Department of Defense
Psychological Operations Master Plan

March 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISP)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SO/LIC)
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COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT
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GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan - Necessary Actions

I have recently distributed the 1990 Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan approved by the Secretary earlier this year. The plan requires us to complete a number of challenging staff actions in the near future, and in other instances encourages a longer term redirection in PSYOP policy.

While reviewing the plan, I was gratified to note that world events that have transpired since drafting have not, by and large, rendered the guidance obsolete. The premise which guided the plan's development, that psychological operations are a "strategic instrument of national security policy," is more true today than when the plan's drafters began their efforts. Many respected members of the national security policy community would argue that PSYOP's role as a strategic instrument has greatly increased in the last eighteen months. Our strategic vision now focuses on differently constructed governments which increasingly and importantly respond more directly to the demands of constituents. Ensuring that the information such newly empowered constituents receive is accurate, helpful, and supportive of U.S. national security policy is likely to become a point of main effort for the Department's overt peacetime PSYOP activities.

The PSYOP revitalization process continues. My purpose in distributing this paper is to suggest that an addendum to the Master Plan could be helpful in bridging revitalization efforts to a changing world order. The addendum would amend, when appropriate, the basic plan. The addendum would also adjust the basic plan's staff action completion dates as necessary.
Enclosed is a draft product, including the specific reason(s) why we believe additional guidance is necessary in certain areas. Before approaching the Secretary with an adjusted master plan, I need the benefit of your review and comments. I would appreciate your replies by 30 August 1990. When I have received these, I will redraft and recoordinate the addendum before seeking the Secretary's approval. My POC is Colonel Louis H. Anderson, the Director for PSYOP. He can be reached at extension 55692.

Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy (Security Policy)
Proposed Addendum

to

Psychological Operations Master Plan

The Executive Summary needs to acknowledge that the environment within which PSYOP revitalization is taking place is itself less defined than when the 1985 master plan was written. Also, the great tactical success of PSYOP during JUST CAUSE is insufficiently credited during the 1990 plan, which was written in 1989. The following paragraph, envisioned to lead the addendum, makes these points.

"The military-political assumptions upon which the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan rested are less evident today. The implications of increased pluralism, if not democratic political process, in nations once ideologically hostile to these concepts are not fully researched or perhaps researchable at this juncture. The PSYOP community will confront a greater element of uncertainty and ambiguity in the construction of country-specific products, at least in the near term. Although the military-political assumptions may be under challenge, the doctrine and precepts of PSYOP remain valid. Operation JUST CAUSE commanders continue to attest to the combat advantage PSYOP forces brought to their battle. In the measure most crucial to U.S. campaigns throughout history - American lives lost - PSYOP revitalization efforts begun six years ago have yielded calculable and significant dividend on the battlefield."

Paragraph 11 of the Executive Summary discusses force structure modernization, and by implication the resources required to support this concept. The resource environment is considerably less favorable today, to support a robust force structure modernization effort, than was the case when
the plan was drafted. Further, the Secretary has acknowledged that force structure reductions will occur in the years and months ahead. The addendum should address this reality. The following paragraph is crafted to address resource related issues.

"Clearly PSYOP force structure, and the modernization of that force structure, will be impacted by the budgetary imperatives of the 1990s. It is not known if PSYOP force structure should reduce in proportion to total force structure reductions, or if PSYOP forces, and the capability they portend in peace and conflict, should receive greater or lesser budgetary priority than other Department of Defense functions. PSYOP programs demonstrably wedded to combat capability stand the best chance of resource support. Programs whose relationship to combat capability is more notional, yet whose contribution to national security is very great if not always well articulated, will require strong programmatic support at every level."

Paragraph (3) of the Introduction chapter of the plan discusses the "continuous and global war of information between the Soviet Union and the United States." While the paragraph also discusses "similar conflict among other aligned and non-aligned nations," the statements in this paragraph do not sufficiently acknowledge the uncertainty which presently characterizes "the continuous and global war." The following paragraph in the addendum provides a more current perspective on the global competition that continues to exist.

"The traditional PSYOP objectives pursued by the Soviet Union are experiencing great and fundamental change. Revision of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, once the most heinous of crimes, is at times extolled, at least rhetorically, from major Soviet pulpits. In such a period of instability, it is prudent to
avoid quick or sweeping conclusions concerning the intentions of the only nation in the world with the potential to destroy our society. If we can state with confidence that the objectives of Soviet PSYOP have changed, we cannot state with any confidence that the methods and tactics of our adversaries have undergone similar change. For the foreseeable future we should anticipate that our many potential adversaries in the less developed regions of the world will pursue their anti-American agenda with resources and methods which closely parallel the Soviet model. The intentions of the Soviet Union itself, despite an apparently greater willingness to acknowledge the will of Soviet people, are very unclear with respect to their relationship with states who until recently accepted Soviet leadership albeit often unenthusiastically. Will the Soviet Union prosecute an "active-measures" campaign to retain influence with their previous satellites in Eastern Europe and Central America? We should be prepared to counter such an eventuality."

