Insurgent Network Analysis:

Northeast Thailand (U)

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by
Richard D. Crawford
H. B. Fredman
William P. Tsow
Andrus Viliu
Thomas C. Wyatt

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SERVICE
WASH. DC 20301

RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION
MCLEAN, VIRGINIA

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FOREWORD

(C) It is accepted that intelligence is a basic element in countering subversive insurgencies. Realistically detailed investigation is required before insurgent vulnerabilities can be pinpointed and targeted for counterinsurgency programs.

(C) Intelligence operations and analytic techniques that have proved satisfactory in conventional operations fail to yield the requisite understanding of insurgency.

(C) There is a clear and urgent requirement for the development of a responsive and long-term capability to conduct in-depth research into the nature of an insurgency, using data from all sources of intelligence information. This intelligence information must be designed to be directly applicable to counterinsurgent operations.

(C) This report represents further progress toward the long-range goals of the Research Analysis Corporation to develop methodologies through which these understandings and capabilities can be acquired and ultimately transferred to satisfy user needs. The report analyzes intelligence data relating to the network of subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand to the extent required to establish a framework for development and testing of analytic techniques to be used by military intelligence officers at the operating level to support programming, planning, and conducting counterinsurgency military operations.

(C) It is intended that the methods used may be sufficiently generalized to apply to the collection and analysis of intelligence information in early developing insurgency elsewhere in the world.

George A. Martinez
Head, Unconventional Warfare Department
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Problem

(U) To analyze the insurgency in Northeast Thailand by using selected analytic approaches in a program of research leading to the development of data-management systems and techniques for use in providing intelligence support to counterinsurgency military operations.

Facts

(U) On the basis of methodology and data-management techniques developed in context of the insurgency in South Vietnam (1965–1966), in WY67 RAC undertook a phased-study program for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to provide a new analytical foundation for counterinsurgent intelligence (CII) in Thailand; this analytical base was designed to improve existing CII capabilities.

(U) The core of the study program is a detailed analysis of key insurgent areas in Northeast Thailand. The analysis and the process of deriving it represent initial phases of product and methodology. The product is a detailed functional analysis of the insurgent network, a tactically biased threat analysis; the analytical systems developed and employed in deriving this threat analysis represent the initial installment of the new analytical foundation for CII.

(U) The discussion of analytic techniques and the analysis reported herein are based primarily on the daily reports of the Thai Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC). The analysis covers the period 1 Aug 66–31 Jul 67. This basic-data set has been supplemented by Thai preliminary interrogation reports, captured insurgent documents, and various US and Thai intelligence summaries.

(U) Concurrent with the analysis of the insurgency, RAC also conducted a study of the physical and socioeconomic environment in a small area of Northeast Thailand. This sample study is based on field investigations, aerial photography, and information compiled by various Thai and US agencies in Thailand. The results of this study are to be published separately. The environmental and insurgent-related analyses are to be combined in WY68 to arrive at a set of map overlays, refined analysis techniques, and a related standing operating procedure for managing intelligence data to aid in planning more efficient counterinsurgent military operations.
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SUMMARY

Discussion

The decision to choose Northeast Thailand as the area for analysis was based on a preliminary estimate, made in the course of a study in 1966, directed at the problem of indicators in insurgency. This estimate suggested that the insurgency in the Northeast was a serious threat to subversion on the part of the Communist Bloc and that it had external support, primarily through the North Vietnamese-controlled Pathet Lao channels. However, it was unclear what stage of development the insurgent network had reached or how effective, in fact, this network was.

Counteraction on the part of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in 1966 reportedly had failed to destroy or suppress the insurgency effectively. The RTG did not demonstrate an ability to develop an adequate understanding of insurgent operational methods or to militarily take the offensive against the insurgent threat. In undertaking this study, it was proposed that the immediate goal was to assist this counterinsurgency effort by determining the structure of insurgent organization and activity at the tactical or sector level. Acceptably valid techniques would then be developed for area reduction and predictive targeting of insurgent basing, support, and operational patterns. This process was designed to organize intelligence, terrain, and socioeconomic data in terms of the insurgent, and, for reasons of ready tactical-level access, to display this information to the maximum feasible extent by a map-overlay system.

The historical account and evaluation of Communist Party Thailand (CPT) and external support to the insurgency have been developed. Counterinsurgency operations and intelligence have been surveyed and described. The covert insurgent-support organization and internal basing and support system have been determined, within data-base limitations, as well as many aspects of the insurgent's concept of operations, command and control, and organizational structure within sample areas of the Northeast. Insurgent armed operations have been recorded and analyzed, as have his propaganda and recruiting efforts to extend his base of popular support.

A point has now been reached where analysis products and their applications may be organized as the basis for more effective counterinsurgency planning procedures. The next steps, in WY66, relate to first tests of the system in the field in Northeast Thailand.

Conclusions

Technical Findings

In view of the current (1967) effort being made to develop means of employing remote-sensor systems against the insurgent in Northeast Thailand, it is important to note that at present very few overt insurgent installations are
susceptible to discovery through image interpretation. Existing installations are well concealed to prevent effective utilization of such systems.

Aerial photography alone, for example, therefore has very little apparent utility as an analytical tool. As a corollary, attempts at area reduction through conventional photographic interpretation procedures, regardless of method or technique, for specific pinpoint targeting for sensor application against the insurgent basing system alone are futile in a low-density Phase I insurgency. On the other hand, it may be profitable to view insurgent bases or camps as temporary way stations and then to analyze insurgent movement patterns in conjunction with basing, support, and operational activities. Taking the operation of the insurgent network as a system, the coordination of ground intelligence with proper utilization of photography appears to permit optimization of this capability.

Because of differences in the scale and intensity of operations, in the types of insurgent activities, and in the objectives of these activities as a function of the insurgent-network operations, it is not practical to employ the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), “Pattern Analysis Technique” (for Phases II and III counteroperations) in tactical-level CII against the Phase I activities taking place in Northeast Thailand. This technique as currently organized is probably completely inappropriate to insurgent activity at levels such as those encountered in Northeast Thailand.

The development of an improved system of analysis and data-management techniques appropriate to the level of insurgency encountered in Thailand, i.e., Phase I insurgency, is possible; the initial phases of such an improved methodology are already completed.

Intelligence Findings

The organizational phase of the subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand has developed in the past 15 years from a very small base. The appearance of precipitate expansion of the insurgent structure, both in numbers and areas of operation since 1964, is therefore deceptive. By the same token, current reckoning of insurgent areas of operation and numbers stemming from incident reports is liable to gross error, since organizational (network) structural activity takes place covertly, surfacing in the form of propaganda meetings and acts of terror only after the local network base is considered to be established.

Aside from the overt aspects of command, operations, and support of the current level of conflict in Northeast Thailand, it should be recognized that (a) covert preparations (the generation of necessary assets) are under way to initiate an escalated phase of insurgent activity, (b) insurgent organizers are operating covertly in areas not currently considered to be active on the basis of reports of overt insurgent activity, and (c) the CP is engaged in establishing a separate covert command and control net and clandestine intelligence nets to support the insurgent units operating in the jungle.
(1) (2) Restating these findings, it is now apparent that insurgent short-range goals currently are to develop a base of popular support at the village level and to prepare for an escalated phase of insurgency in selected areas. Twenty-two separate groupings of covert insurgent activity can be identified in Northeast Thailand. Additional areas still in process of covert organization in this region can be extrapolated. Intelligence reports suggest that such networks are concurrently being developed in other regions of Thailand, e.g., the North and mid-South.

(3) (4) The insurgent network organization, as identified, consists of three different but related echelons responsible for the current phase of insurgency operations in Northeast Thailand: (a) the precinct echelon, characterized by covert recruiting in the villages; (b) the group echelon, capable of conducting forced propaganda meetings, with the primary mission of recruiting, indoctrinating, and training local villagers; and (c) the sector echelon, capable of supporting highly mobile and flexible guerrilla groups and having a parallel mission of preparing for an escalated phase of insurgent activity. In addition to the three echelons of insurgent command, insurgent units are organized along functional lines. The principal insurgent-unit staff sections developed to date are the military, propaganda, and provisions sections.

(5) (6) The success of the insurgent movement in Northeast Thailand has directly depended on the training and material support provided by North Vietnam and Communist China, not on subversive exploitation of local grievances. For example, the armed insurgent units in active insurgent areas are usually commanded by strangers to the local area who have been trained in North Vietnam rather than by leaders identified with reformist programs. Intimidation and terror, not long-standing incipient rebellion or economic distress, are the basis for recruitment and other village-based support.

(7) (8) Strength estimates based on analysis of available raw intelligence and collateral data suggest that there were approximately 1300 armed and trained insurgents in the Northeast in July 1967. Insurgents in local units undergoing training within the Northeast are estimated to exceed 1600, and insurgent supporters in villages are estimated to exceed 15,000. Of these numbers, over 500 cadre trained in North Vietnam and more than 300 CPT cadre represent the hard core and driving force of the network organization.

(9) Basing and support of insurgents in Northeast Thailand is not the product of evolution nor is it a matter of patchwork and expediency. Even though crude by any standards, and apparently inefficient, the existing basing and support mechanism serves the insurgent purposes very well. With minor exceptions, the basing and support process is operated with a high degree of similarity in all insurgent areas and therefore is concluded to be the result of policy and direction emanating from the communist insurgent leadership.

(10) (11) The basing component calls for the housing, feeding, and low-level training of guerrilla soldiers in temporary camps, usually located within the most desirable terrain in the area 2 to 5 km from the assigned operational area or target-village complex. These temporary camps are to be abandoned
if threatened by Thai suppression forces. All camps are protected by guards positioned at vantage points. Security is relaxed during the hours of darkness, because the insurgents are aware that the Thai suppression forces do not operate at night.

(1) The support component is supported with food, information, and general supplies almost entirely by villagers in the operational area, sometimes willingly, sometimes involuntarily. There is no evidence that the communist terrorist (CT) in Northeast Thailand engages in food production for his own consumption, as is the case in some of the well-developed base areas in South Vietnam. There is, however, some evidence that short-term caches are being used for the storage of food, ordnance, and supplies. The use of caches apparently is more a matter of practice of individual insurgent groups than it is of overall doctrine or policy at this time.

(1) Armed operations that are aimed at developing an area of insurgent influence usually follow a sequential pattern of armed attacks against RTG authorities, followed by armed propaganda operations and terrorism. It is important to note that such armed insurgent operations were not significantly disrupted by the principal RTG counterinsurgency effort, the 0910 Dry Season Plan. Secured villages were struck with the same frequency as undefended areas.

(1) Armed insurgent operations are unsophisticated and simple. They are the products of planning, decisively executed, and employ squad- and platoon-sized groups temporarily combined for larger operations, especially armed propaganda. These propaganda operations constitute the major armed insurgent activity and are so patterned that they may be predicted and countered. The insurgent is adequately supplied with automatic and semiautomatic small arms, but he has not as yet introduced large-caliber or indirect-fire weapons, mines, or demolitions.

(1) The 22 separate areas of armed insurgent activity that have been identified on the basis of density, level, and direction of activity describe an arc that appears to be intended to isolate a section of Northeast Thailand. Insurgent insertion and extraction points along the Thai-Lao international boundary fall at the terminals of this arc.

(1) The insurgent network in Northeast Thailand is largely managed by the CPT, with direct assistance and partial control furnished by the North Vietnamese Communist Lao Dong Party organization in the Northeast. External support of the CPT covert system exists and is integral to it. The Chinese Communist Party, the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, and the Pathet Lao, a subsidiary of the North Vietnamese control apparatus, all play a significant role in providing cadre training, some logistical support (including weapons and ammunition), financing, and sanctuary. The external support appears to be furnished directly through the communications-liaison networks to identified and scheduled recipients, but control for this external support is channeled through the regional-level insurgent command and control organization, which, in effect, places control of outside support within the scope of the CPT.
(g) Net evaluation of the RTG counterinsurgency effort indicates that it failed to deter the rapid growth of the insurgency in the Northeast during 1966–1967. Armed insurgent actions alone increased significantly during 1966 and continued to grow through the reporting period at a rate four times greater than counterforce actions. With respect to RTG counterinsurgency operations, it can be said that (a) operations are organized along political administration lines and are not oriented on the insurgent network, and (b) current counterinsurgency operations are inadequately responsive to the threat. Authority is withheld but responsibility is extended to the operator level, and the command and control structure is unnecessarily complex and multiple.

(f) The RTG does not have a comprehensive and centrally controlled CII system as the basis for reaction-response programs. It is concluded that unless major changes are made in current approaches to countering the insurgency in Northeast Thailand, insurgency will expand and escalate rapidly.
Insurgent Network Analysis:
Northeast Thailand
ABBREVIATIONS

AGILE  ARPA project title: Remote Area Conflict
ARPA  Advanced Research Projects Agency
BPP  Border Patrol Police
CAS  Controlled American Source
CC  Central Committee
CENTRAL  Central Association of Vietnamese Refugees for Safeguarding the Fatherland
CEA  critical elements for analysis
CTI  counterinsurgency intelligence
CPM  civilian-police-military
CPT  Communist Party of Thailand
CSC  Communist Suppression Committee
CSOC  Counter Subversion Operations Command
CT  communist terrorist; term borrowed by the Thai from British operations against the subversive insurgency in Malaya in the 1940's and 1950's
JRC  Joint Repatriation Committee
JSC  Joint Security Center
LMG  light machinegun
MRDC  Military Research and Development Center
OCS  Officer Candidate School
PRA  Party Representative Assembly
RCT  regimental combat team
RTA  Royal Thai Army
RTG  Royal Thai Government
SMG  submachinegun
SOF  Staff Office of Foreign Affairs, Communist China
SOP  standing operating procedure
USARPAC  US Army, Pacific
USMACHTAI  US Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USMACV  US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
0910 plan  Contraction of Buddhist Years 2509 and 2510, used as short title for RTG communist-suppression dry-season operations plan

GLOSSARY OF THAI WORDS

Amphoe (Amphur)  County
Ban  Village
Changwat  Province
Hual  Stream
Luang  Uncle
Muban  Village
Na  In front of
Nai  Mister
Noi  Small (or wife)
Phu  Mountain
Phyuiban  Village chief
Tambon  Village group (administrative jurisdiction above village)
Thahan mai  Jungle soldiers
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM

The purpose of this report is to analyze the insurgent network in Northeast Thailand and from this analysis to project a CII system. This is the initial task of a continuing study leading to the development of techniques for use by the intelligence officer in supporting counterinsurgent military operations. The insurgent network as defined in this context is the total activity relating to insurgent operations, command and control, organization, support, and environment.

This report addresses the first critical steps toward the ultimate goal of producing a refined set of analytic techniques for use by a tactical-level intelligence officer so that he may produce analyzed intelligence data on which his commander can plan counterinsurgent military operations with a reasonable probability of success. Some of the intermediate steps leading to this goal are the determination of the elements and framework of an intelligence-data base, and the management of the base to keep it current and adequately displayed.

BACKGROUND

Early in 1965 RAC recognized a requirement to develop a capability to study and understand the evolution of subversive insurgencies, particularly in the early stages. A study made that year, "Neutralization of Viet Cong Safe Havens," highlighted this requirement. This study was aimed at suggesting ways to find and destroy the enemy in vast areas from which he conducted military operations with relative impunity. It was found that only area-denial techniques could be suggested because Viet Cong activities within the safe havens could not be pinpointed accurately for specific targeting. A precise understanding of what safe havens were and how they operated was determined to be the key to pinpoint targeting.

The search for ways to identify and locate insurgent vulnerabilities for counterinsurgent operations during 1965 and 1966 led to further generalized

conclusions. The central thought that emerged was that in order to discover insurgent vulnerabilities in a particular situation the total insurgent organization as a system or network of systems had to be reexamined. This paper discusses the analysis of the total insurgent network in Northeast Thailand. The insurgent vulnerabilities that are implicit in the text have been derived on the basis of such a systems approach.

The lesson of Vietnam has underscored the need by the US for an operable CI/II base before involvement (either directly or in an advisory role) in counteroperations. Unfortunately, in spite of marked improvement of conventional systems since 1961-1966, it has not yet provided such a base. That is to say, the methods now evolving in Vietnam to manage intelligence information do not appear to be applicable for use in lower-level insurgencies. The conflict in Vietnam, particularly since the escalation that began at the close of 1964, is unique from a purely intelligence and data manipulation point of view. No other subversive insurgency has generated such a volume of information. The extent and richness of the acquired mass of data in Vietnam have determined the solution now being employed—the use of machine sorts and statistical models to manage the intelligence collection and format.

Where such a mass of data is not available, i.e., where the insurgent threat is in Phase I* or in early Phase II, no analog to the Vietnamese solution can be employed. At the same time, Vietnam also has demonstrated that the problems of intelligence requirements, collection, management, and display for operational use have proved to be almost impossible of solution with conventional methods.

This situation has had the effect of providing the insurgent command and its operating and support units with relative immunity from system-targeted counteroperations until the subversive insurgency has achieved a solid base for operations in Phase II. This suggests that subversive insurgency has been virtually safe from effective counterinsurgency operations until it has the capacity to resist such operations. The existence of past successful counterinsurgency operations demonstrates that this impunity is hardly absolute. Investigation of counterinsurgency operations conducted in Malaya, the Philippines, and South Korea stresses that it was only where the counterinsurgent had advantages in troops deployed, a sophisticated intelligence system, and a highly motivated and effective police or gendarmerie force in addition to significant advantages of a political, economic, and demographic nature, that victory was achieved. When the legitimate authority is deficient in these areas, the insurgent organization appears to be immune to a systems-targeted attack.

This appears to be the case with the insurgency in Northeast Thailand. The selection of this area as the initial arena of conflict undoubtedly was made.

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defines Insurgency Phases I and II as follows:

Phase I. This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or already incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or periods of uncontrolled insurgency activity.

Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.
by the CPT with the direction, guidance, and support of the Chinese Communists on the premise that the Northeast would meet the insurgent needs for an area of operation in Thailand.

PURPOSE

(V) (O) To recapitulate, the purpose of the phase of research reported in this paper was (a) to gain an understanding of the extent and depth of the subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand in sufficient detail and (b) to permit the initial development and refinement of the analytic techniques and formats required for an operable CII base. To meet this requirement, some aspects of intelligence production are reported in the form of a functionally organized insurgent-threat analysis.

METHOD

(V) (O) Analysis of the raw and finished intelligence data collected in Thailand, as well as in-country observation during the collection process, suggested strongly that although the Vietnamese context might well provide means of measuring the level of insurgent threat in the Thai Northeast, it would not provide a suitable analog from which close inference and comparative statistical data might be drawn. The insurgency in the Thai Northeast is in the latter stages of Phase I, with some Phase II activities going on. The Vietnamese analogs analyzed by RAC during 1965 and 1966 related to organization and operations in late Phase II and beyond.

(V) (O) Research then proceeded on an empirical basis, with one goal being to construct descriptive hypotheses concerning the organization and support system of the Thai insurgent apparatus from analysis of available intelligence data. This proved to be an extremely productive approach. For example, the Thai insurgency appears to parallel Castro-type Latin American subversive organizational patterns and lines of communication and control now also under study by RAC. The role of outside support, which also appears to follow the Latin American pattern, is quite different from that experienced in Vietnam. In short, it is possible to hypothesize that the Vietnamese insurgency is technically an anomaly, whereas the Thai insurgency appears to fit a widespread Phase I pattern.

(V) (O) Raw intelligence contributed to a data base necessary to counterinsurgency operations. New techniques were developed to manage this information. It was apparent to the study team from its collective Vietnamese research experience (1964-1966) that conventional combat-intelligence operations and analysis techniques that also utilize raw and fragmentary information are inadequate in that they fail to produce an operable data base under conditions of Phase I insurgent operations. Conventional combat-intelligence analysis techniques were replaced with new techniques in some areas and revised standard techniques in others.

(V) (O) Finally, the Thai attitude toward insurgency and the RTG counterinsurgency command and control, organizational structure, and operations were
examined and described to provide for a balance of understanding of insurgent activities. Further, an appreciation of counterinsurgent military operations presents a base against which insurgent vulnerabilities and flexibilities may be measured.

The techniques utilized for developing the basis for CII and the formulation of a set of Critical Elements for Analysis (CEA) will lead to the creation of more effective sets of collection requirements. Such analysis also points the way for the development of a standing operating procedure for analyzing and utilizing data in subsequent research and testing. Emphasis is divided among the elements of the insurgent network of command, control, organization, operations, and support that comprise the CII data base, and the methodological and technical aspects of generating and analyzing these elements of the data base.
Chapter 2
COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Historically, counterinsurgency operations have been conducted on an ad hoc and patchwork basis, by the initial use of intelligence operations and analysis techniques that have proved satisfactory in conventional operations, and by unconventional methods within the experience of those who control the operation or are engaged in an advisory role. This patchwork effort is often tailored for the moment to fit the situation at hand, usually after the action has begun and has been significantly invested. It becomes evident, soon after action begins, that the special and unique problems posed by the particular insurgency require variations in methods and new approaches to solve them. Then an interim phase develops that is essentially an attempt to improve the information-collection capability so as to improve the reliability and timeliness of the reporting that is essential if the end product of these efforts, i.e., combat CII, is to be useful in planning counterinsurgency operations.

Five factors for success, all of which are interactional, have been found in the most successful counterinsurgency operations of the past: (a) effective military combat forces located and operating in the insurgency environment; (b) population and resource control and security within the insurgent area of activity; (c) an effective system of command and control for managing and operating the counterinsurgency effort; (d) effective information, development, and welfare programs; and (e) good intelligence and counterintelligence.

Subversive insurgency is not the product of accident or a fortuitous combination of events and trends, nor is it an inevitable outcome of social and political evolution. Every subversive insurgency on record has been the result of the work of an organized and highly developed command apparatus that has spanned the activities of the legitimate authority under attack and depended on a planned diversity of resources ranging from urban and rural-front organizations to active terrorist and guerrilla units. The control exerted by this apparatus through a form of organized systems and policies for utilization of these systems has made it possible to develop resources and strategies for their exploitation.

* Also called "internal defense and development intelligence" or "stability operations intelligence."
Among the systems evolved by the insurgent command in each case of escalated-phase insurgency have been those associated with the support network of the command structure. The key systems in the support network of the military arm of the insurgency have been in-country basing networks that have included a capability for resource acquisition, in-country communication and liaison systems for the exercise of control by the command at each level of its operations, and, usually, sanctuary basing and lines of supply and communication. In all instances the command apparatus has also generated intelligence systems for its own support and the support of its tactical elements. Taken together, the logistic and information-acquisition systems have been the mainspring of subversive insurgent military operations.

Analysis has indicated that at the same time the basing and communications networks came into being, the leadership has generated the forces to utilize these and associated support systems. The relation between the two has been direct and can be understood only in terms of the requirements that must be met if the armed insurgent or terrorist can survive and perform his mission. These requirements change as the level of insurgency increases. Each increment of change in the numbers, capability, and tactics of the insurgents is forecast by preceding changes in the support structure.

The record of the past decades suggests strongly that counterinsurgent operations conducted without adequate understanding of the subversive insurgent command net and its support systems have been ineffectual. This is particularly true where counteroperators have lacked the knowledge required of those segments of insurgent command associated with military operations and the support systems that make these operations possible. Without such knowledge it is not possible to target the sources of command decision, the lines of communication and logistic support, the bases from which armed insurgents operate, and finally the armed forces themselves.

Because the nature of subversive insurgent operations and the support for these operations differ in kind and in degree from those of conventional warfare, the intelligence base and analytic techniques from which successful counteroperations must proceed will differ from those associated with conventional warfare. Vietnam has most recently illustrated this difference and has highlighted the need for the development of methods and associated techniques required to produce and employ an operable CII base.

It has been generally agreed that it is desirable to apply counteraction to a subversive-insurgency situation at a low level of intensity; i.e., when the movement is at its weakest point. During this early developing phase, information about the insurgent organization is meager, imprecise, relatively unreliable, and difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, intelligence remains absolutely vital to the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Even though it is almost universally accepted that good intelligence and counterintelligence are absolute musts for effective counterinsurgent operations, a number of obstacles have continually impeded the development of good CII systems. Some of the major impediments to effective CII are (a) lack on the part of the insurgent target country of an intelligence system for internal defense that is capable of reacting to the insurgency on a timely basis, thereby permitting the insurgency to gain stature and momentum and thus penalizing counterefforts by placing them in a come-from-behind position; (b) the general inability to specify the
essential elements of information necessary for CII, the ensuing lack of specific requirements for collection action, and then the necessity to develop and conduct collection operations against the stated requirements; (c) the preponderance of the tactical information required resides with the local (insurgent target masses) population, which usually resists collection efforts by outsiders, e.g., national- or province-level civilian and police or military authorities; and (d) a conflict of concept and method relating to priorities and approaches to internal defense and counterinsurgency in and among civilian, police, and military agencies that results in inherently diffuse and inefficient practices when CII must be centrally controlled and highly coordinated to satisfy combat-intelligence requirements.

This report does not address issues such as the "conflict of concept" obstacle or the effectiveness and viability of the RTG approach to CII. For instance, it is apparent that the RTG and the CSOC have good information-reporting systems, but the reliability and timeliness of this reporting is questionable and subject to improvement.

The particular analytical approach broadly outlined here is designed to ensure the capability to analyze the scope of both the external and internal aspects of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand and the activities, functions, and operations that this insurgent organization must carry out in order to achieve its stated goals and objectives, all as a part of the RTG reaction-response systems currently under development in Thailand.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

A national effort designed to counter actively and effectively through military operations a Phase I insurgency, such as that found in Northeast Thailand, is founded on a detailed understanding of the insurgent and his inherent vulnerabilities. This is the function of an intelligence system designed, structured, and operated specifically for that purpose. Such an intelligence system, because of the unique nature of the insurgency at hand, must be the result of new approaches and techniques of combining various elements of classic combat intelligence. For example, one of the distinguishing marks of intelligence operations against a subversive insurgency should be a reduced emphasis on information concerning enemy military organizations. Order-of-battle information on military units and organizations, although still required, has a lower priority than in conventional operations. The reason for this is that the insurgent leadership considers the military arm less important than the party and the masses. Documentation and analysis of military forces by type is adequate for understanding conventional operations. It is often true, certainly in the subject case, that a refined pattern of military operations does not develop in the earliest stages of subversive insurgency; i.e., a pattern that is statistically stable and by traditional configuration recognizable. As a consequence the CII analyst is faced with the task of tracking and predicting enemy insurgent operations in unique dimensions and must find solutions by new methods of applying old techniques.

It is suggested that the careful reporting and analysis of all possible aspects of the where, when, how, and why of insurgent movement in conjunction
with basing and operations would provide lucrative results for operational planning purposes. As of this time, the CTs in Northeast Thailand are exploiting elusive and mobile to the maximum. The objective should be to turn this tactic to which he is committed into a vulnerability. Implicit in this suggestion, of course, is the existence of a highly developed and refined intelligence-reporting-analysis-reaction-response system.

(CI) CII therefore is primarily tactical or combat intelligence in nature as opposed to theater- or national-level intelligence. In this sense the information flowing into the system for analysis, production, and use is relatively perishable and short-lived. The system therefore must be structured and operated on a quick-response basis.

(CI) CII is a means of analyzing data and a method of displaying data in uncomplicated form as an aid to counterinsurgency military operations by reducing the search area and providing target-intercept points with a reasonable degree of predictive validity.

(CI) The subsequent chapters of this report address various aspects of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand, not with the intent of preparing an intelligence estimate of the insurgency in the Northeast, but rather to present the results of the research conducted to discover and exercise various analysis techniques, using realistic data of an ongoing insurgency so that the limitations of the data available could be taken into account in the development of the techniques.

(CI) The two major points of departure for improving the CII component of military-suppression planning and operations are (a) to improve the quality and timeliness of the raw-intelligence information and (b) to develop collection techniques, and analysis techniques founded on this approach to collection, in order to utilize available data to the maximum extent.

(CI) When applied to the counterinsurgency effort against the insurgency in Northeast Thailand, these two major points of departure lead naturally to two complementary avenues of investigation. First, it becomes obvious after examination and study of available Thai intelligence data that little or no guidance is furnished to collectors, sources, or informants. Second, it becomes equally obvious that there is little appreciation of the extent and detail of information that can, should, and, in many cases, must be known about the insurgent and the entire insurgent movement, i.e., a graded statement of CII/CEA. It is clear also that the data available to Thai intelligence personnel are being neither utilized adequately nor analyzed properly. A number of analysis techniques have been proved to have utility and value in gaining insight and understanding of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand. The concept, nature, and utility of these analytical techniques are discussed in the following paragraphs.

AREAS AND TECHNIQUES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Data Formats

(A) A set of data categories, commonly recognized and used, is a necessary prerequisite for the analysis and display of intelligence information concerning insurgent activities. These data categories must be structured in such a way as to satisfy the basic requirement for effective and continuing communi-
culation between the information collector and the intelligence analyst and yet must not overly restrict the meaningful range of data analysis or the number of display categories. It has been found that the practice of restricting information reporting to a small number of artificial categories results in seriously limiting the information content of the intelligence-data base and thereby inhibits the analyst's efforts to perform his tasks.

(5) The data categories used for the analysis of the insurgency were based on the original orientation of the Insurgent Network Analysis study, which analyzed the enemy from the enemy (Red) point of view rather than from the standard friendly (Blue) vantage point. The aim was to assess enemy capabilities through a functional analysis value per se. Conceptually, insurgent activity was classified into the following list of separate activities considered as critical insurgent functions: (a) basing, (b) materiel acquisition and storage, (c) security, (d) communications-liaison, (e) attacks on government forces, (f) sabotage, (g) forced propaganda meetings, (h) terror, (i) recruitment, and (j) harassment. Each of these critical functional activities was first assigned a color for coding and plotting. The broad functional categories were then broken down by subcategories and assigned a symbol within the category color group. The available RTG intelligence data, covering a 1-year period, was coded in accordance with this color/symbol method and then plotted and analyzed to determine whether the actual data, as reported, justified the particular data categories and breakdowns conceived or whether additional categories were necessary. The resulting set of data categories, color codes, and symbols are shown in Fig. 1. The major limitation of this approach to determining data categories and formats for data management is absence of categories for a number of recognized critical insurgent functions carried out covertly. For example, no data categories are established for such functions as insurgent intelligence collection, insurgent counterintelligence, Communist Party communication and support channels, financial-support sources and channels, etc. The reason for the absence of categories for these activities is that no data were available within the body of intelligence information made available for the study.

Direct Relations of Intelligence Data

(5) It is characteristic of spot-information reports of incidents and sightings that they are fragmentary and thus limited since they provide only a small input to one facet of the overall mosaic. Various approaches were attempted in the analysis of this insurgency to derive relations among the critical functions being analyzed. For example, after sufficient study was made of the functions of basing and food acquisition, a direct relation between a report of a food pickup and the location of local camps or more remote bases was found, and spot reports of large insurgent-group movement and large group activity were considered to relate to analysis of group camps. This relation is examined in Chap. 5.

(5) The objective of these attempts to establish direct relations among numerous fragmentary reports is of course to develop and refine techniques for the extrapolation of isolated spot-information reports into more meaningful assessments of insurgent operating patterns.

*To meet the delivery deadline the color codes used in the early stages of this study are replaced by black and white symbols in this paper. These symbols are explained where they are used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLOR</th>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>base. A permanent facility (shelter, physical security, support function) with provisions for training or propaganda production or command staffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>local camp. Facility used to directly support activity in nearby village or villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>⊙</td>
<td>mobile-group camp. Facility used to support large insurgent-group activity. Not necessarily a local group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>assembly point. Preoperations assembly point or local village-level training and indoctrination point used by a recruiting team. Also indicates after-operation reassembly point, part of insurgent movement pattern, insurgent group, or leaders' meeting area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>food-supply pickup point. Includes food, money, other supplies (voluntary and involuntary) outside villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>material-storage area. Consistent with support of camps or bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>◊</td>
<td>support village. Primarily food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>♦</td>
<td>informant assistance to CTs. Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>helicopter sighting. Sightings, circulations, and landing (includes fixed-wing aircraft).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>movement of armed men. Arrow for direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>movement of porters or recruits. Arrow for direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>clash. Government-initiated contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>encounter. Brief meeting, no casualties, or merely sighting by armed unit. Includes arrests and captures and defections from village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>clash. CT-initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>harassment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>armed propaganda meeting. Propaganda activity other than meetings (includes recruiting).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>sabotage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>⊙</td>
<td>recruitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>terrorism against groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>terrorism against individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1—Color Codes and Symbols Used in Preliminary Stages of Study
points, communications liaison, and way stations. Finally, the environment must be analyzed in terms of the derived constraints to reveal likely or preferred geographic locations for facilities to serve the function under in-

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Fig. 3—Hypothetical Area: Groundwater Added

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Depth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0–5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5–10 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&gt;10 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 4—Hypothetical Area: Slope Added

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Slope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0–10 deg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10–30 deg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>&gt;30 deg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 5—Hypothetical Area: Vegetation Added

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>○</td>
<td>Cultivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Sparse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>△</td>
<td>Dense forest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most desirable areas
Fig. 6—Hypothetical Area: Soils Added

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Thickness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>○ Alluvium, terrace deposits, lowlands</td>
<td>5 to &gt;20 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Bedrock areas and thin, stony, some laterite</td>
<td>0-2 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▲ Thick upland soils, abundant laterite</td>
<td>3-5 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 7—Hypothetical Area: Preferred CT Camp Locations

- : Most desirable areas
- : Base camp
- : Forward camps

(U)
represent a base camp. It is recalled that the CT will not locate on a trail,
but in close proximity to one, and that a base site is situated further from the
target or support village than an operational camp.

(c) By combining this approach with a study of recent known insurgent
movement patterns, that section of the trail not being used by the CT can be
identified. One can then predict intercept points with a reasonable degree of
validity and recommend these to the counterinsurgent-force commander.

(d) In addition to the foregoing demonstration of one technique of analysis,
it should also be possible to develop "village files" that would indicate ethnic,
family, and economic ties with insurgent-infected villages and thus form the
basis for predicting insurgent activity in the subject village.

(e) It should not be construed from this discussion that such an area-
analysis effort is sufficient for planning and conducting counterinsurgency
military operations. Many more remote areas, village groups, and villages
in Northeast Thailand could be considered to be at least possibly useful to the
insurgent than could ever be effectively cleared and protected by counterinsur-
gency suppression forces. It is suggested, however, that if the warning-
reaction-response system indicates that a particular area has been activated or
placed under attack by the insurgent, such an area analysis will provide a
valuable assist in evaluating the ensuing spot-intelligence reporting and in
planning counteroperations.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
INTELLIGENCE

(f) If emphasis is to be placed on a detailed, functional examination of
the insurgency as a systemically organized process, a need clearly exists for
an equally detailed statement of the CEA—what it is that the analyst needs to
know about the insurgency that he is to analyze.

(g) One of the objectives in creating a set of CEA is to create a means
whereby intelligence analysts can be clearly and continuously aware of what it
is that they know, so that they can state what it is that they do not know against
an accepted understanding of what it is they should know about the insurgency
situation being analyzed and operated against. The element of the equation
called "should know" is here defined as the CEA.

(h) Techniques for the development and analysis of CII cannot be effec-
tive or viable if the user is not aware that his needs for information are indeed
limited. As techniques and data formats are used and refined there undoubtedly
will be a tendency to revise and adapt their content. There will also undoubt-
edly be a tendency toward expansion with a decreasing alertness to relevancy.
In any case the use of the equation implied previously will allow the analyst
to discover gaps in intelligence holdings and enable him to state more defini-
tively his requirements for information.

(i) A list of CEA (see App A) has been postulated as a first step toward
formulating a comprehensive statement of the essential intelligence-information
inputs required, based on an appreciation of the insurgency in Northeast
Thailand to date. It is recognized that certain critical topics are not covered,
e.g., insurgent psychological-warfare themes, the details of the sector-level
intelligence apparatus, and organization of recruitment activities.
The list is founded on a number of major elements of information divided into two sections that take cognizance of the two levels of responsibility and command as the situation exists today: a national-level list of critical elements that outlines specific needs for information relating to the external covert-support apparatus, and a tactical-level list that outlines needs for information relating to the internal insurgent network to be analyzed in support of tactical-level operational planning.

A national-level list would normally subdivide into three major categories that relate to the requirement at the national level for an overall continuing assessment of the insurgency from the national point of view: (a) overall assessment of the insurgency by region, (b) the external covert-support apparatus and capabilities, and (c) lines of communication. The explication of such a national-level list of CEA is beyond the scope of this report.

The tactical-level list of CEA (App A) has been derived from the analysis of the Phase I insurgency in Northeast Thailand and is divided into eight major categories of information. Raw information or finished intelligence covering the detailed aspects of these eight categories should be available to the intelligence officer performing the analyses required to support counterinsurgency tactical military planners.
Chapter 3

INSURGENT GOALS, ORGANIZATION, AND STRENGTH

CONCEPT OF INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

The basis of any useful analysis of insurgent activity is a conceptual understanding that relates observable insurgent activity to a set of short-range or long-range insurgent goals. The analyst must know, for instance, why the insurgents hold forced propaganda meetings or assassinate certain villagers before he can manipulate the available information and thus arrive at conclusions about the course of the insurgency. A great deal of confusion can be avoided by stating explicitly the insurgent goals and objectives, relating these to the activity that serves the various objectives, and, finally, specifying the insurgent organizational echelons responsible for each type of activity.

The goals and objectives of the insurgency are discussed first. Next, these goals and objectives are related to some basic insurgent organizational concepts and then to the various types of relevant insurgent activity. The insurgent goals and objectives are referred to as “tactical goals and objectives,” in order to avoid broader questions such as what region of Thailand the insurgents should attack first, when (what year) the organization of armed insurgent elements should be initiated, and from whom the insurgents should seek the necessary external support. The word “tactical” is used to refer to the operational problems of the insurgent leaders in implementing the decision to proceed with the insurgency.

Tactical Concepts, Goals, and Objectives

The insurgent priorities and short-range objectives are directly related to the existing level or phase of the insurgent movement. It is customary to visualize subversive insurgencies, such as the insurgency in Thailand, as consisting of the three phases outlined in the writings of Mao Tse-tung. For the purposes of this discussion, Phase I insurgency is defined as that phase of the insurgency characterized by propaganda meetings, attacks against individuals, e.g., representatives of the government or other active opponents of the insurgents, and intensive recruiting of villagers. In short, Phase I insurgency is primarily a matter of establishing a popular-support base. Phase II insurgency is primarily involved with the development of guerrilla units. It is characterized by an increasingly large number of contacts between government military or paramilitary units and armed subversive bands of company or
battalion size. The primary goal of the insurgents during Phase II is to force the government to disperse its armed forces. Finally, Phase III is the mobile warfare phase, characterized by regimental-sized insurgent military units and aimed at the destruction of the armed forces of the legitimate government. It should of course be recognized that all insurgent activity throughout the target country does not move simultaneously through the three phases and that when significant activity associated with a higher phase of insurgency appears activity associated with the lower phase does not stop or even decrease. It is more correct to visualize Phase III, for instance, as the combination of all three phases as opposed to just mobile warfare.

A further difficulty with this phasing of subversive insurgency is that it focuses only on overt insurgent actions. To be sure, the appropriate statistics or indicators showing insurgent progress from one phase to the next are relatively easy to compile. What is not considered in this activity analysis is that the insurgents must generate during Phase I the resources and the assets that make Phase II activity possible. Analogously, some insurgent resources must be allocated during Phase II to make Phase III activity possible. In effect, these preparations by the insurgents to initiate a new phase of activity are more dangerous to the target country than is the actual insurgent activity during Phase I or Phase II. The insurgents cannot, of course, finally succeed unless the insurgency escalates.

The current tactical goals and objectives of the subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand are examined in terms of the characteristics of Phase I insurgency as described above. Principal activities of the insurgents fall into two major categories: those associated with generating the popular-support base, e.g., propaganda meetings, terrorism, and intimidation through a show of force by insurgents; and those associated with generating the assets required for initiating Phase II operations.

Inherent in the process of propagandizing and mobilizing the peasants and workers in the target country, i.e., the goal of generating the popular base, is an insurgent concept of organization. In the case of the Viet Cong insurgency against President Diem’s government in South Vietnam, the solution to this organizational problem was the classical communist solution. The rural population was controlled through a system of “front” associations that were in turn controlled by Communist Party chapters and cells. This was a significant achievement for the Lao Dong Party (the Vietnamese Communist Party). The magnitude of this achievement becomes clear when one considers the basic bureaucratic limitations of a Communist Party, e.g., the long probationary period for new members, the requirement for recommendation of a new member by two party members, the lengthy training and indoctrination of new members, and the requirement for individual members of the party to work with a nearby party chapter until enough members (three) for a party cell in a village or insurgent guerrilla band have been accepted. These Communist Party regulations are basically derived from a requirement for party security. They do, however, represent very real limits to the rapid geographic expansion and numerical growth of a Communist Party.

In the case of South Vietnam, important party elements remained behind in South Vietnam when the Viet Minh armed elements withdrew to North Vietnam. The province, region, and interregion party committees continued to
operate clandestinely, and records were maintained by the party concerning the whereabouts of ex-Viet Minh agents. Conceptually, it would be possible for the CPT to develop in time the capabilities possessed by the Communist Party in South Vietnam before the renewal of insurgent activity in that country in 1959. The limited capability of the CPT as of late 1964, when insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand expanded significantly, prevented it from using the organizational concept adopted by the Viet Cong. The timing for the expansion of insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand is discussed in App D.

(3) The basic insurgent requirements for a technique to identify, persuade, recruit, and train individuals sympathetic to the avowed aims of the insurgency; to amplify the impact of party propagandists; and to guide insurgent activity along party lines, had to be met by the CPT in another way in Northeast Thailand. The requirement for finding, recruiting, and training willing villagers for the insurgent movement was apparently to be satisfied in Northeast Thailand through the use of cadre trained at Hoa Binh in North Vietnam. These trained cadres were to be sent back to their native areas as "cell leaders" (this, of course, wouldn't be a Communist Party cell) in order to recruit their friends and relatives, who would in turn recruit their friends and relatives in their home villages and guide these new recruits to training sessions that would be led by the original trained cadre sent to the area. An audience for the party propagandist was to be ensured in Northeast Thailand by extensive use of forced village propaganda meetings. An alternative for the loyal, disciplined, highly motivated party members to guide insurgent activity along party directives and accurately report on the progress of the movement was of course most difficult to find. There is some evidence1 that the CPT has tried to overcome the shortage of party members by (a) limiting the party's missions as implied in the altered concept of organization, (b) eliminating intermediate echelons of command (i.e., the province party committee), and (c) making use of the Vietnamese Communists within the Vietnamese refugee community in Northeast Thailand to lead or guide various insurgent subgroups. In addition, the CPT has apparently relocated some of their largely urban-oriented party members to Northeast Thailand, made a determined effort to enlarge the party membership, and reabsorbed some of the Pathet Lao activists of Northeast Thai extraction.

