CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO
THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN LEBANON (U)

SECOND INSTALLMENT
16 July - 30 October 1958
16 Jul 58 USAFE reported that the first aircraft carrying BLUE BAT Force A (187th Airborne Battle Group) to Adana from Germany were scheduled to depart at 1606Z and to arrive at 1420Z. The last aircraft would depart at 1613Z and arrive at 1703Z. (TS) Msg, USAFE to JCS, TS 1359, 160442Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME, aboard the TACONIC 1000 yards off Red Beach near the Beirut airport, reported that the airfield had opened at 0600Z for normal operations and commercial traffic. The 3rd BLT, 6th Marines, had begun landing at 0530Z, with the mission of taking over defense of the airfield from the 2nd BLT, 2nd Marines. Brig Gen Wade had gone ashore at 0530Z and would represent Adm Holloway with the US Ambassador. (TS) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1810, 160644Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58 At the Direction of the State Department, the US Ambassador in Beirut called on the senior members of the UN Observer Group to urge that the Group continue its work and to offer US cooperation and support. With some bitterness the Group's Chairman charged that the US landing had undone their work, and he informed Ambassador McClintock that the Observer Group was ceasing all activities. McClintock argued against this and urged that the Group at least continue aerial observation from the Beirut airport. The UN representatives refused to give a definite answer at that time other than to state that there would be no liaison between the Observer Group and US forces. During the day the UN Observer Group issued a statement disclaiming any link or desire for a working relationship of any sort with the US forces in Lebanon. (6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 442, 17 Jul 58; (6) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 218, 15 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files. NTT, 17 Jul 58, 4:4.

16 Jul 58 On instructions from Secretary Dulles the US Ambassador in Amman reaffirmed to Prime Minister Rifai the previous US pledges to assist Jordan in preserving its independence and integrity. (TS) Msg, SecState to Amman, 100, 15 Jul 58. (TS) Msg, Amman to SecState, 122; 16 Jul 58.

16 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME informed CNO that at 1000Z there were sufficient Marines ashore in Lebanon to carry out sustained operations. There had been no hostile reaction to the landing, the civil population appeared friendly, and air reconnaissance had disclosed no military activity elsewhere in Lebanon. The 3rd BLT, 6th Marines, had completed landing and had taken over the airfield, releasing the 2d BLT, 2d Marines, which had begun moving north at 0655Z to enter the city of Beirut and secure the approaches and harbor area. (TS) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1824, 161004Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.
16 Jul 58

In Iraq, troops that had carried out the coup returned to their barracks, leaving only a few guards to protect foreign businesses and embassies in Baghdad. Brig Gen Nadim Rubaiya, new President of the Republic’s Council of State, arrived triumphantly from Jidda, where he had been Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Brig Gen Abdul Karim Kasem, leader of the movement that had proclaimed the Republic on 14 July, took the post of Premier. Baghdad radio officially confirmed the deaths of King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdullah, and Premier Nuri.


16 Jul 58

The Chief of the Iranian intelligence and security organization told a US representative that Turkey and Iran would be ready to use their forces to intervene in Iraq if the US would station troops in Jordan.

(8) Msg, Tehran to SecState, 138, 16 Jul 58,
DA IN 133515.

16 Jul 58

Ambassador McClintock talked with President Chamoun and Gen Chehab during the morning. Chehab repeated his objections to US deployment in Beirut, but finally agreed to consider a gradual movement into the city by small detachments. On word from Gen Wade, McClintock told Chehab, who expressed surprise, that Lebanese artillery and tanks had taken up positions along the road leading from the airport to the harbor area. He suggested that the General accompany him to make arrangements for the safe passage of the Marines.

The two proceeded in the Ambassador’s car toward the airport, where they found the US advance blocked by Lebanese tanks and recoilless rifles. Here, shortly after 0900Z, they met Adm Holloway, who had come to investigate the halt in the Marine advance. After some delay, the two Americans succeeded in persuading Chehab to accompany them in the car and lead the column past the tanks. Chehab also issued the necessary orders to his troops and arranged for a Lebanese officer-escort for the Marines.

The first group having passed the tanks, Chehab proceeded alone with it, while Holloway and McClintock returned to find the other groups still delayed by the Lebanese tanks. Ordering all of the remaining Marines to close up behind them, the Admiral and the Ambassador proceeded through the deployed tanks without incident toward the harbor area. This, commented Adm Holloway, "seemed to act as moral sustain of the first order."

Most of the Lebanese Army forces, including most of the senior staff officers, who were believed to be responsible for the delaying tactics, disappeared from the scene. Holloway and McClintock personally led the column to the harbor area, completing the movement by about 1300Z without further major incident.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 428, 161732Z Jul 58,
DA IN 133462, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3. (8S) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1821, 161156Z Jul 58; (8) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 2142, 162056Z Jul 58; both in JMEQ Lebanon Msg File.

- 2 -
16 Jul 58 After completing the deployment of the Marine battalion to the Beirut harbor area (see above item), Ambassador McClintock and Adm Holloway during the afternoon called on President Chamoun, who expressed thanks for the speedy and effective Marine landing and directed the Lebanese Army to cooperate with US forces and allow their free circulation in Beirut. Arrangements were made with Gen Chehab for Lebanese liaison officers to serve with the Marines. Having concluded, with Ambassador McClintock, that a landing at Tripoli was unnecessary, Adm Holloway determined to land the 1st BLT, 8th Marines, north of the Beirut harbor area to occupy additional objectives and consolidate further the US control of the city. Adm Holloway, however, reported his belief that it would be necessary eventually to occupy all of Lebanon.

During the conference with President Chamoun, Adm Holloway indicated that the US contemplated landing greater forces than were needed solely for the maintenance of Lebanese independence. Chamoun replied that he would welcome and assist a larger deployment of US forces, which he believed would maintain not only Lebanon's independence but also the integrity of other friendly countries in the Middle East.


16 Jul 58 At the UN, the Swedish delegate denounced the US action in Lebanon and declared that the US landing was not justified under Article 51 (covering "collective self-defense") of the UN Charter. Earlier in the day, the Soviet and UAR delegates also denied the applicability of Article 51 to the US action. Actually, US delegate Lodge had not stated that the US action had been taken under Article 51, although President Eisenhower, in his statement of 15 July, had said that the UN Charter recognized "the inherent right of self-defense," and the British and Lebanese delegates to the UN had stated that the US had acted under Article 51.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:13, 8:3; debate excerpts, 8:1-8.

16 Jul 58 The Soviet Union issued an official statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and calling on the UN to "take urgent and vigorous measures to curb aggression." The Soviet statement—delivered to the US Ambassador in Moscow and then made public—declared that the USSR could not "remain passive toward events creating a serious threat" in an area close to its frontier and that the Soviet Union reserved "the right to take the necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security." At the same time, the USSR formally recognized the new Iraqi Government, and Tass announced that Soviet land and air forces would hold maneuvers along the Iranian and Afghan borders.

(6) Msg, Moscow to SecState, 135, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133709 (17 Jul 58). NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:8; text, 7:2-5.
16 Jul 58

Communist China issued an official statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon. The US action, said the statement, was a violation of the UN Charter and an "extremely grave warlike adventure" aimed at suppressing Arab independence and creating world tensions. In another announcement, Communist China proclaimed its recognition of the new Government of Iraq.

_NYT_, 17 Jul 58, 4:5.

A British War Office official told the US Military Attaché in London that British Forces, Arabian Peninsula Command, had been alerted for action "anywhere in Persian Gulf Area at moments notice." British units would be employed in Jordan if King Hussein so requested.

