III

THE GENEVA ACCORDS

1954
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

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FOOTNOTES

1. MenCon between Douglas MacArthur II (State, Europe) and Ianiel at Bermuda, December 4, 1953 (SECRET).

2. Radford memorandum to the Defense Secretary (Wilson), March 12, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


5. Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. MIAC 15 to the Acting Secretary (Smith) for passage to the President, April 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


8. The briefing was reported in a priority cable from Dulles at Geneva, tel. SECTO 6, April 25, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL); emphasis supplied.


10. Ibid.


12. Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference (Dept. of State), Second Plenary Session, p. 87. (Hereafter cited as U.S. Verb Min./session7)


15. Ibid.


2. In forwarding these conditions to the Embassy for transmittal to the French, Dulles noted that a prompt, favorable decision would be premature inasmuch as it might internationalize the war in a way offensive to the British, leaving the French with the difficult choice of internationalization or capitulation. Dulles "eyes only" tel. to Paris MIAC 4023, May 11, 1954 (TOP SECRET). The conditions are also cited in Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, *La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), pp. 179-77.

3. Dulles' words are as paraphrased. In a State Department Memorandum of Conversation, May 11, 1954, of a White House conference May 10 attended by the President, Dulles, Wilson, Deputy Defense Secretary Anderson, Radfor, Robert Bowie, and Douglas MacArthur II (TOP SECRET).

4. Dillon "eyes only" from Paris to the Under Secretary (for Dulles) No. 4383, May 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

5. Dillon commented: "I am certain that unless we can find some way to get around this requirement (that the Vietnamese have the option of leaving the French Union, French will never ask for outside assistance." In ibid.

Dillon proposed that the real objection among Asians to the position of the Associated States rested not on the "purely juridical" problem of the right to leave the Union, but on Indochina's lack of powerful national armies. The Ambassador recommended that American training and equipping of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA), coupled with a French statement of intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps after the establishment of peace and a national army, would significantly dampen Asian antagonism to the Bao Dai regime. (Dillon from Paris tel. MIAC 4402 to Dulles, May 17, 1954, TOP SECRET). May Dillon assumed Asians would significantly change their attitude toward French Indochina when, even with an American takeover of the training and equipping of the VNA, French forces would still be on Vietnamese territory for a lengthy period is not known.

6. Dulles "eyes only" to Paris (Dillon) tel. MIAC 4094, May 15, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

7. Dulles "eyes only" to Smith at Geneva tel. TEDUL 75, and to Dillon at Paris No. 4261, May 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


9. FMA, Annex on "Studies to be Undertaken Immediately within United States Government," attached to ibid., (TOP SECRET).

11. This conceptualization stemmed from discussions of the NSC Planning Board, and was part of a broader contingency study program. See the Board's statement in an enclosure to a memorandum for Robert Bowie (the Board's chairman), May 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


13. These conclusions were subsequently confirmed when, at the direction of General Ridgway, a technical team of seven officers representing the Engineer, Transportation, and Signal Corps went to Indochina on a covert mission to determine military aid military-related resources available there in the event U.S. intervention was implemented. The team spent the period May 21-June 22 in the field. Their conclusions were, in general, that Indochina was devoid of the logistical, geographic, and related resources necessary to a substantial American ground effort such as Ridgway felt would be required for a success. The group's findings are in a report from Col. David W. Keihan, its leader, to Ridgway, July 12, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL).

The Chiefs' conclusions were disputed, however, by Drumright (in a memorandum to MacArthur, May 21, 1954, TOP SECRET). He argued that if, as everyone agreed, Indochina was vital to American security, the U.S. should not consider more than a token, ground troop commitment to be a serious diversion of our capabilities. While not arguing for a substantial troop commitment, Drumright suggested that the U.S. plan for that eventuality rather than count on defense with atomic weapons or non-nuclear strikes on Chinese territory. Somehow, however, Drumright's concern about the Chinese did not extend to the consideration that a massive U.S. troop commitment, which he stated elsewhere in the memorandum might prove necessary should token forces fail to do the job, risked bringing on the Chinese.


16. On April 28 French and Vietnamese representatives in Paris initialized separate treaties of independence and association. The treaties did not take effect, however, until June 4, when the French National Assembly finally approved the documents.


