HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP/SEVENTH AIR FORCE
AND JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1975 (U)
30 JUNE 1975

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Commander

PACIFIC COMMAND


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(This page is Unclassified)
PREFACE

(U) The first three months of 1975 found USSAG/7AF personnel putting in extremely long days as the tempo of Southeast Asia activities increased dramatically. The three areas which demanded the most attention were the Mekong River convoys, the airlift operations, and the revision of non-combatant emergency and evacuation plans.

(U) An aerial resupply of historic proportions to a besieged Cambodia became necessary on 5 February when the Khmer Communists (KC) activity closed the Mekong River, lifeline to the survival of Phnom Penh.

(U) Chapter II, RESUPPLY OF THE KHHER REPUBLIC, contains information about USSAG/7AF actions to assist Cambodia during the January-March time frame. In addition to documenting Mekong River convoy lessons, a review of airlift activities from the beginning to the end of operations on 17 April is provided in Chapter II. Specific convoy lessons learned are included at Attachment 2.
The remainder of this preface is devoted to Southeast Asia intelligence estimates for January-March 1975. These estimates were provided by USSAG J-2 (Intelligence). A review of the organization's quarterly activities will be more meaningful when the environment is understood.

**Vietnam.** The first two months of the year saw enemy activity concentrated in Military Region (MR) III, where Communist forces overran all of Phuoc Long (P) during early January. Further north, only slight pressure was reported in MR-I and MR-II, as the enemy continued massive preparations for major assaults during the dry season. In the delta, Viet Cong (VC) units continued their slow, but steady, erosion of government security. A significant development occurred in January when the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) called in airstrikes on a large convoy in the Western Highlands above Kontum, reportedly catching a division on the move. Subsequent reporting revealed that a new division, the 968th, had moved into northern MR-II from Laos. This was viewed as a prelude to strong attacks at Kontum and Pleiku.

The dry season offensive in MR-II, began 28 February, with attacks and attacks by fire (ABF) in Kontum, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh Provinces. The Communists focused their attention against the major lines of communication (LOC). By 9 March, all overland access to the western Highlands had been interdicted. Further to the south, in Daklak (P), the provincial capital of Ben Me Thuot came under
heavy enemy attack on 10 March. This was the pivotal battle, because the enemy's success here precipitated the South Vietnamese decision to cede the western Highlands. Although the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) reinforced Ban Me Thuot, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had moved in the 316th Division from North Vietnam and had moved the 320th and elements of the 10th Division south from Pleiku and Kontum. As a result, the enemy had overwhelming superiority, and the city was lost. South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the withdrawal from Kontum and Pleiku, and an unorganized withdrawal began from both cities. Both the ARVN and the civilians panicked, and as the convoy passed through Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces, it came under heavy attack. The enemy continued his drive toward the coast; by the end of March, all of MR-II with the exception of two southern coastal provinces (Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan), was in enemy hands.

On 4 March, shortly after the attacks began in MR-II, enemy forces launched their dry season offensive in MR-I. Soon heavy fighting was taking place on the Quang Tri/Thua Thien border; Hue was receiving ABFs and Highway 1 was interdicted just north of the Hai Van Pass. Local force units and civilians in Quang Tri panicked, as word spread of ARVN unit redeployments to Da Nang and Saigon. A mass exodus began toward Hue, and by 19 March, the Citadel at Quang Tri was in enemy hands. A defensive line was formed to the north (at the Ky Chanh River), but it failed to hold as friendly forces retreated.
The civilian populace then began leaving Hue for Da Nang. By
25 March, ARVN had evacuated Hue, with most of the friendly forces
evacuating by sea to Da Nang. More than one million refugees
poured into Da Nang, creating tremendous internal problems. In
the meantime, the enemy was able to wrest control over all of
southern MR-I, leaving Da Nang as the only major government enclave.
At Da Nang, air and sealift began to move some of the refugees to
safety, but on 29 March, ABFs resulted in a totally chaotic situation.
Late the next day, the city had fallen into enemy hands, and all
organized ARVN resistance had ended.

In MR-III, the North Vietnamese widely propagated their
intentions to isolate and then capture Tay Ninh City. To the east
of Tay Ninh City, enemy forces overran Tri Tam in March, and then
attacked toward Go Da Hau along Highway 1. Fighting in this area
continued and spread further to the east toward Saigon. In eastern
MR-III, the enemy launched coordinated attacks on 17 March, in Binh
Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces. Highways 20 and 1 were cut and three
district towns were overrun. Xuan Loc, the provincial capital of
Long Khanh Province started receiving ABFs. The withdrawal was
carried out with only light enemy pressure, but subsequently attacks
against Chon Thanh, Binh Long (P), increased. The North Vietnamese
achieved control over the northern tier of provinces in MR-III, with
the exception of the bottom half of Tay Ninh Province, and a major
battle was apparently shaping up around Tay Ninh City. With the
situation in both western and eastern MR-III seriously deteriorating,
the enemy had the option to attack directly toward Saigon.

In the Delta on 10 March, enemy local force units started their monthly high point, with activity subsiding after about a week. The communists increased their efforts to seize and hold territory and it was expected that enemy main force units would be committed to strong attacks in April and May.

Vietnam Summary: The first quarter of 1975 saw the loss of all of MR-I, and most of MR-II to the North Vietnamese; not by military conquest, but due to panic and resulting chaos. Over two million new refugees seriously burdened the Saigon government, which was also trying to reorganize the remnants of its forces rescued from the northern provinces. During the period, the North Vietnamese stepped up the flow of men and material into the south and reporting indicated that some of their reserve divisions started deploying into South Vietnam. March ended with Saigon facing the strongest communist military capability in the history of the war. A major turning point had been reached and the political and military viability of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was being seriously threatened.

Cambodia. The first quarter of 1975 also marked a major turning point in the Khmer. On the first of January, the KC launched a country-wide dry season offensive. Major initiatives around Phnom Penh resulted in very significant enemy inroads. Along the lower Mekong River, the communists steadily increased pressure, interdicting the river and culminating in the fall of Banam Neak Luong. The KC carried out strong attacks in the provincial areas and created a
serious threat to Kampot and Battambang. Also on the first of January, the KC attacked Phnom Penh from every direction except the south. These attacks were successful in interdicting all the major roads leading into the city's defensive perimeter. Both Phnom Penh and Pochentong airfield started to receive ABFs which steadily intensified as the year progressed. By the end of March, enemy forces were within 10 kilometers of Pochentong airfield, which was receiving 105mm howitzer and 107mm rocket ABFs as the KC attempted to strangle the capital city.

In the outlying areas, coordinated attacks increased with ground attacks and ABFs at all the major provincial capitals. As the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic (FANK) attempted to withdraw troops to help defend Phnom Penh the enemy increased his pressure in an attempt to prevent these withdrawals. As fighting progressed, both sides were forced to deploy men to Phnom Penh, where heavy casualties had been sustained, especially in the area northwest of Phnom Penh and along the lower Mekong. At the end of the quarter, the situation in the outlying regions was most serious at Battambang with the enemy attempting to isolate the city. Ground attacks and ABFs were reported both north and south of the city and enemy forces were at one time within 1 1/2 kilometers of the airfield. Additionally, internal pressures by students and the Buddhists complicated the situation. Kampot was also the scene of heavy fighting with the enemy tightening the defense perimeter. Government forces held out, however, as the KC were forced to dedicate much of
their ammo to the Phnom Penh and Neak Luong battlefields. Oudong fell early in the quarter as the KC moved toward Phnom Penh from the northwest.

This success gave greater access to resupply from the north and enabled them to sustain the high level of fighting along Route 51 to the northwest of the capital. During February and March, FANK and the KC took heavy losses in this area, but persistent KC pressure allowed them to press beyond Route 51 toward the North Dike Road. They also captured Toul Leap to the west and established positions for highly accurate 105mm and 107mm rocket fire on Pochentong airfield. These caused heavy losses to the Cambodian Air Force (KAF) and sporadically interrupted the airlift of supplies into the beleaguered capital. FANK made several concerted efforts to push the KC back to the west and northwest and did manage to retake Toul Leap only to lose it again within a few days.

To the east of Phnom Penh the KC introduced additional units and began to force FANK off the east bank. Toward the end of the quarter, as Prek Luong fell, FANK defensive lines on the east bank were penetrated as the KC attempted to establish positions for attacks on Chrouy Chang War Naval Base and Phnom Penh. Pressure was also maintained from the north and the FANK defensive perimeter began to move in closer to Phnom Penh as more and more FANK units were evacuated or forced to redeploy to the northwest of the city where attacks were most severe.

1) Perhaps the most significant goal the KC achieved during
the quarter was the interdiction and capture of the lover Mekong. One-by-one they captured strategic positions at the major choke points along the river and set up positions for effective attacks by recoilless rifles, rockets, and mortars. These, in conjunction with mines and barriers in the river, stopped all convoy activity in the first week in February. Several 105mm howitzer artillery tubes were captured as government positions were overrun, and, finally, only the large enclave of Banam/Neak Luong remained. The KC then used the captured 105mm artillery, as well as organic mortars, and rockets to launch heavy ABFs on the enclaves, softening it up for attacks by two KC divisions and sector forces. The enclave was finally overwhelmed in an aggressive coordinated assault as March ended. This development will allow at least one KC division to deploy to the area south of Phnom Penh where FANK forces were reported to be weak.

Cambodian Summary. Inside the capital, the KC were instructed to create chaos and dissatisfaction with the government, but because of effective Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) countermeasures, the enemy was not successful. The KC completed several major objectives on a time scale which reflected their intentions to gain control of Phnom Penh this dry season. Whether this would be attained through political collapse or military assault was still unanswered at the end of March.
This quarter was characterized by relative
calm in Laos. The coalition government operated satisfactorily with
cooperation between the Vientiane side and the Lao Patriotic Front
(LPF) in carrying out various government projects. Prince Souvanna
Phouma, recovering from his late July 1974 heart attack, was living
in the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The government was principally
run by acting Premier Phoumi Vongvichit (a leftist) in Vientiane
who purportedly received instructions from the communist headquarters
at Sam Neua. The military situation was quiet during the period.
During this time frame, however, leftist dominated "student movement"
in Laos was taking shape. The movement's influence was felt in
demonstrations at Ban Houei Sai and Thakhek. These demonstrations
enlisted the support of some Royalist (FAR) Army personnel and —
for the first time — cooperation between FAR and Pathet Lao (PL)
troops. These demonstrations and the movement of PL forces into
strategic positions near FAR outposts enhanced the bargaining
position of the LPF in the coalition government. In other developments,
numerous road sections in northern Laos were completed by Chinese
forces. As road segments were completed, the Chinese force was
reduced from 23,000 to 14,000 personnel.
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U.S. CLASSIFIED
CHAPTER I
MISSION AND RESOURCES

MISSION (U)

From 1 January through 31 March 1975, there was no change
in the four-fold mission of the United States Support Activities
Group/Seventh Air Force (USSAG/7AF) located at Nakhon Phanom Royal
Thai Air Force Base (NKP), Thailand. The mission remained.¹

--- To plan for resumption of an effective air campaign in Laos,
Cambodia, the Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnam as directed by
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).

--- To maintain a command and control structure for the
management of air elements which may be committed to it and a
capability for interface with the Vietnam Air Force (VHAF) Air
Control System.

--- To maintain liaison with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF) Joint General Staff (JGS), Carrier Task Force (CTF) 77,
and committed Strategic Air Command (SAC) systems.

--- To exercise command over the Defense Resources Support and
Termination Office (DRSTO), and operational control of the Joint
Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).
HEADQUARTERS USSAG/7AF
ORGANIZATION CHART
(As of 31 March 1975)

COMUSSAG/CDR 7AF
DEPCOMUSSAG
CHIEF OF STAFF/DEP CDR 7AF

J-1
Personnel

J-2
Intelligence

J-3
Operations

J-4
Logistics

J-6
Communications Electronics

SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF

COMAND
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
COORDINATION & LIAISON

IG
PAO

HQ
7th AF

JCRC
DRSTO

SAC ADVON

FLT COORD GP
ROSTER OF US CAG/AF KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 MARCH 1975

Commander
Deputy Commander
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff/Personnel
Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations
Assistant Chief of Staff/Logistics
Assistant Chief of Staff/Communications-Electronics
Inspector General
Secretary of the Joint Staff
Public Affairs Officer
Chief, Defense Resources Support and Termination Office
Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group
Chief, SAC ADVCN

Lt Gen John J. Burns, USAF
Maj Gen Ira A. Hunt Jr., USA
Maj Gen Earl J. Archer Jr., USAF
Col Robert W. Nelson, USA
Col Robert A. Stenfik, USAF
Maj Gen Earl J. Archer Jr., USAF
Col Delbert E. Smith, USAF
Lt Col Donald L. Whalen, USAF
Col Melvin J. Steinberg, USAF
Lt Col Larry L. King, USAF
Lt Col Ronald C. David, USA
Maj Gen H. D. Smith, USA
Col John P. Vollmer, USA
Captain Delbert W. Nordberg, USN
Lt Col Frank G. Schlier, USAF
(U) Positive results of liaison with CTF 77 and the command
and control management structure for air elements became particularly
visible toward the end of the quarter. On 1 March, CINCPAC
ordered a 24-hour alert posture to be assumed for possible
implementation of EAGLE FULL. Although the response time varied,
an increased alert posture continued through the end of March.

PERSONNEL RESOURCES (U)

(U) Key Staff Change. Lt Col Frank G. Schlier, USAF, became
the Chief, SAC ADVON on 18 Feb 75.

FISCAL RESOURCES (U)

(U) Budget. A limitation of $75,000 was imposed on travel/TDY
on 16 January. The FY 75 resource authorization was reduced on
12 March to $750,000 (new obligation authority). Quarterly
allocations were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Quarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Quarter</td>
<td>225,900</td>
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<td>3rd Quarter</td>
<td>225,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Quarter</td>
<td>24,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
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</table>

INSPECTOR GENERAL (U)

(U) Efforts of the USSAG/7AF Inspector General (IG) were
directed toward monitoring and advising in the areas of joint
operational readiness, operational security, and command and
control. Two field visits were made to inspect Thailand-based
flying operations.

(U) The IG visited the Thailand Airlift Control Center at
U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base on 4-5 February, where
he monitored briefings of the Bird Air Company flight crews.
He reported a significant improvement in the quality of the briefings. He also recorded that crews were reaching the maximum allowable flying hours, unless additional waivers were granted.

(U) During a visit to the 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 19-20 March, the IG attended a combat briefing prior to a photo reconnaissance mission to Phnom Penh. No discrepancies were observed. All crews were being thoroughly briefed on the rules of engagement.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (U)

(U) Press Conference. Approximately 55 news media representatives from Thailand, Germany, Japan and the U.S. attended a 15 March press conference at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base. Most of the questions by newsmen regarded the airlifting of supplies to Cambodia by Bird Air, a U.S. civilian contractor. The first USSAG Fact Sheet on the Cambodian Airlift operation was distributed to those attending.

(U) Release Coordination. During the quarter, several requests for information were received from the CINCPAC Public Affairs Liaison Office (PA LNO). Information was obtained from appropriate USSAG staff offices, coordinated, and provided to PA LNO. Topics included the shipment of supplies to South Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as the Bird Air operations. Near the end of the quarter, COMUSSAG requested a feature story about the airlift operations to Cambodia with emphasis on the airdrop portion.
(U) Production of the USSAG Daily News Summary continued, with special news coverage as appropriate.

PROTOCOL (U)

(U) **Distinguished Visitors.** A list of distinguished visitors to USSAG/7AF during the quarter is included at Attachment 1.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. CINCPAC Instruction (S) S3020.23, Change 3, 28 Apr 1973, Inclosure 5.

2. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 0100352 Mar 75, Subj: Unknown.


4. Msg (U), CINCPAC to Commander JCRC (and others), 1600527 Jan 75, Subj: FY 75 Travel Funding Reduction.

5. Staff Summary Sheet (U), USSAG/IG to USSAG/CC, 13 Feb 1975, Subj: Visit to the Thailand Airlift Control Center, U-Tapao RTAFB.

6. USSAG/7AF History, 1 October-31 December 1974 (TS/HFD), Pgs 5-6.

7. Staff Summary Sheet (U), USSAG/IG to USSAG/CC, 26 Mar 1975, Subj: Trip Report/Visit to 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.
CHAPTER II
RESUPPLY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC

MEKONG CONVOYS (U)*

(U) The distance from Tan Chau, South Vietnam, to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, is about 60 miles. Convoys were able to traverse the course of the Mekong River in about 18 hours under good conditions. And the Mekong convoys looked good until mid-December 1974. Until that time, there had been some highway resupply to Battambang and Sisophon, but 90 percent of the Khmer resupply had been by river convoy.

(U) However, during this quarter, the KC was successful in denying use of the Mekong. The marked change in U.S. efforts to resupply beleaguered Cambodia became evident. In March, 97 percent of the resupply was by air (89 percent airland and 8 percent airdrop) and three percent was by road to the Battambang area.

(U) January-March 1975. Four resupply convoys to Phnom Penh (TP) were attempted in January and February. Three down-river convoys from Phnom Penh (PT) were also made. The following is a summary of the activities significant to the understanding of the perils experienced due to the Khmer Rouge dry season offensive and, ultimately, the closure of the Mekong to resupply convoys.

Convoy TP-111. Initial planning for convoy TP-111 called for four ammunition barges, four petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) vessels and two rice vessels scheduled to cross the Cambodian border.

*This narrative includes only discussion about convoy experiences this quarter. Previous convoys have been reported in prior histories. However, a message containing general lessons learned is provided at Attachment 2. Charts of surface and airlift amounts delivered and a discussion of the 5 Feb 75 Mekong Convoy Recountants Conference are included in Chapter VI.
on 3 Jan 75. However, due to deteriorating security conditions on the Mekong, the convoy was rescheduled several times at the request of the Etat Militaire Generale (EMG), Cambodia. As news of increased Khmer Rouge activities became public knowledge and the worsening situation along the Mekong became apparent, concern about the willingness of tug and coastal freighter and tanker crews to transit the Mekong started to increase. A decision to sail the convoy 21 January was finally agreed to by the EMG.

When the tug/barge, rice and POL vessel movements from Vung Tau to the An Long staging area commenced, the unwillingness of crews to transit the Mekong started to become obvious. Vessels that had been waiting in the Vung Tau area for several days suddenly started to report problems with steering, generators and, in one case, the lack of sufficient lubricating oil. Vessel substitutions were made to maintain the desired mix of commodities, and the vessels were moved to the convoy staging area at An Long. After the vessels arrived at An Long, more apprehension among the rice and POL vessel crews manifested itself, and they refused to go.

When the convoy finally got under way from An Long, it consisted of only two ammunition barges and four tugs. After the convoy had passed Tan Chau, on its way to the Cambodian border, the crews of the SEAPAC, Inc., tugs started to have second thoughts about making the trip. As a result, the convoy turned around and returned to Tan Chau where crew members willing to make the trip were grouped on three tugs, and the convoy then got under way again with two ammunition barges and three tugs. This turmoil resulted in
the convoy crossing the Cambodian border at 2100 hours. An
added problem was the fact that no Khmer river pilots were
available for the tugs.

When the convoy entered the Peam Reang Island Channel,
the tug Shibaura ran aground and experienced propeller and engine
problems. She managed to free herself, and the convoy continued
up-river. After the convoy cleared the Peam Reang Island Channel,
it halted because the tug Asiatic Enterprise was having engine
problems, and the tug Shinano had a fouled propeller. The convoy
remained in place for approximately nine hours before repairs
were completed and movement could continue to Neak Luong.

At Neak Luong the master of the Asiatic Enterprise refused
to continue to Phnom Penh. Marine Nationale Khmer (MNK) personnel
were placed on board the tug, and the crew sailed. After the
convoy departed Neak Luong, the Phnom Penh harbor tug Harumi was
ordered to move down-river to meet the convoy and assist it to
Phnom Penh. The master and crew of the Harumi were paid a $100
bonus each for this trip in order to get them to go. The convoy
finally closed at Phnom Penh between 1010-1035 hours, 23 January.

Of significant note is the fact that no casualties were sustained
by the crews on the tugs even though numerous AEFs were received.
The most predominant factor in tug and crew protection was the use
of shield barges to protect the tugs, which had not been done
previously.
(U) Convoy PT-111. Convoy PT-111 was composed of only MK escort craft.

Convoy TP-112. Initial planning for this convoy called for two ammunition barges, two rice vessels and three POL vessels. After the success of convoy TP-112, it was hoped that the crews of the rice vessels and POL vessels would be willing to make the transit to Phnom Penh. However, such was not the case. Of the rice and POL vessel crews, only the crew of the POL vessel Vira I agreed to go and stuck with that decision. The crews of the other vessels, excluding SEAPAC tug crews, waivered on the borderline until the morning of the convoy sailing date, 25 January. At that time, the rice vessel crews made their decision to stay at An Long. The crew of the Bayon Trader indicated that they would go, but they were skittish. Their actual departure from An Long was questionable.

When the convoy got underway from the An Long staging area the Bayon Trader started up-river. After it reached Tan Chau the crew started to have second thoughts about the trip, and the vessel stopped. The MNK convoy commander boarded the vessel and talked to the master of the ship, finally persuading him to make the convoy. When the convoy crossed the border at approximately 1400 hours, 25 January, it consisted of four tugs, two ammunition barges, and the POL vessels Vira I and Bayon Trader. Two tugs were used to tow each ammunition barge in order to attain maximum possible speed for the convoy. The tugs and ammunition barges were
deployed in front of the POL vessels, because they were well protected by shield barges and could better withstand ABFs. The plan called for the tugs and barges to transit enemy held choke points before the POL vessels. The POL vessels would hold back at the choke points until the tugs/barges had cleared and then pass through at maximum possible speed.

When the convoy entered the Peun Reang Island Channel, it encountered a barricade across the channel which was cut by the MNK. At approximately Parallel 38, the convoy received an ABF which set the Bayon Trader on fire. The Bayon Trader halted with MNK escorts to fight the fire, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded to Neak Luong. The fire, in the galley and crew living quarters area, was extinguished, and the vessel moved on to Neak Luong. After a halt at Neak Luong, the convoy continued toward Phnom Penh. At approximately Parallel 54, the Bayon Trader reported that a fire had again broken out in the area of the galley and crew living quarters. The vessel turned around and proceeded back to Neak Luong, while the rest of the convoy continued toward Phnom Penh. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 0615 hours, 26 January.

Once again, due to the effectiveness of the shield barges, no casualties were sustained among the tug crew members even though numerous hits were taken on the screens mounted on the barges alongside the tugs. The Bayon Trader was finally brought up to Phnom Penh.
at 0545 hours, 27 January.

Convoy PT-112. Convoy PT-112 departed Phnom Penh on 27 January with four empty ammunition barges, five empty cargo vessels, one empty PCL vessel, and seven tugs. Approximately 10 kilometers south of Phnom Penh the tug Shibaura went aground and was attacked; the captain was wounded. The tug Shinano, the Phnom Penh harbor tug, was dispatched to assist, and they both returned to Phnom Penh, carrying four shield barges and one empty ammunition barge. Approximately two hours after the convoy left Phnom Penh, the tug Harumi turned around and returned to Phnom Penh for unknown reasons.

When the convoy was passing through the Dei Dos area, the coastal freighters Port Sun I and Tung Pao received ADFs, resulting in two wounded. The Port Sun I later experienced engineering problems and ran aground at Parallel 47.5; she was subsequently freed approximately one hour later and continued to Neak Luong for repairs. The remainder of the convoy proceeded on to An Long after a short halt at Neak Luong, crossing the border between 1010 and 1035 hours, 28 January. Three shield barges were recovered enroute.

On 28 January the tugs Shibaura and Harumi sailed from Phnom Penh under MXX escort for An Long. At Neak Luong, the two tugs were joined by the Port Sun I for the remainder of the trip to the border. Between Parallel 22-23 (Pean Reang Island Channel) the Port Sun I received an ADF which set her on fire, and the crew
abandoned ship. The vessel beached on the west bank at Parallel 22. Navy escort craft picked up the crew, and the convoy continued to the border, crossing at 0645 hours, 29 January.

**Convoy TP-113.** Planning for this convoy called for two ammunition barges, two rice barges, four rice vessels, four POL vessels and one vessel loaded with salt. The coaster Adriana, loaded with salt, ran aground before reaching An Long on the up-river trip from Vung Tau and could not be freed in time for the convoy. The POL vessel Vira IV sailed from Vung Tau on the afternoon of 28 January and managed to arrive at An Long in time to make the convoy. Two of the four rice vessels scheduled for this convoy, the Wah On and Tung Lee, had been at An Long since convoy TP-111 was staged and had refused to participate in both TP-111 and TP-112. The participation of the Wah On and Tung Lee in TP-113 was questionable.

A representative of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) from Saigon was transported to the An Long staging area to persuade the two rice vessels to participate in the convoy and to head off trouble with any of the other rice and POL vessels. Early on the morning of 29 January the convoy got under way from the An Long staging area, and, with assistance of the USAID representative, all vessels at An Long got under way except the rice vessel Tung Lee. SEAPAC, Inc., in anticipation of trouble with their tug crews, had pre-positioned extra tug crew members at An Long. This proved fruitful, as the crew of the tug Asiatc Stamina refused to sail
at the last moment. Replacements were quickly obtained from An Long City, and the tug got underway.

When the convoy crossed the Cambodian border at 1030 hours, 29 January, it consisted of two ammunition barges, two rice barges, three rice vessels, and four POL vessels. All barges were towed by two tugs with shield barges being used to protect the tugs, including the four USAID tugs, and the ammunition barges. Between Parallels 21 and 25 the convoy sustained an AEF which resulted in the POL vessel Han Seung 7 catching on fire and beaching on the west bank at Parallel 27. The vessel was abandoned by the crew. NKK escorts remained behind to protect the vessel, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded on to Neak Luong.

During this same period of time, the POL vessel Han Seung 2 sustained major damage from an AEF which resulted in her rolling over and sinking. The Han Seung 2 crew managed to abandon ship before she sank. The rice vessel Wah On ran aground approximately four kilometers south of Neak Luong, and NKK elements remained with her for protection. Remaining convoy elements proceeded to Neak Luong.

After arrival there, the rice vessels Port Sun II and Port Sun III reported engineering problems. After halting at Neak Luong, two ammunition barges, two rice barges and two POL vessels continued on to Phnom Penh, arriving at 0530 hours,
30 January; the Port Sun II and Port Sun III remained at Neak Luong. At 0300 hours, 31 January they departed Neak Luong for Phnom Penh, arriving at 0600 hours. Salvage of the Wah On, Han Seung 7 and Port Sun I (lost on PT-112) was scheduled for PT-113.

Convoy PT-113. Convoy PT-113 departed Phnom Penh in two increments; one departed at approximately 1000 hours, 31 January, followed by the second increment at 1800 hours, 2 February. The first increment was composed of two support Cambodia Cut of Thailand-Transhipment (SCOOT-T) tugs, four USAID tugs, and three empty USAID barges. The second increment was composed of two SCOOT-T tugs, two POL vessels, and four empty ammunition barges. The first increment proceeded to Neak Luong and then attempted to salvage the vessels Wah On, Han Seung 7 and Port Sun I. All three vessels were found to be severely damaged, and the Wah On and Han Seung 7 were burning. No attempt was made to salvage any of these vessels.

Shortly after the second increment departed Phnom Penh the POL vessel Vira IV reported steering problems and returned to Phnom Penh. The second increment joined the first increment at Neak Luong at 0030 hours, 3 February. At Parallel 22 the convoy sustained an ABF which set the POL vessel Bayon Trader on fire. The vessel was beached, and the crew abandoned ship; HMR escort craft evacuated the crew.
At Parallel 19 the SOOS-T tug Timberjack was damaged by an underwater explosion, presumed to be some type of underwater mine, and sank. The USAID tugs Hawkeye and Suckeye, which were towing together, experienced an underwater explosion which caused both tugs to sink in the vicinity of Parallel 21. The USAID tug Geronimo sustained serious damage as a result of enemy fire and had to be towed to Tan Chau. The head of the convoy crossed the border at 0630 hours, 3 February, with the tail crossing at 0745 hours. Based on reports from the crew members of the tugs that were sunk, it was concluded that underwater mines had been employed in the Peam Reang choke point.

Convoy TP-11A. Based on the losses experienced on the previous convoys with unprotected high silhouette rice and POL vessels, and the mine threat in the Peam Reang Island area, a decision was made to limit this convoy to two ammunition barges and four tugs. The convoy crossed the border at 1200 hours, 5 February. In the vicinity of Parallel 08 (approximately two kilometers west of the border), the convoy received an ABF that resulted in the partial sinking of a river patrol boat (PBR). As a convoy main body approached to within three kilometers of Peam Reang Island, five PBRs preceding the tugs Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust initiated or were the targets of three underwater explosions. No damages were sustained. Shortly thereafter, there was an underwater explosion to the starboard of the Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust, and both tugs altered
their course, causing them to run aground.

The tug Shinjo Maru, which was towing the tug Shibuura, slipped the lines attaching her to the Shibuura and proceeded toward the position of the Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust to assist them. The Shinjo Maru then struck a mine or was holed by shore fire, causing her to sink. In the meantime, the tugs Asiatic Enterprise and Asiatic Trust were maneuvering to free themselves, and they struck a mine which broke them apart with both tugs going aground again. The MHK escort rescued the survivors from the tugs and cut loose the ammunition barge attached to the Asiatic Enterprise. The Shibuura turned around during this time and headed back to Vietnam with her ammunition barge in tow. She safely made it back across the border. The barge from the Asiatic Enterprise was taken under tow by MHK escorts and was returned to Tan Chau.

In summary, during the months of January and February a total of four SCOOT-T tugs, two USAID tugs, fifteen shield barges, two rice vessels, three POL vessels, three miscellaneous barges/junks and a self-propelled barge were lost on the Mekong.

(U) With the intensified ABFs along the river, the KC controlling the choke points, and the mines blocking passage of the Mekong, the convoys ended.

JANUARY-MARCH 1975 MEKONG AIRLIFT ACTIVITY (U)

(U) Increased enemy activity in January resulted in the delay of vital Mekong convoy resupply movements to replenish
recognizing the need for specific types of munitions items that were rapidly approaching critical stockage levels, action was taken to exercise an option in the Bird Air contract to increase the daily number of resupply sorties from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh to a maximum of 10 per day, pending improvement in the Mekong security situation and the continuation of resupply convoys. (In the past, when Mekong convoys provided the major portion of supplies, the C-130 airlift remained at a low level of activity, averaging about four missions per day.)

(U) Contract Operations. To continue the reduced presence of U.S. military personnel in the Khmer, Bird Air Company had been retained to provide civilian contract crews for the C-130 airlift, effective 8 Oct 74. The company's original strength of five aircrews to fly five daily C-130 sorties, on aircraft provided and maintained by the USAF, was not sufficient to satisfy the rapidly increasing airlift requirements in early 1975.

On 9 January, the airland of munitions began with six airland sorties to Phnom Penh delivering 97.6 S/T. Emphasis on the airlift of munitions continued throughout the remainder of January. An additional requirement for fuel became evident on 16 January. Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery Systems (ABFDS) for C-130 aircraft were obtained from war reserve material stocks stored at Yokota AB, Japan. Delivery of fuel continued until 29 January when a successful Mekong convoy containing two FOL tankers arrived
in the Cambodian capital. Between 10-31 January, Bird Air
provided from 9 to 12 sorties per day, exceeding the 10 sorties
per day surge commitment on three days. The limiting factor
on the number of daily sorties was available crew time.

On 5 February, the Khmer Rouge successfully
interdicted the Mekong River, thus closing the last surface
LOC into Phnom Penh. Just as the Soviets had successfully blocked
all rail, water, and highway routes into Berlin in 1945, the
Khmer Rouge had now successfully interdicted all surface LOCs
into Phnom Penh. Air was the only resupply method available.
Two actions were then taken—determination of minimum requirements
for MAP-CB materials needed by the Khmer Republic and expansion of the
Bird Air contract to lift these materials. It was recognized that
expansion of the Bird Air capability to at least 30 airland/airdrop
sorties daily would take time. To serve as a stopgap, a commercial
contract was issued to two U.S. carriers to provide a capability
of lifting 300 tons of ammunition into Phnom Penh daily, using
DC-6s. Between 15-26 February, this commercial augmentation was
highly successful, lifting 5,229 S/T of ammunition.

(U) It is timely, however, to remember the monumental task
faced in attempting to resupply the Khmer Republic by air, even
on a limited scale. Fifty C-130s or 25 DC-6s are required to carry
the average load of one ammunition barge. Similarly, 60 C-130s
or 39 DC-6s are required to equal one POL tanker. Also, 25 C-130s
or 15 DC-6s are required to equal one general cargo barge.
Additionally, some commodities, i.e., cranes, large bulldozers, Bailey bridges, could not physically be lifted on the C-130 or DC-8 aircraft. The 5,229 tons of ammunition airlifted into Phnom Penh, requiring 111 sorties, equated to only four and one-half ammunition barges. The best results were on 22 February when 523.5 S/T were delivered on 11 missions.