(6) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, C 69, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133560.

16 Jul 58

President Eisenhower, at a conference with State and Defense Department officials, decided that an emergency airlift of petroleum products to the Government of Jordan should be implemented on an urgent basis, in response to Jordan's request of 15 July.

(6) Ltr, Actg Asst SecState for Econ Affairs to Dep Asst SecDef (S&I), 16 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

President Eisenhower requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report on what the US could do to strengthen the military position of Turkey and Iran. In addition to aid programs involving only indigenous forces, he was to consider special American-manned units if they could be employed to advantage.


16 Jul 58

Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy was sent to Lebanon by President Eisenhower, as the President's special political representative. He left Washington by air with instructions to do everything possible to "restore peace and order" in Lebanon and to assist President Chamoun to this end.

_NYT_, 17 Jul 58, 11:1.

16 Jul 58

At a North Atlantic Council private session on the Lebanese situation the US representative presented an official statement on the US intervention. General support of the US action and of forthcoming moves in the UN was expressed. During the discussion the British representative said that the UK was not participating in the intervention because its assistance might be required elsewhere in the Middle East.

(6) Msg, Paris to SecState, POLTO 217, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133806 (17 Jul 58).
16 Jul 58
Headquarters USAF directed MATS to add ten more C-124s
to those at Rhein Main Air Base in Germany as soon as
possible in order to bring the total number of C-124s
to thirty-six for use in operation BLUE BAT.
(6) Msg, Hq USAF to COMMATS and CINCUSAFE, APOOPTR-TF 53320, 16 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

16 Jul 58
At 1600Z the Austrian Foreign Minister informed the US
Ambassador in Vienna that large numbers of US aircraft,
other than those already cleared for passage, had flown
over Western Austria in military formation during the
day. The flights had attracted such public notice that
the Austrian Government found it necessary to issue
immediately a press release saying that strong represen-
tations had been made to the US Embassy calling the
overflights an intolerable violation of Austrian air
space. The press release stated that Austria was not
in a position to give permission for military overflight "to any state whatever." The Foreign Minister confided
that his government felt compelled to make such a
public declaration in order to preserve its status of
neutrality and maintain its ability to refuse possible
future requests for overflight from the USSR or its
satellites.
(6) Msg, Vienna to SecState, 168, 16 Jul 58,
DA IN 134178 (18 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58
Ambassador McClinton reported that the landing of US
Marines 24 hours previously had had a marked effect
on the Lebanese crisis. Opposition forces seemed
stunned and political maneuvers for the election of a
new President had been completely disrupted by the
event. The Speaker of the Parliament protested the US
action but was not nearly as violent as when he had
previously predicted to the Ambassador that he would
personally lead Lebanese armed resistance to a US
landing (see item of 18 June 58).
(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 430, 16 Jul 58,
DA IN 133756 (17 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58
In a communiqué issued at the close of a Baghdad Pact
meeting of the heads of state of Turkey, Iran, and
Pakistan—originally planned to include King Faisal
of Iraq—the participants praised the US action in
Lebanon and affirmed their intention of maintaining
the Baghdad Pact. The three heads of state also sent
a message to President Eisenhower, congratulating him
on his "bold and appropriate decision."
NYT, 17 Jul 58, 7:8, 11:1.

16 Jul 58
King Hussein at 1700Z formally requested US-UK military
intervention in Jordan. He based the request on the
critical situation facing Jordan as a result of the
Lebanese crisis, rebellion in Iraq, and on information
that a UAR-inspired coup was scheduled to take place
within 24 hours. Hussein pledged that Western forces
would not be called on to crush civil disorders
directly, but would be used only to repel external
aggression, back up the security forces, and prevent
outside subversive elements from taking over the country.
In London, after receiving Hussein's request, Prime Minister Macmillan held a three-hour Cabinet meeting late in the evening and made two telephone calls to President Eisenhower; his Government decided to fly British troops into Jordan.

DA IN 133649 (17 Jul 58), NYT, 18 Jul 58, 2:3, 4.

CINCSPECOMME, at 1801Z, issued a change to the BLUE BAT plan that removed all references to British participation in the operation.

Mag, Amman to SecState, 132, 16 Jul 58,

16 Jul 58

COMSIXTHFLT informed CNO of word received from the US Naval Attache in Paris that four French warships were due to arrive off Beirut early on 17 July. Their announced mission was to protect French nationals; they reportedly carried no troops.

Mag, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 1896, 161835Z Jul 58,

16 Jul 58

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd flew to Washington to discuss the Middle East situation. He was accompanied by Air Marshal Sir William Dickson of the British Chiefs of Staff.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:4.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told a State Department official there was a good chance that the US military intervention in Lebanon would help the Lebanese in solving their internal problems. However, if this action was all the US Government had in mind regarding the Middle East, it would be "one of greatest farces in history, comparable to Suez multiplied by one hundred." The US decision to withdraw its forces must be made in consideration of the entire Middle East situation; otherwise the events that had recently taken place in Baghdad would be duplicated in Beirut within a few months.

Mag, SecState to Beirut, 256, 16 Jul 58,

DA IN 133962 (17 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58

UAR President Nasser, in a statement released in Cairo but apparently sent from his yacht while returning from Yugoslavia, warned that any attack on the new Iraqi regime would be considered aggression against the UAR. Nasser also charged that the US landing in Lebanon was a threat to peace in the Middle East and, in view of the UN report that there had been no UAR interference in that country, a "farce."

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:2.

16 Jul 58

Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, having received the previous day a British request for permission to overfly Israeli enroute to Jordan in case intervention there was required, sought an expression of US views before presenting the question to his Cabinet.

Mag, Tel Aviv to SecState, 57, 16 Jul 58.
A Moscow radio broadcast warned the UK against committing the "final, fatal error" of intervening in the Middle East. The broadcast came amidst the "confident predictions of diplomats" that intervention in Jordan was imminent.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:4, 3:1.

The US Ambassador to Israel reported information that Nasser had ordered his agents in Jordan to start action designed to overthrow King Hussein on 16 or 17 July.

(42) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 47, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 13367.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to stage, if possible, a demonstration flight by carrier-based jets over refugee camps on the west bank of the Jordan River and over Amman and the northern border of Jordan for 75 miles at about 0600Z, 17 July. The object was to discourage any uprising by disaffected Jordanians and Palestinian Arabs, suspected because of reported arms concentrations just north of the Jordanian border. The Governments of Jordan and Israel had been notified about the demonstration, and CINCSPECOMME was instructed to notify the British.

(45) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 944916,
162321Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

CNO directed CINCPSECOM to maintain a special alert during the period 17-18 July. "Unusual events" requiring counteraction might arise from unpredictable Soviet and UAR moves, from Lebanese Army defection or opposition, or from the unsettled situation in Jordan and Iraq.

(4) Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME and CINCNEIM, 29515, 162351Z Jul 58, JMEP Lebanon Msg File.

An Israeli official warned the US Embassy twice that Nasser was planning an immediate coup involving the assassination of King Hussein and the overthrow of the Jordanian Government. The Israeli Government believed Nasser wanted the King out of the way at once to preclude any successful request by him for intervention by Western forces.

(6) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 54, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133685 (17 Jul 58).

CNO directed CINCPACFLT to send one reinforced battalion landing team in fast shipping to the Persian Gulf area. He advised that it might be necessary to increase this force to a regimental landing team on relatively short notice.

