JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY

HISTORY OF THE
UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
1977 - 1983

HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT SECRETARIAT
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S
DETERMINATION REQUIRED
HISTORY OF THE
UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
1977-1983

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
July 1985
FOREWORD

This special historical study, prepared at the request of the Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, traces the history of the Unified Command Plan from 1977 through the approval and issuance of the current plan in October 1983. It updates the earlier special study, The History of the Unified Command Plan, which covers the period 1946-1977. Dr. Ronald H. Cole, of the Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared the study.

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not considered the content of the study, it is to be construed as descriptive only and not as constituting the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on unified and specified command arrangements.

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HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
1977-1983

Background: 1946-1975
(U) On 3 April 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the Congress on behalf of legislation for greater unity within the national military establishment. He advised:

separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. . . Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands . . . singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief.  

(U) The system of unified commands alluded to by President Eisenhower began during World War II with the establishment of geographic theaters of operations. Each theater comprised forces from more than one Service, a joint staff, and a single commander. After the war, at the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Harry S. Truman formally endorsed the system by approving the first Unified Command Plan (UCP) on 14 December 1946. By that document the President created unified commands for the Far East,

1. Presidential Msg, 3 Apr 58, Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 (1959), pp. 274-290. All citations in this study are UNCLASSIFIED unless indicated otherwise at the beginning of the citation.
the Pacific, Alaska, the Atlantic, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Northeast (Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland). He also recognized the existence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a strictly Army Air Corps command that, like the unified commands, served the President at the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² By the National Security Act of 1947 Congress formally endowed the Joint Chiefs of Staff with legal status and assigned them the responsibility, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, "to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security."³

(§) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the basic charter of the unified and specified commands. Revised eight times between 1946 and 1975, it outlines the geographic areas and responsibilities of the various commands. It also provides guidance on the execution of operational command, and defines "normal operations" to include the planning and conduct of contingency operations, wars, evacuations, disaster relief, military security assistance, and the maintaining of proper command relationships with component commands, sister commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴

². JCS Hist Div, History of the Unified Command Plan, 20 Dec 1977, C, pp. 1-4. SAC was the first example of what was later designated a specified command; though the term did not come into general use until 1951.
The Unified Command Plan of 1975

(U) Throughout the period 1977 to 1983, the UCP of 1975 provided for five unified and three specified commands. The unified commands comprised the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), the US European Command (USEUCOM), the Pacific Command (PACOM), the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM). Made up solely of USAF forces, the three specified commands included the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC). 5

(?) In the UCP of 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved to themselves direct responsibility for the Soviet bloc, the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China), the Mongolian People’s Republic, Africa South of the Sahara, the Malagasy Republic, Canada, Greenland, and Mexico. The conduct of normal operations in all other countries, however, remained the responsibility of the unified commands. From headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), presided over US military forces in the Caribbean Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean in the north from 95° W longitude to 100° E longitude and in the south from 92° W longitude to 17° E longitude. The Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), operating from Oahu, Hawaii, watched over all of the Pacific west of 92° W longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean area not covered by LANTCOM, the Indian Ocean east of 17° E longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Aleutians,

5. SM-356-75 to CINC s et al., 27 Jun 75, JCS 1259/758-43, C, JMP 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
Africa South of the Sahara, the Malagasy Republic, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, (Antarctica, Alaska, and CONUS are NOT assigned to any unified or specified command.}
and the countries of Southeast Asia, and South Asia to
the western border of India. From headquarters in
Stuttgart, Germany, the Commander in Chief, Europe
(USCINCEUR), held responsibility for normal operations
in Western Europe, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula,
and the Middle East up to Afghanistan. Finally, at
Quarry Heights, Panama, the Commander in Chief, South
(USCINCSO), protected the Panama Canal and presided
over US forces and operations in all of Latin America
except Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.  

