALIF

QUARTERMASTER FEC TOYO JAPAN

TO:

CO ZONE, HOS ACRS CAMP KOKURA JAPAN

USAF SCDY SVC SAN ANTONIO TEx

530 PERSONS ATTN CAS BR AMC ATTN MCDCG FER ATTACHMENT MEMORIAL DIV CAS

BAG RAP CONTAINS ONE SEVEN NAMES OF NON BATTLE MISSING PERSONS:

ALPHA CLM STANLEY KEITH O'KEELLY PD BRAVO CLM CAPTAIN PD COCOA CLM

OSCAR SEVEN SEVEN SIX ZERO ZERO TWO PD DELTA CLM PERTAINS TO

ERECT VIA RALEIGH AND HILL CLM THREE FOUR THREE STRAT RCH SQ CLM

FIVE STRAT RCH US CIA FORCES AFB CIA KANSAS TDY WITH NINE

STRETCH RCH SQ CIA AND ONE TWO EIGHT PD ECHO CLM PERTAINS

TO CIA ONE FIVE FIVE HOURS ITEM TIME TWO NINE JULY FIVE THREE

FROM CLM PERTAINS TO ALL CIA ACFT DEPARTED YOKOTA AB HONSHU

TRAN WITH INTENDED DESTINATION YOKOTA AB HONSHU JAPAN PD GOLF

IN: 150 (29 Jul 53) Page 1 of 6 Pages
TWO JALYB ASH.

MARGARET KATHRYNE OKELEY CIA WIFE CIA THREE THREE SEVEN ONE
22 STREET CIA TOPEKA CIA KANSAS CIA FIVE MARCH FIVE THREE
PD COIN TO BE NOTIFIED BY CHIEF OF STAFF AND COMBRA FIVE FIVE
VT RECON HC CIA FORBES AFB CIA JANSAS INDIA CLN PERTAINS TO AL

ON FLY PAY STATUS PD JULIETT CLN PERTAINS TO ALL CIA OKELEY
ACFT COMBRA CLN ROCHE CIA PILOT SMCLN CZYZ CIA RADAR
CLN VICCINS CIA NAV SMCLN KEITH CIA NAV SMCLN SANDERSON CIA
PR SMCLN STALMAKER CIA ECM OPR SMCLN HARRD CIA ECM OPR SMCLN
CA CIA ECM OPR SMCLN LEVER CIA ECM OPR SMCLN BROWN FLT ENGR
H RADLER CIA CENTRAL FIRE CONTROL GUNNER SMCLN GOULET CIA
PR SMCLN JOOBS CIA LEFT GUNNER SMCLN RUSELL CIA TAIL GUNNER
H PADDLEH CIA ECM OPR MCLN HILL CIA ECM OPR PD KILO CLN PERTAINS
ALL CIA RECENT FOR DUTY PD LIMA CIA FORWARDED SEPARATE

GENDER HSG METRO CLN ONE FIVE APRIL FOUR FOUR PD ALFA CLN
G ENTER ROCHE PD BRAVO CAPTAIN PD COCOA CLN ALFA OSCAR
ZERO TUG NINE TUG SIX EIGHT PD GOLF CLN NADEMEE VIRGINIA ROCH
ONE CIA FIVE NINE ZERO FIVE DEAL DRIVE CIA WASHINGTON TWO ONE
HIA ONE TUG MARCH FIVE THREE PD METRO CLN ONE AUGUST FIVE ZERO

5 TH 120 (29 Jul 53) Page 2 of 6 pages.
INCOMING UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FIVE JAPAN 46H

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

MEET CIA AGENT HOLLY CIA. NEW JERSEY CIA FIVE

HE MARCH FIVE THREE

METRO CLN ONE SEVEN OCT FIVE ZERO PB ALFA CLN JAMES EDWIN

JES PB BRAVO CLN AIRMAN SECOND CLASS PB COCOA CLN ALFA CIA

STROT TWO FOUR FRO ONE THREE ONE TWO TD GOLF CLN ELIZABETH

BAR FODS CIA MOTHER CIA FIVE ONE COLLEGE AVE CIA BUCKHANON KIA

AT VIRGINIA CIA FOUR FEB FIVE THREE PD METRO CLN ONE THREE FEB FIVE

C PB ALFA CLN CHARLIES JOSEPH RUSSELL PD BRAVO CLN AIRMAN SECOND

ASS PB COCOA CLN ALFA FOXTROT ONE THREE THREE NINE ONE

A FIVE EIGHT PD GOLF CLN FRANCES WHALEN RUSSELL CIA MOTHER CIA ONE

O ONE TWO SOUTH BEINARD STREET CIA PHILADELPHIA CIA PENNSYLVANIA

O ONE ONE MARCH FIVE THREE PD ALFA CLN DONALD GEORGE HILL PD

FO CLN STAFF SERGEANT PD COCOA CLN ALFA FOXTROT ONE NINE THREE

WE THREE NINE SEVEN SIX PB DELTA CLN PERTAINS TO HILL AND

AINL ONLY CIA SIX NINE TWO ZERO SECURITY GP CIA JOHNSON ABE, HOKISHI

AND CIA AFGH TO NINE ONE STRAT AN S H CIA APO THREE TWO EIGHT FOR

THE ONLY REPEAT FOR FLYING ONLY PD GOLF CLN HARRIE HILL CIA FATHER

FOX NINE FIVE ONE CEA KELLOGG CIA IDARA CIA FIVE NOVEMBER FIVE TWO

P HA 230 (29 JUL 53) Page 5 of 6 Pages
METRO CLN TWO-ONE JUN FOUR NINE PD ALFA CLN EARL UILBUR RDELETEN
PD BRAVO CLN AIRMAN SECOND CLASS PD COCOA CLN ALFA FOXTROT
FOUR THREE SEVEN ZERO SEVEN THREE TWO PD GOLF CLN EARL

ALLEEN SR CIA FATHER CIA TWO FOUR ZERO THREE EAST FIVE STREET
CHATTANOOGA CIA TENN CIA ONE ONE JAN FIVE ONE PD METO CLN ONE
JAN FIVE ONE PD
1303Z JUL JAYD

AEE : SCA TS 4593 (29 Jul 53) for supplemental information.

ACTION: PHP-12-E

INFO : ASC, COM CHTR, HSS, CQP-UP

AT TN : 130 (29 Jul 53) Page 6 of 6 Pages PH/avp
In reply refer to 
EE 711.5522/8-2753

My dear Mr. Brooks:

Reference is made to your letter of August 27, 1953 concerning the incident on July 29, 1953 in which an American RB-30 plane was shot down over the Sea of Japan by Soviet aircraft. You ask to be advised of the action that has been taken to recover any American survivors who may have been picked up by Soviet authorities, and of the results that have been obtained from such action.

Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, acting on the instructions of the Department of State, has made strong representations to the Soviet Government on this incident on three occasions. In these representations, Ambassador Bohlen has been particularly concerned to do everything possible to obtain information on any American survivors who may have been rescued by Soviet craft operating in the area of the incident, and to secure their immediate repatriation.

On July 30, as soon as the Department received confirmation that an American plane had been shot down, Ambassador Bohlen was instructed to protest in the strongest terms the shooting down of this aircraft and to demand information regarding the survivors presumed to be in Soviet custody and the arrangements being made for their repatriation. Ambassador Bohlen saw Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko on July 31 and delivered to him an aide memoire which carried out the Department's instructions referred to above. A copy of a Department of State press release containing the text of this aide memoire is enclosed.

On August 4

The Honorable
Overton Brooks,
House of Representatives.
On August 4 Ambassador Bohlen saw Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov specifically on the subject of the possibility of survivors having been rescued from the American plane. In the face of the Soviet Government's insistence that it had no information whatsoever concerning any survivors, Ambassador Bohlen urgently requested that the Soviet Government make a further, exhaustive investigation.

On August 5 Ambassador Bohlen delivered a new note to the Soviet Government, reiterating our protest of the incident and again requesting the Soviet Government to undertake a further investigation regarding any surviving members of the American crew. A copy of a Department of State press release containing the text of this note is also enclosed.

I deeply regret to say that the Soviet response to all these representations has been a denial that the Soviet Government picked up any survivors or has any knowledge of their whereabouts.

Unfortunately this Department, in view of the Soviet attitude in this matter, is extremely limited in the possibilities of conducting an investigation of the facts as to the existence of survivors. The investigation is being actively continued; however, to the extent of our abilities and with assistance from other agencies of the Government. You may be assured that we shall continue to do everything possible in behalf of any crew members who may have survived, and that any further information of interest to the families of the crew members will be promptly communicated to them.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Ben H. Brown, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:
Press Release No. 428
Press Release No. 422

CC: Defense - Colonel Bond
    (for Colonel Springfield)  
    L - Mr. Bashong

CUR:EE: DEBoster: all 9/2/53
CASUALTY REPORT

[Redacted]

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 15 April 1944

Place: [Redacted]

Injuries: [Redacted]

Date of Birth: [Redacted]

Sex: [Redacted]

Signatures:

[Signature]

M.C. LIPINS

[Rank] USAF

[Name] Casualty Liaison

[Redacted]
<table>
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<th>Name of Casualty</th>
<th>Date of Prepar</th>
<th>Service Number</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<th>Race</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Prior Service</th>
<th>Date of Entry Current Service</th>
<th>Aeronautical Rating</th>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Cashion</td>
<td>27 May 1954</td>
<td>20-092-923</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>29 July 1953</td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Mary (Name, relationship and address) 20 Form 93 dated 9 February 1953.

Occupation: Navigator

Promoted to the grade of Captain per Paragraph 3, Special Orders 93, Department of the Air Force, dated 19 May 1954, with rank from date of order effective subsequent to date officer became missing and is subject to possible further action if a change occurs in his status.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

[Signature]

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

[Signature]

M. L. Wilson
Major, USAF
Asst. Chief, Casualty Branch
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: Continuation of Missing Status Beyond Twelve Months, SR&D Case #543 (29 July 1953)

FACTS

1. a. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," a full review has been made of the facts and circumstances set forth herein to determine whether the missing status of the following personnel may reasonably be continued after a year's absence, or terminated by a presumptive finding of death:

   Major Francisco J. Tejeda
   Captain Robert E. Stalnaker
   Captain John C. Ward
   Captain Edmund J. Cayz
   Captain Lloyd C. Wiggins
   First Lieutenant Frank E. Beyer
   First Lieutenant Warren J. Sanderson
   Staff Sergeant Donald W. Gabree
   Staff Sergeant Donald G. Hill
   Airman First Class Roland E. Goulet
   Airman Second Class Earl W. Radlein, Jr.
   Airman Second Class Charles J. Russell, Jr.
   Airman Second Class James E. Woods

   Of the four additional personnel of this crew, the remains of Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, AO 776 002, and Master Sergeant Francis L. Brown, AF 19 053 497, were recovered along the coast of Japan; Captain John E. Roche, AO 2 029 268, was rescued and returned to military control and Captain James G. Keith, AO 2 092 926, has been determined dead under the provisions of Section 9, of the Missing Persons Act. Therefore, their status is not being considered herein.

2. a. Circumstances: These persons comprised the crew aboard an RB-50 aircraft which departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, at 0307 hours, 29 July 1953, to perform a routine navigational training mission over the Sea of Japan. At 0615 hours the aircraft was attacked from the rear, without warning, by MIG-15 aircraft at a point approximately 40 miles east of the Siberian coast. The statement of the rescued crew member, Captain John E. Roche, reveals that the first attack disabled the number one engine and an emergency was declared by giving the signal to prepare for bail-out. Shortly thereafter the number two engine was damaged by the second fighter attack and signals, both visual and audio, were given to abandon the RB-50. Seconds later, the right wing broke off causing a violent upward lunge of the aircraft's fuselage followed by its rapid
descent. Captain Roche was thrown into the nose section, but was able to climb back to the nose wheel escape hatch and parachute at an altitude of from 200 to 300 feet. While making his way back through the forward compartment, he did not notice any of the subject persons still in the aircraft. Immediately after his parachute opened, he landed in the water. Later, he located the pilot, Captain O'Kelley. At one time while the two were together, shouting could be heard faintly, but they could not locate or identify the person who was calling. Late that afternoon a B-29 dropped a life raft in the area which Captain Roche was able to reach safely. The raft landed a greater distance from Captain O'Kelley, and he was unable to reach it.

b. Search Efforts: When the RB-50 failed to transmit a radio identification message at the time of its scheduled return over Japan, search efforts were immediately initiated. At 1750 hours 29 July 1953, a search and rescue aircraft sighted a group of survivors and dropped a life raft. A second group of two or three survivors was sighted approximately one-half mile east of the first group. A third sighting was made of aircraft debris and possible additional survivors 1 mile east of the second group. The pilot of the search aircraft further reported twelve unidentified small surface craft in the area, nine of which were heading toward the location where aircraft debris and possible survivors had been sighted. At 0400 hours, 30 July 1953, a United States naval vessel accomplished the rescue of Captain Roche. The surface and aerial search was hindered by low hanging cloud formations which obscured large portions of the search area and was further impeded by radar and communications interference. No further evidence or leads of the fate of the subject persons were developed and the organized search was suspended 31 July 1953, when it became apparent that further efforts would be unsatisfactory.

c. Subsequent Information: During August 1953, the United States Department of State issued a series of protests to the Soviet Government concerning this incident and requested them to undertake an investigation regarding any surviving members of this crew. The Soviet response to these representations has been an unsatisfactory denial that the Soviet Government picked up any survivors or has any knowledge of their whereabouts. A recent report from the Commander of the Far East Air Forces reveals that no new information has been received concerning the whereabouts or fate of the subject persons and recommended that their status be continued as missing.

DISCUSSION

3. Information of record reveals that the RB-50 was shot down while engaged in a noncombat mission off the Siberian coast and that an unknown number of the crew did survive the accident as revealed by aerial sightings.
from our search aircraft. The nature of the incident and its proximity to the coast of Russia present a possibility that some of these survi-
vors were rescued by Russian personnel. This assumption is further strengthened by the sighting of small surface craft proceeding toward the location of the crash area. Although not identified, these vessels may be presumed to be of Russian registry because of their number, size, and closeness to Russian territory. Notwithstanding the denial of the Russian Government of any knowledge of any surviving crew member of this aircraft, past experience has demonstrated that the USSR has deliberately withheld or distorted information concerning the whereabouts or fate of United Nations personnel who have disappeared in territory controlled by the Communist countries. Therefore, until positive proof is developed that members of this crew were not rescued and detained, or until other events occur which disclose their non-survival, the available information must be considered insufficient to establish their fate, and any change in their status on this date may be premature and beyond the sure's calculated risk of error.

RECOMMENDATION

4. Pursuant to the authority contained in Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, 7 March 1942, as amended, and following the mandatory review of all available information on this date, it is recommended that official casualty reports be issued stating that the personnel listed in paragraph 1a, above, will be continued in a missing status following the expiration of 12 months' absence, effective 30 July 1954.

R. J. KEENES
Brig. General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

26 JUL 1954

Under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

JOHN S. MILLS
Major General, USAF
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

Classification canceled (changed to Unclassified) by authority of Chief of Staff, USAF.

by

Classification canceled (changed to Unclassified) by authority of Chief of Staff, USAF.

by
INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT

B-29 Loss
13 June 1952

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HQ AFMPC/DPMC
RANDOLPH AFB TX 78150
**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  

**CASUALTY REPORT**  
(NON-BATTLE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT OF DEATH</th>
<th>17 Nov 55</th>
<th>☐ INTERIM ☑ COMPLETE</th>
<th>☐ CORRECTED (Destroy all copies of previous reports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>BUSCH, Samuel Nathan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRADE</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE NUMBER</td>
<td>A0 733811</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPORT ISSUED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PL 108 ONLY</td>
<td>☐ YES ☐ NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLACE OF CASUALTY**: Departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, for mission over Sea of Japan

**CAUSE OF CASUALTY**: Aircraft accident (military)

**ORGANIZATION OF LAST ASSIGNMENT**: 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, Med, APO 328, San Francisco, California

**HOLD ADDRESS PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO SERVICE (CITY, COUNTY, STATE)**: Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania

**IF PASSENGER, WAS TRAVEL BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT DIRECTED BY COMPETENT ORDERS**: ☐ YES ☐ NO  

**NEXT OF KIN (ADULT)**: Mrs. Ruth Busch, wife, Mrs. Leah Busch, mother, Miss Charlotte Busch, sister, address same as mother (A)

**PRINCIPAL (P) AND ALTERNATE (A) BENEFICIARIES FOR 6 MONTHS’ GRATUITY DESIGNATED ON DD FORM 93**: (In event there is no surviving spouse or eligible child)

**DATE (CURRENT DD FORM 93)**: 5 May 52

**DATE ENTRY (CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE)**: 5 Mar 1951

**PRIOR SERVICE NUMBER**: 13053332

**AERONAUTICAL RATING**: Senior Pilot

**POSITION (IF CREW MEMBER)**:

**FINDING OF DEATH OF MISSING PERSON**:  
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 7 March 1942, PL 490, 77th Congress as amended, and upon direction and delegation by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel finds subject person to be dead. He was officially reported as missing as of 13 June 1952. For the purposes stated in said Act, death is presumed to have occurred on 15 November 1955.

**In line of duty—not misconduct**

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

G. R. HAMILTON  
Major, USAF  
Asst Chief, Casualty Branch
Dear Senator Schweiker:

This is in reply to your recent letter in behalf of the families of Staff Sergeant Miguel W. Monserrat, USAF (deceased), and Major Samuel H. Busch, USAF (deceased). They have again contacted you regarding additional questions pertaining to the disappearance of Sergeant Monserrat and Major Busch.

The feelings and concern of the Busch and Monserrat families for their brothers are understandable, particularly since no remains were recovered; however, the families were kept fully informed of all known circumstances from the time the airmen were reported missing on June 13, 1952, until a change in their status was made on November 15, 1955. All subsequently available information requested was provided.

Beginning in January 1975, with the request from Ms. Gloria Campisi, Philadelphia Daily News, who sought information of Sergeant Monserrat, considerable research has been expended on this case. This includes research into other incidents which occurred during the Korean War. In this regard, the Air Force has provided all the information it has in this case. As you will recall, the records pertaining to Sergeant Monserrat were destroyed in the fire that occurred several years ago at the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri. Nevertheless, on February 6, 1975, Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch reviewed similar master personnel records pertaining to Major Busch. Through your office they were provided copies of the finding of death issued by the Department of the Air Force; copies of correspondence they requested were subsequently provided after reviewing Major Busch's record, and every effort was made to reply to their inquiries. It appears from the questions posed in their July 19, 1975, letter that they do not accept the information provided. In this respect, we are not capable of answering questions outside the Air Force scope of operation.
If the Monserrat and Busch families are interested in information beyond that which has already been established in this case and information outside our authority and responsibility, we suggest they be encouraged to research the Congressional Records from 1953 through the late 1960's for hearings on the cessation of hostilities in Korea and information on the meetings of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjon, Korea. Information on the subject of prisoners of war (POWs) would also be covered.

(Every piece of paper gathered and/or initiated while a member is carried in a missing status is not included in the individual master personnel records) After a military member's status is changed to deceased and all assistance to the next of kin is completed (over an indefinite period of time), the missing record is screened and only pertinent documents which summarize the case and copies of correspondence to and from the next of kin are maintained for file in the member's master personnel record.)

(During the Korean conflict, it was Air Force policy to file correspondence initiated within the Casualty Branch, seeking additional information, such as the letters sent to Mr. Koski, Mr. Hand, and Mr. Combs, in a file known as the Supplemental Missing Report. This file was established by the date of the incident and included the names of all members involved in the same incident. It was used to collect data on the incident rather than on an individual basis and contained any classified information on a particular incident, search and rescue efforts, results thereof, statements from witnesses and debriefing reports, if any. This file was maintained in the Casualty Branch for ten years after the status was changed to deceased, then destroyed in accordance with established file disposition procedures. Therefore, it is not possible for the Air Force at this time to fully answer many questions that have been or may be asked, without the supporting documents that were maintained in the Supplemental Missing Report. However, it can be assured that had any information been received which would have changed the facts at the time the presumptive finding of death was made, the next of kin would have been advised and the information included in the master personnel records.)
In response to the specific questions of Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch, the following is submitted:

Items 1 and 2. Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch are apparently assuming follow-up action should have been taken. It cannot be confirmed or denied that any such action was taken without access to the destroyed supplemental missing report and information contained therein. In an effort to obtain more information, intelligence personnel were contacted, who in turn spoke with Mr. Koski. Mr. Koski stated he could not provide any further information other than that contained in his letter of January 26, 1956. It is believed any information Mrs. Combs could possibly provide would be hearsay and could neither be confirmed nor denied; therefore, she was not contacted.

Item 3. Debriefing reports are made in confidence and are not placed in the master personnel records. Confidentiality of personnel debriefings is maintained because it helps surface all the information an involved serviceman witnesses. It is a protection to the individual who is being debriefed so that he may be free to divulge all he knows. The debriefing report would have been placed in the Supplemental Missing Report and destroyed at the end of the ten-year period.

Items 4, 5, and 6. The documents and information requested must be referred to the referenced agencies for reply. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations does not have information in their files pertaining to this subject.

Item 7. The Murphy Note states its purpose, and item 6 of our May 13, 1975, letter further elaborates on this by stating: "The reports that Americans were being detained in Russia presented the possibility that some could possibly be members from this B-29 aircraft and our government questioned the USSR in that regard." This is the third time the second part of this question has been addressed to the Air Force; our first was in reply to a letter submitted by Ms. Campisi and stated: "The Soviet Government replied on 13 August 1956 and categorically denied holding any United States Military personnel." The next time, we phrased our reply in this manner: "On 13 August 1956, the Soviet government replied to our 16 July 1956 note and
stated that a careful investigation revealed no American citizens from the American Air Force, or Naval Air Force were on Soviet territory." It is believed that because the Chinese questioned some of the repatriates concerning Major Busch, there was an indication that he or other crew members were being held by them. Although Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch may feel it was an indication, there was no proof.

Item 8. The question posed to us read: "Noble, was he C. I. A.?" Our reply states, "We do not have a detailed answer available on John K. Noble. We hope to have that for you in the near future, as we are attempting to locate official information on him." The Air Force does not have in its possession any statements from Mr. Noble, nor was a promise made to forward any statements. We have been advised that he was an American citizen (civilian) living with his family in Dresden, Germany, in 1945, when he was locally interned by the Germans. After Russian troops occupied Dresden, they took him to Russia. He has written two books which may be of interest, entitled "I Was a Slave in Russia" and "I Found God in Soviet Russia." Both books were published by Cicero Bible Press, 2301 Roosevelt, Broadview, Illinois.

Items 9, 10, and 11. Since no information was provided to the Air Force as a result of Mr. Facteau and Mr. Downey's debriefings, there is no reason to believe they possessed information on any of our personnel. We suggest the questions be referred to the Department of State.

Item 12. Evaluation of the Mr. Monserrat's picture would be of little value at this time. Even if referred to photo experts, Mr. Monserrat would have to provide more information, i.e., when and where the picture was taken, how he obtained it, and his rationale for believing the individual to be his brother.

Our government has not forgotten or written off the men who were declared killed in action after having been in a missing status. The Air Force and our government have always attempted to determine as accurately as possible what actually happens to a missing member. After repatriation of POWs and assembling all known facts, each case is individually reviewed to determine if a missing member should be continued in that status. After careful consideration, often the only realistic conclusion one can reach is that the missing member can no longer reasonably be presumed living. However, we understand the difficulty for the missing member's next of kin to accept the presumption of death without positive proof.
To the best of our knowledge, we have provided all information in our possession on this case. There is nothing more the Air Force can do to change the attendant facts and circumstances.

We understand your continued concern in the Monserrat and Busch families and trust this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Ronald J. Graham, Colonel, USAF
Congressional Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Attachment Consti Corres
Honorable Richard S. Schweiker
United States Senate
1. Reference is made to correspondence dated 31 July 1975 to Major General Maglione from Senator Schweiker in behalf of his constituents, Mr. George Busch and Mr. John Monserrat. (Your Special Instructions, 3 Sep 75, also refers).

2. The queries are again addressed in the order listed.
   a. Reference Paragraph 2b (page 2). It is our understanding that during the meeting on 6 February 1975 in the Senate Office Building with members of Senator Schweiker's staff present, Air Force representatives advised these members and the families involved that Sergeant Monserrat's records were destroyed in the fire that occurred in the storage area of the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri. Also, reference is made to this in the last paragraph on page 5 of our letter erroneously dated 13 May 1975, (written 13 May 1975) copies of which were provided SAF/LL and the Senator.
   b. Paragraph 2b (page 3) - We do not have access to the 1953 through the late 1960s Congressional Records. We do know Congressional Hearings were held during that period and that they may be of interest to the constituents.
In this regard, we simply support and concur with paragraph 2 of Senator Schweiker's 30 July 1975 letter to Major Silverbush, in which he indicates he asked the families to do some additional research on their own.

c. Paragraph 3 (Items 4, 5, and 6) - We cannot reply to item 5 even though it is an Air Force response. The constituents state they would like to see the integrated files of the OSI, CIC, and CID. Under the Freedom of Information Act the custodian of such records (if they in fact exist) has the authority to grant or deny access to the files. Therefore, we again suggest you refer this query to the OSI. However, the OSI, as we understand it, administers centrally directed programs, including criminal, procurement fraud, and loyalty investigations. The type of counterintelligence programs handled by the OSI includes counterespionage, investigation of possible acts of espionage upon a US installation, treason, sedition, disloyalty, sabotage, subversion or penetration of installation. It coordinates counterintelligence activities but not the type of activity involving this crew in question, who disappeared while engaged in a noncombat mission over the Sea of Japan in 1952.

d. Paragraph 3 (Item 7) - The answer to this question was first replied to in paragraph 2d of SAP/LL suspense
dated 8 January 1975 submitted by Gloria Campisi on behalf of the Monserrat family. (Also see page 3, paragraph 2 of SAF/LL 15 January 1975 letter to Senator Schweiker.)

As a result of the 15 January 1975 letter, Mr. Busch and Mr. Monserrat prepared a questionnaire and the question is implied in items 6, 10, and 16 (copy attached). Item 10, page 2 of our 13 May 1975 letter contains the second reply, and paragraph 2, page 7, again summarizes the reply from the Soviet Government.

e. Paragraph 3, (Item 8) - The question was posed in item 5 of the same questionnaire by both constituents.

f. Paragraph 3 (Item 8) - The referenced questionnaire indicates to us the families are seeking information on Russia and feel that secrecy surrounds Mr. John R. Noble. We felt that the books would be educational on the treatment of prisoners by Russia and at the same time distill some of the secrecy they feel surrounds Mr. Noble. The book entitled, *I Was a Slave in Russia* tells that he was 21 years of age when he was taken prisoner in 1945 by the Russians. His father was taken prisoner at the same time but later released. That his parents were German born, but naturalized American citizens/ He had a brother born in Switzerland who was also a naturalized American
citizen. He and his brother worked for their father who owned or managed a camera factory in Dresden, Germany, and that all four of them lived together in Dresden at the time. It reveals the limited number of Americans he actually saw in captivity and what happened to each. In addition, it reveals alleged information concerning other Americans being held captive, but none of whom he actually saw or learned their names. He heard eight American flyers were being held. It was after his release that the US sent the note to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the reader can assume that he was one of the persons referred to in the note who heard there were Americans in detention in the Soviet Union. We do not have a copy of the book, I Found God in Soviet Russia but assumed it would be informative to anyone showing an interest in its author; in short, the families inquired about Mr. Noble, but in our reply we stated we do not have any information on this man. We simply suggest to read his biographical books in order to better understand the man and his life.

g. Paragraph 3 (Item 12) - We did not intend to have the picture evaluated because we did not want to encourage
further futile correspondence. Our experience with unidentified photos reveals that this course of action solves nothing, as even the best of photographic analysts never really commit themselves fully unless they can positively identify at least eight points of comparison. If the photo is of poor quality, as we suspect it is, it will only raise more questions than it answers. However, if Mr. Konserrat desires to send the picture to us, we will have our photo experts analyze it and provide him with any conclusions reached. He should also send a clear photograph of his brother for comparison. In addition, it would be helpful to know when and where the picture was made, the source from whom he obtained it, and rationale such as any identifying features or birthmarks for believing the individual is his brother.

3. To the extent required, this paper has been coordinated with all interested DCS/Personnel Staff agencies. No further staff coordination is required.

A. W. GRATCH, Colonel, USAF
Asst for Casualty Matters
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers

1 Atch
Questionnaire sub by
Mr. Konserrat and Busch
MEMORANDUM FOR: AFMPC/DPHCA (RAFB, TEX) (FAX)

SUBJECT: MONSERRAT, MIGUEL W., SSgt; BUSCH, SAMUEL N., Maj

The attached Congressional Inquiry is forwarded for the action(s) indicated. Adherence to the provisions of NOI 10-20 is imperative, with particular attention being given to meeting the suspense established above.

(✓) Request a proposed reply (double-spaced draft in duplicate.)

( ) Provide a telephone response to Action Officer.

( ) (DO NOT) return this memorandum and attachments.

MAJ Labell
Action Officer

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: (See attached)

RALPH J. MAGLONE
Major General, USAF
Director
Legislative Liaison
The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has refused to coordinate our answer pertaining to the above subject. That office has asked that the following questions be answered before they sign off on final coordination.

(Reference your input dated 22 August)

1. Para 2b (page 2) - "As you will recall, the records pertaining to..." Is the Senator aware of this? Action Officer (A/O) could not find reference in previous correspondence.

2. Para 2b (page 3) - The families are encouraged to research the Congressional Records from 1953 through 1960. What is in these documents that might be of use to these families? A/O assumes these hearings pertain to MIAs and POWs in Korea.

3. Para 3 (Items 4, 5, and 6) - What about the OSI? This is an Air Force response.

4. Para 3 (Item 7) - "This is the third time the second part of this question has been asked:..." By whom?

5. Para 3 (Item 8) - "The question posed to us read:...." Question posed by whom?

6. Para 3 (Item 9) - Why would these books be of interest to these families?

7. Para 3 (Item 12) - How do we know we cannot evaluate the picture? We have not seen it. Do we intend to try?

SAFR is working closely with L&L to satisfy the Senator's office and close this case once and for all. Hopefully, the answers to these questions can complete this case. We understand the work that has been involved by your staff. However, it is important to do as much as we can to resolve this matter.
1. Reference is made to correspondence dated 31 July 1975 to Major Gen Maglione from Senator Schweiker in behalf of his constituents, Mr. George Busch and Mr. John Monserrat.


2. Proposed reply:
   a. First, I wish to apologize for the date of 13 May 1974 stamped on our 13 May 1975 letters to Mr. Busch and to Mr. and Mrs. Monserrat. I sincerely regret this administrative error.

   b. Mr. Busch and Mr. Monserrat's feelings and concern for their brothers are understandable, particularly since no remains were recovered; therefore, the manner and details of their deaths are not known. However, their families were kept fully informed of all known circumstances from the time their relatives were reported missing on 13 June 1952, until a change in their status was made on 15 November 1955, and we are confident that subsequently any available information requested was provided. Beginning in January 1975, with the request from Ms. Gloria Campisi, Philadelphia Daily News, seeking information of Staff Sergeant Miguel W. Monserrat, we have expended more than 200 research hours on this case, including research into other incidents which occurred during
The Korean War, in an attempt to satisfy her and all the demands of Mr. and Mrs. John Monserrat and Mr. George S. Busch. In that regard, the AF has provided all the information it has in this case. As you will recall, the records pertaining to Sergeant Monserrat were destroyed in the fire that occurred at the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, several years ago. Nevertheless, on 6 February 1975, Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch reviewed similar master personnel records pertaining to Major Busch. Through your office they were provided copies of the finding of death issued by the Department of the Air Force; subsequently we provided copies of correspondence they requested after reviewing Major Busch's record, and every effort was made to reply to their queries. It appears from the questions posed in their 19 July 1975 letter that they do not accept the information provided and are seeking material on the history of the Korean conflict. In this respect they should be advised we are not an "all source agency" capable to answer questions outside our realm of operation. Unlike a detective agency able to meet the inquisitive demands of any citizen with the right fee, we can only respond to issues within our authority. In any contingency levied upon the Air Force lives may be lost but we take care of our men as best as any
Military force is able to do. If the Monserrat and Busch families are interested in information beyond that which has already been established in this case and information outside our realm of authority and responsibility, we suggest they be encouraged to research the Congressional records from 1953 through the late 1960s for hearings on the cessation of hostilities in Korea and information on the meetings of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjon, Korea. There is an old English proverb which states: "A fool may ask more questions in an hour than a wise man can answer in seven years." To the best of our knowledge, we have provided all information in our possession on this case at this time, 23 years after the incident.

c. To aid your constituents in understanding that we have exhausted our sources and ability to reply to their queries, we will briefly explain our files and information contained therein. Every scrap of paper gathered and/or initiated while a member is carried in a missing status is not included in the individual master personnel records. After a military member's status is changed to deceased, and all assistance to the next of kin is completed (over an indefinite period of time), the missing record is screened and only pertinent documents which summarize the case and copies of correspondence to and from the next of kin are maintained for file in the member's master personnel record.
During the period of the Korean conflict it was Air Force policy to file correspondence initiated within the Casualty Branch, seeking additional information, such as the letters sent to Mr. Koski, Mr. Hand, and Mr. Combs, in a file known as the Supplemental Missing Report. This file was established by the date of the incident and included the names of all members involved in the same incident. It was used to collect data on the incident rather than on an individual basis, and contained any classified information on a particular incident, search and rescue efforts, results thereof, statements from witnesses and debriefing reports, if any. This file was maintained in the Casualty Branch for 10 years after the status was changed to deceased, then destroyed in accordance with established disposition of files procedure. Therefore, it is impossible for us, at this late date, to fully answer many if not all questions that either have been or may be asked, without the supporting documents that were maintained in the Supplemental Missing Report. However, we can assure you that had any information been received which would have changed the facts at the time the Presumptive Finding of Death was made, their next of kin would have been advised and the information included in the master personnel records.

3. To the best of our ability, we are responding to the questions in the same sequence provided in the 19 July 1975 letter from the constituents:
Items 1 and 2. I would like to point out that Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch are apparently assuming follow-up action should have been taken and was not. We cannot confirm or deny that any follow-up action was taken without access to the destroyed Supplemental Missing Report and information contained therein. In an effort to obtain more information we contacted our intelligence personnel, who in turn spoke with Mr. Koski. Mr. Koski stated he could not provide any further information to that contained in his letter of 26 January 1956. We feel, and are sure you will agree, that any information Mrs. Combs could possibly provide would be hearsay and could neither be confirmed nor denied, therefore, we did not contact her.

Item 3. Debriefing reports are made in confidence and are not placed in the master personnel records. Confidentiality of personal debriefings is maintained because it helps to surface all the information an involved serviceman witnesses. It's a protection to the individual who is being debriefed so that he may be free to divulge all he knows. The debriefing report would have been placed in the Supplemental Missing Report and destroyed at the end of the 10-year period.

Items 4, 5, and 6. The documents and information requested in these items will have to be referred to the referenced agencies for reply.
Items 7 and 8. The Murphy Note states its purpose, and Item 8 of our 13 May 1975 letter further elaborates on this by stating: "The reports that Americans were being detained in Russia presented the possibility that some could possibly be members from this B-29 aircraft and our government questioned the USSR in that regard." This is the third time the second part of this question has been asked; our first reply stated: "The Soviet Government replied on 13 August 1956 and categorically denied holding any United States Military personnel." The next time we phrased our reply in this manner: "On 13 August 1956, the Soviet government replied to our 16 July 1956 note and stated that a careful investigation revealed no American citizens from the American Air Force, or Naval Air Force were on Soviet territory." The question posed in 7A is answered in 7 above, and the statement made by Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch may feel it was a matter of opinion. We do not feel that because the Chinese questioned some of the repatriates concerning Major Busch that it was an indication that he or any of the other crew members were being held by them, and even though Mr. Monserrat and Mr. Busch may feel it was an indication, there was no proof. Surely, the writers cannot object to our government's efforts to live up to its promise
of not leaving any stone unturned in seeking information as to the ultimate fate of our missing personnel. This answer also applies to 7B.

Item 8. The question posed to us read: "Noble, was he C. I. A.?" Our reply states, "We do not have a detailed answer available on John R. Noble. We hope to have that for you in the near future, as we are attempting to locate official information on him." We do not have in our possession any statements from Noble, nor did we promise to forward any statements. We have been advised that he was an American citizen (civilian) living with his family in Dresden, Germany, in 1945 when he was locally interned by the Germans. After Russian troops occupied Dresden, they took him to Russia. He has written two books which may be of interest to the constituents. They are titled, _I Was a Slave in Russia_, and _I Found God in Soviet Russia_; both books were published by Cicero Bible Press, 2301 Roosevelt, Broadview, Illinois.

Items 9, 10, and 11. Since no information was provided to us as a result of Facteau and Downey's debriefings, we have no reason to believe they possessed information on any of our personnel. This question, together with questions 10 and 11, perhaps could be pursued better if referred to the Department of State.
Item 12. Our office cannot evaluate the picture that Mr. Monserrat claims to show Miguel Monserrat being marched down a Korean street in a group of 20 POW's. Even if referred to photo experts, Mr. Monserrat would have to provide more information about the picture, i.e., where and when the picture was taken, how he obtained it, and his rationale for believing the individual to be his brother.

We do not feel that our government has forgotten or written off the men who were declared killed in action after having been in a missing status. When dealing with aircrew members or passengers flying over vast oceans and at times over hostile continents there have been many cases in the past, and more will be in the future, in which the ultimate fate of a crew member cannot be positively determined. A more recent example is that of Representative Hale Boggs and crew who disappeared while on a trip over the state of Alaska. No wreckage of his aircraft nor remains were ever located despite the most extensive search this country could provide. The Air Force and our government have always attempted to determine, as accurately as possible, what actually happened to a missing member. After repatriation of prisoners of war and assembling all known facts, each case is individually reviewed to determine if a missing member should be continued in that status. After careful
consideration, often the only realistic conclusion one can reach is that the missing member can no longer reasonably be presumed to be living. However, it is often very difficult for the missing member’s next of kin to accept the presumption of death, without positive proof, i.e., remains returned.

This is unfortunate as it leads to years of anguish and fruitless, unjustified hope which seems to ignite and renew itself each time this country faces a situation resembling that of the past.

There is nothing we can do to change the facts involved in this case. Due to the passage of time, it is now impossible for us to reconstruct all the information and logic used in determining that Sgt Monserrat and Maj Busch would not return, consequently, they were declared deceased.

4. To the extent required, this paper has been coordinated with all interested DCS/Personnel staff agencies. No further staff coordination is required.

Signed

A. W. Gratch, Colonel, USAF
Asst for Casualty Matters
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers
United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 30, 1975

Major E. Silverbush
AFMPC/DPMSCB
Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

Dear Major Silverbush:

I first wish to thank you for your efforts in researching all of the records immediately available pertaining to Staff Sergeant Miguel W. Monserrat and Major Samuel N. Busch.

Since your letter of May 13, 1974, my office has continued to discuss the circumstances of this case with Mr. and Mrs. John Monserrat and Mr. George Busch. We have asked that they do some additional research on their own and then list additional questions which they may have. These questions are listed in the enclosure.

I believe it is especially important to note the content of the letter of January 26, 1956, from William E. Koski and the detailed information he provided regarding Major Busch. Obvious questions arise regarding why Air Force personnel specifically solicited information regarding Major Busch and what efforts were undertaken to follow up the reply from Mr. Koski.

These and other points enclosed, the possible existence of information within other agencies of the government, and the continuing availability of Mr. Koski and perhaps others appear to offer plausible grounds to merit additional dimensions of research regarding these cases.

I hope that you will agree and will take appropriate steps to render assistance. Mr. John Casciotti, of my staff, who can be reached at 202-224-8187, is available to assist you in any way possible, as of course are Mr. and Mrs. Monserrat and Mr. Busch.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Richard S. Schweiker
United States Senator

RSS:jcs
CC Major General Ralph Maglione
Chief of Legislative Liaison
July 19, 1975

Mr. John Casciotti
c/o Senator Richard S. Schweiker
United States Senator
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Casciotti:

1- Why no follow up to letters sent to (a) William Koski (b) Edwin Combs or any other released from that crew.

2- We have interviewed Koski, by phone, and he states that other than initial de-briefing, he was never contacted by Air Force Personnel. After he responded to letter sent to him, which he answered at great length, there still was no follow up investigation conducted. Edwin Combs, who is now deceased, wife interviewed, she states no follow up and no letter received! Each of these above named persons have indicated a willingness to cooperate.

3- We would like de-briefing reports, which for some reason, have not been co-ordinated into the files of the missing personnel who are concerned (i.e. Sam Busch, Miguel Monserrat, etc)

4- It is our understanding that the CIA has what is called a "RECORDS INTEGRATION DIVISION" We would like any information from this division or, for that matter, any part of the CIA, if at any time any mention was made by anyone regarding Busch or Monserrat.

5- We would also like to see the integration files of the OSI; CIC; CID, our reason for asking this- it is our understanding that these intelligence units of the government debriefed released prisoners at service hospitals and installations throughout the country at the time of their release.

6- William Koski relates that sometime in 1957 he saw his Chinese interrogator, as part of a Chinese trade Commissioin in the "FLYING TIGER" magazine. He reported this to FBI field office in Chicago and he made on further attempt to follow this through. He was told that Edwin Combs could not identify this man and as a result the charges were unsubstantiated and out of FBI hands. Koski is certain, to this day, this man was his interrogator, because he could never forget the beating this man gave him while in Chinese prison camp.

7- What was the basis of the Murphy Note? What intelligence information was received?

A- Why would they knowingly ask the Russians, and demand release of these airmen, when liberated crews, who had already been debriefed, had indicated they were being held by Chinese?

B- Reference to this-check dates of letters already sent to Koski, Combs and Hand.
3- What were John R. Nobles statements? We are still waiting for these.

9-What personnel have been identified as being held with Fecteau and Downey?
   A-Who were they questioned by?
   B-Who were they questioned about?
   C-We would like any information about Busch and Monserrat mentioned in debriefing files of Fecteau or Downey.

10-Where are the intelligence summaries on this crew presently kept and why are they not included in the answer to our previous inquiry?

11-Where are the State Department files and what State Department information regarding this crew? What became of the radio monitoring information from Russia, China and Korea that was kept in Japan or Korea regarding this broadcast.

12-We have a picture of about 20 men being marched down a Korean Street. I believe one is Miguel Monserrat.

We know there is a great length of time that has passed since downing of this aircraft, and that files and records have a tendency to be mislaid and not properly cared for. We do not feel that these types of files would or could come under that category as some of the information that is in them at one time or another would have come under the classification of HARD intelligence.

We further feel, however, since it's no longer hard intelligence, and has not been for many years and we are dealing now with human lives who have been either forgotten or just written off by their government. We do not want to believe this is so and we are still willing to let our Arm Forces prove us wrong.

We feel the questions we asked above can be answered in a reasonable amount of time, say 90 days, as this is the second time this year we are making this request.

Mr. Cacchiotti: This letter may seem hard and abrupt, however, we want you to understand that none of this is directed to you or to the Senator. Any additional information that we have been able to gain has been as a result of your good office.

If you have any further questions that you would like to add, please feel free to do so.

Sincerely,

George Busch
John Monserrat
BUSCH, SAMUEL N., Major, MIA 13 Jun 1952, KIA 15 Nov 1955
MONSERRAT, MIGUEL W., SSgt., MIA 13 Jun 1952, KIA 15 Nov 1955

MEMO FOR RECORD AF/DPEC 6 February 1975

Attended a previously arranged meeting at 1300 hours in the New Senate Office Building. Attending, in addition to the undersigned, were:

Mr. George S. Busch, brother of Major Busch
Mr. & Mrs. John Monserrat, brother and sister-in-law of Sergeant Mon. 
Mr. John Casciotti and Mrs. Jean Wilson, representing Senator Richard
S. Schweiker, Rep., Pennsylvania
Colonel Donald R. Keeney, SAF/LLI
Major Frank Luna, AF/JACL
Captain Michael H. Harris, SAF/LLI

Purpose of the meeting was to discuss the case of Major Busch and crew of 11, who were lost over the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952, and to answer questions or begin research where necessary. Mr. Busch and Mr. Monserrat had previously advised Senator Schweiker's office that there were discrepancies in the Air Force report of the incident, and that they believed one or more of the crew members may be held prisoner in North Korea, China or Russia.

Mr. Casciotti began the meeting by asking me to provide a short description of procedures and laws involved with missing persons. I advised initially that I could not speak authoritatively about the procedures which were followed in the 1950s, but that the basic law had not changed significantly since then. I gave a short briefing on the Missing Persons Act and our efforts to account for MIAs and to keep families informed.

Mr. Busch and Mr. Monserrat then discussed the discrepancies they believe they have uncovered, most of which are listed in the attached sheets (questions 14 and 15 are duplicates of questions 12 and 13). They are interested in knowing exactly what happened on the flight. Most of the questions/discrepancies are prompted by press reports or hearsay information. For example, Mr. Busch has talked to a Mr. Conrad Chimick, who teaches at West Chester State College. Mr. Chalick, then in the AF, had supposedly participated in the SAR for Major Busch and crew. He recalls a radio transmission from Vladivostok, USSR, on 14 June 1952 which stated "airmen-officers" were captured. Some concern is also prompted by a report from a John R. Noble (see question 5) that some Americans were being held in Russia. They also related the now familiar story of Steve Kiba ("he had been written off as dead"). I explained that Kiba had never been declared dead; that he was carried as missing, then captured. They said we had tried to convince Kiba's mother that he was dead. I said our records show no such efforts. They produced a lengthy letter from Kiba, which had been distributed by VIVA (they did not provide a copy). One of Kiba's claims was that he saw a
Fellow crewman, Paul VanVoorhis, at least 9 times after the Chinese had reported he was deceased (see questions 11 and 12).

They also wanted to know why there were 12 men on the crew. They had checked with the Boeing Company, manufacturer of the B-29, who advised that the crew of a B-29 was 8-10 depending on the mission. They wanted to know why the extra men were doing there, and specifically wanted to know what Sgt. more was doing. They also expressed an interest in Fecteau and Downey, who were released from China. They wanted to know how they got there in the first place (Downey allegedly said he was tried by Chinese with the crew of a B-29 shot down in 1952). Mr. Busch advised that some unnamed members of the 111 Tactical Air Support Group (TAC) at Willow Grove Naval Air Station were in on the SAR for Major Busch's crew or have knowledge of the incident. One or more of these individuals told Mr. Busch there were three transmission from the aircraft:

- We're being observed by Soviet aircraft
- We're under attack by MiGs
- We're going to try to ditch

According to Mr. Busch, these individuals are reluctant to discuss the incident as they are approaching retirement (we may have to ask Mr. Busch to give us names). Also, according to unnamed sources, the intended route of the aircraft in our official reports is wrong; the crew was allegedly sent over the Russian mainland.

In short, because of various news reports and hearsay information, the Busch and Monserrat families questioned virtually everything in our 13 Jan 75 letter to Senator Schweiker except the date, type aircraft and number of crew members. They were surprised to read a letter from a Mr. William Koski, a repatriated Korean prisoner, which was contained in the Master Personnel Records of Major Busch, and asked for a copy of that letter and letters to Mr. Koski and two other returnees who apparently had mentioned having heard Major Busch's name while in captivity. I advised I would provide the copies (see attached letter).

At the conclusion of the meeting we agreed that the AF could deal directly with the Busch and Monserrat families on their questions, keeping Senator Schweiker's office informed by sending info copies to SAF/LL. It was emphasized that research into a 22 year old case would take considerable time, and both families acknowledged that fact, and said they wouldn't be concerned as long as they felt some efforts were being made. To conclude further inquiries to Senator Schweiker's office, we should give both families a progress report every 30 days. They seemed genuinely interested in trying to learn all they can about their brother's loss, but they appear to have been misled by a lot of hearsay information. My impression is that they will be well satisfied until we advise them that our research is complete and we have no evidence their brothers are alive — then they'll go back to Senator Schweiker.
1. In force, in letter Jan. 13, 1975, claims plane on combat
mission- states plane not shot down.

2. Mailed to family note, associated with release, Moscow, July 19,
1975, states I-28 shot down by Russians, also concerns navy
prisoner released by Russians.

3. Also states I-28 informed and compelled to believe crew member
in Soviet prison, denied April 3, 1990, T-29 shot down June 15,
1990, held by Russians.

4. The other side of I-28 was seen in Oct. 1975, in hospital
in Russia, North of Tashkent. At least one circuit from private
holds in Soviet prison camp- 1975.

5. Also, also, the I-28 spent 21 years of a Soviet prisoner, said on
July 24, 1975, in writing, that eight retired from private
hold in prison camp- 1975. Also, was no...?

6. Family also explains for some time... has received information
of a person from ex-soviet imprisonment that they had converted
ex-soldiers on news reports of American airmen in actual detention
in soviet union.

7.vably agreed, etc. Informing sentence and 10 others, crew made
exchanged on Nov. 1, 1975 (Kissing fences act).

8. Later later, July 19. 1975, family note states existence of
I-28 crew (were the guy got information for family note?)

9. The family in a hurry to close case on I-28 crew

10. I-28, however, Korea. The intelligence of I-28, the surname
in Korean, etc. What, story of car

11. Formerly to be named of J. . . .In July of a

12. A letter into the clip that they were not any more in Russia.

13. Captured in Korean conflict. China, a forested by man
and they were notin. Am: one year after sending, without
I-28, recorded for,claimed air on violence. This is dispatched. On
river time and it men from I-28 confirmed alive- 3 or more
of time he was not.

14. Thus, Lumi, 4 fighter pilots released. August 6, 1975.


16. The same, and Menschen, one, of 2 Chinese, de-

17. The case is still closed.

18. Russian 5 years are of mention veracity and John Lowery, etc.

19. I-28 were held for 10 days as a group, stated claim that... etc.

20. Here are currently active for 1-2 recipients.

BEST COPY POSSIBLE
14. 1955, memorial day, 4 fighter pilots released August 4, 1955, 11 crewwmen of B-29 released. One of crewwmen of B-29, Steve Hill, and fellow crewwman, Paul VanHooris, 9 times, after Chinese declared him dead. VanHooris is still missing.

15. 1975, 6 years ago of Richard Oelrich and John Lookey, Jr., who had been held for 20 and 21 years, support claim that a man of physically and mentally survive long imprisonments.


LIST OF CREW OF B-29

2. Staff Sgt. Miguel Carvajal New York, N.Y.
5. Mr. Samuel H. Service Berkeley, California
7. Staff Sgt. William Mischard Arlington, Washington, California
8. Airman Ist. classe Ivan I. Ikonish Texas
10. Airman Ist. classe Joseph Becker Tillamook, Ore.
11. Airman 2nd classe Larry Williams Orange, Texas
12. Technical Sgt. David J. Moore— no address
A RESISTING MIRACLE OF SURVIVAL.- "AIAA PICARD OF ALABAMA-OFFICIALS"

BY \textit{J. M. F. E. LEYDEN}, LONDON, JUNE 13, 1942

A FIFE CLAIMED THE MIRACLE WAS FOUND OF B-29,

JUNE 17, 1942.-A OFFICER OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE CLAIMED THE SAFETY OF THE PILOT OF THE B-29 PLANE WHICH WAS FIRST RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS FIRST TO LAND IN JAPAN THE AIR BASE IN KOREA AND NORTH IN HOKKAIDO.

A FIFE CLAIMED THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN CONTACT MISSION, THEY ARE NOT OF "I'M IN JAPAN" ONLY.

IT'S CARL L. J. R. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

A FIFE CLAIMED THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN CONTACT MISSION, THEY ARE NOT OF "I'M IN JAPAN" ONLY.

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Mr. and Mrs. John D. Monserrat

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Monserrat

As Colonel Sorrentino advised you in his response in behalf of the President, and as you were advised during your 6 February 1975 meeting with Air Force representatives and representatives from Senator Schweiker's office, we have reinvestigated the circumstances surrounding the loss of your brother, SSgt Miguel V. Monserrat. After having thoroughly researched all of the records immediately available, and on the basis of the facts and documents which have surfaced at this point in time, we have been unable to substantiate many of your concerns. Throughout the Korean as well as the Southeast Asian conflict, there were many instances where rumors and "unofficial reports" created concern and false hope among the involved families. We have tried to carefully review the information available in an effort to answer your questions. We hope you understand that we must deal with the true facts as we know them, and avoid speculation or unwarranted assumptions.

The master personnel records of six of your brother's crew members were located and retrieved. All of the concerned next of kin were provided with essentially the same information as contained in Department of the Air Force letter dated 13 January 1975 with the exception of the departure time, which should have read 10:07 A.M. rather than 10:27 A.M., an administrative error which we regret. Since then, we have carefully reviewed the information available, and have responded to your questions in the same sequence as the list you provided.

1. As far as we can determine, the aircraft was not on a combat mission nor do we know what emergency actually befell it. Executive Order 10195, dated 20 December 1950, defines the combat zone as Korea, including the waters adjacent thereto within the described limits. The B-29, of which your brother was a crew member, departed Yokota Air Base, Honshu, Japan, on a reconnaissance mission over
the Sea of Japan at 10:07 A.M., 13 June 1952. The intended route was not within the defined combat zone; rather, it was from Yokota to Sado Shimo and then over water as far as coordinates 46 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 139 degrees 28 minutes east longitude, approximately 60 miles from the Russian Coast. In a broad sense, possibly every Air Force mission during a period of hostilities could be defined as a combat mission. However, the usual definition involves actual activity over hostile territory, and a high flying, unarmed reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan does not fit that description. Nevertheless, the type of mission really has no bearing on what might have happened to your brother's aircraft. All we know is where they were supposed to be, and that they did not return.

2. The loss of your brother's aircraft was widely publicized throughout the United States, and various news releases referred to the aircraft as being "shot down", "missing", "downed", and "crashed." The incident appears to have been sensationalized by the press, a situation over which we, of course, have no control. Nevertheless, our official information does not reveal what actually happened to the aircraft. The Murphy note (an extract of the note is attached) stated the aircraft "came down", which was a logical assumption based on the information available.

3. We are enclosing an extract copy of the official United States note to Moscow. You will observe that the extract refers to the B-29 as "missing" and states that it "came down." (See Attachment 1). The terminology was undoubtedly chosen to jar the Soviet Union into action if they had any information.

4. The note states an officer believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew.

5. We do not yet have a detailed answer available on John R. Noble. We hope to have that for you in the near future, as we are attempting to locate official information on him.

[Signature]
6. We believe if you will read the attached copy of the note in its entirety, you will get the same impression we do. Although we had hearsay information that Americans were being held, names were not furnished with that information. To our knowledge, those reports were never substantiated.

7. Sergeant Monserrat and his 11 fellow crew members were presumed dead, 15 November 1955, under the provisions of Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended.

8. We are not quite sure that we understand this question. As you know a finding of death was made on your brother because he no longer could reasonably be presumed to be alive. In cases of this nature we continue to seek all possible relevant information. The reports that Americans were being detained in Russia presented the possibility that some could possibly be members from this B-29 aircraft and our government questioned the USSR in that regard. The fact that eight months had lapsed since his status was changed to deceased was inconsequential to the attempts of locating him.

9. This crew was kept in a missing status 3 years, 5 months, and 2 days, as previously explained to you this is an exceedingly long period. The crew members were retained in a missing status until there was no longer any reasonable basis to presume them alive.

10. Yuri Rastvorov did not provide the names of Americans being held in captivity in Russia. On 13 August 1956, the Soviet government replied to our 15 July 1956 note and stated that a careful investigation revealed no American citizens from the American Air Force or Naval Air Force were on Soviet territory. In all frankness we must tell you, we have no reliable information or intelligence which would support the belief that your brother, or anyone of the crew members, was ever in the custody of the USSR.

11. Because of the numerous misleading statements on this incident, the following information is provided to set the record straight. The B-29 disappeared on 13 January 1953 while on a combat mission. On 21 January 1953, a propaganda broadcast from Peking, China, claimed
that the aircraft had been shot down over Manchuria and that all but three of the 14 crew members had survived and were captured. Because this information was unofficial and unconfirmed, no change was made in the status of any of these crew members. On 21 June 1954, a list containing the names of these 14 crew members and 4 fighter pilots was presented to the Chinese Communists at the Geneva Conference for an accounting. In reply, the Communists acknowledged that three members of the B-29 crew, given by name, died while attempting to parachute over Antung, China. The reply also revealed that the remaining 15 persons were in their custody. Subsequently, letters were received by the next of kin from each of the 15 personnel. Their status remained as missing in action until 20 December 1954, when it was administratively changed to captured, based on an official acknowledgement by the Chinese Communists that the personnel were being held in their custody. At no time did the Department of the Air Force even remotely consider changing their status to deceased.

12. Some of the statements allegedly made recently by Mr. Kiba are not in their entirety in agreement with statements he made immediately after repatriation, which are now the official records. Captain Van Voornis was one of the crew members declared dead after receipt of official information from the Chinese Communists.

13. We agree with this statement.

14. and 15. are duplicates of questions 12. and 13.

16. As mentioned in the answer to question 10, we have no reliable information to support the belief that Korean veterans are being held captive in the Soviet Union.

The items on your page marked, Air Force Discrepancy, are replied to in the order listed. An unofficial report intercepted on 16 June 1952 from Radio Moscow stated that one survivor, an officer, was picked up by a Russian vessel on or about 14 June 1952. No identifying data was given, nor had the report been confirmed through official channels. In an investigation conducted by the overseas commander and the State Department, persons who had reported hearing this and subsequent broadcasts were contacted and questioned. They stated that broadcasts first believed to be related to the B-29 in question were later definitely established as pertaining to an officer who was reported missing in action on 14 January 1952.
Despite the 17 June 1952 newspaper clippings you have, the official Air Force records reveal that the wreckage of this B-29 aircraft has not been located. History reveals that it is not uncommon for aircraft on long over water flights to have disappeared without leaving a trace of personnel or wreckage. However, as you have been advised, we do know that a life raft was sighted, and possibly another one, although they could not be confirmed as being from your brother's aircraft. The life rafts could have been construed as "wreckage" in newspaper reports.

The lighthouse keeper's statement may be true, but it does not establish what happened to the B-29 your brother was aboard. Your next two queries are answered in items 1 and 8 above. We have no official information which indicated the aircraft departed from anywhere but Honshu. At any rate, even if the departure was from a different location, it would not shed any light on what happened to the aircraft in question. As to the next statement concerning information you received from Boeing-Vertol, we can only reaffirm that during the Korean conflict B-29s flew with crews complements up to 15 men, depending upon the requirements of the mission. Sufficient life rafts were always carried aboard the aircraft to accommodate all crew members.

In regards to the allegation that three distress transmissions were received from the aircraft, we can only state that this is not supported by the official record. We know of no reason why anyone participating in the search efforts would have withheld such information at the time. If you know someone who has participated in this search and claims to have other information relating to the search, we'll be glad to get in touch with such a person in order to resolve any obvious discrepancies.