(45) Msg, CNO to CINCPACFLT, 29519, 170031Z Jul 58, JMEP Lebanon Msg File.

The Chief of Naval Operations directed COMSIXTHFLT to stand by to evacuate King Hussein from Amman with two planes and appropriate air cover.

17 Jul 58
At 0401Z, the Chief of Naval Operations directed COMSIXTHFLT to coordinate his air demonstration over Jordan with the British, since British forces might go into Jordan. In a further message sent 30 minutes later at British request, CNO directed COMSIXTHFLT to confine his air demonstration to the west bank of the Jordan River and to coordinate it with the British Commander in Chief, Middle East Air Force. If COMSIXTHFLT was unable to effect coordination, he was to cancel the demonstration. The British request had been passed by Adm Sir Michael Denny, BJSN, to Maj Gen V. B. Barnes, JMEPG, together with notice that British paratroops were scheduled to land at Amman by 0800Z.

errored Msg, CNO to COMSIXTHFLT, 170401Z Jul 58;
(ER) Msg, CNO to COMSIXTHFLT, 170431Z Jul 58. Both
in CCS 381 (6-23-57) sec 6. (ER) Memo for Record,
Maj Gen V. B. Barnes, Chmn JMEPG, "Minister of Defense

17 Jul 58
Adm Sir Michael Denny informed Gen Barnes at 0430Z that the aim of the British operation in Jordan was to support King Hussein and his Government and to protect Western lives and property in Amman. One parachute brigade group (less one battalion) would be moved to Amman to secure the airfields, and the Guard Brigade at Cyprus would be used to reinforce the parachute unit. The UK was also moving troops for reinforcement to Kuwait and in the Persian Gulf area generally, and British warships would stand by off Libya to embark the King there if necessary.

(ER) Memo for Record, Maj Gen V. B. Barnes,
Chmn JMEPG, "Conference with V/Adm Denny, RN," 17 Jul 58,
JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

17 Jul 58
The US and British Ambassadors in Baghdad submitted their joint conclusion as of 0500Z that Allied landings in Iraq, unless swiftly executed in overwhelming force, would very likely lead to indiscriminate killing and looting of Americans and Europeans by mobs whom the Army would be totally unable, even if willing, to control. Further, landings in Jordan would also entail the risk that this might happen.

(ER) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 181, 17 Jul 58,
DA IN 133964.

17 Jul 58
The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that he had seen the message the British Embassy was shortly to present to Hussein, according to the King's request for military intervention. British troops would be flown to Amman from Cyprus in sufficient strength to provide for the security of the airfield, the capital, and the person of the King. The British message stated that this action had "US moral support."

(ER) Msg, Amman to SecState, 139, 17 Jul 58.

17 Jul 58
COMSIXTHFLT launched jet aircraft from two carriers by 0700Z to stage the West Bank demonstration flight over Jordan. The carriers recovered their aircraft prior to 1000Z after a successful operation without incident.

(ER) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSEACOM, 2240,
170740Z Jul 58. (ER) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 2355,
171140Z Jul 58.
One transport carrying the advance party and commander of the British 16th Parachute Brigade arrived at Amman at 0700Z. It had been ordered down over Israel but had disregarded the Israeli instructions. Other aircraft in the first flight had turned back to Cyprus. At about 1000Z, seven British transports arrived at Amman, landing approximately 500 paratroops.

(2) Msg, USARMA Amman to DEPTAR, CX 53, 171321Z Jul 58, DA IN 13\42\37 (18 Jul 58), JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.


At 0900Z the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv presented the US answers to questions posed by Premier Ben Gurion the previous day regarding the British request for overflight rights should intervention in Jordan be required. The answers stated that the US supported the British request, that Jordan also desired Israel to permit the overflights, and that no other practical alternative route existed by which British forces might quickly come to King Hussein's aid.

(2) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 64, 18 Jul 58.

A senior member of the UN Observer Group informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that the Group had decided to resume its operations. There was still to be no official liaison with US forces, but there would be no objection to private contacts.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 442, 17 Jul 58, OGCJS files.

CINCSPECOMME informed the Chief of Naval Operations that he considered the designation of a US political advisor for his staff to be desirable.

(2) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 170911Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, the President's special emissary, arrived in Beirut.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 6:6.

The French Ambassador in Beirut informed the US Ambassador that he was under pressure from Adm Jozan to permit a landing of French forces from the naval units stationed in Lebanese waters. The French Ambassador had been stalling, he said, and McClintock strongly urged him to prevent any landing of French marines.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 447, 17 Jul 58, OGCJS files.

Armored cars still patrolled Baghdad, but otherwise the city seemed to have resumed its normal activities. Illustrated brochures were distributed showing UAR President Nasser and Iraqi Premier Kassem together, and crowds in the street shouted their approval of Nasser. Baghdad radio announced that the Iraqi Government had decided to restore normal diplomatic relations with the USSR immediately. (Iraqi-Soviet relations had been severed in 1955 by the government of King Faisal.)

17 Jul 58 A crowd of Russians gathered before the US Embassy in Moscow to protest against the US landing in Lebanon. The well-organized demonstration, staged by an estimated 2,000 people, lasted about five hours. The crowd was orderly and well-controlled.

NUT, 18 Jul 58, 1:4.

17 Jul 58 At approximately 1330Z the British Government received official notification of Israeli permission for over-flight. The notice was accompanied by an Israeli protest against the earlier British effort to overfly prior to receipt of permission.


17 Jul 58 Fifteen aircraft, comprising the second echelon of the British overflight of Israel, began arriving at Amman at 1530Z. They set down approximately 600 paratroopers, bringing the total of British forces in the airport area to about 1100.

(2) Mag, USAIRA Amman to DEPTAR, CX 54, 171922Z Jul 58, DA IN 134088, JMEFG Lebanon Mag File.

17 Jul 58 Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons that the British intervention in Jordan had occurred at the request of King Hussein and had deterred a potential coup d'etat. The British forces were not dispatched to suppress the revolt in Iraq; their mission was to prevent the spread of revolution from Iraq to Jordan by conspiracy and aggression. Despite strong opposition from the Labour Party, the Macmillan Government received a comfortable majority when the House voted on the issue.

NUT, 18 Jul 58, 1:8.

17 Jul 58 In a note delivered to the State Department, the French Government complained of the absence of US-UK consultation with France on matters relating to the Middle East crisis. France had interests in the Middle East, had supported US-UK intervention there, and had received the impression that tripartite consultations with the French were desired by the US and UK. Even though France permitted use of her bases and overflights of her territory, which might implicate her in an unfavorable aftermath of the crisis, she was not enjoying consultation rights with the US and UK.

(20) Mag, SecState to Paris, 284, 18 Jul 58, DA IN 135061 (19 Jul; 58).

17 Jul 58 The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in a report to the Security Council, asked for additional men and aircraft so that it could maintain a direct and constant patrol of the 179-mile border between Lebanon and Syria.

NUT, 18 Jul 58, 1:5, text, 6:3-8.

17 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed USCINCEUR that the Greek Government, because of its concern for Greek nationals in Egypt and elsewhere, had refused to allow further landings in Greece of US aircraft. Greece would permit overflights, as high as possible, and
would assist with navigational aids, but requested that this be given no publicity. Routine flights, not connected with operations in Lebanon, might be approved at a later date.


