MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)

1. a. This memorandum provides the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the need for and the estimated capability to provide additional forces recently requested by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. These force requirements are tabulated in Appendix C hereto and consist of a minimum essential force for South Vietnam (SVN) of two and one-third divisions, five tactical fighter squadrons (TFS), the remainder of the mobile riverine force, other naval patrol forces, and the required support forces; a force of three TFS in Thailand; and an additional 8" gun cruiser and five additional destroyers for naval surface operations in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. These forces are in addition to Program 4 and are required as soon as possible during FY 1968. It is noted that, on 8 April 1967, you approved an addition of 7,822 spaces to Program 4 for PRACTICE NINE. These forces will apply against the above FY 1968 requirements.

   b. Subsequent to consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the foregoing requirements, they received from CINCPAC (CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 191432Z April 1967) a request for reactivation of two battleships. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will advise you at a later date concerning their review of this request.

2. Beyond the immediate FY 1968 forces outlined above, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC have indicated that another two and one-third division equivalents, five more TFS, plus the required combat support and combat service support and additional Navy combat ships may be required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate additional requirements together with an examination of the ultimate requirement for forces to achieve a satisfactory conclusion to the war and will advise you of their findings at the earliest practicable date.
3. The current situation in Vietnam can be summarized as follows:

   a. There are three general areas of military effort that should be pursued in the conduct of the war:

      (1) Operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces in SVN while concurrently assisting the South Vietnamese Government in their nation-building efforts.

      (2) Operations to obstruct and reduce the flow of men and materials from North Vietnam (NVN) to SVN.

      (3) Operations to obstruct and reduce imports of war-sustaining materials into NVN.

   b. In the first area, the United States and its allies have achieved considerable success in operations against VC/NVA forces. However, sufficient friendly forces have not been made available to bring that degree of pressure to bear on the enemy throughout SVN which would be beyond his ability to accommodate and which would provide the secure environment essential to sustained progress in Revolutionary Development. The current reinforcement of I CTZ by diversion of forces from II and III CTZs reduces the existing pressure in those areas and inevitably will cause a loss of momentum that must be restored at the earliest practicable date.

   c. In the second area, US efforts have achieved appreciable success. Greater success could be realized if an expanded system of targets were made available.

   d. In the third area, relatively little effort has been permitted. This failure to obstruct and reduce imports of war-sustaining materials into NVN has affected unfavorably the desired degree of success of operations in the other areas.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, while the deployment of the additional forces recommended herein should provide an increased level of effort in both SVN and NVN, action also must be taken to reduce and obstruct the enemy capability to import the materiel support required to sustain his war effort. The cumulative effect of all these operations in concert should hasten the successful conclusion of the war and should reduce the over-all ultimate force requirements. Appendix A hereto contains an updated concept recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It envisions employment of additional forces and expanded operations in both the North and the South.
5. (C) Appendix B hereto outlines the rationale for the FY 1968 forces. It is summarized as follows:

a. The FY 1968 force for SVN is primarily needed to offset the enemy's increased posture in the vicinity of the DMZ and to improve the environment for Revolutionary Development in I and IV CTZs. To achieve the secure environment for lasting progress in SVN, additional military forces must be provided in order to (1) destroy the enemy main force, (2) locate and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces, and (3) provide security for the population. The increased effort required to offset VC/NVA main forces' pressure is diminishing the military capability to provide a secure environment to villages and hamlets. Diversion of forces from within SVN and the employment of elements of CINCPAC's reserve are temporary measures at the expense of high-priority programs in other parts of SVN. Thus, if sufficient units are to be available to provide both direct and indirect support to Revolutionary Development throughout SVN, added forces must be deployed.

b. The three-TFS force for Thailand and the additional Navy forces in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin are required to bring increased pressures to bear on NVN.

6. (C) The Service-estimated capabilities to meet the force requirements are in Appendix C and are summarized below. They were determined under two alternative cases.

a. Case I - No Reserve callup or extension of terms of service. Present tour and rotation policies would be maintained. By July 1968, only a one and one-third Army division force, a part of the mobile riverine force, and no additional Marine Corps forces could be in place in SVN. A second Army division force to fill out the FY 1968 requirement probably could not be provided until the first half of FY 1970. The additional 8" gun cruiser, five additional destroyers, and about half of the in-country naval forces could be provided in FY 1968, but only by the undesirable expedient of extending present periods of deployment. The three TFS in Thailand and five in SVN requested by CINCPAC could be furnished in FY 1968. Three TFS in SVN would be required to meet the need for air support of the one and one-third divisions that could be deployed in FY 1968.

b. Case II - Callup of Reserves and a twelve-month involuntary extension of terms of service. Present tour and rotation policies would be maintained. A Reserve callup and the collateral actions enumerated below would enable the Services to provide the major combat forces required in PACOM not later than end FY 1968. The forces would include one and one-third
Army divisions, three US Air Force TFS, one Marine division/wing team which includes two TFS, the major portion of the mobile riverine force, naval patrol forces, and most of the required support forces for SVN; three US Air Force TFS in Thailand; one additional 8" gun cruiser and five additional destroyers.

Appendices D and E hereto contain a discussion of the factors used by the Services in determining their estimated capabilities to meet the requirements under certain ground rules, possible problem areas, and logistic implications. Identified in these Appendices are the need for:

a. Callup of Reserves and extension of terms of service.

b. End-strength increases required above current force levels.

c. Expansion of the sustaining base.

d. Funds additional to the FY 1968 budget.

e. Drawdown of war reserve, operational projects, and pre-positioned stocks and partial mobilization of industry.

7. (TS) The Services have developed their plans to provide the additional forces to SVN in FY 1968 so as to minimize the impact on the over-all US military posture: Decisions must recognize the lead time necessary to produce not only the requisite forces for deployment but also the sustaining base to support them in order that a responsive over-all military posture can be maintained.

8. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The concept in Appendix A provides a sound basis for the conduct of the war.

b. The current situation in I CTZ highlights the requirement for additional forces. Therefore, in order to retain the initiative and maintain momentum in the conflict, the forces requested for FY 1968 must be provided as soon as possible during FY 1968.

c. Concurrently, actions must be taken to impede increasingly the flow of men and materiel from NVN to SVN and to obstruct the flow of war materiel into NVN.
d. Considering our current worldwide commitments, a Reserve callup for a minimum of 24 months and involuntary extension of terms of service for twelve months are the only feasible means of meeting the additional FY 1968 requirements in the stipulated time frame. The effect of a 24-month limitation on callup of Reserves is that the Armed Forces would expend their major reserve assets by end FY 1972 as a result of successive callup and commitment of Reserve units. This would be avoided if Reserve units were held for the duration of the emergency. Authority to do this and to extend terms of service involuntarily would require Congressional action.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The military strategy for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia, as described in Appendix A, be approved in principle.

b. The list of forces in Appendix C, Case II, less forces approved on 8 April 1967, be approved for deployment.

c. Authority be obtained for a Reserve callup for a minimum of 24 months and involuntary extension of terms of service for twelve months in order to meet FY 1968 force requirements and to prepare for possible future requirements.

d. To support the preceding recommended actions, authority be granted to provide for:

   (1) Access to equipment from sources in the following priority:

      (a) CONUS depot assets and programmed production deliveries not committed to higher priority requirements.

      (b) Operational project stocks.

      (c) Contingency stocks.

      (d) Reserve components not scheduled for callup.

      (e) Pre-positioned equipment in Europe.

      (f) Diversion of items for recently activated units.

      (g) Drawdown from nondeploying active units in CONUS.

   (2) Reopening of CONUS inactive installations, as required.
c. An early decision be provided on both funding in addition
to the FY 1968 budget and increased end strengths to support
all aspects of the deployment of FY 1968 forces.