In reply to your question as to whether a letter was sent to Major Baumer concerning information on this incident, the answer is no, nor was it necessary. We had Major Baumer's debriefing statement and he could provide no information on any of the members of this crew. In response to your query concerning Mr. Combs, our records do not contain a reply to his letter.

As previously explained to you, after 22 years our records are not complete. Numerous files similar to that of your brother were destroyed as a result of a fire a few years ago.
ago at our storage area in St. Louis. However, you can be sure had there been any pertinent information the next of kin would have been notified of such information long ago. In reference to Sergeant Moore, he was the maintenance chief.

In closing, we think it is important to once again review here the information we have regarding your brother. Sergeant Monserrat was the central fire control gunner in a crew of 12 aboard a B-29 which disappeared while engaged in a noncombat mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft departed Yokota AB, Japan, at 10:07 A.M., 13 June 1952, on an intended route from Yokota AB to Sado Shimo, Japan, and then over water as far as approximately 60 miles from the Russian coast. Upon completion of the mission, the aircraft was to return to Yokota AB; estimated time of return being 7:07 P.M. The last radio contact was at 10:27 A.M. and was a routine position report indicating the aircraft had left the coast of Japan and was proceeding northward over water. The aircraft was tracked by radar until 1:20 P.M., at which time it left the radar zone over the Sea of Japan, approximately 100 miles northwest of Hokkaido, Japan, at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The plane failed to return to Yokota AB on schedule and, at 7:20 P.M., several attempts were made to establish radio contact with the missing aircraft. These efforts were unsuccessful and it and the crew were reported missing in flight.

The aircraft was known to be carrying three six-man life rafts, and 11 one-man life rafts, and to be equipped with enough food and medical supplies to care for the entire crew for three days. Air rescue operations were initiated at 8:30 P.M. A total of 10 aircraft participated in an intensive search of the proposed route and adjacent areas. At 2:45 P.M., 14 June, one of the search planes sighted and photographed an empty six-man life raft, which was right side up, about 300 miles off the southern tip of Hokkaido, at a point approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast. Search planes remained in the area until darkness, but were unable to salvage the raft because of prevailing conditions, nor could it be identified as belonging to the missing aircraft. An unconfirmed report indicated a second raft was seen four miles south of the first raft, but this sighting could not be verified. The search was resumed on the 15th, but results were negative and there was no further trace of either life raft. The search continued until 17 June; no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors.
At the lapse of a 12-month period, Sergeant Monserrat and the other crew members were continued in a missing status pursuant to Section 5, Public Law 489, Missing Persons Act (Section 555, Title 37, United States Code). The reasons for the determination to continue them in a missing status are as follows: Under normal conditions, the absence of any word for this lengthy period of time would tend to conclusively establish that the crew perished when their aircraft was lost. The route of this B-29 and its probable location at the time of the accident precluded such a determination. Official reports disclose that the scheduled route was such that the accident may have occurred at a point where survivors could have been rescued by foreign personnel and removed from the area before the arrival of our search aircraft on the following day. This supposition had not been substantiated through Department of State channels. However, this possibility alone, although remote, was sufficient to warrant a continuance of the missing status of the entire crew until further information could be developed. A full review of the status of the personnel of this B-29 was made in November 1955 and revealed the following: No information had been received from any source which would indicate what emergency actually befell the B-29. Sufficient time had elapsed during which it is reasonable to assume some definite intelligence would have been received, had any crew member survived. In view of the lapse of time and complete absence of information which would support a continued presumption of their survival, the missing status of Sergeant Monserrat and the other crew members was terminated by a presumptive finding of death pursuant to Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act. The date of presumed death was recorded as 15 November 1955.

On 16 July 1956, our government specifically requested information of the United Soviet Socialist Republic concerning the possibility of their holding members of air crews or any other Americans. The Soviet Government replied on 13 August and categorically denied holding any United States military personnel.

We know there is nothing we can do or say to assuage your grief as a concerned relative. However, we do hope that the information we have provided will be helpful. We hope that you also recognize the fact that the Air Force is now and always has been dedicated to mission accomplishment and full cooperation with families whose loved ones were lost. We, too, deeply feel the loss of our comrades throughout all the years that the United States Air Force has been called upon to serve its country.
We will contact you whenever any additional information is uncovered. In the meantime, please feel free to contact me if you would like clarification of what has been provided to date.

Sincerely

ED SILVEREUSH, Major, USAF
Chief, Missing Persons
Casualty Matters
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers

1 Atch Extract of Text to USSR, 16 Jul 56
EXTRACT OF TEXT NOTE TO USSR
(16 July 1956)

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the question of the detention of United States military personnel in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has for some time received, from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air Arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has sought in all such cases to obtain, if possible, precise identification of American nationals detained by the Soviet Government, although it notes that by international law and international practice the Soviet Government is obliged to inform the United States Government first of any American nationals whom the Soviet Government holds in custody or to permit such nationals to communicate with the proper United States authorities. The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible, that, although the United States Government is not able to identify by name the American nationals now detained by the Soviet Government, it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person who has been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since January 1, 1949 of whom the United States Government has not heretofore been informed by the Soviet Government, giving in each case the name of the person and the circumstance underlying his detention.

Specifically, the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continues to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which came down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this
United States aircraft were, and are, detained in Soviet detention places in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union. In particular, it is informed, and believes, that in 1950 and in October, 1953 at least one American military aviation person, believed to be a member of the crew of this United States Navy Privateer, was held at Camp No. 20 allegedly near Taishet, and Collective Farm No. 25, approximately 54 kilometers from Taishet, said to be under sentence for alleged espionage. This American national was described as having suffered burns on the face and legs in the crash of his aircraft and using crutches or a cane.

Reports have been received from former-prisoners of the Soviet Government at Vorkuta that in September, 1950 as many as eight American nationals, believed to be members of the crew of the United States Navy Privateer to which reference is made, had been seen in the area of Vorkuta and specifically, that one person who was interned at Vorkuta in September, 1950 stated that he was serving a twenty-five year espionage sentence and had been a member of a downed United States aircraft.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the crew of the United States Navy Privateer when it departed for its flight over the high seas of the Baltic consisted of the following United States Navy personnel, all nationals of the United States:

(Names of entire crew were submitted)

2. One or more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952, either over the Sea of Japan or near the Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union. An officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew, was observed in October, 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadam near the crossing of the Kolyma River between Elgen and Debin at a place called Naboriug. This officer stated that he had been convicted, wrongfully, under Item 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the United States Air Force personnel on board the B-29 which has been missing since June 13, 1952 were as follows:

(Names of entire B-29 crew were submitted)
27 February 1975

Mr. John D. Konserrat

Dear Mr. Konserrat

Thank you for your recent letter regarding your brother and his crew. I have taken the liberty of forwarding the letter to Major Silverbush at the Air Force Military Personnel Center. He is conducting the research on your questions. As I advised you, we will make every effort to locate available information on your brother. I appreciate you reminding us of the information on Major Baumer and Mr. Combs.

Sincerely

[Signature]

EDWARD E. LINQUIST, Major, USAF
Assistant for Casualty Matters
DCS, Personnel
Sir:

My wife and I wish to thank you for your assistance in our meeting with you and the other Air Force Personnel on February 6, 1975. We received your letter, with enclosed material. We hope that you are successful in discovering another copy of my brothers file.

We hope that facts, we presented, prove to you that there is much more to be learned about this particular B-29 crew, and with your expertise and facilities, we hope that you can uncover much more material than we have, as amateurs.

On reading the copies of letters sent and received, we did notice two things we would like to bring to your attention. First, Mr. Koski mentioned a Major William Baumer as possibly having more information than himself, was a letter sent to him? Second, the letter to Edwin Combs mentions a picture of Major Busch which apparently he had referred to in de-briefing. Can anything further be done to follow this through?

We are sure that you have probably already seen these two items, but we thought them unusual enough to mention again.

Perhaps, if the Air Force co-operated 23 years ago, as you have recently, there would have been hope for my brothers crew and the other 944 American Servicemen on the Korean MIA list. We hope by your further investigation that you help us, not only in our quest for the fate of my brother and the others in his crew, but also, in the restoration in our faith of concern of the government and military for its missing men, who served so well.

Very truly yours,

John D. Monserrat
Mr. George S. Busch

Dear Mr. Busch

This is to inform you that we have just recently received the list of questions/discrepancies you provided during your meeting with Mr. John Casctiotti and Mr. Jean Wilson from Senator Schweiker's office. As it was explained to you, we maintain contact with and provide information to families of Air Force members who are missing, captured, deceased, or who become casualties by any other means. In that sense, we will keep in touch with you.

We are in the process of gathering as many of the master personnel records as there are in existence of the entire crew of your brother's aircraft. Since this particular incident occurred over 22 years ago, the task of answering your specific queries at this point in time may prove to become a difficult task. I assure you we will do the best we can. We do not maintain the inactive files here at Randolph Air Force Base; and due to the elapsed time since the incident, it is envisioned that it will take a considerable amount of time to complete our investigation. We, therefore, ask for your understanding.

We will do all we can in our investigation and notify you of our progress as it becomes available. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office at any time.

Sincerely

Edward Silverbush, Major, USAF
Chief, Missing Persons Branch
Casualty Services
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers
11 February 1975

Mr. George S. Busch

Dear Mr. Busch

I enjoyed meeting you last Thursday. As we discussed, attached is a copy of the letter written to the Air Force Casualty Branch by Mr. William E. Koski, a repatriated prisoner of the Korean conflict. Also attached, per your request, are copies of letters from the Casualty Branch to Mr. Koski and to two other prisoners. Apparently, Mr. Koski was the only one who responded to the inquiry, although we will attempt to verify that while we are working on your other questions.

A summary of our meeting, and the list of questions/discrepancies you provided, is being sent to the Chief, Casualty Services, Air Force Military Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base near San Antonio, Texas. That office has the responsibility for maintaining contact with, and providing information to, the families of Air Force members who are missing, captured, deceased, or who otherwise become a casualty. The trained analysts in their Missing Persons Branch will be conducting most of the research into your questions. They have already requested the Master Personnel Records on the entire crew of your brother's aircraft. I will assist them in their contacts with Washington area agencies.

You should be hearing periodically from the Air Force Casualty Services Office as their investigation progresses, and we will also keep Senator Schweiker's office informed. The principal point of contact at the Air Force Military Personnel Center will be Major Ed Silverbush, mailing address: AFMPC/DP/MSCB, Randolph AFB, TX 78148, telephone (toll free): area code 800-531-5501. You may call or write him directly, or if you prefer, my mailing address is: Hq USAF/DPEC, Washington, D.C. 20330, telephone: area code 202-697-8116.
Again, I enjoyed meeting you, and I hope we'll be able to answer most or all of your questions. Please feel free to call either Major Silverbush or me whenever we can be of assistance.

Sincerely

EDWARD E. LINDONIST, Major, USAF
Assistant for Casualty Matters

4 Atch
1. Mr. Koski's ltr. 1/26/
2. Lt Col Steele's ltr to
   Mr. Hand, 11 Oct 55
3. Lt Col Steele's ltr to
   Mr. Combs, 11 Oct 55
4. Lt Col Steele's ltr to
   Mr. Koski, 11 Oct 55
Dear Mr. Monserrat

This is in further response to your letter of 27 December 1974 to President Ford regarding your brother, Sergeant Miguel Monserrat.

Reference is made to your recent meeting with Mr. John Casciotti and Ms. Jean Wilson from Senator Schweiker's office. Major Lindquist, USAF Assistant for Casualty Matters, also attended this meeting, and has provided us a resume of the points of discussion. Reference is further made to the 19 February 1975 letter from Major Silverbush of this office. As you know, we have the responsibility of maintaining contact with the families of Air Force members who are missing, captured, deceased, or who have become casualties by any other means.

As Major Silverbush advised in his letter to you, we are in the process of gathering existing master personnel records of the entire crew of your brother's aircraft. Since the incident occurred over 22 years ago, the task of responding to specific queries at this point in time may prove to be a difficult task. Please by assured, however, that we will do the best we can. Inactive military personnel records files are held in the records repository at the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, and it may take a considerable amount of time to gain the loan of available records and complete our investigation.

We will certainly do the best that we can in our investigation and will keep you posted on our progress as information becomes available. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact us at any time.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

A. W. GRATCH, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Casualty Services
Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers
MEMORANDUM FOR: ATKNC/DEMSO

SUBJECT: MONTERRAT, MIGUEL SOY

Attached are copies of a Presidential or Presidential inquiry and our interim reply. Please take the following action(s).

1. Send substantive REPLOY DIRECT to correspondent by the above suspense date. Opening paragraph of reply will read:

"This is in further response to your letter of (date) to ............................................."

Provide two (2) copies (reproduced copies are acceptable) of your reply to SAFLII within THREE (3) duty days thereafter. These copies must be letterhead and must be devoid of the drafter's name, coordinating etc. That information and the WH Case or SAFLII Transmittal Number is to be shown only on the DD 95 transmitting the correspondence to SAFLII.

2. Return attachment to correspondent's letter to him with your direct reply.

3. Special instructions are attached.

4. Return attached basic correspondence to SAFLII.

5. The attached copy of the basic correspondence may be retained for your file.

Correspondence/memoranda will be signed by at least a colonel or civilian equivalent.

SAFLII Action Officer is Lt Col Thomas S. Collins. 57394

RAFAH J. MAGLONE
Major General, USAF
Director
Legislative Liaison

RAFLII Action Officer is Lt Col Thomas S. Collins. 57394
February 13, 1975

Dear Mr. Monserrat:

On behalf of President Ford, I am acknowledging your recent letter to him and placing the matter in the hands of appropriate officials for their careful consideration. You will receive a further reply as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

M. L. SORRENTINO
Colonel, USAF

Mr. John D. Monserrat

OSD WH 5532
AF/DPMSCB - Direct Reply
Suspense: 21 Feb 75
February 7, 1975

Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
ATTN: White House Correspondence Section
The Pentagon
stop 103

Dear Sir:

The attached letters referred to the Department by the White House appear to contain subject matter that should be handled by your agency.

It would be appreciated if you would send the White House a copy of each reply to the Attention of Mr. Frank Matthews, White House Central Files, Room 68, Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
John S. Pruden
Director
Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center

Enclosures:

Ltr. to Pres fr: Mrs. Carter/Germany
Darlene Berkovitz/Pittsburgh, Pa./Nov. 17, 1974
Aristides Aguilar/New York, N.Y./Nov. 7, 1974
Pvt. William Rivera/Fort Gordon, Georgia/Dec. 31, 1974
Mrs. Anita Baldwin/Fort Riley, Kansas/Sept. 16, 1974
Mrs. Isabel Vigil/Vandenberg A.F.B., Calif./Nov. 8, 1974
Mrs. Lesbia de Meachum/APO N.Y./Dec. 3 & 9th, 1974
Loura Moehlman/Detroit, Michigan
Mark Makowitz/Brooklyn, N.Y.

cc:
White House Central Files
ATTENTION: Mr. Frank Matthews
Room 68
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

[Signature]
Mrs. Kenneth Ralston/Waltham, Mass.
Mrs. Abe Jitter/Miss Camara J. Duty
Rodolfo R. Alejandro/Philippines
DECEMBER 27, 1974

PRESIDENT GERALD FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am writing to you out of sheer frustration. I hope this letter of mine reaches you.

My brother Sgt. Miguel Monserrat, AF 13164064, was a crew member of a B-29 that was shot down June 13, 1952. The plane took off from Otaru, on the west coast of Japan's Hokkaido Island, 450 miles from Vladivostok. Plane was last seen 12 miles from Russian held Salskalin Island. The wreckage of the B-29 was found in the sea of Japan, between Korea and Honshu Island.

On July 17, 1956, the United States charged that the Russians were holding American airman from two, possibly more, downed U.S. planes. This note came from U.S. embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Sighted specifically were two crews - a Navy Privateer shot down April 8, 1950 and an air force B-29. The B-29 carried 12 men, the privateer ten. Referring to the B-29, the note said an officer believed to have been a member of the crew was reported seen in October, 1953 - in a hospital at Marionburg north of Magadan near the Kolyma River. The note declared at least one airman believed to be from the Navy Privateer was reported to be seen at a Camp near Taishet in eastern Siberia and at a collective farm in that area in 1950 and 1953. (John H. Noble of Detroit who spent 9½ years as a Soviet prisoner told a Berlin news agency conference January 11, 1955 that eight airmen from privateer maybe alive in Soviet prison camps.) The note went on that the Soviet government has in its custody members of other United States aircraft, particularly crew members of the aircraft engaged on behalf of the United Nations command side of military action in Korea since 1950.

Sir, my father and I served in the armed forces during World War II, My son is at present in the army. My father, my son, my brother and I all were volunteers. We did what our country asked of us, we never shirked our duty. Long before President Kennedy's famous quote "ASK NOT WHAT YOUR COUNTRY CAN DO FOR YOU, BUT WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR YOUR COUNTRY", we were doing it.
It seems to us that all most every man returned from Soviet or Chinese prisons have been C.I.A. men. If the men are not held by the Russian or Chinese, why are the files still classified information.

Sir, I don't presume to remind you that the one thing our country needs now is credibility in our elected officials. I consider my family the back-bone of this country. We work, pay taxes, fight and die for our country when necessary. We understand that you are discussing the men missing in Viet Nam. Kindly do not forget the men missing during the Korean War. We don't want a form letter in return correspondence sir, we want definite steps taken to release these men.

Again I want to know if these men are not being held by the Soviets or Chinese, why is the file on them being kept confidential. If they are dead why hasn't the Government honored them? We would like to make arrangements to see this file at the earliest possible time.

Respectfully,

John D. Monserrat
John Monserrrat Hopes

Yule-Born Son Missing Since Korea

By GLORIA CAMPSI

The holidays are always tough on John Monserrrat.

It is Christmas Day and he sits at the dining room table turning over in his hands an old photograph from the Korean War.

The young man in the photo is dressed in the uniform of a U. S. Air Force sergeant. He stands with an air of certainty, his hand easy on his hip.

The young man is Monserrrat's son. His name is Miguel—his grandfather was a Spaniard, the old man explains. But everybody always called him Mickey, or Mike or Big Mike when he was playing football at St. John's High. "He was 6 foot 3."

Monserrrat, 69, remembers the day Mickey was born.

It was Christmas Day 1938 and his wife, Maria, had just finished decorating the tree. Monserrrat, later a policeman, and now retired in Brigantine, N. J., was driving a bus then.

"I STOPPED THE BUS," he said, during one of his runs, "went in the house, and she was still decorating the tree. The doctor was there. When I came back after work, the baby was born and the doctor was gone."

Monserrrat also remembers the day early in 1952 that he drove Mickey to the train station at the end of a leave. "He waved to me and said, 'So long.' It was the last time he saw his son."

On Father's Day 1952, he received a telegram saying the B-29 his son was aboard had crashed a few days before, with no trace of survivors.

"But I always believed he was alive," Monserrrat said yesterday at the home of his other son, a SEPTA employee also named John, 48, at 6063 Upland st. For 22 years, the elder Monserrrat has believed it; though Mickey's mother died accepting her son's death.

In 1956, the U. S. Government sent a strongly worded note to the Russians saying it was "compelled to believe" the crew of at least two downed U. S. planes—the B-29—were being held by the Soviets. The note said the B-29 may have been lost near Siberia.

The Russians replied that they were holding no American military personnel.

Through the years, bits and pieces of rumor and fact came to Monserrrat's ears, though nothing official was learned.

BUT FRESH HOPEs were stirred when two Americans captured by the Chinese in a 1952 CIA spy mission—Richard Friciano and John Downey—were released in 1972 and 1973.

And so the Monserrrat family sat around the table on Christmas Day—Mickey's birthday—reliving all the pain and uncertainty.

"It's like the pieces of a puzzle," said the younger Monserrrat. "You don't know what to believe, and what not to believe."
11 February 1975

Mr. & Mrs. John Monserrat

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Monserrat

I enjoyed meeting you last Thursday. As we discussed, attached is a copy of the letter written to the Air Force Casualty Branch by Mr. William E. Koski, a repatriated prisoner of the Korean conflict. Also attached, per your request, are copies of letters from the Casualty Branch to Mr. Koski and to two other prisoners. Apparently, Mr. Koski was the only one who responded to the inquiry, although we will attempt to verify that while we are working on your other questions.

A summary of our meeting, and the list of questions/discrepancies you provided, is being sent to the Chief, Casualty Services, Air Force Military Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base near San Antonio, Texas. That office has the responsibility for maintaining contact with, and providing information to, the families of Air Force members who are missing, captured, deceased, or who otherwise become a casualty. The trained analysts in their Missing Persons Branch will be conducting most of the research into your questions. They have already requested the Master Personnel Records on the entire crew of your brother's aircraft. I will assist them in their contacts with Washington area agencies.

You should be hearing periodically from the Air Force Casualty Services Office as their investigation progresses, and we will also keep Senator Schweiker's office informed. The principal point of contact at the Air Force Military Personnel Center will be Major Ed Silverbush, mailing address: AFMPC/DPMSCB, Randolph AFB, TX 78148, telephone (toll free): area code 800-531-5501. You may call or write him directly, or if you prefer, my mailing address is: Hq USAF/DPEC, Washington, D.C. 20330, telephone: area code 202-697-8116.
Again, I enjoyed meeting you, and I hope we'll be able to answer most or all of your questions. Please feel free to call either Major Silverbush or me whenever we can be of assistance.

Sincerely

[Signature]

EDWARD E. LINQUIST, Major, USAF
Assistant for Casualty Matters
DCS, Personnel

4 Atch
1. Mr. Koski's ltr, 1/26/56
2. Lt Col Steele's ltr to Mr. Hand, 11 Oct 55
3. Lt Col Steele's ltr to Mr. Combs, 11 Oct 55
4. Lt Col Steele's ltr to Mr. Koski, 11 Oct 55
Dear Senator Schweiker:

This is in reply to your inquiry of December 20, 1974, in behalf of the family of Staff Sergeant Miguel M. Monsererrat, USAF (deceased), regarding his disappearance. Ms. Gloria Campisi contacted you.

 Authorities in Air Force Headquarters report Sergeant Monsererrat was one of a 12-member crew of a B-29 which disappeared while engaged in a noncombat mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft departed Yokota AB, Honshu, Japan, at 10:27 a.m., June 13, 1952, on an intended route from Yokota AB to Sado Shimo, Japan, and then over water as far as approximately 60 miles from the Russian coast. Upon completion of the mission, the aircraft was to return to Yokota AB; estimated time of return being 7:07 p.m. The last radio contact was at 10:27 a.m. and was a routine position report indicating the aircraft had left the coast of Japan and was proceeding northward over water. The aircraft was tracked by radar until 1:20 p.m., at which time it left the radar zone over the Sea of Japan, approximately 100 miles northwest of Hokkaido, Japan, at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The plane failed to return to Yokota AB on schedule and, at 7:20 p.m., several attempts were made to establish radio contact with the missing aircraft. These efforts were unsuccessful and it and the crew were reported missing in flight. (Since the Air Force has never learned what caused the loss of the B-29, the term "shot down" as used in the inquiry is an erroneous assumption. In addition, the term missing in action (MIA) is used when an individual disappears as a result of participating in combat operations. Sergeant Monsererrat was not on a combat mission and, therefore, was reported in a status of missing only.)

The aircraft was known to be carrying three six-man life rafts, and to be equipped with enough food and medical supplies to care for the entire crew for three days. Air rescue operations were initiated at 6:30 p.m. A total of
10 aircraft participated in an intensive search of the proposed route and adjacent areas. At 2:45 p.m., June 14, one of the search planes sighted and photographed an empty six-man life raft, which was right side up, about 300 miles off the southern tip of Hokkaido, at a point approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast. Search planes remained in the area until darkness, but were unable to salvage the raft because of prevailing conditions, nor could it be identified as belonging to the missing aircraft. An unconfirmed report indicated a second raft was seen four miles south of the first raft, but this sighting could not be verified. The search was resumed on the 15th, but results were negative and there was no further trace of either life raft. The search continued until June 17; no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors.

At the lapse of a 12-month period, Sergeant Monsarrat and the other crew members were continued in a missing status pursuant to Section 5, Public Law 489, Missing Persons Act (Section 555, Title 37, United States Code). The reasons for the determination to continue them in a missing status are as follows: Under normal conditions, the absence of any word for this lengthy period of time would tend to conclusively establish that the crew perished when their aircraft was lost. The route of this B-29 and its probable location at the time of the accident precluded such a determination. Official reports disclose that the scheduled route was such that the accident may have occurred at a point where survivors could have been rescued by foreign personnel and removed from the area before the arrival of our search aircraft on the following day. This supposition had not been substantiated through Department of State channels. However, this possibility alone, although remote, was sufficient to warrant a continuance of the missing status of the entire crew until further information could be developed. A full review of the status of the personnel of this B-29 was made in November 1955 and revealed the following: No information had been received from any source which would indicate what emergency actually befell the B-29. Sufficient time had elapsed during which it is reasonable to assume some definite intelligence would have been received, had any crew members survived. In view of the lapse of time and complete absence of information which would support a continued presumption of their survival, the missing status of Sergeant Monsarrat and the
The date of presumed death was recorded as November 15, 1955.

On July 16, 1956, our government specifically requested information of the United Soviet Socialist Republic concerning the possibility of their holding members of air crews or any other Americans. The Soviet Government replied on August 13 and categorically denied holding any United States military personnel. Please assure Ms. Campisi that no intelligence was ever received which would substantiate a belief that Sergeant Monserrat survived the incident and was ever a prisoner.

As an additional point of information, the 389 unaccounted for United States servicemen from the Korean War were declared dead under the Missing Persons Act. A fact sheet pertaining to our efforts to account for these men is attached for your information.

Your interest in behalf of Sergeant Monserrat's family is appreciated, and we trust you find this information helpful.

Sincerely,

DONALD K. CRANEY, Colonel, USAF
Congressional Inquiry Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

1) fact sheet
2 Attachments 2) congressional inquiry

Honorable Richard S. Schweiker
United States Senate
23 Jan 75

Capt Harris advised that Senator Schweiker's office had again called him regarding this case, and stated everyone up the line to include the Senator were satisfied with our reply; however, the sister-in-law was not. She seems to hold the edge over her husband who is the brother to Sgt Monserrat, and so far as can be determined, the only primary living NOK. At the time of Capt Harris' telecon, unless matters changed the brother is going to sign a letter to review whatever records we have on Sgt Monserrat. I again advised Capt Harris that the only thing we had on Monserrat was the C/S Memo when we made him dead and some newspaper clippings. He asked if we did not have an incident report. I gave him a negative reply. He said, well he was just apprising me so I could get whatever we have together because he is pretty sure these people will be coming to DC to see what we have; that the Senator's office has attempted to pacify them and could not. I asked Capt Harris if this was the brother and his wife, why was her name Gloria Campisi. He advised that he had since learned Campisi was not the sister-in-law, that she was someone else. Never the less, through some means the brother was signing a letter to see the records.

JANIE BECKNER
Missing Persons Branch
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

14 NOV 1955

SUBJECT: Finding of Death, SRAD Case #418 (13 Jun 52)

FACTS

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," reconsideration has been given to the facts and circumstances relating to the disappearance of the Air Force personnel listed below, who were initially reported missing on 13 June 1952.

2. Following a full review of this case pursuant to Section 5 of the Act, the subject personnel were continued in a missing status at the expiration of the initial 12 months' period of absence.

3. An examination of available reports and records pertaining to the status of the subject personnel discloses that they have not been repatriated or otherwise returned to military control and that the available information is insufficient to conclusively establish their ultimate fate.

4. a. Circumstances. The personnel listed were the crew of a B-29 which departed Yokota Air Base, Honshu, Japan, at 1007, 13 June 1952, on a classified reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft was followed by radar over the course to be flown until 1320, at which time the radar contact was lost at coordinates 46 degrees 5 minutes North, 140 degrees 40 minutes East, approximately 100 miles north of Hokkaido at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The aircraft failed to return to Yokota Air Base and although several attempts were made to establish radio contact, all were unsatisfactory. The missing aircraft was known to have 3 six-man and 11 one-man life rafts aboard and sufficient food and medical supplies to care for all 12 men for three

The attached documents were forwarded in Feb 75 to Major Lindquist for Captain Harris, LBL.
days. On 14 June 1952, during the search, an empty six-man life raft was sighted, right side up, at a point about 100 miles off the Russian coast, but search planes were unable to salvage the raft due to prevailing conditions. An unconfirmed report indicated that a second six-man life raft was seen four miles south of the first raft but this sighting could not be verified. Although the search was continued through 17 June 1952, no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors.

b. A message was received from the Commander, Far East Air Forces, indicating that an official report from Radio Moscow on 16 June 1952 stated that one officer survivor was picked up by a Russian vessel about two days before. The name of the survivor was not given and efforts to confirm this report were unsuccessful. Later FEAF reported that the cited broadcast did not pertain to personnel from the B-29, basing their premise on the fact that subsequent broadcasts concerned biological warfare propaganda and mentioned the names of Air Force personnel reported missing in action on 14 January 1952. Several repatriates from Operation "Big Switch" indicated that the Chinese had asked them questions concerning this crew. However, their captors never volunteered any information as to whether or not there actually were survivors or what had happened to the aircraft.

c. A recent message from the Commander, Far East Air Forces, dated 7 October 1955, states that they have received no additional information concerning the members of this crew since they were continued in a missing status in June 1953.

DISCUSSION

5. The circumstances surrounding the missing status of the members of this crew appear unfavorable for survival but are insufficient to conclusively establish their ultimate fate. The twelve persons listed above were continued in a missing status in view of the fact that experience had shown the USSR had previously withheld or distorted information concerning the whereabouts or fate of United Nations personnel who had disappeared in territory controlled by the Communist countries. However, in view of the fact that there has never been any indication as to what emergency actually befell the B-29, or that any of the crew were able to abandon the aircraft and were picked up by foreign personnel, the likelihood that any of these twelve persons is still alive may no longer reasonably be considered. This conclusion is further substantiated by the lapse of over three years since they became missing, with no information forthcoming which would support a continued presumption of their survival. It is reasonable to assume that, had they survived, some word would have been received from or about them during this period. Therefore, under the provisions of Public Law 490, a presumptive finding of death is warranted.
Memo for DGSP, subj: Finding of Death, SR&D Case #418 (13 Jun 52)

RECOMMENDATION

c. It is recommended that, pursuant to the authority contained in Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, official casualty reports be issued stating that the missing status of the Air Force personnel listed in paragraph 1 has been terminated by a presumptive finding of death. Further, that the casualty reports include a statement that the presumptive finding was made following a subsequent review of all available information and, as provided by and for the purposes of the cited law, the date of presumed death has been established as 15 November 1955. Death is held to have occurred while in pay and duty status, in flying pay status, in line of duty and not as the result of misconduct.

1 Attachment
List of Source Material

Under the authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

EMMETT O'DONNELL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Text of U.S. Note on Missing Airmen

WASHINGTON, July 16 —

Following is the text of a United States note to Moscow advising the United States airmen said to be prisoners in the Soviet Union.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the question of the detention of United States military personnel and civilians in the Soviet Union.

The United States Government has, for some time, received, from persons of various nationalities, reports concerning United States military aviation personnel and civilians, either on the United States Air Force or on the United States Navy, in actual custody or in transit through the territory of the Soviet Union.

The United States Government has sought to obtain, wherever possible, information concerning United States military personnel and civilians detained by the Soviet Government. It has been revealed to the United States Government, however, that international law and international practice in such cases do not provide for the protection of the right of communication with the proper United States authorities.

The reports concerning such personnel and civilians have now become so persistent and so well-organized and so public that it has been necessary for the United States Government to inform the United States Government of the number and names of all such personnel, as well as the names of all those who are alleged to have been detained or are suspected of being detained.

Specific Cases Are Named —

Specifically, the United States Government is informed in reference to the following:

1. Two or more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29, which was downed on June 12, 1952, either near the Soviet Union or in the Kamchatka area of the United States.

2. Two or more members of a United States Air Force B-29, which was downed on July 11, 1952, near the Soviet Union, and later observed in the Tschukotsk region of the Soviet Union.

3. The United States Government has received reports from persons of various nationalities, including United States military personnel and civilians, that they have been detained or are suspected of being detained.

The United States Government believes that the Soviet Government has the right to require the United States Government to inform it of the number and names of all such personnel, as well as the names of all those who are alleged to have been detained or are suspected of being detained.

For the information of the

United States Government, the United States Air Force personnel on board the B-29 above have been missing since June 12, 1952, were 30,000 feet above sea level.

In the course of the foregoing, specific cases involving the crew members of two aircraft, it may be necessary for the Soviet Government to require the United States Government to inform it of the number and names of all such personnel, as well as the names of all those who are alleged to have been detained or are suspected of being detained.

4. While the foregoing, specific cases involving the crew members of two aircraft, it may be necessary for the Soviet Government to require the United States Government to inform it of the number and names of all such personnel, as well as the names of all those who are alleged to have been detained or are suspected of being detained.

The United States Government desires that the Soviet Government make its inquiry on the foregoing subject as thoroughly as possible, but that it keep this Embassy informed of progress as soon as possible.
The United States Government has received reports that various members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which came down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950, have been detained at Fort Gommut, near Taishet, and subsequently in Vorkuta, places in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union, and have been held at Camp No. 1, allegedly for espionage.

This American national was described as having suffered burns on the face and legs in the crash of the aircraft and was held at Camp No. 1, near Taishet, approximately fifty-four kilometers (about thirty-four miles) from Taishet, and reportedly under guard for alleged espionage.

Reports have been received from former prisoners of the Soviet Government at Vorkuta that in September, 1950, many as eight American nationals, believed to be members of the crew of the United States Navy Privateer which the Soviet Government has admitted to have been in the area of Vorkuta and specifically that one W. J. Knowles, who was interned at Vorkuta in September, 1950, stated that he was serving a twenty-five year, espionage, sentence and had been a member of a downed United States aircraft when it departed for its flight over the high seas of the Baltic consisted of the four (four) men from the United States Navy. The crew of this United States aircraft was present in the Baltic during the following United States Navy
Air Senator Cooper:

This is in response to your inquiry of 19 December 1960 in behalf of Mr. Richard H. Moore concerning information relating to his brother, Master Sergeant David L. Moore. Sergeant Moore was placed in a missing status on 15 June 1952 and was presumed dead on 15 November 1953.

Attached is a summary of the circumstances pertaining to the disappearance and current official status of Sergeant Moore. Mr. Moore's feelings and concern for his brother are understandable, particularly since no remains were recovered and the manner and details of death are not known. However, Sergeant Moore's family has been kept fully advised of all information relative to his status. If any additional facts are received regarding his fate, they will be notified immediately.

Although certain phases of the mission from which Sergeant Moore became missing remain classified, these are not relevant to the status of Sergeant Moore. The Department of the Air Force has received no positive intelligence which would substantiate that Sergeant Moore survived the incident or was ever a prisoner of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

It is assumed that Mr. Moore's reference to his brother's records being open in "Archives" refers to Sergeant Moore's Master Military Personnel Records which are at the records depository at St. Louis, Missouri. Should Mr. Moore desire to review these Air Force records regarding his brother, it is suggested that he write to the Chief, Air Force Branch, Military Personnel Records Center, USAF, 9700 Page Boulevard, St. Louis 32, Missouri, and make his request known.

Should it be more convenient for Mr. Moore to review the records in Washington, D.C., area he should advise the Chief, Casualty Search, Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C. He should allow sufficient time before his anticipated visit so that the records may be procured from the records depository, and arrangements can be made for a specific time for the personal of Sergeant Moore's records.

I hope the above information will be useful. If we can do anything further to assist you, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,
COORD CARLK Mr. Cramer RPM-6-1-C

GEORGE R. LOCKHART
Colonel, USAF

Congressional Inquiries Section
Office 90 S 1 W 17

[Handwritten notes on the memo]
AMENDAMENT FOR CHIEF, CONGRESSIONAL DIVISION,
DIRECTORATE OF LEGISLATIVE LIASION

ATTN: MAJOR G. L. HARDIM

SUBJECT: Staff Sergeant Joseph A. Becker, AF 19 391 613.
Decommissioned, 15 November 1955.

1. Evidence is made to suspense Case HAFL 56602.

2. Staff Sergeant Joseph A. Becker, AF 19 391 613, was a crew member
aboard a B-29 aircraft which departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, on 17 June
1952, to perform a classified non combat reconnaissance mission over the
Sea of Japan. The last radio contact with the B-29 was a routine position
report indicating the aircraft had left the coast of Japan and was proceed-
ing northward over water.

3. Approximately 100 miles north of Hokkaido, Japan, at a point about
120 miles from the Russian coast, radar contact was lost with the B-29.
When the aircraft failed to return to Yokota Air Base at the scheduled time,
Air Rescue facilities were alerted and a full scale aerial search was initi-
ated. The following day an empty six man life raft was sighted, right side
up, at a point approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast, 300 miles off
the southern tip of Hokkaido. Approaching darkness prevented the recovery
of the raft. It could not be definitely identified as belonging to the sub-
ject B-29, nor could it subsequently be located. The extensive, organ-
ized search of the proposed route of the missing aircraft as well as other adja-
cent areas to which it may have traveled was suspended 17 June 1952. No
information was obtained which would indicate the whereabouts of the B-29
or its crew.

4. Sergeant Becker and the other members of his crew were continued
in a missing status until 15 November 1955. Based upon the results of a
full review of the facts and circumstances involved in this case, their miss-
ing status was terminated by a presumptive finding of death pursuant to the
provisions of section 5 of the Missing Persons Act. The date of presumed
death was recorded as 15 November 1955.

5. Congressman Norland may be informed that the headlines in the Jour-
nal Daily paper of Portland, Oregon, apparently refer to the new release of
our Government's note to the Soviet Union on 16 July 1956. The note stated
that credible reports had been received indicating that American nationals,
who could not be identified by name, might be detained by the Soviet Government.
Memo for Chief, Congressional Div, Dir of L&L, subj: Staff Sergeant Roscoe G. Becker, AF 19 391 813, (Cont)

The note cited two cases, one of which concerned an officer associated with Sergeant Becker's B-29, and asked the Soviet Government for detailed information concerning each American military person who may have been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since 1 January 1949. On 13 August 1956, the reply of the Soviet Government categorically denied holding any United States military personnel. Congressman Moreland may be assured that no intelligence has been received which would substantiate a belief that Sergeant Becker survived the incident and was ever a prisoner in the USSR. Sergeant Becker's family has been fully advised of all information relative to his status and if any additional facts are received regarding his fate, they will be notified immediately.

6. It is noted that the letter from Congressman Moreland implies that Sergeant Becker was reported "missing in action" in the Korean conflict. The term "missing in action" is used when an individual disappears as a result of participating in combat operations. Sergeant Becker was not on a combat mission and, therefore, was reported in a status of missing only. Mrs. Alice Becker, mother of Sergeant Becker was previously advised of the meaning of this terminology. Since the Department of the Air Force has never learned what caused the loss of the B-29, the term "shot-down", as used by Congressman Moreland's constituent, is an erroneous assumption.

7. This paper is of a routine nature and requires no additional coordination. Any inquiries may be directed to Major W. S. Chichester, extension 56957.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
Receipt Case 8AFLL 56602
Memo R/S at 26 May 56
w/1 incl

W. C. BEARD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst Chief, Casualty Branch
Special Activities Group
Directorate of Military Personnel
Mrs. Ruth Busch:

Dear Mrs. Busch:

This is in reply to your letter of 15 October 1956 concerning the payment of the Federal income tax of your late husband, Major Samuel N. Busch.

At the time your husband became missing, he was not serving in a combat zone. As you know, the crew had departed Yokota Air Base, Honshu, Japan, on a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft was last tracked by radar at a point approximately 100 miles northwest of Hokkaido, Japan, which area was not in the combat zone as set forth in Executive Order 10195, dated 30 December 1955. The "combat zone" was defined as Korea, including the waters adjacent thereto within described limits.

I suggest that you contact the Internal Revenue office in Philadelphia and discuss this matter with one of their consultants. I am inclosing a copy of the official death report concerning your husband which you may present to the officials there.

Sincerely yours,

Lt Col
Cas Ntpt

R. J. KEEN
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

W/B: Discussed this case with Lt Col Stuhl, Legal Assistance, who advised that we not tell her she is not entitled to tax exemption, although he indicated from the facts presented to him, Major Busch was not entitled to combat zone exemption. AAF has map marked off, showing the "combat zone" defined in above executive order. Major Busch did not go missing anywhere near the combat area.
FOREIGN OFFICE NOTE 79/OSA OF AUGUST 13 REFERS TO
EMBASSY NOTE 42, JULY 16, (ON AMERICAN FLIERS IN SOVIET CUSTODY)
NOTE CLAIMS "CAREFUL INVESTIGATION" REVEALS NO AMERICAN CITIZENS
FROM AMERICAN AIR FORCE OR NAVAL AIR FORCE ON SOVIET TERRITORY.
INVESTIGATION "LEAVES US DOUBT" EMBASSY'S CLAIM HAS NO BASIS IN
FACT. SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS NECESSARY OBSERVE THAT
US GOVERNMENT WAS APPARENTLY MISINFORMED BY PERSONS WHO ATTEMPT
BY FALSE INFORMATION HINDER DEVELOPMENT NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
SSR AND USA".
MATT

SUBJECT: State Department Note of 16 July 1956 to the Soviet Union

To: Commander
Rolling Air Force Base
ATT: Personal Affairs Officer
Washington 25, D.C.

1. On 16 July 1956, the State Department asked the Soviet Government for detailed information concerning each American military person who may have been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since 1 January 1949, about whom the United States Government has not heretofore been informed.

2. In particular, our Government queried the USSR about the crew of an Air Force B-29 which went down on 13 June 1952 either over the Sea of Japan or near the Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union. Names of the crew members were listed for the information of the Soviet Government.

3. One of these crew members whose casualty assistance case was assigned to your base is _________________________________.

4. If the next of kin or any member of the family should query your base, now that the text of our Government's note to the Soviet Union has been released to the press, you should explain to them that this Headquarters has received no additional information which would change the facts related to them at the time the presumptive finding of death was made.
5. You should further advise them that they will be promptly advised by Headquarters USAF if any tangible information is received regarding the ultimate fate of this particular crew and that nothing further will be known until the Soviet Union replies to the State Department's note.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

R. J. REEVES
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel
12 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major Harvey E. Hawkins

SUBJECT: State Department (Mr. Klaus role in the three aircraft missing in the Sea of Japan).

1. On 9 September 1955, I talked with Mr. Klaus of State Department with reference to new information on the B-29 (English crew) missing 7 October 1952.

2. From our conversation, I learned that his function is legal in nature — working on the presentation and submission of claims to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. It appears that both countries involved in a dispute must consent to air their dispute before any action is taken by the Court.

3. a. In the case of the B-29 (English crew) missing 7 October 1952, the State Department has presented a claim to the International Court of Justice. The USSR has formally refused to go into court in this case. Our claim is still on record and still open for possible future action along these lines by the State Department.

   b. In the case of the RB-50 (Tojoda crew) missing 29 July 1953, Mr. Klaus has prepared a claim for submission to the International Court, but action has been suspended because the Department of the Air Force does not sanction its presentation to the International Court of Justice.

   c. In the case of the B-29 (Tojoda crew) missing 15 June 1952, no claim has been prepared by Mr. Klaus. To report from the Department of the Air Force received that the aircraft was shot down. Informed them that we had a report that on 16 June 1952 radio Moscow broadcast that one survivor picked up by a Russian vessel about two days before, Mr. Klaus stated he did not have this information and requested it be sent to him.

Raymond C. Obertone
Dear Mr. Bennett:

This is in reply to your letter of August 15, 1956, regarding Airman Second Class Marvin Jacob Kaminen, 16313003, whose parents have heard reports to the effect that he might possibly be held in a Soviet prison camp.

As you are already probably aware, there have been rumors from time to time concerning the possibility of American personnel, particularly airmen, being held in Soviet prison camps. Quite recently, on July 16, the United States Government specifically requested of the USSR information concerning the possibility of their holding members of air crews or any other Americans. One of these crews was also on a B-29 type aircraft which was lost close to an area held by the Communists on the same day, June 19, 1952, that Airman Kaminen's plane was lost. Consequently, it is believed that the story which the Kaminen family has heard might possibly have made reference to this crew in some manner or another, thereby raising the hope in their minds that their son is alive and also a prisoner. At this point I might state that on August 13 the Soviet Government in reply to the United States Government categorically denied holding any United States military personnel.

In order to help both you and the Kaminen family to better understand this situation more clearly, I can advise you that the B-29 upon which Airman Kaminen was aboard was lost approximately ninety miles from Kwajalein Island which is, as you know, in the mid-Pacific northeast of Australia. This area since World War II has been designated as the Trust Territories of the Pacific Island and is under the supervision of the United States. Additionally, the island is several thousand miles from the nearest Communist held territory. Therefore, the geographical factor in itself would most certainly preclude the possibility of members of this crew being picked up by the Communist elements.

It is certainly most regrettable that these conflicting and obscure reports have had the tendency to
renew agonizing thoughts in the minds of parents who have already suffered so much in the loss of a son who was serving his country.

If I can be of further assistance to you, please advise me accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

Wade M. Fleischer
Colonel, USAF
Director
Office of Legislative Liaison

Honorable John B. Bennett
House of Representatives

cc: AFRMP-5-1 Attn: Lt Col Steele
    ASO/OSD Attn: Mr. Kelleher

H/R: Coordinated with AFRMP-5-1 (Lt Col Steele)
Richard A. Steele  
Lt. Col. USAF  
Chief, Casualty Branch  
Personnel Services Division  
Directorate of Military Personnel

Dear Sir,

I recently received a letter from your office, dated 11 Oct. 55, forwarded to me after a considerable delay.

This letter is in relation to your investigation of the fate of Major Samuel N. Busch, last of the 91st Strat. Recon. Squadron.

As you are aware the communists asked me numerous questions about Major Busch, expressing enough interest in him, to the exclusion of any of his crew members as to indicate to me the likelihood of their holding the Major a prisoner.

I was first approached on the subject in late October or early November of 1952. This occurred after the communists discovered I had been involved in a search mission looking for the Major's ship. They asked about Busch and only about him, which to me jived with the communist radio report that had been monitored in Japan on 13 June, stating that one officer airman had been picked up. (Verify with Major John Norton or Col. Fredrick McCoy who were then with the 91st)

They proceeded to question me about Major Busch, very intensively, including questions about his personality, past history, previous service, etc. Having been acquainted with the Major at both Fairchild and Yokota I knew a little random information about him. Most of this being common knowledge, I told what I could in the belief that my verifying whatever the Major had told them would relieve some of the pressure undoubtedly being put on him.

They never would say what happened to the aircraft or that there were any survivors. On the other hand my accusations that they had shot the airplane down in international waters and were holding survivors were not denied. At no time that I can recall did they ever give any indication of the source of their knowledge or reason for their interest in Major Busch.

As I have already stated, their interest in the Major certainly seemed to me as enough indication that they were holding him. After 1500 hours of interrogation I know that they didn't bother questioning about immaterial matters. They had a definite interest in Busch and since they never asked or made mention of any of his crew I assumed he was the only survivor.
The recently repatriated Major William Baumer might have more to say on this subject since he commanded the search mission on 15 June and was later a prisoner in the same jail and with the same interrogators as I had.

This last will probably be of little interest to you since it is only my conclusions regarding the incident, a result of my experiences with the Chinks. As you know the search mission did locate a life raft, safe indication that there were survivors. Since the raft could only have been launched from the rear entrance door or the mid-upper raft compartments, why should the A/C who would have to crawl through his escape window to get out of a ditched B-29, be the only one to make it, with the exclusion of 10 or 11 other men? (The opinion of those who saw the raft in the water was that it was the type to have been launched from the rear door rather than from the fuselage compartment, indicating that there must have been survivors from the aft section) Therefore, if there were one survivor, there should have been several, though this is in contradiction with all I could find out from the Chinks.

Generally, I could glean considerable information from the communists by manipulating the answers I gave to their questions in such a way as to gain a fair idea as to what their current problem was. However, in this case I failed to do much other than establish my own conviction that survivors, including Major Busch were being held prisoner.

Other than this there isn't much I can add except that I sincerely regret this delay in answering. This thing has intrigued me for a long time and I would greatly appreciate your letting me know if my assumptions as to the Major's fate are correct or not.

Respectfully yours,

William E. Koski
1/26/56
... and Mrs. Adolph Busch

... Mr. and Mrs. Busch:

It is with deep regret that I must officially notify you of the termination of the missing status of your son, Major Samuel N. Busch, since it can no longer reasonably be presumed to be alive.

This headquarters has just completed a full review of the facts and circumstances relating to the status of your son and his crew members. You know, Major Busch was continued in a missing status because the actual route of the flight was such that a remote possibility existed he or other members of his crew might have been picked up by Russian personnel and they have been able to abandon their aircraft. Unfortunately, no information has ever been forthcoming from any source which would indicate that emergency actually fell on the B-29 and sufficient time has elapsed since which it is reasonable to assume some word would have been received, and any crew members survived. In view of this lapse of over three years since your son and his crew became missing, and the complete absence of information which would support a continued presumption of their survival, it can only be concluded that they may no longer reasonably be presumed to be alive.

Consequently, it has become necessary under the provisions of the missing persons act to terminate Major Busch's missing status by a presumptive finding of death, the presumed date being recorded as 15 November 1955. This is not considered to be the actual or probable date of death, but it is established in accordance with the cited law for the purpose of terminating pay and settling accounts. An official report of the change in his status has been issued by the Department of the Air Force.

I realize how distressing it is to receive so little information about his fate. While we can offer no assurance of further particulars, I do want you to know that the termination of his missing status will not affect our efforts to obtain more complete details. You may be certain that you will be notified immediately if additional information is received concerning him.
I am extremely sorry that this message does not lighten the grief in your heart. Please accept my deepest sympathy in your sorrow.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

M. J. RIVENS
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel
SUMMARY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEATH

OF

MASTER SERGEANT DAVID L. MOORE, AF 15229915

1. Master Sergeant David L. Moore, AF 15229915, was a crew member aboard an
B-29 aircraft which departed Yokota Air Base, Japan, on 13 June 1952, to
perform a classified, non-combat, reconnaissance mission over the Sea of
Japan. The last radio contact with the B-29 was a routine position report
indicating the aircraft had left the coast of Japan and was proceeding
northward over water.

2. Approximately 100 miles north of Hokkaido, Japan, at a point about 120
miles from the Russian coast, radio contact was lost with the B-29. When
the aircraft failed to return to Yokota Air Base at the scheduled time, Air
Intelligence facilities were alerted and a full-scale aerial search was initiated.
The following day an empty six-man life raft was sighted, right side up, at
a point approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast, 300 miles off the
northwestern tip of Hokkaido. Approaching darkness prevented the recovery of
the raft. It could not be definitely identified as belonging to the subject
B-29, nor could it subsequently be located. The extensive, organized search
of the proposed route of the missing aircraft as well as other adjacent areas
in which it may have traveled was suspended 17 June 1952. No information was
obtained which would indicate the whereabouts of the B-29 or its crew.

3. An unofficial report intercepted on 16 June 1952 from Radio Moscow stated
that one survivor, an officer, was picked up by a Russian vessel on or about
14 June 1952. No identifying data was given, nor had the report been confirmed
through official channels. In an investigation conducted by the overseas com-
mander and the State Department, persons who had reported hearing this and
subsequent broadcasts were contacted and interrogated. They have stated that
broadcasts first believed to be related to the B-29 in question were later
indefinitely established as pertaining to an officer who was reported missing in
action on 14 January 1952.

4. At the lapse of a 12 month period in the missing status, Sergeant Moore and
his other members of this B-29 crew were continued in a missing status pursuant
to the provisions of section 5, Missing Persons Act (Title 50, USC, App. 109).
The following were the reasons for this determination: under normal conditions,
the absence of any word for this lengthy period of time would tend to conclusively
establish that the crew perished when their aircraft was lost. The route of this
B-29 and its probable location at the time of the accident precluded such a
determination. Official reports disclose that the scheduled route of the aircraft
was such that the accident may have occurred at a point where survivors could have
been rescued by foreign personnel and removed from the area before the arrival
of our search aircraft on the following day. This supposition had not been sub-
stanciated through State Department channels. However, this possibility alone,
Although remote, was sufficient to warrant a continuance of the missing status of the entire crew until further information could be developed. A full review of the status of the personnel of this B-29 was made in November 1955 and revealed the following: No information had been received from any source which would indicate that emergency actually befall the B-29. Sufficient time had elapsed during which it is reasonable to assume some definite intelligence would have been received, had any crew members survived. In view of the lapse of time and complete absence of information which would support a continued presumption of their survival, the missing status of Sergeant Moore and the other crew members of the B-29 was terminated by a presumptive finding of death pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the Act. The date of presumed death was recorded as 15 November 1955.

5. On 16 July 1956 the Government of the United States petitioned the Government of the USSR in the form of a note which stated that credible reports had been received indicating that American nationals, who could not be identified by name, might be detained by the Soviet Government. The note cited two cases, one of which concerned an officer who was associated with Sergeant Moore as B-29, and asked the Soviet Government for detailed information concerning each American military person who may have been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since 1 January 1949. The reply of the Soviet Government, received on 13 August 1956, categorically denied their holding any Air Force military personnel. This incident has been widely publicized throughout the United States by the news media.

H. A. BJERKELUND
Major, USAF
Directorate of Military Personnel
Memorandum for Record:

1. Letter fr Mr. Richard M. Moore to Senator John B. Cooper, undated and rec'd at the Senator's office 19 Dec 50, was forwarded to SAVL. Mr. Cramer, SAVL, ext 57361 forwarded ltr to AFMP-8-1 for preparation of a draft of proposed reply with suspense date 3 Jan 61. Mr. Moore is the brother of MSgt David L. Moore, missing 13 June 1952 and presumed dead 15 Nov 55. Brother indicates Senator helped him get info before but AF Security prevented answers to all the questions (Prior congressional correspondence - Senator Cooper - SAVL Suspense Case 06422G, dated 27 March 1953). Mr. Moore is now requesting all information pertaining to the status of his brother. He apparently is anxious to see the records as he is also requesting when MSgt Moore's records will be open in "Archives" as he understands that they will be then open to the public.

2. MSgt Moore's MPR called for from NRC, St. Louis by Airmail Expedite, SAVL requested to resuspend case to 9 Jan 61 since records nec and not received by the 3rd. Information in summary of proposed reply extracted fr MPR and suppl. Missing Report on file AFMP-8-1-0. With reference to "Archives" it is believed Mr. Moore is referring to the records depository. Regardless, it appears his main concern is to view his brother's records. Believe we should offer to make files available to him at St. Louis or Washington whichever is most convenient to him. Wife then residing with Sergeant Moore's mother, was offered the opportunity in 1952 to view the records but did not respond. This also will possibly convince the NOK that info is not being withheld. Mr. Moriarty, AFCAS, ext. 72526, coordinated approach with reg to "Archives" question and inspection of files contained in last paragraph by telephone conv w/Mr. Ober tone, AFMP-8-1-0 on 5 Jan 61.

J. G. LUTHER
Major, USAF
Dear Mrs. Busch:

Since I last communicated with you, a report has been received from the overseas commander concerning the known events leading to your husband's missing status. I know that you are anxious to learn as much as possible of what happened to your husband, Major Samuel N. Busch.

Our report states that Major Busch was the aircraft commander of a B-29 type aircraft which departed from Yokota Air Base, Tokyo, Japan, 13 June 1952, on a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft was last seen when it departed from Yokota Air Base at 10:07 a.m. and the last radio contact was a routine position transmission at 10:27 a.m. Your husband's plane was tracked by radar until 1:20 p.m. when it left the radar zone. When the aircraft failed to return as scheduled, Air Rescue Service was alerted and a search was begun. A total of ten aircraft searched the proposed route of the missing plane on 14 June 1952. An empty six-man life raft was sighted but could not be retrieved and identified as belonging to the missing aircraft. The search was resumed on 15 June and again on 17 June but all efforts to locate survivors have met with negative results. All crews on missions in the area have been and will be briefed to maintain surveillance for evidence of the missing crew. There are no known eyewitnesses or persons having knowledge of the facts surrounding the disappearance of the aircraft.

I want to assure you that if your husband is located or any other information is secured regarding him, a report to that effect will be furnished to you without delay. We will continue to record him as missing until such time as his fate is ascertained.

I join in the hope that there will soon be some definite news of your husband and that it will be favorable. My sympathy continues during this period of waiting.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

John H. McCormick
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

201 Busch, Samuel N., AO 733 811

JUL 11 1952

AFMP-12-2-2/134/FF/14679

Ref 24

9 July 52
CASUALTY QUESTIONNAIRE

At 25 minutes after midnight on 4 July 1952, I had already received word that there were 5 enemy aircraft in the area on an interception course. We were at 22000 feet and after I turned for the target they started passes on us from about 8 o'clock position high. They got direct blasts in the center wing tank, inboard fuel tank; #2 engine was on fire, as was the auxiliary power unit and the oxygen system. The elevators were burned away and there was fire and smoke throughout the forward compartment. We were at 22000 feet when we were hit and the last time I looked at the indicator, we were 20000 feet. This happened within a 3 minute period. The navigator left his position, crossed over the open hatch and facing aft. The nose gunner left his position and was standing behind the navigator. There was no action being taken so I pushed the navigator out thru the nose hatch. I grabbed hold of the nose gunner and attempted to push him thru the exit, whereupon he took a swing at me. I left him standing beside the aircraft commander's seat and started across the hatch toward the radio operator for I did not see him go out. There was fire coming through the forward bulkhead door and I think that he may have been frozen in his position, scared or something, and that is the last I remember until I came to about 1000 feet above the ground. Just as I pulled the chute I saw an explosion on the other side of the ridge which may have been the aircraft. Nose-gunner: S/Sgt Clifford H. Mast (NOT RMC). Navigator, Lt J. E. Moreland (RMC)  

Major William H. Baumer, A0 733786. In March 1953, they started interrogating me pretty heavily as to Maj Baumer's personality and characteristics; what kind of commander he was, etc. That kept up for quite a while and I told them it seemed like an anti-climax. In the latter part of April 1953, I was taken before what was considered the chief interrogator and he dragged out of an envelope of many pictures, one of Maj Baumer. At the same time he stated that he was captured. In the picture Maj Baumer was wearing a B-15 jacket and it looked like snow on the ground in the background. The picture was a glossy finish, about 2" x 3" size - from the waist up. As late as June I asked about Baumer and they told me he was not in very good physical condition. I said I had seen a picture and the interpreter asked me if I had seen a full picture; I said no, just the upper part. I had known Baumer prior to going missing and in the picture it seemed like he had lost a lot of weight. Maj Baumer was pilot on B-29 missing on mission from Yokota AB Japan (Col Arnold's crew).  

Maj Samuel N. Busch, A0 733811 (missing on reconnaissance flight over Japan Sea, 13 June 1952 (acft comdr). Some time during my interrogation, they brought up the fact that they knew about Maj Busch's crew being shot down off of Vladivostock. The Inter-European Language Student from Peking University told me this. They also knew that there were life rafts there—they asked me if I know how many were picked up and I said "no".  