The Psychological Operations Doctrine section does not require any revision in our view. One notes however, that a necessary effort to rationalize Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and PSYOP as suggested in paragraph 6, and directed by paragraph 7, needs to acknowledge the diminished role of Public Diplomacy within international information programs in future endeavors. This larger task will require a more extensive staffing effort. Accordingly, the recommended completion date for the actions required by paragraph 7.a. should be amended to 31 Oct 90.

The Psychological Operations Planning section notes in paragraph 5 that it is desirable to replicate the progress in joint planning that has been achieved in the immediate past, with new initiatives in the Combined arena. These prophetic comments have forecast well the great need for Combined hemispheric efforts in counternarcotics activities as well as the increased
necessity - with the expected reduction of U.S. Armed Forces presence overseas - to cooperate with host nation and/or allied military units during peacetime contingency activities. The suggested addendum paragraph which follows, attempts to capture the necessary emphasis to encourage further progress in Combined activities.

"The time to increase our attention to Combined PSYOP activity has arrived. The designation of counternarcotics programs as a high priority national security concern by the Secretary of Defense, the increased attention of our Military Departments to the less developed world - and that world's increasingly worrisome pace of armament modernization - and the nascent spirit of political choice evident in many locations thought unlikely, combine to present the most propitious time in recent history to advance the interests of the United States through international information programs, including Combined PSYOP. In realization of the increased emphasis contained within this addendum, the Chief of Staff, Army is encouraged to recommend a course(s) of action to the CJCS NLT 30 Nov 90 vice 31 Jul 90 (see para 6.a.). This same increased emphasis in combination with pending organizational developments within the executive departments warrant extending the required completion dates for the DoD - USIA cooperation agreement to 30 Nov 90 (see para 6.b.). Given the high probability of a consolidation of broadcast assets in the near future, the DoD - BIB cooperation agreement should not be pursued. Accordingly, para 6.c. of this section is no longer applicable."
The Education and Training section continues to read well. No additional emphasis is warranted, nor should any language contained in this section be reduced in strength.

The Force Structure Modernization section rests upon the assumption that alliance relationships, forward based forces, and Reserve Component mobilization plans would not be subjected to the sort of fundamental reassessment now in progress. PSYOP force structure modernization, in terms of peacetime mission assignment, training, logistic support, and deployment planning will be greatly impacted by the reassessment process. Pre-positioning of equipment may not be as practical a choice as once believed. The practice of wedding specific units to specific wartime taskings may not be an efficient or effective one. The need to mobilize specific Reserve Component units quickly, short of hostilities, may be imperative if such units are the sole source of a critical capability. The following paragraph, suggested for addendum inclusion attempts to articulate force structure issues.

"It has become increasingly clear that force structure modernization, as a PSYOP community issue, needs to be revisited. The strategic vision of our leaders is increasingly turning to focus on our national interests in the third world, while prudently retaining surveillance of second world political stability. The PSYOP community needs to respond to this wider view with greater mobility, greater awareness of third world issues - to include counternarcotics - with less rigidity in unit/personnel assignments. The Master Plan must retain the spirit of revitalization while fully accepting the reality of a smaller force structure, tasked to contribute to a national strategy less exclusively focused on the Soviet Union. This issue is the most crucial one the PSYOP community faces in the near term. The Actions Required section of the Force Structure Modernization section (see para 5) should be replaced with the following:
a. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will coordinate a review of PSYOP logistic requirements, and a survey for host nation capabilities to provide equipment and material for the support and conduct of PSYOP. Reports of the status of this planning will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by 30 Sep 1990.

b. In concert with related comprehensive force structure reduction issues, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will ensure that the discriminate capabilities PSYOP forces provide to Unified & Specified Commanders are retained and enhanced as possible.

c. Unified and Specified Commanders will assess the potential capabilities PSYOP forces represent to newly assigned responsibilities in counternarcotics and make appropriate force structure recommendations.

d. USCINCSOC will specifically address the issue of proportional representations of PSYOP units in active and reserve components and make appropriate recommendations to the CJCS.

e. USCINCSOC will forward to the CJCS the recommended actions to resolve peacetime PSYOP command and control issues by 30 Sep 1990."

