Dear Mr. Kohler:

In accordance with your telephone request of this date to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Douglas, has authorized
the release to the Department of State of the attached two
enclosures.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Frederic L. Miller
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region

Prepared by Col. J.H. Schofield/elm/7 Mar 60
EurRtg/IBA 36253 Ext. 54812

Dist:
- Addressee-Orig w/Encls & 2cc (C-21960)
- JCS-3cc w/o encls
- OSD Files w/o encls
- R&C Files w/o encls
- R&C Rdg File w/o encls
- Comeback
- Stayback

Refer to: I-12896/60

MAR 7 1960

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF:

[Signature]

17 May 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

References: a. Embassy Bonn Message to Secretary of State No. 1580, dated 18 February 1960
b. Buenos Aires Message to Secretary of State No. SEC 111, dated 26 February 1960
c. Attachment to Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from JCS, dated 24 February 1960

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the tripartite agreement with our Allies (reference a) and the decision (reference b) on this subject and are prepared to resume high altitude flights into Berlin.

2. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is primarily a cold war tactic, under the present circumstances, and that the military requirements for these flights are secondary.

3. If the flights are resumed, the military contingencies as outlined in the proposed warning message to USCINCEUR (reference c) might result. In the event an aircraft is damaged or destroyed by Soviet or GDR aircraft or ground fire, a logical follow-on would be to dispatch a subsequent aircraft at altitude to Berlin with fighter escort.

4. It is recommended that you approve the dispatch of the warning message to USCINCEUR as outlined in reference c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to issue appropriate execution orders to initiate these flights when you so direct.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

THOMAS D. WHITE,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

12875/60

SEC DEF CODE 43

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF 11 MAY 1968

DATE

4MAR1960

Copy 4 of 9 Stacks each
TO: The Acting Secretary of Defense.
FROM: The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To provide the JCS with guidance on the subject of future actions, with regard to high altitude flights to Berlin.

Discussion: In the light of recent events with which you are fully familiar, it is considered that the last issued memorandum of the JCS (Tab A) should be answered for the purpose of officially informing them of the action taken on their recommendation and to provide them with guidance on this subject for use in regard to current and future plans and military requirements.

The attached memorandum (Tab B) reflects the above recommendation.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the JCS (Tab B).

2 Incls.
1. JCSM-04-60, 4 Mar 60 (I-12875/60 - Cy 5)
2. Proposed memo for
Chmn. JCS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

Reference: JCSM-38-60, 4 March 1963

In view of the President's decision on Tuesday, 3 March, that there was not at present an operational need to fly in the Berlin corridor above 50,000 feet, the actions recommended in reference mentioned were not approved.

The President's decision, which was determined by current operational needs and after consideration of other factors related to this subject as of that date, did not preclude a future favorable consideration. The President specifically stated that there was tripartite agreement to conduct these flights when it was operationally necessary and desirable.

In view of these facts, I consider that such high altitude flights are requested from an operational point of view, such as the execution of contingency plans associated with air support of Berlin, authority for such flights can be expected. Therefore, plans should continue to contain provision for high altitude flights to Berlin as required.

The above guidance is furnished for use in future planning.

Prepared by Col J.H. Schofield, Jr.,elm/28 Mar/G
EurReg/ISA 35253 Ext. 54812
Dist:
Addressee-Cys 1, 2, 3 & 4 (C-21966)
OSD Files-Cy 5
RAC Files-Cy 6
Comeback-Cy 7
RAC Rdg File-Cy 8
Stayback-Cy 9

I-12875/60

TOP SECRET
TO: The Acting Secretary of Defense.

FROM: The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) [Signature]

Problem: To provide the JCS with guidance on the subject of future actions with regard to high altitude flights to Berlin.

Discussion: In the light of recent events with which you are fully familiar, it is considered that the last issued memorandum of the JCS (Tab A) should be answered for the purpose of officially informing them of the action taken on their recommendation and to provide them with guidance on this subject for use in regard to current and future plans and military requirements.

The attached memorandum (Tab B) reflects the above recommendation.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the JCS (Tab B).

1. JCSM-84-60, 4 Mar 60
   (R-12875/60 - Cy-5)
2. Proposed memo for
   Gen, JCS.

Prepared by Col J.H.Schofield, Jr./elm/28Mar60
   EurReg/ISA 36253 Ext. 54612

Dist:
   Actg SecDef-Cy 1 (C-21967)
   R&C Files-Cy 2
   Comeback-Cy 3
   R&C Rdg File-Cy 4
   Stayback-Cy 5

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
17 MAY 1984
CASE #
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (S)

References: a. Embassy Bonn Message to Secretary of State No. 1580, dated 18 February 1960
b. Buenos Aires Message to Secretary of State No. SECT 11, dated 26 February 1960
c. Attachment to Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from JCS, dated 24 February 1960

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the tripartite agreement with our Allies (reference a) and the decision (reference b) on this subject and are prepared to resume high altitude flights into Berlin.

2. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is primarily a cold war tactic, under the present circumstances, and that the military requirements for these flights are secondary.

3. If the flights are resumed, the military contingencies as outlined in the proposed warning message to uscinceur (reference c) might result. In the event an aircraft is damaged or destroyed by Soviet or GDR aircraft or ground fire, a logical follow-on would be to dispatch a subsequent aircraft at an altitude to Berlin with fighter escort.

4. It is recommended that you approve the dispatch of the warning message to uscinceur as outlined in reference c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to issue appropriate execution orders to initiate these flights when you so direct.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

THOMAS D. WHITE,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
HYPOTHETICAL LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN DEFENSE OF BERLIN

(Final Draft Parts I and II)
HYPOTHETICAL LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN DEFENSE OF BERLIN

I. THE SITUATION

A. Situation Between the Western Powers and the Bloc

1. Interference with Allied Access to Berlin. After a series of relatively minor harassments of U.S., U.K. and French access to Berlin, the Soviets have demanded that the Western Powers submit to new controls which, in effect, permit East German personnel, rather than the Western Powers to decide what persons and goods will move between the Federal Republic and Berlin in connection with the occupation of Berlin. The Allies have refused to accept these demands by the deadline fixed by the Soviets. The Soviets have thereupon declared that the Allies refuse to accept the only reasonable compromise which would permit the German Democratic Republic (GDR) personnel to continue clearing allied traffic through the "sovereign" GDR. The Western Powers have requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and the adoption by the Council of a resolution calling upon the parties to refrain from actions violating existing agreements, to resume negotiations, and to report the results to the Council. The Soviets have vetoed this resolution and have withdrawn their personnel from the rail and road checkpoints. The GDR personnel at these checkpoints have refused to clear allied trains or vehicles, alleging that the postwar quadripartite agreements are not binding on the GDR and that the GDR will not permit free passage to the "NATO" forces which are bent on its destruction. Simultaneously, the Soviets have withdrawn from the Berlin Air Safety Center on the grounds that the GDR now enjoys full "air sovereignty" and the GDR has declared that its military forces will take defensive action against any aircraft which attempt to overfly GDR territory without GDR permission. Realizing that the allied position in Berlin is untenable
unless free access can be maintained, the U.K. and France have concurred with the U.S. in undertaking to employ force to test Soviet intentions and to attempt to reopen access.

2. Attempt to Gain Control of Western Sectors in Berlin. By infiltrating agitators into the Western Sectors of Berlin from the surrounding Soviet-occupied territory, the Communists have been able to stage serious riots throughout the city. The ostensible purpose of the rioting is to protest against the unwillingness of the Western Powers to deal with the East German authorities in seeking to move Western personnel and supplies across East German territory to Berlin. To aid the rioters, the East Berlin police and paramilitary (Kampfgruppen) forces have occupied points on the Communist-controlled rapid transit network (S-Bahn) in West Berlin. The Communist government of East Berlin (Magistrat), claiming to speak as the legitimate government of all Berlin, has openly supported the rebellious mob. The Magistrat has demanded that the Government of West Berlin (Senat) recognize the will of the people and withdraw from office. The Government of the so-called "German Democratic Republic" (GDR), declaring that Berlin (Including the Western Sectors) is the "capital of the GDR", has demanded the withdrawal from Berlin of the U.S., U.K. and French "NATO" Forces. Since these demands have not been met, the GDR has alerted the Kampfgruppen and the East German Army which are poised and ready to move into the Western Sectors and "restore order". Protests made by the Western Powers to the Soviet authorities in Berlin and the USSR Government in Moscow have been rejected by the Soviets on the grounds that the alleged incidents concern the internal order of the GDR, which, as a sovereign state, is alone competent to deal with them. After several days of contending with serious riots, during
which their reserves and paramilitary units (Bereitschaf
en) have been fully committed, the West Berlin Police have
realized they will be unable to fend off the impending
incursions of the Kampigruppen and the East German Army.
In view of the gravity of the developments, the Allied
Commandants in Berlin have assumed personal command of the
defensive operations in the deteriorating situation. In
conformity with established allied policy, the Commandants
have implemented existing defense plans.

B. Enemy Objectives

The objectives of the USSR in permitting or directing
the GDR to undertake the actions in A. preceding, and of
the GDR itself, are to induce the Allies to withdraw from
Berlin, thus to strengthen the Communist grip on East
Germany, and to shake the faith of the world in the capacity
of the U.S. to resist the USSR. The USSR hopes to achieve
these objectives without the overt engagement of its own
armed forces.

C. U.S. and Allied Objectives

To preserve the allied position in Berlin and to
reestablish allied access to the city.

1. Factors Requiring U.S. Intervention

a. The United States, together with the U.K. and
France, bears special responsibility as an occupying
power for the security and welfare of Berlin. U.S.
spokesmen have, moreover, repeatedly asserted that we
would regard an attack on Berlin from any quarter as
an attack upon ourselves.

b. Additional major factors bearing upon the U.S.
decision on intervention are:

(i) Berlin has become a symbol of U.S.
determination to prevent the USSR from swallowing
up Europe.
(ii) U.S. failure to act to maintain the Allied position in Berlin could lead the German Federal Republic to conclude that it would be well advised to make the best accommodation possible with the USSR. As a consequence the whole NATO structure might begin to disintegrate, and confidence in the United States as the bulwark of the free world would be seriously shaken outside Europe.

(iii) Berlin has major intelligence and security values for the U.S. and its Allies.

2. Restraints on the use of nuclear weapons systems.

a. Use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict over Berlin would not be in the U.S. interest from a foreign policy standpoint.

b. It would, because of the effect upon our allies, make it more difficult to maintain firm Western unity in the face of the Soviet challenge, and it would result in widespread criticism of the U.S. by neutral countries.

c. Fear of West European peoples that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to the destruction of Europe makes it unlikely that the U.S. could gain the consent of the British and French governments to the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Berlin.

d. The political importance of placing upon the Soviet Union the onus for expanding the conflict by the first use of nuclear weapons represents a further limitation on their use by the U.S. in this instance.

e. A unilateral U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in order to give access to Berlin would only be warranted in the face of the considerations cited above, if such limited use seemed likely to achieve our purpose without generating a substantial increased probability of general war. This is not believed to be the case in the present instance.
The U.S. military action should thus be conventional in nature until and unless it becomes clear that U.S. national objectives cannot be achieved in this way, and a decision at that time to use nuclear weapons must be based upon a willingness to accept further risk of general war.

D. Non-Military Measures taken by Western Powers

1. During the development of the situation as described above, there has been a continuing, intensive diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free world governments including:

a. Primary emphasis on Allied responsibilities to the free people of West Berlin and on the consequences for the entire free world should these free people be engulfed by the Communist empire, in addition to clarification of the legal basis of the Allied position, attempts to expose the Communist ploy of attempting to put the onus for resort to force over Berlin on the Allies.

b. Approaches to individual governments tailored to their particular interests and susceptibilities, giving due regard to the special positions of the other American republics and some of the more important uncommitted states.

c. Presidential letters, briefing of ambassadorial groups by high-level State Department officers, meetings of the Foreign Ministers of OAS, ANZUS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, presentations at regular meetings of pact councils, etc.

d. Exploitation of the diplomatic capabilities of the UK, France, GDR and other friendly governments in particular areas and with respect to particular countries.
2. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign has been launched with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major Allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence. This campaign is designed to reflect Allied determination to meet force with force if necessary and from time to time this determination is made explicit, making clear that the communists would bear the onus of aggressive use of force. The propaganda capabilities of the UK, France, GFR and other friendly governments are being fully exploited.

3. The following additional actions have been taken:

b. A continuing effort is being made through full consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.

c. In connection with continuing evaluation of possible use of the UN, a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position at the earliest practicable opportunity is being sought.

d. An urgent agreement is being sought with the UK and France on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the UN in order to be prepared for negotiations with the USSR.

e. Continuing close consultation is being maintained with Congressional leaders and frequent reports made to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.