17 Jul 58

The Turkish Foreign Minister informed the US Ambassador in Ankara that King Hussein had requested Turkish intervention in both Syria and Iraq, and that Turkey, though not concerned with Syria, was ready and wished to move into Iraq. While not wanting to push the US into an "adventure," Turkey urgently requested effective US backing in the form of moral and material support. The Foreign Minister argued that Iraq would be lost to the West unless immediate steps were taken, that the entry of the USSR into Iraq must be forestalled, that whichever side entered first was unlikely to be dislodged by the other, and that the USSR, if it wished, could already consider Turkey an aggressor because of the facilities recently made available to the US at Adana.

A few hours later the Ambassador submitted to Washington his opinion that while the Turkish political leaders might desire to intervene in Iraq, it was probable that the Turkish General Staff, when ordered to do so, would "raise so many conditions that effect will be non-compliance."

17 Jul 58

The UN Security Council held two sessions on the Middle East crisis. At the first meeting, in the afternoon, the Council agreed to add to its agenda a complaint by Jordan, submitted that morning, that the UAR was interfering in Jordan's internal affairs. Jordan announced that it had asked the UK and US for assistance against UAR-inspired "subversive elements" and that the UK had responded in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UK delegate then promised the withdrawal of British troops as soon as the UN was able to ensure Jordanian independence and integrity. There followed a long and bitter speech by the Soviet delegate, who concentrated his attack on the US. Ambassador Lodge announced US support of the British action in Jordan and charged that a plan existed, "master-minded from one source," to take over the Middle East. He urged adoption of the US resolution of 15 July calling for the establishment of an international military force for Lebanon. The Soviet delegate asked the Security Council to request the immediate withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon and Jordan, or else, he said, he would call for a special session of the General Assembly.

As the second Council session opened, in the evening, Sweden introduced a resolution calling for a suspension of the activities of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon, since, it charged, the US action had
Substantially altered the situation there. The Soviet delegate announced that he would support this resolution.


**17 Jul 58**

CINSPECOMME informed the JCS that he had ordered:
1. The 1st BTL, 8th Marines, to land across the beach northeast of Beirut at 180700Z;
2. Army Force A to make an administrative landing at Beirut airport beginning at 190400Z, and to be bivouacked near the airport, available for employment as needed; and
3. Army Force B to remain on 24-hour alert in Germany.

CINSPECOMME was consolidating his forces in the Beirut area and would develop this area as a base from which to conduct such other operations as might be required.

_{46} Mag, CINSPECOMME to JCS, 2776, 171916Z

Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

**17 Jul 58**

UAR President Nasser, following a secret flight to Moscow, conferred with Premier Khrushchev. He reportedly urged the Soviet leader not to take any action in the Middle East that would threaten world peace. Nasser was said to be gravely concerned over the possibility that US and British landings in the Middle East would precipitate Soviet intervention in that area. He reportedly advised Khrushchev, however, that Soviet help would be expected if Western troops attacked Syria.

_NYT, 19 Jul 58, 1:8.

**17 Jul 58**

The US Ambassador in Cairo informed the UAR Foreign Ministry that any attack on US forces by troops of the UAR, or under UAR control, would lead to "grave consequences."

_NYT, 19 Jul 58, 1:7; text of a State Dept announcement, 3:2-3.

**17 Jul 58**

CINSPECOMME discussed the US military build-up in Lebanon with Presidential representative Murphy and US Ambassador McClintock. Neither diplomat was able to provide guidance concerning the ultimate direction of the US intervention. Adm. Holloway, accordingly, was playing the operation "a good deal by ear," in his own words. The next US move, he believed, should be to inspire Gen. Chehab to use the Lebanese Army aggressively against the rebels.

_{46} Mag, COMSPECOMME [sic] to CNO, 2979, 181821Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

**17 Jul 58**

The Secretary of State instructed the US Ambassador in Jordan to inform King Hussein that the US response to his request for military intervention was taking the form of strong support of the British operation, as evidenced by the morning's demonstration flight by US aircraft and the statements made by Ambassador Lodge at the UN during the day. The US would continue to keep the situation under close observation to determine whether further measures were necessary.

_{46} Mag, SecState to Amman, 132, 17 Jul 58.
During discussions in Washington with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary Dulles confirmed the US willingness to provide logistic support to the British forces in Jordan if necessary. Lloyd strongly urged the US to consider placing at least a token force in Jordan as a means of demonstrating US-UK solidarity. Secretary Dulles replied that no such move was currently contemplated but that the US would study the possibility should the British encounter unexpected difficulties in Jordan. The conferees agreed to concert their efforts to determine the best means of holding Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and Dhahran for the West. The British Government had not yet decided whether military intervention in Kuwait was desirable, in view of the adverse political developments that might result.


The Secretary of State informed the US Ambassador in Vienna that the US Air Force was seriously handicapped by being unable to overfly Austria. He therefore requested that efforts be made to obtain permission for a maximum number of overflights with minimum advance notification.

(36) Msg, SecState to Vienna, 158, 17 Jul 58, DA IN 134512 (18 Jul 58), JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.

The Saudi Arabian Prime Minister, having received the US Ambassador's explanation of the US action in Lebanon, stated that Saudi Arabia's policy during the current Middle East crisis would be one of complete neutrality and non-interference.

(37) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 71, 17 Jul 58, DA IN 134516 (18 Jul 58).

Noting that the previous plans for US contributions to the Arab Union budget were no longer valid, the State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Amman to resume direct budgetary support to Jordan. The Ambassador was authorized to release up to $7.5 million in FY 58 funds for budgetary support in the second quarter of Jordan's current fiscal year.

(38) Msg, SecState to Amman, 119 (?), 17 Jul 58, DA IN 135480 (20 Jul 58).

According to the New York Times, the White House talks between President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and British Foreign Secretary Lloyd had resulted in an agreement to limit the intervention in the Middle East to Lebanon and Jordan. So long as the new Iraqi Government respected Western oil interests, there would be no intervention in Iraq. Reportedly, officials felt that the current Anglo-American actions would suffice to restore Western prestige in the Middle East and to stabilize Saudi Arabia and the other friendly oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. The State Department announced that, while US aircraft had supported the British landing, there was no plan at present to send US troops to Jordan. State Department officials
confirmed that King Hussein's appeal had gone to the US as well as to the UK, but said that, in view of the UK's long experience in Jordan, it had been deemed wise to leave the operation to the British.

NIV, 18 Jul 58, 1:6-7.

The Chief of Naval Operations requested CINCSPECOM's advice on how to make the earliest possible delivery of 1500 drums of diesel oil and gasoline to Amman to relieve the critical POL situation in Jordan. This was to be a stopgap measure, pending arrival of a tanker at Aqaba about 22 July and replacing a projected USAF operation from Bahrain that had been blocked by political considerations.

(67) Mag, CNO to CINCSPECOM, 180727Z Jul 58,
CNS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

The French cruiser DE GRASSE in company with three French destroyers entered Beirut harbor. The four vessels departed Beirut at 0500Z the next morning.

(67) Mag, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSPECOM, 2819,
180940Z Jul 58. (6) Mag, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSPECOM,
3250, 190850Z Jul 58.

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that both Hussein and Rifai were intensely disappointed when informed that the US would not send troops to Jordan. The panic that had precipitated Hussein's call for foreign troops had itself caused a serious loss of prestige for the Jordanian Government, but the fact that the UK alone had answered the call posed a special problem for the regime. The presence of British troops was resented by the public as indicating a return of British control over Jordan. Hence the Jordanian leaders felt that US forces were necessary to offset the purely British character of the foreign contingent. In reporting to Washington, however, the Ambassador counseled against sending US troops, inasmuch as no justification had been offered other than on psychological grounds. He recommended that the US concentrate on measures of a humanitarian nature to assist the Jordanian population, such as POL airlift, providing free food and other supplies, and financial and economic aid.