The Subordination of PSYOP Staffs section does not, in our view, require revision. As a point of emphasis, the addendum's draft language suggests that the Soviet Union may increasingly choose to pursue their interests in Eastern Europe and elsewhere through "active measures." It remains
at least as important as before to "establish staff responsibility for PSYOP planning and operational functions separate from special operations."

The Establishment of a Joint Psychological Operations Center section also requires no amendment.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Psychological Operations
Master Plan

This is the 1990 Department of Defense Psychological
Operations Master Plan which I have approved. This 1990
Plan, which replaces the 1985 Plan, captures the values of the
earlier Plan, analyzes conditions which have changed, and provides
direction for continuation of the Presidential-directed
revitalization of Psychological Operations.

I expect this plan to be carried out within the time
envisioned. All organizations will complete the actions
outlined in the plan to ensure revitalization of psychological
operations within the Department of Defense.

[Signature]

10 FEB 1990
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................. ii - iv  
Introduction .............................................................................. 1  
Psychological Operations Doctrine ............................................. 2 - 3  
Psychological Operations Planning ............................................ 3 - 4  
Education and Training .............................................................. 5 - 7  
Force Structure Modernization .................................................. 7 - 8  
Subordination of PSYOP Staffs ................................................... 8 - 9  
Joint Psychological Operations Center ........................................ 10 - 11  
Distribution .............................................................................. 12 - 15
Executive Summary

1. The end of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War marked the beginning of a decade-long period of decline and atrophy of military psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities. By the late 1970s, shortcomings and deficiencies developed in a number of critical areas, including doctrine, planning, force structure, readiness and policy.

2. A series of National Command Authorities decisions and directives were put in place first to reaffirm the importance of PSYOP to national security policy and, second, to ensure that PSYOP would be again fully integrated into military planning and operations during peacetime, crises and war. The resulting foundation for this revitalization effort was the 1985 Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan.

3. The 1985 Plan was based on input from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. It provided an across-the-board review of a range of PSYOP functional areas, an inventory of deficiencies, and recommended actions for improvements.

4. The 1985 Plan enhanced DoD PSYOP capabilities. As a result of initiatives directed by the Plan, the institutional structure for revitalizing military PSYOP is partially in place and daily progress is being made. Since the 1985 Plan was approved by the Secretary of Defense, a number of critical problem areas have been addressed and corrected. Interagency mechanisms that reach the National Security Council level were established to consider PSYOP issues. PSYOP and special operations progressed toward separation. Joint doctrine has been published. Movement has been made in military education and force structure modernization. The Services and U&S Commands are establishing PSYOP as a regular part of their current and long-range planning. Current peacetime PSYOP programs are beginning to come on line in a number of Unified Commands.

"The 1985 Plan and its carefully developed rationale provided the impetus for the noticeable improvement in PSYOP during the period 1985-1988."

5. The 1985 Plan detailed the rationale for its recommendations. It expanded on the Presidential direction to revitalize psychological operations and integrate this military force multiplier into ongoing peacetime programs. The 1985 Plan and its carefully developed rationale provided the impetus for the noticeable improvement in PSYOP during the period 1985-1988. However, the DoD Reorganization Act, the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the improvements fostered by the 1985 Master Plan significantly changed the environment described in that Plan. Although much of the underlying rationale remains valid, it has become technically difficult to implement the 1985 recommendations.
"The 1990 Master Plan is built around the 1985 Master Plan's six primary themes: doctrine, planning, education and training, force structure, PSYOP staff unique functions, and a Joint Psychological Operations Center (JPOC)."

in the present environment. Therefore, this Master Plan replaces the 1985 Master Plan. This 1989 Plan captures the values of the 1985 Plan, analyzes the changed conditions, and provides direction to continue the Presidentially directed revitalization.

6. Activation of USSOCOM and assignment of Army and Air Force PSYOP forces to that command provide unique opportunities to continue the revitalization. Congressionally mandated responsibilities and authority for USSOCOM will assure that PSYOP enhancement gains the focused attention of the U&S Commands. Directives of this Plan recognize the unique position of USCINCSOC.

7. The 1990 Master Plan is built around the 1985 Master Plan's six primary themes: doctrine, planning, education and training, force structure, PSYOP staff unique functions, and a Joint Psychological Operations Center (JPOC).

8. Doctrine sets forth the purposes and fundamental operating principles for employment of forces. Joint PSYOP doctrine has been published. Still to be accomplished are development of policy guidance on the relationship of PSYOP to public affairs, public diplomacy, and other information programs. Additionally, Service PSYOP doctrine must be aligned with joint doctrine, and with national policy regarding integration of all U.S. Government international information programs.