E. International Reaction Including Expected Free World Support

1. There are grave fears throughout the world that the Berlin crisis will set off World War III. Despite wide divergencies of public opinion in the U.K. and France, the governments of these two countries have firmly insisted
that the allied position in Berlin must be maintained.

The NATO Council has unanimously supported this stand.

The other NATO governments have not, however, been
asked to contribute forces to the defense of Berlin, in
view of the special Three Power responsibility for that
defense. The Three Powers propose to discharge that
responsibility on the basis of previous tripartite planning.

2. Most of the other free governments, including those
of the uncommitted states, have condemned the GDR threatened
resort to force but are also urging the Allies not to
respond in a manner that would make World War III inevitable.
Several of these governments are engaged in intense diplo-
matic activity to support negotiations between the Allies
and the USSR as to the future status of Berlin.

3. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is engaged in an intensive
propaganda campaign focusing on two themes: first, that the
continuing division of Berlin, an East German city, is an
intolerable anachronism, and second, that the Allies must
leave the city which they are using as a base for subversive,
"cold war" attacks on the "people's democracies". The
USSR has emphatically declared that the GDR must be "master
in its own house".

4. U.S. public opinion has strongly supported a firm
stand on Berlin. U.S. Government spokesmen have stated
unequivocally that the allied position in Berlin is based
on unchallengeable rights and that the United States is
determined to maintain that position. We have made clear
to the USSR in diplomatic demarches our conviction that the
GDR is acting in this situation as the agent and puppet of
the USSR.
II. MILITARY ACTIONS

A. Military Objectives
   1. Enemy
      a. To deny the tripartite surface and air access to West Berlin.
      b. To force tripartite withdrawal from West Berlin.
   2. Friendly
      a. To maintain surface and air access to West Berlin.
      b. To maintain the security of West Berlin.
      c. To maintain an obvious U.S. and allied military capability and readiness to deal with any expansion of limited military operations relating to Berlin as may be considered appropriate to the objectives at stake.

B. Availability of Military Forces
   1. Enemy Forces in the Area
      a. Total Forces
         (1) The East German Army, with an over-all strength of approximately 75,000, is organized into four motorized rifle and two tank divisions. In addition, there are approximately 50,000 troops in the Military Security Forces. There are some 220 aircraft in the East German Air Force of which 175 are jet fighters. This force is basically tactical, with a primary mission for the jet fighters of air defense of the homeland.
         (2) The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSG) consists of 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions, supported by appropriate artillery and anti-aircraft artillery units. This force is organized and deployed within six ground armies and is supported by one air army. There are approximately 1,000 aircraft in the Soviet Air Forces stationed in East Germany. Of this total, 550 are jet fighters and 90 are jet light bombers.
b. Immediately Available

The GDR could redeploy its forces so as to position
one division around the periphery of Berlin and one
division athwart the access routes thereto, holding
the remaining four divisions in reserve in present areas.
The majority of the 175 jet fighter aircraft could be
positioned to support ground operations against Berlin
and along the Berlin-Helmstedt corridor, or to intercept
Allied aircraft attempting to reopen access along any
of the three air corridors. Internal security in
remainder of the GDR could be assumed by Soviet forces, if
necessary.

2. Friendly Forces in the Area

a. Total Forces

(1) The United States, United Kingdom and France
have 11 M-Day Divisions committed to NATO. Approximately
17 additional M-Day Divisions in the Central
European Area are provided by other NATO countries
including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In addition, most
of these countries have other forces, including
paramilitary units with national missions which,
however, probably could not be brought to bear effect-
ively on the enemy during the early stages of a war,
in the Central European Area.

(2) The United States, United Kingdom and France
have over 1,200 aircraft, mostly jet, which can be
utilized immediately along the Iron Curtain. Reinforce-
ments in approximately the same number could be moved
into the European theater if warranted by the world-
wide situation at the time. The other NATO countries
in Europe can muster approximately 1,000 combat aircraft,
the majority of which are jet aircraft.
b. Immediately Available
Forces to test enemy intentions or to reopen access to Berlin are available in the U.S., U.K. and French forces located in West Germany.

C. Logistic Considerations and Limitations
1. Enemy. No significant logistic problems confront the East Berlin civil population, the East German Army forces or the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (should the latter be employed), in meeting any limited military action which might be taken by the Western Powers.

2. United States and Allies
   a. West Berlin Civil Population
      Logistic support for the relief of the West Berlin civil population poses no immediate problem because of the status of the stockpile program.
      (1) The U.S. forces have a one-year level in all supply classes, except for ammunition (20 day level at combat rates).
      (2) The U.K. and French stockpile of supplies is estimated to be approximately 120 days, except for ammunition which is somewhat less than that of U.S. Forces.
      (3) Any supply maladjustments or imbalances encountered during blockade conditions could be remedied through reallocation of tripartite resources.
   c. Logistic Posture of Theater Forces
      (1) U.S. forces maintain all classes of supply in immediate readiness condition and availability to permit sustained action by D-Day forces at wartime rates in excess of 60 days.
(2) U.K. and French forces maintain a lesser readiness posture to ensure continuous operation of units for 30 days.

(3) There are no major logistic considerations or limitations which will impede any limited action now contemplated by the tripartite powers.

D. Synopsis of Military Action

1. General
   a. Events have created an extremely difficult situation. Attempted forceful entry into Berlin along the autobahn through the narrow Helmstedt-Berlin corridor can easily be halted. This corridor will not accommodate large troop formations deployed for combat. Forces so employed could be outflanked from the outset, would be highly vulnerable, could be hampered by demolitions and physical barriers, and, if unsuccessful, might find withdrawal difficult. Even if initial penetration were successful, provision of continued security along the route is not militarily feasible. Access by train along any of the established routes or by barge up the Elbe River is not feasible since the trains and locks are operated by GDR personnel. The air situation is analogous to that on the ground. Combat aircraft, suffering some attrition, could effect penetrations and engage in air-ground operations. However, successful escort of cargo, troop carrier and passenger aircraft would be extremely difficult. With the existing balance of forces, no limited military action could, by itself, reopen access to Berlin if the Soviets remain determined to prevent such access by the use of force.

   b. The military situation in Berlin is equally unfavorable. The garrison forces there are capable of maintaining of internal order, but cannot conduct a
successful defense without reinforcement against an
attack by Kampfgruppen and East Germany Forces available.
While the security of U.S. and allied non-combatants
and dependents is in jeopardy, safe evacuation cannot
be guaranteed at this time. Further, use of military
force along the access routes may further aggravate
the situation in the city.

c. Despite the above, a series of limited Allied
ground and air actions could achieve the following results:

(1) Test GDR and Soviet intentions;
(2) Demonstrate Allied determination to reopen
access;
(3) Possibly provide circumstances favorable to
tripartite negotiations with the Soviets; and
(4) Compel the Soviets, if they persist in
obstructing Allied access to Berlin or jeopardizing
the security of the Allied Berlin garrison, to face
the unmistakable imminence of general war.

2. Phase I

a. In some respects, the early sequence of events
followed the pattern of the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis.
A period of several weeks passed between the Soviet
announcement of intent to introduce new controls permit-
ting East German personnel to clear allied traffic, and
the actual Soviet withdrawal from rail and road check-
points. During this period of diplomatic negotiation,
U.S. commanders world-wide were alerted to the possibility
that operations might not be confined to this area.
In accordance with previous planning, the governments of
France, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed
on tripartite procedures, and further agreed that what-
ever military measures might be undertaken would be
subject to tripartite agreement and coordination. It
was agreed that US CINCEUR would supervise tripartite military planning and would be the over-all commander in event of military action. The Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, (CINCBOR) was designated the commander of field forces in event of ground action, and the Commander-in-Chief United States Air Forces, Europe, (CINCUSAFE) the commander of air forces in the event of air action. In Berlin, the Allied Commandants finalized plans to assume full control of their various sectors, coordinating their actions through the British Commandant.

b. Additionally, numerous quiet preparatory and precautionary military means prior to Soviet withdrawal were taken by the U.S. and her Allies. These were of a kind which did not create undue public alarm, but were detectable by Soviet intelligence. No one measure in itself was of great significance, but collectively, they provided substantial evidence that there was firm tripartite resolution to respond with force, if necessary. Military traffic along the autobahn and air corridors was increased. Guards at checkpoints, on trains, and at allied airfields in Berlin were augmented with additional personnel. Naval patrols were intensified, anti-submarine barriers strengthened; fleet carrier exercises conducted; and selected naval elements put to sea. Reconnaissance flights were conducted to photograph the autobahn, its checkpoints, and adjacent areas. Small tactical air units from the United States were rotated to Central Europe. Air defense systems were quietly exercised. In the United States practice loadings for airborne troops were conducted. These actions were designed to dissuade the Soviets from turning over control of checkpoints to the GDR, improve the Allied military posture, and demonstrate Allied
solidarity. The application of force was planned to take place only after all other measures failed, and at a time when the Allies were prepared to accept the risk of general war.

c. PHASE I Comment It is possible that the foregoing actions would, in fact, dissuade the Soviets from turning over control of checkpoints to the GDR, provided negotiations permitted them to refrain from doing so without damage to their prestige. The possibilities of such a Soviet reaction are treated in Section III.

3. Phase II

a. On the day of Soviet withdrawal, Allied objection to GDR inspection and control was reiterated. All traffic to and from Berlin was suspended pending a tripartite test to be conducted from each end of the autobahn. Three unarmed vehicles, one French, one British, and one American, were dispatched together from West Germany and three from Berlin. Each vehicle bore its country's flag. In each instance, East German police manning the checkpoints stated that inspection was required prior to clearance for passage. Both the inspection and the stated requirement for GDR clearance were refused and the vehicles returned.

b. This action was followed by similar air probes consisting of single military transport planes from each country, dispatched along each of the three air corridors. Flight plans were transmitted to the Berlin Air Safety Center. Soviet representatives had withdrawn, and GDR personnel were refused entry to the Center. As a result, the GDR stated its "air sovereignty" had been violated. Allied air transport planes were met by GDR fighter aircraft in each instance and forced to return to base.
4. These actions constituted confirmation that the Soviets, in conjunction with East Germany, had taken action to deny to the Three Powers their rights of surface and air access to Berlin.

d. International tension increased and allied military activity was openly stepped up. Precautionary measures included cancellation of military leaves of absence, placing defense and warning systems on a higher state of alert. Bringing tripartite troop units in West Germany up to strength by personnel augmentation and increasing internal security measures. Also, it was announced that until further notice, there would be no civil defense exercises; and warnings received would be real, not practice.

e. PHASE II Comment The seriousness of the above developments could provide sufficient impetus to East-West negotiations so as to reach at least a temporary solution to the crisis. Since the crisis is entirely of their making, it must be assumed the Soviets would, at this point assess very carefully the risks attendant to maintaining their position, without compromise, as is indicated in Section III hereafter.

4. PHASE III

a. The heads of government of the tripartite power decided to conduct an armed probe to determine whether the GDR would meet force with force to keep the access route closed. Supplemental to this decision, the tripartite power decided to evacuate allied non-combatants from Berlin. On the recommendation of SACEUR, the North Atlantic Council held an emergency meeting and directed execution of a "Simple Alert" for all NATO forces.
b. CINCBAOR was directed to dispatch a platoon sized
unit of armor vehicles along the autobahn from Helmstedt.
It was fully realized that such a unit could provide only
a further test of GDR and Soviet intentions and a basis
for decision as to whether employment of substantial
forces to reopen access was necessary. The commander
of the force was given orders to proceed as far as
possible, adhering to tripartite procedures, but not
accepting an additional restraints. Orders precluded
initiation of fire, but permitted return fire and whatever
defensive action might be necessary. The unit was then
dispatched.

c. At the first checkpoint in Helmstedt, the probing
force was halted by GDR police who refused passage
when presented with proper identification. The commander
informed the police that all proper requirements had
been met and that his force intended to move on. He
directed his first armored vehicle to crash through the
barrier and the platoon proceeded down the autobahn.
After progressing several miles, the platoon encountered
physical obstacles across the road covered by an
estimated GDR company. This unit opened fire with small
arms at the lead vehicle, wounding the platoon leader.
Since further passage was blocked, the probing force
returned.

d. In the city of Berlin, the Commandants were directed
to take whatever security measures were considered
necessary to protect non-combatants. Rioting in the
city became more serious. Members of the Kampfgruppen
in civilian clothes infiltrated the Allied sectors.
Formal intervention by GDR police under the pretext of
restoring law and order was threatened. Sporadic
sniper fire caused a few Allied casualties and certain
Allied supplies were sabotaged.
e. In the face of all kinds of harassment, attempts were made to evacuate non-combatants from Berlin by private automobile, augmented by civilian aircraft for medical evacuees after negotiations through Red Cross channels. Military personnel in Europe were advised that facilities would no longer be available for their dependents in Western Europe.

f. Following closely upon failure of the second probe, the President of the United States took the lead in increasing pressure on the Soviets. A state of national emergency was declared. Selected Reserve Forces were called to active duty. Partial industrial mobilization was commenced. Additional military forces were deployed to Europe.

g. Soviet submarines were reported to be penetrating anti-subbarriers; troop and air movements were reported within Russia; and there was evidence of considerable buildup of forces along the Chinese coast.

