IV. A. 5.

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

ORIGINS OF THE INSURGENCY

1954 - 1960
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV. A. 5.
EVOLUTION OF THE WAR
ORIGINS OF THE INSURGENCY
1954 - 1960

The Administration was severely criticized in public. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, while the conference was in session on the eve of Dien Bien Phu's fall, asserted that: "American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal...We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world." New York Times, May 7, 1954. Anthony Eden, *Toward Peace in Indo-China* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), ix-13. The Administration analysis of public record is in Secretary Dulles, Department of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954. For "inner councils" see OCB, "Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," NSC 5405, August 6, 1954) TS; and, NSC, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5429, August 4, 1954) TS.

2. U.S. Department of State telegrams,

DULIE 187 from Geneva, 16 June 1954 (TS)
DULIE 553 from Geneva, 2 July 1954 (TS)
Dillon 32 from Paris, 2 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 650 from Geneva, 17 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 638 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 643 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)


5. Ibid., 53.


7. Department of State telegrams SECTO 632 and 645 of 17 and 18 July, 1954, respectively.


12. The French National Assembly ratified on 4 June 1954 two treaties, one providing for independence for Vietnam, the other for Vietnam’s association as an equal with France in the French Union. The latter permitted Vietnam to determine subsequently the extent of association. The former recognized Vietnam “as a fully independent and sovereign State invested with all the competence recognized by international law.” Vietnam agreed to assume France’s part “in all the rights and obligations resulting from international treaties or conventions contracted by France on behalf or on account of the State of Vietnam or of any other treaties or conventions concluded by France on behalf of French Indochina insofar as those acts concern Vietnam.” U.S. Department of State, Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference, VerbMin/3 (May 12, 1954), 99-101. Department of State telegram, Dulles to Paris, 4398, June 4, 1955, (T5).


17. Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 94-95; U.S. Department of State, telegrams as follows:

- Paris 481, 5 August 1954
- State to Paris for Dulles, WFPUL 14, 22 October 1954
- Manila SECTO 50, 1 March 1955
- Saigon 4661, 19 April 1955
- Paris 4396, 9 April 1955
- Paris 4576, 21 April 1955
- Paris 4780, 24 April 1955

Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Possible Developments in South Vietnam" (NIE 631-2-55, 26 April 1955), TS; Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) from his Deputy, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," (13 April 1955), TS; JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "Indochina (Vietnam)" (9 May 1955), TS; Staff Study, OSD/ISA, 13 April 1955, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," TS.


20. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 May 1955, Part I.

23. Reported in the New York Times (March 5, 1955), and Economist
(March 17, 1956).
Committee Print.
27. Background Information..., op. cit., 83.
28. U.S. Dept. of State, telegram, Secretary Dulles to Paris No. 77,
7 July 1954 (S). Also, President Eisenhower quoted in B. Fall,
"How the French Got Out of Vietnam," op. cit., 89; U.S. Dept. of
State, Memorandum dated 5 May 1955, "U.S. Views on All Vietnam
Elections," (S), in Dept. of State Research Memorandum, "The Shift
in the United States Position Towards Vietnamese Elections Under
the Geneva Accords," (RM-765, 1 Sept 1965), (S); Dept. of State
Memorandum of Conversation between Senator Mike Mansfield and
Assistant Secretary of State Walter B. Robertson, 7 Dec 1954, (TS).
29. CCB, "Progress Report...," NSC 5405, op. cit., and "Review of U.S.
Policy in the Far East," NSC 5429, op. cit. Also, CIA, National
Intelligence Estimate, "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indo-China," (NIE
63-5-54, 3 August 1954) (S), 1, 4, 6.
32. There were DRV communications with the GVN on this subject July, 1955;
May and June, 1956; July, 1957; March, 1958; July, 1959; and July,
cit., 30-33. CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 July 1955; CIA, Current Intelli-
gence Weekly Review (7 July 1955); B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided,
op. cit., 181-184.
34. Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict,
35. CIA, Memorandum for the Record, 8 February 1957; Murti, op. cit.,
176-177; John Norton Moore, op. cit.; 3, n.7. United Nations, General
Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Special Political Committee

37. NSC 5612/1 (September, 1956); NSC 5809 (2 April 1958). The First Indochina War culminated in Viet Minh military victory and the Geneva Conference of 1954, but during it a Vietnamese government under Bao Dai, like Ho Chi Minh's DRV claiming dominion over all the Vietnamese, but Nationalist, anti-Communist, and French-supported, came into being. From 1949 on, this nascent state provided the political alternative to the DRV; it was Bao Dai's regime which inherited South Viet Nam, and a counterclaim to a unified nation, after the 1954 Geneva settlement. (Fall, *The Two Viet Nams*, op. cit., 210-223).