(5) This organizational concept of the CPT, although responsive to the basic goals and objectives of Phase I subversive insurgency, is in some respects very vulnerable to even sporadic counterinsurgent activity. There is nothing to hold a village-level insurgent organization together if the trained insurgent leaders originally sent into the area are captured or killed. Further, it appears that the firm control of superior echelons over subordinate echelons and the relatively effective counterintelligence capability that was a characteristic of the Viet Cong insurgency are not possible with the current CPT organizational concept.

(7) It is not possible to relate insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand on a day-by-day basis directly to basic goals and objectives of Phase I insurgency without first discussing in detail the insurgent command and control organization. It is possible, however, to categorize insurgent activity during Phase I as responsive to either of two major goals: the development of a popular base, and eventual escalation to Phase II insurgency. Insurgent activities designed
to develop the popular base can be further categorized into four major missions:
(a) propagandizing of villagers, (b) disruption of the government presence in
the villages by assassination or intimidation of government representatives,
(c) protection of the insurgent propaganda activity from government suppression
operations with armed guerrilla units, and (d) recruiting and training of new
insurgent members to expand the propaganda and recruiting activity.

(v) The last two missions imply the existence of armed guerrilla units
plus at least a rudimentary in-country insurgent training capability. The char-
acter of the armed units and their activity level during Phase I are such that
they do not represent a really significant drain on insurgent logistics and bas-
ing resources. For instance, the weapons of these armed bands consist strictly
of rifles, submachineguns, and pistols, thus placing a minimum load on an ins-
urgent ordnance section, and the tactics and activity of these guerrilla groups
do not demand fixed bases or the continuous concentration of units greater than
30 to 60 men. In other words, the guerrilla units need only to be trained in
platoon-level tactics, and because their main task is to support the propaganda
sections who must move from village to village, the guerrilla units must move
also. To be sure, the guerrilla units and propaganda units must be fed, and
command cadre who are too important to be risking in day-to-day operations
must be housed; hence even for this level of insurgent activity some relatively
stable basing arrangements must be made. These bases would not be such,
however, as to prevent easy and periodic relocation.

(v) The training of new recruits is accomplished in temporary camps
within Thailand during intervals between insurgent operations and supplemented
in North Vietnam for future insurgent leaders. Standard training texts are
smuggled into Thailand, and the cadres previously trained in sanctuary act as
the instructors.

(v) Turning now to the second goal of Phase I subversive insurgency, esca-
lation of the conflict to Phase II, it becomes evident that since the assets re-
quired in Phase II are different, the tasks that must be undertaken to prepare
for Phase II are different both in character and scope from those needed to
support the overt insurgent activity usually associated with Phase I. New and
conflicting requirements must be satisfied and short-range insurgent plans
must be reevaluated in the context of the longer-range insurgent goal to es-
calate the conflict. Furthermore the assets that must be available for Phase II
insurgent activity to be effective or even possible must be generated covertly
to avoid discovery and disruption in their formative stages.

(v) Briefly, the Phase II level implies a comprehensive system of insur-
gent command and control from the national level to the region, the province,
the district, the T Lomb, and finally, to the village level. Insurgent leaders
who could otherwise be assigned to command a guerrilla band during Phase I
must be trained further and reassigned to coordinate insurgent activity at the
district or province level because of an eventual Phase II requirement for such
coordination. Specialized staff sections, including those for military affairs,
political affairs, propaganda, communications-liaison, finance, and counterin-
telligence, must be organized and assigned at least skeletal staffs, which also
results in a drain of scarce leadership resources from Phase I insurgent op-
perations. This need for insurgent functional specialization is a basic difference
between Phase II and Phase I. In regard to basing, facilities must be prepared
for accommodating company- and battalion-sized units and their logistics suppor
elements, which in turn would include ordnance shops, field hospitals, quartermaster depots, and messing facilities. Food-acquisition and storage facilities must be expanded significantly beyond day-to-day hand-to-mouth needs in order to accommodate the required rapid increase in the number of full-time insurgents living in the hills in early Phase II. Support of battalions cannot be accomplished on a day-to-day basis. Training areas must be prepared for larger-unit training, crew-served weapons training, and radio-communications training, which are inherent in the effective coordination and use of these larger military formations. In addition, various kinds of specialists must be trained to support the staff organizations. Security elements must be organized and checkpoints must be established to secure the insurgent basing and storage areas. The host-government counterinsurgency and intelligence organizations must be penetrated by insurgent agents. Finally, a system of guides, liaison stations, and transport units must be developed and sited to permit the flow of men and material from the base areas to the insurgent operational areas, from sanctuary to the base areas, and in between base areas to ensure flexible, secure, and responsive insurgent operations and deployments.

The insurgent assets required for Phase II operations are beyond the known current capabilities of the insurgents in Northeast Thailand to generate. Indeed, any broad-based attempt by the insurgents to generate simultaneously all the assets required for Phase II in many areas of Northeast Thailand is not likely to be productive. What is both possible and very probable is that the insurgents will choose one or two places where Phase I insurgent activity has been effective and take the initial steps toward developing the required capabilities for Phase II insurgent operations. The problem of specifying insurgent goals and objectives in this connection thus reduces to one of identifying the proper priorities for the insurgent-escalation process on an insurgent group-by-group basis.

By July 1967 the insurgency in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province had developed to the point where insurgent leaders could be expected to have begun to develop the capabilities required for Phase II operations. Evidence indicates the existence of a definite hierarchy of command and control in the Na Kae District. Specialized insurgent staff sections, although rudimentary in character, are reported to be operating and training insurgents. There are indications of a somewhat more stable and elaborate basing system than is required to support Phase I insurgent operations. There appear to exist insurgent base areas and guerrilla groups that do not support the Phase I activity directly. Insurgent agents are reported to specifically collect information on government military units.

The point is that an analysis of day-to-day insurgent activity in the villages and of the support structure that makes this activity possible does not exhaust the scope of insurgent activity during Phase I. The insurgent is necessarily developing capabilities required for Phase II insurgency. These assets are, for security reasons, usually developed in base areas other than the ones used by the operating bands. It is estimated that the proper priorities for the insurgent armed activities as of July 1967 were first to expand the military capabilities of the guerrilla bands by training them in the use of mines and crew-served weapons such as mortars, recoilless rifles, and machineguns and, second, to develop the capability for manufacturing or acquiring from sanctuary the ordnance required to support these expanded military capabilities.
In summary, the insurgent goals and objectives during Phase I insur-
gen
cancy consist of the generation of sympathetic, responsive support elements in
the villages; removal of the government presence from the organized villages;
and development of the capability to initiate Phase II insurgent operations in a
few carefully chosen areas. It is estimated that as of July 1967 in a few dis-

tricits in Northeast Thailand, including the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom
Province, perhaps Sawang Daen Din District of Sakon Nakhon Province, and
one or two others, the insurgents had begun to prepare for Phase II operations.

Insurgent Instrument for Subversion of Northeast Thailand

Background. The immediate goals and objectives of the insurgent
movement in Northeast Thailand as of July 1967 have been discussed in the
previous paragraphs. The insurgent concepts of organization responsive to
these goals were described in general terms. This section of the paper will
describe sample insurgent organizational elements that implement these or-
ganizational concepts.

The total insurgent organization, the instrument for subversion, ranges
from international communist command committees to the insurgent cell leader
in a remote village. Because Northeast Thailand is the subject of this study,
the national-level CPT structure and the international communist connections
will be discussed only to the extent that these affect the Northeast. Examples
of actual insurgent organizational elements will be given where possible in
order to clarify the "model" insurgent organization, which will be described
later.

The Northeast Region of Thailand is controlled by a CPT executive
committee for that region. Aside from the conventional staff and command
committees of the party at the region level (see App D), the Northeast Region
party executive committee is divided into four subcommittees, each responsible
for a particular geographic "area command" within the region. Conceptually,
the area commands should be groupings of two or more provinces that would
facilitate CPT support and insurgent growth. Actually this level of CPT
organization has apparently been based on the existing strength of insurgent groups
in the area. A five-province area command has been identified for Sakon
Nakhon, Khon Kaen, Maha Sarakham, Udon, and Nong Khae; another command
for Sisaket, Surin, Southern Ubon, and the Khorat plateau area; one for the Na
Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province and northern Ubon Province; and one
for a Tambon in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom. This at first glance is
certainly a curious division of responsibility for a group of CPT region-com-
mittee members. When this division of labor is related to insurgent strengths
and activity levels, however, it appears more reasonable. That is, in the sim-
plest sense, the ratio of party members to region-level committee members is
approximately constant within each area command except for the case of the
one Tambon in Na Kae District. The intent appears to be to treat the Phi Thai
minority group in Northeast Thailand as a special case. The villages involved
are Phi Thai villages; the people in these villages have relatives in nearby
provinces and districts of the Northeast; and there is evidence that the insur-
gents have used these family and minority-group ties to facilitate insurgent re-
cruitment.
From the insurgent tactical-command point of view, these CPT area commands apparently have a different meaning. Each area command represents one or more points of direct CPT support to the insurgents and usually includes the presence of an important insurgent leader, e.g., Champa Khunarak in Sawang Daen Din District of Sakon Nakhon Province and, temporarily, during the first half of 1967, Yod Tisawat's deputy, Bunmi Ouanwang, in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province, while Yod Tisawat was out of the country.

Directly subordinate to the preeminent insurgent leader within an area command are generally a number of operating insurgent groups that together form an insurgent echelon hereafter called "the sector command." For instance, roughly within the boundaries of Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province there are three insurgent groups. One of the insurgent groups, commanded by Bunmi Ouanwang, operates primarily in the northern and central areas of Na Kae District; the Khong Sithin/Nai Phao group operates in western Na Kae District and the eastern portion of Muang District of Sakon Nakhon Province; and Luan Wongtraso's group operates in the southeastern area of Na Kae District. Analysis of insurgent activities indicates some coordination and cooperation between these three groups and perhaps even some transfer of armed guerrilla units from one group to the other. The leader of the Na Kae Sector has been Yod Tisawat and his CPT contact, Nai Pha.

Bunmi Ouanwang's group is further divided into a military section, a political section, and a provisions section. The responsibilities of the political section are to indoctrinate insurgents and to conduct propaganda meetings. An art subsection is subordinate to the propaganda section and is responsible for teaching singing and dancing (Molah) to the subsection members and performing during propaganda meetings. The responsibilities of the military section are to conduct raids, ambushes, and attacks against government units. The responsibilities of the provisions section are to collect, store, distribute, and cook food. These three main insurgent staff sections in other areas of Northeast Thailand are referred to as the mobile force, the armed propaganda force, and the village protection unit (village cells); and, also, as the camp security unit, the mobile warfare unit, and the village organization (Farmer's Liberation Association). Some functional and organizational modifications are inherent in the terminology changes although the impact of these changes on insurgent operations is minor.

Aside from the insurgent groups directly subordinate to the sector-command echelon, there are a number of insurgent groups that might best be described as independent or autonomous. These independent insurgent groups are spawned by the sector-command echelon and are assisted when necessary by sector insurgent groups, but they do not belong directly to the sector organization because they are geographically located as separate pockets of insurgency. Characteristically the sector echelon dispatches a few well-trained insurgent leaders plus a nucleus of armed guerrilla instructors into a promising and desirable area for insurgent development where local village organizations have been established by insurgent organizers previously sent to the area. Groups of villages are usually assigned to separate insurgent training teams.

After the three basic staff sections (political, military, provisions) have been established by the independent insurgent group, recruiting teams are
sent into nearby villages. A recruiting team has from two to about seven members who functionally belong to the propaganda (political) section of this independent insurgent group. Depending on the availability of assistance from the sector echelon, the insurgents either conduct a series of propaganda meetings at this point as a show of strength or attempt to expand the insurgent cell structure in the villages through visits by recruiting teams before initiating operations. In either case the recruiting teams contact individuals in the villages assigned to them and attempt to involve them with the insurgency in such ways as supplying food, recruiting their friends, and participating in propaganda meetings. Once an individual is recruited he is asked in turn to recruit his friends and relatives and thus be promoted to insurgent cell leader. These insurgent cells are given propaganda material to study and basic military training at a nearby insurgent camp or safe area chosen by the insurgent group. The insurgent cells in the area are trained separately during periodically arranged training sessions that last a few hours. Eventually, either as a result of police investigations or fear of arrest instilled into individuals by the insurgents, a number of recruits in the villages will elect to live in the local insurgent camps and become "jungle soldiers." At this point it is possible for the insurgents to give these recruits more intensive training and subsequently to use them either to augment their recruiting teams or to collect and store provisions.

(1) The initial foundation for establishing an independent insurgent group is a net of villages with a basic insurgent village organization. There is evidence that insurgent leaders trained in North Vietnam are sent back directly to their native area or, alternatively, provided with a cover such as medical doctor, buyer, or tradesman and assigned as needed throughout Northeast Thailand. This trained individual recruits and indoctrinates his close friends (if he is sent to his native area) or people with whom he comes into contact who appear to be sympathetic to the avowed aims of the insurgency. These newly recruited individuals are promised various rewards and told to go back to their native villages, recruit others, and thus become cell leaders. This grass-roots expansion is a most efficient use of trained recruiters but it is also most vulnerable to police action. A newly organized insurgent cell would be forced to disband if the local authorities acted against the insurgent recruiter before contact was established with a nearby insurgent group. The basic insurgent technique is, of course, to take maximum advantage of the existing situation and to tailor the insurgent growth and organization to counter-insurgent capabilities and deployments. This local insurgent organization, consisting of a few cells in adjacent villages and a few untrained insurgents in a local camp, will subsequently be referred to as the precinct-echelon insurgent unit.

(2) Model Insurgent Organization. In summary, the insurgent instrument for subversion of Northeast Thailand, the model insurgent organization, is structured around four echelons of insurgent command (see Fig. 8). Three of these echelons, the precinct unit, the independent insurgent group, and the insurgent group subordinate to the sector are designed primarily to expand the insurgent popular base in the villages. The precinct unit is the most efficient in generating village-support cells in the absence of an effective government presence in the villages. The insurgent group subordinate to the sector headquarters,
Fig. 8—Model Insurgent Organization
although representing the least rapid growth of the insurgent support base in the villages per trained insurgent cadre involved, is most effective in resisting counterinsurgency activity. The independent insurgent group is a compromise. It allows the insurgents to activate pockets of insurgent activity geographically removed from established insurgent areas and still ensures that the insurgents have some capability to resist government suppression operations. The fourth echelon of insurgent command, the sector, is best suited for generating the assets required for the initiation of Phase II insurgent activity. It represents a drain to the insurgents in terms of Phase I operations, and the activity of this echelon must be carefully controlled so as not to jeopardize the constant and rapid growth of the insurgent movement. On the other hand, undue delay in initiating the critical generation of assets for Phase II insurgency destroys the proper tempo of the insurgent movement.

It should be emphasized that the insurgent organization depicted in Fig. 8 is a model insurgent organization. All aspects of this model organization are derived from available intelligence information on the insurgent organization from sector to sector and from subgroup to subgroup. The discussion of a model insurgent organization is useful to the extent that it clarifies the options available to the insurgent leaders and indicates the scope, purpose, and character of insurgent activity.

INSURGENT COMMAND AND CONTROL, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, AND OPERATIONAL AREAS

Introduction

The structure of the overt operating levels of insurgent organization is examined in the following paragraphs. The covert aspects of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand are discussed at length in Chap. 6. The CPT and the regional echelon of insurgent command are discussed in App D. It is sufficient for the following discussion of the insurgent sector, group, and precinct order of battle to summarize the basic missions and elements of the CPT Northeast Region structure.

An executive committee of the CPT for Northeast Thailand has the mission of coordinating insurgent activities in the Northeast Region. This executive committee was reportedly headed by Thawarn Wongswan, who was captured by the Thai police in early 1967. This committee apparently also coordinates the distribution of external support to the insurgents and the movement of insurgent trainees between Northeast Thailand and North Vietnam. There is also some evidence that the party has organized a network of couriers for internal liaison and has placed agents into various Thai counterinsurgency organizations. Subordinate to the region committee of the party are the CPT area commands described previously. The primary area command and center of CPT control appears to be located in Sawang Daen Din District of Sakon Nakhon Province. This is in part suggested by the routing of insurgent trainees to North Vietnam and the reported presence of Thawarn Wongswan in Sawang Daen Din District before his capture.

Subordinate to the CPT area commands are the insurgent-sector and independent-group echelons of command. The locations and the ranking of the
areas of insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand are discussed first. Next, the insurgent leaders and insurgent strengths are listed for the active insurgent areas, and three sample insurgent-group organizations are examined in detail. Finally, the insurgent strength estimates are reexamined and an alternative basis for estimating insurgent capabilities is suggested.

**Insurgent Operational Areas**

Analysis of insurgent activity over the 1-year data base has revealed the existence of 22 separate groupings of insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand (see Table 1). These groupings become apparent when reports of insurgent activity are displayed on a time-sequenced set of map overlays. Each of the 22 insurgent areas has been designated by a letter. Insurgent activity in Buriram Province of Northeast Thailand is the only significant concentration of reported insurgent activity that is not included within the set of 22 groups. The data reported and analyzed indicate a significant range in the level of activity, continuity of activity, and size of the 22 identified areas.

This table will be used as the basis for the subsequent discussion of insurgent strengths, order of battle, and command and control. The table includes a listing of the districts and provinces involved in each of 22 areas and gives the approximate coordinates of the centers of insurgent activity. The relative locations of the 22 areas are shown in a later figure.

A recent US Army, Pacific (USARPAC) study provides an insurgent order of battle for Northeast Thailand that is based on RTG administrative boundaries. Insurgent operational areas, however, often encompass more than one district or province, thus prohibiting the use of administrative boundaries as a basis for compiling and calculating an insurgent order of battle. An insurgent order of battle based on the 22 insurgent operational areas has been derived from the USARPAC study with the aid of supplementary Thai and Controlled American Source (CAS, Thailand) intelligence reports. This revised order of battle is presented in Table 1.

A number of insurgent groups are said to exist whose presence is not directly supported by reports of insurgent activity. In some cases this discrepancy probably results from the rapid change and reorganization of insurgent groups. Previous guerrilla-band leaders are either reassigned to other duties or several bands are integrated into a larger group with new leaders, but the previously confirmed insurgent subunits are not eliminated from the order of battle. It is also true that several insurgent groups of 15 to 30 men may not have initiated overt insurgent activity. The existence of these groups may have been confirmed by police reports. One would not expect to be able to predict their existence from summaries of insurgent activity. The precinct-level organization discussed previously is precisely the form of covert insurgent activity that would be involved. Finally, there is the possibility that insurgent activity is not reported in those areas of Northeast Thailand where counterinsurgency forces have not been deployed. A listing of insurgent units that cannot be readily associated with insurgent activity is provided in Table 2.

Estimates of total insurgent strength have been made on the basis of data such as are contained in Tables 1 and 2 concerning the size of individual identified guerrilla units. Table 1 implies a total insurgent strength of 1340 in Northeast Thailand as of mid-1967. Although it is quite likely that some of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Center of Insurgent Activity, Coordinates</th>
<th>District or Subdistrict</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Insurgent Cadre</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Level of Insurgent Activity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>TE38</td>
<td>The Bo, Si Chang Mai</td>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known, est. 15</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Insurgent activity possibly related to communications-liaison between Northeast Thailand and Pathet Lao in Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>UF11</td>
<td>Bung Kae</td>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>Chief: Phatthi Sirikhom or Sathan Sirikhom</td>
<td>60, armed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Most influential group in Nong Khai Province; the insurgents operate in area referred to as Pha Sing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>TE21</td>
<td>Nong Ban Lamphu</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief: Yoed Theburi Deputy: Boon Tualaphom</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>This group is reported to have contact with insurgent elements in Loei Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>TD19</td>
<td>Kamphawapi, Nong Phong</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>Maha Sarakan</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known, est. 20</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>This group may have moved to Wanawin District of Sakon Nakhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>UE12</td>
<td>Nong Hae</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known, est. 15</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Insurgent activity may be related to relocation or movement of a nearby insurgent group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>UD38</td>
<td>Kamphawapi, Sabtsa Rakan</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>Kalasin</td>
<td>Chief: possibly Join Lapha, Sekha Pha Dao, or Sanaa</td>
<td>20 plus 20</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>This grouping of insurgent activity may be related to three different insurgent subgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>VD08</td>
<td>Kuchinarai</td>
<td>Kalasin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief: Bustainability or possibly Suei Sing-keam</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>The leader of this insurgent group is reportedly a native of Central Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>VD13</td>
<td>Kuchinarai</td>
<td>Kalasin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known, est. 15</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Insurgent activity possibly related to in-country liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>UE47</td>
<td>Wanawin</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief: Thong Phan Sophamai and Mine Rassami Jandawong or possibly Chan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>This group reportedly also operates in Ban Dung District of Udon Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter designator</td>
<td>Center of insurgent activity, coordinates</td>
<td>District or subdistrict</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Insurgent cadre</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Level of insurgent activity</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>UE77</td>
<td>Abet Amanai</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Chief: Sai Roithuanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Very low level of insurgent activity in this area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wangsaiwet</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>UE41</td>
<td>Sawang Dees Din</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Chief: Jampa Khamek; also former group of Damri Setchail, who was killed in Apr 67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>Preeminent insurgent group in Sakon Nakhon Province; also reported to operate in Nong Than District of Udon Thani Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>UD89</td>
<td>Phana Nikhom</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Chief: Sama; more recently Dao</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>Chief of the group is reportedly a Vietnamese; the deputy chief, We Khama, was killed 17 May 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ket Bek</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Deputy: We Kothma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>VD18</td>
<td>Meang</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Chief: Kohn Rio Phao</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>This group is subordinate to the insurgents in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy: Khong Sithia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>VES1</td>
<td>Meang</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Chief: Phrom Kom Chana; replaced Duan Kaengthai</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>Duan was killed 16 Mar 67; group is sometimes referred to as the Pla Pak Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>VD58</td>
<td>Na Koe</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Chief: Phairid Tiewat and Duan Pho Thoom</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Part of Phairid's group was originally part of Duan Kaengthai's group; both groups are subordinate to Damri Osumuang, who also operates in this area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of 2d group: Tion Tiawat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>VD47</td>
<td>Na Koe</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Chiefs: Damri Osumwang and Sophian Phromhinite</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Intensive</td>
<td>In the absence of Yod Tiawat, Damri Osumwang appeared to assume operational control of several units in this area; Na Pho may be the CPT representative in the area and thus directly subordinate to Wast of the CPT Northeast Executive Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>VD55</td>
<td>Na Kae</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom Chief: Luen Wongtrase Deputies: Sai, Lan, Kamphas Wongtrase, and Sek Intensive This group is reportedly subordinate to Yod Tiewwat although very little direct evidence is available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>VD44</td>
<td>Kham Che-u</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom Chief: Su Sukri, Tharn Mongthon, and Sao Moderate This group, although adjacent to the area controlled by Yod Tiewwat's group, is reportedly not directly controlled by Na Kae group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>VD76</td>
<td>That Phanom</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom Chief: Plaeng Rubgam, Khan Benkein, Lad Tawangtau, and Mian Wongtrase Moderate Choy Rachanai, the previous leader, was wounded and may have died in late 1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>VC59</td>
<td>Nakdahan Don Tao</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom Possibly 2 groups Chief: Lek Khamni, Pramuk Phuthawet; possibly led by Long Nek Intensive It is probable that these two groups coordinate with other nearby insurgent units for operations; there are persistent reports of the presence of Paibat Loei units in the area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>VD41</td>
<td>Loeng Nek Tau Amat Chareon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ubon Chief: Ned or Thuan and Soh Kajitam Limited This group reportedly moved into Nakhon Phanom Province border area in early 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>VC87</td>
<td>Chanuman Amat Chareon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ubon Chief: Song Chareonrat, possibly aka Ben Chanuman with Deputy Choe Phatjai Moderate This group is still apparently strictly in the recruiting and basic training phase of development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2
Independent Insurgent Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center of insurgent covert activity, coordinates</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Insurgent cadre</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VD395668 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Yod Tisawat</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably absorbed into Buemi Oamswang’s group while Yod is out of country (see Table 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE616040 Muang</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Phao Suansom</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD507919 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Yen Phok Tumsum</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD391655 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Chado Singheam</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD308710 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Beat Uamswang</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>This group is probably part of Buemi Oamswang’s group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD39770 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Khae Phoikhachat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD4056 Na Kao</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Roi Cheeckham</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably absorbed into Lean Wangrana’s group (see Table 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD6594 That Phanom</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Wanae Humswang</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD625057 Don Tee</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Jornhuri Cholaphan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD862003 Don Tee</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>Thead Dangbai</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD223760 Muang</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Zai Channsam</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD42400 Muang</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>It</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably subordinate unit of Buem Thaum group (see Table 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD38093 Muang</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Dech</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Part of Choy Ratchaisin’s group, divided between Don Khamphuak and Yod Tisawat when Choy Ratchaisin was wounded (see Table 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE3825 Sawai Daen Din</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Prid</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably integral part of Champa Kheark’s group (see Table 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE4118 Sawai Daen Din</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Prad</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE6000919</td>
<td>Kut Bok</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Saha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE22</td>
<td>Kaeo man</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>Siat Angkhana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE9899</td>
<td>Ban Pha</td>
<td>Udon Thani</td>
<td>Rit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE012371</td>
<td>Nong Buri Lampang</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>Na Phran Phoonthao</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE0269</td>
<td>Ban Pha</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>Amphoe Ban Pha group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE855021</td>
<td>Nong Buri Lampang</td>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>Captain Theem</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF9707</td>
<td>Si Changmai</td>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>Sichai</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB28</td>
<td>Phibun Mongkon</td>
<td>Ubon</td>
<td>Pradit Sirirat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably local precinct-echelon unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One company of Pathat Lao has been reported in Nong Khai and also in Ubon Province; no known confirmation of these reports.

Nong Buri and Lahan Sai Districts of Surin Province are reported as areas of insurgent activity.

Katharalek District of Surin is reported as an area of insurgent activity.
Insurgent units listed in Table 2 are at least in part already included in the former total, it could be assumed that the maximum insurgent strength in Northeast Thailand is the total of the insurgent unit strengths listed in the two tables. This figure is 2090 armed men, not including the two Pathet Lao companies or the reported insurgent activity in Buriram and Sisaket Provinces.

Difficulties arise with this process of estimates of insurgent unit strength when one attempts to describe the insurgent elements included in the tables. It will become obvious that village support cells are not included in the estimates. For instance, in the case of the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak unit in Sakon Nakhon, discussed in following paragraphs, about 400 persons are organized into village cells to support the 50 guerrillas included in the estimates. Members of the CPT living in the Northeast Region but not serving within the operating units are also not included. Full-time mobile insurgent bands are generally included in the estimates, although the accuracy of the estimates is certainly questionable. The primary uncertainty in insurgent strength estimates arises from not being able to differentiate between slightly trained jungle soldiers, who are really members of newly recruited precinct cells undergoing indoctrination in the jungle, and relatively well-trained precinct groups already augmented by cadre trained in North Vietnam. The precinct unit could have been supplied with weapons, be permanently based in insurgent camps, and be just a reorganization away from initiating overt insurgent activities in conjunction with an existing nearby insurgent unit. These two extremes in local insurgent-band development span the echelon of insurgent organization previously referred to as the precinct level.

Sixteen precinct-level insurgent bands noted in Table 2 were not predicted by analysis of overt insurgent activity. These insurgent areas have apparently been located on the basis of other information concerning covert insurgent activity. It is characteristic of insurgent precinct-echelon organizations that the initial cell organization, the establishment of temporary training areas, and the arrival of insurgent political and military instructors into the area would remain covert. Even a casual comparison of the total number of insurgents reported to have been trained in North Vietnam with the number consistent with the insurgent groups reported in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that additional areas of covert insurgent activity have not been reported. This possibility again points up the limited usefulness of indiscriminate total insurgent strength estimates.

Command and Control and Organization of Sample Insurgent Groups

Three insurgent groups are analyzed in order to better understand the growth of the insurgent organization and to form a basis for a reevaluation of insurgent strength estimates. The three groups chosen for detailed study are the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak insurgent group in Sakon Nakhon Province, the Bunmi Quanwang group in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province, and the Nong Bua Lamphu group in Udon Province.

Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak Insurgent Group. A detailed discussion of the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak insurgent group is considered useful because of (a) the depth of data available, (b) the relatively uncomplex history of insurgent activity, and (c) the existence of clearly identifiable phases of the insurgent-group development.
Insurgent activity in the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak area can be traced back to 1959. Ong Tam, a Vietnamese pork merchant from Ban Phaeng Kham, recruited Sern Laphiphon in 1959 while the latter was working at a sugar plant in a nearby Tambon. Sern, We Khotama, and three other men left for training in North Vietnam in 1960. After serving with the Pathet Lao, Sern and We returned to their native villages and began recruiting in late 1964. Ong Tam collected money from the local Vietnamese to support the insurgents.

Dao Dokmai came to cut wood near Ban Phak Kham Phu in 1963. He became acquainted with Seng, one of the original members of a Farmers Liberation Association established in 1964 in that village. Dao left the area for a period of time and returned in late 1964. Nok Laphiphon, reported from Ban Phom Tum in Na Kae District, was the recruiter in Ban Phak Kham Phu. Nok moved in with his son-in-law and asked six villagers to join the Farmers Liberation Association in 1964. Nok gave loans of 1000 to 4000 baht to each of the six charter members, and four or five meetings were held in 1964 and 1965.

Also in 1964, Chan Mirawong came from Na Kae District to Ban Rua of Phanna Nikhom to recruit for the insurgents. Sai and Thorn from Waritchaphum District of Sakon Nakhon Province and Kow from Ubon Province were reportedly other recruiters. Chan Mirawong reportedly worked with a Mr. Pha.

During 1965 Dao reportedly was present, together with Champa Khunarak and a man named Pan from Vientiane, at an insurgent meeting in Sawang Daen Din District. It was reported that weapons had become available in the area. Also in 1965 Dao brought Nkhon and Nwat, two quack doctors, into Ban Phak Kham Phu. In early 1965 We was reportedly recruiting in his home village of Ban Nong Phak Thiam. A man named Sanan was introduced by We to his recruits in May 1965. Weapons training began in late 1965 for small groups from Ban Nong Phak Thiam. Bun, alias Sithat, and Sup were the trainers. Both had served with Kong Le’s forces in Laos and are reportedly served with Thai forces in Laos in 1962.

In early 1966 the two trainers in Ban Nong Phak Thiam were augmented by Bunmi Malithong, Thongdi Tufhila, and Som Mangkasi. In March 1966 the group received three rifles and in July 1966, 16 M-3 submachineguns, 10 rifles, 8 carbines, 5 pistols, and 47 grenades. Weapons training for Ban Kiang, Ban Bua, and Ban Phak Kham Phu occurred in nearby camps and in a camp near Ban Nong Phak Thiam. There were three instructors for Ban Bua; four for Ban Kiang, including Sern Laphiphon and Charoen Malithong; and seven for Ban Phak Kham Phu, including Nok Laphiphon, Dao, Nkhon, and Nwat.

In July 1966 the local insurgent groups were combined into one group, and the combined group initiated covert insurgent activities. Sanan was chief of the combined groups, We Khotama was deputy for political affairs, and Dao was deputy for military affairs, with Sern Laphiphon in charge of military activity during forced propaganda meetings. From July 1966 to March 1967 this group held 21 forced propaganda meetings. During September 1966 Champa Khunarak’s group (32 men) assisted this Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak insurgent group, and in March 1967 a Na Kae group (43 men) came from 30 km away to assist in the forced propaganda meetings in the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak area.

In April 1967 Dao became chief of the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak group in place of Sanan. Suthep, who was Sanan’s superior, probably remained in control of the insurgents. Suthep reportedly lived in a nearby town and evidently
was the ranking CPT representative in the insurgent-group area. As of April 1967, Dao's group consisted of 56 members and was organized as follows:

- We Khotama, deputy for political affairs; he and Sihat were responsible for leading recruitment teams into villages where forced propaganda meetings had been held.
- Sern Lapilphon, probably acting deputy for military affairs; responsible for military activities during forced village meetings.
- Dang, administrative chief; responsible for storage and distribution of food, equipment, and supplies and the cooking of food.
- Bunmi Malithong, chief of youth affairs; responsible for small-group indoctrination, morale problems, and reporting incorrect opinions of individual members to the chief of the group. This function is the clearest indication of Communist Party influence within this group.
- Tip (Dao's wife); responsible for supervising other women in camp and teaching first aid.

Charoen Malithong; in charge of typing propaganda leaflets with the assistance of Kanchana, who had been trained in North Vietnam, and also by Dao and Tip.

(3) In late April 1967, Dao temporarily redivided this 56-man group into three subgroups. Dao took about 20 men with him to Na Kae District. We Khotama was assigned 19 men. We broke this group into two elements, one commanded by himself, the other by That (possibly an alias of Sihat). The third group was possibly commanded by Sern Labilphon. By June 1967 Dao had returned to the area and the recombined insurgent group, with supporting subgroups from Na Kae District, Nakhon Phanom Province, and Kalasin Province, held a 100-man propaganda meeting in Ban Phak Kham Phu. In the meantime, We Khotama had been killed by government security forces after an informant's tip led to a successful ambush.

(5) In summary, the phases of insurgent organization in the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak area were as follows:

- 1964. Insurgent organizers sent into several strategically placed villages in the area.
- 1965. Organization of insurgent cells in the native villages of the insurgent organizers and subsequently in nearby villages.
- Early 1966. Arrival of military instructors and some weapons; establishment of temporary camps and training of recruits.
- July 1966. Combining of the scattered precinct-echelon insurgent subgroups into one independent operating group; delivery of more weapons and initiation of forced propaganda meetings.
- Late 1966 and early 1967. Increased coordination with nearby insurgent groups and increased intensity of overt insurgent activity.

(5) The village support base for this insurgent group can be estimated from the data compiled by a Thai intelligence team that operated in Phanna Nikhom and Kut Bak Districts of Sakon Nakhon Province in early 1967. From these data it is estimated that there were about 240 village supporters in Kut Bak District, with about 80 percent of this number in the three villages of Ban Klang, Ban Phak Kham Phu, and Ban Bua. Another 100 supporters are reported in six villages in Phanna Nikhom, near Ban Nong Phak Thiam. Figures for the
Ban Rua area of Phanna Nikhom are not available, but a safe estimate would be 50 to 70 supporters. The total number of insurgent supporters in the villages in the area of Dao's insurgent group is estimated to be about 400. This does not include possibly related insurgent recruiting activity in Kumkawapi District of Udon Province and Sahatsakhan District of Kalasin Province.

Finally, it is interesting to note which aspects of insurgent activity in this area have also been observed in other insurgent areas. First, there is the presence of Vietnamese. The Vietnamese are reported to be making the initial contact with future insurgent leaders, organizing financial support, and serving in critical positions in the insurgent movement. Next, there is the use of particular covers for the insurgent recruiter, e.g., quack doctor, merchant, or buyer of farm products. Third, there is the connection with some aspect of sugar production. Sern Lapliphon was working at a sugar plant when he was approached by an insurgent recruiter, and one of the initial insurgent acts in Na Kae District was the formation of a Sugar Growers' Association.

Bunmi Ouanwang's Na Kae Group. Insurgent activity in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province can be traced back to 1957. In 1957 the Tambon chief of Phon Tum village recruited members for a Sugar Growers' Association with which Yod Tisawat was associated. Bunmi Ouanwang was chairman of a parallel Sugar Growers' Association. These associations recruited members and operated for a period of 2 to 3 years. During 1962 and early 1963 Yod Tisawat was the only ranking subversive reported to be operating in Na Kae District. In March 1963 Bunmi Ouanwang was reportedly organizing cell leaders in Phon Tum village, and in May 1963 he was indoctrinating village cells in the jungle. In June 1963 a Royal Thai Army (RTA) civic-action unit was introduced into Phon Tum village, and the insurgents promptly assigned one of their recruits to spy on it by acting as the representative of the village. In late 1964 the insurgents terrorized the village chief of Phon Tum into resigning and elected an insurgent as the new village chief.

In early 1965 Bunmi introduced a Mr. Pha to the insurgent recruits from Phon Tum village. By August 1965 several assassinations had taken place in Na Kae District, and insurgent meetings were being held in rice fields outside the villages. It is estimated that as of September 1965 there were 137 insurgents in Na Kae District. Yod Tisawat, Bunmi Ouanwang, Somphien Phromphinit, Mak Wongkasos, and Thep Wangthapha were the leaders of separate insurgent groups.

The insurgent groups in Na Kae District expanded rapidly during 1966 and extended their influence primarily into the northern and eastern sections of the district. In late 1966 and early 1967 major elements of the Na Kae groups moved into the southeastern portion of Muang District of Sakon Nakhon Province.

Bunmi Ouanwang's group remained in their original area of operations.

As of June 1967, Bunmi Ouanwang's group was organized as shown in the accompanying tabulation:

Seventy-one known individuals, including Somphien Phromphinit, are listed as part of Bunmi's group. If it is true that this same individual was the group leader in Na Kae District during 1965, he probably leads the second group of guerrillas, and the estimate of guerrilla strength of 120 for the six groups is probably low.

An individual referred to as Friend Pha provides Bunmi's organization with money, supplies, and documents during monthly visits to Bunmi's
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chief</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Bunmi Ouanwang, acting</td>
<td>Raids, ambushes, attacks against government units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Located in separate camps, 10-30 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Bunmi Ouanwang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d</td>
<td>Phan Phromprijit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Chadi Singnay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Thin Tisawat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Utbid, 60-year-old Vietnamese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Thin Saenkmam</td>
<td>Medical aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art subsection Cham</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indoctrinating and training recruits; lectures at forced propagandas meetings; teaching singing and dancing; performing at village meetings; collecting, storing, and distributing supplies; cooking food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>Chaun Noiphao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Headquarters area at VD3364. Insurgents in Sakon Nakhon Province arrange for recruits from the Na Kae area to go to North Vietnam for training. As of June 1965 nine individuals from Bunmi’s group were reportedly receiving training in North Vietnam.

(1) (G) Bunmi Ouanwang’s group has been one of the more active insurgent groups in the Na Kae District. It should be noted that one of the missions of the military section of Bunmi’s group is to attack government units. Further, several prominent insurgent leaders known to be associated with the insurgent groups in Na Kae District are not included in the order of battle of Bunmi’s group, and the indicated capabilities of the subordinate guerrilla units to undertake attacks are not consistent with past insurgent activities in the Na Kae District. It must be concluded that the sector echelon of insurgent organization and the generation of assets for initiating Phase II activity are not included in the foregoing description of Bunmi’s insurgent group.

(2) (G) Nong Bua Lamphu Insurgent Group. Very little can be reported about the early history of the Nong Bua Lamphu District, Udon Province, insurgent group. It is known that, as of September 1965, the insurgents were well established in two camps in the vicinity of TE31 in Udon Province. An interesting feature of the Nong Bua Lamphu group is their strict adherence to a ranking system for insurgents. The most experienced and most completely indoctrinated insurgents are referred to as first-class or complete members of the Nong Bua Lamphu Party. The middle level, or second-class members, include even some cadre who had been trained in North Vietnam but are considered to be partly trained insurgents. The third-class members are referred to as jungle soldiers and consist of new recruits.

(3) (G) Aside from the ranking of insurgents into classes, the Nong Bua Lamphu insurgent group also had a conventional functional organization. Mr. Khaem was chief of the male insurgents in Nong Bua Lamphu, and Mrs. Phen, the chief’s wife, was chief of the female insurgents. Mr. Khaem reported to an “Uncle” Than who sometimes visited the insurgent camp, and Mr. Khaem...
also went twice a month in early 1966 to either the district or province capital to get money for the insurgents. Subordinate to Mr. Khaem were Mr. Bun and Mr. Wisut, who commanded the two insurgent camps. Training in the two insurgent camps was separate for each of the three classes of insurgents. Mr. Khaem taught the first-level insurgents including Bun, Thong, Yot (possibly Yot Thepburi), Wisut, Prasit, and six others. Bun and Thong taught the second-level insurgents. Mr. Phen taught politics, and Mr. Prasit, who had the title of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, taught military subjects to the third-level insurgents, the raw recruits. As of November 1965, about 35 insurgents were divided about equally among the three classes. Mr. Khaem and Mr. Wisut typed the documents and texts used during training sessions. Two recruiting teams, one headed by Bun (four persons) and the other headed by Wisut (seven persons), were assigned one set of villages each for operations. Mr. Wisut and Mr. Thong were in charge of medical services, and Mr. Suk Ang, a village member of the insurgents, was in charge of developing techniques for making explosives. Mr. Suphot, who had been trained in North Vietnam, gave the weapons training.

The Nong Bua Lamphu insurgents also had an organization in the villages that included insurgent cells, food-collection teams, and intelligence cadre. In February 1966 Mrs. Phen and eight other insurgents, mostly women, returned to their villages when the main insurgent group moved their camp yet another time. From September 1965 to June 1966 the insurgents moved their camp about once a month. The insurgent camp was attacked in May 1966 and all insurgent supplies were captured. The insurgents had food and equipment stored in various caves in the vicinity, however, and continued to operate after relocating their camp.

The activities of this insurgent group from August 1966 to July 1967 are also described in detail in Chap. 4. It is evident from the analysis that the Nong Bua Lamphu group was primarily concerned with indoctrinating their recruits rather than developing the capabilities for widespread overt insurgent activity. The group had five recruits at the Hoa Binh insurgent-training school and about six or seven insurgent cadre in the camp who had already been trained at Hoa Binh, North Vietnam.

ANALYSIS OF INSURGENT STRENGTH ESTIMATES

The estimates of total insurgent strength in Northeast Thailand as of mid-1967 are certainly confusing in view of the description of sample insurgent groups. The shortcomings in insurgent strength estimates result primarily from confusion about the types of insurgent groups or elements that should be included within the estimates. It is suggested that five estimates, rather than one, are required to represent insurgent strength in Northeast Thailand.

A schematic of the insurgent-personnel breakdown is given in Fig. 9. On the basis of day-to-day activities and training background, the individuals involved in the insurgency can be segregated into five significant groups: (a) members of the CPT, (b) insurgent command cadre trained outside Thailand, (c) full-time insurgents who are members of sector- or group-level insurgent bands, (d) part-time insurgents undergoing training and indoctrination by local insurgent organizers, and (e) village-based supporters of the insurgents, some
Fig. 9—Insurgent Personnel in Northeast Thailand
organized into a formal insurgent cell (not CPT) structure. These five categories are distinct but not mutually exclusive.