E. Additional Non-Military Measures to Put Pressure on Soviet Union and GDR During Preceding Phases

1. After it was determined at the end of Phase III above that the Soviets would permit the use of force by the GDR to keep the surface access routes closed to Allied traffic, the Western Powers made a final attempt, before resorting to an attempt to reestablish Allied freedom of access by force, to put pressure on the Soviet Union to conclude a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Parallel efforts were made to put pressure on the GDR.

2. The Western Powers redoubled their attempts to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a threat to the peace. However, large elements of world opinion, including important elements in the Western countries, insisted that it was irrational for the Western Powers to take steps
propelling the world toward a general war rather than accepting nominal transit traffic controls over Allied movements at the hands of the GDR. The GDR warned that any resort to violence along the Autobahn could result in the cessation of interzonal traffic and that it would be entirely the fault of the Western Powers if transport and supply for the West Berlin population were cut off.

3. Counterharassment and economic measures taken by the Allies appeared to have no serious effect on the economy of the Soviet bloc. The Allies were unable to win the full agreement of the Free World which resulted in a Western decision against a large-scale program of this kind against the Soviet bloc.

4. The Western Powers made a new appeal to the Security Council for the restoration of the status quo ante, but the Soviet Union vetoed any Security Council action. The Western Powers then considered but decided against an appeal to the General Assembly. Substantive proposals on the Berlin problem were being made in the General Assembly at this juncture and some members, especially the neutrals, were seeking compromise without regard for the merits of the case. The prospect of winning General Assembly support for the maintenance of the Allied position in Berlin appeared too slim for the Western Powers to gamble on the outcome of a U.N. solution.

F. PHASE III Comment U.S. and Allied measures to place their forces in a high state of operational readiness and to mobilize their resources for any eventuality would have a very sobering effect upon the GDR and the USSR. The Soviets would certainly have serious doubts as to their ability to limit the situation in Berlin and along the auto-bahn now that military skirmishes have taken place. Possible Soviet reactions at this point are treated further in Section III.
G. Synopsis of Military Actions Continued - PHASE IV

1. Tripartite plans had already been prepared to utilize a substantial force to reopen access into Berlin if necessary. Consideration was given in this situation to utilization of a composite tripartite division acting in concert with appropriate air elements. This course of action was discarded because of the impact on the NATO general war posture, and the difficulties in employment of this size force along the narrow route. Consideration was also given to forceful reopening of air access. However, it was concluded that air action would be inconclusive with respect to permanent reopening of the air corridor and could indicate possible Allied willingness to accept closure of ground access. It was determined that allied aircraft could be used most effectively, in this situation by furnishing air support to a ground element.

2. Decision was reached to form a tripartite brigade, of three battalions, augmented with air support, but with plans to employ only one battalion initially along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn. NATO nations backed this decision and formal notification was sent to the Soviets that the battalion would be dispatched. Instructions to the force commander were: The force will approach the roadblock, identify itself according to agreed tripartite procedures, and request passage. If there is no opposition, the force will proceed to the opposite end of the autobahn. If resistance is encountered the force will overcome it and proceed toward the opposite end of the autobahn taking over control points as required. In the event over-whelming armed resistance is encountered or if physical barriers are beyond its capabilities to overcome, the force will disengage and await orders from higher authority.
3. The NATO Council directed major NATO commanders to place their forces on "Reinforced Alert". U.S. Commands throughout the world were placed on general war alert. Corresponding civil defense measures, including blackouts, were put into effect.

4. The tripartite battalion moved out.

5. It encountered only token resistance initially, and proceeded slowly as far as the Elbe. Here it was met by sizeable GDR forces. There was an immediate exchange of fire, initiated by the enemy, and the tripartite battalion deployed off the autobahn into battle positions. Heavy fighting ensued. It soon became evident that the tripartite force was not only seriously outnumbered, but that its avenue of withdrawal had been cut off. The commander established a perimeter defense and radioed that he was under attack and suffering heavy losses. Allied tactical aircraft, maintained on airborne alert while the battalion proceeded along the autobahn, furnished air support and resupply, despite engagement by GDR interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft fire.

6. In the city of Berlin, skirmishes between the East and West German police have occurred at the Sector boundaries with significant casualties on both sides. The eleven thousand U.S., U.K. and French troops have been deployed into defense positions to back up the West German Police Forces against attack or incursion by the Kampfgruppen and the East German Army surrounding Berlin.

7. **PHASE IV Comment** Placing NATO forces on "Reinforced Alert", ordering U.S. forces world-wide to general war alert, and dispatching the tripartite battalion to force access to Berlin represented a most grave decision.
It demonstrated a readiness and willingness to take whatever measures might become necessary. Only if the Soviets were indifferent to subsequent eventualities could they permit the GDR to engage this force in combat. For further evaluation, see Part III.

H. Effect on U.S. Posture for General War

From the outset of deteriorating political events to the peak of the military crisis, the United States posture for general war steadily improved as a result of timely implementation of emergency measures.

I. Possible Courses of Military Action and Appraisal of Each

1. Courses of Action

There are now five possible courses of military action each with a large number of variables:

a. Accept military defeat along the autobahn and in Berlin, negotiating for withdrawal of forces to West Germany.

b. Accept military defeat along the autobahn and negotiate for withdrawal of these forces, while continuing to stand firm in Berlin pending negotiation of a 4-power settlement.

c. Commit the remainder of the tripartite brigade and air units associated therewith up the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor to continue and to intensify Allied efforts to reopen access to Berlin, and to relieve pressure on the Berlin garrison.

d. Employ substantial Allied forces on a broad front without regard to existing access routes but converging on Berlin, to inflict military defeat on the GDR and impose Allied will upon that country.

e. Resort to general war measures.

2. Military Appraisal

Military judgments concerning the above courses of action are contained in subsequent paragraphs:
a. Acceptance of complete defeat would represent failure of military force and threat of force to satisfy allied objectives relating to Berlin. It would have broader military implications in that it would have a degrading effect on the allied deterrent posture and cause a reassessment of allied military commitments world-wide.

b. Acceptance of defeat along the autobahn only would have the same adverse military effects outlined in paragraph a above. While standing firm in Berlin does not represent total and immediate military defeat, neither can it be construed as a military victory. The 11,000 garrison troops in the city do not present a military problem to the enemy since they are both outnumbered and surrounded. An overt attack by the GDR on the Western sectors of Berlin would renew hostilities on a dangerous scale, but such action is not a military necessity. Allied forces in Berlin are not capable of taking effective offensive action, whereas they may be subjected to overt or covert harassing action by the enemy. In six to nine months these forces would require re-supply either by surface means or by an airlift. In either case access could be gained only under conditions acceptable to the enemy because of the acknowledged allied defeat along the corridors.

c. It is estimated that employment of the remainder of tripartite forces against determined resistance would not be successful in reopening access to Berlin or in relieving pressures on the Berlin garrison. The brigade could not be employed effectively within the corridor, nor could it be expected to solve the problem. If the brigade were permitted by the GDR to reach Berlin, it could not hold one hundred miles
of access route open behind it. Even in the remote possibility that it could be successful in extricating the remnants of the surrounded battalion this would be at cost of severe casualties.

d. (1) Employment of Allied forces along a broad front would involve engagement with Soviet forces in East Germany unless they withdrew. In this situation Allied use of tactical atomic weapons would probably be required to gain military objectives. A large portion of the Berlin garrison would probably be sacrificed, since a major Allied attack from West Germany would almost certainly trigger a GDR attack on West Berlin. Some degradation of the NATO posture for general war would occur through overextension of Allied forces.

(2) Such a major attack would almost certainly succeed against GDR forces alone. It would almost as certainly fail and probably expand to general war if the USSR intervened with major forces.

e. The military posture assumed by the Allies would contribute significantly to the Allied ability to wage general war, should it occur.

J. Considerations Pertaining to the Use of Nuclear Weapons

1. The enemy, possessing a significant military advantage in terms of numbers and position, did not find it necessary to use nuclear weapons to deny access to Berlin or to maintain pressure on the Western Sectors of the city. Neither would he require such weapons to prevent a substantially larger Allied force from accomplishing its mission. The USSR has not released control of any nuclear weapons to GDR forces through the situation as depicted. If the Allies chose to attack on a broad front utilizing tactical nuclear
weapons to achieve their objectives, the Soviets would almost certainly release nuclear weapons to the GDR and utilize them with their own forces in response.

2. The tripartite powers did not use nuclear weapons in the hypothetical military action. The use of small yield weapons along the access route would almost certainly result in casualties and destruction outside the corridor, with particular reference to small civilian communities. Neither would such use assure reopening of access because of lack of maneuver room for exploiting forces and creation of obstacles on the route itself (blown bridges, rubble and abatis blocking road, etc.). Consideration was given to detonating a single weapon in a carefully selected location as an indication of Allied intent, but this was rejected as providing insufficient military advantage to justify the censure of world opinion and the risk of retaliation.

3. Allied nuclear weapons were not stored in Berlin even during the period of tension leading up to the attempted reopening of access. Use of nuclear weapons in support of the Allied garrison has not been called for by the situation to date, and probably would not be undertaken even if an all-out attack were made on the Western sectors of the city.

4. If the Allies chose to make a large scale attack on a broad front from West Germany, they would, as previously indicated, use nuclear weapons if necessary to gain their objectives. The Allies would have made such a heavy commitment of forces that they could not afford to be defeated militarily. Further, the risk of general war would be already so great that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not add significantly to the risk.

5. In the event of general war, the Allies would, of course, use all forms of nuclear weapons in accordance with then current strategic plans.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. AND ALLIED RESPONSE

A. General  The record of Allied and Soviet reactions described hereinafter is hypothetical. The following judgments are made to support the study and are not to be construed as intelligence estimates or a prognosis as to the course of events in an actual situation.

1. Bloc Reaction
   a. In considering the Soviet reaction to the hypothetical U.S. response, we believe it reasonable to assume that: (a) the USSR, in sanctioning and controlling the GDR moves in the Berlin situation, has limited objectives and does not intend to precipitate general war with the U.S. and (b) the USSR estimates that the U.S. likewise will seek to avoid actions which would immediately precipitate a general war.

   b. In accord with these assumptions, the Soviet posture and actions throughout the developing Berlin situation would be designed to: (a) avoid irrevocable commitment to GDR actions and positions, seeking always to provide for a possible Soviet exit through a settlement which would not badly damage Soviet prestige; (b) exert maximum diplomatic and propaganda pressure, involving threats and intimidation in order to weaken the Allied will regarding Berlin and to create friction among the U.S. and the NATO allies; (c) assure continued Communist control over East Germany, regardless of the outcome in Berlin, and (d) resist Western military probes with that degree of military force best calculated to minimize the risk of expanding the conflict into general war, provide the USSR with a strong bargaining position in any negotiations for settlement of the conflict, and place the blame on the West for any expansion of hostilities. At each new development in the situation, the Soviet leaders would weigh their next step in the light of these considerations seeking to assess the risks of each step as compared with the probable gain.
2. Allied Reaction

Reaction in the Free World would be conditioned almost exclusively by the fear that the situation would lead to general war. If the response were successful in leading to a return to the status quo or improvement of the Western position, U.S. prestige would be strengthened.

B. PHASE I

1. Bloc Reaction

The Soviet leaders would almost certainly have anticipated the U.S. and Allied actions taken in Phase I and would regard them as a normal reaction to their pressure.

2. Free World Reaction

During the initial stages of the Berlin crises, the Western European countries would join actively with the U.S. in the development of common Western action and policy. Widespread sympathy for the peoples of West Berlin, the recognition of the symbolic importance of a Free Berlin, a belief that evidence of Western determination and unity would cause the USSR to back down, and the governmental sense of obligation to prior commitments all would help to create a generally favorable climate for forthright U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives.

C. Phase II

1. Bloc Reaction

Having decided on the initiation of a new Berlin crisis, the Soviet leaders would probably have concluded in advance that they could and should go at least as far as to turn over the access controls. However, in deciding to turn over access controls to the GDR, the Soviet leaders have taken an important step in increasing the risks for them in the Berlin situation. In weighing the considerations involved, their decision to proceed on this course
was predicated on the conclusions that there remained further thresholds of decision before the risk of war became uncontrollable, and that Western determination would flinch before these thresholds were crossed. Despite the general atmosphere of crisis, the Soviets characterize the turnover of controls as a simple and peaceful recognition of the facts of life, declaring that the GDR was magnanimously ready to allow continued Western access, though of course having the right to end it.