The United States recognized Bao Dai's regime, the GVN, on February 7, 1950. We had no relations with the DRV, although for six months after the departure of the French from the DRV in 1955, we maintained a vice-consulate in Hanoi, withdrawing it after persistent DRV isolation and harassment. Since, the United States has maintained full relations with GVN, but not even a postal exchange with the DRV. (*Ibid.*; 191, 194). However, although no formal U.S. recognition has been extended, we have acknowledged DRV sovereignty, at first implicitly, and then, after 1962, explicitly. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the U.S. "observer" related U.S. policy toward the DRV to that we have pursued re North Korea and East Germany. U.S. recognition of, consistent relations with, and increasingly strong support of the GVN after Geneva, were not accompanied by public policy statements more directly aimed at changing the status quo in North Viet Nam than that 1954 position. However, national policy papers of the period included the more ambitious objectives quoted.


40. The table is from *Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam* (April 11, 1955 to August 10, 1955). (London: H.i.S.O., 1955), 30, App. IV. Cf. B.S.N. Murti, op. cit., 88-91. The U.S. Dept of State's "White Paper" of 1965 entitled *Aggression from the North* mentioned "more than 900,000 refugees" who fled from North Viet Nam. a/ Bernard Fall has used the figure 860,000 in his books and essays; b/ Fall also has reported that the French transported 610,000 refugees South. c/ The
U.S. Navy alone moved 310,848 refugees in "Operation Exodus," and although U.S. National Intelligence Estimates in 1955 mention 650,000 refugees from the North, a U.S. Department of State review of the issue in 1957 put the total at "nearly 900,000;" the current (1964) National Intelligence Survey refers to "nearly a million." No better estimate is likely to be taken, given the paucity of reliable records.


c/ Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154; Fall, "How the French...", op.cit., 8f


44. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (New York: Praeger, 1964), 166-168, 209-229. Hoang is a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre; Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), 118-135; Bernard B. Fall,


49. E.g., a mob of refugees attacked the billets of the ICC in Saigon in July, 1955, just before the consultations were due, in an apparently manipulated protest. These and other uses of refugees by the GVN are elaborated in below.


52. ICC, Fourth Interim Report..., op. cit., 12.

53. Ibid., 11, 21. The Canadians reported 11,422 first party petitions in the North, and not more than 1,000 in the South upon which no action had been taken as of 18 May 1955.

54. Ibid., 12.

55. Ibid.


57. ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12-13, 23-24. The Canadian report includes the following:

"The reports of the teams disclosed further that incidents of obstruction and hindrance made it difficult for them to complete their tasks effectively. A common experience was to encounter organized groups of persons presenting petitions about forced evacuation and demonstrating in a noisy and disorderly manner, with the effect that not only was the limited time available to the team for its investigation squandered, but also would-be evacuees were intimidated....In at least a dozen instances, intending evacuees were physically molested by such hostile crowds and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity of meeting the team. Team 56 on its visit to Ha Tinh on five occasions saw individuals physically molested and dragged by force from the presence of the team....In our view this phenomenon was not a mere social manifestation but an organized plan. While it has been impossible for the Commission to prove that these measures were organized as a matter of policy by the authority in control of the North, owing to the frequency and the common features of this form of obstruction in all provinces investigated there would seem to be little doubt that these obstructions and hinderances had been deliberately planned...it is still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so...."

59. Fall, The Two Viet Nams, 154; Ellen Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today, 149-150.


68. In part, this explains the political power of the Buddhists acquired in 1963 -- an amorphous religion, so essentially apolitical and unwieldy that it was among the few Vietnamese institutions ignored by the communists, became the focus of Viet nationalism and a prime contributor to Diem's undoing. Cf., Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 468-472. Bernard Fall's essay on the "Seas of Division" quotes a Vietnamese saying that success in life hinged on "3 D's: -- Diem (family connections); Dao (religion); and Dia-phuong (province of origin). Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1965), 206-210.

70. CIA, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957," (NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956), 10. A thesis advanced by Bernard Fall that the Viet Minh deliberately sent the families of the stay-behinds north, so that the hard-core regulars who remained in the south could engage in "mobile warfare, without having to worry about reprisals against their relatives," has not been substantiated in recent interviews with Viet Cong. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 359.

71. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 224; U.S. Dept. of State, "Southern Regroupees and Northerners in the Communist Military Force in South Vietnam," (Research Memorandum RFE-49, November 9, 1966), SECRET, iii. Fall once accepted a figure of 120,000, but later tended to a ceiling of 100,000. Cf., Fall in Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 57; and Fall, Vietnam Witness, op. cit., 216. The 130,000 total approximates the figures published by the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1956; 150,000 Viet Minh troops and their families. a/ Wilfred G. Burchett, the Australian communist, has referred to "the withdrawal of the 140,000 Viet Minh and the cadres to the north." b/. The statistic usually used in U.S. official publications -- for example in the 1965 White Paper -- is 90,000 Viet Minh troops moved north, and this is commonly regarded as an invaluable reservoir for the DRV's subsequent infiltration of South Vietnam. c/ But the dimension of this resource extended beyond 90,000 "warriors." There were Montagnards who proved particularly useful in building and protecting the infiltration routes down through the Lao Cai and Vietnamese Highlands. There were also children, an obvious long-range asset. d/ The DRV set up a special school for southern Montagnards, and some 14 elementary and higher schools were reserved for other southern children. e/ Moreover, there is evidence that the Viet Minh systematically broadened its family ties in the South through hundreds of hasty, directed marriages for departing "warriors" and by recruiting very young men and boys just before departure. f/


c/ U.S. Dept. of State, Aggression from the North (Washington: GPO, 1965) (Dept. of State Publication 7639, February, 1965), 11. Intelligence estimates of the 1954-1956 period used the figure 95,000; e.g., NIE 63-56, op. cit., 6.


A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary; according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

"(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle."
(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.

(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A Viet Cong cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup....They were afraid...."

Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ Asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?" the following responses were typical: d/

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.

(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PA) Our political officer explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

s/ R-4703, op. cit., 27, 35.
b/ Ibid., 34.
c/ Ibid., 35.
d/ Ibid., 36.

75. Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12, 21; Murti, op. cit., 87-88.

76. RM-5153, op. cit., 6-7.

U.S. view, see for example, the March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles,
public statement on the consultations scheduled to take place be-
tween DRV and GVN preliminary to the general elections; inter alia,
he opined that it would "be hard to create in the North conditions
which allow genuine freedom of choice." U.S. Dept. of State,
"Chronology on Vietnam," (Historical Studies Division, Research
Project No. 747, Nov 1965), 12.

78. RM-4703, op. cit., 8; U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The
North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the

79. Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 296-360; ICC Interim
Report (S).


82. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants (Office of Program Coordination, March 17, 1967), 57. The
total through 1964 was over $1 billion; NIS 436, op. cit., 70.

83. V. J. Croizat, trans., A Translation from the French: Lessons of
the War in Indochina (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, RM-5271-PR,
May, 1967), 204-205.

84. J. J. Zesloff, The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist
China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946-1954 (Santa Monica: RAND

85. NIS 436, op. cit., 38; CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations of the
Geneva Agreements on Vietnam," (Current Intelligence Memo, SC No.
03085/64).

86. IAC-D-93/2, Viet Minh Violations...Through 31 December 1954, op. cit.,
10-11; also CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 October 1955, 6.
87. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.

88. Ibid., 56-59; Zesloff, Political Motivation...The Vietminh Begroup- ses, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 44-52.


90. Ibid., 10.


92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 67.


94. NIS 43D, op. cit., 69.


98. "Direct Aid to the Associated States..." in ibid., 88-89.


100. Quoted in Nighswonger, op. cit., 42, from New York Times for February 13, 1955, p. 1. General Collins, the President's emissary to the GVN, was reported at the same time to be pressing for a "more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from external aggression supplied by SEATO. Ibid., quoting Baltimore Sun for 1 February 1955, p. 1.

101. NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," (September 5, 1956), 11, provides that the U.S. will: "assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." "United initial resistance" was defined by JCS memo for SecDef, dated 21 December 1956, subject as above, as follows: "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the UN Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral assistance and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked."


104. U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram JCS 974802 of 30 March 1960 to CINCPAC noted increasingly deteriorating internal security in Vietnam and informed that:

"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare." This cable among many of that period refocused the MAAG Mission on internal security, and this became the central theme of the military portions of the "Counter-insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam" of January, 1961. U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Despatch No. 276, of January 4, 1961. The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistic superstructure of ARVN, and on


106. Ibid., 111-115. The author concluded that the Saigon-Bien Hoa Highway had been undertaken for military reasons, and that "this 20-mile stretch of highway cost more money than the United States provided for all labor, community development, social welfare, housing, health, and education projects in Vietnam combined during the entire period 1954-1961."


109. JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," sets an objective of a minimum French force of four divisions until four RVNAF divisions were available to replace them; it also stresses that the Geneva Agreement constituted in Vietnam "a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment." In a JCS Memo of 19 October 1954, subject: "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," the Chiefs, noting the Geneva limit on personnel, recommended against MAAG's RVNAF unless "political considerations are overriding." In a Memo of 17 November 1954, subject: "Indochina," the JCS addressed the problem of a 77,000 man RVNAF, and found it adequate for internal security only; noting the Viet Minh strength, they stated that a force of that size could not provide for external security if French forces were withdrawn, but agreed that the MAAG could train RVNAF at that level while complying with Geneva ceilings on personnel. Other examples of the continuing U.S. concern for observing the Geneva Agreements on the one hand, and on the other hand proceeding with the task of providing for Vietnam's security within its restrictions are provided in the MAAG, Country Statements, op. cit., and in U.S. Dept of State telegram 2601 from Paris, of 19 December 1954, in which Secretary Dulles accepted.
the principle that U.S. should not contravene the settlement. Dept of State telegram 3441 from Saigon of 17 February 1955 discloses Ambassador Collins' concern for observing the agreements even when observance precluded U.S. assistance for refugees.

110. Anita Lauve Nutt, Trojka on Trial, op. cit., 315-328. Though questionable on some judgments -- e.g., attributing to the "civilian branch of the U.S. Government" a view that was in opposition to that of "military authorities" and against U.S. assumption of RVNAF training, Mrs. Nutt is essentially correct in her assertion that the U.S. abided by the Geneva ceilings for six years. The principal departure from the 342 strength accommodated TENG, a 350-man Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission which from May 1956 to December 1960 worked to recover, control and outship MDAP supplies -- albeit upgrading the RVNAF logistic capability significantly in the process. The first substantial increase in MAAG followed a February, 1960, GVN request, which raised the ceiling from 342 to 685 -- still below the figure of 898, the combined 1954 strength of French cadres with RVNAF and MAAGs.


112. Ibid.


114. ICC, Sixth Interim Report..., op. cit., 31-32.

115. ICC, Seventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 16-17.


119. Ibid., 15-19.

120. Ibid., passim.

121. Ibid., 101-102.

122. Ibid., 106-107.

FOOTNOTES


9. See map, Tab 1, p.21.


13. This lack of de facto independence has figured in recent controversy over Diem's responsibility to the Geneva Agreement signed by France, e.g., Kailin and Lewis, op. cit., 56-57.


25. U.S. Dept of State, Memo for Asst. SecState Robertson, 30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation," which foresaw trouble on the Hill if Diem were forced out.


27. U.S. Dept of State, telegram, SECTO 50 from Manila, 1 March 1955, reports that Secretary Dulles "told Diem that U.S. Government -- President and himself -- had great stake in him and in Vietnam... if there is failure here, U.S. prestige would be gravely affected"; also Resch. Memo 765, op. cit.


31. Ibid., 237.


34. Scigliano, op. cit., 56-57.

35. Ibid., 58, 75-76, 110-111; Warner, op. cit., 32, 307-308; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 246-252.


37. Ibid., 168, 169.

38. Ibid., 79-82.

39. Ibid., 165-171.


42. Warner, op. cit., 116-117, 214, 224; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 250; Scigliano, op. cit., 75-80; Shaplen, op. cit., 128-132.

43. Scigliano, loc. cit.

44. Ibid., 77.


47. Warner, op. cit., 105-106.


49. Ibid., SECTO 8 of May 8, 1955.

50. Ibid., T3DUL 2 of May 8, 1955.

51. Ibid., T3DUL 9 of May 9, 1955.


53. Ibid., 103.


57. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.


60. Ibid; Report of the SM, op. cit., 43-44; CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 May 1955 on "South Vietnam."


64. Sciglano, op. cit., 121; Shaplen, op. cit., 143.
65. Ibid., 104-105, 121-124; GVN, 7 Years of the Ngô Dinh Diem Administra-
tration (Saigon: October 26, 1961), 319-325.
69. Bain, op. cit., 122, Sciglano, op. cit., 91-98; Shaplen, op. cit.,
133-134.
70. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 168.
73. Ibid., 170-171.
74. Ibid.
Today (No. 16, February, 1960), 73.
77. Sciglano, op. cit., 169.
78. Ibid., 173-174; Nighswonger, op. cit., 40.
79. Ibid., 45; Sciglano, op. cit., 169-172.
80. Ibid., 114; Nighswonger, 45-46; John D. Montgomery, The Politics of
Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1966), 72-83.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 179.
86. Ibid., 180; Nighswonger, op. cit., 46.
87. Ibid., 46ff; Scigliano, 180-183.