The members of the CPT are active primarily at the regional and area command levels. Their primary missions are the coordination of insurgent activities, liaison with external sources of support to the insurgency (North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Pathet Lao), and penetration of RTG counterinsurgency centers for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Party members apparently also inspect local insurgent groups and in some cases perhaps act as members of insurgent groups, i.e., in charge of youth organization or small-group indoctrination. A March 1967 estimate gives a CPT strength of 1000 members for all of Thailand. Considering the contrary tendencies of insurgent emphasis in Northeast Thailand and the urban background of the party members, it is likely that only about 300 CPT members are active in Northeast Thailand within this first category of insurgent organization.

The separate category for insurgent cadre who have been trained outside Thailand (e.g., Hoa Binh, North Vietnam) is important because the availability of qualified military instructors, indoctrinators, and recruiters effectively controls the rate of growth of the insurgency. As of the first half of 1966 it is estimated that about 450 trained insurgent cadre were at large in Thailand. If the approximately 300 additional cadre who were probably trained in late 1966 and early 1967 are included and if an estimated two-thirds of the cadre trained outside Thailand were returned to the Northeast region, an estimated 500 trained insurgent cadre were in Northeast Thailand as of mid-1967. If the ratio of one trained insurgent cadre to five or seven locally recruited insurgents, suggested by the earlier detailed analysis of insurgent groups, is used, a total trained insurgent strength of 2500 to 3500 (sector, group, and precinct echelons) is estimated.

The third insurgent category would include the independent insurgent groups, such as the Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak group; the insurgent groups subordinate to a sector-echelon organization, such as Bunmi's group in Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province; and insurgent guerrilla groups training for Phase II insurgent activities. In short, this category includes primarily insurgent groups directly responsible for overt insurgent activity. Table 1 suggests that there are 1340 insurgents at this echelon of insurgent organization.

The fourth category of insurgents represents the transition mechanism between an insurgent village-level organization and the independent insurgent group that is able to conduct overt insurgent activities such as forced propaganda meetings and harassment of government security forces. The lowest form of this organizational echelon is a three- to seven-man insurgent cell undergoing basic military training with wooden weapons. At the other extreme is the permanent local insurgent group that occupies a primitive insurgent base camp and has received the weapons, training, indoctrination, and trained leaders required for initiating overt insurgent activity. It is very difficult to estimate the number of insurgents in this category because insurgent activities at this echelon are covert. About 400 of the insurgents indicated in Table 2 would fall in this category of local insurgent groups. Perhaps the best indicator for the number of insurgents in this category is the relatively well-known number of trained insurgent cadre in Northeast Thailand. If a 1 to 6 ratio of trained insurgent cadre to local insurgents is used and the estimated 1340 insurgents...
at the insurgent-group echelon and above are subtracted, about 1600 to 1700 insurgents are within precinct-level insurgent organizations. It is the partial inclusion of this precinct echelon of insurgent organization in numbers estimates that is responsible for the wide and frequent fluctuations in estimates of total armed insurgent strength in Northeast Thailand.

The fifth category includes the insurgent support structure in the villages. The primary missions of this echelon are to collect and deliver food to the insurgents, to report on the activities of government agents, and to assist the insurgents in transporting supplies between base areas. The majority of these insurgent supporters are organized into a cell structure, with the cell leader being responsible for the guidance and indoctrination of the cell members. Again, it is difficult to get an accurate estimate of the total number of village supporters per full-time insurgent in the jungle. The Phanna Nikhom/Kut Bak group (the only group for which extensive data are available) suggests a ratio of 7 to 1 or 8 to 1. Use of this ratio leads to an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 insurgent sympathizers and supporters in Northeast Thailand as of mid-1967, using the extremes of estimated trained insurgent strength.

Much more accurate estimates of insurgents in each of the five categories would be possible if Thai police information on a village-by-village basis were available. The intent of this chapter is not to arrive at adequate estimates of insurgent strength but to indicate the shortcomings of using just one figure for insurgent strength in Northeast Thailand. If insurgent strength estimates must be made, it is suggested that separate categories be maintained for village supporters, precinct-echelon guerrillas, and full-time group and sector-level insurgents. If separate estimates for CPT membership and externally trained insurgent cadre are maintained, care must be taken not to count twice the insurgents that belong in more than one category. The latter two estimates do serve as a cross-check on insurgent strength estimates and permit some extrapolation of insurgent growth.
Chapter 4

INSURGENT OPERATIONS

APPLICATION OF SUBVERSIVE INSURGENT POWER IN ARMED OPERATIONS

(U) This portion of the report will be concerned with clashes, encounters, and acts of terrorism. Sabotage is not discussed because fewer than 10 incidents were reported during the period studied. Armed propaganda, recruitment, and counterinsurgency efforts will be discussed in later sections.

(U) Armed operations conducted by the subversive insurgent are defined as armed propaganda meetings, planned clashes and encounters with counterinsurgency forces (police, military, and paramilitary), and acts of terrorism (assassination, kidnapping, threats, intimidation, and other coercive forms of behavior change) against individuals or groups.

(U) Where power, classically, is considered latent force and force is understood to be its application, CT armed operations in Northeast Thailand are viewed as expressions of power. The insurgent purpose to displace the RTG and substitute one of its own design is clearly set forth in declarations. To understand, predict, and counter this one must look at its development, style and character, complements of organization and equipment, level of intensity, geographic distribution, effectiveness of purpose, and relation to other insurgent activities.

(U) It must be understood that military-operations analysts look only at a section of subversive insurgency. Snapshot views that do not consider the dynamics of a movement are misleading. Even though they contribute to a momentary evaluation of the subject under investigation, such presentations can be as misleading as are single-determinant theories that have little explanatory value in understanding causal relations. The armed operations of the insurgent are merely indicative of the level of the one overt phase of his total effort.

(U) One of the distinguishing marks of intelligence operations against communist-led insurgency is the reduced emphasis placed on enemy military organizations. This is to say not that effort in this area is lessened, only that it has a lower priority than in conventional operations. Habit-breaking is difficult at best, but it must be done when intelligence operations are designed for early phases of insurgency, because the insurgent considers the organization of his military arm the least important of his threefold organizational tasks, following organization of the party and of the masses.

(U) Documentation of a type military force is adequate for understanding conventional operations. What is often true—and most certainly in the subject case—is that a refined pattern of military operations does not develop in the earliest stages of subversive insurgency; i.e., a pattern that is statistically
stable and recognizable by traditional configuration. Consequently, the counterintelligence operator is faced with the task of tracking and predicting enemy operations in unique dimensions and must find his solution by new methods.

Military objectives of a subversive insurgent effort usually consist of four general tasks:

(a) Require a maximum number of counterinsurgency forces to secure static positions, thereby subjecting counterforce lines of communication and resources to selective attack, dispersing counterforce strength, denying economy-of-force counterinsurgency operations, and transferring the advantage of surprise and mobility to his own force, thus gaining freedom of movement and facilitating his choice of time and place of engagement.

(b) Expand the base area of operations and "liberate" new areas, generating assets for increased levels of intensity for a growing insurgency.

(c) Form cadres through coercion or persuasion, and continue or extend population control.

(d) Destroy military opposition to the insurgency.

Subversive insurgents engaged counterinsurgency forces in armed clashes and directed armed propaganda and terrorism at villagers and officials in Northeast Thailand in 530 reported incidents during the period August 1966–July 1967 (the data base of this study). This represents a substantial increase in activity since insurgent power was introduced to the area early in this decade.

An average of about 44 incidents per month has been recorded during this time frame (Fig. 10). Certain areas within the Northeast have experienced

![Graph](image-url)

**Fig. 10—Level of CT Military Operations, Propaganda, and Terrorism in Northeast Thailand, August 1966–July 1967**

Total: 530 incidents

Standard deviation = 20.0
a greater concentration of activity than others (see Figs. 11 and 12). Although
Fig. 12 is schematic and displays only three relative sizes—large, medium,
and small—the relations were determined statistically from reported-incident
data. A generalization of these data is displayed in Fig. 13 as a cutoff arc of
insurgent activity.

(U) The development of insurgent activity over the time period, its direc-
tion of expansion, and the type of activity in the Northeast can be seen in Figs.
14–17.

(2) Several interesting developments can be found in the presentation in
Fig. 13. The historical center of insurgent activity, Na Kae (Area N), does not
now appear to be the central point or to occupy the position of importance it once
enjoyed. Area N is obviously in a key geographic position, and expansion trends,
although radiating from it, are not as omnidirectional as other areas. Growth
is greater in Areas C, G, H, M, and U; with particular attention directed toward
G and C. Area G (Sawang Daen Din–Waritchaphum), in ascendency during the
period, appears to be the controlling center, with expansion out in all directions.
Insurgency in Area C, in northern Sakon Nakhon Province, directed its influ-
ence south toward Area G instead of north toward Area A (Phu Sing) or to the
east (Area D).

(5) The overview of this display offers the most revealing aspect of all.
The insurgent is active along the Phu Phan mountain range and the intercon-
necting lowland gaps. A pattern of expansion may be seen that describes an
arc from the Mekong River at the international border in Ubon Province (Areas
O, U, and V), swinging northwest to Sawang Daen Din (Area G), then north in
the vicinity of Ban Dhampa Dong (Area C), then northwest to the international
border near Phu Sing (Area A)—again at the Mekong River. This arc is inter-
preted to be the effective demonstration, by insurgent activity, of the communists-
led subversive intent to separate from the whole a section of Thailand.

(5) The activity level is high, the area well defined, and activity within
the identified geographic locations is significant. Further to the west of this
cutoff arc a second active area (Areas B and E) is developing from the Mekong
River in the vicinity of Vientiane, Laos, south to Ban Nong Bua Lamphu (west
of Udorn). This second area describes a third future corridor into Thailand
from Laos. Coincidentally, the terminal points of the cutoff arc are not termi-
nal at all but have a good fit into communications-liaison way stations described
in later sections. Additionally, recent insurgent operations along National
Highway 21, south of Udorn (Area J) and the expansion of Area J to the west
show a probable link up between the western active area and the previously de-
scribed activity arc. This display has only recently been extracted from data.

(U) Activity in the Na Kae (Nakhon Phanom Province) sample area is ex-
amined in detail in Figs. 18–20.

(U) Tables 3–6 chart levels of activity by type, including RTG counter-
force operations, for Areas A to V. Comparative levels of CT and RTG power
application can be seen in Fig. 21.

(5) During the reporting period CTs mounted 142 armed actions, forced
propaganda meetings, or acts of terrorism against counterinsurgency forces,
RTG officials, and villagers in the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province.
Discounting roundups and individual arrests of CTs, supporters, or suspects,
counterinsurgency efforts in the area for the same period numbered 33, a ratio
of one for every four subversive insurgent acts (Fig. 22).
Fig. 11—Area of Insurgent Activity in Northeast Thailand, August 1966-July 1967

Area of insurgent and counterinsurgency armed operations shown in Figs. 18-20
Fig. 13—Armed Insurgent Cutoff Arc
Scale 1:1,250,000

▲ Historical insurgent stronghold—to 1966
★ Recently established areas of insurgent influence—since January 1966
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Fig. 15—Density of Insurgent Activity,
Northeast Thailand: December 1966—March 1967

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### Fig. 17 — Density of Insurgent Activity,  
Northeast Thailand: August 1966—July 1967

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Fig. 18—Continued
b. Central Sector

- Dec/Jan
- Apr/May
- Feb/Mar
- Jun/Jul

UNCLASSIFIED
Fig. 18—Continued
c. Southeast Sector

- Dec/Jan
- Feb/Mar
- Apr/May
- Jun/Jul
### TABLE 3

**Armed Propaganda Activities**

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### Table 5

**Acts of Terrorism**

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**TABLE 6**: RTG Counterinsurgency Operations (By month, August 1966-July 1967)
Fig. 21—Comparison of Activity Levels of CT and RTG Forces in Northeast Thailand, August 1966–July 1967

- Military operations, propaganda, and terrorism activities
- Military counterinsurgency operations
(U) (G) Following a considerable drop from a reporting-period high of 35 incidents in August and September to a low of 13 acts during the next 2 months, there was a general upswing in activity. The pattern of terrorism was more consistent for armed propaganda, and armed clashes declined near the end of the reporting year.

![Graph showing incidents over time]

Fig. 22—CT and RTG Operations and Activity Levels, Na Kae District, August 1966–July 1967
- RTG-initiated counterinsurgency military operations (does not include CT-suspect roundups arrests)
- CT-initiated military and propaganda operations
- Acts of terrorism against village individuals and groups

(U) (G) Armed propaganda and clashes with counterinsurgency forces held a two-to-one average-frequency ratio advantage over terrorism for the period, as seen in Fig. 23. This is a distorted statistic owing to the inordinately high August–September level of clashes. The display did, however, suggest an investigation of the scheduling sequence of operations to determine the timing of show of force and propaganda in relation to terrorism. Do the insurgents terrorize first, then make their armed appeals and show force, or is the reverse true?

(U) The Na Kae (Nakhon Phanom Province) sample area was divided into four parts for inspection, according to clustering of activity: the southeast, centering at Ban Dong Luang (VD5358); the northeast, centering at Ban Nong Thao (VD5091); central, along National Highway 118 (Sakon Nakhon–Thatphanom)
road) and west, centering in Ban Muang, Muang District of Sakon Nakhon Province (VD0976). Insurgent activity and the RTG counterinsurgency effort were plotted by point location and coded for time sequence by type of activity (Figs. 18-20).

It can be seen that the insurgent strikes first with show of force, attacking established government authorities, and conducts armed propaganda meetings before he terrorizes the villages and officials. This schedule is most clearly seen in the southeast and west sectors, since the central sector is too well worked over for good time-sequence patterning.

![Graph](image)

Fig. 23—Level of CT Activity, No Kaoo District, August 1966-July 1967
- - - CT-initiated military and propaganda operations
- - - Acts of terror against village individuals and groups

There is considerable preponderance of armed clashes within the area generally, except in the western sector, where the ratio is nearly even. This is significant in two respects: the overall ratio for the selected area is 2 to 1 and the west sector developed late in the period. These ratios could very well provide clues to the technique used when the insurgent develops new areas of influence. Further investigation of other areas is needed to support a patterned technique. Information at this point, although interesting, is not conclusive.

Figure 24 shows the distribution of events over time in each of the analyzed sectors. Figure 25 displays this distribution of activity by type and sector for comparative purposes.
Fig. 24—Level of CT and RTG Operations, Na Kae Area, August 1966–July 1967

- - - CT-initiated military and propaganda operations (e.g., clashes and encounters with RTG forces, armed harassment, armed propaganda meetings)

Act of terrorism against village individuals and groups (e.g., attempted and successful assassinations, kidnappings, detention, threats, intimidations)

Sectors:

W West central quadrant (SE portion of Sakon Nakhon Province)
C Central, along Highway 118 (Sakon Nakhon That Phenom Road)
NE Northeast quadrant, north of Highway 118 including south half of Target B, 0910 Plan
SE Southeast quadrant, south of Highway 118 within Na Kae District

Total incidents (area) = 142
Fig. 25.—Sector Distribution of CT Operations, N. Kao Area, August 1966—July 1967

Area: N. Kao Area

Central 20%
Southwest 17%
Northwest 13%
West 42%

Acts of terrorism

Percent of total activity

Military and propaganda operations

Central 37%
Southwest 30%
Northwest 15%
West 25%
Insurgent preferences for day of week and time of day for armed subversion are shown in Figs. 26–29. Monday, with a daily average of incidents of 7.7 over the year, is the preferred day for terrorism. As a matter of interest, if a terrorist act is scheduled for a Tuesday, chances are 8 to 1 it will be aimed at an individual rather than a village; on a Monday or a Saturday, the chances are nearly 2 to 1 that a group, not an individual, will be the target (Fig. 29).

Fig. 26—Preferred Day of Week for CT Operations, No Koe Area, August 1966–July 1967
Includes military operations, propaganda, and terrorism activities; total, 134 incidents.

No significant difference could be determined statistically between night and day operations; however, it is worth while to note that the insurgent appears to enjoy a considerable degree of freedom in his after-dark activities (Fig. 29).

Examination of data discloses these patterns of armed operations of the CT in Northeast Thailand:
(a) Usually in groups of 10 to 20 armed men
(b) Armed with US M1 carbines, M1 rifles, pistols, M3 SMG, and ChiCom hand grenades
(c) Most often against a defended target
(d) Without preference for day or night operations or regard for season (wet or dry)
(e) Within 3 km of a village, whether or not it is secured by RTG 0910 counterinsurgency forces
(f) Most often in Nakhon Phanom Province, with Sakon Nakhon ranking second
(g) Occur almost exclusively within 1 km of a stream, river, road, or trail
(h) Engagement broken off by CT, often within 30 min but usually within 15 min
Fig. 27—Preferred Day of Week for Terrorism, No Kao Area, August 1966–July 1967

Total: 54 incidents  □ Standard deviation = 1.74

1. Dressed in green uniform with several types of soft headgear; some reports of civilian dress or mixes; black uniforms are seldom reported
2. Tactics are not classic ambush style but are patrolling operations
3. Absence of LMG, mortars, or recoilless weapons during operations
4. Land navigation relies on terrain familiarity or guides; maps not used
5. Use of radio for tactical control not reported
6. Acts of terrorism employ 2- or 3-man terror teams
7. Demolitions, antipersonnel, or vehicular mines not used
8. Sabotage rare
9. Well trained in jungle operations for squad-sized units; good marksmanship
Equipment for the insurgent is believed to be brought from outside
the country and infiltrated to dispersal and distribution points on the Mekong
River. Serial-number checks of captured weapons and ammunition point to
WWII China issues, US combat losses in Korea, and US and French losses in
Vietnam. Hand grenades and small-arms ammunition have been traced to Chi-
namese manufacture but primitive facilities for their production have been found
in Thailand.

![Graph showing preferred day of week by type of terrorism.]

**Fig. 28—Preferred Day of Week by Type of Terrorism,**
**No Kao Area, August 1966—July 1967**

- △ Acts of terror toward individuals
- ○ Acts of terror toward groups

Interrogation reports reveal that medical support usually consists of
locally purchased medicines dispensed by young women who serve as field
nurses. Reports have been received that these nurses have a distinctive uniform
with hammer and sickle and star insignia and that they were trained at
Hoa Bin, North Vietnam.

Food supplies, discussed in Chap. 5, are normally obtained during
propaganda operations. If foraging from villages is necessary it occurs be-
tween 0300-0400 hours, and the food party returns to its camp site not later
than 0900.

Patrols, the most active form of unit tactics, are sent out from the
camp at 0500 hours and are relieved at 0900 hours and 1800 hours, with the
last patrol returning to camp about 2000 hours. Weapons and tactical training
is usually conducted in the early evening for 1 to 2 hours each day. The group leader or his assistant instructs small groups; a trained weapons specialist, the larger groups. Camps are moved every 3 to 4 days.

Insurgent defense tactics are based on evasion and escape. A typical camp is secured by three guards at the camp perimeter, 6 to 10 m from the living area, which is about 30 to 40 m in diameter. Guards have prepared defense positions and are always armed. They challenge with recognition signals, usually voice, that are regularly changed. Security, although constant, is relaxed during the hours of darkness, for the insurgent is aware that counterinsurgency forces normally do not operate at night. When they are attacked, camp members break into groups of 10 or fewer men and move away from the attacking force for 300 m. If not pursued, they reunite; if pursued, personnel continue escape and evasion to rejoin at a prearranged location.

Fig. 29—Preferred Month for CT Operations, Nha Kao Area, August 1966–July 1967
Includes all CT military, propaganda, and terrorism operations and activities.

- Daylight operations (0500–2000 hr)
- Night operations (2000–0500 hr)
Several reports indicate that radios are to be found in the insurgent field organization. These normally handle administrative or command traffic not of a tactical-maneuver nature. Trained radio operators man the radio and occasionally Vietnamese language has been monitored on the counter-insurgency-operations nets.

The condition and number of weapons have improved during the reporting period. One 40-man group was armed with 27 M1 rifles, 2 carbines, 2 shotguns, 3 SMG, 15 to 20 grenades, and 1 bayonet per man. These weapons were new and in good working order. Every man knew assembly and disassembly techniques and was equipped with cleaning materials and oil. Another 50-man group was reported to be armed with M3 SMG (1903) and M1 rifles, .45-cal pistols, hand grenades (2 per man), knives, and some homemade rifles. Another group had 4 modern rifles, 4 pistols, and 2 hand grenades in January 1966 but by April 1967 it was armed with 20 SMGs, 15 rifles and carbines, 6 pistols, 47 hand grenades, and one LMG.

ARMED PROPAGANDA AS A SIGNATURE ACTIVITY OF SUBVERSIVE INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

Introduction

A survey of open and classified literature of subversive insurgent activities, from the earliest period of rebellion to the present, shows propaganda operations as a basic and high-priority item in a movement's even schedule. Academic disciplines of psychology and sociology also elevate propaganda to a high position in behavior-chance operations. This section discusses the aim and purpose of armed propaganda operations in Northeast Thailand, its current level of effectiveness, its assigned priority, whether it is professionally and skillfully conducted, the location and degree of intensity, its nature and character, and its relation to other insurgent activities.

Detailed examination of the insurgent psychological operations and total propaganda work is beyond the scope of this report. Such investigation would warrant and should receive special study; it poses a fascinating challenge and promises a significant contribution to the understanding of subversive insurgency. It is of more immediate use to select out of this complexity one segment for analysis—armed propaganda meetings.

Armed propaganda meetings are operations by the insurgent where an armed force makes the populace of a village its captive audience for propaganda speeches, collects food, solicits support of the insurgency by persuasion or coercion, gathers intelligence information, punishes the uncooperative, and facilitates recruiting efforts.

Aim and Purpose

The basic objective of armed propaganda operations is to overthrow the established Royal Thai Government; the immediate purpose of the propaganda effort is to assist in the development of the popular-support base.

When the decision has been made to appeal to a selected target for support of an idea, this appeal may be made in writing or orally, by individual
contact or mass-production methods, with persuasion or coercion, or a combination of all these. To eliminate discussion of why one or the other method is employed, it can be said that to present controversial appeals to a semi-im-poverished target with a low level of education and spread over a large geographic area, and still to comply with a rigid time schedule, mass meetings with coerced audiences appear to be a sound method.

(U) (O) Although the basic purpose of forced propaganda meetings—to promote the overthrow of the established government—is painfully obvious, other inferred objectives are more difficult to discern and interpret in their proper context. One such example, often considered most important, is the resolution of the food-supply and-pickup problem. The continuous and growing demand for food has placed a strain on the CT logistic system—unsophisticated by US standards, but still effective. This problem is adequately solved for this level of activity by combining procurement and propaganda. During the propaganda meeting an appeal is made for food. It is usually purchased at a fair price, demanded and not purchased, or taken. The last two devices are emergency, not customary, procedures. Data indicate that this is one of the important functions of the armed propaganda meeting since: (a) it is part of nearly every meeting, (b) one-third of the insurgent force is assigned duties to collect food at the meeting, and (c) if purchase attempts or demands are not met, counterproductive coercion or violence often follow. Large amounts of food and sometimes other supplies are gathered this way. It is an economy-of-force move for it is combined with other operations; it has an armed escort built into the operation; it is less likely to be discovered owing to the reduced exposure of a one-time pickup as opposed to many distributed over a larger area; and the labor (bearers) force is ready-made in the constituted CT-group organization.

(U) (O) Another purpose served is the show-of-force principle—mild coercion—necessary to promote the development of the popular-support base. To the villager this power display shows the CT contempt for RTG military force, boasts of the insurgent strength in that area, and demonstrates that the CT are prepared and equipped for military eventualities.

(U) (O) Assessment of the village for future operations and as a supply source is a hidden objective, as is identification of targets for recruitment efforts that may follow. Collection of intelligence information is concurrent with the mass meeting and confirmation of previous informer reports and other covert activities is made.

(U) (O) Armed propaganda is the early and frequently applied tool used to open new geographic areas of popular support for insurgent operations. The pattern is similar in each area targeted by the CT. Key areas may be identified by the persistence and intensity of the meetings. For example, in Sakon Nakhon Province the Klat Pau area was targeted for insurgent development. This Tambon (village group) was the site of 42 meetings in 200 days, about one each week during the period September 1966-August 1967.

Effectiveness

(U) On the basis of the available data it is difficult to evaluate the insurgent's propaganda effort in quantifiable measures. However, the effectiveness
of the effort, in terms of the CT purpose, can be evaluated in a nominative and qualitative sense.

The insurgent appeal to the villager for food is being met in amounts adequate to sustain his needs at his present force level. A few instances of deficiencies are reported from time to time but only one record entry has been made where operations were disrupted because of food shortage. As the insurgent strength has grown and food demands increased, response has also increased.

RTG officials have taken steps to counter both persuasive and coercive propaganda appeals. The insurgent appeals for non-support of the government, with the result that villagers do not report the presence of insurgents in their area, except in an after-the-fact manner. A generally responsive attitude to RTG authority is not to be found among the villagers, except for the officials in areas where insurgent armed propaganda efforts are registered.

Counterinsurgency operations aimed at separating the CT from the people are followed by spurs of armed propaganda meetings mounted by the insurgent to reestablish or hold on to his support base. This has been found in the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province.

Once the villager has sold or given the requested food supplies to the CT, he becomes a captive of the insurgent. This relation may not be of a long-term nature, but long enough, and counterinsurgency efforts to discourage it have met with little success. The RTG operations have been unable to diminish the effect or the frequency of armed propaganda; on the contrary, the number of CTs and meetings has been increasing with explosive intensity since early 1966

The development of new areas of influence, new or continued support, lack of cooperation with the established government, lack of success by RTG forces to diminish CT efforts, and the growing intensity and frequency of meetings are good indicators that armed propaganda is effective in Northeast Thailand.

Priority

Armed propaganda was assigned high priority by the CPT in their instructions to the field. It was included as one of six basic operations necessary to successful insurgency during the first 6 months of a 1-year plan. The second 6 months of that plan found armed propaganda elevated to the number-one position. This type of operation was considered more important than fighting. Data (see Fig. 30) reveal that propaganda meetings occurred more often during the period August 1966 - July 1967 than did other forms of insurgent activity. Throughout the seven most sensitive provinces of the Northeast (Loei, Udorn, Nong Khai, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Kalasin, and Ubon) armed propaganda meetings averaged 16 per month during the data period, or about one every 2 days (see Fig. 31). The degree of investment by the CT is illustrated by the number of insurgents involved in these operations. During the period the average level was established at 902 men per month. When this level is compared with the estimated strength of armed insurgents in the Northeast (about 2000) it becomes most significant. In the selected area of Na Kae, Nakhon Phanom, about 50 km by 50 km, the average number of CTs involved in armed propaganda meetings per month is set at 283; the very high degree of investment for the relatively small area considered (Fig. 32) is a priority-importance indicator.
Fig. 30—Levels of CT Activity in Northeast Thailand, by Type, August 1966–July 1967

△ CT-initiated military operations  □ Propaganda  ▲ Terrorism against village individuals and groups
Fig. 31—Level of Armed Propaganda Meetings in Northeast Thailand,
August 1966–July 1967
Total: 192 Meetings  Standard deviation: 4.4
Professionalism

(\emph{U}) One good indication of professionalism in operations is the presence of well-trained personnel directing these operations. In this section the influence of skilled leaders and organizers is implied by showing the products of their work in the measure of operations.

![Graph showing number of CTs involved in armed propaganda meetings in No Koe Area, August 1966-July 1967.](image)

(\emph{U}) Armed propaganda operations in Northeast Thailand are modeled after those conducted in Vietnam. There is very little variance between meetings regardless of their geographic location. (Nature and character of meetings are discussed later.) These are not locally generated, designed, or written; neither are they, in a large measure, conducted by the low-level Tampon organization. Propaganda themes are universal throughout the Northeast and the local items appear as additives rather than as central ideas. The style and even the number of armed insurgents appear to be uniform, as
does the length of meetings. In some instances meetings have been led by
Vietnamese, and new speakers, not known to the villagers, were heard during
the increased-intensity period that began in July 1966.

The organization of the meeting itself with specific roles for each
element of the insurgent group, entertainment, security, relative freedom of
operation (from counterinsurgency operations), and perhaps most important of
all, scheduling and execution in different areas at the same time, indicate a
high degree of planning and professional skill.

The middle of 1966 saw a virtual explosion in the number of armed
propaganda meetings throughout Northeast Thailand. These meetings were
not confined to a single area, and, when plotted, they fit well into the general
movement, operations, basing, and organization traces over the sensitive
Northeast as shown in Fig. 12 and Figs. 18-20.

The reports of intersector cooperation between insurgents, implying
planned and directed operations, further testify to professionalism. Estab-
lished insurgent groups combine and hold several meetings in one area, thus
giving the impression that this area is infested with CTs. (One group of less
than 60 CTs held two meetings in the same Tambon in one day.) Four
groups—three located in Kut Bak, Phanna Nikhom, and Sawang Daen Din of
Sakon Nakphon Province and one in the Na Kae District of Nakphon Phanom
Province—were found to be combining their operations for the saturation of
the Kut Bak District of Sakon Nakphon Province. These larger groups put extreme
pressure on the target area, then move on, leaving the sustaining-program
responsibility to the local group.

During the period of intense pressure on Kut Bak, 100 armed CTs
moved from Ban Phon Tum, Amphoe Na Kle, Nakphon Phanom Province, long a
CT stronghold, to that area (a distance of approximately 70 km) to support and
participate in the propaganda program. One of the local-group missions dur-
ing the follow-up is recruitment, exploiting the resistance drop caused by the
program.

The 1-year data period shows there were two significant drops in the
number of meetings and the number of CTs involved (see Figs. 9 and 33). These
have been interpreted as evaluation periods and underscore the idea of pro-
fessionalism. Captured documents reveal that this evaluation has taken place.
These data indicate that armed propaganda efforts are by no
means a trial-and-error operation.

Characteristics

Although this is not to be an overall analysis of insurgent psychological
operations, a necessary part of the description of the nature and character of
armed propaganda meetings in the insurgent Northeast is a simple listing of
themes given in the vernacular as follows:

Throw out the Thanom and Praphas government.
The Thai are no longer free. The government has sold out to US.
Redistribution of land.
No taxes. Taxes are now going to US.
Everyone will be equal.

Armed propaganda meetings, in order to serve their purpose, usually
take place outside the concentration area of CT bases; e.g., within village and
village groups instead of the sparsely populated mountain hideouts. They conform to other constraints, however, that are interesting and informative. In the Na Kae sample area 146 armed propaganda meetings were reported during the data period August 1966–July 1967. Fifty-five of these were held in villages secured by the 0910 counterinsurgency plan and 57 were over 5 km from such villages. Of the latter meetings, only 16 were conducted during the first half of the period, indicating that, as RTG forces appeared, armed propaganda efforts moved away. Thirty-eight of the 55 meetings held in 0910 secured villages occurred before concerted counterinsurgency operations in the area (Fig. 34).

Fig. 33—Number of Insurgents Involved in Propaganda Meetings in Northeast Thailand, Aug. 1966–July 1967
These are not cumulative and may reflect mobility.
Total number: 10,825  □ Standard deviation = 40

The study of CT psychological operations revealed some interesting data about frequency and predictability of meetings. It was found that meetings occurred in clusters by geographic and temporal dimension. If one meeting took place in a village, there was a 50-50 chance that another would occur within 5–10 km and 1 week of the first. If a second meeting was held, there were 3 chances out of 4 that a third would be held within 5–10 km within a week. This was expanded to say that there were 4 out of 5 chances that a cluster of 2 to 10 meetings would be held within a radius of 5–10 km in a period of 14 days. One can say that a group of 4 or 5 armed propaganda meetings
Fig. 34—Distance of CT Military Operations, Propaganda, and Terrorism Activities from 0910 Villages, Nha Kao Area, August 1966–July 1967

P, propaganda level in total activities
would be held in 1 week in an area, then another cluster of meetings in the area would occur in 1.5 to 2 weeks, followed by another cluster in the same area after about 2 weeks. The data support this thesis and add that there would be a dormant period of several months within the area. Propaganda efforts were found to be significantly greater during the dry (November to May) season, and

![Graph - Preferred Season for CT Military Operations, Propaganda, and Terror Activities, No Kao Area, August 1966-July 1967]

the dry season disclosed a significant difference in the level of armed propaganda operations but no other class of insurgent activity (see Fig. 35).

Data also show that Sunday is the preferred day of the week for armed propaganda operations and that darkness is the preferred time of day (see Figs. 36-48). The average duration of a meeting has been found to be about 4 hr.
Characteristics of nearly all 192 armed propaganda meetings reported in the database in Northeast Thailand are listed as follows:
(a) Food collection
(b) Group divided into three elements: command (speakers, entertainers, leaders), food collectors, and security

![Graph of preferred day of week for armed propaganda meetings, No Kae Sample Area, August 1966-July 1967. The graph indicates the number of incidents per day, with a standard deviation of 1.6.]

(c) Group enters and departs from several directions
(d) Whistle signal ends meeting
(e) If terrorism, it follows meeting
(f) Group is familiar with village but not necessarily native to it

Relation to Other Activities

Earlier it was stated that armed propaganda meetings were integrated into the overall plan of insurgency. It would be difficult if not impossible to
separate them from the total effort; but definitive relations to other insurgent activities may be found. Although recruitment does not receive a major treatment in this study, it should be noted that the relation between these two activities is sequential. Most of the evidence indicates that recruitment is a person-to-person operation that precedes armed propaganda in the covert period (pre-Phase I) and follows it during the extension of the support base.

![Graph showing monthly meeting totals, August 1966 to July 1967.](image)

(C) Fig. 37—Propaganda Meeting, No Kee Sample Area:
Monthly Totals, August 1966–July 1967

The extension of the support base is considered to be the development of the popular-support base. This recruitment is covert in that it is person-to-person, but it is a calculated-risk operation when intensified. Here the time-sequence difference may be seen. Recruiting before propaganda is more collective, slow, and thorough; after armed propaganda, it is intensified, target qualifications are not emphasized, and it relies on coercive propaganda and threat of force.

The simultaneous appearance of armed propaganda in several areas of Northeast Thailand implies that a regional organization exists in this area. The relation to organization is clear. The patterning of propaganda efforts and other insurgent activity discloses the relation to the effort to sever a section of Thailand from the rest. The current themes, uniform throughout Northeast Thailand, indicate that insurgency is at the Phase I level (as defined in Chap. 2), thereby showing its relation to other activity evaluated to be at the same level of intensity and development.

**Summary**

It has been shown that armed propaganda is an organized, well-planned, and professionally skillful activity integral to the overall insurgent activity in
**Fig. 38**—Propaganda Meetings, Na Kon Sample Area: August 1966

Total meetings, 6.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 39—Propaganda Meetings, No Kao Sample Area: September 1966
Total meetings, 17.51
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 40—Propaganda Meetings, Na Kae Sample Area: October 1966
Total meetings, 8.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

DURATION: Not given
BEGINNING TIME
DATE Nov 13
16

1000
1000

Fig. 41—Propaganda Meetings, Ha Kae Sample Area: November 1966
Total meetings, 2.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 42—Propaganda Meetings, No Kao Sample Area: December 1966
Total meetings, 6.
FREQUENCY AND BEGINNING TIME

The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

NUMBER OF CTs: Not given

Total meetings, 2.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 44—Propaganda Meetings, Na Koe Sample Area: Mar.+ 1967
Total meetings, 6.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 45—Propaganda Meetings, Na Kae Sample Area: April 1967
Total meetings, 5.
The number of the ring to which the pointer extends represents the number of meetings that began at the time indicated. Beginning times are not always known.

Fig. 46—Propaganda Meetings, No Kao-Sample-Area: May 1967
Total meetings: 4
Fig. 47—Propaganda Meetings, Na Kao Sample Area: June 1967
Total meetings, 1.

Fig. 48—Propaganda Meetings, Na Kao Sample Area: July 1967
Total meetings, 5.
Northeast Thailand. It is effective and growing. It may not be immune from suppression operations but has successfully avoided them. It may be considered a signature piece of intelligence information because of the importance assigned to it by the insurgent; therefore, understanding, explaining, and patterning this activity may be most productive for a counterinsurgent force.

RECRUITMENT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF INSURGENCY AND AN ADJUNCT TO PROPAGANDA

Introduction

Because recruitment is often the follow-up of armed propaganda and is an adjunct to it, the purposes are similar except that the products of recruitment become the tools to put the machinery of subversive insurgency into operation. To develop the popular-support base, extend influence, promote and ensure viability of movement, provide for security, and directly separate the target from the established government are a few of the broad reasons for recruitment.

Targets

The discussion of armed propaganda disclosed two levels of recruiting targets: the early, most selective level, and the later Phase I recruitment, which appears to be taking place now in Thailand. In this phase nearly everyone who is capable of providing support to the insurgency is recruited. There are some constraints; e.g., the food productivity of the area must be able to support the group, organization sophistication (leadership, facilities, equipment, etc) must be able to absorb increased personnel loads, mission needs must demand additional personnel, and security requirements always must be adhered to. One unsolved problem is the inability to determine the level of sophistication of insurgency in Thailand at the present time. The solution may rest in the measure of recruitment of the insurgent. The level of sophistication could be determined by knowing what the insurgent organization should be and by knowing what the recruiting efforts are, both in quantity and quality.

Recruiting is usually drawn along the classic cell-building model.
One trained organizer recruits several cell leaders, who in turn recruit cell members. Another device is the recruiter who recruits individuals for support organizations by assigned duties and task demands rather than along compartmented-cell organizational lines. These satisfy short-term goals. Most often the extended family group is used as the recruitment source. In Northeast Thailand extended family groups dominate the social organization of the community.

The insurgent-recruiting pattern in the Northeast fails to fit the expectations of exploiting the youth of the area. The jungle soldier is not the fierce young man usually expected in such organizations. Stated qualifications are not always met nor are they always attempted. The age limit for thatan mai, jungle soldiers, has been set at not over 30 years; youths 14 and 15 years of age will make fine jungle soldiers. Those over 30 years of age should be used as supporters and spies. It has been reported that recruiting directions have overlooked—or perhaps it is a planned deviation set by necessity—target qualification restrictions. One member was told to recruit five new members from his village without regard to qualifications, indoctrinate them according to a furnished theme, and assign them duties according to a furnished list of requirements.

**Method**

One theme stands out in the analysis of recruiting information available in the database: success is based on fear rather than conviction. Many reports indicate that recruitment efforts were successful because the member chose to support the insurgent rather than be killed by him and because he had no evidence that the RTG could protect him from the CT threat. Promises of large sums of money, elimination of debts, tractors, rank in the insurgent organization, land, and trips abroad for training are but a few of the rewards offered for membership. Threatened violence to self or family and death and other forms of terrorism were offered as punishments for refusing membership. These propositions, coming on the heels of armed propaganda meetings, show of force, and acts of terrorism with near impunity, have had a great effect on the villagers.

Subter schemes are worked on difficult targets. Involvement is a favorite. This is possible when the CT performs an act of terrorism in public and involves by his presence the duped villagers, later threatening to expose him to authorities if he refuses to cooperate. Another device is to lure the unwary into the jungle or outside his village on the pretext of hunting, fishing, or some other innocent occupation; once there, he is met by a CT group and an indoctrination meeting is held. After this the subject's name is placed on the insurgent's roster, which he is shown, or it is leaked to his fellow villagers and he is coerced into joining.

Finally, family pressure is applied to recruit new members. One family member in the insurgent organization is encouraged or coerced to exploit his kinship group; this is particularly effective in families with members in key community positions. At present, family recruiting seldom goes beyond the Tambon (village group) level. In instances where a family member, or clan group, has relocated, the responsibility belongs to another recruiter.
Five steps to organization of the people and recruiting outlined in captured documents and interrogation reports are listed as follows:

(a) Share complaints with target about troubles; everyone has some.
(b) Make friends; long-term effort.
(c) Establish foothold in the area—after determining the most vulnerable targets—through recruiting some members.
(d) Act of recruiting; take those of good reputation only.
(e) Organize; move the recruit into indoctrination, then into a useful place within the organization.

Recruiters who do not comply with this guidance create difficulty for the insurgent effort. According to reports, recruiters disrupt operations because their recruits joined for personal instead of ideological reasons. Whenever there is a question about the quality of a new recruit, he is assigned at least one "big brother," occasionally t-o; training is held to a minimum and security restrictions are many; 6 to 9 months of observation and indoctrination are devoted to a suspicious new member.

Summary

Recruitment is based more on fear than on ideological conviction; follows the classic methods found in other communist-inspired insurgent areas; has few novel devices; is usually constrained by quality-control efforts that are not always successful; and, although an elusive measure, can provide an evaluation of the level of insurgency with a reasonable degree of accuracy, once understood. The evaluation of its success and effectiveness may be simply stated: despite mass arrests and operational casualties killed and wounded, the number of armed insurgents and their supporters has steadily grown in Northeast Thailand. Recruitment is successful and effective.

SUMMARY OF INSURGENT OPERATIONS

Subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand became a greater problem during the period August 1966–July 1967. The insurgent continued to develop his historical strongholds and established new areas of influence, describing a cutoff pattern to separate northeast provinces from the target nation. Ineffective counterforce efforts have not only had marginal disruptive effect on insurgent plans but may even have contributed to insurgency growth by demonstrating the inability of the RTG to destroy the CT or protect the people.

June 1966 marks the near-explosive increase of CT armed operations throughout the Northeast. Armed propaganda and overt recruiting activities took a quantum leap upward, showing signs of a high degree of planning and professionalism. Both of these activities were quite effective. Terrorism increased along with the insurgent show of force. The incident rate grew from sporadic levels in apparently disconnected areas to a monthly average of 44, with a total of 530 contacts, propaganda meetings, or acts of terrorism along a defined line supporting the cutoff scheme.

More and better weapons came into the hands of the CT. Submachine guns and semiautomatic rifles replaced homemade handguns and antiquated
hunting rifles. Uniformed groups with tactical skill in jungle operations increased, as did reports of Vietnamese leadership. The size of armed groups increased from 10-20 men to 100-200-man groups.

(3) Recruiting efforts, based on fear, increased and became more open, following the classic model found in communist-inspired insurrections, and extended the popular-support base. Despite mass arrests and increased losses by counterinsurgency operations, the number of armed CTs increased.

(4) Counterinsurgency forces increased but continued to be ineffective. Counteroperations fell below the frequency level of insurgent operations to a ratio of 1 to 4 and were not always mounted in the areas where the greatest damage was being done. The 0910 plan had not succeeded in separating the insurgent from the people or destroying him, and significant organizational changes—insertion of RTA control apparatus—were rumored by the end of the period.

(U) Operations analysis was achieved by extracting from the database information about activities by type, date, location, and description. These data were plotted on maps of the area for standard pattern-analysis use. Further, interrogation reports and captured documents were examined for new or confirming activity information.

(5) An activity “clock” was signed that provided simultaneous display of time, date, location, frequency level, number of CTs involved, target size, and cumulative frequency of armed propaganda meetings. This proved to be a useful analytic tool. The cutoff pattern of CT activity was determined by sequentially overlaying activities by time blocks of 2-month periods, showing type of activity and direction of expanding efforts.