9. The planning process has been improved, with additions to the Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Joint Operations Planning System. Training for PSYOP planners has been established; procedures have been built into the crisis action system; and a new system initiated to monitor world events and inform Unified Commands of PSYOP opportunities. Updates of the cooperation agreements with other government agencies remain incomplete, and continued refinement and improvement of the planning process in the Unified and Specified commands and the Services is still required.

"The services must be encouraged to develop requirements integrating PSYOP instruction into accession and career development courses."

10. There have been significant accomplishments in PSYOP education and training, but additional progress is required to insure qualified personnel are available at all levels and within all services. Individual qualification training has been significantly enhanced in the Army. Interservice quotas are available at joint courses conducted at Ft. Bragg, NC and Hurlburt Fld, FL. Yet to be accomplished are integrative initiatives, identified
in the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, at the Senior and Intermediate Service Schools, and at National Defense University. Additionally, the Services must be encouraged to develop requirements integrating PSYOP instruction into accession and career development courses. This Plan addresses these issues with the intent of integrating PSYOP training and education enhancements within the present curricula at these institutions.

"In the area of force structure modernization much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done."

11. In the area of force structure modernization much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. Funding lines for equipment modernization and acquisition are beginning to produce tangible results. A personnel plus-up and creation of a new active component battalion have reduced the dual tasking problem. The Army’s LTOE reorganization will continue this process. Assignment of active and reserve component Army and Air Force PSYOP forces to the new US Special Operations Command significantly affects force structure alignment. As this new force structure matures, sustainment and enhancement of these initiatives remain critical.

12. The 1985 Plan outlined in detail the necessity to separate PSYOP staffs from special operations staffs throughout DoD. Experience has demonstrated the efficacy of the 1985 Master Plan analysis. Assignment of PSYOP forces to the Special Operations Command does not obviate the need for functional independence of PSYOP staff elements. Therefore, functional staff separation remains a valid goal of the 1990 Master Plan.

13. Establishment of a Joint PSYOP Center, which the 1985 Plan viewed as the critical factor necessary to institutionalize the overall revitalization of DoD PSYOP capabilities, has been deferred pending the maturation of USSOCOM and its J-9 PSYOP staff element. The new command structure and other developments since 1985 may have substantially altered the envisioned scope and functions of the proposed center. The issue must be reexamined in light of these developments.

14. The 1990 Master Plan reflects a variety of DoD initiatives executed in support of Presidential direction to integrate US international information programs. The roles and tasks of the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U&5 Commands, the Services, and applicable DoD agencies are outlined in subsequent chapters of this Plan. Each component is charged to fulfill its respective responsibilities as outlined herein within the present Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)."
Introduction

"The objectives and supporting rationale of the 1985 Master Plan— and the updated actions required to complete the revitalization of PSYOP are contained in this 1990 Master Plan."

1. To respond to Presidential direction to revitalize DoD PSYOP and integrate it into other international information programs of the United States Government, the Secretary of Defense promulgated the 1985 Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan. The 1985 Master Plan was preceded by DoD Directive S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War, which assigned responsibilities and provided policy guidance for conducting PSYOP within DoD. The Presidential direction expressed in relevant National Security Decision Directives and DoD Directive S-3321.1 are the foundations that make DoD PSYOP one of the strategic instruments of national security policy, establish PSYOP as an inherent responsibility of military commanders, and require consideration and use of PSYOP in peacetime, crisis, and war. The 1985 Master Plan provided the rationale and framework for rebuilding the Department's PSYOP capabilities, and for melding these capabilities into military operations at all levels.

2. Situational changes prompted by implementation of the 1985 Master Plan’s recommendations, by legislation reorganizing DoD, by the advent of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), by the subsequent assignment of Army and Air Force PSYOP forces to USSOCOM, and by the changing foreign policy environment have prompted review and revision of some of the courses of remedial action in the earlier plan, and establishment of new timelines. The objectives and supporting rationale of the 1985 Master Plan and the updated actions required to complete the revitalization of PSYOP are contained in this 1990 Master Plan. Actions contained in the 1985 Master Plan but not included in the 1990 Master Plan either have been completed satisfactorily, are ongoing successfully, or have been overcome by subsequent events.

3. Today’s environment for PSYOP involves not only the continuous and global war of information between the Soviet Union and the United States, but similar conflict among other aligned and non-aligned nations as well. Since 1985 much progress has been made, but significant shortfalls and challenges remain to be overcome. PSYOP Manning has been improved, and separate PSYOP functional responsibilities have been more clearly laid out. Not all commanders utilize PSYOP effectively and interagency coordination has not reached the desired level. Today’s environment includes fiscal austerity and a resource-scarce reality that will affect planning and require inventive solutions to PSYOP problems for the foreseeable future.
Psychological Operations Doctrine

"Joint PSYOP doctrine is the foundation for developing all other parts of US military PSYOP capability examined in this Master Plan."