19. McClintock from Saigon No. 2468 to Dulles, May 19, 1954 (SECRET); Dillon from Paris "eyes only" for Dulles, Smith, and McClintock No. 4566, May 27, 1954 (TOP SECRET), reporting Trapnell-Ely talks. Ely and O'Daniel were still at odds, Dillon noted, over structural changes in the NVA, war strategy, and the role of U.S. advisors.


24. Eisenhower's unwavering attitude toward action in Asia only in concert with allies put him at odds with Dulles, who was prepared to act unilaterally at least in circumstances of overt aggression. When the issue of possible CPA air intervention came before the President, he is reported to have reacted sharply. Evidently supposing that conflict in the air would lead to a Sino-U.S. war, the President said the United States would not intervene in China on any basis except united action. He would not be responsible for going into China alone unless a joint Congressional resolution ordered him to do so. The United States should in no event undertake alone to support French colonialism. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this kind would destroy us. If we intervened alone in this case, we would be expected to intervene alone in other parts of the world. He made very clear that the need for united action as a condition of U.S. intervention was not related merely to the regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia but was also a necessity for U.S. intervention in response to Chinese Communist overt aggression.

Yet, when reminded by his Special Assistant, Robert Cutler, of NSC 5405's position that U.S. unilateral action could not be ruled out in the event of overt Chinese aggression against Thailand, Burma, or Malaya, and of Dulles' September 2, 1953 warning to China of a direct U.S. response to Chinese aggression in Indochina, the President stated that no difference existed between himself and Dulles. (Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Cutler, June 1, 1954, TOP SECRET).
The next day, June 2, the President directly confronted Dulles on this matter. Dulles distinguished between U.S. involvement in a collective grouping, which could only come about on satisfaction of the preconditions, and action in response to overt Chinese aggression. The Secretary's view was that in the latter case, the U.S. should act unilaterally upon authorization by Congress, citing prior statements by himself and the President that had warned China of the consequences of overt aggression. The President responded, according to Cutler's report, that direct Chinese aggression would force him to go all the way with naval and air power (including "new weapons") directed at air bases and ports in mainland China. He would therefore have to have much more than Congressional authorization in view of the likely public reaction to a Presidential request of Congress for war acts against China. Even though the Thais, Filipinos, French, and Indochinese would likely support such action, other countries, such as Australia, had to be brought along as well. The President, in short, was as concerned about the politics as the logic of getting involved in a conflict with China. (Memorandum of conference in the President's office, June 2, 1954, involving the President, Dulles, Anderson, Radford, MacArthur, and Cutler, TOP SECRET.) At its 200th meeting on 3 June, the NSC received, considered, and agreed upon the President's views.

Following this important Presidential determination, Dulles called in the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors on the question of overt Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. He explained that direct Chinese action was unlikely, but that the French had been pressing for assurance of a U.S. reply to Chinese air intervention in the delta. He reported the U.S. position that Chinese aggression required a collective response and a UN appeal, and distinguished this procedure from the united action concept of March 29. A brief memorandum was suggested by the Secretary by which the ANZUS powers would pledge, in the event of overt CCP aggression, to request approval of their parliaments for the use of armed forces, support a UN appeal by the attacked party, and seek to persuade other free nations to join in acting against China. The ambassadors, however, merely asked questions and, apparently, the proposed memorandum was not agreed upon by any of the Allies during the course of the Geneva Conference. See Dulles priority tel. to American Embassy - Canberra No. 238, June 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

25. Memorandum from Bidault to Eisenhowser, Geneva, June 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 158, June 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

26. Dillon tel. to Dallas No. 4766, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). Also, Dallas tel. to American Embassy - Paris No. 4286, May 27, 1954 (TOP SECRET); here, the American position was that French forces would be maintained during joint action except for normal troop rotation, replacement by native forces as the military situation permits, and consultation with allies engaged in the joint action.

28. Murphy (acting Secretary) "eyes only" tel. to American Embassy - Paris (Dillon), No. 4503, June 10, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

29. Dulles "eyes only" priority to American Embassy - Paris No. 4579, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

30. Dulles priority to American Consul - Geneva (Smith) TEDUL 197, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

31. Dillon "eyes only" from Paris to Dulles No. 4841, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

32. See, e.g., Schumann's remarks to Dillon in the latter's cable from Paris 15. 4766, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

33. Dulles to American Consul - Geneva (Smith) TEDUL 208, June 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

34. Smith "eyes only" for the Secretary from Geneva TEDUL 164, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

35. Dillon priority telegram to Dulles No. 4424, May 18, 1954. Cf. Dulles' comment of June 7 in a cable to Geneva (priority TEDUL 169, TOP SECRET): "I have long felt and still feel that the French are not treating our proposal seriously but toying with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva."