2. Allied Reaction

Western European support for the first unarmored tripartite air and land probes, and the diplomatic resolutions attacking the GDR action, would be firm.

D. PHASE III

1. Bloc Reaction

a. The next major step for the USSR would be the decision to employ fire to halt the initial small Western probe force. The Soviet leaders might assess Western determination and the risks involved at this stage to be sufficiently high that they would prefer to let the probe force pass and seek to negotiate. However, there is at least an equal chance that they would take action to interdict the probe, since they would probably estimate that there still remained the option of backing down at a higher threshold before the risks became uncontrollable. They would doubtless seek at this stage to capitalize on the fullest on growing Western fears of war by a massive campaign for maintenance of the current status quo during renewed negotiations. In negotiations, or in public statements, they would probably offer a "compromise" from original demands, retaining the substance of their objective but couched in terms calculated to appeal to those in the West eager to find an "honorable" way to accede and withdraw.
b. The Soviet reaction to a "stand-pat" posture by the U.S. following the failure of the small probe would probably be to wait. They would probably consider that Western prestige had suffered through this defeat, and that the chances of a subsequent resort to greater force had not necessarily increased. Over-all, they would conclude that their position was somewhat stronger than at the outset, and they could afford to await further developments.

2. Allied Reaction

With the failure of the tripartite armored platoon to achieve its mission Western European resolve would be shaken. The subsequent U.S. declaration of a national emergency would fan Western European fears that the situation was getting out of hand. As a consequence, pressures for a negotiated settlement at the cost of some concessions to Soviet demands would increase sharply, especially in the U.K. and the smaller European countries. Such thinking would be most vocal in the opposition parties of the several countries, but the reaction would be broad and essentially national in character. At the same time, however, the clear evidence of U.S. resolve would encourage government leaders in West German, France and the U.K., to continue to endorse a policy of firmness and military probing.

E. Phase IV

1. Bloc Reaction

By the time that the Western battalion had moved, the Soviets would have determined that the extent to which the Western powers were ready to compromise was much less than they had estimated at the initiation of the crisis. They would now face a decision whether to persist in a situation in which the risks would no longer be entirely
controllable by then. At the same time, the commitment of their prestige to the crisis would have increased. It is difficult to predict the outcome of these two opposing considerations. If negotiating feelers for a compromise settlement had been rejected prior to dispatch of the force, the Soviets might feel that it was necessary to take the increased risks in order to test Western determination still further, and as the only alternative to suffering a major political defeat. On the other hand, it is at least equally likely that they would decide that the risks now exceeded the potential return and that they ought not test Western determination further. In either event and particularly if there were a subsequent engagement of forces, they would at all times hold out the alternative of negotiated settlement, even though not offering terms as attractive as the status quo ante. In this connection the Soviet leaders would probably not invoke the Warsaw Pact at this time on the grounds that honoring the provisions of the Pact would shortly involve direct confrontation of Soviet and U.S. forces. In short, they would always offer an alternative to general war and show their preference for such alternatives, banking on Western readiness under great pressure to settle for limited political and even military reversals rather than bringing on an avoidable general war.

2. Allied Reaction

The failure of the tripartite Brigade would result in a widespread and aroused European opinion against further military efforts. The possible commitment of large-scale Western forces and use of nuclear weapons at this time would certainly be rejected by most of the NATO countries.

F. Reactions to Possible Subsequent Courses of Action

1. Bloc Reactions
   a. If, following the failure of the tripartite battalion, the Western Powers were to decide to withdraw
from the Berlin situation the Soviets would do every-
thing to facilitate the Western withdrawal without
incident, considering the advantage of avoiding possible
reversal of the decision as outweighing any further
political capital from underlining further the Western
defeat.

b. If, instead, the Allied powers decided at this
point to commit the remainder of the tripartite brigade
to action, East German forces would place them in the
same position as the initial battalion.

c. The employment of substantial Allied forces on a
broad front toward Berlin without regard to existing
access routes would almost certainly be met by all avail-
able Soviet forces as well as by East German troops. The
Soviets would not use nuclear weapons unless and until
the Western powers used them, in which case they would
probably respond with reciprocal limited use of such
weapons against Western forces in East Germany, and
possibly in West Germany. The Soviets would almost
certainly not initiate general war by attacks on the
U.S. for the following reasons:

(1) The Western restraint in choosing large-scale
but limited action would be a clear indication that
the Western powers preferred to avoid general war,
and hence preemptive action would not be required;

(2) Optimum conditions for surprise attack would
not obtain, in view of the Western alert status;

(3) Soviet superiority in capabilities for limited
war in Central Europe would provide them the oppor-
tunity to contain and probably to defeat the Western
forces without extending the limits of the hostilities.

In addition, particularly if the Western actions were
not clearly and authoritatively stated to be temporary
and limited to the purpose of restoring access -- and not to defeat and conquer East Germany -- the Communist political position in their own countries and in much of the world would be strong despite their own provocation of the initial crisis.

2. Allied Reactions

a. Without what they consider to be reasonable military options, the Western European countries would probably press to initiate negotiations which would permit withdrawal of the beleaguered Western force, and lead to a broader settlement of the Berlin problem. In order to achieve this, most Western European countries, including powerful forces in West Germany, would probably be willing to accept a solution which would afford the GDR de facto (e.g., control of access to Berlin) if not outright formal recognition. Considerable opposition to a direct retreat on the status of West Berlin would remain, but would not preclude willingness to accept a new contractual arrangement and reduction (and final withdrawal) of Western forces, especially if some face-saving procedure (e.g., phased substitution of UN for present Western troops) were provided.

b. Even at this stage, nevertheless, NATO countries would probably view U.S. leadership as decisive. A U.S. decision to pursue military efforts further would thus probably elicit substantial support, especially in West Germany and France. Pursuance of such military actions to the point of imminent general hostilities, or intent to initiate general war, would probably reopen serious rifts within NATO, and, time and circumstance permitting, possibly result in open defections.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. The adequacy of U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations in defense of Berlin is dependent upon demonstrated U.S. and Allied resolution to risk general war over this issue and Soviet unwillingness to accept such risk over Berlin.

B. The danger of accidental involvement in general war can be substantially reduced provided we make it unmistakably clear to the Soviets at an early date that we are willing to accept this eventuality if they persist in denying us our rights, and provided we then time our military actions so that at each threshold of increasing risk there is an opportunity for settlement through negotiation.

C. U.S. and Allied military operations of battalion or larger size with air support, conducted along the Berlin corridor, would force the Soviets to choose either to persist in a situation involving grave risk of general war or to decide not to test U.S. and Allied resolution further. Such operations are well within Allied capability. On the other hand, no limited military operation could, by itself, maintain the Allied position with respect to Berlin if the Soviets remain determined to force Allied withdrawal.

D. U.S. and Allied posture for general war in connection with the Berlin crisis would be significantly improved as a result of timely implementation of emergency measures such as a declaration of a national emergency, calling of reserve forces to active duty, deployment of additional forces to Europe, and placing U.S. forces worldwide on general war alert. Moreover, these emergency measures, taken separately over a period of several months prior to dispatch of the Allied force to open access to Berlin, would be extremely significant in convincing the Soviets...
of Allied resolution, and might well be decisive in forcing a solution to the issue.

E. The Allies have in Berlin an adequate capability to prevent the loss of West Berlin, provided the city is not subjected to organized military attack. However, a substantial reduction in the strength of the Allied garrison would jeopardize this capability as well as reduce our stake in maintaining access rights.

F. Prestocked theatre logistic resources are adequate to support the level of limited military operations studied. However, in this area the danger of limited military operations expanding into general war is so great that partial industrial mobilization would be required on a precautionary measure and to validate the U.S. general war posture.

G. The purpose and character of the limited military operations studied in this situation are not suitable for assessing the effectiveness of weapons systems or types of warfare.

H. The use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations in defense of Berlin would not contribute effectively to the achievement of U.S. and Allied objectives. Political and military restraints inherent in the Berlin situation prevent effective use of such weapons by the Allies. Moreover, the Soviets have the capability of responding in kind with a consequent nullifying of any military advantage and a heightening of the risk of general war.

I. Success in achieving U.S. national objectives pertaining to Berlin would bolster U.S. prestige and Free World resistance to the spread of Communism. Conversely, failure to achieve our objectives would have a deleterious effect upon collective security.
J. The problem of evacuating U.S. dependents and non-combatants from Berlin could force a difficult choice between some acceptance of GDR controls for this purpose or abandoning evacuation plans. Evacuation of U.S. civilians could also have serious consequences for morale in Berlin, although it might also serve notice of our intention to resist forcibly in Berlin.

K. The efficacy of Allied limited military operations, or the threat of limited military operations, as a deterrent against possible Soviet actions to impair Allied rights of ground access to Berlin is related directly to the extent to which Western popular opinion can be prepared to accept the necessity for a solution of the problem by force, even at the risk of general war. The maintenance of such a state of opinion is in turn dependent on the broadest possible definition of the issues—i.e., in terms of Western commitments for the survival and freedom of Berlin rather than on technical aspects of stamping documents—in order to command free world support for these principles as a casus belli.
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SUPPLY & LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, CASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations

A State-CIA-JCS-Defense study is in process to prepare a report to the NSC on the U.S. and Allied capabilities for coping with limited war. The study is for the period to 1 July 1962 with basic assumption that essential elements of U.S. national strategy will remain unchanged.

The concept for the study is to examine likely situations (Berlin, Iran, Laos, Offshore Islands and Korea) which may develop and involve the United States in limited military operations. From these studies, conclusions are drawn with regard to capabilities existing in the period, particularly with regard to the achievement of U.S. objectives through military action calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Enemy and Allied operational and logistic capabilities are studied to include employment of nuclear, BW and CW weapons systems when applicable.

Your comment on the attached draft would be appreciated. In your review it should be recognized that the situation described is hypothetical and may or may not represent universal agreement on the most likely situation. However, it does represent one way in which the situation might develop and your review should be undertaken within the framework of the situation presented. Special attention should be given to the conclusions section and to that portion of the study dealing with your area of competence or responsibility. Detailed textual proposals are not required. Comment should be submitted to this office no later than 2 May; on this section of the study.

Particular care in handling the present memorandum and its attachment is requested. No coordination with either the Joint Staff, the Services, or other OSD elements is necessary since separate action is being taken with these agencies.

JAMES H. POLK
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Planning

1 Incl.

Draft, Berlin, 30 April 60

(1) Included previously forwarded Dr. Parsons (OSD/EM)
20 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAMS

SUBJECT: Summary of Comments by OSD Offices on Berlin LEO Study

In response to an MMA request of 15 April 1960, OSD offices submitted comments on the draft study, "Hypothetical Limited Military Operations in Defense of Berlin," dated 9 February 1960. The major views received are summarized below, and are followed by Plans Office comment where appropriate.

The Office of Special Operations made no comment. The Office of the ASD(SL) found "no logistics implications that would prevent or limit the actions discussed within the framework of the assumptions given."

The Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy) strongly doubts that the phased increase in intensity of probing military actions by small conventional forces, as outlined in the study, will convince the DDRB of U.S. or Allied determination. He believes there will result in failure and loss of prestige. In his view, "modern weapons" (atomic) should be used from the outset of military conflict to obtain a well-defined goal. Probing action should not be used to help make use of atomic weapons more acceptable, since he comments that "it has been clearly stated as NATO policy supported by the United States that atomic weapons will be used from the outset of military conflict."

Plans Comment: These comments appear to overlook the fact that the U.S. and Allied objectives set forth in the study are "to preserve the Allied position in Berlin and to re-establish Allied access to the city." (Page 3, para c). These objectives geared to seeking the status quo ante are not served by initiating nuclear conflict. As indicated in the study, use of nuclear weapons would not yield a military advantage and would heighten the risk of general war (p. 23, para j; p. 33, Conclusion II). The basic concept of phased probing actions is to provide increasing military incentive for the DDRB to seek a political, rather than military, solution to the issue in a manner which is compatible with U.S. objectives.
NATO policy does not state that "atomic weapons will be used from the outset of military conflict." NATO strategy, as defined in the December 1956 Political Directive, states that NATO forces must be designed to deal with incidents, such as infiltrations, incursions, or hostile local actions, "without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons." To deal with other armed aggression NATO forces are to operate "in accordance with the concept of 'forward strategy', counting on the use of nuclear weapons at the outset." This strategy, while providing that nuclear weapons may rather than will be used, is fully consistent with U.S. Basic National Security Policy (ESC 7506/1) which states: (para 12a) "It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; ....."

The Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, felt insufficient attention was given in the study to the possibility of a strictly air-to-air war conducted over the corridor from Bremen to Berlin. For the purposes of refining SDG guidance, it would have been useful if the study had assessed the relative value of air-to-air missiles with differing ranges during air operations either (a) to assure access by transport aircraft, or (b) to conduct an aircraft attrition campaign. Surface-to-air missiles might have been given similar examination.