1. This section describes the context within which the Joint Staff published joint psychological operations doctrine. It also refers to the PSYOP doctrine of each Service, cites the need and makes recommendations to ensure Service and Unified and Specified Command efforts and resources are fully supportive.

2. Military doctrine underpins training and operations. It sets forth objectives and fundamental operating principles to employ forces, and delineates basic responsibilities of forces and derivative mission areas and tasks. Doctrine should not be rigid or inhibitive; rather, it must be adaptive, responsive, and sustaining. PSYOP doctrine flows from and is consistent with national security interests and policy.

3. Joint PSYOP doctrine is the foundation for developing all other parts of US military PSYOP capability examined in this Master Plan. This doctrine has been published as JCS Pub 3-53, February 1987, Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine.

4. Each Service has developed its own doctrine for conducting psychological operations.
   
   
   
   

5. Each doctrinal statement acknowledges PSYOP as a joint and interagency enterprise. To date, however, the Service doctrines have not been reviewed and amended to bring them in line with published joint PSYOP doctrine. These actions are necessary for Service doctrines to be compatible with and supportive of joint PSYOP doctrine.

6. To ensure that PSYOP doctrine is consistent with national security policies, and that PSYOP can contribute with maximum effectiveness to national and theater international information programs, it is necessary to define and establish the principal characteristics and differences among the boundaries between, and the legitimate foci of interests for, public affairs, public diplomacy, and PSYOP. Moreover, principles and procedures must be developed for coordination and cooperation among these three functions in
areas of mutual concern.

7. Actions Required:
   a. USDP, ASD(PA), and DUSD(SP) will develop policy which defines, distinguishes, delineates, and provides principles for cooperation among PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs (by 31 July 1990).
   b. Each Service will evaluate its PSYOP doctrine and amend it as necessary to be compatible with and support joint PSYOP doctrine by (31 August 1990).
   c. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will amend JCS Pub 3-53 to take into account OSD and Service inputs.

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**Psychological Operations Planning**

1. The extensive review performed in preparing the 1985 Master Plan established that the planning, coordination of planned operations, and integration of PSYOP into military operations was required. The plan identified deficiencies in long-range planning guidance, implementing directives, planner training, and agreements for interagency and inter-Service coordination. The effect of the 1985 Plan was to initiate measurable improvements in each identified area, ameliorating many of the problems the document identified.

"With the advent of USSOCOM, new command and coordination arrangements have become necessary."

2. Planning and Coordination Directives: Revisions to the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) Volumes I, II, and IV, JSCP, Annex D, Volumes I and II, and annual updates to Defense Planning Guidance were identified and completed. Revision of Annex D to the JSCP, with appropriate Unified and Specified Command supplements was also undertaken. Revisions, updates, and supplements were initiated for peacetime programs, to include PSYOP in crisis actions, and to integrate PSYOP more completely into deliberate planning. PSYOP is now becoming a part of crisis action consideration, exercise play, and daily military activities. With the advent of USSOCOM, new command and coordination arrangements have become necessary.

3. Planner Training: Education and training, and nurture of PSYOP related planning skills are necessary for effective expansion of the PSYOP role in military operations. The US Army Joint PSYOP Staff Planning Course and the USAF Joint PSYOP Course should form the basis for this planner training.

4. Interagency and Inter-Service Agreements: Updating obsolescent interagency agreements regarding PSYOP has so far eluded the best efforts of OSD and the Joint Staff. For example, current agreements with the United
States Information Agency (USIA) and the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) have been in effect since 1983 and 1977 respectively. Because significant change has occurred in the actual relationships among these organizations, these outdated documents are not conducive to effective coordination and cooperation and, lag behind the excellent progress made in coordinating with other public diplomacy and international information programs.

5. Development and improvement of Joint Staff Courses has led to a perception that PSYOP's progress in the Joint arena could be replicated in the Combined arena by the use of the same method. Allied nations invite US military personnel to several PSYOP courses, yet the equivalent US courses currently have limited ability to provide a US PSYOP perspective to military personnel with whom we will work in contingency situations. Success of the 1988 Joint Senior PSYOP Conference for NATO officers demonstrated the mutual international benefit of such presentations by the USAF Special Operations School. Other US courses may be amenable to modification for presentation for NATO personnel or third world nationals.