(U) During this interim, Bird Air continued to hire and train additional crews. By 27 February, Bird Air was adequately manned to sustain 30 C-130 missions daily. Although this was adequate to meet the minimum requirements for military products, the requirements for rice and POL for the civilian sector were equally critical and required greater tonnage.

DC-8/C-130 Trade Off. USAID, the agency responsible for providing all U.S. aid material to Cambodia, then requested the Air Force to contract for airlift to bring in up to 545 metric tons of rice and 120 cubic meters of POL per day. As refugee population increased, the amount of rice required on a daily basis was increased periodically until it reached 700 metric tons per day. To accomplish this, 16 DC-8 aircraft missions daily were required for rice and kerosene. World Airways proposed use of a Boeing 747 as a more economical alternative due to larger capacity. However, engineering estimates of runway and taxiway load bearing capacity mitigated against its use. Analysis of alternatives to implement airlift of USAID commodities to Phnom Penh identified a weak
point, from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, in the delivery of POL. As initially envisioned, USAID POL products would have been transported by contract stretch DC-8s operating between Tan Son Nhut and Pochentong. An analysis of this proposal indicated that it would entail enormous logistical problems in that the POL would have to be moved in containers, such as 55-gallon drums or 500-gallon rubberized containers (seal drums). The DC-8 was not capable of using the ABFDS.

Use of containers necessitated additional time and equipment to fill and empty the containers, the need of a large quantity of containers to permit uninterrupted delivery, movement and storage of pallets and containers within the aerial ports, and the time to load and off load the palletized containers. It was determined that a more cost effective procedure would be the use of C-130 aircraft equipped with the ABFDS. This would expedite aircraft utilization through reduced ground time for loading and unloading, and allow maximum possible flying time, resulting in increased sorties per day. The C-130 alternative required the procurement of bulk POL from the U-Tapao area and, after USAID approval of the concept was obtained, USAID made arrangements to procure bulk POL from the 625th Supply Squadron at U-Tapao. Under this concept, USAID agreed to provide three DC-6 sorties of MAP munitions per day from U-Tapao to Pochentong in return for six C-130 sorties delivering USAID POL.
DC-8 Conclusions. The three DC-8s moved from U-Tapao to Tan Son Nhut in Saigon on 27 February. There they initiated the contract airlift of USAID rice and kerosene to Pochentong.

The number of DC-8 missions varied daily depending upon the number of aircraft provided by the carriers (Airlift International, World Airways, Trans International Airways, Flying Tiger Lines, and Seaboard World). Factors affecting these numbers were other commitments, hostile threat at Pochentong, battle damage, and availability and efficiency of the loading crews at Tan Son Nhut. On 18 Mar 75, six DC-8s airlifted 896.8 S/T of rice, 153.2 S/T of ammunition, and 46.9 S/T of kerosene for a record 1,133.9 tons.

The most rice delivered to Pochentong in a single day was 1,085.6 S/T airlifted by seven DC-8s on 31 March. The overall performance of the DC-8 contractors was outstanding, particularly in view of the hazards involved.

The performance of the Bird Air crews, operating daily under the most demanding conditions in a hostile environment, was also outstanding. Their best record was on 17 Mar 75 when 34 missions (26 airland and 6 airdrop) were flown. Delivery that day totaled 654.1 S/T of critically needed supplies for Phnom Penh and Neak Luong.

During the quarter, 1,574 rounds of artillery and rocket fire hit Pochentong and the immediate vicinity. The daily average was 15 in January, 8 in February, and 29 in March. In all, there were 710 AEFs between January and March; 433 occurred while U.S. military forces were in the area. Further detailed discussion of contract operations may be found in Chapter VI.
U.S. aircraft were on the ground. Fortunately, only minor damage to two DC-8s and five C-130s resulted.

(U) USSAG Tactical Analysis Branch (DOTA) analysts computed probabilities of aircraft damage/loss due to ARPs. These analyses, although dependent upon selective assumptions of enemy intentions, quantified the risks taken during the airlift operations. Rocket patterns and trends were studied by DOTA analysts, both in points of impact and the times of the attacks. Early firings indicated a random haphazard time pattern and gave little evidence that the point of impact could be adjusted to a specific target. By March there was evidence that the ARPs were in response to DC-8 landings. Also, pattern analysis indicated some enemy capability to adjust fire upon a selected point target as captured 105mm howitzers were brought into range of the airport.

(U) When the pressure of rocket attacks exerted by the Khmer insurgents steadily increased at Pochentong, specially coded grid maps were constructed to insure accurate and rapid dissemination of rocket impact points to key staff personnel. Impact patterns were monitored continually and every conceivable step was taken to minimize the probability of losses. These steps included changes in operating patterns, movement of the off-load activities to areas of least impacts, and when prudent, suspension of operations for variable periods of time until favorable changes in the impact pattern could be discerned.\textsuperscript{2}
(U) Command and Control. Command and control over the entire airlift operation and key operational decisions were made through the USSAG Tactical Air Control Center (TACC/Blue Chip). Initially the Thai Airlift Control Center (ALCC) at U-Tapao provided sufficient airlift liaison for Blue Chip. As airlift operations expanded, cargo control teams (CCT) were flown into Phnom Penh on the first C-130 each day and out on the last flight of the day to provide additional on-scene command and control. While at Pochentong, the CCT provided aircraft control, communications, threat assessments, and served as a backup for the control tower.

(U) As the volume of traffic increased, a 7AF Supervisor of Airlift (SOA) was deemed necessary and four officers with airlift background were brought in TDY from Clark Air Base. The SOA and CCT members remained overnight in Phnom Penh on a rotational basis. This control was necessary to effect a rapid turnaround of the increasing traffic at Pochentong.

(U) As the total scope of operations increased to include contract DC-8s flying out of Saigon, special airlift teams were established in Blue Chip to insure continued close control and effective working relationships. A 7AF SOA was also established in Saigon in order to effect necessary coordination between the C-130 and DC-8 operational schedules to Pochentong. The Saigon SOA expanded to a five-man operation when it also became responsible for the mammoth task of scheduling the airlift support for
OPERATION MILITARY and the Vietnam evacuation flights.

(U) **Contract Terminated.** DC-8 airlift operations to Cambodia were terminated 14 April. 3

In view of SECEDEF action terminating all Military Assistance Program—Cambodia (MAP-CB) shipments, JCS requested termination of the Bird Air contract within 48 hours of receipt of their 19 April message. 4 The contract was terminated 20 April. 5

(U) Approximately 56,300 S/T were delivered this quarter in 2,142 missions. In comparison to last quarter, this represented a 678 percent increase in the number of missions and a 1,592 percent increase in the tonnage delivered.

(U) Airland missions into Pochentong tallied 1,780 delivering approximately 52,370 S/T of supplies. There were 63 airland missions last quarter. Rocket and howitzer attacks on the airfield caused an ammunition dump fire (on 13 March) and 87 C-130 missions and 69 DC-8 missions were cancelled as a result of incoming fire.

**U.S. AIRLIFT SUMMARY (U)**

(U) The American airlift to the Khmer Republic—airland and airdrop—resulted in another significant chapter in U.S. firepower response. During the two years and six days of operation (11 Apr 73 to 17 Apr 75), 162,514 S/T of critically needed ammunition, rice, POL, and general cargo were delivered to Cambodia.

(U) The sustained airlift support began on 11 Apr 73 with USAF C-130s transporting JP-4 to Pochentong. Until 14 Aug 73, when U.S. combat operations in Cambodia ended, 20,415 S/T of cargo
were airlifted. However, the cessation of combat operations did not stop the airlift support.

(U) From 15 Aug 73 through 17 Apr 75, 7,876 missions were flown delivering 142,096 S/T of supplies. The mix of airland and airdrop missions varied, dependent upon hostile operations affecting the use of the Mekong River by supply convoys. C-130 and DC-8 airland missions during the period totaled 5,413, while 2,463 C-130 airdrop missions were flown (data on the number of missions prior to 15 Aug 73 not available).

(U) Airdrops. The aerial resupply of the Khmer Republic resulted in the largest sustained airdrop effort in USAF history (more than three times the tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh in 1968).

(U) Twenty-five important isolated provincial enclaves, including Kompong Seila and Neak Luong, were sustained by airdrops of 25,893 S/T of ammunition and rice. Approximately 98 percent of the bundles delivered were reported recoverable on small drop zones, some with less than a 500-meter radius of security from hostile forces. Significantly, these airdrops were made from altitudes above 10,000 feet using the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) and Station Keeping Equipped (SKE) C-130s with the 26-foot ring slot high velocity parachute delivering up to 15 one-ton bundles.

(U) In February 1974, the high altitude free fall of rice was successfully tested in the soft soil at Chanh...
Thailand. However, a combat evaluation was flown in the Khmer on 23 Apr '74, with the conclusion that 95 percent of the rice was unusable due to pulverization and ruptured bags.

The major problem in the airdrop operation was a five to seven percent streamer rate. In April 1974, high level interest in the streamer rate resulted in tests to determine causes. High speed film coverage showed the primary cause of streamers was bundle collision after exits from the aircraft. The collisions frequently resulted in tangled shroud lines or collapsed parachutes. Various corrective actions had little effect in improving the streamer rate which remained about six percent.

(There were 377 streamers between 1 Jan-17 Apr '75, six percent of the total drops. However, all but 14 of the streamers hit the drop zone.) When considering the adverse environment of the high altitude, high velocity delivery system, being flown under operational conditions, the 94 percent chute reliability was considered extremely successful.

(U) From 1 Jan-17 Apr '75, 6,334 bundles were dropped. Only .23 of the bundles having good chutes missed the drop zone.

(Twelve bundles were lost due to AWADS computer malfunctions.) This was a 99.7 percent success rate. This high success rate demonstrated the skill and professional ability of the crew in using the AWADS equipment to compute and attain accurate drop release points. Additionally, the accuracy of determining
release points was improved by computation and refinement of ballistic winds by the USSAG Weather Division.8

(U) Airland. Supplies airlanded into the Khmer totaled 123,621 S/T. C-130 airland missions were flown into Pochentong, Ream, Chhnaeng, Cham, and Battambang in the early days of the operations. However, beginning in mid-1974, all C-130 airland missions were into Pochentong as were the DC-8s during January-April 1975. In January 1975, with the interdicting of the Mekong River, Phnom Penh became completely dependent upon U.S. airlift to provide life sustaining supplies of rice, ammunition, and fuel. The last mission into Pochentong was 11 Apr 75, one day prior to the execution of EAGLE PULL, the noncombatant emergency evacuation.9

(U) Environment. The resupply of Phnom Penh was carried out in the daily environment of deadly rocket and howitzer attacks by the Khmer Rouge. Thus, the Cambodian setting was in marked contrast to the Berlin airlift with which many chose to compare the Cambodian resupply operations. Actually, the hostile environs of Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sanh would be more comparable.

(U) More than 2,500 rounds impacted on or near the Pochentong airfield between 1 Jan-17 Apr 75. There were eight instances of minor to moderate shrapnel damage to aircraft. Although no American lives were lost, nine members of the Cambodian military and civilian off-load crews were killed and approximately 40 were wounded. (See also pg x).

"The execution of EAGLE PULL, 12 Apr 75, will be the subject of a separate account in the next USSAG/7AF History."
(U) Termination. The final Khmer airlift support mission, an airdrop, was flown 17 Apr 75, when a Bird Air C-120 completed a rice drop to Kompong Chhnang. 9
CHAPTER II

1. USSAG/7AF History (TS/NSD) 1 Oct-31 Dec 74, pgs 91-95.

2. Msg (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC (and others), 230530Z Apr 75, Subj: Komer Airlift Summary.

3. Msg (C), MAC to JCS, 150630Z Apr 75, Subj: DC-9 Cambodian Operation (U).

4. Msg (C), JCS to CSAF, 190035Z Apr 75, Subj: Termination of Bird Air Contract (U).

5. Msg (C), CINCPACAF to PACAF Procurement Center, Bangkok, 191830Z Apr 75, Subj: Termination of Bird Air Contract (U).

6. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPACAF, 210045Z Apr 75, Subj: None.

7. Ibid.

8. USSAG/7AF History, 1 Oct-31 Dec 74 (TS/NSD), pg 74.

9. Same as Footnote 52.
CHAPTER III
PERSONNEL

MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)

Pipeline Reinstated. On 22 Jan 75, USSAG notified all services that effective immediately the personnel pipeline for USSAG/7AF would be reinstituted.\(^1\) Replacements would be requested from the services to satisfy minimum manning requirements beyond FY75. Requisitions to all services were prepared and forwarded by 11 Feb 75. Earliest replacements are expected in May 1975.

Strength. The military strength for USSAG dropped from the 31 Dec 74 figure of 344 to 334 on 31 Mar 75. 7AF strength for the same reporting period increased by 1 from 74 to 75.\(^2\)

(U) USSAG/7AF strength breakdown by branch of service is reflected in Figure 5.

PLANS AND PROGRAMS (U)

(U) Individual Awards and Decorations. The USSAG Awards and Decorations Board considered 59 recommendations for decorations. The board recommended one Medal of Honor be downgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross; recommended approval of four Legion of Merit; recommended approval of five Meritorious Service Medals; recommended approval of 45 Joint Service Commendation Medals;
USSAG/7AF Reserve Military Strength
As of 31 Mar 73
By Service Branch

USSAG

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{USAF} \\
282 \\
\hline
\text{USA} \\
54 \\
\hline
\text{USN} \\
15 \\
\hline
\text{USMC} \\
3 \\
\hline
\text{USAF (RES)} \\
334
\end{array}
\]

7AF

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{USAF (RES)} \\
75 \\
\hline
\text{USAF} \\
9 \\
\hline
\text{USAF (RES)} \\
66
\end{array}
\]

Enlisted Officer
recommended disapproval of three Joint Service Commendation Medals and recommended approval of one Air Force Commendation Medal.

(U) Air Force Assistance Fund Drive. The FY75 Air Force Assistance Fund Drive was conducted 1-15 Mar 75. A total of USSAG/7AF contributions totaled $516.05. Contributions from this drive assisted the Air Force Aid Society, Air Force Village and Air Force Enlisted Widows Home Foundation.

HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION (U)

(U) Dormitories. Turn-in of excess equipment and furniture, i.e., beds, dressers, refrigerators, etc., continued. Due to unprojected gains this quarter, the unit obtained one additional dormitory (Bldg 2278) on 6 Mar 75. Through self-help, the dormitory was renovated in 13 days and presently houses 16 personnel.

(U) Self-help upgrade actions in the remaining dormitories continued. Renovation of the rooms in Building 2285 was completed 1 Feb 75. Renovation of Building 2285 will commence about 15 Apr 75, again using self-help, with an estimated completion date of 15 May 75.

(U) Presently 61 rooms in 13 buildings provide a maximum of 294 bed spaces of which 259 are currently in use. It is anticipated that this total will not significantly change during FY75.

(U) Disciplinary. One individual remained on International Hold as a result of his arrest by Thai authorities in Udorn.
With respect to possession of heroin. He has appeared in Thai civil court three times; however, disposition of his case has not yet been made.

(U) Disciplinary actions increased. Article 15 action was taken against three individuals, and three Letters of Reprimand were issued.

(U) Three personnel are presently being carried in the Weight Control Program. Two were continued in the program from the previous quarter and the third was added in late January. All are progressing satisfactorily.

(U) Training. A decrease of one individual in On-the-Job Training was experienced. The total on OJT is now six. Phase II Race Relations Training and Drug/Alcohol Abuse Control Education continued to be the most active training areas. A total of 63 individuals completed training in these areas.

(U) Administration. A new base regulation governing basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) was received. It established, for the first time, a basewide policy for BAS eligibility. The most significant change is that final approval authority now rests with the base commander, whereas previously, unit commanders had final approval authority.
CHAPTER III

1. Maj (S), USSAG/7AP DP to AMCP (and others), 22000Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG/7AP Personnel Pipeline Reinstatement (U).


CHAPTER IV
INTELLIGENCE

PLANS AND SUPPORT (U)

During this period, the Plans and Support Division (INP) was engaged in two major areas of endeavor: (1) planning for noncombatant emergency and evacuation (NCEVAC) operations in Cambodia and Vietnam, and (2) participating in developing numerous options which addressed long term U.S. force levels in Thailand, with special emphasis on follow-on command structure (i.e., disposition of USSAG/TAF).

EAGLE PULL. In January, INP disseminated applicable changes to the contingency plan (CONPLAN) which provided photographic and descriptive coverage of helicopter landing zones (HLZs) in Phnom Penh and other key Cambodian locations. INP also coordinated intelligence support requirements for the EAGLE PULL battle staff and briefed tactical units at NKP scheduled to support EAGLE PULL operations.

On 22 March, JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy an additional CVA/CV to the Gulf of Thailand for increased EAGLE PULL requirements. In anticipation of CTF 77 requirements for CONPLAN tabs containing photos and descriptions of the HLZs, INP reproduced 10 copies of the tabs and provided them to a CTF 77 representative on 25 March. (See also pgs 91-96).

TALON VISE. A 214-page document was compiled as tabs to
provide photos and descriptions of 101 landing zones for COMPLAX 503CV. Intensive examination of all source materials was required to insure accuracy and completeness of the document. The hand-held photography and descriptive data on the HLZs/airfields provided by Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon was compared with 1:50,000 charts, city plans, high altitude vertical photography and other source data. This analysis paid off, as the locations of several HLZs were found to be incorrectly identified. Appropriate corrections were incorporated into the final document. Several additional HLZs were added. Most of the additions were in IIR-IV, since the majority of extraction points for that region were airfields. It was felt that airfields would be likely primary targets for enemy activity and therefore identification of alternate HLZs could be a useful additional planning factor. All changes and additions were communicated to DAO Saigon, both informally via telephone and by formal correspondence.²

In support of TALON VISE contingency planning, South Vietnam analysts presented four special briefings in March to the USSAG staff on the current situation in South Vietnam. Briefings also included assessment of probable enemy courses of action.

**TALON PIAZE.** A review of photographic tabs for the USSAG plan for Laos was also initiated. To improve reproduction capability, INF requested the original negatives from the American Embassy, Vientiane. Duplicate photos and negative were produced for permanent retention by USSAG/INF and the originals were returned.
TAION EAGLE. Responding to CINCPAC guidance, ZNP served as the J-2 point of contact for changes to USSAG/TAF OPlan J-0001, TAION EAGLE. Changes this quarter involved the inclusion of North Vietnam (NVN) counter-air threat to U.S. interdiction and close air support operations in RVN, as well as reformatting of the entire input in accordance with the Joint Operational Planning System. This information was compiled as a revised annex to the OPlan and provided to USSAG's Contingency Plans Branch.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

Analytical Activities. On 14 January, a Vietnam analyst responded to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) query concerning the North Vietnam 1975 dry season infiltration effort. On 22 January, an analyst was prepared assessing the enemy threat against Hue City. The assessment concluded that a major offensive against the city would probably not occur until March. Probable enemy tactics, routes of approach and chance of success were discussed.

Military trends, a tactical assessment of NVN capabilities and possible courses of action in MR III were discussed in a 17 March analyst.

On 24 March, North Vietnam analysts prepared an analysis which discussed the anomalies observed in the current infiltration offensive. Basic knowledge was reviewed and hypotheses presented to explain the possible new developments in the North Vietnam
Infiltration efforts.

Assessment. On 8 January, Vietnam analysts prepared an assessment of enemy plans, capabilities and objectives in M-III. This assessment was published in the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) for that date.

In an effort to validate NVA/VC strength holdings, Vietnam analysts prepared a gains/losses assessment of Communist forces since 1967 in South Vietnam. Data was provided to the USSAG deputy.

In March, the Vietnam section prepared an assessment of the military threat to Laos. This assessment was provided as an input for the revised TALON BLADE Operations Plan.

In response to the deteriorating situation in northern South Vietnam, analysts prepared papers on comparison of forces in Thua Thien Province on 20 March and a comparison of forces in Quang Nam Province on 25 March for CONUSAG and the principal staff members.

JCRC Assessment. During the quarter, South Vietnam analysts prepared one threat assessment and three update assessments on a proposed JCRC recovery operation in Kien Hoa Province, South Vietnam.

To clarify enemy Order of Battle (OB) in South Vietnam, the Vietnam desk published its Communist OB holdings on Communists forces in South Vietnam on 12 Feb 75.
Cambodian military activities. Cambodian analysts prepared reports on the military situation in Cambodia and assessments of enemy plans and capabilities for inclusion in the DISUM and Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). The Southeast Asia INTSUM was instituted 10 February as part of USSA3 intelligence support to units responsible for EAGLE PULL execution.  

**DAO Phnom Penh Support.** A Cambodian analyst went TDY to DAO Phnom Penh from 6 Dec 74 to 11 Jan 75 to replace the DAO intelligence analyst, while the latter was on leave. During the TDY, the analyst was responsible for providing intelligence support to DAO, the country team and DIA. In addition, he prepared daily briefings for the ambassador and the country team. Analyses also provided detailed Khmer Communist CB information on three occasions to the DAO analysts.  

**EAGLE PULL Support.** Two complete Khmer Communist CB listings were provided to the U.S. Third Marine Division. Production of the INTSUM was increased from a 24-hour to a 12-hour basis. A briefing on the dry season offensive and projections of probable enemy courses of action for the remainder of the dry season was presented to the EAGLE PULL planning conference at USSA3, 31 Jan-2 Feb 75. Informal briefings were made to intelligence officers from Thailand-based units with EAGLE PULL responsibilities. Specifically, aircrews of the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW), 338th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), and 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) were briefed.
Cambodian Analysts. Three analysts were composed during the quarter. They treated the course of the dry season offensive, enemy capabilities in the changing tactical situation and probable enemy courses of action during the remainder of the dry season. 14

Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) Evaluation. Analysts prepared a detailed survey of the capability of information gained through ARDF and other sensitive sources for the January-February timeframe during the 1974 and 1975 KC dry season offensives. 15

Special Study. At the request of the Command Section, analysts prepared the intelligence input, and collated inputs from other staff agencies, for a special study designed to compare the 1974 and 1975 dry season offensives from both the friendly and enemy perspectives. The study was provided to Major General John R.D. Cleland, Jr., Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 16

Reconnaissance Evaluation. In support of a USAFR and national evaluation of the utilization of resources and impact of possible cutbacks, Cambodian analysts prepared a report each month on significant results obtained from tactical reconnaissance flights over Cambodia. 17

Other Special Studies. Due to the interest in the possible use of Route 5 as an alternate supply corridor into Cambodia, analysts prepared two threat assessments on Route 5 between Kantaibang and the Thai/Cambodia border. 18 Cambodian analysts also prepared an intelligence input for a requested Pacific Air
Forces (PACAF) study on the feasibility of using CBU-55 ordnance in support of Mekong River convoys. Acting on a request from the Command Section, analysts evaluated a PACAF High Command Intelligence Report which discussed the enemy dry season strategy.

**HINDIS/WARNING NOTICER: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS**

Involvers Air Capabilities. The first quarter of 1975 was highlighted by the deployment of the Kien An-based MIG-17 regiment to Bai Thuong Airfield and the subsequent deployment of elements of the regiment to Dong Ho and Vinh Airfields; the deployment of SA-2 battalions below the 19th parallel; the dramatic increase in SA-7 hit and kill ratios against VNAF aircraft; and the continued expansion of HAA/SA-7 operating areas throughout South Vietnam.

**Air Order of Battle.** The entire regiment of MIG-17s based at Kien An Airfield deployed to Bai Thuong Airfield during the month of January. The move was accomplished in two phases, one in early January and the other during the latter part of the month. Based on last year's deployment activity below the 20th parallel, this deployment had been expected. However, the size of the deployment (the entire regiment) was a complete surprise. Surprises continued into February and March, when the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) moved contingents of Bai Thuong-based MIG-17s into Dong Ho and Vinh Airfields. Four MIG-17s were deployed to Vinh in the latter part of February and four were deployed to Dong Ho in two phases, early and mid-March. In the past, the NVAF had not deployed MIGs into these two airfields until the summer months.
the most noteworthy change in the NVAF in war and delivery in early February of eight MiG-21s from the People's Republic of China. This increased the number of MiG-19s in their inventory to 78. The number of MiG 21s in the inventory remained unchanged at 71, but the number of MiG-15/17s decreased from 113 to 112. MiGs continued to operate out of Dong Suong, Nha, Phu, Yen and Yen Bai. Bai Truong replaced Kien An as an operating base late in January. Dong Hoi and Vung, again, became active MiG deployment bases.

Analysis of 6 March

GIANT SCALE photography revealed that only 1,320 feet of PSP had been applied to the northeast end of the runway to Dong Hoi. This may have been enough PSP to allow the North Vietnamese to deploy MiGs to the airfield during the rainy season. Shortly after the photography was taken, MiG-17s were deployed to Dong Hoi.

Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle

Further analysis of 26 Nov 74 and 2 Dec 74 GIANT SCALE photography revealed that NVA completed deployment of all 12 SA-3 sites to defend the area around Hanoi. All key population centers in NVA remained under SA-2 coverage. GIANT SCALE photography on 6 March revealed at least one SA-2 regiment in the process of moving below the 15th parallel. This move was interpreted to be protection of air assets in this area, or in light of recent developments, to establish control over newly acquired territories.
There were 23 SA-7 firing incidents with 26 missiles launched against VMAF aircraft during the quarter. Five firings took place in MR II, eight in MR III, nine in MR IV, and three in Svey Rieng Province, Cambodia. Of the 25, 18 were successful in hitting VMAF aircraft. Of the 18 aircraft hits, 14 aircraft were destroyed. A breakdown of destroyed aircraft follows: nine A-37s, three UH-1s, one F5-A, and one CH-47. The North Vietnamese have improved their hit ratio to 72 percent, and their kill ratio to 58.5 percent. This compares to a ratio of 23.3 percent and 23 percent, respectively, during the last quarter. As a result of the success of NVN against VMAF aircraft during this quarter, three new SA-7 operating areas have been established, two in MR II and one in MR III. Also, four SA-7 operating areas were expanded, two each in MR II and MR III. The increased hit ratio of the SA-7 firings by the NVN may be attributed to a combination of an improved SA-7 missile, better trained SA-7 crews, and an increased aggressiveness on the part of the VMAF.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Order of Battle. There were 113 reported incidents of AAA firings against VMAF aircraft, and 115 VMAF aircraft were hit by these firings. During the quarter, 15 VMAF aircraft were shot down by AAA. Losses included: seven A-37s, four UH-1s, one F5-A, two 3-1s and one CH-47. As a result of these incidents, nine new AAA operating areas were established in South Vietnam. One area was in MR I, seven in MR II and one in MR III. Four operating areas in MR III and one in MR I
Air activity over Thailand. There was increased unidentified air activity around the NKP area. There were human intelligence (HUMINT) reports of helicopter landings six times in Nak Beng, Thailand, vicinity VE 3837. The wreckage of a small aircraft, black in color with no identification markings, was found in the vicinity of Non-Saard and Ban Plusi, approximately 140 nautical miles southwest of NKP. On 22 February, a small single engine aircraft was observed crossing into Thailand from Laos at 1900L. Between 28 February and 4 March, helicopters were reported to have flown very low and slow between the hours of 1900-2100 local, vicinity VE 5036, 19 nautical miles northwest of NKP. From 11 February to 27 March unidentified air activity was reported in the NKP area on 15 separate nights. This activity was reported by HUMINT sources. In addition to these reports, radar facilities at NKP noted unidentified tracks on several evenings between 11 February and 26 March. The unidentified track activity was seen on INMET, radar approach control, and weather radar scopes, increasing the validity of the activity reported. Most tracks were in northeast Thailand, with many disappearing after transiting from Thailand into Laos.

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE (II)

On 9 February, CINCPAC verbally directed USSAG to obtain photo coverage of the area designated for use in EISEE PLUS. This coverage was obtained on 11 February. Coverage had previously been
obtained of Phnom Penh and the surrounding area. Photos or photo mosaics of these areas were provided to all organizations involved in the anticipated operation.

During this quarter 227 RF-4 missions were flown, 203 in Cambodia and 24 in SVN. The 24 missions in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) represent a significant increase in tactical reconnaissance activity in that country.

Major events which received photo reconnaissance coverage included the defense and eventual abandonment of Kontum, Pleiku, and Dan Ke Truoc in South Vietnam, and the closing of the Mekong River as a supply route to Phnom Penh. Many missions were flown in an attempt to locate the rocket firing positions used against the Siemraps capital and Pochentong Airfield.

Attempts were made to use two noteworthy new products to improve reconnaissance results: underwater detection film and camouflage detection film.

Underwater Detection Film. An inquiry into the use of underwater detection film to locate obstacles, barriers and mines in the Mekong River was initiated. CINCPAC concurred, and Kodak and GAP film were obtained for use in the tests. A test mission was flown on 26 February, using GAP film in a K-72 camera on an RF-4 at 6000 feet. The film was shipped to the 546 Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) for processing and interpretation. Results proved negative; water penetration was slight. Objects above the water were less visible on the underwater detection film than on
the normal film used in a KA-91 camera.23

The second test flight was performed on 18 March using
GAF film in one KS-72 camera and Kodak film in the other KS-72
with results essentially the same as those from the first flight.24
This failure to obtain the desired results was apparently due to
high silt content in the Mekong River. USSAG recommended
discontinuing the tests.25 CINCPAC concurred26 and testing was
halted in late March.

Camouflage Detection Film. CINCPAC J-3 suggested that
camouflage detection film be used to locate the Khmer Communist's
artillery and rocket firing positions around Phnom Penh and
Pochentong Airfield. USSAG/IN concurred and a test flight was
flown on 27 March. Dual coverage was obtained of areas containing
suspected firing positions by using the camouflage detection film
in a KA-91 camera and black and white film in KS-72 cameras aboard
the same aircraft.26 A second RF-4 was to provide comparative black
and white coverage of the areas using the KA-91 camera, but the
camera on the second aircraft malfunctioned.

(U) The camouflage detection film was sent to the 548
Reconnaissance Technical Group at Hickam AFB for processing. It
was determined to be out-of-date and the test was declared invalid.29
Further tests will be scheduled when usable film is received.30

Photographic Processing and Evaluation Requirements in
SEA. The chief of the Reconnaissance Branch participated in a
joint PACAF/AFLC survey chartered to determine future photo
processing and exploitation facility requirements in Southeast Asia. The result of the 11-22 February survey was a recommendation for relocation of one-half Photographic Processing and Interpretation Facility (PPIP) to U-Tapao to process RF-4 film and utilization of the 307th Strategic Wing photo lab to process BUFFALO HUNTER film. 31 Subsequent communications resulted in CINCPACAF recommending that the one-half PPIP be relocated to North Vietnamese U-Tapao, along with the remaining RF-4 aircraft.32 IN concurred with the exception of moving the 14th PPIP from Udorn. The Collections Division recommendation was to obtain a rehabilitated one-half PPIP from AFLC and return the 14th PPIP to the U.S. for rehabilitation. This change would eliminate the 4-5 month delay required to move and rehab the 14th, during which no PPIP would be operational in this theater.33

HUMINT INTELLIGENCE (U)

Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR). Three ICRs were generated. One ICR on enemy threat to airfields in South Vietnam was generated in response to USSAG analytical requirements. This was levied on the 500th Military Intelligence Group, 7602nd Air Intelligence Group, and DAO Saigon under ICR control number U-UPR-U1954.34 Another ICR, U-UPR-34537, was levied on DAO Vientiane requesting information from two sources in response to USSAG analytical requirements.35 ICR U-UPR-U1955, which covered military assistance to North Vietnam was generated by DAO Saigon and given a USSAG control number.36 This was the first time DAO Saigon had generated an ICR.
Additionally, six IGR supplement messages were sent requesting collectors emphasize the need for locating the NVA 10th and 320th Divisions, enemy use of armored personnel carriers, possible deployment of SA-2s to NR III, possibility of the KC having 37mm guns and possible use of Kinex Krums as replacements for KC forces in the dry season offensive.37

The average number of information reports received per month during the quarter was 307. Between 10-15 percent were evaluated.

Prisoner of War (PW) Data. A detention facility was reported by the 500th MGp in the U Minh Forest, South Vietnam (VR 97-46).38 This facility was allegedly there for five years. As JCRC is interested in any PW camp holdings for the purpose of casualty resolution, the 500th MGp report was forwarded to them. There were aerial photos taken of this camp and copies have been requested from DIA.

The 7602nd reported that there was no PW camp at WU 975 01939 as originally reported by the 500th MGp in April 1971.40 Also, the 500th reported that there was no PW camp at WS 00 7441 as was originally reported by DAO Saigon in November 1973.42

(U) The Collections Branch (INCC) continued to maintain a complete data base on alleged PW camps still containing U.S. personnel in SEA.

INCC began a file on Charles Dean, an American, and Neil Sherman, an Australian, who were captured while traveling
in Laos and are currently being held by the Pathet Lao.