Please Comment: The primary purpose of the study is to examine U.S. capabilities to achieve U.S. objectives, rather than to examine all possible courses of action which might provide planning guidance. As stated in the study, U.S. and Allied objectives are "To preserve the Allied position in Berlin and to re-establish Allied access to the city" (p. 3, para c). Air action alone would not meet these objectives, since such action does not lead to any finite time at which it can be made evident that air access has been permanently reopened. Air action alone also could imply Allied acceptance of closure of ground access, again failing to meet the U.S. objective of re-establishing the permanent access necessary to preserve the Allied position in the city.

The ASD (Controller) suggests that there may be several developments that may serve as a brake on the USSR's willingness to force the Berlin issue to the point of military action; e.g. Soviet troop reduction could reduce military readiness, and if followed by military conflict over Berlin, would discredit those favoring the reduction. Please Comment: This study was not designed to apply to the existing international situation, but was purposely geared to a hypothetical situation developed to contain major factors from which general analyses would be conducted.

The ASD (Controller) also suggests that any military action in the Berlin situation would require a rather extensive reconsideration of "our entire National Security Policy."
Planes Comment: There is no concrete explanation given for this view. However, it would appear that deliberate Soviet willingness to engage in significant military action (i.e. at the level of the "platoon probe", Phase III, p. 13) would be an indicator of Soviet intentions that would justify a basic policy review. It would indicate Soviet willingness to adopt a militarily more aggressive posture in the world struggle.

The ASD (Comptroller) also suggests clarifying lesser points in the study, such as: Conclusion D - whether deployment of additional forces to Europe would be token or major; also in Conclusion D - whether a declaration of National Emergency would be limited, as in Korea, or all-out; whether we are "technically" at war with East Germany in our present legal position toward Germany.

It should be noted that none of the conclusions are challenged and that, except for General Loper, the concept is not challenged. Rather, other comments request clarifications or additions that will assist a particular staff section, certainly not the purpose of this study.

SIGNED

JAMES H. FOLK
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Fleming

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee (copy 1+2)
1 bl - RAC file 1 (by 3)
1 bh - Plans Subj file (by 4)
2 yel - Plans Chrons (copy 5+6)
No ISA Reading file copy

Prepared by:
R. J. Albright/ASD(TSA)/Plans
Fm 35283/79675/eb/20 Jun 60
Counting apprehension concerning the political obstacles to the MRM program has prompted State Department personnel to study quite closely a sea-borne deployment as an alternative to land-based MRM (including inland waterways). German participation is of particular concern to State posing as it does an expected opposition from several WEU countries including the U.K. Further they believe Soviet reaction to German participation could possibly take serious form stemming from a genuine fear of a resurgent Germany possessing a nuclear strike capability. On the other hand deployment in Germany without German participation could appear discriminatory to a degree that would cause a serious waning of German support of NATO. The State Department study gives support to the view that the political problems could to a great extent be solved by pursuing a sea-borne MRM program. The study has been made available to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signature**

John A. Duff
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. Thurston.

My office is in the process of evaluating the subject; however, we are reluctant to proceed without a clear understanding of the military requirements involved. I would greatly appreciate your views as to whether a sea-borne deployment of SSM's would meet your requirements. Perhaps in this connection it may be worthwhile to consider in addition a sea-borne deployment of the SSM supplemented by a land-based deployment of shorter-range weapons the existence of which would not engender the political opposition associated with the SSM.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Two LIVE OAK Proposals of USCEIC (U)

References: 
   a. USCEIC message to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ECJCBT 9-10679, DTG 241353Z August 1960 (DA IN 35535)
   b. USCEIC message to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ECJCBT 9-10678, DTG 241353X August 1960 (DA IN 35536)

1. In the above messages, General Norstad proposes, respectively:
   a. Assign a German Liaison Officer to the LIVE OAK Group;
   b. Name the U.S. Commandant in Berlin as the Single Allied Commander responsible to him.

2. With regard to the first proposal, the original intent of LIVE OAK planning has been to keep the FRG informed adequately in order to coordinate and implement LIVE OAK Plans. Now that the major portion of LIVE OAK Planning has been completed, and since General Norstad, as the over-all tripartite commander, so recommends, it is considered that the United States should concur in his proposal.

3. With regard to the second proposal, LIVE OAK Planning has proceeded on the premise that the over-all field commander for tripartite military land operations, that is CINCEABOR, would for practical military purposes deal with a Single Allied Commander in Berlin. On 5 June 1959, the U.S. Government approved the designation of a Single Allied Commander in Berlin and indicated that the U.K. Commandant would be a logical choice. The British Government, likewise on 22 June 1959, indicated that they favored the designation of a single commander and were agreeable to the appointment of the U.K. Commandant, but that they considered the designation of this commander to be the prerogative of General Norstad. For
various political and security reasons it has been inappropriate previously to name such a commander; however, in view of the current situation and in order to facilitate the consummation of arrangements, it is considered that the United States should support the proposal of General Norstad to name the U.S. Commandant in Berlin as the Single Allied Commander.

4. For the reasons stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in both proposals of General Norstad. However, since both proposals involve important political implications and therefore require both U.S. and tripartite approval, it is considered that a U.S. position of concurrence with General Norstad’s proposals should be established.

5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense note and support action by the J. C. S. Representative on the U.S. Coordinating Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, to:

a. Establish a U.S. position of concurrence with General Norstad’s proposals.

b. Urge that the British and the French also concur in General Norstad’s proposals.

6. At such a time as a U.S. position on General Norstad’s proposals has been established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise General Norstad of the action taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

N. F. TWINUING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy for: Conclusive Or Release
USCINGEUR

SECOND AND CONTROL OFFICE
OSFA

26-16 44-62-20

- 2 -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

References:
   a. JCM-280-60, 12 May 1960
   b. JCM-280-60, 26 May 1960

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference a. paragraph 2.a., stated that "...if it becomes evident that implementation of such plans is inevitable, certain political, economic, psychological and military measures should be taken to improve our military posture and to convince the USSR...".

In reference b. the Joint Chiefs forwarded a checklist of military and non-military measures which could be taken in connection with Soviet actions against Berlin.

Recent events have emphasized the importance of being prepared to move to a posture of improved readiness on short notice. I would like, therefore, the Joint Chiefs to inform me of those specific military measures, in order of significance and timing, which they recommend be taken to improve our military posture, or to convince the USSR of our determination in the event of a change by USSR action to the current Berlin situation.

It is further requested that the list furnish me specific those measures which will require my attention and decision, and include where appropriate the estimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.

Signed
JAMES H. DOUGLAS

31 May 1960
Prep: Col. J.H. Schofield, Jr/elm
Rewritten: Col. Schofield
Eur Reg/ISA, 3D265, x54812
Distr: Addressee-Orig (Cy 1) & cys 2,3,4
OSD-Cy 5
RCA-Cy 6
ISA-Cy 7
Comeback-Cy 8
Stayback-Cy 9

Total 9

Copy 1 of 9
Refer to I-1393160
TO: The Secretary of Defense

(Signed) John N. Irwin, II

FROM: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To determine the nature and timing of certain specific military measures related to Berlin contingency planning.

Discussion: The Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum JCSM-625-60 dated 12 May 1960 (Tab A) informed you that the U.S. military posture in mid-summer 1960 would permit implementation of Berlin contingency plans. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs noted that inherent in the implementation of these plans was the risk of general war, and that certain military measures should be taken when it becomes evident that implementation of these plans is inevitable. By cable (Tab B) DEF 9720, you were informed in greater detail with regard to the military and non-military measures referred to in para. 2.e. of Tab A.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished you, by attachment to memorandum dated 26 May 1960, subject: Studies of Military and Non-Military Countermeasures to the Berlin Crisis (U) (Tab C), a checklist of possible military and non-military measures that could be taken. This list does not indicate which measures are recommended by Joint Chiefs of Staff for implementation.

Recent events confirm the need for the U.S. to be fully prepared at all times for sudden shifts in Soviet policy and immediately ready to take appropriate measures. The Berlin situation is an example of where a policy shift of this type could occur. These military measures within the capabilities of the three services and the Joint Chiefs are reflected in current capabilities and operational plans. However, certain measures can only be taken after approval at the level of the Secretary of Defense or higher, and may require action by other agencies of the Government. In order to familiarize you in advance with the scope and implications of these actions and the capabilities which will result from your decision, the Joint Chiefs should inform you of these measures and submit them to you as soon as possible.

The attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D) informs the Joint Chiefs of your views in this regard and requests the necessary action to implement the above.
Recommendation: Recommend signature and dispatch of the memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D).

4 Incis
1. Tab A—JCSM-202-60, 12 May 60 (I-13531/60)
2. Tab B—DEF 97271, 16 May 60 (ES Cy 7)
3. Tab C—JCSM-220-60, 26 May 60 (I-1143/60)
4. Tab D—Proposed memo for Chair, JCS

Prepared: Col. Schofield/js/31 May 60, Eur Reg/ISA 3D256, x54812

Distr: Addressee (Cy 1) (C-36274)
RAC Files-Cy 2
ISA-Cy 3
Comeback-Cy 4
Stayback-Cy 5

Copy 2 of 5 Copies.
Page 2 of 2 Pages.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Studies of Military and Non-Military Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 1 May 1959, and the memorandums by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-174-59, dated 8 May 1959, and JCSM-354-59, dated 31 August 1959.

2. As requested in your referenced memorandum, a current status of organization and planning undertaken for military and non-military actions and, in addition, a checklist of military and non-military measures that could be taken are forwarded hereto.

3. In the light of recent developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing the adequacy of the subject planning, with particular reference to the checklist of military and non-military measures that could be taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (24 pages)
APPENDIX "A"

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

1. U.S. Coordinating Group:
   Responsible for U.S. interagency coordination, and for the
   coordination of further planning on studies of military and non-
   military countermeasures, with particular reference to selection
   and timing, referring major decisions for the President's approval
   as they become necessary.

2. Tripartite Ambassadors in Washington:
   Responsible for over-all coordination of Berlin contingency
   planning.

3. Three Embassies in Bonn:
   Responsible for development of recommendations regarding
   identification of Allied movements, instructions regarding
   detailed procedures at checkpoints, and air access planning to
   the point where air traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

4. Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak Staff):
   Under the supervision of General Norstad, responsible for
   military planning of "Preparatory Military Measures"; the "Initial
   Probe of Soviet Intentions"; and for studying measures which
   might be taken to restore freedom of access to assist the Three
   Embassies at Bonn; and for air access planning after the point
   that Allied air traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

5. Three Ambassadors to the United Nations:
   Responsible for making recommendations regarding timing
   of approach to U.N. in effort to mobilize world opinion against
   USSR violation of agreements.

6. Berlin Headquarters of Three Powers:
   Assist Three Embassies at Bonn.

7. National Military Authorities:
   Develop national plans to support tripartitely planned
   measures.
APPENDIX "B"

CHECKLIST OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES -

1. PRIOR TO SOVIET TURN-OVER - PURPOSE: TO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.
   a. Continue close consultation with Congressional leaders and frequent reports to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.
   b. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free governments.
   d. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.
   e. Consult NATO in advance to maintain solidarity.
   f. SSK patrols in Iceland-Faeroes Gap to be intensified.
   g. Execute anti-submarine barriers at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits, with visible patrolling.
   h. Utilize air corridors at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet, if required.
   i. Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in Central and Eastern Mediterranean.
   k. Conduct a tripartite military exercise which could be easily identified with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.
   l. Assemble key tripartite commanders at Paris for readiness conference.
   m. Have the military leaders of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany meet with General Norstad at the time political negotiations over the Berlin issues reach an impasse.
   n. Tighten control of frontiers, ports and airports.
   o. Increase air activity along USSR radar barrier.
2. **SOVIETS TURN-OVER TO GDR - PURPOSE: TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.**
   a. Review of foregoin; measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.
   b. Execute identification and checkpoint procedures.

3. **GDR/SOViet ACTIONS RESULT IN FORMALITIES OR CONTROLS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES - PURPOSE: TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION.**
   a. Early agreement with the U.K. and France in advance of negotiations with the USSR, on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the U.N.
   b. A persistent world-wide diplomatic and propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.
   c. Consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.
   d. If appropriate, consult with SEATO and/or CENTO members to gain support.
   e. Increase civil defense readiness.
   f. Review plans for mobilization of industry.
   g. Determination of the degree of harassment which can be applied that is compatible with forces deployed and political-military situation.
   h. Conduct world-wide measures to counter Soviet harassment in connection with the Berlin crisis.
   i. Reference to the concept of reprisal should be made in discussions with free world governments.

k. Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains and at Allied airfields in Berlin.

l. Replace (utilizing force if necessary) GDR guards and administrative personnel at the autobahn checkpoints with tripartite military personnel.
P. Start tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis, announcing tripartite assumption of responsibility for traffic to and from Berlin.

q. Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communication equipment.

s. Increase tripartite utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.

t. Utilize increased military traffic to Berlin to increase the stockpile of weapons and ammunition.

u. Deny GDR participation in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC).

v. Conduct reconnaissance flights in the air corridors to photograph the autobahn and its checkpoints.

w. Occupy the Steinstuecken enclave and exercise the right of access.

x. Increase intelligence collection activities in Berlin and East Germany.

y. Intensify and coordinate reconnaissance activity (electronic and visual).