(U) All data were treated statistically to determine means and standard deviations in order to find significant differences of insurgent preferences for time and place, by type of activity.
Chapter 5

INSURGENT BASPING AND INTERNAL SUPPORT SYSTEM

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this section is to examine the subversive insurgent internal basing and support system in Northeast Thailand through an analysis of basing and support activities in two critical sample insurgent areas.

A 1966 RAC report defined safe havens as territorially limited areas, internal to the country or region of conflict, that have features rendering them comparatively secure for the insurgents and are therefore chosen to perform certain functions in support of the overall insurgent effort. It was further stated that havens are linked, not with revolutionary uprisings, but rather with that kind of activity which is organized, has the objective of attaining political power, accepts a largely rural base at the outset, expects a protracted period of conflict, and anticipates a movement from limited irregular engagement to military activity on a considerable scale.

Unlike coups and uprisings involving only a short period of violence, true insurgency requires increasingly elaborate efforts to provide for the acquisition, storage, improvement, and maintenance of resources. This includes obtaining, caching, and distributing food, weapons, and equipment; the provision of military and politica training for insurgent personnel of various types; the development and maintenance of communication and transport links; and the development and maintenance of highly sophisticated and effective security and defensive systems to protect such capabilities and resources at many levels of command and organization.

Three salient conclusions were reached in this report. First, in the early phase of a true insurgency, base areas are likely to be internally oriented. In the case of Northeast Thailand no large support burden was placed on any particular area in the Northeast to provide support to other operational areas. For example, weapons and materiel undoubtedly were passing through insurgent facilities in the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province, but there was no evidence of significant collection, storage, and distribution facilities designed to support other insurgent operating groups or areas. Second, a time lag of some duration exists between the time the insurgent activity begins to take on serious and critical importance to the host government and population and the point at which a viable Phase II support network with stable, functional aspects is required and begins to appear; i.e., the lower stages of a Phase I insurgency will tolerate greater inefficiencies and a more fractionalized and sporadically
functioning support system. Third, if certain locations (e.g., those being used internally by existing groups) do not meet the requirements for haven areas and networks necessary for the later stages of the insurgency, the insurgent command may be forced to develop new areas designed for just those purposes.

Chapter 3 presented a conceptual delineation between the goals to be attained in Phase I insurgency and those that must be achieved in order for the insurgency to escalate from Phase I to Phase II. The requirements and tasks that enable the insurgency to move into the more advanced phase are carried out covertly and are therefore difficult to observe, understand, and report. But this is not to say that safe havens, resource acquisition, and storage are not present.

BASING AND SUPPORT DOCTRINE

On 17 April 1967, between 1100 and 1200 hours, an RTA platoon clashed with a CT group in the vicinity of Houei Sai (UD387998). During this encounter the leader of the CT group, Nai Damri Suichai (also known as 2LT Thongphan), and a number of the members of his group were killed.

After the clash, members of the RTA platoon confiscated a significant volume of CT supplies, weapons, medicines and pharmaceuticals, and official and personal documents. One of the most interesting and revealing documents discovered on the remains of Nai Damri was a paper which was obviously the contents page of an operational or training manual. A page from the manual was translated from the original Lao/Thai language as follows:

Chapter 6
Selection of Operational Base
1. Types of Operational Base
2. Zone of mobile Ops warfare* and Ops base
3. Condition of base selection
4. Base fortification and expansion
5. Type of encircle each other between friendly and enemy

Chapter 7
Defensive and Offensive of Mobile Ops Warfare Strategy
1. Defensive of Mobile Ops Warfare Strategy
2. Offensive of Mobile Ops Warfare Strategy

Chapter 8
The Expansion towards Mobile Warfare

Chapter 9
Chain of Command

The information gained from this and other captured documents clearly indicates the existence of a crude but explicit communist doctrine and

*Probably guerrilla warfare.
policy for the siting and establishment of bases, camps, and support facilities. It is evident that, with respect to the Phase I goals of the subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand, bases and camps are selected and sited in implementation of the doctrine expressed in the communist document entitled “People’s War and Guerrilla Tactic.” This doctrine makes the following stipulations:

(a) The guerrilla tactic expands from small units or bands into an ever-larger and better-organized command that evolves finally into what might be called “The Peoples Revolutionary Army.”
(b) If the enemy is destroyed while protection is afforded to the guerrilla soldiers, their force can be expanded.
(c) If, on the other hand, the guerrilla soldiers adopt a posture of defense and individual protection, they will ultimately be searched out, destroyed, and defeated.
(d) Therefore, to take the offensive and fight to destroy the enemy is the essence of the guerrilla tactic.
(e) Any degree of personal discomfort, adverse physical environment, and weather conditions must be endured if the bearing of such burdens will allow the advantageous location and timing of attacks on the government forces.

BASING PRACTICES

In practice the current Phase I insurgent basing and support system in the Northeast calls for the location of CT camps in areas that are secure from government controls or suppression operations, yet with relatively easy access to towns, villages, or house groups for attack and support purposes. Furthermore the communist military doctrine does not call for a tenacious defense of these bases or camps. In this regard, a recently acquired document concerning the insurgency in the Kut Bak subdistrict and Phanna Nikhom District of Sakon Nakhon Province states:

The guerrillas move constantly and form temporary camps whenever and wherever necessary. When sweep forces or patrolling units enter an area they break up into units of ten men or fewer and take evasive action. Patrolling forces cause them a great deal of trouble and force them away from villages supplying food and supplies. Camp sites are abandoned during sweeps but are reoccupied afterward. New camps are often established near old sites when a sweep is completed.

Reports estimate that camps have been vacated (or abandoned) from 45 min up to 10 to 15 days before the arrival of Government forces. Some reports allege that camps have been found that were abandoned months previously.

Twenty-two known insurgent operating areas in the Northeast Region were described and analyzed in Chap. 4. It should again be noted that the size and shape of these operating areas are based exclusively on plots of overt operational activities of the CT, quite apart from the insurgent basing and support system. Support activities such as food, supply, and information acquisitions are frequently carried out in conjunction with operational activities (particularly in forced propaganda meetings). For purposes of analysis, therefore, a clear distinction between operations on one hand and support on the other is
often difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, references to maps showing terrain features reveal that, in accordance with the communist doctrine and the previously outlined Guerrilla Tactics, base-area locations are predicated on operational objectives and tasks assigned to the individual insurgent units or groups. Relatively inaccessible areas, providing good security, are naturally preferred for bases or camps; but if the operational objective requires operations in areas that are less secure or attractive, the best terrain available in the new local area will more than likely be used as long as it is within an acceptable distance from the target area.

Of the camp areas that have so far been discovered, all but a very few were located in forested or jungle uplands with good concealment. Normally camps are sited under high canopies of evergreen or triple-level jungle foliage to preclude both horizontal and vertical observation, with sources of water for squad-sized groups only a short walk away (80 percent were found to be less than 1 km).

It is interesting to note that wherever possible the guerrilla camps are located adjacent to province or district boundaries, thus permitting operations into two and sometimes three province or district administrative jurisdictions.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENT Basing and Support System

Introduction

The following analyses of bases and camps in two sample insurgent areas in Northeast Thailand are derived from a collation and review of RTG raw intelligence and operational data that, at best, leave much to be desired in terms of arriving at an understanding of the basing and support system. The analyses are based mainly on source and informant reports of information collected in areas where rigid security practices are employed by the insurgent. Patterns and trends of CT overt operations, i.e., propaganda, harassment, intimidations, and attacks on government forces can be reported, after the fact, with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Understanding of the CT basing and support system, however, must be gained from assumptions and extrapolations from reports of overt operational activities.

Data Used

(a) RTG CSOC daily reports of insurgent activities, sightings, locations and suspected activities called CSOC “dailies,” classified Confidential.
(b) Weekly reports submitted by the CG MACTHAI representative to CPM-1, Sakon Nakhon.
(c) Selected intelligence reports from the American Embassy, Bangkok (referred to as “FTBs”) relating to base/camp policy; camp operation, security, and discipline; and food acquisition.
(e) A number of captured CT documents.
(f) Preliminary interrogation reports of captured or surrendered insurgents.
(C) In continuation of research concerning safe havens in South Vietnam and Northeast Thailand, the research team was concerned very early with the acquisition and review of intelligence data on the insurgent basing and support structure. The first 6-month segment of the CSOC dailies yielded the first data acquired on the subject. Although crude, imprecise, and relatively unreliable, these initial reports provided the first and the most valuable insights into the insurgent basing, camp, and assembly doctrine, policy, and operation. The second 6-month segment of the CSOC dailies contained considerably less reporting than the first 6-month segment on base and camp sightings, possible preoperational assembly areas, and supply (mainly food) sources, pickup points, and caches.

(1) Representative examples of the CSOC intelligence items, showing the type of data available, are given in the following paragraphs.

(a) On 25 July (66) approx 100 CTs were hiding in vicinity of Dong Chaem Phu (UE370030) in the area of Phu Hak. This portion of CT used to levy rice and feed from villagers of Tambol Sonz Dao, Amphoe Sawang Daen Din.

(b) On 10 August approx 50 armed CTs, led by Nai Champa Kunarak, were gathering in vic. UE420s.

(c) On 24 Nov approx 60 CTs were located at UE394092, attached with four female advisors who trained from Peking. At the operations base situation weapon and ammo dump, and dispensary providing w/good security during the day.

(d) 23 January. Approx 41 CTs including 7 females, are located on Phu Pha Led (UR360) with food supplied from villagers at Ban Bo Kea Nei.

(e) On Feb 4, approx 60 CTs were hiding between Phu Mak Nud (UE40103) and Phu Hib (UE7903).

Approach

(1) The functional approach to analysis of the insurgent-development pattern in Northeast Thailand was described in Chap. 2.

(1) After the color codes for the broad categories of CT activity and symbol shapes for each of the subdivisions of the broad category were established, each item from the CSOC daily reports that fell within two selected, sample insurgent areas was plotted on overlays over 1:50,000 topographical maps. (The color codes are replaced by black and white symbols in this paper.)

(1) The final result of this approach was the grouping of plots of reports of bases, camps, mobile operational camps, and assembly points into the areas shown in Figs. 49 and 50. In certain instances the numbers of reported locations plotted were so concentrated within a relatively small area that they clearly represented preferred CT basing areas.

(1) The base and camp areas mentioned were formulated for analytical purposes only. The grouping of plots of reports on possible sightings of CT bases and camps should not be construed to mean that the areas shown are confirmed CT base areas or organized CT basing complexes. The areas do, however, clearly indicate the locations and features of the more permanent areas used by the insurgents for bases and camps.

Descriptive Analysis

(1) A brief analysis of the selected sample insurgent area in the Sawang
Daen Din District of Sakon Nakhon Province is contained in App B and of the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province in App C.

(U) The physical, demographic, operational, and support aspects of each of the areas were analyzed from studies of the area plotted on 1:50,000 Army Map Service (AMS) topographical maps on which were overlaid plots of known locations of the RTG 0810 defended villages and the reported locations of insurgent supply pickup, source, and storage locations.

(U) In the topographical analysis of the areas, slopes were graded 1, 2, and 3 as follows:

- Slope grade 1 has maximum slopes less than 10 deg (17 percent)
- Slope grade 2 has slopes of 10 to 30 deg (17 percent to 57 percent)
- Slope grade 3 has slopes from 30 deg to nearly vertical

(U) An area having grade 1 slopes and rice cultivation was considered to have poor concealment when the other vegetation was not indicated on the map. When other vegetation was indicated as forest the concealment was considered good. When the slope grade was 1 and no vegetation by type was shown the concealment was considered unknown. Areas with grade 2 slopes and those with slopes of grades 2 and 3 combined were considered to afford excellent concealment, because with that type of relief even single-canopy sparse vegetation would provide a good area for secure base or camp sites.

(U) One of the principal purposes of the analysis was to gain an understanding of the relation of locations selected by the insurgents for bases, camps, mobile operational camps, and preoperational assembly areas to the villages and village complexes where food, supplies, and information are obtained; the possible impact of the proximity of villages that are defended by armed counter-insurgency forces on these locations; and a review of the vegetation, water, and relief aspects of the physical environment.

(U) In the analysis of the Na Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province (Fig. 50 and App C), aerial photographs covering base and camp areas 1 to 6 were meticulously scanned in an attempt to obtain better knowledge of the topography, water availability, vegetation density, canopy cover, paths, houses, and any signs of human activity or presence. It was not presumed that insurgent bases or camps could be discovered or confirmed through 1:25,000-scale aerial photographs, but any signs of human existence in the extremely difficult terrain and vegetation environment in these six base and camp areas would confirm that man can and does survive there. Methodologically, an overlay of the six base and camp areas was photographically enlarged to proper scale and oriented on flight strips. The coordinates of the reported base and camp locations were plotted on this overlay. Because of the previously mentioned possibility of inaccuracies in reporting coordinates, the entire area was searched.

The major result was that, even after lengthy search with high-powered optical equipment, no positive identification of what could be insurgent bases or camps was possible from the aerial photos in this mountainous terrain. It was evident, however, that people are cutting timber and keeping paths open through frequent use, which indicates that the areas are accessible and inhabited. The detailed results of this photo analysis are included also in App C.

(U) Analysis of Basing and Support in Sawang Daen Din Sample Area. The Sawang Daen Din/Waritchaphum sample area was chosen for extensive investigation because it is one of the oldest, most active, and best organized of the insurgent sectors in Northeast Thailand.
Na Kae Sample Area: Map Display of 63 Base and Camp Areas, Supply System, and 0910 Plan Defended Villages

Figures by symbols indicate day and month of first report.

- Local camp
- Mobile-group camp
- Assembly point
- Base
- 0910 defended village
- Material-storage area
- Food-supply pickup point
- Support village
Over the data period 51 reports pertained to CT base, camp, or assembly points. Of this total, 12 were interpreted as reports of bases, 23 as reports of mobile operational camps, and 9 as reports of assembly points. Groupings of these reported locations resulted in the formulation of 18 base and camp areas, as shown in Table 7. Five of these 18 areas were based on five or more reports of sightings. An additional 6 of the 18 areas were supported by two or more reports. The final seven clearly separate areas were established on the basis of only one report of a base-type sighting at the coordinate given.

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*See App B.

These 18 base and camp areas in Sawang Daen Din (Fig. 49) were supported by reports of four locations in or near villages serving as supply (mainly food) sources for CTs operating in the area. An additional 29 reports were interpreted to be locations where food supplies or information were picked up by the CT or delivered to them by supporters. No reports gave indications of food- or supply-storage areas outside the 18 base and camp areas. A summary of the analysis of the 18 base and camp areas developed in the Sawang Daen Din insurgent area, as indicated by the 1:50,000 map and overlay review, is given as follows:

(a) Villages

8 have villages within the area described
7 areas are within 1-5 km of a village
3 are between 5.5 and 10 km from the nearest village
0910 plan defended villages
4 areas contain 0910 villages
11 areas are within 1–5 km of the nearest 0910 village
3 are between 5.5 and 10 km from the nearest 0910 village
(c) Supply, pickup, and storage points
8 areas have reported supply activity within the area
8 are within 1–5 km of reported supply activity
2 are between 5.5 and 10 km from any reported supply location
(d) Topography (slope grades of 50 percent or more of area)
32 areas have grade 1 slopes
13 have grade 2 slopes
18 have grade 2 and 3 slopes
(e) Concealment (horizontal line of sight, 20 men for 24 hours)
23 areas have excellent concealment
3 have good concealment
18 have poor concealment
19 have unknown concealment
(f) Water (perennial and intermittent streams, ponds, lakes)
35 have perennial streams, ponds, or lakes
11 have intermittent streams or ponds
17 have no surface water

Analysis of Basing and Support in Na Kae Sample Area. The sample sector in the Na Kae District was chosen as an area for extensive investigation because it is perhaps the most active and highly developed insurgent area in Northeast Thailand in terms of basing and support activities as well as operations. It also has one of the longest histories of insurgency in the Northeast.

Over the data period covered by the C30C reports, a total of 204 reports pertained to CT basing, camps, mobile operational camps, and assembly points. Of this total, 23 were judged to be reports of bases, 106 were interpreted as camps, 45 were considered to be mobile operational camps, and 45 were judged to be assembly points. Groupings of these reported locations resulted in the formulation of 63 base and camp areas (see Table 8).

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*See App C.*
Over the period covered by the data used to formulate these 63 areas (Fig. 50) 3 areas were established on the basis of over 10 reported sightings in the area (one area, No. 10, was established on the basis of 22 reports), 12 were based on 5 to 10 reports each, and 48 were based on 1 to 5 reports.

These 63 base and camp areas were supported by reports of 42 locations in or near villages serving as supply (mainly food) sources for CTs operating in the area. An additional 26 reports were judged to be locations where food was picked up by the CT or delivered to them by supporters. Only three reports gave indications of food-storage areas outside the 63 base and camp areas.

A summary of the analysis of the 63 areas developed in the Na Kae insurgent area, as indicated by the 1:50,000 map and overlay review, is given as follows:

(a) Villages
   11 areas have villages within the area
   34 areas are within 1–5 km of a village
   13 are between 5.5 and 10 km from the nearest villages
   5 are more than 10 km from the nearest village

(b) 0910 plan defended villages
   4 areas contain 0910 defended villages
   19 areas are within 1–5 km of the nearest 0910 village
   24 are between 5.5 and 10 km of the nearest 0910 village
   16 are more than 10 km from the nearest 0910 village

(c) Supply, pickup, and storage points
   11 areas have reported supply activity within the area
   32 are within 1–5 km of reported supply activity
   18 are between 5.5 and 10 km from any activity
   2 are over 10 km from any reported supply location

(d) Topography (slope grades of 50 percent or more of area)
   14 areas have grade 1 slopes
   2 have grade 2 slopes
   2 have grade 2 and 3 slopes

(e) Concealment (horizontal line of sight, 20 men for 24 hours)
   5 areas have excellent concealment
   6 have good concealment
   3 have poor concealment
   4 have unknown concealment

(f) Water (perennial and intermittent streams, ponds, and lakes)
   3 have perennial streams, ponds, or lakes
   10 have intermittent streams or ponds
   5 have no surface water

POTENTIAL OF BASE AREAS FOR PHASE II SAFE HAVENS

It has already been established that the insurgent in Phase I is concerned primarily with the development of a popular-support base and, in Phase II, with the development of guerrilla units. Phase II is characterized by an increase in the number of CT-initiated contacts with host-government military
or paramilitary units through the employment of armed insurgent bands of company or battalion size. The conceptual requirements, functions, and tasks to be accomplished to achieve the transition from Phase I to Phase II were also established.

(U) (S) Basing, in the sense and definition of safe havens discussed earlier, was considered to be one of the seven basic, critical functions to be carried out in the process of preparing to move from Phase I to Phase II. The meager data—of any kind or quality—available on this component of the basing and support system are examined here in an attempt to discern the communist insurgent's efforts to generate assets that would allow the initiation of Phase II operations.

(U) (S) Since operations to internally generate assets and to provide external support for Phase II are covert (secret), the lack of raw, reliable information and the absence of acceptable indicators concerning the insurgent's activities in this functional area are understandable.

(U) (S) If the information that has been obtained, however, is interpreted in the light of the Phase I/Phase II concept, certain insurgent activities appear to be out of the understood context of Phase I activities; these activities probably represent the beginning of an extended program to generate resources for a Phase II-level insurgency. A cursory examination of large land areas in Northeast Thailand would reveal areas that, from all previous evidence and known criteria, would appear to be acceptable as basing or camp areas but that are apparently not being used for this overt purpose—at least no reports have been received of such use.

(U) (S) A series of intelligence items abstracted from CSOC dailies, America Embassy, Bangkok, FTBs, and weekly reports submitted by the CG MACTHAI representative to CPM-1, Sakon Nakhon are presented here as examples of the type of insurgent activity that would be associated with a Phase II level of insurgency.

(U) (S) CSOC No. 404: 7 April 1967

NKP-CPM
1.2 on 031400 Apr 67, Nai Sanya Ratchasin, resident of Nong Kung (VD 565881), T. Renu, A That Phalom went to fish in Lam Nam Bang (VD 530875), was seriously wounded by the booby trap planted in that area.
1.3 on 032000 Apr 67, friendly of Ban Na Soke (VD 440720) on patrol mission found one well camouflaged 2.5x2 meters tunnel enough for ten men to stay in vic. (VD 421724), A. Na Kae. Water bucket and weapon cleaning oil were seen along with other supplies. Estimating that the CT left about ten days ago.

(U) (S) CSOC No. 466: 9 April 1967

Approx 24-30 VNs (Viet Minh) split into two groups were scattering in vicinities B. Don Kiao (VD 737724) and Hual Tha low (VD 7662) in Laos. Estimating they probably plan to support the CT in Thailand.

(U) (S) CSOC No. 522: 4 June 1967

Sakon Nakhon CPM
On 010330 June 67, Mr. Charoen Mallhong, a CT who had stayed in the jungle since January 67, surrendered himself to authorities at Ban Nong Phak Thiam (UD 699967) in Amphoe Phanna Nikhom together with a hand grenade. Later, he brought the authorities to uncover a portable Thai typewriter, a galvanized iron box containing 3
30-50 cm boxes containing explosives and a jar with a galvanized iron lid containing explosives, where he had hidden them. Mr. Charoen indicated that his 12 partisans have also planned to give in to authorities. Now authorities are in a position to encourage these CTs to surrender themselves.

CSOC. Weekly Summary: 7 June 1967

Information on Unknown Planes and Helicopters

Over the week, there were 12 reports on unknown helicopters reaching here (sometimes, 3 helicopters were reportedly seen in the same day). These helicopters often flew over the CT influential areas. In their reports, it was learned that some unknown helicopters appeared in Amphoe Nakae just one time, in Amphoe Kham Cha-1 two times, in Amphoe Waritchaphum two times, in Amphoe Sawang Daen Din two times, in King Amphoe Kut Bok one time, in Amphoe Phanna Nikhom one time, in Amphoe Nong Bua Lamphu one time, in Amphoe Wang Saphung one time and in Amphoe Ban Naan one time.

Considerations

Even though numbers of armed fighting augmented there is something indicating that the said numbers are decreasing, however. But CT activities in spreading Communism, which appeared in public have a tendency to augment. Such activities have included the rallies staged in several villages, this has been intended to call the public interests.

However, both armed fightings and CT activities in carrying out their Communism are still intensive in the imposed target areas and their vicinities.

Movements of some unknown night helicopters are still reported in even more times than last week. Such movements are reportedly also intensive in the imposed target areas (particularly in Amphoe Phanna Nikhom-Waritchaphum-Sawang Daen Din and Nakae-Kham Cha-1).

As it was reported that Pathet Lao/Vietminh on the Bank of the Mekong River have still crossed to Thai border from Laotian territory, it now is a possibility that they might have entered Thai border in persons rather than in units.

CSOC NKP-CPM: 1 July 1967

Ref DIS No. 546 of 28 Jun 67 para 1.3. Total 27 CT suspects were captured and from basic interrogation, two of them disclosed that in approx Apr-May 66, Vietnamese came to recruit for liberation with pay. The weapon training was scheduled to in March 67 at B. Na Jok school (VE 750207) and at B. Lao Phumy school (VE 716163), of Amphoe Muang on rifle, smg, carbine and 120 Mor (Mortar) and 3 x 120 mor (mortar) together. 21 of them were released, rest were sent to NKP CPM for further investigation.

COMSMAC Rep. CPM I

Weekly Periodic Report Nr. 31. 251200 Aug to 011200 Sep

Nakhon Phanom

1. CPM NKP reps that 1 company (about 100 persons) of Pathet Lao incl 6 Vietnamese crossed into Thailand at VF 6915 on 16 Aug.

Loei

1. 221130 Aug Lt. Bunsing, a Laotian, told vlg chief of Ban Hual La SF 920170 that there were 500 CT in Loei and asked for boats to bring more CT to Thailand. Lt Bunsing told when the vlg chief refused.

3. 26 Aug CPM NKP rpd that 300 CT were hiding in cave at SF 865060.

(From), COMSMAC Rep CPM L

Weekly Periodic Report Nr 32. 011200 to 081200 Sep

Nakhon Phanom

1. 20 Aug 6 armed Viet Minh crossed the river at Ban Lak Sila VD7180. They were met by Capt Ontha Mahawong (Chief of Viet Minh and Pathet Lao) near Pla Pak.
Nong Khai 2. Sep C/S CSOC rpt that CT wpns receiving unit has approx 20 men
and ldr is Nai Na Donkaeo. Wpns are brought in by hcpu. Hcprs reported to have
landed between Ban Hual Dokmai UF740275 and Ban Hual Chauam UF7822, at Ban
Khokkhong UF 7524 or Pausing UF 7409.

(S) Reports of booby traps, tunnels, typewriters, and explosives boxed
for long-term storage are important only in that they indicate that the insurgent
organization has, to an unknown extent, commenced activities apparently
to acquire and improve resources to be expended in operations in advanced
stages of insurgency. As of the data period covered by this report, elaborate
features found in Viet Cong bases in South Vietnam, such as extensive tunnel-
ing, large rice caches, sophisticated defense preparations, fixed warning de-
vices, communications centers, headquarters complexes, well-thought-out
training facilities, and other components of a highly developed base system
simply have not yet been developed in Thailand as far as can be determined.
The insurgent camps that have thus far been located by RTG forces in the
Northeast are unsophisticated in organization and construction. The base-
construction effort has emphasized simple, lightly built structures and limited
security measures.

(S) It can, however, be assumed from the vague reports of such activities
and the repeated reports of infiltration from the Laos sanctuary—both on the
ground and from helicopters—that assets are being introduced into Northeast
Thailand in excess of the current resource requirements for the overt aspect
of the current Phase I insurgency.
Chapter 6

THE COVERT SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND

Covert Organization of Subversion

(1) The covert operations directed to the support of the insurgency in the Northeast fall into two closely related but apparently separate categories. There is tight coordination between the self-support activities undertaken by the operating insurgent units in the Northeast and those undertaken in behalf of the operators by the complex of covert and subversive organizations generated and controlled by the CPT and their Chinese Communist mentors, and those activities of the North Vietnamese subversive and intelligence organizations that are allocated to assist the insurgency. The organization and activities for self-support were discussed previously; this chapter is concerned with the organization and activities of the CPT and its subordinate agencies, the Chinese Communist organs of subversion, and the North Vietnamese government and its agencies.†

(1) The CPT is the primary agent in support of the insurgent field operations in the Northeast. Intelligence data suggest that although the CPT does not conduct all covert support and, in fact, plays a minor role in several aspects of this category, it does act as coordinator of support. In this sense the CPT is the chosen instrument of the Sino-Vietnamese Communist aggression against the RTG. The degree to which the CPT can and does exercise initiative in the Northeast Thailand insurgency is not known. It appears from analysis of interrogations, agent reports, and captured documents that the CPT does not operate as an independent organization with respect to policy formulation; initiative may be restricted to the implementation of general policy and to decisions regarding tactical policy and operations.

(1) Analysis of past records indicates that the relation between the CPT and the Chinese Communist Party has been extremely close. There is no evidence to suggest that in the past decade the CPT has become more independent. In fact, the current increase in size and activity of the CPT can be directly attributed to an increase in support given it by the Chinese Communist Party. As noted in App D, the Staff Office of Foreign Affairs (SOFA) is the agency of the Chinese Communist Party that is directly concerned with the support of the

† See App D for discussion of the formal organization of these agencies of support.
CPT. Analysis of the biographies of the SOFA personnel associated with the conduct of support of the insurgency in the Northeast indicates that CPT personnel and SOFA personnel are often interchangeable and that the position of CPT personnel in Communist China generally equates with that of Chinese Communist Party functionaries.

The experience of the former Premier, Phra Phuttha, and other antigovernment Thai personalities with the Chinese Communist regime underscores this supposition. In each case reviewed, the Chinese Communist authorities have used the position and personnel of dissident and political-refugee organizations to augment the capability of the CPT. Negotiations between Chinese Communist authorities and these Thai have resulted in support being given the CPT, either through the use of front organizations and propaganda, or by transfer of personnel from these organizations into activities bound into the CPT program of subversive activity. Finally, recent data concerning activities in North Thailand point to a very direct control by the Chinese Communist Party and its organization of early-stage insurgent activity in that area. This involvement by the Chinese Communist Party is coordinated with North Vietnamese support in terms of training of cadres at Phu Tho, North Vietnam, and association of the cadre with the Pathet Lao, I.e., North Vietnamese-controlled operations and support. In parallel, subversive operations along the Cambodian border, e.g., in Buriram, may be supported through the North Vietnamese apparatus of subversion, with the most likely sources of funding, instruction, and direction being located in the North Vietnamese mission in Phnom Penh, the Lao Dong organization in Northeast Thailand, and in the Pathet Lao structure, also controlled by the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party apparatus.

The question whether the insurgency in the Thai Northeast is indigenous or foreign-supported may well be answered unequivocally. The insurgency in its operational phases may be largely conducted by ethnic Thai or Thai-Chinese but the structure of support, particularly that which dictates policies of use of support provided, is Thai only by fact of location, not by the ultimate end points of command and the control mechanisms that exert this command. The Thai or Thai-Lao insurgents may conduct the campaign of terrorism and social disruption in the Northeast, but they do not control it. As for the Vietnamese contribution to this support, the apparatus of command and control is ultimately in Chinese Communist hands, with a rather significant investment by the North Vietnamese. The price of such an investment suggests a Vietnamese voice in the making of policies and in the conduct of policy implementation.

The issue may well be settled by considering the means by which support is generated through the agency of the CPT. The interface between the Thai dissident in the field and the Bangkok-centered apparatus of the CPT lies in the organization of insurgent cells that provide the translation of a Chinese or urban identity to that of the Thai or Thai-Lao farmer and laborer in the Northeast. For example, the cells that in fact make up the structureless Farmer's Liberation Association (see Chap. 3) for a basis from which CPT cadre have effectively recruited manpower for the insurgent movement and through their formal organization have provided the networks required to train and field recruits, generate supplies, raise and transfer funds, maintain effective communications, and, in general, act as the rear-echelon staff and support section of the insurgent units deployed in the jungle.
The CPT and the Insurgent Operating Forces

(1) The CPT is largely urban-based and urban-biased, and in spite of an effort to transfer cadres to the countryside of the Northeast in the past decade, the fact remains that most of the CPT membership are inept in tactical management of segments of a guerrilla movement. Transfer, then, has largely implied a transfer of the assets for covert operation into the Northeast in an effort to extend and strengthen the network of support of both CPT operations and those of the insurgent guerrilla units. Ultimate command of the units operating in the Northeast appears to have devolved on a few selected long-term CPT cadres, supplemented by left-wing dissident leadership, professional bandits who either have joined the guerrilla movement or who have been utilized by it, and men turned up by CPT cadres either in the course of direct CPT cell operations or through the cells that make up the Farmer's Liberation Association and other similar tactical and local devices for mobilizing support.

(2) These new men have been given very sketchy military and political training in-country, and then have been sent into Laos and North Vietnam for what amounts to an officer training course. This course, located at Hoa Binh, takes about a year (round trip), and is given by what is reported as the Political and Military School of the CPT. The school, staffed by CPT cadres for the most part, apparently is completely under Lao Dong control. Before the opening of this school in about 1964, training was provided through the North Vietnamese-controlled Pathet Lao training facilities, most probably located in the Mahaxay area.

(3) The effect of this expansion through rapid recruitment and training of personnel who probably will never be CPT members has been to generate a loosely structured guerrilla organization with centralized policy control, but with coordination through insurgent cells, linked by a covert communications-liaison system.

(4) Local insurgent organizations such as the Farmer's Liberation Association have been devised as a means of providing a structure through which units can be developed. These units usually are initially indigenous to the areas of operation and the appeals are local in scope, although a nationalistic basis always exists. The leadership may or may not be of local origin. The operating patterns of such units suggest that tactical control is decentralized and indirect; this tactic may be related to the limitations of CPT management at the provincial levels as well as to CPT planning for Phase II. Ultimate coordination of Phase II operations will most likely take place with the formation of a national front organization that typically will be organized and controlled by the CPT.

(5) At present, however, CPT cadre either are in key positions in these field units or direct the field leadership through covert insurgent cells. The majority of the officer cadre appear not to be CPT cell members and do not have access to the CPT operation network of communications and intelligence. Reports indicate that only one or two members of any guerrilla band have this capability. The liaison is effected through members of a communications-liaison cell associated with the Farmer's Liberation Association, a parallel local group controlled by a CPT member, or members of the CPT assigned to the guerrilla movement and provided with access privileges granted as part of their command duties. None of the ordinary guerrilla rank and file appear to
have access to the CPT, although membership in front-type cells such as the
Farmer's Liberation Association appears for some to be a preliminary step
in their CPT recruitment, training, and integration process.

Thus far two out-of-country levels of training have been identified.
First, there is "post-graduate" training of CPT members and nonparty Thai
subversives by the Chinese Communist Party, with SOFA acting as the respon-
sible agency. These trainees are usually either well placed in the CPT hier-
archy or are slated for CPT-controlled operations. In effect, such training
makes possible a Chinese Communist Party stamp of approval on CPT mem-
bers as well as their de facto integration into the Chinese Communist organi-
ization, or, in the case of nonparty subversives, into party-controlled activity.
Second, the Hoa Binh school, already mentioned, provides an officer training
course for guerrilla cadres who may or may not be CPT members. Missing
in this echeloning of training is a third intermediate level of military and politi-
cal training. Yod Tisawat, a known insurgent leader, was probably retrained
at such an intermediate school. The requirements of Phase II insurgency de-
mand such a capability, a commanders' school. The location of such a school
may be at Phu Tho in North Vietnam, where the Chinese Communist Party/
SOFA is training cadre for operations in North Thailand, or it may be in the
Mahaxay area, collocated with Pathet Lao training.

The CPT is thus not directly involved in the day-to-day tactical con-
trol of the subversive guerrilla movement, but appears to treat this Phase I
operation organizationally as a front activity. At the same time the primary
CPT effort is to build the foundation of support for Phase II operations. This
foundation of support is dependent on the success of the Phase I insurgent
guerrilla movement, particularly in building the popular base required for the
development of Phase II. It is in the areas of development of effective propa-
ganda techniques and the generation of intelligence and informer networks that
the CPT is closest to the insurgent Phase I operations.

THE CENTRAL ASSOCIATION OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FOR
SAFEGUARDING THE FATHERLAND

Before continuing the discussion of the workings of the network of
support furnished the insurgent operator in the Northeast, it is necessary to
identify the Vietnamese segments of this system (see App D).

The Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong, operates through a
front organization, the Central Association of Vietnamese Refugees for Safe-
guarding the Fatherland (CENTRAL) in Northeast Thailand. CENTRAL is the
Thai counterpart to the front organization supporting the Viet Cong in South
Vietnam and, like the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam and the Viet-
namese organization in Cambodia, the Viet Kieu, it is the creature of the Lao
Dong, is controlled through Lao Dong cells, and acts in the interests of the
North Vietnamese Communist Party and government.

Control of CENTRAL flows through two principal channels, the North
Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane and the Lao Dong cells within its structure.
Direct control probably is exercised through the Office of Foreign Affairs in
Hanoi, the SOFA counterpart in the Lao Dong organization. In the past, control
of CENTRAL also has been channeled through the Vietnamese Red Cross and the Vietnamese Repatriation organization, both of which have functioned to cover covert and subversive Lao Dong activities.

The primary functions served by CENTRAL are the management of the Vietnamese population in Thailand and their use in supporting the policies and activities of the Lao Dong organization. In practice, this has meant primarily the generation of funds and intelligence collection for relay to North Vietnam. Within the past few years these functions have been expanded to include selective support of the insurgency in the Northeast.

It should be pointed out that CENTRAL is not limited to the Northeast, but the Zone III organization (see App D) also includes Bangkok and other areas outside those of primary interest. CENTRAL therefore can be considered to be organized to operate roughly in parallel with the CPT, with its basis and its location being functions of the numbers and geographic distribution of ethnic Vietnamese. The tenor of cooperation and coordination between the CPT agencies and CENTRAL is directed ultimately by the Chinese Communist Party and the Lao Dong acting in concert or in competition.

NETWORK OF SUPPORT

It should be apparent that the network supporting the insurgency in the Northeast is a complex derived from operating segments of several organizations and is dependent on their mutual cooperation and coordination. This coordination is the ultimate product of policy and implementation agreements reached between the Chinese Communist Party, the CPT, and the Lao Dong. Also involved in this arrangement as instruments of the North Vietnamese apparatus of command and control are the Pathet Lao (which, in this context, may well be another joint Chinese Communist-North Vietnamese venture in subversion), with operational control being held by the North Vietnamese and CENTRAL, the direct instrument of the Lao Dong in Thailand.

In many respects the operations of this network do not relate directly to the support of the present insurgent military operations in the Northeast. The network does assist these operations extensively, but evidence points to a wider scope of activity, apparently directed to the development of systems that will become operative in Phase II insurgency. As the present level of insurgent activity escalates, it is assumed that these activities will be fitted into the support system now being generated by the CPT to accommodate them.

For example, insurgent operations appear to be designed to develop the popular base within potential haven areas; these havens are prerequisite to Phase II operations. Concomitantly it appears the intelligence networks to support Phase II are being emplaced in these areas, particularly those on the village-cell level. It may be presumed that these informational resources will support the war zones forecast by the pattern of overt Phase I operations. Similarly a high level of recruiting and organizing activity designed to elicit supplies on a volume basis in these areas, beyond that currently required, can be explained in terms of preparation for future escalated levels of operation. The network interface with the CENTRAL organization appears to be far more extensive and to have far greater capabilities than are required for current levels.
of operations, but the resources implied by such a point toward the generation of greater capabilities than exist at present.

This aspect of the network's activities is exemplified best by the out-of-country training support currently being rendered. The pace of recruitment of cadre for future as well as current levels of military operations appears to have been stepped up in 1964, anticipating the decision by the Chinese Communist Party and the CPT to open the insurgency on a full Phase I level in early 1965 and the order to CPT cells to initiate such operations dating from November of that year. The Military and Political School of the CPT, located in North Vietnam about 85 km from Hanoi at Bien Ho, appears to be a permanent installation. (The number of recruits delivered to this Officer Training School is estimated at about 700 by mid-1967.) The intricate system of identifying, recruiting, moving, training, and reinserting these junior officers requires the coordination of the local insurgent cells, the CPT, CENTRAL, the North Vietnamese counterpart to SOFA (which organized and supports this school), and the insurgent field command. These men and women are returned to Thailand and although many are assigned positions in operational units, others are treated as reservists, i.e., some are used in current operations on a limited, temporary basis and others are clearly being held in reserve. No insurgent system would operate to produce military and medical reservists unless it were in the schedule adopted by the system to recall this trained manpower for use at a later date. The reservist's contacts appear to be local leaders, often members of the CPT with managerial responsibility in the areas of the Northeast. The decision to field this growing number of junior officers appears to be made by the CPT in response to current need and to the program to which they are, in fact, assigned. In this light the calling up of reservists appears to be a function of the escalation of the forces now being fielded.

Functions performed by this covert insurgent support network thus relate to both current and projected operations, and although the same agencies often perform both tasks, other segments of the system appear to be limited to the anticipated escalation to Phase II operations. The communications-liaison systems of the CPT and CENTRAL, for example, interface to support both current and projected levels of operations. Intelligence reports dealing with radiotransmission capability suggest, however, that few guerrilla units currently operating in the Northeast utilize radio transmission although radio receiving equipment abounds, particularly in the form of small commercial transistor radios. Most insurgent groups utilize couriers and runners drawn from their own membership, and they are linked into a network of couriers that includes servicing from the CPT and CENTRAL communications-liaison systems. In each case the system use appears to be functional to the service being performed. Most reports dealing with CENTRAL suggest that linkage with field units serves to tie these groups to funding, importation of weapons, and cadre reinsertion or return from the training facilities supported by the Vietnamese apparatus.

Communications, including control of forces, orders regarding reassignment of personnel, some funding, directives regarding recruitment and propaganda activities, and intelligence are principally shunted to the operators through the CPT network. The division of labor also is geographic; areas of principal concern to CENTRAL also provide the operators with short-term tactical intelligence, i.e., warning to guerrilla bands within their range regarding counterinsurgent operations, organization, and planning.
The operations conducted by the covert networks in direct support of the units fielded in the Northeast fall into two major groupings: communications and intelligence support and the organizational support functions such as supply of money, food, and matériel; recruiting; and the provision, according to prearrangement of field cadres for purposes of training, for replacement and for the formation of additional operational subgroups. The combination of intelligence and communications support generally defines the control aspects of the CPT command as it relates to the operators. The remainder comprise the logistics, personnel, and lines-of-communication categories of support.

Communications and Intelligence Support

As stated, the communications and intelligence support is a function of control, although, in the case of the CENTRAL network, transmission of intelligence and other operational information is the major purpose of the interface with the insurgent organization. It is possible, however, that by arrangement, particularly when and where CENTRAL objectives are involved, control as well as intelligence is furnished the insurgent. As a case in point, there is evidence that Vietnamese advisors and cadres accompany or have accompanied some insurgent groups. It is conceivable that these groups may be undergoing field training, in which case CENTRAL direction might substitute for that of the CPT. This type of cooperation is not unreasonable in the light of close coordination of the communications networks with respect to movement of CPT cadres into Laos for training and on their return to Thailand. There are also reports of Pathet Lao and Vietnamese intrusion into Thailand, primarily for purposes of providing stiffening as well as transfer of experience. Operator groups containing forces such as these would tend to fall under control of the Lao Dong cadre who dominate the CENTRAL organization.

Review of a number of defector and prisoner interrogations has yielded a general pattern of network operation. Apart from the liaison developed by the insurgent groups in the course of their activities, the CPT apparently has a network of cells that span the Northeast; these cells supply the basic means of communication, utilizing couriers and working within established and conventional covert patterns. Linkage between the network and the insurgent group is limited, probably restricted to contact with one or two command cadre within each group. Because the average insurgent is not a member of the CPT, defections from the ranks yield little or no information about this network and its interface with the insurgent groups. By the same token, the villagers who have been used as porters or couriers by the insurgent groups do not interface with the CPT network. Contact with a local cell, then, is made by prearrangement through the CPT network, and such prearrangement includes all the trappings of covert contact practice.

The effectiveness of such a system is apparent when the counterinsurgent record is examined. The warning function of the network, apart from that generated by the operator group through its own contacts, relates primarily to planned operations conducted by Royal Thai forces. There is no question regarding the fact of penetration of these commands and agencies by CPT agents. The recent disclosure of penetration of the Special Branch is indication that the
CPT, over the past decades, probably has managed to place agents in key positions in the civil and military organizations of the RTG.

An example will suffice to point up the general efficiency of the system. A defector reports that, on his return from training in North Vietnam, his group was halted as soon as it crossed the Mekong. He and four companions were ordered by the contact who met them to remain in the area, and were supplied accommodations in a nearby Vietnamese village. They were informed that counteroperations were being conducted in the areas to which they were scheduled to return. Two additional members of the group were passed on to the network to be moved home. Their area and the routes selected to it were considered safe. Several days later the five who had been held were inserted into the network for movement home and reassignment.