**Miscellaneous.** INCC wrote an evaluation on Project 0710-1K, a bilateral operation run by the 500th MI Group and Unit 701 of the Vietnamese Navy. The evaluation stated that the information was helpful in monitoring enemy logistics activity, but of little help in monitoring the tactical situation.

**ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (U)**

**ARDF.** The 60-day test to evaluate the intelligence value of ARDF ended 15 Jan 75. The test data was consolidated and analyzed by J-2 personnel, and a final test report was issued 11 February. The result was a strong endorsement of the ARDF program, and a recommendation to the Pacific Command (PACOM) that U-2 LAMPIK EAGLE sorties be retained in support of USSAG intelligence assessments in the Khmer War.

JSSAG's evaluation to PACOM stressed that ARDF played a vital role in compiling an intelligence estimate of the KC forces. General locational continuity was maintained on KC entities through ARDF. This information assisted USSAG in assessing the scope, timing and direction of the dry season offensive. In several instances ARDF provided unique and essential information, obtainable through no other source in the time frame required. Continuity on key terminals improved markedly during the test period. KC terminals were located through ARDF an average of every 24 days, while "Command Interest" terminals (those which USSAG regarded as critical to the intelligence assessment) were located on an average of
every 10 days. The fix rate per hour was 1.0, the highest for
the U-2i ARDF effort since the beginning of Khmer missions in
May 1974. Availability of aircraft also improved significantly.
During the test period, the rate of effective hours over target
was 92 percent of the total hours tasked -- also the highest figure
for U-2i Khmer missions over a comparable period of time.

(U) The task management system, stressing a management by
objectives concept, was retained, and was included as a permanent
feature of USSAG Operation Order 75-1, dated 12 Mar 75. The system
proved ideal for the management of an ARDF program with limited
resources, a requirement for high target selectivity, and possessing
rapid secure communications among the units involved in the program.

USSAG's evaluation was supported by the National Security
Agency (NSA) which stated that ARDF had been a valuable aid to
technical continuity.45 On the basis of the USSAG and NSA assessments,
COMUSSAG recommended that the LAPPING EAGLE effort, consisting of
four U-2is flying an average of two sorties per day, be retained
in support of USSAG's intelligence requirements.46

(U) In February, DIA requested that PACOM provide its
evaluation of the ARDF effort.47 Relying largely on the USSAG
evaluation, PACOM strongly supported the retention of the LAPPING
EAGLE effort, but recommended that LEFT JAB aircraft be returned
to U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) for disposition.48

In March, DIA queried PACOM concerning the advisability
of continuing LAPPING EAGLE sorties in the event that U.S. Embassy
personnel were evacuated from Phnom Penh.49 The USSAG response
indicated that JCS guidance would be appropriate. FACOM concurred with this recommendation to DIA, adding that ARMY resources currently supporting the Khmer War could later be used to cover Thai insurgent activities, or returned to USASA for disposition. On 31 March the JCS directed that LAPPING EAGLE missions be continued in support of the war effort, but be suspended upon implementation of EAGLE PULL. JCS also directed that the LEFT JAB aircraft be returned to USASA.

The LAPPING EAGLE program continued its valuable intelligence support to USASAG. According to an evaluation performed between 16 January-12 March, Khaer entities were fixed on an average of every 13 days, and "Command Interest" terminals on an average of every 4.3 days, the most favorable statistics compiled by U-2s. The fix rate per hour stood at 1.1, while effective hours over target were 93 percent. Overall, USASAG had a higher confidence level concerning the location of K5 entities than at any previous time.

TARGETING (U)

Special Reports. Since October 1974, the Targets Division has been involved in preparing a Weekly Logistics Report utilizing all source intelligence. The report covers North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodian and Laos. Personnel from each branch have been assigned reporting responsibilities. Contents of the Logistics Report include such items as NVA/VC ammo expenditures, cargo
shipments destined for South Vietnam, POL activity in North Vietnam and North Vietnamese merchant shipping and rail activity.

Articles which have been included in various editions include:

NVA logistics unit organization, unit moves and logistics movements,

South Vietnam Western Highlands Logistics Corridor (status and activity), KC logistics routes, storage areas, transshipment points,

KC ordnance movements and ammunition reserves and expenditures.

Several articles have been sent to the national intelligence community in the form of analits. The Tactical Targets Branch (INTT) prepared two reports for the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). The first was a list of target materials, equipment and support documents which would be transferred to CINCPAC should USSAG be disestablished. The second was a comprehensive study of the use and effectiveness of the CBU-55 in a SEA environment. The Targets Development Branch (INTD) submitted a BUFFALO HUNT Imagery Interpretation Report to various agencies on 15 February and made several other reports to amplify essential elements of information noted on film.

In response to a request from the USSAG deputy commander, INTD prepared a report on KC ammunition expenditures which was subsequently incorporated into an analit on the KC ordnance logistics system. Another analit was written on the utilization of southern Laos Logistics Corridor.

OPLAN Maintenance. The ARC LIGHT Branch (INTS) provided a revised and updated targets list for the FRENH HUNI OPLAN, which differed considerably from the previous list. The new list
reflected the increased lucrativeness of selected targets and was again prioritized to reflect the actual damage which would be accomplished using the currently available strike force. E-52 target list changes amounted to 15 deleted targets and 23 added. INTT also prepared an updated target list for this plan using current intelligence based on an increased photo reconnaissance effort. Priority of targets in the new list was determined by a combined formula of total square feet of storage space, number of buildings, and density of buildings/storage within the target area. A new target list for the TENNIS RACKET OP plan, which considers time sensitivity of targets, was forwarded to CINCPAC.

DAO Saigon was provided a list of all RVN ARC LIGHT targets in the USSAG Target Data Bank. The list and its release were coordinated with CINCPAC and DIA. Contents of the list included target name, military region location and UTM coordinates. INTT also reviewed the TALON SNIVEL, TALON EAGLE and EAGLE PULL plans for target intelligence updates.

Staff Assistance. INTT visited the 432 Reconnaissance Technical Squadron in January and obtained photography of ambush points and barricades along the Mekong River between the NVN border and Bei Doh, Cambodia. This was taken to DAO Phnom Penh. INTT conducted staff assistance visits to the 432 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 335TFW and 347TFW at Udorn and Korat for the purpose of coordinating target intelligence production matters and providing the wings with needed targeting materials and assistance.
Var Gaming Simulations. INIT updated simulations of the FIREKILL and TACTIC RACLET OPfics using current weather information and new targets and targeting data.59

Weapons Orientation Course. Staff assistance visits revealed that trained targets officers were not available at the tactical wings, even though two officers were authorized for each wing. Newly arrived personnel filling these slots lacked formal training in target intelligence and weaponry. To alleviate this problem, INIT directed a weapons orientation course (28-30 January) for AFSC 8066 officers of tactical units and 12AW. A total of eight personnel attended the course. Specifically, the course covered:

a. Basic weaponry terminology, documents and delivery accuracy parameters.

b. Weapons and fusing characteristics/limitations.

c. Target vulnerability and weapon selection.

   (1) Damage mechanisms.

   (2) Target analysis.

d. Functioning and use of WANG Weaponery Computer and IBM Printer.

e. Familiarization tour of INVERT Ground Directed Bombing (GDB) Facility (Det 5, 621 TCS) to include GDB delivery techniques and equipment orientation.60

Weaponery. Targets added to the target data banks were weaponed for optimum weapon selection and fusing. Weaponery analysis was prepared on:
a. Comparison between the CBU-14, CBU-15, and CBU-32.
b. Comparison of the effectiveness of the CBU-52 and CBU-53 against personnel.
c. Comparison of the CBU-24, MK-62 (with instantaneous fuse) and MK-62 (with proximity fuse) against targets in an aquatic or delta region.

**Briefings.** Beginning in mid-January, INTD prepared and presented weekly briefings on the status and activity in the western Highlands Logistics Corridor and/or the Southern Laos Logistics Corridor (SLLC). During February, the PACT inspector general and the U.S. Defense Attaché, Vientiane, were briefed on the SLLC. The USSAG staff was briefed on 12-13 March on KC ammunition expenditures, basic loads and ammo receipts during the 1974 and 1975 dry season offensives. Briefings were also presented on the status of strategic and tactical targets maintained by INNS and INTT. An NVN POL status update briefing was presented to the chief, Targets Division and selected staff officers.

**Special Study.** The chief of INT prepared a study recommending the use of C-130 aircraft with night sensor equipment to detect KC and VC/NVA logistics movements in selected low threat areas of Cambodia and South Vietnam. These unarmed aircraft flights would not violate the cease fire protocols. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn after consideration of political factors, long lead time required for implementation, and the then-pending tactical situation.
(U) With the increased tactical activity in SRA during the quarter, the message traffic in the special intelligence (SI) category increased from a daily average of 180 in January to a daily average of 230 by the end of March. Revised distribution methods of SI message distribution led to a savings of approximately $2000 per month in Xerox copying during the quarter.

A system for MIG Threat Warning to the VNAF was implemented in January to notify VNAF when foreknowledge of adverse intentions was obtained concerning aircraft movement and notification of any aircraft reaching 17 degrees north on a southerly heading.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 221542Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE FLY (U).

2. Ltr (C), USSAG/TAF/IN to USDAO, 23 Mar 75, Subj: Tabs A-E, Appendix 4, Annex N, USSAG/TAF COMPLAN 5053 (U).

3. Ltr (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 5 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG/TAF OPLAN J-0001 (U).

4. Msg (S/CW), APSSO NKP to SSCDIA/DI-6, 121100Z Jan 75, Subj: RVN Personnel Infiltration (U).


6. Msg (S/CW/XPD), APSSO NKP to SSO FACOM (and others), 171152Z Mar 75, Subj: USSAG Analysts' Tactical Assessment of NVA Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action in and around GVN HR-III (U).

7. Msg (TS/CW), APSSO NKP to DIRESA, 241150Z Mar 75, Subj: (Special Access Required).


10. Msg (S/XPD), USSAG/J-2 to CONSIDVENTHAF (and others), 100900Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG Daily Intelligence Summary for A (INCOO 75-041) (U)

11. Trip Report (C), INOE to IN, 13 Jan 75, Subj: Trip Report to USDAO Phnom Penh, C/R, 6 Dec 74-11 Jan 75 (U).


15. Special Study (S/CW), USSAG/INCOE, updated, Subj: INCOE KC Personality Study (C).

16. Cleland Paper (C), March 1975, USSAG/INCOE files.

17. Working Paper (S), INCO to INCO, 4 Mar 75, Subj: Significant Recon Results (U).

18. Msg (S/KFD), USSAG/J-2 to CINCPAC/SPO 3, 120502Z Feb 75, Subj: Status of Rte 5 in Western Cambodia (U). Ltr (S/KFD), J-2 to J-4, 16 Mar 75, Subj: Route 5 Battambang to the Thai Border (U).

19. Msg (S/KFD), USSAG/DXC to PACAF, 200520Z Jan 75, Subj: CMJ 53s (U).

20. Msg (S/CW), APBSO/WKP to ESS Phnom Penh, 271000Z Jan 75, Subj: ESS Intelligence Assessment (U).

21. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCAC, 121132Z Feb 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

22. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 120432Z Feb 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

23. Msg (C), 51SRTG to DIA, 070315Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

24. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 080706Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U). Msg (U) USSAG to 51SRTG, 190302Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film. Msg (C), 51SRTG to DIA, 220100Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

25. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 250115Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).

26. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG, 260046Z Mar 75, Subj: Underwater Detection Film (U).
27. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG, 272045Z Mar 75, Subj: Photo Recon Requirements (U).

28. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 270950Z Mar 75, Subj: Camouflage Detection Film (U).


30. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 320735Z Mar 75, Subj: Camouflage Detection Film (U).


32. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CSAP, 220500Z Mar 75, Subj: Program Change Request (U).

33. Msg (C), USSAG to CINCPAC, 241145Z Mar 75, Subj: Disposition of WSH-303 Assets (U).

34. Msg (C), USSAG to CSAP, 240120Z Jan 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).

35. Msg (C), USSAG to DIA, 180500Z Jan 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).

36. Msg (C), USDAO SHO to USSAG, 120105Z Mar 75, Subj: Intelligence Collection Requirement (U).


38. Msg (C/NFD), Special Acty Op Bk to USSAG, 310105Z Mar 75, Subj: Communist Pk Camp, Kien Giang (P) (U).

39. Msg (C), 7602 AIG to USSAG, 101519Z Feb 75, Subj: Negative Pk Camp at Wu 979 015 (U).

40. Msg (C/NFD), USDAO SHO to USSAG, 240100Z Apr 75, Subj: U.S. Pk Camp Located in Khe K Area (U).

41. Hard Copy ITR (C), 520th NCD to USSAG, Subj: Negative Report of Pk Camp in area Trasu Mountain, Tien Bien District, Chau Due Province (U).
42. Msg (C), USSAG 30C to USSAG, 060700Z Nov 75, Subj: U.S. FW Sighting (U).

43. Msg (C/NO), USSAG to USAINT, 210930Z Feb 75, Subj: Evaluation of Project CYLO-14K (U).

44. Msg (S/CCO), USSAG to CINCPAC, 111030Z Feb 75, Subj: Evaluation of ARDF, COINT and other Sources to Locate KC Entities (U).

45. Msg (S/CW), DIA to SSO PACOM and NBSO MIP, 222124Z Jan 75, Subj: Cambodian ARDF/U-21 Evaluation (U).

46. Msg (C/CCO), SSO DIA to SSO PACOM, 271900Z Feb 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE Program (U).

47. Ibid.

48. Msg (S/CW), SSO PACOM to SSO DIA, 010800Z Mar 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE Program (U).

49. Msg (S/CCO), SSO DIA to SSO PACOM, 113156Z Mar 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE (U). Msg (U), SSO PACOM to USSAG, 110150Z Mar 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE.

50. Msg (C/CCO), AFSSO MIP to SSO PACOM, 111130Z Mar 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE Requirement (U).

51. Msg (S/CW), SSO PACOM to SSO DIA, 122037Z Mar 75, Subj: LAPPING EAGLE (U).

52. Msg (C/CCO), JCS to CINCPAC, 311257Z Mar 75, Subj: SEASIA Airborne Radio Direction Finding Operation (U).

53. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 182120Z Dec 74, Subj: USSAG Targeting Functions (U). Ltr (S), USSAG/INT to IPAC, 20 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG Targeting Functions (U). Msg (S), AFSSO MIP to AFSSO PACY/INA, 290930Z Jan 75, Subj: CM-55 Use in Cambodia (U).

54. Report (C), INT to 432RTS, 15 Feb 75, Subj: BUFFALO 27002 (U).

55. Staff Summary Sheet (S), INT to IN, 15 Feb 75, Subj: Target List Request (U).

56. Msg (TS), USSAG/J-2 to CINCPAC, 240300Z Feb 75, Subj: TENNIS PACKET (U).

57. Trip Report (S), INT to IN, 23 Jan 75, Subj: Trip Report/Jeorn and Dr.D. Pimor Peak (U).
58. Trip Report (S), INT to IN, 16 Jan 75, Subj: Staff Assistance Visit (U).

59. Staff Summary Sheet (S), INT to IN, 31 Jan 75, Subj: TERRIUS ROCKET War Gaming Simulation (U).

60. Ltr (U), INT to INT, 21 Jun 74, Subj: Warponering Course.

61. Ltr (C), INT to INT, 27 Jan 75, Subj: Comparative Analysis of CMU-14, CMU-55 and EMU-22 (U); Report (U), INT 15 Feb 75, Subj: Comparison of CMU-55 and CMU-58 Against Personnel (U); Ltr (C), INT to INT, 2 Jan 75, Subj: Proximity Fuses and Fuse Extenders (U).

62. Operating Instruction (C), USSAC/TAAP/TACC, 26 Jan 75, Subj: DOCH Operating Instruction 55-25 (U).
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS
COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)

Daily Operations. TACC airlift controllers provided coordination for the successful conduct of 192 intra-Thailand C-130 "Kiong" missions, 247 Komer airdrop missions, 1,762 Komer airland missions and 13 missions in support of the Four Party Joint Military Team. Airlift controllers provided flight advisory service to U.S. aircraft transiting the Saigon Flight Information Region. The TACC also provided operational control and flight following for 175 T-39/C-118 Scatback missions.

The TACC air defense position coordinated with U.S., Thai, and VNAF air defense personnel in the effort to resolve the identity of 78 unknown tracks. The position provided operational control of 245 tactical reconnaissance sorties in the Khmer and South Vietnam, including refueling support. The tankers for these combat missions also refueled 70 ferry flights to/from Clark AB, PH.

(U) On 24 January, the TACC provided a vital command and control link when it was determined that a 5680W CH-53 had crashed 24 miles southwest of KXP while on a routine functional flight. The TACC quickly directed Search and Rescue (SAR) and observation resources to the scene where the bodies of the four crew members and crash remains were recovered. The cause of the accident was determined to be a failure in the main rotor head.
Special Interest Items/Reports. In the latter part of January, because of high level interest concerning U.S. personnel traffic to and from Cambodia, the TACC was tasked with approval/disapproval authority for all U.S. aircraft and personnel entering or departing the Khmer. Procedures were implemented whereby proposed passenger lists were passed to the TACC daily for documented control of U.S. force status.1

The TACC participated in all Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMMCS) emergency training exercises, WHAT ROCKET/Pinnacles, commander's availability checks and the commander's daily locator checks without noted discrepancies.2

The TACC processed numerous CPF/P Pinnacle and Baseline reports. There were 16 incidents concerning confrontations between Thai and U.S. personnel, and 17 operational incidents. There was more than three times the number of incidents last quarter.

Air Defense Summary. CINCPACAF directed USSAC/71P to develop, implement and be prepared to execute procedures to provide VAP with tactically perishable MIG warning and flight data. Voice communication circuits were connected between Blue Chip, Da Nang Control and Reporting Center (CRC) and the alternate CRC at Pleiku. Tactical information was passed on all air activity when foreknowledge of adverse intentions were known, as soon as it became available, and/or when the aircraft reached 17 degrees parallel on a southerly heading. Blue Chip would transmit the unclassified notification.
Procedures for the use of Mark X IFF/SIF were revised 30 January to reflect the use of the AKAA-283 True Track Mode III code tables which were effective 1 February. The basic IFF operation procedures remained unchanged. The change was in the documentation that directed the procedures of how, when and where to use the codes. AKAA-283 Mode III True Track (peacetime) code tables replaced the PACOM true track code tables.

AKAA-285 is the wartime mode III IFF code tables held in unit communication security accounts and released only upon specified authority from a unified commander as approved by JCS. These codes would be used by strike aircraft to secure safe passage through allied or U.S. ground environment systems as they execute the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) or the Chinese Communist/North Vietnam OPlans. USAGS holds the AKAA-285 codes for RVN. DAO Saigon agreed to hold the AKAA-285 code tables and distribute to each of the five RVNAAF air control and warning sites upon receipt of the implement order.

A message was sent to CINCPAC stating the concept and procedures by which the TAF Commander would defend the Mainland SEA Air Defense Region (MSEDAR) in a contingency situation. The message explained that the MSEDAR is divided into two nationally oriented air defense sectors—East and West, and then further
divided into four sub-sectors. The 7AF Commander is responsible for the active air defense of SEA West Sector and must be prepared to assume the responsibility for the employment of U.S. forces in the active air defense of the SEA East Sector. Air defense of the region is an integrated effort between the MAC, VNAF and USAF. Letters of agreement are used between the responsible countries to facilitate and provide for the integrated air defense within the region. The USSAG/7AF Commander, as 7AF Commander, is responsible to CINCPACAF for the air defense of NIEBAND. There is no change during the transition to wartime contingency plans. 6

(U) Air Traffic Control. Numerous hazards existed for aircrew members who operated aircraft within Laos, Kissar Republic and South Vietnam. USSAG/7AF requested that DAQs in each country construct airfield folders for each airfield in their respective country that is transited by EOD non-tailed aircraft. The DAQs were also requested to formulate operating procedures that would give the aircrew members the best methods to use during enroute arrival and departure phases of flight within their respective country. 7

One MAC and Scatback aircraft insisted on using spiral approach procedures at Tan Son Nhut. Such procedures were developed by USSAG/7AF Air Defense Branch (DOCK) for use in SA-7 AAA high threat areas and were published for specific use at Packertong Airport at Phnom Penh. Saigon Air Route Traffic Control Center and Saigon Approach Control asked DAO Saigon to stop the VFR spiral descents. USSAG/7AF/30 transmitted a message which informed all
U.S. aircraft of the recommended arrival procedures to use at Tan Son Nhut.  

(3) COMUSMACV requested comments and recommendations on ways to reduce U.S. military visibility in and around Chiang Mai Airport. The problem was one of scheduling and coordinating arrival and ground times. It was recommended that COMUSMACV control the operation entirely. Since they do 90 percent of the flying into Chiang Mai, they agreed that control can best be maintained at that level, coordinating with their own Political-Military Division to reduce Chiang Mai traffic when required.

Intelligence information indicated that 57mm AAA with a tactical effective range of 19,700 feet was in position and within range of R-68/Track 7 in the vicinity of PL-11 between Tan Son Nhut and Phnom Penh. As the manager of the Saigon Airspace, USSAG/7AF dispatched a message recommending aircraft use a minimum altitude of FL200 along airway R-68/Track 7 to avoid the threat. Aircraft that could not maintain at or above FL200 should use airway W-31. Minimum altitude on R-67 and G-72 was raised to FL240. Airways W-2, W-3, and W-7 were closed.

Target Management. Rapidly deteriorating military and political situations in RVN and GVN caused staff agencies throughout USSAG/7AF headquarters to substantially reassess nearly all on-going and contingency programs, as well as to develop some totally new solutions to traditional problems. The chaotic retreat of RVN in
the rise of an apparent VC/NVA general dry season offensive, as well as the severe military losses suffered by NVA, resulted in a serious deterioration in security of the territories and population centers still under friendly control.

(U) These reversals posed two immediate problems to USMAC staff agencies. First, they stimulated immediate action to insure that all preparations necessary to protect and evacuate U.S. nationals and other designated individuals currently located in threatened areas were complete and able to be implemented. The reversals also created severe problems in efforts to continue to provide vital MAP equipment, material and humanitarian supplies to beleaguered friendly forces.

(U) Targets Management Branch (DCMX) personnel engaged in numerous coordination activities to provide basic information and interpretations on the operational constraints contained in current Air Operating Authorities (AOA), Rules of Engagement (ROE), U.S. Law and existing international agreements. Additionally, DCMX personnel were directly involved in several major staff activities concerning SAR, reconnaissance, airlift, and as members of task groups to revise and refurbish MACV plans.

AOA and ROE. From the point of view of providing logistics support, all activities supporting the RASR resupply were well within the bounds established by current SEC AOA/ROE and the RVN cease-fire agreement, but another factor was not quite as clear-cut.
The issue of concern involved providing SAR support for fellow airmen and passengers (PAX) aboard contract aircraft, should a crew-down or mechanical failure occur over hostile territory. Current AMC/ROE authorized the TAF commander to conduct SAR for U.S. personnel throughout SEA. However, as a result of a USAF/TAF inquiry to CINCPAC when the original airlift contract was being negotiated in July and August 1974, the JCS interim and final replies indicated that requests to provide SAR for civilian contract crews would be approved on a case-by-case basis by JCS after PHM assets were exhausted and AMES Panom Penh requested U.S. military assistance.

This seemed fairly clear cut, but an interpretive difficulty developed when USAF C-130 operations into Panom Penh ceased. Shortly thereafter, TAF support aircraft flights (T-37) to Panom Penh were curtailed due to increasingly heavy AEPs against Pochetong Airfield. Considerable passenger hauling capability in and out of Panom Penh was routinely required, due to the relatively large numbers of U.S. military personnel assigned to the 5th MDE, U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MIDTC) or on etc from other PACOM locations. The individuals had previously used USAF C-133s and Seabuck, but now these individuals had to try to look on the already overtaxed AMES C-17, various MIDTC support aircraft or "hitchhike" on contractor flights. With this knowledge in mind, and also with the tremendous increase in the number of contractor
Nickles during February and early March, on 4 March, CINCPAC reconvened CINCPAC on the issues of SAR support for contractor operations (making specific reference to those flying military planes). CINCPAC initially approved SAR, IAW current AR 380-88 for military PAX, and forwarded a request to JCS for additional guidance. The JCS reply stated that SAR for contractors would continue to be approved on a case-by-case basis after local national efforts were exhausted. They further stated that U.S. military personnel and other U.S. or third country national (TCN) civilian PAX would not be authorized to use contractor flights and suggested that a USAF administrative support flight be reestablished to satisfy personnel travel requirement.

CINCPAC initially suggested that the military support requirement be fulfilled by U.S. Army U-21 assets belonging to the 75th Aviation Squadron at Don Muang. After additional study, a USAF C-130 flight, five days a week, was authorized to support JCS/ADBAC administration and travel requirements. Though not directly stated in the JCS guidance, the assumption was that SAR in support of this mission would be IAW current AR 380-88.

The AECG3 Phnom Penh attempted under HABP FULL Option II (Embassy directed evacuation) to assist those non-essential U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as Khmer and TNI's for whom the State Department had accepted evacuation responsibility, in
Leaving before too assured a personal safety, a safety developed.

The objective of this effort was to reduce to a minimum, the number of people to be evacuated using an HMMWV with evacee(s) Option II (military fixed wing) or III (military helicopter) operation.

Accomplishing this goal, however, required the use of commercial Air Cambodia, the AKMEL, NEMS and contractor operated aircraft. The available PAX capacity of the first three carriers was far too limited to provide the needed support alone. Due to this problem, the JCS restriction on passenger use of contractor backhaul flights was appealed as a significant obstacle to attempt to reduce the number of potential evacuees.21

**NEMVAC Rules of Engagement.** With the sudden closure of the Mekong River in February, attention and interest were quickly focused on the viability of current NEMVAC plans for Cambodia. An operations task group was formed on 4 February to review the OPlans for EAGLE PULL Options II and III. A working group meeting, chaired by the USSAC/7AF/CS, was held 4 February to establish initial directions and goals. On 5 February, the task group members briefed COMSSAC on their initial findings and proposals, and after brief discussions and additional guidance, the various members began to prepare their final drafts. The initial objective was to prepare the OPlans as quickly as possible, secure verbal approval, and then get them inserted into the JTF Strike Computer in Special Instructions (SPIES) to the EAGLE PULL frags. Thus, if the operation had to be
executed before the OP plans were formally published, the guidance would be available to all tasked organizations.

DOCS personnel, participating in the effort, were charged with providing an updated ground security force (GSF) and air operations ROE consistent with current higher headquarters guidance and realistic mission objectives. This opportunity was a culmination of efforts by DOCS personnel dating back to September 1972 and January 1974 to provide a specific air ROE for the HENAVAC CONPLAN.22 The provisions for air ROE, up to this time, had cited current USSAG/7AF ROE/ACA guidance as applicable to HENAVAC. The problem was that current USSAG/7AF guidance on day-to-day activities was far too broad and general to be easily applied at the aircraft level to specific mission objectives (close air support (CAS) to GSF, etc.). It was also unnecessarily restrictive in many areas (notably on provisions for return of hostile fire) considering that relief from current AOA had been provided by JCS on 30 July 73.23 Under the restrictions of existing AOA, any attempt by hostile forces to contest the evacuation would preclude completing the mission or even defending the lives of the evacuees. The completed ROE developed for EAGLE FULL was read and approved by USSAG/7AF/CS and placed in the computer OPNS on 8 Feb 75. Subsequently, the OP Plans were formally published on 23 February (Option II) and 24 February (Option III).24 The EAGLE FULL ROE was also provided to the OPFs for USSAG HENAVAC CONPLAN 5050L (TALEX BLADE) and 5050V (TALEX VISV) for inclusion into these plans.
The new EAGLE FULL air RCE, included the following guidance (published CSF RCE remained unchanged): 25

a. Rules for the general conduct of TACAIR strikes, including the specific responsibilities of the Forward Air Control (FAC) and strike crews.

b. Specific rules and requirements for the conduct of FAC, including the scope of authorized operations, the responsibilities of the GSF/evacuees and FAC/strike crews, and additional guidance on identifying and engaging targets.

c. Specific rules and requirements for the return of groundfire, including the authority to suppress (rather than withdraw from) groundfire during specified mission-essential phases of the operation.

d. Guidance and restrictions on the use of ordnance, including guidance on approval requirements.

e. Specific guidance on the channels and procedures for the request, validation and approval of targets for strike, including who must approve various requests and what constitutes a disapproval. COMUSNORTHCOM was identified as the final approval authority for all TACAIR ordnance deliveries. A standardized target request form and guidance on its use were also provided in the OP#.

f. Realtime commander's right to self-defense and provides authorities for the emergency support of the GSF and return of groundfire.
c. States that all operations not specifically addressed will be conducted IAW current USSOC/PAF CHINAC APR. RCL.

(U) EAGLE FULL options had barely been published and the coordinations with various tasked units, service components and headquarters completed when the abrupt withdrawal of ARVN and South Vietnamese units from the Central Highlands (notably from Konum and Pleiku) signaled the start of a near total rout of ARVN forces from the northern two-thirds of South Vietnam. As district and province defenses fell into chaos before the advancing INVA and VC forces, refugees and shattered military units pressed into the few remaining coastal areas still in SVN control. Now attention had to be turned to the NERVAC provisions of USSOC COMPLAN 5830V and its associated OPlans. However, the military situation in northern SVN deteriorated so quickly that Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Quin Nhon, Thu Trang and Can Rahn Bay all fell or were abandoned to enemy pressure before a coherent evacuation operation could be mounted. As a result, efforts at USSOC focused on developing the OPlans and supporting documentation necessary to execute the final evacuation of the Saigon area if that action should be required.

(U) EAGLE personnel entered the task group on 25 March to produce RCE for GSF and air operations. The starting point used for this effort was the recently developed EAGLE FULL RCE, but due to the totally different character of the tactical situation in SVN, including the higher levels of threat to U.S. evacuation aircraft and
forces, and the sheer numbers of evacuees, the final product became considerably more involved than the EAGLE FULL proposal. A preliminary draft was prepared and ready for coordination by 21 Mar 75.

The expanded provisions of the ROC for TALINH WIND (above those of the EAGLE FULL ROC discussed earlier) include:

a. The substitution of fast mover PAC-qualified or Flight Lead qualified pilots in-place of CV-10 PACs to provide strike control due to the high AAA/SAM threat anticipated throughout most of the intended area of operations. Guidance requires that the PAC/Flight Lead have direct communication with 355th commander when conducting air strikes within 1,000 meters of GSF/evacuee positions to ensure proper and timely coordination and to preclude inadvertent injuries to friendly personnel.

b. Provisions for active visual reconnaissance patrolling within a 22 NM radius of the assembly/extraction areas and critical LOCs to locate long range weapons (artillery and rocket launchers) and concentration of troops and/or armor which were firing on or being maneuvered so as to fire on or engage the GSF/evacuees. This activity is necessary due to the potential threats posed to GSF/evacuees by the large numbers of armed personnel, long range artillery weapons and armored vehicles possessed by the combatants on both sides, as well as in view of the fact that either group might attempt to disrupt a U.S. evacuation.
c. Provisions for air defense/counter air operations including combat air patrol (CAP/CCAP) activities. The guidance for air defense was provided due to the fact that the JVM Council had already established limited SAM and Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) radar capability in newly captured areas and possess several serviceable airfields within operational range of the evacuation area, thus presenting a credible air-to-air capability. In addition, the ultimate WSRP reaction to U.S. evacuation effort was not known, and they do possess a considerable bombing/interdiction capability that must be monitored.

d. Expanded guidance on the conduct of SAM activities including specific criteria for the return of groundfire and hostile fire.

e. Modification to the strike/target request procedures to reflect the changes in strike control, the new provisions for interdiction activities and guidance on counter-air requests. Also, authority statements have been modified to provide a more definitive role to the airborne mission commander aboard airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) in processing/approving target requests, while still insuring that CINCPAC received overall control over ordnance delivery activities (especially, the initial decision to permit ordnance expenditures).

EJCAF Protection for AEIA Reconnaissance. On 22 March, CINCPAC, as a result of issues raised during a Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPAC) conference in Japan, requested
simplified guidance from JCS on the authorities and restrictions in providing armed protection for unarmed P2RFQ mission aircraft operating in ASEAN Area Ten (all of ASEAN except East Timor, the territorial airspace of Malaysia). This request was based on the assumption that the requirements would be fulfilled by tasking U.S. Thai-based TACAIR assets. At the request of USAMC/IMC, both personnel conducted research on the current authorities and international agreements to determine the types of support authorized in various areas, the engagement criteria for conduct of CAP/escort activities, including the firing of weapons, and the operational feasibility of providing authorized support using Thai-based assets. The findings were briefed to USAMC/IMC on 25 March and subsequently included in a fact sheet to be provided for future reference in the General Officer Fact Books. A summary of findings follows:

a. Current SHA AOA/ROE provides for:

(1) Armed escorts and MINCAP/AIRCAP over SEA international waters and, by exclusion, within the territorial airspace of Thailand (MINCAP/MEK will be assumed of an intent to fly missions in Thailand).