10. Based on decisions on the above, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Services, as appropriate, will advise you relative
to:

a. Appropriate modifications resulting from a refinement
of the requirements and capabilities to meet them. In this
respect, it is noted that capabilities reflected in this paper
are based on 1 May 1967 decisions, and any delay beyond
1 May 1967 will result in delays in projected closure dates.

b. Specific actions required to generate, ready, deploy,
and sustain the FY 1968 forces.

c. Specific actions required to execute the concept con-
tained in Appendix A.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM (U)

1. This concept outlines the military strategy for
the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. It reinforces
concepts previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the most recent of which was forwarded to the Secretary of
Defense by JCSM 702-66, dated 4 November 1966, subject:
"Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 1967 Requirements (U)."
The concept covers operations by US, South Vietnamese, and allied
military forces and encompasses the concepts set forth to date
by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for the conduct of the war.

2. National Objective. The national objective with
respect to Vietnam which is supported by this concept is
restated for reference as follows: To attain a stable and
independent noncommunist government in South Vietnam.

3. Military Contributions. The military forces of the
United States and its allies are employed in pursuit of this
national objective. Actions are directed toward three general
areas of military effort:
   a. Operations against the VC/NVA forces in SVN while
      concurrently assisting the South Vietnamese Government
      in their nation building efforts.
   b. Operations to obstruct and reduce the flow of men
      and materials from NVN to SVN.
   c. Operations to obstruct and reduce imports of war
      sustaining materials into North Vietnam.

4. Military Objectives. The military contribution
toward achieving the national objective will have been made
when the following military objectives are fulfilled:
   a. To make it as difficult and costly as possible for
      NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause
      NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency.
b. To defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces.

c. To extend Government of South Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over South Vietnam.

d. To deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs.

5. **Military Operations.** The military operations described below are to be conducted in coordination with appropriate political, economic, and sociological programs of US, other Free World, and host country agencies. Combat operations are mounted from South Vietnam, the South China Sea, Guam, and Thailand and are supported by PACOM forces in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Taiwan. An integrated and expanded air and naval campaign is conducted against NVN and the infiltration routes through the DMZ, Laos, and the South China Sea as outlined in subsequent paragraphs.

Intensified offensive ground, naval, and air operations are conducted concurrently against VC/NVA forces in SVN and in immediately adjacent areas near the DMZ and in Laos so as to create a secure environment in which Revolutionary Development can progress. The actions in the south will be expanded with the deployment of additional forces. This concept provides for bringing significantly greater military power to bear on the enemy in a sufficiently short time so as to be beyond his ability to accommodate or counter.

6. **To make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency, an integrated air and naval campaign is conducted against military and war-sustaining target systems in all areas of NVN, including the Hanoi/ Haiphong complex. This campaign includes intensive interdiction**
operations within NVN and its coastal waters to harass and disrupt military operations and obstruct the movement of materials into NVN and of men and materials from NVN into Laos and SVN.

Mining of ports, inland waterways, and coastal waters is accomplished to reduce imports and the flow of war resources.

Naval surface operations are conducted against enemy military installations and LOCs along the SVN/NVN coast. Aerial reconnaissance and special air operations are conducted in support of the overall effort. Ground fire from positions in SVN is directed on military targets in NVN. Offensive air operations and special ground operations are conducted in Laos to make the infiltration of men and supplies as costly as possible, and guerrilla warfare is initiated against the communists in Laos. Limited ground and air operations are conducted in Cambodian border areas against identified enemy forces. Attacks against population centers will continue to be avoided.

7. To defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVN and force withdrawal of NVA forces, the following actions are taken:

a. US, South Vietnamese, and allied forces conduct operations against the enemy in South Vietnam. Coordinated offensive operations are conducted against the enemy main force units, his base areas, and safe havens to destroy him or keep him under sustained pressure and deny him freedom of movement. Separate air strikes are also made against these targets as required. Long-range patrols harass and keep enemy forces off balance. Friendly forces contain enemy forces posing a threat from their out-of-country and DMZ sanctuary areas and detect and destroy infiltration or invasion attempts from such areas. Access to population and food resources is denied to the enemy. In the delta, riverine operations are conducted to search out and...
destroy enemy units and installations. Psychological operations are conducted to support the over-all campaign and to induce defections. To provide a foundation for the operations in SVN, establishment and buildup of bases is continued in key areas.

b. Anti-sea infiltration forces detect and restrict enemy seaborne infiltration traffic in coastal waters from the 17th parallel in the north to the Cambodian border in the south and beyond, as necessary. Naval forces patrol the inland waterways to intercept, harass, and restrict enemy activities. Naval forces conduct amphibious operations, and provide shore bombardment and gunfire support to forces operating ashore.

8. To extend GVN dominion, direction, and control over SVN, increased and intensified military operations are conducted to permit expansion of Revolutionary Development in the major national population areas. An extensive campaign to find, identify, root out, and destroy VC guerrillas and the communist infrastructure is mounted. LOCs are opened, secured, and improved. Military civic action programs are conducted in coordination with GVN programs. Assistance, transport, and protection is provided in the furtherance of the Revolutionary Development Program. Assistance in refugee relief, relocation, and settlement is provided. Friendly sources of food are protected and denied to the enemy. Advice and training is provided for paramilitary and military forces.

9. To deter the CHICOMS from direct intervention and to be prepared to defeat such intervention, should it occur, the following actions are taken:

a. Maintain and improve bases and logistical posture in all of WESTPAC.

b. Maintain deployed forces in a high state of readiness, and maintain reconnaissance of communist areas.
c. Expand and improve the logistic posture in Thailand, including LOCs, to support air and special operations against the enemy in Laos and NVN.

d. Assist Thailand in countering externally supported insurgency, to include: improvement of Thai counter-insurgency posture and operations; military assistance to insure adequate training, equipment, and facilities; advisory effort to strengthen the Thai Armed Forces; transport assistance, as necessary.

e. Maintain the capability of US forces to employ nuclear weapons.
APPENDIX B

RATIONALE FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES

1. [Redacted] In FY 68, opportunity should develop for significant gains or improvement in the military situation in SVN provided operations in both the north and south are sustained and expanded. In the north, there are two pressing problems. The first is to obstruct the flow of war supporting equipment, material and supplies in NVN, from where they can and are being used effectively against US and friendly forces in both NVN and SVN. The second is that expanded authority and increased level of effort required to further obstruct the flow of men and materials from NVN into combat zones. In SVN, additional forces must be introduced to meet the growing threat in the I CTZ, and to provide adequate mobility to the 9th Division when deployed to the IV CTZ. In addition, the RVNAF requires assistance by US/FWMAF in fulfilling its Revolutionary Development responsibilities with the concomitant requirement for additional US force resources to fill the operational void resulting from the RVNAF Revolutionary Development orientation. To maintain the momentum of current US/FWMAF/RVNAF operations and to exploit the initiatives already achieved, major additional deployments are required at an early date. The minimum essential force, above Program 4 levels, to meet the FY 6820 requirements includes two and one-third division force equivalents (DFE), eight tactical fighter squadrons, the remainder of the mobile riverine force, an additional 8" gun cruiser and 5 destroyers, additional Navy patrol forces, and support forces.

2. I Corps Tactical Zone.
   a. The current buildup of enemy forces in and adjacent to the DMZ has required COMUSMACV to deploy combat forces from other high priority tasks in II and III CTZ in order to counter the threat which has developed. An example is Task Force

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
OREGON. A provisional division size force of three or four brigades is being formed from units in the II and III CTZ and elements have been deployed to an area in the southern I CTZ to free III MAF forces for operations in northern I CTZ.