6. Actions Required:

a. As JCS Executive Agent for joint PSYOP training, Chief of Staff, Army will explore the feasibility of developing combined PSYOP courses and recommend a course(s) of action to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (by 31 July 1990).

b. DUSD(SP) will update the cooperation agreement between the Department of Defense and the United States Information Agency (by 31 July 1990).

c. DUSD(SP) will update the cooperation agreement between the DoD and the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) (by 31 July 1990).

d. DUSD(SP) will ensure psychological operations are considered in contingency planning and crises.
Education and Training

1. Psychological operations require a wide variety of skills. Not all skills involved are peculiar to PSYOP, and a variety of Service training programs produces personnel with skills usable in PSYOP.

"PSYOP personnel require training in language skills, regional issues and cultures, PSYOP strategy, tactics, and policy considerations, as well as the ability to plan and execute active programs in support of national policies."

2. Education and training requirements for DoD personnel fall into three categories: Service requirements, joint education requirements, and combined training requirements. Optimal Service training would produce PSYOP personnel with language skills and country or regional qualifications, as well as produce strategists and planners who understand PSYOP and can evaluate situations and identify PSYOP objectives and target audiences in support of national policies, preparations for war, and joint or single-Service mission objectives. Service training also should produce planners who can prepare PSYOP plans and supervise their execution. Joint education and training should expand the skills of strategists and planners to identify uses of PSYOP and expand their abilities to prepare and supervise implementation of joint PSYOP plans from national, combined, and multi-Service perspectives. Combined PSYOP training should acquaint planners with the PSYOP capabilities of US allies and a general understanding of their national policies, objectives, organizations, capabilities, and unique characteristics, including restrictions regarding command, planning, and operational procedures.

3. Current in-Service training requirements, primarily Army and Air Force, fall into four categories: user-oriented, support, awareness, and planning.

a. User-oriented training prepares personnel to analyze and produce PSYOP materials for dissemination. This training emphasizes understanding human psychology, cross-cultural communication, techniques of persuasion, and research analysis skills. Language training and area orientation are included in this category.

b. PSYOP support training includes dissemination techniques and instruction in PSYOP organization sufficiently detailed to facilitate coordination of activities.

c. Awareness education and training addresses the purposes, uses, and capabilities of friendly PSYOP activities and the hostile PSYOP threat.

d. Instruction in PSYOP planning focuses on the use of PSYOP by senior commanders and staff officers to support national objectives and military missions, and on the capabilities of organizations to employ PSYOP in support of their missions.

4. The Army has established programs that include training from the user level to the Joint Staff planning level. The Chief of Staff, Army is the JCS Executive Agent for a Joint
"Exercises are critical vehicles for training in every field, no less so in PSYOP, as a means to perfect skills, identify shortfalls, and develop courses of remedial action."

PSYOP Staff Planner Course (JPSPC) for all Services. The Air Force has two awareness courses: one for senior officers and one for junior personnel. The Navy has included PSYOP education and training requirements for the Naval War College, Naval Post Graduate School, and Tactical Training Groups in draft guidance on PSYOP, and will include PSYOP in the Navy's Military Deception Planner Course. Joint requirements for Navy PSYOP planners will be met by sending officers and civilians to the JPSPC.

5. DUSD(SP) has provided a baseline set of PSYOP curriculum materials to all of the Intermediate and Senior Service Colleges. These materials are intended to allow all Service Colleges to meet established Service educational goals without duplication of extensive research in the PSYOP field.

6. Prior to 1985, Army PSYOP officers were managed as Foreign Area Officers (FAO, Functional Area 48). In 1985 the Army implemented its FAO Enhancement Plan, which eliminated PSYOP as a FAO-associated career field and put PSYOP officers in a special operations functional area for career management purposes. In 1987, the Army approved Special Forces as a separate branch, and subsequently designated a separate functional area (FA 39) and career path for PSYOP officers. While the change was a clear improvement for training and management of the PSYOP officer, it is unclear how the loss of FAO-oriented skills (language, cultural, regional, US foreign policy, and politico-military analysis), will affect FA 39 education and training paths. It is also unclear how well the Army will fill the qualitative and quantitative gap over the next several years as the FA 39 program develops.

7. Exercises are critical vehicles for training in every field, no less so in PSYOP, as a means to perfect skills, identify shortfalls, and develop courses of remedial action.