(2) Armed overflights of the remainder of SEA are restricted to MINCAP and SAP escorts or aircraft engaged in defensive response/immediate pursuit.

b. U.S. Forces currently maintain air defense alert aircraft at Udon RAFB. The current AOA/ROE phase CNSAC and JCS guidance directing CINCPAC, as the director of the HICPAC, provide
the authorities to conduct operations throughout the region. Also, a mutual agreement between MAC and the RFD on air defense responsibilities is in force for operations in Thailand. 37

d. The existing Strip Alert aircraft can only provide practical air defense coverage for a small section of PAMFO Area Ten due to limitations imposed by the amount of warning time available versus distance to travel to the engagement area.

d. A more practical solution to the defense of PAMFO would be to establish NIGCAP/SIGCAP assets in authorized areas, but even this solution has limitations, unless several further conditions are met as well.

(1) Thai-based TACAIR can provide adequate coverage of western Area Ten from orbits in Thai airspace. CAP Thai-based aircraft, however, cannot provide practical coverage to eastern Area Ten due to current AOM restrictions on the overflight of Laos, Cambodia, and RVN that would be required by armed aircraft on the way to and from the orbits over SEA international waters.

(2) CAP aircraft cannot adequately defend PAMFO aircraft operating more than 50 NM from orbits (due, again, to warning time/distance to travel problems) unless the CAP aircraft are authorized, under the commander's provisions for action taken in self-defense, to depart orbit when a hostile attack is known to be imminent (all source intelligence considered). Ordnance expenditures would still require a receipt of hostile fire.
e. In conclusion, the most practical defensive arrangement to protect the PARFRO platforms would require CAP orbits in Thailand supported by USAF Thai-based aircraft for western Area Ten, and CAP orbits over SEA international waters supported by CVA TACAIR (Navy carrier-based) to cover the easter sector. To provide a timely response, while remaining within AOA/ROE restrictions, CAP aircraft could be directed to depart orbits when a hostile attack on PARFRO assets is known to be imminent, under the AOA provisions of self-defense, as long as ordinance is expended IAW AOA provisions for defensive response (hostile fire received first).

f. A JCS reply received on 27 March, confirmed the authority to react IAW defensive response, but stated that armed aircraft should not penetrate Laos, CKR, RVN or NVN airspace until hostile fire is received. The JCS message does not, however, address the authorities of the commander to take action in self-defense of his forces (granted in the basic JCS AOA/ROE messages). DODC recommended that the conclusions of the 25 March task group are defensible IAW the spirit and intent of that basic JCS AOA/ROE guidance.

On 28 March CINCPAC dispatched a message to JCS requesting temporary relief from the JCS SEA AOA restrictions on intra-country movement of military equipment and supplies in RVN. The actual purpose of the request was to seek authority to provide C-141 airlift support (two aircraft) to the VNAF 6th Division by airlifting vitally needed military equipment and materiel from Tan Son Nhut AB to Phan Rang AB. The basis of the request was that the cease-fire agreement
upon which the existing airlift restrictions were based seemed to have been overtaken by events. The JCS reply, received on 29 March, states that though they understood the concern, the current climate in Washington precluded taking action on such a request and that perhaps the ARVN JCS should consider civilian contractor support, if VNAF airlift capability is not sufficient. 33

(3) Operational Guidance. In response to an informal conversation between USSAG/7AF/CS and DCSM personnel on 4 March concerning the quality of operational guidance available to Unified Commanders, DCSM personnel prepared a detailed analysis of the perceived deficiencies and problem areas in existing guidance, along with proposals for corrective actions. The analysis and accompanying proposal were presented to and approved by USSAG/7AF/CS on 7 March. A summary of the findings and DCSM follow-on actions follows:

a. Current USSAG/7AF ROE/AGA for SEA operations are provided to subordinate units in three messages. 34 USSAG Opord 74-01, Rules of Engagement Southeast Asia, provides ROE for contingency planning and training purposes only and becomes effective as combat ROE when directed by COMUSAG. It is not valid for current operations, but often is mistakenly referred to as the current USSAG/7AF ROE for SEA because of its Opord title.

b. USSAG/7AF subordinate units are handicapped by the lack
of comprehensive, definitive ROE guidance of the conduct of daily operations over which USSAG/TAF has operational control, i.e., SEA, SAC reconnaissance, airlift, air defense. A need exists for a single document which contains all of the rules of engagement and operating authorities governing current USSAG/TAF operations in SEA. In addition, there is also a need to develop an OPlan to replace USSAG OpOrd 74-01 which would contain anticipated rules of engagement for operations not presently authorized (i.e., armed reconnaissance, all-weather interdiction, etc.). This plan would have limited distribution, would not be a required item of knowledge for subordinate units for CRI purposes, but would serve as a basis upon which to plan for a resumption of hostilities. To satisfy these needs, USSAG began development of a comprehensive ROE OpOrd and a contingency ROE in OPlan format.

c. The new OpOrd should be specific in nature, written in clear, concise terms, and provide the detailed guidance deemed necessary by COMUSAG/TAF to insure mission accomplishment within the present political and military constraints. The organization should reflect the division of SEA for ROE purposes into North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic on the one hand, and Thailand on the other. A discussion of the general rules applicable to each of the two major areas should be followed by sections dealing with specific rules based upon missions and tasks. The proposed organization by mission-type would provide easily understood, comprehensive guidance to all categories of users, while avoiding
the redundant verbage required in a NOD organized primarily
along country lines. A target date of 30 Jun 75 was tentatively
established for final approval of the new OpOrd. A parallel
development of the OPlan is anticipated, but no completion time
has been forecasted yet.

GARRISON OPERATIONS (U)

(U) Daily Air Operations. The C-130 support of U.S. personnel
at Thailand bases continued under operational control of USSAG/7AF.
The C-130s flown by USAF aircrews out of U-Tapao, continued to
support all intra-Thailand requirements, including the frequent
MITRAPAB (Thai word for "friendship") rural school fund-raising
parachutist demonstrations and the weekly Saigon-Hanoi liaison
flights. Administrative support C-130 flights between U-Tapao,
Bangkok and Pochentong, flown by USAF crews, returned to the schedule
17 March.

(U) The 566OW Seatback aircraft remained under operational
control of USSAG/7AF. On 17 January, one C-118 departed KPE for
retirement at Davis-Monthan AFB, reducing the Seatback fleet to two
T-39s and one C-118. Seatback flew 176 missions this quarter in
support of USSAG/7AF. Additional missions were flown as required
to provide ANX 60-1 aircrew proficiency flying.

(U) DCSO continued to be the single point of contact for USSAG
for CH-53 operations of the 21st Special Operations Squadron. Two
helicopters were used to assist in transport of JCSO personnel and
equipment during the organization's move to Suu Ne San in January.
Nightly reconnaissance missions for NLF perimeter defense continued during the quarter. Training exercise support for JRRC was discontinued due to the fluid tactical situation in SEA which required the helicopters to be on an increased alert status for possible EAGLE PULL operations. Training sorties for CH-53s were curtailed to a maximum of 20 per week in order to maintain a higher aircraft operationally ready rate for potential EAGLE PULL use.

DOOS personnel were involved with providing the airlift expertise for various contingency plans developed this quarter. The USSAG support plan for CINCPAC OPlan 5135 was written. The plan developed requirements to accomplish total North resupply via airlift using available contract and USAF C-130 assets to provide up to 90 sorties per day. This plan was followed by the USSAG support plan for CINCPAC OPlan 5136, to implement DC-8/C-130 airlift operations out of Saigon and U-Tapao into Po Chentong. The airlift portions of EAGLE PULL and TALON VISE were also written.

(U) Thailand Flood. Heavy flooding in the southern part of Thailand in early January was described as the country's worst national disaster in 100 years. The floods caused an estimated $45 million damage, killed 239 persons, left 15,384 people homeless and another 59 missing. The U.S. was requested by His Majesty, the King of Thailand, to provide USAF airlift in support of flood relief operations. A C-130 from the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) resources at U-Tapao, two CH-53s from the 565th at NKP, and two UH-1s from the HACTHAI Support Group provided the support, under
operational control of UNDCP. In a 14-day period from 13-27
January, 420.7 S/2 of cargo and 73 passengers were airlifted at a
cost of $124,724. The overall U.S. assistance was accepted by the
Thailand Government as an indication of friendship and concern.

KAF Self-Sufficiency (KSS) Program. The KSS Program
progressed on schedule to include student training. The first
C-123K flying training class began at Udorn on 27 January and
graduated six pilots, four co-pilots, five navigators, five flight
mechanics, and five loadmasters on 25 March. These crewmembers
became valuable assets to the KAF capability to provide in-country
airlift of critically needed supplies. The increased requirements
of the KAF C-123 fleet were reflected on 29 March when 11 airdrops
and 10 airlift missions were flown.

Drug Orders. During this period, AEFP (U-21) and photo
reconnaissance (PFL) made up the majority of the operational
sorties staged. The location of SAR alerts for two HH-53s was
moved from Ubon to Korat, and one HH-53 was added to the daily
frag for SAR at NKP. SAR Alert was maintained at Korat NAFB with
four A-7s, two HH-53s and two HC-130s. Air defense alert was
continued with two F-4Es at Udorn NAFB. A typical frag day
included two U-21s, two F-4Es, four A-7s, two HH-53s, 1 CH-53, two
HC-130s, and two RF-4Cs.

Daily Air Operations. There was no change in AEFP operations
this period. U-21s were fragged for an average of 14 sorties per
week in Cambodia.
RF-4 activity remained at an average of 2.5 sorties per day. All activity was day photo. A total of 20 sorties were fragged into NVM with all the remaining being fragged in Cambodia.

**COMMAND ACCESS (CS).** CS scenarios remain the mainstay of the exercises developed by the Weapons and Tactics Branch (WITB). These scenarios continue to reflect LINEBACKER-type missions. CS X, Alpha scenario (High Threat), was scheduled and exercised on 3 Jan 75. CS XI, Bravo scenario (High/Low Threat), was scheduled and exercised on 24-25 Feb 75. Fogs were workable and both exercises were conducted in a satisfactory manner. To exercise the full spectrum of command and control during a LINEBACKER-type operation, the CASS was utilized in the conduct of CS X and CS XI. Weather coordination among all 10th Weather Squadron units resulted in outstanding weather support and successful forecasting.

**Combat Training Event (CTE).** Each tactical fighter wing and the 568OW were tasked to perform two CTEs during this period. All CTEs were satisfactorily completed with the exception of the CTE scheduled for the 383/347 TFW on 10 March and the CTE scheduled for the 568OW on 31 March. The 383/347 TFW CTE was cancelled due to a PACAF ORI. The 568OW CTE was cancelled due to EAGLE-PULL preparation.

**Air-to-air Exercise.** The 432TFW was tasked for three air-to-air exercises during the quarter. These exercises were designed to realistically evaluate the NFCAF and escort role of the 432TFW. The scenarios contained realism incorporating dissimilar fighters (A-7 and F-111). The use of A-7 Takers was discontinued in January.
1973 due to an imposed airlift limitation. Emphasis continued to increase on the function of TACP. Overall, the air-to-air exercise continued to improve the HCS suppression tactics for TACAIR crews and supporting agencies in HIA.

(u) TALON SWIVEL. TALON SWIVEL, scheduled for 20 Feb 73, was cancelled due to operational commitments.

Kilo Composite Strike (KCS). Each tactical fighter wing and the 563OW were tasked to perform a KCS during this period. All KCSs were fragged and conducted in a satisfactory manner.

The Fighter branch (SFC) made a major departure from its normal duties during this quarter when it was tasked as the SFC for the development of C-Plans to support USSOC/TAF C-Plan 50600.

EAGLE PULL. A major effort by all elements of the current Operations Division developed USSOC/TAF C-Plans 50600-1-75 and 50600-2-75 which described in detail the various courses of action, unit taskings, TACAIR deployment, communications and ROE to meet EAGLE PULL objectives. These plans were prepared utilizing the Strike Computer to facilitate rapid dissemination and to permit timely updates.

An EAGLE PULL deployment exercise for the 563OW and 563OW was developed to determine the capability of these units to deploy aircraft, equipment, and personnel to Ubon airfield as a forward operating location. The exercise was conducted on 2 Mar 75. All helicopter assets were flown on a simulated EAGLE PULL route, and other elements were taken through the mobility and equipment marshaling phase for deployment to Ubon. No significant problems were noted.
and observers based on their recommendations to improve future
deployment procedures.

**NBPKE Operations.** The CEU-55 weapon system was
introduced in Cambodia to destroy Khmer Rouge fortifications along
the Mekong River. The CEU-55 was used solely in support of convoy
resupply operations for Phnom Penh and proved effective. (See also pg 157).

**Tactical.** (Chaff employment configurations and new tactical
recommendations for B-52 support were submitted to MACP during
March. This was accomplished in compliance with CRF request
for updating chaff employment concepts.

**Nape Operations.** The BUFFALO HUNTER Program included

-28 sorties scheduled for January, 21 successful, 30 sorties for
February, 21 successful, and 40 sorties for March, 26 successful.

The Reconnaissance Operations Branch (DOCA) conducted an
in-depth study of scheduling, coordination and monitoring procedures
for BUFFALO HUNTER operations. This was done to research the
potential for mid-air collision with traffic in the operating
locations and along recovery routes. It was learned that scheduling
through PARPRO and coordination and monitoring procedures for the
drone missions together with careful route selection away from
airways, minimize the mid-air collision potential. There have been
no reported incidents in more than 3,400 drone sorties.

DOCA also monitored the OLYMPIC NEED/TOREX program
which are U-2 RECON/ELINT missions flown over selected routes in
the theater. During January, there were 52 TOREX and 2 RECON sorties.
During February, there were 56 CH-53 and 4 MEBT sorties and during March there were 56 CH-53 and 9 MEBT missions. The RO-135 ELINT/SEINT program COMBAT APPLE flew 24 sorties.

DOOR was responsible for coordinating the suppression of radar/interceptor reaction to the EC-121 GIANT SCALE sorties flown throughout SEA. Six sorties were scheduled and five were flown.

A congressional inquiry requested, through CINCPAC, the number of USAF reconnaissance flights by type and date which occurred over North and South Vietnam since 27 Jan 73. Information as to number of flights specifically by and date was not available; however, monthly totals for the requested period by type were prepared and forwarded by DOOR.

CINCPACAF requested replacement aircraft from CONUS resources to maintain the 14THS surge capability upon departure of five LORAN-C equipped aircraft from Udorn. DOOR conducted a study as to impact of the loss of the LORAN aircraft on the 14THS mission capability and the requirement of maintaining the LORAN-C Ground Chain after the aircraft departed. It was established that loss of the LORAN aircraft would have minimal impact on the 14THS mission capability. The LORAN-C Ground Chain was still required in the theater due to its use by other systems including F-4s, B-52s and the BATTLE HUNTER drones.

DOOR coordinated the Aerial Photography Project at Clark AB, PI which was initiated on 25 January. Photo requests had not been acquired on the original attempt, 12-23 October, due to low cloud cover associated with a typhoon.
DOE personnel concluded a study as to what impact returning the A-10-34K(2) drones to the 71 would have on the BUFFALO HUNTER mission capability. Since there were only two A-10-34K(2) drones in the center and these were flown only over specific tracks, return of these to the 71 would not impact significantly on the BUFFALO HUNTER program.

The American Ambassador to Laos requested after the fact information on reconnaissance flights conducted in Lao airspace in order to answer political questions arising from the overflights. Procedures were established for Blue Chip to provide this information to the embassy on a daily basis.

(u) PARPRO. DOE prepared the computer program and transmitted the USSOC PARPRO monthly schedules.

DOE personnel attended the January and March PARPRO conferences in Yokota, Japan. They presented the USAF KJ-30 and U-2I missions requests at both meetings. At the March conference limitations of USSOC fighter support was briefed and the question concerning rules of overflight in relation to the Paris Peace Accords of fighters aiding a PARPRO platform was discussed. A letter of agreement outlining fighter and tanker support for PARPRO in the PARAN area was drafted. Coordination is now in process with CONCACS and NSWAC.

DOE conducted an analysis of the cost of reconnaissance support for Cambodia and South Vietnam. This was prepared pending
possible inquiry from the General Accounting Office. Actual figures have not been authorized for release by JCS at this time.

SURFACE OPERATIONS AND PLANS (U)

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V (TALON VISE). The basic CONPLAN was revised in accordance with instructions received from CINCPAC. Copies of the 28 February revision were distributed to all concerned on 26 March. Plans were prepared for the NEMVAC of Da Nang, however, they were not implemented as civilian assets were utilized to accomplish that mission during the last week of March 1975. Detailed planning for evacuation of the remainder of RVN continued. (See also pgs 37-38, 75-77).

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060L (TALON BLADE). A detailed OPlan for NEMVAC operations in Laos is under development. American Embassy, Vientiane furnished an update on the number of potential evacuees in Laos. The new figures of 1,711 reflected a decrease of 263 persons for the previous reporting period.37

NEMVAC Plan, USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C (EAGLE PULL). On 3 February, USSAG/7AF informed all EAGLE PULL addressees that Change 2 to USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C and Changes 1 and 2 to Appendix 3, Annex N of the CONPLAN had been approved by CINCPAC. Modifications to supporting plans, caused by approval of these changes, were due at USSAG within 30 days.

As a result of the advent of the enemy's dry season offensive, which began in Cambodia on 31 December, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT on 6 Jan 75 to reconstitute the CH-53 helicopter mix aboard Amphibious
Ready Group (AHG) ALFA and reduce the AHG response posture from its present 168 hours to helicopter launch position off Kompong Som to 96 hours. 39 CINCAC reported to JCS on 11 Jan 75 that these actions had been achieved. 40

CINCAC PM Phnom Penh reported on 7 January that the number of potential EAGLE PULL evacuees in Cambodia was 768. 42 CINCAC requested COMUSAG evaluation and comments on the impact of the latest evacuate figures. 42 COMUSAG replied that increased evacuation time and aircraft utilization rate during helicopter evacuation would be the chief factors resulting from the latest evacuate totals. 43

A USAG representative attended the Khmarg coordination conference at U-Tapao, 23-24 January, and provided briefings to representatives of NACTHAI and Thailand-based USAF units tasked with support requirements for EAGLE PULL, Gia Lai BLADE, and KALOK VISEB. Subsequent requests necessitated separate briefings for the PHNOM support group commander and the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia.

G7F 79/77 NAP on 30 January provided country clearance information to NACTHAI on representatives of Marine units tasked with EAGLE PULL support for purposes of travel to NAP for a coordination conference with USAG/77F representatives during period 31 Jan-2 Feb 79. 44 The representatives were from II NAP, 36 Marine Division and ARN ALFA/31st MAN. The visit included coordination conferences, a visit to Phnom Penh with a tour of the LZs for all conferences before their departure on 4 February.
On 3 February, a war game of EAGLE FULL Option III (helicopter evacuation) was conducted at USSOC/TAZ. Participants included key members of those USSOC staff sections who would supply EAGLE FULL Staff representation if EAGLE FULL were executed, key personnel from 568MM, 385RCS, 421RCS, and 563RCS and visiting Marines from CTF 79/I/III WAP. This exercise indicated the planning factors employed were current.

Following a CTF 79 recommendation having COMUSMACV concurrence, CONELEVENTHFLTF approved deployment of the senior ground security force (GSF) commander and three staff officers to MCZ for briefings and preparation for their possible insertion into Phnom Penh if execution of EAGLE FULL appeared imminent. CTF 79 requested country clearance from MACVAF for the incoming marines. Following arrival of senior GSF commander and staff on 7 February, CTF 79 requested country clearance for the remainder of the command group which arrived on 8 February.

AMNEB Phnom Penh reported on 6 February that their estimated total or potential EAGLE FULL evacuees was 335.

CINCPACAF addressed AN/TRM-17 expeditionary TACAIR support at the emergency helicopter divert point for EAGLE FULL operations at Chanthaburi on 9 February. Thirteenth Air Force was tasked for providing such support with 1961 Comm Group assets. On 11 February, 1374 Comm Group responded to CINCPACAF with airlift, maintenance and operational support requirements. On 12 February, CINCPACAF requested IAF take the lead on accomplishing support and coordination.
requirements for the AH/THI-17 BACAR. In view of a 24-36 hour lead time between implementation and initiation of equipment operation, advance staging of the BACAR at Chateauvert was recommended. In February, USSAG requested 13AF provide consolidated information on time, personnel and material support on activating Chateauvert including financial impact.

Thirteenth Air Force provided the requested information and recommended that in view of the heavy support requirements and cost of deploying and utilizing the AH/THI-17 BACAR that the jeep-mounted M-108 combat control team vehicle with UHF homing beacon be used instead.

In February, the chief of the Fleet Coordinating Group expressed concern to CTF 78 that political constraints may inhibit timely introduction of the senior CTF commander into Phnom Penh prior to EAGLE PULL execution and outlined USSAG/7AF fullback position. CTF 78 requested CONNEVENTMIL to insure early insertion and CONNEVENTMIL requested CINCPAC/78 early resolution of political constraints.

USAG/7AF, on 10 February, published modifications to Annex K of USSAG/7AF CPlan 50630-1-74 to all holders of the CPlan.

JCS reviewed responsibilities of CINCPAC for evacuation of additional TCUs in Phnom Penh not currently addressed in EAGLE PULL as the responsibility of the American ambassador. Their priority was
to and after American citizens. 60

CINCPAC granted CINCPAC LNO blanket authority to transport
potential EAGLE FUSE evacuees from Phnom Penh on C-130
aircraft. 60

CINCPAC tasked the CINCPAC PA LNO for coordination of
information coverage of EAGLE FUSE operations for release to news
media. 61 USSC/M/ADF advised all concerned that due to the limited
helicopter lift capability, insertion of a two-man photo team into
Phnom Penh was not practical and stated that CINCPAC had agreed
to document the operation from Phnom Penh within existing photographic
capability. As a result, CINCPAC LNO cancelled tasking to 602 Photo
Squadron to provide coverage. 63

On 16 February, AMEM Phnom Penh reported to SGENR that
there were 200 Americans in country who were assigned as official
embassy personnel and approximately 202 private American citizens
in country. 64 The Ambassador stated in embassy advisory letter
was directed to 35 dependents and 50 transient Americans in the latter
category who had no essential reason for remaining.

AMEM Phnom Penh advised SGENR regarding his discussion
on 20 February with United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires on potential
evacuation. 66 The chargé had informed the American Ambassador that
he had recommended to London that his embassy staff remain and that
he thought public opinion would not accept the British Embassy staff
making use of American evacuation means.
All 63 Peace Pacts reported to JCS-121 that they had
informally advised news correspondents that they would be unable
to assume responsibility for those working for newspapers in North
Republic, due to their then already high figure of 757 potential
evacuees. By the last of March, the number of evacuees in the
Kmer had gone to 1,157. Throughout the month, the ARBS reported
the reopening of friendly embassies.

Based upon the increased number of evacuees, JCS directed
CINCPAC to deploy on short notice a CVN EAGLE in support of EAGLE
PAC on 22 March. The CVN Hancock was directed to off load personnel and
material to accommodate 17 UH-1H 53D helicopters, 42 officers and
234 enlisted marines and to leave for Subic Bay. Furthermore, on
29 March, CINCPAC directed ARS ALPH to reduce to a 6-hour response
time to Kompong Som. This was accomplished the same day.

(U) COMPLIANCE OF ALL ACTIVITIES

(U) SUMMARY: To accomplish the mission of keeping abreast
of all activities in SEA, including cease-fire violations in RVN,
the Surface Operations Branch (DSOS), maintained situation maps,
combat statistics and other data on a daily basis. A daily summary
of significant activity in SEA was forwarded to the JCS. The JCS
Daily Status Report of Selected Southeast Asia Activities provided
recipient an executive summary of significant ground actions that
occurred in the Kmer Republic and South Vietnam.

(U) REASONS FOR deactivate:

(U) Significant development during the quarter were:

Further discussions of the Kheong Convoys are provided in Chapters
II and VI.
a. The procurement of 13 additional auxiliary barges.

b. The establishment of continuous situation reporting by an officer during convoy transit and the initiation of a periodic situation reporting system. This system was event, rather than time, related.

c. Internal staff responsibility for Mekong operations was transferred from Surface Operations and Plans to DASS.

d. Agreement with the French and all concerned to establish the minimum monthly Mekong resupply requirements by tonnage and commodity.

e. Convoys consisting of only tugs and barges were conducted and USAID and Military Sealift Command (MSC) assets were merged.

f. Interested agencies in the Western Pacific, Washington, and Hawaii convened for a wide-ranging conference to discuss and clarify measures to improve convoy security and operation. Agency responsibilities for the resulting recommendations were also specified.

g. The decision to indefinitely postpone scheduling of future convoys in view of the lack of adequate bank security.

h. The Mekong Air, Ground and Riverine Operations Study Group of the Tri-Partite Deputies met in Saigon on 27 January and 26 February.
VNAF Mission Progress. The FY 75 VNAF Flying Hour Program, totaling 232,260 hours, continued approximately as programmed throughout the quarter. Intensified hostilities during March were reflected in increased hours flown by the VNAF. The average number of daily hours flown were 655 during January, 836 during February and 1070 during March. The average daily flying costs for the mixed fleet were $250,000 in January, $350,000 in February and $250,000 in March. The number of hours programmed for CH-1 helicopters were being overflowed considerably, but other systems were either as programmed or behind the programmed hours. DOR analysis monitored the VNAF flying hour program, compared the actual hours against the budget and provided this information to command elements. The VNAF force structure remained relatively stable until late March when the enemy offensive forced RVN evacuation from Pleiku and Da Nang. Losses of aircraft, munitions, PCL, spares and other VNAF equipment were also yet continued although it is known that they were very high.

EAF Sortie Trends. In the third quarter FY 75, 1064 TAC/ER sorties were flown to blunt the VC dry season offensive. T-28, AC-24, AC-47 and OH-1 sorties were concentrated around Thai Leng in support of rocket and 105mm howitzer clearing operations and in defense of the Hau Nghia perimeter (Figure 4). C-123s were flown in support of diverse enclaves using both airland and airdrop sorties to move personnel, equipment and food (Figure 5). C-130s were used to expand M-60 boxes in support of Thai Leng operations and in defense
## KAF Strike Sorties

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<th>AC-47</th>
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**Table Note:** The table above represents the number of strikes for each month from July to June. The total strikes for each month are shown in the last column. The data shows a fluctuation in strikes throughout the year, with a peak in some months and a trough in others.
## KAF Support Sorties

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of the Neak Luong perimeter. Maintenance problems continued to plague KAF operations, but effective use of operationally ready assets provided high sortie rates during critical periods of the KC offensive.

(U) Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO). One CHECO report, USAF Close Air Support in SVN, 1 Jan 72-31 Jan 73, completed USSAG/7AF coordination, received command approval and was forwarded to CHECO on 27 January. One CHECO team completed two weeks of microfilming on 28 January. A second team will return in the 4th quarter FY 75 to microfilm pertinent data on the Khmer Republic airlift.

Cambodia Airlift - Aircraft Ground Times at Pochentong. The enemy shelling of Pochentong Airport placed added emphasis on the turnaround times of airlift aircraft. Bird Air C-130 traffic was monitored from 16 January and DC-8 traffic from 15 February. The average time elapsed from touchdown to takeoff through 31 Mar 75 for C-130s was 23.3 minutes and for DC-8s was 28.9 minutes. These averages were computed on 1,197 C-130 sorties and 593 DC-8 sorties.

(U) Data Retrieval. DOT continued to provide many interested agencies with information from the Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB). DOTA analysts obtained information on the numbers of hours and sorties flown by both South Vietnamese and Khmer Air Force. DOTB briefers used this information as background and for periodic presentations during their air operation briefings to the headquarters staff.
(U) **VNAF Operations/Management Plan (V-OPS).** At the direction of CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, the Tactical Analysis Division (DOT) developed a comprehensive contingency plan to assist the VNAF in optimizing their resources. Previous studies, analyses and trip reports conducted by DOT provided the basis for this task. Coordination was completed within the headquarters in February, a draft was forwarded to DAO Saigon for their comments. This plan had high level interest and will be forwarded to Headquarters PACAF early in the next quarter.

(U) **VNAF Quarterly Assessment.** The second quarter FY 75 RVNAF Quarterly Assessment was received and distributed for review.

**OPERATIONS PLANS (U)**

(U) **USSAG/7AF** was released from exercise play in PRIME RATE 75 by CINCPAC. However, CINCPACAF requested two representatives be present at Clark Air Base to fulfill USSAG/7AF responsibilities.

Four plans continued different options for the EAGLE PULL operation. It was felt that a single plan was needed to prevent duplication and delete excess detail, so OPlan 5060C-3-75 was completed in March.

CINCPAC-directed changes to the TALON EAGLE contingency plan were completed. However, the renewed fighting in South Vietnam precluded final coordination. The change was in a hold status at the end of the quarter awaiting the outcome of the military and political situation.
CINCPACAF was provided the numbers and locations of all F-5E aircraft in South Vietnam. The final summary, as of 17 Jan 75, showed 33 F-5Es at Phan Rang and the remaining 20 at Bien Hoa. The 33 F-5E aircraft at Phan Rang were moved from Bien Hoa to avoid rocket attacks.

SA-7 Defense. Recent VNAF A-37 losses to SA-7 missiles highlighted the inadequacy of existing infrared countermeasures. A study was conducted and it concluded that at the present A-37 loss rate, infrared jammers would be cost effective and would enhance the survivability of the A-37 against the SA-7 threat. However, they are very expensive and limited in number. A missile launch detector (MLD) associated with the ALE-20 flare dispenser would be ideal, but none are available. The ALE-20 for USAF aircraft was not designed as a continuous deployment system. MLDs are still in the development stage. It is doubtful that the DAV program would have sufficient funds to speed the MLD program out of the development stage. In the interim, strike aircraft tactics should be developed which position the aircraft not delivering ordnance to look for SA-7 launches when the other aircraft are unable to detect missile launches.

Thailand Air Assets. CINCPAC tasked USSAG/7AF to assess the feasibility of consolidating Thailand U-21 assets at Don Muang Airport. An in-depth study was undertaken and the recommendation was that consolidation be delayed at this time. Facilities and secure communications circuiting are not available at Don Muang to support
highly classified operation of the 7th Radio Research Field Site Aviation Detachment. It also appears that the added mission flexibility and appropriate responsiveness of retaining the JCRC U-21 assets at U-Tapao is desirable. It was determined some logistical economies could be gained through consolidation, but the savings might possibly be offset in mission degradation.

USSAG/7AF comments regarding reduction of the current HH-43 inventory in Thailand was requested. MAC has restricted the HH-43 to a life or death mission only, pending the complete evaluation of its airworthiness and supportability. CINCPACAF proposed the inactivation of HH-43 at NKP and Korat; and the SAR efforts for these bases would be provided by in-country HH-53s. USSAG/7AF concurred.

USSAG/7AF requested the 386TFW develop AC-130 SAR tactics to support HH-53 rescue operations. The missions flown to date have proved that the concept is valid and affords a far greater degree of operational flexibility than was originally conceived. The 16 SOS is concurrently developing the operational procedures, training scenarios, and a briefing to review the added combat potentialities realized.

**Ubon Meteorological Equipment.** USSAG/7AF recommended the transfer of all meteorological equipment at Ubon RTAFB, to the RTG when U.S. operational control of that base ends. This recommendation was predicated on the fact that if the RTG does not receive this equipment, as verbally agreed upon, then they would probably
withdraw weather observing support, primarily in the personnel field. This would necessitate an increase of approximately 20 USAF weather personnel billets in Thailand. The cost of this action would be considerably more than the cost of the meteorological equipment, approximately $30,000. In addition, it would require the addition of U.S. personnel in Thailand at a time when withdrawal is being emphasized.

**Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand.** CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations for the force level mix, and basing requirements for the manpower levels from present to 21,300 by the end of FY75, reduction to 12,000 beyond FY76, and a third reduction to 10,000 by 31 Dec 76. Also included were withdrawal plans, any change to logistical support, changes in plans for reduction in joint headquarters and in plans for telecommunications and the resulting base closure schedule. USSAG/7AF recommendations were provided.

**Beddown Posture.** Thirteenth Air Force requested comments on the following beddown changes:

a. Maintain two unspecialized F-4D squadrons at Korat instead of one F-4D and one F-4E squadron.

b. Transfer the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) detachment (six RF-4C) with tailored PP1F support from Udorn to Korat vice U-Tapao. The RF-4Cs would remain at Korat until post-SEA when an appropriate tactical organization would be activated at U-Tapao.