(6) The UCP of 1975 provided more specialized
missions for USREDCOM and the three specified commands.
From headquarters in Tampa, Florida, the Commander in
Chief, US Readiness Command (USCINCRE D) presided over
major combatant general purpose forces in the
continental United States (CONUS) that could be used
either to reinforce the other commands or to conduct
joint training and military operations, evacuations,
and disaster relief in the unassigned areas. In mid-
1977 the Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded USCINCRE D's
mission to include the planning, coordination, and
execution of the land defense of CONUS, and support of
domestic US civil defense operations—responsibilities
previously held by the US Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM). Operating out of Omaha, Nebraska, the
Strategic Air Command was responsible for all US-based
ICBMs and all nuclear and conventionally armed long-
range bombers. From headquarters at Colorado Springs,

6. See Map, p. 4. SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun
75, JCS 1259/758-43, C, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
Colorado, the Aerospace Defense Command was charged with the air defense of CONUS, Alaska, and Canada. Established on 1 February 1977, the newest of the specified commands, the Military Airlift Command (MAC), planned the conduct of strategic airlift from headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.\^7

In the UCP of 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the operational mission of all unified and specified commands: to provide for optimum combat effectiveness of military forces and to deploy those forces at home or abroad for normal operations in support of national security policy objectives. When implementing operational missions the commanders enjoyed the privilege of direct communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Likewise in such uniservice matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, the commanders could communicate directly with the Service chiefs.\^8

**Requirement for a Biennial Review**

\(^7\) One of the earliest administrative modifications of the UCP of 1975 involved the requirement for mandatory review and revision. In 1977 President Carter had directed a sweeping review of the National Military Command Structure System (NMCSS). Less than a year later, Richard C. Steadman, the study director for the

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\(^7\) Ibid. USREDCOM Command History, 1977, S, p. 1-1.
\(^8\) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75, C, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
Defense Department, submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense in which, among other recommendations, he urged that the Commanders, the Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a review of the UCP at "intervals not to exceed two years." Mr. Steadman believed that a mandatory biennial review would permit the President and the Secretary of Defense to respond more efficiently and effectively to the increasingly rapid evolution of "political and military realities."^9

^{9}(9) The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the recommendation for a biennial review of the UCP and issued Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 181 on 29 January 1979 to implement the new procedures. The MOP provided for a biennial review to be accomplished during a six-month cycle in each even-numbered year. The review would begin with a Joint Staff solicitation of comments from the Commanders of the Unified and the Specified Commands, followed by Service and Joint Staff review, and would conclude with formal JCS recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.10

10. JCSM-290-78 to SecDef, 1 Sep 78, JCS 1977/409-5, S, JMF 010 (13 Jul 78) sec 2. JCS MOP 181, 29 Jan 79, JCS 1259/844, JMF 040 (15 Jan 79).
Air Defense of the Panama Canal, 1978

(§) The first substantive UCP issue to arise after 1977 concerned air defense of the Panama Canal. By a treaty ratified in April 1978, the United States agreed to relinquish to the Republic of Panama in the year 2000 all control over the Canal and the Canal Zone. Meanwhile USCINCSO was to defend that area with a modest force that included the 193d Infantry Brigade, the 450-man US Naval Station, and a handful of A-7 Corsair II close air support fighters from the USAF Southern Division. While such forces might suffice to protect the canal from sabotage or land attack by a neighboring state, USSOUTHCOM forces could not prevent a major air assault by Cuba.11

(§) In 1978 the Soviet Union provided Cuba with several MiG 23 Floggers, fighter-bombers with an effective radius of 615 nautical miles. Alarmed, USCINCSO wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 September requesting six F-4 Phantoms to provide his command with the capability to shoot down at sea any Floggers attempting to mount an attack on the Canal. Under the UCP air defense of the Caribbean air approaches to the Canal was the responsibility of CINCLANT. In the event of air attack the UCP specified that CINCLANT and USCINCSO were to coordinate their air assets in a joint defense—LANTCOM aircraft intercepting attackers at sea and USSOUTHCOM finishing off any attackers that managed to reach the Canal Zone. Arguing that shared command

arrangements led to ambiguity and delay, USCINCSO requested that he alone be tasked with all aspects of defending the Canal—air, land, and sea. In his opinion, augmentation or replacement of A-7 Corsairs with the higher performance F-4 Phantoms would enable his command to assume such responsibility.12

12. Ltr, USCINCSO to JCS, 8 Sep 78, JCS 1259/828, S-NOFORN, JMF 040 (8 Sep 78).
13. Ltr, USAF DCSOPS to DJS, "Air Defense of the Panama Canal (U)," 25 Sep 78, S-NOFORN; Memo, ASD (ISA), to SecDef, "Air Defense of Panama Canal (U)," 28 Sep 78, S-NOFORN; Memo, Vice DepDir, I&R, DIA, to Dir J-5, "Air Defense of the Panama Canal (U)," 20 Oct 78, S; SM-1011-78 to USCINCSO, 15 Dec 78, JCS 1259/828, S; JMF 040 (8 Sep 78).
The Middle East and the First Biennial Review, 1980