8. Actions Required:

a. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries, as appropriate, will develop recommendations for changes in the curriculum of the National Defense University and the respective Senior Service Colleges, commanders courses, and general/flag officers/civilian-equivalent orientations (by 30 Sep 90), with the goal of increasing understanding of the proper, effective use of PSYOP among and senior leaders in all Services. DUSD(SP) has provided these colleges with the results of its contracted PSYOP curriculum research to minimize duplicative research investment.

b. The Service Secretaries will develop recommendations for integration of PSYOP awareness and orientation training into officer and enlisted basic and mid-career courses by 30 Sep 1990.
c. As the FA 39 program matures, Chief of Staff, Army, in concert with the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, will evaluate its effectiveness and report the results to the Secretary of Defense.

d. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of Unified Commands and USCINCSOC will regularly integrate PSYOP in Service, joint, and combined training exercises. Active and Reserve components will be exercised to ensure that PSYOP activity in such exercises is realistic, adequate, meaningful, and promotes joint PSYOP capabilities.

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**Force Structure Modernization**

"Prepositioning PSYOP equipment and supplies, and developing host nation support agreements, ensure early access for and sustantiation of PSYOP activities supporting execution of contingency and war plans."

1. The 1985 Master Plan approached force structure modernization issues by examining dual tasking, forward deployment, prepositioning, host nation equipment support, Reserve mobilization, and peacetime command and control. A number of initiatives in these areas were undertaken pursuant to the 1985 Master Plan. It is important to sustain and enhance these initiatives.

2. Prepositioning PSYOP equipment and supplies, and developing host nation support agreements, ensure early access for and sustantiation of PSYOP activities supporting execution of contingency and war plans. Early availability requirements for Army Reserve Component (RC) PSYOP assets, the paucity of sea and air lift, and the low density nature of most PSYOP-specific equipment reinforce the need for agencies and commands throughout DoD to solve these problems. The importance of prepositioning will increase as the Army procures additional PSYOP equipment and as overseas basing options decrease.

3. Army RC mobilization planning trails the generally positive developments in Active Component (AC) force structure modernization. Many RC units still mobilize far from their embarkation sites, and most low readiness postures in PSYOP organizations are found in RC units. Units formerly appearing in the 100K/200K mobilization packages no longer do so. Early in-theater arrivals of RC units have been severely limited. RC PSYOP units have yet to achieve parity with Active units in peacetime mission assignment, training, logistic support, or pre-mobilization deployment planning.

4. There remains considerable uncertainty regarding RC PSYOP peacetime command and control (C2). Temporarily held in abeyance pending the establishment of USSOCOM, these issues can now be resolved. The resolutions can be put in place concurrently
with implementation of the Army's LTOE. Peacetime C2 should parallel wartime C2 as closely as possible and reflect peacetime CAPSTONE alignments.

5. Actions Required:

a. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will coordinate a review of PSYOP logistic requirements, plans for pre-positioning PSYOP equipment in theater, and a survey for host nation capabilities to provide equipment and material for the support and conduct of PSYOP. Reports of the status of this planning will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by 30 Sep 1990.

b. Each Service will develop an RC PSYOP enhancement program which will include preparedness and readiness to meet U&S Command requirements, timely deployment, and the integration and sustainment of RC PSYOP activities in peacetime, crisis, and war. This program will be implemented as resources permit in conjunction with scheduled reorganization actions.

c. USCINCSOC will forward to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the recommended actions to resolve peacetime PSYOP command and control issues by 30 Sep 1990.

Subordination of PSYOP Staffs

"Military PSYOP supports US national security policy and a wide range of military missions."

1. Military PSYOP supports US national security policy and a wide range of military missions. These can be conducted by or in support of every type of military force. Approximately 90 per cent of Army PSYOP forces are designated to support regional unified commands in wartime; the remaining 10 per cent support special forces operations and missions. Air Force PSYOP forces primarily support conventional and contingency operations of joint commanders, while other Air Force elements execute PSYOP actions to support national objectives or military missions as required. Navy and Marine Corps PSYOP capabilities support national objectives and military missions as required.

2. For several reasons, (i.e. the Presidentially-mandated overt peacetime PSYOP program, isolation of PSYOP planning from strategic and operational planning, the dominance of the general warfare PSYOP mission, and widespread misunderstanding of the nature of military PSYOP activities), the 1985 Master Plan recommendations emphasized the need to establish staff responsibility for PSYOP planning and operational functions separate from special operations. The primary thrust was to insure that PSYOP staff planning was not stultified by subordination to special operations staffs.

3. Establishment of independent PSYOP staffs subsequently occurred within OSD, the Joint Staff, and at the Service levels. Several
Unified and Specified Commands also brought their staff arrangements in line with the 1985 Master Plan recommendations. Other organizations have not yet implemented this Master Plan recommendation.

4. In September 1987, the Secretary of Defense approved assigning Army and Air Force active and Reserve Component PSYOP units to the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The assignment of PSYOP forces to USSOCOM in no way invalidated the rationale for separation of intrinsic PSYOP staff functions from special operations staff functions.