Network operations are also apparently highly channeled as well as specialized. Another former cadre reported that, having missed his contact at midpoint in his trip across the Northeast to the Mekong, he followed instructions and returned to his starting point where he was reinserted into the network. Two such entry points in the Laos-bound line of communication to North Vietnam were reported in 1967.

The amount of information and administrative traffic flowing through the network is apparently quite large and transmission is efficient. A defector, on returning home after his training in North Vietnam, met his contact, a senior cadre in his district, and found that the cadre had been fully informed of his bout with malaria in Hanoi soon after his arrival in North Vietnam almost a year before, as well as his relatively poor school record. The meeting took place a few days after his return. It seems probable, given the time involved, that the cadre had received a full report on the trainee before he arrived and was informed precisely when he would arrive.

Logistics and Personnel Support

Logistic support of the operators in the Northeast appears to be limited in scope and volume, with the operating insurgent groups largely funding for themselves. Short-term stockpiling is reported, of course, and a coordination with CENTRAL of arms procurement in Laos. Medical supplies on a limited basis are procured locally by CPT cells, but this appears to be an occasional function. The insurgent groups usually generate this type of procurement through their own resources. All in all, the network's logistic activities, as reported by defecting insurgents, seem far too limited to square with statements made by former cadres describing capabilities. Additionally, the financial resources of the CPT in 1966 and 1967 do not appear to be directed largely to the support of the operating groups, but may well be consumed either by activities associated with party work, such as propaganda and internal recruiting.

The financial support provided to the Northeast is mentioned in App. D. The sums involved cannot be related with any accuracy to the support given the insurgent operating groups, because this type of information is missing. Piece-meal reporting does, however, suggest that some money is disbursed by the CPT through the network to cell operators and from these to the insurgent units.

It is possible to speculate, however, that much of the money forwarded to the Northeast is consumed in the course of conducting the business of the cells, in contrast to the business of the insurgent operators (e.g., in providing
funds for transportation of couriers, purchasing weapons and ammunition from arms smugglers for storage or distribution, and subsidizing trainees) instead of providing food and other supplies directly to the insurgents. The CENTRAL operation, as noted, does channel some funds directly to operational units, but much of the money generated by this front for its use locally goes into parallel support of its agents, paying operating costs, and purchasing in Laos weapons and supplies that then enter the logistic network for redistribution by the CPT. (U) [S] CPT funding sources may be posited. These sources fall into two general categories: funds raised locally in Thailand in the overseas-Chinese community and elsewhere through contributions and extortion, and funds generated externally by the Chinese Communist Party and transferred into CPT channels. Informed sources in Hong Kong suggest that the methods used to generate and transfer funds in other countries, for example Burma and Indonesia, are not used in the case of the CPT. The usual channels involve the Communist-controlled Bank of China and the financial arrangements, usually business loans and repatriation of funds, between that organ of the Chinese Communist regime and the overseas-Chinese communities. The Bank is not allowed to operate in Thailand and other methods are employed. (U) [S] The most likely method involves preferred companies, usually those engaged in the import and export of goods to and from Thailand. These companies, such as those involved in the rice and sugar trade, are allowed to sell to Communist China to put rice into channels on a preferential basis through brokers fronting for the Chinese Communist regime; the profits from these transactions are returned to Thailand legitimately, and an agreed-upon portion of these profits is delivered to CPT channels. (U) [S] Other funds are allocated directly by the Bank of China in Hong Kong through the very large volume of business that provides foreign exchange for the Chinese Communist regime. These funds are moved through Hanoi to CENTRAL, probably in the form of credits, or are put directly into the CPT through the Chinese Communist mission in Vientiane. Helicopters were allegedly used to transfer Thai currency purchased on the Hong Kong market in 1966 directly to the CPT communications-liaison network in the Northeast. (U) [S] Reports of stockpiling of materiel and associated supplies in Laos and the flow of arms across the Mekong into Thailand are persistent. Although there is no direct evidence to suggest that these stocks are not directly placed in the hands of the operators, reports from former members of field guerrilla units suggest that they are operating on a hand-to-mouth basis. The recorded performance does not square with the probable capability of the CPT organization to provide these units with adequate food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. The only conclusion that can be drawn, in the face of apparent efficiency in other aspects of network activity, is that only favored, core units are adequately supplied and that surplus food and materiel are being covertly stored in potential haven areas for the opening of Phase II operations. (U) [S] As stated earlier, there is a great deal of evidence regarding close cooperation between the CPT and the Vietnamese organizations in providing training in North Vietnam for selected cadres, including nurses. The routing of this flow of personnel into and out of North Vietnam suggests a direct assumption of responsibility by the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese organizations to transfer, train, and return personnel to Thailand. The selection of cadres,
however, does present several interesting aspects. By and large, most of those who have been selected are from the Northeast; there are, however, trainees from other areas of Thailand, which suggests planned augmentation of CPT insurgent capabilities outside the Northeast. The cadres selected for training were not necessarily long-term CPT associates or party-cell members; more often than not they were minor CPT operators or relatively new acquisitions of the insurgent organization.

In effect, CPT recruitment and other logistics support relates more to future insurgent operations than to present activities; by the same token, the effort to generate the present level of activity was probably made after 1958 and up through 1964, with the establishment of the Pathet Lao near the Mekong in 1962 opening the door to further escalation into Phase I. The lead time, given the effort required to train, equip, and command these forces, appears to have been in the neighborhood of 5 or 3 years. Past performance does not mean that escalation into Phase II is necessarily on the same timetable, as arrangements made in the period 1964–1966 for further escalation are being rapidly put into effect. For example, movement into active Phase II in Vietnam took far less time than did the initial rebuilding of the Viet Minh forces.

The Phase I operation initiated early in 1966 actually went through a planned 6-month trial-and-error phase before commitment in mid-1966 to the present course of increased activity. Reporting during the period covered in this study does suggest, however, that the rapidity of escalation indicates a concurrency of certain aspects of Phase I and Phase II.

Lines of Communication and Supply

Analysis of the routing within the Northeast suggests that the lines of communication and supply at present are not identifiable as such and that the legitimate routes and means of movement are employed in the conduct of the communications-liaison activities and the transfer of supplies of food, materiel, and recruits from place to place. Interrogations support this thesis; normally scheduled bus traffic and trucking suffice to meet requirements for movement. The trails and tracks of the Northeast provide the means outside areas accessible to wheeled traffic. There is specialization of areas or lines of movement only in the sense that there are preferred initial points and end points along given circuits.

Once across the Mekong the routing appears to be channeled more in the pattern of the Ho Chi Minh Trail of 1960–1965. Figure 51 is a plot of sightings of movement from Northeast Thailand to North Vietnam as well as known Pathet Lao–North Vietnam support and lines-of-communication bases. A general statement of the major patterns of movement into and within Thailand is provided in App E.

The helicopter problem appears to fit best into this context. Sighting of unknown helicopters along the frontier margin of the Northeast in the past few years has become a major concern of both the RTG and the US Mission to Thailand. There probably will continue to be a number of theories concerning the identity and function served by these aircraft. The most comfortable theories explain the sightings as unidentified-flying-object phenomena or as operations of friendly or neutral illega. and legal operators. None of these theories can
accommodate fully the pattern that exists. Granted some natural phenomena erroneously identified as sightings, as well as clandestine and smuggler activity, there still remain a pattern and level of sightings reported that relate quite closely to known guerrilla base areas.

The helicopter phenomenon fits neatly into the concept of key units or key sites, both associated with the CPT organization of Phase II operations.

The requirements for effective radio communications for air-ground control and the utilization of helicopters under the circumstances that prevail in the Northeast point up the limitation of their use to support the activities of these key units, particularly those units closely associated with actual or potential command functions. Provision of key cadres, funds, material, and guidance from sanctuary in Laos and North Vietnam would answer the questions being asked regarding the function of these aircraft with more credibility than the theory of legal or illegal use. If this is the case, then it is apparent that when and if Phase II does arrive in the Northeast, it will be accompanied by a greater sophistication of movement and support than was available to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam in the early 1960's.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS

Background and General Findings

There should be no question about the nature of the crisis in Northeast Thailand. It is a subversive insurgency, which implies that the RTG is not dealing with (a) a traditional Asian peasant uprising; (b) a popular uprising in the region or a manifestation of demand for movement to a more democratic polity, e.g., a demand for a constitution or a registry of popular protest about the current or past regimes or administrations; (c) an irredentist movement; (d) a violent surfacing of economic aspiration; or (e) protest against an unbearable economic situation. Not only is the crisis unequivocally that of subversive insurgency, but it is an insurgency that is meeting several basic and now classic requirements for such attempts at subversion. It has the hallmarks of such movements of "national liberation," e.g., foreign communist support, primarily located in an international sanctuary, national Communist Party cadre generating or acting as this command echelon, and front-type activist cell organization.

Although the intensity of the insurgency varies from place to place at any given time, by and large it fits accepted descriptions of subversive insurgency in its early phases. The support patterns, particularly those relating to the regional levels of command and support of local guerrilla units, bear a marked resemblance to insurgent movements in the Caribbean. The pattern of covert operation, from sanctuary through communist organization down to activist units, resembles that of the Latin American cases.

It is possible, given these resemblances, that the Thai case may well fall into a general subversive insurgent developmental pattern, hence the conclusion that the insurgency in South Vietnam is probably anomalous or atypical. For example, the current subversive insurgency in South Vietnam did not go through a Phase I or transit from Phase I into Phase II but has moved directly from Phase II into Phase III. The reasons for this are historical and relate to the ready-made Viet Minh base of the Viet Cong and its front organizations. By
the same token, such a base is lacking in Thailand and in such countries as Venezuela and Colombia, and therefore the building phase of insurgency, Phase I, is required if the Thai, Colombian, and Venezuelan CT are to be able to escalate to success.

(1) The present levels of overt insurgency in the Northeast date from the beginning of 1966. There is documentary evidence that the initiation of the present campaign was a command decision that emanated from the CPT leadership and dated from the fall of 1965. Inferences can be drawn regarding the exertion of Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist control over this decision; these relate not only to direct evidence of a close relation between the Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Thai parties, but also to the lead time involved in such a decision and to the measures of outside communist support of such a decision that predate 1965 by half a decade or more.

(2) Without belaboring this point, it appears evident that the overt manifestation of the insurgent operation was triggered by a decision made outside Thailand and was not purely evolutionary and therefore inevitable. Speculation suggests a direct relation between the timing of the escalation in the Northeast into widespread violence, the limitations placed on the kinds of violence permitted, and the direction taken by the war in South Vietnam.

(3) 1965 appears to have been the scheduled time of Viet Cong victory, but by the close of the year, the Viet Cong had lost their initiative; concurrently, the movement of North Vietnamese regulars into South Vietnam in 1965 also appears to have failed to meet its purpose, of closing off resistance on the part of the South Vietnamese government.

(4) At the same time, the years 1964-1966 saw a vigorous expansion of covert organizations in the Northeast. Such expansion and integration is a necessary precondition to being able to field guerrilla forces on a Phase II level of operation. For example, as evidenced in Chap. 2, the development of a subversive political base in the areas of concern was indispensable in the provision of support to the field insurgent.

(5) The direction that the insurgency is taking suggests several observations regarding the strategy that has been adopted. First, it is becoming evident that the area between the Phu Phan range and the Mekong River is being gradually detached from the control of the RTG. This is the process of developing a basic or general haven area within which areas of absolute CT control will be located.

(6) Second, although the various insurgent groupings are not yet overtly linked by a national-front structure, this cohesion will take place as soon as the political base within the general haven area is completed or when politically convenient to the CPT and its sponsors. Such a front, in effect, will provide an alternate to the RTG as well as a justification for the shadow regime that will govern the areas directly under CT control. The front will be controlled by the CPT through location of cadres and cells within the key sections of the front structure. The front headquarters will probably be located in sanctuary in Laos, because location in North Vietnam or Communist China will militate against its nationalist appeal.

(7) Third, preparations are well under way to extend the insurgency in other areas. With the exception of the southern region, in which the Malayan CT organization is located in its Thai sanctuary, these other areas, primarily
the North and mid-South, are in earlier stages of development than is the North-
east. It is not profitable to speculate on the possibilities of a regional lineup,
because it is not yet clear how the insurgency is intended to function as a sup-
port of the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist sponsors.

The CT injunction against attacks on US facilities and personnel sug-
gest that the Thai insurgency is regarded currently by its foreign supporters
as an investment in the negotiations expected to take place over the settlement
of the South Vietnamese insurgency. Escalation to include targeting US person-
nel and installations is likely during the course of negotiations. Past Chinese
Communist strategy and that of the Viet Minh in 1954 suggest that, as the con-
flict reaches a stage of negotiability, the Asian Communist Bloc will extend
the scope of the war on a temporary and negotiable basis, e.g., will open Phase
II operations in selected areas, as was done in Cambodia in 1953–1954 and in
Laos.

In the case of Cambodia, the Communist Bloc considered the Cambodian
adjunct to the Viet Minh as thoroughly expendable. The Thai CT may not fall
into this category after the close of the Vietnam war. They will be closely
supervised to preserve their integrity and the insurgency will be deescalated
as price of negotiation. It is therefore possible that for the present the insur-
gency in Thailand may not move into Phase II except with limited objectives
over the negotiating phase, with the bloc being quite satisfied, at the end of the
cycle of warfare and negotiation, to have invested Thailand with an insurgent
organization, and to allow future circumstance and the communist timetable to
guide the destiny of this organization.

The Insurgent Network in Northeast Thailand

The insurgent network of systems is largely managed by the CPT
with direct assistance and partial control furnished by the North Vietnamese
Communist Lao Dong Party organization in the Northeast. This control is
made possible by and exercised through placement of CPT cadres and cells
throughout the network of support and operation. The network consists largely
of systems and organizations, large and small, that are not directly tied to the
CPT but that have been created, captured, or partially infiltrated by the CPT
and to a lesser extent by the North Vietnamese CENTRAL apparatus of sub-
version. In effect, the CPT controls a coalition, sometimes unwitting, of dissi-
dent and subversive groups and systems of groups.

External support of the system exists and is essential to it. The Chi-
inese Communist Party, the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, and the Pathet
Lao, a subsidiary of the North Vietnamese control apparatus, all play a signif-
ificant role in providing cadre training, financing, and sanctuary for those en-
gaged in the insurgency. All this support is either channeled through or directed
by the CPT or is furnished by sponsor or intermediary organizations to third
parties in line with the objectives set by and for the CPT.

This support appears to be furnished directly through the commu-
nications-liaison networks to identified and scheduled recipients, but control of this
support is channeled through regional-level organization, which in effect places
control of outside support within the scope of the CPT. CPT staffing is direct
don to regional level and becomes sketchy or indirect below this level; man-
agement of lower levels is organized through CPT control cells located in sys-
tems operating below the regional level.
(S) As noted in the text in detail, management of insurgent operations on the area, sector, and precinct levels becomes complex and is biased heavily in direction of function and through insurgent lower-level organization. Insurgent organizations on the area level and below exist in all functions, are controlled by CPT or CENTRAL cadres and cellular groups, and perform all missions required to maintain the insurgency short of effective control of it above precinct level. These operational and service nodes, as stated previously, at present are not directly integrated in a national-front structure and therefore give the appearance of a heterogeneous coalition of organizations that somehow are coordinating to subvert and overthrow the RTG.

(S) Current levels of overt operations and the support required for these operations are designed solely to broaden the base of the insurgency. Much of the insurgent organization is quiescent, and a large portion of it is intended to remain covert. Selected sectors and precincts of the Northeast in which insurgent organization is firm are now being joined into larger areas, a reverse oil-spot operation. All operations that have been identified fall into the Phase I insurgency-building phases of activity. No Phase II type of activity has yet been discovered.

(S) Estimates of insurgent strength are inaccurate because they represent, at best, aggregations of numbers based on overt activity patterns. Total estimates of insurgent strength in the Northeast may run as high as 35,000, depending on the type of analysis made. Estimates of insurgent strength made in mid-1967 of under 2000 represent an aggregation of strengths of overtly operating units and are deceptively small. The bulk of the insurgent organization is devoted to organizational building activities and estimates based on guerrilla incidents will tend to yield a highly biased indicator base.
Chapter 7
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND

The attitude of the Thai toward subversive insurgency has grown from mild apathy and disinterest displayed during the late 1940's to the current state of national anxiety; resources are now being expended on military field operations. The RTG's convictions about the insurgency vacillated, ascribing first external and then internal influence when the question of source surfaced. The most popular feeling in the past, except during periods when the political stability of Laos was upset, was that difficulties in Thailand were internal, with no real out-of-country threat, and that these isolated disturbances were police business and did not warrant military action.

Subversive insurgent activities in the Northeast increased in number, diversified in nature, and began seeping into larger geographic areas (see Fig. 52). By 1965 the RTG regarded subversive activities as an externally inspired, internally organized and executed threat to be countered by government joint-agency effort. What had been a Ministry of Interior (police) problem was now to be confronted by the Counter Subversion Operation Command (CSOC) and its execution arm, the Special Operations Coordination Center (Special Action Force). Such a system had been used successfully against insurgency in Borneo.

This new organization was to operate against the insurgents, the CTs, for a period of 90 days, beginning 15 January 1966. The outgrowth of this device, which actually remained operational until 17 August 1966, was the Forward Field Headquarters of CSOC.

Newly directed and inspired counterinsurgency operations were undertaken on 15 January 1966. They have continued on an increasing scale, beset with command-and-control complexity and technique-simplicity difficulties. The original 90-day trial period has been repeatedly extended, new organizations devised, and effort increased until today counterinsurgency operations demand more effort and attention from the RTG than any other activity.

CONCEPT

The central idea adopted by the RTG was that insurgents must rely on the village population for support and growth and that the movement was
Fig. 52—General Areas of Communist Activity in Thailand, July 1967

As presented to GEN Maxwell D. Taylor at the CSOC briefing, 27 Jul 67, Bangkok.

- Heavy armed struggle
- Medium armed struggle
- Political struggle

0  100  200  300  400 km
doomed to failure if denied this association. The secure-village concept was used as the guiding principle of counterinsurgency operations. To carry out such a scheme, an organization and a specific plan of operations were developed. The CSOC approach to national security is shown in Fig. 53.

![Diagram showing the CSOC approach to national security]

**Fig. 53—The CSOC Approach to National Security**

By 1965 the growing subversive insurgency in Thailand prompted Thai government officials to settle on an integrated counterinsurgency strategy. Led by the Deputy Prime Minister, General Prapat Charusathien, the RTG agreed that the route to success would be found in a joint effort of the civilian, police, and military (CPM) agencies of government, with control resting with the civilians. This idea was alleged to be similar to the British approach during their successful counterinsurgency efforts in neighboring Malaya a decade earlier. The contention that subversive insurgency must be countered by "winning the hearts and minds of the people" at the village level was considered sound.

*Gen Prapat (also spelled Praphat) is considered to be the strong man in the Thai political structure. He holds 16 other official positions within the government, including those of Chief of Military Forces and Minister of Interior.*
(U) Strategy would be planned at CSOC in Bangkok by the CPM joint staff, which included key members of these agencies. General Prapath, as Deputy Prime Minister, ordered 17 key members of various ministries, departments, and bureaus to take office space in the Civil Affairs Division of CSOC to gain support for CSOC operations from the civilian side of government. *(U)* The Civil Affairs Division is responsible for directing activities of ministries, departments, and bureaus concerned with administration, development, public relations and information, education, public security, and welfare in threatened areas. In cooperation with the police, the Civil Affairs Division is responsible for arrests, detention, investigation, and reindoctrination of CT suspects and prisoners.

(U) The concept of police effort in CSOC follows the classic lines. The Thai National Police Department, using three of its major divisions (Provincial, Border Patrol, and Special Branch), is coequal in counterinsurgency efforts at the policy and planning level and primary at the execution level, except where large (company-sized and above) military operations are conducted. The primary intelligence effort has been identified as a police responsibility. Heading up the CSOC Intelligence Division is Police LTG Channas Manukhananda.

(U) Military forces in the CPM counterinsurgency concept are to be used as backup for all other efforts. Military forces are to be considered the reserve power arm, to provide day-to-day public security elements to reinforce police and to provide organizational structure, communication, and logistical facilities for field operations.*

**ORGANIZATION**

**Present Mission and Organization**

(U) The CSOC mission, as currently organized, has the following responsibilities and tasks:

(a) Command all combined suppression forces: CPM-1, provincial CPMs, provincial communist suppression committees, JSC/CPMs, Interrogation Centers, and other assigned units.

(b) Give direction in suppressing communist subversion by giving both village security and village development.

(c) Direct operations to counter subversive and insurgency activities with decisive suppression action.

(d) Coordinate closely with all government agencies concerned in suppression of CTs by:

(1) Encouraging official units concerned to counter communism to the fullest capacity;

(2) Directing and coordinating all units concerned for most efficient countercommunist operation;

*CSOC staff members include Dr. Channas Yuvalon, Director General, Dept of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior (most important position in the Min. of Interior below the Minister, Gen Prapath); Chief of Staff, RTA serves also as Chief of Staff, CSOC; Director General of Thai National Police is police advisor to CSOC.
(3) Carrying out the mission according to its necessity and priority whenever no unit handles it or is capable of handling it or units agree on CSOC operation.

(e) Carry out psychological operations toward the people and CTs in the country.

(U) Figures 54-59 display the organization of CSOC.

Planned Reorganization.

(U) Parenthetically, it is important to note that the formal organization of CSOC failed to support the informal organization along functional lines. The military strongly resented civilian control over operations in the field. Field operations of the CSOC Civil Affairs Division came off a poor second to military and police actions. The results of counterinsurgency operations were evaluated and protests responded to by high-level policy makers. Pressure from the military for control of operations in the Northeast appears now to have received favorable consideration. Reports indicate the military will have a stronger hand through a reorganization device of inserting a military headquarters between CSOC in Bangkok and the political administration at province level (governors) in the field. Contrary to denials, plans are made and movement has begun to absorb CPM-1, formerly the field command post of CSOC, into the field headquarters of the Second Army.

OPERATIONS

General

(U) Joint countersubversion field operations devised in December 1965 were conducted on a trial basis in the Northeast. These operations and supporting organizations had been the outgrowth of lessons learned since late 1961 when the newly formed National Security Command deployed mobile development units to determine the needs and aspirations of the rural Northeast populations. Accelerated Rural Development, the second passive measure taken to promote self-development among the villagers, appeared in 1964. It became clear, especially with the Peking announcement that Thailand was next on its schedule for subversion, that the passive practices were not enough. Subversive actions increased, with terrorism, assassinations, and armed incidents recorded throughout the area.

(U) The joint counterinsurgency efforts attempted in early 1966 met with command and control difficulties. The initial organization, the Special Action Force discussed earlier, was severely criticized by civil authorities because it concerned itself almost exclusively with military operations. This was contrary to the original concept of withholding military force until an absolute necessity had been established. Task Force Mukdahan (Special Action Force) was disbanded on 28 Sep 66 and reestablished as CPM-1 in Sakon Nakhon the following month. The operations that followed this reorganization and relocation were severely criticized by the police and military because of inefficient command and control of field operations by civil authorities—tactical operations conducted by province governors or civilian deputies. These independent operations were contrary to the original concept of integrated effort. These initial,
Fig. 55—CSOC Command and Operations Network

*JSC CPMs: Collocated Joint Security Centers (regional level intelligence collection and coordination centers) and CPMMs not associated with the Northeast CI operation plan 0910.

*Provincial Communist Suppression Committees (CSCs) exist in the following charge: Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Trang, Phathalung, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satul, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Phetchaburi, Ratchaburi, Kanchanaburi, Chaiyapham, Khet Kaen, Maha Sarakham, Roi Et, Phetchabun, and Si Sa Ket. All are authorized by the Ministry of Interior to charge persons and investigate communist activity. Other provinces without CSCs rely on police support.
Fig. 56—Organization of JSC/CPM

Fig. 57—Organization of Provincial CPMs

Fig. 58—Organization of Provincial Communist Suppression Committee

--- Chain of command --- Chain of coordination
Fig. 59—CSOC Organization, Command, and Coordination

Chain of command

CSOC

- Special Branch Police
- Border Police
- Provincial Police
- RTAF
- RIA
- IRCG
- JSC/CPM

Chain of command through assigned units

112th and 123rd Police
124th Police
8 provinces, 85 police

Alert and CO
Service and support
Inf Co
CPM

Inf Co
Provincial CPMs
and continuing, difficulties were not without some accompanying successes, described in following pages.

The 0910 Plan (Dry Season Operation)

(5) Previous operations developed very broad information about communist operations and locations. This information and intelligence produced by the Thai National Police Department's Special Branch were interpreted. Thai officials estimate there were about 1500 to 1700 armed insurgents in the Northeast—without conventional organization, operating in bands with no secure fixed bases, conducting no coordinated action, and dependent on the village population for survival and growth.

(8) The Thai also evaluated previous counterinsurgency efforts (sweep operations) as totally inadequate to cope with the situation because they were temporary in nature and did not allow forces to remain with the people to provide long-term security.

(8) Combining the assessment of the CT situation and the evaluation of previous operations, a new, ambitious, and somewhat naive plan was formulated: the 0910 plan. This plan called for operations aimed at restricting the movement of CTs away from their hiding areas (certain areas identified through intelligence estimates as base and operational zones), and used the indirect approach of providing village security instead of concentrating on direct military actions such as sweep operations.

(5) Three basic weaknesses of previous operations exploited by the CTs were considered in this plan. First, government forces had never stayed in the villages long enough. Normally they stayed 1 or 2 weeks at most, which was not sufficient time to develop a secure village environment. CTs were able to return as soon as RTG forces departed. Second, the conduct of small units deployed in the villages tended to work against the long-term goal of gaining the villagers' support for the government. For example, taking food from villagers without payment and irresponsible confiscation of housing tended to blemish the central-government theme.

(8) The third weakness addressed was timeliness. It was determined that effective activity must begin at the village level immediately. Previous plans had been slow to develop.

(5) The 0910 plan provided security forces in the villages to live with the people on a permanent basis, to help them and gain their confidence. These forces are combinations of civilian Voluntary Defense Corps (VDC), police, and military squad-sized units and are not to be confused with the Village Security Officer Program.* In addition to the security provided villagers, these units were able to collect intelligence information from the village level—perhaps the most valid source available to the counterinsurgency program. Actions based on this information led to increased confidence in the security elements.

*VSO—Village Security Officer, a USOM-devised program to select, arm, and train villagers. The program in effect has placed 5- to 12-man groups in 92 villages and 5 Amphoe (districts) in Nakhon Phanom Province. The objective of 625 personnel will complete the pilot project. Due to initial losses of men and equipment, the program was revised to group VSOs of a Tambon (group of villages) into an element of 25 to 30 men and patrol among the Tambon villages rather than defend from fixed stations. The program has not been formally evaluated as of this writing.
and developed the secure village environment that it was hoped would isolate the communists from the villagers.

(U) The areas of CT operations and suspected base-support locations selected as targets for the 0910 plan operations are shown in Fig. 60. They are well-known areas with generally mountainous or hilly terrain, usually heavily forested.
Each of the target areas is composed of inner-circle and middle-circle areas. The inner-circle area is the grossly and arbitrarily identified CT area. The middle circle is that zone surrounding the CT area used by the insurgent for operations and support and by government forces to deny such activities. This middle-circle area is, then, the contested area, according to the plan. Any area outside the middle-circle boundary was not considered the business of the 0910 plan operation and was to be cared for by normal provincial administration. A sample target area is shown in Fig. 61.

![Fig. 61—A Sample Target Area](image)

Each target area contains a similar system of secured villages. Selected villages are secured by a Joint Security Team (squad), composed of police and VLC members. A control headquarters is provided for the target area, and a strike-force reaction platoon is deployed in the area. The reaction platoon acts on intelligence gathered by the Joint Security Teams or furnished by CPM and CPM-1 headquarters.

Command and control links and communication between targets and the counterinsurgency command are shown in Fig. 62. Figures 63 and 64 depict actual deployments in two current 0910 target areas. Target 8 is in Pla Pak subdistrict of Nakhon Phanom Province; the 1st Bn of the 13th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) is deployed to provide security in this area. Target 9 is located in Loeng Nok Tha and Amnat Charoen Districts of Ubon Province.

*The CTs no longer restrict activities to the middle-circle area but operate, nearly at will, within, outside, and between target areas.*

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Fig. 63—Target Area B: Amphoe Pla Pak, Changwat Nakhoon Phanom
Fig. 64—Target Area 9: Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha, Chongwat Ubon

Joint Security Teams stationed in villages
(U) The total personnel strength of the 0910 organization is shown in Table 9. The RTA forces committed to CSOC in the Northeast operation are shown in Table 10.

### TABLE 9
Personnel Strength in 0910 Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDC*</td>
<td>2,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village chiefs and volunteers</td>
<td>1,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*VDC forces in 176 villages around target areas.

### TABLE 10
RTA Units Committed to CSOC in Northeast Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Co., 1st Bn., 3d RCT</td>
<td>Sawang Daen Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co., 3d Bn., 13th RCT</td>
<td>Sawang Daen Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co., 2d Bn., 3d RCT</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co., 2d Bn., 6th RCT</td>
<td>Na Kee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Co., 31 Bn., 3d RCT</td>
<td>Na Kee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 platoon, 1st Bn., 6th RCT</td>
<td>Loeng Noi Tha (1 platoon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 platoon, 2d Bn., 6th RCT</td>
<td>Amaat Charoen (2 platoon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 13th RCT</td>
<td>Pla Pak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 platoon, 2d Bn., 13th RCT</td>
<td>Phu Sing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 platoon, 13th RCT</td>
<td>Nong Buu Lamphu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Co., 31 Bn.</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 A Team, SF Gp</td>
<td>Distributed among 0910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 3d RCT</td>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The shift in CT activity* is interpreted by US authorities as indicating that the 0910 plan has failed in one of its objectives—to shift the CT from the people. Figure 65 illustrates the seeping growth of CT activity confronting CSOC. Plans are being designed to prevent CT expansion beyond the dashed line shown on the map in Fig. 65.

(U) Operations devised by the 0910 plan have met with some success. For example, during the period January 1966 through May 1967, 186 CTs have been killed, over 2000 arrested (including CT supporters and suspects), and more than 1800 have surrendered. Government forces have captured 380 weapons and about 5000 rounds of small-arms ammunition (see Table 11). Data on the number and type of CPM operations and CT incidents during one sample reporting period are given in Table 12.
Fig. 65—CJOC Operational Areas
- Target areas under 0910 plan
- JSTs are assigned to combat CTs leaving target areas
- Surveillance teams organized from CA, VDC, and others

0 100 200 300 400 km
### TABLE 11
**Communist Personnel and Equipment Losses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defected</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured Weapons and Equipment&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon, total</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handmade shotguns</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>4966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives and equipment</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol radio receivers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical equipment</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents and memoranda</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other materials</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> 1 Jan 66--27 May 67.
<sup>b</sup> 1 Jan 66--31 Mar 67.

### TABLE 12
**Major Operations and Incidents, 10 May--28 June 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>CPM Actions</th>
<th>CT Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrons</td>
<td>Patrons with contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Udorn</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Nong Khai</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Ubong</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Kalasin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Laoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM Nakhon Phnom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSC CPM 5, in the North</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSC CPM 8, in the South</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial CSC, in the Central Plains</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

(3) The communist presence became increasingly disturbing and reached
the level of a national threat in the first half of this decade, as manifested in
the Northeast. It could be identified as the beginning of subversive insurgency-
latent and incipient. The beginning of the second half of the 1960’s revealed
organized guerrilla warfare taking place in two Northeast provinces: Sakon
Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom.

(4) Counteraction was entrusted to a National Security Command, a coun-
tel of ministers led by the Prime Minister. The execution of the program
rested mainly with the National, Provincial, and Border Patrol Police and was
passive in nature. Emphasis was placed on aid to the rural population and in-
telligence-information collection.

(5) The RTA forces seldom took the field, and it was not until the early
1960’s that significant deployment was undertaken as a reaction to the external
threat from Laos, rather than a response to communist activities, which were
at that time interpreted as a pressure from within. The military were held as
backup power, to be used only if absolutely necessary.

(6) As time passed and incidents increased, it became clear to some that
the situation might not be any more internal than the infamous Fifth Columns
of the WWII era. A few of the more perceptive saw that the present difficulty
would call for increasing effort and greater attention by the national government.
It would naturally follow that a greater effort would require larger forces and
extended responsibility. In short, the agency or personality that controlled the
communist-suppression activities would also enjoy a position of authority, re-
sponsibility, and importance that would parallel the growth of the threat. That
day, despite the existence of the National Security Command, CSOC was born.

(7) The CSOC experienced development problems, was less than success-
ful in gaining full cooperation from the many agencies marked for integration
into the counterinsurgency operation, and suffered from the struggle for con-
trol between civilian, military, and police authorities. Military actions were
response-type operations reminiscent of operations conducted by the national
fire brigade, except for those conducted at province level. These were civilian-
led and were independent and self-serving rather than integrated into the whole
counterinsurgency scheme. Intelligence operations have been noted to be nearly
exclusively the property of police elements or province-level administrator-
designed efforts. Reporting systems are designed but inconsistently used, and
information feedback to the tactical user is usually a response to demand rather
than systematic dissemination.

(8) One and one-half years of CSOC counterinsurgency operations have
netted many encouraging results. However, the armed CT strength has in-
creased; terrorism, propaganda, and military-action frequency rates are up;
despite the increased number of government forces deployed the CT movement
pattern covers a greater area.

(9) The increasing pressure from the military for a takeover of the opera-
tions in the Northeast has recently received support from the highest level in
the central government. If this situation should materialize, command and con-
trol problems—whether the approach is proper or improper—will be closer to
solution. Effectiveness of field operations under these circumstances should
improve, save for one obstacle: counterinsurgency intelligence. The military, abiding by its defined role of backup force, has neither developed the system nor practiced the technique of counterinsurgency intelligence in suppressing the insurgents, historically supported as the key success factor in antisu-
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Appendix A

TACTICAL-LEVEL COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE:
CRITICAL ELEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS

(u) MAJOR CATEGORIES

Communist regional political and military command, control, and support systems
- Insurgent sector command and control system
- Insurgent basing system
- Insurgent resource-input system
- Insurgent security system
- Insurgent movement pattern and network
- Scope and character of insurgent operations
- Types and numbers of insurgents; modus operandi and functional responsibilities

CRITICAL ELEMENTS BY CATEGORY

(u) Communist Regional Political and Military Command, Control, and Support Systems

(a) How does the regional apparatus exercise command and control and provide support to the subordinate sectors in terms of the following criteria?
   (1) Political activities (subversion and development of the masses)
   (2) Guerrilla and military operations
   (3) Propaganda themes and techniques
   (4) Recruitment
   (5) Training
   (6) Resource support: funds, weapons and ordnance, and communications
   (7) Intelligence, counterintelligence, and security

(b) What is the extent, nature, and form of the command and control exercised by the regional organization over subordinate sectors in terms of the following criteria?
   (1) Doctrine, policy, and direction
   (2) Command and operational control

(c) Where is the regional headquarters for operational command, control, and support?
(d) Where is the regional headquarters for political control? What is (are) the front organization(s)?
(e) What is the nature and extent of coordination between c and d; or, which entity (c or d) has primary influence over the other?
(f) What are the channels and frequency of coordination or contact between c and d?
(g) What are the channels, means, procedures for, and frequency of regionally controlled coordination of activities between sectors?
(h) Who are the top- and second-echelon personalities involved at the regional level—political, guerrilla, and military?

\( (v) \) \{C\} Insurgent Sector Command and Control System

(a) What is the order of battle in terms of the following criteria?
(1) Guerrilla bands: leaders and deputies, strength, operational areas and base locations, and general characteristics of band and level of development
(b) How are intrasector command, control, coordination, and support exercised and provided in terms of the following criteria?
(1) Channels of communications-liaison, routes used, cutouts, and frequency of contact
(2) Extent and success of sector-leader command, control, and direction (discipline)
(3) Retraining and development of insurgent leaders, cadre, and promising recruits
(c) What is the degree of functional specialization of sector-level operational and support elements?

\( (v) \) \{C\} Insurgent Basing System

(a) Within a sector, what criteria are used to determine the following?
(1) Locate and house command and control cadre (i.e., the political rear base);
(2) Locate and house operating personnel and military units
(3) Locate and conduct formalized training activities
(4) Site insurgent-support activities; e.g., ordnance, QM, medical, signal, and air support
(5) Select and establish temporary operational camps
(6) Select and designate mobile operational camps
(7) Select and designate assembly points
(8) Site and conduct military training at the village level

\( (v) \) \{C\} Insurgent Resource-Input System

(a) How are supplies initially acquired, transferred to CT cadre, transported, stored, and distributed?

\( (v) \) \{C\} Insurgent Security System

(a) What areas are or would be defended by armed guerrilla units?
(b) What main trails are controlled by checkpoints?
(c) What are the criteria for posting guards (surveillance or warning)?
(d) What is the method of receiving and transmitting warnings from villagers?

(3) **Insurgent Movement Pattern and Network**

(It is presumed that there exists a network of communications-liaison stations, points, there are guides and porters, and routes have been surveyed and established.)

(a) Within the sector, what is the movement network, by function, route, and echelon?
(b) What is the separation (distance) between communications-liaison stations?
(c) What are the criteria for setting communications-liaison stations?
(d) What is the movement network between sectors?
(i) At what echelon are inter-sector liaison maintained and movements authorized?

(4) **Scope and Character of Insurgent Operations**

(a) What are the categories of insurgent operations within a sector, in terms of the following criteria?

(1) Propaganda activities
- What villages involved
- If meeting, how conducted
- Duration and frequency
- Insurgents involved and number armed
- Type and extent of propaganda material distributed or used per meeting
- Other activities associated with meeting; e.g., organization attempts, recruitment, threats, information gathering, and food pickup

(2) Guerrilla and military activities (includes CT-initiated raids, clashes, harassment, terrorism, and sabotage)
- Targets and objectives of each CT-initiated operation
- Where, when (time of day and duration)
- Size of guerrilla force and weapons used
- Tactics employed
- After-action appraisal of the planning and conduct of the CT operation, including a gross estimate of ordnance expended by type, casualties both sides, weapons, supplies, and other material captured and lost

(3) Individuals targeted for assassination, kidnapping, intimidation, and terrorism
- Who—name and position
- Why was individual targeted
- Tactics employed
- Where and when
- Number of CTs involved and weapons
- Assessment of activity: apparent intelligence available to CT, and effectiveness of activity and/or objective
Types and Numbers of Insurgents; Modus Operandi and Functional Responsibilities

(a) How many insurgents are there of each type, and what are their methods of operation and functional responsibilities in each of the following categories?

(1) CPT members operating above village or Amphoe level
(2) CPT members operating at village level
(3) Military officer and parallel-level personnel (command, planning, training)
(4) Military noncommissioned and parallel operating-level cadre
(5) Specialists in propaganda dissemination and indoctrination
(6) Specialists in security and counterintelligence
(7) Other specialists, by type: ordnance, medical, sapper, communications, etc.
(8) Front-group organizers and leaders
(9) Local recruits for permanent assignment to military-type units
(10) Part-time guerrillas—village level
(11) Front-group members used to deliver and pickup food, conduct demonstrations, or act as porters or guides
(12) Coerced or intimidated locals
(13) Minority groups
Appendix B

ANALYSIS OF BASE AND CAMP AREAS IN
SAWANG DAEN DIN SAMPLE AREA

Following is a brief analysis of the physical, demographic, operational, and support aspects of each of the 18 base and camp areas within the Sawang Daen Din sample area, as discussed in Chap. 5 (see Fig. 49). These analyses were developed exclusively from study of 1:50,000 topographical maps on which were overlaid plots of known locations of the RTG 0910 plan defended villages and reported supply-pickup, -source, and-storage locations.

Area 1
Approximately 9 sq km.
Six intermittent northbound streams that support 30 percent paddy in the area. A 180- to 200-m elevation slopes to the north. Fourteen or more cart tracks connect two RTG 0910 plan defended villages in the area with the many potential insurgent target villages in all directions just outside the area. The defended village in the northeast section has a 250- by 200-m perennial pond 0.75 km to the west. The district capital, Sawang Daen Din, is 5 km north of the area's center. One supply source and one supply-pickup point were reported in the southwestern section of the area.

Area 2
Approximately 1 sq km.
The highest elevation in this area is 160 m. The one intermittent stream in the area flows east to support the 30 percent paddy. The nearest defended village is 5.5 km to the southwest. The nearest outside village is 1.5 km to the east. A major road, Number 26, which is a continuation of 18 running through Sakon Nakhon, cuts through the northern portion of the area. Two cart tracks connect the two villages in the area to others outside to the east and southeast. One supply-pickup point was reported in the area with an additional three points reported between 3 and 6 km to the southeast.

Area 3
Approximately 1 sq km.
This area is characterized by a flat plain at an elevation of 170 m. There are no streams and the nearest paddy is 0.75 km northeast. There is a perennial pond 2 km southeast. The nearest defended village is 3 km to the west and
another village is 2.5 km northeast. One cart track runs through the north section of the area. Three supply-pickup points (the same three reported in Area 2) were reported. They are 4 to 6 km to the northeast.

Area 4

Approximately 1 sq km.
The mean elevation of the area is 170 m over flat plain that consists of 50 percent paddy, for which there is no visible water; however, intermittent streams flow 1 km to the south and north. An 0910 defended village is 4 km to the south. The town in the area is connected by three cart tracks running to village complexes to the north and southeast. There were three reports that the area was used as a supply-pickup point for the insurgents.

Area 5

Approximately 1.5 sq km.
The area consists of a flat plain at 190-m elevation, with the nearest paddy 0.75 km to the south. There is one 0910 defended village 2 km west and another 2.5 km southeast. An intermittent stream lies 1 km southwest. There are no apparent footpaths or tracks. One supply source was reported 1 km to the southwest.

Area 6

Approximately 1.5 sq km.
The two intermittent streams in this area flow north and east from 190 and 180 m in elevation. Five percent of the north sector is paddy. One 0910 village is 5 km to the northwest and one 3 km to the north (the same two reported in Area 5). The nearest nondefended village is Ban Phom Saun, 3.5 km south. A cart track runs east-west through the area. Two pickup points are in the area and one supply source is 2 km from the center of the area.

Area 7

Approximately 3 sq km.
The villages of Ban Lao, Ban Khoh Klaug, and Ban Khop Phutsa are tied together with cart tracks that also service the surrounding village complexes. There are two pickup points in the area and one 5 km to the northeast. At 170-180 m in the eastern sector are four intermittent streams flowing northeast. Two RTG 0910 villages are 1.5 km from the area and are connected to it by cart tracks. There were two reports of insurgent pickup points within the area, and one 2 km to the northwest.