USSAG made these comments.
a. Inactivate the 34 TFS at Korat and transfer the aircraft out of Thailand. Move one F-4D squadron (special equipped) and two F-4E squadrons (TISEO/MAVERICK/COMBAT TREE equipped) to Korat. This would give a balanced fighter force to insure an adequate in-place capability.

b. In order to consolidate photo processing and to minimize moves, USSAG/7AF recommended that the 1STRS detachment with tailored PPIF support move to U-Tapao as programmed. A permanent PPIF can then be established for support of both drone and RF-4 operations at one location for FY76 and the follow-on years.

CINCPACAF requested comments on proposed transfer schedule and programmed beddown posture. USSAG concurred with the proposed basing, force level and aircraft mix for Thailand F-4D and F-4E assets in the post FY75 SEA withdrawal phase. In view of higher force levels and the JCS decision to consider U-Tapao and Korat closure at a later date, USSAG/7AF recommended that 12 RF-4C aircraft be moved to Korat with the remaining six RF-4C aircraft returning to the CONUS. This would consolidate all Thailand TACAIR assets at one location, facilitating logistics support, management, and command and control. Additional RF-4C aircraft (12 vice 6) are required to accomplish USSAG/7AF day/night reconnaissance requirements.

KAF Night Strike Capability. CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF's analysis in coordination with USSAG/7AF, TAC, CSAF to determine if T-28 all weather/night strike capability should be considered urgent-cost/mission-effective requirement and be included in KAF FY76 training program. USSAG concurred with CINCPACAF.
essence, the existing night capability in AC-47, AU-24, and UH1G, coupled with artillery, provides significant fire power against enemy ground troops, the primary night target. With the limited air resources and MAP funds, the added capability represented by expanding T-28 strike operations does not justify the urgent funding classification. CHMEDTC requested reconsideration be given to KAF T-28 night training. CINCPACAF recommended that in view of the additional rationale T-28 night CCT in the FY76 KAF training program should be instituted. USSAG/7AF concurred in support of the desirability of a night T-28 strike capability. The rationale and justification submitted by MEDTC was considered sound and the requested training should be high on the priority list for funding after essential levels of ammunition and other basic commodities.

4ACTHAI Reorganization Plan. USSAG/7AF reviewed and concurred with the proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 with the following comments:

a. The plan should delineate the commander's interface with the Thai police and intelligence organization. Also, the functional description should designate the new directorate or staff elements that will provide this interface.

b. If continued operation of the Training and Logistics Detachment, based on KAF requirements, is needed beyond FY75, USSAG/7AF recommended the responsibility for this detachment be transferred to CINCPACAF/13AF.

c. In the event present planning is modified for the
drawdown of Thailand based forces, that is surge commitments are continued or forces are not withdrawn on schedule, MACTHAI/JUSMAG should be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate the situation.

Headquarters Disestablishment Planning. CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations on the following options should the political/military situation require retention of USSAG beyond FY75:

- a. Move essential functions to Clark Air Base and dual-hat the USSAG commander with the 13AF commander (inactivate 7AF).
- b. Retain reduced USSAG at NKP.

The USSAG/7AF response centered around these vital considerations:

- a. Minimum manpower requirements to continue contingency planning, command and control, logistics monitoring, and intelligence functions at NKP.
- b. Minimum additional manpower requirements at Clark Air Base to form a USSAG/7AF headquarters.
- c. Time required to achieve a move to Clark, if directed.
- d. Base support considerations for both options.

B-52 OPERATIONS (U)

The B-52 Operations Division continued operational staff support for the USSAG mission. The primary activity within the division was continued training in order to maintain proficiency among the assigned personnel. Operating procedures were reviewed and updated for use in the event of renewed hostilities in SEA.
Weekly scheduled exercises were conducted to maintain the capability of processing and validating ARC LIGHT targets and to exercise coordination efforts with SAC ADVON in order to effect strikes on selected targets. In addition to submitting simulated targets in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam for strike planning proficiency, the division provided SAC ADVON with actual radar bomb scoring targets for training missions flown in Thailand. These training sorties were flown from Anderson AFB, Guam and U-Tapao, and employ the various bombing methods used by the B-52 fleet.

WEATHER (U)

(U) During the first half of the reporting period, efforts were confined to improving environmental support to USSAG and providing COMUSSAG with weather forecasts for specialized missions. The second half of the reporting period saw a significant increase in air operations as a massive resupply effort for Cambodia was initiated. Airlift weather support coordination became the primary task of the USSAG TACC weather officers.

(U) Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP): The DMSP facility, Site 23, continued to produce high resolution visual and infrared photographs in support of USSAG mission requirements. Power budget problems with satellite number 8531 occurred on 3 February. In order to solve the problem, tests were conducted on 8, 22, and 27 February, as well as 3 and 6 March. The test resulted in a loss of some data over SEA. During the past quarter, Site 23 supported the USAF Selective Reconnaissance Program by
telephoning 15 tropical storm analysis and position reports to
the Joint Typhoon Warning Center at Guam.

(U) BUFFALO HUNTER. DOW briefed COMUSSAG on all scheduled
BUFFALO HUNTER missions by track and probability of cloud free
sky. Missions were not launched solely on the basis of intelligence
needs and adequate weather in the areas of concern. Recovery area
weather played an extremely important role in go/no go decision
making due to the atypical weather conditions which prevailed over
the SEA interior during March. Visibility seriously hampered BUFFALO
HUNTER missions. Regarding March weather at NKP, the temperature
averaged 6 degrees above the climatological norm of 84.5°F. More
importantly, visibility was less than five miles 40 percent of the
month at NKP, as opposed to the climatological norm of 12 percent.

(U) Miscellaneous Weather Support. Weather inputs for OLYMPIC
MEET and GIANT SCALE missions were routinely briefed. USSAG J-2
was provided a weather study regarding Thailand precipitation.
Support to the 6908th Security Squadron also continued.

(U) Tactical Reconnaissance Forecasting. DOW continued to provide
forecasts which were geared to facilitating USSAG RF-4 tactical
reconnaissance decision making. Surface observations were routinely
secured from Phnom Penh, and sporadically received from Battambang,
Kampot, Chhnang, and Lovek. They were extremely valuable
when used in combination with Defense Meteorological Satellite photographs.
In addition to providing the above weather forecasts, a procedure was
established in January whereby the CACC weather officer would provide an optimum weather time-frame for RF-4 reconnaissance by geographical area. This "weather window" was given to the USSAG/J-2 Reconnaissance Branch for both the current day's operations and as a planning forecast for missions being contemplated during the next 24 hours.

(U) The idea of a "weather window" generated flexibility in reconnaissance scheduling whereby "weather" versus "intelligence to be derived from a mission" became a planning factor, rather than too much emphasis being placed on the former. Thus, if the cloud free probability of seeing a target were 95 percent between 1030 and 1200 hours, but was 70 percent from 0800 to 1000 hours; the latter time might be selected to preclude the enemy from restricting his movements during the most cloud free periods. The "weather window" concept is most applicable during the October-May period. From June through September, the southwest monsoon and associated deteriorating weather conditions result in a very narrow "weather window." This minimizes the value of the window concept and causes the optimum weather time to become the dominant planning factor.

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS (U)

(U) Computer Operations. The following figures represent the percentage of total computer processing time dedicated to each major functional area for the months indicated:
Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB)/OPREP-5        32.07  32.53
Republic of Vietnam Analysis                   25.42  15.99
Joint Casualty Resolution Center               8.67  12.76
Systems Maintenance                            5.06  5.33
Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia      2.51  1.36
Frag Order Preparation                         2.96  7.02
Southeast Asia Reconnaissance Inquiry File (SIRFA) 2.60  2.56
Other                                          20.70  22.45

The March figures are unavailable due to a hardware failure. However, there were no significant changes from February.

(U) **Programming Analysis.** Nine data automation requests for development work were completed. Most were for enhancement or modification of existing capabilities.

(U) Due to the critical nature of the logistic support of the Khmer, much work was accomplished on the MEDTC ammo system. To supplement the logistics accounting system, an airlift load optimizer program was assigned which provided Phnom Penh with a means of matching ammo needs with available airlift. Output from this analyzer was transmitted automatically to Phnom Penh.

(U) The RVN Cease-Fire Analysis System was turned over completely to the primary user, the special assistant to the DEPCOMUSSAG.

(U) **Systems Programming.** An on-line copy processor was completed that permits the disk-to-disk transfer of any type of data set. It permits the movement of data with the use of several parameters to establish the attributes of the resultant set. This is a useful adjunct to the existing capabilities of the Interactive Console System.
(U) JCRC File and Retrieval System. A modification was made to the on-line processor for JCRC that permits entry of literal statements into a series of records with only one command. The capability has substantially reduced the time needed to alter biographic records when a statement is applicable to many records at the same time.

(U) Fragmentary Order Preparation. A significant system "clean up" was conducted and an extraordinary use of frag prep was made in an extensive plans generation task. As the result of a comprehensive analysis, 50 percent of the frag prep data base, and 60 percent of the programs in the main subsystems were deleted. These components were found to be obsolete and dysfunctional. Thus, a significant reduction in frag order preparation processing time and training time for new personnel was achieved. Also, surge capability was tested and affirmed.

(U) The IBM 1130 frag prep software was modified to reduce by 45 percent the time required to punch cards for dissemination. This alteration is significant when the normal dissemination capability through the IBM 360 is inoperative and the 1130 card punch must be used.

(U) Documentation Retirement. Twenty-two boxes of combat operational reports were prepared for permanent retirement to the National Records Center, Washington, D.C.

(U) CINCPAC returned the SEADAB History Tape for January-November 1974. A note on the transmittal sheet stated that this project has
been cancelled at CINCPAC. A message confirmed that CINCPAC will not require the monthly history tape and the daily transactions for SEADAB, because they no longer have capability to process SEADAB data.108

(U) Combat Air Operations Support Systems. From 7-17 January, Lt Col McCleary Douglas, CINCPACAF/ACDP, visited the USSAG Automated Systems Division (DOY) to discuss and review current USSAG Combat Air Operations Support Systems. The primary purpose of his trip was to transport to PACAF all existing documentation and source programs used for frag preparation and SEADAB capabilities. These concepts will eventually be used in the creation of similar capabilities on the WMMCCS hardware and software. CINCPACAF requested additional program listings.109 DOY transmitted a magnetic tape containing most of the requested programs.110 Some programs could not be furnished because they were obsolete and the listings had been destroyed. CINCPACAF later requested the SEADAB Edit Tables and an explanation of several programs' functions.111

(U) In February, the 374 TAW began reporting contractor DC-8 (non-military) flights in OPREP-4s. DOY requested PACAF guidance regarding how this data should be entered in SEADAB and OPREP-5.112 CINCPACAF directed entry of the DC-8 activity in SEADAB with a Service Code of "O" for others, and requested the time required to modify the OPREP-5 for automatic inclusion of this activity.113 DOY estimated two weeks for the changes and recommended that manual tabulation of this activity should be used.114 On 5 March, DOY began coding
and inputting the DC-8 activity into SEADAB. Since adequate personnel were not available in Saigon to produce OPREP-4s, the 7AF TACC Airlift Flight Following Log and the Cambodian Airlift Summary, Saigon Reports are used to make SEADAB records. Data from 27 February through 4 March was coded and input on 5 March.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 310245Z Jan 75, Subj: Approval/Disapproval Authority (U).

2. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 250035Z Jan 75, Subj: Commanders Locator Check (U).

3. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPACAF, 210830Z Jan 75, Subj: Threat Warning for the VNAF (U).

4. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8707, 250940Z Jan 75, Subj: Procedures for the Use of IFF Mark X (IFF) Mark XII in the PACOM (U).

5. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC, 061115Z Feb 75, Subj: AKAA-285 Distribution (U).

6. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPAC (and others) 170430Z Mar 75, Subj: Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region (MSEAADR) (U).

7. Ltr (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to USDAO Khmer, Laos and RVN, 5 Jan 75, Subj: Airfield Folders and Aircrew Guidance.

8. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8707, CINCPAC, PACAF (and others) 060950Z Mar 75, Subj: Approach Procedures at Tan Son Nhut, RVN (U).

9. Msg (U), USSAG/7AF/DO to COMUSMACTHAI, 170440Z Mar 75, Subj: Military Air Traffic at Chiang Mai Airport.

10. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/DO to CSAF (and others), 271320Z Mar 75, Subj: AAA/SAM Threat (U).


15. Msg (TS), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 040415Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract Airlift Support for Cambodia (U).


18. Msg (S), CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 150410Z Mar 75, Subj: Bird Air Cambodia Operation (U). Msg (S), CHMEDTC to COMUSNAVTHAI, 141012Z Mar 74, Subj: Unknown (Requests U-21 Support to Phnom Penh) (U).

19. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG (end others), 152342Z Mar 75, Subj: Unknown (Directs USAF C-130s to provide support to DAO/MEDTC) (U).

   Implemented by: Msg (S), USSAG to CHMEDTC (and others), 160835Z Mar 75, Subj: USAF C-130 Administrative Support Flight to Pochentong, CB (U).

20. Msg (S), AMEMB Phnom Penh/5179 to CINCPAC (and others), 211010Z Mar 75, Subj: Unknown.

21. Ibid.

22. Ltr (S), DOC to DOSP, 20 Sep 73, Subj: Air Elements Rules of Engagement (U). Memo for Record (S), DOCM Internal, 6 Jan 74, Subj: ROE for Evacuation Assistance Operations (U).

23. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 310220Z Jul 73, Subj: COMUSSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-EAGLE PULL (U). (Retransmittal of JCS 30 Jul Guidance.)

24. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 231439Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-1-75 (EAGLE PULL) (U). Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 241342Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-2-75 (EAGLE PULL) (U).

25. Ibid.


UNCLASSIFIED
27. Flag Note (U), USSAG/7AF/CS to USSAG/7AF/DO, 24 Mar 75, Subj: Strip Alert/Fighter Support - PARPRO SEASIA.

28. Fact Sheet (TS), USSAG/DOC to CC, CS, DO, DOCB, 2 Apr 75, Subj: Fact Sheet on Strip Alert/Fighter Support - PARPRO SEASIA (U).

29. CINCPAC Instruction 3020.2G (S), 9 Jan 71, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (U).


31. Msg (TS), JCS 3250 to CINCPAC, 271722Z Mar 75, Subj: Reconnaissance Operations in SEASIA (U).

32. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 280902Z Mar 75, Subj: Resupply of 6th VNAF Air Division (U).

33. Msg (S), JCS 1149 to CINCPAC, 292009Z Mar 75, Subj: Resupply of 6th VNAF Air Division (U).

34. Msg (TS), USSAG/7AF to AIG 789 and JCRC, 151030Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Operating Authorities (U). Msg (TS), USSAG/7AF to AIG 789, 151200Z Aug 73, Subj: SEASIA Basic Rules of Engagement (ROE), Cease-Fire in NVN, RVN, The DMZ, Laos, and Cessation of Combat Activities by U.S. Forces in GKR (U). Msg (S), USSAG/7AF to 13AF (and others), 090240Z Feb 74, Subj: Operating Authorities and Rules of Engagement, Thailand (U).


36. Ltr (S) CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 16 Dec 74, Subj: USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 50600V (S).

37. Msg (S) AMEMB Vientiane to COMUSSAG, 190637Z Mar 75, Subj: E & E Personnel Figures (U).

38. Msg (U) USSAG/7AF/DO to AIG 8713, 030740Z Feb 75, Subj: USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C EAGLE PULL with Appendix 3. Ltr (U), CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 22 Jan 75, Subj: Review of Change 2 to USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C, EAGLE PULL.


40. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J3/DOO to JCS, 111909Z Jan 75, Subj: None.
41. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 070450Z Jan 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

42. Msg (C) CINCPAC/J31/J3 to COMUSSAG, 100257Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

43. Msg (S) COMUSSAG/7AF/CS to CINCPAC, 170545Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

44. Msg (S) CTF 79/III MAF to AMEMB/DAO Bangkok, 000419Z Jan 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

45. Ltr (S), USSAG/7AF/DOS to Staff Sections, Info: 56SOW, 1 Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL War Game (S).

46. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMSEVENTHFLT, 050602Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

47. Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF 79, 051128Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

48. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMUSSAG, 060045Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

49. Msg (S), CTF 79 to COMUSSAG, 080030Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE FULL Command Group (U).

50. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 060440Z Feb 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

51. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to 13AF, 090210Z Feb 75, Subj: Deployment Directive, TACAN Support (U).


54. Msg (S) JSSAG/7AF/LG to 13AF and COMUSMACKTHAI, 140805Z Feb 75, Subj: Chantaburi Support Requirements (U).

55. Msg (S) 13AF/CS to USSAG (and others), 220055Z Feb 75, Subj: 13AF EAGLE PULL Support Tasking (U).

56. Msg (S) CHF/LT/COORDGRU to CTF 79, 090213Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Command Group (U).
57. Msg (S) CTF 79 to COMSEVENTHFLT, 100435Z Feb 75, EAGLE PULL Command Group (U). Msg (S) COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT, 100750Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Planning (U).

58. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF/DC to AIG 8713, 100700Z Feb 75, Subj: Change 1 to Annex K, USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060C-1-74 (EAGLE PULL)(U).

59. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 102220Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Planning (U).

60. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J3416/J01 to COMUSSAG, 112021Z Feb 75, Subj: Transport of Civilians on Military Aircraft (U).

61. Msg (S) CINCPAC/J74 to CINCPAC LNO, 150310Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Public Affairs (U).

62. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 220130Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Photographic Support (U).

63. Msg (U) CINCPAC LNO to 601 Photo Squadron, 240545Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL Public Affairs.

64. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 160630Z Feb 75, Subj: Evacuation of American Citizens (C).

65. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 181045Z Feb 75, Subj: Coordination of Evacuation Plans with Thai Embassy (C).

66. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 210600Z Feb 75, Subj: Discussion with UK Charge on Potential Evacuation (U).

67. Msg (C) AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 220520Z Feb 75, Subj: E & E: TCNs Working for U.S. Networks (U).

68. Msg (C) CINCPAC/J3411/J3 to USDAO Phnom Penh, 202152Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (C) USDAO Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, 220330Z Feb 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

69. Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 010324Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

70. Msg (C) COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT, 022130Z Mar 75, EAGLE PULL (U).

71. Msg (S) CINCPAC to MAC, 020135Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 022035Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

72. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to DAO Phnom Penh, 030505Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).
73. Msg (S) CIHREDTC to USSAG/7AF, 080445Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

74. Msg (C)ATMEMB Phnom Penh to USSAG/7AF, 111225Z Mar 75, Subj: Addition Potential Evacuees for NEWAC Plan (C).

75. Msg (C) ATMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 150602Z Mar 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).

76. Msg (C) ATMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 310515Z Mar 75, Subj: Emergency and Evacuation: Estimated Number of Potential Evacuees (U).


78. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 221544Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) CONSEVENTHFLT to CTF 76, 2211410Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

79. Msg (S) CINCPAC to JCS, 222146Z Mar 75, Subj: Concept Plan for EAGLE PULL (U).

80. Msg (S) CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 280533Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U). Msg (S) CTG 76.4 to CTF 76, 281333Z Mar 75, Subj: EAGLE PULL (U).

81. Msg (C) CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 260001Z Jan 75, Subj: Additional Shield Barges (U).

82. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 211254Z Jan 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Sitrep Number 1 (U).

83. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 240711Z Jan 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).

84. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to ATMEMB Phnom Penh (and others), 300525Z Jan 75, Subj: All Barge Mekong Convoy Concept (U).

85. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 040338Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).

86. Msg (C) USSAG/CD to CINCPAC (and others), 261330Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Update (U).
87. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 180700Z Jan 75, Subj: VNAF F-5E Aircraft (U).

88. Msg (U) CINCPAC to COMUSSAG, 010152Z Feb 75, Subj: Consolidation of U-21 Assets at Don Muang.

89. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF, 270304Z Dec 74, Subj: HH-43 Reduction in SEA (U).

90. Msg (U) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 070515Z Jan 75, Subj: HH-43 Reductions in SEA.

91. Msg (C) 13AF ADVON to 13AF, 130750Z Feb 75, Subj: AC-130-CH/HH-53 SAR Integration (U).

92. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CSAF, 030230Z Mar 75, Subj: Turnover of USAF Meteorological Equipment (U).

93. Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF (and others), 061903Z Mar 75, Subj: Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels Thailand (U).

94. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 120820Z Mar 75, Subj: Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (U).

95. Msg (S) 13AF to USSAG/7AF, 150320Z Feb 75, Subj: Thailand Force Review (U).

96. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to 13AF, 260755Z Feb 75, Subj: Thailand Force Review (U).

97. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF (and others), 150513Z Mar 75, Subj: Thailand Programming on F-4 Specialized System Beddown (U).

97a. Msg (S) JCS to CINCPAC, 142244Z Feb 75, Subj: U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand FY76 and Beyond (U).

98. Msg (S) CINCPAC to CINCPACAF (and others), 070330Z Jan 75, Subj: Reductions in Headquarters and Support Elements in Thailand (U).

99. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPACAF, 160200Z Jan 75, Subj: Khmer AF Night Strike Capability (U).

100. Msg (S) CHMEDTC to CINCPAC, 290931Z Jan 75, Subj: Reductions in Headquarters and Support Elements in Thailand (U).

101. Msg (C) CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 040200Z Feb 75, Subj: KAF Night Strike Capability (U).

102. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 011105Z Feb 75, Subj: KAF Night Strike Capability (U).
103. Msg (S) CINCPACAF to USSAG/7AF, 0101114 Jan 75, Subj: Proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 (U). Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG, 242115Z Dec 74, Subj: Proposed MACTHAI Organization Plan for FY76 (U).

104. Msg (S) CINCPAC to USSAG/7AF, 030235Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG Options (U).

105. Msg (S) USSAG/7AF to CINCPAC, 211045Z Jan 75, Subj: USSAG Options (U).


108. Msg (U) CINCPAC/J63 to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 170157Z Jan 75, Subj: SEADAB Data.

109. Msg (U) CINCPACAF/ACDP to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 230230Z Jan 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

110. Ltr (U) USSAG/7AF/DOY to CINCPACAF/ACDP, 4 Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

111. Msg (U) CINCPACAF/ACDPC to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 270115Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB Programs.

112. Msg (C) USSAG/7AF/DOY to CINCPACAF/XOCR, 180904Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).

113. Msg (C) CINCPACAF/XOCR to USSAG/7AF/DOY, 210115Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).

114. Msg (C) USSAG/7AF/DO to CINCPACAF, 241305Z Feb 75, Subj: SEADAB/OPREP-5 (U).
CHAPTER VI
LOGISTICS

OVERVIEW (U)

(U) Logistics continued to concentrate primarily on monitoring munitions, POL, rice and equipment required by the Khmer Republic. Funding constraints and interdiction of the Mekong River necessitated virtual hour-by-hour analysis of the MAP-CB management. In addition, funding constraints continued to require detailed analysis and management for Military Assistance Service funded and Defense Assistance, Vietnam (DAV). These efforts, including the necessity to advise the national command authorities daily on the status and effectiveness of the supply effort, received major emphasis during the quarter.

KHMER REPUBLIC LOGISTICS (U)

Movement of Munitions and General Cargo from Vung Tau to Vayama. As a result of a steadily increasing drain on limited MAP-CB funds, CHMEDTC took action to gain some relief through the deobligation of munitions loaded aboard nine barges at Vung Tau. These barges had been frustrated at Vung Tau due to the inability of the EMG to regain control of the Mekong River. DAO Saigon was extremely concerned about the possibility of sapper attacks against these barges if they remained at Vung Tau for an indefinite period of time. Consequently,
after Secretary of Defense approval, USSAG took action to move six barge loads of munitions approved for deobligation to Vayama for off-loading and storage in the Vayama Ammunition Depot. The commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMCTHAI), obtained the necessary customs clearance for importation through Vayama and on 14 March the six barges arrived at Vayama. On 22 March, after SECDEF approval, USSAG initiated action to move the three remaining loaded barges from Vung Tau. Again, COMUSMCTHAI obtained the necessary customs clearance for the move, and on 30 March the three barges departed Vung Tau enroute to Vayama, scheduled to arrive on 3 April. As of that date, all SCOOT-T barges loaded with munitions and general cargo will have been returned to Vayama for off-loading.

All-Barge Concept for Mekong Movements. On 23 January, U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean called a meeting at Phnom Penh to discuss all aspects of the scheduling and operation of Mekong convoys with the USSAG deputy commander, CHMEDTC, USAID Cambodia, and CINCPAC/J4. At that meeting it was decided that convoys should go to an all-barge concept for munitions, rice and POL, and requirements for additional shield barges and USAID tugs and barges were identified. CINCPAC was requested to approve use of SCOOT-T tug/barge assets in support of USAID for movement of rice and POL on a reimbursable basis and incentive pay for SCOOT-T crew members. The American Embassy Phnom Penh was requested to reaffirm agreement to reimburse the SCOOT-T assets. As a result of these proposals, it was necessary to call a joint meeting of all interested activities and agencies.
Mekong Convoy Requirements Conference. On 5 February, a conference was held at DAO Saigon to discuss Mekong convoy requirements and to reach agreements on actions to be taken by all interested parties. Activities and agencies participating were: CINCPAC/J4, HQ USSAG, USAID Washington, USAID Vietnam, USAID Phnom Penh, commander Military Sealift Command (COMSC), COMSC Far East, MACTHAI Support Group, DAO Saigon, Military Sealift Command Office Vietnam, and U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. A myriad of closely interrelated topics, having a direct bearing on the movement of supplies by the Mekong under the all-barge and tug concept, were discussed during the conference. Actions were directed and recommendations made for the accomplishment of necessary tasks required to implement the concept. The following is a summary of tasks and the status:

a. Acquisition of Additional Shield Barges. Approval for ten additional SCOOT-T shield barges and 12 USAID shield barges was obtained. Funding in the amount of $1.8 million was provided jointly by CHMEDTC and USAID. Construction of 21 shield barges had been completed.

b. Use of Target Cloth Covering on Outer Screen of Shield Barges to Obscure Enemy Gunners' View of Shielded Vessels. Test of this concept under actual conditions, using one set of shield barges on a tug, was agreed upon. Since no convoys were attempted after the meeting, a test did not take place.

c. Shield Barge Repairs at An Long and Vung Tau. COMSC Far East had taken action prior to the meeting to amend the contract to include repairs at An Long in addition to the original requirement for repairs at Vung Tau.
d. Requirement for Repair of USAID Acquired Shield Barges. USAID agreed to hand receipt their shield barges to COMSC who would then provide the necessary repair services as part of the existing shield barge repair/maintenance contract. This would permit pooling of assets and interchangeable use by both COMSC and USAID.

e. Requirement for Additional Mooring Buoys. Additional buoys at An Long are not required. Two additional buoys at Phnom Penh are required, bringing the total number of buoys up to four. Four buoys at An Long and four at Phnom Penh will handle the requirements.

f. Use of Rice-Stuffed CCNEX containers to Provide Shielding on Munitions Barges in Lieu of Chain Link Fence and Sandbag Protection. Agreement was made to test the concept utilizing one barge. The lack of adequate MAP-CB funds and the Khmer Rouge interdiction of the Mekong River precluded this project.

g. Use of Rice for Protective Tons, Covering On-Loaded Ammunition Barges in Lieu of Sandbags. USAID Saigon was unable to obtain the necessary RVN customs clearance for rice to be used for the project.

h. Change of Mekong Operations to an All-Barge and Tug Operation. All participants agreed to this proposal. Four additional tugs and barges were identified as needed for the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract. USAID identified a total requirement of eight tugs and 13 barges. Action was initiated by COMSC and USAID to procure the
additional assets. COMSC and CINCPAC took action to locate tugs owned by the services that could be obtained for use as government furnished equipment for the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract. As a result, four small Navy-owned tugs (820-1081 BHP) were offered from CINCPACFLT assets, and two Army tugs in wet storage at Okinawa were located. The SCOOT-T tug/barge contractor, SEAPAC, Inc., located and hired one tug from Japan and two barges— one cargo barge from Vung Tau and one POL barge from Singapore. USAID hired one additional tug from its tug/barge contractor and then issued a request for proposal (RFP) to obtain six additional tugs and POL barges.

On 27 February, CINCPAC requested that all ongoing negotiations for new or expanded SCOOT-T requirements be limited to phases short of contract award due to exhaustion of MAP-CB packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) funds. Expenditure of funds was authorized at the existing level for current contracts, and CHMEDTC was requested to submit compensating decreases for new or additional SCOOT-T requirements. On 28 February CHMEDTC recommended to CINCPAC that the additional cargo barge brought on-hire be released in order to reduce expenditures. CHMEDTC also recommended that further action by COMSC to acquire additional tugs should be terminated and that the government option for a three-month extension of the fire fighting tugs Shinano and Asiatic Stamina be exercised for the period April-30 June 1975. This extension, providing a total of eight contractor tugs without increased costs, was approved on
On 3 March, CINCPAC concurred in the CINCPAC request to off-hire the recently acquired cargo barge and in the termination of action to obtain additional tugs from commercial sources. CINCPAC later proposed that the four small tugs from CINCPACFLT assets being offered to COMSC might be crewed by Khmer personnel, that the tugs be provided to SEAPAC, Inc., as government furnished equipment, or that other arrangements be made. The object was to reduce costs, as SEAPAC, Inc., had indicated a daily per diem rate of $1,100 to crew each tug. On 8 March, COMSC advised that use of Khmer personnel to crew the tugs was not considered appropriate for a civilian contractor operation. Such manning was considered to be a loan of U.S. Government assets to a foreign government, requiring approval of higher headquarters. In further attempts to reduce MAP-CB PCH&T costs for the SCOOT-T operations, COMSC Far East proposed a series of recommendations pertaining to the SCOOT-T tug/barge contract. Requested comments on the recommendations were provided to CINCPAC along with a statement of tug and barge requirements for optimum resupply of Phnom Penh, using four convoys per month and short term requirements based on MAP-CB PCH&T funding limitations for FY 75. On 20 March, Ambassador Dean directed that all USAID barge and tug assets under contract on behalf of USAID Cambodia be put off-hire and that bids and offers from shipping companies for additional assets were to be cancelled. This action left a total of eight tugs and 13 barges under contract
1. Status of Actions to Procure Fire Fighting Tugs and Equipment for Use by MNK. The GKH presented a formal request in early January to the AMEMB Phnom Penh for the loan of two 65-foot fire fighting tugs for use as harbor tugs and escort for Mekong convoys. These tugs were available from U.S. Army assets in Japan and Korea. The request was forwarded to SECSTATE for further coordination with the Department of the Army. 10 Action progressed to provide fire protection on Mekong convoys and the pier in Phnom Penh in February; four P-250 water pumps and two fire fighting kits were shipped to MSCO Vietnam.

3. Requirement for Pre-Convoy Briefing of Tug Crews Participating in Convoy. All concerned agreed that briefings on the tactical situation and air and artillery support to be provided were essential for successful convoy passage. DAO Phnom Penh was requested to insure that MNK convoy commanders fully brief tug crews.

4. Communications Requirements for Convoy Control and Protection. Existing communications gear on convoy tugs was non-standard and the primary frequency (HF 6232 KHZ) unreliable due to propagation and interference. It was considered to be too expensive to replace existing gear, and all concerned were requested to explore other, more economical, means of communication.

