U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE
FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR

1950 - 1954
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

II

U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE
FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR:
1950 - 1954
II. A. 1. 

FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., 712.

5. Ibid., 724; Shaplen, op. cit., 63.


7. Ibid., 82.

8. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op. cit., 246. General Revers' "Secret" report was widely publicized in 1950, and occasioned a political scandal in Paris known as "the affair of the generals."


10. Ibid., 78.

11. Ibid., 79.

12. Ibid., 65.

13. Ibid., 76.


15. Ibid., 278.


19. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1950 (TOP SECRET)


27. Ibid., 81.

28. Ibid., 87.

29. Ibid., 81-82.


32. Hammer, op. cit., 283.

33. Ibid., 299-300.

34. Ibid., 300.

35. Ibid.

36. Shaplen, op. cit., 78.

37. Ibid.


40. Kahin and Lewis, loc. cit.
41. Shaplen, op. cit., 86; 90.
42. Ibid., 90; 87.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 88-89.
45. Ibid., 66, 84-85.
46. Ibid., 91.


3. Memorandum from Col. George W. Coolidge (CS, Acting Chief, Plans Division) to Defense Member, NSC Planning Board (att: Col. Ronsteel), December 8, 1953 (TOP SECRET).


5. Davis letter to Ronsteel, January 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


7. Summary and Comments of the 179th NSC meeting, January 8, 1954.


9. United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405), January 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET). NSC 5405 differs from NSC 177 in only two respects: a paragraph on the U.S. response to a Chinese move into Thailand, and a deleted reference in the earlier paper to France's decline as a world power, with repercussions on her position in Europe and North Africa, if Indochina should be lost.

10. The Annex was recirculated on March 29, 1954.


14. See the undated State Department position paper apparently written between April 2 and 5, just prior to the French request made through

R-14
Diller, for direct U.S. air intervention at Dien Bien Phu. The State paper, with minor changes, became NSC Action No. 107/A, April 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

15. Summary and Content of 192nd NSC Meeting, April 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


3. Dulles telegram No. 180 to American Embassy - Paris, July 15, 1953, (TOP SECRET) following bilateral talks of July 12. This position was reaffirmed in NSC 177 of December 30, 1953.

4. See Dulles' September 2, 1953, address to the American Legion, in which he said: "We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development." Cf. a French memorandum, undated, following tripartite (U.S.-U.K.-France) talks in Washington in July 1953. Here, it is urged that the Chinese representative to the Korean political conference be sounded out on China's intentions toward Indochina. China must be made to conclude "that her best interest is to cut down her support of the Viet Mink, in order to enjoy the benefits which she might expect to derive from a prolonged or final cessation of hostilities on the 38th parallel." (CONFIDENTIAL).


7. According to the Defense Department, Chinese aid was constant at 1000 tons a month from March 1953 to March 1954, with the exceptions of June 1953 (2200 tons) and March 1954 (2500 tons). See memorandum of Robert H. R. Wade (OASD) to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel (OASD, ISA), April 13, 1954 (SECRET).

8. Dulles reminded Ely that once the U.S. committed any of its armed forces to the war, we would want to have a success, which in turn meant "a greater degree of partnership than had prevailed up to present time, notably in relation to independence for Associated States and training of indigenous forces." Dulles priority telegram to American Embassy - Paris (eyes only for Ambassador Dillon) No. 3277, March 23, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


14. Memorandum by Bonbright (EUR) of conversation among Dulles, Ambassador Spender (Australia) and Ambassador Munro (New Zealand), April 4; memorandum by Bonbright of conversation between Dulles and Munro, April 6, 1954, TOP SECRET - as given in Department of State Research Project No. 370, op.cit., p. 16.


25. Dulles "eyes only" telegram DULTE 9 from Geneva for Smith, Dillon, and Aldrich, April 26, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

26. "View of British JIC /Joint Intelligence Center/ on Indochina," April 16, 1954 (SECRET). JIC estimated that the Chinese could deploy about 128,000 men in three field armies to the Indochina frontier within twelve days. In the air, the CCAF would probably provide "only minimum air support." JIC calculated, inasmuch as the Chinese would doubtless want to reserve their air power for defense of the mainland.

27. See Aldrich priority cable "eyes only" No. 4382 from London to Dulles, April 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

28. See Dulles "eyes only" cable NIAC 5177 and 3478 (TOP SECRET), written after a conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, on April 2, 1954.


30. Dulles "eyes only" telegram from Geneva DULTE 5 for Smith, April 25, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


33. Memorandum by Merchant (EUR) of conversations between Ambassador Makins and Smith (U) and between Makins and Dulles, April 18, 1954, SECRET; from Paris, tel. DULTE 3, April 22, 1954, TOP SECRET. In Department of State Research Project No. 370, July, 1955. Hereafter cited as "R.P. No. 370."


38. From Paris, tel. DULTE 2, April 22, 1954, TOP SECRET. (See also from Saigon tel. 2096, April 23, 1954, and tel. 2098, April 24, 1954, both TOP SECRET.) From Saigon the Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group reported that the French Commander lacked the ability to wage war on a scale necessary to win, and he suggested that the United States assume operational and training control in southern Indochina. From Saigon, Army tel. KG 1122 A 220402Z and tel. 2072, April 22, 1954, SECRET and TOP SECRET, respectively. R.P. No. 370.


40. From Paris, tels. DULTE 7 and 10, April 23; DULTE 15, April 24, 1954, all TOP SECRET. R.P. No. 370.

41. From Paris, tels. DULTE 2, April 22; DULTE 7 and 10, April 23; DULTE 17, April 24; memorandum by MacArthur of conversation among Laniel, Vidal, Bougenot, and himself, in Paris, April 23, 1954, all TOP SECRET. R.P. No. 370.


43. From Paris, tel. DULTE 13, April 24; to Paris, tel. TEDUL 8, April 24, 1954, TOP SECRET. For comments on American policy by Secretary Dulles at a background meeting with correspondents in Geneva on April 25, see from Geneva tel. SECTO 6, April 25, 1954, CONFIDENTIAL. R.P. No. 370.


45. From Paris, tels. DULTE 3, April 22; DULTE 10, April 23, DULTE 18, April 24, 1954, all TOP SECRET. R.P. No. 370.


From Geneva, tels. DULTE 7, April 26; DULTE 30, and DULTE 34, April 30, 1954, all TOP SECRET. Secretary Dulles told Mr. Eden that the initial nucleus in the proposed Southeast Asian defense plan should comprise Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Associated States of Indochina (from Geneva, tel. DULTE 33, April 30, 1954, TOP SECRET). R.P. No. 370.

Memorandum by McBride (WE) of conversation among Dulles, Smith (U), R. G. Casey (Australia), and T. C. Webb (New Zealand), in Geneva, May 2, 1954, SECRET; see also from Canberra, tel. 257, May 7, 1954, SECRET. R.P. No. 370.

To Geneva, tel. TEDUL 16, April 28, 1954 (containing summary by Robert Cutler of the White House staff, of principal points made by the President), TOP SECRET. R.P. No. 370.


To Geneva, tel. TEDUL 16, April 28, 1954, TOP SECRET; memorandum by Cutler (White House staff) of conversation in the President's office among the President, General Smith (U), Admiral Radford, and himself; April 28, 1954, TOP SECRET. R.P. No. 370.


For the official conference transcript see Department of State Bulletin, XXX, No. 778, May 24, 1954.

B-36