Area 8

Approximately 1 sq km.
One intermittent stream irrigates the paddy that covers 100 percent of the area. One perennial pond is 1.5 km to the southeast. The area is a flat plain at an elevation of 170 m. Seven cart tracks run from Ban Tan Kon to villages outside the area. The nearest 0910 village is 7.5 km southwest. A pickup point was reported 1.5 km southwest (the same point reported near Area 7).
Area 9

Approximately 3.5 sq km.
Three intermittent streams in the southern sector supply 10 percent paddy at 180-m elevation. There are 4 sq km of paddy to the south and east. Ban Dong Mafai is connected to the surrounding villages by two cart tracks. The nearest village outside the area is 1.5 km to the south and an 0910 village is 1.2 km east. Two pickup points were reported: one on the western border and one 1.5 km to the south.

Area 10

Approximately 4 sq km.
Area 10 has 60 percent paddy at 190-m elevation. Water is derived from two intermittent streams. A perennial pond 1.5 by 200 m lies 1.7 km southeast. The nearest defended village is 2.5 km northwest, just outside Area 9. Two cart tracks run east. The area is divided in half by the Amphoe boundary. One village is on the southeast border and one just outside the area in the northeast corner. One insurgent pickup point was reported at the western border.

Area 11

Approximately 1 sq km.
The nearest paddy is 0.75 km to the south. An intermittent stream touches the southern border and a perennial pond 150 by 150 m lies in the southwest sector. Bau Nong Phai is 1 km from the area and the nearest defended village is 0.5 km to the southwest. There are four 0910 villages between 2 and 3 km to the north and northeast. An insurgent pickup point was reported just outside the defended village of Ban Song Dao. Three cart tracks run through the area at 210-m elevation.

Area 12

Approximately 1.5 sq km.
Grade 2 and 3 slopes with escarpments and high plateau 500 by 250 m. Peak is 622-m elevation. The nearest paddy is 1.25 km south, with an intermittent stream 1 km south. No footpaths are apparent in this area. The nearest village is 6 km southwest and the nearest defended village is 5 km northeast. The Amphoe boundary is 1.25 km southeast. Between 5.5 and 6 km to the southwest is one pickup point and one supply source.

Area 13

Approximately 4 sq km.
There are grade 2 slopes 200-500 m high. Five intermittent streams flow northeast. There is a paddy 400 by 100 m in the northeast sector at 210-m elevation. The paddy is plentiful 1.5 km northeast of the area. No paths run through the area. The Amphoe boundary touches the east border. The nearest village is an 0910, 3 km north. This village was also a pickup point for the insurgents before the establishment of the defended village.
Area 14

Approximately 3.5 sq km.

Two intermittent streams flow through the center of the area along the Amphoe boundary at 200-m elevation and nourish 30 percent paddy. There is also a perennial pond 175 by 175 m in the eastern sector. Five cart tracks connect the area to village complexes outside. One village and two 0910 villages are within the northern border. An insurgent pickup point was reported in the area at the northeast corner.

Area 15

Approximately 4.5 sq km.

Four intermittent streams flow northeast down grade 2 slopes to a plateau 210 m high. There is a high point of 420 m in the south. The 0910 village in the northeast is surrounded by 5 percent paddy. One cart track connects the area to the nearest village 4 km northeast. The nearest 0910 village outside the area is 3.2 km north.

Area 16

Approximately 1 sq km.

One intermittent pond 125 by 125 m on the southwest border supplies the only water in this area. One perennial stream lies 4 km southeast. There is a paddy on the southeast border and near the village in the eastern sector. One cart track links the defended village 0.75 km north and one 1 km south. There is one pickup point 4.5 km northwest of the area, one 6.2 km southeast, and one 9 km south.

Area 17

Approximately 1 sq km.

The nearest paddy is 2.7 km north. One intermittent stream flows north at 300-m elevation. One cart track runs through the area to the nearest village 2.5 km north. The nearest 0910 village is 4.5 km northwest. The slopes in this area are grade 1. There is one pickup point 3 km northwest and two more between 3 and 4 km to the northeast. There is also a supply source 4 km to the northeast.

Area 18

Approximately 1.5 sq km.

The northern half of the area ranges from grade 2 and 3 slopes to high plateau. Peak is at 471-m elevation. Two intermittent streams flow south. The nearest paddy is 275 km northwest. The Amphoe boundary is 1.5 km north. The nearest village is 575 km northwest and the nearest 0910 village is 7.5 km to the east. There is one footpath near the northern border. Three pickup points and one supply source were reported between 6 and 8 km to the northwest (the same as in Area 17).
Appendix C

ANALYSIS OF BASE AND CAMP AREAS
IN NA KAE SAMPLE AREA

ANALYSIS OF 63 AREAS, BASED ON TOPOGRAPHICAL MAPS

Following is the brief analysis of the physical, demographic, operational, and support aspects of each of the 63 base and camp areas described within the Na Kae sample area as discussed in Chap. 5 (see Fig. 50). These analyses were developed exclusively from study of 1:50,000 topographical maps on which were overlaid plots of known locations of the RTG 0910 plan defended villages and reported supply-pickup, -source, and storage locations.

Area 1
Approximately 12 sq km.
From an elevation of 400 m, four perennial streams flow south to the valley 200 m below. A plateau of 500 to 529 m covers 30 percent of the area.
It appears to be protected by escarpments. A footpath crosses the plateau from the village, Ban Nong Rak Khawal. Slopes are grade 2 and 3. Paddy is 5 km southwest. The nearest village is 8 km northeast. The nearest defended village is 5.5 km south. One pickup point was reported 4 km from the northern border.

Area 2
Approximately 3.5 sq km.
Twenty-five percent of this area consists of a high plateau that rises from 500 to 586 m. Two perennial streams flow from an elevation of 350 m and 400 m. Slopes are grade 2 and 3 through 75 percent of the area. The nearest village and defended village are 5 and 6.5 km from the area, respectively. The only paddy is 3.5 km north. No footpaths appear on the map. An insurgent pickup point was reported 3 km northeast of the area (the same point reported in Area 1).

Area 3
Approximately 4 sq km.
Grade 2 slopes rise from 200 m in the north to 500 m in a distance of 2.5 km to the south. Paddy is 2 km northeast. One perennial stream flows north from an elevation of 340 m. The closest village is 5 km; the nearest
0910 village is 4.2 km. There are no footpaths. The same pickup point reported in Areas 1 and 2 is east of this area.

(1) Area 4

Approximately 6 sq km.

Three perennial streams flow north from a height of 400 to 460 m to the valley floor at 200 m. There are grade 2 and 3 slopes throughout the area. Paddy is 2.25 km north of the area. A footpath crosses the area from north to south from 200 m to a high of 500 m. It is 5 km to the nearest village and 3 km to the nearest defended village. One insurgent pickup point is on the northern border. Four pickup points and one supply source are reported between 3 and 3.5 km to the northeast. These are centrally located between Areas 4, 5, and 9. One pickup point and one supply source are 5 and 6 km northeast, respectively.

(1) Area 5

Approximately 10 sq km.

Three footpaths climb over the mountains to a height of 520 m. Three perennial streams flow north from an elevation of 400 m. Three plateaus, 200 to 100 m by 428, 522, and 641 m, respectively, allow for 360-deg protective visibility. Paddy is 1.5 km north. The slopes are grade 2. The nearest 0910 village is just outside the area on the east and Ban Phon Tum is 6 km to the northeast. There are three pickup points, two in the east and one in the southwest. See Area 4 for those adjacent to the eastern border.

(1) Area 6

Approximately 9 sq km.

The paddy source is 6 km south of the area. The slopes are grade 2 and 3. Five perennial streams flow south from high points of 500 m. One footpath crosses the area north–south along a ridge 500 m high. Ban Kaeng is 10.5 km northeast across slopes of grade 2 and 3. The nearest defended village built on the same type of slopes, is 5.1 km south. There are three or more escarpments in the area. The nearest village is Bau Kham Noh Kok, 3 km to the northwest. This village is located in Area 31. The defended village is 4.5 km to the south. There were no reports of insurgent pickup points or supply sources in the immediate vicinity. Those reported for Areas 4 and 5 are between 4 and 9 km to the north.

(1) Area 7

Approximately 4 sq km.

Half the area consists of a high plateau. Two perennial streams, one on the eastern border and one on the western border, flow south from 400 m. Two plateaus, stretching 4.5 km between the streams, are faced with escarpments. The slopes are grade 2 and 3 throughout 50 percent of the area. The closest nondefended village is 12.4 km northeast. The nearest 0910 village is 2.2 km south. The paddy area is 2 km south. There is no reported activity within 8 km of this area.
Area 8

Approximately 6 sq. km.

The area is dominated by two small plateaus, 100 by 250 m and 450 by 568 m, respectively. The eastern border may have escarpments on the grade 2 and 3 slopes. Three footpaths, one along a perennial stream flowing north, rise from a plain 190 to 400 m. Paddy is located 2 km north. The nearest village is 3.5 km north; the 0910 village is 6.5 km east. Two pickup points and one supply source were reported between 4 and 8 km from the area in a northeast direction. One supply source is located 5 km northwest of the area.

Area 9

Approximately 5 sq km.

This area is traversed by two cart tracks and five footpaths that serve the two villages on the northern border. One perennial stream flows northeast from 170-150 m into the Hua Nam Kam. The area is a flat plain. Paddy production is beginning south of the villages. A defended village is on the northern border. The area north of the villages is 100 percent paddy. One pickup point and two supply sources are within the area.

Area 10

Approximately 17 sq km.

The area has two intermittent streams in the northeast quarter. Paddy covers 50 percent of the flat plain. Three villages to the east and south are 4 km away. The nearest defended village is 8 km south. Twelve or more footpaths and four cart tracks wind throughout the terrain in a north–south direction. One pickup point is reported in the area and a supply source is 6 km to the southwest.

Area 11

Approximately 15 sq km.

Two intermittent streams supply water for the paddy that covers 50 percent of this area. The area has six or more footpaths and cart tracks connecting two villages in the area. The area is a flat plain, reaching an elevation of 150-160 m. This area is reported to be a source of supplies for the insurgents. A cluster of 0910 villages is 4 km north. One pickup point was reported 5 km to the southwest.

Area 12

Approximately 4 sq km.

The area is 160 to 170 m in elevation, through which one intermittent stream flows south. Paddy is sparse, but there is good paddy 1 km south. The nearest village is 4 km to the south, and three defended villages are the same distance to the northeast. One supply source was reported 3 km north.

Area 13

Approximately 12 sq km.
The elevation of this area is 170 to 179 m. It contains 25 percent paddy and is fed by three intermittent streams flowing south. Two perennial ponds are situated along a perennial stream 5 km to the southwest. The nearest village is 5 km to the west and a defended village is 8 km to the east. The area is situated on an Amphoe boundary. One supply source is in the northwest corner.

Area 14

Approximately 5 sq km.
Two footpaths run north-south through sparse paddy. One intermittent stream flows south from an elevation of 170 m. The area is situated between two villages 4 km to the east and west. One perennial pond is 2.25 km to the east. Paddy covers only 5 percent of the area, but there is good paddy 1 km to the southeast. The nearest 0910 village is 8.5 km northeast. The supply source was reported 4.5 km to the northwest.

Area 15

Approximately 11 sq km.
One perennial river, Nam Bang, is in the northern section and flows south from an elevation of 156 m. Three intermittent streams flow south. These streams aid irrigation of the 60 percent paddy in the south. The area contains one village in the south and one 0910 village inside the northern border. Large villages to the east and south are connected by cart tracks and footpaths. One supply source and one storage area are reported 6 to 6.5 km northwest in Area 43.

Area 16

Approximately 1.4 sq km.
One small village is surrounded by 80 percent paddy that is fed by the Hual Nam Kam, flowing at an elevation of 145 m. One perennial pond, 100 by 1 km, is on the western border. Two cart tracks and one footpath connect the area to a village 1 km south. The nearest 0910 village is 6 km south. One pickup point was reported in the area and one supply source was reported 4 km southwest.

Area 17

Approximately 2.5 sq km.
Three perennial streams flow south from an elevation of 250 m. There are no footpaths in the area. There is paddy near the area to the southeast. The nearest village is 6 km east and the nearest defended village is 2.5 km southeast. Two supply sources were reported within 3.5 km to the southeast.

Area 18

Approximately 3 sq km.
The area is 50 percent paddy. Two villages lie within the area in the north and east. Two perennial streams flow east from 190-m elevation. Two intermittent ponds, each 200 by 300 m, are 2 km east of this area. One road
and five footpaths link the area to villages outside. One defended village is also located within the area. The area is used by the insurgents as a source of supplies and as a pickup area.

(\(A\)) Area 19

Approximately 2.5 sq km.

The area is a waterless plain at an elevation of 190 m. One perennial stream is 2 km north and one intermittent stream is 1.5 km south. Paddy covers only 10 percent of the area. One footpath and one cart track link the closest villages to the area. The nearest village and defended villages are 3 km north and 3.5 km northwest, respectively. The closest pickup point was reported 6 km southwest.

(\(A\)) Area 20

Approximately 2 sq km.

One perennial stream, touching the northwest border, flows from an elevation of 200 m in a southerly direction. An intermittent stream on the eastern border flows east from 190-m elevation. The area contains 10 percent paddy in the north. A defended village is 3 km east. One footpath connects the area to an 0910 village 3 km to the south. One pickup point was reported 4 km south.

(\(A\)) Area 21

Approximately 1.5 sq km.

Two cart tracks and three footpaths lead to a streamless plain at an elevation of 170 m. An intermittent stream lies 1.5 km east and the Bang Sai River is 3 km south. There is one 0910 village in the area. The nearest non-defended village is 5.5 km northwest in Area 20. One pickup point was reported 2.5 km west.

(\(A\)) Area 22

Approximately 2.5 sq km.

In the northern section one perennial stream flows south from an elevation of 400 m. Just outside the eastern border, a perennial stream also flows south. The slopes in this area are grade 2. The nearest village is 12.5 km north and the nearest 0910 village is 11 km southeast. No paths are indicated on the map. The storage point in Area 31 is 45 km north of this area.

(\(A\)) Area 23

Approximately 1.5 sq km.

The Bang Sai River flows through half the length of the area, is joined by two perennial streams, and then flows south. Two footpaths at 180 m run north-west and north-south. There is paddy 4 km southeast. The nearest village is 16 km north through 400- to 500-m heights or 22 km to the southeast over the river plain. There is one 0910 village within the area. The nearest activity reported is 9.5 km northwest of the area.
Area 24
Approximately 1.5 sq km.
Two 300- to 400-m escarpments run on both sides of two perennial streams
flowing to the Huai Bang Sai River 2.5 km north. The slopes are grade 2 and
3. No footpaths are apparent in this area. There is paddy 3 km east of the
area. One perennial stream 1.5 km to the west flows north. The nearest non-
defended village is 19.5 km southeast and the 0910 village is 7.5 km northwest.
The nearest reported activity is 13 km northwest of the area.

Area 25
Approximately 1 sq km.
There are no streams or footpaths in the area. Slopes of grade 2 and 3
reach an elevation of 534 m. The nearest paddy is 3.5 km east at an elevation
of 180 m. It is 9.5 km east to the nearest village and 4 km north to the closest
0910 village. There are perennial streams 1 km west, 1.5 km north, 2.5 km
northeast, and 2 km southeast. The nearest pickup point is 10 km to the east
near Area 21.

Area 26
Approximately 1 sq km.
The Bang Sai River flows southeast through 30 percent paddy at an eleva-
tion of 180 m. One perennial stream flows east to the river. Two footpaths
follow the river. One heads south over the heights at 240 m and on to paddy at
3.5 km. The nearest village is 8.5 km east. One defended village is 0.5 km
south and one 1.5 km northwest. There are a few grade 2 slopes. There is
nothing reported in the area 7.5 km east to the pickup point.

Area 27
Approximately 1 sq km.
One perennial stream starts at 360 m and flows south, protected by grade
2 and 3 slopes and escarpments to the northeast and west. One footpath touches
the northeast border at 500 m. The nearest village is connected by this path
5 km north. The closest defended village is 5.5 km to the south. There is a
small amount of paddy 3.5 km south. There is no activity reported 6 km north-
west to pickup point.

Area 28
Approximately 1 sq km.
The slopes are grade 2 at 200 m over all this area. There are no foot-
paths. One perennial stream is 0.5 km east, and there is paddy 0.75 km north-
east at 170-m elevation. The nearest storage area is located 4.5 km northwest.
The nearest village is located 4 km northwest and the nearest 0910 village is
5.5 km from the area.

Area 29
Approximately 1 sq km.
The elevation in this area is 190 m. It is situated between two perennial streams flowing north. One footpath connects to a village 1 km north. The footpath also connects Area 1 and Area 27. The paddy is sparse throughout the area. A defended village is 5 km north. Three pickup points and three supply sources are reported within 6 km of the area.

Area 30
Approximately 1 sq km.
This area is 20 percent paddy plain at an elevation of 170 m. There is one sparse kilometer of paddy 0.5 km east. The nearest water is a perennial stream 0.75 km west. Three footpaths hit the fringe on the south, east, and northeast. The nearest village, which contains 2 sq km of paddy, is 3 km south; an 0910 village is also 3 km south.

Area 31
Approximately 1 sq km.
The slopes in the area are grades 1 and 2 at 300- to 350-m elevation. Two perennial streams flow south through small villages. One footpath is 1.5 km northeast. A defended village is 7.5 km northeast along a cart track into town. The nearest paddy is 6 km northeast. One pickup point is 2 km away in Area 5.

Area 32
Approximately 1 sq km.
The area is on a high plateau at an elevation of 500 to 520 m. Fifty percent of the area is obscured by cloud cover. No footpaths are apparent in the visible portion of the area. Two perennial streams 3.5 km north and northeast run north from 350-m elevation. Paddy is 7 km to the north. The nearest village is 85 km northeast and the nearest defended village is 11 km east. A storage point was reported in the area.

Area 33
Approximately 1 sq km.
One perennial stream 0.5 km east flows northeast from 300-m elevation. The slopes are grade 2 at 340 to 400 m throughout the area. The nearest paddy is 2.75 km northeast at 190-m elevation. Two villages 5 km northeast have footpaths to the bottom of foothills. A defended village is 10 km northeast. A supply source is 3.5 km to the northeast.

Area 34
Approximately 1 sq km.
One perennial stream flows through the area at 280-m elevation heading north. Grade 2 slopes extend down to the plain at 190-m elevation. The nearest paddy is 2.5 km east and the nearest village is 4 km east. A defended village is 10 km east. A supply source is 2.5 km east (the same source reported for Area 33).
(v) Area 35

Approximately 1 sq km.

The area consists of a flat plain with 50 percent paddy at 180-m elevation. One perennial stream flows north. Footpaths lead to several towns. Route 223 is 4.4 km north via footpath and cart track. Foothills are 1.5 km south. The nearest village is 2 km north. A defended village is 10 km east. Two supply sources are reported just west of this area.

(v) Area 36

Approximately 1 sq km.

An intermittent stream borders on the east. A flat plain consisting of 50 percent paddy is at 170-m elevation. Two intermittent ponds are 1 km to the east and southwest. A perennial pond, 200 by 700 m, is 3 km to the east. Route 223 is 1 km north. The nearest village is 1.5 km northwest and the nearest 0910 village is 7 km southeast.

(v) Area 37

Approximately 1 sq km.

An intermittent stream flows south through the center of the area. One perennial stream is 1 km west. Paddy covers 50 percent of the area. There are two villages in the area, but it is 7.5 km to a defended village. Three footpaths lead to a village 2.5 km south and northeast. An insurgent pickup point was reported 4 km northeast of the area.

(v) Area 38

Approximately 1 sq km.

Ban Nong Sang borders on Nong Sang Lake on the west. Paddy is plentiful at an elevation of 150 m. The village in the area is connected to others outside by four cart tracks. A defended village is 3.5 km south of the area. Two supply sources were reported within the area.

(v) Area 39

Approximately 1 sq km.

One perennial stream flows through the center of the area at 140-m elevation. One perennial pond touches the eastern border. The area itself contains only 10 percent paddy, but is surrounded by paddy. A cart track and footpath pass 1 km to the south and west. The nearest village is 1 km southwest. A defended village is 9 km south. One supply source is reported 4.2 km west of the area.

(v) Area 40

Approximately 1 sq km.

One perennial stream flows south at 140-m elevation. Nam Bang River is 0.5 km southeast. The area is a flat plain with 10 percent paddy. Paddy surrounds the area. There are no footpaths in the area. The nearest village
is 0.75 km west. A defended village is 10.5 km southwest. A supply source is reported 5 km to the southeast (the same source reported in Area 39).

(Area 41)

Approximately 1 sq km.
The area includes part of Ban Phra Song and is connected by three cart tracks and one footpath going north and south to villages outside the area. A village borders on Nam Bang River. There is paddy throughout the area. The nearest 0910 village is 8.5 km north. The same supply source reported in Area 39 is 6.5 km southwest of the area.

(Area 42)

Approximately 1 sq km.
The Nam Bang River cuts through the southwest corner of the area. One intermittent stream flows south into the Nam Bang. The area consists of 50 percent paddy at 140-m altitude. There are no footpaths. The nearest village is 0.5 km east. A planned defended village is 5.5 km northeast. The nearest reported activity is a supply source 8 km northwest in Area 43.

(Area 43)

Approximately 1 sq km.
The nearest water to this area is the Nam Bang River 1.5 km east. The area is a flat plain with 10 percent paddy at an altitude of 150 m. No footpaths are in the area. The nearest 0910 village is 1 km north. The closest non-defended village is 6 km southeast. One supply source is 2.5 km to the northwest.

(Area 44)

Approximately 4 sq km.
Five intermittent streams flow northwest from an elevation of 300 to 400 m and empty into the Huai Tham, a perennial stream. Slopes are grade 2 except in the northwest sector, which is flat plain at 190-m elevation. The plain supports only sparse paddy, but plentiful paddy starts at the northwest border. There are no footpaths. The nearest village is 5 km northwest and the nearest defended village is 11.5 km east. A supply source is reported 6.5 km to the northwest.

(Area 45)

Approximately 2 sq km.
The flat plain supports 40 percent paddy at 180-m elevation. The paddy is plentiful just outside the area to the northeast and northwest. One intermittent pond, 100 by 100 m, is located in the center of the area and one perennial stream flows north inside the west border. Two cart tracks run north to the village and south to footpaths going over the hills. Two pickup points are reported 3 km to the northwest. The same supply source for Area 44 is 4.5 km northeast of this area. The nearest village is 1.5 km north and the nearest 0910 village is 17 km east.
Area 46

Approximately 1 sq km.

One intermittent stream flows northwest and supports 5 percent paddy on flat plain at 180- to 190-m elevation. The slopes are grade 1. The nearest village is 3 km northwest. This village has abundant paddy. The nearest 0910 village is 12.5 km east. A supply source is 3.5 km northwest of the area.

Area 47

Approximately 1 sq km.

There are no streams in the area. An intermittent stream 1 km south flows northwest at 360-m elevation. The slopes in the area are grade 1 and 2 at 300-m elevation. Good paddy is located 3.4 km southwest. The nearest village is 6 km west and the nearest 0910 village is 10 km east. The supply source located 6 km northwest is the same reported in previous areas.

Area 48

Approximately 1 sq km.

The elevation of the area is 200 to 300 m with grade 1 and 2 slopes. The nearest intermittent streams are 7.5 km northwest of the border and 1 km northeast of the border. A footpath 1 km north runs into cart tracks 1.4 km northeast from the area's center. The nearest village is 4.4 km northwest. A defended village is 9 km east. Paddy is located 2 km northeast. One supply source is 7.5 km west of this area and one is 4.5 km northwest.

Area 49

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The area is flat plain at an elevation of 180 to 200 m. An intermittent stream is 0.40 km from the south border. A cart track is 1.8 km northwest and paddy is 0.75 km northwest. The nearest town is 1.5 km north and the nearest 0910 village is 11.8 km southeast. A supply source is 1.5 km northwest of the area.

Area 50

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

One intermittent stream flowing north touches the west border. Another intermittent stream is 0.70 km southeast and flows northeast. A cart track and one footpath in the northern half of the area tie the area to the nearest village 2 km northeast. There is a flat plain at 170-m elevation with 15 percent paddy. There is good paddy 0.70 km southeast. One perennial pond, 100 by 100 m, is in the center of the area. Route 223 is 2.5 km northeast. A defended village is 3.5 km east. The same supply source is 5 km southwest of the area.

Area 51

Approximately 1 sq km.

One perennial stream flows northwest from 340-m elevation. The center of the area is protected by escarpments 0.70 km to the east and west at 500-m
Approximately 0.5 sq km.

One intermittent stream, inside the eastern border, flows north from 380-m elevation. The slopes are grade 2 at an altitude of 360 to 400 m. Paddy is located 3 km north. One footpath touches the western border. The nearest village is 3.5 km southwest. It is 14.2 km southwest to the nearest 0910 village. A pickup point is 2.5 km southwest.

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

From an elevation of 320 m, one intermittent stream flows northeast. Grade 1 and 2 slopes lead to a high plateau at an elevation of 343 m. The nearest paddy is 1.25 km north. One footpath 1.5 km to the northeast runs to a village 2.5 km southeast of the area. The nearest 0910 village is 10.5 km southwest. An Amphoe boundary lies 2 km south. The same point reported in Area 52 is 2.75 km east of the area.

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The nearest perennial stream is 0.80 km south of the area at an elevation of 200 m. Grade 1, 2, and 3 slopes reach to a high of 300 m. A footpath is 0.75 km southeast. The Amphoe boundary runs east-west through the center of the area. There is paddy 1.1 km to the southwest. The nearest town is 1.5 km southeast. The nearest defended village is 10.25 km southeast. The same pickup point reported in Area 52 is 2.4 km northeast of this area.

Approximately 1 sq km.

One perennial stream touches the southeast border point. Slopes of grade 1, 2, and 3 with escarpments reach a high point of 426 m. A patch of paddy, 200 by 200 m, is along a stream and there is good paddy 1.4 km north along the same winding stream, the Huai Bang Soi Noi. One footpath is 1.2 km to the northeast in a flat river valley at an elevation of 190 m. The nearest village is 4 km southeast. A defended village is 10.4 km southwest. The Amphoe boundary is 1.2 km north. The same pickup point reported in Area 52 is 4.5 km southeast of the area.

Approximately 1.2 sq km.

One perennial stream flows south. There is one village with sparse paddy.
One footpath goes through the area. Slopes are grade 2, reaching a high of 220 m. An 0910 village is 10.25 km southwest. It is 8.5 km to the storage area reported in Area 32. It is 8 km northeast to the pickup point mentioned in Area 52.

Area 57

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

One perennial stream is 1.1 km east and another is 1.2 km west of the area. The nearest paddy is 2.5 km southwest. Slopes are grade 2 and 3 with a high of 420 m. There is a footpath 90 km northwest of the area over an escarpment. The nearest village is 2.8 km southwest, and the nearest 0910 village is 9.3 km southeast. It is 6 km northeast to the same supply source reported in Areas 56 and 58 and northwest to the pickup point reported in Area 52.

Area 58

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

Two intermittent streams join in the area and flow east at 320-m elevation. The area has no footpaths. The Amphoe boundary is 1.5 km southwest. Paddy is 3 km southwest in the adjacent Amphoe. The slope grade is 1. The nearest village is 6.5 km southwest, and the nearest 0910 village is 3 km southeast. It is 10.5 km to the nearest supply source.

Area 59

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

An intermittent stream is 0.80 km from the southeast border. Slopes are grade 1 at 280- to 300-m elevation. Paddy is sparse in the northern sector. There are no footpaths. The area is 4.8 km north of the Amphoe boundary. One village is within the area and an 0910 village lies 5.5 km southeast. It is 7.5 km northeast to the nearest supply source (reported in Area 58).

Area 60

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The area is a flat plain at an elevation of 200 m. One intermittent stream flows east, and one perennial stream 1.5 km south flows east. Paddy is 0.60 km to the northeast. There are no footpaths, but one cart track passes the area 1.1 km to the east. This cart track leads to the nearest village, 2.25 km north. It is 13.25 km to the nearest 0910 village. It is 1.75 km south to the nearest supply source (reported in Area 58).

Area 61

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The area consists of a flat plain with four intermittent streams feeding 90 percent paddy at 190-m elevation. A village touches the southern border. Another village is 1.75 km east. The nearest 0910 village is 16.25 km south. One footpath passes through the area. One pickup point is on the southern border. There are also two pickup points 2 km to the east.
(U) **Area 62**

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The area is a flat plain that contains 40 percent paddy at 180-m elevation. A cart track touches the southern boundary. The Huai Nam Phung River passes 0.80 km to the east. This area is in the center of the town complex. The nearest village is 1.25 km east. Two 0910 villages are 18 km south and 18 km east, respectively. One pickup point is 1.75 km northwest.

( U) **Area 63**

Approximately 0.5 sq km.

The area is a flat plain that has sparse paddy at an elevation of 180 m. Paddy is abundant 0.5 km east and 1.25 km southeast. One intermittent pond is 0.70 km east and a river is 2.5 km east. The nearest town and 0910 village are 1.4 km and 19 km east, respectively. One supply source is 2.3 km northwest of the area, and another is 2.7 km northwest. A third source is 8.5 km to the northeast.

**ANALYSIS OF SIX BASE AND CAMP AREAS BASED ON AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY**

(U) **Area 1**

The forest is moderately dense except for many small man-made clearings and sparse, steeper mountain sides. Footpaths or logging tracks leave the clearings, but they are only faintly discernible through the canopy. One footpath, north-south, is well defined inside the eastern border. What appear to be houses and signs of human habitation can be seen in several small clearings about 1 km north of coordinate 395615. Two perennial streams would ensure upland crops, but the aerial photos show no evidence of cultivation. The area, with its tree-covered mountains and escarpments, offers excellent concealment for training facilities. The cleared patches are adequate for helicopter pads and seem to contain only low shrubs.

(U) **Area 2**

The forest is moderately dense except in the central and northeast sections, where it is sparse with much exposed bedrock. There are a few cleared areas, but logging trails and footpaths are not discernible. One perennial stream cuts through the western section, but no cultivation is visible. Even in the sections of sparse vegetation the growth appears tall enough to provide good horizontal protection, except in the completely shrubless portions; these do not appear to be extensively used since no tracks are evident. Helicopters could, of course, find landing zones in these shrubless sections and in a few clearings. One perennial stream, northeast of an escarpment 1 km from the eastern border, starts its flow northeast to the plains. The area contains slope grades from flat to escarpment, but the high plateau is mostly rolling hills.
(U) **Area 3**

The forest is dense, with many man-made clearings and a few weathered heights where the bedrock is exposed. Two perennial streams join and flow north. There are many clearings 200 m on both sides of the fork. Sparse cultivation at 220-m elevation in some clearings does not appear to be paddy. Paddy starts 1 km northeast and northwest of the fork. Area 3 is 50 percent cloud- and shadow-obscured and therefore the footpath indicated on the AMS map is not visible. Helicopters could land only in the valley clearings or possibly in clearings on the hilltops 1 km south of the fork. The canopy offers excellent cover throughout the area, but houses are visible in the vicinity of the fork of the streams.

(U) **Area 4**

The forest is very dense in the southern 75 percent of the area, except for the weathered mountains along the western border. There are very few clearings in this portion of the area. One well-defined footpath runs north-south inside the eastern border. Two perennial streams provide for sparse paddy and other crops in the northern 25 percent of the area. In this portion many footpaths link the cultivated fields and head north to villages 4 km away. The canopy is thick enough throughout the rest of the area to prevent aerial detection of human presence.

(U) **Area 5**

The forest is dense except for man-made clearings and the tops of the weathered mountains, which are covered with sparse shrubs. Three perennial streams start at about 400-m elevation and flow north. Helicopters could land on the sparse mountaintops and in the clearings, particularly in the paddy in the northeast. The area has four footpaths, three more than the AMS map indicates. The canopy is thick enough to offer good concealment, and the area is far enough from villages to be able to contain training camps.

(U) **Area 6**

The forest is dense, providing good cover throughout the area. The northwest, about 25 percent of the area, is cultivated along two perennial streams. The clearings are clean and would be excellent helicopter landing zones. There is one footpath inside the eastern border. The area is mountainous, particularly the eastern half, which contains several escarpments. The area is isolated and would be excellent for training camps. The cultivated clearings in the northwest are connected with discernible footpaths where the canopy is less thick. A few houses are visible along the tree line in some clearings.
Appendix D

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT

SUMMARY

Because of Communist China’s position as a leading communist nation in Asia and her relations with the CPT, the subversive activities in Thailand follow Peking’s concept of people’s war. The insurgents in Thailand are launching a Maoist protracted war against the RTG. A subversive movement of this form calls for gaining support of the masses through integrating political, economic, social, and military aspects using protracted time and space factors. Although both Communist China and North Vietnam offer considerable assistance to the subversive movement in Thailand by training personnel at all levels, the local insurgents themselves are Thai. They are encouraged to be self-sufficient. The Chinese claim that Mao Tse-tung has developed a revolutionary methodology applicable to all the underdeveloped countries in the world, and that the war in Vietnam and the subversive insurgency in Thailand are tests of the validity of Mao’s methodology. The insurgency in Thailand costs Peking and Hanoi very little, and there is no reason why they could not support it over a protracted period.

The CPT party structure breaks down considerably when it reaches the regional level. Committees below the region are usually appointed and organized according to the number of members available in a given area. Overall direction and responsibility for activities in the Northeast are shouldered by the Northeast branch of the Party Central Committee. At times members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau participate in subversive activities in the region as well.

Both Communist China and North Vietnam offer considerable training facilities and financial assistance to CPT. The Pathet Lao also contribute aid in the form of training sites, infiltration routes, sanctuaries, and other conveniences. At the same time, Vietnamese refugees assist the Thai insurgents in the Northeast.

HISTORY

The origin of the CPT dates back to 1926, when the predominantly Chinese “Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Group” was founded in Singapore. The group was under the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party, which
in turn was subordinate to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. For its activities in Thailand the Nanyang Communist Group established a "Siam Special Committee" in 1928; the members were largely Chinese.

(S) The communists in Thailand, with the exception of a brief period between 1946 and 1952, suffered varying degrees of repression at the hands of the Thai authorities and have always operated on a covert basis. Arrests took place in 1928 and 1929, and among those arrested were Chinese Communists who, some two decades later, attained important positions in the Chinese Communist government and party.* By July 1929 the Siam Special Committee claimed to have established a party, a communist youth organization, and a Siamese "General Labor Union" with a membership of 1000 despite actions taken by the Thai government. In June 1930, when the Nanyang Communist Group was dissolved, the Siam Special Committee was put under the direction of the newly founded Communist Party of Malaya. By 1933 communism was outlawed in Thailand, an act that remained in force until 1946. Before WWII the communists were at no time a significant force in Thailand and had little influence among the Thai population. Their activities were confined largely to Chinese labor circles in Bangkok and to the Chinese communities of the South Thailand provinces near the Malay border. Between 1933 and 1938, party membership dwindled to as low as 25 at one time. In fact, communist activities were so dormant that the present-day CPT gives its formal date of foundation and first national congress as 1942. The first meeting of the Party Representative Assembly (PRA) was convened and the CPT was officially founded on 1 Dec 42.

(U) Even during WWII, despite a communist-controlled anti-Japanese resistance movement in South Thailand and established relations with the Communist Party of Malaya, the Thai Communists played a rather insignificant resistance role.

(U) (57) The postwar liberal regime of Pridi Panomyong allowed the CPT to become increasingly active. Despite a bill that was passed in 1946 to repeal the 1933 anticommunist laws, the CPT continued to keep the vital elements underground. A communist-directed "Bangkok Labor Union" was legally registered in the same year. In April 1947 the Bangkok Labor Union established the General Labor Union of Siam, also known as the Central Labor Union, as a federation of trade unions. In January 1949 the Central Labor Union became affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The CPT published its own newspaper, and procommunist influence was widespread in the national press. The CPT also claims to have held its second congress in March 1952.

(U) (27) In November 1952 anticommunist measures that had been promulgated earlier by the Phibul Songgram regime were put into effect. The waves of arrests that the Thai police continued well into 1954 severely hampered the CPT. From 1952 to 1957 there were few overt indications that the CPT was in existence. However, the covert movement continued and many of the top members of the CPT were sent to Communist China for training during the early 1950's.*

* For example, Wu Chih Chih, who was probably arrested in 1929 and jailed in Thailand until 1938, when he returned to China, became a senior official of the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs after WWII.

†In 1946 an M.P., Prasert Sabunthorn, who claimed to be a communist, introduced a bill to repeal the 1933 act prohibiting communist activity. Chu Shou Lien, who returned from China, was a senior official of the underground party, possibly Secretary-General, until about 1952.
Between 1956 and 1958, as the Thai Government relaxed some of the political restrictions, there was a resurgence of vocal procommunist sentiment in the province among some of the trade unions and new political parties. This resurgence was quickly stamped out when Marshal Sarit took control of the government in October 1958. Existing political parties were declared illegal and the trade unions were dissolved.

Since 1958 there have been many arrests of subversive elements. For example, between May and August 1961 four separate series of arrests took place in Northeast Thailand. Interrogation revealed that the subversives were propagating the view that the Northeast Thai provinces were Lao-populated and should be united with Laos. These activities do not appear to be controlled by the CPT.

During the early 1960's, as Communist China and North Vietnam increased their activities in Southeast Asia, the CPT was revitalized. By 1961 the CPT had regained sufficient momentum to convene the third session of the PRA, which was held across the river from Bangkok in Thon Buri. It was at this assembly that the foundations for the present subversive campaign in Thailand were laid.

Judging from the preceding paragraphs, it appears that up to 1961 the CPT constituted little or no threat to the Thai government. However, with the active support of China and North Vietnam, the CPT could develop into a force of great concern to Bangkok.

PARTY STRUCTURE

Three PRAs have been held since the CPT was founded in 1942. At the PRA, policies and regulations of the CPT were set and the Central Committee members elected. The Political Bureau, elected by the Central Committee, is the highest level of CPT leadership; it controls the policy and administration of the party. Current membership of the CPT is in the neighborhood of 1000, and some members have been trained in China. The number of hard-core communists is considered to be small. The CPT, however, has been successful in expanding its activities in the rural areas, especially in Northeast Thailand.

The general hierarchy of the CPT is shown in Fig. D1. In addition to this structure, there are subunits for factories and communities that cannot be classified according to region, province, district, or tambon. Geographically, the CPT is organized into four regions: Central, North, South, and Northeast.

Party Representative Assembly

Party regulations call for a PRA to be held every 5 years. The regulation has not been followed, however, because of the opposition and generally unfavorable conditions the CPT has to face. As an underground operation, the CPT's Central Committee must give careful consideration as to when an assembly is to be held and the number and level of personnel to invite. Consequently, the assembly has only been held three times since the founding of the CPT in 1942.
Fig. D1—Structure of Communist Party of Thailand

SECRET

Communist Party of Thailand

Party Representative Assembly

(3 members in North Vietnam)
Central Committee

(4 or 5 members in China)

(1 member in North Vietnam)
Political Bureau

(1 member in China)

controls

Regional Branches of the Central Committee

South
Central
North
Northeast

Provincial committees

District, city, and subdistrict committees

Tambon committees

Party chapter

Party cells

In theory, members are elected; in practice, they are appointed from above.

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The first PRA was held on 1 Dec 42. The CPT was a composite of Chinese, Vietnamese, and Thais. Only four Thais from the Northeast attended.

The second PRA was held in 1952. Most of the present members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau were selected at this assembly.

The third PRA, held in 1961 in Thon Buri, had the highest attendance. By decision of the Central Committee, representatives of the district committees and above were permitted to attend this PRA.

Central Committee

The Central Committee is elected at the PRA. Its number depends on the total number of party members. At the third PRA, about 30 Central Committee members, including four female members, were elected. The chairman and the secretary-general of the Central Committee were then elected by its members. Subsequently, the members of the Political Bureau were elected. Usually, the chairman and the secretary of the Central Committee are made chairman and secretary of the Political Bureau.

Political Bureau

The Political Bureau is the governing body of the CPT. It controls policy and all administrative operations of the party. About 7 members of the Political Bureau were elected during the first PRA (1942), about 9 at the second PRA (1952), and 11 at the third (1961).

Regional Branches of the Central Committee

The next administrative level of the CPT is apparently based on the traditional concept of four major geographical regions in Thailand: Central, South, North, and Northeast. In February 1967, Central Committee branches were reported in all four regions.

Provincial Committees

In theory the provincial committees are organized on the basis of provincial boundaries. In practice, however, they are organized according to the number of members available in a given area. By CPT regulations, members of these committees are to be elected by a provincial representative assembly, but in actuality they are appointed by the Central Committee. The operations are conducted either directly by the Central Committee or through the branches of the Central Committee. The CPT regulations also call for a committee at any level to have one member from the next-higher committee. The number of members of such a committee is not fixed; it depends on the amount and demand of work.

District, City, and Tambon Committees

The district, city, and Tambon committees have the same general organizational structure as the provincial committees. Members are appointed by the higher level, and boundaries of operation depend on the size of membership and demand of work. Usually such a committee comes under the direction of the next-higher level committee, i.e., the provincial committee. This, however,
is not always the case if new or critical operations are involved. For example, armed units organized by the CPT in the Northeast have liaison with the region central committee or even the Political Bureau itself.4-7

Party Chapters (Unit Committees)
(4) The unit committees are important to the CPT because they represent the masses. In any factory, village, or group where there is a party membership of more than seven members, a unit is formed. These committees have from 3 to 11 members and are headed by a chairman of the unit's committee assembly. Committees of this category are at present appointed from above.

Party Cells
(4) The party cells, with membership of 3 to 7, are under the direct control of party chapters.

Foreign Influence in the Party Structure
(4) The CPT structure has a high degree of foreign influence and support. A number of high-level CPT leaders are almost permanently stationed in Communist China and North Vietnam (see Fig. D1). It is reported that currently four or five Central Committee members and one or two Political Bureau members are stationed in China, and three Central Committee members and one Political Bureau member are stationed in North Vietnam. These CPT members work closely with the Communist Chinese, and in Peking they meet weekly at the Foreign Language Institute. Such meetings are usually presided over by the Chinese. Among the CPT members in China is Nit (Phongdaphet), alias Suri. As the official representative of the CPT to China, she is responsible for maintaining liaison with the Communist Parties and transmission of Chinese orders to the CPT, and she participates in the publication of the newspaper, Voice of the Thai Patriots.8

(4) Table D1 shows the membership of the CPT Central Committee and the Political Bureau, and at all levels in the Northeast.