Francis A. Strieby, 1st Lt., USAF  
A0 1 912 123  
(F) Personal interview in Casualty Br.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: Finding of Death, SR&D Case #418 (13 Jun 52)

FACTS

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," reconsideration has been given to the facts and circumstances relating to the disappearance of the Air Force personnel listed below, who were initially reported missing on 13 June 1952.

- Major Samuel N. Busch  
  - Captain James A. Soulely  
  - Captain Samuel D. Service  
  - First Lieutenant Robert J. McDonnell  
  - Master Sergeant William R. Homer  
  - Master Sergeant David L. Moore  
  - Staff Sergeant William A. Blizzard  
  - Staff Sergeant Miguel W. Monserrat  
  - Staff Sergeant Leon F. Bonura  
  - Staff Sergeant Roscoe G. Becker  
  - Staff Sergeant Eddie R. Berg  
  - Airman First Class Danny H. Millsbury

2. Following a full review of this case pursuant to Section 5 of the Act, the subject personnel were continued in a missing status at the expiration of the initial 12 months' period of absence.

3. An examination of available reports and records pertaining to the status of the subject personnel discloses that they have not been repatriated or otherwise returned to military control and that the available information is insufficient to conclusively establish their ultimate fate.

4. a. Circumstances. The personnel listed were the crew of a B-29 which departed Yokota Air Base, Honshu, Japan, at 1007, 13 June 1952, on a classified reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft was followed by radar over the course to be flown until 1320, at which time the radar contact was lost at coordinates 46 degrees 5 minutes North, 140 degrees 40 minutes East, approximately 100 miles north of Hokkaido at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The aircraft failed to return to Yokota Air Base and although several attempts were made to establish radio contact, all were unavailing. The missing aircraft was known to have 3 six-man and 11 one-man life rafts aboard and sufficient food and medical supplies to care for all 12 men for three
days. On 14 June 1952, during the search, an empty six-man life raft was sighted, right side up, at a point about 100 miles off the Russian coast, but search planes were unable to salvage the raft due to prevailing conditions. An unconfirmed report indicated that a second six-man life raft was seen four miles south of the first raft but this sighting could not be verified. Although the search was continued through 17 June 1952, no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors.

b. A message was received from the Commander, Far East Air Forces, indicating that an official report from Radio Moscow on 16 June 1952 stated that one officer survived was picked up by a Russian vessel about two days before. The name of the survivor was not given and efforts to confirm this report were unsuccessful. Later FEAF reported that the cited broadcast did not pertain to personnel from the B-29, basing their premises on the fact that subsequent broadcasts concerned biological warfare propaganda and mentioned the names of Air Force personnel reported missing in action on 14 January 1952. Several repatriates from Operation 'Big Switch' indicated that the Chinese had asked them questions concerning this crew. However, their captors never volunteered any information as to whether or not there actually were survivors or what had happened to the aircraft.

c. A recent message from the Commander, Far East Air Forces, dated 7 October 1955, states that they have received no additional information concerning the members of this crew since they were continued in a missing status in June 1953.

5. The circumstances surrounding the missing status of the members of this crew appear unfavorable for survival but are insufficient to conclusively establish their ultimate fate. The twelve persons listed above were continued in a missing status in view of the fact that experience had shown the USSR had previously withheld or distorted information concerning the whereabouts or fate of United Nations personnel who had disappeared in territory controlled by the Communist countries. However, in view of the fact that there has never been any indication as to what emergency actually befell the B-29, or that any of the crew were able to abandon the aircraft and were picked up by foreign personnel, the likelihood that any of these twelve persons is still alive may no longer reasonably be considered. This conclusion is further substantiated by the lapse of over three years since they became missing, with no information forthcoming which would support a continued presumption of their survival. It is reasonable to assume that, had they survived, some word would have been received from or about them during this period. Therefore, under the provisions of Public Law 490, a presumptive finding of death is warranted.
Memo for DCSP, subj: Finding of Death, SF&D Case #418 (13 Jun 52)

RECOMMENDATION

6. It is recommended that, pursuant to the authority contained in Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, official casualty reports be issued stating that the missing status of the Air Force personnel listed in paragraph 1 has been terminated by a presumptive finding of death. Further, the casualty reports include a statement that the presumptive finding was made following a subsequent review of all available information and, as provided by and for the purposes of the cited law, the date of presumed death has been established as 15 November 1955. Death is held to have occurred while in pay and duty status, in flying pay status, in line of duty and not as the result of misconduct.

Attachment
List of Source Material

R.J. REEVES
Maj. General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

14 NOV 1955

Under the authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

E. ODONNELL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
FACTS

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," a full review has been made of the facts and circumstances set forth herein to determine whether the missing status of the following personnel may reasonably be continued after a year's absence, or terminated by a presumptive finding of death:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>AO</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Samuel H. Busch</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>733 611</td>
<td>A violate Cmdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant James A. Sculley</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>693 414</td>
<td>Plt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant Samuel D. Service</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>752 500</td>
<td>Radar Op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant Robert J. McDonnell</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>2 222 234</td>
<td>Navigator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant William R. Homer</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>7 025 704</td>
<td>Plt Eng</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant David L. Moore</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>15 229 915</td>
<td>Maint Chf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant William A. Blizard</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>19 244 175</td>
<td>Radio Op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant Miguel W. Monserrat</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>13 164 054</td>
<td>C/Fire Con Gar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant Eddie R. Berg</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>17 231 746</td>
<td>Tail Gunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant Leon F. Bonura</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>10 359 162</td>
<td>Gunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant Roscoe G. Becker</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>19 391 813</td>
<td>Gunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airman First Class Danny H. Pillsbury</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>18 245 934</td>
<td>Gunner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. a. Circumstances: The personnel listed comprised the crew of a B-29 which departed Yokota Air Base, Honshu, Japan, at 1007 hours, 13 June 1952, on a single plane reconnaissance mission of shipping activity over the Sea of Japan. The intended route was from Yokota to Sado Shimo and then over water as far as coordinates 40 degrees 30 minutes North latitude and 130 degrees 20 minutes East longitude, approximately 60 miles from the Russian coast. Upon completion of mission aircraft was to return to Yokota Air Base, estimated time of return being 1907 hours. Last radio contact with the B-29 was a routine coast-out transmission at 1027 hours. The aircraft was tracked by radar until 1320 hours, at which time it left the radar zone over the Sea of Japan, approximately 100 miles northwest of Hokkaido at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The plane failed to arrive at Yokota on schedule and at 1920 hours several attempts were made to establish radio contact with the missing aircraft. These efforts were unsuccessful and the crew members were reported missing in flight 13 June 1952. The missing aircraft was known to be carrying 3 six-man life rafts and 11 one-man life rafts, and to be equipped with enough food and medical supplies to care for the entire crew for three days.
b. Search Efforts: Air Rescue operations were initiated at 0530 hours, 13 June 1952, and the first search plane departed Yokota at 0617 hours, 14 June 1952. A total of 10 aircraft participated in an intensive search of the proposed route and adjacent areas. At 1445 hours, 14 June, one of the search planes sighted and photographed an empty six-man life raft, which was right side up, about 500 miles off the southern tip of Hokkaido, Japan, at a point approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast (coordinates 41 degrees 39 minutes north latitude, 133 degrees 55 minutes east longitude). Search planes remained in the area until darkness but were unable to salvage the raft due to prevailing conditions. An unconfirmed report indicated that a second six-man life raft was seen four miles south of the first raft but this sighting could not be verified. Search was resumed on the 15th but results were negative and there was no further trace of either life raft. Although search was continued through 17 June, no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors.

c. Weather Conditions: Unlimited ceiling and visibility of 30 miles were reported over the intended route of the B-29, with wind blowing southwest at 10 to 15 knots. Temperature of water was 45 degrees Fahrenheit, with waves of 3 to 5 feet and current flowing north to south. Estimated length of survival in water under these conditions is less than three hours.

d. Subsequent Information: A message from the Far East Air Forces indicated that an unofficial report from Radio Moscow on 16 June 1952 stated that one officer survivor was picked up by a Russian vessel about two days before. The name of the survivor was not given and efforts to confirm this report through State Department channels were unsuccessful. On 16 October 1952, PEAF reported that the cited broadcast did not pertain to personnel aboard the missing B-29, basing their premise on the fact that subsequent broadcasts from Radio Moscow concerned biological warfare propaganda and mentioned the names of Air Force personnel reported missing in action on 14 January 1952. A recent report from the Commander of the Far East Air Forces reveals that no new information has been received concerning the whereabouts or fate of the personnel missing in flight aboard the B-29.

DISCUSSION

3. Information of record reveals that the B-29 disappeared while engaged in a noncombat mission over Russian controlled waters. Whether the plane was lost because of a malfunction or through a hostile act of a foreign power is a matter of conjecture. However, in either event, official reports disclose that the aircraft was flying over waters near foreign territory, where rescue of any survivor of the accident could have been accomplished by foreign personnel. While evidence does not conclusively establish that members of the crew successfully escaped from the B-29,
sighting of one and possibly two empty six-man life rafts indicates a likelihood that some of those aboard survived and, through some unknown means, were removed from the area before arrival of our search planes on the day following the accident. This likelihood, although not confirmed by official reports, is strengthened by the release of information through Radio Moscow soon after the accident occurred, implying that the Russian Government may have some knowledge of the accident. Past experience has demonstrated that the USSR has deliberately withheld or distorted information concerning the whereabouts or fate of UN personnel who have disappeared in territory controlled by the Communist countries. Therefore, until positive proof becomes available that members of the crew were not detained, or other events occur which disclose their non-survival, conclusive evidence of their fate cannot be established and any change in their status on this date may be premature and beyond the safe calculated risk of error.

RECOMMENDATION

4. Pursuant to the authority contained in Section 5, Public Law 490, 77th Congress, 7 March 1942, as amended, and following the mandatory review of all available information on this date, it is recommended that official casualty reports be issued stating that the personnel listed in Paragraph 1 will be continued in a missing status following the expiration of 12 months' absence, effective 1 June 1953.

1 Attachment
List of Source Material

JOHN H. MCCORMICK
Major General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

Under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

E. E. WEIZEL
Major General, USAF
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff
Personnel

For and in the name of

ERIK J. O'DONNELL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT

RB-47 Loss
1 July 1960

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HQ AFMPC/DPMC
RANDOLPH AFB TX 78150
FACTS:

1. Personnel Involved:

   a. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Persons Act," consideration has been given to the facts and circumstances set forth herein in determining the status of the following listed Air Force personnel of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, missing 1 July 1960:

      Major Eugene E. Posa       AO 203613
      Captain Oscar L. Goforth    AO 3053269
      Captain Dean B. Phillips    AO 3064733

   b. Of the three additional personnel of this RB-47 aircraft, Major Willard G. Palm, AO 2037476, died as the result of the incident and his remains were recovered and returned by the Russian authorities on 25 July 1960. Captains John R. McKone, AO 2210173, and Freeman B. Olmstead, 54818A, survived the incident, were held prisoners by the Soviets and were returned to the United States authorities in January 1961. Therefore, the status of these three officers is not herein considered.

2. Circumstances of Missing: On 1 July 1960 the above personnel comprised the crew of a RB-47 aircraft which participated in a navigational training mission over the North and Barents Sea. While over international waters of the Barents Sea off the coast of the USSR, the aircraft was shot down by a Soviet aircraft at 1953 hours. The remains of Major Willard G. Palm, AO 2037476, tangled in his parachute shrouds, were recovered from the water by the Russians three days later on 4 July 1960. Those remains were returned to the United States authorities on 25 July 1960. Report of autopsy indicates that his death in all likelihood was caused by drowning. Two other crew members, Captains John R. McKone, AO 2210173, and Freeman B. Olmstead, 54818A, survived the incident and were rescued by a Soviet fishing trawler. They were held prisoners and returned to the United States authorities in January 1961.

3. Information from the Survivors: The RB-47 was hit by gunfire from a Soviet fighter aircraft and almost momentarily assumed a left wing down, flat spin to the left. The bailout order was given and the crew evacuated the RB-47 at approximately 23,000 feet. The lapse of time between first being fired upon and bailout was approximately one minute and there was no time to transmit a "Mayday" report. While descending in their parachutes,
the survivors observed what appeared to be their aircraft crash into the water and burn with intense flames of short duration. On the way down, the survivors accounted for three other crew members and possibly the fourth and last crew member. Two unidentified crew members were observed descending in their deployed parachutes, but no survival kits were seen to be attached. Also, one unidentified person was observed to fall past without his chute being deployed. Captain Olmstead thinks he also saw an unidentified figure falling to the water dressed in a black flight suit and a black chute. The two survivors landed in the water about a quarter of a mile apart and immediately got into their dinghies. The only time they were able to see each other was when they both crested the five to six-foot waves at the same time. Water currents and surface winds prevented the survivors from getting together. They did not see anyone else in the water which they reported as being a temperature of 33 degrees (not stated but assumed to be Fahrenheit). The only other thing which they saw subsequent to bailout and while adrift in the water, was a PBY type aircraft which they tried to signal with no noticeable results. Exposure suits were not available to the crew members of the RB-47. After approximately six hours adrift, the survivors were rescued by a Soviet fishing trawler which apparently knew their location as it came directly upon them. Together they were taken to the vessel's boiler room and given hot liquids. Subsequently they were separated and placed in individual cabins. The trawler remained in apparent search for approximately six hours and, to the knowledge of the survivors, no other crew members were found. They were on the trawler approximately 12 hours - six hours of which was used in the area search and six hours used in traveling in a straight course away from the search area. They were then, while out of sight of land, transferred to a speed boat. After a journey of one and one-half hours they were landed ashore and taken six to eight miles by jeep to an airfield, where they began their aircraft flight to Moscow, USSR. When they arrived at Moscow they were separated and remained isolated until their release, except for two occasions when they were brought together and jointly interrogated. They were allowed to receive mail, however, they actually received only a portion of what was sent to them. During an interrogation of Captain McKone the Soviets showed him Captain (Major) Palm's identification card.

4. Sea Conditions: Reports from the United States Navy Hydrographic Office, Division of Oceanography reveal that the mean ocean surface temperatures in the area of crash for June and July are 35 and 40 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. The maximum water temperature for July is 43 degrees Fahrenheit. ANM 64-2 (July 1955) reveals that the maximum survival time of an uninjured person immersed in water of 40 to 50 degrees Fahrenheit without watertight clothing (exposure suit) is approximately six hours.

5. Soviet Position: The Soviet authorities deny having any knowledge of the three men herein under consideration.

DISCUSSION:

6. The recorded facts establish that the personnel and their aircraft came down within a relatively small area in the international waters of the Barents
The data is not clear as to whether all the crew members parachuted from the Mi-4. However, this is not of paramount importance in this determination of status, since to survive in any instance would require assistance within a short period of time. The available information substantiates beyond a reasonable doubt that the three subject officers did not survive the incident. This determination is supported by the following:

a. The survivors' statements reveal that it is unlikely that the other officers or were in a position to have used a survival kit or dinghy.

b. Any survivors would have been immersed in the cold water, exposed to its full effects, and would have succumbed in the six hour period prior to arrival of rescue facilities.

c. The presence of the search type aircraft over the area and the direct pickup of the two survivors by the fishing trawler, which conducted a six-hour area search, indicates the location of survivors had been pinpointed by the aircraft and rescue efforts were assigned to this one surface vessel.

d. Had other surface vessels been in the area, any survivors undoubtedly would have been brought together with Captains Mckone and Olmstead for airlift to Moscow.

e. Since there was no attempt to keep Captains Mckone and Olmstead separate during the trip to Moscow, it is unlikely that different action would have been taken for other survivors of this crew. Therefore, their survival would have been known to Captains Mckone and Olmstead.

f. It is noted that after Captains Mckone and Olmstead were isolated in prison they were twice brought together for interrogation. Thusly, it is logical to presume that, had there been other survivors of this crew, they too would have been present on these two occasions.

g. Since the USSR has exploited this incident, admitted holding two survivors and returned them to our control, there appears no logical reason to suspect they are withholding information of any other survivors.

h. Finally, the absence of any positive intelligence during the last two months which would suggest survival of any of the subject personnel tends to lend credence to the Communist's stand that they have no knowledge of these unaccounted for three missing crew members. Based upon the information set forth herein it can only be logically concluded that the officers listed in paragraph 1a, above, died 1 July 1960 as the result of an aircraft accident in the international waters of the Barents Sea off the coast of the USSR.

RECOMMENDATION:

7. Pursuant to the authority contained in the Missing Persons Act, Title 50 U. S. C. App. 1009, it is recommended that the foregoing information be accepted as an official report of death and that a report of casualty be
issued for each officer listed in paragraph 1a, stating that they died (Non-Battle) on 1 July 1960, as the result of an aircraft incident in the course of duty. Death occurred while in pay and duty status, and in flying duty status. Evidence of death will be considered to have been received on the date of approval of this action.

A. P. CLARK
Maj. General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

Under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, the above recommendation is approved.

TRUMAN H. LANDON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Proposed Termination of Missing Status - Certain Crew Members of RB-47 Shot Down 1 July 1960 (Possible Presidential Interest)

1. Last January, President Kennedy showed a personal interest in the crew of the RB-47 aircraft, when its two surviving crew members were returned from Russia after having been shot down in the Barents Sea on 1 July 1960. Six Air Force personnel comprised the crew of this RB-47. Two crew members, Captains McKone and Olmstead, survived the incident and were held captive and returned by the Soviets in January 1961. The remains of one crew member, Major Willard G. Palm, were recovered from the Barents Sea by the Soviets and returned to the United States authorities in the latter part of July 1960. The remaining three crew members, Major Eugene E. Pose, Captain Oscar L. Goforth, and Captain Dean B. Phillips, continue to be recorded as missing.

2. Information from the survivors, and other pertinent factors involved, led to a logical conclusion that these three officers died as the result of this incident. A detailed brief of information and logical reasoning to establish this conclusion is attached to the proposed letter to the Secretary of the Air Force. Based upon authority granted to DCS/P to make determination of status by SAFS Order 248.1, 23 July 1953, the status of these persons should be changed from missing to dead at this time.

3. In view of the President's prior interest in this crew, the Secretary of the Air Force should be advised prior to the completion of this contemplated action so that he may inform the President.

4. This action has been discussed with and approved by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. The "brief" has the concurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

RECOMMENDATION

5. That the attached letter to the Secretary of the Air Force be signed.

John H. Cluck
REPLY TO ATTN OF: AFCCS

SUBJECT: Proposed Termination of Missing Status - Certain Crew Members RB-47 Shot Down 1 July 1960 (Possible Presidential Interest)

TO: SAFS

1. Last January, President Kennedy showed personal interest in the crew of the RB-47 aircraft, when its two surviving members were returned from Russia. Headquarters USAF proposes to terminate the status of the three unaccounted for personnel of the RB-47 by a determination of death, pursuant to the "Missing Persons Act." This action is brought to your attention as it may be desirable that you advise the President prior to its completion. Action is being withheld pending your reply.

2. A detailed brief is attached concluding that these crew members died as the result of the aircraft incident in the Barents Sea. In addition to administering the intent of the Missing Persons Act properly, it is in the best interests of the Government and the next of kin involved, that the proposed action be taken at this time for the following reasons:

   a. Prolonged continuation of a missing status, without a logical reason indicating survival, suggests to the next of kin that information is being withheld. This creates increased anxieties and false hopes.

   b. To put off this action delays the next of kin's transition to normalcy - personal affairs remain unsettled, insurance cannot be paid, permanent homes cannot be established, and Veterans Administration and Social Security benefit payments cannot be started.

   c. The suspense caused by a lengthy continuation of the missing status is extremely painful to the next of kin of the missing personnel. Since there is no evidence that these officers survived the incident, it is in the best interest of their next of kin to terminate the missing status as soon as possible. A positive official determination of death by the Government will give assurance to the next of kin that the deceased are not being subjected to Soviet imprisonment.

1 Atch
Brief of Facts and
Circumstances
Memo for Record

22 May 1961

1. Additional reasons for taking the action to terminate the missing status is as follows:

a. To retain these three officers in a missing status would only serve to raise false hopes in the minds of the next of kin who are always eager to grasp at any shred of information or the slightest situation which might indicate their loved one survived.

b. An appropriate period of time has now lapsed since the two crew members were released by the Soviet authorities to adequately evaluate their information and all other aspects of the case.

c. It is believed that the next of kin of these unaccounted for persons will at this time be most susceptible to the logical conclusion and be most able to begin to make readjustments to their lives.

2. Experience in casualty reporting shows that, if personnel are continued in the missing status for a prolonged time, without the existence of concrete evidence of survival, the next of kin interpret the status quo to mean that the service is withholding information which proves their loved one is alive. This imposes upon them greater and needless anxieties and will later cause them to doubt the logic of a termination of the missing status which, under the circumstances of this case, is inevitable.

[Signature]

W. A. KERNELAND
Major, USAF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


As the attached file indicates, it is the intention of the Air Force to declare officially dead the remaining crew members of the RB-47 shot down on July 1, 1960. This action is in line with normal procedure and is necessary before action can be taken toward settling the personal affairs of their survivors including such items as social security benefits, insurance benefits and veterans' benefits for the men's families. However, in view of the fact that the President has just returned from discussions with Mr. Khrushchev, there is a possibility his office would have an interest in the timing of the announcement and any publicity thereeto.

It is accordingly requested that clearance be obtained from the White House to permit the Air Force to take the action contemplated and to approve the proposed press release, attached hereto. It is planned if approval is obtained that Colonel Leo Geary, Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, who has spent a considerable portion of his time keeping the men's families advised of pertinent developments will thoroughly brief the individuals concerned prior to the action being officially announced. We believe this procedure will ease any shock from the announcement of the Air Force decision.

Attaches. 2
Proposed press release (Tab A)
Brief of Facts and Circumstances (Tab B)

JOSEPH V. CHARYK
Under Secretary of the Air Force

SecDef cy
SAP file
Off of sign
Mr Goode(SAPD)
SAFO
ATFMC (copy)
AFCCB
Facts And Circumstances:

1. Personnel Involved:

   a. Pursuant to the provisions of the "Missing Personnel Act," i.e., a "missing status" has been given to the names and circumstances for the personnel of the 526th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, missing 1 July 1960.

   Major Eugene D. Pena  
   Captain Douglas D. Goff  
   Captains Hoyt P. Phillips

   b. All three additional personnel of this RB-47 aircraft, Major Millard O. Paine, 40-204716, died as the result of the incident and his remains were recovered and returned by the Soviet authorities on 23 July 1960. Captains John R. McNally, 40-221073, and Freeman P. Clifton, 54-8118, survived the incident, were held prisoners by the Soviets and were returned to the United States authorities in January 1961.

2. Circumstances of Missing:

   On 1 July 1960 the above personnel launched the crew of a RB-47 aircraft which participated in a navigational training mission over the North Sea, east of the United States. While over international waters, their aircraft was shot down by a Soviet aircraft, and 1000 miles from the coast of the USSR. The remains of Major Millard O. Paine, 40-204716, tangled with his parachute gear, were recovered from the water by the Russians three days later, and 23 July 1960. These remains were returned to the United States authorities on 23 July 1960. Report of autopsy indicates that his death in all likelihood was caused by drowning. No other survivors.

   a. Captain John R. McNally, 40-221073, and Captain Freeman P. Clifton, 54-8118, survived the incident and were rescued by a Soviet rescue plane. They were held prisoners and returned to the United States authorities in January 1961.

3. Information from the Survivors:

   The RB-47 was hit by gunfire from a Soviet fighter aircraft and almost instantly assumed a left wing down, flat spin to the left. The bailout chutes were given and the crew escaped the RB-47 at approximately 18,000 feet. The lapse of time between first being fired upon and bailout was approximately one minute and there was no time to transmit a "Mayday" report. While descending in their parachutes,
the survivors observed next appeared to be their aircraft crash into the water and burn with intense flashes of short duration. In the very near
the survivors accounted for three other crew members and possibly the
fourth and last crew member. Two unidentified crew members were observed
decending in their deployed parachutes, but no survival kit was seen to be attached. Also, one unidentified person was observed to fall into
without his chute being deployed. Captain Wirtz thinks he also saw an unidentified figure, falling to the water, clothed in a black flight suit
with a black chute. The two survivors landed in the water about a quar-
ter of a mile apart and immediately got into their dinghies. The only
time they were able to see each other was when they both crisscrossed the creek to six-foot waves at the same time. Strong winds and surface wind
prevented the survivors from getting together. They did not see exposed on
in the water which they reported as being a temperature of 33 degrees (as
stated but assumed to be Fahrenheit). The only other thing which occurred
subsequent to bailout and while adrift in the water was a F11 fisherman
which they tried to signal with no noticeable result. Exposure suits were
not available to the crew members of the 9203. After approximately six
hours adrift, the survivors were rescued by a Soviet fishing trawler which
apparently knew their location as it came directly upon them. Together
they were taken to the vessel's boatroom and given hot liquids succes-
sively. They were separated and placed in individual cabins. The trawler
remained inoppelant search for approximately six hours and, to the knowledge
of the survivors, no other crew members were found. They were on the trawler
approximately 12 hours (six hours of which was used in the area search and
six hours used in traveling to a straight course away from the search area).
They were then, while out of sight of land, transferred to a special boat. After
a journey of one and one-half hours they were landed ashore and taken
for eight miles by jeep to an airfield, where they began their slow back
flight to Moscow, USSR. When they arrived at Moscow they were separated
and remained isolated until their release, except for two occasions when they
were brought together and jointly interrogated. They were allowed to receive
mail, however, they actually received only a portion of what was sent to them.
During an interrogation of Captain Wirtz, the Soviets showed him Piatnitsky
(Major), Soviet identification card.

4. Sea Conditions: Report from the United States Navy Hydrographic Office,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, reveals that the mean ocean surface temperatures in
the area of crash for June and July 1959 were 69 and 68 degrees Fahrenheit, re-
spectively. The maximum water temperature for July 1959 was 78 degrees Fahrenheit.
AAD 04-1 (1 July 1959) reveals that the maximum survival time of an unaided
person, immersed in water at 60 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit without underwater
clothing (survival suit) is approximately six hours.

5. Soviet Position: The Soviet authorities deny having any knowledge of the
three men herein under consideration.

Discussino

6. The recorded facts establish that the personnel and their aircraft came
down within a relatively small area in the international waters of the Pacific

The data is not clear as to whether all the crew members parachuted from the RB-47. However, this is not of paramount importance in this determination of status, since to survive in any instance would require assistance within a short period of time. The available information substantiates beyond a reasonable doubt that the three subject officers did not survive the incident. This determination is supported by the following:

a. The survivors' statements reveal that it is unlikely that the others had or were in a position to have used a survival kit or dinghy.

b. Any survivors would have been immersed in the cold water, exposed to its full effects, and would have succumbed in the six-hour period prior to arrival of rescue facilities.

c. The presence of the search and aircrews over the area and the direct pickup of the two survivors by the fishing trawler, which conducted a six-hour area search, indicates the location of survivors had been pinpointed by the aircraft and rescue efforts were assigned to this one surface vessel.

d. Had other surface vessels been in the area, any survivors inadvertently would have been brought together with Captains Makino and Obladen for airlift to Moscow.

e. Since there was no attempt to keep Captains Makino and Obladen separate during the trip to Moscow, it is unlikely that different action would have been taken for other survivors of this crew. Therefore, their survival would have been known to Captains Makino and Obladen.

f. It is noted that after Captains Makino and Obladen were isolated in prison they were twice brought together for interrogation. Finally, it is logical to presume that, had there been other survivors of this crew, they too would have been present on these two occasions.

g. Since the USSR has exploited this incident, admitted holding two survivors and returned them to our control, there appears no logical reason to suspect they are withholding information of any other survivors.

h. Finally, the absence of any positive intelligence during the last ten months which would suggest survival of any of the subject personnel tends to lend credence to the Commint's stand that they have no knowledge of these unaccounted for three missing crew members. Based upon the information set forth herein it can only be logically concluded that the officers listed in paragraph 1, above, died 1 July 1960 as the result of an aircraft accident in the international waters of the Barents Sea off the coast of the USSR.

PROPOSAL

EXEC ZEUA DIA

7. The Department of the Navy Personnel, Headquarters, USM, proposes to terminate the missing status of Major Peck and Captains Reith and Youle, by a determination, pursuant to Section 9 of the Missing Person Act (Title 10, U. S. C.) that they died 1 July 1960 as the result of the aircraft accident in the Barents Sea.
Attention is directed to paragraph 52 (b) AFI 30-4, regarding the three missing north 51-17 aircraft missing 1 July 1950. No prior report has been received this office. This investigation will include all information available regarding the incident which is pertinent to a determination of status. There will be a statement from each of the two returned crew members which includes how, when and where the incident occurred, a summary of their escape, survival and capture, and weather and water conditions at the time; when and under what conditions the missing crew members were last seen; what their captors had to say regarding the status of the AMERICAN others and any other information deemed pertinent upon which to base a determination of status.

Further request that this report be expedited and submitted to this office soonest. Action taken to remind staff of need for an investigation and to get info early so that there will be time to obtain additional info if report is incomplete.

AFMD-5-1

Maj Luter
Following are notes supplied by Captain John R. McKone and Captain Freeman B. Olmstead at a news conference at Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas, today:

Our RB-47 aircraft took off from RAF Station Brize Norton, England, at 11:00 a.m. local time on July 1, 1960, to fly a mission with a pre-planned flight route which would take us north and east from the United Kingdom and then over water never to come closer than 50 miles from the Russian land mass.

About five hours after departure from Brize Norton while our plane was flying on an overwater track at an altitude of about 30,000 feet in the Barents Sea parallel to the Soviet shore line, a Soviet fighter type aircraft passed a few thousand feet above and behind our plane and turned toward the RB-47 from the seaward side. The Soviet airplane then disappeared from our view.

Shortly thereafter we took a radar fix and determined that we were on our planned flight track. Our navigational equipment functioned perfectly during the flight. Just prior to starting our planned turn to the north we observed a Soviet MIG type fighter just off our right wing. As we started MORE
our turn to tl. north the fighter crossed to tl. near and opened fire. We returned the fire. We observed gun flashes from the fighter and saw hits on numbers 2 and 3 engines of our left wing. There was immediate loss of control of the aircraft and numbers 2 and 3 engines began to burn.

Major Palm alerted the crew for possible bail out; when control of the plane could not be regained, the bail out order was given. Although there were six crew members aboard the plane, Captain Olmstead saw only three other parachutes and Captain McKone saw only two. During our descent we also saw an intense fire of short duration on the water.

We landed in the water approximately 1/4 mile apart and our dinghies inflated automatically. The weather was hazy and the sea was extremely cold and rough with waves cresting six to eight feet. As they crested, we spotted each other and attempted to paddle toward each other. However, we did not succeed because of the rough water. We did not see any of the other crew members.

About six hours later the Soviet fishing trawler picked us up. No one aboard the trawler spoke English. We were wrapped in blankets to relieve the cold and were given soup. We were then given dry fatigue type clothing although all of our personal effects were taken away from us. Captain McKone retained his watch for several hours. We were placed in separate compartments aboard the trawler.

We remained in the area for some time while the trawler was apparently searching for additional survivors. At that time the trawler took a steady course apparently heading for land which we reached some MORE
Upon reaching the coast we were placed aboard a small boat and went up a river to a point a few miles inland. We were then transferred to a surface vehicle and driven a few more miles to a small airfield. We were put aboard a Russian aircraft similar to a DC-3 and flown to another airfield a short distance away. After a brief interrogation during which we gave only our names, ranks and serial numbers, we boarded another Russian DC-3 type aircraft and were flown directly to Moscow.

Upon arriving in Moscow we were taken to a prison and placed immediately in solitary confinement. During the first two to three weeks we were interrogated separately several times daily and there appeared to be a concentrated effort by the Soviet interrogators to link our flight to the U-2 incident of May 1960.

Our diet during the first few months in prison consisted of small but regular quantities of rice, macaroni products and boiled meat. While we were not subjected to physical punishment, living and sleeping conditions were poor and we were continually subjected to persistent questioning.

The interrogators constantly led us to believe that we would be tried by a Soviet court and continued to stress that they considered our mission to be of the same nature as the U-2 flight. They pointed out that we were being held for a serious crime possibly punishable by death. After approximately 16 days in a prison which we could not identify, we were transferred to Lubyanka in Moscow and remained in solitary confinement.
Our cells were similar -- each was about 15 by 8 feet with a solid wooden door which was kept locked. These cells each contained a table, chair and a steel bed. There was a great amount of artificial light in each cell which was left on twenty-four hours a day. There was a translucent window at about shoulder height.

The interrogations continued on a daily basis for the first few weeks in the Lubyanka prison; gradually they declined to an average of twice weekly for each of us. Occasionally, periods of ten days elapsed between interrogations.

We saw each other for the first time on September 14th at which time we were jointly interrogated by Soviet officials for about 30 minutes. During imprisonment each of us found ways to pass the time and keep our minds occupied. I, Captain Olmstead, did math problems in my head and made two sets of playing cards out of the foil from cigarette packages, one of which I gave to Captain McKone when we were allowed to meet on the day before Christmas. We both became very adept at the game of solitaire.

We were allowed to read some English language books, mostly fiction by Dickens, Thackery and others. We saw two issues of one English language newspaper published in Russia, but neither issue contained any reference to our imprisonment or the RB-47 incident. This was two weeks before our release.

We were kept completely ignorant of world affairs for the greatest part of our stay in prison. One of the interrogators said something about Senator Kennedy being elected to the presidency but this was about 3 weeks after
the election. About midway during our imprisonment, the quantity of
food which we received increased; however, each of us lost more than
40 pounds during the early period of our stay in prison.

Each of us were permitted to go out doors in a solitary compound
every day for a brief period to get fresh air and exercise but no one
directed that we follow a physical conditioning program. We both did
exercises we had learned either in school or in the Air Force. I,
Captain Olmstead suffered a back injury sometime during the evacuation
from the plane. During the first several weeks I was bedridden because
of the injury and later began doing therapeutic exercises. I received
medical attention for the injury from the prison doctor. I, Captain
McKone suffered a slight stomach problem. Neither of us became
seriously ill in prison. Our cells were dry but uncomfortably cold.
Captain Olmstead asked for warmer clothes and received them, but even
then it was cold.

We had been in prison seven weeks before either of us received a
letter. I, Captain Olmstead was told that our outgoing mail would be
censored but that our incoming mail would not be. Obviously, however
there had been censorship of the letters received. We were allowed to
have writing materials only to answer the letters that were received.
Sometimes letters were delivered several at a time, but we are sure we
did not get all of them. The quickest mail delivery we can recall was
19 days from date of postmark.
We were escorted at all times by guards who remained completely indifferent. We asked Soviet officials many times about the others of our crew and once they showed Captain McKone Major Palm's identity card but did not tell him what had happened to him. We both asked for a Bible but only I, Captain Olmstead, received one after some time. We were not allowed to see members of the clergy.

Neither of us received all the Christmas packages which were sent by our families. I, Captain McKone, received only two pair of socks, one pair of which I gave to Captain Olmstead during the Christmas Eve meeting. Captain Olmstead received all his clothing presents but did not receive the cigarettes, candies nor the Bible which his family had sent. Both of us were given Russian cigarettes by prison officials during our captivity. Take our word for it, they will never replace American cigarettes.

I, Captain Olmstead, made a small Christmas tree in my cell out of paper from cigarette packs and braided together the pull strings from the packs to make ornaments.

We were taken during the last two weeks of our imprisonment to see two Russian films, which we were told were being shown in the United States. One was titled "The Cranes are Flying" the other was called "Ballad of a Soldier." In the room where we were shown the movies we were not allowed to talk to each other and an interpreter translated the dialogue into English for us.

During the interrogations, each of us was asked specifically about our crew duties, our airplane and all other airplanes of the Strategic Air
Command. The Russians knew we were assigned to the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas, and that we had started our mission from Brize Norton. On several occasions they handed us statements they had prepared to the effect that we had been ordered to cross the Soviet border. They wanted us to sign these but we refused to sign any such statements.

We did not learn that we were to be released until the night before it actually happened. The next day, January 25th, we were driven by Russian officials to the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and turned over to Mr. Thompson the American Ambassador. This was the first time we had seen any other Americans since we bailed out. We asked the Russians again before we left the prison about the other crew members but we did not receive any information. We spent about two hours in the Embassy and then were driven to the Moscow airport where we boarded a commercial airliner for a flight to Amsterdam. After our take-off was delayed 12 hours due to tire trouble the flight from Moscow to Amsterdam then took about six hours. At Amsterdam we were picked up by a USAF C-121 and headed for the United States. The plane stopped to refuel at Prestwick, Scotland but we slept through this stop. We flew to Goose Air Base in Labrador and remained overnight due to bad weather conditions in Washington. We got a chance to clean up, sleep and get haircuts. We also got new uniforms from the base exchange. We were told our wives would be waiting for us in Washington and we were able to talk to them on the
telephone that evening from Labrador. We were also told that President Kennedy would meet our airplane at Andrews Air Force Base.

The next morning, January 27th, we flew to Washington and were reunited with our wives. We are sure you all know what happened in Washington.

After returning to Forbes we were reunited with our children and parents. We visited the wives and children of the other members of our crew. We saw some of them in Topeka and went to California to see others. These visits were strictly personal in nature.

On February 8, we went to Puerto Rico for 2 1/2 weeks leave. The people at Ramey AFB put us up in guest houses and did everything possible to make our vacation most enjoyable. We went fishing, both deep sea and fresh water and got lots of sunshine and rest.

We returned to Forbes last weekend. Both of us are looking forward to a return to normal duty wherever we may be assigned. We both like flying and are ready to accept any job the Air Force gives us.

As a final note, we would like to express our appreciation to thousands of our fellow Americans who wrote letters and prayed for us while we were in prison. We learned at the American Embassy in Moscow that many pouches of mail, letters, cards and a Christmas message from General White, Air Force Chief of Staff, had been received at the Embassy. They had been forwarded to the prison for us but they were never delivered to us save for a small portion of them which we received upon our release.
It won't be possible to thank everyone individually, but we want everyone to know how much your concern meant to us and our families.
Memo for Record

30 January 1961

1. Colonel Baer, Executive to Secretary Zuckert, contacted this office through Colonel Ireland and Lt Col Dienes. He desired we furnish him what was necessary from the stand point of personnel actions to change the status of Goforth, Phillips and Fosa from missing to dead. I advised him that we required a statement or a summary of the circumstances from Captains McKone and Olmstead to fill in the gaps in information we now have. Colonel Baer seemed satisfied and requested we give him a report of what we had done within two days.

2. Colonel Baer called back later and said he wanted us to be sure that we understood the Secretary was not of the opinion that the status should be changed; but merely to insure that any administrative work that must take place was promptly initiated.

3. Received a telephone call from Colonel Patteson, Executive to General Walsh, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, concerning our wire of 27 January to Forbes and SAC requesting a report of the circumstances of the RB-47 incident. Colonel Patteson advised that General Broadhurst, Deputy Chief of Staff, SAC, had called General Walsh and advised him that they were aware of our requirements for information and why we needed it and stated that it would be submitted but not as soon as we asked for it in our wire. General Broadhurst advised the two Captains are being isolated from outside contact and will remain so for approximately one week before they are debriefed. As soon thereafter as the information is received it will be forwarded to this headquarters.

4. I called Lt Col Mullins, SAFOI, concerning the press release made by Lt Col Robert Eby and inquired as to the reasons for what might be a premature release. Colonel Mullins furnished this office a copy of the release, but stated his office declined to take any action and suggested that I use personnel channels. I furnished General Clark a copy of the press release without comment.

5. Apparent secrecy attached to McKone and Olmstead has been the direct result of Mr. Salingers action.

6. Called Colonel Geary, AFCIE, who has been in personal contact with the wives of all of the crew. Colonel Geary stated he was proceeding to Forbes within a matter of minutes, that he was unable to furnish any information in sufficient time. (Col Geary has talked to these two officers for several hours while enroute from Amsterdam to this country).

W. A. Bjerkelund
Major, USAF
A Pentagon Air Force officer disclosed last night that Captains John McKone and Freeman Olmstead don't know what happened to the 3 members of the B-47 crew still listed only as missing.

McKone and Olmstead were relaxing today with their wives and children. They are under orders not to grant any interviews. Air Police guard their homes.

Lt Col Robt Eby, who accompanied the two flyers to Topeka, Forbes AFB Saturday, said he had talked to them and "they just don't know; the three men are still missing as far as we are concerned." Earl Olson, a Defense Department official, said last night that the flyers will be allowed private talks with wives of the missing men. There was no indication when that will be.
AFIP-A

RB-47 Crew Condolence Letters

AFIP (General Clark):

1. Attached are the letters prepared for President Kennedy on Saturday.

2. Colonel Dear, Executive to Secretary Zuckert, called and inquired as to what was necessary to change the status of three missing officers. Major Bjerkeland advised him statements from Captains McKone and Olmstead or a summary of the events prior to the time they were picked up would be desirable.

3. Apparently someone has given a "no talk" order on this subject, which would make it difficult to adequately explain to the widows, unless we can get this restriction lifted. Perhaps General Walsh could assist in this area.

1 Atch
ATTN

AFPDC

Request for Debriefing Information

TO: ANCIG

1. This request is forwarded in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3b(12) HOI 11-4 which is classified Confidential.

2. Captains McKone and Olmstead have been returned from imprisonment in the Soviet Union. They are scheduled for debriefing in the immediate future. We require all available information concerning the incident to establish possible survival of other members of their crew who are presently in a missing status. We need this information to determine whether the missing status should be continued.

3. Members of the crew still in a missing status are:

   Major Eugene E. Posa
   Captain Oscar L. Goforth
   Captain Dean E. Phillips

TRUMAN H. LANDON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Memo for Record 27 January 1961

1. On 1 July 1960 an RB-47 was shot down by Soviet aircraft in the Barents Sea. The Soviets picked up and interned Captain John R. McKone and Captain Freeman Olmstead, and recovered the remains of Major Willard G. Palm which they subsequently returned to American authority. The Soviets have maintained that they have no knowledge of the fate of the other three crew members, Major Eugene E. Posa, Captain Oscar L. Goforth and Captain Dean B. Phillips. The Casualty Branch of the Directorate of Military Personnel issued "missing reports" for the two interned personnel and for the other three whose fate was not definitely known.

2. Since the Soviets had exploited this incident and admitted holding two survivors there appeared to be no logical reason to suspect that they were withholding information of any other survivors, but since Captains McKone and Olmstead were being held "incommunicado" it was deemed advisable to maintain the "missing status" until Captains McKone and Olmstead could be questioned.

3. Now that Captains McKone and Olmstead have been released, they will be debriefed and it will be possible to ascertain whether they have any knowledge of the possible survival of the other three crew members. This information should be relayed as soon as possible to the Casualty Branch, Colonels Group, Directorate of Military Personnel because the Casualty Branch will have to initiate proper action as to status of the three, and make notification to the next of kin, preferably before release to news media.

W. A. BERGELEUND
Major, USAF
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 27, 1960

SUBJECT: RB-47 Case. Mr. Clinstead's intention to send a letter to Khrushchev in New York appealing for his son's release.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. and Mrs. Clinstead, Elmira, New York

Mr. Clinstead telephoned me at 3:00 p.m. today "to clear" a letter he desired to send to Khrushchev in New York appealing for the release of his son, Captain młodzieniec, one of the survivors of the RB-47 shot down by the Soviets on July 1, 1960. He read me the text of his proposed letter appealing for the release of his son on humanitarian grounds and asking Khrushchev to announce their release in his speech before the General Assembly on September 27. He asked whether we would have any objection to his sending such a letter.

I replied we had no objection and Mr. Clinstead said he would send us a copy for the Department's records.

Mr. Clinstead said that he and his daughter-in-law had been in touch with Col. Geary of the Air Force who invited them to come to Washington next Thursday, September 27. He asked if he would see me then. I said that as I had told him before, I would be glad to see him and Mrs. Clinstead any time though I had not known of this particular approach by Col. Geary. I said I would be in touch with Col. Geary and we would make arrangements for an appointment at the State Department while he was in Washington.

USUN, New York

[Redacted]
**MISSING PERSON(S) SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT**

**TO:** Director of Military Personnel

**THRU:** (Command channels)

**FROM:** BPPA

**ATTN:** Casualty Branch

Washington 25, D. C.

**DATE OF REPORT:** 20 July 1960

**TP:** 2AF

**SN:** SAC

**DEP:** Forbes AFB, Kansas

**1. MISSING**

**A. DATE:** 1 July 1960

**B. TIME:** 1400Z

**C. LOCATION:** Bristo Norton to Bristo Norton

**D. INTENDED ROUTE:**

- On record at Hq. SAC

**E. WEATHER CONDITIONS (If applicable):**

- Barents Sea Area

**2. AIRCRAFT (Check applicable box)**

- Last sighted or seen
- Last contacted by radio
- Seen to crash
- Information not available

**3. DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT (If missing in aircraft):**

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<th>Model</th>
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<th>Serial Numbers</th>
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<td>-25</td>
<td>G.E.</td>
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**4. PERSONNEL AND/OR CARGO (If missing in aircraft):**

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<th>Crew Position</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Middle Initial</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>PALM, Willard G.</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>TIMSLEY, Freeman R.</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
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<td>MCKINNE, John R.</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
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<td>Major</td>
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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
1. On record at USAF and USAF Headquarters.

2. Following extracted from Unolas APPM-5-1-4 68794, 12 July 1960:

"A news release from Moscow, 11 July 1960, stated that the Soviets shot down a RB-47 at 1803 hours local time 1 July 1960 in the Barents Sea. Further that 1st Lt Freeman B. Clinstead and 1st Lt John R. McKe one were in the hands of the Soviet authorities. That the remains of Captain William G. Palms had been recovered and that there was no trace of the remaining crewman, Captain Eugene E. Pose, Captain Oscar L. Goforth and 1st Lt Dean B. Phillips. The information contained in this release is unofficial and has not been confirmed. Efforts are being made through diplomatic sources to verify this information.

This Headquarters will be responsible for all notifications regarding RB-47. No change in status of missing personnel will be made without the prior concurrence of this headquarters."

---

Unverified information stated in Section 12, above.
AF Form 424, 20 Jul 60, Missing Persons Supplementary Report

1st Ind (BPPA) 28 JUL 1960

Hq 21 Air Div, Forbes AFB, Kans

TO: 2AF (DPSP), Barksdale AFB, La.

Attached are AF Forms 424, Missing Persons Supplementary Report, 20 July 1960, furnished per paragraph 324, AFM 30-4.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copy to:

YLIJAH W. SHACKLETT JR.
Captain, USAF
Deputy Director of
Administrative Services

3 AUG 1960

2d Ind (DPSP)

Hq 2AF, Barksdale AFB, La

TO: SAC (DPSP)

Forwarded for necessary action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOSEPH R. NILES
Lt. Col, USAF
Directorate of Personnel
I have been in contact with Major Bowen of your Casualty Branch, AFMPM-S-1-b, regarding a change of status of the three officers still missing in the RB-47 incident. The Secretary has an interest in this case, and I have informed Major Bowen that a determination of death should not be made until it is cleared with the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff.

T. B. WHITEHOUSE
Colonel, USAF
Executive to the
Vice Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major Bjerkelund
PMP-S-1

In line with our conversation yesterday, request you keep me advised of any more requests from the Vice Chief's office concerning the RB-47 incident. As we discussed yesterday, after you have taken your normal action, the correspondence must be flagged so that it is brought to the attention of Col Whitehouse, or at least so that General Landon will know of this request from Colonel Whitehouse.

ROBERT O. FRICKS
Colonel, USAF
Executive
Directorate of Military Personnel
EXPLANATION FOR FILED

3 August 1945

SUBJECT: Soviet Foreign Food Organization Of Commission For

and Missed by Lt. Mustang (44-477056)

1. Lt. Mustang has been overseas for a month, long before the war's end. He was called to active dutyrey in Japan.

2. The mother of Lt. Mustang's wife is an American woman who is currently living in Japan.

3. Received a letter from Lt. Mustang's mother in Japan. The letter contains a request for assistance from the United States. It was given by Lt. Mustang's mother.

4. Attached is the letter from Lt. Mustang's mother, as requested.

5. Lt. Mustang's mother attached a photograph for identification purposes.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Air Force 8-3-60

SECRET: Action forces and info may be used for reference only.


Soviet authorities reported: (1) they had brought down the A1-1;

in the waters east of the Barents coast (2) they rescued Captain

John Richard Venn, 40 2410173 and Captain Francis B. Glentz,

40 2410173 by ship from the waters of the Barents Sea (3) the remains

of Major William A. Fries, 40 2667876 were found at least 4 July 1960

40 2667876 were found at least 4 July 1960

in a vessel and recovered (4) that Soviet autopsy indicates body

(5) a search for the three other members of the crew was

inundation. The remains of Major Fries have been returned to U.S.

authorities and positively identified. Whether the emergency was

L L L 1345

Air Force 8-3-60

MAJOR J. C. LUTHER/en

56755 1 2

W. A. LUTHERED

MAJOR, USA

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

ADD 1560
AIR FORCE

incident and of a violent nature thus preventing Major Ramey L. Rose
and Captains Dean H. Phillips and Oscar L. Goforth from escaping.

The aircraft prior to its crash can only be conjectured. Never-
theless, if these three survived the crash of the FB-47, or para-
ted into the sea, the maximum water temperature in this area in
May of 40 degrees Fahrenheit with a surface air temperature of
approximately the same degree would preclude their survival beyond
a matter of hours without assistance. Since the U.S. has exploited
this incident and admitted holding survivors, there appears no lo-
tal reason to suspect they are withholding information of any
other survivors. The above facts and circumstances establish, pur-
uant to paragraph 32a, AFR 30-4, conclusive evidence that Major
Rose and Captains Phillips and Goforth died 1 July 1949 as the re-

cent of an aircraft accident. Request death reports be submitted

in these three officers. Upon receipt, Headquarters USAF will

notify the SEC. Captains Wesson and Onstead will continue to be


carried in a missing status. Headquarters USAF will keep in contact

with their SEC and monitor their future status.

AFMP-P-5-1 AFMP-A AFMP AFPG AFVC

AFCEH AFXED

AFMP-S-1-7 2 2 UNCLASSIFIED
A II: Mr. Killian of the Soviet Desk, State Department, Code 122, ext. 2550, concurred in terminating the missing status of Major Eugene R. Foss and Captain Dean B. Phillips and Oscar L. Goddess. All available evidence logically points to the fact that the three personnel could not have survived and are not now in the hands of Soviet authorities. Retaining these persons in a missing status would only serve to raise false hopes in the minds of the NCK who are eager to grasp at any shred of info which would indicate their loved one is alive. It is believed that they will at this point be more susceptible to a logical conclusion and be most able to adjust their future lives. Experience in casualty reporting shows that if personnel are continued in the missing status for a prolonged time, without concrete evidence of survival, the NCK's hopes for survival soar and they believe the AP is withholding info which proves their loved one is alive.
1. At the time of the RB-47 incident, casualty assistance personnel at Forbes AFB made immediate contact with the families of each crew member to furnish all possible aid. Captain Phillips' wife is now being assisted by Mather AFB and Captain Olmstead's wife by McGuire AFB. Forbes AFB is continuing assistance to Mrs. Posa, Mrs. McKone, Mrs. Goforth, and Mrs. Palm. If they move, responsibility for furnishing assistance will be transferred to the air base nearest their residence. Everything possible in the way of monetary help and any other aid necessary is being afforded these families. Close contact will be maintained while the officers are missing, and this contact will continue until all benefits are paid should their status change to deceased.

2. Major Palm, Deceased. Mrs. Palm will receive $3,000.00 gratuity pay and approximately $900.00 arrears of pay for the period 1 - 28 July 1960 upon her return to Forbes AFB. Normal Veterans Administration and Social Security benefits are applicable.

3. Captains McKone and Olmstead, Illegally Detained. Pay and allowances (including flying pay) continue until death. These officers will be considered for promotion while missing under normal promotion criteria.
   a. Mrs. McKone is receiving $582.50 monthly. This represents 100% of Captain McKone's pay after deductions (tax, insurance, etc.).
   b. Mrs. Olmstead is receiving $400.00 monthly which is 75% of her husband's pay after deductions. Approximately $125.00 is accruing monthly to Captain Olmstead's pay account.
4. Major Posa, Captains Goforth and Phillips, Missing. Pay and allowances (including flying pay) continue until their status is changed from missing to deceased. The change of status appears to be warranted at this time. Because of the international aspect, the Department of State has been asked to concur in this action.

If it interposes no objection, the officers' status will be changed to deceased.

a. Mrs. Posa is receiving $625.00 monthly which is 100% of her husband's pay after deductions.

b. Mrs. Goforth is receiving $440.00 monthly. Approximately $156.35 is accruing monthly to the officer's pay account. She has been informed of the additional money available to her.

c. Mrs. Phillips is receiving $355.00 monthly. Approximately $210.00 is accruing monthly to Captain Phillips' pay account. She has also been informed of the money available to her.
General Thomas D. White, USAF
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosed is a copy of the appeal which is being sent to Mr. Khrushchev on August 5, 1960. A copy of this has also been sent to Mr. Richard Davis.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. Gail B. Olmstead

Mrs. Gail B. Olmstead

Enclosure
August 4, 1960
Plainfield, New Jersey

Premier Mikita Khrushchev
The Moscow
Moscow
Russia

To, our wives of Lt. Freeman B. Olmstead and Lt. John R. McKone, and this personal appeal to you, Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev said at the Security Council,

"With regard to any possible applications by members of the families of the surviving crew members of the RB-47, such applications will be considered by the appropriate Soviet authorities, and decisions will be made in accordance with Soviet laws."

We believe you are a people who will honor this statement, so we ask that a representative of the International Red Cross be allowed to see these men.

We appeal to you for the release of our husbands. We know they are not spies; only air men on a routine mission.

So that the world may know that the Russians are not without heart, please send these men home to their wives and children.

Please reply to Mrs. Freeman B. Olmstead

Anxiously Awaiting Your Answer,

Mrs. Gail B. Olmstead
Mrs. Constance B. McKone

Copy
Correspondence from Mrs. Olstead and Mrs. McConahey

1. The wives of Lt. McConahey and Lt. Olstead (USN) have requested (Atch 4 and 5) the assistance of the Chief of Staff in consulting the Department of State for advice and guidance concerning a projected visit to the USSR.

2. Contact with the State Department on 3 August disclosed that on 1 August, the Bureau of European Affairs (State) wrote both Mrs. Olstead and Mrs. McConahey letters of advice and guidance as to procedure in establishing contact with the Soviet Embassy, and offered such assistance as may be required.

3. Lt. Gen. Hall, Commander CONAD, has also written the Chief of Staff in the matter (Atch 6).

4. Letters of response to Mrs. Olstead, Mrs. McConahey, and Lt. Gen. Hall have been prepared for the signature of the Chief of Staff.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Chief of Staff sign the attached letters (Atch 1, 2 and 3) to Mrs. Olstead, Mrs. McConahey, and Lt. Gen. Hall.

6 Atch
1. Lt to Mrs. Olstead
2. Lt to Mrs. McConahey
3. Lt to Lt Gen Hall
4. Lt fr Mrs Olstead, 30 Jul
5. Lt fr Mrs McConahey, 29 Jul
6. Lt fr Lt Gen Hall, 29 Jul

APFDC Coord
APFDC Coord
APFCAV Approval
APFCCS Signature

Cal Lambert
BS-47 Incident

Lt. Gen. William E. Hall, USAF
Commander, Continental Air Command
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, N.M.

Dear Bills:

1. Your letter of 28 July on the BS Security Council debate over the BS-47 incident is greatly appreciated, and your providing Mrs. Clinstead and Mrs. McKane with copies as well as transcripts of the remarks by the Soviet delegate was most helpful. Appropriate authorities in the Department of State have been contacted to assure expeditious handling of the requests by Mrs. Clinstead and Mrs. McKane for assistance in obtaining permission to visit their husbands.

2. State has advised me that they have written both Mrs. Clinstead and Mrs. McKane letters of advice and guidance concerning making arrangements for these visits through the Soviet Embassy here in Washington and through the Soviet Government in Moscow, and have offered assistance to this end. I have so advised Mrs. Clinstead and Mrs. McKane, and hope that final approval and arrangements can be made in the immediate future.

3. Your interest and concern in the matter are greatly appreciated, and, I'm sure, have been of considerable comfort to the families of the detainees.

Sincerely,
In response to your letter of 14 July, appropriate authorities in the Department of State have been contacted to ensure that every effort is being made to expedite action on your request for permission to visit your legation.

I understand that as I leave the Bureau of European Affairs tomorrow, you are to furnish additional information to the proper government in respect to the Soviet Embassy in Washington for the required permission.

Your plan to utilize the assistance of your American lawyer should be of benefit in securing speedy action.

If I can be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Mrs. Freeman B. Olstead

My Dear Mrs. Olstead:

In response to your letter of 30 July, appropriate authorities in the Department of State have been contacted to ensure that every effort is being made to expedite action on your request for permission to visit your husband.

I understand that on 1 August, the Bureau of European Affairs wrote you a letter of advice concerning an approach to the Soviet Government in Moscow or the Soviet Embassy in Washington for the required permission.

If I can be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 1, 1960

SUBJECT: 23-47 Crew

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Keenan of Congresswoman Deyor's Office;
Mr. W.B. Lester, Acting Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs.

COPIES TO: Mr. Davis
Mr. Claxton
Mr. Wehmeyer
Air Force - Col. Lambert

Mr. Keenan said that Congresswoman Deyor had just called from Elizabeth, New Jersey, to say that she had talked with the family of Lieutenant Olstead. Mrs. Olstead apparently had received a letter from a Colonel Haney, Information Officer at Altus Field, who said he had written at Ambassador Lodge's suggestion, and wanted the wives to know that the Soviets had left the door open in the Security Council discussions for the families to make requests directly to Premier Khrushchev. The wives were anxious to do anything they could, but did not want to do anything out of line.

I said that as a matter of fact a letter was being signed this morning by Mr. Richard Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, to the wives and parents of Lieutenant Olstead and Lieutenant Adams, calling their attention to the case statement which evidently Ambassador Lodge also had in mind. This letter was intended to provide some advice to the families on this question, and Mr. Davis would certainly be glad to answer any further questions which occurred to the families after they had received the letters.

Mr. Keenan said this would undoubtedly take care of it.
August 1, 1960

Dear Mrs. Olstead:

I know that Acting Secretary Dillon has written to assure you of the Department of State's desire to assist you in any way that it can during this very difficult period for you while your husband is under illegal detention by the Soviet Government.

In this connection, I want to call to your attention a statement which the Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kuznetsov, made when he vetoed the resolution in the Security Council calling upon the Soviet Government to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to see your husband and Lieutenant Alton. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"With regard to any possible applications by members of the families of the surviving crew members of the K-129, each application will be considered by the appropriate Soviet authorities, and decisions will be made in accordance with Soviet laws."