89. Scigliano, op. cit., 33; Shaplen, op. cit., 133-134.

90. Scigliano, op. cit., 167.


92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 40; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 109-110; Shaplen, 253-254.


96. Text is from Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 432-438.

97. Scigliano, op. cit., 177-178.


99. NIS 43D, op. cit., 39-40; CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam" (No. 0811/66, 4 May 1966), and "The Vulnerability of Non-Communist Groups in South Vietnam to Viet Cong Political Subversion" (No. 0829/66, 27 May 1966).

100. Scigliano, op. cit., 207.


103. Scigliano, op. cit., 165-166.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 162-165; Montgomery, op. cit., 62-70.

107. Scigliano, op. cit., 187-188.
113. Quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 324.
118. Quoted in Warner, op. cit., 91-93.
119. Ibid., 92.
120. This same misapprehension appears in U.S. "counterinsurgency" literature; e.g., W. W. Rostow: "Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building." W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Under-developed Areas," Speech at the U.S.A. Special Warfare School, June, 1961, in Reskin and Fall, eds., op. cit., 113.
121. Diem, quoted in Ibid., 127-128.
122. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 59.
123. Pike, op. cit., facing 1.


127. The document is known in intelligence circles as "the CRMP Document," having been captured by elements of the US 1st Infantry Division in the Iron Triangle area of Binh Duong Province on Operation CRMP, 6-14 January 1966. Its accuracy and authenticity have been verified by US authorities.


129. Pike, op. cit., 76-77.

130. Ibid.


132. Ibid., 185-186.

133. Ibid., 160; CIA, NSC Briefing for 23 October 1957.


135. CIA, NSC Briefing of 30 November 1957.

136. DIA, "North Vietnamese Role in the Origins...," op. cit.


138. U.S. Senate, Background Information..., op. cit., 5; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 160.

139. Quoted in ibid.


144. Pike, op. cit., 102.

145. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 239; 360-361.


147. Time, 7 November 1960.


149. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 172, 184-185; and Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 317 ff.


154. Ibid., 78.


156. Warner, op. cit., 159; Saigon to State Despatch 278, op. cit.

157. U.S. Dept. of State, telegrams, Saigon to State 2288 of 1 Feb 1960, and 2301 of 2 Feb 1960; Warner, op. cit., 160; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 435; Raskin and Fall, eds., op. cit., 120.


159. Scigliano, op. cit., 140; DIAAP, North Vietnemese Role..., op. cit., 31.


161. U.S. Dept. of State, Despatch 278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960, p. 8 of Encl 1; Cf. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.

162. Ibid.

164. U.S. Department of State, Despatch 278, op. cit., Encl 1, p. 11.


166. Cf., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 113-116. Also: "New National Front Formed in S. Vietnam," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, 31 January 1961, pp. EEE 13-17. On 2 February 1961 (ibid., 2 Feb, EEE 5), Radio Hanoi elaborated: "The French language paper LA DEPECHE DU CAMBODGE of Phnom Penh, Cambodge... on 24 December announced that it had received the manifesto of the front which said that it had come into existence to meet the aspiration of the South Vietnamese people, and that it undertook to liberate them from Ngo-Diem slavery." The same paper quoted REUTERS, report dated 24 December "the front may have intensified its political activities in the countryside and among the South Vietnamese armed forces..." The U.S. Department of State, however, has taken the view that the NLF was formed in Hanoi; cf., the "White Papers" of 1961 and 1965, op. cit., and Letter, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans, 5 March 1968.


168. For the "official" (February 11, 1961) text of the NLF Manifesto, see Pike, op. cit., 82, 341-347; and CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam" (1603/66, 26 September 1966), Annex II.


170. Ibid., 351.

171. Ibid., 350-351.

172. Ibid., 356; "zone" refers to the two "regrouping zones" established by the Armistice Agreement of 1954.

173. Ibid., 358-369.

174. CIA, Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, op. cit., 5-6.

175. Biographical information on 73 of the leaders and key cadre of the NLF and affiliated organizations indicates that 66% (48) of this group were born in South Vietnam, and that an additional 8 are probably Southerners. Only 2 of the 73 were certainly born in the North, while an additional 2 may have been born there. (The birthplace of 13 of the 73 is unknown.) It can also be ascertained from the biographical data that at least 60 of the 73 are highly educated, particularly so by Asian standards. Ibid.