Y. The tripartite military powers in Europe implement appropriate alert measures to include, but not limited to:

(1) Protection against sabotage and subversion.

(2) Bringing air defense systems up to strength.

(3) Reinforcement of frontiers and refugee control.

(4) Implementation of the first stage of the ACE Communications - Electronic plan.

(5) Preparing forces for deployment.

z. Bring tripartite troop units in Germany to authorized strength and improve status of early warning systems.

aa. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises, and increase in-place exercise.

bb. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.

cc. Control radio traffic over whole area to suggest increased alert.

dd. Augment and vary pattern of detectable communications activity.

ee. Increase "information" programs in units.

ff. Intensify atomic training of tripartite forces.

gg. Elements of U.S. Second Fleet to proceed to war stations, exercising from U.K. ports and in Norwegian Sea.
Turkish forces with U.S. and U.K. submarines to conduct exercises in Black Sea and along Turkish coast within terms of Montreux Convention.

Active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.

Rotate fighter interceptor force of no more than 5 squadrons to Central Europe.

Similar and simultaneous movement and reinforcement of British and French Air Forces in coordination with two preceding statements.

Rotate troop carrier squadron to Central Europe.

Take further action to prestock airfields.

Resolve, at least temporarily, special weapons storage problems affecting readiness.

Accelerate deployment of missile units to West Germany.

Produce and stockpile appropriate maps and issue on a limited scale.

Arrange for temporary storage of weapons in additional delivery units.

Through diplomatic channels take preliminary steps to arrange for U.S. access to foreign ports, staging areas, airfields, communications facilities, etc.

4. TRAFFIC (AIR OR GROUND) IS OBSTRUCTED - PURPOSE: TO EXECUTE A PROBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SOVIETS/GDR WILL USE FORCE TO PREVENT ALLIED PASSAGE.

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Step-up civil defense measures.

c. Final tripartite determination of size and composition of forces to be used in the context of existing political-military situation.

d. Consult NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local (ground) action. In addition, Benelux's concurrence and cooperation should be obtained.

e. Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn route to Berlin, but if blocked will reopen the route. The force will be directed not to fire unless fired upon.

f. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.

Withdraw non-essential personnel, including dependents, from Europe.
h. Discontinue tourist and non-essential traffic to Europe.

i. Deploy tripartite force to Helmstedt area.

k. Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to BAOR area.

l. Step up and practice alert and combat procedures.

m. Improve state of readiness of BAOR and RAF/Germany to include movement of combat service support units, and strategic reserve from U.K. to continent.

n. Establish air courier service between Paris and major tripartite headquarters in Europe and U.K.

o. Reinforce Adiz measures and extend them to the Austrian border.

p. Execute aircraft squadron dispersal plan.

q. Be prepared to execute demolition and mining plans.

r. Increase border patrol activity and surveillance.

s. Execute the probe.

5. FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND ALLIED TRAFFIC IS STILL OBSTRUCTED - PURPOSE TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS.

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Final tripartite determination of the size and composition of forces to be used in the context of the existing political-military situation.

c. Seek support of all friendly nations.

d. Evaluation of possible use of the UN and the laying of a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position.

e. Review preparations for rationing.

f. Direct commanders of unified and specified commands to implement selected alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.

g. Consult and inform friendly nations and allied organizations, including NATO, SEATO, and CENTO of the seriousness of the situation and urge they take appropriate action including selected alert measures.

h. Execute electronic countermeasures.

i. Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR shipping.
1. Deploy to ACE compensatory replacements for the tripartite force.

k. Partial or complete evacuation of hospital patients to the rear.

l. Execute operation to reopen access.

6. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT GENERAL WAR MEASURES.*

a. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or, if not already executed, for implementation.

b. Alert Congressional leaders to the eminent likelihood of war, and seek Congressional authorization for use of forces, as necessary to redress our grievances, the President to inform the people of the gravity of the situation.

c. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free governments.

d. Harass and impose increased security restriction on Soviet military personnel.

e. Take civilian political and economic steps in accordance with current plans.

f. Reinforcement of forces on the European continent.

g. Initiate mobilization.

h. Take any additional and final measures to achieve full U.S. military and civilian defense readiness for general war.

i. Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.

j. Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans.

* NOTE: It should be noted that general war measures could be implemented at any appropriate time.
APPENDIX "C"

SUMMARY AND STATUS OF
MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

SECTION I
PREPARATORY ACTIONS COMMON TO ALL ALTERNATIVES

"A" MILITARY

ACTION

1. Preparatory military measures for appropriate degree of mobilization, unit deployments, readiness and establishment of alert measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preparatory military measures for appropriate degree of mobilization, unit deployments, readiness and establishment of alert measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The degree of mobilization indicated will be recommended at such time as the situation dictates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 23 July 1959 General Norstad forwarded additional preparatory measures that could be taken. Further additional preparatory measures were submitted in the Live Oak study, "More Elaborate Military Measures".

On 23 July General Norstad forwarded additional preparatory measures that could be taken. By memo the JCS forwarded comments to Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
2. NATO forces should maintain a sufficient capability to contain a Soviet attack until our retaliatory forces can respond.

3. Planning, on a tripartite basis under the general supervision of General Norstad (Live Oak Group) for quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in Europe of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence, to provide evidence of the three powers' determination to maintain their free access.

Action pending decision for commitment of military force.

On 29 May SACEUR message to commanders and MOD's referred to stated intentions of France, U.K. and U.S. and to NAC declaration of Dec 56. He stated a situation might arise which would make it desirable to enhance the state of readiness in ACE. SACEUR requested commanders to study measures for establishing military vigilance that could be sustained.

General Norstad's study, on "More Elaborate Military Measures" to reopen ground access, includes the following statement: "The size of any tripartite ground force should be such that the removal of its elements from the NATO Shield would not seriously affect NATO's defense structure."
1. Early agreement between U.S., U.K., France and the FRG, as to nature and timing of the initial probe of Soviet intentions.

On 13 May General Norstad submitted his "Probe Plan". The French, U.K., and U.S. Governments have approved the Plan. The plan includes 3 courses of action; the U.S. prefers courses "B" or "C" and the U.K. prefers course "B". General Norstad's plan included a proposed command structure that was also approved; General Norstad to be the over-all Commander and he may exercise command from SHAPE, the Field Commander to be CINCBAOR.

Final agreement at Bonn has been reached between the U.S., U.K. and FR on a basic plan for dealing with a possible withdrawal of Soviets from the Berlin Air Safety Center.

General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSAFE, instructing him to prepare a detailed tripartite plan to maintain air access to Berlin. In anticipation of receiving this letter of instruction, CINCUSAFE conducted several tripartite

Final decision on which course of action, "A", "B", or "C", and the timing of execution will be made at the time, and in light of the political and military situation. A letter of instruction from General Norstad to CINCBAOR was issued on 10 July that requires CINCBAOR to prepare supporting plans.

USCINCMEUR and his subordinate commanders, in fulfillment of their U.S. responsibilities, have prepared plans for employment of limited military forces to conduct a probe in order to determine Soviet and/or GDR intentions to deny our rights of access to Berlin.

Plans exist for maintaining civil air services (FAA, BEA, Air France) under flight safety conditions not usually considered normal.

By agreement between Bonn and the Live Oak Group in Paris it has been agreed that the Live Oak Group will be responsible for planning measures to be taken after air access has been forcibly obstructed by aircraft shot or forced down. These plans have been prepared.

5. Planning for maintenance of unrestricted air access to Berlin.
planning conferences with France and Royal Air Forces in Germany. As a result, CINCUSAFE’s plan was completed and reviewed in Wiesbaden by Live Oak on 6 May. It has been sent to General Norstad for his review.

On 5 May 1950 General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSAFE, instructing him to review and coordinate all military tripartite airlift contingency planning for Berlin and to assume operational control over these airlifts when implemented. In anticipation of receiving this letter of instruction, CINCUSAFE has had several conferences with French and Royal Air Forces in Germany, and has prepared a plan to comply with this letter of instruction. This plan has also been reviewed at Wiesbaden on 6 May by Live Oak and was presented by CINCUSAFE on 11 May to the three embassies at Bonn for coordination. Following this coordination the plan was submitted to General Norstad for approval.

On 5 May General Norstad signed a Live Oak letter of instruction to CINCUSEUR. This letter states, in part: "Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, has been delegated the authority to review and coordinate tripartite Berlin air contingency planning to include Operation TRIPLE PLAY."

CINCUSAF has prepared, in fulfillment of their planning responsibilities, for U.S. and tripartite plans for:

a. Tripartite "garrison airlift" plan - This plan provides for air supply of U.K., U.S. and French garrisons in West Berlin; provides for certain non-allied and non-official airlifts. (NOTE: Plan was developed at Bonn by the political counsellors of the three embassies, three civil air attaches, U.S. air attaches, and representatives of the three air forces.)

b. Tripartite "civil airlift plans" - This plan is designed to maintain as normal a flow of air traffic for West German civilians as possible between West Germany and West Berlin, and to transport refugees normally carried by civilian airlines.
By JCS message to USCINCUBE additional guidance was furnished USCINCUB in connection with his air contingency plan for Berlin as approved by JCS.

USCINCUB informed CINCUSAFE that a Berlin airlift would be undertaken only as a last resort, that any impression that the U.S. is preparing for a Berlin airlift should be avoided, and that this planning should be on a strictly need-to-know basis in order to prevent any indication to the USSR that the U.S. would accept an airlift in lieu of aggressively defending our rights of access to Berlin. Upon the concurrence of the U.K.

Chief of Staff (French have already concurred), CINCUSAFE will be delegated the authority to coordinate military planning for QBAL and to exercise operational control over the airlift efforts executed.

The U.S., U.K., and FR have approved a paper entitled "Possible Soviet Withdrawal from Berlin Air Safety Center", as a basis for more detailed planning by the three embassies at Bonn.

Embassies at Bonn recommendations granting appropriate allied air commanders discretion to order corridor flights over 10,000 feet in event implementation of air contingency plans as approved by U.S.

On 18 May 1949, the Secretary of State informed Foreign Ministers that plans for Berlin airlift should not be construed to mean that decision already taken to mount such airlift but merely that relevant plans exist.

Contingency plans for a Berlin airlift and for the maintenance of air access to Berlin could be executed at any time.
On 17 May 1960 the JCS approved a USCINCEUR plan for the maintenance of unrestricted air access to Berlin.

The Live Oak staff developed a study for "More Elaborate Military Measures".

On 5 August 1959, General Norstad submitted the foregoing study to the military chiefs of the U.S., U.K., and France. The U.S. position, forwarded to General Norstad, stated that the study was very useful, and requested that detailed contingency plans be prepared in accordance with the conclusions of the study. The U.K. and France authorized General Norstad to prepare detailed plans based on the foregoing study.

On 7 May 1960 USCINCEUR informed the JCS that the detailed plans were being prepared by CINCPAC, in coordination with CINCUSAREUR and CINC French Forces in Germany. This plan was submitted by CINCPAC through the Live Oak staff to General Norstad.

On 15 May 1960 the JCS approved a USCINCEUR plan for employment of limited U.S. military force for reopening ground access to Berlin.

The tripartite plan is known as "More Elaborate Military Measures", to be undertaken after the USSR has turned over its functions to the East German Government (GDR), and after allied traffic to Berlin has been forcibly obstructed.

The tripartite plan for reopening access to Berlin could be executed at any time.
TOP SECRET

ACTION

1. Diplomatic campaign to explain the Allied position on Berlin to all free governments.

2. A persistent world-wide propaganda campaign should be conducted on Berlin with peaks of intensity and urgency tied to major allied moves and to instances of communist intransigence.

3. Hints of the possible nature of resort to force contemplated by the Allies should be disseminated through covert channels.

4. Consultation to maintain NATO solidarity on the Berlin issue.

STATUS

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

The reports were made on the Berlin situation to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 1 April 1959 and on 14 April 1960.

REMARKS

Diplomatic approaches to non-NATO Governments regarding the Foreign Ministers Conferences have been made in an effort to build support for possible future action in the UN. The U.K. has kept the Commonwealth members informed.

General Norstad, the U.K., and French Ambassadors informed that U.S. position is that NAC should be consulted before initiation of a probe.