Should you wish to attempt to arrange for a visit with your husband, either by yourself or by another member of the family, I suggest that you apply for permission directly to the Soviet Government in Moscow or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I would urge, however, that no travel to Moscow be undertaken unless written assurances have been received from Soviet authorities that the member of the family concerned will be able to see Lieutenant Olstead. The Department is ready to assist you, or another member of the family, in any feasible way to arrange a visit. I believe that you will also want to keep the Air Force informed of any plans that you may make.

In any event,

Mrs. Fruman S. Olstead,
C/o Care of Mr. Stanley Burner,
Mr. Olstead said that he had heard of a radio report which said that Captain Ulstred and his companions had been released. He asked if there was any confirmation of this story. Mr. McHiney told him the Department had not heard any news story emanating from Mexico in the last two days to the effect that rumors were current in Mexico that the two men would not be tried and would be released. Mr. McHiney said that he would be unable to confirm the accuracy of the story until he was informed as to whether it was true or not. Mr. Olstead expressed his appreciation.

Mr. Olstead then asked if it would be possible for him to send a Christmas package containing some cigarettes, books, etc., to his son. Mr. McHiney said that a message would be sent to Mexico to ascertain whether such a package could be sent. Mr. Olstead asked if it would be possible for him to find out what particular items would be acceptable in such a package. Mr. McHiney promised to telephone Mr. Olstead as soon as word was received from Mexico.
In providing you with the above information, I wish to make it clear that the Department does not wish to influence you one way or another in coming to a decision whether you should or should not attempt to visit your husband in Moscow. Your Government is continuing its efforts to have a representative of our Embassy in Moscow see him and will do all it can to secure his release and return home.

We shall also be glad to send to our Embassy in Moscow any letters which you may wish to have delivered to your husband. Our Embassy would transmit these letters to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for delivery to your husband. If you prefer, you might also attempt to communicate with your husband through the facilities of the Red Cross.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you, and please call upon me at any time if I may be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Richard D. Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Concurrences:

L - Mr. Webster
P - Mr. Kilduff
H - Mr. Claxton

2/S - Mr. Day
10 - Mr. Lee

Air Force - Col. Lambert
SCA - Mr. Donaldson

SUBJECT: Delegation
7/30/60
August 1, 1960

Dear Mrs. Mcllins:

I know that Acting Secretary Dillon has written to assure you of the Department of State's desire to assist you in any way that it can during this very difficult period for you while your husband is under illegal detention by the Soviet Government.

In this connection, I want to call to your attention a statement which the Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kuznetsov, made when he vetoed the resolution in the Security Council calling upon the Soviet Government to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to see your husband and Lieutenant Udiasad. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"With regard to any possible applications by members of the families of the surviving crew members of the 72-h7, such applications will be considered by the appropriate Soviet authorities, and decisions will be made in accordance with Soviet laws."

Should you wish to attempt to arrange for a visit with your husband, either by yourself or by another member of the family, I suggest that you apply for permission directly to the Soviet government in Moscow or through the Soviet embassy in Washington. I would urge, however, that no travel to Moscow be undertaken unless written assurances have been received from Soviet authorities that the member of the family concerned will be able to see Lieutenant Udiasad. The Department is ready to assist you, or another member of the family, in any feasible way to arrange a visit. I believe that you will also want to keep the Air Force informed of any plans that you may make.

In

Mrs. John R. McIlins,
In providing you with the above information, I wish to make it clear that the Department does not wish to influence you one way or another in coming to a decision whether you should or should not attempt to visit your husband in Moscow. Your government is continuing its efforts to have a representative of our embassy in Moscow see him and will do all it can to secure his release and return home.

We shall also be glad to send to our embassy in Moscow any letters which you may wish to have delivered to your husband. Our embassy would transmit these letters to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for delivery to your husband. If you prefer, you might also attempt to communicate with your husband through the facilities of the Red Cross.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you, and please call upon me at any time if I may be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Richard N. Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Concurrence: L - Mr. Wernsman  P - Mr. Kilmaff  H - Mr. Claxton  
3/8-Mr. ID Mr. Sweeney Air Force-Col. Lambert  
Day  
ACA - Mr. Donaldson
August 1, 1960

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Olmstead:

I know that Acting Secretary Dillon has written to assure you of the Department of State's desire to assist you in any way that it can during this very difficult period for you while your son is under illegal detention by the Soviet Government.

In this connection, I want to call to your attention a statement which the Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kuznetsov, made when he vetoed the resolution in the Security Council calling upon the Soviet Government to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to see your son and Lieutenant Holcomb. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"With regard to any possible applications by members of the families of the surviving crew members of the S-47, such applications will be considered by the appropriate Soviet authorities, and decisions will be made in accordance with Soviet laws."

Should you wish to attempt to arrange for a visit with your son, either by yourself or by another member of the family, I suggest that you apply for permission directly to the Soviet Government in Moscow or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I would urge, however, that no travel to Moscow be undertaken unless written assurances have been received from Soviet authorities that the member of the family concerned will be able to see Lieutenant Olmstead. The Department is ready to assist you, or another member of the family, in any feasible way to arrange a visit. I believe that you will also want to keep the Air Force informed of any plans that you may make.

Mr. and Mrs. James S. Olmstead,
In providing you with the above information, I wish to make it clear that the Department does not wish to influence you one way or another in coming to a decision whether you should or should not attempt to visit your son in Moscow. Your government is continuing its efforts to have a representative of our Embassy in Moscow see him and will do all it can to secure his release and return home.

As you know, we shall also be glad to send to our Embassy in Moscow any further letters which you may wish to have delivered to your son. Our Embassy would transmit those letters to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for delivery to your son. If you prefer, you might also attempt to communicate with your son through the facilities of the Red Cross.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you, and please call upon me at any time if I may be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Richard H. Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Concurrence:
L - Mr. Wehmer
P - Mr. Kilduff
R - Mr. Clinton
IO - Mr. Sweeney
SCA - Mr. Donaldson
AirForce - Col. Lambert

2/3 - Mr. Day
Dear Mr. and Mrs. A. H. McDougal:

I know that Acting Secretary Dillon has written to assure you of the Department of State's desire to assist you in any way that it can during this very difficult period for you while your son is under illegal detention by the Soviet Government.

In this connection, I want to call to your attention a statement which the Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kuznetsov, made when he vetoed the resolution in the Security Council calling upon the Soviet Government to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to see your son and Lieutenant Olmstead. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"With regard to any possible applications by members of the families of the surviving crew members of the U.S.S.R., such applications will be considered by the appropriate Soviet authorities, and decisions will be made in accordance with Soviet law."

Should you wish to attempt to arrange for a visit with your son, either by yourself or by another member of the family, I suggest that you apply for permission directly to the Soviet Government in Moscow or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I would urge, however, that no travel to Moscow be undertaken unless written assurances have been received from Soviet authorities that the members of the family concerned will be able to see Lieutenant McDougal. The Department is ready to assist you, or another member of the family, in any feasible way to arrange a visit. I believe that you will also want to keep the Air Force informed of any plans that you may make.

In providing you with the above information, I wish to make it clear that the Department does not wish to influence you one way.

Mr. and Mrs. Jean A. McDougal,

[Handwritten note:]

Air Force
way or another in coming to a decision whether you should or should not attempt to visit your son in Moscow. Your Government is continuing its efforts to have a representative of your Embassy in Moscow see him and will do all it can to secure his release and return home.

We shall also be glad to send to our Embassy in Moscow any letters which you may wish to have delivered to your son. Our Embassy would transmit these letters to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for delivery to your son. If you prefer, you might also attempt to communicate with your son through the facilities of the Red Cross.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you, and please call upon me at any time if I may be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Richard H. Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Concurrence:

L - Mr. Mahoney
P - Mr. Kilduff
H - Mr. Claxton

S/S - Mr. Day
IO - Mr. Sweeney

Air Force - Col. Lambert
SCA - Mr. Donaldson
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kelana,

I know how great your disappointment must be at this meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which has just been reconvened, but has not resulted in any action by the Soviet Government leading to the release of your son, Lieutenant Kelana. We all deeply sympathize with you in this matter.

I want to assure you at this time, however, that your Government will continue to do everything that it can to obtain the release of Lieutenant Kelana and Lieutenant Glante.

While I know that you have been able to follow the exchange of notes between our Government and the Soviet Government in the press, I am enclosing for your convenience copies of our two notes in which we have demanded the return of the two men and immediate access to them by our Embassy. As you know, Ambassador Lodge has also requested the Soviet Government to permit the International Red Cross to see the men so that it may reassure you as to their well-being, and the Italian Delegation to the United Nations Security Council introduced a resolution similarly calling upon the Soviet Government to allow access to the men by the International Red Cross. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government vetoed this resolution.

If there are any developments concerning your son, you will be promptly informed. In the meantime, the Department will be glad to assist you in any way that it can, and I hope you will feel free to call upon me at any time.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

FDM - Mr. Davis
RCI - Mr. Donaldson
H - Mr. Clinton
C - Mr. Haring
Acting Secretary
P - Mr. Sweeney
Air Force - Col. Lambert

Unofficial


Mr. and Mrs. Joan A. Kelana,

[Address]

[Signature]

Transmitted 7/17/60

[Typed]

JUL 20 1960

S/S-RO

JUL 30 1960

A true copy of signed original
JUL 29 1960

Dear Mrs. Keleşen:

I know how great your disappointment must be that the meetings of the United Nations Security Council, which have just been concluded, did not result in any action by the Soviet Government leading to the release of your husband, Lieutenant Keleşen. We all deeply sympathise with you in this matter.

I want to assure you at this time, however, that your Government will continue to do everything that it can to obtain the release of Lieutenant Keleşen and Lieutenant Chastain.

While I know that you have been able to follow the exchange of note between our Government and the Soviet Government in the press, I am enclosing for your convenience copies of our two notes in which we have demanded the return of the two men and immediate access to them by our Mission in Moscow. As you know, Ambassador Lodge has also requested the Soviet Government to permit the International Red Cross to see the men so that it may reassure you as to their well-being, and the Italian Legation to the United Nations Security Council introduced a resolution similarly calling upon the Soviet Government to allow access to the men by the International Red Cross. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government vetoed this resolution.

If there are any developments concerning your husband, you will be promptly informed. In the meantime, the Department will be glad to assist you in any way that it can, and I hope you will feel free to call upon us at any time.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ DOUGLAS DILLON

Acting Secretary

Enclosures


Mrs. John R. Keleşen,

[Signature]

[Date] JUL 30 1960
Dear Mrs. Clintond:  

I know too great your disappointment must be that the meetings of the United Nations Security Council, which have just been concluded, did not result in any action by the Soviet Government leading to the release of your husband, Lieutenant Clintond. We are deeply sympathetic with you in this matter.

I want to assure you at this time, however, that your Government will continue to do everything that it can to obtain the release of Lieutenant Clintond and Lieutenant Arildson.

While I know that you have not been able to follow the exchange of notes between our Government and the Soviet Government in the press, I am enclosing for your convenience copies of our two notes in which we have demanded the return of the two men and immediate access to them by our consular officers. As you know, Ambassador Lodge has also requested the Soviet Government to permit the International Red Cross to see the men on that it may reassure you as to their well-being, and the Italian Delegate to the United Nations Security Council introduced a resolution similarly calling upon the Soviet Government to allow access to the men by the International Red Cross. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government vetoed this resolution.

If there are any developments concerning your husband, you will be promptly informed. In the meantime, the Department will be glad to assist you in any way that it can, and I hope that you will feel free to call upon us at any time.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Include:


[Handwritten notes]

S/S RO

[Handwritten signatures]
JUL 29 1960

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Olmstead,

I know how great your disappointment must be that the recent vote of the United Nations Security Council, which we have just been concluded, did not result in any action by the Soviet Government leading to the release of your son, Lieutenant Olmstead. I am deeply sympathetic with you in this matter.

I want to assure you at this time, however, that your Government will continue to do everything that it can to obtain the release of Lieutenant Olmstead and Lieutenant Adams.

While I know that you have been able to follow the exchange of notes between our Government and the Soviet Government in this regard, I am enclosing for your convenience copies of our two notes in which we have demanded the return of the two men and immediate access to them by our Moscow Embassy. As you know, Ambassador Lodge has also requested the Soviet Government to permit the International Red Cross to see the men so that it may reassure you as to their well-being, and the Italian Delegate to the United Nations Security Council introduced a resolution similarly calling upon the Soviet Government to allow access to the men by the International Red Cross. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government vetoed this resolution.

As Mr. James Jennings in Counter Liaison's office has informed you, we received from his your letter to your son and immediately forwarded it to our Embassy at Moscow for delivery. You will be promptly informed when we have received word of its delivery.

If there are any developments concerning your son, you will be promptly informed. In the meantime, the Department will be glad to assist.

Mr. and Mrs. James B. Olmstead,
assist you in any way that I can, and I hope you will feel free to call upon us at any time.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ DOUGLAS DILLON

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:


S/S-RO

JUL 30 1960

A true copy of signed original

SIR - Mr. Lewis

COL - Mr. Donaldson

M - Mr. Cline

P - Mr. Erving

1200 100 20 10 10 50 00 10 - Mr. Secombe

AIR FORCE - Col. Lambert

Sent by USN 7/27/60 7/27/60

ASAP - Secretary of Navy

DEPARTMENT OF NAVY

OPERATIONS SECRETARIAL

re-staged 7/29/60
General Thomas D. White, USAF
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Tommy:

At the conclusion of the UN Security Council debate on the 48-47 incident Tuesday night, Ambassador Lodge pointedly mentioned a matter about which I feel you should be informed.

Mr. Lodge emphasized that the Soviet Representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, in summation on the incident on 26 July, had intentionally left a door unlocked through which the families of the two crewmen, now in the hands of the Russians (Capt. McKee and Lt. Olmstead) could make an appeal to the Russians for permission either to visit or to obtain information on the whereabouts and condition of the two officers. This, Mr. Lodge believes, is significant and obvious; the Soviet Representative knew in advance that his government would veto the Italian resolution as well as the American resolution calling for an impartial investigation. I have extracted the pertinent paragraphs from the Russian remarks and they are attached as an enclosure.

Here are the excerpts that are usual pattern of castigation which advanced before the Russians opened the door slightly.

... they are inclined to believe the Russian representative made... greatly impressed and for that reason... therefore, advised the wives... so they can have some contact to the families, they should take the opportunity... On the other hand, he advised them to initiate an appeal to Russian authorities, obtaining reassurances from the Air Force and State Department. He should to be sure to quote the remarks of Mr. Kuznetsov, those in para... so on of my statements, in their appeal.

I shall be sure to have the wives listen to the Russian broadcasts. Chances are that you have the full text, in this matter.
I believe you will be interested to know that Mr. Lodge also stated that the presence of the wives at the Security Council had been of great assistance to him and that they had conducted themselves in such a manner as to reflect credit on the Air Force and the nation.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. HALL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Copy furnished
Further, it is impossible to pass over in silence the fact that the representatives of the United States and its partners in the aggressive bloc in a clear attempt to divert attention from the threat to peace constituted by the systematic incursions of United States aircraft into Soviet air space continue shamelessly to exploit the very understandable feelings of members of the families of the crew members of the RB-47 aircraft. The hypocritical statements by the organizers of the provocative flights, of course, have nothing in common with genuine feelings of humanity; they only show once again that they will not shrink from any means of concealing the responsibility for everything that happened in connection with the RB-47 aircraft.

In this connection, it is quite understandable that the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Italy does not pursue any humanitarian aims, in spite of the statements to that effect propounded by the representative of Italy with so much warmth. This draft resolution is aimed at diverting attention from the necessity to condemn the organizers of the aggressive actions. Moreover, the Italian draft resolution is directly aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and with the normal processes of justice which are now being carried out in regard to the two crew members, Mckone and Oinstead, of the RB-47 aircraft which committed the aggressive incursion into the air space of the Soviet Union for espionage purposes. When the examination of their cases has been completed, they will appear before a Soviet tribunal.
This represents an implementation of the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union, in which no interference by any outside organizations will be tolerated.

WITH REGARD TO ANY POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE FAMILIES OF THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE RB-47, SUCH APPLICATIONS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, AND DECISIONS WILL BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET LAWS.
AP IN : 13467 (9 Aug 60) Z/dfe
INFO : PMP-S-1, ASC

SMD A 002
KZCHQD947ZCYJA402
RR RJEZHQ
DE RJWXBR 319
R 082055Z

FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJWFFB/21AIRDIV FORBES AFB KANS
INFO RJEZHQ/C OF S USAF WASH DC
RJEBKF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA

BT
UNCLAS DPS 11695 (INFO USAF FOR AFPMP-S-1) INFO
2AF FOR DPSP). SUBJECT IS CASUALTY REPORTS ON THREE
MISSING RB-47 CREW MEMBERS. INFO RECEIVED IN THIS HQS
ON 6 AUG 60 FROM HQ USAF INDICATES THAT CHANGE OF STATUS
FROM MISSING TO DEAD IS NOT REPEAT NOT YET APPROPRIATE.
REQUEST YOU WITHHOLD ANY ACTION TO CHANGE STATUS PENDING
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ USAF.

BT
08/2058Z AUG RJWXBR
5 August 1960


To: Captain Luther
AFIP-P-8-1
Rm. 52313, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Enclosed please find a copy of the preliminary report on the examination of Major Willard G. Palm, AD 2037476, AFIP Accession No. 969935.

2. This copy is forwarded as per your telephone request of 5 August 1960 to Captain W. H. Davidson, USAF, MC, of the Aerospace Pathology Branch, AFIP.

ROGER H. PULLER
Captain, MC, USN
Acting Director
Preliminary Report on Examination of Body of Major Willard G. Palm, 20 2437476, AFIP Accession No. 434479

TO: Major General O. K. Bliss, USAF, USA The Surgeon General Headquarters, USAF Washington 25, D. C.

1. The body of Major Willard G. Palm was received at the AFIP Morgue at approximately 0430, 31 July 1960. It has previously been examined by U.S. Army forensic-medical experts O. F. Pagot, B. O. Levenson, and L. V. Allievich on 4 July 1960 at the hospital in Krasnodar Region of the Russian Union. The Soviet protocol of autopsy examination states the following under the heading of "Preliminary Information":

"On the 4th of July, 1960, northeast of the preserve of Sevastopol Sea, the dead body of Willard George Palm, entangled in the screens of the parasite, was found in the water."

The Soviet examination showed greenish wet clothing and liver vertices over the face, head, neck and upper shoulder girdle. They found "conspicuous freckles of skin bubbles and of whitish-gray color," coming from the area and mouth. Multiple subcutaneous hemorrhagic areas and abrasions were present on the extremities. Internally the trachea and bronchus were filled with thick, frothy fluid. The lungs were congested with fluid blood. The skin had a "greyish fleshy" appearance.

The Soviet conclusion was that the death

"was due to asphyxia as a result of the closure of the respiratory pathways by fluid in consequence of drowning in water. The injuries detected . . . could have been caused shortly before death by blunt impact objects, and they were of a light nature, not endangering life . . . ."

The Soviets took tissue for chemical and histological examination, and culminated the body with a formal, formalin, glycerol and alcohol mixture."
2. On 26 July 1960, Major Claude L. Leeper, USAF, MC, examined
the remains at the USAEUR Mortuary at Frankfurt/Main, Germany. Dr.
Leeper found all organs in the body cavity in haphazard arrangement.
He concluded, after gross and microscopic examination, that no
conclusive statement as to cause of death could be made in absence
of detailed information about the nature of the insident. His
diagnoses were:

1. Lacerations, abrasions and ecchymoses of body surface,
minimal severity, due to unknown cause.
2. Hemorrhage, minimal, lungs, spleen, adrenal and mesentery,
due to unknown cause
3. Vascular dilatation, moderate to severe, generalized
internal tissue and organs.
4. Hashimoto's Disease of thyroid.
5. Ulcer (2) superficial of esophagus.
6. Chronic cholecystitis, early.

3. Re-examination of the body of Major Palm was done by
Capt. W. H. Davidson, USAF, MC, and Maj. F. L. Lovell, USAF, MC,
at the AIP Morgue Between 0900 and 1500 31 July 1960. This
examination confirmed Dr. Leeper's gross findings. Complete
roentgen examination revealed no fracture and only minor degenerative
osteoarthritic change of vertebral bodies. Extra dural hemorrhage
was present in the spinal canal. The tympanic membranes were intact.
Scal hemorrhages were present in the lateral vertebral ligaments
adjacent to L1 and L2. The arrow described by the Soviets as
shovelling lividity (head, neck and shoulders) showed dark-red to black
discoloration with a mummified-leathery consistency.

4. Microscopic examination of the lungs shows marked congestion
of capillaries and veins, distension of alveoli, some with air and
some with eosinophilic amorphous material and infrequent intra-
alveolar hemorrhage. Alveolar macrophages are prevalent. Vascular
dilatation in the submucosa of the trachea and bronchi is prevalent.
Focal collections of neutrophiles are present in veins and alveoli.
Bacterial growth is moderately heavy without acute inflammatory
reaction. Skin sections show subcutaneous hemorrhage and deminution
of epithelium with hyalinization of the corium and dilated vascular
channels.

5. In conclusion, it is believed the cutaneous wounds represent
ante-mortem trauma probably occurring during ejection. Whether they
prevented Major Palm from getting into his life raft (if one were
available) is conjectural, but in view of the absence of bone
fractures, this is doubtful. One aspect which must be considered is
the water temperature in this area. The U. S. Navy Hydrographic
Office, Division of Oceanography, states that mean ocean surface
temperature for June is 25° and for July 40°. Variations occur
due to northerly or southerly winds—Survival time in such temperatures
is a matter of a few hours. The microscopic examination of the lungs
is considered consistent with but not pathognomonic of drowning. An
attempt is being made to recover distance from lump by said digestion.
The significance of the extracranial spinal hemorrhage is at present uncertain. In cutaneous wounds microscopically appear to be ante mortem. Others appear to be abrasions with loss of epidermis. Thus, death by drowning remains a strong possibility as suggested by the Soviets. This may have occurred after several hours of exposure in the water.

FRANK R. TOWNSEND
Colonel, USAF, MC
The Director

cc:
Col. W. L. Green, AFML
Col. W. H. Gilman, SAPOI

Examination and Report by:

Capt. W. H. Davidson, USAF, MC
INCOMING

No.: 5543 (30 Jul 60)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORI
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RECEIVED: PMP-3-1
... : ACC, COM CTR, HSS-03-3, CSS.CIC

JUL 1 413

CLASS: REG/SCWJA113

PP: ZK,RJW/BR

FL.: ZFB 13

F.: 36Z ZFJ2 RJW/BR

F.: IRDIV FORBES AFB KANS.

RJW/BR/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

RJW/BR/COMAF 2BARKSDALE AFB LA

BY

UNCLASSIFIED CASUALTY MESSAGE FROM EPPA 1346. FOR

LAD: ATTENTION CASUALTY BRANCH. SUBJ: CASUALTY

TH: REFERENCE YOUR UNCLASSIFIED AFFMP-3-1-A 73659.

FOR: OFFICIAL USE ONLY, THE FOLLOWING NON BATTLE DEATH

IS SUBMITTED:

1. IN, REPEAT PALM, WILLARD GEORGE,

2. ...

3. 343D STRAT RECON SQ, 55TH STRAT RECON Wg, FORBES AFB,

KANS. TETCHED 3920TH COMBAT SUP GP, BRIZE NORTON, ENGLAND.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE,
INCOMING

REPL: PAGE SMD B 173
PAGE TWO RJEFB 16
N PARENTS SEA AREA.
F-C-1. ON FILE YOUR HEADQUARTERS.
I. READY.
J. NADIA PALM, WIFE,
K. SYDIL STARR PALM, MOTHER,
L. ON FILE YOUR HEADQUARTERS, CHERENCE YOUR UNCLASSIFIED SFMP-S-1-A 65794.
M. 323-12-6878.
N. E. CUSE.
O. NADIA (NMI) PALM, WIFE,

P. 27 MAY 1960, AF FORM 246-3.
Q. NO.
R. PRESENT FOR DUTY. ACTIVE DUTY.
S. O.R.
T. YES, CREW MEMBER.
U. AIR FORCE RESERVE.
V. PRESBYTERIAN.
W. CAUCASIAN.
X. NOT APPLICABLE.
Y. NADIA PALM, WIFE
Z. 75

TONE 2 OF 2
INCOMING

IN: 4293 (29 JUL 60) R/NAGB
ACTION MSS-03-3
PO : PNP 5-1

CH: B157ZCUJA215
F: RJEZHQ
To: RUFOX 07

R: 29132OZ
F: CO USAQMORTSYS FRANKFURT GER
T: RUEPC/DA WASHDC
RJEZSB/CMAPOE DOVER AFB DEL.
RJEZHQ/CSUSAF WASHDC
WFPBW/CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GER
INFO RUFGA/C/CG USAREURCOM Z ORLEANS FRANCE FOR AECZQ-0

BT
MCLAS MO-889. DA FOR QMGME-D. REMAINS SHPNG REPT PER PAR 53C 638-40
REF OUR MSG MO-882 DTD 28 JUL. 1. AIRLIFTING REMAINS OF CAPT WILLARD
P. PALM A02087476 FORBES AFB KANSAS ABT 29 JUL ETA DOVER AFB DEL

30 JUL
2. REMAINS DLVR RHEIN MAIN AFB 29 JUL
3. FLT NR FURN BY RHEIN MAIN AFB
4. MW PROT
5. TRF CASE NR 97
6. 290 LBS

RMKS: THIS REMAINS BEING SHIPPED IN ACD W/INSTR FURN THIS HQ BY HQ

CFN MO-889 53C 638-43 MO-882 28 1 A02087476 29 30 2 29 3 4 5 37
AF IN : 4293 (29 Jul 60)

PAGE TWO RUFYAX 07

USAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY. REQ. TRF CASE NR EU-97 BE RTN HQ USA QM
MORTUARY SYS EUR FRANKFURT GER BY ATCO DOVER AFB DEL
BT
CFN EU-97
29/1333Z
กองทัพอากาศ

หัวข้อ: 4101 (29 Jul 60) INCOMING

หน่วย: PMP-3-1

เจ้าหน้าที่: COMM CTR, ASC, MSS-3, CIS, CIG

SMD B 140

CZQHQ06E02CNJA935

DD RJEZH

DE RJFPPW 120

D 291330Z ZFF2 RJEZH

FM HQ USAF

TO COFS USAF

BT

UNCLASSIFIED FROM PPSPA 118638. ACTIONCOFS. CASUALTY MESSAGE, DEATH REPORT, NONBATTLE.

A. PALM REPEAT PALM WILLARD GEORGE.

B. CAPTAIN.

C. A02037476 REPEAT A02037476.

D THROUGH H. INFORMATION ON FILE YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

I. READY.

J THROUGH Y. INFORMATION ON FILE YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

BT

29/1438Z JUL RJFPPW
UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CJWB P 7-28-60. ATTN: PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER WESTOVER.

CASUALTY REPORT, DEATH REPORT, NON-BATTLE

PART 1 REF AFMSS GS-3-73077 FROM HQ USAF AND CONFIRMS TEL CONVERSATION WITH THE FOLL: MR H. MONROE HQ USAF, MAJ GEORGE DOVER AFB, MSGT ZASTRE WESTOVER AFB. BASED ON PRIOR COORDINATED PLAN BETWEEN L G HANSCOM FLD AND WESTOVER AFB. WINCHENDON, MASS FALLS WITHIN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF WESTOVER AFB FOR FURNISHING MIL HONORS. WESTOVER AFB WILL FURNISH MIL HONORS IN COMPLIANCE WITH PAR 126E AFM 143-1 FOR A/B MARSH A MARTIN AF21279638, PART 11 INFO FURNISHED WESTOVER. REMAINS OF A/B MARTIN BEING SHIPPED BY DOVER TO LAFRAMBOISE FUNERAL HOME, 20
MECHANIC ST WINCHENDON MASS. NOK FATHER, MR MARSHAL H. MARTIN 12 WOODLAND ST WINCHENDON MASS. RACE CAUCASIAN RELIGION CATHOLIC. ATTN: PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

DOVER. PLEASE ADVISE WESTOVER ETA REMAINS OF SUBJECT ANN. WINCHENDON.

BT

29/1718 Z JUL RJEZBF
FROM USAFE LINDSEY AS GERMANY
TO SAF WASH D C

UNCLASSIFIED FROM OII 172349, FOR SAFOSI-3 LT COL THOMPSON.

REMAINS OF LATE CAPT WILLARD PALM DEPARTED RHEIN MAIN AB AT 1537Z 29 JUL ABOARD C-118 NR 7655 TO DOVER VIA LAGES. ESTIMATE 22 HOURS ENROUTE. LIGHT PRESS COVERAGE OF DEPARTURE WITH MOST NEWS SERVICES COVERING EVENT VIA TELEPHONE.

29/1710Z JUL RJFPBW
AF IN: 2923 (28 Jul 60) R/wgs
INFO: MSS-GS-3, PMP-S-1

SMD A142
ZCHQE846ZCUC178
RR RJEZHQ
DE RUFYAX 07
ZNR
OR 281600Z
FM CO USAQMORTSYS FRANKFURT GERMANY
TO RUEPC/TOMG DA WASHDC
INFO RJEZHQ/CSUSAF WASHDC
RJFPBW/CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
RUFGAE/CG USAREURCOMZ ORLEANS FRANCE FOR AECZQ-O
DA GRNC
BT
UNCLAS MO-882. REP IS MADE TO MSG MO-881. PLEASE DISREGARD MO-881.
RE REMAINS CAPT WILLARD G PALM AO2087476. USAF REP THIS COMD ARNG BY TELECON FOR RTN OF REMAINS TO CONUS (USIP) ASAP AFTER CFM OF FINGERPRINT IDENT BY FBI. REQ UR OFF CORD ARNG FOR MOVT OF REMAINS W/USAF REP AT UR LEVEL AND ADVISE THIS HQ ASAP AUTH FOR REL AND SHIPPING INSTR. XPD
BT
CFN MO-882 MO-881 MO-811 AO2087476
28/1602Z
INCOMING

AF IN: 2903 (28 Jul 60) K/hgh
INFO: MSS-GS-3, PMP-S-1
SND C2211

CZCHQC330ZCUJB187
RR RJEZHQ
DE RUFFYAK PY
XNR
OR 281520Z
FN CO USAQMORTSYS FRANKFURT GER
TO RUEPC/TQMG DA WASHDC
INFO RJEZHQ/CSUSAFAF WASHDC
RUPPBW/CINCUSAFAE WIESBADEN GER
RUFGE/C/G USAREURCOMZ ORLEANS FRANCE FOR AECZO-0
DA GRNC
BT
UNCLAS MO-881. RE REMAINS CAPT WILLARD G PALM AO2087474 USAF
REQ THIS COMD ARNG BY TELECON FOR RTN OF REMAINS TO CONUS (USIP)
ASAP AFTER CFM OF FINGERPRINT IDENT BY FBI. REQ UR OFF CORD ARNG
FOR MOVT OF REMAINS W/USAF REP AT UR LEVEL AND ADVISE THIS HQ ASAP
AUTH FOR REL AND SHIPPING INSTR. EXPD
BT
CFN MO-881 AO2087476
28/1522Z
DATE: July 27, 1960

SUBJECT: RB-17 Case

PARTICIPANTS: Miss O'Dell, Congressman Avery's Office
Mr. D.E. Boster, SOV

COPIES TO: H - Mr. Hogland (2)
EUR - Mr. Davis (2) (1 sc)
L/SUR - Mr. Kearney (2)
Air Force - Col. Moore
SOV - (5) (2 sc)

Miss O'Dell telephoned me today with reference to an inquiry they had received from a Kansas State Legislator about the possibility of a member of the McKune family going to Moscow to see Lieutenant McKune. In our discussion, I referred Miss O'Dell to the account of the Security Council meetings in today's New York Times in which Kuznetsov had stated that his Government might consider appeals by the families of the survivors for the right to communicate with the prisoners. I said it would be our advice that members of the families should not attempt to go to Moscow unless and until they had assurance from the Soviet Government that they would be permitted to see the officer concerned. We agreed that Khrushchev was probably the most effective person to whom a request should be addressed. I suggested to Miss O'Dell that anyone making such plans should, of course, be in touch with the Air Force.
FROM: 1422 (27 Jul 60) K/au
TO: ZCH0929ZCSBA275
PP RJEZHQ
DE RJEZSB 16
PR 271505Z ZEX
FM 1607THABG MORTUARY 27-G-1 FOR MORTUARY BR. REQUEST CLOSE
COORDINATION OF THE REMAINS OF CAPTAIN WILLARD PALM. IT IS DESIRABLE
THAT THE REMAINS ARRIVE DOVER AFB DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS OF
NORMAL DUTY DAY. ALSO REQUEST MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE OF ETA.
BT
27/1513Z JUL RJEZSB
AF IN : 2052 (28 Jul 69) NCOMING cas
INFO : MSS-GS-3, PMP-S-1, SAFS
NNNN
SMD A 017
ZCZCHQA338ZCYJC434
MM RJEZH0
DE RJDAA 177
M 272128Z ZEX
FM MATS SCOTT AFB ILL
TO RJEZF/EAStAF MCGUIRE AFB NJ
INFO RJEZHQ//HQ USAF WASH DC
RJWXR/SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
RJEBKF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
BT
UNCLAS MAOTO/CO 27 G 98
ACTION EAStAF INFO HQ USAF FOR AFMSS-GS-3 SAC 2AF. SUBJECT: RETURN
OF RB47 CREW MEMBER REMAINS. THE REMAINS OF CAPTAIN PALM, PRESENTLY
AT RHEIN-MAIN AB GER, ARE TO BE RETURNED TO THE CONUS VIA MATS CHANNEL
TRAFFIC AIRLIFT. IT IS INTENDED THAT AN HONOR/RELIGIOUS CEREMONY BE
CONDUCTED AT RHEIN-MAIN PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF THIS TRIP AND AGAIN AT
DOVER UPON ARRIVAL OF THIS TRIP. EAStAF IS AUTHORIZED TO ADJUST
SCHEDULE AS NECESSARY TO PERMIT DEPARTURE FROM RHEIN-MAIN AT 1600
LOCAL STANDARD TIME AND ARRIVAL AT DOVER 1000 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME.
PRESIDENT PLANNING INDICATES TRIP WILL DEPART RHEIN-MAIN 29 JUL 69;
AF IN: 2052 (28 Jul 60)

PAGE TWO RJEDAA 177

HOWEVER, DEPARTURE DATE IS DEPENDANT UPON POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS. EASTAF WILL COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH MR. MONROE, USAF MORTUARY, TELEPHONE WASH DC, OXFORD 64014, 64029. GENERAL McCONNELL, COMMANDER 2AF, V WILL BE SENIOR USAF OFFICER MEETING AIRCRAFT UPON ARRIVAL AT DOVER. DEPARTURE TIME FROM RHEIN-MAIN AND ARRIVAL TIME AT DOVER MUST BE GUARANTEED.

BT

27/2318Z JUL RJEDAA
UNCLAS MO-871 MSG IN TWO PARTS.

PART I. REMAINS ALLEGED TO BE THOSE OF CAPT WILLIARD G PALM AO 20874-76 REC AMSTERDAM, HOLLAND 25 JULY 60. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION DISCLOSES REMAINS ATTIRE IN FLYING SUIT, UNDER GARMENTS, SOCKS AND FLYING BOOTS. CONDITION OF REMAINS INDICATES ATTEMPTS OF PRESERVATION TAKEN BY RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS PROBABLY BY USE OF PHENOL. HEAD AND NECK EXTREMELY DISCOLORED. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF ABRASIONS OVER
JULDERS, LOWER ARMS AND LOWER LEGS, NUMEROUS INCISINS OBSERVED OVER ARMS, RIGHT LATERAL HIP, AND LOWER LEGS. AT THIS TIME IT HAS NOT BEEN DEIM WHETHER THESE LACERATIONS ARE AS A RESULT OF TRAUMA OR EXAM CONDUCTED BY RUSSIA MEDICS. CRANIAL, NECK, THORACIC, AND ABDOMINAL AND PELVIC CAVIDIES HAVE BEEN POSTED.

PART II. NO REC ESCEPT SEROLOGY HAVE BEEN MADE AVAL FOR COMPARISON STUDIES. PLESE XPD ACT TO GET PHYSICAL-DENTAL CHARACTERISTICS TO THIS STA ASAP. BELIEVE HOME STA OF CAPT PALM TO BE FORBES AFB, KAN. SGN RALSTON BT

26/16387 Page 2 of 2
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE
INCOMING

AF IN: 59398 (25 Jul 60)  H/cas
INFO: CIN, MSS-03, PMP-S-1, SAPS

FROM: MOSCOW

NR: 229  25 Jul 60

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(AFR 11-30)

NOTE: 202 1s AF IN 56517 (22 Jul 60)
FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 229, JULY 25, 6 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 229, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 12.

EMBTEL 202.

BODY CAPT. PALM RECEIVED FROM SOVIETS THIS MORNING AND
PLACED ABOARD KLM AIRCRAFT WITHOUT INCIDENT PER REFTEL.
BRIEF MILITARY CEREMONY AND PRAYER HELD PLANESIDE WITH
DIGNIFIED PRESS COVERAGE. EFFECTS TURNED OVER CONSISTED
ONLY CLOTHING ON BODY, AND MILITARY ID CARD AND CARD
RELATING GENEVA CONVENTION. ESCORT OFFICER MCCANN HAS
ABOVE CARDS, EMBASSY'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE COPY OFFICIAL
PROTOCOL OF TRANSFER OF REMAINS SOVIET TO U. S. CUSTODY,
AND EMBASSY'S SOLE COPY IN RUSSIAN OF AUTOPSY STATEMENT.

AUTOPSY ALLEGEDLY PERFORMED JULY 4 AT SAAMSKI RAYON
HOSPITAL MURMANSK OBLAST GIVES CAUSE DEATH AS ASPHYXIA
FROM BLOCKING BRONCHIAL TRACK BY FLUID AS RESULT
DROWNING (UTOPLENIE V VODE). AUTOPSY STATEMENT MAKES
NO REPEAT NO MENTION RUBBER RAFT IN WHICH SOVIET NOTE
67/OSA STATED BODY PALM FOUND, BUT STATES THAT BODY
FOUND JULY 4 IN USSR TERRITORIAL WATERS NE OF CAPE
SVYATÓR NOS IN THE WATER TANGLED IN PARACHUTE SHROUDS.

AIRGRAM WITH TEXTS DOCUMENTS FOLLOWS.

FREERS

MB/20
UNCLASSIFIED

AF IN: 58196 (23 Jul 60)
INFO: CIN, PMP-S-1, MSS-GS-3

FROM: MOSCOW
NR: 220 22 Jul 60

NOTE: 202 is AF IN 56517 (22 Jul 60)
FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 220, JULY 22, 6 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 220, REPEATED INFORMATION AMSTERDAM 2.

RE EMBTEL 202 TO DEPARTMENT, 1 AMSTERDAM.

MFA PROPOSED TODAY THAT CAPTAIN PALMI'S BODY BE TURNED OVER
BOTH OFFICIALLY AND ACTUALLY MORNING JULY 25.

AMSTERDAM REQUESTED MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR MAJOR MCCANN NIGHT JULY 25.

FREERS
AF IN: 57399 (23 Jul 60) X/cas
INFO: CIN, MSS-GS-3, PMP-S-1

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE

NR: 162 22 Jul 60

NOTE: 202 is AF IN 56517. (22 Jul 60)
RPTD INFO to American AMSTERDAM

Proposal satisfactory to Department and Defense. Please have attach notice USAF present.

Mr. Munro

EUSA SOV/Deirdre 7-22-60

SOV - David Klair
UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

AF IN: 56517 (22 Jul 60)
INFO: CIN, MSS-GS-3, PMP-S-1

FROM: MOSCOW
NR: 202  21 JUL 60.
FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 202, JULY 21, 7:00 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 202; REPEATED INFORMATION AMSTERDAM 1.

MFA INSISTS ON TURNING OVER CAPTAIN PALM’S BODY OFFICIALLY ON JULY 23. AFTER CHECKING AVAILABLE FLIGHTS AND AIR FREIGHT REQUIREMENTS, EMBASSY BELIEVES MOST PRACTICABLE PLAN IS TO ACCEPT BODY FORMALLY ON JULY 23, BUT NOT REMOVE IT FROM MORGUE UNTIL MORNING JULY 25. MFA AGREEABLE. BODY WOULD THEN BE TRANSPORTED DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT FOR KLM RPT KLM FLIGHT DEPARTING MOSCOW AT NOON AND ARRIVING AMSTERDAM 1535 DUTCH TIME. MAJOR MCCANN OF AIR ATTACHE OFFICE WOULD BE UNIFORMED ESCORT OFFICER.

IF PROPOSAL SATISFACTORY TO DEPARTMENT, AIR ATTACHE CAN NOTIFY USAFE.

EMBASSY REQUESTED MFA FOR CERTIFICATE INDICATING CAUSE OF DEATH, BUT MFA MADE NO COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE DOCUMENT.

FREERS

HZK-22
AF IN: 55761 (21 Jul 60)  
ACTION: MSS-GS-3  
INFO: PMP-S-1  

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION  

INCOMING  

X/wg  

SAD A 240  
ZCHQC187ZCGJD848  
AR RJEZHQ  
DE RJFPBW 302  
R 211523Z  
FM USAFE LINDSEY AS GER  
TO COFS USAF WASHDC  

SACLAS FROM MWSS-S 184101. YOUR AFMSS-GS-3 70566. NO  
WORD RECEIVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS TO DATE CONCERNING TRANSFER  
OF REMAINS TO AIR FORCE CUSTODY. AIR ATTACHE, US EMBASSY,  
BONN AND COMMANDER, TEMPLEHOF AIR BASE, WEST BERLIN, HAVE  
BEEN CONTACTED ON THIS MATTER AND REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY  
NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS AT ANY HOUR IF ANY WORD IS RECEIVED.  
CONCERNING RETURN OF THE REMAINS TO AIR FORCE CUSTODY. YOU  
WILL BE ADVISED IMMEDIATELY OF COMPLETE DETAILS IN THE EVENT  
SUCH TRANSFER DOES OCCUR.  
31  
21/1700Z JUL RJFPBW
AP"21 July 60. The body of the pilot of the U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down July 1 is scheduled to be turned over to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow by the Soviet Government tomorrow. The Russians say the body of the pilot -- 39 year old Captain Willard Palm of Oak Ridge, Tennessee -- was found floating in a rubber boat off shore after a Soviet jet fighter brought down the plane. Two survivors are being held and the Russians say the other 3 crewmen are missing.

Send the above message, subject to the terms on back, which are hereby agreed to.

PLEASE TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER - DO NOT FOLD

1259-(5-60)
AF IN: 52123 (19 Jul 60)
INFO: PMP-S-1, MSS-GS-3

NNNN SMD A 071
RR RJEZHQ
DE RJWXBR 167
R 181946Z ZEX
FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJEFBFB/21AIRDIV FORBES AFB KANS
INFO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC
RJEBKF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
BT

UNCLAS DPS 04724. SUBJECT IS CASUALTY REPORT ON MISSING RB-47
AND CREW. REFERENCE YOUR BPPA 0670, 15 JUL 60, REQUEST YOU PREPARE
AND DISPATCH AF FORM 484 AS PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED. STATUS OF CREW
REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM MISSING AS OF THIS DATE. AFPMP-S-IA MSG 68794
MERELY RELAYED UNCONFIRMED REPEAT UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION TO NEXT OF
KIN AND DID NOT INDICATE CHANGE IN STATUS. MESSAGE INDICATED HQ USAF
WOULD MAKE FUTURE NOTIFICATIONS TO NOK AND CHANGE STATUS WHEN APPLIC.
YOU WILL UTILIZE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, I.E. NEWSPAPER REPORTS, MSGS
FROM HQ USAF, ETC., TO ACCOMPLISH FORM 484. INFO RECEIVED THIS HQS
ON 18 JUL 60 FROM HQ USAF INDICATES NO VERIFICATION HAS BEEN MADE OF
CREW STATUS TO DATE AND NEGOTIATIONS BY STATE DEPT CONTINUE IN
EFFECT. NOK ARE BEING ADVISED OF PROGRESS DIRECT FROM HQ USAF.
BT

18/1947Z JUL RJWXBR

NOTE: 0670 15 AF IN 42597 (16 Jul 60)
UNCLAS FROM BPPA 0670. FOR DPSR-SAC, FOR AFPMP-S-1-A, HQ USAF. DUE TO RECEIPT OF MESSAGE AFPMP-S-1-A 68794 DATED 12 JULY 1960 FROM HQ USAF AFTER YOUR MESSAGE DPSR 03037, DATED 12 JULY 1960, PREPARATION AND DISPATCH OF AF FORM 484 BEING HELD PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS. PARTICULAR ATTENTION INVITED TO LAST TWO SENTENCES OF USAF MESSAGE CITED ABOVE.

BT

15/2148Z JUL RJEZHB

NOTE: Reference is not identified in SMD
UNCLASSIFIED

AF IN : 50493 (16 Jul 60) H/cem
INFO : CIN, XPD, PMP-8-1
FROM : MOSCOW
NR : 143

16 Jul 60

FOBIDNIA ASSN
(AFR 11-30)
FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 143, July 16, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

Embassy telephoned MFA American Section today regarding arrangements obtain Captain Palm's body. MFA officer said he would inquire and inform Embassy later.

FREERS

SGC
LO DOUBT THE SOVIET UNION OFFERED TODAY TO HAJD OVER THE BODY OF A AIR FORCE OFFICER RECOVERED WHEN AN AMERICAN RB-47 RECONNAISSANCE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN JULY 1.

A WASHINGTON AGENCY DISPATCH SAID THE OFFER WAS MADE IN A NOTE PRESENTED TO U.S. CHARGE DS D'AFFAIRES EDWARD L. FREE AND WHICH REJECTED AS "GRANDULESS" THE U.S. PROTESTS OVER THE DOWNING OF THE PLANE.

THE OFFICER PREVIOUSLY WAS IDENTIFIED AS CAPT. WILLIAM PAL, 39, FROM OAK RIDGE, TENN.

7/15 -- ORDERED

UPI-76 71

ADD AIRMAN MOSCOW

A WASHINGTON AGENCY NOTE SAID THE BODY OF THE CAPTAIN "WAS HANDLED OVER TO THE U.S. BEN WHITE AS AT ANY TIME".

THE UNITED STATES CHARGED A NOTE DELIVERED LAST WEEKDAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN PLANE WHILE IT WAS ON A PEACEFUL MISSION OVER THE OPEN SEA. THE NOTE DEMANDED AN EXPLANATION FROM THE SOVIETS. THE UNITED STATES CHARGED THE SOVIET "BECAME INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT WITH THE CAPTAIN".

A WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF THE DAY SAID SOVIET PREMIER NIKOLOVCHENKOFFY WAS DURING WHEN HE SAID THE PLANE HAD VIOLATED SOVIET AIR SPACE.

THE WHITE HOUSE ALSO ACCUSED SKRULSKII OF DELIBERATELY TRYING TO STAR IN AN INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT WITH TURCHIE.

7/15 --TS 106/RD
REO. STJ. MSO. DIV.

JUL 12 49 43.50

THE FOLLOWING CASUALTY MESSAGE WAS DISPATCHED FROM THIS
TO ALL NK OR AF PERSONNEL CONCERNED.

HEADQUARTERS II JUDEY 1960: QUOTE: Reference your (insert
reluctantly, rank, and full name) missing on KS-47 flight. A

AERO/releases from Headquarters II JUDEY 1960 stated that the Soviets
sent down a KS-47 at 1403 hours local time 1 July 1960 in the


districts. Further that 1st Lt Freeman E. Olmsted and 1st Lt

John R. Slone were in the hands of the Soviet authorities and

the remains of Captain William O. Palo had been recovered and

that there was no trace of the remaining crewman, Captain Eugene

Palo, Captain Oscar L. Goetz and Lt Col Dean H. Phillips.

The information contained in this news release is unofficial and

not been confirmed. Efforts are being made through diplo-

mats to verify this information.

July 1960

[Signature]

W. A. LEE

[Stamp: Hq. 1st Inf. Div.]

[Stamp: Document Control]

[Stamp: Confidential]

[Stamp: Secret]

[Stamp: Top Secret]

[Stamp: Restricted]

[Stamp: Classified]

[Stamp: Sensitive]

[Stamp: NTM]

[Stamp: Release]

[Stamp: Date]

[Stamp: Time]

[Stamp: Month]

[Stamp: Year]
Please accept my sincere sympathy in this hour of anxiety. Major General A. P. Clark, Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, Washington. This headquarters will be responsible for all future notifications regarding AB-47. No changes in status of missing personnel will be made without the prior concurrence of this headquarters.

On above personnel TBD from Forbes AFB, Kansas.

[Signature]
Capt. Luther

DD, May 23, 173-1
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REFERENCE

DATE: July 12, 1960

REFERRED TO:

Major Bjerkelund - AF, AFMP-S-1, Rm. 5E269

RE: Air Force Headquarters, The Pentagon

WRITER HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THIS REFERENCE

COMMENTS:

Attached herewith are 12 copies of the Department's Press Release No. 388 Re: U.S. Reply to Soviet Note of July 11. Copy sent to following on 14 July 1960:

Lt Col Ruth McGraw, Hq. SAC, Offutt AFB and to

Capt Gustau A. Eggersten, Forbes AFB Kansas.

SIGNATURE

R. T. Davies, Public Affairs Adviser

OFFICE OR DIVISION Office of Soviet Union Affairs
JULY 12, 1960

UNITED STATES REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 11

The Embassy of the United States of America today delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow the following note, in reply to the Soviet note of July 11, regarding the shooting down of the U.S. Air Force RB-47 aircraft:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with reference to the Ministry's note No. 67/OSA of July 11 has the honor to convey, upon instruction of the Government of the United States of America, the following:

The Ministry's note cannot, in view of the nature of the circumstances concerned, represent other than willful misinterpretation and misstatement of fact.

The United States Air Force airplane in question, with a crew of six, was proceeding on an entirely legitimate mission over international waters and at no time penetrated Soviet territory or even areas which have been claimed at one time or another as territorial waters or air space of the Soviet Union. At no time was the airplane closer to Soviet land territory than about 30 miles (approximately 48 kilometers).

It is therefore evident that pursuant to instructions of the Soviet Government airplanes of the Soviet Air Force wantonly attacked the American airplane over international waters with the admitted loss of that aircraft and of the life of at least one of the members of its crew. Two other members of the crew have, according to the Soviet note, been taken into custody without any legal basis and are to be subjected to trial under what is called "full severity of Soviet law." The three other members of the crew remain unaccounted for.

The Ministry's note attempts to establish some kind of link between this flight of an American Air Force airplane over international waters with the incident which occurred over Soviet territory on May 1. These flights were, as must be known to the Soviet Government, entirely different in character. The Air Force flight on July 1 was one of a continuous series of electromagnetic research flights well known to the Soviet Government to have taken place over a period of more than ten years. Instructions to the crews of these airplanes rigidly require that the aircraft remain well outside the air space of Soviet territory.

The Government
The Government of the United States of America rejects the completely unfounded allegations contained in the Ministry’s note under reference. It solemnly and vigorously protests the unwarranted shooting down of an American airplane over international waters and the cynical failure of the Soviet Government to make its action known for a period of days during which a search for the missing men was known to be in progress, in which the Soviet Government was voluntarily participating in what was apparently good faith. It demands release to its custody of the two United States Air Force officers admitted to be in Soviet custody. It further demands that a representative of the United States Embassy in Moscow be permitted to see these men without delay. Additionally, it demands that the body of Captain Palm be returned to the custody of United States officials immediately.

The Government of the United States is prepared to undertake in cooperation with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other authority as might be acceptable to both sides, a thorough search for the downed airplane and the missing members of its crew and examination of such remains of the aircraft as may be located.

The Government of the United States of America reserves its right to demand full compensation from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for its unjustified action in this matter. It should be clear to the Soviet Government that a repetition of acts of this nature cannot fail to have the most serious consequences, responsibility for which would rest upon the Soviet Government alone.

* * *

STATE--RD, Wash., D. C.
UNCLASSIFIED

AF IN: 44571 (12 Jul 60)
INFO: OOP, CIN, XPD, XDC, ODC, CJA, CCS, SAFS, CDF, CIG, FMP-

PROM: MOSCOW
NR: 67 SECTION II OF II 11 JUL 60

NOTE: Section I is AF IN 44578 (12 Jul 60)
FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 67, JULY 11, 5:53 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

FACT

JUST TWO MONTHS AGO AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITES USA WHICH EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN PREMEDITATED INTRUSION OF AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT INTO USSR WITH ESPIONAGE PURPOSES, AND IN DECLARATION SUCH PROVOCATIVE ACTS AS NATIONAL POLICY OF US, LED TO BREAK-UP BY GOVT USA OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND WERE UNANIMOUSLY CONDEMned BY PUBLIC OPINION ENTIRE WORLD. NEW VIOLATION OF BORDERS SOVIET UNION BY AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT SHOWS THAT GOVT USA IS CONTINUING PROCEED ON SAME PATH DANGEROUS FOR CAUSE OF PEACE. NOW EVERYONE SEES WHAT IS REAL VALUE OF SOLEMN ASSURANCES OF GOVT USA AND OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER PERSONALLY CONCERNING THE ORDER SUPPOSEDLY GIVEN BY PRESIDENT TO STOP ESPIONAGE FLIGHTS BY AMERICAN AVIATION OVER TERRITORY USSR.

QUESTION ARISSES WHAT PURPOSES GOVT USA IS PURSUING, CONTINUING POLICY AGGRESSIVE INTRUSIONS INTO AIR SPACE SOVIET UNION. THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE ANSWER, ACTIONS GOVT USA REPRESENT PREMEDITATED VIOLATION GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLICY OF CONSCIOUS PROVOCATIONS DIRECTED TOWARD INFLAMING SITUATION AND INCREASING THREAT OF WAR.

IN THIS, AS PREVIOUSLY, USA IS CONTINUING USE FOR ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS TOWARD SOVIET UNION MILITARY BASES ESTABLISHED BY IT ON TERRITORIES OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ALLIES OF USA IN MILITARY BLOCS.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-2- 67, JULY 11, 5:53 P.M. NIAC (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

IF FATE AMERICAN PILOTS WHOSE LIVES, EVIDENTLY, ARE LITTLE VALUED BY GOVT USA AND ARE CONSCIOUSLY SACRIFICED BY IT IN ORGANIZING ESPIONAGE FLIGHTS OVER USSR, MAY BE REGARDED AS INTERNAL AFFAIR OF USA, THEN THIS CAN BY NO MEANS BE SAID OF ENORMOUS THREAT TO GENERAL PEACE WHICH ARISES FROM PROVOCATORY ACTIONS OF GOVT USA. THIS IS QUESTION TO WHICH NEITHER SOVIET UNION NOR ANY OTHER STATE SHOWING GENUINE CONCERN FOR PRESERVATION OF PEACE CAN BE INDIFFERENT.

CONSIDERING THAT VIOLATION OF BORDER WAS IN PRESENT CASE CUT OFF IN ITS INITIAL STAGE, SOVIET GOVT CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT ITSELF TO DESTRUCTION OF VIOLATING PLANE AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT OF SURVIVING MEMBERS OF ITS CREW, WHO WILL BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO FULL SEVERITY SOVIET LAWS.

AT SAME TIME SOVIET GOVT IN ALL SERIOUSNESS WARNS GOVT USA OF THOSE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES TO WHICH CONTINUATION OF PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WILL LEAD AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHICH WILL REST ON GOVT USA.

GOVT USA CANNOT BUT KNOW TO WHAT CONSEQUENCES ITS POLICY OF CONSCIOUS PROVOCATIONS AGAINST SOVIET UNION CAN LEAD. IT CAN FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER CONCEAL THIS FROM ITS PEOPLE. HOWEVER, GOVT USSR CONSIDERS IT ITS DUTY TO WARN GOVT USA THAT IT HAS NO RIGHT TO PLAY WITH FATE OF WORLD. AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THIS WARNING AS WELL AS OF FACT THAT SOVIET UNION HAS DONE AND IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE NOT TO BRING UPON PEOPLES DISASTERS OF A NEW WAR AND THAT GUILT FOR GRAVE TRIALS TO WHICH WORLD IS TODAY-SUBJECTED WHOLLY RESTS ON GOVT USA.

/SOVIET
SOVIET GOVT WITH DEEP REGRET HAS TO STATE THAT GOVTS OF SOME STATES WHO ARE ALLIES OF USA IN MILITARY BLOCS HAVE NOT YET DRAWN NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FROM KNOWN FACTS CONNECTED WITH AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF USA AIR FORCE PERMITTING USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY BASES SITUATED ON THEIR TERRITORY, THEY CONTINUE TO PURSUE POLICY OF PARTICIPATION IN AFOREMENTIONED AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, AND THROUGH THIS BRING GREAT DANGER UPON PEOPLES OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

IN CONNECTION WITH NEW VIOLATION OF SOVIET BORDER BY AN AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH TOOK PLACE JULY 1, GOVT USSR MAKES A DECISIVE PROTEST TO GOVT USA.

MOSCOW, JULY 11, 1960.

FREERS

HZK-23
UNCLASSIFIED

AF IN: 44578 (12 Jul 60)

INFO: OOP, CIN, XPD, XDC, ODC, CJA, CCS, SAFS, CDF, CIG, PMP-S-1

FROM: MOSCOW

NR: 67 SECTION I OF II 11 JUL 60
-2- 67, JULY 11, 8:00 P.M. NIACT (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

AIRCRAFT WERE PICKED UP BY SOVIET SHIP IN TERRITORIAL WATERS OF USSR. THEY PROVED TO BE: NAVIGATOR OF THE AIRCRAFT, FIRST LIEUTENANT OF USAF JOHN RICHARD MACCOUN, BORN IN 1932 IN STATE OF MISSOURI, AND SECOND PILOT FIRST LIEUTENANT OF USAF FREEMAN BRUCE OLMSTEAD, BORN IN 1935, IN STATE OF NEW YORK.

AS MACCOUN AND OLMSTEAD STATED ON INTERROGATION, AIRCRAFT ON WHICH THEY FLEW, A SIX-MOTOR RECONNAISSANCE BOMBER, TYPE "RB-47", BELONGED TO AVIATION SUB-UNIT OF AMERICAN MILITARY-STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE INCLUDED IN 55TH WING, AND WAS EXECUTING SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHARACTER. AIRCRAFT WAS ARMED WITH TWO 20-MILIMETER CANNONS WITH SUPPLY AMMUNITION FOR THEM AND HAD COMPARTMENT IN WHICH SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE PHOTO AND RADIO-ELECTRONIC APPARATUS WAS LOCATED.