OBJECTIVES IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

General
(4) At the PRA in 1961 the following guidelines for the extension of the CPT were established.9

(a) Expand the work among the masses, especially among the farmers.
(b) Accelerate conditions for armed struggle.
(c) Expand work in the urban areas.
(d) Expand propaganda activities by opposing the aggressive intervention of the Americans and the traitorous and dictatorial ways of the Thai government. Also publicize the poverty and hardship of the people.
(e) Strengthen the party by recruiting young men and women from the workers, farmers, and other poor classes.
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<td>Propaganda</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Niyom Khamsaihphum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samphan Phangpradit, South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sa Ngob</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anan Polachai</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nit Phongdeppet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sak Suphakaisom, Voice of the Thai People, Laos</td>
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### Table D1 (continued)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wirat Anghathaworn</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Erb</td>
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<td>Wirat Anghathaworn</td>
<td>United Front</td>
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<td>Phayom Chulanond</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prasit</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Northeast Branch of Central Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaworn Wongnuma, overall leader</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niyom Khampaichum</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirat Anghathaworn</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seng</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soakhun Phichaiyal</td>
<td>Chuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichai Tampangancharoen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prasit</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Korat, Sisaket, Surin, Ubon Provinces (except Amnart Chasron and Loeng Nak Tha Districts)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Saken Nakom, Nong Kha, Udorn, Khon Kao Naka Srotkham, and possibly Rai Et and Loai Provinces.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaworn Wongnuma</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bo Koo District, Nakom Phonam Province; Loeng Nak Tha and Amnart Chasron Districts, Ubon Province.</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>Wirat Anghathaworn</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phon Tom, Bo Koo, Nakom Phonam Province.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Niyom Khampaichum</td>
<td>See Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ban No Sai Yai District Committee</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sii</td>
<td>Si</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prachub Ruengrat</td>
<td>M. L. Pricha Hanumat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chai</td>
<td>Ruang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tambon Committees: (a) Phu Xesar (b) Ban No Sai Pai (c) Ban No Khun, Loeng Nak Tha</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Khaiyim</td>
<td>Sino Phu Pnom</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chai</td>
<td>Sai Duangnet</td>
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<td>Wichai Charoenrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sawat Nahitva</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Muk Khlempan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Pan Krommat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toi Nongkhen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cha Chuliphan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swng Prakpouk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Also member of Central Regional branch of Central Committee.

**Also member of Northern Regional branch of Central Committee.

*Also member of Southern Regional branch of Central Committee.
(f) Expand the front work by bringing together patriots, democracy-lovers, and other individuals who can work together.

(g) Fight revisionism and participate in international activities.

(u) (v) The Political Bureau was made responsible for formulation of policies according to these guidelines. It was decided that the Political Bureau must meet at least once a year to review and evaluate the activities of the previous year and proofrun activities for the coming year.

(u) (v) The Northeast, a vulnerable region in Thailand, seems to be the area of the most extensive communist efforts. During the early 1960's the Thai Exiles Association and its affiliates, Laos-based groups of Thai leftists, supported subversive groups in the Northeast. Between 1961 and 1962 Thai security services disrupted three major subversive networks in the Northeast and arrested some 400 persons on charges of communist activities. A primary objective of these three covert networks was the propagation of the following themes:

(a) The Northeastern Thai Provinces are Lao, not Thai, and should be returned to Laos.

(b) The Sarit government neglects the Northeast and oppresses its people.

(c) The leaders of the Bangkok government are the tools and lackeys of the US.

(v) (v) At that time, the Thai National Police estimated that from 15,000 to 30,000 of the 8 million inhabitants in the Northeast were responsive to communist-oriented subversive groups. Although the threat in this area was serious and potentially critical, there was no hard evidence of subversive insurgency.

(v) (v) Thus the situation in 1962 was deemed not critical. In fact, a June 1964 report alleged that the extent of subversion in the Northeast was overemphasized.

(v) (v) A communist document, "Calendar for 1964," clearly stated that although some progress was made in party activities in 1963, the advances were comparatively insignificant. Lack of armed personnel, arrests by the government, and unenthusiastic members were cited as factors hampering party growth. By 1965 the Political Bureau judged that although some progress had been made in the previous year, the CPT still was lacking strong armed forces and secure bases. Under the circumstances the Political Bureau decided that selected units would be allowed to take the offensive only if they had a clear tactical advantage. Consequently, Na Kae District in Nakhon Phanom Province was reportedly picked as the area where conditions were most favorable to gain some initial exposure and test the best method to be used.

(v) (v) Another captured document, "Project for the First Six Months of 1966," indicated a change in CPT policy. Emphasis was to be placed on expansion rather than initial building of the organization. Members were asked to engage in armed struggle, participate in training of guerrilla units, gather intelligence, take census in target villages, and establish mobile, temporary schools.

(v) (v) At the same time, Thai communist-front leaders in Peking outlined a strategic plan for the subversion of Thailand. This plan called for open insurgency to control the major geopolitical divisions in Thailand. Phase I of
the plan was aimed at the Northeast. A guerrilla-training center was to be established in Laos. Military and political training would be given by the Chinese and the Thai exiles in Peking. Subsequently, in 1965 and 1966 management activities in Thailand have included an increase in the number of armed clashes, forced propaganda meetings, and armed guerrilla units.

Objectives for 1967

(1) The CPT objectives for 1967 are as follows.18
(a) Improve and strengthen organization of the masses in the rural areas.
(b) Expand and strengthen the armed forces in quality and quantity under the leadership of the Central Committee branches.
(c) Expand the work in towns with attention to labor, students, and women.
(d) Extend propaganda in various forms, with collection of supplies as a tangible form of propaganda.
(e) Raise the theoretical level of Marxism-Leninism, and especially study the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the summit of Marxism-Leninism in the present era.
(f) Expand the work of organizing a united front.
(g) Struggle against revisionism in any form.

These activities would be carried out under the direction of Central Committee branches, and armed units would be encouraged to increase the intensity of armed propaganda programs. Under the guidelines for extending propaganda activities, party members would be instructed to give consideration to the involvement of villages by the collection of supplies. This is consistent with recent reports that in almost every forced village propaganda meeting now being held, insurgents require that villagers give them some provisions.

The emphasis on the study of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, on the work of organizing a united front, and on the struggle against revisionism in any form (Objectives e, f, and g) clearly reveals the increasing influence of Communist China and the international connections of subversive insurgency in Thailand as well as Southeast Asia.

In Northeast Thailand, the Northeast branch of the Central Committee of the CPT directs the operations (see Table D1).

Support Activities

Although the CPT is responsible for the direction and implementation of the communist activities in Northeast Thailand, it relies on Communist China, North Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao for overall policy, recruitment, training, finance, and other matters vital to its operations.31 As in Vietnam, the ultimate direction of insurgency in Thailand lies with the supporting powers. A number of the CPT members are of Chinese origin and nearly 300 of the approximately 1000 party members have been trained in China. Moreover, a number of high-ranking officials of the CPT are permanently stationed in Peking and Hanoi.

Liaison between Communist China and Thai dissidents may be divided into four channels.32,33
(a) The first and most overt is the liaison between the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs through foreign diplomatic missions in Bangkok.

(b) The second channel is through "unrecognized" movements such as the People's United Front of Thailand, formerly headed by Amphom Suwana

(bun. These movements are the responsibilities of the Staff Office for Foreign Affairs (SOFA) (see Fig. D2), which also formulates, implements, and coordinates China's foreign policy. SOFA has the responsibility for providing guerrilla and political training for all groups brought to China by those who are not members of the Communist Party. SOFA is also responsible for censorship of all speeches broadcast over Radio Peking and for all financial matters involved in training of Thais in China. A SOFA official once stated that it cost the Chinese 20,000 baht (approximately US $1000) to cover the expenses involved in bringing one person from Thailand to China for training. Upon completion of training, each trainee would be given 5000 baht (US $250) in Hong Kong by the SOFA representatives. Control of the Thai trainees is in the hands of Chinese Communists. SOFA maintains at least one officer with the trainees. Amphom Suwana freely admitted that his movement had little control over "his" group while it was in China, because directives, letters, and messages went through SOFA representatives.

(c) The third channel is the Afro-Asian-Latin American committee (subordinate to SOFA), which is responsible for certain recognized Thai front groups in China; for example, Phayom Chulanom's Thai Patriotic Front. Recognized front groups such as the Thai Patriotic Front are used as propaganda vehicles by the Chinese Radio Peking and other media. To be recognized, the front leader must be either a communist or endorsed by a parent Communist Party.

(d) The fourth, most direct, and secret channel is the party relation
between the Chinese Communist Party and the CPT. Not only are a substantial number of CPT members of Chinese origin, but several high-ranking officials of the CPT are permanently stationed in China. Between 1952 and 1957 nearly 200 members of the CPT received intensive training in China. The majority of the trainees were Thai nationals, had been members of the CPT, and were trained as cadre for the forthcoming revolution. Most of the trainees went to China during the Indo-Chinese war. Their backgrounds were diversified; they ranged from university graduates and village chiefs to laborers and farmers. Although the training period usually lasted 3 years, some trainees studied much longer on special assignments. Some researched special subjects such as economics and the Communist Chinese revolution, and others studied Mao Tse-tung's writings on the problems of workers and farmers. Still others studied land reform and minority problems in the Sipsong Panna region. The training sites also varied; some trainees remained in Peking, and others were deployed to Chungking and Kunming. After they had completed their training in China, most trainees returned to Thailand by travelling overland through Laos in small groups.

A partial list of the CPT trainees who had studied in various parts of China between 1952 and 1957 is given in Table D2.

The CPT China trainees appear to have been carefully selected.

Judging from the period of time spent in China and the large amounts of money and personnel involved, these trainees must have been given important responsibilities and assignments with respect to the future of CPT. Presumably such
Communist Party of Thailand — Communist Party of China

State Council

SOFa

Overall Responsibilities:
Responsible for the formulation, implementation, and coordination of China's foreign policy

Specific Responsibilities with CPT:
Responsible for all liaison and for arranging certain political and guerrilla training for Thais, providing support to foreign exiles and "unrecognized" movements, censor all speeches broadcast over Radio Peking

Afro-Asian-Latin American Commission* responsible for "recognized" Thai movements in China

Political and guerrilla training under SOFA

Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (overt relations)

Other central government organizations involved in foreign affairs

SOFa Peking Office

East Asia Department

West Asia

East Asia

Thai Section

Indonesian Section

Malayan Section

Other various national sections

*Certain officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afro-Asian-Latin American Commission, and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee are concurrently SOFa officials.

Fig. D2—Staff Office for Foreign Affairs, Communist China
trainees would form the nucleus for the development of the CPT. They are probably the future leaders of the party and therefore not as expendable as their less-trained fellow travelers.

(S) North Vietnam also trained Thai subversives; as of early 1966, approximately 350 Thai nationals had been trained in North Vietnam since 1962.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias</th>
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<tr>
<td>Somphorn Anghaikaworn, female</td>
<td>Sin Tiewmin</td>
<td>Thaworn Wongphumne</td>
<td>Uncle</td>
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<td>Sin Dmulin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prasert Supanuthorn, instructor</td>
<td>Poom Roy</td>
<td>Prasit</td>
<td>Cross-eyed</td>
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<td>Phin Rueom</td>
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<td>Thienbunlert</td>
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<td>Prasert Uthitawarop</td>
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<td>Pan Kriwmat</td>
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<td>Amavuy, last name unknown</td>
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<td>Praphan Wattanakit, interpreter and school official</td>
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<td>Nikorn, Northeast Thailand, last name unknown</td>
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<td>Tao</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE D2**

CPT Trainees in Communist China, 1952–1957

(2) The male students usually spent 4 or 5 months on political studies and about 3 months in military education. The female students, instead of receiving the military instruction, were sent to Sontay Hospital for 8 months of medical training.27

(2) Courses concerning political training included

(a) History of civilization: imperialism vs socialism
(b) Revolution in Thailand: “semicolony” under US domination
(c) Economics: role of workers and farmers
(d) Revolution in Vietnam: communist success in the North and liberation of the South

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(e) Juvenile problems; importance of youth
(f) Problems of the Thai farmer; hardships and difficulties of peasants
(g) Public relations among local people; good will before indoctrination
(h) Controlling and propagating the villages; a must for "mass" support
(i) Miscellaneous lectures and trips; lectures on the Laotian struggle, the Latin American struggle, and the North and South Vietnamese struggle; political movies; trips to factories and military and industrial museums

Instructions concerning military training included
(a) Mobile warfare; small-scale harassment
(b) Psychological warfare; aimed at the villagers
(c) Tactical retreat; use guerrilla instead of conventional tactics; avoid face-to-face confrontation; employ brief attacks, small arms, and ambush theory and practice
(d) Weapon training; various light arms
(e) Survival training; jungle operations, escape and evasion, signals, small-unit tactics, and scouting

The medical courses for the female trainees included theory and practice of injured armed personnel and civilians as a result of air raids. Other courses covered:
(a) Physiology; nursing techniques, description of wounds, and symptoms
(b) Pharmacology; use of medicine, methods of compounding simple medicines, techniques of injections, and the various types of medicines used; general first aid
(c) Anatomy
(d) Special course; treatment of malaria, cold fever, brain fever, venereal disease, typhoid, cholera, etc.

On the completion of training, the trainees would be sent back to Thailand in small groups.²⁷

Although training in North Vietnam is of a lower level than in China, such training is vital and necessary. For example, a group of trainees was sent to a military camp in the Phu Tho area of North Vietnam because the country offered more similar climate, customs, terrain, and human relations than China. Also they were to study the Vietnamese modes of revolutionary struggle.²⁸

Thai insurgents are sometimes trained in both China and North Vietnam, depending on the purpose and objective of each training program. For example, certain trainees sponsored by Pridi Panomyong's Volunteer Liberation Organization (VLO) received a 3-month political-instruction course in Canton, a 6-month military course at a camp near Muang Viet Chi in the Phu Tho area of North Vietnam, then returned to Peking for advanced political indoctrination and a first-aid class in Canton. The trainees were mostly Sino-Thai or overseas Chinese. After they had completed their training, they were dispatched to Laos to work with the Pathet Lao to gain practical experience leading to eventual infiltration into Thailand to organize the hill tribes of northern Thailand.

* In most cases it is difficult to determine names of students, since they use an alias on arrival in North Vietnam and are sworn to secrecy about their backgrounds and true names.
An interesting aspect is that the Thai trainees in Peking were told by Liao Ch'eng-chih, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and head of Overseas Chinese Affairs, that he would increasingly support the CPT and advised them not to get involved in the dispute between Pridi and the CPT. The trainees were further advised not to discuss any important matters with Pridi but to let certain other people handle them. Later, when these trainees went back to Canton, Pridi gave two lectures on the revolution in Thailand. Although he did not mention the CPT by name in his lectures, his comments were directed against the policy of advocating the Chinese Communist example of a peasant's revolution. This reveals not only possible dissensions among the Thai insurgents, but also the attempt by Peking to enhance its own position through the control of the trainees. At the same time, Hanoi probably is also trying to influence the trainees to secure its own interests. Hence, although the CPT and its supporters all wish to overthrow the Thai government, each, especially Hanoi and Peking, has its own interests to protect and these interests are not necessarily compatible.

Training of Thai subversives in China is multileveled. Not only were the best-qualified party members of the CPT sent to China but, in many cases, the nonmembers of the CPT sponsored by Pridi were also sent there. The training period varied, depending on the type of personnel and objectives. Training could last anywhere from a few months to a few years. On many occasions trainees were returned to China for additional education and, while there, appeared to be subject to strict controls. Groups were kept separate and no actions could be taken by a trainee without first obtaining approval. The Chinese assumed all financial and tutoring obligations during the student's stay.

The North Vietnamese offered tactical-level training to the Thai insurgents. Those with greater potentialities were sent to China for further training. There is no set pattern as far as training sites are concerned. Most promising trainees have received some training in both countries. Peking offered higher ideological education aimed at future CPT leaders and longer-range plans. For practical and tactical experience, North Vietnam appeared to be more suitable.

Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand

Approximately 32,000 Vietnamese refugees live in Thailand, usually in or near the largest towns of the provinces. About 90 percent of them are reportedly literate and most speak fluent Thai. A breakdown of the refugees by provinces is given in the accompanying tabulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Vietnamese refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Udon</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nong Khai</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakon Nakhon</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubon</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>8,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prachinburi</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surat Thani</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phatalung</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As most of these refugees are located near the major transportation networks and provincial, district, and municipal offices and police stations, they can be extremely useful to the subversive insurgents. For example, Udon and Nong Khai are linked to Bangkok by a highway and a railroad. The major road network linking Nong Khai, Udon, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Loeng Nok Tha, and Ubon runs through the heart of the areas where the heaviest refugee population is concentrated. Under the circumstances, the refugees who are procommunist could play an exceedingly important role in the overall subversive insurgency activities in Northeast Thailand.

Because about 85 percent of the refugees have pro-North Vietnam leanings through personal devotion to Ho Chi Minh, in addition to the estimated 5 percent who are genuinely procommunist, they prove to be a vital instrument for the CPT. Consequently, the refugees were able to establish covert organizations to assist subversive activities in Thailand.

Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese

The communist-controlled Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese (Fig. D3) is a good example of how subversive activities sponsored by North Vietnam are carried out in Thailand. The Thai branch of the Lao Dong Party controls and directs the association by placing its members throughout all levels of the association. In addition, a number of Lao Dong members who hold no official positions act as observers and report their findings to Hanoi. By controlling nominations and elections of the Association, the Lao Dong assures election of its members.

The structure of the Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese is as follows:

(a) Central Committee. It is the governing body of the Association. Members are selected from various geographic regions and usually meet once a month in either Ubon or Sakon Nakhon.

(b) Five-man zone committee. The association divides Thailand into three zones and each zone has a five-man zone committee.

(c) Area committee. Each zone is divided into areas that vary in size according to the number of Vietnamese refugees within the zone. Each area committee has five members and each member chooses two assistants.

(d) Five-man village committee. The village committee has jurisdiction over hamlets, which in turn oversee the villages. From this level down, all personnel are appointed from above. In each village the people are in three special front groups: The old men's group with men 50 years of age or over, the old women's group with women over 36 years of age, and the youth group that includes all females and males over seventeen. A leader is appointed to each group.

The area committees as well as the village committees have the following sections:

(a) Propaganda and study
(b) Elementary education
(c) Relations with Thai
(d) Cultural
(e) Economic and finance

The village committee, in addition, has an adult education section, which is subordinate to the cultural section.
Thai branch of Lao Dong Party
controls and directs
Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese
governed by
Central Committee
selected by

Zone I
Nakhon Phanom
Sakon Nakhon
Five-man zone committee
selected by
Areas
selected by
5-man village committees
Elections: In theory: every 3 years
In practice: less frequently
selected by
Hamlets (Tambon)
appoint
Village chiefs
appoint
Old men's group
Old women's group
Youth group

Zone II
Udon
Nong Khai
Khan Kaen
Five-man zone committee
Areas
5-man village committees
Hamlets (Tambon)
Village chiefs
Old men's group
Old women's group
Youth group

Zone III
Ubon
All areas south of Ubon
including Bangkok
Five men zone committee
including Joint Repatriation Committee
Areas
5-man village committees
Hamlets (Tambon)
Village chiefs
Old men's group
Old women's group
Youth group

Fig. D3—Organization of Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese
Communality links between all levels of the association are by personal contact. Time and place of meetings are established during a previous gathering or by messenger. Messages are transmitted covertly.

(C) The Joint Repatriation Committee (JRC), with representatives in all Vietnamese refugee areas and in Bangkok, has been the overt arm of the Central Association. Practically all JRC representatives are members of village or area committees of the association. Through the JRC, the association maintains contact between Thai officials and pro-Hanoi refugees.
Appendix E

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION ROUTES AND DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS IN THAILAND

INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains a list of infiltration routes and distribution patterns in Thailand. Tables E1 to E4 have been taken from an unpublished study prepared in the Military Research and Development Center (MRDC), Bangkok, Thailand. The discrepancies in the spelling of place names are exactly as they appear on the original list.

The list of routes and patterns was developed from a number of sources by Thai personnel assigned to the MRDC. The MRDC is a joint Thai-US R&D effort. US military and civilian personnel are members of the ARPA R&D Field Unit, Thailand. Thai military and civilian personnel are assigned to the center from the Ministry of Defense.

The statement of communist infiltration routes and patterns was prepared originally in Thai and then translated into English by the Thai authors. The English version is presented here virtually unedited to preserve the evidence that it is a Thai document developed from Thai sources and because an attempt to state such a list in an edited English syntax might lead inadvertently to changes in meaning and intent.

The list covers all of Thailand. In this sense it is beyond the scope of this study. The scope of the report is exceeded in this instance in the hope that data on communist-support patterns over the entire country would be useful in counterinsurgency programs and in further research efforts.

FINDINGS

Infiltration Routes

(a) The 2500 miles of Thailand coast are incredibly vulnerable to infiltration and insurgency. Royal Thai Security Forces are light and scattered.

(b) The 50-mile-wide body of international water at the end of the Gulf of Thailand, edged on three sides by Thai territory, dominates the problems of coastline security.

(c) Fishing craft and fishing villages along the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea provide adequate support to CT infiltration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chong Te Phet TA0870</td>
<td>Phnom Dangrek Range bordering Huirum and Cambodia, with dense forest</td>
<td>From Chong Te Phet, Chong Baraooq and Chong Ken Thop Phet to (a) Amphur Prakhan Chai, Amphur Nang Rong, and Amphur Chok Chai (b) Amphur Nang Rong to Huirum for further distribution, to Amphur Khudthdaowong–Korat–Khun Keun Highway, or Amphur Chum Phomburi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Baraooq TA8172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Ken Thop Phet UA0184</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Sai Take UA0485</td>
<td>Phnom Dangrek Mountain Range bordering Surin and Cambodia for an approximate distance of 100 km</td>
<td>From most of the mountain passes to (a) Amphur Prakhan Chai and to Huirum (b) Amphur Phrae Chai–Amphur Nang Rong–Amphur Chok Chai–Korat (c) Amphur Prasat (UA3018)–Surin for for further distribution</td>
<td>People speak Thai and Cambodian. Thai take the topographic low of the terrain at most of the mountain passes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Chao Khoon, Chong Ta Moan UA0785</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Sonar (Passe de Tchop Smarch) UA1687</td>
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<td>Chong Kaeng UA1887</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Kao Toeng UA3388</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Ta Leng UA4595</td>
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<td>Chong Don Kao UA4994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Phat Tung UA6196</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chong Chom UA6196</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chong Wat: Siwat (Map No. ND48-6)

Phnom Dangrek Mountain Range bordering Siwat and Cambodia for an approximate distance of 120 km, with partly open dense forest country.

From Chong Tatka, Chong Gale, Chong Samron, Chong Phnom Cham Reuk, and Chong Hua Soo; by trails to Amphur Khru Khun for distribution to Siwat, Surin, Roi Et, Phatthalung (VH1528), Khorat, and Ubon; via roadways and railroads.

Thai take lower ground of most of the mountain passes existing along the Phnom Dangrek Range.

Chong Wat: Ubon Ratchani (Map No. ND48-2, ND48-3, ND48-4, ND48-7)

Any point along Mae Nam Khong.

Rice fields, open to dense forest country to mountainous terrain; Mae Nam Khong bordering Ubon and Laos for an approximate distance of 160 km.

From Amphur Chanaoman [Ban Nong Sida (KC0290)]—Ban Hong Chiao (KC05791) by trails and village roads to (a) Amphur Loeng Nok Tha area (b) Amphoe Charoen—Mukdahan Road (c) Amphoe Charoen—Faathoon.

From Chong Tap U, Chong Phoeng Phra Phut, Chong Phoeng Vihear, Chong Te Thao, and Chong Phnom Dan Ton to Amphur Kantareuk (IV1220) and Det Udorn for further distribution.
**TABLE E1 (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d) Cross the Annat Charea—Makdahan Road to Amphur Phon Thong (UD9101)—Kuchinarai or Kesarin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>From Amphur Khemarat (Han Bung Chiao—Han Hong Ten (US1840) by trails and village roads to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Amphur Loeng Noi Tha are</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Amphur Annat Charea</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Amphur Trakan Phut Phon—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Amphur Khong Chian—Amphur Phibun Mongkhon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a, b, and c mostly for further distribution, not for any activities</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Amphur Phan Dan (R15494) (Han Pha Cho (US1382)—Chong Phok (R65101) by trails and village roads to</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Amphur Trakan Phut Phon (T10212)</td>
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<tr>
<td>or Amphur Khong Chian (Q13207)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Amphur Phibun Mongkhon—Ubon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Det I D总部 by trails via Han Pak Hua Luang (R141375)—Han Nong Hua Hi Yai (R25671), or Han Ang Hin Ya (R13055), or Han Non Chik (R13061)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mountain passes</th>
<th>From Rau Khoa Hah, Amphur Han Dan (R16291), Lao:—Thai:—Cambodian borders by mountainous terrain of Phnom Dangrek Range with dense forest, for an approximate distance of 260 km; a good number of mountain passes and mountain trails provide effective concealment for the infiltrators.</th>
<th>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</th>
<th>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chong Pory</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA1392</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong An Mah</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA10750</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Hok</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA2296</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Pong Daeng</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA1288</td>
<td>From Chong Pory and Chong An Mah to (a) Amphur Kantarara (V161119)—Chongwat Sinskri for further distribution to Surin, Ubon, and Roi Et</td>
<td>(b) Det I D总部—Ubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CT could take advantage of hideout along the Phnom Dangrek Range, crossing the border back and forth. In 90 percent of the mountain passes along the border, the Thai take the lower ground of the terrain, which is a disadvantage in military operations. Nom Nam Vun and Nam Nam Chi.
Chong Kham Mek (Phu Sa Khan) WR 45099
Chong Han Phai (Phu Hak) WR 50808
Chong Han Ko (Phu Khan) WR 5717
Chong Tap Kung (Phu Lom Khan) WR 5725
Chong Yang (Phu Song Yang) WR 6236
Phu Lao WR 5914
Chong Mek (Phu Mot Ngam) WR 5173
Chong Phok (Phu Chan Daeng) WR 5950
Chong Katin WR 5086

Chongwat: Mekong Phanom (Map No. ME48-10, ME48-14, ME48-6)

Any point along Mae Nam Khong

Open forest, villages, plantations, and rice fields; bank heights up to 15 m in dry season, 45° to 85°-deg slopes; hilly country on Laos bank

Mae Nam Khong borders Mekong Phanom and Laos for an approximate distance of 230 km

From Chong Kham Mek and Chong Han Phai to Amphur Phat Udorn and Amphur Banaraticg

could be utilized as long-distance transport routes by the CT under environmental concealment and aid from agents in the areas

From Chong Han Ko and Chong Tap Kung by trails to Amphur Phat Udorn and Amphur Banaraticg

From Chong Yang and Phu Lao Passes by trails and village roads to Amphur Banaraticg, Amphur Phat Udorn, and Ubon

From Amphur Phub Phubhara by village roads to Amphur Phub Phubhara, and Ubon

From Chong Mek by village roads to Amphur Phibun Mangevan, and Ubon

From Chong Phok and Chong Katin by trails to Amphur Phibun Mangevan, or across Mae Nam Nai to Ampur Khong Chain, and Amphur Trakan Phut Phnom

Mae Nam Songkhrum could be an effective communication line from the early period to the end of the rainy season. Vietnamese in Mekong Phanom are still loyal to the North Vietnam government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) The town of Mukdahan (VD7228)</td>
<td>for distribution</td>
<td>(b) To Amphur Loeng Nok Tha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) That Phanom-Mukdahan-Annoet Chanthom Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Amphur Kham Chai by roads or by trails via Phu Hin Lu (VD5224) to Amphur Kurinaree-Amphur Sakhonphan (VD8005) Amphur Kraman-Amphur Yong Phan Lam Pho (Ubonratchathani) Sri Chiang Mai (Nong Khai)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Cross the road to Phu Mek (VD5445) Phu Tham Phong (VD4350) Phu Tham Nok (VD1350) Phu Phan (VD1466) Phu Yang Luang (VD2241)</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Amphur That Phanom (Han Kham Wok Phrao (VD7250) to Han Na Thom That (VD7691) to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Amphur Na Kar-Phu Phan-Phu Yang Luang-Han Lat Kra Chor (VD9189) Phu Khiers-Phu Phra (VD730) Amphur Warachaphum (VD561) or Phu Yang Luang Phu Pha Deroo (VD185) Han Na Kham (VD7809) Phu Hin Darang jungle</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Amphur Na Kar (VD4873) Sakonnakhon</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Amphur Na Kar-Phu Phan-Phu Tham Nok-Phu Bak Di-Kurinaree-Sakhonphan-Pho Kump</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Phu Yang Luang-Phu Thak Wong-Han Yong Phu (VD7251) and other villages in Amphur Kurinaree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Han Nang (VD6885)–Han Pla Pak (VD5988)–Amphur Muang Sakonnakhon and further to Udonthani
From Nakhon Phanom area to
(a) Han Pla Pak by trails via Han Wang Krome (VE6211), or other alternate routes, or by roadways
(b) Amphur Na Kae by trails or roadways via Han Nong Din Daeng (VE6703)–Han Na Nan (VD1182)
(c) To Sakon Nakhon by roads or trails via Han Pho Phanom (VE3321) for further distribution
From Amphur Thu Utheen area [Han Yang Nok Ho (VE7135)–Han Krong Som Hong] to
(a) Sub-Amphur Kasuman (VF2817)–Sakon Nakhon
(b) Amphur Sri Songkhram (VF2149)–Amphur Wanon Nisat (VE6041) by trails or village roads, via Amphur Akat Anamani (VE9546) and/or to Warithaphum
From Amphur Ban Phang [Han Hasi Muang (VF2147)–Han Suan Kao (VE5888)] to
(a) Amphur Akat Anamani and Amphur Wanon Nisat
(b) Sakon Nakhon via Sri Songkhram

Chiangwat: Nong Khor–Laochon Border (Map No. HE48-9, HE48-6, HE48-5)

Any point along Mae Klong: points frequently used:
Han Krong Kaei 13-1 198

Mae Klong borders Lao and Nong Khor for approximately 120 km. The terrain ranges from hills country with dense forest to open flat land, villages and plantations on both banks, the river is up to 2 km wide, banks are steep and up to 12 m

From Han Krong Kaei proceed to Amphur Nong Hua Lam Phu by way of
(a) Han Krong Kaei, enter Laochon Territory–Han Chiang Di (TE0609)–Han Nam Sam (TE1370)–Han Na Si

Jungle and mountain ridge trails:
Phu Phra Tat–Phu Pha Deng–Phu Pha Khao (TD4773); link
Sri Chiang Mai–Nong Bua Lam Phu–Kho Kao–Chinaphum
Phu Pha Tat–Phu Pha Deng–Phu Pha Khao (TD3081); link
Phu Wiang; link Sri Chiang Mai

### TABLE E2
Infiltration Routes and Distribution Patterns: North

(Map series L509, scale 1:250,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changwat: Loei—Loation Border (Map No. NE47-12, NE47-8, NE48-9, NE48-5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran Muang Phrae QV2337</td>
<td>Mountainous, dense forest; Nam Heung and Mae Khong bordering Loei and Loei; Nam Heung joins Mae Khong north of Ran Tha Di Vi (QV7371)</td>
<td>From Ran Muang Phrae and Ran Pak Man travel along the Nam Wan valley trails to (a) Amphur Dan Sai (QV2912); further distribution to Loei, and Amphur Wang Sapung (QV6161) by trails or roadways (b) From Dan Sai to Amphur Nakhon Thai (QV6963) and to Pitsanulok (c) From Dan Sai to Ban Khok Kam Pura (QV3131), to Lam Sak (QV4257), Changwat Phetchabun</td>
<td>The CT could distribute from Amphur Dan Sai to Lam Sak, Phetchabun, Lopburi, and Pitsanulok; or from Amphur Wang Sapung to Amphur Nong Hea Lam Pha or Chaiyaphum; Changwat Loei is the gateway to the Northeast from the Northern region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran Na Kraweng QV5838</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ran Na Kraweng to Amphur Tha Li and further to Dan Sai and Amphur Muang, Loei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphur Chiang Khan (QV3821) to Ban Pak Chom (RV0066)</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Amphur Chiang Khan to (a) Amphur Muang, Loei and Amphur Wang Sapung (b) Amphur Si Chiang Mai, Changwat Nong Khai</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ban Pak Chom to Amphur Muang Loei via Pha Nong Ya Plong trail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changwat: Utharadit—Loation Border (Map No. NE47-12, NE47-8, NE47-11)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pha Muang QV1561</td>
<td>Mountainous and dense forest</td>
<td>From Pha Muang proceed by trails to (a) Mae Nam Nan at Nam Pat (PV6762) (b) To Utharadit via Ban Nam Khrai Nai (PV74561)—Ban Nam Khrai (PV6215)—Ran Nong Pha (PV8712)</td>
<td>Changwat Utharadit is the gateway to the Central region from Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of entry and coordinates</td>
<td>Terrain description</td>
<td>Distribution and movement</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>QV1677</td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) The same route as b but alternate course at Ban Nan Phi to Mae Nam Nan at Ban Kaeng (P4220)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From QV1677 to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Nan Pat via Phak Tha (P9376)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) Uttaratdi via Phak Tha–Ban Nam Kraci Nai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pua Thong Aen</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA0331</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Pua Thong Aen and QA3115 to</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA3115</td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Nan Nok (P93156) in Nan Province</td>
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<td>(b) Mae Nam Nan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(c) Hua Phak Tha (P9376) via Hua Hua Tien (P4291) and proceed to Uttaratdi</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chiangwat: Nan—Loatian Border (Map No. NE47-8, NE47-4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QA2810</td>
<td>Mountainous, dense forest</td>
<td>From QA2810 (mountain pass)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Proceed by trails across Mae Nam Nan to Amphur Su</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA3671</td>
<td>(mountain pass)</td>
<td>(b) Proceed by trails to Mae Nam Nan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From QA3671 proceed by trails via Ban Nam Lane (QA3671–Ban Hang Thong (QA1251–Ban Na Luang (P49065) to Chiangat Nan or Amphur Su</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>QB1718</td>
<td></td>
<td>From QB1718 proceed to Amphur Thong Chang (P49053) through Ban Na Luang (QB1718–Amphur Paen (QB17221), or to Chiangat Nan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pua Chao</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Pua Chao to Ban Sakaet Nan (QB12311) to Amphur Thong Chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QB1313</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ban Prata by trails and Mae Nam Nan waterway to Amphur Thong Chang, Amphur Paen, and to Nan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roadways and Mae Nam Nan waterways are vehicles for further distribution from Amphur Khung, Chiangat Nan; Amphur Luang; Amphur Paen; and Amphur Su, to Chiangat Uttaratdi, Pitsanulok, and Nakhon Sawan. Mae Nam Nan is one of the vital rivers that link strategic provinces of Nan, Uttaratdi, Pitsanulok, Phichit, and Nakhon Sawan; it is still an open route to the central plain. Trails: Amphur Su–Na Nok (P49128)–Ban Thong (P47111)–Mae Nam Nan at Ban Sup Li (P46595)–The Pla (P46168) is an alternate route for Mae Nam Nan waterway. Mae Nam Nan, at Nan Province, could easily be reached from the Loatian border.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Route Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pang Sa</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ban Pang Sa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) By trails to Nam Yoe waterway to Anam Thong Chang or Nam through</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>roadways or Mae Nam Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) By trails to Ban Muang Sa (PHB314)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chiang Rai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chiang Mai (Map No. ME47-3, MF47-15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doi Mae Chong Long</td>
<td>Mountain and jungle</td>
<td>From Doi Mae Chong Long to Amphur Mae Chang along the trails through Doi Mae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC5548</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nam Yoe (NC5535), then to Chiang Rai for further distribution via roadways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and river.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphur Mae Sai</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Amphur Mae Sai and Amphur Chiang Sae, Nam Mae Kok and Mae Khong</td>
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<tr>
<td>NC9262</td>
<td></td>
<td>could be easily crossed at any point; proceed to Amphur Mae Chan and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chiang Rai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphur Chiang Sae</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ban Pha Kham proceed upstream along Mae Kok River to Chiang Rai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PC1442) to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pha Kham</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Amphur Chiang Khong and Ban Sup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PC7031)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ling, Mae Ling valley trails and waterways combined to Amphur Thong and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphur Chiang khong</td>
<td></td>
<td>farther to Chiang Rai, or to Amphur Payao on Lam Pang-Chiang R' road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC7142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Sup Ling Nae</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Khao Khan Yuen by trails to Chiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC5336</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khan and proceed further to Payao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast of Ban Pang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHB3595</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Khan Yuen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHB3565</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai (Map No.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alternate route for Ban Than Khan--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME47-2, ME47-3, ME47-6,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chiang Dao--Chiangmai to Ban Than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF47-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doi Hauz Mae Lat</td>
<td>Mountain and jungle</td>
<td>From Doi Hauz Mae Lat and Doi Nang to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB9575</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Pha Kham (PHB314) to Ban Hauz Po</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nam Mae Kok links Burma and Laos; it flows from north of Amphur Pang (NC5720) to Mae Khong River, the Burma-Thailand-Laos border at Ban Pha Kham (PC2053) through Amphur Muang. Chiangmai (Chiang Rai); Nam Mae Kok could possibly serve as a CF communication route between Burma and Laos via Chiang Rai, as it was used by smuggling rings.