5. Incentive Pay for Crews Operating on the Mekong. USAID and COMSC were requested to explore all possible avenues relative to providing incentive pay to tug crews to insure payment could be made.
m. **Consolidation of SCOOT-T Support Contracts under COMSC Far East.** All concerned agreed to consolidation of all SCOOT-T surface support contracts under COMSC Far East. COMSC Far East agreed to accept responsibility for initiating new procurement actions from 1 Apr 75 onward. On 21 February, COMSC Far East issued a RFP for a new contract covering SCOOT-T stevedoring and cargo documentation services at Vung Tau and the security/maintenance/repair of SCOOT-T shield barges that would become effective 1 April. On 4 March, SECDEF requested CINCPAC extend the existing contract for a 30-day period (1-30 April) and insure coverage for SCOOT-T documentation services. SECDEF also directed that the outstanding RFP be cancelled. COMSC Far East gathered the cost estimates for the various contract extensions and requested authority from CINCPAC for expenditure of $333,363 to cover the extension period. The expenditure of this amount was approved and COMSC Far East provided the necessary notification.

n. **Use of COMSC Personnel to Perform Contract Management of All SCOOT-T Functions.** During the conference, COMSC Far East identified a requirement for 10 additional personnel for this function, nine to be added to the MSCO Vietnam staff. DAO Saigon indicated that these additional U.S. national spaces could be accommodated through 30 Jun 75 within the existing ceiling; spaces would require JCS approval after that date. COMSC has taken action
to obtain necessary spaces and funds for FY 76.14

o. Liabilities to be Encountered by USAID if COMSC

Assets are used for Movement of USAID Commodities/Barges. USAID was tasked with: obtaining from GKR liability releases for rice moved on SCOOT-T munitions barges or USAID barges towed by SCOOT-T tugs; establishing through State Department channels procedures for reimbursement through the Department of the Army to MAP-CB for COMSC movement of USAID cargo; and establishing procedures for settlement of any marine casualty/loss claims. On 12 February, AMEMB Phnom Penh advised CINCPAC that funds had been reserved to cover costs of USAID financed commodities transported by COMSC assets and any claims against USAID for COMSC asset losses.15

On 13 February, AMEMB Phnom Penh advised CINCPAC that GKR had agreed to waive all claim rights against U.S. Government and COMSC contractors for any losses sustained in connection with Saigon/Phnom Penh transshipment.16

p. Movement of MAP-CB General Cargo from Sattahip to Phnom Penh. At the time for the conference, Sattahip had a backlog of approximately 5,000 measurement tons of general cargo awaiting transshipment to Phnom Penh. The last surface shipment of general cargo to Phnom Penh was in mid-December 1974. Since that time, tug and barge assets had been devoted strictly to the movement of munitions to sustain required stockage levels in Phnom Penh. Sufficient airlift was not available to handle the volume of critically needed medical supplies and spare parts. It was agreed that every effort should be
made to move this cargo by surface mode. On 8 February, USSAG took action to move the barge load equivalent of general cargo to Vung Tau via deep draft vessel for subsequent discharge into a SCOOT-T barge for movement to Phnom Penh. On 22 March, due to the interdiction of the Mekong, action was taken by USSAG to return the general cargo (delivered to Vung Tau on 13 February) to Sattahip for off-loading.

q. **Color Coding Sensitive Items of Munitions Requiring Maximum Protection or Special Handling for Ease of Identification.**

In order to facilitate identification of items to be stowed in the center of barges, for maximum protection, representatives of USAMAA recommended items such as fuzes, mines and propellant charges be distinctly color-coded at time of shipment from origin. After reviewing the proposal, at the request of CINCPAC, U.S. Army Munitions Command recommended that subject items be block stowed and segregated at time of loading each SCOOT-T vessel in CONUS for ease of access and identification. CINCPAC concurred and requested implementation of future shipments from CONUS, directing USSAG to monitor effectiveness and insure proper loading of barges at Vung Tau.

r. **Modification of 105mm Artillery Ammo Packaging Techniques.**

Representatives from USAMAA also discussed a new concept for packaging 105mm artillery ammunition that could result in a 30 percent reduction of pallet weight while allowing 42 rounds to be transported in place.
of the present 30 rounds per pallet. Subsequent information indicated that new packaging techniques were also being developed for 81mm mortar ammunition. CINCPAC requested evaluation of the proposed new concept. USSAG/7AF recommended that: the proposed packaging method be discussed at the March Ammo Conference - Pacific Area (scheduled for 18-21 March); an economic analysis, from production to firing, should be conducted for the items to assist in determination of true cost avoidance; testing should be conducted to include sealift, airdrop delivery, and outside storage. It was also strongly recommended that a test quantity (approximately 2,000 S/T) be packaged in proposed wirebound packs and shipped on the first available SCOOT-T vessel in order to gain actual experience on the viability of the concept. Discussion of the proposal at the conference revealed that apparent monetary advantages were currently outweighed by disadvantages and not to be further pursued for SCOOT-T at this time. The concept was recognized as having possible merit if using containerized shipments. Future consideration was recommended following normal development channels for economic operation without the special requirements associated with SCOOT-T.

NEMVAC PLANS (U)

Airlift of TCNs, U.S. Press and Civilian Personnel. The air movement of passengers from Phnom Penh to adjoining countries became a matter of great concern to the American Embassy as artillery and rocket attacks on Pochentong Airfield caused virtual cessation of commercial passenger flights. Air Cambodge was the sole commerical
airline which continued to fly; it flew on an infrequent basis. The AMEMB received an increasing number of requests for airlift of U.S. and other nationals out of Phnom Penh, using the C-130 and DC-8 aircraft employed in the airlift of rice, POL and military supplies to the beleaguered city. In mid-February CHX:EDTC requested blanket authority for the movement of selected U.S. and foreign nationals covered by the Embassy evacuation plan, utilizing Bird Air C-130 aircraft for space-available transportation from Phnom Penh to U-Tapao.23 AMEMB Phnom Penh would determine eligibility and control passenger movements.

The request was approved under the provisions of paragraphs 14-6 and 14-8, DOD Regulation 4515.13R, with movements to commence not earlier than 0600 hours, 12 February.24 USSAG advised AMEMB Phnom Penh and CHX:EDTC that a maximum of 22 seats were routinely available on cargo configured C-130 aircraft for backhaul of evacuees to U-Tapao and that in an emergency, 100 persons could be hauled if floor pallets were used.25 In early March, the U.S. press services approached the State Department with requests for assistance in the evacuation of their TCNs using the Bird Air C-130s and contract DC-8s. Both SECSTATE and SECDEF concurred in these requests, and authority was granted for evacuation to U-Tapao by DC-8s.26 This was later modified to include flights to Saigon. However, AMEMB Bangkok objected to the movement through U-Tapao, as the TCNs could not be properly processed through Thai customs.27 There was a potential for adverse reaction by the RTG with a risk of exposing reconnaissance
operations to the news media. The Embassy counterproposed that flights be routed to Saigon as a first choice, followed by Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, with U-Tapao being the last choice. It was also proposed that for those press service personnel having valid reasons for wanting to come to Thailand, it would be more prudent to use the regularly scheduled USAID aircraft scheduled into Don Muang Airport; proper customs processing could be handled there. The AMEMB Phnom Penh agreed and assured that it was planning to use the USAID charter flights to Bangkok or Saigon. The American Embassy Saigon agreed, recommending Don Muang to AMEMB Phnom Penh.  

During this same period of time, it was discovered that a waiver of FAA regulations requiring passenger briefings on the contract DC-6s on the use of oxygen equipment and evacuation procedures was needed before passengers could be backhauled.  

There was also a question of carrier liability in case of an accident. Headquarters MAC advised that the use of DD Form 1381 (Waiver of Liability) was unenforceable. No waiver was required of personnel being transported, as the government had already indemnified the carriers for passenger liability in the airlift support for Cambodia. Waiver of the FAA regulations required certification by SECSTATE that an emergency condition existed. On 27 March the waiver was granted. Other foreign national passenger movement complications were centered around requests to assist in the evacuation of foreign nationals assigned to allied embassies in Phnom Penh. A policy was requested that would permit the use of
DC-8s to carry limited numbers of these personnel to Saigon.32
On 31 March, the embassies of Thailand and Vietnam both requested assistance in moving some of their personnel. A request for guidance was telephonically passed to CINCPAC.

**Contract Operations (See also pts 19-21).** Comments and recommendations were provided to CINCPAC questions and proposals, as follows:

a. Two DC-8s on the ground simultaneously at Pochentong was preferable to night operations.33

b. Use of 747 aircraft was feasible, based on limited available information, and should be considered as an alternative. However, since charter cost was unknown, cost effectiveness should be considered.34

c. Proposed concept of operations could be handled by expanding/modifying the current command and control, flight scheduling, fragging, flight following and coordination functions.

d. USAID Phnom Penh be responsible for off-loading at Pochentong with assistance/coordination of CHMCIDTC as required.

e. Consideration should be given to use of Bird Air C-130 bladder airlift as overall solution to the delivery of the required POL products; use of 55-gallon drums, 500-gallon rubberized containers (seal drums) and the **Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System (ABFDS)** had been considered. POL products could be contracted for in the U-Tapao area by USAID. Under this concept, a USAID chartered
DC-8 would fly three missions per day from U-Tapao to Pochentong with MAP-CB cargo to offset six MAP-CB funded C-130 sorties delivering USAID POL.

f. If available, two additional 25K loaders and two 10K forklifts should be moved to Pochentong. Loaders in Thailand were committed. Additional material handling equipment (MHE) assets would have to come from sources outside of Thailand.

g. Based on past experience with DC-8 cargo operations, 18 pallets (5,000 to 5,500 pounds each) versus 14 pallets (6,500 pounds each) would facilitate ease of handling, expedite off-loading and still maximize allowable cabin load (ACL).

h. Requirement for airlift mission commander at Tan Son Nhut to act as single point of contact for coordination and supervision of contract DC-8/747 operations was valid.

Other involved agencies added information and assistance. CINCPACAF advised of many operational and support problems involved with use of 747s. CHMEDTC advised that two 25K loaders and six 10K Hyster forklifts would be needed to off-load two DC-8s at one time, but with assets already on-hand from the DC-8 munitions airlift only one additional 25K loader and two additional 10K forklifts would be required; that daylight operations with two DC-8s on the ground at the same time was preferable to partial nighttime operation; that the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC), Bangkok had advised against use of 747s as Pochentong ramp did not have sufficient concrete thickness. AMEM Saigon advised that necessary arrangements at Tan Son Nhut were being taken care of and that there was a need for 463L pallets, nets, and tie down equipment, one 25K loader and
one 10K forklift. MAC agreed to provide, as availability permitted, pallets, nets, tie downs and M4E; 500 pallets/nets were available from McGuire AFB, two 25K loaders were available at Clark AB and one 10K rough terrain forklift was available at Travis AFB.

Based on these inputs, a modified operations plan was forwarded to JCS on 20 February. On 22 February, the proposed plan was approved with the following exceptions and limitations:

a. If CSAF was unable to generate commercial assets to meet the 25 February start date, then one of the three DC-8s at U-Tapao airlifting munitions was to be pulled and a rice airlift started on 25 February, if date remained as a firm requirement. Additional commercial aircraft were to be input as soon as possible.

b. Approval/authorization was granted to commit up to $5.5 million in support of operations.

c. No additional personnel were authorized at Saigon or Phnom Penh to support this operation except for a mission commander at Tan Son Nhut, provided the ambassador concurred. With embassy concurrence, two individuals were authorized at Tan Son Nhut, arriving in place on 23 February. The chief, Logistics Management Division, USSAG/7AF, was selected to serve as the Seventh Air Force Supervisor of Airlift, Saigon, providing the required continuity, supervision and coordination with all concerned. An assistant from USSAG/7AF/DO was also authorized in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 5136. Subsequently, a contract administrator from 604MASS, Clark AB, was assigned to insure contract compliance, and a fourth
officer from USSAG/7A/PD was assigned to assist in the overall operation at Tan Son Nhut as a result of the expanded requirements.

Implementation of Rice/POL Airlift. MAC was directed to implement the airlift starting 27 February. A requirement for five stretch DC-8s was identified with two of the required aircraft to be provided by WCA and one by All at the termination of the MAP-C3 munition airlift from U-Tapao on 26 February. Of the two additional aircraft required, one was to be in place at Tan Son Nhut on 1 March with the remaining aircraft in position at U-Tapao on 4 March to assume airlift of MAP-C3 cargo to offset two C-130 aircraft scheduled to commence airlift of USAID POL on that date. On 27 February, with three DC-8s in position, a total of nine sorties were flown, delivering 425 S/T of rice to Phnom Penh. MAC provided additional 463L pallets from McGuire AFB; one 10K forklift from Travis AFB, one 25K loader from Clark AB and two 10K forklifts from Travis AFB were provided for the Pochentong off-load operation. On 23 February, Bird Air achieved the desired 30 sorties level per day with the attendant capability of delivering 600 S/T per day. On 1 March a Flying Tiger (FTL) stretch DC-8 was added to the operation at Tan Son Nhut and on 4 March the final aircraft, a Trans International (TIA) stretch DC-8 was positioned at U-Tapao.

DC-8 Off-Loading Operations at Pochentong. Off-loading of DC-8 aircraft at Pochentong was set up at the east end of the commercial ramp, the area formerly used by C-130 aircraft for off-loading munitions. Due to the increased frequency of rocket attacks
on Pochenton, impacting heavily on the commercial side of the airport, a decision was made to move operations across the airport to the military side, or "Charlie" ramp. The ramp, constructed of soil cement, was surveyed by engineers to determine its ability to withstand heavy DC-8 traffic, with several engineering opinions emerging as to the rate at which these surfaces would fail under sustained usage. An engineering analysis conducted by the 635th Civil Engineering Squadron, U-Tapao, indicated that the soil cement ramp would sustain up to 90 DC-8 sorties without failing; shear cracks could be expected from use by the heavily loaded DC-8s, but the base material would provide sufficient strength to prevent the soil cement from total failure in the form of depressions. Therefore, the opinion continued, aircraft should avoid cracks to prevent failure after only a few sorties, because the ramp was designed to accommodate C-119/C-47 aircraft. Further, since C-130s had been operating, some fatigue may have already been experienced. He recommended that if the ramp and taxiway was to be used, aircraft movement should be monitored by engineering personnel. While this would not preclude possibility of sudden failure, general trends and rate of deterioration could be evaluated.\(^{39}\)

On 27 February, CINCPAC and CINCPACAF concluded that regardless of which assessment was used, it appeared that the soil cement surfaces would fail under the anticipated usage, particularly in channelized traffic areas.\(^{40}\) The taxiway and the transition/loading
areas on Charlie ramp were the most suspect areas. AM-2 matting was recommended for installation on these areas, initially proposed to cover a 54-foot wide segment or two 10-12 foot wide tracks for the DC-6s plus an 80-foot area on Charlie ramp. Action was taken to move 200 bundles of AM-2 matting, located at Sattahip and marked for KASS, to Pochentong by airlift.

Actions taken to accomplish this effort included:

CHMEDTC would call forward the material and make the necessary KASS funds reprogramming actions; Bird Air C-130s would airlift the matting from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh, fitting this material into the scheme of other MAP commodities; USAID Phnom Penh agreed to share cost of the airlift (by flying three DC-6s of MAP cargo for the six C-130s of matting) since the matting was needed primarily for the DC-8 airlift operation; FANK engineers would install the matting after training at U-Tapao; and work would be done at night to prevent disruption of the airlift operation. On 3 March, release was requested for an additional 152 bundles of matting, required to surface a 36-foot (vice 54) wide segment lengthwise on taxiway One and a transition/DC-8 off-load/turn around area on Charlie ramp, so that the project could continue without interruption.

(U) The matting work started on taxiway One the night of 4 March and was completed on 8 March. The transition area on Charlie ramp was completed on 11 March. At project completion, approximately 235 bundles of AM-2 matting had been used; ten were
reserved for repair work, and 102 remained at U-Tapao. The complete DC-8 off-load/turn around area was not completed (accounting for the extra 102 bundles), because engineering and operational evaluation indicated that this portion of the Charlie ramp area was satisfactory without the matting. The completed project allowed for ingress and egress of Charlie ramp by DC-8s, using the primary taxiway, with C-130s entering via the main taxiway and exiting by the laterite taxiway.

C-130 Airlift of USAID POL. On 21 February, AYXM Saigon was queried as to the acceptability of the proposal for exchanging equivalent DC-8 sorties for C-130 POL sorties using the ABFDS to transport USAID bulk POL. The State Department concurred and approval was given for implementation provided that the C-130s carried POL at least equal to the amount that a DC-8 would be capable of delivering in one day; 120 cubic meters (CM) a day was noted as the minimum. Three ABFDSs had been obtained previously for the support of CHMEDTC requirements and two additional systems had to be obtained to support the USAID requirements; these items were secured from war reserve material stocks (HARVEST EAGLE) located at Yokota AB, Japan. (See also pgs 21-22).

This allowed for the use of two equipped C-130 aircraft to fly three sorties per day each for a total of six sorties, delivering 126 to 132 CM of POL. The requirement for kerosene could not be handled within the U-Tapao area, and USAID resorted to procurement of packaged kerosene in Saigon, dedicating a DC-8 sortie
every other day to the movement of this product into Pochentong. Requirements for MGCAS, AD0, and AVGAS were handled by C-130s flying out of U-Tapao. Starting 17 March, after a delay in obtaining permission for a fuel specialist to enter Cambodia, the operation to defuel JP4 from the C-130s was begun. This procedure was to increase the average ACL on each POL sortie by 1.73 S/T.

Cargo Operations at Tan Son Nhut AB. USAID Saigon was responsible for coordinating and arranging the transportation of rice and packaged kerosene in the local area, providing covered storage and palletization of items, loading of aircraft to include provision of some MHE, and control of pallets and nets. To accomplish these tasks, it was necessary to execute contracts covering various aspects of the operation. Stevedoring at the Saigon port and dryage to Tan Son Nhut cost $4 per metric ton (MT); off-loading at Tan Son Nhut at $3 per MT; pallet buildup at $10 per pallet; pallet buildup supervision and coordination of aircraft loading, movement of pallets, use of MHE, maintenance and security of government furnished MHE at $10 per pallet; loading and unloading of aircraft at $43.4 per flight; covered storage/pallet buildup at $3642 per month; and miscellaneous cost of $20,000.

Expansion of DC-8 USAID Rice/PCL Airlift. On 8 March, AGR3 Phnom Penh increased the daily requirement for rice to 700 MT, estimating that two additional DC-8s would be required. These two aircraft would raise the number of contract support aircraft to six.
The embassy estimated that 16.25 sorties at 40 MT per sortie would be required to support these increased requirements. USAID Washington was requested to make the assets available as soon as possible. AMEMB Saigon suggested, based on their experience, that five aircraft could lift 601 net MT of rice a day with four sorties daily per aircraft; four aircraft could lift 641 net MT per day. This would be reduced by 40 MT every other day when one sortie of kerosene was hauled.

SECSTATE requested that SECDEF increase the daily rice airlift average and confirm the capability of five aircraft to provide the new requirement, while staying within the $5.5 million project ceiling.

The expanded airlift was executed on 12 March by JCS, directing necessary arrangements for DC-8s and MHE to move the required rice and POL. JCS further advised that no additional U.S. personnel would be authorized in Saigon or Phnom Penh, funding limitations of $5.5 million would apply, and a "no comment" reply would be given to all news media queries. CINCPAC directed implementation as soon as the fifth DC-8 aircraft was in place, suggesting that USAID Saigon increase the labor force and lease or rent additional MHE to support the revised requirements. CINCPACAF recommended that Pan Am provide the additional MHE, being more cost effective than airlifting the equipment from the CONUS. PACAF would provide 200 additional pallets and 400 side nets to Saigon on 14 or 15 March. MAC was requested to provide, as soon as
possible, still another 150 pallets, 250 top nets and 100 side nets to meet the expanded needs.

On 15 March, MAC Phnom Penh reiterated the 700 MT per day requirement and cited as unacceptable the 440 MT per day (11 sorties) average since the airlift began.52 It was pointed out that the discrepancy between delivery and distribution requirements would exhaust rice stores about 16 April.

USSAG/7AF advised that a minimum of 18 sorties per day were necessary to meet the required tonnage.53 Further, using the MAC contract scheduling effectiveness rate of 80 percent, 22.6 sorties must be scheduled to attain the required level of 18. Although a scheduling effectiveness rate of 85 percent had been experienced in the operation, the sustained sortie rate could not be produced with four aircraft. Five DC-8s could surge to the required level provided maintenance problems or battle damage did not disable any aircraft. Six DC-8s would be required to produce and sustain the required 18 sorties per day capability and augmentation was requested as soon as possible.

On 18 March, MAC indicated that six DC-8s were contracted for use in the airlift (5-6 operating during the period 15-26 March).54 However, on 26 Mar 75, the $5.5 million would be exhausted causing cessation without any additional funds. On 19 March, SECESTATE increased the USAID rice/POL lift dollars by $8 million to extend the DC-8 operation for another 30 days.55

Battle damage, with resultant down time, and contractual
fluctuations caused the following schedule of aircraft available for airlift, during the closing days of the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL A/C Available</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>Contract terminated for WOA 305 at COB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>Three DC-8s operating (one each, WOA, AII, FTL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>28 March</td>
<td>WOA 805 available after MAC renegotiated to use the in-place aircraft for an additional seven days (28 March-3 April).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>Added Seaboard World (SEW) DC-8 commenced flying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>30 March</td>
<td>A second FTL DC-8 added.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>A second SEW DC-8 additionally contracted by MAC to help meet requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Airlift Interruptions/Volume. Between 27 February and 31 March, 1427 total sorties were flown into Cambodia despite the ever increasing accuracy and frequency of ABFs in and around Pochentong Airport. Temporary interruptions occurred on three occasions:

a. On 11 March TIA representatives notified the Seventh Air Force Supervisor of Airlift, U-Tapao, that they had terminated their operation into Cambodia after two of four scheduled sorties due to the risk from artillery and rocket attacks. They agreed, however, to reassess the security situation the next day. Two hours later, without knowledge of the TIA decision, the other three carriers operating out of Tan Son Nhat advised of their intent to suspend operations after the third sortie of each aircraft. They did, however, indicate their willingness to fly five sorties with each of their three aircraft in conjunction with a significant
b. On 21 and 22 March aircraft were damaged three times at Pochentong. On 21 March TIA aircraft sustained shrapnel damage to the nose section on the first sortie of the day. On 22 March a TIA aircraft and a Bird Air C-130 were damaged severely enough to be left on the ground and operations were suspended. The following day, only one airland sortie was flown into Pochentong carrying equipment and personnel to prepare the grounded aircraft for flight to U-Tapao. The TIA craft was flown to U-Tapao where sufficient maintenance was performed to enable the plane to be flown to Hong Kong for complete repair. The C-130 was returned to U-Tapao for repair there. On 24 March, with the exception of TIA, all carriers flew as scheduled.

c. On 28 March, airland operations were suspended at 0040Z hours due to ABFs. No DC-8s landed and only three C-130 sorties were able to off-load. On 29 March operations returned to normal.

Between 27 February and 31 March, 414 rice sorties and 13 POL sorties were flown by the DC-8s with 19,512 S/T of rice and 595 S/T of kerosene being delivered to Phnom Penh. In addition, 149 C-130 POL sorties were flown by Bird Air in support of USAID with 2,853 S/T of other POL products (including 27 S/T of JP4 defuel) being moved from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh during the period 27-31 March. NAF-CB reccored 57 DC-8 sorties from USAID, delivering 2,725 S/T
of MAP supplies to Phnom Penh from U-Tapao, in return for USAID use of the MAP funded Bird Air C-130s delivering PCL. The cumulative figures for the airlift through 31 March are shown at Figure 6.

(U) Resulting C-130 airland and airdrop statistics are shown at Figures 7 and 8. Commodities transported by surface modes are reflected at Figure 9.

MAP-CB Transportation Charges (FAC A\$:4). Congress imposed a $200 million limitation on FY 75-MAP-CB. However, they further authorized an additional $75 million of special authority funds under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act. By the end of December 1974, all but $6.5 million of the initial $200 million MAP funds had been expended. A Presidential Determination, processed by the State Department, was required before any of the up to $75 million could be provided to Cambodia under the Section 506 special authority. Presidential Determination 75-9 authorized the additional expenditures. The Foreign Assistance Act also changed accounting procedures, directly impacting on the transportation picture. Previously, transportation costs for the movement of MAP-CB supplies had been charged against world-wide PCH&T funds. Under the 1974 Act, all transportation costs for MAP-CB would be reimbursed from the total MAP-CB authorization. Costs chargeable against the PCH&T funds included: operation of the Bird Air C-130 contract airlift; all contracts in support of the Mekong tug and barge operation; port handling costs and highway
AIRLIFT - TII/PVE TO CAMBODIA

As of 31 March 1975

Report of tonnage delivered (short. tcns) to date (inclusive) from 27 February 1975:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARRIER</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>RICE</th>
<th>GENNOS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. WOA</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>596.1</td>
<td>7835.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8431.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. AII</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4956.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4956.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FTL</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5994.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5994.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TIA</td>
<td>60*</td>
<td>2714.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>141.6*</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2866.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SBW</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>585.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>607.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BIRD</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>8218.2</td>
<td>7390.3</td>
<td>613.9</td>
<td>1659.6</td>
<td>17882.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. &quot; MAP</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>8218.2</td>
<td>4538.3</td>
<td>613.9</td>
<td>1659.6</td>
<td>15030.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. &quot; AID</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2852.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2852.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. TOTAL MAP</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>10933.0</td>
<td>4538.3</td>
<td>613.9</td>
<td>1659.6</td>
<td>17755.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. TOTAL AID</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>3440.6</td>
<td>19512.3</td>
<td>691.6</td>
<td>40738.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

(1) WOA, AII, FTL and SBW fly from Tan Son Nhut carrying AID products, primarily rice.

(2) TIA and Bird Air fly from U-Tapao, TIA carrying MAP cargo and Bird Air carrying MAP cargo and AID POL.

(3) Exceptions to notes (1) and (2) are identified below:

* Three USAID rice sorties flown either from Tan Son Nhut or with rice loaded at Tan Son Nhut. The sortie count and tonnage for these three sorties are computed into the "Total AID" figures.

Figure 6
C-130 AIRLAND STATISTICS

NAP-Cambodia Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>AVERAGE SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>AVERAGE SHORT TONS/SORITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munitions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-31 (Note 1)</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 (Note 2)</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-28 (Note 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 (Note 3)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-31 (Note 3)</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 (Note 1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-31</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-14 (Note 4)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-28</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Cargo:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>17.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
1. Decision made to airland critical items to Phnom Penh due to delay in Mekong Convoy sailing.
2. Gross aircraft cargo load increased to maximum of 24 S/T by stripping aircraft of unnecessary items.
3. Due to funding limitations for munitions, daily deliveries had to be reduced to conserve funds causing a reduction in airlands after 10 April.
4. Arrival of Mekong convoys TP-112 and TP-113 at Phnom Penh in late January eliminated POL airland requirements during this period.

Figure 7
C-130 AIRDROP STATISTICS
NAP-Cambodia Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>AVERAGE SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>AVERAGE SHORT TONS/SORTIE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8
## SURFACE DELIVERY STATISTICS

### MAP-Cambodia Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>Short Tons Delivered:</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munitions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Cargo:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL by Commodity:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Munitions</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>General Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,768</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td>7,444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>5,322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL by Mode:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mekong River</th>
<th>Road</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,259</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9
transportation costs incurred by MACTHAI Support Group for MAP-CB supplies; ocean transportation costs for general cargo and munitions delivered directly from CONUS to Vung Tau; delivered by deep draft vessel from Vung Tau to Koompong Som and Vung Tau; CONUS port handling costs; CONUS inland transportation costs; and air shipments to include special assignment airlift mission. As a result, $55.045 million of the total $5 million special authority funds was set aside for MAP-CB PCMT expenditures. Subsequent to the Presidential Determination, SECDEF initiated action to closely control all future expenditures of MAP-CB PCMT funds, advising that, effectively immediately, all transportation costs citing TAC A454 would be referred to SECDEF/DSA (Comptroller) for approval prior to implementation. CINCPAC's implementation of the SECDEF procedures required submission on a case-by-case basis to CINCPAC for review prior to forwarding to SECDEF/DSA. On 18 February, SECDEF advised that the monies set aside for TAC A454 had been fully committed and that any additional requirements could be funded only with the identification of compensating decreases in FY 75 MAP-CB requirements. A breakdown of the TAC A454 commitments was requested from CINCPAC, as data on actual expenditures incurred previous to the SECDEF directive had not been provided to CHMEDTC. The request was subsequently forwarded to JCS. SECDEF subsequently directed CONSC to provide information relative to SOOT costs so that the necessary cost data would be available to accurately control
the legislative ceiling on assistance to Cambodia. Specifically requested were the costs accrued for the period 1 Jul 74 to 29 Feb 75 by certain major categories and an estimate of additional weekly accrued costs by category to be incurred during March 1975, reporting actual expenditures at the end of each week during March. The submitted data reflected a total cost of $14.5 million as being accrued for the period in question and an estimated additional cost of $580,000 to be incurred each week during March. Further, an estimate of $2.6 million was made for contract cancellations/terminations if effected on 28 February. SECDEF then provided a breakdown of the PCHET funds status reflecting that as of 28 February $9.4 million had been committed. 64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface Transportation</td>
<td>$17.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird Air Contract</td>
<td>4.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-day DC-8 Augmentation</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Modes</td>
<td>26.6 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the meantime, SECDEF had directed that all ongoing contractual negotiations for new or expanded SCOOT requirements, excepting airland and airdrop operations, were to be suspended short of contract award and fund commitment. For those suspended requirements considered essential requests with offsetting decreases to funded FY 75 MAP requirements were to be submitted for approval. 65 CCWSE Far East obtained the cost data for the extension of the existing Vung Tau stevedore contract, shield barge security/maintenance/
repair contract and cargo documentation services and requested approval for the expenditure of the funds.\textsuperscript{66} The expenditure was approved on 20 March. However, on 29 March, CINCPAC directed termination of all SOCCOT surface support contracts funded by MAP-CB as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{67} SECDEF subsequently approved this action and provided guidance on actions to be taken.\textsuperscript{68} However, due to the worsening situation in South Vietnam, the available tugs and barges on contract to MAP-CB had been loaned to DAO Saigon on 24 March for use in evacuating refugees from coastal towns and cities in the northern part of South Vietnam and would be required for an extended period of time.\textsuperscript{69} Arrangements were then made for DAO Saigon to pick up the daily per diem for the tugs and barges being used, relieving MAP-CB funds.\textsuperscript{70} Action to terminate the other contracts was subsequently initiated by COMSEC Far East on 30 March.\textsuperscript{71}\\nAMMUNITION - CAMBODIA (U)\\n
Management of ammunition stockage in Cambodia was complicated by two factors: the ammunition budget, critically low on January 1, was virtually depleted by the dry season offensive which started on 3 Jan 75; and the closing of the Mekong necessitated heavy reliance on ammunition airlift (both airdrop and airland).

Phnom Penh Ammunition Stockage. Because of the factors mentioned above, stocks in Phnom Penh declined from 18,150 S/T (15,400 S/T ground and 2,750 S/T air munitions)\textsuperscript{72} on 3 Jan 75 to
8,473 S/T (7,772 S/T ground and 701 S/T munitions) on 20 Mar 75. The average monthly stockage for the quarter and country-wide month expenditures are shown in Figure 10. January expenditures were particularly high due to renewed operations by FANK, MKK and KAF in efforts to keep the Mekong open.

Ammunition Airland into Cambodia. The Mekong closure caused complete reversal in the earlier trend of reduced ammo airlands as depicted in Figure 11.

Deployment of CEU-55. Introduction of the Mid-air explosive weapons system (CEU-55) into Cambodia was accomplished in late January. The CEU-55 gave the KAF an additional capability for clearing operations along the Mekong River banks in support of convoys. Subsequently, employment was expanded to other targets including attempts to detonate river mines by means of hydrostatic shock waves induced by the CEU-55. Its use for this purpose was determined not to be cost effective. (See also pg 88).

AMMUNITION - VIETNAM (U)

Visibility of ARVN Assets. Subsequent to the receipt of 34,000 S/T of excess Lao and Thai reserve stocks in January, the ground ammunition posture began to deteriorate. As of 24 March, a total of 75,686 S/T were on-hand in the 13 operational ARVN depots. Five depots were lost during the period due to NVA/VC activity (Ban Me Thout, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bai, Chu Lai). Distribution by Area Logistical Command (ILC) and Military Region of the remaining
AMMUNITION STOCKAGE
PHNOM PENH

THOUSANDS
OF
SHORT TONS

UTILIZATION

GND
AIR

JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
MONTHLY ANNO HIPPMENTS

PHNOM PENH

AIRLAND AND MEKONG

THOUSAND TONS

JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN

MEKONG  AIRLAND
stocks was as follows (also see Figure 12):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALC</th>
<th>MR</th>
<th>Short Tons (Thousands)</th>
<th>Dollars (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>202.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 28 March, a total of 12,622 S/T was effectively lost at Da Nang, further reducing the total stockage.

As of 24 March, ground ammunition on-hand, by category was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>S/T</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>6,751</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kortar</td>
<td>10,611</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>52,373</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade &amp; Signal</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>2,394</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Comp/Misc</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75,686</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>202.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The March Vietnam Ammunition Monthly Program requisition for $23 million (1,901 S/T) completed requisitioning activity for FY 75, considering the normal pipeline time of 90 days. The
program for FY 75 totaled $239.2 million.

During the period, a total of 59,243 S/T were received; 73,563 S/T were issued. Issues cost an average of $2,011 per S/T.

Based on a daily expenditure rate (DER) of 617 S/T, which represents the daily average for the previous 90 days, and in consideration of 32,630 S/T due-in, a balance of 23,450 S/T was forecast for 1 July. However, with the fall of Da Nang, the forecasted quantity was reduced to 15,828 S/T. With an anticipated increase in combat intensity, as evidenced by a peak of daily issues averaged 1,351 S/T, the end of the year position was forecasted at the following rates and expressed in days of supply (DOS) at the intensive combat rate (ICR) and DER:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DER</th>
<th>Due-in</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>1 July</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>DOS</th>
<th>DOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td>15,823</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>817</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>80,066</td>
<td>7,694</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>88,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>107,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>95,894</td>
<td>117,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On-hand stocks, plus quantities due-in, equates to 53 DOS at the ICR, or 71 DOS at the daily average of 1,351 S/T for the past two weeks.

During March, MAC Saigon computed and implemented a revised Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) which, together with an average 13
percent cost increase (effective 24 March), resulted in the cost per day increasing from $1,191,503 to $1,529,622. The Department of Defense Identification (DODICS) are actively monitored by USSAG/7AF. These actions resulted in the cost per S/T for the TSR increasing from $2,075 to $2,234.