ACCORDING TO OLMSTEAD AND MACCOUN, FOUR OTHER PERSONS WERE INCLUDED IN CREW AIRCRAFT IN ADDITION THEMSELVES: COMMANDER AIRCRAFT CAPTAIN PALM AND THREE OFFICERS — SPECIALISTS ON PHOTO AND RADIO-ELECTRONIC APPARATUS — CAPTAIN POWSE AND FIRST LIEUTENANTS GOUFFORT AND PHILLIPS. BODY FIRST PILOT DOWNS AIRCRAFT, CAPTAIN PALM, FOUND BY SOVIET VESSEL IN RUBBER BOAT AND TAKEN ON BOARD. SEARCH FOR OTHER MEMBERS CREW AIRCRAFT PRODUCED NO RESULTS.

ACCORDING EVIDENCE OF OLMSTEAD AND MACCOUN, AIRCRAFT "RB-47" ON WHICH THEY WERE FLYING TOOK OFF JULY 1, 1960 AT 1000 HOURS GREENWICH TIME FROM AMERICAN MILITARY BASE LOCATED IN BRASE-NORTON (ENGLAND) ON COURSE ALONG NORTHERN BOUNDARIES NORWAY AND SOVIET UNION WITH ORDERS
FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 07, JULY 11, 8:00 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

EXACT

FOLLOWING NOTE HANDED TO ME BY GRUMYKO TODAY.

BEGIN TEXT:

"NO. 07, USA.

GOVERNMENT USSR ADDRESSES US GOVERNMENT WITH THIS NOTE IN CONNECTION WITH NEW RUDE VIOLATION OF AIR SPACE OF SOVIET UNION BY AN AIRCRAFT OF ARMED FORCES USA.

ON JULY 1, 1960 AN UNKNOWN MILITARY AIRCRAFT MOVING TOWARD BORDER OF SOVIET UNION WAS DETECTED IN BARENTS SEA NEAR KOLA PENINSULA BY AIR WARNING SERVICE OF SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE TROOPS. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WAS SENT UP TO ESTABLISH NATIONALITY OF THIS AIRCRAFT AND TO PREVENT IT FROM AN INTRUSION INTO TERRITORY OF USSR.

PILOT OF SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ESTABLISHED THAT UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT WAS BOMBER WITH IDENTIFICATION MARKS OF USA AIRFORCE. AMERICAN AIRCRAFT VIOLATED STATE BORDERS OF USSR 22 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CAPE SVYATAY NOY AND WAS MOVING IN DIRECTION OF CITY OF ARKHANGELSK.

DESPITE SIGNALS GIVEN BY SOVIET FIGHTER (#) CONTINUE TO PENETRATE DEEPER INTO BORDERS OF AIRSPACE OF SOVIET UNION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDING ORDER OF ARMED FORCES OF SOVIET UNION CONCERNING DEFENSE OF SOVIET BORDERS AIRCRAFT-VIOLATOR WAS BROUGHT DOWN AT 18 HOURS 03 MINUTES.

AIRCRAFT TIME OVER SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS EAST OF CAPE SVYATAY NOY.

AFTER SOME TIME TWO PERSONS FROM CREW OF DOWNE AIRCRAFT..."

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
RETURN UPON COMPLETION OF ITS ASSIGNMENT TO SAME BASE IN ENGLAND, WHERE SUB-UNIT OF USAF TO WHICH THIS AIRCRAFT BELONGED IS LOCATED. BEFORE TAKE-OFF, CREW AIRCRAFT WAS WARNED BY COMMANDER OF THEIR SUB-UNIT AT BRASE-NORTON BASE MAJOR DEBELL THAT FLIGHT MUST BE KEPT IN STRICT SECRECY AND THEREFORE CREW WAS FORBIDDEN MAINTAIN REGULAR RADIO CONTACT WITH BASE.

HZK-23

(##) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
Newport R.I. (AP)-Officially ordered United States silence prevailed today as President Eisenhower awaited a government report on Russia's assertion it has shot down another American plane.

The order to all federal officials to keep mum was announced at the summer white house yesterday.

Press Secretary Hagerty told a news conference there would be no public comment from anyone in the administration pending receipt of the report.

The President sent word to the State and Defense departments that he wants full information on the Moscow charges and that no federal spokesman should comment while the charges are being studied.
ADD PLANE, MOSCOW

Ironically, the Soviet Union announced that it was sending a Coast Guard cutter to help with the search, but Western sources said it never was seen by the search craft.

The missing RB-47's last reported position was given by the U.S. Air Force as 73.30 north and 35.00 east, a point that would have put it off Russia's Kola Peninsula.

Thearents Sea, where the Soviet broadcast said the plane was shot down, lies in this general area. Thearents Sea lies north of Scandinavia and European Russia.

At the time the U.S. Air Force announced the plane was missing, the spokesman at Wiesbaden said that although it was "highly unlikely" the plane had entered the Soviet Union, "anything can happen."

"If the plane was flying over the water near the (Soviet) border," the spokesman said at the time, "it might be very difficult for it to have told where it was exactly. It is always possible, too, that the plane was set by Soviet interceptors while flying in the vicinity of the border."

7/11--JR1250P

ADD PLANE, MOSCOW

(The summer White House at Newport, R.I., had no immediate comment on the Soviet report.)

The plane shot down July 1 was the second U.S. plane downed by the Soviet Union in two months. The Russians reported they downed a U-2 spy plane over Sverdlovsk on May 1. The plane's pilot, Francis Powers, has been indicted by Soviet authorities and is to stand trial for espionage.

7/11--JR1253P

ADD PLANE, MOSCOW

Radio Moscow said the protest notes were handed today by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to British Ambassador Sir Patrick Reilly, the Norwegian Ambassador and U.S. Charge D'Affaires Edward Freers, who is substituting for American Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, currently vacationing in Italy.

The Soviet notes all concerned "the violation on July 1, 1960, of the Soviet frontier by an American military plane."

The Soviet note to the United States said one corpse was recovered after the plane was shot down.

The note said three other persons were missing from the plane.

The Russian note said no trace was found of the missing men aboard the U.S. plane.

7/11--JR100P
THE SOVIET NOTE, ACCORDING TO RADIO MOSCOW, SAID THE "NEW CROSS VIOLATION BY AN AMERICAN AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT" OCCURRED IN THE BARENTS SEA NEAR THE KOLA PENINSULA. IT SAID SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES SPOTTED THE PLANE "FLYING TOWARDS THE FRONTIER OF THE U.S.S.R."

RUSSIA'S NOTE SAID A FIGHTER WAS DISPATCHED TO IDENTIFY THE "UNKNOWN MILITARY AIRCRAFT" AND TO "PREVENT IT INTRUDING INTO THE CONFINES OF U.S.S.R. TERRITORY."

RADIO MOSCOW SAID THE SOVIET NOTE TO LONDON ACCUSED "BRITAIN OF BEING AN ACCOMPlice OF THE UNITED STATES IN ACTS HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WARMS BRITAIN OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES."

THE SOVIET NOTE IDENTIFIED THE CORPSE PICKED UP AS THAT OF A "CAPT. PALM."

THE OFFICIAL CREW LIST GIVEN OUT BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AT WIESBADEN ON JULY 2 CONTAINED THE NAME OF CAPT. WILLIAM C. PALM, 39, OF 369 EAST DRIVE, OAK RIDGE, TENN.

THE RUSSIANS SAID THE TWO AMERICAN SURVIVORS WERE 1ST LT. FREEMAN OLMSTEAD, 24, OF ELIINA, N.Y., AND 1ST LT. JOHN R. MCKONE, 28, OF TONGANOXIE, KAN.

THE RUSSIANS SAID THE RUSSIAN FIGHTER IDENTIFIED THE PLANE AS AMERICAN BY ITS MARKINGS.

RUSSIA SAID THE AMERICAN PLANE CROSSED INTO SOVIET AIR SPACE 13.67 MILES NORTH OF THE CAPE OF SVYATOGORY NOX AND PROCEEDED TOWARD THE SOVIET CITY OF ARCHANGEL.

THE RUSSIANS SAID THE RUSSIAN FIGHTER IGNORED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE RUSSIAN FIGHTER TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET PLANE AND LAND.

7/11--TS123FED
JULIETTIN
PLANE
LONDON (AP)-THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED TODAY IT HAD SHOT DOWN A MISSING AMERICAN
PLANE OVER THE BARENTS SEA JULY 1 AND THAT THE TWO MEN WERE PICKED UP.
EH1230PED 7/11

LONDON--ADD PLANE (76)
MOSCOW RADIO SAID A NEW SOVIET NOTE WAS HANDED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY PROTESTING A
"VIOLATION" OF ITS AIR SPACE BY THE RB-47 RECONNAISSANCE CRAFT. THIS WAS THE FIRST
WORD OF THE FATE OF THE PLANE, WHICH DISAPPEARED JULY 1 WITH SIX MEN ABOARD WHILE
ON A SCOUTING FLIGHT OVER WATERS NORTH OF NORWAY AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE U.S.
AIR FORCE SAID THE PLANE, BASED TEMPORARILY IN ENGLAND, HAD BEEN ON AN ELECTROMAGN
MAPPING MISSION. MOSCOW RADIO SAID THE SURVIVORS WOULD BE PROSECUTED "WITH FULL
SEVERITY OF SOVIET LAW." THE SOVIET BROADCAST SAID RUSSIAN NOTES ALSO HAVE BEEN
HANDED TO BRITAIN AND NORWAY.
EH1238PED 7.

UPI-79
ADD PLANE, MOSCOW
A U.S. AIR FORCE RB-47 RECONNAISSANCE BOMBER WITH SIX MEN ABOARD HAS BEEN MISSING
SINCE JULY 1 AND WAS FEARED TO HAVE CRASHED NEAR THE SOVIET COAST. A U.S. AIR
FORCE SPOKESMAN AT WIESBADEN, GERMANY, SAID A DAY AFTER THE PLANE DISAPPEARED THAT
IN A MAP-MAKING FLIGHT FROM BRITAIN TO NORWAY. HE SAID ITS ENTIRE ROUTE WAS OVER
WATER AND THAT IT WAS NOT SCHEDULED TO HAVE FLOWN OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. AN ARMADA
NEARLY 20 U.S. AND ALLIED SEARCH PLANES SCOUNDED THE AREA FOR THE MISSING PLANE.
7/11--JR1242P
LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1954 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to refer to the Security Council proceedings of 10 September 1954 in which the Council considered the United States complaint of an unprovoked attack by Soviet military aircraft against a United States Navy airplane over high seas on 4 September 1954. I wish to refer also to Document S/3295 which relates to another attack of this type and which was circulated to Council members at my request.

In my statement before the Council on September 10 I affirmed the determination of the United States Government to seek a negotiated settlement of claims arising out of incidents of this type and, in absence of such settlements to submit them to impartial adjudication by the International Court of Justice.

The United States Government, in a note delivered to the Soviet Government on 9 October 1954, has now presented a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government on account of the destruction by Soviet aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 aircraft in the international air space over the Sea of Japan on 29 July 1953 and has invited the Soviet Government, if it denies liability, to join in submitting this matter to the International Court of Justice. In this note, the United States Government also reiterates its demand for the release of any survivors of the destroyed American aircraft. The note, based on a thorough investigation, follows an earlier interchange of notes on this subject. It deals with another of the series of hostile attacks against the United States aircraft to which I referred in my statement before the Council.

May I ask you, Mr. President, to circulate a copy of the attached text of this note to the Members of the Council.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Text of note presenting formal diplomatic claim by the United States Government against the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the case of USAF B-50 aircraft shot down over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953.
Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit, upon the instruction of my Government, the following communication from my Government to your Government:

The Government of the United States of America refers again to the destruction on July 29, 1955 by Soviet military aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 type aircraft off Cape Povorotny in the international air space over the Sea of Japan. On January 26, 1954, following an intensive investigation and study of the incident, the United States Government delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a note requesting certain detailed information with respect to the incident and with respect to the various allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes of July 30, 1953, August 4, 1953 and August 26, 1953. The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government’s note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government, through its Embassy at Moscow, transmitted another note on May 25, 1954 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgement whatever to either note, although far more than sufficient time has elapsed to enable the Soviet Government to make a reply or to state its intentions with respect to such reply. The United States Government must conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Government is fully aware that it is not in a position to make a responsive or adequate reply to the United States Government’s note of January 26, 1954.

This circumstance, the United States Government concludes, reinforces and confirms the essential accuracy of the findings of fact resulting from the United States Government’s own investigation and study, as well as of the statements made in the various communications of the United States Government to the Soviet Government on this subject, particularly the United States Government’s note of August 4, 1953.

The United States Government therefore takes this opportunity to place solemnly upon the record the facts relevant to the Soviet Government’s liability and to prefer against the Soviet Government a formal international diplomatic claim for damages as set forth below.
The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum, and it charges, the following:

1. Early in the morning of July 29, 1953 a four-engine aircraft of the United States Air Force, of the B-50 type, was duly dispatched from its base in Japan by United States Air Force authorities to perform a routine navigational mission in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan, returning to base in Japan upon completion of the mission. The officers and crew were instructed prior to departure that under no circumstances was the aircraft to fly closer to the Soviet-held land mass than twelve nautical miles.

Upon its departure the B-50 type aircraft had on board a crew of seventeen persons, all members of the United States Air Force and all nationals of the United States. They were, as the Soviet Government was informed in the United States Government's note on August 4, 1953, the following:

Stanley Keith O'Kelley - Captain - Serial No. AO 776002
John Ernst Roche - Captain - Serial No. AO 2029268
Edmund Joseph Czyz - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2072656
Lloyd Clayton Wiggins - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 695999
James Gordon Keith - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2092926
Warren John Sanderson - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2066184
Robert Elbon Stalnaker - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 761337
John Cyrus Ward - Captain - Serial No. AO 655270
Francisco Joseph Tejeda - Major - Serial No. AO 726704
Frank Ernest Boyer - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2003286
Francis Luther Brown - Master Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 053497
Donald Wayne Gabree - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 333787
Roland Edgar Goulee - A/1C - Serial No. AF 12 327933
James Edwin Woods - A/2C - Serial No. AF 24413122
Charles Joseph Russell - A/2C - Serial No. AF 13 351658
Donald George Hill - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 53976
Earl Wilbur Rudelin, Jr. - A/2C - Serial No. AF 14 370732
The B-50 aircraft proceeded on a course of approximately 315 degrees from the Japanese Island of Honshu. When it arrived in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan at a point approximately 50 miles from the coastline, the aircraft turned to the right and proceeded on an easterly heading, flying at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet, the crew carrying out the instructions given them as above stated.

The aircraft had reached a point in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Povorotny, flying on a heading of approximately 95 degrees at an altitude of 20,000 feet when suddenly, at approximately 6:15 in the morning local time and without any prior warning whatever, Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft intercepted and fired upon the United States aircraft. One MIG-15 type aircraft commenced the interception and firing by coming up from below and to the left of the B-50 and shooting the No. 1 engine, rendering it inoperative. One or more additional MIG-15 type aircraft thereupon appeared behind the B-50, directed fire on the No. 4 engine and upon the right wing and other portions of the aircraft, and set the No. 4 engine on fire. When the Soviet MIG-15 aircraft appeared from behind, shooting at the B-50, one or more of the personnel on board the B-50 aircraft opened fire in self-defense against the oncoming attacking MIG-15 aircraft, but to no avail.

Immediately upon being hit, the B-50 aircraft dived sharply, losing altitude rapidly. The shots from the rear attack tore off the right wing and the tail section and caused the aircraft to disintegrate. The component parts of the B-50 then hit the water, at approximately the same position at which the interception and attack took place. The total time which elapsed between the commencement of the attack until the component parts of the aircraft hit the water was approximately two minutes.

Upon the B-50's first becoming disabled, in consequence of the actions of the MIG-15 aircraft against it, the members of the crew of the B-50 were directed by the aircraft commander, Captain Stanley K. O’Kelley, to abandon the aircraft and to seek safety by bailing out of the aircraft. The United States Government is informed and believes that, apart from First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, all members of the crew above named bailed out of the aircraft, or parachuted, into the Sea of Japan, all coming down at points within the area of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Povorotny.
The United States Government finds, and charges, that all the actions of the MIG-15 type aircraft above described were taken upon the deliberate and willful orders of competent Soviet authorities.

When the B-50 failed to return to its base at the time required for its return, and could not be otherwise accounted for, the competent United States authorities commenced and conducted a meticulous and thorough search of the area by aircraft and by surface vessels of the United States Government and with the assistance of a naval vessel of the Australian Government in the area. The search of the Sea of Japan off Cape Pavorotny succeeded in the sighting in the international waters of several survivors and disclosed the active presence in the same area of Soviet PT-type boats, trawlers and aircraft. One of the search aircraft dropped a lifeboat to a group of survivors but only Captain John E. Roche, the co-pilot, was able to reach the lifeboat and get into it. Intermittent fog hampered the rescue efforts and no other personnel could be rescued by the United States and Australian surface vessels. When the weather in the area cleared up, by dawn of July 30, 1953, no evidence of survivors, other than Captain Roche, could be seen in the international waters of the Sea of Japan by the air or surface rescue craft.

2. The United States Government finds, and charges, that in direct consequence of the Soviet Government's actions above described, the following took place:

a. The B-50 aircraft was totally destroyed.

b. First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, navigator situated in the nose of the aircraft, was thrown from his position and mortally wounded, so that he was unable to bail out of the aircraft, and died.

c. Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and shock and of his exposure for approximately twenty hours in the Sea of Japan.

d. Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, flight engineer, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and of shock and of long exposure in the Sea of Japan.
o. Captain John Ernst Roche, the co-pilot, was thrown headlong into the body of the aircraft, suffering numerous bodily injuries and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft but he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft. He suffered further shock and exposure in the Sea of Japan from approximately 6:17 in the morning local time July 29, 1953, to approximately 4:20 in the morning local time July 30, 1953. He was rescued from the waters of the Sea of Japan by a search vessel of the United States Navy.

f. The remaining thirteen members of the crew have not so far been accounted for. The United States Government finds, however, that all of them suffered bodily injury and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft. It finds further that a number, if not all, of them successfully parachuted to the surface of the Sea of Japan in the area above described in which the attack and destruction of the B-50 took place. It must conclude that these persons were either picked up alive by surface vessels of the Soviet Government in the area in which they hit the water, or that in due course, dead or alive, they were carried by the prevailing currents to Soviet-held territory and into the Soviet Government's custody. Those dead, the United States Government finds and charges, were brought to their death by the injuries caused in the course of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, by shock and by exposure in the waters of the Sea of Japan. Those that were alive when they came into the custody of the Soviet Government, the United States Government finds and charges, suffered in addition injuries and anguish caused by their long detention by the Soviet Government, by the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government with respect to their whereabouts and their condition or to permit them to communicate with United States Government authorities.

These conclusions are based on the following considerations:

(i) As the United States Government has previously indicated, personnel on board search craft of the United States Government observed at least twelve Soviet PT-type boats, at least one armed trawler-type Soviet naval vessel, and Soviet aircraft, proceeding at high speed to and from the area of the scene of the incident. Other surface vessels of Soviet nationality were in the vicinity,
These observations were made as late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon local time July 29, 1953. In view of the failure of the Soviet Government to make responsive reply to questions of the United States Government in its note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government is confirmed in its conclusion, and it charges, that these Soviet craft picked up survivors and portions of the disabled B-50 aircraft.

(ii) The prevailing currents of the Sea of Japan at the positions above mentioned and at the date of the incident, which are well known to the Soviet Government, move toward the coast, in a northerly and northwesterly direction at a rate of approximately 0.7 to 1.1 knots. Even if the Soviet Government did not have these crew members in custody, dead or alive, earlier, it must have become aware of their arrival in Soviet territorial waters or on Soviet soil by August 1, 1953.

3. The B-50 aircraft at the time of the attack upon it and its destruction, and the navigational and flying equipment thereon, were in efficient and good working order. Each member of the crew was efficient and experienced in the performance of his task. In particular, Captain O'Elley, the aircraft commander, was an efficient and experienced pilot; Captain Roche was an efficient and experienced co-pilot; First Lieutenant Cryz, First Lieutenant Wiggins and First Lieutenant Keith were efficient and experienced navigators.

II

The United States Government finds as a result of its investigation that in its notes above mentioned the Soviet Government willfully and knowingly made material misstatements of fact for the purpose of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States Government. These misstatements of fact are most explicitly made in the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953 on this subject, which substantially reiterates the misstatements contained in the Soviet Government's earlier notes on the same subject:

1. The Soviet Government states that the B-50 aircraft at about 6 a.m. local time "violated the state boundary of the USSR, at first in the region of Cape Gamev, and continued the flight over the territory of the USSR at Askold Island not far from Vladivostok". But the Soviet Government has refused, although
duly requested, to state where the boundary, which it claims, runs in this
region. The United States Government must therefore conclude, as it has found,
that the B-50 aircraft at no time crossed into territory of the Soviet Union in
this area but, on the contrary, flew entirely in the air space over the
international waters of the Sea of Japan.

2. The Soviet Government states that two Soviet fighter aircraft approached
the B-50 with the intention of showing the B-50 that it was within the boundaries
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with the intention of suggesting
that the B-50 leave the air space of the Soviet Union. This statement must be
characterized as false, as well as misleading, since the first intimation which
the crew of the B-50 had of the approach of any aircraft was the destruction of
the No. 1 engine on the B-50 by fire directed from one of the Soviet MIG-15 type
aircraft, which had appeared without any warning whatever to the left and from
below the B-50 aircraft. This fact and the shooting which immediately followed
directed by MIG-15 type aircraft coming up without warning from behind the B-50
aircraft conclusively demonstrates that it was the intention of the MIG-15
interceptors, and of the competent Soviet authorities who dispatched them and
controlled their actions, to give the crew of the B-50 aircraft no warning
whatever but, on the contrary, to effect the B-50's destruction without any
warning or opportunity to the crew to disengage or to defend themselves.

3. The Soviet Government's statement permits the implication that the
interception of the B-50 by Soviet aircraft took place within the air space over
Soviet territory. This statement is false also. As has been stated above, the
interception as well as the attack took place approximately forty miles south of
Cape Povorotny and in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of
Japan.

4. The Soviet Government states that fire was first opened by the B-50,
being directed against the intercepting Soviet aircraft. This statement is false.
As the United States Government has stated above, the B-50 aircraft did not open
fire until after two firing passes had been made by the Soviet intercepting
aircraft. The first MIG-15 type aircraft, which as stated above without warning
destroyed the No. 1 engine, flew away unscathed. When immediately thereafter one
or more MIG-15 type aircraft appeared from behind, the MIG aircraft were firing
and the gunners on board the B-50 were compelled in self-defense to open fire
against the MIG aircraft so firing upon the B-50.
5. The Soviet Government states that the attack took place at 6:12 in the morning local time. The United States Government charges that this statement is untrue and is known by the Soviet Government to be untrue. The United States Government has found that the interception and attack took place not earlier than 6:15 in the morning local time, if not later. By this time the B-50 aircraft, as the Soviet authorities well know, had reached a point approximately forty miles off the Soviet land mass at its closest proximity.

6. The Soviet Government states that one of the Soviet aircraft was seriously damaged by fire from the B-50 in consequence of which the Soviet aircraft was compelled to fire upon the B-50. This statement is misleading as well as false. Even if, contrary to fact, the B-50 gunners had opened fire on the MiG aircraft appearing from the rear, the destruction of the No. 1 engine by the MiG aircraft which appeared first and the hostile attitude of the MiG aircraft appearing in the rear would have justified the B-50 gunners in opening fire on the MiG aircraft.

7. The Soviet Government states that after the Soviet aircraft fired on the B-50 the B-50 "departed in the direction of the sea" and that the Soviet authorities have no further information regarding the American military aircraft. This statement must be characterized as false as well as misleading. As stated above, within seconds after the Soviet aircraft hit the right wing and fuselage the B-50 disintegrated and fell into the sea. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft could not but have seen the consequence of their actions and reported it to the competent Soviet authorities. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government admits that the pilots upon returning to base, if not earlier, reported what they had done and what had happened.

8. The Soviet Government indicates that it has "verified data", presumably including reports of ground observers as well as the testimony of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved, and that these data "refute the statement that the American airplane B-50 did not violate the boundary of the USSR and was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan". The Soviet Government, although duly requested, in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, has failed and refused to produce these supporting data. The United States Government is compelled to conclude that such data as exist do not support the Soviet Government's conclusion and that these statements are therefore false.
9. The Soviet Government states that, contrary to the allegations contained in the United States Government's notes, there were no Soviet surface ships on July 29, 1953 in the area of the Sea of Japan in which the shooting incident took place, and it further implies that the weather conditions of fog and darkness were such that the observations of the crews of search craft reported in the United States Government's notes were not in fact made. These statements as above indicated, are false and misleading. The weather, during the hours of daylight, was in fact foggy but at the low altitudes at which the search aircraft flew, and on the surface of the sea at which the naval craft proceeded, there was as the Soviet Government well knows intermittent visibility permitting the observations which were made and which were reported by the United States Government.

10. The Soviet Government states that "as a result of investigation, it has been confirmed that the Soviet authorities have no information concerning the crew of the American bomber B-50". For the reasons above stated this statement must be characterized as false and misleading.

III

The United States Government finds and it charges that the foregoing action of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft and of the competent Soviet authorities made the Soviet Government guilty of deliberate and wilful violations of international law, on account of which it has become liable to the United States Government for damages and other amends.

1. Since the Soviet Government has evaded the questions in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government declares that the limit of the territory of the Soviet Government in the area of the incident extends no further than three nautical miles from the mean low water mark of the shore line of the Soviet-held land mass in this area, following the sinuosities of the coast and the sinuosities of each of the Soviet-held islands. While the United States Government in instructions to its personnel has prohibit any overflying aircraft or seagoing craft from coming closer than twelve miles to Soviet-held territory in traversing the international waters of the Sea of Japan or the air space above, the United States Government takes this opportunity
again to inform the Soviet Government that it does not recognize the claim of the
Soviet Government to territorial waters in excess of three miles from its coast.

In the opinion of the United States Government there is no obligation under
international law to recognize claims to territorial waters in excess of three
miles from the coast.

2. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the Soviet Government
to make every effort, following the wrongful destruction of the B-50 aircraft,
to search for and pick up members of the crew, dead or alive, to cooperate with
all other searching aircraft and surface craft in such search and rescue
operations, and promptly to turn over to authorities of the United States
Government rescued personnel, the bodies of any dead personnel picked up and any
portions of the aircraft salvaged; or to make arrangements for their prompt
delivery to the United States Government. The failure of the Soviet Government
to do so constitutes violation of international obligations.

3. It was the duty of the Soviet Government to make truthful statements
to the United States Government in the notes above mentioned which the Soviet
Government delivered to the United States Government in connection with this
incident. The willful making of false or misleading statements in these
circumstances constitutes a violation of international obligation.

4. The continued detention of survivors by the Soviet Government, and the
failure of the Soviet Government immediately upon receipt of information at any
time from its own sources of the observation of bodies of any of the crew members
constitute violations of the part of the Soviet Government of international
obligation.

5. Any shooting by the crew of the B-50 at the MIG aircraft, in the
circumstances of the case, was lawful as an exercise of the right of self-defense.
The B-50 having been fired upon and hit without prior warning, the crew of the
B-50 were justified in the exercise of self-defense in shooting at the approaching
MIG aircraft.
The United States has suffered the following items of damage in direct consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty and international legal obligations, for which the Soviet Government is liable, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet Government pay the following sums on account thereof:

1. United States Air Force airplane B-5C type No. 47-145A and equipment thereon, amounting in total to $1,468,908.56.
2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government $491,584.38.
3. Damages to Captain John Ernst Roche, a national of the United States, for injuries to him, $250,000.00.
4. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, for the deaths of Captain Stanley Keith O'Kelley, Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, $150,000.00.
5. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, of the remaining thirteen crew members for all injuries resulting from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government, including the wrongful deaths of such crew members or the wrongful and unlawful detention by the Soviet Government of such members of the crew as survived, $650,000.00.

The United States Government declares that its demand for compensation on account of the members of the crew who survived does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the withholding of those crew members from return to the United States, or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding their whereabouts or welfare, or the making of false statements by the Soviet Government with respect thereto. The United States takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government forthwith provide the information in this regard which the United States Government has already requested, and make provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide such crew members with the maximum degree of care and comfort and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States.
Government. The United States Government further declares that such demand for compensation with respect to members of the crew whose bodies came into custody of Soviet authorities but who were no longer alive does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of such facts or to turn over such bodies to the United States Government. The United States Government further reserves the right to make additional demand upon the Soviet Government for amends or other actions on account of its conduct on or since July 29, 1953 with respect to such survivors or such dead crew members.

Furthermore, the United States Government has not included in its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the United States Government and to the American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government. In this regard the United States Government had determined to defer to a future date the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Government and against the American people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this communication.

Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the United States Government deems an international dispute to exist falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government invites the
Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules to determine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth herein.

The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
There follows a translation of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs note No. 129/OSA:

"No. 129/OSA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and in connection with Embassy note No. 381 of December 7 this year has the honor to state that according to renewed inquiries conducted by the Ministry, Soviet authorities have no information concerning the members of the crew of the American aircraft "B-50."

Moscow, December 26, 1955

To the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow."

For the Ambassador:

John C. Guthrie
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Russian text of Soviet Note No. 129/OSA
From JCS, J-3 Joint Staff sends. For OSD/ISA.

1. Based on survey of records and existing information the Military Departments have deleted 61 names from list of unaccounted-for servicemen from the Korean War. List is used by senior member UNMAC, Korea in demanding accounting from KPA/CPV representatives. There follows listing of names by Service which should be deleted from your list:

### ARMY

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JCS 504175
**MESSAGE**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE**

**NR: JCS 504175**

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<tr>
<td>Roop, Donald H</td>
<td>RA 15 421 785</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samczyk, Stanley J</td>
<td>RA 16 303 702</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanders, James B</td>
<td>RA 18 283 828</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shibao, Hiroshi</td>
<td>US 56 010 180</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snider, Glenn A</td>
<td>RA 39 480 119</td>
<td>M/Sgt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorrentino, Anthony T</td>
<td>RA 12 325 141</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stansbury, William H Jr</td>
<td>RA 17 245 840</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starling, Robert C</td>
<td>RA 14 333 967</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stidham, Floyd D</td>
<td>RA 15 267 441</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stiles, George W</td>
<td>ER 19 284 333</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, Harwood H</td>
<td>ER 12 246 136</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vickers, Wendell</td>
<td>RA 13 269 020</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaver, Edward P</td>
<td>RA 13 315 911</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westphall, Johnnie S</td>
<td>RA 19 329 233</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, William F</td>
<td>RA 16 268 651</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willis, Charles A</td>
<td>ER 57 307 012</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood, Lyle E</td>
<td>RA 17 247 032</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AIR FORCE**

- Connors, Archibald H Jr  AO 2221998  1st Lt
- Ferrer, Nolan H           AO 2222141  2d Lt
- Jamieson, Joseph C        AF 12287088 Airman 3d Class
- Wood, Melvin C            11313A Major

**MARINE CORPS**

- Baker, Billy W            624946  PFC
2. Text of public statement on reduction of list to be released 0900 hours Washington time July 29:

The Department of Defense announced today that the list of unaccounted-for servicemen of the Korean War was being reduced from its earlier figure of 452 to 391.

The reduction was made because in 61 cases definite evidence of death has been established through the continuing efforts of the military services to establish the facts in each individual case.

A provision of the Armistice Agreement which brought about the ceasefire in Korea had stipulated that each side would render to the other side a full accounting of any prisoners of war whether alive or dead of whom they had any knowledge.

When the United Nations Command placed its first demand on the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans for an accounting, immediately after the completion of the prisoner exchange in the fall of 1953, the figure of unaccounted-for Americans stood at 944. Through partial accounting by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans, but mainly through the continued efforts of the UN Command and US governmental agencies to establish the facts, the figure was reduced by June 1955 to 450. It was subsequently increased to 452 based on re-examination of intelligence and information from repatriates.

The Department of Defense, in reducing the figure to 391 emphasizes that while all of the original list of 944 except for these 391 have now been accounted for, this accounting has been accomplished largely, not by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement, but through the efforts of US Graves Registration Units and the US Intelligence Agencies, working with little or no cooperation or assistance from the North Koreans or Chinese Communists.

Repeated demands for an accounting have been made through the Military Armistice Commission in Korea and at the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists at...
Geneva and Warsaw. To date, the Chinese Communist representative in the ambassadorial talks has refused to discuss the matter, stating that it should be taken up with the Military Armistice Commission in Korea. The Chinese Communist and North Korean representatives on the Military Armistice Commission however, have stated flatly that they have rendered an accounting and refuse to entertain any request for further effort. In this stalemated situation the US government has proceeded to follow every possible course of inquiry in an attempt to solve the problem. The efforts to obtain a satisfactory accounting from the Communist side, and other efforts to ascertain the fate of the personnel still unaccounted-for will continue.

In making this public announcement on the reduction, the Department of Defense also emphasizes that the United States Government has no reliable information from any source to indicate that any of the American servicemen remaining on the list of 391 unaccounted-for since the Korean hostilities are still alive and held in Chinese Communist prisons. Although the possibility cannot be completely foreclosed that some few of them might still be alive, there are no reliable facts to support such a conclusion.

The reductions in the list, by Service, are as follows:

- Army
  - From 246 to 190
- Navy
  - None
  - 3 remain
- Air Force
  - From 190 to 186
- Marine Corps
  - From 13 to 12

In all cases the next of kin and other interested parties have been notified by letter concerning deletions from the list.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, OSD, SDLO
Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War

The U.S. Government has ongoing efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for while serving their country. In the case of Korea, 8,177 Americans are unaccounted for, including 389 who were listed as prisoners of war (POWs). Discussions with the North Koreans on the subject of unaccounted for personnel are conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), which provides updated information to the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers Military Armistice Commission (KPA/CPV MAC) as it surfaces. The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in the defense of freedom in Korea.

For the past 34 years, the UNCMAC repeatedly has called upon the KPA/CPV to account for the 2,233 unaccounted for UNC personnel, including the 389 Americans, known to have been under enemy control during the Korean War. Also, from 1955 to 1957 the U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia met in Geneva with Chinese representatives 77 times to discuss the accounting of missing Americans. In August 1982, the UNCMAC specifically requested, for the first time, the repatriation of any UNC remains buried in North Korea, even though the Armistice Agreements called for each side to return the other's war dead.

In keeping with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements, the UNCMAC has returned the remains of CPV soldiers discovered in the Republic of Korea in the years following the war. In May 1987, the UNCMAC attempted to return the remains of 25 North Korean soldiers found in a wartime mass grave, but the KPA refused to accept them even though the KPA had on previous occasions accepted from the UNCMAC the bodies of post-war North Korean civilians who had drowned and washed ashore in the South.

In August 1986, the UNCMAC turned over to the KPA/CPV MAC a thick file of material regarding the locations of UNC remains. The detailed maps and charts pinpointed the burial sites associated with 13 former POW camps and a POW hospital, identified seven former UNC cemeteries in the North and listed 291 crash sites from which lost UNC airmen had not been recovered. In a spirit of compromise, the UNCMAC on July 30, 1987 formally offered to field a Multi-National Team comprised of representatives from UNC nations to assist the KPA in searching for UNC remains. This humanitarian initiative was rebuffed by the KPA.

Other than the 4,439 U.S. POWs returned in 1953 and the 1,868 American remains returned in 1954, there has been little progress, despite U.S. and UNC efforts, on the part of the other side to resolve the cases of Americans still unaccounted for in North Korea. However, the lack of responsiveness thus far by the KPA on this issue will not blunt the determination of the U.S. Government to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War.
No. 947

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to request the Ministry's assistance in the following matter.

The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States Government desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time.

American Embassy,

Moscow, April 5, 1954.

Shaugnessy
DHHenry: mfc
PURPOSE: To provide an update on the remains issue.

DISCUSSION:

- The Armistice Agreement provided for the voluntary repatriation of POCs and for the repatriation of remains (Para 13f). To implement Para 13f, both sides agreed (17 Aug 54) to an "Understanding" on the delivery and receipt of remains, under which approximately 15,000 KPA/CPV and 4,023 UNC remains were repatriated in 1954.

- On 20 Oct 54, both sides agreed to terminate the 17 Aug 54 Understanding but kept in effect Para 20 of the Understanding, which provided that any remains discovered subsequent to the termination of the agreement would be returned through the MAC Secretaries.

- Subsequently, the UNC concluded that the KPA/CPV failed to return 2,233 UNC military personnel and 16 civilians known to have been alive in KPA/CPV POW camps. Over the years, the UNC made repeated attempts to obtain an accounting of these personnel with no positive NK response. Eight (8) UNC nations including NK have unaccounted for POCs and missing personnel.

- In 1981, the UNC recovered and returned to the north the remains of two CPV soldiers IAW Para 20 of the Understanding. Beginning in 1982, the UNC began asking the KPA/CPV side for an accounting of unrecovered remains as well as unaccounted for POCs.

- Over the years, the UNC has, for humanitarian reasons, returned the remains of NK military and civilian personnel recovered in the south subsequent to the signing of the Armistice. They were usually drowning victims. The KPA/CPV reciprocated with similar returns of South Korean drowning victims.

- In late 1985, NK began to indicate that it might be prepared to search for remains if requested by the U.S. Govt. Since then, the UNC has, through correspondence, formal meetings, and contacts at Panmunjom, continued to press for the return of UNC remains. A detailed chronology of UNC efforts is enclosed.

- In July 1987, the UNC called a formal MAC meeting to protest the KPA/CPV failure to cooperate on this issue.

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- The UNC stated its position that: The KPA/CPV has an obligation to return UNC remains which NK officials have told US Veterans that they have discovered, and the UNC is prepared to dispatch a multinational team, accompanied by UNSC representatives, to assist NK in locating UNC remains.

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- The KPA maintained its standard position that: "Search for and recovery" remains is not an Armistice issue, and the KPA/CPV would not discuss the issue at MAC meetings in the future.
In January 1986, three Congressmen (CODEL McCloskey) visited Korea enroute to Vietnam to discuss the MIA/POW issue there. They requested and received a briefing on the status of the MIA/POW remains issue in Korea. Subsequently, while on a tour of the JSAR, they asked to personally contact NK officials at Panmunjom, stating that they were there to receive remains from the Korean War. Following coordination with US JCS/STATE, they were informed by US Embassy Sec that they should not attempt to make such a contact because it would be perceived as bilateral US-NK negotiations, and against U.S., ROK and UNC policy. It was subsequently proposed to the three Congressmen that UNCMAC call for a MAC Secretary-level meeting to ask for the return of "previously discovered" remains and that the Congressmen would be present in the JSA as observers of the meeting and be willing, if requested by the KPA/CPV, to participate in the receipt of remains. After CODEL agreement, this proposal was thoroughly staffed with US JCS/STATE, ROFG and the Chiefs of the UNC Liaison Groups. Following concurrence and/or clearance of objections, a message was sent to the KPA/CPV proposing such a meeting for 15 Jan 88 (The day CODEL said they could be back to Korea) and clearly indicating that CODEL would be present. The KPA/CPV, however, refused to come to this meeting, counter-proposing for an informal procedural meeting on the issue for 20 Jan 88 (The ROFG publicly announced the KAC PLT 658 bombing incident on 15 Jan 88). After several messages were exchanged in an unsuccessful effort to agree on a date for a procedural meeting, the KPA/CPV announced publicly on 2 Feb 88 that they were holding remains of two U.S. Army soldiers by-name (among others) but that due to U.S. "sanctions," they would not return the remains. See enc1 for detailed chronology.

On 12 May 1989, at the 495th MAC Secretaries meeting, UNCMAC returned 15 partial sets of CPV remains recently discovered at the Chipyong-ni battle site. They were received in a perfunctory manner, without comment. No publicity for North Korea about the return was noted. No North Korean press representative were present; only Chinese and Russian press attended from the KPA/CPV side.

On 10 May 1989, the UNCMAC Senior Member sent a letter to his KPA/CPV counterpart requesting the return of the remains of all UNC soldiers they have publicly stated they are holding.

On 5 Jun 89, the KPA/CPV SM responded that they are not obligated by the Armistice Agreement to disinter remains, but they are willing to return remains due to humanitarian reasons if United States sanctions are lifted.

NK objectives: NK is trying to use the issue of return of US remains to achieve direct US-NK government-to-government dialogue and contact as part of its overall strategy. Using a narrow interpretation of Para 20 of the Understanding, they claim the MAC is not competent or obligated to deal with searching for remains, but that any remains discovered by chance will be returned. In Feb 88, however, they changed their position, stating publicly for the first time that they are holding remains but will not return them because of the U.S. "sanctions" (imposed because of the NK backed KAL 858 bombing).
**Chronology of UNC POW/MIA/REMAINS Efforts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 18th MAC</td>
<td>9 Sep 53</td>
<td>Original list of 3,404 unaccounted for POWs passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 54th SEC</td>
<td>24 Sep 53</td>
<td>List amended: US-add 41, delete 27; UK-add 2; Canada-add 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 47th MAC</td>
<td>17 Aug 54</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 67th MAC</td>
<td>26 Nov 55</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 69th MAC</td>
<td>25 Feb 55</td>
<td>KPA/CPV returned 67th MAC list giving accounting. Final revisions result in UNC list of 2,233 unaccounted for POWs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SEC Ltr</td>
<td>7 Jul 58</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 94th MAC</td>
<td>22 Jan 59</td>
<td>Inquiry by Senior Member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SM Ltr</td>
<td>24 Jun 60</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- KPA in 1954 provided the UNC with reports containing the burial sites of 1,399 deceased UNC POWs.
- UNC in 1954 provided a record of 2,488 deceased UNC military personnel buried in ten (UNC) cemeteries in NK.
- KPA in 1954 returned a total of 4,023 remains, including POWs, of deceased UNC military which included 1,399 Americans.

**MAG:** Military Armistice Commission
**SEC:** (MAC) Secretaries
**KPA:** (Korean) Korean People's Army
**CPV:** Chinese People's Volunteers
**SM:** (MAC) Senior Member
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. SM Ltr</td>
<td>16 Jan 62</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SM Ltr</td>
<td>22 Feb 63</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SEC Ltr</td>
<td>11 Aug 64</td>
<td>List passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 210th MAC</td>
<td>4 Jun 65</td>
<td>Senior Member referred to 11 Aug 64 list asking for accounting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 229th MAC</td>
<td>11 Oct 66</td>
<td>UNC Senior member referred to 11 Aug 64 list asking for accounting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. 137th MAC</td>
<td>7 Nov 67</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member raised the matter of the 2,233 unaccounted for UNC POWs. KPA ignored this request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>26 May 69</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. No response from KPA Senior Member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>10 Apr 70</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. No response from KPA Senior Member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>16 Apr 71</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>1 May 71</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply to UNC Senior Member's letter of 16 Apr 71, which stated that they repatriated all prisoners to UNC side and that the UNC must return KPA POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>25 Apr 72</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>26 May 72</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>31 May 73</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>26 Jun 73</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>17 May 74</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>28 May 74</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>19 Jun 75</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>26 Jun 75</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>2 Jul 76</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>17 Jul 76</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>17 Aug 77</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>22 Aug 77</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>17 Aug 78</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>24 Aug 78</td>
<td>KPA/CPV Senior Member's reply similar to that of the previous year's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>20 Aug 79</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>29 Aug 79</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>8 Aug 80</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>13 Aug 80</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>3 Sep 81</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>17 Sep 81</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>11 Aug 82</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>17 Aug 82</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41E MAC</td>
<td>22 Dec 81</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member requested the KPA/CPV to conduct a search of the burial sites of UNC POWs at UNC POW Camp No. 5 for possible UNC remains and passed a map depicting the burial site. KPA ignored the request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>17 Aug 83</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs; also asked for the return of remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>22 Aug 83</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>17 Aug 84</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to Senior Member, KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs; also asked for the return of remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA SM Reply</td>
<td>24 Aug 84</td>
<td>KPA Senior Member simply referred to his previous letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>28 Aug 85</td>
<td>UNC Senior Member sent a letter to KPA/CPV requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs; also asked for the return of remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. NK Foreign Minister in N.Y.</td>
<td>20 Oct 85</td>
<td>NK Foreign Minister tells Frank Kerr of the Chosin Few that NK will cooperate in returning military remains if the U.S. Govt formally requests a search for and recovery of US war dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA Staff Officer's comments</td>
<td>Oct 85</td>
<td>KPA staff officer comments informally at Panmunjom that NK might start looking for military remains if asked to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>23 Nov 85</td>
<td>UNC requests KPA search for and repatriate UNC remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Comments by UNC and KPA officers</td>
<td>Jan-Feb 86</td>
<td>UNC position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The subject of military remains is a humanitarian issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Remains should be returned through the MAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPA position:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Armistice does not cover search and exhumation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Recommends US-NK bilateral negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. UNC Ltr to UNC Members</td>
<td>11 Feb 86</td>
<td>UNC/CMAC Senior Member sent letters to 16 UNC Members nations requesting all available information regarding the status of MIA's. Eleven nations responded to this query; some with additional info on MIA's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. UNC SM ltr</td>
<td>14 Feb 66</td>
<td>Remains issue involves the UNC, not just U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CINCUNC, signatory to the AA, represents all UN/ROK forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. KPA SM ltr</td>
<td>4 Mar 66</td>
<td>MAC, not a new agency, should handle remains issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. UNC SM ltr</td>
<td>5 Apr 66</td>
<td>UNC is prepared to discuss details involving the process of searching for military remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. KPA SM Ltr</td>
<td>26 Apr 66</td>
<td>Military remains will be returned when recovered, but AA does not require search and exhumation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. 479th SEC</td>
<td>19 Aug 66</td>
<td>Both sides have a moral and humanitarian obligation to search for, disinter, and deliver military remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. KPA SEC public release</td>
<td>11 Sep 66</td>
<td>Proposed exchange of info on possible location of remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. UNC SEC Ltr</td>
<td>22 Oct 66</td>
<td>UNC recommended KPA call a no-press Secretaries' meeting to discuss remains issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Meeting w/Chosin Few</td>
<td>11 Dec 66</td>
<td>NK position remains the same, will return military remains when discovered, but not obliged to search for remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provided KPA with available information regarding remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NK position remains the same, info passed to &quot;appropriate agencies&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asked if KPA recovered any remains based on info provided at 19 Aug 66 SFC meeting; provided additional info on three Colombian MIA's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Briefed UNC actions/position on remains negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AE: Armistice Agreement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46. UNC SEC Ltr</td>
<td>16 Dec 86</td>
<td>A follow-up ltr asking if they have had any success in discovering remains; provided additional info on KPA discovery of UNC remains in DMZ in 83 and 85.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. KPA/CPV SEC Ltr</td>
<td>29 Dec 86</td>
<td>Responded to UNC 18 Dec 86 ltr: maintained same position; info passed to &quot;relevant organs.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. UNC SEC Ltr</td>
<td>12 Jan 87</td>
<td>Notified KPA of 25 remains searched for and recovered vic. Obong-ni; offered to return remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. KPA/CPV SEC Ltr</td>
<td>25 Jan 87</td>
<td>Acknowledged UNC's 12 Jun 87 letter and requested evidence and CIL Rpt. (Both passed at JDO Mtgs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. KPA/CPV SEC Ltr</td>
<td>3 Mar 87</td>
<td>Declined to accept Obong-ni remains &quot;due to lack of evidence.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. UNC SEC Ltr</td>
<td>11 Mar 87</td>
<td>Asked north to review all available info once more before rejecting the remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. 432nd SEC</td>
<td>26 May 87</td>
<td>Offered to return 25 KPA remains; provided info on burial sites at the KPA APEN Camps; and requested the return of UNC remains. The KPA again rejected the offer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. 436th MAC</td>
<td>30 Jul 87</td>
<td>UNC position:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The KPA has an obligation to return UNC remains which NK officials have told US veterans that they have discovered. |

- The remarks made by KPA staff officers led the UNC to believe NK may have already discovered UNC remains. |

- The question of remains is not only an Armistice issue but also humanitarian issue. The MAC is the appropriate agency to deal with the remains issue. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The UNC is prepared to negotiate</td>
<td>30 Jul 57</td>
<td>a subsequent agreement similar to the one of 1954 to eliminate any technical problem involving the question of searching for and discovery of remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the UNC is prepared to dispatch</td>
<td></td>
<td>a multinational team, accompanied by the NNSC representatives, to assist NK in locating UNC remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The KPA must return the UNC remains</td>
<td></td>
<td>thru the MAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA position:</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Search for and recovery of remains is not an armistice issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- KPA would not discuss the remains issue at the future MAC meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- KPA ignored the UNC proposal for dispatching a multinational team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following the 483rd MAC mtg, UNC</td>
<td></td>
<td>held a press conference and made the following points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM held a press conference</td>
<td></td>
<td>- The UNC must and will continue its efforts to resolve the remains issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The UNC multinational team proposal offers the capability the KPA say they do not have, within the MAC to look for remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The UNC has been working diligently on this issue over the years, but is being stopped by the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The KPA is using the remains issue in an attempt to force bilateral negotiations with nations that currently do not recognize NK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NNSC: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>14 Nov 87</td>
<td>Korean war remains is an Armistice and a humanitarian issue. MAC is the most appropriate agency to handle the issue. A multinational team may be sent to NK to assist searching for UNC remains. Requested the KPA return UNC remains which NK already has in its possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. KPA SM Ltr</td>
<td>21 Nov 87</td>
<td>Responded to the 14 Nov 87 UNC Ltr, repeating its standard position that Korean war remains issue is outside the purview of the Military Armistice Commission. Proposed the 490 SEC meeting for 15 Jan 88 to deliver and receive UNC (U.S.) remains which NK indicated to numerous individuals that they have in their possession. Advised the KPA that three U.S. Congressmen will participate in receiving UNC remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. UNC SEC Msg</td>
<td>9 Jan 88</td>
<td>Responded that the MAC Secretaries meet informally on 20 Jan 88 to discuss the procedures for the return of &quot;U.S. Army&quot; remains they have &quot;recently disinterred.&quot; Suggested that the three U.S. Congressmen attend the meeting on 26 Jan 88. KPA accepted the UNC counterproposal to delay the informal meeting until 27 Jan 88.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. KPA SEC Msg</td>
<td>14 Jan 88</td>
<td>Proposed the 490th SEC meeting be held at 1500 hrs, 27 Jan 88 to receive the UNC remains which the KPA discovered (Following the informal meeting planned for 1000 the same day).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. KPA SEC Msg</td>
<td>22 Jan 88</td>
<td>Cancelled the 27 Jan 88 SEC meeting under the pretext of the U.S. &quot;sanctions&quot; against the NK bombing of a KAL plane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. UNC SEC Msg</td>
<td>26 Jan 88</td>
<td>Pointed out the NK misuse of the remains issue for their irrelevant propaganda, and requested the return of UNC remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. KPA SEC Msg</td>
<td>26 Jan 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. UNC SEC Msg</td>
<td>26 Jan 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. KPA SEC Msg</td>
<td>2 Feb 68</td>
<td>Repeated its excuse for cancelling the meeting and specifically mentioned the names of two &quot;U.S. Army men&quot; whose remains they have discovered &quot;among the remains of U.S. Army men in our possession.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. UNC SEC Msg</td>
<td>3 Feb 68</td>
<td>Proposed the 490th SEC meeting for 1400 hrs, 5 Feb 68 to receive the remains of the two U.S. Army men they have discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. KPA SEC Msg</td>
<td>4 Feb 68</td>
<td>Rejected the UNC request for the 490th SEC meeting saying that the subject of the remains &quot;disinterred&quot; is outside the purview of the MAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. UNC SM Ltr</td>
<td>16 Feb 68</td>
<td>Called for return of all UNC remains that KPA has publicly announced they are holding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. KPA SM Ltr</td>
<td>29 Feb 68</td>
<td>Rejected UNC SM request of 16 Feb 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. 490th SEC</td>
<td>23 Mar 68</td>
<td>UNC side asked KPA to reconsider their decision to not return remains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. 492nd SEC</td>
<td>27 Apr 68</td>
<td>The KPA continue to refuse to return remains they publicly state they have in their possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The KPA have a humanitarian obligation to search for, disinter, and deliver remains; especially remains which have previously been discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The UNC again asked the KPA to return all remains they presently have in their possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. 443rd MAC</td>
<td>26 May 88</td>
<td>UNC position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The KPA has a humanitarian obligation to return the remains of UNC military personnel they officially and publicly admitted to have already discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Such a humanitarian act would help create a more positive atmosphere on which to base progress in other areas of concern to both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72. 494th SEC</td>
<td>23 Jun 88</td>
<td>UNC Position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The KPA continue to refuse to return remains they publicly state they have in their possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The KPA have an Armistice and humanitarian obligation to search for, disinter, and deliver remains; especially remains which have previously been discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The UNC again asked the KPA to return all remains they presently have in their possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Meeting w/Chosin Few</td>
<td>26 Jun 88</td>
<td>KPA Response:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The issue of the return of remains is not an Armistice issue and the reason the issue has not previously been resolved is due to the unreasonable attitude of the U.S. Gov't; i.e., imposing sanctions against NK over the KAL Flт 008 bombing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Briefed UNC actions/position on remains negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. 444th MAC</td>
<td>15 Jul 88</td>
<td>- UNC side asked the KPA to discuss the return of UNC remains they publicly acknowledged holding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
75. 446th MAC 13 Feb 89

**DESCRIPTION**

- UNC Closing Statement mentioned that an easy confidence building/tension reduction measure requiring only unilateral KPA action is to return the remains they have publicly admitted holding and those they are holding but not publicly acknowledged.

- UNC pointed out their humanitarian and legal responsibilities to return all UNC remains.

- UNC asked the KPA/CPV to return the Korean War Remains they've publicly stated they're holding and pointed out it would be a very easy, unilateral confidence building measure on their part.

- UNC returned to the KPA/CPV the partial sets of remains of 19 CPV soldiers recently discovered at two locations at the Chipyong-ni Korean War Battlesite.

- Noted KPA/CPV identified by name on 2 Feb 88 the remains of 2 UNC soldiers they're holding.

- Stated UNC continues to honor the AA as the 12 May 89 CPV remains return demonstrates.

- States remains return is a confidence building measure which will reduce tension on the peninsula.

- Requested the return of all UNC remains the KPA/CPV publicly stated their holding.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPA SM Reply</td>
<td>5 Jun 88</td>
<td>- Not obligated by AA to disinter remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Willing to return remains due to humanitarian reasons if US sanctions are lifted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mr. Robert R. Dumas  
c/o Ms. Mary B. Ryan  
420 Highland Avenue  
Cheshire, Connecticut 06410  

Dear Mr. Dumas:

The Army Board for Correction of Military Records has asked me to inform you that your late brother's records have been corrected in accordance with their findings. A certificate evidencing correction of his records is enclosed.

The Commander, U. S. Army Finance and Accounting Center, ATTN: PINCP-EC, Port Benjamin Harrison, Indiana 46249 has been informed of the correction of your records.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Reid A. Barrett  
Colonel, Armor  
Adjutant General  

Enclosure
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the records of Roger A. Dumas, 21 094 494, have been corrected under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code 1552, to show that he was in a prisoner of war status in Prisoner of War Camp 3 from 4 November 1950 until 26 February 1954. The presumptive finding of his death on 26 February 1954 is affirmed.

This certificate furnished 11 September 1954.

ROBERT M. JOHNSON
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
Mr. Robert R. Dumas
C/O Ms. Mary B. Ryan
420 Highland Avenue
Cheshire, Connecticut 06410

Dear Mr. Dumas:

The Secretary of the Army has approved the request for correction of your late brother's military records under the provisions of Title 10 U.S.C. 1552 in accordance with their findings.

No monies are due as a result of the correction of these military records.

Sincerely,

J. R. Banks
Chief, Claims/Inquiries Division
Centralized Pay Operations
DAAG-PES Dumas, Roger A.
RA 21004481 (9 Nov 79)
SUBJECT: ABCHR Application

TO: CSA, ABCHR
FROM: DAAG
DATE: 21 NOV 1979

1. The case of Corporal Roger A. Dumas has been carefully reviewed and the following information is provided for your guidance:

   a. The Dumas family has written extensive correspondence to members of congress, officials of the Department of Defense and Department of the Army in an effort to change the status of Corporal Dumas from deceased to prisoner of war.

   b. On 24 November 1950, Corporal Dumas was officially reported missing in action in an area northeast of Anju, North Korea, on 4 November 1950. His company was in action against the opposing forces, and when the action terminated, he could not be located. No further information concerning Corporal Dumas was received.

   c. Under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, each side to the conflict undertook to repatriate or otherwise account for all captured and deceased combatants of the opposing side of whose fate it had knowledge. After completion of the prisoner exchange in the Fall of 1953, American and United Nations Command authorities presented to the North Koreans a list of servicemembers whose status remained unresolved. In pressing the North Koreans to comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreement, our actions were never intended to imply that the North Koreans were actually holding Americans alive and in prisons.

   d. In the absence of an official accounting by the North Koreans, our government has expended considerable effort through other means to determine the status of those individuals who were unaccounted. American prisoners of war who returned were interrogated to obtain information regarding other missing persons and intensive efforts were made to locate and positively identify the remains of missing American personnel. Further, qualified officials examined all available records and reports pertaining to the circumstances of the disappearance of these men.

   e. Many of the casualties from the Korean Conflict who were carried on the records of missing in action in Korea were actually captured and transported to North Korea where they later died; however, specific information is lacking as to the number, identity, or circumstances surrounding their disappearance. Resolutions with list of individuals unaccounted for were introduced to the Congress to attempt to learn of the fate of Americans unaccounted for in Korea. Basically, these individuals listed were categorized as prisoners of war, regardless of how they were originally reported as casualties.

   f. The official military personnel records of Corporal Dumas were destroyed in July 1973 during a fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. In response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Mr. Clarence Dumas, a separate record pertaining to Corporal Dumas was located. This record was
one of the records compiled by the Memorial Division of the Office of The Quartermaster General on all deceased service members whose remains were non-recoverable at their time of death. These records were compiled for the purpose of assisting in the identification of any remains that might have been recovered after the cessation of hostilities. With the passage of time, these records are no longer under the control of the Department of the Army, but are now maintained by the General Archives Division, National Archives and Records Services, Washington, D.C. 20409.

g. Copies of all documents in the above file were obtained by the Office of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, and provided to Mr. Clarence Dumas on 14 October 1977. Included in these documents was a 29 April 1957 fact (summary) sheet that made reference to a statement from a former prisoner of war (PW) Cecil V. Preston, that a Private Dumas was alive, but in poor physical condition in Camp #5, Pyoktang, North Korea. The National Archives furnished The Adjutant General with two statements by Cecil V. Preston; however, neither statement made any specific reference to Roger Dumas. The Archives did actually establish that a Private Donald Dumas was a PW in Camp #5, Pyoktang, North Korea. The 29 April 1957 fact sheet indicated that all references were to a "Private Dumas" (no first name given), which logically would relate to Donald Dumas, the known PW. The relating of the statement by Cecil V. Preston to Roger Dumas was mistakenly based on the fact that only one, Roger Dumas, was reported as missing in action in Korea. However, only Donald Dumas, not Roger Dumas, is known to have been a prisoner of war in Korea.