176. Ibid., I-44 to I-46.

177. Ibid., 426-427.
178. Ibid., 115.


181. Pike, op. cit., 137.

182. Ibid., 138.

183. Loc. cit.

184. Ibid., 137.


186. Pike, op. cit., 75-76.
FOOTNOTES


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<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Algeria*</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Communist China</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>East Germany</td>
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U.S. Dept. of State, Ltr, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congress- man Evans (March 5, 1963) gives 24 countries, 12 communist.


6. Ibid., 179. It should be noted that this announcement followed the peasant revolt in Nghe-An Province in November 1956.


8. The National Assembly is elected for 4 years by universal, direct, and secret suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 50,000 citizens. Article 44 establishes the Assembly as the "only legislative authority." Two meetings per year are prescribed. The Assembly
elects the President and Vice President, and may amend the Constitution. It appoints the Premier upon recommendation of the President, and the Ministers upon recommendation of the Premier. In the interval between the sessions of the National Assembly, its powers are exercised by the permanent Standing Committee. One-seventh of the Assembly seats are reserved for national minorities. The Council of Ministers "the executive organ of the highest state authority" (Art. 71) is responsible to the National Assembly (or the Standing Committee). Following diagram is from NIS 43C, op. cit., 31.


12. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 12, 30.


16. Ibid.


18. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 11, compared with CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.


Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 107-108. For Ho's statement on land reform in late 1953, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 258-263; the statement was made to the Third Session of the National Assembly of the DRV (Dec 1-4, 1953), in which the Assembly enacted an Agrarian Reform Law based on reports by Ho and Pham Van Dong.


22. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, loc. cit.

23. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 211.


25. Hoang, op. cit., and Gerard Tongees, L'Enfer communiste au Nord Vietnam (Paris: Les Nouvelles Editions Debress, 1960), are both sometime residents of the DRV, the former a Viet Minh defector of 1955, and the latter a French professor who left Hanoi in 1959. Their accounts of the agrarian reform campaign are consistent with eye-witness reports recently collected from prisoners and defectors in South Vietnam, reported in J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Vietminh Defectors (U) (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-4703-IBA/ARPA, August 1966) (Confidential), 44-53, 159-160. The best short summary is that of CIA Staffer George A. Carver, op. cit. For contemporary intelligence estimates, see: U.S. Intelligence Board, National Intelligence Estimate:

NIE 63-5-54 (3 Aug 1954)
NIE 63.1-55 (19 Jul 1955)
Special NIE 63.1-4-55 (13 Sep 1955)
NIE 63.1-3-55 (11 Oct 1955)
NIE 63-56 (17 Jul 1956)
NIE 63.2-57 (14 May 1957)
NIE 63-59 (26 May 1959)

Also: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (INR) International Communism, Annual Review (December 1955) (5650.49)

26. For a description of village politics in South Vietnam which suggests why Northerners might have reacted adversely to disruption of the traditional society see Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 176-211.
27. DRV Government Decree No. 239 of March 1953, translated in Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, op. cit., 172-178, is an early example; the process was considerably refined thereafter. A particularly vivid eye-witness account is in Zasloff, op. cit., 47-48.


29. Carver, op. cit., 354; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124; Hoang, op. cit., 156. Ellen Hammer: "at least 50,000 were killed"; Hammer, op. cit., 341.

30. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 305-309.


34. Ibid.

35. Hoang, op. cit., 224-228. For data on employment of Southerners against the uprisings, see DIA "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin...." op. cit., esp. Vol II, Item 84, 80, Text, p. 74.


38. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 157.


40. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33. It is significant that the DRV armed forces near the border assumed a defensive posture in 1956; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (31 May 1956).

41. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 102; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit., 169.

42. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, loc. cit.

43. Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.

44. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124.

45. Ibid., 25, 39; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 188-190; Hoang, op. cit., 228-239.

46. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 187.
47. NIS 43C, op. cit., 39.
49. NIS 43C, op. cit., 25, 43.
50. Ibid., 41.
51. Ibid., 35-38, 41-50, 52-53.
52. Ibid., 45.
53. Ibid., 53.
54. Ibid., 52.
55. Loc. cit.
56. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, 296. It should be noted that in the same context Ho offered "preferential" economic relations with France; no such offers were repeated after 1956, when it was clear that France would not meet its Geneva commitments to the DRV, and was pulling out of Vietnam.

62. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 272

63. Ibid., 334

64. Cf., Bain, op. cit., 54-78; Hoang, op. cit., XIV, XV; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 4-6, 16-19. Even the name of the country reflects the turmoil of its history. Gia Long called his empire Nam Viet (South Viet). Since the Dai Viet were ethnically related to the people of Kwang-si and Kwang-tung, the Chinese decided that the name Nam Viet implied an irredenta, and reversed the name to Viet Nam. Up to 1945, Gia Long's successors used the more pretentious name Dai Nam (Great South), but only internally, when the DRV revived "Vietnam."


68. Cf., J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Vietminh Regrouped (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, August, 1965, RR-4703-ISA/ARPA), 25-26; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 February 1956) SECRET. The former speculates based on interviews with POWs and defectors, but reaches conclusions similar to those of the latter. A like 1954 estimate by the U.S. Army Attaché, Saigon, is included in Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 October 1954), 6.

69. Fall, Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 302.

70. Some 1,000 Chinese advisers entered North Vietnam; hundreds of Vietnamese were trained in China; and a steadily increasing stream of war material, variously estimated at 400 to 1,000 tons per month, flowed south from China: Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1954" (NIE-91, June 4, 1953) SECRET; Memorandum, OSD, Robert E. B. Wade to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel, April 13, 1954 (SECRET). J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946-1954," (Santa Monica: RAND, RR-4618-PR, May 1967), passim.

71. Hammer, op. cit., 331-337.

72. NIS 43C, 32-35.


76. Ibid., 59.

77. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.


79. Ibid., 346; also 342-344; cf., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 276-277; and P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, 30-32.


87. Fell, ed., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 298-299.

89. CIA, *Current Intelligence Weekly Review* (2 August 1956).


94. *SIE 14, 3-63*, op. cit., 1-5.


98. Ibid.


100. Ibid., 12-14, 18-19.

101. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role...", loc. cit.

102. NIS 430, op. cit., 33.


109. DIA AP-4 (May, 1967), op. cit. This study was designed to answer queries from Congressman Evans (f. Katzenbach Letter), and was considered for publication, modified, as a "White Paper."

110. Interrogation of a Montagnard originally from Quang Tri Province, infiltrated into South Vietnam in October, 1961. DIA, "Role," 69-70; Katzenbach letter.

111. Interrogation of a member of one of the "special border-crossing teams." DIA, "Role," 70.

112. Ibid., 71. Interrogation of two members of the 603d Battalion.

113. Ibid., 71, 72. Interrogation of Senior Sergeant of VC 5th Military Region (Zone V) captured in Quang Ngai.

114. Ibid., 73. Interrogation of several agents captured in June and July, 1961; Interrogation of a member of a VC communications cadre.

115. Ibid., Interrogation of a 1962 infiltrator.

116. Ibid., Interrogation of several former NVA officers who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of officer of "1st VC Regiment," who defected in April 1963.


118. DIA, "Role...", op. cit., Katzenbach letter.

119. Ibid.


121. Ibid., 15-16.

123. Zasloff, RM 4703, 73.


125. NIS 43C, op. cit., 30.

126. DIA, "Role . . .," op. cit., 10-11; CIA, Biographic Data.


130. DIA, "Role . . .," 14-15.

131. Ibid., 28-29.

132. Carver, op. cit., 369-370. One prisoner attended an infiltration course at Son Tay in January, 1960, with a group of 60, and infiltrated with the same group in March, 1960. All 60 were officers or NCO's. One became a company commander of a VC unit in Quang Ngai; another a political officer of a battalion in the same province; another a deputy commander of the same battalion. DIA, "Role . . .," 77.

133. Ibid., 61-62.

134. This judgment is based on interrogations of 19 Vietnamese officers and senior NCO's who infiltrated in the years 1959-1963, and of NVA officers who surrendered in 1963. Under Secretary Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 19.

135. DIA, "Role . . .," 62-64.

136. Ibid., 4-8.

137. Ibid., 9-13; Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 185-199.

139. Ibid., 9-10.

140. Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, 25-37. A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Reorganization Diary; according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

"(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General [Central??] Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.

"(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.

"(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup . . . They were afraid . . ."

Still, the Reorganization Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ In the RAND Study, the regroupers were asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?" The following responses were typical: d/

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.
(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PW)  Our political officer explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

a/ RM 4703, 27, 35.

b/ Ibid., 34.

c/ Ibid., 35.

d/ Ibid., 36.