(67) Mag, Amman to SecState., 169, 18 Jul 58.

The first units of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines (Minus), airlifted from the United States via Port Iqayet, began arriving at Beirut at 1000Z. Final landings occurred on 20 July. The battalion was assigned to reserve and shore party augmentation duties.

(67) Mag, CINCSPECOM to CNO, 3808/3833, 192226Z
Jul 58. (6) Mag, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOM, 4270,
201132 Jul 58, JMEF Lebanon Msg File.

The USAIRA in Athens advised US military headquarters concerned that the Greek Air Force was willing to ignore any occasional deviations from conditions laid down by the Greek Government regarding landings by US aircraft, providing there were no undesirable publicity
or other complications. Similarly, empty cargo aircraft returning westward would be permitted to land at Athens as long as they attracted no attention.

(S) Msg, USAIRA Athens to USAFE ADVON, 181045Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

18 Jul 58

The Government of Turkey informed the US Embassy in Ankara that it would permit the US to stockpile ammunition and moderate quantities of other military equipment such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft at Adana Military Airfield under the Military Facilities Agreement.

(GS) Msg, USCINCEUR to DEPTAR, EC 9-3824, 221624Z Jul 58, DA IN 136384, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

18 Jul 58

UAR President Nasser, in a speech in Damascus, denounced Western actions in the Middle East, supported the new regime in Iraq, and said that the Arabs would fight to defend Arab nationalism. "We shall not be terrorized," he declared, "by threats of fleets or atomic bombs."

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 2:3; excerpts, 2:4-5.

18 Jul 58

Egyptian-UAR officials expressed alarm over Secretary Dulles' message to Nasser of 17 July, which stated that the US had intervened at Lebanon's request for no purpose other than to preserve Lebanon's independence and protect US nationals, that the US hoped US-UAR relations would not be unduly strained, but that if US forces were attacked by UAR forces or by elements under UAR control or direction "there would be grave danger that the scope of the problem would expand and the state of our relations be seriously impaired."

A UAR Foreign Office official to whom this message was first conveyed thought Nasser would surely interpret it as an ultimatum. Ali Sabri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, also anticipated a violent reaction to the message by Nasser, who was expected to arrive in Egypt on 19 July. Sabri argued that a single instance in which the US concluded that some attacking force was connected with the UAR would put the fate of the UAR in the hands of the American Government or even possibly some local US commander. The US Ambassador in Cairo endeavored to assure Sabri that the US was not looking for a pretext to cause trouble but for a means to avoid it.

(S) Msg, SecState to Cairo, 148, 17 Jul 58. (G) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 169, 18 Jul 58. (S) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 176, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58

USCINCEUR requested the JCS to authorize expansion of the number of C-124s for use in BLUE BAT from the 36 on hand to the 54 called for by CINCSCOMME OPLAN 215-58. He supported this request by citing the current anticipated imposition of airlift requirements beyond those of the original plan and the limitations placed on landing and refueling in Greece.

18 Jul 58 Tens of thousands of Russians surrounded the US Embassy in Moscow, shouting, whistling, and throwing stones, bricks, ink bottles, and other missiles at the building. Soviet policemen and soldiers stood by and watched the crowd break two-thirds of the windows on the first floor of the Embassy before, after more than an hour, forcing the crowd back from the building. Earlier in the day several delegations of Russians had presented petitions to the Embassy, calling for the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon.

NIT, 19 Jul 58, 1:6-7.

18 Jul 58 East German mobs attacked the US and British military missions in Potsdam. An estimated 1,000 demonstrators tore down flags and damaged the building while shouting slogans against the US and British actions in the Middle East. The two missions received no protection from Soviet or East German authorities.

NYP, 19 Jul 58, 3:1.
18 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that the Government of the Iraqi Republic had given formal notice of its withdrawal from the Arab Union and that it repudiated all financial, military, and other obligations devolving upon Iraq from that union.

(U) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, unnumbered, 18 Jul 58, DA IN 721198 (19 Jul 58), JMKG Lebanon Mag File.

18 Jul 58 In response to a request for permission to fly US aircraft over Israel to deliver petroleum products to Jordan, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion replied that if the flights were absolutely necessary, the US should "do it but don't ask us." Ben Gurion added, however, that Israel would have to make a gesture of protest against any such overflight and that a supply line to Jordan not involving use of Israeli's airspace must be established without delay. He wished the US to realize the extent to which the overflight question was exposing Israel to the danger of Soviet-UAR retaliation.

(47) Msg, SeeState to Tel Aviv, 42, 18 Jul 58.
(20) Msg, Tel Aviv to SeeState, 72, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58 Baghdad Radio Announced that the new Iraqi regime would "respect its obligations" toward foreign oil interests. In Beirut, an IPC spokesman said a normal flow of oil was still being pumped through to the Tripoli refinery.

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 5:1.

18 Jul 58 Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Lloyd, confering in Washington on the Middle East crisis, agreed that Turkey's proposal to send Turkish troops into Iraq was unwise. They foresaw that such a move would not win the approval of world opinion, in view of the absence of internal resistance to the new Iraqi regime. It would probably solidify the Iraqi people behind their new government and might provoke a dangerous Soviet reaction.


18 Jul 58 The UN Security Council failed to agree on action to be taken concerning the Middle East Crisis. The USSR vetoed the US proposal to dispatch a UN force to Lebanon, and the Council also voted down both a Soviet resolution calling for the withdrawal of US and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan and a Swedish proposal that the operations of the UN Observer Group be suspended. Late in the day, US Ambassador Lodge introduced a resolution calling an emergency session of the General Assembly, but withheld the move from a vote pending a compromise resolution that the Japanese delegation had earlier indicated it planned to introduce. A few hours after the Council had adjourned until 21 July, the Soviet Union circulated the draft of a resolution calling an emergency session of the General Assembly. This differed in context from the US resolution in that it blamed the Middle East crisis on the Western intervention and charged that the US and British actions constituted a serious threat to peace and security.

18 Jul 58  CINCSPECOMME informed the Chief of Naval Operations that gasoline was available in drums and diesel oil in 5-gallon tins at Beirut. He intended to begin the POL airlift to Jordan on 19 July, using C-124 aircraft as they completed lifting Army Force A from Adana to Beirut.

Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3050, 1821512 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

18 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Vienna was informed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given assurance there would be no further US overflights of Austria without adequate clearance. The standing arrangement permitted flights by 30 planes a day over Austria under a 48-hour clearance procedure. If the Ambassador thought it desirable, these flights could be limited to night operations and could occur at levels up to 20,000 feet to attract less notice. Should cessation of all overflights be required, planes flying from Germany to the Middle East would be forced to take a 300-mile detour.

Mag, SecState to Vienna, 172, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58  Secretary Dulles informed the Turkish Government that the US saw grave implications in Turkey's proposal to intervene in Iraq (see item of 17 July 58) and felt unable to give encouragement to the action without further information regarding Turkey's plans, capabilities, and estimate of the situation. Besides raising the question of the military feasibility of the scheme, considering the difficult terrain of the Iraqi-Turkish border region, Secretary Dulles stressed particularly the absence of any organized group within Iraq opposing the new regime that would welcome the Turkish invaders.

Mag, SecState to Ankara, Cir 72, 18 Jul 58.

19 Jul 58  The UAR and the new Iraqi Government concluded an agreement embracing mutual defense and cooperation in the economic, military, and international fields.