The alleged photograph which was provided to the Office of the Adjutant General by Clarence Dumas, was analyzed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA determined that the individual in the photograph is not Roger Dumas, despite the claims to the contrary by his brothers. The CIA has also informed the Office of The Adjutant General that they have no record that indicates that Roger Dumas is in China.

1. No positive evidence was ever received in the Department of the Army that Corporal Dumas was captured and became a prisoner of war. Full consideration was given to all information bearing on the absence of Corporal Dumas, including all records, reports and circumstances. The lapse of time without any information to support a presumption of survival led to the conclusion that Corporal Dumas was no longer alive. Therefore, under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 7 March 1942 (Public Law 490, 77th Congress) as amended (Missing Persons Act), the Secretary of the Army changed Corporal Dumas' status from missing in action to deceased. The finding did not establish an actual or probable date of death. As required by the law, the presumptive date of death, 26 February 1954, was established to terminate pay and allowances, settlement of accounts, and payment of death gratuities.
DAAG-PCS Dumas, Roger A.
RA 21004481 (9 Nov 79)
SUBLCT: ABCMR Application

2. It has been determined that there is no factual evidence to warrant reconsideration by the Office of The Adjutant General of the missing in action status and presumptive finding of death pertaining to Corporal Roger A. Dumas. Therefore, the only recourse for consideration of the request of the Dumas family is through the Army Board for Correction of Military Records.

3. Inclosed is the reconstructed OMPF with all inclosures that were maintained in the Office of The Adjutant General.

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

2 Incl
Added 1 Incl
2. Reconstructed OMPF w/incls

REVIEW-Personal Affairs Dir, TACCEH
COL, GS, DIRECTOR DIVISION CHIEF

ANN B. SMITH
Colonel, GS
Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs
1. Reference is made to the inclosed application for correction of military records in the case of the above-named individual with respect to a requested change of status from killed in action to prisoner of war as of 24 April 1953.

2. Reference is also made to a telephone conversation between Miss. Johnson of your office and Mr. Devine.

3. It is requested that the application, together with all military records and all correspondence received concerning the case be carefully reviewed and this office furnished with a comprehensive opinion for the guidance of the Board regarding the issues raised.

4. Apparently much of that which is in our file are photocopies of documents in your files. Nevertheless, included is the entire ABCMR file in the matter.

5. It is our understanding that your office is in possession of the applicant's reconstructed OMPF. Please forward the former service member's reconstructed OMPF, all inclosures hereto, and any other pertinent information contained in the files of your office, upon rendering your advisory opinion.

Raymond J. Williams
Executive Secretary
22 March 1979

Mr. Robert R. Dumas Sr.
Howe Road
Canterbury, CT 06331

RE: Dumas, Roger A.
RA21 004 481

Dear Mr. Dumas:

This is to acknowledge receipt of application for correction of military records.

Please be advised that much time is involved in obtaining military records and staffing the application. Also, there is a large volume of other applications currently pending before the Board. In fairness to all, the Board acts on applications according to the dates they are received.

If the Board determines from a review of the application and military records that a formal hearing is authorized, all interested parties will be advised sufficiently in advance of such hearing to make adequate arrangements for presentation of the case.

You are assured that the Board will consider the case as soon as circumstances permit. Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated, and you will be further informed regarding the Board's decision. Please advise the Board of any change of address.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond J. Williams
Executive Secretary
Board for Correction of Military Records
**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

**Date:** 20 March 79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E.E. WILMETH - ABCNR, WASH. D.C.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| REF: |          |      |
| DUMAS ROGER A. |          |      |

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>File</th>
<th>Note and Return</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>For Clearance</td>
<td>Per Conversation</td>
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<tr>
<td>As Requested</td>
<td>For Correction</td>
<td>Prepare Reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulate</td>
<td>For Your Information</td>
<td>See Me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Investigate</td>
<td>Signature</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Justify</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

PER TELEPHONE DISCUSSION ON 19 MARCH 1979 - 2:45PM

Attached application received by our office 23 Feb 79.
The record is charged out to:

Maj. England
DAAG-PES-HQS-DA GB-03E,
Forrestal Bldg
Washington, D.C.

Phone No: 223-6315 / 36454 / 36453

Status Determination Division

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)</th>
<th>Room No.—Bldg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSA-A SSG Brown RCPAC-St. Louis, MO</td>
<td>4565</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>7780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)**

Prescribed by GSA
PPMR (41 CFR) 121-11205
APPLICATION FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY OR NAVAL RECORD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, U.S. CODE, SEC. 1552

(See instructions on reverse side BEFORE completing application.)

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 22-2009

BRANCH OF SERVICE

[ ] ARMY [ ] NAVY [ ] AIR FORCE [ ] MARINE CORPS [ ] COAST GUARD

1. NAME (Last-name-middle initials)(Please print)

DUMAS Roger A.

2. PRESENT RANK, GRADE

CPL

3. SERVICE NUMBER

RA 21004 481

4. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER

UNKNOWN

5. TYPE OF DISCHARGE (if by court-martial, state type of court.)

PRISONER OF WAR

6. PRESENT STATUS, IF ANY, WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMED SERVICES (Active duty, retired, reserve, etc.)

7. DATE OF DISCHARGE OR RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY

8. I DESIRE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (No expense to the Government.)

[ ] YES [ ] NO

9. ORGANIZATION AT TIME OF ALLEGED ERROR IN RECORD

CO C 197TH INF REGT 24TH DIV

10. NAME AND ADDRESS OF COUNSEL (If any)

NONE

11. I REQUEST THE FOLLOWING CORRECTION OF ERROR OR INJUSTICE:

CHANGE OF STATUS FROM KILLED IN ACTION TO PRISONER OF WAR RETROACTIVE TO APRIL 24TH 1953

12. I BELIEVE THE RECORD TO BE IN ERROR OR UNJUST IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:

OUR BROTHER WAS LEFT IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY AFTER HOSTILITIES ENDED IN 1953

13. IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPLICATION I SUBMIT AS EVIDENCE THE FOLLOWING: (If Veteran Administration records are pertinent to your case, give Regional Office location and Claim Number.)

Documents and evidence attached to this application for a hearing


APRIL 24TH 1953

B. IF MORE THAN THREE YEARS SINCE THE ALLEGED ERROR OR INJUSTICE WAS DISCOVERED, STATE WHY THE BOARD SHOULD FIND IT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE TO CONSIDER THIS APPLICATION.

WE DID NOT KNOW THE FULL TRUTH UNTIL MARCH OF 1978 AND UNTIL NOW.

CERTIFIED MAIL

916675

REQUESTED ZIP CODE (Applicant should forward notification of)

AND: Canterbury Conn 0633

DATE 2-18-79

SIGNATURE (Applicant must sign here.)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

AC79-01178
INSTRUCTIONS

1. For detailed information see:
   Air Force Regulation 31-3
   Army Regulations 15-185
   Coast Guard, Code of Federal Regulations
   Title 33, Part 52
   Navy, NAFIOS P-473, as revised

2. Submit original only of this form.

3. Complete all items. If the question is not applicable, mark—"None".

4. If space is insufficient, use "Remarks" or attach additional sheet if necessary.

5. Various veterans and service organizations furnish counsel without charge. These organizations prefer that arrangements for representation be made through local posts or chapters.

6. List all attachments or enclosures.

7. ITEMS 9 and 10. Personal appearance of you and your witnesses or representation by counsel is not required to insure full and impartial consideration of applications. Appearances and representations are permitted, at no expense to the Government when a hearing is authorized.

8. ITEM 11. State the specific correction of record desired.

9. ITEM 12. In order to justify correction of a military or naval record, it is necessary for you to show to the satisfaction of the Board, or it must otherwise satisfactorily appear, that the alleged entry or omission in the record was in error or unjust. Evidence may include affidavits or signed testimony of witnesses, executed under oath, and a brief of arguments supporting application. All evidence not already included in your record must be submitted by you. The responsibility for securing new evidence rests with you.

10. ITEM 14. 10 U.S.C. 1552b provides that no correction may be made unless request is made within three years after the discovery of the error or injustice, but that the Board may excuse failure to file within three years after discovery if it finds it to be in the interest of justice.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIL COMPLETED APPLICATIONS TO APPROPRIATE ADDRESS BELOW</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
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<td>COMMANDER</td>
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<td>ADDRESS:</td>
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<td>PAUL P. COOK</td>
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<td>ST. LOUIS, MO 63132</td>
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RECEIVED
1979 MAR 22
FINDING OF DEATH OF MISSING PERSON

In accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 7 March 1942 (Public Law 102-25), I, the Adjutant General, have been directed and delegated by the Secretary of the Army, to the Casualty Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, to issue this certificate.

I hereby certify that the individual whose name is given below was officially reported as missing in action as of the 4th day of February 1950. For the purposes stated in said Act, death is presumed to have occurred on the 4th day of February 1954.

Charles J. Dunn

Adjutant General
Chief, Casualty Branch

[Signature]

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

FLIGHT: Late, from Japan, missing 13 Dec. 1944
STATUS: Status: Missing, presumed dead as of 4 Feb. 1950

Yes No

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war in the hands of Communist forces have not been repatriated or otherwise accounted for since the cessation of hostilities in Korea; and

Whereas under the terms of the Korean armistice agreement all American prisoners of war should have been accounted for long before now; and

Whereas the United States of America has never acquiesced in actions by foreign nations which illegally deprive our citizens of their liberty; and

Whereas the historic policy of firmly supporting the rights of American citizens should be continued: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the
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PRISONERS OF

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EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
May 29, 1990

(NOT TO BE USED UNTIL REMAINS ARE RETURNED MAY 28)

NORTH KOREA: WAR REMAINS

Q: Any comment about North Korea's May 28 repatriation of American war remains to Congressman Montgomery?

A: -- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPRECIATES THE RETURN OF WAR REMAINS. WE RECOGNIZE THIS AS A POSITIVE STEP BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

-- IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS IS THE FIRST RETURN OF REMAINS FROM NORTH KOREA SINCE 1954. WE HOPE THIS STEP WILL LEAD TO THE RETURN OF THE ADDITIONAL REMAINS OF SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT UNDER THE UN FLAG IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT. OVER 8,000 AMERICANS ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR FROM THAT WAR.

-- WE SUPPORT AND APPRECIATE THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE DELEGATION LED BY CONGRESSMAN SONNY MONTGOMERY. WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESSMEN AND APPRECIATE THEIR EFFORTS AND COOPERATION. SEVERAL KOREAN WAR VETERANS GROUPS HAVE ALSO WORKED CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD THIS END.

-- AS SECRETARY BAKER STATED TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 1: "WE ARE LOOKING FOR A STEADY, RECIPROCAL PROCESS TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS BOTH BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA AND BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA." THE RETURN OF REMAINS IS A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.
Q: Who received the remains?

-- THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND THE CONGRESSIONAL DELegATION JOINTLY RECEIVED THE REMAINS. REPATRIATION WAS THROUGH THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM.

-- THE RETURN OF DISCOVERED WAR REMAINS THROUGH THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION IS AN IMPORTANT ARMISTICE OBLIGATION.

Q: But the North Koreans say the Congressional delegation signed for the remains and not the UN Command?

A: -- THE RECIPIENTS WERE THE CONGRESSIONAL DELegATION AND THE UN COMMAND. UN COMMAND OFFICERS ACCOMPANIED THE CONGRESSMEN AT EACH STEP IN THE TRANSFER PROCEEDINGS.

Q: Who negotiated the transfer procedures?

A: -- DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD OVER MANY MONTHS IN SEVERAL CHANNELS:

-- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DPRK UN MISSION IN NEW YORK. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WORKED CLOSELY WITH HIM.

-- THE UN COMMAND SPOKE TO NORTH KOREAN ARMY COUNTERPARTS IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
-- IN OUR MEETINGS WITH THE NORTH KOREANS IN BEIJING, WE URGED THE DPRK TO TURN OVER THE REMAINS. WE DID NOT USE THAT CHANNEL TO NEGOTIATE THE RETURN.

-- PRIVATE VETERANS GROUPS ALSO LET NORTH KOREA KNOW OF THEIR CONCERNS, AND INFORMED US OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

Q: (IF ASKED) Did the State Department participate in Congressman Montgomery's meetings with North Koreans?

A: -- A KOREA DESK OFFICIAL WAS PRESENT AS AN OBSERVER. HE ALSO ACCOMPANIED THE DELEGATION TO KOREA.

-- HE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE REPATRIATION PROCEEDINGS AT PANMUNJOM, SINCE THIS WAS NOT A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT EXCHANGE. DISCUSSIONS AT PANMUNJOM WERE HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

Q: When did North Korea find these remains?

A: -- IN 1987 NORTH KOREA FIRST SAID IT HAD THE FIVE SETS OF REMAINS. IT AGREED TO RETURN THEM VIA THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION IN JANUARY 1988. BUT IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW THROUGH WHEN THE U.S. PUT NORTH KOREA ON THE "TERRORIST LIST" FOR DESTROYING KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 858.
Q: Will the U.S. be upgrading dialogue with North Korea?

A: -- DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND DPRK POLITICAL COUNSELORS IN BEIJING WILL CONTINUE. WE GRANTED PERMISSION FOR A DPRK UN MISSION OFFICIAL AND TWO DPRK ACADEMICIANS TO VISIT WASHINGTON THIS MONTH FOR AN ACADEMIC CONFERENCE.

-- AS IN THE PAST, ANY FURTHER STEPS ON OUR PART WOULD BE TAKEN IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

Q: What would it take to normalize relations with North Korea?

A: -- IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS DEPEND ON SEVERAL THINGS. THESE INCLUDE THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE, RESOLUTION OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE, INCLUDING CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT PYONGYANG DOES NOT SUPPORT TERRORISM, AND NORTH KOREAN CONCLUSION OF A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

Q: What will happen with the remains now?

A: -- THE FIVE SETS OF REMAINS, IN COFFINS DRAPED WITH THE UN FLAG, ARE BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY IN HAWAII BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO TRY TO ESTABLISH INDIVIDUAL IDENTITIES.

-- ONCE IDENTIFIED, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE AIR FORCE MORTUARY AT TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA, WHERE THEY WILL BE HELD PENDING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE NEXT OF KIN.

-- UNTIL THE NEXT OF KIN ARE NOTIFIED, THE NAMES CANNOT BE RELEASED.
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - RETURN OF REMAINS

A. FONECON OF MAJ ROGERS/OASD{PA}=DPL WITH MR. KEN BAILES/
STATE DEPT EAP/P ON 25 MAY 1990

1. REF A ADVISED SECSTATE WILL BE SENDING PRESS GUIDANCE VIA
SEPARATE MESSAGE ON RETURN OF REMAINS BY NORTH KOREA AT PANMUNJOM
ON 26 MAY 1990 FOR USE AFTER CONFIRMATION OF EVENT.

2. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED:

ASD:PA//ASD:ISA{EAP}//
DJS-PA//

MAJ S. ROGERS, USMC, PLANS OFFICER, OASD{PA}=DPL/SR/
25 MAY 90/31075

NIGHT ACTION NOT REQUIRED

[Signature]
A. REFER QUERIES CONCERNING DETAILS OF CEREMONY AT PANMUNJOM TO UNCMAC PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT (011) 82-2-7913-4662.

B. REFER QUERIES REGARDING ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT HICKAM AFB, HAWAII OR MATTERS REGARDING CILHI TO USCINCPAC PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT (808) 477-1137 OR PA DUTY OFFICER CAN BE REACHED THROUGH USCINCPAC COMMAND CENTER AT (808) 477-5156.

C. REFER QUERIES REGARDING EVENTS LEADING UP TO RETURN OF REMAINS OR DIPLOMATIC ISSUES TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL OR U.S. STATE DEPT.

3. FOR CINCUNC PA:

A. REQUEST YOU NOTIFY THE OASD{PA} DUTY OFFICER VIA TELEPHONE (202) 697-5131 IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEREMONY TO CONFIRM THE EVENT HAS OCCURRED AND TO PASS ON ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SIMILAR INFORMATION TO THE JOINT STAFF.

B. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE TRANSCRIPTS OF PRESS CONFERENCES BY REP MONTGOMERY AND UNCMAC PERSONNEL ASAP VIA IMMEDIATE MESSAGE TO SECDEF, JOINT STAFF, SECSTATE, AND USCINCPAC.

4. POC FOR PLANS IS MAJOR S. ROGERS, AV 223-1075 OR COMM (202) 693-1075; POC FOR MEDIA QUERIES IS LCDR E.H. LUNDQUIST, AV 227-5131 OR COMM (202) 697-5131.
DoD Response to Unfounded Allegations that the U.S. Government Abandoned POWs in World War II and Korea

This fact sheet is designed to respond to the many inquiries received by the Department of Defense (DoD) concerning allegations that American prisoners of World War II and the Korean War are still detained in the Soviet Union, China, or some other third country. Taken with its attachments, this document provides a more complete picture of this matter than would be possible in the course of individualized responses on this issue.

Allegations that America has consistently disregarded the plight of our unaccounted for personnel and their families since World War II appeared in an August 13, 1987, Wall Street Journal article, "POWs: Four Decades of Abandonment." At the heart of the article's arguments was the charge that in 1945 the United States willfully allowed the Soviet Union to illegally detain 15,597 Americans previously interned in German prisoner of war camps. The article similarly charged that reports of American prisoners of war held in China and North Korea following the Korean War were systematically disregarded.

The theme of World War II prisoners in Soviet hands was expanded in articles by James D. Sanders for other newspapers and journals, and in the materials prepared for the Legal Affairs Council—a political action organization which solicits contributions to further Mr. Sanders' researches on this issue.

The Department of Defense found these charges very surprising. The U.S. Government, including the military, is composed of people whose values and morals derive from the same heritage as their fellow citizens and who are sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. These are not people who abandon their fellow citizens or consider them expendable. Furthermore, it is very difficult to believe that revelations such as those Mr. Sanders purported to make could have been concealed or covered up for this many years.

Still, the seriousness of the allegations mandated an in-depth review to determine the extent of their validity, if any. Defense Department officials and the U.S. Army Center of Military History conducted extensive research in the many thousands of linear feet of World War II records relevant to the issue. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) personnel also lent their time and expertise to the research.

In September 1988, NARA personnel and officials of the British Public Record Office in London located a series of World War II communications with a direct bearing on this matter. Photocopies of these documents are enclosed, but for the sake of clarity, the sequence of events may be summarized as follows.

On May 29, 1945, the British Air Ministry Special Signals Office (AMSSO, as it appears on the messages) sent the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, DC, a message which appears to indicate 15,597 Americans and 8,462 British personnel released by Marshal Tolbukhin were being detained by the Soviets. These specific numbers play a major role in the World War II-era allegations.

A subsequent message from the Joint Staff Mission, dated May 31, 1945, expressed incredulity that these allied personnel were still in Soviet hands. At this juncture the British War Office transmitted
a message to Allied Forces Headquarters asking AFHQ to clarify whether their accounts referred to American and British citizens or Soviet nationals held by U.S. and British forces in Italy.

The misunderstanding was finally corrected by a message from AFHQ dated June 3, 1945, which affirmed that the figures cited in the earlier messages referred to Soviet citizens held by U.S. and British forces.

Further confirmation of the status of American POWs was discovered by NARA personnel in April 1989. In the enclosed message signed by General Eisenhower on June 1, 1945, the general notes that the 25,000 POWs reported in an earlier communication as being in Russian hands was an estimate as of May 19, 1945. He continued:

It is now estimated that only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands. These no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps.

Research on the Korean War aspects of the charges involves combing other very large bodies of records. Because there has been less historical work done on the Korean War than World War II, archivists have less familiarity with the documentation of the period.

In addition, with respect to POW/MIA issues, the Korean War offers a unique situation. Men from fifteen allied nations as well as South Korea fought in conjunction with U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula under the United Nations Flag. Since the cease-fire ending hostilities in 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) has continued to demand from the other side an accounting, in particular for the 2,233 UNC soldiers—including 389 Americans—who were known to have been under enemy control. Yet neither they nor their remains have been returned.

Since 1954 the UNC Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) has annually called for the Korean Peoples Army/Chinese Peoples Volunteers (KPA/CPV) to account for UNC POWs. The UNC has requested the repatriation of United Nations war dead numerous times beginning in 1982. In August 1986 the UNC passed new information to the North which included maps/charts of 13 POW camps and a POW hospital, 291 air crash sites (total of 301 personnel unaccounted for), and the list of 2,233 UNC POWs and 18 foreign nationals never repatriated. So far, the other side has yet to give a reasonable response to the UN appeal to account for the UNC POWs and return the remains of the men who fought in defense of freedom in Korea. However, in 1988 the North Korean Government announced holding the remains of two Americans, declining thus far to repatriate them. This lack of humanitarian cooperation will not blunt our determination to pursue the issue.

It is also worth noting that the circumstances of the end of the Korean conflict were not as described in the August 13, 1987, Wall Street Journal article cited above. The United States did not "fail to win on the battlefield" in Korea. The successes of the United Nations Command in the Korean War and the continued U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula have assisted the forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in deterring further communist aggression. ROK and U.S. Armed Forces have also provided the shield behind which the ROK's industrial growth has taken place and which has led to its progress towards democratization and current economic success.

We hope this information provides a clearer understanding of these important issues.
UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE
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FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
TO HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//LGTA/PAMO/DEHS/AF//
15ABW HICKAM AFB HI//DUX//
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA-PW-MIA//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5/PA//
CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
CDRUSAC I FT SHAFTER HI//DAPC-PED-H//

UNCLAS //NO30000//
MSGR/D/SYS.RRM/USCINCPAC J3/1432133/MAY/SSS//
REF/A/RMG/USCINCPAC J3/900518/2033Z//
AMPN/SUBJ: REPATRIATION CEREMONY SUPPORT, 29 MAY 90//
RMKS/1. REF REQUESTS USCINCPACAF TO CONDUCT APPROPRIATE JOINT
CEREMONY ON 29 MAY 90 TO HONOR THE RETURN OF FIVE (5) U.S. WAR DEAD
FROM NORTH KOREA (DPRK).
2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERAN'S AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSMAN "SONNY" MONTGOMERY, WILL ATTEND THE CEREMONY.
CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY'S CODEL OF SEVEN OTHER CONGRESSMEN WILL ALSO
ATTEND. SEVERAL SENIOR CIVILIAN OFFICIALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS
(FLAG RANK) ARE ALSO EXPECTED TO ATTEND. AS MANY AS 100-150 PERSONS
COULD RESPOND TO HIS INVITATION AND ATTEND, IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL
ATTENDANCE BY INTERESTED ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL. IN VIEW OF THIS,
PLEASE ARRANGE SEATING FOR 100-150 PERSONS.
3. CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY DESIRES TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE
BASE OPERATIONS BLDG FOLLOWED BY REFRESHMENTS FOR VIPS IN THE DV
LOUNGE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEREMONY. REFRESHMENTS CONSISTING OF
NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NUTS, AND CHIPS WILL BE PAID FOR BY THE
CODEL/CINCPAC. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT.// BT
THE RETURN OF DISCOVERED WAR REMAINS THROUGH THE MILITARY
ARMISTICE COMMISSION IS AN IMPORTANT ARMISTICE OBLIGATION.

Q: BUT THE NORTH KOREANS SAY THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
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A: THE RECIPIENTS WERE THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION AND
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CONGRESSMEN AT EACH STEP IN THE TRANSFER PROCEEDINGS.

Q: WHO NEGOTIATED THE TRANSFER PROCEDURES?

A: DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD OVER MANY MONTHS IN SEVERAL
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CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DPRK UN
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Q: (IF ASKED) DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATE IN
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A: A KOREA DESK OFFICER WAS PRESENT AS AN OBSERVER. HE
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VISIT WASHINGTON THIS MONTH FOR AN ACADEMIC CONFERENCE.

AS IN THE PAST, ANY FURTHER STEPS ON OUR PART WOULD BE
TAken IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

Q: WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA?

A: IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS DEPEND ON SEVERAL
THINGS. THESE INCLUDE THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE
SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE, RESOLUTION OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE,
INCLUDING CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT PYONGYANG DOES NOT
SUPPORT TERRORISM, AND NORTH KOREAN CONCLUSION OF A
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY.

Q: WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE REMAINS NOW?
A: THE FIVE SETS OF REMAINS, IN COFFINS DRAPED WITH THE UN FLAG, ARE BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY IN HAWAII BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO TRY TO ESTABLISH INDIVIDUAL IDENTITIES.

UNTIL THE NEXT OF KIN ARE NOTIFIED, THE NAMES CANNOT BE RELEASED.

3. END TEXT.

4. THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT DOD IS ASKING THE UN COMMAND TO NOTIFY WASHINGTON UPON THE RETURN OF REMAINS AND TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT OF ANY REMARKS BY CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY OF THE UN COMMAND. IN LIGHT OF INTEREST HERE IN LEARNING WHAT TRANSPIRES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING THE EMBASSY COULD DO TO HELP.

Baker 87
President, through his own offices, and those of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, should make the return of the four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war still imprisoned by Communist forces the foremost objective of the foreign policy of the United States.
PRISONERS FROM THE KOREAN WAR.
Q4: DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATE SAID FUTURE RETURN OF U.S. REMAINS WILL DEPEND ON THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES. SO WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE U.S. STAND OR POSITION ON FUTURE (INADMISSIBLE)
A4: MONTGOMERY: WELL, I WOULD HOPE THE NORTH KOREANS WOULDN'T TIE IN THE HUMANITARIAN GESTURE OF RETURNING AMERICAN REMAINS TO SOMETHING ELSE PERTAINING TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT WOULDN'T BE TIED TOGETHER. IT SHOULDN'T BE TIED TOGETHER. BUT I DO GO BACK AND RECALL WHAT SECRETARY BAKER SAID TESTING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. HIS WISH IS TO GET BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES. THAT WILL HAVE TO BE DONE BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

THAT REMARKS WERE FOLLOWED ON MR. CURT WELDON. ONE OF THESE REMAINS HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS FROM HIS DISTRICT. HE MIGHT WANT TO COMMENT ON IT.

WELDON: THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN. LET ME JUST START OFF BY SAYING ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE DELEGATION AND THE ENTIRE CONGRESS WE ARE INDEBTED TO CHAIRMAN MONTGOMERY FOR ORGANIZING THE TAKING OF THESE REMAINS. IT'S A HISTORIC DAY FOR AMERICANS AND ALL OF OUR VETERANS. THAT WE ARE BRINGING THESE HEROES HOME TO A HERO'S WELCOME AND THEY WILL GET THAT WHEN THEY GET BACK TO AMERICA. IT'S A VERY SOLEMN DAY FOR ME BECAUSE WE FOUND OUT JUST YESTERDAY THAT ONE OF THE FIVE IS FROM A MILE-AND-A-HALF FROM WHERE I WAS BORNE AND RAISED. I TOLD THE FAMILY WE WOULD BE COORDINATING THE APPROPRIATE RETURN TO AMERICA OF HIS REMAINS.

Q5: WHAT'S HIS NAME?
A5: WELDON: HIS NAME IS ARTHUR L. SEATON. MONTGOMERY: I'D LIKE TO COMMENT THAT THE AMERICAN WAR VETERANS' ASSOCIATION, THE GREGORY OF THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS - AMERICAN KOREAN WAR VETERANS ASSOCIATION, WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH THIS DELEGATION IN PUTTING THIS ALL TOGETHER - A LOT OF THE CREDIT GOES TO THIS AMERICAN KOREAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION WHO ARE TRYING TO BRING PROPER RECOGNITION TO THE AMERICANS WHOSE FALLEN AMERICAN ARMS AND THAT PROPER RECOGNITION, THE CAMPBELL IS NOT COME FOR 40 YEARS.

Q6: WHAT DO YOU THINK THE NORTH KOREAN MOTIVATION FOR MAKING THIS GESTURE NOW, AND WHAT ARE THEY AFTER AND HAVE THEY SAID ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT?
A6: WELDON: THEY HAVEN'T TOLD ME WHAT THEY WANT. MAINLY OUR JOB IS TO TRY TO GET THESE - MORE REMAINS FROM THE NORTH KOREANS AS FAR AS GOOD RELATIONS TO THE US DOUBT CANDIDLY WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT UP TO THE PRESITENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

MAYBE ONE MORE QUESTION AND WE'LL MOVE ON.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I HAVE ONE COMMENT ON THAT BOTH CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY AND I SPOKE WITH THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND HE SAID DO (BOTH) THAT THEY WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE

UNCLASSIFIED

FINAL SECTION OF 007

SUBJECT: TRANSPORT FROM HONOLULU ON RETURN OF REMAINS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND WOULD LIKE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE TERRORIST CLASSIFICATION.

4. MONTGOMERY: I'D LIKE TO THANK DICK ADAMS OF THE KOREAN/AMERICAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION, ALONG WITH GREGORY STILLWELL, WHO WAS COMMANDER BACK IN THE 50S (5IC70'S) AND WE ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE U.S. ALLIES WHO FOGGED OVER HERE - THAT THEIR REMAINS ALSO BE RETURNED IF THEY ARE LOCATED.

WE HAVE A CONGRESSMAN WHO WAS OVER HERE WHEN HE WAS 18 YEARS OF AGE MR. CAMPBELL WHITEHORSE. CAMPBELL. HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT.

5. CAMPBELL: I'M BEN WHITEHORSE. CAMPBELL FROM COLORADO AND I GUESS I'M THE ONLY ONE WITH THE DELEGATION WHO WAS ACTUALLY OVER HERE DURING THE COMBAT. I WAS AN 18 YEAR OLD AIR FORCE CORPORAL AND THAT IS THE FRONT LINE FOR 18 YEARS FOR ME AND IT CERTAINLY HAS BEEN A WORLDERFUL EXPERIENCE COMING BACK TO COUNTRY THAT IS SO FULL OF VIBRANCY AND STRENGTH AND HAVE REBUILT THEIR COUNTRY TO THE DEGREE THAT THEY HAVE IN SOUTH KOREA. I LOST A CLOSE FRIEND OF MY FRIENDS. SOMEONE WHOSE FATHER WAS 18 YEARS AGO, I'M 18 YEARS AGO AND I HAD TWO OF THE IDENTIFIED ONES MAY BE MY FRIENDS. THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

6. MONTGOMERY: LET ME CLOSE BY SAYING WE'VE HAD COOPERATION FR-
THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS MISSION AND THE MEMBERS WILL BE AROUND FOR ABOUT THREE OR FOUR MINUTES IF YOU WANT TO INTERVIEW INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS.

2. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMING OUT TODAY.

BT BT

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OASD(PA)
MESSAGE DIST.
FROM: DM. 2E311

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B. The two secretaries also discussed the sequence of events. (Meeting at 1:00 PM, May 30, in the MAC conference building; view the remains, acknowledge receipt of the remains; pass the remains) for the day's activities. The DPRK representative, Li Song Ho, and the senior US congressional representative, Congressman G. "Sonny" Montgomery, were to be the signatories to the "confirmatory note." 

3. The meeting. At 11:00 AM, May 30, Colonel Talley and Rep. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (R-MD) led a council consisting of Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY); Rep. Bob Walter (R-CA); Rep. Frank McCluskey (D-MN); Rep. James H. Bilbray (R-NV); Rep. Curt Kvelson (R-CA); Rep. Bob Stump (R-AZ); and Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D-Colorado), into the military activity commission conference building to begin proceedings for the remains transfer. The DPRK representative, Li Song Ho, spoke first. Briefly welcoming the council and introducing the three parliamentarians (DPRK supreme people's assembly members) at the table with him. Rep. Montgomery introduced his committee and reviewed the DPRK-prepared documents, agreeing to them as presented. There were two English and two Korean originals. Mr. Li briefly expressed hope that this ceremony would mark the beginning of United States-DPRK cooperation and that the remains identification and signing be conducted before further statements were made. All agreed, and the meeting recessed briefly before the two groups met at the military demarcation line (MDL) to proceed to the northern half of the JSA to review the remains.

4. The inspection. The meeting reconvened immediately at the military demarcation line between the MAC conference building and the neutral nations supervisory commission conference building. The DPRK representative, accompanied by his delegation, escorted the council and UNC party across the MDL into the northern yard of the JSA. In front of the KPA's Panmunjom building, where the five remains and effects were reviewed. In one fashion, Rep. Li read a description of the remains and when they were excavated, and displayed the remains and effects at each casket. The 150 press present surged in and around the coffins and council throughout the viewing.

5. After the fifth casket was viewed, the parties returned to the MAC building from their inspection. At 11:18 AM, the two Korean and two English copies of the receipt were then signed by Rep. Montgomery and Li Song Ho. After the signing, one copy of each language was kept by both signatories. Rep. Montgomery later had his copies signed by the other council members. A copy of the signed receipt and description of the effects have been released; under separate cover.

C. Mr. Li then made a statement again expressing the DPRK's pleasure that congressmen of both countries had begun to reach a solution to this problem, and that they hoped for more of these kinds of contacts in the future.

D. Rep. Montgomery followed Mr. Li's remarks with the following:

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO SECTION 002 OF 003

STATEMENT: "Mr. Parliamentarian, on behalf of my delegation and other members of my group, I am greatly pleased and honored to come to this peace site today. As you stated, we have come this great distance to receive remains which have been identified as five of my countrymen who died in the Korean conflict. We thank the Democratic people's republic of Korea for returning our war dead, and we recognize your humanitarian concern. We especially appreciate your agreement to return these remains today at the time when America pays tribute to its war dead. The return of these remains makes this memorial day even more important to all Americans. I also know that my government takes positive note of your agreement to use the MAC facilities and this channel. Mr. Parliamentarian, this is an historic occasion, the first return of war remains from your country in 36 years. I hope this positive step will expedite the transfer of additional remains from all American countries who fought in the Korean conflict. This humanitarian gesture should help foster good will that can lead to a step-by-step improvement in relations. Thank you."
ISSUE. UPON CONCLUSION OF HIS STATEMENT, THE PARTIES THEN EXITED THE MAC BUILDING THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES AND MET AT THE MOL, WHERE THE TRANSFER OF THE REMAINS BEGAN.

5. THE TRANSFER. THE NORTH KOREANS WERE CASUAL TO THE POINT OF CALLOUSNESS. THEIR PALL BEARERS WERE DRESSED IN ILL-FITTING CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND OBSERVERS NEARBY LIT CIGARETTES. THEY CARRIED EACH CASSETTE TO THE MOL, BETWEEN THE MAC ANDJNIIC BUILDINGS, WITH A SMALL WOODEN BOX CONTAINING THE ACCOMPANYING EFFECTS RESTING ON TOP. THE MULTINATIONAL UNC HONOR GUARD PALL BEARERS RECEIVED THE CASSETS AND CARRIED THEM TO THE SOUTHERN YARD OF THE JSAC AND PLACED THEM ON LITTER STANDS. EACH CASSETTE WAS IMMEDIATELY DRAPED WITH UNITED NATIONS COMMAND FLAG BY A CODEL MEMBER, A UNC OFFICER, AND HONOR GUARD PERSONNEL. WHEN THE LAST CASSETTE WAS PASSED, THE DELEGATIONS PARTED WITH THE NORTH KOREANS EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THEY WOULD MEET AGAIN.

6. JSAC MEMORIAL CEREMONY. THEN, WITH ALL THE CASSETS RESTING ON LITTER STANDS IN THE SOUTHERN YARD OF THE JSAC AND DRAPED WITH UNC FLAGS, UNC CHAPLAIN (COL) DANNY DOHUE OFFERED PRAYERS AND A PRAYER OVER THE REMAINS. MILITARY HONORS WERE RENDERED, AND THE CEREMONY ENDED.


9. IN CURIOUS JUXTAGPOSITION TO THE DPRK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED SENSITIVITY AND HUMANITARIANISM, THERE ARE SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF THEIR LACK OF EITHER QUITETY OR DELICATE OR NOT, WE STAND HERE FOR THE RECORD AND SUGGEST THEY BE MADE KNOWN TO THE DPRK.


(2) WHILE MR LI DID NOT SPEAK FROM A PREPARED SCRIPT, IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT HIS REMARKS WERE NOT WELL REHEARSED BEFORE THE TIME. DESPITE THAT THE DPRK TRANSLATOR WAS OBITUALLY INEXPERIENCED AND NOT UP TO THE TASK, THEY WERE ASSIGNED TO SERIOUS ISSUES. HE SPOKE MUTELY, NERVIOUSLY, AND IN INCOMPLETE SENTENCES THAT APPEARED DESIGNED TO KEEP THE ENGLISH PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION TO A MINIMUM LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING.

(3) THE DELIBERATE LACK OF CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND OBSERVERS BY THE NORTH KOREAN MAC AND DPRK AUTHORITIES DURING THE REMAINS VIEWING WAS DISCREPANT AND COMPLETELY UNCHARACTERISTIC OF THEIR TOTALLY CONTROLLED SOCIETY. THE CHAOS AND NEAR PANDEMONIUM, AMONG, OR AND NEARLY IN THE COFFINS, WAS UNFORTUNATELY A RECURRENT INCIDENT. MR LI DESCRIBED SUCH DISRESPECT FOR THE DEAD AND DISCREPANT CODEL, OR IGNORANCE ABOUT BASIC PROTOCOL FOR SUCH EVENTS, THE NORTH CLEARLY DID NOT MAKE ANY PLANS FOR CROWD CONTROL EVEN AFTER THEIR SECRETARY WAS TOLD BY THE UNMAC SECRETARY, REPEATEDLY, AT THEIR PRELIMINARY MEETINGS TO EXPECT UP TO 150 PRESS FROM OUR SIDE.

(4) THE NORTH'S USE OF CIVILIANS AS PALL BEARERS (A UNC MAC STAFFER WAS TOLD BY A KPA MAC OFFICER THEY WERE A CREW OF LOCALLY CONSCRIPTED WORKERS) WAS PROBABLY TO EMPHASIZE THE NON-MAC NATURE OF THE EVENT; IT ONLY PUNCTUATED THE NORTH'S LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE EVENT AND OUR WAR DEAD. (AS AN ASIDE, THE NORTH KOREANS ROUTINELY FIELD A CLASS ACT FOR THE TRANSFER OF REMAINS NORTHWARD, AND MILITARY POLICE TEAM (I) WERE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE UNMAC SECRETARY IN TWO PRELIMINARY MEETINGS WITH HIS KPA COUNTERPART.)

10. WHERE ARE WE NOW? A. AS DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN UNMAC, EAP-K, AND OSD PLAYERS (19-22 MAY), NOW IS A GOOD TIME TO REVIEW THE CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE EVENT ITSELF WITH AN EYE TOWARD THE FUTURE. WITH THAT IN MIND, THE FOLLOWING UNC MAC COMMENTS ARE OFFERED.

B. IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL THE PLAYERS GOT SOMETHING OUT OF THE MEMORIAL DAY TRANSFER OF REMAINS:

** CODEL MONTGOMERY TOOK THE COUNTERPARTS' HAND, HAVING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE REPATRIATION PROCESS AND PROVING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A TRANSFER.

C. IN 1987/88, CODEL MCCLOSKEY WORKING WITH THE NORTH KOREAN VETERAN GROUPS AND DPRK OFFICIALS, HAD NEARLY COMPLETED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF FIVE SETS OF REMAINS AT PAMMUNJOM. CODEL MCCLOSKEY WAS TO PLAY A PASSIVE, OBSERVER ROLE IN THE ACTIVITIES AT PAMMUNJOM. HOWEVER, THE EXPOSURE TO DPRK RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NOV 87 KAL 858 BOMBING PROMPTED A SERIES OF EVENTS AND DECISIONS THAT CAUSED THE NORTH KOREANS TO RENEGE ON THEIR PROMISE TO RETURN THE REMAINS.

D. TWO YEARS LATER, CODEL MONTGOMERY WORKING ON THE SAME ISSUE WITH THE SAME NORTH KOREAN VETERAN GROUPS AND THE SAME DPRK OFFICIALS, ARRANGED THE TRANSFER OF THESE SAME FIVE SETS OF REMAINS. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CODEL MCCLOSKEY IN 1988 AND CODEL MONTGOMERY IN 1990 WAS THAT CODEL MONTGOMERY WAS ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING AND DECISION PROCESS, IN FACT, DOMINATING ALL EVENTS LEADING TO THE TRANSFER AT PAMMUNJOM. THE RETURN, IN FACT, WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT REP MONTGOMERY'S IMMENSE INFLUENCE (AN OCT 88 U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY SHIFT THAT ENABLED MORE FLEXIBILITY IN CONTACTS WITH THE DPRK MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR).

E. WITH THE RETURN OF REMAINS THEY HAVE ADMITTED HOLDING, THE NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR CLAIM THAT THE MAC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE REPATRIATION OF REMAINS, THEY WILL PRESS THE U.S. FOR MORE NEGOTIATIONS, MORE ONE-ON-ONE CONTACTS, MORE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DO SO.

II. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THERE IS A SEVERAL AREAS OF CONCERN THAT AFFECT THE UNMAC AND ITS ROLE IN FUTURE REPATRIATIONS. LET ME STAND HERE FOR THE RECORD AND SUGGEST THEY BE MADE KNOWN TO THE MAC.

A. QUESTION: WILL PROCEDURES FOR CODEL MONTGOMERY BE THE SAME AS FOR CODEL MCCLOSKEY? CODEL BURGER, CODEL ASIMPT. YES
"REPATRIATION BY CODEL" A GOOD POLICY?

UNCMAC COMMENT: CODEL SHOULD BE DIVORCED FROM RECEIPT/NEGOTIATION OF REMAINS ASAP.

B. QUESTION: WILL THERE BE A U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY SHIFT THAT WILL ELIMINATE OR REDUCE UNCMAC ROLE IN REPATRIATION OF REMAINS? UNCMAC COMMENT: IF THE RETURN OF REMAINS IS PARAMOUNT, A U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY SHIFT MAY BE INEVITABLE. ONE OPTION WOULD BE A SPECIAL COMMISSION HEADED BY A (RETIRED) FLAG OFFICER TO NEGOTIATE/RECEIVE REMAINS AT PANMUNJOM. COMMISSION WOULD REPRESENT UNC AS WELL AS U.S. INTERESTS.


12. POC IS COL JAMES TALLEY, UNCMAC SECRETARY, 723-6011/3110. BT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT REGARDING UNACCOUNTED-
FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE KOREAN WAR

By John Zablocki, Committee Chairman, May 5, 1957

Under the Korean Armistice Agreement each side agreed to repatriate or otherwise account for all POWs and deceased combatants of the other side of whose fate it had any knowledge. The efforts of the U.S. Government to get the Communists to fulfill their commitments in this regard have been continuous, persistent, frustrating and largely unrewarding. Shortly after the official exchange of POWs had been completed in September of 1953 officials of the UN Command handed the Communist side a list of 3104 names of missing UN Command personnel including the names of 914 U.S. servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge. (At the outset I should like to make it clear that in placing this demand for an accounting on the Communists, the UN Command did not intend to imply that we were charging the Communists with holding this large group of Americans alive and against their will. Rather, under the terms of the armistice agreement we were demanding an accounting for missing UN Command personnel of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge of their whereabouts if alive, or the circumstances of their death and the location of their remains, if deceased.)

Our belief that the Communists should have knowledge of these individuals was based upon several sources of information:

First, interviews with repatriated personnel who stated that they had seen certain named individuals who had not been repatriated, who had not been otherwise accounted for, and who had been alive and in Communist hands; secondly, Communist radio broadcasts
giving the names of certain UN Command personnel and admitting that they were under Communist control; thirdly, propaganda pictures in our possession which had been taken by the Communists and circulated for propaganda purposes showing American military personnel on forced marches taking part in parades in Communist-held cities (undoubtedly against their will); fourthly, mail which had been written by FICs to their friends and relatives in the U. S. attesting to the fact that they were in a POW status; fifthly, air crews who had seen our U.S. parachute forces disabled aircraft and after safe landings, surrounded by enemy forces or civilians. In addition, other intelligence reporting supported our contentions.

The point I am trying to make here is that there is considerable circumstantial evidence from which to draw the conclusion that these individuals were alive and under Communist control in relatively stable situations, removed from battle, and at periods ranging from several days to many months after they had become missing in action from their own UN Command units.

This demand on the Communists for an accounting produced a superficial and totally unacceptable reply. On several subsequent occasions similar demands were placed upon the Communist side through the Military Armistice Commission for an accounting. The results have been essentially negative. In addition to efforts to secure an accounting through the Military Armistice Commission, the Graves Registration Units of the UN Command continued their investigations, the military services continued the sifting of thousands of reports, interviews with returned POWs, and the interrogation of friendly sources of Korean and other nationalities, attempting to piece together all available information which would throw light on the fate of the missing.
Through the unilateral efforts of the U. S. Government which I have just mentioned, the list of 944 had been reduced to 526 by August 1954. This reduction came about because the efforts we had made produced conclusive evidence of death for 418 of the original list.

Even though the Communist side under the terms of the armistice agreement owed us an accounting for the complete 944, we presented them with a revised list of 526 in the fall of 1954, hoping that the reduced list might result in a more satisfactory accounting by the Communists. Such was not the case.

In the meantime, in June of 1954, at the Genova Conference on Korea and Indo-China, the Department of State initiated certain actions which will be described to you by the Department of State representative here today. Due to these actions by State, plus further efforts to uncover additional information, the list was further reduced to 450.

For the past several years the Department of Defense and the Department of State have worked jointly and cooperatively in continuing efforts to secure from the Communists a satisfactory accounting. In support of the efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the military services have concentrated on an intensive effort to collect every scrap of information and intelligence regarding the unaccounted-for 450. The military services under a quarterly report requirement have been producing individual dossiers on each case. These dossiers have been made available to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson for his negotiations with representatives of the Chinese Communist regime at Genova.
A breakdown of the 450 unaccounted-for personnel is as follows:

Army 211
Navy 3
Air Force 190
Marine 13

By way of examples of the circumstantial evidence upon which we base our insistent demands for an accounting from the Communists I shall cite the following cases:

(a) An Air Force Major, pilot of a B-29 that was shot down on 9 September 1950. He was taken prisoner and held for a time in a jail in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Later the same year the Agency "Soviet Picture" released a picture of this flyer, together with the statement that he had been taken prisoner by the Communist forces. In one of the inadequate accountings furnished by the Communist side, they stated that they had no data regarding the fate of this pilot.

(b) A U.S. Army Captain, pilot of a liaison plane shot down October 1952. This Captain was taken prisoner and held by the Communists. From the statements of fellow prisoners later repatriated, we know that he had lost one leg when shot down; and by November, 1952 his other leg had been amputated. In the so-called "accounting" given by the Communists it was stated that this Captain had "escaped". Note that by this time the Captain was a double amputee.

(c) A U.S. Army Private, taken prisoner by the Communists in August 1950. Several months later a Communist radio station broadcast a number of messages to mothers in the U.S. from POW's held by their side. This Army Private's mother was one of those to whom such a message was addressed. In the so-called accounting the Communists
stated they had no data regarding the fate of this soldier.

On the other hand, many of those named on the list of 450, if we draw the logical conclusion from the circumstantial evidence, are dead. There are cases where other repatriated POWs have certified to the fact that individuals were badly wounded and receiving inadequate medical attention, suffering from malnutrition or exposure, and were on the verge of death. There are cases where repatriated POWs have stated that they saw some of those prisoners die. In the majority of cases, however, these deaths occurred at varying lengths of time after capture, and in relatively stable situations removed from the battlefield. Under such circumstances any responsible military force of a responsible government would have, and should now be able to furnish to us, data regarding the circumstances of death and the whereabouts of the remains of such individuals, particularly in view of the fact that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists agreed to abide by the terms of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.

Due to the inevitable confusion at the time the exchange of POWs was completed in Korea (September 1953) and due to a certain amount of inaccurate reporting regarding the subject of missing POWs, the impression is still current among some segments of the American public that the U.S. Government believes that a large group of American military personnel are alive and still held in Asian countries by Communist captors. While the possibility exists that there may still be some personnel held, alive and against their will, we do not have any further positive information or intelligence from any source that such is the case. Because of the lack of positive information to
SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

Pvt Walker was last seen while in action against the enemy at Chinju, Korea, on 31 July 1950 and has not been reported since that date.

During the period of the 26th and 27th of July the 3d Bn of the 29th Inf Regt was attached to the 19th Inf Regt of the 24th Division. The 3d Bn 29th Inf Regt was dispatched to move via different routes to the vicinity of Hadong and establish contact with the enemy, which had been reported in the vicinity.

On the evening of the 27th of July, after a period of no contact with the 3d Bn 29th Inf Regt, the Bn commanding Officer arrived at the Regimental C.P. and reported that contact had been made east of Hadong, forcing the 3d Bn 29th Inf Regt to withdraw with considerable loss of equipment and heavy casualties.

A count the next day of the assembled 3d Bn 29th Inf Regt showed that there were only 354 officers and men, including some walking wounded, able for duty. The loss of key officers in the battalion was severe.

On the 28th of July, the day after Hadong, the 3d Bn 29th Inf Regt, was reorganized, all remaining personnel being grouped in K and L Companies. The next day, K Company was attached to the 2d Bn 19th Inf Regt at Chinju, and L company to the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt, two miles to the south of Chinju.

On the 31st of July 1950, after withdrawing from the Chinju area, DP 165945 (MS 6819 IV) the 19th Inf Regt and 1st Bn 29th Inf Regt were deployed in the following defensive positions:

The 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt was in position from DP 311938 to DP 317925 (MS 6819 IV) overlooking the Chinju-Masan road.

The 2d Bn 19th Inf Regt was backing up the 19th Inf Regt in the vicinity of the town of Segon-ni, DP 344939 (MS 6819 I). Their defensive positions ran from DP 344945 to DP 346934 (MS 6819 I).

On the evening of the 31st of July enemy forces attacked the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt. After beating off the initial attack the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt withdrew through the 2d Bn 19th Inf Regt and 1st Bn 29th Inf Regt. to new defensive position at DP 369969 to DP 382568 (MS 6819 I).

On the 1st of August, after withdrawal of the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt was completed, the 2d Bn 19th Inf Regt leapfrogged through the 1st Bn 29th Inf Regt and joined the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt in their defensive positions.

Attacking enemy forces were stopped momentarily by the 1st Bn 19th Inf Regt who were in defensive positions on the high ground overlooking the Chinju-Masan road. After repulsing this attack the 1st Bn 29th Inf Regt withdrew back through the defensive positions from DQ 385014 to DQ 393008, approximately 2500 yards southwest of the town of Chugam-ni DQ 408017 (MS 6819 I).
1. **RECOVERY OF SKELETAL OF US SOLDIER**

Time and Date of Recovered: 1640 hours, 87 05 21

Place Recovered: San-An Community Cemetery, #417, Sinan-dong, Chinju City, Kyongsan Nam-do Province. (Grant Number 680)

Status: Serial Number: RA 13295325

Name: WALKER, JACK L.

T 49.50.0

Personal Effects: Helmet - 1 each, Bayonet - 1 each, Water pail - 1 each, belt and 63 rounds of M-1 rifle bullets - 1 each, Well disinfection bottle - 1 each, bell pen - 1 each, Toothbrush - each, Hair brush - 1 each, Poot - 1 pair.

Disposition of Skeletal Remains: The Skeletal remains was reburied in the estate when it was found.

2. **HOW TO BE RECOVERED:** Recovered during the work moving old graves to construct the site of the Kyongsan Farmer's Education Institute.

This is a certified true English copy of the attached Korean Recovery of Skeletal Remains of US Soldier.

[Signature]

[Stamp]

[Date]
A Board of Officers appointed by paragraph 1, Division Order No. 25, dated 27 October 1955 (copy attached) convened at 1000 hours, 16 January 1956, for the purpose of reviewing all relevant data pertaining to unresolved casualties of the late Korean Conflict and, after considering the pertinent factors involved as outlined below, duly approved Findings of Nonrecoverability of Remains in the case of SCHLES, Lewis W. Sfc RA 2C 922 355.

American Graves Registration personnel have concluded thorough and systematic search and recovery operations in all of South Korea. Although these operations effected the recovery of many United States deceased servicemen, the search was unsuccessful insofar as this particular individual is concerned. Area Clearance Certificates have been received for all of South Korea, and an applicable Certificate of Nonrecoverability for this decedent has been furnished by the Overseas Command.

Available evidence indicates that many of the casualties which are carried on the records of the Department of Defense as missing in action in South Korea were actually captured and transported to North Korea where they subsequently died; however, specific information is lacking as to the number, identity or circumstances surrounding their disappearance.

Shortly after cessation of hostilities in 1953, arrangements were made between representatives of the opposing forces to permit search and recovery operations in the Demilitarized Zone for a limited period of forty-five (45) days. Within the restrictions imposed, as complete a search as possible was made and some remains were recovered. Entry into the Demilitarized Zone by either side for search and recovery operations has not been permitted since that period.

In September 1954, the United Nations Military Armistice Commission and the Communists concluded negotiations regarding the recovery of those deceased servicemen who were interred in territory under the control of the opposing forces. As a result of these negotiations, disinterments were accomplished by the occupant of the territory and a mutual exchange of remains was subsequently effected. The agreement did not permit either side to enter the territory of the opposing side to conduct search and recovery operations. Although the Communists turned over approximately 4000 United Nations deceased personnel, it is now known that not all of the United States servicemen actually interred in North Korea were returned.
All United States remains recovered by Graves Registration units or received from the Communists during the exchange of remains in 1951 were removed to laboratories in Kōnuma, Japan, where they were scientifically processed by identification specialists and physical anthropologists. Despite the most exhaustive efforts, identification of a number of these remains could not be established.

Physical characteristics and dental data for each unidentified remains as recorded by the professional personnel of the laboratories have been compared with like data for each unresolved casualty, including those known to have been lost at sea, without effecting an association. A wide disparity exists between the number of unidentified remains and the number of unaccounted for casualties.

In view of the completion of search and recovery activities in accessible territory, the inaccessibility of both the Demilitarized Zone and North Korea, and the inability to associate remains in our custody at this time with the decedent, it is concluded that his remains are NONRECOVERABLE.

1 Incl Special Order No. 25

APPROVED:

ROY A. WALL
Colonel, QMC
CHIEF, MEMORIAL DIVISION
War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

1. In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Ku, Khan Li, Chi'yu) (2069/0199/1419/3810/5710) in P'Yongyang, under Colonel Ho-men-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1232), an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and YAM II (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.

2. The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps," detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Ch'angchun. Peace camps were also at K'ai-yuan K'ing (124-05; 42-36) and Panchi (123-43, 41-20).

3. Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on reindoctrination of the prisoners.
Korean prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.

Officials of North Korean prisoner-of-war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. KPA army officers were being arrested. KPA army soldiers were being reindoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

Kangdong Camp.

6. On May the largest North Korean prisoner-of-war camp, containing twelve thousand prisoners, was near T'ai-Ling (1132/1545) mountain, six miles southeast of the Kangdong (126.05, 39.09) (E8, 8077) railroad station. The camp, surrounded with barbed wire and manned by emplacements, was divided into four partitions for American, English, French, and Turkish prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities. KPA army officers and other prisoners of war were members of the I Cavalry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division. General William Dean was moved from Kerbin and Mokden to this camp in 1952.

7. The Kangdong camp, organized into study, management, sanitation, and finances sections, compelled the prisoners to study for three hours, to labor for four hours, and to discuss political problems for two hours.

8. On 5 May nine thousand (sic) KPA army prisoners and fifty United Nations prisoners were in caves at the Kangdong camp, extending from approximately ML-16263 to ML-49368 in a valley at Adal-qi, Kangdong-ri (126.05, 39.09) (E8, 8077). Two of the KPA army prisoners. 10 percent were officers, 50 percent non-commissioned officers, and 40 percent privates. Of the United Nations prisoners 10 percent were Negroes. The prisoners, who received 600 grams of food and salt each day, were not required to work and spent only two hours each day out of the caves. An average of two prisoners were dying daily from malnutrition and eruptive typhus. The majority of prisoners at this camp were
One Republic of Korea soldier who was captured by the Communists on 29 October 1950 was sent to a war prisoner camp at Pyoktong (125-26, 40-36) in North Pyongin. This camp in early November had about 1,000 American war prisoners, of whom about 700 were negroes, approximately 1,500 ROK prisoners, and about 500 POcivilian employees of the United Nations forces. These men were classified by nationality and housed in barracks which accommodated about 70 men each. All prisoners were questioned and searched every three days but were otherwise left to themselves. Each man received a daily ration of 700 grams of millet, milking, or corn, in theory, but actually they received mostly corn and rice in about half the assigned quantities. Additional food could be obtained by bartering watches, uniforms, hats, and cigarettes. No blankets or bedding of any kind were supplied, but straw was available.

2. ROK prisoners were released after a period of several months (the soldier reporting these facts was released on 30 December) and given the choice of joining the North Korean army, settling down as civilians in North Korea, or returning to their homes. Most of those released were first-year soldiers or civilians. They were issued certificates of release which could be presented on their way back home in order to obtain food from local residents. Villagers stated that food given to released soldiers was deducted from their taxes in kind.

3. The Chinese and North Korean Communist troops referred to the war prisoners as "liberated soldiers."

Seven Americans were captured in Seoul on 8 January 1951 and were turned over to the Seoul headquarters of the North Korean army. According to an officer of the North Korean State Security Bureau, they were scheduled to be sent to Pyongyang as soon as orders from general headquarters there arrived for their transfer. On 10 February, they were still in Seoul and were seen pulling handcarts from the West Gate toward the East Gate under the supervision of three North Korean soldiers. All the Americans appeared undernourished and weak from hard labor.
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This is unevaluated information.

1. Officers captured in North Korea by the Chinese Communists are now interned in a former army prison in Mukden.* Enlisted men are confined in concentration camps in T'ungsha (125-57, 11-43). The daily routine includes physical exercise, political training in Marxism and Leninism, and analysis of the Korean war by Communist political directors. A specially printed paper is distributed daily. Personnel assigned to manage the camps have been greatly increased. Most of them are volunteers who were students in foreign language departments of the various Chinese universities.

2. Comment. SO-54598 reported 03 POW camps in Mukden and Chaochien.
On 1 May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp Number 106 at approximately TD-7211, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Mirim railroad station (125°51', 39°01') (TD-1722). Prisoners held here, having been processed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.

Each prisoner received 50 won monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 85 grams of soy bean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Mirim-1 airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, carbines, and M1938's, was at the camp.
F-3 11. On 5 May 200 ROK army prisoners and 110 prisoners from other United Nations armies, including 80 Negroes, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp at the site of the former Suman mine (126-23, 39-17) (TY-7361). Ten kilometers north of Seun (126-22, 39-17) (TY-7166), Lieutenant Colonel Kim Kye-jun (6955/1145/3562) commanded the camp. Although other United Nations prisoners were not required to work, the ROK army prisoners constructed shelters and trenches throughout the entire day. The prisoners received only rice balls for food. Several of the other United Nations prisoners had obtained wheat paste from villagers in exchange for watches and other personal possessions. Thereafter the villagers were prohibited from entering the camp area. Sanitary facilities were provided for the prisoners. Approximately fifteen prisoners, including both ROK and United Nations personnel, were too ill to stand.