36. Dulles priority tel. to American Consul - Geneva TEDUL 175, June 8, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
FOOTNOTES

6. Dulles "eyes only" tel. TEDUL 222 to Smith at Geneva, June 18, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
14. Ibid.
16. Dulles to American Embassy - Paris tel. No. 77, July 7, 1954 (SECRET). Regarding the U.S. view of a Ho Chi Minh electoral victory, we not only have the well-known comment of Eisenhower that Ho, at least in 1954, would have garnered 80 per cent of the vote, but also the privately expressed view of Livingston Merchant (Dept. of State) that Ho would be the likely winner. See the latter in Dept. of State Memorandum of Conversation of May 31, 1954, at which Merchant reportedly "felt their /the Associated States' status was sufficiently independent so that they could freely express their will on a point of this type, although he recognized the possibility that in Viet Nam Ho might win a plebiscite, if held today." (TOP SECRET).


25. Ibid.


27. In a talk between Huang Hua (of the CPR delegation) and Seymour Topping of the New York Times, as reported in Smith's tel. SECTO 661 from Geneva, July 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


29. This threat was transmitted through Seymour Topping by Huang Hua near the end of the conference. See Smith's tel. SECTO 639 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


7. The U.S. objection was based on long-standing opposition to any move that would accord China the status of a major power equivalent to the fifth member of a "Big Five." See, e.g., Dulles to American Embassy - Canberra tel. No. 158, April 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


10. Lacouture and Devillers, p. 123, n. 3.


12. Ibid., p. 187.


15. Lacouture and Devillers, p. 234.

16. French insistence on the 18th parallel originated in the recommendation of General Navarre, who was asked several questions by the French delegation at Geneva regarding the likely impact of the then-existing military situation on the French negotiatory position. Navarre's responses were sent April 21. On the demarcation line, Navarre said that the 18th parallel would leave "us" the ancient political capitol of Hue and Tourane (Da Nang), and permit the retention of militarily valuable terrain. See General Ely's Memoires: l'Indochina dans la Tourmente (Paris: Plan, 1954), p. 112, and Lacouture and Devillers, p. 126.

17. Ibid., pp. 235-36.
19. I.C. Restricted/5, p. 16 (C). Records of the Restricted Sessions are summaries rather than word-for-word quotations, for the most part.
20. I.C. Restricted/6, p. 16 (C).
22. U.S. VerMin/7, p. 344.
23. I.C. Restricted/14, p. 26 (C).
24. CIA Report CS-42198, July 14, 1954, from Saigon (SECRET). Lacouture and Devillers hold that Diem was stupefied when he learned of partition for the first time from Ambassador Heath via a personal letter from Eisenhower, July 12 (pp. 256-57).
31. Ibid., p. 355.
33. Dulles to Smith at Geneva priority tel. TEDUC 212, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
34. Smith from Geneva priority DULTE 195, June 18, 1954 (SECRET). In an aide-memoire delivered by Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador to Washington, to Dulles and Eden on June 26, the French government urged the U.S. not to encourage an adverse Vietnamese reaction to partition. The U.S. was also asked "to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be..."
state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always
been possible heretofore because of the war." See Dulles' tel. No.


III. C. I.

FOOTNOTES

1. CIA Study 0017/66, "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic" (S), p. 42.

2. CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43.


4. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

5. After Dien Bien Phu and the withdrawal of most French forces to the Tonkin Delta, Viet Minh strength in and around the Delta was reported as 94 infantry battalions, 1 artillery division, 110 district companies, and from 40,000 to 50,000 militia. French-Vietnamese strength stood at 109 battalions (of which some 60 percent was VNA) and about 80,000 auxiliary troops and militia. Despite this manpower advantage for the French Union forces, an intelligence estimate for the period said they faced possible defections on a mounting scale which could become very large if the Viet Minh scored major victories or if the French were believed about to abandon Hanoi and portions of the Delta. See NIE-63-4-54, "Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina over the Next 30 Days (15 June-15 July)," June 15, 1954 (SECRET). In General Valluy's report to the five-power military staff conference on June 4, moreover, he stated there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese once the Tonkin Delta was lost and defense of the South became necessary. See Dulles' tel. TEDUL 171 to the American Consul - Geneva, June 7, 1954 (TOP SECRET).