Nam Mae Ing could be utilized in the rainy season as a transport line from Amphur Thong to Mae Khong River, Chiang Rai--Mae Sai--Wiang Ph Pao--Doi Saket--Chiang Mai have been used by smuggling rings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doi Nguan</td>
<td></td>
<td>(MH954) - Chiang Rai - Doi Nguan Road</td>
<td>Khaeb - Anphur Phrae (NB2243) or Chiang Rai - Phrao-San Sai - Chiang Mai for better concealment. Most of the trails mentioned used to be opium-smuggling routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Kiu Pha Wok</td>
<td></td>
<td>(MH954) - Chiang Rai - Doi Nguan Road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH956</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Chong Kiu Pha Wok to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Than Moong Wai (MH9753) - Chiang Mai - Fang Road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Than Na Nai (MH9760) - Than Tham Khaeb (MH9863) on Chiang Mai - Fang Road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doi Nam Pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Doi Nam Pha to Anphur Phrae (NE4712)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pho Phao Kluey</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Ban Pho Phao Kluey, Doi Lak Road, and Ban Sae Nai to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC802</td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Fang by mountain trails and Nam Vat Fang valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Nam Vat Klao River and proceed along Vat Khao way to Chiang Rai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Ban Vat Sai (MH9773) and proceed) to Ban Fang - Chiang Rai Road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Sae Nai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC802</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Changwat: Mae Hong Son - Burmese Border (Map Nos. NE47-10, NE47-16, NE47-27)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khao Mak Kha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jungle and mountainous, Salween and Moe Rivers bordering Thailand and Burma, Karen State; mountain ridges bordering Mae Hong Son and Burmese Kayah and Shan States</td>
<td>These trails were once used by the hill tribes as opium-smuggling routes to Chiang Mai and Tak, and could function as infiltration routes as well. Mae Sai Ang-Hiaw-Chiang Mai is an all-weather road. Mae Ping River, Chom Thong-Hiaw-Yan Hao Dam can be traversed by any type of boat. Air service operated between Chiang Rai - Pai - Mae Hong Son - Khan Yaam - Mae Sai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MH 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Mae Ping River via Ban Mak Ton (MH 2004) diverting along the way or cross the river to Anphur Li (b) Yan Mo Ton, at Ban Sam Man, proceed by waterway along Nam Mac Ton to Mae Ping, now a year-round navigable channel due to the Yan Hae Darn (c) Li-Chiang Mai Road via Ban San Men pong, Doi Kha (MH 2268), cross Mae Ping River at (MH4760) - Ban Mak Ton (MH4768)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | | | |
Tha Song Yang
IM 6542
Khao Lek Yabe
(II.A 6272) to
Phichit
(II.A 6075)
Hua Sai Song Khwae
Ban Tha Chang
(II.A 6298)
Hua Sai Phichit,
Nam Mae Pai
(II.A 6295)
Doi Mae Son Khon
(H.I.05653 to
Doi Phe Khot
(H.I.05675)
Chong Doi Sam Wang
MT 3356

From Tha Song Yang, Khao Lek Yabe, and
Phichit to
(a) Om Ko and Mae Ping River
(b) Mae Sarieng (II.A 6077)

From Hua Sai Song Khwae to Mae Sarieng

From Hua Sai Phichit to Changwat Mai
Hao Son and distribute to Chiangmai
via Pai and Mae Taeng, or proceed
down to Mae Sarieng

From Doi Mae Son Khon (Thai-Kayak-
Shan Border) to
(a) Mae Hong Son-Mae Sarieng via Han
Hung Kha Khan (II.I.06611) - Han Huk
Chumpor (II.H.02481) - Han Hung Luang
(b) Pai (MT 9239) - Mae Taeng - Chiangmai

From Chong Doi Sam Wang to Pai

Changwat: Tak—Burmese Border (Map No. ND47-2, ND47-3, NE47-10, NE47-14, NE47-15)

B05: Song Ta Rua
MT 1336

Dense jungle and mountains; Nam
Mai River borders Burma and
Thailand for an approximate dis-
tance of 200 km from Changwat Tak
to Salween River at Changwat Mar
Hong Son

From west of Han Khao Ya Wu (MT 5648) the
utilization should move along Karen
Ford tracks: Han Pakahai (MT 3451-
Khao Puch Khao Khoeng (VT 31411)-
Sam Nok Ping Chang Phuak (VT 30243)-
Amphur Lu Ya, and further to Changwat
Yom at Songkai

Nam Mae Moei could be utilized as a
communication line from Amphur
Mae Sarieng to the Salween River, and
it is not an obstruction to insur-
gents or smugglers

Air service operated between Bangkok-
Tak-Mae Sarieng
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khao Khok Pho Cho MTR291 to MT8695</td>
<td>From Khao Khok Pho Cho area, the old nature-management trails to Changwat Kamphaeng Phet via Ban Suan Mak Di (MTR8695) at Mae Ping River, for further distribution through roadways and/or waterways at Changwat Kamphaeng Phet or proceed to Amphur Phan Kratol and Changwat Phitsanulok through village roads and earthen tracks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of Ban Tienap W4 6321</td>
<td>From Ban Tienap proceed to Kamphaeng Phet through Ban Mong Tha (W4 9221) to Ban Nong Chao (W4 3115) or Changwat Kamphaeng Phet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Mae Kao Ken W4 3533</td>
<td>From Ban Mae Kao Ken and Amphur Mae Sod move along Tak-Mae Sod mountain road to Ban Nong Chao or Tak.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Mong At (Amphur Mae Sod) W4 4746</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphur Mae Ramat W4 4774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pha Daeng W4 4283 to W4 3696</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE E3
Infiltration Routes and Distribution Patterns: Central
(Map series L509, scale 1:250,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chonburi—East Coast (Map No. MD47-16, MD47-12)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ao Bang Sar 
QQ512 to QQ525 |
| Ao Bang Lamung 
(Laem Chabang) 
QQ5715 to QQ5446 |
| Ao Chonburi 
(Mae Nam Bang Pakong) 
QQ1066 to QQ1090 |
| Open beach with partly steep banks; fishing villages, coconut plantations, seaside resorts, and mangrove |
| Infiltrated by means of fishing craft and distributed through roadways; infiltration aided by agents in the country; the infiltrates were delivered by ships offshore |
| Proceeded upstream Mae Nam Bang Pakong to Cha Choeng Sao or further to Prachinburi by waterways, roadways, or railroad |
| **Samut Prakan (Map No. MD47-12)** |
| Any point along the coast |
| Chao Phraya River |
| Klung Dan fishing village 
QQ9792 |
| Mangrove and nipa palm; salt evaporating flats; mud beach and shallow water |
| Proceeded upstream Chao Phraya River |
| Aided by agents, the infiltrates entered by small craft, were delivered offshore by ship and then distributed through roadways |
| **Rayong (Map No. MD47-16)** |
| Along the coast |
| Ban Pak Ruan 
(QQ5702) entering 
Klung Chak Mah 
or Klung Chuong 
Tai |
| Ban Pak Klung 
(QQ6001) entering 
Klung Yai |
| Ban Nong O 
QQ5497 |
| Open beach with fishing villages and coconut plantations; mangrove approximately 15 km along the coast at Pak Nam Prasae; Bangkok–Trat highway extends to a maximum distance of 10 km from the coast |
| From Ban Pak Ruan by streams or trails to highway |
| From Ban Pak Klung by Klung Yai or road to Rayong; |
| From Ban Nong O to highway |
### TABLE E3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Pho</td>
<td>Q9495</td>
<td>From An Pho to highway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Phong Chonbhe (Q97307) and Ban Klong Lang (Q97307) entering Klong Klaeng</td>
<td></td>
<td>From Klong Klaeng to highway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai Manao at Ban Phong Sawai</td>
<td>Q97300</td>
<td>From Huai Manao to highway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Nam Pranee</td>
<td>Q9205</td>
<td>From Mae Nam Pranee to Amphur Klaeng by waterway, road, or trails</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klong Phaeng Rat</td>
<td>095105</td>
<td>From Klong Phaeng Rat proceed upstream to highway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From Chongwat Rayong distributed through roadways, or proceed to Amphur Ban Kla (Q95055) and travel further by village roads and trails to Amphur Ban Hua (Q99735), Chongwat Chomkhon via Ban Kao klang Thang (Q95150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From Amphur Klaeng proceed to Amphur Ban Hua by trails via Kao Khun In (Q96571-Khao Chao (Q95605)-Ban Hua)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Changwat: Trat—East Coast (Map No. MD48-13)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Across the Cambodian border through the mountain trails</th>
<th>Banthat Mountain Range bordering Trat and Cambodia, with de.sert forest, partly open in the southern coastal area</th>
<th>From Phnom Ban Vien Pass by trails to Amphur Klaeng, Amphur Klong, and Khao Sa Rong in Chiang Rai</th>
<th>From Phnom Banthat Pass to Ban Chang Khao (TL 3571) by trails or streams and</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Ban Vien Pass</td>
<td>TI 3997</td>
<td>From Phnom Ban Vien Pass by trails to Amphur Klaeng, Amphur Klong, and Khao Sa Rong in Chiang Rai</td>
<td>From Phnom Banthat Pass to Ban Chang Khao (TL 3571) by trails or streams and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TUS580
Phnom Thom Pass
TI6975
Open area along
Amphur Klong Yai

 proceeding to Amphur Khao Sameng or Trat
From Phnom Thom Pass by trails to
Khao Phla to Ban Chong Klu: or Ban
The Kum (TU460) to Trat
From areas along Amphur Klong Yai
[Laem Saphep (TU7388) to Khao Pha-
noen Sung (TU5341)] by trails to Trat
or by sea to Ban Huang Nam Kha
(TU3442), Ban Laem Sila (TU3447),
Klong Yai (TI3555) to Trat
From small bay at Ban Huang Nam Kha
and Ban Laem Ngop to Trat, entering
by roadways or, for better concealment,
by stream

From Ban Thamachat Lang by trails
and streams to Trat
From mangrove terrain at Ban Nam Weu
to Chanthaburi–Trat Road for further
movement

Chanthaburi (Map No. HD48-9, HD48-13, HD47-16)

Any point along the
border line
Open to dense forest and hilly coun-
try, bordering Chanthaburi and
Cambodia for an approximate dis-
tance of 100 km

From Cambodian border by trails to
(a) Ban Ta Rue (SV9462)–Amphur Sa
Keo for distribution through Prachinburi
From Ban Ta Rue possibly choosing
the trails via Khao Si Pa Chan–Khoa
Lalak–Khao Nong Nai (QQ9777) to Ban
Krok Sakae (QQ9084) proceed by trails
and village road to Amphur Bang Xia
(QR4821), Chanthaburi Chachoengsao
From Ban Ta Rue select the trails
through Khao Ta Phla–Khao Phae
Khaph (SV7536)–Ban Nam Khan
(SV7830)–Khoa Kachai–Ban Taphong
(RQ2120)–to Hango–Trat Highway
(b) Ban Phra Trong (SV9952) and Ban
Ta Man (TV0447), proceed northward
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From the Gulf of Thailand at any point along the coast</td>
<td>Open beach with fishing villages, coconut plantations, and rice fields; partly mangrove and nipa palm terrain; many small streams with navigable channels facilitate small-craft entry to the sea</td>
<td>To Sa Kaeo and Prachinburi southward to Amphur Makham, Chantaburi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Ban Laem (TV3141) and Ban Bong Chaoang (TV2041) to Amphur Pong Nam Ron (TV1015), proceed to Prachinburi or Chantaburi</td>
<td>From Ban Nong San (TV2829) and Ban Kong Yai (TV2732) to Khao Klu–Amphur Makham–Chantaburi</td>
<td>From the shore to Banphok–Chantaburi Highway; and from Mae Nam Chantaburi to the town for further distribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any point along the border line</td>
<td>Medium-dense to dense forest; partly hilly country</td>
<td>From Khao Saraphi (TV3093) to Khao Plai Kong Phlu Hip–Amphur Sa Kao–Amphur Kabinburi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Ban Nong Pen (TA2301) to Amphur Ratana Nakhon–Amphur Kabinburi–Amphur Chok Chai</td>
<td>From Aranyaprathet distributed railroad or roadways</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foot trails and animal trails intersecting the terrain provide adequate concealment for CT movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Ban Nam Mak Man (TA5325), and Khao Phanom Chat to Aranyaprathet</td>
<td>From Ban Rulom (TA7355) to (a) Amphur Ta Phraya (TA6319)–Aranyaprathet (b) Chong Ka Kiu and Chong Tako (TA4666) Khao Ban Tont–Amphur Nong Hongs for further distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoi Neakhaithong (Amna Pass)</td>
<td>Mountainous and jungle; some tin mines near the border</td>
<td>From Khoi Neakhaithong: 4½ m a Pass</td>
<td>Mae Klong River (River Khwee) and Mae Nam Khwae Noi have been</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>proceed to Mae Nam Khoe Noi via</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ban Pong Sakae–Ban Dan Lam Sai, or to Amphur Chom Hong, Rashburi, via Ban Takien Ngam–Ban Tab Tako, for further distribution

From Ban Pong Sakae proceed to Mae Nam Kwai Noi at Sai Yok (NR1759)

Ban Pong Sakae

Karei Tribe trails join tin mine and logging trails that reach Mae Klung River at Sub-Amphur Si Sawat (NS50522), and Mae Nam Kwai Noi at Sai Yok (NR1759)

Karei Tribe trails join tin mine and logging trails that reach Mae Klung River at Sub-Amphur Si Sawat (NS50522), and Mae Nam Kwai Noi at Sai Yok (NR1759)

Ban Bongti

MR9757

Khao Song Kwae

MR5197 to MS4605

Khao Doen

MS3717 to MS3323
to

MS227

( east of Khao Chang Phuk)

Phra Chedi Sam Ong

MS3592, MS3787

Hitibasam

MTS417

utilized by the CT as transportation route

From Ban Na Suam (NS0634) and Sub-Amphur Si Sawat (NS0522) upstream the Mae Klung River to Huai Khao Kheng, areas around Khao Krang Kri (NS2866) suspected of being CT transit camp that is 4 km with the Karei Tribe villages

Amphur Ban Rai, Changwat Uthai thani could be reached from Si Sawat via Ban Na Suam–Ban Tha Kradai–Ban Pak Krong Kri–Ban Ton Yang–Ban Lop or Si Sawat–Khao Kuan (NS1223)–Khao Pho Chang Mop (NS2928)–Ban Thang Makok (NS3341)–Ban Hua Hin Dam (NS4052)–Ban Song Pla Kang–Ban Na Suam (NS5357)–Ban Rai

At Ban Mong Lai (NR1787) Mae Klung River, there are trails to Amphur Ban Rai via Ban Pho Yorng Mo–Khao Chong Prato–Khao Ukhkhum (NS4501)–Ban Nong Ri–Khao Chong Phon–Ban Tab Kradat (NS6541)–Ban Nong O (NS6551)–Ban Thap, Khao (NS6461)–Ban Rai; or, at Ban Tab Kradat, turn eastward to Changwat Singwai via Ban Chang Ngaen (NS8241)–Amphur Donn Bang Nong Beud–Singwai or at Khao Ukhkhum to Chaiwat Chaiwat via Khao Chuang Phon–Ban Tong No 7 Fia (NS7237)–Ban Nong Sala (PS249)–Ban Hua (PS0958) at Ma Nam Mekham 1 km Chaiwat or to Changwat Suphanburi via Khao Chong Prato–Ban Wang Tai hian (NR4971)–Khao Chong–Kae Kham
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
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<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Along the Burmese border: N0373 and N01902 (Khao Wai Nai) | Mountainous and dense forest; Karen Tribe trails | Infiltrate through various Karen Tribe trails, by hiring the tribe men as guides and bearers:  
(a) To Amphur Khao Yoi, Petchburi (N09064), through Huii Mae Phadon area (Karen village) (N04414)  
(b) To Han Pak Tho, Raytham (N09279) through Khao Lak Chang (N09068) route  
(c) To Khao Chom Phon, Amphur Chon Buri (suspected CT transit camp)  
(d) To Kanchanaburi via Khao Wai Nai –Kha Rong Sakre – Han Lam Sai trail | Khao Wai Nai – Chom Rong – Raytham – Samud Songkram and Khao Wai Nai – Khao Lak Chang – Han Pak Tho – Samud Songkram routes utilized by the CT as a communication channel between Burma and the Gulf of Thailand |
| Ben Klong Chong P00574  
Ben Bang Cha Keng, Mae Klong River P00367 | Tidal flat, with salt evaporating fields, mangrove and nipa palm; streams and canals intersect the area; link Mae Klong River in Samud Songkram section to Petchburi, Raytham, and Thanburi; scattered fishing villages along the coast, the largest one at Han Bang Cha Keng with most facilities for fishing fleets | Infiltrate by means of fishing craft and offshore delivery  
Proceed up the Mae Klong River to Raytham or further to Kanchanaburi; alternate route to other inland waterways to Samud Sukho or Thanburi, or travel by railroad to Thanburi  
Proceed from the coast to Han Pak Tho (N09279), distribute through railroad, and/or roadways, and cross-country to | The routes Khao Wai Nai (N01902) (Burmese Border)–Khao Lak Chang–Han Pak Tho–Samud Songkram (Han Bang Cha Keng) could be useful communication and supply lines between Burma and the Gulf of Thailand |
Mae Klong River flows from Tak through Kanchanaburi-Ratchaburi to the Gulf of Thailand at Ban Bang Cha Krang, Changwat Samut Songkhram.

Khao Hui Sun and Khao Luk Chang (NQ1988), to Amphur Chom Heng, Changwat Ratburi, to Kanchanaburi through Han Dan Makham Tia, and to Amphur Kam Phraeng Buek, Changwat Nakorn Phathom.

Changwat: Samut Sakohn—Gulf of Thailand (Map No. ND47-11)

Along the coast and directly to Ao Tha Chin (PQ3894), The Chin River mouth: Open mud beach, with salt fields; scattered mangrove and nipa palms at the coast; villages are approximately 3 km inland.

Infiltrate by means of fishing craft and offshore delivery.

Proceed through the criss-cross inland waterways to railroad and roadways.

Proceed up the Tha Chin River to Nakorn Chai Si or further north; distribute through roadways or waterways to Chao Phraya River.

From Samut Sakohn the CT should distribute to Nakorn Pathom, Ratburi, Kanchanaburi, Suphanburi, Thonburi, and Bangkok.

Changwat: Petchaburi—Gulf of Thailand West Coast (Map No. ND47-11, ND47-11)

Ban Tanot Noi
Ban Khok Phlap PQ1757
Ban Pak Thale PQ1655
Ban Laem PQ0861

Ban Bang Tabun PQ0367

Open beaches, tidal flats, rice fields with sugar palms, scattered fishing villages and coconut plantations; navigable streams for small craft, and village roads connecting the beach areas to railroad and highways; Petchaburi River flows to the Gulf of Thailand at Ban Laem.

Infiltrate by means of fishing craft or delivered by ships offshore; infiltrators take cover along villages or in the mangrove terrain at Ban Bang Tabun area; they are dispersed through railroad, roadways, waterways, and trails to other CT active areas, and/or proceed cross-country to Khoa Ha Chang areas (NQ5503) (CT transit camp), Khoa Phanom Thang (NQ4723), Huey Mac Pladon areas (NQ1441) (Amphur Khoa Yoi, Khoa Phai Sao (NQ1988), Khoa Chom Phom (MR6506) Amphur Chom Heng, Changwat Ratburi, and then to Changwat Aekator in Thani via Han Dan Makham Tia, or distribute to Nakorn Pathom, Thonburi, and Bangkok for further movement.

The trails could be employed by the CT as communication routes between the Burmese jungle and the Gulf of Thailand.

Along Burmese border:

Mountainous, dense jungle, inhabited by Karen Tribesmen

Infiltrate along the Karen jungle trails under environmental concealment; distributed to the above-mentioned areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khao Mae Ramphung UE7208</td>
<td>Open sandy beach with coconut plantations and scattered fishing villages; large fishing village at Pak Klong Hang Sapan, Ao Mae Ramphung; railroad and roadways run parallel to shoreline at a close distance</td>
<td>Infiltrate by means of fishing craft, offshore delivery, small boats landing at specific points</td>
<td>One village at Sam Roi Yod beach is known to have facilities for supplying false ID cards and government documents for persons illegally entering the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Cha Muang UE6204</td>
<td>Baren sandy beach with navigable stream that flows from Sam Roi Yod marsh, and dirt road to Kui buri</td>
<td>Dispersed through railroad and roadways, or moved cross-country to CT active areas between Pranburi and Kui buri.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Nai Ruk (Klong Nam Kem) UE7737</td>
<td>Open beach with sugar palm and and rice fields; Sam Roi Yod Range lies approximately 1.5 km from shoreline</td>
<td>Infiltrate through the border along mountain trails by hiring Karen Tribesmen as guides and bearers; distributed at Tap Sakee, Huai Yang, Han Nong Hin, Kui buri, and Pranburi; or proceed to the CT transit camp at Khao Hop Sisiat (NP7560) for further movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Kha Doeng PP0642</td>
<td>Open beach with large fishing village and fishing-craft facilities, 15 km from Amphur Pranburi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Roi Yod PP0655</td>
<td>Mountainous and dense forest country along the Burmese border; Karen Tribesmen inhabit the area</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Pak Klong (Pranburi River) PP0872</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khao Yai UE5046</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khao Lao UE7563</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mae Dang Pass UE8279</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kha Doi NPS155</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP4867</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Top Tako—Ban Don Maham Tia; the trails were revealed to be a useful supply and communication route, as well as a retreat passage from Kanchanaburi.

Changwat: Surat Thani—Gulf of Thailand (Map No. MCA7-11, MCA7-10, MCA7-15)

- Ao Ban Don
  - NL4019
  - Ban Bang Nam Chat
  - NL2427
  - Ban Pak Nam Tha Tong
  - NL5518
  - Ban Pak Nam, The Krachai (Amphur The Chaoa)
  - NL2362
  - Laem Kula
  - NL8131

Open coastline, mostly mud, with some high steep banks; coconut plantations and fishing villages, some being remote along the steep banks or hillsides (see Fig. E1 and E2). Numerous navigable streams for small-craft entry to the Gulf; major river in Klong Phum Duang Mae Nam Ta Pi flows from Amphur Chamang, Changwat Nakorn Sri Tham, through Amphur Ban Na San, joins Klong Phum Duang at Amphur Phun Phin (NL2506). Klong Chamang flows from Ban Na San to Mae Nam Ta Pi at Ban Pra Chan (NK1164)

Infiltration by means of fishing craft, coastal freighters, offshore delivery, Malaysian junk.

The infiltrators should distribute inland via
(a) Klong Phum Duang to Amphur Phun Phin and Khiriwat Niwom
(b) Klong Kradae, Amphur Kanchanodit to Ban Na San CT active area; Khao Prasuk (NK5765) and Khao Pha Yai (NK5585)
(c) Cross-country from Laem Kula through Khao Wang Ri to Ban Na San
(d) Cross-country or Klong Tha Krachai and Klong Tha Chana to CT active areas along Ranong—Surat Thani border
(e) Mountain trails from Sub-Amphur Kapor through Khao Daen entering The Chana area
(f) Railroad and secondary roads to other CT active areas
(g) CT utilized Mae Nam Ta Pi as a communication and supply route between active areas of Kanchanaburi, Phun Phin, Ban Na San, and Chamang.

Changwat: Chumphon—Gulf of Thailand West Coast (Map No. MCA7-7)

- Ban Hin Sam Kao (Klong Lang Saen)
  - NL1999

Open sandy beach with coconut plantations and fishing villages

Infiltrated by means of fishing craft, offshore delivery, small coastal freighters; moving from nearby towns in small boats.

People in Amphur The Saen refuse to cooperate with government officials and law-abiding persons, but
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pak Nam Tako UP1975</td>
<td>Mangrove swamp and coconut plantations, fishing villages; navigable channels: Klong Sawi, Klong Nga, Klong Wisai, and Klong Chumphon.</td>
<td>Fishing craft, moving cross-country or via roads from Ranong. Proceed from point of entry upstream Mae Nam Chumphon-Mae Nam Tha, Klong Chumphon, Klong Wisai, Klong Nga, and streams at Ban Pak Nam Tako, or other possible channels; distributed through roads or railroad move from points of entry via Amphur Tha Sae (UP1644) to CT active areas: Khao Nam Lao (UP1650), Khao Lat (UP1660), and Map Amonit parahuller-plantation area (UP1660) that was suspected as one of the CT transit camps from Southern Region to the Central Plain and Northeast Region. CT helicopter landing pads are known to exist among the parahuller-plantation areas, and have attained a certain degree of operational frequency.</td>
<td>They like to help bandits and the like; the CT should take this advantage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ao Sawi: Ban Siap Yon UP1295</td>
<td>Open sandy beach, partly rock; coconut plantations; large fishing villages with all facilities for fishing craft and monsoon season shelters. Channel: Mae Nam Chumphon.</td>
<td>Infiltrated by means of Malaysian junka. Fishing craft, transship from coastal freighter to small fishing boats, crossing Pak Chao River. Movement under terrain concealment, and by posing as tin mine workers. Distributed through roads or, having crossed the highway, proceeded by mountain trails to Khao Mahen (ML8888) and Sub-Amphur Patok; traveled through Klong Lang Suam waterway by means of locally constructed bombo rafts, and long-shaft boats to Amphur Lang Suam; further distribution through</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Pho Si UP1996</td>
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<td>Ban Wisai UK1703</td>
<td>Ma</td>
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<td>Ao Thong Kha: Ban Thong Kha</td>
<td>Ma</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK2111</td>
<td>Ma</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Pak Nam UK3217</td>
<td>Ma</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ban Thong Ha UK5566</td>
<td>Ma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Kam Phuan ML3437</td>
<td>Ma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small bay at Ko Piak Nam to Ban Sai and Khlong Kao Tor ML4150 to ML5157 Ko Sai Dam (ML5777) to Ban Nok Ngang (ML5777) Khao Chak (ML5085) to Han Pak Nam (ML5790)</td>
<td>Ma</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pak Chan River, Ban Pak Nam—Kra Huri (U7353)—Amphur Pak Chan (U7822)

Mangrove and nipa palm, small fishing villages; from Kra Huri to Amphur Pak Chan: nipa palm, villages, and rice fields; upstream from Amphur Pak Chan: hilly country with dense forest.

People could easily swim or wade across Pak Chan River at low tide.

roadways, railroad, and seaway

Entered Khlong La Chan (U0658), proceeded upstream to Khlong Bang Phra (U07384), intermingled among remote villages, then net out along the trails at Ban Pak Phraek (U07875), to Ban Khao Talu (U09489) and continued to Chumphon—Lang Suam Road (UK1095), or traveled from Ban Khao Talu by bamboo rafts in rainy season through Khlong Sawi to Ban Thung Raya (UP1089), distributed through roadways, railroad, and seaway.

Changwat: Nakom Si Thammarat—Gulf of Thailand West Coast (Map No. NC47-15, NB47-3, NC47-11)⁹

Han Ho Khon Thi (PK1405) to
Han Makham Thet (PK3917)

Ban Nam Hak (PK3533)
Amphur Huai Sai
(PIJ60)
Ban Pak Phya
(PK1641)

Open beach, partly tidal flat and mangrove; streams, navigable for small boats, flow from Ban Nam Pak Phanang to the sea.

Mangrove and tidal flat with navigable streams accessible to roadways.

is illustrated by means of

(a) Malaysian junks
(b) Coastal freighters
(c) Locally hired fishing craft
(d) Offshore delivery
(e) Overland routes to and from Krabi, Patalung and Songkhla
(f) Inland waterways (Ban Nam Pak Phanang and its branches) to and from Amphur Cha Ved (PIJ2255), and Amphur Kham Khanun (PIJ365, NJ050)

Changwat Patalung

The CT should proceed to Amphur Thung Song, Amphur Chawang, Amphur Ban Na San, and Amphur Lam Sak through mountain trails and roadways and railroad, for continued distribution or the conducting of insurgency in the aforementioned areas.

Distributed to Amphur Ban Na San and to Phangnga and Krabi via mountain

Ban Talat Bang San
(PK0372)

Open sandy beach, fishing villages, scattered coconut plantations;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of entry and coordinates</th>
<th>Terrain description</th>
<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pak Nam Si Chon, Amphur Si Chon, PK0197</td>
<td>mountain range almost parallel to the shoreline; tin mines</td>
<td>trails, they are shielded by the environment and by posing as tin-mine workers or para-rubber-plantation laborers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Khao Chai Son, Amphur Khao hom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ao Lek Bay and Phuket Sea through navigable streams</td>
<td>From Krabi—Trang border to south of Amphur Muang Krabi, mangrove forest with navigable streams that extend to the roadways</td>
<td>Infiltrated by means of Malaysian junks (see Fig. E3), fishing craft, trans-shipped from coastal freighters to small fishing boats</td>
<td>Movement under environmental concealment with or without assistance from agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ko Hong (Ao Ho Fung)</td>
<td>North of Amphur Muang Krabi to Pheng Nga Bay, open beach, partly rocky, and steep banks with navigable channels for small craft</td>
<td>Distribution through roadways to Ranong, Trang, and Patthalung or across country to Amphur Ban Na Sar, Changwat Suratthani (Khao Prasat NK4765) and Khao Phu Yai (NK5855); Amphur Chawang, Changwat Nakorn Sri Thammarat via Amphur Thong Yai (Khao Laung NK7510) and Khao Wang Hip (NK7766); Amphur Losak, Changwat Nakorn Sri Thammarat (Khao Wang NK0071)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ko La Pha Lue</td>
<td>Roadways about 15 km from coastline</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NJ1453</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changwat: Songkhla—Gulf of Thailand West Coast (Map No. NBO-3, NBO-2)</td>
<td>Open sandy beach with rice fields and scattered coconut plantations; streams link inland sea to the Gulf</td>
<td>Infiltrated by means of Malaysian junks, coastal freighters, locally hired fishing crafts, delivered by ships offshore and ferried in by local crafts, overland routes from Malaysian border</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any point along the coast</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Rawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJ5353</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Laem Noi
(Thale Sap Songkhla entrance)
P71500

At Ban Rawa the CT should proceed across the inland sea (Thale Luang) to Amphur Khuan Khunun, Changwat Patthalung (Khuan Hin Kling (NJ9050) or mangrove forest north of Thale Noi (P737365), or to Amphur Cha Lad, Changwat Nakorn Sri Thammarat, mangrove forest and swamp (P722863).

From the coast the CT should move across Thale Luang and proceed overland to Khao Luang camp along Trang-Patthalung border (P70114).

Entry through Thale Sap Songkhla and Port Authority of Songkhla, the CT should distribute through waterways, roadways, railroad, and trails to the destinations indicated above and other places.

Changwat: Patthalung—Peninsula (Map No. NB47-3)*

CT activity areas:
- Khao Hin Kling (NJ9050) and mangrove forest north of Thale Noi (P737365)
- Patthalung—Trang border, Khao Luang (P70114)
- Knok (P73022), Amphur Pak Pa Yon, the CT terrorized along Thale Luang water (Songkhla inland sea).

Changwat: Trang—Andaman Sea Coast (Map No. NB47-2, NC47-15, NB47-3)*

CT activity areas:
- Infiltration by means of Malaysian junks (see Fig. E3), hired fishing craft, transfer from ships at sea to small local craft
- Proceeded through waterways under environmental concealment, distributed.

Through Amphur Huay Yud, Amphur Pak Phin, Changwat Trang
Through Amphur Huay Yai, and the shoreline of Changwat Songkhla
Amphur Tong Ra, Changwat Satun

Media and dense forest; para-rubber plantation; tin mines; mangrove forest; and swamps

An Sihan
Han Pru Chat
(NJ9355) to Han
Laem Sai (NJ3242)
to Han Khang Khao
(NJ30146)

Drainage: mangrove forest and nipa palm, flooded at high tide; soft-soil coastal CI reading 0 to 18; partly open sandy beach
Navigable streams flow through the mangrove terrain; major rivers:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Distribution and movement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban Haed Sai Khon NJ507</td>
<td>Mae Nam Trang and Mae Nam Palian; most streams reach all-weather roads (mangrove terrain and waterways, see Fig. E1)</td>
<td>through roadways to Songkhla, Nakorn Sri Thammarat, Chumphon, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Ta Yong Li Ling (NH6688) to Ko Taban (NH7788)</td>
<td>Travelled across-country to Amphur Khuan Khanun, Changwat Pataung (Khuan Hin Klang (N°90°50) and mangrove forest north of Thale Nos (P'27165)) and to Amphur Cha Nai, Changwat Nakorn Sri Thammarat (mangrove forest and swamp (P'2285))</td>
<td>The CT should distribute from the landing points at Ko Taban through roadways or move cross-country to Trang – Pataung border, Khao Luang (P'0113), suspected CT training camp, and proceed to Songkhla by trails and roadways</td>
<td>It is important to note that the infiltrator could land at any point along the coastline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changwat: Phangnga—Andaman Sea Coast (Map No. MC47-148)

Ko Phra Thong and Klong Khau Red ML2500 and ML3024 Ko Yao ML2019 Waterways at Sub-Amphur Ko Kho Khan (MK2907) and Amphur Takua Pa (MK2089) Open beaches with some steep banks, medium-dense vegetation, scattered fishing villages and coconut plantations; inland terrain composed mostly of tin mines

Southern highways almost parallel to the coast at a maximum of 15 km from the shore

Infiltrated by means of Malaysian junks, fishing craft, offshore delivery

Movement facilitated by environmental concealment and by poving as timber workers

Distributed through roadways to Ranong, Chumphon, and Suratthani

Traveled cross-country from Amphur Takua Pa or Amphur Tub Poed (MK6610) to Amphur Khiri Rat Sathan (MK8811)
Water along Phang Nga Bay

The Straits of Malacca, waterways
- Khlong Pi Yai (QN220470) and waterways (QN245469)
- Ban Lat Dam waterways (QN305141)
- Ban Lat Dam To Hinh and waterways (QN390570)

Waterways at
- Ko Doong (QN470105)
- waterways and Ban Chai Mai Lang (QN528225 and QN5451-8)
- Waterways at Ko Han To (QN570390)
- QN665651 Waterways
- QN700805

Mangrove swamps and nipa, with cross-blind streams and navigable channels for small boats

Proceed inland through waterways to Lao Ngou-Patian Road for further distribution

Proceed inland to Amphoe La Ngou and Rhab Jhich trail, to Satun-Rattanaburi Road
Proceed inland to Ban Chai Mai Lang-Satun Road for further distribution

To Amphoe Muang, Satun for further distribution through roadways

To Satun or cross-country to CT operational area in Amphoe Sadao

Changes: Satun—Peninsula

Any point along Pattani shore, and distributed from

Open beach, mangrove, and lot, open forest; coconut plantations and fishing villages

Infiltrate by means of fishing craft, coastal freighters, Malaysian junks, offshore delivery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yala and Narathiwat</td>
<td>From the coast proceed inland to roadways via trails, village roads and waterways to CT operational areas or for further distribution. Proceed by roadway or inland along the river to CT active areas around Yala and Banang Nata.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Changwat: Yala—Peninsula**

**Along the border**

- Mountainous and dense forest, adjacent to para rubber plantations.
- Sahakheu Mountain Range bordering Malaysian and Yala.

**From the points of entry, join CT activities around the five-amphoe areas of Yala, proceed to nearby provinces or to Hand Yai by roads or railroad for further distribution to Ranong, Chumphon, Pattalung, Nakon Si Thammarat, and Trang.**

Mountain trails and remote-area waterways are well utilized by the insurgent forces.

**Changwat: Narathiwat—Peninsula**

**Any point along Narathiwat coast**

- Klong Bang Nara
- Mae Nam Saiburi
- Waterways at Q1-66275
- Malaysian border

**Open beach and scrub**

- Proceed inland by trails to roadways and further to CT operational areas.
- To roadways, or proceed deeper to Bang Pau (Q1-05800) for better concealment of movement.
- To roadways, or proceed inland to CT active areas in Amphoe Rama, and upstream further south in the mountainous country along the Malaysian border.

Mountain trails, para rubber-plantation areas, village roads, trails, and Mae Nam Saiburi, Mae Nam Pattani, and other streams have been utilized by the CT as communication and supply routes.
(d) Frontier rivers bordering Thailand and other countries are no obstacle to the attempted crossing teams.

(e) Tributary waterways to the Gulf of Thailand and frontier rivers could be well utilized as means of communication to proceed inland.

(f) Frontier mountain passes and border jungle trails provide open routes for infiltration; 90 percent are uncontrollable by Royal Thai Security Forces. Thailand sovereignty begins 3 km from the pass entrances on lower ground.

(6) Distribution and Movement

(a) Infiltration and insurgent movement mainly proceed on foot on jungle and mountain trails used as communication systems. A long-range operations network has been established by the CT through the jungle and remote areas.

(b) At least 65 percent of inland waterways, major rivers, canal systems, and remote-area waterways have been utilized by the insurgent forces to support movement and activities.

(c) Roadways and railroads are the primary means of supporting CT movement. Transportation networks, distribution terminals, depots and boat landings, and road security checkpoints are not effectively controlled.

(d) Certain routes within Thailand could be utilized by the communist movement as a communication link to connect Burma with the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, Laos, and North Vietnam.

(e) The infiltration movement has been supported by locally hired communist agents or agents trained by Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, or the Pathet Lao; these agents have an organized communication network.

GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Coastline and Thailand Water

(U) The coastlines along the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea are together approximately 4000 km (2500 miles) long and consist of 45 percent open beach, 30 percent tidal flat and mangrove, 15 percent steep bank, and 10 percent rock. Vegetation varies from scattered to dense, with and without undergrowth. Sections of the coast consist of islands and small bays, such as Satun, Trang, Krabi, and Ranong along the Andaman Sea; and Chantaburi, Trat, Chumphon, and Suratthani in the Gulf of Thailand. Such terrain provides adequate concealment for the attempted landing parties.

(U) Thailand's coast is open to all possibilities of infiltration and insurgency. The National Security Forces patrolling systems are light and scattered; the operational frequency could not match those of the smugglers and the CTs.

(U) The small international water at the end of the Gulf of Thailand, touched on three sides by the Thai coast of Hua Hin–Samud Songkram–Chonburi–Sattahip, is only 50 miles across. The offshore deliveries of insurgent personnel and supplies to the high-speed smuggling craft are efficiently operated. The inland sea looked upon as international water imposes certain difficulties on the Thai National Security Forces in controlling infiltration and insurgent communication and supply lines.
Fig. E1—Fishing Village at Moe Nam Pranburi

Fig. E2—Isolated Fishing Village
Barely accessible from inland.

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Tributary Waterways to the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea

Hundreds of waterways with navigable channels for small craft flow to the Gulf and the Andaman Sea and provide entrances and passage under environmental concealment for the insurgent movements to proceed inland. Stream and river-mouth terrain varies from open mud flat and sand to dense mangrove, bare or with fishing villages of various sizes (see Fig. E1).

The navigable-channel entrances are open and unprotected. Such waterways link the seas and inland villages, towns, railroads, and road networks. None of the effective checking systems and patrolling patterns have been studied for purposes of river-mouth protection and counterinsurgency operations.

Fishing Villages

Shore dwellers and fishing villages are scattered along the coasts, except at major waterway inlets or seaside towns. The larger fishing villages such as Chumphon, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Chantaburi, Trat, Rayong, Songkhla, and Suratthani, were ports of call for most of the long-range fishing craft and coastal freighters in the Gulf. The fishing craft entered to deliver or transship their catch for bulk transport, for crew exchange, crew relief, or to receive supplies. Such fishing towns could be utilized as CT communication center and/or distribution points (see Fig. E2).

Small fishing villages serve as entry points for the infiltrators and insurgent forces. No adequate checking system has been established.

Fishing Craft

Local Fishing Craft. Fishing craft of various types and sizes throughout the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea are potential means for transporting infiltrators and insurgents into the kingdom. Hired smuggling vessels are well equipped and can operate at speeds up to 36 knots; some are armed. The pickup and delivery of CT personnel and supplies in international water in the Gulf of Thailand are effectively conducted by CT-owned local craft ostensibly engaged in ordinary fishing activities. The craft should make delivery direct to fishing towns or big villages or transship to local small craft for delivery to remote villages (see Fig. E3).
(U) Fig. E4—Tributary to Mekong (Mekong) with Access Roads
Provides adequate CT distribution points.

(U) Fig. E5—Tributary Stream to Mekong (Mekong)
Fishing equipment and fishing boats, similar on both sides.
Malaysian Junks. The Malaysian junks visit a port of call in Thai territory to deliver sugar and pick up their cargo of charcoal, coconut, and dry fish. The Malaysian junks are usually active along the southern provinces and furthermost to Ranong. These junks could carry CTs and supplies and deliver them at any point along the coast.

No adequate patrolling, searching, or checking systems are available to control the fishing-craft movements and activities in port or at sea.

**Boundary Rivers and Tributary Streams**

Rivers bordering Thailand and the neighboring countries, such as Mae Nam Khong (Mekong) Mae Nam Ruak, Mae Nam Moei, Mae Nam Pak Chan, and Mae Nam Sughai Kolok (see Figs. E4 and E5) can be crossed without limitations of time, area, or means of transport. The CTs proceed inland through the tributary streams or along the adjoining overland routes for further distribution. Thailand does not have sovereignty over the mid-channel of the Mae Nam Khong, but can only exercise navigation rights.

**Boundary Mountain Ranges**

Mountain passes along the border provide open routes for infiltration and insurgency; 90 percent are uncontrollable and undetectable by the Thai Security Forces. Along the frontier mountains, Thailand lacks a strategic advantage for counterinsurgency operations in that it exercises sovereignty only over an area 3 km from the mountain-pass entrances at the lower ground, particularly along the Cambodian border.

**CT Distribution and Movement**

**Mountain and Jungle Trails**

Infiltration and insurgent movement and distribution are mainly based on jungle and mountain trails. The long-range operations network has been established through the jungles and remote areas with ample avenues for communication, logistics, and mission operations, as shown in the following examples:

- From the Burmese border along Prachau Khiri Khan to Pranburi-Petchburi-Ratchburi-Kanchanaburi-Suphanburi
- From the Burmese border along Tak to Kanchanaburi-Uthaithani-Nakhon Sawan, or Singburi
- Kanchanaburi or Rachburi-Samud Songkram-Gulf of Thailand
- From Vientiane to Amphur Sri Chiangmai-Dong Chomphu Jungle-Phu Phan Ridge-Amphur Nong Bua Lam Phu-Krakuan-Sah sakhan-Sakhon Nakhon-Nakhon Phanom
- Nong Bua Lam Phu-Phu Khieo-Petchabun
- From the Laotian border along Nan to Phayao or Uttaradit-Pitsanulok-Nakhon Sawan
- From the Laotian border to Loei-along Petchabun Range to Chaiyaphum or Lopburi

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(h) From the Cambodian border along Amphur Pong Nam Ron to Chachoengsao or Krabinburi-Korat
   (i) Rayong-Chonburi-Krabinburi
   (j) Ranong-Patoh-Lang Suan-Chumphon
   (k) Yala, Satun to Patalung-Surathan

Inland Waterways

At least 65 percent of the inland waterways have been utilized by the CT to support movements and activities. The remote area waterways are feasible communication and transport routes with better environmental concealment and the means for transporting supplies in large quantities. The inland-waterways security system is inadequate.

The critical waterways that flow through key cities are listed as follows:

(a) Mae Nam Mae Klong from north of Kanchanaburi-Ratchaburi-Samut Songkhram
(b) Mae Nam Chao Phraya from Nakhon Sawan-Chai Nat-Uthithani-Bangkok
(c) Mae Nam Nan from Nan-Uttaradit-Pitsanulok-Nakhon Sawan
(d) Mae Ping from Chiangmai-Tak-Khamphaeng Phet-Nakhon Sawan
(e) Mae Nam Pa Sak from Lom Sak-Petchabun-Saraburi-Ayudhaya
(f) Mae Nam Tapi from Surathani
(g) Mae Nam Saiburi from Nara thivat
(h) Mae Nam Mun from Korat-Sisaket-Ubon Ratchathani

Canal networks in the central plain link the Gulf of Thailand to major towns. Examples are:

(a) Samud Prakan, Chachoengsao to Prachinburi, Nakhon Nayok, Saraburi, Ayudhaya, Pathumthani, Nonthaburi, Bangkok
(b) Samud Songkram, Samud Sakhon to Rachaburi, Nakhon Pathom, Pathumthani, Ayudhaya, Saraburi, Pathumthani, Thonburi

Roadways and Railroads

Road and railroad networks throughout the country provide efficient communication and transport lines to infiltrators and insurgent forces. Security, control, and search systems are light and scattered and lack sufficient equipment and planning.

Transportation Distribution Points

Railroad, bus, and water-taxi systems could be well utilized by the insurgent forces to support their movements and distribution throughout the country. Buses could stop at any point to pickup and deliver passengers and cargo. Railroad stations, bus terminals and depots, and boat landings are open and uncontrolled. No sufficient and continuous transportation-distribution-point control system has been established. The nearly isolated railroad stations could easily be used by the CT; village bus depots and boat landings could serve their purposes as well. Such distribution points contribute adequate movement concealment (see Fig. E6).
Infiltration Support Activities

Communist Agents. The communist insurgent headquarters controlling the major CT movements throughout Thailand, except through the southern provinces along the Malaysian border, is organized in Bangkok, with a network of regional commands and agents providing the planning and support of infiltration and insurgent movements. Communist agents are long-time infiltrated North Vietnamese, refugees, Chinese, Laotians, Moscow- or Peking-trained Thai-born Chinese and Northeast Thai, and Hanoi-trained Tak and Chiengrai hill tribes. Some supporters of infiltration are agents hired in groups or individually.

(U)

Fig. 6d—Loaded Village Bus

Communication. The communist communication system is based mainly on a person-to-person method using the following sources: (a) bus and truck systems; (b) mobile medicine vans, also used for audio-visual propaganda purposes; and (c) the various gathering places such as the market fair, village or wat festivals, rice mills, village coffee shops, and groceries (see Fig. E7).

From headquarters to regional commands the communists communicate through certain commercial radio programs and fake advertisements in Chinese- and Thai-language newspapers.

Inland waterways and jungle trails within Thailand are utilized as communication routes between communist countries, as shown in the following examples:

(a) Between Burma and Laos through Mae Nam Kok in Chiengrai; mountain trails in Chiengrai; mountain trails and waterways along Tak-Phu Suan Taen-Nan; Mae Hong Son-Phayao-Nan; Loei-Petchabun Mountain Range; and Tak-Khampaengphet-Phichit-Petchabun-I oei.
(b) Between Burma and the Gulf of Thailand through jungle and mountain trails along Kanchanaburi-Ratchaburi or Mae Nam Mae Klung-Samud Songkhram; jungle and mountain trails through Petchburi or Prachub Khiri Khan; jungle trails and waterways through Ranong and Chumphon; and across the peninsula from the Andaman Sea via jungle trails, waterways, and roadways.

(U) Fig. E7—Market Fair
Gathering place for all kinds of people; CTs easily merge and are distributed.

(U) Finance and Supply. The communist movement obtained money and supplies by extortion, by agents collecting in nearby villages, or from communist-operated fronts such as commercial firms and other quasi-welfare organizations. Mobile medicine vans have also been used as sources of financial and medical support (see Fig. E8).

(U) Air delivery, mostly by helicopters from existing communist countries, commenced along the critical areas not far from the border.

(U) Areas known to have air delivery are as follows: Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Udon Thani, Ubon Ratchathani, Loei, Prachub Khiri Khan, Chumphon, Nakon Sri Thammarat, Yala, Pattani, Satun, and Narathiwat.

(U) Transit Camps. Transit camps for infiltration movements were established in the dense forests or over the mountain ridges along the long-range operational routes, at 2- to 3-day walking distances apart, or from the areas of entry. The camps were usually abandoned and then reestablished at certain periods of time for concealment purposes; alternate sites were allegedly no further than a 1-day walk. A number of villages along the coast and border were used as transit places for the infiltrators and insurgent forces (see Fig. E9).
Fig. E8—Medicine Van with Fake Trade Names
Operated by CT along the Northeast remote areas as source of communication and propaganda, equipped with low-cost medical supplies, 16-mm movie projector, amplifier and power generator.

Fig. E9—Abandoned CT Transit Camp
North of Nong Bua Lam Phu, Phu Phan Mountain Range, Udonthani.
The report analyzes both intelligence data and its content relating to the development, organization, and operation of the network of subversive insurgency in Northeast Thailand for the purposes of establishing a framework for the generation and testing of analytic techniques to be used by military intelligence officers at the operating level to support programming, planning, and conduct of stability operations in internal defense and development.
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