Survivor

F-3 12. In late April approximately eight hundred United Nations prisoners were in a series of underground shelters at approximately IC-436673 in a valley between two hills four kilometers northwest of the Sariwon railroad station (125-14, 38-30) (IC-4061). On each side of the valley at the base of the two hills were 25 shelters. One shelter in every five accommodated the camp guards. Eight hundred Chinese Communist soldiers, armed with FNiks and rifles, guarded the area. Dummy guards were also used at night. The majority of the guards were billeted in a nearby village of fifteen homes. The groups were easily visible from the air. Each prisoner received pork soup and 600 grams of cereal three times daily and a package of cigarettes each week.
13. On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Haiio Han Kuan Creek, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Haiio Han Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

1. **Comment.** In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Kangdong.

2. **Comment.** This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraphs 6-7 above.

3. **Comment.**
1. In early April American prisoners of war from Korea began arriving in Hankow, where they were turned over to the Chinese Communist Central and South China Military Command. By 15 April approximately 500 had arrived in Hankow, and on 21 April some of these prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hankow under heavy guard.

2. In mid-April 60 prisoners of war, most of whom were American and the rest British, arrived in Canton via the Canton-Hankow railway. In early May they were being detained in a foreign-style compound at the corner of Tunghua Road, East, and Buiminnao (x2, x2, x2) in Tungshan, Canton. There were barbed wire barricades around the compound, and a Public Security division mounted a heavy guard around the area. No one was allowed to enter without permission from high Communist authorities. The prisoners were treated fairly well, and were given good food and billets.

3. In mid-June 52 American prisoners of war from Korea were incarcerated in the Baptist church on Tunghua Road, Canton. These prisoners were sent to Canton because the Chinese Communist authorities hoped to obtain military and medical supplies from the United States government in return for their release. They planned to demand U.S. $100,000 worth of supplies for each prisoner released. The British and Indian governments were to be used as intermediaries.

1. Comment. According to another informant, there was no indication, as of 21 May, that American prisoners of war were being sent to Canton. There were no barbed wire barricades at the end of Tunghua Road, East, Canton.
On 13 September CIALA Erh-lu (Chorlu), a staff member of the Central and South China Military Area headquarters, after inspecting a camp for American and British prisoners of war at 52 Fu-Hsing (復興) Road, Shameen, issued an order prohibiting prisoners from speaking to people outside the compound.

... of some of the prisoners in this camp from the United States Eighth Army, the British Gloucester Regiment, and the British Argyll Battalion are follows:

United States Eighth Army

Hai-chia-to (參加帝)² (fistnale), ³ 1st Lieutenant.

Li-k'o-en (李克恩)², warrant officer.

-wu-chi (卜吉)² (Booth), ³ warrant officer.

Lo-em (羅斯)² (Ross), ³ enlisted.

Po-em (波斯), enlisted.

Hua-en-zu (華德交)² (Fetz), ³ enlisted.

Hua-lai-te-shih (華萊德士)² (right), ³ enlisted.

Po-em (波斯)² (Borden), ³ enlisted.

Chia-hua-shih (嘉華士)² (Jarvis), ³ enlisted.

Po-em-ku (波斯谷)² (Kex), ³ enlisted.

Li-wai (李威)² (Zerry), ³ enlisted.

The above are...
Comment. Casual informants have stated that as of 20 April 25 American prisoners of war who had arrived in Canton were being held in three foreign style houses at the end of Tungchuan Road, East. See 20-637/15 and 20-650/66. 20-650/66 reports that some of these prisoners were transferred to Meinin on 2 May.

Comment. According to some Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, the presence of United States or United Nations troops in Canton as of mid-June cannot be confirmed. The original report appeared in the Hong Kong newspaper Hsing Tao Jih Pao (like the Hong Kong Tiger Standard, a publication of AP Hoos-haw) in late April. The reporter probably based his information on the statement of a traveller from Canton, who stated he had seen prisoners in Tungchuan. The Hsing Tao Jih Pao would print any news embarrassing to the United States.
1. **Comment.** According to SO-71667, about 170 United States prisoners of war arrived in Canton on 3 October, and were taken to the former American consulate building on Shosen. No pedestrian was permitted to approach closer than 50 meters to the compound. Other recent reports on prisoners of war in Canton may be found in SO-71388.

2. **Comment.** The report also contained the following information:
   - *Ko-ching* was also reported as 2nd Lieutenant Kiang. Li-koo-eh, also reported as Warrant Officer Lebarreer. Po-chih was also reported as Warrant Officer Botte.

3. **Comment.** These interpretations were supplied by the field.
On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Kao Han Hwan Camp, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Hondo. One building, used as the police headquarters in Kao Han Hwan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red armband on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and vegetables were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

1. (Comment. In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Langdong.

2. (Comment. This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraphs 6-7 above.

3. (Comment. The two buildings at the Kao Han Hwan Camp were used for various purposes during the Japanese occupation, including as the police headquarters.
In May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one-hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp Number 106 at approximately ID-472214, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Mirim railroad station (125-51, 39-01) (ID-4722). Prisoners held here, having been processed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.

10. Each prisoner received 50 won monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 45 grams of soybean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Mirim-ri airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three Platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, carbines, and M1918's, was at the camp.
**COUNTRY**
China

**DATE OF INFO.**
Early April 1951, except as stated

**SUBJECT**
2. POW Camps, Mukden and Shenyang

**PLACE ACQUIRED**

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**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

**SOURCE**

1.

2. Officers captured in North Korea by the Chinese Communists are now interned in a former army prison in Mukden. Enlisted men are confined in concentration camps in Yuncheng (125-57, 14-43). The daily routine includes physical exercise, political training in Marxism and Leninism, and analysis of the Korean war by Communist political directors. A specially printed paper is distributed daily. Personnel assigned to manage the camps have been greatly increased. Most of them are volunteers who were students in foreign language departments of the various Chinese universities.

3. 

*Comment. SO-51578 reported US POW camps in Mukden and Shenyang.*
December 13, 1951

Respectfully referred to the Department of Defense for attention and further reply.

WILLIAM D. HABEKT
Secretary to the President

Ltr. to the Pres., dtd. 12/10/51, from

Mrs. Josephine Cardero Judice,
601 Park Avenue,
Brooklyn 6,
New York.

Writer claims she receives letters from her nephew, Lt. Hector Cardero, who was reported missing in action about a year ago. Says he is a POW in Peking, China, gives his address, etc. Asks that his status be changed from "missing in action" to "POW" so he can have a chance of being released.
US B-29 aircraft in routine operation; surveillance Japan Sea reported missing since June 13. Last friendly radar check 1500Z longitude 140°E latitude. Unidentified aircraft wreckage discovered June 14 11328′N 133°55′E. Report two source indicates SOV radio station June 16 mentioned picking up survivor AMER plane crash time area.

USG comments FICG urgently substantial as POLS: US B-29 aircraft operating under POL on routine flights Japan Sea reported missing since June 13. Unidentified aircraft wreckage discovered June 14 at coordinates above mentioned included life rafts, oxygen bottles, life preservers, etc. Presence such items lend support there were survivors who

have been picked up by SOV and in circumstances US SOV requested

AGS investigation urgently and inform E54 any circumstances.
A letter received this afternoon from Vyshinski states that in accordance with US Government's request "instructions have been given to appropriate Soviet civilian and military authorities to clarify whether persons were picked up by Soviet ships after June 13 in the area mentioned in your note".

CUMMING
Following information was received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC Government. Report originally came from Nationalist Chinese Embassy.

1. Russia has established a Higher Informant Training Team at URAK, KOGASUGU (Peninsula) in Siberia in October 1952 and is conducting training of communist agents returning to use in Far East countries. 500 persons are receiving training; one third of them are women. Japanese constitute the largest group and the others are Koreans, Filipinos, Burmese and Americans. Mao Tse-Tung held a military conference at KOWAM, Peiping, on 10 December 1952. More than 600 leading military officials were present. Mao reported on the military situation and all members agreed that the following was the outlook:
   a. The Korean war will remain as it is until spring and then will expand.
   b. If the war is expanded, the Nationalist Chinese will attack Southern China by landings from Formosa.
   c. Manchuria, Southern China and Eastern China will be bombed heavily.
   d. The entire Chinese coast will be blockaded.

To counteract these possibilities, the Manchuria area will be defended with Russian help. In North and East China, all people will be mobilized and armed. After these people are inducted into the National Defense Forces, they will be used to counterattack Nationalist landings.

Tactics were further discussed at the meeting. Since October, owing to the increase in action on the frontlines, there have been many casualties among the CCF. The trains from Peiping and Hankow are all occupied by wounded soldiers. On 10th December, it was reported that over 300 wounded were transported to Hankow. Among these were many permanently disabled soldiers but these were not allowed to return to their homes. On 10th December, 12 Russian aircraft appeared over Peiping and dropped leaflets proclaiming the friendship that exists between the Chinese and Russian people. This was the first time that Russian aircraft have appeared openly before the Chinese people. It is reported that CCF planes are due to fly to Moscow for a return call soon.

2. According to reliable information, the CCF has transferred UF PTZs to Russia in violation of the Geneva Conference. These PTZs will be specially trained at Moscow for espionage work. Eight transferred to Moscow are grouped as follows: British 3, Americans 13, Canadians 3, and 50 more from various countries.

3. The Communist International Asian Intelligence Bureau recently added a Mobilization Committee. Lee Yoo Han, now Chief of the Chinese Communist Unification Front, will be chairman of the new committee. He has announced an emergency declaration concerning mobilization as follows:
   a. Party members from each area must be ready to join the armed forces.
   b. Those people who have extra jobs other than acting as Party members must abandon this extra work.
   c. Party members must be ready to receive mobilization orders at any time.
4. About 7,200 artillery men and engineers attached to the KPA field army now stationed in the SACHEON area have recently returned from the front in Korea. The North Korean puppet government has secretly left PIONGYANG since 22 December. The command of PIONGYANG was turned over to LMG DGK XI, Chief of Staff of CCF. The Russian naval vessel Stalin (an old DD) is reported to have appeared in the gulf of P'EI-HAI recently. It is also reported that Russia has turned over to China many submarines. Naval vessels turned over to China by Russia are the "Huang-Hai" 1,909 tons, the "Cheong-Hubel" 1,878 tons, 3 landing craft and 2 small gun boats. It is reported that if the Korean war expands, Ishtopo (I) Chief of Staff of the Russian Far East Forces will take over the position of Supreme Chief of Staff now held by Mao Tse-Tung and be (Ishtopo) will command the CCF (I).

CERAK Comment: Command (Reference Paragraph 2). This office has received sporadic reports of PIA being used in the USSR since the very inception of the hostilities in Korea. These reports came in great volume through the earlier months of the war, then tapered off to a standstill in early 1951, being revived by a report from January of this year. It seems unlikely probable a new situation is being taken as evidenced by recent reports. All previous reports state PIA who are used in the U.S.S.R. are technical specialists who are employed in mines, factories, etc. This is the first report that they are being used as espionage agents that is carried by this office.

NOTE: Any portion of this report reproduced will be identified by CERAK # M-101 (RED ORI.).

DISTRIBUTION:

A
Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia
Continued from page 61

were shown every night. Instruction in the Russian language was
available to anyone who wanted it and short discussion sessions
with camp political officers were held three or four times a day.

Various delegations visited the camps and tried to influence
the opinions of the captives. The delegations included various
peace movements, local school children, women's societies, and so forth.

The children were particularly vocal in describing to the prisoner-

ners the hardships committed against their homes and their par-
ents by U.N. forces. A Welfare Committee for Prisoners of War,
including many prominent citizens, administered the camps.

The Yalu camps, however, play host to the G.I.'s for only a few
weeks. Then the Communists are ready for further screening and for
work on their victims.

The political officers, who conducted discussions on world
events, now begin conducting daily interrogations. Within a day
or two, they know which prisoners they want. Most of the men
are settled in ordinary P.O.W. camps in North Korea and China.

The children are suspected of active anticommunism, and those in
whose remarks the officers see possibilities of conversion to the
Communist "faith" are transferred to the Russians. They are
marked as dead on the official P.O.W. lists.

The first screenings are of a general character, so a substantial
number of Americans who do not fit into the Communist plans are
incarcerated on the trip to Siberia. Our information indicates that
the overwhelming majority of the transferred prisoners refuse to be
used in the propaganda work.

The second lap of the journey takes the selected P.O.W.'s to
transit camps near Chita, in the Khabarovsk and Kom-

somolsk areas. The men are transported by rail in trains heavily guarded by
the N.V. men accompanied by dogs. At the transit camps there
are more interrogations, and then selected P.O.W.'s are sent to
Chita, located east of Lake Baikal and near the Chinese border.

The town, one of the largest on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, has
an impressive M.T.H. prison.

Here the Communists start

taking force. The prisoners know that their fate is entirely in the
hands of the Soviet police; they are told that the North Koreans
have declared them dead.

It was at this point the prisoner is given the choice of co-operating
with his captors, and going to a rest camp at Shishka, or not
co-operating and winding up at one of the more rigorous camps in
the Komi-Permiak District. Even

after he had been sent to Komi-

Permiak, however, the prisoner
can still change his mind—the

Russians are trying to dupe and
utilize as many men as they can.

The Komi-Permiak National
District lies northeast of Molo-
tov. One camp for Americans is
located in the district: the Yenisei,
Kudymkar, and others are in the
towns of Chemevo and Gubakhov.

There are four separate pairs of
these three labor camps and the fourth a
disciplinary prison camp.

In these labor camps these camps do not differ from
thousands of similar slave-labor camps in Russia.

The day starts in the over-
crowded barracks at five in the
morning. We know that last June,
in the "Great Camp" near Chem-

ev, about two hundred Ameri-
cans were forced to labor; and
we may take their daily routine
as typical. After a breakfast of
soup and tea, a slice of dark bread, the men—
a number of them engineers assigned to the
workshops—were sent to where they were working on the
local railroad. Lunch was
brought out to them. Judging
by the Russian standard, it was
badly. But they were all
accommodated to a far better diet and
they were suffering considerably,

of these camps under strict
control. Political control is exer-
cised by a special delegate from
the Central Committee of the
Komi-Permiak National District of the Communist Party. His name
is Comrade Edovin. Military
control is in the hands of a man
called Kalybas, who was transferred to the job from Moscow in the middle
of February, 1939.

Every day a few men from each
camp are taken to Molotov, where
the Russians make further at-
ttempts to get them to co-operate.

They never return to the camps
they have left; but some probably
wind up in Shishkovo.

Shishkovo is a small place near
Chita. The camp is run by a few
men who strike the Com-

munists as deserving special treat-
ment. It is luxurious, well run,
with good food, clean living condi-
tions and general conditions far
above anything known by the
average Russian. The allotted
stay at the camp for a period of
to five weeks. At the end of
that period they either graduate
and receive an assignment, fail
and return to the labor camps.

We have not been able to find
out the number of G.I.'s sent to
Shishkovo or the number sent out
on assignments. The political de-
partment of the East Siberian Rail-
roads issued at the beginning of
1935 a classified report to all its
personnel, requesting complete data
on the journeys of American
P.O.W.'s. The penalty for

plainly this order was 25 years in
prison or death.

From Shishkovo the road is wide
open to Moscow. Most of the few
who take that road start their work
by giving lectures on new
American weapons, strategy,
political trends and psychological
warfare to selected groups of red

Continued on page 104
Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia
Continued from page 101

army officers. The others are used in various propaganda drives.
Three America officers captured
in Korea have made good-will visits to Warsaw, Prague and Dribu-
rice, bearing greetings to the
peoples of Poland, Bulgaria and
Rumania from the American pris-
ocess of War Posing Committee.
No doubt they also assured these
people of the peaceful intentions
of Russia and the warmongering
of the United States.

The story comes to me from a
unique informant, a short, husky
little man whom I met in Berlin in
the early part of 1952. He was
then fresh from a trip to Poland.
He was not a Pole, but he was
interested in and all of the
countries which had fallen victim
to Communist aggression. He had
lived under Communism and de-
dized to devote his life to fleeing
it. He wanted to put as much news
as possible out of the Red orbit.

"The West must know," he said.
"Otherwise it will perish."

By the time I was boarding
my plane back home we had
agreed upon a trial operation.
He was to furnish the
Foreign News Service with any
material he might lay his hands
on, but he was never to divorce
his sources to me or to anyone
else. "You may take it or leave it," he said. "You are not to
warn me unless I tell you so."

His dispatches started arriving
soon thereafter. At first they
looked so sensational that I was
afraid to use them. Then I was
able to verify one or two or through
other channels. From then on, my
Berlin friend became a regular
contributor to our organization.
I have never been able to check
directly the reliability of his
stories. I cannot go to Russia,
and can I send anyone there. This
way of reporting has been forced
on the men in the Kremlin,
and my friend looks as though he
were one of the few masters of
the new technique. His methods are
a combination of interviewing
refugees, reading the Soviet press
and establishing contact with
people inside the Soviet world.

The only way I could possibly
be confident in him was to re-
ceive confirmation of his major
stories from some other sources.
I waited several months, and
then the confirmations came. One
of his stories arrived in May. It
described how a group of young
boys, members of the Kolkosth Youth League,
in Chaparai, Western Kazakhstan,
listened regularly to the Voice. They listened to
Russian and in Turkestan, using a
radio set in the local post office.
They had an organized group with
senior boy listening every night
and reporting to the others.

The group was betrayed by its
own device. A teacher in the
boys' school found a couple of
inside a textbook about the
previous night's broadcast of the
Voice. The police came, and one
of the boys stabbed an officer
to death, then hanged himself.
Two others were killed while try-
ing to escape. Four went to jail.

The story was interesting and
I released it. It went, of course,
to the Voice of America. A couple of months later I was
informed that the Government
had confirmed its accuracy.

Shortly after that first indirect
confirmation he sent me another
interesting story: A painter is
going on a trip to the Soviet Republic
of Georgia. It is the Propaganda
officials and many people will soon be riding
Georgia to Stalin's native land
and he takes special care of it.

Late in the evening he has made a
trip to Georgia. He quoted from
Bara's speech allegedly delivered
at the Congress of the Georgian
Communist Party.

My first reaction was that this
time it was a little too far fetched.
I kept the story for two weeks then
decided to let it go. My release
date was July 22, 1952.

I received a confirmation on
August 11, 1952. Then a dispatch from Moscow to
the New York Times announced
the painter and Bara's visit. The
dispatch must have passed through Soviet censorship.
In other words, the confirmation
came from official Soviet sources.

This account of American
P.O.W.'s in Russia, every detail in
it, was received from the same
man. I do not know his sources
or his contacts; asking him would
mean losing him. All I can do is
to wait again for confirmation.

The story itself, loaded with
factual details, is convincing as far
as I am concerned.

But what does it mean? To me
it means that the Soviet Union is
still applying, though it is now
supposedly a nonbelligerent, the
ruthless techniques it used in the
last war. A captured man is merely
a useful object to the Soviet
Government: useful as a teacher
or a propagandist if he is eu-
operative, as a slave if he is not;
and useful always as a way to
undermine the morale of his rela-
tives at home. The Communists
see to it that a prisoner's family
rarely if ever hears from him: they
do not allow him to write letters
and refuse to permit the
International Red Cross to
visit the camps. Their tight cen-
sorship guarantees that the
stories will never appear public-
ly unless they split with China and
the two Communist states start
banging each other's heads.

To Americans generally this
story should be another reminder
of the nature of the foe they are
fighting. Our men need for
rud heads, cool judgment and
resolution in dealing with the
Communists. Eventually these
qualities may bring back from
their Russian slavery the men
missing in Korea.
UNREPORTED G.I.'S IN SIBERIA

There is a shocking story, and those who wish to believe it may rest their hopes on the fact that we do not have proof of it. Reporting newspapers that occur in the Soviet Union happen to be a somewhat easier task than a century of Chinese news. However, there are no official sources that can be trusted, eyewitnesses are often murdered or silenced by threats, all the electronic and mechanical means of communication are monitored by government. Information does go out, through refugees or smugglers or secret agents, and a great deal of this information comes to us because of the General Press Sentiment of the Foreign News Service, an organization which specializes in gathering news from behind the Iron Curtain. But we have no proof, and we always may be wrong.

Our information, gathered over the last year, tells us that American soldiers captured by Communist forces in the Korean conflict have been shipped to the Soviet Union to labor camps or to train as Communist propaganda agents. This article presents the details of the story as I know them, the proof available to me, and as much information as I am able to reveal.

We have almost forgotten about it by now, but a totally unexpected shock hit this nation on November 13, 1953. The United States forces were shocked by reports of mass killings of American P.O.W.'s in the Korean and Chinese Communist camps. This news came as part of a new wave of propaganda orchestrated by the Soviet Union as a result of the Korean War. The Soviet Union was keen on ensuring that the world knew of its power and influence in the region.

The story began when a new Communist tactic near the beginning of World War II led to severe consequences. Several thousand Polish officers had been killed by the Russians in Katyn Forest, and their bodies thrown into a mass grave. They, too, had been killed by bullets fired from behind; their hands, too, had been tied behind their backs. A report issued by the Communist Party was later acknowledged and their tactics were changed. Up to April, 1951, I received many reports from individuals who had witnessed mass shootings of captured U.N. troops. Up to that time, the Chinese and North Korean forces were harsh and brutal in their treatment of P.O.W.'s.

After the P.O.W.'s were captured in battle, orders were given that the prisoners be treated as human beings. This technique, too, was an old one. During World War II, the Russian power captured and imprisoned Americans, and in one instance, gave a figure of 1,500,000. It seems that some of these P.O.W.'s returned home, but many—perhaps many—were still unaccounted for. Germany claims that one and a half million of its own soldiers are still missing; Japan gives a figure of a hundred thousand, Italy of 65,000. To all these, the Soviet leaders calmly answer that all but war criminals have been repatriated.

According to official statistics, the number of American soldiers missing in action in Korea was 20,012 in December, 1952. We do not know how many of these men are still alive, how many are prisoners in Korea, how many are in China or Russia. But we do know that a large number of Americans are now living in camps scattered in the various regions of Russia.

The co-ordinating center for these camps seems to be the city of Molотов: the Northwest peninsula of Molотов, in the area commonly known as the Northwest Siberia, Americans have been seen in at least six camps, and other American P.O.W.'s have been reported from camps situated on the Pacific Coast of Siberia, in the cities of Chita and Omsk, both on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Molотов, formerly known as Perm, has a population of 255,000 and lies west of the Ural Mountains. It has been an industrial center since the early eighteenth century, when copper smelting plants were established, and today it produces agricultural machinery, lumber and leather goods, and, of course, refined copper. In Molотов the Headquarters of the Soviet political police is a large building also used as a prison. In Molотов, P.O.W.'s have been kept there for periods of screening and interrogation.

The Communist tactics procedure was as follows: for South Korea, and for all other U.N. personnel, in dealing with prisoners of war. South Koreans are sent to near-by camps and interrogated, often by Russian technicians who are separated and sent to the nearest outpost of the Soviet Military Mission in China. It is widely rumored in China that a secret agreement has been concluded between Peiping and Moscow regarding these prisoners. According to this agreement, cases are automatically transferred by the Chinese to the Soviet authorities. Such cases include all high-ranking South Korean officers who can be accused of deliberate and co-operative co-operation with the enemy.

Active anti-communists, men unwilling to talk, and other minor cases are also turned over to the Russians.

The men must pass Soviet Military Mission screening. Those who fail to pass are sent to isolated camps in the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Republic, the largest in area of the Russian republics (716,000 square miles) but one of the smallest in population (only 420,000 inhabitants).

The region has no railroads, and highways are the sole means of transportation. In the Ministry of State Security, the capital of Yakutak, the capital of the Republic, is the Central Commission for Soviet P.O.W's.

Colonel Ivan Aleshagurov, a police officer who heads the Central Commission, recently mentioned a number of South Korean officers to 15 to 25 years in labor camps. Although Russia officially is not at war with the United Nations forces defending Korea, the prisoners were all accused of co-operation with the enemy.

Only Asians are sent to Yakutak. All other U.N. prisoners are sent to camps located on the Yalu River where they are interrogated by Russian officers who speak perfect English. These officers conduct the first screening. American air force officers, artillerymen, tank specialists and other technicians are separated from the rest and sent to special camps. (Some of these specialists, considered particularly valuable, are flown directly to Russia. Their first stop is at Pevek, a naval station at Pevek Bay on the Chinese-Soviet frontier.)

These special camps are scattered along the Chinese side of the Yalu River. In June, 1953, I heard descriptions, without names or locations, of two of them. At that time about nine hundred non-Korean P.O.W.'s, mostly Americans and some British and Turks, were housed in the two camps. Each camp had about 450 men divided into units of fifty or sixty. The Communist were trying their best to make their captives feel at ease. Food was abundant, the daily routine was light, and there were plenty of recreation. Books and magazines were available in English, French, Russian and German. Battle films, usually featuring villages and cities bombarded by U.N. planes—(Continued on page 101)
SUBJECT: UK POW Camps in Manchuria and China

1. BACKGROUND:

   a. A compilation of reports indicates that during the past six months, several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea, which includes Manchuria, China, and Siberia. These reports include:

      - JOSE (61-08-121580)
      - HANDBER (61-08-212544)
      - KOROFF (61-08-126035)
      - TELETRON (61-08-128654)
      - YERUSALEM (61-08-115334)
      - TELETRON (61-08-117130)
      - UNCIJ (61-08-121580)
      - YERUSALEM (61-08-166530)
      - TBUNSHI (61-08-117130)
      - CARCK (61-08-111316)

   b. Figures show that the total number of POWs known to have been transferred is less than the total number released by the POW camps in North Korea.

2. SPECIFIC SECURITY:

   a. Are there any reports indicating that POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to the United States? If so, provide the names of the POWs and the dates of their transfers.

   b. Are there indications of increased military activity in the vicinity of POW camps? If so, provide the names of the POWs and the dates of their transfers.

   c. Are there reports of increased military activity in the vicinity of POW camps? If so, provide the names of the POWs and the dates of their transfers.

3. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

   a. This is a continuing requirement and will remain in effect until cancelled by this headquarters.

   b. This is a priority II intelligence requirement within the meaning of Intelligence Directive No. 1, United States, dated 1 March 1953.

   c. Information will be forwarded by classified means.

   d. All reports to this CBT will be returned to classified means.

   e. (Signatures)

   DECLASSIFIED
   Authority: NIODCSN-30
   by: [Signature]
4. It is significant finally that 118,000 Communist sympathizers of the Communists in the Armed Forces were employed in the direct investigations of the United States. Since the reports on the activities of the Communist hold in secret or propagating counter-guerrillas, (a) possible collaborators and possible enemy volunteers or service executive additions (with new formulas), there resulted a list (Continued).
3. In an effort to ascertain the existence and location of any new evidence developed, phone CQ SWITCH contacts were made with the Security Group (Lt. Col. McNutt and Maj. Larraceur); D/3 TRAV, EX Sect (Capt. Oakes in absence of Maj. Larraceur); 02 AFAB (referred to Lt. Col. McNutt, Security Group); HAVN Intnl (no information); Pave Lacerca-FBA; Casualty-Sort (Maj. Manak). AFFA AB (2d Vet. Gramer); 500 HIG (Ms. McNairfield). No new evidence was reported.

4. To determine the scope of documentary lists of non-repatriated P.W.'s prepared in connection with CQ SWITCH, the location, disposition, and status of records was determined. CQ switches at Camp Zama, 10 at Camp Drake; extensive retired files at TRAV and HAVN, plus a file in JS are involved. Little or none of the material in these references is available. Index alone is provided by IBM records developed continuously during Aug-Oct 54 by Casualty Branch, AFFA AB. The organization set up for the following to the new Advanced Plans for the development of evidence (interrogations, etc.) included the requirement that Washington be made aware. Final lists were prepared by Washington approximately 2/3 of the records at Camp Drake are peaked for shipment to Washington by 25 Dec 54 at the direction of NA.

5. The records at Camp Zama are under the control of 4th AFAB.

6. "CQ Catalog No. 8 to last EP, presented a list of positively identified non-repatriated US P.W.'s, states the circumstances of documentation, and recommends that proposed actions occur only after a trip to Washington for specific exploitation of available information."
In an effort to ensure the existence and protection of the
named nods US personnel and the "enemy" were able with the
public designation of presumed dead would be necessary to
make this information public within Security Branch.

3. Consequently, on the basis of the information presented above,
the question of the original listing

4. The documentary evidence presently available in the FNS to support the original
listing of 566 names is incomplete. Complete interrogation of repatriates, subsequent
to 210 WISES, was conducted outside the FNS while the repatriates were enroute to
the U.S. In addition, the extensive correlation of evidence from all sources in
developing case studies for each man was conducted in the U.S. Full exploitation
and documentation in Washington occurred in support of the protest made by Ambassador
Lodge in the U.S. Little or none of this information has been received by local
agencies, who have been relying on the fullest exploitation of the evidence as of date.

5. The available documentary material in the FNS is voluminous, but it is
generally not cross-referenced and is arranged by source rather than case history.
Sources include: interrogations of repatriates, press, broadcasts, photographs,
and other documents. A copy of all WISES and 205, 206, 207 interrogations of enemy
prisoners, press, broadcasts, and other information of similar nature with high N.I.A. rates, and
confidential sources. More than 100 pages of files are available in volume storage
(94 at Camp Sana; 16 at Camp Drake; others at FNS, HAVES, etc.) Little correlation
exists between these files. Case histories could be developed only by months of
research. All of this material, reported by the Machine Records of the Casualty Branch
of S.P. S., was included in subsequent documentation in Washington. Most of the files
at Camp Drake are in the process of shipment to Washington by direction of NA.

6. In view of the incomplete data presently available in the FNS, it is
recommended that, if a protest before the NA is contemplated, it be made only after
a trip to Washington for complete exploitation of available evidence.

1 Final
List of 74 names, (Tab A)

REDHEF BAINES, Maj Gen, 98
Assistant Chief of Staff, NA

SECRET
### Presumed Dead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Amber, John H.</th>
<th>2nd Lt</th>
<th>AO 3225724</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ashley, Gilbert L., Jr.</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>AO 3225724</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Beauford, Howard</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Byers, Howard D.</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>AO 3225724</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Crum, J. R.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Evans, John E.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Godwin, John W.</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Goldin, Norman C.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Glatzer, Gerald N.</td>
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<td>Gross, Milton V.</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Hare, Arvin D., Jr.</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>Hatfield, Douglas E.</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Olson, Arthur H.</td>
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<td>O'Neill, Julian E.</td>
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<td>Sheddick, John C., III</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Stevens, Frank J.</td>
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<td>Thesek, Kees</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Turner, Harold P.</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Van Nostrand, Paul R.</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Vaillant, Harry B.</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Kiesler, Joseph P.</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>AO 3225724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POSSIBLE VOLUNTARY NON-REPATRIATES

Accounted For

1. Adams, Clarence D.
   Gpl
   RA 11376452
2. Adams, Howard C.
   Gpl
   RA 11375651
3. Hatcher, Claude J.
   Prf
   RA 12125465
4. Bolshyan, Anthony
   Prf
   RA 12946652
5. Bell, Gino C.
   Prf
   RA 12296454
6. Gorick, Richard N.
   Prf
   RA 11372564
7. Green, William A.
   Prf
   RA 11375976
8. Richards, Edward H.
   Prf
   RA 11374661
9. Douglas, Ruff R.
   Gpl
   RA 11371266
10. Dunn, John R.
    Prf
    RA 11372161
11. Fortman, Andrew
    Gpl
    RA 11372453
12. Griggs, Louis E.
    Prf
    RA 11372932
13. Hawkins, Samuel D.
    Prf
    RA 11373921
14. Peters, Arlie M.
    Prf
    RA 11377721
15. Nash, Scott L.
    Gpl
    RA 11377462
16. Simon, Lowell D.
    Prf
    RA 11378164
17. Sullivan, Lawrence F.
    Gpl
    RA 11370146
18. Tomeraro, Richard R.
    Prf
    RA 12931252
19. Veneros, James O.
    Gpl
    RA 11362921
20. Wast, Harold H.
    Gpl
    RA 12323486
21. White, William C.
    Prf
    RA 12323118
22. Wills, Harry E.
    Prf
    RA 11334646
23. Wilson, Arvon F.
    Prf
    RA 12324603

Unaccounted For

1. Haas, John J.
   Sgt
   RA 16176229
   Declared Dead

POSSIBLE COMMUNIST COLLABORATORS

Accounted For

1. Cameron, Lyle W.
   Lt IA
   226341
   See Note (b)  2 4  (b)
2. Fleischer, Harald N.
   Capt
   22044126

Unaccounted For

1. Bell, James L.
   A/lie
   AF 19367163
   Declared Dead

NOTES:

(a) Among 11 identified in China and concerned with present UN protest action.

(b) Identified by Mackenzie.

(c) Turned over to NRC 25 Sep 53 for explanations.

SECRET
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTATION
OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
PRISONERS OF WAR

WASHINGTON, D.C.
July 1955

DECLASSIFIED
OAIM-FAR-SD#17
DATE 7/1/19

OSA, C&R Control No. 31054

DCMA #4905
Dear Mr. Secretary:

We submit herewith the report of your Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. It consists of three sections: (1) the Report proper with a general statement of our recommendations and the reasons therefore which, subject to your approval, we recommend be released to the public; (2) our specific recommendations as to the actions we feel you should take on various aspects of the problem, including proposed directives and letters drafted for your signature; and (3) Committee Documentation.

Within the terms of our directive, the proposed actions are, in our judgment, the most practical means of providing Americans who serve their country in battle with every means we can devise to defeat the enemy's techniques of physical, mental and moral persuasion. They provide for a Code of Conduct, a program of training and education to make the Code effective and the means for coordinating action in these matters.

We examined the publicly alleged divergent action taken by the Services toward prisoners repatriated from Korea. The disposition of all cases was governed by the facts and circumstances surrounding each case, and was as consistent, equitable and uniform as could be achieved by any two boards or courts. Legal steps, including appeals, are completed and in light of the uniqueness of the Korean War and the particular conditions surrounding American prisoners of war, the appropriate Service Secretaries should make thorough reviews of all punishments awarded. This continuing review should make certain that any excessive sentences, if found to exist, are carefully considered and mitigated. This review should also take into account a comparison with sentences meted out to other prisoners for similar offenses.

The Committee examined military planning designed to secure the release of prisoners of war. We recommend further action in the diplomatic field to promote the release of prisoners still illegally held by the Communists, along with certain other measures to meet the eventualities of any future conflict.

We are hopeful our recommendations will assist towards strengthening our Armed Forces as well as countering Communist propaganda efforts to exploit American personnel.

Respectfully yours,

[Signatures]

The Honorable Charles E. Wilson
The Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT)

SUBJECT: Prisoners of War

The below-named officers and officials of the Department of Defense are hereby designated as a Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.

CHAIRMAN

Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P)

VICE CHAIRMAN

John E. Hull, General, U. S. Army (Retired)

MEMBERS - Civilian

Dr. Frank Berry, Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&M)
Mr. Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of Army (M&F)
Mr. Albert Pratt, Assistant Secretary of Navy (P&F)
Mr. David Smith, Assistant Secretary of Air Force (M&P)

MEMBERS - Military

Frank W. Milburn, Lt. General, U. S. Army (Retired)
C. A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Idval H. Edwards, Lt. General, U. S. Air Force (Retired)
Merritt Edson, Major General, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

In addition to the above-named members, staff support will be provided in the form of a Secretariat. Legal Counsel will be provided by the Office of General Counsel (OGC). Research Assistance will be provided through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

Liaison between this Committee and government agencies outside the Department of Defense will be conducted through appropriate Assistant Secretaries of Defense, as coordinated by the Assistant Secretary (M&P).

Terms of reference will be provided separately. The Committee will submit suitable recommendations within sixty days after its first meeting.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Demands for Accounting from the Opposing Forces for Missing United States Military Personnel

1. After the cessation of hostilities in Korea and completion of repatriation of prisoners of war the Casualty Branch of The Adjutant General's Office proceeded to resolve all cases of missing, missing in action or captured personnel under the provisions of PL 490 (The Missing Persons Act). Upon completion of this action there remained a residue of 944 unresolved cases of which 610 were Army.

2. The files of Casualty Branch of TAGO contained scraps of unverified information that led to the belief that at one time these persons were alive and possibly in the hands of the enemy. However, they were not among the repatriated US personnel nor did the enemy render an accounting of their fate. Repeated demands for an accounting have been presented to the enemy by the UN MAC to no avail.

3. Subsequently the list of 610 has been reduced to 202 as reports of death were issued on the basis of additional information.

4. A review of 356 files presently available in Casualty Branch reveals that action to issue reports of death was predicated on the following information:

   a. Status changed to Killed in Action on the date reported Missing in Action on the basis of statements - 32.

   b. Status changed to Killed in Action on the date reported Missing in Action on the basis of recovered remains - 13.

   c. Status changed to killed or died of disease while in the hands of Communist Forces, based on statements - 311.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STUDY GROUP III

RECOVERY OF UNREPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR

Problem A. Assess Efforts to Recover Unrepatriated Military Personnel

American Military Personnel Unaccounted for by the Communists

Document Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by

Lt. Col. James L. Monroe
U. S. Air Force
Prisoner Officer
13 June 1955

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR BY THE COMMUNISTS

On 9 September 1953, the United Nations Command submitted to the Military Armistice Commission a list of 944 missing U.S. military personnel concerning whom reports were received which indicated that the Communists possessed knowledge of their fate. In many cases the reports on these men were scanty and inconclusive. It was never believed or intended to be implied that all of these men were still living.

By 6 December 1954, through exchange of bodies and receipt of other information, this list of personnel unaccounted for was reduced to 470. This figure was announced by Ambassador Lodge at a Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1954. This reduction was accomplished largely through information obtained by our own effort, rather than from the Communists.

In order to provide for death benefits, insurance settlements, and survivor rights, the military Departments have declared nearly all of the 470 missing servicemen as "presumed dead," under the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (P.L. 490, 77th Cong.). This classification is reflected in the latest official Department of Defense statistical report on Korean War casualties, dated 4 November 1954, which indicates that of a total of 5,866 U.S. personnel classified as missing in action, only 24 were still identified as "current missing."

However, the Department of Defense position and the current U.S. government position is that the Communists continue to be responsible for an accounting of the complete list of 470 U.S. personnel.

Responsibility for the coordination of information on this list within DOD has been assigned to the Defense Prisoner Officer, Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Monroe, USAF.
EMGRAMDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: American Military Personnel Unaccounted for by the Communists.

1. Reference is made to the Chairman's oral request for current figures of American military personnel missing in the Korean Theater and not accounted for by the Communists.

2. The total number of U. S. military personnel still unaccounted for is 470. According to the rules of the Geneva Convention and in accordance with the usual practices of civilized nations, the Communists could be held responsible for an accounting.

3. The original list presented on 9 September 1953 to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) included the names of 944 U. S. military personnel.

4. By 17 August 1954, through exchange of bodies and receipt of other information, the U. S. list was reduced to 526. This list was taken to a meeting of the MAC on that date, but the Communist representatives left it lying on the conference table when they departed.

5. By 6 December 1954, as a result of additional information received, the list was further reduced to 470. This figure was announced by Ambassador Lodge in the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1954.

6. On 14 June 1954, the United Kingdom Mission in Peiping asked an accounting of all U. N. personnel unaccounted-for at that time. The Mission supplied a list which included the names of all U. S. personnel unaccounted for at that time.

7. In arriving at a figure for which the Communists can be held to have responsibility for an accounting, it should be borne in mind that the steady reduction of our unaccounted-for list has been largely through information obtained by our own effort. The Communists, therefore, cannot be held to be relieved of responsibility for an accounting of the original list of 944.

CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: American Military Personnel Unaccounted for by the Communists (continued)

6. There are six Navy and five Coast Guard personnel who were missing in the Swatow crashes and were not included in the above figure since they were not operating under the U. N. Command. At Geneva the Communist representatives denied any knowledge of them. However, because of the intelligence report that two American Airmen were seen in Swatow, the Chinese denial was unacceptable.

9. Recommendation: Provided it is made entirely clear that the reduction from the original list of 944 U. S. personnel has been through information obtained by our own effort, it is recommended that the position be taken that the Communists still are responsible for an accounting for 470 U. S. personnel.

10. The further question was raised by the Chairman as to how many of the above figure we can prove were at one time in Communist hands. We have no absolute proof that all were in Communist hands while alive. However, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a sizeable number of the above were known to be alive in custody of the Communists at one time.

JAMES L. MONROE
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Prisoner Officer
Korean prisoners of war include U.S. military personnel known to have been captured by the enemy during period of Korean hostilities, 25 June 1950-27 July 1953. Also includes 6 Marine Corps personnel captured and released after 27 July 1953. Excludes personnel missing in action during Korean hostilities about whom no information is available. Nearly all of these personnel have been found presumably dead under Missing Persons Act of 1942.

Deaths while in captured status include, in addition to definitely determined deaths, a small number of presumptive "findings of death" under Missing Persons Act of 1942.

Returned prior to truce include personnel held for short time only and recovered prior to 27 July 1953.

Repatriated include personnel returned in accordance with prisoner exchange agreements.

Comparability with earlier POW statistics. Above data may differ from earlier POW statistics due to subsequent status changes and more complete information.
U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL KNOWN CAPTURED DURING KOREAN HOSTILITIES, BY SERVICE
(As of 8 June 1955)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,190</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
Marine Corps total includes 6 captured and released after 27 July 1953.
KOREAN PRISONER-OF-WAR DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total Known Captured</th>
<th>Deaths while in captured status 1/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>As percent of Total Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,190</td>
<td>2,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>2,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Includes following presumptive findings of deaths: Army, 15; Navy, 4; Marine Corps, 9; Air Force, 5.
# SERVICE ACTIONS ON REPATRIATED KOREAN PRISONERS OF WAR

**As of 30 June 1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total returned or repatriated</strong></td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct found satisfactory</td>
<td>3,863</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct questioned</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleared or dropped</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted assignment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted by Court Martial</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred to FBI</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMMARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total returned or repatriated</strong></td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleared or dropped</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td>3,845</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punished or Administratively</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Punished</strong></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SELECTED MEDICAL STATISTICS ON REPATRIATED POW'S

The following statistics are based upon an analysis of preliminary medical reports on 3,745 repatriated United States prisoners of war by the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army.

1. Number of medical evacuation cases. Of the 3,745 repatriates, 1,281 or 31% were evacuated to the United States in a patient status. About two-thirds of these 1,281 patients were designated as requiring convalescent care only.

2. Length of hospitalization. As of 30 June 1954, about 3,000 Army repatriates had been returned to duty after an average length of hospitalization of about two months. Only 40 former POW's were still in Army hospitals; 22 of them were receiving treatment for tuberculosis.

3. Malnutrition and weight loss. Nearly one-fifth of the repatriates were diagnosed as malnutrition cases upon initial examination after repatriation. Average weight loss among all repatriates was 21 lbs.; 257 men lost 40 lbs. or more.

4. Battle wounds among recovered POW's. About one-half of the repatriates had been wounded prior to capture. Due to the long average period of captivity (117 weeks), very few were in need of further immediate medical care for the battle wounds incurred prior to capture.

5. Frostbite. 35% of the repatriates had suffered frostbite, mostly incurred after capture. Almost a third of the frostbite sufferers (about 10% of the total repatriates) had some residual of this frostbite when recovered.

6. Psychiatric findings. About 15% of the repatriates were recorded as suffering from some psychiatric condition at time of repatriation, mainly anxiety conditions. Only 1% of the returned men were reported as suffering from psychoses.

7. Disability separations. As of 30 June 1954, only 108 Army personnel, of a total of 3,323 Army repatriates studied, had been separated for disability, while 40 additional personnel were still hospitalized. Even if it is assumed that all the remaining cases will receive a disability separation, this would represent a disability separation rate of about 4%.
### COMPARISON OF POW DEATHS: WORLD WAR II AND KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number Captured</th>
<th>Deaths While in Captured Status</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>WW II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>129,701</td>
<td>7,190</td>
<td>14,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army 1/</td>
<td>124,079</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>12,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,348</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force 1/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Army data for World War II include Army Air Corps.

Notes:

Deaths include determined deaths and presumptive findings of deaths of personnel known to have been captured. The statistics on deaths of Korean War POW's include the following number of presumptive findings of death: Army, 15; Navy, 4; Marine Corps, 9; Air Force, 5.
survivors held in detention; and publicity to the request may encourage other repatriates to come forward with information.

Moscow’s and Tokyo’s comments are requested on the general desirability of such action and particularly on the following proposed note.

VERBATIM TEXT

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the question of the detention of United States military personnel in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has for some time received, from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air Arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has sought in all such cases to obtain, if possible, precise identification of American nationals detained by the Soviet Government, although it notes that by international law and international practice the Soviet Government is obliged to inform the United States Government first of any American nationals whom the Soviet Government holds in custody or to permit such nationals to communicate with the proper United States authorities. The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible, that, although the United States Government is not able to identify by name these American nationals now detained by the Soviet Government, it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person who has been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since January 1, 1949 of whom the United States Government has not heretofore been informed by the Soviet Government, giving in each case the name of the person and the circumstances underlying his detention.

Specifically, the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continues to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which was shot in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this United States aircraft were, are, detained in Soviet detention places
in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union. In particular, it is informed, and believes, that in 1950 and in October, 1953 at least one American military aviation person, believed to be a member of the crew of this United States Navy Privateer, was held at Camp No. 20 allegedly near Vladivostok, and Collective Farm No. 25, approximately 50 kilometers from Vladivostok, under sentence for alleged espionage. This American national is described as having suffered burns on the face and legs in the crash of his aircraft and using crutches or a cane.

Reports have been received from former prisoners of the Soviet Government at Vorkuta that in September, 1950 at least one American military aviation person, believed to be a member of the crew of the United States Navy Privateer to which reference is made, had been seen in the area of Vorkuta and specifically, that one person who was interned at Vorkuta in September, 1950 stated that he was serving a twenty-five year espionage sentence and had been a member of a downed United States aircraft.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the crew of the United States Navy Privateer when it departed for its flight over the high seas of the Baltic consisted of the following United States personnel, all nationals of the United States:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Serial Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fette, John H.</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>320676 USNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seechel, Howard W.</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>264095 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds, Robert D.</td>
<td>Lt., Jg</td>
<td>368573 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgess, Tommy L.</td>
<td>Ens.</td>
<td>506762 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danes Jr., Joe H.</td>
<td>AD1</td>
<td>3683438 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Jack W.</td>
<td>AD1</td>
<td>2242750 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beckman, Frank L.</td>
<td>AT1</td>
<td>2799076 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purrell, Edward J.</td>
<td>CT3</td>
<td>2540438 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimmar Jr., Joseph Morris</td>
<td>AT3</td>
<td>2542600 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourassa, Joseph Jay</td>
<td>AL3</td>
<td>9539864 USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. One or more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952, either over the Sea of Japan or near the Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union. An officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew, was observed in October, 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Tolog River between Elgen and Debina at a place called Novosibirsk. This officer stated that he had been convicted, wrongly, under Item 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.
Reference is made to the Department's Airmen A-765 of April 16, 1954 to the American Embassy, Tokyo on the subject "Aircraft Incident Survivors" and related telegraphic correspondence, including Section of Moscow's Telegram to the Department No. 944 of February 1, 1954, final paragraph.

The Department is considering whether it has become appropriate as well as desirable at this time to question the Soviet Government specifically with reference to the detention of American fliers whose presence has been reported by repatriates from Soviet prison camps and detention places, even though the basic information received in the Department is not as specific as that which has underlain the representations made to the Soviet Government in other cases.

The Soviet Government has already denied knowledge of the whereabouts of any crew members of the B-29 destroyed by Soviet fighters off Hokkaido on October 7, 1952 and the B-50 destroyed by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. This Department, however, made no specific inquiry with respect to the detention of survivors of the United States Navy Privateer shot down by Soviet fighters over the Baltic Sea on April 8, 1950, nor with respect to the B-29 missing over the area of the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952; nor has it made specific representations with respect to the reported detention of United States aviation personnel who may have come into Soviet custody during the-Korean hostilities. There have been reports mentioned in the communications under reference, from American, Japanese and other sources indicating specifically the detention of American aviation personnel since 1949 and the possibility that among them are included crew members of such lost or destroyed aircraft. The Embassies are, of course, aware of the widely publicized allegations of the repatriate, John Noble, which have been corroborated in part by other repatriates, concerning the Navy Privateer crew. It is believed that the information may be specific enough to justify a departure from the existing practice of identifying by name individual
FORMER COMRADES ACCUSE CORPORAL

Ex-Prisoners of Red Chinese Testify that Dickenson Was an Informer

WASHINGTON, April 30—Five of Capt. Edward S. Dickenson's former prison camp comrades testified today that since had informed their Chinese Communist captors of an escape plot and tried to convert them to communism.

The former prisoners appeared as witnesses at Corporal Dickenson's court martial charges of collaboration with the enemy in Korea and informing on fellow-prisoners to get favored treatment for himself.

Capt. Thomas A. Carrich of Blacksburg, Va., who shared a cell with the Corporal Dickenson's cell-mate before their capture in 1950, said he had observed Corporal Dickenson reveal the escape plans of four prisoners to a Communist political officer.

Capt. John W. Moore of San Pedro, Calif., Capt. Frank G. Barrett of Richmond, Va., who were Corporal Dickenson's prison roommates, said he had tried to get them to accept the Communist doctrine and spread anti-American propaganda.

Former Sgt. Barmey M. Young Jr. of Hamlin, Va., said he had heard Corporal Dickenson give an address over a public address system in a prison camp and that he had appealed for help.

Sgt. Dominic J. Candille of Boston testified that Corporal Dickenson, after he had been confined in the squad room, had been observed preparing for an "escape" to see the war and to return to the States to fight for freedom.

Sgt. Dominick J. Candille of Boston testified that Corporal Dickenson had given the prisoners a copy of a letter written by a death row prisoner in a Communist prison, saying that they should have won their release.

Colonel Dickenson is one of two United States Army prisoners who refused to stay in the camp and who were transferred to the big Red Cross camp as they testified against him.

Warfare Brought Up

Corporal Moore said Corporal Dickenson had "permanently" influenced him on Communist philosophy, and that he had talked about the execution of several members of the party in South Korea after the war.

The "Freedom Express," the first of three trains carrying donations for South Korea's devastated areas, left this afternoon after a colorful, bronzed ceremony in the New

Some of the relatives of service men missing in Korea as they left yesterday for capital

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., April 30—A group of women who believe their sons and brothers are held by the Communists in Korea, spent several hours today standing outside the United Nations building, many of them wearing blue ribbons to show "Affection of Forgotten Men." The seventy-two women came here yesterday with an appeal that United States officials help them obtain release of their relatives.

They did not get to see Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but they presented their appeal to Andrew Corder, the executive assistant.

The women, who came here from forty states, said they had been helped by the organizers of the "United Nations," a group of thirty-five members of the group that was not acknowledged until almost noon. By that time the women were preparing to leave for Washington, where they hoped to find President Eisenhower.

According to a United States official, the women were told they would be able to visit President Eisenhower.

The principal attraction yesterday was the Korean Children's Choir, a group of twenty-five young boys and girls who were shown here to help in every way they could.

TRAIN BEARING GIFTS FOR KOREANS LEAVES

New York's New York Times

THE NEW YORK TIMES

of the festivities of the service men missing in Korea. They were supposed to see Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but they presented their appeal to Andrew Corder, the executive assistant.

The women, who came here from forty states, said they were helped by the organizers of the "United Nations," a group of thirty-five members of the group that was not acknowledged until almost noon. By that time the women were preparing to leave for Washington, where they hoped to find President Eisenhower.

According to a United States official, the women were told they would be able to visit President Eisenhower.

The principal attraction yesterday was the Korean Children's Choir, a group of twenty-five young boys and girls who were shown here to help in every way they could.

The women also had sought to see Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., United States delegate, an offer by Mr. Lodge to see thirty-five members of the group that was not acknowledged until almost noon. By that time the women were preparing to leave for Washington, where they hoped to find President Eisenhower.

The Korean Children's Choir was greeted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but they presented their appeal to Andrew Corder, the executive assistant.

The women, who came here from forty states, said they were helped by the organizers of the "United Nations," a group of thirty-five members of the group that was not acknowledged until almost noon. By that time the women were preparing to leave for Washington, where they hoped to find President Eisenhower.
This page contains an article about the situation in Korea, specifically regarding American prisoners of war and the Chinese detention of 51 American soldiers. The article mentions that these soldiers were held captive for eighteen months. The Chinese government is accused of holding these prisoners, and there are reports of torture and mistreatment. The article also discusses the number of prisoners held by the Chinese, which is said to be 544. The article concludes with a statement about the release of one of the prisoners, Harold F. Fletcher, who was declared dead by the Chinese but later reported alive by fellow prisoners.
TO: Department of State
FROM: Amosgen, Hamburg
SUBJECT: Welfare - Whereabouts: William George Robertson

Mr. Fritz Bauer, a German national, recently released by the Russians after thirteen years as a Prisoner of War in the USSR, called at the Consulate General on December 13 and told the following story:

In March 1955 at International Camp No. 6062/III at Kiev, Darnissa he met an American, William George Robertson, who was born on April 1, 1917. He wore glasses, was tall, and had a moustache. He was in New Orleans, and whose father was a lawyer.

Robertson told him that in 1945 he was held by the German military POW camp near Dresden; that the same year the Russians took his fellow inmates of the camp and German POWs to the USSR; that he was held in a POW camp in Leningrad from 1945 to 1949; that from 1949 to 1950 he worked as a laborer in a coal mine in Stalingrad; and that in 1950 he was transferred to the International Camp in Kiev.

Robertson said that no one would believe that he was an American; that he was unsuccessful in getting messages to his relatives. He gave Mr. Bauer a letter which was destroyed by Mr. Bauer when he learned that clothing and equipment were taken away from the men being released when they crossed the border and replaced by other clothing and equipment.

Delay in reporting the matter has been due to confusion with regard to Mr. Bauer's own status. Because he was born in the Tyrol he was erroneously released to the Italians and much delay was encountered before his German citizenship was established.

cc: Ambassadors Moscow, Bonn
USNB Berlin

233-ROBERTSON William George

[Signature]

U.S. Government Property: Classified Document
According to Despatch 1716 from Hong Kong airpouch you, a recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria reported seeing several hundred American POK's being transferred Chinese trains to Russian trains Manchouli late 1951 and early 1952. Some POK's wore sleeve insignia indicating they were Air Force non-coms. Great number Negro troops also observed. This report corroborates previous indications UNC POK's might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities.

United States has been greatly concerned general subject UNC personnel who may still be Communist custody. Department has just accepted British offer make representations helping behalf UNC personnel who may be Chinese Communist custody. Question raising this matter informally Geneva under careful consideration.

Unless you perceive objection, request you approach highest available level Foreign Ministry and leave Aide Memoire indicating reports have now come attention United States Government which support earlier indications that American Prisoners of War Korea had been transported into Soviet Union and are now Soviet custody. Request fullest possible information these POK's and their repatriation earliest possible time.

In your discussion with Foreign Office, you may desire inform Soviets without revealing source that we have reliable accounts transfers POK's Manchouli.
American POWs Reported en route to Siberia

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Hanchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probable; true and the source as of unknown reliability. The full text of the initial Air Liaison Office report follows:

First report dated March 16, 1954, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington, D.C.

This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Hanchouli (Lupin), 49°30'-11°30'. Manchuria Road Map, AHSN 201 First Edition, on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. The source states that there were a great number of Negros among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available Hong Kong for questioning for the next four days.

Upon receipt of this information, USAF, Washington, requested elaboration of the following points:

1. Description of uniforms or clothing worn by POWs including ornaments.
2. Physical condition of POWs.
3. Nationality of guards.
4. Specific dates of observations.
5. Destination in Siberia.
6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian clothing accompanying movement of POWs.
7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned.

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below.

*FROM USAIHILO SGN LACKLEY. CITE C 4. AEUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven questions.

(1) POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy inasmuch as weather considered early spring. Source identified from pictures service jacket, field, MI943. No belongings except canteen. No ornaments observed.

(2) Condition appeared good, no wounded all ambulatory.

(3) Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate bisecting platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian trainmen wore dark blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train uniform but he knows the trainmen are military and wearing regular train uniforms.

(4) Interrogation with aid of more fluent interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside city of Manchouli about three months later with POW train headed towards station where he observed POW transfer. Source was impressed with second observation because of large number of Negroes among POWs. Source states that he was told by a very close Russian friend whose job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouli every time subsequent POW shipments passed through Manchouli. Source says these shipments were reported often and occurred when United Nation forces in Korea were on the offensive.

(5) Unknown.

(6) Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who manned train.
In this connection the Department's attention is called to Charity Interrogation Report No. 619, forwarded to the Department under cover of a letter dated March 1, 1954, to Mr. A. Sabin Chase, DRD. Section 6 of this report states, "On another occasion source saw several coaches full of Europeans who were also taken to USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him."
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4. Specific dates of observations.
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	Julian F. Harrington
American Consul General

cc: Taipei
Moscow
London
Paris
INCOMING MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
Routine
FILE COPY
NY
12 Nov 51

FROM: STATE DEPT WASH DC
TO: SCAP (USFOAD) TOKYO JAPAN

MR: 120718 Z (WAR 12 2 AM) (FROM SAION. SKLAVNATE 1502 WAR 10
6 PM RPTD INTO USFOAD TOKYO 41 TAIPEI 64 HONG KONG 150
HANOI UNRNN)

From intel sources have declared to leg that according report
valued C-3 and dated Dec 9 1950, 3000 Amer prisoners captured in
Korea were transported shortly before that date to Chi AB (6549/
1344) and Sin Mi Chow (2450/5030/1959) near K5 Manchu-Korean border.
Report further states 1200 lightly wounded Amers were at same time
placed in 3d Gen Air Def Hospital at An Tung, Manchu.

ACTION: DIPLOMATIC
INFORMATION: COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, O-1, O-2, AD,
PROVOST MARSHAL

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification
 carried herein per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41o(2)(3) and g(1),
COPY No.
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 26, 1964

SUBJECT: U.S. Personnel Missing and Unaccounted for in Korea War

PARTICIPANTS: 
- Colonel Hurewitz, Defense Prisoner Officer
- Mr. Donaldson, MO
- Mr. Burke, MA
- Mr. Glavich, CA

FCY (4)

- P/F - Mr. Liebshank
- Defense, Colonial Harris
- CO, Ambassador Johnson

Colonel Hurewitz reported that he planned to leave on July 28 for a three-week trip to Japan and Korea. He was going with his own staff and with the United States element in the MAC concerning the presentation which they have been instructed to make to the Communist side. There has been change of personnel in the MAC and little progress has been made there toward preparing this presentation.

Colonel Hurewitz said that an additional part of the MAC personnel had been sent to the State Department for transmission to ambassador Harris in Geneva. The Army was compiling additional data on the missing personnel, but this would probably not be in usable form for at least two months.