CINCPAC has recently been granted authority to deploy as required by COMUSMACV, the 9th MAB from Okinawa to I CTZ because of the threat posed by the continuing buildup of NVA forces in the vicinity of the DMZ.

b. In I Corps Tactical Zone, the bulk of the population and the food producing regions are within 15 miles of the coast. It is estimated that elements of three and possibly four NVA divisions in the vicinity of the DMZ possess the capability to move south into SVN. Additionally, there is constant enemy activity in much of the coastal area. The topography lends itself to the establishment and maintenance of enemy base areas in the remote, sparsely populated regions. The enemy has enjoyed freedom of action for years throughout most of Quang Ngai Province because only limited numbers of friendly forces could be diverted to that area from other higher priority tasks.

c. There are several important tasks which must be performed in I CTZ:

(1) Security of bases and key population centers must be maintained.

(2) Enemy main forces and bases must be destroyed.

(3) The area under GVN control must be extended by expanding existing TAORs, and by opening and securing major LOCs, particularly Route 1.

(4) Enemy infiltration must be impeded, and invasion deterred or defeated.

(5) Surveillance and reconnaissance throughout the CTZ must complement the tasks discussed above.

(6) Ports must be improved and LOCs upgraded.
d. The 20 maneuver battalions of US Marines and the three ROK Marine battalions which normally are in the I CTZ are extended in a general northwest to southeast line which is approximately 150 miles in length. The battalions are deployed in three TAORs to provide security for the civilian population in the three major cities of I CTZ. However, three to five battalions are deployed continually in Quang Tri Province. This deployment configuration has resulted in a limited capability for TAOR expansion, and LOC security. Of the 32 RVNAF maneuver battalions in I CTZ, only 12 are engaged in direct support of Revolutionary Development which accomplishes the extension of GVN control. The remaining 20 battalions are engaged primarily in search and destroy operations, static security, and LOC security missions.

e. The presence of the three and possibly four enemy divisions in the vicinity of the DMZ, the continued use by the enemy of the DMZ as an infiltration route, and the need to provide both direct and indirect support to Revolutionary Development, establish a requirement for additional forces in northern I CTZ. Under Program 4 force levels, US military operations in support of Revolutionary Development cannot be increased to the desired degree in the coastal area and the major LOCs cannot be opened throughout the CTZ as friendly forces must be committed to the vicinity of the DMZ to meet the threat. Deployment of another division to northern I CTZ would provide sufficient forces to meet the enemy threat and to further the progress of Revolutionary Development. Additionally, an armored cavalry regiment is considered to be essential to conduct route reconnaissance and maintain security for the extended LOCs in northern I CTZ.

f. One of the most critical areas in the RVN today is Quang Ngai Province. A division is required there to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy, to eliminate his forces and numerous base areas, and to provide security for the large population and food resources. This additional division would provide security for the coastal
area, facilitate opening and securing Route 1 and the railroad, and relieve some of the pressure on northern Binh Dinh Province. Of particular significance is the support which would be provided to the RVNAF in securing the important Mo Duc area with its dense population and three annual rice crops. Additionally, deployment of the division as discussed above would allow III MAF to accelerate its clearing and securing operations into the heavily populated Tam Ky area north of the Chu Lai TAOR by permitting the redeployment of US/FWMAF operating south of Chu Lai. Long-term security must be provided for both of these areas so that RD can progress.

2. Over-all, it has now been determined that an additional two divisions and an armored cavalry regiment are required in the I CTZ if the enemy infiltration is to be impeded; invasion is to be deterred or defeated; the TAORs are to be expanded and joined; the enemy is to be driven from populated areas into the barren hinterlands; the enemy base areas are to be destroyed; the LOCs are to be secured; RD programs are to be expanded; and GVN control is to be extended.

3. IV Corps Tactical Zone.

a. In IV CTZ, with deployment of the US 9th Division and with increasing success of ARVN operations there, the potential will exist to improve the situation greatly. Primary emphasis will be given to destroying VC main and guerrilla units and their bases, to intensifying operations to extend GVN control, to stopping the flow of food stuffs and materials to the enemy through Cambodia, and to assisting in the flow of goods to GVN outlets in Saigon. In addition, emphasis will be accorded the opening and securing of principal water and land LOCs which are the key to extension of GVN control in the Delta.
b. Effectiveness of the US 9th Division's operations in IV CTZ will be degraded significantly without adequate mobility on the waterways. For this reason, addition of two river assault squadrons (RAS) with their associated support ships is essential. The Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force (MDMRF) originally was tailored and justified at a four RAS level. This requirement still is valid. The primary media of transport in the Delta are air and water. Air mobility is recognized as critical to success of operations in the area, but the size of offensive operations that can be mounted is limited by the inherent physical limitations of airborne vehicles. Accordingly, any sizable offensive operation such as those visualized for the MDMRF must utilize the waterways in the Delta to exploit tactical mobility. Maintenance of LOCs and population control in the areas secured by these operations, along with extension of the interdiction effort, necessitates expansion of the GAME WARDEN Operation.

c. The force requirements for the IV CTZ are two RASs, three barracks ships, a repair ship, a net tender, and an LST to complete the MDMRF. GAME WARDEN forces should be augmented with 50 PBRs and nine armed helicopters.

4. **Tactical Air**

a. Five tactical fighter squadrons are required in SVN to support the added two and one-thirds division equivalents discussed above. These squadrons would be based on existing airbases. Additional in-country airlift requirements will be met from within current theater airlift resources. Other PACOM airlift requirements which exceed theater capability will be absorbed by MAC. MAC will be augmented as necessary to meet additional requirements.

b. Three additional TFS should be deployed and an operational base established at Nam Phong, Thailand in order that the strategy to achieve and maintain maximum possible pressure...
against NVN may be executed. In addition to broadening the NVN target base, increased pressure must be attained by achieving greater effectiveness in destruction of targets, maintaining continuous harassment during periods of darkness and marginal attack weather, and generating surge strike capabilities during periods of visual attack conditions.

In view of the increased hostility of NVN air environment, achievement of around-the-clock strike capability is imperative to effect maximum possible degradation of the NVN air defense system which, in turn, will increase over-all attack effectiveness. As radar bombing/pathfinder capabilities are expanded and techniques perfected, the opportunity to employ additional strike forces effectively in sustained operations will improve significantly.

5. Naval support

   a. Actions to obstruct entry of war supporting supplies into NVN and to further interdict movement of supplies within NVN will require additional naval forces.

   b. Authority for naval surface operations against suitable targets ashore and in coastal waters of NVN have recently been extended to 20°N, as an integrated part of the air and mining campaign. The major objective of the operations against NVN include:

      (1) Interdiction of NVN military and waterborne logistic craft along the coast and on the inland waterways.

      (2) Interdiction of NVN logistic traffic and LOCs ashore.

      (3) Destroying or harassing suitable military targets ashore, such as radar sites, SAM sites, AAA sites, airfields, supply and support areas, bridges, rolling
stocks, and troop concentrations. In the south, RVNAF/US/FWMAF operations in the coastal regions of SVN are creating increasing demands for naval gunfire support.

c. The target structure and LOCs, NVN and SVN, as well as the ground operations in SVN, create a demand for limited heavy caliber long range naval guns. Two 8-inch cruisers in WESTPAC provide the minimum acceptable level for this support. The four heavy cruisers now in the Navy inventory can provide these assets through October 1968 by back-to-back deployments. Two additional cruisers, activated in the immediate future, are required to sustain the deployments.

d. Extended naval surface operations against NVN and increased tempo of naval gunfire support in SVN have also established a requirement for additional destroyers. CINCPAC has indicated an immediate need for five additional destroyers deployed to WESTPAC, which cannot be provided from PACOM assets.

e. Additional naval patrol, construction, and logistic forces for support of the increased force levels and tempo of operations will be required.