In connection with alerting of NORAD, the Canadians have asked the U.S. what circumstances would constitute interference with our access to Berlin. The State Dept. has informed the Canadian Ambassador on this point at the same time they informed NATO.
TOP SECRET

ACTION

5. Evaluation of possible use of the UN and the laying of a solid foundation for maximum UN support for the Allied position.

6. Early agreement with the U.K. and France in advance of negotiations with the USSR, on precise nature and timing of steps to be taken in the UN.

7. Continuing close consultation with Congressional leaders and frequent reports to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.

8. Drafting of detailed procedures at checkpoints and procedures for identification of allied movements.

9. Coordination and development of further planning on studies of Military and Non-military Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis on a national basis.

STATUS

The U.S., U.K., and FR have agreed on a tripartite paper dated 25 May 1959 entitled, "Possible Reference of the Berlin Question to the U.N."

There is an agreed tripartite position that the most advantageous point to seek UN action would be after negotiations had broken down and before the USSR withdraws from its functions in connection with Allied access to Berlin.

Continuing

REMARKS

Tripartite agreement, 18 May 1960, that decision to enter UN would be taken in light of circumstances at appropriate time.

The U.S., U.K. and FR have approved instructions for procedures to be followed by allied highway and railroad movements to Berlin in the event the Soviets withdraw from their present functions with respect to allied access.

A coordination group was formed at the direction of the President. JCS has designated Brig. General Fields, USMC, Deputy Director, J-5, as the JCS representative. Continuing action.

Agreement reaffirmed by the tripartite Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State on 18 May 1960.

Periodic reports are made to the President and the NSC. (On 16 June 1959 and on 18 May 1960).
10. World-wide measures to counter harassment in connection with the Berlin crisis.

**ACTION**

The U.S. paper, "Allied Counter-Harassment of Soviet Bloc Transportation," dated May 15, was passed to the French and U.K. The French have concurred in principal, the U.K. are awaiting instructions from their foreign office.

**STATUS**

The French indicate economic counter-measures as appropriate and desirable, the British have indicated strong opposition. The subject matter is still under discussion.

**REMARKS**

On 18 May 1960, as a result of discussions among Foreign Ministers of U.K. and France and Secretary of State agreement reached to recommend that heads of government approve further planning re indirect counter-measures and possible harassment of German civilian access.
SECTION II. ALTERNATIVE NO. ONE

A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN GROUND ACCESS BY LOCAL ACTION

"A" MILITARY

ACTION

1. Final determination of size and composition of forces to be used in the context of existing political-military situation.

STATUS

REMARKS

Final decision on size and composition of force is contingent upon the political-military situation existing at the time, and agreed on a tripartite basis.

See page 13.
TOP SECRET

ACTION

1. Consult NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local ground action. In addition Benelux's concurrence and cooperation should be obtained.

2. Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn route to Berlin, but if blocked will reopen the route. The force will be directed not to fire unless fired upon.

3. Confidential, advance notice of the foregoing announcement should be provided to selected friendly governments.

4. Preparation of a tripartite agreed draft of a public statement to be made if and when the Soviet Government announces the imminent turning over of the checkpoints to the GDR.

"B" NON-MILITARY

STATUS

Continuing

REMARKS

Report of Paris Foreign Ministers' Meeting given to NAC. During the Geneva meetings, the NAC was informed of Allied positions and progress.

A draft has been circulated by State to the U.K. and French Embassies.

The French apparently approve the draft. The British are awaiting comments from London.
SECTION III. ALTERNATIVE NO. TWO

A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN AIR ACCESS, IF BLOCKED

"A" MILITARY

ACTION
1. Final determination of the size and composition of forces to be used in the context of the existing political-military situation.

STATUS

REMARKS
Final decision on size and composition of force is contingent upon the political-military situation existing at the time, and agreed on a tripartite basis.

See page 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Consult with NATO in advance and seek to maintain solidarity, possibly including a NATO resolution, in support of local air action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preceding the commitment of combat aircraft into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that these aircraft will reopen the established air corridors to Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Selected friendly governments should be informed of proposed action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In March 1960, a paper entitled, &quot;Situations Which Could Arise if Soviets Withdraw from their Functions with Respect to Allied Access to Berlin&quot;, and the basic tripartite paper &quot;Berlin Contingency Planning&quot;, dated 4 April 1959, were circulated to the Germans in the pre-Summit working group on Germany.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Section IV. Alternative No. Three

**Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas**

**"A" Military**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Final determination of the degree of harassment which can be applied that is compatible with forces deployed and political-military situation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>See page 16.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ACTION

1. Reference to the concept of reprisal should be made in discussions with free world governments.

2. Consult NATO in advance to maintain solidarity.

3. If appropriate, consult with SEATO and/or CENTO members to gain support.

4. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.

5. Encourage UK and France to announce the imposition of controls.

### STATUS

### REMARKS

See page 16.

See page 18.
SECTION V. ALTERNATIVE NO. FOUR

GENERAL WAR MEASURES

"A" MILITARY

**ACTION**

1. Take additional final measures to achieve full U.S. military and civilian defense readiness.

2. Conduct military operations.

**STATUS**

Plans constantly under review

**REMARKS**

If action becomes necessary, it will be in accordance with NSC 5904/1 and current emergency war plans.

Action in accordance with current emergency war plans.
"B" NON-MILITARY

ACTION

1. Seek support of all friendly nations.

2. Alert Congressional leaders to the imminent likelihood of war and seek authorization for use of force.

3. When war is imminent, inform NATO and seek implementation of NATO alert stages.

4. Undertake the consultations provided in the Rio, SEATO and ANZUS Treaties. Consult with CENTO members.

5. Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.
U.S. should give serious consideration to the following elements as possible new guidance for Live Oak military planning:

1. Any force committed to reopen ground access should have a capability of buildup to sufficient size to successfully engage the GDR alone and thereby require the Soviet Union to commit Soviet troops; and

2. The initial application of force should be Allied in composition and could be of battalion or smaller size, but if met by GDR military formations, it should rapidly pass through solely West German units up to division or larger in size with larger Allied formations remaining in reserve. The consideration being that East Germans faced with West Germans would create a situation of such danger to the USSR that their time for decision would be immediate. The approval yesterday of a Federal Republic of Germany liaison officer for attachment to the Live Oak group and the introduction of West Germany into more active participation in the military planning for Berlin contingency makes the above now feasible for consideration. Although this aspect of Berlin contingency planning is not the part of the responsibility of IBA, it is believed the idea could be informally discussed with Gen. Lemnitzer or the Chairman, JCS.

Prep by Col. James H. Schofield
European Region/IBA
15 Sept 1960
CONFIDENTIAL JCS XX984632 From JCS, J-5, Joint Staff sends. Reference your letter ECLO 600/74, 7th Oct.

A U.S. position of concurrence with your proposal contained in Para 3 of reference has been established.

Unable to determine downgrading data.

Cleared by:

G. G. O'CONNOR
Colonel, USA
Executive, J-5

JCS 984632

(State Dept.

Page 1

Page Nr.

T.S. attached 81

DTG: 211300Z

hrd/5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Advance Training of the Battalion Combat Team Force, TRADE WIND (LIVE OAK) (3)

1. In a letter, subject as above, dated 7 October 1960, General Norstad formally requested the concurrence of the National Military Authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in his proposal to issue a directive to CINCEUR to assemble and train, under a suitable cover plan, the tripartite force to restore ground access to Berlin.

2. In his letter, General Norstad stated, "With increasing Soviet and East German provocations over the status of West Berlin and routes of access thereto, I consider it essential from a military standpoint that I should be ready to implement operation TRADE WIND immediately on the direction of the three Governments. At the present time the assembling and training of the integrated Battalion Combat Team for use in operation TRADE WIND will take at least sixteen days and, because of problems concerning control of this integrated force, possibly longer to achieve a high standard of operational efficiency."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the view of General Norstad that it is essential to conduct training for the tripartite forces in order that it be prepared to execute plans in a minimum of time. For the reasons stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in General Norstad's proposal and, in view of the political implications involved, consider that a U.S. position of concurrence should be established.

4. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense agree and support action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the U.S. Coordinating Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, to:

b. Urge that the British and French also concur in General Norstad's proposal.

5. At such a time as a U.S. position on General Norstad's proposal is established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise General Norstad of the action taken.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to:
USCINCEUR.
Mr. Irwin

General Miller (I-18,414/60)

5 December 1960

Meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning

1. A meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group has been scheduled by Mr. Merchant for 1530 hours, Monday, 5 December 1960, Room 5100, State. A meeting of the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group is scheduled for the same time and place the following day.

2. It is understood that these meetings were called by Mr. Merchant with a view to cleaning up, insofar as possible, current business prior to his trip to the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting. It is further understood that the principal item to be discussed will be the 2 November 1960 working paper on "Possible Non-Military Countermeasures." (See Enclosure A.)

3. The Joint Staff has recommended to Admiral Ferrall that he raise the following subjects at the meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group by making statements substantially as indicated in the referenced enclosures:

   (a) Downgrading of the Classification of Certain LIVE OAK Matters. (See Enclosure B.)

   (b) Items from the U.S. Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for early unilateral implementation or for emphasis in tripartite discussions. (See Enclosure C.)

   (c) Summary of outstanding actions which should be undertaken or completed by the U.S. Coordinating Group. (See Enclosure D.)

4. It is not likely that the items listed in Enclosure C marked with red stars will be raised by Admiral Ferrall since these will require further coordination at the Chiefs' level. However, one of these items, "Intensified Planning for Appropriate Economic Measures," would be pertinent for you to raise in view of your correspondence with Mr. Merchant on this subject. (See Enclosures E and F.)
5. Although Mr. Merchant in his reply states that "we find ourselves in complete agreement on the fundamentals involved," his suggested course of action, which is to await action by the Committee of Political Advisers and the North Atlantic Council on the Bonn Non-Military Countermeasures Study (Enclosure G), introduces the possibility of a delay which could defeat the effectiveness of any action in this area. Furthermore, the cabled instructions of the Department, which were sent to Paris for use in discussions on the Bonn countermeasures paper (Tab II), lack urgency and positiveness. In addition to the points raised by you in your letter on the proposals on economic sanctions, recent developments in the Inter-Zonal Trade meetings between West Germans and East Germans make it appear that the West Germans may believe, either correctly or incorrectly, that they are negotiating from a position which lacks depth vis-à-vis the GDR. The GDR has recently received assurance from Khrushchev in Moscow that it will receive full and unrestricted support from the USSR in this trade conflict.

**Recommendation:** You should raise the subject of economic sanctions and stress that, in your opinion, there is an urgency to obtaining a political decision as a foundation for possible economic sanction actions, and that, in view of the imminence of the NATO meeting, the U.S. should initiate with determination the obtaining of this decision. Of secondary priority, but equally important, is the need for development of the mechanics or framework to implement action in this field. The ability of NATO to reach agreement in this difficult area would be a convincing demonstration to the USSR of Western determination, and would strengthen the negotiating position of the FRG in trade talks with both the GDR and the USSR.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor

The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides UNCLASSIFIED with instructions with regard to the above subject and specifically informs him of those actions authorized under varying degrees of Soviet harassment.

It should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no reference in their instructions to the applicability of SEC 560A subjects U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Aircraft. This policy authorizes “Use Pursuit”, that is, “In the event of unprovoked Communist aerial attack against U.S. aircraft outside Communist territory, those U.S. aircraft attacked or located in the immediate area of the attack may take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile air space.”

The Department of Defense has previously concluded that SEC 560A does apply for the Berlin air corridor. The Joint Chiefs’ recommended actions do not preclude a later use of this policy by the U.S. In fact, their statement that subsequent to Soviet harassment further instructions will be furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the next scheduled flight, would provide an opportunity for the U.S. Government to consider authorization of the “Use Pursuit” actions of SEC 560A.

I have approved the recommended course of action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the draft instruction to DECISION and transmitted these draft instructions to the Department of State for use in fully informing the President, at the time of his considering the approval of the tripartite agreement for resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor.

(Signed) John N. Irwin, II
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Prepared by Col JESchofield/elm/25Feb60
EurReg/ISA 32253 Ext. 54812
Dist: Cy 1&2 - SecDef (C-22675)
Cy 3,4,5 - JCS (C-21951)
R&C Files-Cy 6, Comeback-Cy 7, Sayt
Copy 6 of 9
R&C Rdg File - Cy 9
Page 1 of 1

2 Items
1. Tab A-Memo for SecDef fr JCS (JCSM-66-60) w/Ann
2. Tab B-Ltr to Sec/State
FEB 2 5 1960

In reply refer to: I-2745/60

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in anticipation of early approval by the President of the resumption of high-altitude flights in the Berlin corridor, have prepared a covering instruction for dispatch to UNICEX (Inception).