As a further result of the revised TSR and an updating of on-hand density figures, the Stockage Objective was increased from 126,150 S/T to the following: (a 6.5 percent increase)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockage Objective</th>
<th>Current Percent</th>
<th>Proposed Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 DOS at Vietnam supply rate</td>
<td>112,430 S/T</td>
<td>1,874 S/T per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 DOS at TSR</td>
<td>21,223 S/T</td>
<td>(764 S/T per day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Days Training</td>
<td>2,277 S/T</td>
<td>(194 S/T per day)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60 DAYS AT VIETNAM SUPPLY RATE

USSAG/7AF proposed a common SEA ICR to representatives of ARVN, DAO Saigon and CHICCC during a "mini-ammo conference" held in Saigon on 6 March. The proposed rate would alter utilization by type weapon category as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Percent</th>
<th>Proposed Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Savings are to be realized by altering the expenditure rates of
artillery versus mortars. For example, an increase in 81mm mortars and a corresponding decrease in 105mm artillery alone would equate to an annual savings of approximately $12 million.

Comparative ammunition consumption data for the U.S. Army Vietnam (USAVN) and USAF with the ARVN and the VNAAF is provided, as available, at Figure 13 for the period 1963 through 1974. A breakout of VNAAF ammo expenditures for the period July 1972 through March 1975 is attached at Figure 14. ARVN expenditures for the period 1968 through 1974 are shown at Figure 15. During CY 69, RVNAF forces fired only 17.6 percent of the total ammunition consumed in the country. In 1970, this percentage increased to 23.8, in 1973 to 34.6, and in 1972 it was 47.2 percent. Since the Cease-Fire was signed in January 1973, consumption has all been by RVNAF forces.

Ground ammunition expenditures averaged $2,356 S/T per month during the six-month period preceding the cease-fire. During CY 73, residual combat activity declined, with $236,510 S/T being expended during the first six months and $96,562 S/T expended during the last half of the year. Expenditures remained relatively stable from July 1973 through July 1974, averaging approximately $15,707 S/T. In-country ammunition stock was reduced from 177,600 S/T, the level at cease-fire, to 118,100 S/T by the end of July 1974. Since then ARVN has operated under stringent expenditure controls, averaging $19,584 S/T per month.
## CONSUMPTION HISTORY

(In Thousands of Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CY 1963</td>
<td>USARV - 15.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 39.2</td>
<td>VNAF - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1964</td>
<td>USARV - 128.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 54.0</td>
<td>VNAF - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1965</td>
<td>USARV - 360.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 119.5</td>
<td>VNAF - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1966</td>
<td>USARV - 648.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 139.3</td>
<td>VNAF - 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1967</td>
<td>USARV - 915.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>153.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 126.0</td>
<td>VNAF - 37.9</td>
<td>153.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1968</td>
<td>USARV - 1,028.0</td>
<td>US - 0</td>
<td>262.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 222.7</td>
<td>VNAF - 39.6</td>
<td>262.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1969</td>
<td>USARV - 907.0</td>
<td>US - 659.3</td>
<td>1,576.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 253.2</td>
<td>VNAF - 43.5</td>
<td>1,576.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1970</td>
<td>USARV - 650.0</td>
<td>US - 695.3</td>
<td>1,385.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 377.1</td>
<td>VNAF - 55.5</td>
<td>1,385.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1971</td>
<td>USARV - 320.0</td>
<td>US - 656.2</td>
<td>976.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 445.2</td>
<td>VNAF - 73.0</td>
<td>976.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1972</td>
<td>USARV - 40.0</td>
<td>US - 958.3</td>
<td>998.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 793.0</td>
<td>VNAF - 95.5</td>
<td>998.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 1973</td>
<td>USARV - 0</td>
<td>US - 401.0*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN - 333.1</td>
<td>VNAF - 58.5</td>
<td>391.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* U.S. bombing ceased in August; 401.0 was mainly in support of FNX.

CY 1974 | ARVN - 205.2 | VNAF - 46.4 | 251.6

Figure 13
**RVNAF AIMO EXPENDITURES**

(Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>7,387</td>
<td>96,187</td>
<td>103,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>102,577</td>
<td>110,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>7,495</td>
<td>72,393</td>
<td>79,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>8,955</td>
<td>62,275</td>
<td>71,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>8,165</td>
<td>73,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>8,595</td>
<td>Avg 52,855</td>
<td>Avg 61,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>Avg 85,460</td>
<td>Avg 93,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>7,907</td>
<td>89,002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>9,574</td>
<td>79,447</td>
<td>89,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>4,242</td>
<td>22,434</td>
<td>26,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>12,272</td>
<td>16,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,835</td>
<td>11,767</td>
<td>15,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>5,894</td>
<td>15,160</td>
<td>21,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>10,387</td>
<td>12,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>15,887</td>
<td>20,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>14,774</td>
<td>18,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>3,758</td>
<td>18,921</td>
<td>22,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>3,719</td>
<td>18,371</td>
<td>22,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>Avg 18,216</td>
<td>15,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,984</td>
<td>Avg 19,691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td>Avg 23,686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>5,196</td>
<td>18,472</td>
<td>23,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>4,411</td>
<td>15,277</td>
<td>19,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>3,134</td>
<td>13,798</td>
<td>16,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>4,425</td>
<td>13,280</td>
<td>17,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4,047</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td>17,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>3,791</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>21,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>16,464</td>
<td>19,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>5,469</td>
<td>23,242</td>
<td>23,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>22,687</td>
<td>26,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>Avg 17,083</td>
<td>19,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>Avg 15,221</td>
<td>17,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4,795</td>
<td>Avg 18,647</td>
<td>23,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>23,025</td>
<td>26,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>22,091</td>
<td>26,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>6,158</td>
<td>29,447</td>
<td>35,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 14*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Short Tons/Month</th>
<th>Short Tons/Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>222,200</td>
<td>18,517</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>292,606</td>
<td>24,384</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>376,239</td>
<td>31,358</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>444,228</td>
<td>37,009</td>
<td>1,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>796,264</td>
<td>66,355</td>
<td>2,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>333,067</td>
<td>27,756</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>205,450</td>
<td>17,121</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15
(U) **VNAP Annex.** Depot losses in the closing days of March placed the VNAP ammunition inventory in a critical position:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Stock (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Cat</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>4,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remaining stocks as of 25 March consisted of 20,000 S/T located at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Thuy.

Based upon a DER of 158 S/T, the daily average for the previous 90 days, a balance of 4,516 S/T (29 DCS) was forecast for 1 July. However, daily issues during the period 10-24 March averaged 270 S/T. If this increased expenditure rate continued, the supply would be exhausted by 6 June.

**LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT (U)**

**VNAP Airlift Self-Sufficiency.** The approved plan to attain KASS made substantial progress during this quarter. 77 Five C-123K aircraft were delivered to the GKR, and a sixth was enroute as the quarter ended. To recap: (1) Seven aircraft were originally scheduled for delivery—five from CONUS and two from Clark AB, representing a change directed by CINCPACAF in which two KC-125s were transferred as an expedient; 78 (2) One was delivered in December 1974,
five during the quarter and one is enroute. This brings the KAF C-123K assets to an end position of 16.

The C-123 Mobile Training Team (MIT) at Udorn RTAFB normally uses four or five of these assets while the remaining aircraft are used daily by the KAF, with seven or eight normally in operationally ready condition. The average number of sorties per day stayed in line with the six month average of 22. Airdrop missions, with an average ACL of six S/T, however, increased from two or three to approximately ten per day. Further, the KAF started employing the C-123K as a bomb platform.

(U) The MIT training schedule for C-123 maintenance personnel progressed smoothly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Graduated</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb 75</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5 reciprocating engine, 3 propeller and 4 hydraulic mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar 75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8 airplane general, 3 electric and 4 jet engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar 75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>corrosion control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar 75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>maintenance control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first flying training class began training on 27 Jan 75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Graduated</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar 75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6 pilots, 4 co-pilots, 5 flight mechanics, 5 leadmasters and 5 navigators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second element of maintenance/aircrew personnel began training on 26 Mar 75.
Hostilities at Pochentong airfield frustrated the construction effort associated with the KASS. Little or no progress was made with aerial port construction, although repairs were made to the laterite taxiway, making it usable for C-123s and other traffic. In early March, KASS AM-2 matting was diverted for use on taxiway One and Charlie ramp to support the DC-8 USAID rice/POL airlift operation (see also pgs 140-143). The following is the status of KASS construction funds at the end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Current Work Estimate</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AM-2 Matting</td>
<td>$162,272</td>
<td>$111,328</td>
<td>$47,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Port Construction</td>
<td>73,493</td>
<td>71,493</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield Repair</td>
<td>19,792</td>
<td>15,792</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Handling</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved for Additional Repair Work</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,843</td>
<td>15,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>$276,400</td>
<td>$201,613</td>
<td>$74,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded Total</td>
<td>$326,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EC-47 Aircraft for VNAF/RTAF/ROKAF.** The project to transfer EC-47/ALR-35 equipped aircraft to the VNAF, EC-47/ALR-34 equipped aircraft to the RTAF and EC-47/UHF only equipped aircraft to the ROKAF came to a stand-still due to the political/military situation in Vietnam, transfer costs and funding constraints. It now appears that the
RTAF is no longer interested because of cost consideration, the VXAF still has reservations and aircraft update is still required before the transfer to the ROKAF.\textsuperscript{79}

The dwindling maintenance and aircrew support for EC-47 aircraft in the 56th SOW, coupled with the uncertain final beddown and deteriorating aircraft condition, caused CSAF to direct temporary storage of these assets at Udorn RTAFB.\textsuperscript{80}

The 15 EC-47 aircraft were relocated to Udorn RTAFB on 10 Mar 75, awaiting further disposition instructions.

**PLANS AND PROGRAMS (U)**

**CHMEDTC Automated Ammunition Data System (MAADS).** The two primary areas of the MAADS, inventory and funds management, were significantly impacted during this quarter. The surge in the level of military activity that closed the Mekong River for ammunition resupply and the scarcity of MAP-C3 funds resulted in CHMEDTC requesting funds credit for the ammunition located on barges at Vung Tau awaiting shipment to Phnom Penh.\textsuperscript{81} In obtaining the credit, the MAADS transactions required identification and reverse-posting by call forward. Due to the scope of the airland and airdrop effort, CHMEDTC required several personnel at Pochentong to monitor aircraft off-loading and verify ammunition loads, causing deferment and/or termination of some CHEDC administrative tasks due to the loss of these personnel from their duty sections.

Valid DODIC expenditure rates were maintained throughout this quarter. Per CHMEDTC request, USSAG/7AF updated the MAADS by
registering CHMEDTC call forwards and documenting all information (call forward, receipt and issue) concerning airdrops. The issue status for other than airdropped ammunition was input into the MAADS by CHMEDTC. CHMEDTC ceased updating the receipt portion of their inventory system in early January 1975.

Also during this quarter, a FY 74 ammunition funds reconciliation was completed. Initially, a figure of $22.1 million was identified as available within 26 different FY 74 report control numbers (RCNs) for 13 different DODICs. The funds availability was then reduced to $21.5 million with the revised computations indicating only $20.9 million.

CHMEDTC had already called forward $10,581,120 worth of ammunition using the FY 74 reconciled RCNs when SECDEF placed a hold on use of the reconciled funds. CHMEDTC and USSAC then examined the call forwards that used FY 74 funds to determine if they could be covered with FY 75 funds.

Since the FY 74 ammunition funds were managed by RCN and DODIC, it was impossible to place call forwards in the file citing FY 74 funds without having the respective RCN in file. Therefore, receipts of call forwards using FY 74 funds could not be documented in the MAADS. Thus, CHMEDTC had the requirement to simultaneously maintain FY 75 funds status (ground, air and navy munitions) and FY 74 funds information under DODIC/RCN funding procedures, while being faced with a decreased manning due to airland operation requirements.
Subsequently SECDEF released a lump sum of $110 million of the FY 74 funds. CINCPAC had already requested and received SECDEF approval to change the RCNs cited on some recent call forwards and cite FY 74 vice FY 75 RCNs. This effort provided funds flexibility for future call forwards rather than having only FY 74 funds available which were locked into specific DODICs. This RCN reverse-posting action was accomplished by CINCPAC immediately after the remainder, or $11.5 million, was released.

Subsequent to that release, Headquarters, Department of the Army discovered the $4.6 million of the $11.5 million that was to be available had been transferred to the USAF on 20 May 74. Another reverse-posting action of ammunition RCNs was required by CINCPAC.

While the upheavals in the ammunition funds status were occurring, the NAP-CB total funds availability was decreasing to a point where it was practically nonexistent. In order to balance the overall program, some funds had to be withdrawn from ammunition to cover expenses in other critical areas. The almost constant switching of funds status as well as the decreased administrative manning at CINCPAC had a negative effect on the MAADS operation.

(U) The primary advantages of MAADS, providing useful information with minimal expense of manhours, timely information from a vast array of data, and a document register for NAP-CB ammunition transactions, were subsequently severely curtailed.
(U) One MAADS report, The Ground/Air Munitions Status (GAMS) report, continued to be a key management tool provided to and used by CIMEDTC. Prior to this quarter, the GAMS report computed DODIC expenditure rates automatically at the end of the month. A program change was implemented in March 1975 through which CIMEDTC and this headquarters could obtain expenditure rates, via the GAMS report, for any specific period of interest, e.g., 10 Feb - 4 Mar 75.

(U) Various "spin-off" computer programs were developed, using the MAADS data base and computer support facilities though not an integral part of the MAADS. The two most useful programs assist CIMEDTC in daily coordination with the airlift source. Each program identifies by DODIC the quantity of items that CIMEDTC should call forward in order to maintain a balanced supply position in the depot for a given projection period and a given constraint. One program was developed using an airlift capacity constraint; the other program operates with a funds constraint. The results from both programs may be transmitted by Autodin to CIMEDTC from the USSAG Strike Computer.

POL. The POL stock balance in Cambodia declined throughout the quarter with only 5,634 CM reaching Phnom Penh by the Mekong prior to its closure. The stocks ranged from a high of 30,389 CM at the start of the quarter to a low of 6,622 CM at the end. The airlift operation was very successful in supplying both the military and civil fuel requirements for Phnom Penh.
A summary of gallons delivered by the airlift between 16 January and 31 March follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAP/Military</th>
<th>Civil/USAID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>289,599 gallons</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>362,215 gallons</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOCAS</td>
<td>609,089 gallons</td>
<td>134,105 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADO</td>
<td>542,201 gallons</td>
<td>665,883 gallons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the first week in February, the storage capability in Phnom Penh was reduced by 7,500 MT to 31,460 MT with the PAXX transfer of the fuel stored in their depot at Prek Phnou to more secure storage in Phnom Penh.

The civil fuel conservation measures continued to be effective with consumption levels declining to approximately 25 percent of the usage last year. The military consumption levels increased slightly due to the increased level of activity.

Rice. The rice situation in Cambodia continued to worsen during the quarter with stocks in Phnom Penh declining from 36,000 (47 DOS) on 1 Jan 75 to 7,650 MT (13 DOS) on 31 Mar 75. Only 6,755 MT of rice reached the city by the Mekong prior to its closure. The USAID airlift stabilized the rice stocks in Phnom Penh at approximately 13 DOS. During the month of February, the daily distribution rate was cut from 770 MT to 545 MT as a conservation method. However, during the month of March the rate increased to 700 MT a day due to the Title II program of providing free rice to displaced persons and needy families.
Airdrop of rice to Cambodia by Bird Air C-130 continued to operate from U-Tapao dropping a total of 755 S/T during the quarter. The rice supply for this effort continued to be a problem due to clearance of only small quantities into Thailand by the RTG. One shipment of 660 S/T was cleared during the period with only 517 S/T on-hand for delivery at the end of the quarter.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

1. Msg (C), CINCPAC to SECDEF (and others), 270340Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Tugs and Barges (U).

2. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CINCPAC, 280925Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Tugs and Barges (U).

3. Msg (C), SECDEF to COMSCFE, 292115Z Feb 75, Subj: SCOOT Fire Fighting Tugs (U).

4. Msg (C), CINCPAC to USSAG (and others), 033237Z Mar 75, Subj: SCOOT Tugs and Barges/Protection of Ammo with Rice (U).

5. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMSCFE, 070442Z Mar 75, Subj: Additional Tugs for TC-106 (U).


7. Msg (C), COMSCFE to CINCPAC and COMSC, 050731Z Mar 75, Subj: Contract TC-106 (U).

8. Msg (C), USSAG/TAF/IO to CINCPAC, 100840Z Mar 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Requirements (U).


10. Msg (C), AMEM Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 130902Z Mar 75, Subj: Request for Loan of Fire Fighting Tugs (U).


14. Msg (C), COMSC to COMSCFE, 212257Z Feb 75, Subj: None.

15. Msg (C), AMEM Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, 120910Z Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoys - Use and Indemnification M5C Assets (U).
27. Msg (C), MAC/SAO to MAC/SAO, 050315Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).
30. Msg (C), MAC to MAC/SAO, 050315Z Mar 75, Subj: Evacuation of TCNs Employed by US Press Services (U).
31. Msg (U), MAC to MAC/SAO, 271440Z Mar 75, Subj: None.
32. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 111155Z Mar 75, 
Subj: One of AID Chartered DC-8 Rice Airlift Flights for 
Passengers from Phnom Penh to Saigon (U).

33. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG and CHDC/EAG, 150520Z Feb 75, Subj: 
Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

34. Msg (S), USSAG/7AP/LO to CINCPAC, 261615Z Feb 75, Subj: 
Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

35. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 280415Z Feb 75, Subj: Cambodian 
Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

36. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 221555Z Feb 75, Subj: Commercial 
Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

37. Msg (S), CSAP to MAC, 221800Z Feb 75, Subj: Commercial 
Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

38. Msg (C), SEAAC/7AF SOA U-Tapao to CINCPACAF, 250252Z Feb 75, 
Subj: Engineering Analysis of Charlie Ramp, Pochentong Airport, 
Cambodia (U).

39. Msg (U), OICC Thailand to USSAG, 260420Z Feb 75, Subj: 
Analysis of Soil Cement Apron.

40. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CHDC/EAG, 270722Z Feb 75, Subj: Operation 
on Charlie Ramp Pochentong Airport (U). Msg (C), CINCPACAF to 
USSAG, 270315Z Feb 75, Subj: Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong 
Airport (U).

41. Msg (C), USSAG/7AP/LO to CINCPACAF, 022235Z Mar 75, Subj: 
Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong Airport (U).

42. Msg (C), USSAG/7AP/LO to CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 031235Z Mar 75, 
Subj: Charlie Ramp Taxiway - Pochentong Airport (U).

43. Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Saigon, 220415Z Feb 75, Subj: 
Cambodian Airlift Contingency Planning (U).

44. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Phnom Penh, 282240Z Feb 75, Subj: 
None.

45. Msg (C), SEAAC/7AF SOA U-Tapao to CINCPACAF, 171155Z Mar 75, 
Subj: Cambodian Airlift Summary Report No 23, as of 171000Z 
Mar 75 (U).
46. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 031136Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Rice Airlift (U).

47. Msg (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 101020Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Rice Airlift (U).

48. Msg (C), SECSTATE to SECDEF, 102152Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice and POL Airlift to Phnom Penh (U).

49. Msg (S), JCS to CSAF and CINCPAC, 121938Z Mar 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

50. Msg (S), CINCPAC to USSAG, 130819Z Mar 75; Subj: Commercial Airlift for Cambodia - USAID (U).

51. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, MAC and 6APS, 140355Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice and POL Airlift - Phnom Penh (U).

52. Msg (C), AMEMB Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 150650Z Mar 75, Subj: Rice/Commercial POL Airlift (U).

53. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/L3 to CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 161112Z Mar 75, Subj: DC-6 availability at Saigon in support of USAID Airlift to Phnom Penh (U).

54. Msg (C), MAC to SECSTATE and SECDEF, 162215Z Mar 75, Subj: Commercial Airlift to Cambodia (U).

55. Msg (C), SECSTATE to SECDEF, 192209Z Mar 75, Subj: Extension of Commercial Rice/POL Airlift to Cambodia (U).

56. Msg (S), USSAG/7AF/CS to CJCS, CSAF, CINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 210705Z Mar 75, Subj: JOCPRE/CMAT/CMAT/CMAT (U).

57. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, CSA, CSAF and CSAV, 232202Z Dec 74, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP (U).

58. Msg (U), SECDEF to CINCPAC, CSA, CSAF and CSAV, 102235Z Jan 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP Ammunition Requests.

59. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 111912Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCCOP Transportation Costs (U).

60. Msg (U), CINCPAC to USSAG and CEHprogress, 102330Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCCOF Transportation Costs.

61. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC (and others), 161832Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP POLMT (U).
62. Mag (U), CINC PAC to JCS, 200202Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia HAP POCRT.

63. Mag (U), SECDEF to CONSC, 212222Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Transportation Costs.

64. Mag (C), SECDEF to CINC PAC, 282222Z Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 HAP POCRT (U).

65. Mag (C), SECDEF to CINC PAC, 212122Z Feb 75, Subj: Project SCOOT Transportation Costs (U).


67. Mag (C), CINC PAC to CONSC, 2901472Z Mar 75, Subj: Termination of SCOOT Surface Contracts (U).

68. Mag (S), SECDEF to CONSC and CINC PAC, 291756Z Mar 75, Subj: Termination of SCOOT-T Contracts and Support (U).

69. Mag (U), MSCOV to CONSC, 240616Z Mar 75, Subj: Refugee Evacuation.

70. Mag (U), USDAO Saigon to CONSC, 270930Z Mar 75, Subj: Fund Cite for Use of Contract T-106 Assets.


72. Mag (C), CHEDTC to CINC PAC, 0609592Z Jan 75, Subj: Weekly Ground/Air Munitions Status and Material Delivery Report (U).

73. Mag (C), CHEDTC to CINC PAC, 211010Z Mar 75, Subj: Weekly Ground/Air Munitions Status and Material Delivery Report (U).

74. Mag (S), JCS to CINC PAC, 200210Z Jan 75, Subj: CHE-55 in Cambodia (S).

75. Mag (S), JCS to CINC PAC, 201510Z Feb 75, Subj: CHE-55 in Cambodia (S).

76. Mag (S), CHEDTC to USSAG, 151111Z Feb 75, Subj: CHE-55 Employment (S).
77. USDAO/HAP History 1 Oct-21 Dec 74, (CS/NFL), pg 92.

78. Msg (C), CINCPACAF to I MAF and 21FP, 240603Z Jan 75, Subj: Delivery of HC-130 Aircraft (U).

79. Msg (S), MACNAHAI to CSAP (and others), 030722Z Mar 75, Subj: EC-12 Aircraft Transfer (U). Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CSAP and AFLC, 190630Z Mar 75, Subj: EC-12 Aircraft (U).

80. Msg (S), CSAP to CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, USDAO Saigon, 261500Z Feb 75, Subj: EC-12 Aircraft Transfer (U).

81. Msg (C), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 271205Z Feb 75, Subj: MAP-CB Ammo Funding (U).

82. Msg (U), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 020146Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Ammo Reconciliation.

83. Msg (U) CMDMC to CINCPAC, 061920Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Reconciliation.

84. Msg (C), SECDEF to DA, 070055Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Army Ammo Reconciliation (U).

85. Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 142352Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia MAP Ammunition (U).

86. Msg (U), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 182158Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Reconciliation.

87. Msg (S), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 212307Z Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia MAP Ammunition (U).

88. Msg (C), CINCPAC to CHMEDTC, 260931Z Mar 75, Subj: CB MAP Ammo Reconciliation (U).
CHAPTER VII
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

GENERAL (U)

Throughout the quarter, the primary emphasis of the J-6 staff was centered upon the preparation of detailed Communications-Electronics Annexes to operations plans in support of USSAG/7IF NEMVAC plans. The installation of communication requirements by the airlift control element to control the Cambodian Airlift was coordinated.

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING - THAILAND (U)

The status of the Integrated Communications System realignment proposal submitted to CINCPAC/J6 by USMACV/J6 on 20 Nov 74 remained unchanged. The proposal was based on projected communications requirements of residual subscribers commensurate with base closures and personnel reduction subsequent to 1 Jul 75. Two tropospheric scatter cross-border radio systems which had been included in the realignment proposal were deactivated as a result of enemy interdiction of the Pleiku and Monkey Mountain Single Integrated Military Telecommunications Systems (SIMS) sites on 16 and 29 March, respectively.

Reconfiguration of SIMS. NVA offensives in MRs I and II and NVA's decision to evacuate the northern provinces resulted in the interdiction of seven SIMS sites, including two cross-border
radio systems between Thailand and RVN. The impact of losing the SIMS Sites upon USSAG/7AF communications was primarily one of flexibility. The cross-border and intra-RVN systems provided an alternate route to the Nha Trang terminal of the Philippine submarine cable (Wetwash Alfa) in the event the 439L undersea cable system between Thailand and RVN was interrupted.

A chronological listing of sites lost to the enemy and radio systems affected is presented below. (Channel capacity for each affected link included to illustrate magnitude of the loss.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SITE/SYSTEM</th>
<th>CHANNELS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar 75</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot - Nha Trang</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar 75</td>
<td>Pleiku³ - Warin (Thailand)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar 75</td>
<td>Pleiku - Monkey Mountain</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar 75</td>
<td>Pleiku - Pr Line</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar 75</td>
<td>Pleiku - Nha Trang</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar 75</td>
<td>Hue/Phu Bai - Da Nang</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar 75</td>
<td>Chu Lai⁵ - Da Nang</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar 75</td>
<td>Monkey Mtn⁶ - Warin (Thailand)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar 75</td>
<td>Monkey Mtn - Vung Chua Mtn</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar 75</td>
<td>Monkey Mtn - Da Nang</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar 75</td>
<td>Da Nang⁷ - Da Nang Cablehead</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 75</td>
<td>Qui Nhon⁸ - Vung Chua Mtn</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 75</td>
<td>Qui Nhon - Qui Nhon Cablehead</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CINCPAC/FOC analysis of operational tests of the COMBAT LIGHTNING Weapons Control Center Radio Relay Aircraft/Fighter aircraft communications link, conducted in accordance with 8AF Communications Test Plan, was received. The COMBAT LIGHTNING Communications Test Analysis document was forwarded to USSAG/7AF Operations Division for review.

RECONFIGURATION OF USSAG COMMUNICATIONS (U)

(U) Blue Chip Communications. Four point-to-point non-secure voice circuits between Blue Chip and the VNAF Direct Air Support Centers and CRCs at Da Nang and Pleiku were deactivated following VNAF evacuation of the facilities on 18 and 29 March.

SUBMARINE CABLE OUTAGE AFFECTING USSAG (U)

(U) The 439L submarine cable between Camp Vayama, Thailand and Vung Tau, RVN was out of service from 11-15 February. USSAG/7AF circuits were restored over the two cross-border radio systems between Warin and Monkey Mountain/Pleiku.

COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

Saigon Satellite Ground Terminal. Contingency plans were developed to insure continuity of communications between COUSSAG and the U.S. diplomatic missions in Cambodia and the RVN. Enemy gains in the northern provinces and an increasing threat against the Nha Trang cable terminal of the Wetwash Alfa submarine cable to the Philippines prompted DAO Saigon to request that CINCPAC arrange for the deployment of a satellite ground terminal. CINCPAC obtained
JCS approval to deploy an AN/TSC-54 Satellite Terminal to Saigon to establish a twelve-channel link to Hawaii. 12

SITE 75A (LONG BINH - PHNOM PENH) (U)

A developing threat against Long Binh, the location of the sole entry point for communications serving the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cambodia, prompted USSAG/J6 to direct DAO Saigon to locate an alternate location. DAO Saigon located a site at Tan Son Nhat. An in-service cutover to the new site dictated a requirement for two additional TRC-129 radio terminals and associated antenna packages. It was determined that U.S. Army Communications Command-Thailand could provide one AN/TRC-129 Radio Terminal complete with the required antennas. A second radio terminal was located by DAO Saigon in the Tan Son Nhat area and was airlifted to the Area Maintenance Supply Facility located at U-Tapao on 28 Feb 75 for extensive rehabilitation. USSAG/7AF/DC submitted a request for $35,000 to defray the cost of rehabilitating the radio terminal, completing site preparation, caretaker manning and security. 13

A proposal to deploy two AN/TSC-50 SHF Satellite Terminals to provide Phnom Penh entry into the Defense Communications System via Clark AB was submitted to JCS by CINCPAC. 14 The terminal for Phnom Penh was to be prepositioned at U-Tapao.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII

1. Ltr (S), Proposal by USMACTMAI/J6 to CINCPAC/J6, 20 Nov 74, Subj: Future Communications Planning - Thailand (U).

2. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 170910Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

3. Ibid.

4. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 260618Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

5. Ibid.

6. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 290513Z Mar 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

7. Ibid.

8. Msg (C), USDAO Saigon to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 011000Z Apr 75, Subj: Status of RVN Communications (U).

9. Ltr (S), SAF to USSAG/7AF (and others), 24 Oct 74, Subj: Communications Test Plan (U).

10. Ltr (C), CINCSAC/DOK to USSAG/7AF (and others), 20 Mar 75, Subj: COMBAT LIGHTNING Communications Test Analysis (U).

11. FONECON (SECOX), Colonel Graham, DAO Saigon, to Colonel Lilly, CINCPAC, 21 Mar 75, Subj: Contingency Communications Planning for RVN Satellite-Ground Terminal (U).

12. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC (and others), 260004Z Mar 75, Subj: Saigon-Hawaii Communications (U).

13. Msg (C), USSAG/7AF/DC to CINCPAC/J6 (and others), 2002002 Mar 75, Subj: Proposed Contingency Site for 75A (U).

14. Msg (C), CINCPAC/J6 to JCS (and others), 2902092 Mar 75, Subj: Request for TSC-50 Deployment (U).
### VISITORS TO USSAG/7AF

**January-March 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Jan</td>
<td>Staff Delegate Robert Q. Old, professional staff member, Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jan</td>
<td>Brig Gen Fred A. Treyz, deputy director of operations, CINCPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jan</td>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, chief of staff, USAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 25 Jan | General Officers' Vietnamization Review:  
Maj Gen Eugene L. Hudson, USAF/LGX  
Maj Gen George Rhodes, AFLC/CS  
Rear Adm Hugh A. Benson, CINCPAC/J1  
Brig Gen Jack W. Waters, CINCPACAF/LG |
| 11 Feb | Col Kenneth H. Kennedy, Thai Regional Exchange commander                           |
| 12 Feb | Adm Noel A.M. Gayler, CINCPAC                                                     |
| 13 Feb | Brig Gen Roswell E. Round, Jr., defense attache to Laos                            |
| 19 Feb | Capt Prapat Krisanachan, RTN, Mekong River Operations Unit Commander               |
| 24 Feb | Mr. Franklin P. Shaw, GS-15, deputy assistant secretary of defense (regional programs)  
Mr. Frank A. Tapparo, GS-16, director of Asia Division, OASD (PADE)         |
| 10 Mar | Maj Gen John R.D. Cleland, Jr., USA, vice director for operations, JCS           |
| 11 Mar | Lt Gen Winton W. Marshall, VINCOPACOF                                              |
| 19 Mar | Maj Gen Walter H. Baxter, 13AF ADVON commander                                     |
| 22 Mar | Brig Gen Robert C. Taylor, assistant DCS/P2O for plans, PACAF                     |
| 29 Mar | Adm Noel A.M. Gayler, CINCPAC                                                     |
| 31 Mar | Honorable David P. Taylor, assistant secretary of the Air Force (manpower & reserve affairs) |

**Attachment 1**
FROM: USSAG NKP APRZ THAI/CD

TO: CINCPAC EMP SMITH HI

INFO: CINCPACAF HICKAY AFB HI

ANEMB SAIGON VS

USDAO SAIGON VS

MSCOF AIGON VS

ANEMB PHNX, PEND CB

USDAO PHNX PEND CB

CHMTRC PHNX PEND CB

CONUSNA ATT HAI BANGKOK TH

CINCPAC FOR J5/J4. USDAO SGN PASS TO JGS, RWNF ATTN.

JG THO, PACAF FOR IN

SUBJ: LESSONS LEARNED, MEKONG CONVOY (U)

DISTR:

CJS-3; EN-2; DO-1; LG-2; DOS-3

FRA A. HUNT, JR., MG USA CD 3717

ATTACHMENT 2
2. There have been three northbound/southbound convoys since the initiation of the KC Dry Season Offensive. The lessons learned from these convoy operations are clear-cut and must be incorporated into future endeavors.

2. Current situation:

A. The Mekong Special Zone plan had almost been fully implemented in December 1974. The plan called for BPM outposts at strategic choke points along the river; an integrated artillery fire support plan that furnished 100 per cent coverage; and KLF support as required. As implemented, the plan insured the success of convoys.