6. Future Requirements. The forces discussed above are those considered by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as essential to the successful prosecution of the war through FY 68. The timeliness with which the FY 68 force requirements are met, as well as the success of the increased pressures on the enemy resulting from the additional forces and relaxation of restraints, will be major determinants of the size of the forces required after FY 68. COMUSMACV has stated that in looking beyond FY 68, it is entirely possible that a requirement for
additional forces will materialize. He further has stated that present planning suggests a requirement for an additional two and one-third division force equivalents and five tactical fighter squadrons beyond FY 68. To permit definitive judgments, a study will be undertaken to estimate the forces that may be required immediately beyond FY 68 as well as those that ultimately may be required to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Recognizing this need for further examination and the uncertainties attendant on determining future force requirements, COMUSMACV's rationale is presented in the Annex hereto.
ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

COMUSMACV ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS BEYOND FY 68

1. COMUSMACV foresees a possible requirement for additional forces beyond FY 68 based on following appraisals of II and III CTZ. This rationale was developed prior to the formation of Task Force Oregon from resources in the II and III CTZ.

2. II CTZ:
   a. Although the major centers of population in the II CTZ are along the coastal plains, sizeable population centers and military bases also are found inland, especially on the western plateau Binh Dinh, An Khe, Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thout, and Dalat all require special attention. Strong enemy concentrations in Phu Yen and northern Binh Dinh Provinces and in the Chu Pong mountain region and the tri-border area, coupled with the requirement for security along the coast, dictate a requirement for mobility and flexibility in US/FWMAF/RVNAF forces. The size of the CTZ, its long lines of communication, and the need for constant surveillance and reconnaissance in force along the Cambodian border further complicates the situation.
   b. The enemy's offensive has been blunted by spoiling attacks and revolutionary development is meeting with some success in the coastal area. However, unless significant improvement occurs as a result of peripheral actions, additional forces will be necessary to:
      (1) Provide base security.
      (2) Support enlarged RD programs.
      (3) Destroy enemy main and guerrilla forces
      (4) Open key LOCs, particularly Route 1 and the railroad throughout the II CTZ, Route 20 from Dalat to the III CTZ boundary, and Route 7 from Tuy Hoa to Chao Re.

Annex to Appendix B
1. (5) Destroy enemy forces in the Pleiku and Kontum areas and impede infiltration from Cambodia and Laos.

(6) Destroy large enemy forces remaining in the heavily populated Binh Dinh Province.

(7) Open LOCs and conduct support operations in the vicinity of the II-III CTZ boundary.

c. COMUSMACV foresees a possible requirement for a force of four separate brigades to meet the operational requirements for the II CTZ discussed above. These would consist of an infantry brigade for northern Binh Dinh; a mechanized brigade for the western highlands; a mechanized brigade for southeastern II CTZ; and an infantry brigade in the Ban Me Thuot area.

3. ^III^ CTZ

a. In the III CTZ, the major objective will be to expand security radially from the Saigon-Cholon area. This will be accomplished primarily by the indirect support of US/FW/RWNAF operations against the VC provincial and district military organizations immediately adjacent to the areas of RD effort, and the direct support of RWNAF operations to establish and maintain security in those areas. Intrusion of enemy forces into areas undergoing RD will be deterred by operations to destroy VC/NVA main forces and bases in the northwestern and central parts of the CTZ. Further, an intensified campaign will be conducted to root out VC guerrillas and to destroy the infrastructure. These operations will be complemented by an intensive effort to open and secure the principal land and water LOCs throughout the CTZ. Success in achieving the major objective in III CTZ during FY 68 will depend on a capability to conduct large-scale operations in the war zones or base area clusters, thereby denying their use to the enemy, while concurrently maintaining offensive operations within the populated area adjacent to the RD areas.
b. Continuous pressure must be maintained on the enemy in War Zones C and D, the Iron Triangle, and the base areas in Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh Provinces, and in the Phuoc Long area. Denial of these areas to the enemy will reduce his ability to reinforce provincial and district VC forces, thereby strengthening the security which is essential to continued RD progress. When the US 9th Division moves to IV CTZ, a gap will be created in the forces available in III CTZ to maintain this security.

c. There are seven significant base areas in Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh Provinces. These areas constitute the home base of the 5th VC Division. This major VC force must be destroyed, and its bases neutralized. Other critical locales requiring considerable effort are War Zone D, and Phuoc Long area in which the NVA 7th Division is believed to be located. Substantial progress can be made with the forces operating currently in III CTZ; but to exploit success and to maintain a secure environment around the areas of RD effort, the gap created by the deployment of the 9th Division to IV CTZ should be filled. Repositioning of existing assets within III CTZ seriously would limit offensive capabilities in the northern and central portion of the zone, and is undesirable.

d. COMUSMACV foresees a possible requirement for an additional division in Bien Hoa Province, just north of Rung Sat Special Zone.
APPENDIX D

DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES

1. The capabilities shown in Appendix Care Service statements of capabilities and are based upon the following parameters and assumptions:

   a. Approval by the Secretary of Defense of force level recommendations in basic memorandum by 1 May 1967.
   b. Necessary obligational authority will be provided by 1 July 1967, as well as Congressional authority to obligate necessary military construction funds by 1 December 1967.
   c. Required funding in addition to the FY-68 Budget will be provided to support all aspects needed for deployment of FY-68 Forces.
   d. The opening of inactive CONUS installations will be authorized.
   e. Service policies with respect to tour lengths and repetitive tours will remain unchanged.
   f. Access to war reserves and operational project stocks, contingency stocks, reserve component units, and prepositioned stocks as required, will be authorized. Reconstitution of stocks will be accomplished as soon as practicable.
   g. Maintain capability to meet NATO commitments (replacement of critical skilled personnel by less skilled personnel is authorized).

2. General

   a. Service capabilities to meet CINCPAC force requirements are the best approximations available at this time and have been developed with limited coordination among Services. These estimates, and availability dates of related forces, must be further refined.
b. Extension of terms of service provides the means whereby the leadership requirements of an expanded structure can be met with trained personnel. For example, by retaining on active duty for an additional six to twelve months those personnel with two to three years of service, the military services will, in effect expand with E-4/E-5 personnel rather than E-1/E-2 personnel. By this technique, cadre level skills required for expansion are obtained most effectively.

(1) Other benefits also accrue. A temporary relief in providing trained replacement for those individuals due to be discharged is realized.

(2) By extending terms of service simultaneously with the Reserve callup, both Reserve assets and extension assets are available as individuals to meet structure requirements, thus tending to reduce competition for personnel from a single source.

(3) The principal problem of a general extension of terms of service is that personnel would be retained for whom there is not a requirement. This would indicate some need for selectivity in extension.

(4) With a twelve months' extension of terms of service, the normal deployment cycle and rotation policies would preclude a second tour in Vietnam for the man drafted for two years.

(5) Extension of terms of service without concurrent recall of Reserves would not provide the capability to meet CINCPAC's minimum essential FY 68 force requirements.

c. Capability of providing the CINCPAC force requirements is dependent, to some extent, on the capability of industry to meet currently scheduled deliveries and new demands. The extent to which separate Service demands on industry may
overlap has not been identified. It is clear that some industrial mobilization would be required to provide adequate and timely additional support for manpower mobilization and increased deployments.

d. The assumptions for this analysis do not include changes to tour lengths or time intervals between tours. However, extending tour lengths in SVN and reducing the interval between tours in SVN, in conjunction with increased end strengths, would provide some short term improvement in Service capability to meet requirements for additional force deployments. On the other hand, these conditions would result in even lower retention rates and a further reduced capability to provide essential ranks and skills to combat units.

e. The capability of the military establishment to increase its deployed forces is limited by two factors, trained manpower and equipment. Manpower problems can be overcome to some extent by mobilization. While equipment shortages will be partially overcome by drawdown authority, the remainder must come from new production.

3. US Army

a. Expansion to meet CINC PAC FY-68 force requirement - two and one-third division force equivalent (DFE).

(1) Two alternative methods of achieving the two and one-third DFE force structure increase were considered. First, (Case I), expansion of the active Army without Reserve Component callup and with no change in current policies. Second (Case II), expansion through Reserve Component callup and involuntary extension of terms of service necessary to provide the force requirements.

