IV. C. 6. (a)

U.S. GROUND STRATEGY
AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

1965 - 1967

VOLUME I
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV.c.6. (a)

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FOOTNOTES

1. CINCPAC 3010, Ser: 000255, 18 Jun 65, Subj: Calendar Year 1966 Adjusted Requirements and Calendar Year 1967 Requirements.


5. Saigon 2564, dtd 3 Aug 66, from Lodge for the President.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 6.


17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid., p. 3.

19. Ibid., Section two, page 2.
22. Ibid., p. 377.
24. Ibid., p. 385.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. CINCPAC to JCS, DTG 0719252 Apr 66, Subj: Counter-Infiltration Barrier.
33. MACV 4287, 24 Sep 66.
34. MACV 4326, 2 Oct 66.
35. COMUSMACV 41191 to CINCPAC, Subj: Threat to I CTZ, dtd 13 Sep 66, emphasis added.
36. MACV 1605192 Sep 66 to CINCPAC; Subj: COMUSMACV Slam Concept
37. MACV 8212 from Westmoreland to Sharp, Subj: Containment of Enemy Forces in Sanctuary, DTG 2011565 Sep 66, emphasis added.
38. Saigon 3670 to SecState, Porter for Komer, dated 17 Aug 66.
41. Ibid.
43. Saigon 7332 to SecState, dtd 1 Oct 66.

44. MACV 44378, Subj: Piaster Budget, CY 1967, 5 Oct 66.


47. JCSM-646-66, Subj: World-Wide U.S. Military Posture (U), dtd 7 Oct 66. Its baseline for requirement analysis was JCSM 721-65, dtd 24 Sep 65, Subj: "US Military Posture (U)," which provided a broad strategic concept embracing the following objectives:

a. In conjunction with allied forces, maintain forward deployments world-wide to deter communist aggression.

b. A military capability to support NATO/Europe obligations with active, readily deployable forces through the first month (M/D+30) in the event or imminence of hostilities.

c. A military capability to conduct other contingency operations in which force commitments are of a minor nature but where timely commitment of such forces may be crucial to the attainment of US objectives.

d. Support military operations in Southeast Asia.

e. Maintain an adequate training and rotation base to support the above.

48. Ibid.


50. SecDef memo for the President, Subj: Actions Recommended for Vietnam, dated 14 Oct 66, emphasis added.

51. For a detailed analysis of this aspect, see Task Force Paper entitled: "Re-emphasis on Pacification."

52. Memorandum for the President, 14 Oct 66, op. cit.


54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.

56. In a sense, JCS-672-66 appears to be a delaying device used to buy time for the CCMUSMACV reclamas to the DCM. However, it concomitantly provided an excellent opening through which to drive home their views on the bombing and negotiations.

57. CINCPAC 3010, Ser 000438, Subj: Calendar Year 1966, and 1967 Force Requirements/Capabilities Programs (U), dtd 20 Oct 66.

58. CINCPAC Serial 000445, 23 Oct 66.


60. Ibid. For McNamara's views on the communications aspects of our force structure in SVN, see page 5, Memo for the President, 14 Oct 66.

61. Ibid., At another time Westmoreland reported that the President had asked him his views in front of Thieu and Ky' and he had given them; that Rostow had asked him to put them into a memo which he was drafting. McNaughton observed that he had a sort of paired list of favorable targets -- open related to air defense, ones to infiltration and ones to "bargaining," but none very explicitly analyzed.

62. The New York Times, 1 November 1966. The article said the Army had 76,451 men more than authorized, the Air Force 44,313, the Navy 12,029, and the Marines over 2,000. The conclusion was that with the increased forces (the Army had been told to go to 1,500,000 according to the piece) the country could support 500,000 troops in SVN in CY 1967 and to these increases 600,000 the following year. It did indicate that resistance from both civilian and military sources was growing in the Pentagon.


65. The New York Times, 6-12 Nov 66. The officer quoted in a front page story was MG William DePuy, then CG, 1st Division.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid. The ambiguity in the statement is interesting. The JCS acknowledge that the program as proposed was adequate (even in light of their earlier analysis of US worldwide posture deficiencies), but could not be developed without some yet unnamed "modifications" to the criteria. The door remained open to come back in for the reserves if need be.
69. Ibid.


71. ASD(SA) Memo for the SecDef, Subj: Deployments to Southeast Asia, dtd 9 Nov 66.

72. The New York Times, 11 Nov 66. The subject of Vietnam was obscured at this conference by the Soviet ABM issue, for McNamara confirmed at this conference that the Soviets had an ABM system, and the US was studying the problem.

73. Memo for the Chairman of the JCS, Subj: Deployments to Southeast Asia (U), dtd 11 Nov 66.

74. Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Recommended-FY 67 Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation (U), dtd 17 Nov 66.

75. See MACV 52414, Subj: "Military Planning and Progress in SVN," dated 8 December 1966. This message extends MACV 061300Z November 1966, same title. This plan, transparently an effort to get the GVN officially on the line for emphasis upon revolutionary development, in COMUSMACV's eyes incorporated two significant innovations:

"...First, the plan requires RVNAF and MACV subordinate commands to prepare supporting plans to accomplish the objectives, tasks and goals stated in AB 142 and to support the achievement of goals stated in provincial revolutionary development (RD) plans. These plans are to be submitted for review by 15 December. Second, to maintain the viable nature of this plan, a requirement for quarterly reviews has been incorporated. These reviews will cover progress made, problems encountered, and recommendations for improvement. A combined RVNAF/MACV directive is being developed which establishes procedures for these reviews..." (See: MACV 341, 0802452 December 1966)

The follow-up to this message, also an extension, is MACV 00989, 9 January 1967.


77. Ibid.


79. Ibid., pp. 378-379.

80. Ibid., pp. 386-387.
81. Ibid., p. 22.

82. Memo for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the JCS, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #4, dtd 18 Nov 66.

83. JCSM 702-66, op. cit.

84. An early plumbing of this line was an article in early 1965 by Hanson W. Baldwin, entitled: "We Must Choose -- (1) 'Bug Out'; (2) Negotiate; (3) Fight." He wrote:

"How many United States soldiers would be needed is uncertain -- probably a minimum of three to six divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or brigade sized units), possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy and supporting units perhaps 200,000 to 1,000,000 Americans would be fighting in Vietnam.

"Obviously this would mean a Korea type conflict, a major war, no matter what euphemisms would be used. Nor could we wage it in the present 'business as usual' economy. We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed up military production. Many weaknesses in our military structure would need strengthening. Even so, we could not anticipate quick success. The war would be long, nasty and wearing." (The New York Times, 21 February 1965, p. 63).