However, the situation changed dramatically with the initiation of the KC Dry Season Offensive. The enemy over-ran almost all of the BPM outposts south of Neak Luong. As a result, the artillery fire support plan was totally disrupted and the enemy gained control of the key southern choke points. North of Neak Luong, PAVN retained control of DEZ DOK and reestablished a EN position at...
PREN YUON. ARTILLERY COVERAGE FOR MOST OF THE NORTHERN
SECTOR OF THE LOWER MEKONG WAS MAINTAINED. HOWEVER,
DURING THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BPM
WAS MARGINAL. IN SEVERAL CASES OUTPOSTS WERE ABANDONED
WITHOUT MUCH OF A FIGHT AND IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE THE
LEADERS ABANDONED A MAJOR OUTPOST PRIOR TO AN ENEMY ATTACK.
BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE OUTPOSTS, PANK HAS HAD TO INSERT
THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF BRIGADES IN THE LOWER
MEKONG. THIS HAS PROVIDED BETTER PROTECTION BUT HAS NOT
ENABLED THEM TO REESTABLISH ALL THE KEY OUTPOSTS OR TO EXPAND
ARTILLERY COVERAGE. CURRENTLY THE ENEMY CONTROLS KEY CHOKES
POINTS NEAR PEAM REANG ISLAND AND MOST OF THE RIVER BANKS
IN THE VICINITY OF DEI DOH AND JUST SOUTH OF NEAR LUCQ.

B. THE MAJORITY OF THE ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS
HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN PARALLELS 21 AND 30 (THE PEAM REANG/
PEAM CHOR AREA) AND BETWEEN PARALLELS 55 AND 69 (THE DEI DOH/PREN
YUON AREA). IN THE 20 PLUS ABPS BETWEEN PARALLELS 21 AND 30
THE ENEMY HAS USED RECOILLESS RIFLES, RPG'S AND MORTARS
WITH ACCURACY WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF FIRE BEING BY
RECOILLESS RIFLES. IN THE 50 PLUS AEPs IN THE BEI DOH AREA THEY HAVE USED RECOILLESS RIFLES AND RPG'S WITH THE
PREDOMINANCE OF FIRE BEING RPC'S. ENEMY FIRE HAS BEEN
PROLONGED AND INTENSIVE, SEVERAL AEPs HAVE LASTED IN EXCESS
OF 30 MINUTES. THE KC HAVE FIRED MORE RECOILLESS RIFLES
AND RPG ROUNDS AGAINST ONE CONVOY LATELY THAN THEY FIRED
DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THOSE THAT
HAVE NOT VIEWED THE CURRENT AEPs TO VISUALIZE THE INTENSITY
OF THE FIRE.

C. ENEMY ATTACKS WERE PROBABLY MORE EFFECTIVE AT NIGHT
THAN DURING THE DAY BECAUSE KAF'S CAPABILITIES AT NIGHT ARE
MUCH REDUCED. BY USING FLARES, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO
SILHOUETTE THE SHIPS AND PROVIDE ACCURATE FIRE. NEW ENEMY
TACTICS ARE THE USE OF BARRACADERS AND MINES. MXK HAS BEEN
ABLE TO CUT THE BARRACADES EASILY ENOUGH AND THEY HAVE NOT
PROVEN EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY'S FIRST USE OF MINES WAS
MOST SUCCESSFUL, MAINLY IT IS BELIEVED, BECAUSE MXK HAS NOT
ACTIVELY SEEKING FOR THEM. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE
MINES ARE THE FLOATING TYPE WHICH SHOULD BE ABLE TO BE EASILY
DETONED.
detected, however, the enemy might have a submerged mine capability that could require a much more sophisticated response by MNK (they probably do not have adequate equipment for the job).

D. Losses on the lower Mekong have not been great on northbound voyages nor had they been particularly acute southbound until PT-113, when three tugs and one PCL tanker were sunk. The following table indicates the track record for the 1975 convoys.

**Mekong Convoys (1975)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Arrived/Sailed)</th>
<th>Barges</th>
<th>Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammo</td>
<td>Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northbound</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southbound</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Major Lessons Learned:**

A. **Firepower:** The greatest deterrent to enemy effectiveness is FAMK firepower. To date, FAMK when...
Utilized has been very successful. Bombs on target
have been able to suppress the enemy. MNK has been gutsy,
but due to the lack of fire power (except mortars), MNK
has not been able to effectively suppress fire. The use of
artillery, particularly that stationed at MNK Luong, has
been poor. To be successful, convoys must be operated when
MNK has maximum availability supported by greatest possible
artillery support. Without these two key elements, it is
doubtful that enemy fire can be suppressed. Until the
enemy is attrited (killed), the situation will not get better.

B. Night versus day operations: Night operations have
not been too successful and in the future they will be
even less so. The enemy is now using mines which might
be visually detected in daytime. MNK at night is not
effective. Therefore, convoys should be run in daytime
when enemy fires can be suppressed and mines hopefully
detected.

C. Use of smoke: All of the enemy weapons, including
command detonated mines are line of sight. MNK has
BEEN PROVIDED SMOKE AND HAS TESTED IT. IT IS HOPED THAT
THE USE OF SMOKE ON THE NEXT CONVOY WILL BE USEFUL IN
REDUCING ENEMY VISIBLEITY.

D. BARGES VERSUS SHIPS: TO DATE NONE OF THE LOW
SILHOUETTE BARGES HAVE BEEN LOST TO ENEMY FIRE. ON THE
OTHER HAND, FIVE RICE AND POL VESSELS HAVE BEEN LOST.
THIS IS A COMBINATION OF TWO FACTORS, FIRST THE BARGES ARE
PROTECTED BY SHIELD BARGES WHICH HAVE PROVEN TO BE OF
NESTERY VALUE. SECOND, THE LOW PROFILE MAKES THEM LESS
VULNERABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE RICE BARGE HAD NO SHIELDS ATTACHED
AND MADE THE TRANSIT. IN THE FUTURE, AN ALL-BARGE-CONCEPT
WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. THE KEY TO THIS CONCEPT IS THE
AVAILABILITY OF SHIELD BARGES.

D. SHIELD BARGES: SHIELD BARGES HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY
EFFECTIVE. OF THE SEVEN BARGES IN CP-111 IT WAS FOUND THAT
EACH SUSTAINED AN AVERAGE OF 20 HITS WITH RECOILLESS RIFLES
OR RPG'S. SHIELD BARGES ARE EXPENSIVE, NOW COSTING ABOUT
$40,000 EACH. ALREADY 10 HAVE BEEN LOST AND IT IS ESTIMATED
THAT ONLY THREE OR FOUR WILL BE RECOVERED. THE ALL BARGE
CONCEPT REQUIRES 36 SHIELD BARGES. FOURTEEN ARE NOW AVAILABLE, 10 ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND 12 MORE HAVE BEEN ORDERED. CONSIDERING CURRENT LOSSES THIS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT AN ALL BARGE CONCEPT.

P. ASSET AVAILABILITY: THE PERFORMANCE OF CIVILIAN CREWS HAS BEEN HEROIC. WHILE MANY CREWS HAVE FAILED TO GO, SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE MAKING THE JOURNEY FOR THE THIRD TIME. PT-113 RESULTED IN FOUR CREW MEMBERS MISSING AND SEVERAL DEAD AND MANY WOUNDED. CREWS ARE PROBABLY UNDERPAID CONSIDERING THE RISKS THEY ARE TAKING. THEY PROBABLY NEED SOME TYPE OF INCENTIVE PAY. BELIEVE CONTRACTS MIGHT HAVE TO BE RE-NEGOIATED TO PROVIDE CREW MEMBERS MORE MONEY. THE NUMBER ONE PROBLEM IS THE AVAILABILITY OF BARGE/SHIP ASSETS. SEAPAC DESERVES A GREAT CREDIT FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE TO DATE. RIGHT NOW THEY ARE THE ONLY CONTRACTOR STILL WILLING TO MAKE THE TRIP. FOR ALL INTENTS THE NICE/POC SKIPPERS HAVE DEFINITELY RENEGED.

WE NEED A SINGLE CONTRACTOR TO OPERATE THE ALL BARGE CONCEPT.

G. LINE THREAT: THE ONLY NEW WEAPON TO DATE HAS BEEN MINES. BY GOING TO DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS AND PROVIDING ___
...elps aggressively floating mines should be handled.

3. On the other hand, if the enemy is using standard little command
    located mines and unless more sophisticated mine detecting
    equipment is made available to Mnk, this could successfully
    close the Mekong. None will be known on the mine threat
    after TP-115. Unless Mnk provides maximum protection
    even the current threat is formidable.

II. Attrition: Assets are being attrited with every
    convoy. Mnk is losing vessels and they are getting tired.
    It is hard to quantify this. We lose additional
    barges and commercial assets are also being lost with each
    convoy. Continued attrition could have serious results. We
    cannot continue to schedule convoys every four days but we
    must get back to a four a month schedule. Plans now call
    for four four-hour convoys per month consisting of 8 barges;
    3 Rinco, 3 rice and 2 plo. This will provide minimum require-
    ments to pinch Mek.

4. TP-115 is a water ship. First Genpro must sail.
WE THINK THEY WILL. HAVING FACILITATED THE CONVOY, IT MUST GET THROUGH. THIS REQUIRES MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT BY ARTILLERY AND KAF AND MAXIMUM COUNTER-MINE MEASURES BY KNF. FAILURE OF TP-116 COULD PERMANENTLY END CIVILIAN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OPERATIONS.

5. IN SUMMARY, CONVOYS SHOULD BE OPERATED IN DAYLIGHT WITH MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT AND AGGRESSIVE MINE SLEEPING. THE ALL BARGE CONCEPT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. SUCCESS OF THE CONVOY REQUIRES MAXIMUM KAF PARTICIPATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE IDENTIFIED AREAS OF MOST INTENSIVE ENEMY FIRE. IT ALSO REQUIRES VASTLY IMPROVED ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THE KEY, OF COURSE, IS TO PUT MORE KAF TROOPS ON THE GROUND AT THE CHOKE POINTS. KNF MUST PERFECT THEIR MINE SLEEPING CAPABILITIES.

COMMERCIAL VESSELS SHOULD BE PROVIDED AND COMPENSATION TO MAKE IT WORTH THEIR WHILE TO MAKE THIS INTENSIVE CONVOY RUN.

IT WILL TAKE TOTAL DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE NENONG OPEN.

GDS 31 DEC 81
ANNEX I
JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

GENERAL (U)

(U) The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) compiled and analyzed data on unresolved cases and initiated casualty resolution (CR) activities, in consonance with its mission of assisting in resolving the status of U.S. missing (MIS) and body not recovered (BNR) personnel.

(U) JCRC Relocation. JCRC relocated during January from KKP to Camp Samse San. The advanced echelon departed on 5 January and the main unit deployed 13-24 January. Full operations at Samse San resumed 27 Jan 75. The only residual JCRC personnel remaining at KKP are about five data automation personnel. They provide interface with the JCRC programs on the USSAG/7AF computers, particularly the BRIGHT LIGHT System.

(U) Operations. The workload continued to fluctuate. Operations figures associated with remains recovery continued to expand. (See Figures 1 and 2).

PERSONNEL (U)

(U) Colonel Terance L. Cavley, USAF, arrived 27 March for duty as the deputy commander.

Strength. Assigned personnel strength dropped from 143 on 1 January to 97 as of 31 March.

(U) Awards. Thirteen recommendations for the Joint Service
STATISTICAL SUMMARY/CPD II/TAIWAN, FEBRUARY, MARCH 1975

Total sites to be located/inspected by country.

Inland Sites:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CRASH</th>
<th>GROUND</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>MAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over-Water Sites: Jan - 76 Feb - 78 Mar - 78

Total Crash-Ground Sites with MIS/ENR Associated: Jan - 1331 Feb - 1331 Mar - 1323

Total Grave Sites:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NVN</th>
<th>SVN</th>
<th>LAO</th>
<th>CAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Sites of JRCR Interest: Jan - 1331 Feb - 1331 Mar - 1328

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Military Missing</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Military ENR</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>1493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Civilian Missing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Civilian ENR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Field Operations/Other CR Activities Conducted to Date: 50 55 55

" - (includes 319 UNR (Nonrecoverable))

FIGURE 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crash/Grave Site Search/Investigation Operations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remains Recovery Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CR Activities</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sites Inspected During Month</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Remains ID to Date</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified as U.S. and Accepted by USAAMAA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified as U.S. and Pending Acceptance by USAAMAA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified as SEAsian Mongoloid and Accepted by USAAMAA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified as SEAsian Mongoloid and Pending Acceptance by USAAMAA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases Recommended for Resolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Resolved</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Pending</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>NVR</td>
<td>LAOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US CIV</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>521</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*5 in Thailand
#1 in Thailand

Total 2155

Figure 2
The CDD was restructured to include Automated Data Processing Division as a branch. This action was necessitated by increased emphasis on casualty records reconciliation, prioritizing of all JCRC case crash sites, documenting the JCRC recurr of effort in casualty resolution, and the master records development program. Additional work space was provided to facilitate augmentation by nine members of the Field Team Element for 90 days. These personnel helped bring RWI records up-to-date and allowed time to draft new Joint Manpower Program to add more analysts to complete the task.

Project 400. Reconciliation of JCRC case files by the Casualty Records Branch with service casualty branch files was designated as "Project 400." The Navy identified 101 cases and Air Force identified 62 cases for primary reconciliation. Of the Navy cases, 32 were prepared for forwarding to Navy Casualty Branch. Thirty-two of the Air Force cases were prepared for forwarding. Upon computerization, these cases will be dispatched to the services.

Project 400. The Crash Site Investigation Branch (CSI) was tasked with developing an empirically based program to rank crash sites in priority, according to probability of successful recovery.
Factors taken into consideration were type of aircraft, terrain, number of personnel on board the aircraft, and age of the crash site. Threat will be assigned numerically. A numerical value will be assigned each crash site, the highest numbered sites will be those having the greatest probability of success. This program, still under development, was identified as Project 55.

(U) All Loss Printout. CSI received the updated All Loss Printout which included losses of USAF, USN, USA, UHSC, RCAF, VNAF, Air America, Continental Air Services, CIA, and civilian aircraft. This document now contains 14,565 entries, each of which must be verified. This action is in progress. CSI began compiling information of all aircraft lost in Laos to answer a request from the Vientiane Liaison Office.

(U) Report 55. Automated Data Processing (ADP) and Analysis and Studies (A&S) branches developed a new BRIGHT LIGHT data base reporting format. Called Report 55, it combines the previously separate Biographical/Site Report 51 and 52. The single report format provides all fixed field biographic and site information, as well as the Narrative Incident Summary. The first Report 55 was published during the quarter for utilization by the Vientiane Liaison Office.

(U) Master Record Project. Presently in the embryonic stage, the master record concept will define the complete set of records for each case by identifying all activities retaining essential case-related documentation. A cross reference will be placed in
each record.

(U) SEA ADP Facility. Delivery of the hardware for the SEA ADP Facility was delayed. Operational date for the WMMCCS conversation is presently scheduled for late September 1975. Programming support for JCRC will be completed as scheduled, 30 Jun 75.

(U) Documentary Record Effort. The ADP Branch was tasked with developing a computerized format which would provide a summary of the JCRC record of effort. A&S Branch has been assigned as the accounting agency for all record of effort information, a review of previous documentation is underway.

(U) Casualty Records. Changes in status based on identification of remains, service determination, or administrative correction posted in January:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>1 Cpt/RVN to Cpt/CB</td>
<td>1 MIA/RVN to BNR/RVN</td>
<td>1 BNR/VS to BNR/VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 MIA/LA to BNR/LA</td>
<td>1 MIA/LA to BNR/LA</td>
<td>1 MIS/VS to MIS/CB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>3 MIA to BNR</td>
<td>2 MIA to BNR</td>
<td>5 MIA/VN to BNR/VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 MIA/RVN to BNR/RVN</td>
<td>1 MIA/VN to BNR/VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 BNR/VS to BNR/LA</td>
<td>1 Cpt/VS to Delete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 MIA/RVN to BNR/RVN</td>
<td>3 MIA/VN to BNR/VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 BNR/OW to BNR/OW</td>
<td>2 MIA/OW to MIA/VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Over Water/Nonrecoverable records continued. As a result of JCRC's recommendation, four EKR/over water cases were accepted and declared nonrecoverable (inactive).

(U) The Air Force declassification program continued with 100 documents, secret and confidential, downgraded or declassified.

(U) Case papers and cranio-facial photographs supporting the proposed identification of James A. Ravencraft, USA, remains recovered 21-23 Jun 73, were forwarded to U.S. Army Memorial Affairs Association 26 February.

(U) Deserter. All information available on personnel carried as deserters by the services (approximately 53) from units formerly in South Vietnam was forwarded to ABP for inclusion in the data base. Case files on deserter personnel were established.

(U) In support of the South Vietnam Site Priority Program, nine sites were recommended for possible casualty resolution efforts and forwarded to JCRC Saigon Liaison Office, 4 Feb 75.

(U) CED assistance to South Vietnam's ADOs in conjunction with Project 40 and the record of effort program, involved the analysis, filing, and/or responses to approximately 60 memorandums. Increased communication and effort is being placed on sites with the highest probability of finding remains. One set of remains
(probable reference number 337) was recovered as a direct result of this program.

(U) Eighty case files were reviewed and forwarded to ADC for inclusion in the LIGHT LIGHT System.

(U) Reconciliation was made of JCRC/DIA last known position coordinate discrepancies involving 15 specific sites. Seven held by both JCRC and DIA were clarified, with DIA accepting the JCRC last known position recommendations.

(U) The Master Records Development Program continued with 514 records completed as of 31 March. Review of all Navy case files in support of Project 400 was completed during this quarter.

(U) The grave site correlation from intelligence reports continued with 101 grave sites posted to date, 20 from DIA grave site data base.

(U) A total review of all NR II sites was conducted for additional submission of site proposals. Although 10 sites were selected for proposal, forwarding of these recommendations was precluded by increased hostile activity in NR II. A similar project was initiated for Laos.

(U) Administration/Security. Security received and placed under secret document control approximately 1,500 microfiche USAF PW debriefs.

(U) Songbird Review Program. Approximately 1,000 Songbird reports containing potential casualty information have been made
available to JCRC from SCCAS files. Approximately 500 documents have been reviewed for additional data which would require correlation.

OPERATIONS (U)

A message from JCRC to CINCPAC provided a CR activity report of a remains turnover at Tam Ky City, Quang Tin Province, KR I, RVN. The remains reportedly were those of a black American who was killed during Tet 1968. Participants in the turnover included the deputy province chief, deputy chief Two Part Joint Military Commission (TPJC), Tam Ky Office, and JCRC Area Desk Officer (ADO)-1. Remains which consisted of 32 teeth, a fractured mandible and maxilla, shattered skull, shattered portions of the upper torso and extremities were subsequently forwarded to the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL).

(U) On 13 January, six JCRC Field Element Command noncommissioned officers successfully completed the 2nd class diver course 1C-75 at the Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines. Individuals completing the course were SFC James L. Knight, SFC Serfín Telles, SSg Charles D. Ball, SSg Michael D. Hughes, Sgt John K. Kelsey, and Sgt Peter A. Galpin. Sergeant Kelsey was an honor graduate of his class, and the school.

A CR activity proposed for 20 Jan 75, in Cam Ranh Special Zone and postponed due to nonavailability of guide, was carried out on 4 Feb 75. With JCRC indigenous operations specialist acting
as a guide, a thorough investigation of the site was conducted with negative results and without incident. No further actions involving this site are anticipated.

A turnover of commingled remains was made by the hau ning province representative to the ADG-3 on 2 Feb 75. There was no previous announcement and no ceremony. The remains were delivered to the ADG-3 office in a bag. Investigation to this point has yielded contradictory information as to probable racial type and origin of remains. There is no correlation with existing reference numbers. Remains were forwarded to CIL for further identification.

Remains were turned over to ADG-1 by the deputy province chief of Quang Tin, Mr-I, Mr. Tran Ngoc Thiery and LTC Huuyen Duc Chung, TPJMC deputy chief of the Tam Ky Office at 1500 hours on 27 Feb 75. The turnover ceremony was brief, simple and dignified. Approximately 75 percent of the remains were recovered including some teeth and the shattered skull. Remains were forwarded to CIL.

On 27 Feb 75 at 1545 hours, remains were turned over to U.S. Delegate Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) representative by TPJMC Region II representative. Turnover was conducted at Region Five TPJMC at Long Binh. Ceremony was brief and dignified with U.S. Delegate tendering thanks to RVN/TPJMC representatives for their continuing support on behalf of the U.S. CR mission. The wooden casket was not, repeat not, flag draped nor did it have any
distinctive markings or names. No media representatives were present, however, RVN delegate TRMC representatives took numerous photos. Remains were accompanied from Long Binh back to Saigon by a JCRC representative. Remains were sent to CIIC. Remains were reported as recovered from wreckage of a C-130 at UTM X8746886 by a platoon of 3/256 FP company of Long Binh sector forces. Recovery was effected at 0900 hours on 27 Feb 75.

On 15 February, JCRC-LINC, ADO-1, accompanied by Commanding General (CONGEN), Do Nang, on a visit to Khe, at 1500 hours met with Thua Thien Province chief to discuss alleged American remains buried in the Thanh Luong Hamlet, Huong Xuan Village, Huong Tra District Thua Thien Province at YD 634275. CONGEN accompanied province chief to gravesite. Province chief wanted to exhume remains at that time, but CONGEN persuaded him to wait and get the TRMC involved with their JCRC-trained personnel. Province chief agreed and ordered TRMC officials to exhume remains on 16 February. At 0800 hours, 16 February, ADO-1 went to TRMC headquarters and met with two RVN TRMC representatives who had received JCRC CH training in Saigon. The three of them drove to Huong Tra District headquarters located at YD 704254 and met with district chief who gave TRMC permission to exhume subject remains. At 0915 hours, TRMC representatives proceeded to the gravesite and exhume remains. The ADO-1 stayed at district headquarters. Remains were turned over to ADO-1 at 1100 hours without ceremony at the District headquarters.
Activity concluded without incident.

Without prior notification, a unilateral TPJMC-initiated remains turnover occurred on 6 March, 1530 hours at Phouc Hau Hamlet where seven sets of remains were received by the assistant AD0-4. Present were representatives of TPJMC Region 7 and the district chief, Nau Thanh District. No news media were present. The ceremony was solemn and dignified. The remains were recovered from a common grave at Phouc Hau Hamlet UTM 65 070569. According to local villagers, these remains were casualties suffered as a result of action in 1968. American casualties at that time were reported as six KIA (according to locals) of which five were recovered immediately after the action. The sixth KIA is alleged to be that of a helicopter pilot whose remains were burned. One of the seven remains recovered is reportedly that of the pilot. The other six are ARVN soldiers. Remains were transferred to CIL.

A unilateral TPJMC-initiated remains turnover occurred on 6 March without prior notification. Alleged U.S. remains were turned over to chief U.S. Delegation FPJMT by TPJMC Region 7 chief. Turnover was conducted at Region 7 TPJMC compound at Long Binh. Ceremony was brief and dignified, with chief, U.S. Delegation FPJMT expressing thanks to RVN/TPJMC representatives and to chief RVN Delegate FPJMT who was also in attendance. U.S. delegation contrasted RVN cooperation with the continued intransigence of DRV and PRC. The wooden casket was not, repeat not, flag draped nor did it have
any distinctive markings or names. No media representatives were present; however, NHM Delegates PNC representatives took numerous photos. Remains were reported as recovered from wreckage of a C-130 at UTM XT 775589 by elements of the 38th Ranger Battalion of Binh Long Province. Recovery was effected at 1230 hours, 25 February. In addition to the remains, one set of metal I.D. tags was also recovered. Remains along with I.D. tags were transferred to CIL. Two I.D. tags recovered belonged to Lester Bracey, FR107-40-5331. The remains of Bracey (TA 0439-75) and five other crew members of a C-130 aircraft were identified.

On 6 March, without prior notification, commanding general, Bien Hoa turned over a partial set of remains, portion of a flak jacket, and aircraft parts to ADO-3. Items reportedly turned in by a hunter/woodcutter. Source claimed they came from vicinity XT 990462. However, source had previously turned in other data plates and identifying numbers of a resolved helicopter crash site vicinity XT 945520 and source states these remains came from the same site. Remains, portion of flak jacket, and aircraft parts were shipped to CIL.

On 15 March, remains were exhumed by Vietnamese laborers in the Hue area at the Ba Don cemetery, and turned over to the operations specialist ADO-1. The remains were initially discovered by local people at TD 747219, in the Citadel, on 1 Mar 75, and reburied at Ba Don cemetery the same day. There
are no known events or statements available to indicate that
they are U.S. remains. Remains are only suspected to be U.S. because
of their large size. No formal turnover ceremony was held.

LOGISTICS (U)

(U) In addition to the normal supply function, the Logistics
Division was heavily involved in renovation and equipping the new
headquarters buildings and logistical support of the organization's
relocation.

(U) The physical location of the division appears to create
some problems. The only available building for logistics operations
was at U-Tapao, inside a B-52 access area. Problems arise
from limited accessibility based on flight line pass requirements,
plus physical distance between JORC headquarters, logistics depots,
and the JORC warehouse.

AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING (U).

(U) In February, ADP became a branch under the Casualty Data
Division.

(U) In January, ADP printouts were provided to ADOS designed
to assist in making assessments and correlations based upon the
sites and people believed to be located in their respective areas
of interest. Initial reaction was favorable.

(U) The conversion of the EIGHT LIGHT System was proceeding
on schedule. Minor problems that arose were worked out with the
Naval Communications Systems Support Activity. One conceptual
problem with an assembler program caused some consternation but, to date, has not reached inordinate proportions.

(U) Delivery of hardware for the SZA ADP facility was delayed. Operational date for the WACKCS conversion is now scheduled for late September 1975.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SJA) (U)

(U) The SJA served as the NKF Base Defense Counsel until 10 January. Five individuals were advised concerning military justice matters.

(U) In coordination with CINCPAC, research was conducted relating to amendments to the Freedom of Information Act on JCRS. A directive was published establishing procedures within JCRS for processing requests.

CONTROLLER (U)

(U) The Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA) between JCRS Liaison Office Saigon and DAO Saigon was received and concurred upon 2 Jan 75. Revised ISSA provides for reimbursement by JCRS assistance when required, utilities and rents for administrative office spaces, special transportation requirements, vehicle maintenance, POL and quarters when provided.

(U) During March, the Section 205 of Public Law 93-594, Article 3679 of the revised statutes, as applied to funds available for travel, was rescinded. The limitation on funds expendable for travel is currently an administrative ceiling in nature, subject to CINCPAC control. The previously established
ceiling of $225,000 for JCRC was increased to $325,000.
The balance available to support travel and transportation of
JCRC personnel as of 31 March was $22,755.74.

(U) Month-end financial documents were submitted to USMACTHAI
for preparation of monthly reports. Year-to-date obligations under
the operation and maintenance (Navy) appropriation through 31 March
amounted to $598,490.62. Official funding for the 4th quarter FY
75 was received in the amount of $96,730 bringing new obligational
authority to a FY 75 total of $650,000.

(U) The annual planning figure provided by CINCPAC for FY 76
is $1,000,000.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

(U) Face-to-face communications continued to be used as the
primary means of conveying the JCRC story to the public. More
than nine briefings were given to approximately 235 national/
international opinion leaders. These included key military leaders
and MIS/3M next of kin. (See Attachment 1)

(U) On 16 Feb 75, Colonel Eugene L. Hollis, Jr., Deputy
commander, and Major Donald L. Gilleland, public affairs officer
accompanied Major Robert Phelps, Major Robert Weilitz, and Professor
Charles P. Warren (Physical Anthropologist with the Central
Identification Laboratory), to Pattaya for an interview with Mr.
Arnold Abrams, managing editor of Asia Magazine. After receiving
an extensive JCRC briefing from CINCPAC PAC LNO, Mr. Abrams
wanted to talk with JCRG personnel about their respective jobs. The interview lasted two hours and was generally restricted to what kind of work the three JCRG men do in a particular day. They restricted their comments to their own area of expertise. Mr. Abrams seemed pleased with the interview.

(U) While visiting U-Tapao, Mr. John Brady and Mr. John Sullivan, Senior Consultants to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, requested a meeting with the JCRG commander. The commander and the public affairs officer met with the staff delegates at U-Tapao at 1400 hours on 25 Feb 75. The staff delegates requested an update briefing on CR efforts from April 1974 to present. The JCRG commander and the public affairs officer provided general background highlighting reduced U.S. accessibility and increased ARVN and TPJMC cooperation and assistance.

(U) At the request of the ADM Saigon, on 2 March, the JCRG commander provided a modified command briefing on casualty resolution efforts to the following Congressmen who were visiting Saigon: Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-Okl), Representatives William Clay, Jr. (D-Tie), Bella Abzug (D-NY), Donald Fraser (D-Minn), Paul McCloskey, Jr. (R-Cal), John Murtha (D-Pa), and Willicent Fenwick (R-NJ).

(U) On 31 March, Mr. David P. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) visited U-Tapao RTNS, Thailand. The briefing provided Mr. Taylor with JCRG problem areas, future prospects and accomplishments.
(U) Distribution of all public communication school notebooks to all provinces in Region 2 was completed.

On 5 Nov 74, ADO-3 presented a briefing to CONGEN-3 about the 45 KIA cases in MR-3.

(U) Colonel Bruce Walker, USAF (retired) next of kin to reference number 1820 visited Da Nang for the period of 16-18 Nov 74.

On 20 Nov 74, Mr. James Tully, ADO-4 briefed all the provincial representatives and CONGEN staff members. During this briefing, ADO-4 emphasized the weakening of the CR program and the need for more support and thorough investigations by the local hire province staff.

On 24 Nov 74, a CR activity was conducted in Thua Thien Province without specific reference number correlation. The remains recovered were transferred to CIL for identification.

The long-term mass exhumation at the Citadel in Hue continued at an average rate of eight remains per day. A total of 215 remains have been exhumed.

(U) ADO-4 and his operation specialist completed visits to eight provinces in the Delta for site investigations and public communications. Two Cambodian refugee camps were also visited. At these camps, the JCIC program was explained to Cambodian religious leaders and specially prepared public communications materials were distributed along with school notebooks.

Second quarter FY 75 information not available for last history.
Prime Minister Tran Chieu Minh issued a policy document on 24 Nov 74, entitled, "Fundamental Operational Instructions for Procedures and Regulations for Search, Exhumation and Transfer of American Remains in the Territory of the Republic of Vietnam."

This document, the first all encompassing statement of policy of its kind, had as its basic thrust that the primary responsibility for recovering remains believed to be those of Americans belongs to the Government of Vietnam. U.S. organizations and agencies assume a support and coordinating role.

The JCRC Liaison Office took action to implement a more positive and active program for casualty resolution efforts. This "Affirmative Action Program" will allow more selective dedication of resources and effort toward those casualty cases which have the highest likelihood of resolution. A "Status of Sites" report will be initiated beginning in January 1975 to give constant updates to JCRC headquarters on pending cases.
ANNEX I

1. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 310232Z Jan 75, Subj: Remains Turnover; Quang Tin Province; Region 1, SVN (U).

2. Msg (U), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 070325Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Cam Ranh Special Zone.

3. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 180900Z Feb 75, Subj: Remains Turnover Hau Nghia Province, Region 3, SVN (U).

4. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 060422Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Quang Tin Province, NK-1, SVN (U).

5. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 060401Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Long Binh Province, NK-3, SVN (U).

6. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 240322Z Feb 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Thua Thien Province, NK-1, SVN (U).

7. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 080302Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Khanh Giang Province, NK-4, SVN (U).

8. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 060322Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Linh Long Province, NK-3, SVN (U).

9. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 140840Z Mar 75, Subj: Casualty Resolution Activity Dung Quang Province, NK-5, SVN (U).

10. Msg (C), Cdr JCRC to CINCPAC (J318), 240330Z Mar 75, Subj: Remains Recovery at YD 747219, In the Citadel, Hue City (U).
## Personnel Who Received the Command Briefing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Senator Strom Thurman in Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Base Personnel at Rama San USO</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Jan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Base Personnel at Udorn USO</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Intelligence Personnel of 432TW (Udorn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Feb</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>SAC Command Post at U-Tapao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Feb</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Mixed audience at U-Tapao USO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Feb</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mr. John Brady, and Mr. John Sullivan, Senior Consultants to the House Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Congressional Delegates; Senator Dewey Bartlett, (R-Ohio); Representatives William Chapell, Jr., (D-Fla); Bella Abzug, (D-NY); Donald Fraser, (D-Minn); Paul McCloskey, Jr., (R-Cal); and Millicent Fenwick, (R-NJ); John Murtha (D-Pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Mr. David P. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, (Marpower and Reserve Affairs) and Command Staff of U-Tapao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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HISTORY OF USSAG/7AF AND JCRC 1 JAN - 31 MAR 75
USLAF, INELITE AIR FORCE AT
ESCALATION CENTER

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ENCLOSURE (3)