(2) In either alternative, the following conditions will apply:
(a) The deployment of the mechanized brigade
(PRACTICE NINE), formed from the resources of the
1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, in early 2nd Quarter
FY 68 is firm.

(b) The drawdown and redistribution of equipment
to support the expansion will be in accordance with
priorities below:

1. CONUS assets and programmed production
deliveries not committed to higher priority
requirements.

2. Selective drawdown of operational
project stocks.

3. Contingency stocks.

4. Reserve components not scheduled for
mobilization.

5. USAREUR 2/10 prepositioned equipment

6. Divert items scheduled to bring recently
activated STRAP units up to full TOE authoriza-
tion.

7. Drawdown of equipment from STRAP units
for deploying Reserve units.

b. CASE I - Expansion without a Reserve Component callup
or extension of terms of service.

(1) During FY 1968 one DFE and an armored cavalry
regiment will be deployed. Concurrently, two DFEs will
be activated. Forces for deployment will be provided
from existing STRAP units or by adjustment of the current
activation programs and deployments will be scheduled as
the sustaining base is expanded. Additionally, expansion
of the CONUS Operating Base by approximately 20,000 spaces
will be necessary to support the increased size of STRAF
and to augment the sustaining base necessary to support
FY 1968 deployments.
(2) Equipment limitations and the time required to develop officers and cadre personnel will prevent programming the activation of additional forces until FY 70, and therefore could delay the deployment of the remaining DFE to Southeast Asia until September 1969. Three DFEs in addition to the two activated in FY 68, and a further expansion of the CONUS Operating Base (27,000 spaces) will be required in FY 70 to sustain the total forces deployed to Southeast Asia.

(3) Under this plan, the STRAF will be increased to and maintained at eight DFEs and the CONUS Operating Base will be increased by 47,000 spaces.

(4) Manpower space requirements (trained strength) to support this plan are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 1968</th>
<th>FY 1969</th>
<th>FY 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,000 Reconstitution Mech Bde</td>
<td>150,000 DFE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79,000 DFE</td>
<td>27,000 CONUS OP Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 CONUS OP Base</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,000 TPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,400 TPS</td>
<td>No Increase</td>
<td>205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These totals are exclusive of the additional 64,822 spaces required to support the current force development program for Program 4 and STRAF expansion through FY 68.

(c) CASE II - Expansion with Reserve Component callup and extension of terms of service.

(1) It is assumed that a Reserve callup, if authorized, will provide for a two year period of service and will be coupled with a six month involuntary extension of terms of service for active Army personnel for an indefinite period. Two options were considered under this assessment, Option A, deployment of both...

\[\text{If new activations scheduled for FY 70 can be accelerated to the 4th quarter FY 69, some of the manpower increase shown in FY 70 will be moved to FY 69.}\]
active Army and Reserve units, and Option B, deployment of active Army units and use of Reserve units to sustain deployed units.

(2) Option A - Deployment of both active Army and Reserve Component units.

(a) This plan provides for mobilization of two DFEs on 1 July 1967. These units will be trained or reequipped as necessary for deployment to Southeast Asia beginning in January 1968. To replace these DFEs in-country the following mobilization schedule will be used (mobilized DFEs will begin replacing deployed DFEs six months after mobilization):

1. Two in July 1968
2. Two in July 1969
3. Two in July 1970
4. One in July 1971

Since all Reserve Component DFEs will have been mobilized by July 1971, a reduction in forces in Southeast Asia would have to begin in January 1972, unless new active DFEs had been activated and deployed to replace the Reserve units due to return to CONUS or unless the DFEs released in July 1969 are reconstituted.

(b) Inasmuch as the plan includes the currently approved deployment of a separate mechanized brigade formed from the resources of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, the expansion of the sustaining base to support this deployment will be accomplished by using active Army personnel on extended service.

(c) The reconstitution and expansion of the CONUS sustaining base requires the activation of an additional DFE and an increase of 40,000 spaces in the CONUS Operating Base. Under this option the STRAP will be maintained at a minimum of five and two-thirds DFEs.
(3) OPTION B - Deployment of Active Army units only and use of Reserve Units to sustain. An alternative to Option A provides for mobilization of Reserve Units for the purpose of expanding the sustaining base to a size necessary to meet deployment requirements with active Army units. As with Option A an additional DFE must be activated; however, the CONUS Operating Base must be expanded by 47,000 spaces. STRAP will be maintained at a constant eight DFEs (four Active and four Reserve) after July 1968.

(4) Use of the Reserve Component units in a purely sustaining role fails to use them for the purposes for which they have been trained and is not recommended.

(5) Manpower space requirements to support Case I are as follows:

FY 1968: 100,000 mobilized
38,000 new activations
40,000 CONUS Op Base (47,000 Option B)
28,000 Transients, patients, and students (TPS)
206,000 Total (213,000 Option B)

FY 1969: 100,000 mobilized
15,800 TPS
115,800 Total

(6) If a Marine Division/Wing Team is deployed as recommended in Appendix C, the manpower and funding requirements outlined above should be revised accordingly.

d. Implications of CINCPAC FY 68 Force Requirement (two and one-third DFE).

(1) Case I - Without Reserve Component callup
(a) Requires increase in end-strengths to 1,714 thousand in FY 68, 1,725 thousand in FY 69, and 1,799 thousand in FY 70.
(b) Increases the current problem of shortages of experienced leaders, both officer and enlisted, and creates severe personnel management problem when forces are phased back to pre-expansion levels.
(c) Requires activation of three inactive CONUS installations.

(d) Cost is maximum:

Total one-time Cost 2,488 million

Increased Annual Operating Cost FY 68 1,023 million
FY 69 2,099 million
FY 70 3,280 million

(2) Case II - With Reserve Component callup

(a) Personnel problem of expansion is greatly alleviated.

(b) Requires opening of two inactive installations

(c) Cost is minimized:

Total one-time Cost 120 million

Increased Annual Operating Cost FY 68 1,735 million
FY 69 3,063 million
FY 70 3,767 million

(d) Annual offset savings in Reserve Component appropriations 223.0 million

4. (TS) US Navy

a. The capability of the Navy to meet the FY 68 requirements is limited by two factors, the availability of trained personnel and the availability of specialized types of ships, craft and equipment. Manpower problems can be overcome through a callup of reserves, extension of terms of service, and changes in rotational policies. Since enlisted manpower shortages involve requirements entirely for senior pay grade personnel, for Case II a SELECTIVE twelve month extension of terms of service through involuntary retention of personnel scheduled for retirement was assumed. Similarly, a SELECTIVE retention of regular officers beyond their scheduled release date was assumed. In addition, for Case II the Reserve callup probably should be limited to two Reserve NMCBs plus one regimental staff. The availability of the specialized types of ships, craft, and equipment can be partially overcome by drawdown authority, authorization for industrial priorities and additions to shipyard and ship repairs facilities.
b. CINCPAC FY 68 Requirement

(1) The estimated additional end-strength required to provide the personnel capability to meet the stated FY 68 requirements (except for the cruiser and destroyer activation and Navy personnel organic to the Marine Division Wing/Team which are covered separately below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE I</th>
<th>CASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct plus pipeline</td>
<td>10,835</td>
<td>7,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotation Base and CONUS Support</td>
<td>4,858</td>
<td>2,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>15,693</td>
<td>10,531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three NMCBs (2136 personnel) and OICC, SVN augmentation (98 personnel) included in the FY 68 Force Requirements will be provided from within current resources.

(2) The estimated additional end-strength including pipeline required in addition to that in paragraph 4b(1) above to provide Navy personnel organic to the Marine Division/Wing Team would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE I</th>
<th>CASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>1,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the direct requirement of 1935 Navy personnel required 304 personnel would be provided from current resources.