(U) With a massive airlift of troops and equipment into Afghanistan on Christmas night 1979, the Soviet Union dramatically provided new impetus for further development of the RDJTF. In the State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980 President Carter pronounced what became known as the "Carter Doctrine":

"Any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. . . . We are . . . improving our capability to deploy US military forces rapidly to distant areas. . . . We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf. . . . all these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and that of the nation we represent. . . ."25

(S) Following up the President's speech, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs asked the Secretary of Defense on 25 January to review the UCP to determine what changes in the existing structures for command and control, intelligence collection, and military security assistance would be required to accommodate establishment of the RDJTF.26


17. JCS 2121/232, 2 Dec 76, C, JMF 821 (2 Dec 76). CSAM 88-77 to JCS, 27 Nov 77, JCS 1259/800, 5 Dec 77, C, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).
18. JCS 1259/800-2, 6 Nov 78, C, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).

19. JCSM-331-78 to SecDef, 28 Nov 78, JCS 1259/800-2, S, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1977-1979

($$) JCS efforts to merge command arrangements for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (MEAFSA)—previously tried between 1963 and 1971 under USCINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA—recurred starting in 1977 with efforts to create a rapid deployment force (RDF) for use in the MEAFSA area. After the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf region forced up oil prices to punish the Western countries and Japan for Israeli occupation of former Arab lands. Further to the east, political and social unrest in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan threatened to create a power vacuum along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Concerned that the Arab states might choke off the flow of oil to the West or that the Soviet Union might invade neighboring Islamic states, President Jimmy Carter on 24 August 1977 directed that a study be made of creating a rapid deployment force of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.20

($$) From 1977 to 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff pondered the difficult task of restructuring US forces to create a multi-division rapid deployment force. By late 1979 they agreed that the bulk of ground forces for the RDF would have to come from CONUS-based USREDCOM. Since that command then possessed only enough air and sea-lift capability to deploy a single

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battalion to the Middle East, advanced bases for headquarters and logistics would be needed to field, larger forces. Out of sympathy for Israel's Arab neighbors, the Islamic nations refused to provide the facilities needed. To circumvent such obstacles, the Secretary of Defense on 22 June 1979 ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the entire system of command arrangements for the Middle East and look into the possibility of obtaining bases in the Sub-Sahara. It was at this juncture that US command arrangements for the Middle East, South Asia, and the Sub-Sahara merged into one of the most pressing JCS UCP issues for the period 1977 to 1983, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (later the US Central Command (USCENTCOM)).

27. Memo, DCS Plans and Policies, USMC, to Dir, J-5, 15 Feb 80, S; Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 8 Feb 80, S; Msg, USCINCREDS to Dir, J-5, 151612Z Feb 80, S; J-5/G&OP Files.

The Transition from the RDJTF to USCENTCOM, 1981-1982

(§) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not agreed in 1979 on the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and command arrangements for the Middle East remained a controversial issue during 1980. Then on 24 April 1981 the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan for transformation of the RDJTF within three to five years or less into a "separate unified command" for the countries bordering the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the western part of the Indian Ocean. He also directed that the COMRDJTF plan to deploy assigned forces anywhere in the world, but especially to Southwest Asia. In the event of imminent Soviet invasion of Iran, the COMRDJTF was to employ air, sea and ground forces to deter the invasion or at least delay its progress.

(§) The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim response to the Secretary of Defense on 18 May 1981. Assuming that the predominantly Moslem nations of Southwest Asia would oppose the sudden assignment of their region to a powerful new US military organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported gradual establishment of a unified command over a period of a year and a half. The evolution from RDJTF to unified command was to take place in three stages. During the first stage, the RDJTF would remain under USCINCRED in Tampa. Placement—already in progress—of

39. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Apr 81, JCS 1259/920, S, JMF 915/040 (24 Apr 81).
40. Msg, JCS 091403Z Jul 81 to COMRDJTF, TS, cited in JCS 2513/33-1, 30 Oct 81, TS, JMF 865/470 (3 Sep 81).
Army, Navy, and Air Force-component headquarters, under the operational control of the COMRDJTF would complete Stage I. Stage II would conclude in the fall of 1981 with designation of the RDJTF as a separate command reporting directly through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Command Authorities. During Stage III the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, would assign forces and work out command arrangements with other unified commanders. For the target date marking conclusion of Stage III and the birth of the new unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose New Year's Day 1983.
42. JCSM-255-81 to SecDef, 6 Jul 81, JCS 2529/24, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Aug 81, JCS 2529/24-1, S, same file, sec 2.