7. IC Restricted/1 (C), p. 8.

8. CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43.


11. CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 44.

12. IC Restricted/14 (C), pp. 18-19.

13. IC Restricted/14 (C), p. 9; CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 45.

14. IC Restricted/15 (C), p. 16.

15. IC Restricted/6 (C), p. 7.

16. DULTE 187, Geneva to SecState, 16 June 1954 (TOP SECRET)
17. SECTO 489, translation of aide memoire, Bonnet to State, 28 June 1954 (TOP SECRET).

18. SECTO 557, Geneva to State, 3 July 1954 (TOP SECRET).

19. SECTO 560, Geneva to State, 6 July 1954 (TOP SECRET).

20. Lacouture and Devillers, La fin d'une guerre, p. 268.


22. Lacouture and Devillers, p. 284.


25. CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 49.

2. In a talk with Nong Kimny, Cambodian Foreign Minister, July 14; in Johnson tel. SECTO 616 from Geneva, July 15, 1954 (SECRET).

3. In a talk with Mendes-France, June 24; in Dillon tel. from Paris priority No. 5035, June 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

4. Ibid. and Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517, June 24, 1954, from Geneva (SECRET), reporting Mendes-France's conversation with Chou in Berne. Chou qualified this somewhat by urging that the resistance elements in the two countries be provided suitable means of re-integration into their respective societies.


6. Ibid. See also Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517, June 24, 1954, from Geneva (SECRET).

7. These views were presented, e.g., to Seymour Topping by Huang Hua at a meeting described by Topping as deadly serious and devoid of propagandistic remarks. "When Huang spoke of possibility American bases in Indochina or anti-communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter." See Smith's tel. SECTO 661 from Geneva, July 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517 from Geneva, June 24, 1954 (SECRET); Smith priority tel. SECTO 463 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (SECRET); and Smith tel. SECTO 636 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).

8. Smith tel. SECTO 635 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). Interestingly, at this same conference, Chou indicated it would be acceptable for the Cambodians to have French or British military instructors, but not Americans.


10. U.S. VerMin/Indochina Restricted 1, pp. 4-5 (CONFIDENTIAL).


12. CIA Memorandum RS 0017/66 (cited previously), p. 39 (SECRET/No Foreign Dis/Controlled Dis.).

13. Ibid., p. 41.
15. Ibid., pp. 239-40.
16. CIA Memo: "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political
Tactic" (SECRET), RSS:0017/66.
22. Ibid.
25. See, e.g., Lacouture and Devillers, p. 213.
27. This was the demand made by the Viet Minh in secret talks with the
French. Reported in Smith's priority tel. from Geneva DULTE 187,
June 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
also Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 217 and 219.
30. In a talk with Smith June 19, Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia
resistance movements and said he saw the possibility of agreement so
long as neither side (i.e., the French or the Viet Minh) "adopted
one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions." Molotov said
about 50 percent of Laotian territory was not controlled by the royal
government (a curious way of putting it), with a much smaller move-
ment in Cambodia. The tone of Smith's report on this conversation
suggests that Molotov saw no obstacles to Viet Minh withdrawal of
(TOP SECRET).
32. See e.g., Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 637, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
FOOTNOTES


2. Aide-memoire delivered by Bonnet to Dulles and Eden June 26, in Dulles' Tel No. 4852 to American Embassy - Paris, 28 June 1954 (TOP SECRET)


5. Department of State press release No. 400, 23 July 1954

6. OCB, Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405), 6 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)

7. NSC, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429), 4 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)

8. Dulles to American Embassy, Paris, Tel No. 77, 7 July 1954 (SECRET)

9. In its Progress Report of 6 August, OCB said there was need for "political action" to build a strong foundation in free Asia for the continued orientation of the countries there toward the Free World. "A test of such political action and orientation will be the elections in Laos and Cambodia during 1955, and in North and South Vietnam during 1956."

10. This objective, stated in NSC 5429/1, was approved by the President. See NSC, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East, 12 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)

11. Ibid.

12. Smith from Geneva Tel SECTO 666, 19 July 1954 (TOP SECRET)

13. Dulles to Smith at Geneva, Tel TOSEC 576 NIACX, 19 July 1954 (TOP SECRET)