(3) In conjunction with end-strength additions, the top six pay grade strength ceilings must be increased by 11,000 to accommodate the qualitative requirements to be met, but with further diminution of experience level.

(4) The estimated FY 68 funds required, in addition to the approved DOD FY 68 Budget, to provide the FY 68 Navy requirements (except for the additional cruisers and destroyers which are covered separately below) are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE I</th>
<th>CASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$731 million</td>
<td>$719 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
beyond October 1968 and to provide for needed overhauls already delayed for current cruiser assets would require the activation of two 8" gun cruisers from the Naval inactive ship maintenance facility and assignment to PACOM. The two LANTCOM and 4 PACOM 8" gun cruisers would then provide the overhaul and rotation base for maintaining two 8" gun cruisers deployed. The additional estimated FY 68 funds and end-strength increases required are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE I</th>
<th>CASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 68 Funds</td>
<td>$28.8 Million</td>
<td>$28.8 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-strength increases,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct plus pipeline</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>2450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) CINCPAC has stated a requirement for five additional destroyers in WESTPAC. The requirement could be met as follows:

(a) CASE I

1. To meet the immediate requirement, five DDs could be provided from PACOM and LANTCOM assets until March 1968 on a surge deployment basis, but at a further increase of the currently high tempo of operations with the attendant reduction in time available for maintenance.

2. To sustain the deployments, 15 naval reserve training (NRT) destroyers could be brought to a deployable status for SEAsia operations (first 5 DDs deploy in March 1968; second 5 DDs ready for deployment in July 1968; and third 5 DDs ready for deployment in December 1968). These ships to be manned by active duty personnel with a significant diminution of experience level in the top pay grades.

3. Bring 15 destroyers from the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities to NRT status to replace the NRT destroyers on a time-phased basis to replace all NRT destroyers by November 1969. This could cause a further diminution of the experience level throughout the Navy.
4. The estimated additional funds required in addition to paragraph 4b(4) above are:

- Overhaul 15 NRT DDs to provide minimum
  SEAsia capability and other associated
  cost items $72.7 million
- Activation of 15 Inactive Ships Navy
  Custody destroyers to NRT status (FY 69) $43.5 million

5. The estimated personnel end-strength, including pipeline, required in addition to paragraph 4b(1) above:

- Overhaul 15 NRT DDs to Deployable Status
  FY 68 1846
  FY 69 2769
- 15 ISNAC to NRT Status
  0 2730

(b) CASE II

1. To meet the immediate requirement, five NRT DDs could be provided from PACOM and LANTCOM assets until January 1968 on a surge deployment basis; but at a further increase of the currently high tempo of operations with the attendant reduction in maintenance time.

2. To sustain the deployments, 15 NRT destroyers could be brought to a deployable status for SEAsia operations (first 5 DDs could deploy in January 1968; the second 5 DDs ready for deployment in April 1968; and the third 5 ready for deployment in September 1968). The ships to be manned by their designated Reserve crews.

3. The estimated funds required in addition to those listed in paragraph 4b(4) above:

- Overhaul 15 NRT DDs to provide minimum
  SEAsia capability and other associated
  cost items $77.8 million

4. The estimated personnel end-strength, including pipeline, required in addition to paragraph 4b(1) above:

- 15 NRT destroyers to deployable status
  for SEAsia operations 2424
The requirement for the eight LSTs for shallow water logistic support in the I CTZ and the I LST in support of Mobile Riverine Force is currently under review by CINCPAC. When the requirement is established, the additional FY 68 funds and personnel end-strength increases will be determined.

5. (TS) US Air Force
   
a. Providing CINCPAC with forces and sustaining those forces in combat has placed the USAF in a position of reduced capability to meet the over-all threat to the United States. The provision of eight tactical fighter squadrons while maintaining NATO capability will require a temporary addition of one wing to the USAF force structure. Further degradation of the US presence in WESTPAC North will be required. This degradation will be proportional to attrition in Southeast Asia, as assets now programmed for reequipping and force modernization will be needed to meet the FY 68 force requirement as follows:

   (1) As the Navy modernizes its force, 110 A-1 aircraft will be made available to the USAF by the Navy. The USAF will form one temporary wing of three A-1 squadrons as a part of the added forces required by CINCPAC to support the added two and one-third divisions in SVN. The other A-1 aircraft, as they become available, will be used in the training base, to bring other USAF and VNAF units up to authorized strength, and to provide replacement for A-1 attrition.

   (2) The tactical fighter wing in Spain is equipped with F-100 aircraft. Two squadrons of F-100s from the tactical fighter wing in Spain will deploy to SVN to provide the other two squadrons required to meet the CINCPAC FY 68 force requirement in SVN. F-4C squadrons will replace the F-100 squadrons in Spain which were withdrawn.

   (3) The three tactical fighter squadrons for Thailand would be met by providing units now programmed to reequip or convert squadrons located in other WESTPAC areas outside of Southeast Asia.
b. The CINCPAC FY 68 requirement can be met without callup of Reserves, but it will result, as pointed out above, in a reduction of visible presence about the eastern periphery of Red China and the USSR. Further, as Army forces are built up there will be no ready source of active Air Force units to move with and support them if they should be needed for other contingency actions. If callup of Reserve forces is authorized, the USAF would require the callup of Air National Guard units in order to maintain the training and rotation base and to provide the ready forces for timely response to other contingencies.

c. From initial estimates, it now appears that in FY 68, no end-strength increase would be required if Reserves were not called. An end-strength increase will be required after FY 68 to provide a training and rotation base and to provide readily deployable air units commensurate with the rebuilding of the STRAP by the Army, but further refinement of program data will be necessary, if this option is approved.

d. If reserves are called to active duty in FY 68, end-strength increases will be required in the number of reserves called to active duty.

e. The estimated cost through FY 2/70 of providing the five tactical fighter squadrons for SVN is $245 million. This cost does not include the three squadrons for out-of-country operations or Reserve callups. The cost data will have to be further refined to support necessary budget adjustment depending upon what portion of the force increase and whether callup of Reserves is authorized.

f. The CINCPAC FY 68 requirement for an additional 29 O-2A aircraft in November 1967 cannot be met. However, the quantity of 0-1 E/F and O-2A aircraft available in Southeast Asia will provide an increase of the FAC authorized level from 250 to 279, by utilizing 0-1 aircraft until
sufficient numbers of 0-2A aircraft are received. The additional 0-2A aircraft will not be available in Southeast Asia to support the 0-2A increase until January 1968, due to production limitations and the ferrying schedule.

g. Personnel can be made available for required pilot training at the expense of other lower priority Air Force programs which are already experiencing acute pilot shortages. Further dilution of personnel assets in reciprocating engine aircraft airmen skills will occur. These assets have been reduced due to normal programming to meet jet conversion requirements. The availability of trained personnel to meet the planned deployment dates is contingent principally on an early decision to provide the additional forces. Due to problems associated with the training base, considerable difficulty in providing airmen in certain indirect support skills is anticipated. The two principal areas are munitions and civil engineering skills. For example, within one Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) there are no skilled airmen assigned within the CONUS who are eligible for Southeast Asia. This severe CONUS/overseas imbalance can only be met by retraining and realignment throughout overseas commands. Studies are currently underway to determine the point at which involuntary second tours in Southeast Asia will be required. Preliminary indications are that second tours in some skills will be required at a future date.

h. The requested civil engineer squadrons do not exist and must be recruited, trained, and equipped. The first squadron requested by CINCPAC is geared to the TURN KEY equipment on hand at Tuy Hoa. Other squadrons will require on the order of six to eight months to recruit, train, and equip. Skill levels at first will be quite low.

i. CINCPAC has requested that a C-130 squadron be provided to meet increased airlift requirements. The USAF has the capability to meet this requirement, and if it were deployed,
would locate it at Ching Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan. However, the additional in-country airlift requirements can be met from within current theater airlift resources. Other PACOM airlift requirements which exceed theater capability will be absorbed by the Military Airlift Command (MAC). MAC will be augmented as necessary to meet additional requirements.1

j. If a Marine Division/Wing Team is deployed under Case II as is indicated in Appendix C, the number of TFS to be deployed will be revised and the end-strength and cost estimates adjusted accordingly.