NYP, 20 Jul 58, 1:6-7; text, 14:1-2.

19 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Moscow offered his opinion that the USSR would react with force to any Turkish intervention in Iraq and might even attack Turkey directly.

Mag, Moscow to SecState, 157, 19 Jul 58.

19 Jul 58  The US Air Force Attache in Vienna reported that the Austrian Minister of Defense had announced that airspace over the part of Austria lying between West Germany and Italy was closed to all aerial traffic above 5,000 meters altitude and was closed to all but commercial aircraft below this altitude, effective 19 July.

Mag, USAIR in Vienna to USAFE, U-433, 190930Z Jul 58, AF IN 23393, JMEFG Lebanon Mag File.

19 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Athens reported that the Prime Minister of Greece had agreed to modify his Government's earlier position on landing rights for US aircraft engaged in BLUE BAT. The Air Attache in Athens furnished instructions to interested US commands for complying with the new conditions. Publicity was to be avoided and crews warned to be silent about BLUE BAT; when possible,
night operations would be scheduled and flights spaced to prevent mass arrivals at any one base, with clearance requests submitted 24 hours in advance; destination of eastward flights was to be Turkey only. These conditions applied to all aircraft connected with BLUE BAT.

19 Jul 58 Jordan's King Hussein told a news conference that he had requested that US troops be sent to Jordan, and, he said, "we expect them." NYT, 20 Jul 58, 1:5.

19 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Jordan was instructed to inform King Hussein and Premier Rifai that the US could not comply with their request for political, economic, and military assistance to enable Jordan, in the name of the Arab Union Government, to put down the insurrection in Iraq. The US and UK had come to the aid of Jordan in response to a call for help to preserve Jordan's independence and integrity; the proposed undertaking went beyond the original purpose of the operation.

19 Jul 58 The Foreign Minister of Iraq informed the US Embassy that one aircraft on each Monday and one on each Wednesday could be used to evacuate American nationals from Iraq.

19 Jul 58 Army Force A (187th Airborne Battle Group) began arriving at Beirut from Adana by air at 0400Z, completing the operation at 2230Z. It numbered approximately 1720 personnel. Force B (503rd Airborne Battle Group) remained in Germany on 24-hour alert. Force C (combat and service support units), already partly transported to Adana, would begin airlift to Beirut when the Force A movement was completed. Force D (service support) was scheduled to move by sea from French and German ports.

19 Jul 58 CINCUSAPE indicated that without further augmentation of his airlift capability it would require approximately 8 days to complete the movement of Force C to Lebanon. On 22 July CINCUSAPE advised that this schedule was acceptable to him.

19 Jul 58 Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, in a letter to President Eisenhower, proposed a conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the US, Britain,
France, and India, with the UN Secretary General participating, to prevent the war that he said was made imminent by the "aggressive act" of the US and Britain in sending troops into Lebanon and Jordan. He proposed to meet at Geneva on 22 July, but stated that the USSR was agreeable to any other place, including Washington, and to another date, though he stressed the need for speedy action. He informed the President that he was simultaneously approaching the other heads of government referred to above.


19 Jul 58 CONSEVENTHFLT issued orders organizing a task group with the mission of deploying the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, from the Western Pacific to the Persian Gulf to conduct operations as directed in support of US interests.

(6) Mag, CONSEVENTHFLT to CTP 76 and CTP 79, 3562, 191652Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

19 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Vienna concluded that in view of the unfavorable publicity being given the matter, any further overflight of Austria would seriously weaken the US moral and propaganda position. Hence he recommended that all overflights cease. If some future emergency made them necessary, Austrian authorization should not be requested and maximum concealment should be practiced. The State Department and Headquarters USAF concurred in these recommendations.


19 Jul 58 In the evening the Japanese UN delegation circulated a draft resolution to other members of the Security Council. Designed as a compromise measure, the resolution called for the UN Observer Group in Lebanon to continue its activities and requested the Secretary General to take measures forthwith to assist the Group in establishing conditions that would make possible the withdrawal of US troops. This was generally taken to imply an enlargement of the Observer Group.

NYT, 20 Jul 58, 1:5 (includes text).

19 Jul 58 CONSIXTHFLT reported that in operations over Lebanon, 16-19 July, 16 aircraft of his command had received damage from ground fire.

(6) Mag, CONSIXTHFLT to CINCSPCOMME, 3892, 200725Z Jul 58.

20 Jul 58 Jordan announced the severing of diplomatic relations with the UAR because of Cairo's recognition of the new Iraqi Government.

NYT, 21 Jul 58, 1:5.

20 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Jidda transmitted Saudi Arabia's refusal of the US request of 17 July for overflight rights as well as for use of the Dhahran airport in order to fly petroleum from Bahrain to Amman, Jordan.

(6) Mag, Jidda to SecState, 87, 20 Jul 58.
20 Jul 58  The State Department instructed the US Embassy in Tel Aviv to express to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion the very deep concern of the US regarding his protest against further British overflights of Israel. The US understood his anxiety and had told the British of Ben Gurion's desire that the UK transport its supplies through channels other than Israel's airspace as soon as possible. The US and UK were hastening to establish such an alternate route. However, loss of Israeli over-flight rights at that time would jeopardize the effectiveness of the British forces guarding the political stability of Jordan, which was a matter of profound importance to Israel.

{6} Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 52, 20 Jul 58, DA IN 135774, (21 Jul 58).

20 Jul 58  During the meetings of Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Lloyd on 19-20 July, it was decided to hold the Baghdad Pact Meeting in London beginning 28 July, as scheduled. Secretary Dulles planned to attend the first day's session.

{45} Msg, SecState to London, 777, 21 Jul 58.

20 Jul 58  The Chief of Naval Operations notified CINCSECOMME that he was authorized to airlift, within his capability, critical POL products requested by the US Embassy in Amman.

{5} Msg, CNO to CINCSECOMME, 202203Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

21 Jul 58  The situation in Amman was calm, and no incidents involving British troops were reported. Meanwhile, the Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad radios urged the people of Jordan to assassinate King Hussein and overthrow his Government.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 15:1, 2, 5.

21 Jul 58  The first aircraft evacuating Americans from Iraq departed Baghdad for Rome at 0820Z, bearing 90 passengers.

{45} Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DEPTAR, CX 47, 211330Z Jul 58, DA IN 135934.

21 Jul 58  In a note handed to the US Ambassador in Moscow, the USSR condemned flights of US military aircraft over Austria as a violation of international law and of the Austrian treaty signed by the US, UK, USSR, and France. The Soviet note called on the US to halt these flights immediately.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 1:7.

21 Jul 58  In a letter to President Eisenhower, President Chamoun of Lebanon expressed his "profound gratitude" for US assistance.

NYT, 28 Jul 58, 5:3-4 (text).

21 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Beirut was informed by the head of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon that he had received authorization to establish liaison with US forces through the US Ambassador.

{6} Msg, Beirut to SecState, 567, 21 Jul 58, DA IN 136043, (22 Jul 58).
21 Jul 58  The Chief of the Turkish General Staff presented the US Army Attache in Ankara with the Turkish plan for an invasion of Syria and Iraq, which was dependent on the US providing air cover and technical material assistance. The plan called for the simultaneous occupation of certain areas in northern Syria and Iraq by two Turkish army corps and an armored brigade. The objective was to hold sufficient territory in northern Syria and Iraq to secure Turkey's southern border and protect over half a million ethnic Turks living within the area, including many in northern Iraq who had declared they disliked the new Iraqi regime.