5. The Joint Staff's PSYOP Division developed guidance to assist the U&S Commands in establishing International Information Committees (IICs). The IICs will enable the commands to use in-house assets and capabilities to initiate, develop, and institutionalize Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3) activities in support of their respective regional military objectives and US national security interests. Thus far, Pacific Command (PACOM); US Forces, Korea (USFK); Central Command (CENTCOM); Atlantic Command (LANTCOM); and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) have established working IICs. Several other commands are in the process of establishing them.

6. Action Required:
   a. OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the U&S commands are encouraged to maintain PSYOP staff organizations which are not subordinate to special operations staffs, with activities devoted to PSYOP on a full-time basis.

   b. The U&S Commands are encouraged to establish IICs, or similar mechanisms as a means of ensuring that psychological operations are planned, developed, coordinated, directed, and executed routinely in accordance with DoD Directive S-3321.1, are integrated into military operations, and are supportive of overall US security goals as they apply to command missions.

"The assignment of PSYOP forces to USSOCOM in no way invalidated the rationale for separation of intrinsic PSYOP staff functions from special operations staff functions."
Establishment of a Joint Psychological Operations Center

"The advent of USSOCOM and other factors now forces reexamination of the nature and functions of the envisioned Joint PSYOP Center."

1. Prior to the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the 1985 Master Plan called for creation of a permanent Joint Psychological Operations Center (JPOC) to provide DoD-wide psychological operations with strategic focus and the capability to orchestrate and coordinate the military PSYOP effort in conjunction with other US Government agencies. This was viewed as the critical factor necessary to institutionalize the overall revitalization of Department of Defense military PSYOP capabilities, and as the essential mechanism to execute coherent strategic programs as required by Presidential direction. Specific features and functions recommended were:

   a. Preferably subordinated directly to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

   b. Organizational and institutional font for PSYOP within DoD.

   c. Located in the National Capital Region.

   d. Key element for interagency coordination and cooperation.

   e. Representation from Department of State, the intelligence community, US Information Agency, Voice of America, and the Board for International Broadcasting sufficient to engage in genuine strategic and operational coordination.

   f. Responsibilities to include:

      (1) Long-range strategic PSYOP plans.

      (2) Doctrine and operational concepts.

      (3) Continuing education and training of personnel.

      (4) Research and analytical studies and assessments.

      (5) Coordination of equipment development.

      (6) Planning, coordination, and direction of the DoD portion of national PSYOP activities.

   "USSOCOM thus assumes a preeminent role in providing assets, and in planning and conducting military PSYOP."

2. Implementation of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, as amended, placed the majority of dedicated US military PSYOP assets within the newly formed US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The advent of
USSOCOM as a major advocate for military PSYOP and an integral part of US national security capabilities now forces reexamination of the nature and functions of the envisioned Joint PSYOP Center. As a minimum, the following factors must be considered in this reexamination:

a. USCINCSOC has declared his intention to assume responsibility for all PSYOP missions in his role as supporting CINC for the Unified and Specified Commands, and to be an advocate for military PSYOP to support the achievement of US national security objectives across the spectrum of conflict. USSOCOM thus assumes a preeminent role in providing assets, and in planning and conducting military PSYOP.

b. While policy and doctrine emanate from the national level, USCINCSOC clearly will have a significant role regarding recommendations and development in these areas, as well as in their implementation.

c. Development and procurement of equipment is a Service function, and provision for this function with regard to specialized equipment has also been made for USSOCOM. It may no longer be necessary to assign the function of obtaining specialized PSYOP equipment to the Joint PSYOP Center. This function, with the extensive organizational development required, could be more effectively accomplished if retained by the Services, in coordination with USSOCOM.

d. As a result of changes and improvements stimulated by the 1985 Master Plan and other developments since 1985, certain functions postulated for the JPOC have been competently assumed by other organizations within the DoD. The functioning of separated staffs has provided manpower and access not present before. Similarly, policy formulation has an institutional home in the Director for Psychological Operations, OSD. The IICs have demonstrated some capability to perform functions originally envisaged for the JPOC. On the other hand, no single DoD organization yet provides full-time strategic PSYOP analysis of crucial issues and potential problem areas. No single institution focuses on developing and providing PSYOP advice to the NCA based on in-house regional, cultural, political, and PSYOP expertise. A complete analysis of the original missions postulated in the 1985 Master Plan for the JPOC is required.

3. Action Required: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the Joint PSYOP Center issue, in view of the factors discussed above and projected resource estimates and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense by 31 December 1990.

"No single institution focuses on developing and providing PSYOP advice to the NCA based on in-house regional, cultural, political, and PSYOP expertise."