6. (TS) US Marine Corps


Although, on a gross numbers basis the Marine Corps can acquire the forces required for deployment by March 1969, under present ground rules, it cannot deploy and sustain additional combat ready regular forces to SVN prior to FY 72. While the Marine Corps enlisted strength can be increased by about 90,000 marines by 30 June 1969, rank and skills shortages would preclude molding these new accretions into a combat ready organization. Diversion of limited available deployable ranks and skills into new deployments could be done only at the expense of deployed units.

b. Case II - With Reserve callup and involuntary extension of terms of service.

(1) This analysis assumes that mobilization would be authorized in accordance with Public Law 89-687 and Title 10 USC. These limit the callup of reserves to a period of 24 months.
(2) In response to an emergency situation, Marine Corps mobilization plans are based on a capability to mobilize the Fourth Division/Wing Team and have it at the port of embarkation within 60 days of date of mobilization. Since the situation examined herein does not qualify as an emergency, the mobilization and deployment of the Reserve units was phased to make more efficient use of shipping, manpower, and facilities assets.

(3) Under these conditions, the Marine Corps could activate and deploy, on a timely basis, a reinforced division and the bulk of an aircraft wing. However, at the end of the mobilization period, when the reserves are phased out, and involuntary extensions are terminated the Marine Corps forces in SVN would be reduced to Program 4 levels.

(4) A solution to this problem is available through the callup of reserves and involuntary extensions of service for the duration of the emergency.

c. Estimated increase in active end-strength required with callup of reserves is 116,000.

d. Estimated increase in funding with callup of Reserves is $750 million.
APPENDIX E

LOGISTICS

1. a. Concept

The logistic concept proposes that essentially all support for the minimum essential forces in the I CTZ would be accomplished through the port of Danang via deep draft vessels and all support for the forces in Thailand would be accomplished in accordance with current established support procedures. The major portion of the materiel for the two and one-third division force proposed for deployment to the I CTZ would have to be back loaded through the port at Danang and thence via shallow draft shipping to the northern CTZ ports of Hue and Dong Ha and the port of Chu Lai for the southern force. Logistic support will also rely on the use of the land LOC, highway Number 1, north and south from Danang.

b. Port upgrading and road improvement work in the I CTZ and airfield expansion at Nam Phong must be completed in the minimum amount of time to provide for the effective employment of the combat forces on arrival.

c. Materiel support of the northern force would be provided from installations at Dong Ha, Hue, and Danang while the southern division force would be supported from installations at Chu Lai and Danang. Materiel support of the added forces in Thailand would be provided from Nam Phong. Materiel to support the additional forces should begin arriving in I CTZ in April 1967 and in Thailand by Feb 1968 or as soon thereafter as possible.

d. Logistic support for additional Air Force units in II CTZ and Thailand and Navy units in III and IV CTZ will continue to be provided in accordance with present procedures.
2. Logistic Implications. In analyzing the logistic considerations, associated with the movement and support of these forces, the following implications were considered:

a. POL. The total requirement of bulk POL for 30 days for the two and one-third division force (including 12.5 aviation companies) will be approximately 156,400 barrels. The total requirement of bulk POL for 30 days for the support of eight TFSs, will be about 302,400 barrels. This will be an additive monthly POL requirement of about 345,400 barrels over the currently estimated 3.0 million barrels for SVN Program-IV forces and a 113,400 barrel additive requirement in Thailand. CINCPAC* raises serious doubts that the optimum storage system of 4.1 million barrels in SVN for support of Program IV forces will be attained due to the shortage of construction funds. CINCPAC thus projects a storage system of approximately 3.6 million barrels due to the shortage of funds. If this situation obtains and troop effort is not capable of constructing certain projects originally earmarked for contractor effort, a continued use of costly floating storage, intra-theater back-hauls from Japan and premium costs for product from commercial oil contracts will continue. The handling of an additional 345,400 barrels of product with this austere storage system will be marginal at best and can be supported only by expanding the costly alternatives identified above which now support Program IV forces. The additional POL requirements in Thailand are not considered to be a problem based on current in-country storage capability.

* (1) CINCPAC msg to JCS, 112214Z March 1967, JCS IN 61244
(2) CINCPAC msg to JCS, 310825Z March 1967, JCS IN 10326
b. Ammunition

(1) Air and Ground. Pending development of detailed
time-phased force list for the additive forces, a
comprehensive item analysis is not feasible. The
following general comments however, apply:
   (a) FY 68 Force. The production base for both air
and most ground munitions can be expanded in time to
meet the increased demands of the additive forces,
assuming that an early decision is given with regard
to these increased forces. An early decision will
permit timely production planning to provide an approxi-
mate 15 percent increase in munition output. For some
items additional facilities will be required and lead
time for receipt of production will not support the
additive forces within the time frame envisioned.
   (b) Additional Forces Beyond FY 68. Assuming
deployment of additional forces beyond FY 68 the pro-
duction base for air and ground munitions would need
to be expanded to meet demands in time to provide
proper support.

(2) Naval Gunfire. Ammunition in excess of antici-
pated expenditures in accordance with the currently
approved naval gunfire program which can be made avail-
able for further increased effort is tabulated below.
For those months in which no excess quantities are
shown, any increased expenditure in a specific part of
the SEAsia area of operations must be compensated by a
consequent decrease in expenditures elsewhere in the
SEAsia area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>5&quot;/38</th>
<th>5&quot;/54</th>
<th>6&quot;/47</th>
<th>8&quot;/55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>JUL</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>OCT</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORECAST PRODUCTION CAPABILITY FOR GUN AMMUNITION IN
EXCESS OF STATED REQUIREMENTS (000, rds)
This chart is based on the assumption that additional production can be obtained within 9 to 12 months, and that funds for this production will be made available not later than 1 July 1967.

c. Construction. The addition of the FY 68 Force and any additional forces beyond FY 68, will impact on construction. Additional forces and additional Military Construction (MilCon) Program funds are required. The forces identified by COMUSMACV* and supported by CINCPAC** are as follows:

FY 68 Force

Army
2 Engineer Battalions, Combat
4 Engineer Battalions, Construction (plus 2 Divisional Engineer Battalions)

Navy
5 NMCOB (Aug)

Air Force
2 CE Squadron (Red Horse)

Specific fund requirements have not as yet been established. CINCPAC recommends*** funds be obtained to retain contractor construction capability pending determination of the magnitude of the total construction requirements. There is no known source of funds immediately available to accomplish the recommendation. The alternatives are to assign to the contractor a larger amount of the $271 million in the FY 1967s than the $100 million now planned, to obtain an amount from the FY 1968R contingency fund as soon as possible and to phase-down by April 1968 in accordance with the COMUSMACV plan.

It is to be noted that the Minimum Essential Force is required as soon as possible and not later than 1 July 1968. The earliest that additive funds could be programmed would be in the FY 1969R, available approximately September 1968.

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*COMUSMACV msg to JCS, 10311 MACJ312/280940Z March 1967, JCS IN 93855
**CINCPAC msg to JCS, 310017Z March 1967, JCS IN 10476
***CINCPAC msg to JCS, 310825Z March 1967, JCS IN 10326

Appendix E
Alternatives are; reprogramming from existing programs, support from the FY 1968 $200 million MCP contingency, and a special supplement MCP.

Engineer troop resources in Program 4 are committed totally to combat support and base development construction to support presently approved force levels. COMUSMACV is currently reviewing* the phase-down of the contractor and the contractor/troop mix. Additional MCP work may be transferred to the troop capability. A stretch out of FY 1968 and prior MilCon programs from mid-CY 1969 to early CY 1970 is expected** to result. At the same time, increase in assignment of combat support effort may further reduce the capability to complete base development construction with current force levels. Therefore, the Minimum Essential Force package must include a balanced engineer element.