The essence of the group was the next step in pressing the Communist for an accounting for missing United States and other United Nations personnel, shall be taken in forms in accordance with the instructions which Defense and State had sent to the MAC last spring. The Communists should be informed that their or called "accounting" was unsatisfactory and they should be told why it was. Only after the MAC has proceeded this matter again at roundtable, should consideration be given to Ambassador Johnson's letting it up again at Geneva.

CONFIDENTIAL
Col. Gorse informed the group that the report on collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning Americans held in China certain countries which was being prepared by a subcommittee of the JIC Committee on this subject should be ready for circulation next week.

Mr. Dornidge mentioned the pressure which was being exerted on the Department in the form of letters and petitions demanding action on missing U.S. personnel. He referred to a proposal that Ambassador Lodge be instructed at an appropriate occasion, to make a speech on this subject in order to remove some of the public misunderstanding. The reaction of the group to this subject was favorable.
A recently returned Austrian prisoner of war, Adalbert Skala, resident Vienna II, Muehlfeldgasse 15, has reported to the Embassy the following information on an American officer, Lt. (Am) Racek, approximate age 38, with whom he claims to have been imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Skala states that he first met Racek in 1951 in Prison #2, Irkutsk, and that the two were cellmates in Irkutsk and subsequently in Luhanka Prison in Moscow until the time of Skala's release in 1955. Skala does not know Racek's first name, but reports that the latter had been a lieutenant of armored troops in Korea, where he was captured. Racek gave Skala the address of his father, Thomas Racek, 358 East 72nd Street, (Harlem 1), New York 21, New York, and asked that he be informed that his son was alive. Racek's prisoner number to which mail and Red Cross packages are addressed is #1310/51. Skala has been forwarding packages to Racek through the Austrian Red Cross and has received acknowledgments of their receipt. In addition, he and Racek worked out a system by which Racek is able to smuggle communications out to Skala through an exchange of Red Cross cards (the exact technique of which is not quite clear to the Embassy). Skala has received a card from Racek this month indicating that he is still in Luhanka Prison in Moscow.

Skala reports that Racek is not in particularly good condition, having had a number of front teeth knocked out, having lost his hair, and generally having suffered the effects of mistreatment. However, he did not indicate that Racek was in any immediate difficulties.

Skala states that subsequent to his release in 1955 he was hospitalized in Austria until recently and that this was why he had not reported to the Embassy earlier his information about Racek. He also states that he had been threatened by the Soviets with reprisals should he give any information to the Americans regarding his imprisonment. Therefore, he had waited longer until he could be sure of reporting directly to "Americans" and not through any Austrian channel. While Skala did not impress members of the Embassy as being of a particularly high degree of intelligence, he did appear sincere in his desire to help Racek and he was altogether positive in his information. He reports that he is writing separately to Racek's father in New York and requested that if the Embassy received additional information regarding Racek from Washington we inform him.
On October 15 a person without identification documents, representing himself to be Richard Sawicki, called at the Consulate. He said he was a Polish National, that he had been until July 1957 a prisoner in the Russian concentration camp of Bulun, in the province of Yakutak. American fellow prisoners in the camp, he said, had urged him to report their presence therein, at the first American Consulate he could contact after his release. Having been released in July 1957, Sawicki said, he returned to Poland. He had now escaped from Poland and was passing through Strasbourg on route to Barcelona to join his mother. His mother, whose name is apparently also Sawicki, is said to reside at Borte Hitalla 17, Barcelona 6, Spain.

The Americans who were detained in the Bulun camp, Sawicki stated, were the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>WATSON, Jack of Buffalo, New York, an American Professor of Physics</td>
<td>Captured by the Russians in Vienna in 1949. Sawicki could not recall Professor Watson's street address in Buffalo or the name of the institution with which he had been connected. He said that Professor Watson had been requested by the Russians to teach physics but refused and therefore had worked as an ordinary laborer in that camp until 1956. Having been released in July 1957, he returned to Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>COCHRAN, Dick</td>
<td>Three Americans soldiers who had been captured in the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>WARREN, Stanley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCOB, Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since there are several persons at the College of Free Europe whose native language is Polish and who are qualified to pass upon the bona fides of refugees, the Consulate requested the College to receive Sawicki. He was given food and shelter for one night and was questioned by officials of the College who at first were inclined to believe his story. He was given a letter and the Paris Office of the organisation was requested to receive him and assist him in visiting the French authorities. However, on the day following his reception...
JINEL) Semi-Annual Historical Report
6004th Air Intelligence Service Det.
Third Air Base, Japan.
 JULY - 31 Dec 1957

CLASSIFIED BY

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER
31, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

NOV 30 1978
Through this reporting period liaison was maintained with established human source contacts and a continuous effort was made to develop more productive and contemporary sources.

Evasion and Escape Library

A total of 231 books and periodicals were purchased during this reporting period, most of which were procured from leftist book stores in the Tokyo area. The following list is representative of the volumes procured:

1. The Economical Geography of the USSR, 1956
2. The Materials of the Economy of Agriculture in Yakutia
3. The History of Yakut A.S.S.R., Vol #1

In addition to the utilization of books and periodicals, to further obtain contemporary information, subscriptions were maintained to various Russian newspapers. Supplementing these subscriptions were periodicals, magazines and newspapers received from the Liaison Section. These publications were screened for material pertinent to the various projects of the section. A total of 2,982 publications were screened by researchers during this six-month period.

Publications

The following gazetteers were completed by the Evasion and Escape Section and published by the Editorial and Productions Section during this reporting period:

1. Gazetteer of Sakhalin, August 1957
2. Gazetteer of the Kurile Islands, October 1957

Project American

This project was initiated in July 1954 for the purpose of carrying out extensive research with regard to USAF personnel unaccounted for after the Korean
conflict. Through information collected from repatriated U.S. and U.N. prisoners of war, Japanese repatriates, foreign refugees, and numerous intelligence reports, a strong possibility emerged that a large number of the personnel listed as "missing in action" may still be alive and interned in Communist prison camps. The objective of this project is to investigate the identification of as many of these men as possible. This objective is to be accomplished by the exploitation of all possible documentary and human sources. Project American was and is currently being developed as a continuing file of all such information with any previously unevaluated material being disseminated as Special Reports or Intelligence Reports.

AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The primary mission of this section is the collection of air technical intelligence information on those areas of prime interest to the Commander, PACAF, and to include other areas as may be designated. Another mission of the ATI section is to provide technical assistance and training to members of other sections of the squadron in the preparation and evaluation of technical reports. This section is also vested with the responsibility of making investigations and preliminary evaluations of foreign air material obtained by the squadron or other 6002d Air Intelligence Service Group units, maintaining liaison with those other military intelligence organizations with an air technical intelligence capability or interest and to aid in the collection of materials upon request of USAF and/or Deputy for Intelligence, PACAF.

The following SKIs and PRIIs were levied on this section during this reporting period:
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-009A)

Subj: Crash of Navy PB4Y-2, 8 April 1950 (U)

Ref: (a) OP-009A Memo of 13 Jun 1973

1. (FOUO) Reference (a) requested a search of NAVINTCOM files to determine the existence of any information relating to the crash of a PB4Y-2 over the Baltic Sea, 8 April 1950. Appended to reference (a) was an affidavit to the President of the United States executed by Mr. John H. NOBLE, a prisoner of the Soviets from July 1945 to January 1955. This affidavit alleged that eight of the ten USN crew members of the PB4Y-2 had survived the crash and were being detained in the Soviet Union.

2. (C) Retrievable holdings of this Command have been summarized from pertinent documents and are reported herein:

   a. On 11 April 1951, BUPERS issued a statement concerning the finding of death of the ten man crew of the USN aircraft PB4Y-2 on 8 April 1950. This report contained an admission by the Soviet government that a U.S. aircraft had been fired upon on that date in the vicinity of Libau, Latvia. Two life rafts were subsequently picked up in the Baltic and these were positively identified as belonging to the missing aircraft. BUPERS at that time indicated no official or confirmed unofficial reports had been received concerning any survivors. (Pers G231-MFD-ilj)

   b. The Associated Press reported on 12 January 1955 that Mr. John H. NOBLE, recently returned from a Soviet prison camp, declared he had been told American airmen were held in a Soviet prison at Vorkuta and that it was common knowledge that some crewmen from the Baltic Sea crash were in captivity. NOBLE and PVT William C. MARCHUK, U.S. Army were released by the
c. MARCHUK and NOBLE while awaiting repatriation at Potma in January 1955 heard from other assembled prisoners about U.S. fliers shot down over Baltic in 1950. A contradiction was noted in their stories. NOBLE stated he talked to prisoners who had seen eight of these fliers alive at an unspecified camp. MARCHUK stated he had heard from other prisoners that they saw bodies of these fliers removed from the plane. Discrepancy unresolved in our holdings. (U. S. State Department Message No. 420 of 12 January 1955)

d. MARCHUK stated to U.S. Army investigators in January 1955 that he had heard from other prisoners that the eight American airmen shot down over Baltic Sea in 1950 were alive and prisoners in Vorkuta. NOBLE stated from first hand knowledge MARCHUK was an avid communist and a thief. (CINCUSAREUR Message No. SX 1167 of 11 January 1955)

e. NOBLE was queried in Berlin in January 1955 by a U.S. Department of State representative concerning the conflict in his earlier statements and those of MARCHUK relative to the Baltic Sea fliers. NOBLE repeated his story in somewhat greater detail. While he was being transferred from Vorkuta to Potma in July 1954 he met a group of Yugoslav prisoners who mentioned that they had met other American prisoners while detained in USSR. In talking with one of these Yugoslavs, NOBLE ascertained that there were eight survivors from the PB4Y shot down in 1950 over the Baltic. This Yugoslav had himself seen and talked with these eight survivors. Yugoslav source told NOBLE survivors were particularly worried because they knew that they were officially dead, the Soviets having announced there were no survivors, therefore they had every reason to believe Soviet authorities would see to it they would disappear. As to date conversation between Yugoslav and PB4Y survivors, NOBLE could only say that meeting occurred "well after time of incident." As to location of U.S. fliers, NOBLE could only remember Yugoslav source saying he had met Americans while latter were being transferred from one camp to another.
f. On 17 January 1955, the DIO-3ND interviewed NOBLE at his hotel in New York City to determine whether newspaper statements attributed to NOBLE concerning Naval aviators being held in captivity were true. In essence, NOBLE related the following: He categorically denied that he had ever said these men were naval aviators and in his previous statement had said that they were American aviators and the inference had later been put in by newspapermen. He said the true facts were as follows: About six months ago he had been transferred from a camp within the Arctic Circle to a repatriation camp in Russia. At this camp in the same barracks were a number of Yugoslavs. These Yugoslavs were divided into three groups - German Yugoslavs, Austrian Yugoslavs, and native Yugoslavs and they were to be repatriated to the three respective countries. The Austrian Yugoslavs were repatriated first and left before NOBLE was repatriated. One of the German Yugoslavs who was to be repatriated to Germany is the man who told him the story that in the camp from which he came in the Arctic Circle there were eight (8) American aviators. He does not remember the man's name but his bunk mate would know it. The Austrian Yugoslav is named FRANZ ZWETKO; address Liebenau, Gradz Austria; street address: Am Greunanger 111. NOBLE stated that ZWETKO knew this man well and would know his name and hence the man who made the original statement would soon be available somewhere in Germany. NOBLE wrote to ZWETKO as of that date and requested the name of the German Yugoslav. If ZWETKO can be contacted in Austria he should be told the man in question lived in the "red room" of the barracks and read aloud most of the time. NOBLE feels that this would be enough information to indicate to ZWETKO who the man was. At this point in time, the DIO discreetly cautioned NOBLE of the dangers involved in saying that the American aviators were the PB4Y 'Navy fliers. NOBLE appeared on television later that night and no mention was made of any internment of Navy fliers. (DIO, 3ND Memorandum)

g. On 18 January 1955, NOBLE was debriefed by the U. S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. The highlights of this proceeding follows:

He had met PVT William MARCHUK and William VERDINE both Americans in June 1954 while imprisoned. At this time, he recalled that while in the company of either MARCHUK or VERDINE, they were told by a German Yugoslav that the latter
had met eight American flyers who claimed to have been shot down over the Baltic Sea. The German Yugoslav stated he was told by the "eight American flyers" in Vorkuta that they were picked up by the Soviet Coast Guard after the crash, and feared they would be hidden in the Soviet Union, since the Soviet authorities had reported there were no survivors in that crash. NOBLE indicated this was the only conversation he had with the German Yugoslav. NOBLE stated MARCHUK had frequently talked with this German Yugoslav who, according to NOBLE, worked closely with the Russians. NOBLE was shown photographs of five members of the PB4Y-2 crew, but stated he had not seen them. The names of all ten crew members of the PB4Y-2 were mentioned to NOBLE and only the name REYNOLDS was familiar to him, but he could not recall the circumstances which caused the name to be familiar.

(U.S. Department of State Debrief of 18 January 1955, Washington, D.C.)

h. ZWETKO advised a USN representative in Austria on 26 January 1955 that he possessed no information on any Americans except NOBLE, MARCHUK and VERDINE; that he knew of no information concerning imprisoned American flyers except that told to him by NOBLE; that he had never been assigned to Vorkuta.

(Naval Message 261400Z January 1955)

i. ZWETKO advised a Navy representative in February 1955 that he recently received a letter from NOBLE. As a result of this communication, ZWETKO identified one WUKOWITSCH as the fellow prisoner at Potma who told NOBLE that the missing USN Baltic flyers were interned in the USSR. ZWETKO believed that WUKOWITSCH was now residing in East Berlin. (Department of State Vienna message 1798 of 14 February 1955)

j. VERDINE was interrogated by COMNAVGER Rep Berlin on 2 February 1955 and denied any knowledge of USN personnel incarcerated by Russians and had not heard of the disappearance of Navy Privateer. (Naval Msg, COMNAVGER, 021737Z February 1955)

k. On 16 May 1955, WUKOWITSCH and VERDINE were interrogated by COMNAVGER. WUKOWITSCH was unable to offer any specific information pertaining to the Navy plane crew. He recalled
hearing on the prison loudspeaker in Vorkuta in early 1950 that an American aircraft had crossed the USSR border, and that the U.S. government had subsequently charged that the aircraft was shot down by the Russians. Further, he was unable to identify any crewmen from photographs displayed to him. VERDINE was able to acknowledge only that while in Vorkuta in 1953, he heard a camp rumor to the effect that a U.S. plane had been shot down in the Baltic. COMNAVGER commented in his report that since no confirmation of NOBLE's stories could be developed it appeared that NOBLE may be fabricating the information. Numerous German and other repatriates were questioned in Berlin upon return regarding the Navy Privateer and the fate of its crew with negative results. (COMNAVGER IR 266-S-55 of 18 May 1955)

1. In March 1955, NOBLE told the FBI he had no definite knowledge of any Americans behind the Iron Curtain, but he felt there were some there due to comments made to him by other prisoners. (Ref. FBI Rpt, Detroit, Michigan, 23 March 1955)

3. (U) It is believed that crewman identified in reference (a) as AT1 Frank L. PECKHAM, USN is intended to read AT1 Frank Lloyd BECKMAN.

4. (C) It is evident from the review of our files on the Baltic Sea incident that statements made by repatriates are not based on fact, but essentially are unconfirmed hearsay. NOBLE's sources of information have denied upon interrogation knowledge of information attributed to them by NOBLE. American aviators allegedly imprisoned in the USSR have never been confirmed to be identical with the U.S. Navy crew of the PB4Y-2. No interviewee has been able to substantiate the rumors that the Navy fliers are alive. NOBLE contributed five articles to the N.Y. Times in 1955, wrote an article for the Readers Digest in February 1956 and according to a parent of one of the crew members has written a book on his experiences as a prisoner in the USSR. This Command has no photographs depicting a Soviet vessel picking up survivors and/or bodies from the PB4Y. Our files do not reflect an interview in Washington, D.C. by Naval Intelligence personnel on 17 January 1955, but as reflected in paragraph 2 above, NOBLE was interviewed by DIO, 3ND in New York on 17 January 1955.

W. E. NYCE
Deputy
the missing Japanese women, but Kim Yu Mi was unable to identify a photo of the missing woman.

A Swedish book reports that a group of four Lebanese women were taken against their will to Pyongyang. They were reportedly placed in a spy school together with women from France, Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries. Two of the Lebanese women managed to escape through a country in Eastern Europe and eventually returned to Beirut in 1979. The book bases its report on accounts by the escapees.

In addition, a South Korean and a Korean-American have apparently been abducted. During an Easter vacation in 1979, Ko Sang-mun, a South Korean, was touring Oslo, Norway. He lost his luggage and asked a taxi driver to take him to the South Korean Embassy. The driver mistakenly dropped him at the DPRK Embassy. The tourist entered the building and was evidently kidnapped by North Korean diplomats. Authorities in Norway and Sweden later reportedly discovered that the DPRK diplomats had transported Ko Sang-mun first to Stockholm and then to Pyongyang. On 30 June Radio Pyongyang announced that Ko "heroically had come to the northern part of Korea." According to Swedish sources who have researched this case, Ko's trip to the DPRK was not voluntary. In the same month, June 1979, "Chung Ryea-sup", a 22-year-old Korean-American soldier was reported by Swedish sources to have disappeared after having been stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. A devout Christian born in South Korea, he immigrated to the US in 1973 and later joined the US Army. After refusing for many weeks to answer questions regarding this case at the Panmunjom talks, the Pyongyang authorities declared in August 1979 that Chung had escaped to the DPRK because he could not "stand the life in the aggressive imperialist US Army."

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During my captivity in the Red Chinese during the Korean War, I saw over fifteen Caucasian prisoners whom I saw from June of 1953 through the summer (June-July) of 1955. (My internment lasted from January 12, 1953 to August 4, 1955.) Most of the sightings were during the months of May through September of 1953, with sporadic sightings within this time period and after this period of time. These fifteen men, in addition to John Downey and Richard Fecteau with whom our B-29 crew spent three weeks (December 7-28, 1954) were one of the fifteen whom I saw was a Lt. Van Voorhis. Van Voorhis was our B-29's instructor, radar operator, and was seen about 8-10 occasions over a 2-3 week period in late July and early August of 1953—seven months after we were shot down. During our trial in October of 1954, the Chinks claimed that Lt. Van Voorhis and Lt. Henry Reese were killed in the crash. In my early interrogations the Chinks told me that they had captured two of our crew as they hit the ground on the night we were shot down (January 12, 1953). They also boasted that they had captured thirteen of us. Of the eleven of us who were freed, none of us were captured on the night of January 12, 1953.

I reported these sightings to our Air Force Intelligence, the CIA, and the State Department upon my return to freedom. Their reaction was one of indifference, and I was admonished to forget not only the fifteen but also Downey and Fecteau. It was suggested that perhaps I had imagined that I had seen these men. Some time during my debriefings I was ordered to forget not only the fifteen but also Downey and Fecteau and to never discuss this matter with anyone. Of course, there was no way I could ever forget these men; after all I had just been released from that indescribable hell that these abandoned men were suffering and enduring.

To my knowledge only one of these fifteen men has been released.

This statement regarding my sightings of Caucasian prisoners left behind in Red China is true, and I would be willing to swear to it.

Steve E. Kiba
ex-MIA/POW of the Red Chinese
Please excuse my English.

I thank you for inviting me to this meeting. My name is Serban Oprica. I am from Romania. My parents suffered loss of jobs and private property while the communists were taking power, the only source of happiness remaining their children's education.

In the year 1967, I received my Master's Degree in Constructions, and I started working at Institute of Designing in Bucharest city. In September 1979, I was sent to North Korea to help build the first television factory in that country. In the month of October in a visit to a museum I saw the event for which I attended this meeting.

It was a beautiful day. The Korean bus with twenty-five Romanian people and North Korean guides drove along winding rural road. After a turn a large field with tiny houses appeared before my eyes. From those houses a man that was taller than the Koreans approached the bus. Behind him, near a house, a Korean woman could be seen. As the bus came closer, everyone in the bus was shocked because that man was not Korean. He was in his 50s and had light-colored eyes. To his right, farther away, we saw more people bent toward the ground. The ones that were closer raised their heads and stared toward the bus. None of these people were Korean. They were tall, in their 50s, and curiously looked at the bus. The rest, at least 50, continued working. An atmosphere of silence filled the bus. We didn't exchange any gestures and we saw no guards.

After this incident, the colleagues that had worked longer in Korea said that they knew about the existence of Americans and that this is something normal in a communist country. After returning from Korea, I completed the documents for emigration with my family in the U.S.A. After 5 years, my dream came true.

In present, I work as an engineer for Savage Engineering in Bloomfield, CT.

I thank the American people for their hospitality. I read in the newspaper about POWs, and that many people don't believe in their existence. I decided to tell what I saw.

Now, I feel better and I hope that in a good day they (POW's) will come back home.
ACSI-SFD

SUBJECT: Continuing State/Defense Efforts to Secure Accounting on Missing Prisoners of War

...was of the opinion that interest in this correspondence rests primarily with Lt. Colonel Hagood, Support Plans Section, Collection Division, inasmuch as he is the Army Member of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

...Colonel Hagood expressed an interest in the overall problem inasmuch as he is concerned with the formulation of policy and plans affecting a program generated in this respect. He could offer nothing of material value. He further indicated that the preparation of an intelligence estimate is not a function of Collection Division but concerning within the operational activity of Production Division.

...Mr. Evan T. Sage and Captain John L. Helms, Eastern Branch, Production Division, could offer no assistance regarding intelligence information.

...Colonel Marion K. Brown, Assistant Chief, Production Division indicated that the preparation of an intelligence estimate would come within the purview of the Division's responsibility but fails to understand what the author of the reference letter means in requesting our intelligence estimate. Intelligence estimates are related to enemy activities rather than to our own personnel.

4. A search of the records of this Division fails to disclose any material regarding the concerned personnel.

5. In view of the foregoing it can be concluded:

a. Records of ACSI do not contain information of an intelligence nature concerning missing personnel.

b. The preparation or non-preparation of an intelligence estimate comes within the operational activity of Production Division.

c. That no real effort has been made toward the collection of information of an intelligence nature regarding prisoners of war or missing personnel.

6. It is recommended therefore, that:

This action be transferred to the Production Division for preparation of the intelligence estimates and the preparation of a reply from the Secretary of the Army to OSD, or any other action which the Division deems appropriate.
An Accounting for the Vietnam MIAs? Remember Korea

By Bill Paul

Tomorrow is National POW-MIA Repeal Day. In Alexandria, Va., relatives of the nearly 2,500 men still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War are holding their 16th annual meeting. For the first time since the war ended in 1975, they have aason to believe that their long ordeal may be almost over.

Two weeks ago, Vietnam said it wants to resolve the "waterfall" of questions aimed at resuming the MIA issue within two years. Secretary of State George P. Shultz responded that the U.S. is ready to work "promptly and decisively" with Vietnam. A formal announcement on the talks is expected shortly.

For years, the Reagan administration, based on the "information available to it" has operated on the "assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive," according to the Defense Department's official POW-MIA Fact Book. In testimony before Congress last month, Pentagon officials said they have 43 eyewitness accounts by refugees of live MIAs that appear to be true but still need corroboration. A few refugees have even passed polygraph tests, it was reported.

But in recent days, before the talks have even begun, both the New York Times and Newsweek have reported that U.S. officials very seriously doubt that any MIAs are still alive.

Why the apparent sudden shift in policy? Because it would be embarrassing to both sides if these led to the return of any remaining prisoners—Hanoi because it has long denied still having any, the U.S. because there would be questions about why the men didn't come home sooner. When faced with a similar situation after the Korean War, the Communists didn't account for all American missing, and the U.S. let them get away with it, despite solid evidence that some GI's were still held captive, even in the Soviet Union.

More than 8,000 Americans still are unaccounted for from the Korean War. In January 1954, five months after the cease-fire and the supposed return of all U.S. prisoners by the Communists, a Senate subcommittee reported that several thousand American soldiers who have not been repatriated were victims of war crimes, died in action, or are presently confined behind the Iron Curtain.

On June 29, 1954, Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., now speaker of the House, entered into the Congressional Record a resolution from the Appropriations Committee that Mr. O'Neill said, had his "unqualified endorsement." The resolution began, "Whereas 944 soldiers of the United States are now prisoners of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea, many of these men highly trained technicians skilled in the handling of the latest and highest secret instruments of war. . . ."

Today, in Camden, S.C., Steve Kiba, one of 11 American fliers whose plane was shot down just south of the Chinese-North Korean border and who were held prisoner by the Chinese for two years after the war (they figured in the 944), remembers the radar man on his ill-fated flight, Paul Van Voorhis. That U.S. soldier Mr. Van Voorhis, as killed in action. Mr. Kiba says he saw Mr. Van Voorhis at least a dozen times after the crash, including after the cease-fire, walking in the exercise yard of the prison they were in near Peking.

He walked to within six feet of my prison cell," Mr. Kiba recalls. "He was in good physical condition." Yet when Mr. Kiba told American intelligence officials about Paul Van Voorhis, "They told me to forget about him and not to mention having seen him to anyone else."

Why would the Chinese have released everyone but Mr. Van Voorhis and the other 10 American POW's? Calling "U.S. Intelligence officials," U.S. News & World Report said in December 1953 that the Communists "primarily wanted—and got—Americans who could handle the sensitive and complex instruments of modern war such as radar, airborne and ground, and Infrared Instruments for night combat."

(Among the missing in Vietnam had special technical training, including in nuclear weaponry.)

In North Palm Beach, Fla., retired Air Force Intelligence officer O'Wighton Dek Simpson remembers the "Top Secret" report he sent to the Pentagon in 1955. As an attaché in the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong, Mr. Simpson had just interrogated an emigre from China in his early 20s who was going to Australia.

The emigre told Mr. Simpson that he had been a railroad worker at Manchouli, on the Manchurian-Siberian border. Around the time of the cease-fire, a train heading north into Siberia stopped at Manchouli. The prisoners could change the undercarriage. The emigre said about 700 prisoners got onto the platform. To be sure, he couldn't recognize English, but many of the prisoners were black, and the only blacks there would have been Americans, Mr. Simpson notes.

"I was convinced that the emigre's story was true," Mr. Simpson says. But, "as far as I know," U.S. intelligence officials never followed up on the report, he says. "I think the Pentagon sent it to the State Department, who sent it to our U.N. ambassador, who asked the Russian ambassador if it was true. You can imagine his answer."

For years, Mr. Simpson adds, he has tried to get someone in Washington to listen to his story. "It's like trying to punch holes in Jell-O," he says, adding that the truth might yet be warm, since the emigre could still be alive in Australia.

Last year, after taking the U.S. Army to court, Robert Van Voorhis, Conn., a brother of a Korean War MIA, finally succeeded in getting the U.S. to change the status of his brother, Roger, from MIA to PHW after producing witnesses who said they had seen Roger in a Korean PHW camp shortly before the cease-fire.

During the trial, dozens of official Army "data sheets" were discovered that showed that the U.S. had listed many GI's as "missing in action" when in fact they were prisoners of war who might well have been left behind when the shooting stopped. The data sheets show that these GI's were known to be POW's because other prisoners who were repatriated saw them in captivity.

Meanwhile, the North Koreans have never budged from their position that they have returned all U.S. prisoners. Periodically, the U.S. does seek information on American "missing," only to be rebuffed by the Koreans. Yet Gen. Eugene Tighe, who headed the Defense Intelligence Agency until his retirement in Sept. 1981, says, "I don't remember ever discussing Korean POW's in the course of his duties in Washington.

Gen. Tighe says that, in his opinion, U.S. prisoners could come home from Southeast Asia in the next two years. But only if the U.S. starts "making leverage" with the Vietnamese, which it never did with the North Koreans. Gen. Tighe says the U.S. must emphatically say to Vietnam, "Sure, we'll restore diplomatic relations, and renew trade, and unfreeze your assets, and offer economic assistance, but only if you start telling us where the hell all those Americans are and arrange for their return."

Mr. Paul, a reporter in New York, has written previously on the POW's/MIA's.

She Found Me in the Alumni Directory

By Jack Markell

"Mr. Markell!!"

I grimaced as soon as I heard the suit. I traded in my contact lenses for new wire-rim glasses. I thought there was no way she would be able to see through my speaking about intrapreneurship in large corporations, given my current responsibilities in establishing a new business for the
Dear Mr. Danielson,

Thank you for your letter dated 6 November 1985 addressed to the Secretary-General.

I believe the following information answers your questions:

1. Since 1948 a number of peace-keeping operations have been established by the United Nations to ease and contain conflict situations. These operations may be classified broadly into two categories: observer missions consisting of a group of military observers, and peace keeping forces composed of national contingents.

2. The first peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), set up in May 1948. Later, other observer missions were set up according to the same principles as UNTSO: the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in August 1949, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in June 1958, the United Nations Yearly Observation Mission (UNOYM) in June 1963, and the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in April 1955. Two of those missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP, are still in operation.

3. The international force in Korea was not a United Nations peace-keeping operation since it was not under the control of the United Nations and was based on the consent of the parties. In that case, the Security Council, in its resolution 83 (1952) of 27 June 1950, recommended that Member States furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea, and in its resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, it recommended that the military forces provided by Member States be made available to a Unified Command under the United States, and authorized that Command to use the United Nations flag at its discretion in the course of its operation.

I extend my best wishes on your forthcoming 35th Anniversary Reunion of the "Chosin Few".
United Nations Command Position of Repatriation of Remains

Background

The Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, provided for the voluntary repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW) and for the repatriation of remains. For the latter purpose, both sides on August 17, 1953, agreed to an "Understanding" on the delivery and receipt of remains, under which approximately 13,000 Korean People's Army/Chinese Peoples' Volunteers (KPA/CPV) and 4,023 United Nations Command (UNC) remains were returned to the respective sides in 1954.

On October 30, 1954, both sides agreed to terminate all but paragraph 20 of the Understanding. That paragraph provided that remains discovered subsequent to the termination of the agreement could be returned through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Secretaries.

The UNC subsequently provided information to North Korea about UNC aircraft crash sites in the north. North Korea searched for and recovered 96 UN personnel which were returned in November 1954. This was after termination of the Understanding of Aug. 17, 1954 and in accordance with paragraph 20 which remained in effect.

After the fighting had ended, the UNC determined that 1,223 personnel known to have been alive in KPA/CPV POW camps and 16 civilians of various nationalities were still unaccounted for. Over the years, the UNC repeatedly attempted to get an accounting of these personnel but received no positive response from North Korea.

In 1961, the UNC recovered and returned to the north the remains of two Chinese soldiers of the CPV forces. That caused the UNC to step up its efforts and, beginning in 1962, to ask the KPA/CPV side for an accounting of unrecovered remains as well as the unaccounted for POWs. Also in 1962, the UNC was asked to inquire about three missing UNC personnel on behalf of their families and was provided a map of North Korean POW Camp 5, which was passed to the north.
Since 1962, the UN has continued to press the KPA/CPV about all unaccounted for POWs and missing personnel and has returned the remains of all KPA/CPV personnel and North Korean civilians in the south.

In late 1965, North Korea indicated that it might be prepared to search for remains. Since then, the UNC has through correspondence, formal meetings and contacts at Panmunjom continued to seek the return of UNC remains.

**UNC Unaccounted For POWs and Those Listed As Missing in Action/Interred In NK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>POWs</th>
<th>MIAs/Interred in NK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>6,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other five countries which made up the United Nations Command - Ethiopia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand -- did not report any POWs or MIAs.

**UNC Objectives with Regard to Remains**

+ Obtain the return of all UNC remains that are in the territory of North Korea as part of an overall accounting of unaccounted for POWs and MIAs.

+ Use the established channels of the Military Armistice Commission for this purpose since there are remains from multiple countries involved on both sides.

+ Stress that both sides have a moral and humanitarian responsibility as well as an obligation under the Armistice to locate and recover remains if they have information on where to look.

Both sides say the remains issue is humanitarian, however, North Korea appears to be trying to use the issue for political purposes such as reducing the credibility of the UNC and/or the effectiveness of the Military Armistice Commission. The UNC considers the MAC the proper and effective means to accomplish this purpose and points out the fact that....
In four occasions -- twice in 1951 and again in 1954 and 1958, the UN returned a total of nine Chinese peoples volunteer remains from the Korean war.

On four occasions, remains of a total of 31 North Koreans, including those of nine KPA soldiers, were returned to the north.

The UN in 1966 recovered the remains of at least 25 KPA soldiers who died in the battles of the Naktong River in August and September 1950 and offered to return them to North Korea for proper burial. The north refused to accept the remains claiming that they were not convinced that the remains were theirs. On June 9, 1967, the UN interred the remains by dignified burial in the Republic of Korea.

Summary

The UNC urges North Korea to help bring to an end the heartbreak of countless families by searching for and recovering UNC remains based on the information made available to them. At the same time, the UNC hopes that the KPA/CPV will accept the return of the remains of their war dead located in the south and is willing to use any information which may be available to conduct new and active efforts.

END
Eastside Forum

It's time to make public news about lost POW's

By Rep. John Miller

They didn't ask for a lot.

Veterans who went to Korea and Vietnam did so because they believed in their country. They left their homes and their families to travel far away, and many of them didn't return.

All they asked was that they be remembered. Now, we may have a chance to remember some of those men, and put the minds of their families at ease.

Over the years, there have been sightings of servicemen captured in the Korean and Vietnam wars. The Defense Intelligence Agency acknowledges it has received since 1975 more than 6,000 reports pertaining to Americans held in Indochina. Of these, the DIA admits 1,100 are "unresolved" cases. Some people say many of the prisoners were shipped across China to prison camps in the Soviet Union. After that, they weren't accounted for. While we have all heard stories about POWs in Vietnam, we have not heard about POWs of Korea, the "forgotten war." Now, KIRO TV reporter Mark Sauter has uncovered information about the Korean War POWs that is bone-chilling. Sauter has found unclassified documents that indicate Korean veterans, too, may have ended up in the Soviet Union.

I HAVE HEARD from some of the family members of POWs in this area. One of them, Bill Sowles of Edmonds, came to talk to me about his father's case. His father was an OSS agent in World War II and was in the army during the Korean War. His father was captured in November of 1950, but was transferred to the presumed dead list in 1953. In November of 1989, Bill Sowles discovered his father's name on a list of known POWs in communist hands when the war ended. He has also found an old picture of POWs held in Korea, his father among them. How can it hurt our national security to allow Bill Sowles to finally know what happened to his father so long ago?

Legislation sponsored by Denny Smith of Oregon would call for the federal government to open up these files. I am co-sponsoring that legislation, because I feel it is the least we can do for the families that are left behind. In fact, I have asked for a briefing with the Defense Intelligence Agency, because I want to get some answers to these allegations. Plus, I have written to the chairman to the Committee on Government Operations and requested a hearing on this bill.

SOME PEOPLE have said releasing this information would endanger the families of these soldiers. This is untrue. Families are protected because no information specifically mentioning a service member can be made public without the written consent of the closest living relative. Other critics have said releasing this information could harm national security. Untrue again. Exceptions are allowed for information which reveals sources and methods of intelligence collection that would compromise national security.

At the end of January, the Washington State Senate passed a memorial — sponsored by Leo Thorsness — asking HR 3603 (now known as "The Truth Bill"). The memorial sends a message to the president, and the leaders of the U.S. House and Senate, supporting the legislation. Theodore Roosevelt once said, "A man who is good enough to shed his blood for the country is good enough to be given a square deal afterward."

I say we make these files public — for our national conscience, for the morale of our veterans, and for the families of these soldiers.

After all, the soldiers didn't ask for a lot when they went to war.

Miller, a Republican, represents the First Congressional District, which includes the northern Eastside.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND
ALEXANDRIA, VA
22331-0482
February 23, 1990

POW/MIA Affairs
Division

Mr. Lewis William Sowles, III
23715 Woodway Park Road
Woodway, Washington 98020

Dear Mr. Sowles:

Thank you for your letter of February 5, 1990, to President Bush, concerning Americans captured during the Korean Conflict and held in Communist prisons, as reported by KIRO/CBS News of Seattle, Washington.

As much as he would like to, President Bush cannot personally respond to every communication he receives; therefore, I have been asked to assist you. In the following letter I will attempt to clarify some of the issues you raised.

Approximately 8,200 U.S. personnel remain unaccounted for in Korea, most of whom were killed in action and buried by U.S. forces in battlefield grave sites. Because of the division of the Korean peninsula, we do not have access to the battlefields in North Korea and, therefore, have not been able to obtain otherwise recoverable remains.

There is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea. The 389 "known to have been alive in Communist prisons following the end of the Korean War" is a misleading statement that has unfortunately gained public acceptance. Many of these men disappeared when their units were overrun by Communist forces; others were air crews believed to have parachuted from their aircraft. There is no evidence that 389 (or any other number) Americans were held in captivity and not released at the end of hostilities.

A number of newspaper reports are circulating that refer to 50 caucasians observed by a Romanian national working on an Agricultural Collective in North Korea in October 1979. During an interview conducted by U.S. Government officials, Mr. Serban Oprica stated that he observed one man who had somewhat caucasian features among at least 50 laborers, some of whom appeared taller than Koreans. He observed no guards and nothing indicated that the people he saw were detained against their will. We know of numerous caucasians in North Korea, including Eastern Bloc
diplomats and technical experts. We cannot rule out the presence of mixed-race individuals, given U.S., Russian, and other Western presence in Korea. Mr. Oprica's conclusion that the caucasian was an American prisoner is based upon circumstantial evidence and pure speculation from other Romanians. His judgment has no basis in fact. Efforts to locate the Agricultural Cooperative have been unsuccessful, due to Mr. Oprica's limited knowledge of the geography and terrain of the region.

An account of American POW's that has been widely circulated in recent years is known as the "Simpson Report." In 1954, Delk Simpson was assigned as U.S. Air Force Attache in Hong Kong, when he encountered a European refugee recently arrived from Manchuria, who described the transfer of 700 American POW's from Chinese to Russian trains near the border of Manchuria and Siberia in late 1951. The source did not have enough knowledge of English to identify the language, but was convinced that the prisoners were American because many of them were black. Simpson claims that the report was never followed up beyond questioning the Russian Ambassador. In 1985, the U.S. Government requested Australian assistance in locating the source, who had emigrated to that country. It proved impossible to track him, not only due to a lack of name and address, but also because of questions as to his nationality. Although Simpson originally reported the source as Greek, he later indicated that he was Polish or Russian. Throughout the Korean War, the French were deeply involved in a war in Indochina. A large portion of the French Expeditionary Forces were French colonial troops—among them many Africans. Colonial troops were targeted by the Viet Minh with propaganda aimed at enlisting them as "Third World brothers," in the liberation struggle. As a result, colonial troops, who rallied or were captured, were treated differently than French nationals. With Chinese and Soviet assistance, hundreds of colonial troops were shipped by rail from Hanoi, north through China, across the Sino-Soviet border in Manchuria and into the European Soviet Union via the Trans-Siberian railroad. They were subsequently repatriated to the colonies, to the distress of the French who lost track of these soldiers. Given the circumstances of the Simpson report, it is probable that the POW's observed by the source were French colonial troops. The Simpson source bases his conclusion that the POW's were Americans on the large number of blacks observed. It should be noted that the percentage of Africans in the French colonial forces is far higher than that of black Americans missing in Korea—another argument for the belief that Simpson's source saw French colonial troops.

Steve Kiba was one of 11 Americans shot down south of the Chinese-North Korean border in January 1953 and held prisoner by the Chinese for 2 years. In newspaper accounts, Kiba described seeing his radar man, Paul Van Voorhies, at least a dozen times
after the crash and during captivity. Subsequent speculation by journalists alleged that the Chinese had detained Van Voorhies for his technical expertise. It is interesting to note that the Air Force conducted extensive debriefings of the 11 crewmembers who were returned by the Korean Government. At that time, all crewmen but Kiba indicated that Van Voorhies was observed during the initial incident and was never seen again. Kiba, during his debriefing by U.S. Government officials, reported having seen a light haired man several times in July 1953. Although he could not give a positive identification, he thought it was Van Voorhies. The Chinese Government has consistently stated that Van Voorhies and two other crewmembers perished while attempting to parachute.

Since the end of the Korean Conflict, the gravest threat to peace in Northeast Asia has been the North Korean development of a heavily-militarized society, maintained in a high state of combat readiness. For this reason, North Korea has been under the intelligence microscope by U.S., South Korean, and Japanese intelligence services for nearly 40 years. One must conclude that this scrutiny would have turned up evidence of American prisoners of war in North Korea if they existed. No such evidence has emerged.

Likewise, the Soviet Union has been the central focus of U.S. and allied intelligence activities for most of this century, as has China for almost 50 years. Similarly, one must conclude that this scrutiny would have revealed at least a hint of American prisoners of war in the Soviet Union or China if they had been taken there. As in the case of North Korea, no such evidence has ever surfaced.

I hope that the above information answers your questions. A fact sheet is enclosed giving an overview of negotiations with the North Koreans on the issue of unaccounted for Americans.

Sincerely,

M. A. Hoherz
Colonel, U.S. Army
Deputy, the Adjutant
General

Enclosure
Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War

The U.S. Government has ongoing efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for while serving their country. In the case of Korea, 8,177 Americans are unaccounted for, including 389 who were listed as prisoners of war (POWs). Discussions with the North Koreans on the subject of unaccounted for personnel are conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), which provides updated information to the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers Military Armistice Commission (KPA/CPV MAC) as it surfaces. The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in the defense of freedom in Korea.

For the past 34 years, the UNCMAC repeatedly has called upon the KPA/CPV to account for the 2,233 unaccounted for UNC personnel, including the 389 Americans, known to have been under enemy control during the Korean War. Also, from 1955 to 1957 the U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia met in Geneva with Chinese representatives 77 times to discuss the accounting of missing Americans. In August 1982, the UNCMAC specifically requested, for the first time, the repatriation of any UNC remains buried in North Korea, even though the Armistice Agreements called for each side to return the other's war dead.

In keeping with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements, the UNCMAC has returned the remains of CPV soldiers discovered in the Republic of Korea in the years following the war. In May 1987, the UNCMAC attempted to return the remains of 25 North Korean soldiers found in a wartime mass grave, but the KPA refused to accept them, even though the KPA had on previous occasions accepted from the UNCMAC the bodies of post-war North Korean civilians who had drowned and washed ashore in the South.

In August 1986, the UNCMAC turned over to the KPA/CPV MAC a thick file of material regarding the locations of UNC remains. The detailed maps and charts pinpointed the burial sites associated with 13 former POW camps and a POW hospital, identified seven former UNC cemeteries in the North and listed 291 crash sites from which lost UNC airmen had not been recovered. In a spirit of compromise, the UNCMAC on July 30, 1987 formally offered to field a Multi-National Team comprised of representatives from UNC nations to assist the KPA in searching for UNC remains. This humanitarian initiative was rebuffed by the KPA.

Other than the 4,439 U.S. POWs returned in 1953 and the 1,868 American remains returned in 1954, there has been little progress, despite U.S. and UNC efforts, on the part of the other side to resolve the cases of Americans still unaccounted for in North Korea. However, the lack of responsiveness thus far by the KPA on this issue will not blunt the determination of the U.S. Government to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War.
March 3, 1990

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. Total Army Personnel Command
Alexandria, VA 22331-0482
POW/MIA Affairs Division
M.A. Hoherz, Colonel, U.S. Army Deputy,
the Adjutant General

RE: SFC L. W. Sowles (RA 20 922 355)

Dear Colonel Hoherz:

Thank you for your letter of February 23, 1990 representing President Bush's response to my letter to him of January 24, 1990. My father, SFC Lewis William Sowles was reported MIA November 30, 1950 and on that date I believe he was taken prisoner by the North Koreans. This is the reason I wrote my letter to President Bush.

Since you failed to address any of my specific questions to President Bush, please allow me to address the specifics of your letter.

In paragraph three of your letter you state that most of the 8200 MIA's from Korea were buried in battlefield grave sites in North Korea by United States forces. This allegation is not consistent with United States government records. (Exhibit 'A')

The United States Army by Division Order Number 25; October 27, 1955 through January 16, 1956, concluded in part: "...Available evidence indicates that many of the casualties which are carried on the records of the Department of Defense as missing in action in south Korea were actually captured and transported to North Korea where they subsequently died; however, specific information is lacking as to the number, identity or circumstances surrounding their disappearance." "...Although the Communists turned over approximately 4000 United Nations deceased personnel, it is now known that not all of the United States servicemen actually interred in North Korea were returned."

In addition, United States Air Force Intelligence, through July 1, to December 31, 1957 in its PROJECT AMERICAN, (Exhibit 'B') states in part: "...a strong possibility emerged that a large number of the personnel listed as, "MIA" may still be alive and interned in Communist prison camps...".

There are many State Department and CIA documents which indicate many American POW's were abandoned in China and Russia. This I shall cover later in greater detail.

French Intelligence reported in 1951: "...3000 American prisoners were transported that date to Chi An and Si N Chow
near North East Manchu Korean Border. Report further states 1200 lightly wounded Americans were at same time placed in 3d General Air Dep Hospital at An Tung, Manchu..." (Exhibit 'C')

Moreover, in paragraph four you state: "...there is no evidence to suggest that any United States Personnel were not released from captivity in Korea." This statement is a direct contradiction to years of official statements. For example, Information Report SO. 91634, dated July 17, 1952 states in part: "...Normal POW camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged..." (Exhibit 'D') CIA documents report the presence of hundreds of U. S. prisoners in the 'Peace and Reform' Camps.

Paragraph five of your letter misstates Mr. Oprica and does not mention the government's failure to follow up other live sightings. Mr. Oprica, in part states: "...after this incident, (seeing the 50 caucasians) the colleagues that had worked longer in Korea said that they knew about the existence of Americans and that this is something normal in a Communist country..." Furthermore, you fail to mention Mr. Wu Shu-jen, a Chinese who claims to have twice seen POW's in China. (Exhibit 'E') The DIA has over 6000 live sighting reports in Indo-China since 1975.

Your reference, in paragraph six: "...700 American POW's...many of them were black...and these POW's were French Colonials..." is in direct contravention to the facts. United States Intelligence Report, Dated: October 1950 - February 1951 states: "...This camp in early November had about 1,000 American prisoners of whom about 700 were Negros." (Exhibit 'F')

In addition, Foreign Service Dispatch number 1716, dated: March 23, 1954, sent by Julian F. Harrington, American Consul General, Hong Kong, states in part: "...This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of POW's in American uniforms being sent to Siberia in late 1951 - 2." "...source states that there were a great number of Negros among POW's..." (Exhibit 'G')

Again, original documents on this sighting specifically say that POW's spoke English and wore United States uniforms.

According to CBS/KIRO News, as reported by Mr. Mark Sauter, documents also refer to other reports apparently still classified—-which corroborate that these (POW's) are Americans. (Exhibit 'H')

Paragraph Seven of your letter states regarding ex-POW Steve Kiba, "...that he could not give a positive identification of Van Voorhies." and "The Chinese government has consistently stated that Van Voorhies and the two other crew members perished while attempting to parachute..." The true facts are, as stated by our American hero, ex-POW Mr. Steve E. Kiba: "One of the 15 (U.S. POW's) whom I saw was a
Lt. Paul Van Voorhies. Lt. Van Voorhies was on our B-29 as an instructor radar operator. I saw him on or about 8 - 10 occasions over 2 - 3 week period in late July and early August of 1953..." 
"...They (Chinese) also boasted that they had captured 13 of us. In my early interrogations the Chinese told me that they had captured two of our crew as they hit the ground on the night we were shot down, 1-12-53."

Mr. Kiba represents his statements to be true and "Would be willing to swear to it." Would you, Colonel Hoherz be willing to do same? (Exhibit "I")

Your microscope of intelligence as stated in your letter, paragraph eight and nine is blurred. Intelligence blunders, such as the Pueblo, U-2, Wallenburg, Soviet Spy Rings and North Korean commando attacks certainly do refute the accuracy of the central focus of U.S. and Allied Intelligence activities for most of the past half century. However, scrutiny, has turned up evidence of POW's in captivity. If in fact your allegations are correct and there are no POW's; then, why in God's name is it necessary to still classify a great number of documents regarding POW's such as Project American? If it is not necessary, then in the name of our Country; declassify!

Sincerely,

Lewis William Sowles, III
23715 Woodway Park Road
Edmonds, WA 98020
(206) 542-0712

cc: United States Congress: Mr. John Miller
    United States Senate: Mr. Slade Gorton
    Speaker of the House: Mr. Tom Foley
    Washington Times: Major Garrett
    Seattle Post Intelligencer: Mr. Cris Hanson
    CBS/KIRO NEWS: Mr. Mark Sauter
    Seattle Times: News Desk
NORTH KOREA TO TURN OVER REMAINS TO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
MAY 27 REPATUREATION WILL BE FIRST IN 36 YEARS

WASHINGTON -- A six-member U.S. Congressional delegation led by Mississippi Representative G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery will accept five sets of remains from North Korean officials in a May 28 (May 27 in the U.S.) ceremony at Panmunjom, Korea. It will mark the first time since 1954 that North Korea has repatriated remains from the Korean Conflict.

"How appropriate that, during the time America pays tribute to its war dead, five so long unaccounted for will be returned," said Montgomery. "It is my hope, and I'm sure the hope of many families who have lived with uncertainty over these many years, that this important first step will stimulate continuing dialogue and expedite the return of additional remains. This humanitarian gesture should help improve relations between the U.S. and North Korea," Montgomery said.


In accordance with the procedures established by the armistice agreement, the turnover and acceptance at Panmunjom will be through the United Nations Command/Military Armistice Commission. The remains will be escorted by Rep. Montgomery's delegation to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii for evaluation in an attempt to establish individual identification.

# # #
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 21, 1990
Contact: Jim Holley
(202) 225-3664

NORTH KOREA CERTAIN REMAINS TO BE TURNED OVER ARE AMERICAN

WASHINGTON - Officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have told Mississippi Congressman G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery they are certain the five sets of remains they have agreed to turn over to a U.S. Congressional delegation are American. Montgomery will lead the seven-member delegation which will inspect, sign for, and receive the remains in a May 27 (May 28 in Korea) ceremony at Panmunjom, the village which separates North and South Korea.

North Korean Ambassador Ho Jong, in a Friday meeting with Montgomery, said the remains will be accompanied by documents which contain information as to where and under what circumstances they were discovered. The Ambassador also said the five coffins carrying the remains will contain items such as dogtags, buttons, knives - which link them to the United States.

"Obviously, we are grateful for this information. These materials are crucial to individual identification," said Montgomery.

The five sets of remains from the Korean Conflict will be the first in 36 years to be repatriated by North Korea. The U.S. was one of 16 nations which participated in the 1950-1953 war.

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By JIM ANDERSON

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The State Department has expressed its appreciation for the North Korean return of the remains of five Americans listed as missing in the Korean War, and called it a step in the direction of better relations.

North Korean ambassador to the United Nations, Ho Jong, told United Press International that there could be further releases of American remains but he could not say how many.

The State Department also listed Tuesday a series of conditions that would have to be fulfilled before there could be further improvement in relations, including inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities and an end to North Korean support of international terrorism.

State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said, "The U.S. government appreciates the return of these war remains. As Secretary (of State James) Baker said, 'We are looking for a steady, reciprocal process toward better relations both between North and South Korea and between the United States and North Korea.' The return of these remains is a step in that direction."

The North Korean government handed over the remains at the Panmunjom truce line on Monday, a procedure that the United States insisted on. Earlier efforts to hand the remains to U.S. veterans' groups in North Korea were turned down by the State Department, because they would have excluded the United Nations command and the South Korean government.

Tutwiler listed the conditions that the United States insists on before there can be further improvement in relations: "North Korean willingness to engage in constructive talks with the Republic of Korea, satisfactory resolution of the terrorist issue, and North Korea signing of a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency."

Ambassador Ho said, "We have heard those conditions before." He had no response to the U.S. conditions.

State Department officials said the United States has made those conditions clear in nine meetings held in Beijing between the political counsellors of the U.S. and North Korean embassies in China. There are no diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang.

North Korea was listed by the State Department in April as one of those countries that supports international terrorism, even though the United States believes that North Korea was not responsible for any act of terrorism in 1989 or 1990.

The State Department blames North Korea for the November 1987 destruction of a South Korean airliner over Burma and the 1983 terrorist attack against South Korean officials in Burma in 1983.

U.S. officials also believe that a nuclear installation near Pyongyang is meant to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel, one step on
the road to producing an atomic bomb.

The return of the five sets of MIA remains raises new questions about the nearly 4,000 Americans still listed as missing in action, 35 years after the end of hostilities in Korea.

In a speech soon after the end of the war, Gen. Mark Clark, a U.S. commander, said that "thousands" of Americans were left behind, but the State Department has said that it has seen no credible information about American POWs who were not returned.

There have been persistent reports of middle-aged Caucasian prisoners being spotted in North Korea by foreign technicians. A series of recently declassified cables show that State Department officials passed on information that Caucasian prisoners were spotted by foreign diplomats. Some of the prisoners were reported in the cables to be on their way to the Soviet Union.

Senior U.S. officials said that the question of the missing Americans, while not the kind of issue that would be raised at the Washington U.S.-Soviet summit, has been raised at the working level with the Soviets.
Eyewitness accounts dispute official denials

By Laurence Jolicoeur
USA TODAY

Soon after the Korean War began, the U.S. knew POWs were being held in camps in China. Reports told of POWs being transported to the Soviet Union.

The Russians who crossed North Korea with pilots, advisors, heavy weapons and ammunition, have always denied having U.S. POWs. The Chinese said the Korean War POWs released in the 1950s were all they had.

Evidence to the contrary:

- A defector from mainland China, Wu Shou-chen, in 1973 told a congressional hearing that in 1960 he saw U.S. POWs working in a factory in Tongchow, on the Chinese coast across the Yellow Sea from Korea.

- Former Air Force crewman Steve Kings, captured when his F-86 crashed behind enemy lines in 1953, says in his Chinese POW camp he saw more than 15 Caucasian prisoners, including a flier the United States now says killed when his plane crashed.

- A declassified Army memo dated April 19, 1954, said a "plan has been formed by use of clandestine systems to obtain recovery of one or more such persons (MIA's in Korea or China) to establish the case beyond doubt that such persons are being held."

- Several hundred POWs were seen in 1951 and 1952 at the Sino-Soviet border, says former U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. O. Delk Simpson, a Greek friend of his who said the men, many of them black, spoke English, wore U.S. military uniforms and were being transferred from Chinese trains to Soviet trains.

- Declassified U.S. military documents dated Nov. 23, 1953, 12 weeks after the two raids supposedly yielded all POWs on Aug. 23 — say three South Korean soldiers who escaped from North Korea across the 38th Parallel reported that the North Koreans and Chinese still held many U.S. POWs. The United Nations' Neutral Nations Commission refused to investigate.

- A former Army intelligence officer, Mel Gliss, who for a year led secret reconnaissance teams behind North Korean lines, says in January 1951 one Korean agent reported that 60 U.S. POWs were to be shipped by truck and train from P'yongyang, the North Korean capital, to China, in the Soviet Union. Gliss personally notified the U.S. Army in Seoul. He says the command canceled all air strikes on the railway line reportedly would be carrying the Gliss. Gliss heard of similar shipments from other recon teams.

- U.S. Army intelligence reported on Jan. 2, 1952, that more than 500 U.S. prisoners were in a camp at Tung Kuan, Yang, 10 miles east of Mukden, "to be given short-term training pending transfer to Soviet Union on order of central authorities." The same report said 494 U.S. POWs had been observed inside China since December 1951. Most were sighted in the area of Hanchow for subsequent transfer northeast to await exchange.

- Declassified CIA documents from July 1951 report 78 U.S. POWs being held under tight security in Shanghai. Names of 10 of the POWs, and the U.S. Army units they were attached to when captured, were found on a scrap of paper retrieved from the POW camp. The Chinese have never acknowledged holding any U.S. POWs in or near Shanghai.

- French military intelligence reported on Dec. 9, 1950, less than six months after the start of the war — that 3,000 U.S. POWs had been transported to Chia-an and Sin Ni Chow near the China-Korea border and that "1,200 lightly wounded Americans" were in the 3rd General Air Defense Hospital at An-tung, Manchua, China.
POW mystery is a painful legacy

Decades after end of war, families still wonder about fate of loved ones

By Laurence Jollio

40 years after the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the fate of thousands of U.S. POWs/MIA's — 5,177 by official count — is still unknown. Their families and friends live in a limbo of grief and hope.

An examination of U.S. documents and interviews with Korean War veterans indicate hundreds or even thousands of POWs/MIA's were never returned after being shipped to hospitals, military posts and labor camps in China and Siberia.

China, which sent several divisions to fight alongside the North Koreans and captured thousands of United Nations troops, supposedly released the last of its Korean War military prisoners — U.S. and Canadian aircrews — in 1955.

North Korea has always insisted that all live U.N. POWs from the 30-month-long war were taken to so-called "turbocamps" which chose to remain behind — were returned in the 1953 POW exchange.

But only one of North Korea's POW camps, most along the Yalu River on the Manchurian border, was opened to International Red Cross inspection.

The hard-core communist regime in North Korea gave five sets of remains that may be U.S. POWs to a U.S. delegation on Memorial Day 1990. Until then, no information about the U.S. troops unaccounted for from the Korean War had emerged since North Korea returned the last remains in 1954.

Many MIA's surely lie in unmarked graves in North Korea. But backing up reports of POWs in Siberia are declassified documents and public statements confirming that U.S. officials believed some POWs were in North Korea. When the U.S. waged a futile campaign to make China and North Korea account for them.

Some evidence, hidden away for years in classified volumes, was convincing enough for the U.S. government to ask the Soviets, in May 1964, to explain reports that hundreds of men in U.S. military garb were being shipped by train to Siberia.

The Soviet reply called the reports "clearly contrived." The matter was dropped.

The U.S. governments public demands for an accounting of all POWs and MIA's — especially those in Siberia — were ignored. Many were taken to a secret camp in the Far East.

The Pentagon and State Department say there is no evidence that U.S. POWs were in North Korea, although they did not account for them.

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But U.S. generals, admirals and diplomats spoke openly and angrily of such evidence in the months following the armistice.

Loved ones at home, after years of trying to get answers, feel betrayed.

The survivors and buddies of thousands of Korean War MIAs think of them as the forgotten casualties of "The Forgotten War." But some have never given up.

Robert Dumas, of Canterbury, Conn., vowed to his dying mother he would never quit searching for his brother, Roger. "I think my brother is still alive," declares Dumas, who also fought in Korea.

"There are too many people in Siberia, Russia, China, North Korea, and even in the United States who were POWs," Dumas said. "We have search parties in Siberia, and we have seen people who look like them." Dumas tracked down ex-POWs who saw Roger in good health as the North Koreans released 4,438 U.S. POWs in "Operation Big Switch" in August 1953.

Bobbi Caruth, of Redding, Calif., says, "We were lined up signing some papers. The Chinese guards came over and took him out of line. I asked him, 'Where you going, Roger?' He shook his head, didn't know. That was the last I saw of him. Caruth came home. Roger Dumas never has."

— Laurence Jollio

POWS are paroled in Siberia.

By Jollio

A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN HOME ENTERTAINMENT.