141. DIA, "Role . . .," 50-53; CIA, " . . . Evidence of North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam Since 1955" (SC No. 2955/64, 10 March 1964), Section I.

142. DIA, "Role . . .," 20-26; CIA, "Evidence. . ." (SC No 2955/64), loc. cit.


144. DIA, "Role . . .," 47-48.

145. Ibid., 49-50.

146. Ibid., 46-47.


149. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 July 1955, mentions the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi's hint that violent action would ensue were consultations delayed, but there was little other indication of Soviet intention to act.
150. CIA, CIWR, 27 October 1955.
151. CIA, CIWR, 22 September 1955.
152. CIA, CIWR, 10 November 1955.
154. Ho on Revolution, (Signet) op. cit., 269-270; cf., Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956).
155. Ibid., and CIA NSC Briefing for 2 July 1956. The difference in the two texts is readily explained in that Fall used the version of the speech published in the presumably edited four-volume edition of The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, 1961, 1962); see Fall, Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (Signet edition), page x.
156. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 274.
158. CIA, CIWR, 2 August 1956.
159. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 277.
161. CIA, Memo for Record of 8 February 1957.
162. CIA, Singapore CS-82270 of 16 January 1956, and FVS-1071 of 21 September 1956; DIA, "Role . . .", 23-29. For further evidence of impatience and diminished faith in the South see CIA, Saigon CS-3,311,416 of April 1957.
163. Ibid.
164. The sequence of events concerning this UN action went as follows:

23 Jan 1957 U.S. and 12 other UN members (in a resolution) call upon the UN Security Council to recommend South Vietnam and South Korea for membership in the UN.
24 Jan 1957 Soviet delegate in UN Security Council, Arkady A. Sobolev, proposes that North Vietnam and North Korea, as well as South Vietnam and South Korea, be recommended for membership in the UN; as a "package deal."
30 Jan 1957  UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee endorses a resolution (backed by the U.S. and 12 other nations) calling for UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea. On the same day, the Committee declines to endorse a "package deal" proposed by the Soviet Union for simultaneous admission of North Vietnam and North Korea.

28 Feb 1957  UN General Assembly recommends to the Security Council UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea (40 to 8 with 16 abstentions, and 40 to 8 with 16 abstentions respectively).

9 Sep 1957  After making an unsuccessful attempt to postpone consideration of the question until Vietnam had been unified, the USSR vetoed the admission of the RVN to the UN.

25 Oct 1957  UN General Assembly (by votes 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions) passes resolution declaring that South Vietnam is eligible for membership in the UN. The resolution "noted with regret the continued inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of South Korea and South Vietnam... to the UN because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union." (Asian Recorder, New Delhi, Vol. 111, No. 51.)


166. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 50.

167. Ibid., 50-51.


171. Ibid., 3-7. For examples of the subsequent import attached to the Declaration of 1957, cf., "The Statement of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Vol XII, No. 18, 28 Dec 1960, and No. 49, 4 Jan 1961), No. 49, p. 6, which refers to the "1957 Declaration" and quotes the cited text verbatim; also Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, "Nhan Dan Views Moscow, Party Statements" (13 January 1961, p. EE 9 ff.), which relates the proceedings of the Lao Dong's Third Party Congress (September, 1960) to the 1960 Moscow Conference, and to the "declaration of 1957."

172. Quoted in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit.


175. Ibid., 61-62.


178. Ibid.


182. Ibid., 207-210.


184. Ibid.

186. CIA, "... Evidence of North Vietnamese ...," op. cit.


188. Ibid., 43-56.


190. Ibid.


194. Ibid., 7.

195. Ibid.


198. Ibid.


Following a rupture between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao and the assassination of the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of the NLF in April 1963, the DRV apparently determined to reinforce the Pathet
Lao, for the U.S. began to receive reports of renewed NVA operations in Laos from multiple sources, including a Pathet Lao defector and a Polish ICC member. By mid-1963, NVA strength was over 10 battalions, with some 5000 to 7000 men plus 3,000 advisers, and new arms and supplies were arriving constantly. For example, members of the Polish ICC team in Hanoi, told their counterparts in Laos in August 1963 that the DRV was dispatching daily shipments of military equipment into Laos, and in February 1964 a Pathet Lao officer in southern Laos stated that the DRV was shipping in new and heavier arms, including tanks. 

a/ Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/TDCSDB 3657725, 4 November 1963, cited in "North Vietnamese Violations...."

b/ CIA/TDC 3572046 of 4 February 1964, in ibid.


204. Ibid., 3.

205. Ibid., 3-5.