Nonavailability of equipment to outfit engineer battalions resulted in the acceptance of units currently approved in Program 4 in order to accelerate deployment. A similar limitation on readiness can be expected for the additional force requirements.

d. Service Support Forces

(1) General. Forces currently approved for deployment in Program 4 have provided a reasonably balanced complement of combat, combat support, and combat service support categories. Ability to provide combat service support for additional forces will be dependent upon elimination of deficiencies in LOCs, expansion of forward support installations and cantonment areas.

(2) Army. Army combat service support units will be required to perform their normal support functions in support of the Army forces, and specifically to assist in upgrading land LOCs.

* COMUSMACV msg, 08867 MACDC-EBD/160320Z March 1967, JCS IN 70119
** CINCPAC msg, 1819552 March 1967, JCS IN 74713
(3) Navy

(a) The requirement for five additional NMCBs in support of the Minimum Essential Force Requirement is as follows: (1) Two NMCBs are required in support of the two and one-third division force proposed for deployment in the northern I CTZ. Especially critical is the timely deployment of construction units to increase port and land LOC capabilities to handle the tonnages required by the tactical units. Construction in the northern section involves port improvements at Hue and Dong Ha together with Route 1 improvements between Dong Ha, Hue, and Danang. Also, the upgrading of Route 9 along the DMZ is required. (2) One additional NMCB is required in the southern section of the I CTZ for similar improvements throughout Quang Ngai Province, particularly Route 1 south of Danang and the roadways in the immediate area of Chu Lai. Port improvements at Chu Lai will also be necessary to support the proposed additional southern forces until such time as the land LOC can be completely secured south of Danang. (3) Two additional NMCBs are required because of the phasedown of contractor operations in RVN which will result in the reassignment of urgent projects from the contractor to troop construction units. To meet urgent needs, one NMCB would be assigned to III/IV CTZ to support GAME WARDEN and MRAF projects and one NMCB in the I CTZ to support construction effort.

(b) Command and control over the increased number of construction units operating within a larger geographical area, requires additional headquarters staffs and augmentation of the existing Naval
Construction Regimental (NCR) staff at Danang. One of the new NCR staffs will direct and control construction operations in the northern I CTZ and the other new NCR staff will accomplish the same functions in the southern section of I CTZ. The Danang NCR staff increase is required to operate a central material yard. This central material yard will support all NMCBs in I CTZ and will receive, store, inspect, issue, and ship construction material throughout the I CTZ.

(c) The augmentation of the CBMU authorized for the IV CTZ is required to provide needed flexibility to meet NAVSUPPACT Saigon's requirements in logistic support. The increasing military activity in IV CTZ has created additional maintenance requirements. An example of this is a requirement of over 500 vehicles to be dispersed throughout various MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN Bases all of which will require maintenance.

(d) The additional Seabee Teams also would support additional civic action projects under USAID Programs.

(e) To bring the ports in I CTZ up to the capability necessary to handle the increased flow of materiel and equipment, additional support personnel such as ship supervisors, drivers, checkers, documentation/administrative personnel, and pier teams will be required at Danang, Chu Lai, and Hue/Dong Ha.

(f) CINCPAC has indicated that additional LSTS will be needed to provide the intra-coastal transport from Danang to the shallow draft ports of Chu Lai, Dong Ha, and Hue in support of the additional forces and related construction effort in the I CTZ. This increased lift capacity is critical to the logistic support of the combat forces to be...
introduced into the I CTZ. In order to preclude costly delays and port congestion, the requirement must be met in timely fashion.

(g) The increase in river patrol forces, which was required with the augmentation of the MDMRF, requires a similar increase in support personnel to man facilities in the Mekong Delta and provide services in maintenance and supply for the additional river patrol force.

(4) Air Force. To support the added TFSs in II CTZ and Thailand, additional combat and service support units, as well as personnel to augment existing support units will be needed. Additional Red Horse squadrons will be needed to support the increase in forces at bases selected and to assume the execution of current MPC projects left over from the contractor phase-out.

e. Offshore Medical Units

(1) Army. Based upon experience to date with the forces in support of SEA, additional offshore hospital capability will be required to support the minimum essential force. CINCPAC has indicated a need for a 800-bed general hospital at Camp Oj1, Japan, and a helicopter ambulance detachment at Camp Zama, Japan.

(2) Air Force. A 45-man 100-bed casualty staging facility is needed at Yokota for intercontinental MAC support in addition to the already existing casualty staging facility at Tachikawa. A 15-man supplement to the 902 AME squadron at Clark will provide three additional C-130 crews.
f. Movement Data. In examining the movement of the forces contained in this paper, the parameters considered were the dates of availability of deployment of the units, the quantity of transportation, and the capacity of the facilities to receive and unload troops and equipment at destination. US Army and Air Force units would be moved by MAC and MSTS during the months which the units become available. In the event Marine Corps forces are deployed, they would be combat loaded and moved by Navy amphibious shipping during the month which they become available. Based on the current information pertaining to availability of units, there is ample lead time to muster necessary transportation to cover all deployments. Our current military controlled transportation is capable of moving units up to brigade size on very short notice. To move a unit of division size would certainly require advance notice and planning. The over-all capacity of Danang port is estimated to be approximately 276,000 short tons per month for the remainder of this calendar year. Actual receipts have averaged approximately 147,000 short tons per month during the past three months. Therefore, there is an unused capacity of approximately 129,000 short tons of additional input. A force of Army division size normally possesses approximately 28,000 short tons of unit equipment; therefore, if the phasing of the arrival of units is properly planned, the Danang port should be able to receive and throughput units and their equipment.

g. Supply

(1) Planned expansion of the common supply system must be reviewed to insure increased requirements are programmed sufficiently in advance to provide continuous responsive support. In particular the interface between Navy Support Activity Danang and the organic support units of additional forces must be clearly established.
A detailed analysis of requirements/capabilities cannot be accomplished until a time-phased force deployment list is prepared. In conjunction with the preparation of such a list, each Service must identify/resolve specific equipment and supply deficiencies.

**CONUS Production Base**

With the increase in DRerable production, possibly some SEAsia programs in S Category (BRICK BAT OTHER THAN .01) may need to be elevated to the highest national category of the Master: Urgency List.

Some consideration must be made for DSA to start negotiations with industry at the earliest possible date. Unless some advance action is taken, certain items may again be in short supply.

**3. Summary**

a. One of the principal logistic impacts on the deployment of the force to the I CTZ lies in the requirement to upgrade Routes 1 and 9. Until such time as the land LOC along Route 1, both north and south from Danang, can be completely secured and its capacity upgraded, the bulk of the tonnage must be moved via shallow draft shipping from Danang to Hue, Dong Ha, and Chu Lai.

b. Another critical logistic requirement is for shallow draft shipping totaling nine LSTs. The availability of these ships is a key to successful logistic support for the Minimum Essential Force.

c. The construction required for expansion of the airfield at Nam Phong also requires immediate action with respect to approval and funding in order for Nam Phong to be operationally ready for acceptance of the forces recommended for basing in Thailand.
d. There is a substantial requirement for additional combat service support units, principally Army and Navy, to provide construction and transportation services. Especially critical is the timely deployment of construction units to increase port and land LOC throughput capabilities.

e. Because of the current limitation on MilCon funding, the construction contractor in RVN is being phased out. Many facilities required by Program #4 deployments cannot be completed by the time they are required. Consideration must be given to making additional construction funds available so that construction contractor capability can be retained in RVN at least until the magnitude of the total facility requirements is determined.

f. Lead time for increased production of ammunition and equipment is necessary, hence an early decision on funding is needed.