43. JCSM-331-81 to SecDef, 23 Sep 81, JCS 2529/24-2, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81) sec 2. That same date the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed the approved terms of reference, including Egypt and Sudan in the AOR, to the Services and the CINCs. Also see SM-661-81 to CSA et al., 28 Sep 81, JCS 2529/24-2, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81) sec 2.

46. Msgs, JCS to CSA et al., 162130Z Apr 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 142007Z May 82, S; CINCPAC to JCS, 172130Z May 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.

48. CNOM 57-82 to JCS, 14 Sep 82, JCS 2529/51, S; CMCM 06-82 to JCS, 10 Nov 82, JCS 2529/51, S; JMF 036 (14 Sep 82).
(4) To reflect the new command arrangements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised the UCP of 1975 for the sixth and final time on 10 December 1982. Effective 1 January 1983 USCINCCENT would plan and conduct all normal operations, with one exception, for: the Northeast African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya; and Somalia; the Arabian Peninsular countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Bahrain; the Middle East mainland countries of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan; and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The exception, security assistance
for Pakistan and Afghanistan, would continue as a CINCPAC responsibility until transferral to USCINCCENT on 1 October 1983. Also under the revised UCP, USCINCEUR would remain responsible for the three confrontation states of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, and for the North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. All other African states, south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya would continue unassigned. 50

50. 6th N/H of SM-356-75, 10 Dec 82, C, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
51. RDJTF Command History, 1982, S, pp. 5 and 75.
52. CINCPAC Command History 1982, TS-NOFORN, p. 28.
53. Msgs, JCS to CSA et al., 162130Z Apr 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 142007Z May 82, S; USCINCSO to JCS, 151800Z May 82, S; CINCPAC to JCS, 172130Z May 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
54. Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 20 Sep 82, JCS 1259/970, U, JMF 040 (20 Sep 82).
57. Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 15 Nov 82, JCS 1259/982, S, JMF 040 (15 Nov 82).
58. Msg, JCS to CINCAD et al., 262309Z Nov 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.

59. Msgs, USCINCRE to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S; USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
62. Msgs, USCINCRED to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S;
USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS,
152330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.

63. Msg, JCS to USCINCSO and CINCLANT, 232314Z Dec
82, S; USCINCSO to JCS, 302330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP
Files.
64. Msg, USCINCSO to JCS, 302330Z Dec 82, S, J-5/G&OP Files.
During the early part of 1983, the Joint Staff reviewed the comments and proposals of the Commanders and the Service Chiefs. On 2 May, rather than submit more revisions of the UCP 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense the draft of a new unified command plan. It embodied several important changes affecting USEUCOM, PACOM, USCENTCOM, and USREDCOM. While retaining to themselves responsibility for the Soviet Union as a country whose size and military capabilities could overwhelm one or more of the unified commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all other countries of Eastern Europe: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. By so doing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to exploit the growing "potential for improvement in political-military linkage between this region and the West."

Seeking similarly to use longstanding links between certain NATO nations and their former colonies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all states of Africa, above and below the Sahara, except for those assigned to USCENTCOM (Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia). By adding to the North African states already in USEUCOM those countries from the Sahara to South Africa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to signal to allies and adversaries the strategic importance the United States attached to this hitherto unassigned region.
Although the UCP does not mention the Mongolian People's Republic by name, the map clearly includes it in CINCPAC's area. Interviews of J-5 officers verified that Mongolia had been assigned to USCINCPAC in the new UCP.
Before disseminating the UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made one minor change to accommodate CINCPAC. He believed that his title, Commander in Chief, Pacific, suggested the inclusion of non-US forces, and he had asked that his title and command be redesignated USCINCPAC and USPACOM, respectively. The Joint Chiefs of Staff honored the request on 11 October and, in the interest of uniformity, renamed CINCLANT and LANTCOM respectively USCINCLANT and USLANTCOM.69

67. JCSM-129-83 to SecDef, 2 May 83, JCS 1259/994, S, JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).
68. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jul 83, JCS 1259/994-1, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 83, JCS 1259/994-2, S; JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).