The Department of Defense considers that, in addition to providing explicit instruction to UNICEX prior to resumption of high-altitude flights in the Berlin corridor, the statement should emphasize that the President was fully advised of the U.S. actions presently contemplated should the high-altitude flights be subjected to secures Soviet harassment.

It is requested that the President be fully informed on this subject at the time the tripartite agreement for resumption of high-altitude flights is submitted to him for approval.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
THOMAS S. GATES

Prepared by Col. JHSchofield/elm/25 Feb 60

BursReg/ISA 3e53 Ext. 54812

Dist:

Addressee-Cys 1, 2 & 3 (C-21952)
JCS-Cys 1, 4 & 5 (C-21951)
R&C Files-Cy 6 7
R&C Rnd File-Cy Y 8
Comeback - Cy 8 9
Stayback - Cy 9 10
OSurge - Cy 11
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridor (5)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the progress being made toward trilateral agreement to the resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor. In anticipation of approval by the President, a warning instruction has been prepared for dispatch to USCINEUR.

2. It is believed explicit instructions should be given to USCINEUR prior to resumption of such flights. The attached message is designed to serve this purpose.

3. In view of the guidance contained in a memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NSC), subject: USCINEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin, dated 9 May 1959, and the implications of applying NSC Policy 5404, dated 19 February 1959, to flights in the Berlin corridor, it is requested you secure the necessary approval for the attached message prior to dispatch to USCINEUR.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARLIEH BURKE
Chief of Naval Operations

Enclosure: message
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Berlin (U)


Mr. Khrushchev has stated that unless a satisfactory agreement on Berlin is reached at the Summit meeting he will proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This would result in East German responsibility for land and air access to Berlin.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested on the following questions related to this situation and to the joint study on Berlin access referenced above:

a. Will the U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 be such as to permit implementation of contingency plans, accepting and being prepared for the risks of general war?

b. What actions are recommended be taken relating to the Berlin garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin in the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty?

SIGNED

JAMES H. DOUGLAS
ACTING

Rewritten by:
Secy Douglas/cja
28 Mar 60

[Handwritten notes and corrections]

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
ORD 155

DATE

CASE #
TO: The Secretary of Defense

FROM: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Problem: To secure a statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to U.S. ability to implement Berlin contingency planning.

Discussion: The report at Tab A was approved by the President on 23 April 1959 as a basis for further planning, with the caveat that implementation of the measures would be subject to later decision. The report lists "general war measures" as one of the four alternative courses of action (page 1), and states that "each of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force here considered would introduce the risk of general war with little warning" (page 6, para. B-9). In order that the Secretary of Defense may properly advise the Secretary of State and the President as to Defense support for the U.S. negotiating position at the Summit, it is desirable to secure the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to U.S. military posture in relation to Berlin contingency plans.

A general answer to the above question can be drawn up on the basis of NCR 5912, Part I, Section II, pp. 1-2, wherein it is stated that current military capabilities assure that the United States and its Allies will prevail in a general war. However, it is desirable to secure a statement specifically referring to Berlin contingency plans.

In addition, it would be desirable to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the proposed letter to the Secretary of State previously forwarded to the Secretary of Defense under OASA-Covering Brief I-13,571/60.

Recommendation: Signature of the attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab B).

Concurrences: None required.

Prep'd: Col. JETyler/msw
OASD/ISA-Br Reg 3D-266/Ext 713-3-15-60 Distr: Cy l&2 w/encls
Ad: 3-RFC; 4-Comeback; 5-ISA Rdgs.

Ends

1. Tab A - Report "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin" (I-13,669/9) - cy #5 Ser "A"

2. Tab B - Proposed Memo for Chairman, JCS
RECOMMEND signature of attached Covering Brief, which is self-explanatory.

Frederic H. Miller
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region

Coordination:
None Required
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 26 March 1960, requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the U.S. military posture in the mid-summer of 1960, and actions recommended to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that:

a. The U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans and the courses of action set forth in the State-Defense-JCS-CIA study, "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin," dated 15 April 1959, provided the assumptions on page 3 of the study are valid. The risk of general war is inherent in the use of military forces. In this connection, when and if it becomes evident that implementation of such plans is inevitable, certain political, economic, psychological and military measures should be taken to improve our military posture and to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war. The military measures should include, on a progressive basis, increased alert, unit deployments or dispersal, and use of emergency powers of the President to effect an appropriate degree of mobilization.

b. In the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty, there are no additional military actions to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin, other than those that are currently foreseen in tripartite and unilateral plans which would be implemented at the appropriate time.
3. It is realized that a delicate balance must be maintained between the implementation of military and non-military measures and the possibility of unduly alarming the nation. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is essential that the United States convince the Soviets of our ability and determination to maintain our rights in Berlin in an effort to deter them from adverse actions and decisions based on a miscalculation of our capabilities and intentions. It would be most difficult to establish in the Soviet mind the U.S. determination to accept a general war as an alternative to the relinquishment of our rights, without making manifest preparations for such a possibility.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signed]

M. R. TRICKERY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Reference JCS views on Berlin contingency planning, as contained in JCSM-302-60.

Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-302-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans provided the assumptions on page 3 of the 15 April 1959 study are valid.

The political, economic, psychological and military measures, referred to in the third sentence of paragraph 2a of reference, are not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be essential to the military ability of the United States to carry out the military measures of the 15 April 1959 study. However, when and if it becomes...
evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend these measures to convince the USSR
that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war
and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political, 
economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from
among those of the agreed 11 April 1979 analysis of non-military
measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western
access to Beringia. The additional military measures would include
those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOUGLAS

SUBJECT: JEH Views on Berlin Contingency Planning

Attached for your information is a copy of a paper

subtitled by Mr. Irwin on 12 May for possible discussion

with Secretary Gates during the flight to Paris.

(Signed) Robert H. Knight

Robert H. Knight,
Acting Assistant Secretary

Sealed

Cyg 1 of 1 qrs Ser "F"

Prep'd: Col JETyler/msw: 5/13/60

En Reg/Reg & Nato Affrs 3D-262

Original w/cc to ADIEE w/encl.;

Blue - R&C ISA; Yellow - Comeback;

White - ISA Reading
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th>CONCURRENCE</th>
<th>APPROVAL</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DEPUTY ASD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE OFFICER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DEPUTY ASD/POLITICO-MIL AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MESA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FAR EAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL DIRECTOR, WH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, FOREIGN MIL RIGHTS AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPUTY ASD/DISARMAMENT AND MIL AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, DISARMAMENT &amp; UN AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPUTY ASD/MSC &amp; PLANS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, MSC AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, DCS AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPUTY DIRECTOR/MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, MA PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, PROGRAMMING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPTROLLER (ASA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, MANPOWER &amp; TRNG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, WPHE PRODUCTION &amp; SALES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECTOR, MA EVALUATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEGAL ADVISOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PUBLIC AFFAIRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RECORDS AND CONTROL (ASA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUBJECT**
JCS Views on Berlin Contingency Planning

**REMARKS**
Recommend signature of attached memorandum.

**ORIGINATOR AND EXTENSION**
Col. J. E. Tyler, USA Ext. 71386

**FREDERICK E. MILLER**
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, European Region
JCSM-202-60
FROM: Trumino D.F. (JCS) I-13019/60
TO: I-13931/60at

CL: Top Secret DATE: 4/12/60
D.D. S2 Germany (Berlin) Cy 4
C.R. JCS I-13,943/60 which was attached
C.R. Action Cy 4 to I-13,966/60 as Encl. Memo for
REF. D/Europe F&C Mr. Douglas for sign ASD/ISA 5/13
IO: 5/12/60 5/13/60
D.D. 5/26/60

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)
Cy 4 & 5 of Memo for Sec Def PBS 481
Cy 4 routed above
Cy 5 (1) D/ASD(2) DASD/ENA(3) F&C

481
**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>ADV ACTION COPY TO</th>
<th>INFO COPY TO</th>
<th>THIS IS AN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF THE ARMY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF THE NAVY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Comp)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (H&amp;M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&amp;I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (S&amp;L)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MP&amp;R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL COUNSEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTOR, ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Special Operations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ASSISTANT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

Draft

Cy #4 attached as encl. (Tab A) to I-13,943/60 which was attached to I-13,966/60 as an Encl - Memo for Mr. Douglas for sign ASD/ISA 5/13/60 - Memo prep’d Col. Tyler Regional & NATO Affairs, European Region 5/13/60

**SUSPENSE DATE**

[Signature]

1 MAR 60
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/3/60

Inez:

The attached "crept" into R&C from D/Eur yesterday. I don't know where it came from before it got there. The snowflake is oddly typed.

I am adding an "I" number for reference, and sending to you in case Mr. Irwin wishes to retain this.

Thanks:

Margaret T.

[Handwritten notes:]

[Signature]

Per

6/3/60
INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

MSG NO: TOREPNAM 165
DEF 977271

PTG: 1623122

FROM: CSD WASHDC

TO: DEPREPNA PARIS FRANCE

TOREPNAM 165. FROM OASD(ISD) EXCLUSIVE FOR IRWIN FROM KNIGHT.

Reference JCS views on Berlin contingency planning, as contained in JCSM-202-60.

Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-202-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that U.S. military posture in midsummer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans provided the assumptions on page 3 of the 15 April 1959 study are valid.

The political, economic, psychological and military measures, referred to in the third sentence of paragraph 2a of reference, are not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be essential to the military ability of the United States to carry out the military measures of the 15 April 1959 study. However, when and if it becomes evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend those measures to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political, economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from among those of the agreed 11 April 1959 analysis of non-military measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western access to Berlin. The additional military measures would include those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED
FROM: ODW washinton d.c. 172 2407 May

TO: DEFENSE FION FINCE.

CONFIDENTIAL 1977329
FREE CODE (DA) EXCLUSIVE
FOR INFO FREE REPLY. TOOKER 489. REFERENCE TOOKER 489.

Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm interpretation of JCS 288-69. Master JOB.

given in seconds.

ATTACH

(Signed) Robert H. Knight
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

TYPED (or stemped) NAME AND TITLE

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF

DATE

RECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF

DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)

SIGNATURE

(Signed) Robert H. Knight

DA FORM 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173. 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

DD FORM 173

1 MAY 59
Reference JCS views on Berlin Contingency Planning, as contained in JCSM-202-60.

Representatives of the Joint Staff have concurred with the following interpretation of JCSM-202-60. I am, however, clearing this interpretation tomorrow with the JCS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit implementation of contingency plans provided the assumptions on page 3 of the 15 April 1959 study are valid.

The political, economic, psychological and military measures, referred to in the third sentence of paragraph 2a of reference, are not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be essential to the military ability of the United States to carry out the military measures of the 15 April 1959 study. However, when and if it becomes
evident that implementation of contingency plans is inevitable, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend those measures to convince the USSR
that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war
and to improve U.S. military posture. The additional political,
economic and psychological measures would probably be chosen from
among those of the agreed 11 April 1959 analysis of non-military
measures to induce the Soviet Union to remove obstructions to Western
access to Berlin. The additional military measures would include
those given in the last sentence of paragraph 2a of reference.
TOP SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE

TO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
INFO: CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
USCOB BERLIN GERMANY

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

From JCS.

Ref a. Message Embassy Bonn to State No. 1580, info Paris No. 536, dated 18 Feb 1960;
Ref b. DAIR/F(45)71 Second Revise, dated 22 Oct 1956;

1. In view of ref a, make preliminary preparations for resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor above 10,000 feet by C-130 aircraft within 24 hours after receipt of execution order from the JCS. Following guidance applies:

   a. Conduct flights under presently agreed quadripartite rules for air corridors contained in ref b.

   b. Conduct flights at the most efficient cruise altitude of the C-130 above 10,000 feet on a regularly weekly schedule as outlined in ref c. In the event sufficient lead time is given conduct such flights on the first Wednesday after receipt of execution order and each Wednesday thereafter; otherwise, within the time limit specified in the execution order and each week thereafter. Essential that flights are maintained on a regular and continuous schedule without restriction to visual flight conditions.

   c. In the event of Soviet/GDR interference with these flights such as:

      (1) Harassment by fighter passes or formation flying:

         (a) Continue flight, and ignore efforts to divert aircraft from corridor;

         (b) Continue scheduled flights;

Declassified by Authority of
OSD/JS
17 May 1994

Top Secret

Date

208

Cased #
(c) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level.

(2) Ramming - intentional or unintentional:
   (a) Prepare to continue scheduled flights;
   (b) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level;
   (c) Further instructions will be issued by the JCS prior to the next scheduled flight.

(3) Soviet and/or GDR aircraft or AAA fire across nose of or at the transport aircraft:
   (a) Instruct aircraft commander to take whatever action is necessary for safety of aircraft and crew;
   (b) Prepare to continue scheduled flights;
   (c) Anticipate protest will be made at the appropriate level;
   (d) Further instructions will be issued by the JCS prior to the next scheduled flight.