(20) Msg, USARMA Ankara to DEPTAR, AAC 125, 211340Z Jul 58, DA IN 135768.

21 Jul 58  CINCSPECOMME requested that, in view of the size and complexity of the Lebanese operation, a major general or lieutenant general of the Army or Marine Corps be assigned immediately as COMMLANTFOR. This senior ground force officer's headquarters would comprise an echelon, with highly important duties, between CINCSPECOMME and the two brigadier generals who commanded the Army and Marine forces, respectively.

(20) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 4119, 211341Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 3.

21 Jul 58  In consultation with Secretary Dulles, Israeli Ambassador Eban expressed his country's approval of the US action in Lebanon and urged that US and British troops not be withdrawn from the Middle East prematurely. Noting that Israel expected soon to receive a stern protest from the USSR regarding the permission given for US-UK overflights and that Israel's identification with the US-UK intervention would deepen her security problem once the Western forces had withdrawn, Eban suggested that the US and UK should acknowledge a special obligation to aid and protect Israel. Secretary Dulles replied that the US action in Lebanon should give confidence that an Israeli appeal would receive a similar response, and he promised a fresh review of Israeli arms requests.

(20) Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 61, 21 Jul 58.

21 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Rome reported that the Italian Government desired for political reasons to assume that the destination of US aircraft refueling in Italy was Adana and requested the US to avoid any public indication to the contrary.

(20) Msg, Rome to SecState, 240, 21 Jul 58, DA IN 136301 (22 Jul 58), JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.

21 Jul 58  At the UN, the Soviet representative strongly attacked the Japanese compromise resolution on the Lebanon question (see item of 19 July 58) because it failed to call for the immediate withdrawal of US troops. Just as the Security Council was about to vote on the Japanese motion, the Lebanese representative requested a postponement on the grounds that his government needed more time to study the resolution. After an acrimonious exchange between the Soviet and US representatives, the vote was postponed until 22 July.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 178; debate excerpts, 8:1-8.
The US Ambassador in Amman reported that Premier Rifai, upon being informed that the US would not assist Jordan in putting down the Iraqi revolt, maintained that there must have been some misunderstanding inasmuch as Jordan had no intention of intervening militarily in Iraq. Despite this complete reversal of the Jordanian position, Rifai again stressed at length the purely domestic and psychological reasons for wanting US troops in Jordan, namely that they were needed for internal security and to offset reaction to UK troops whose presence was interpreted as a step toward re-imposition of British control. To Washington the Ambassador repeated his recommendation that the US forego sending troops but continue to supply commodities and provide financial and economic assistance.

In the evening the US and British Ambassadors were again summoned to the palace, where King Hussein formally requested them to forward a new request for US troops and additional British forces to their Governments. In doing so, the US Ambassador noted evidence that some plan for intervention in Iraq by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan was in the making, in which Jordan might join. Pointing out that, once stationed in Jordan, US forces would have no choice but to perform expanded security duties if Hussein suddenly ordered the Jordanian Army into Iraq, he underscored his recommendation against sending US troops.

(5) Msg, Amman to SecState, 211, 21 Jul 58. (3)
Msg, Amman to SecState, 214, 22 Jul 58.

Undersecretary of State Murphy was instructed to inform Lebanese officials that the US would assist Lebanon in economic rehabilitation once the present crisis was over.

(5) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 334, 21 Jul 58.

The British War Office told the US Ambassador in London that there were between 1700 and 1800 British troops in Jordan.


CINGSPECOMME reported that Undersecretary Murphy's efforts in Lebanon were being widely acclaimed. The fact that Murphy had given equal attention to arranging conversations with opposition and Government leaders had been extolled in the press, and one leftist opposition paper had stated “the crisis is on the way to solution.” Meanwhile US aircraft had encouraged the favorable turn of opinion by dropping a million leaflets over Lebanon.

(6) Msg, CINGSPECOMME to CNO, 4895, 222116Z Jul 58, CCF 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

The UN Secretariat received a protest from the UN Observer Group in Lebanon against low-flying US aircraft that were having a disquieting effect on the Lebanese population and hence making the work of the Observer Group more difficult. The Group was also concerned to note that US flights along the border were drawing Syrian antiaircraft fire, since UN patrol craft might also be fired upon as a result. In forwarding this report to Washington, Ambassador Lodge recommended that both types of operation be stopped if possible.

(3) Msg, New York to SecState, 114, 22 Jul 58.
Replying to Khrushchev's letter of 19 July, President Eisenhower pointed out that the UN Security Council had been created for the purpose of determining whether any threat to peace existed, and, if one did, what measures should be taken. Therefore, if Khrushchev seriously believed there was a threat to peace, he should take it up with the Security Council. Heads of government, the President further pointed out, could represent their countries in the Security Council. If they were to meet, he said, they should make use of the existing machinery and orderly procedure of that body, rather than improvised procedures bypassing it and thus derogating from UN authority and prestige, as proposed by Khrushchev. The US would join in a Security Council meeting of heads of government if such a meeting were generally desired.


By patient discussion Ambassador McCloy persuaded President Chamoun to send immediate instructions to Lebanese delegate Malik at the UN reversing his stand against the Japanese resolution. Malik was directed to acquiesce in the Japanese resolution if it provided that US forces would not be withdrawn from Lebanon until the UN measures were considered adequate, with the determination of adequacy being reserved to the US and Lebanese Governments.

(8) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 588, 22 Jul 58, DA IN 136295.

CINCSPECOMME requested CINCUSAEUR to ship all of Force E (tank battalion) to Lebanon as soon as possible.

(8) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAEUR, 2216012 Jul 58, DA IN 136271.

At the UN, the Soviet Union vetoed the Japanese resolution on the Lebanese crisis after the Security Council had rejected Soviet amendments calling for the immediate withdrawal of US forces. The vote on the Japanese resolution was 10-1. After the voting, Secretary General Hammarskjold announced that he intended to strengthen the UN Observer Group, despite the failure of the Security Council to agree on any action in Lebanon. The Council then adjourned indefinitely.

NYT, 23 Jul 58, 1:4; debate excerpts, 4:1-8.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted an estimate by JMEPO of the US forces that might be required in Lebanon if UNR coaxer assistance to the Lebanese opposition continued and long-term military support of the Lebanese Government was required. The estimate of Army and Marine land forces was two divisions (or equivalent) and one armored cavalry regiment, with supporting elements, totaling approximately 50,000 personnel. If the UN intensified its covert intervention, up to three divisions might be required. The study pointed out that military operations in Lebanon of the magnitude indicated in the estimate would reduce US logistical readiness for general war and cause significant deficienies in US ground force availability until a partial mobilization of industry and personnel became effective.
With State Department and OSD concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff canceled a study concerned with contingency planning for evacuation of American citizens from Iran, which had been directed following interdepartmental consultations on 18 July.

By this date, in response to President Eisenhower's request on 16 July, a flash study on what the US could do to strengthen the military position of Turkey and Iran had been prepared and used by the Chairman, JCS, in discussions with the President. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had arranged for expedited delivery of various items of ground force materiel to Turkey and Iran, and for certain naval items to Iran. His office was in the process of determining what other items should be similarly expedited.

The State Department announced that the US had expressed its regrets to Austria for flights made over that country without Austrian permission. A Department spokesman emphasized that the aircraft had been unarmed transports and stated that all unauthorized overflights of Austrian territory had ceased.

The Chief of Naval Operations directed CINCSPECOMME to continue airlifting critical POL products to Amman until surface support became effective or until the US Embassy in Amman advised that the airlift was no longer required.

Adm Sir Michael Denny, BJSN, Washington, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that UK authorities had concluded that the sending of further British forces to Jordan would make no contribution to political stability there,
but that the arrival of a small US force would have an effect out of all proportion to its size. Accordingly, approaches were being made through the State Department to request the sending of a contingent of US troops, "however small," into Jordan.  

23 Jul 58  
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported the salient details of the financial crisis confronting Lebanon as outlined by the acting Minister of Finance. Since the crisis was expected to be acute for the following three months, the Minister of Finance requested that the US give immediate consideration to providing budgetary support for Lebanon.  
(45) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 635, 23 Jul 58.

23 Jul 58  
President Eisenhower received a letter from Prime Minister Macmillan that urged US military participation in Jordan in company with the British and requested a US airlift from Cyprus to Amman to provide partial logistic support to the British forces.  
(47) Memo, Dir NE S.Asia and Afr Reg OSD (ISA) to Asst SeDef (ISA), "Logistic Airlift in Support of UK Forces in Jordan," 23 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

23 Jul 58  
Advising CINCSPECOMME that higher US authorities had reservations regarding the number of US troops to be stationed in Lebanon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him to clear with them before moving Army Force B from Germany, except in emergency.  
(46) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 945311, 23 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

23 Jul 58  
Premier Khrushchev replied to President Eisenhower's letter of 22 July. Agreeing to a meeting of heads of government within the framework of the Security Council, Khrushchev stated that Premier Nehru of India should participate in this special session of the Security Council, and also representatives of the "interested Arab states." Again stressing the need for speed, he proposed that the meeting begin in New York on 28 July.  

23 Jul 58  
The Soviet newspaper Izvestia opposed a heads-of-government meeting in the Security Council because, it said, that US would have a "mechanical majority" in the Council. Moreover, asked Izvestia, did the US "seriously imagine that anyone could agree to discuss important problems with Chiang Kai-shek?"  
NYT, 23 Jul 58, p.17.

23 Jul 58  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CINCSPECOMME's recommendation that a senior officer be appointed to the joint ground force command in Lebanon (see item of 21 July). Maj Gen Paul D. Adams, USA, was designated to serve as COMAMLANFOR. CINCSPECOMME retained over-all command and responsibility for major military and policy decisions; COMAMLANFOR, with a joint staff of Army and Marine personnel, was charged with all joint and combined
aspects of land force operations and support planning in the Middle East area and with assisting CINCSPECOMME in maintaining liaison with Gen Chéhab and other commanders. The Department of the Army directed USAREUR to assist Gen Adams by supplying personnel, equipment, and units, including a signal detachment, as required. (c) Memo, DA to USCINCUEUR and CINCUSAREUR, DA 945322, 23 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

23 Jul 58 Speaker Osseiran of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies issued a call for Parliament to meet on 31 July to elect a successor to President Chamoun.

NYT, 24 Jul 58, 1:8.

24 Jul 58 In a note delivered to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Union accused Turkey of planning to attack Iraq and strongly warned against such action. A spokesman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied the Soviet charge.

NYT, 26 Jul 58, 4:5.

24 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Department of State to consider, as a matter of priority, the assignment of a political advisor to the staff of CINCSPECOMME, in view of the complex and changing political situation in the Middle East and the international ramifications of the operations CINCSPECOMME was then directing in that area (see item of 17 July).

(c) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "The Assignment of a Political Advisor to CINCSPECOMME's Staff (U)," 24 Jul 58, derived from (c) JCS 1887/480, 22 Jul 58. Both in CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCSPECOMME that the US Government had approved the British request for US assistance in airlifting logistic support from Cyprus for the British forces in Jordan. They instructed him to ascertain British requirements and render such assistance as he could without jeopardizing his primary mission.

(c) Memo, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 945452, 24 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCSPECOMME that the Israeli Ambassador had told Secretary Dulles the US had clearance for overflight of Israel in support of British forces in Jordan "for a number of days."

(c) Memo, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 945462, 24 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58 The strength of US Marine Corps units in Lebanon was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Marines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>2nd</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 6239

(c) JWR Situation Report No. 12 (Middle East), 25 Jul 58, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 1.
25 Jul 58 CINCPELM REAR forwarded the estimate of logistic support required by the British by airlift from Cyprus to Jordan pending establishment of a sealift to Jordan about 1 August. In terms of C-130 aircraft loads it totaled 55 per day, for purposes of routine fuel and dry-cargo supply maintenance and the establishment of a minimum reserve of jet fuel.


25 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Amman reported that in the light of US refusal to send troops to Jordan he had been presented with an alternate proposal by King Hussein and Rifai. Jordan proposed to increase her internal security forces so that foreign troops could depart. While the idea of intervening in Iraq would be given up, border tribes and agents would be organized to penetrate Syria in order to create unrest. To achieve these objectives it was requested that the US provide Jordan with the estimated $8 million necessary to raise two additional brigades recruited from tribes loyal to the King, and that the US and Jordan conclude a mutual defense agreement under which the US would re-equip the Jordanian Army and supply technical and other military assistance under the supervision of a US MAAG. In addition, on grounds that the Baghdad Pact was no longer an effective defense arrangement, it was requested that the US undertake to establish a new regional defense organization to be known as METO, which would include Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, US, UK, France, West Germany, Greece, Libya, and Italy.

(69) Msg, Amman to SecState, 272, 25 Jul 58.

25 Jul 58 At a meeting of President Chamoun, Gen Chehab, Undersecretary Murphy, Ambassador McClintock, and ADM Holloway, Gen Chehab rejected the idea of any large-scale joint Lebanese-US operations against the rebels, since he was sure his mixed army of Christians and Moslems would break apart if called upon to take all-out action against the largely Moslem opposition. The scoring of some military success against the rebels seemed important, however, as a means of improving political conditions prior to the presidential election scheduled for 31 July. Accordingly the conferees agreed that the Lebanese Army would undertake an operation that afternoon with the limited objective of reducing the size of the rebel-held Basta district of Beirut, without attempting to clean out the area entirely. To increase the forces available to Gen Chehab for this and other operations, US troops would so far as possible replace Lebanese units in static positions. Also, the US would respond to Lebanese requests for light military material, such as small arms and ammunition, tear gas, and psywar loudspeaker trucks.

(68) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 698, 25 Jul 58, DA IN 137951, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

25 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Cairo transmitted a formal protest received from the UAR which charged that American aircraft had violated UAR airspace in Syria and had
intercepted UAR civil aircraft. The protest described seven infractions occurring on 13 and 21 July and warned that UAR armed forces had been ordered from that day to take any measures necessary to protect the airspace from violation.  

(6) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 298, 25 Jul 58, DA IN 137905.

25 Jul 58

Secretary General Hammarskjold requested the consent of the Government of Lebanon to expand the functions and increase the size of the UN Observer Group.

NYT, 26 Jul 58, 3:8.

25 Jul 58

The US UN delegation in New York was instructed to advise Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold confidentially that the US was prepared to offer substantial financial assistance for expanding the UN Observer Group in Lebanon.


25 Jul 58

The Swiss Government announced that it had refused permission for US military transport aircraft to overfly Switzerland when the US had requested such permission for the night of 15-16 July. Since that time, said the announcement, three US aircraft had violated Swiss airspace by mistake, but the Swiss Government did not contemplate making any protest.

NXT, 26 Jul 58, 3:7.

25 Jul 58

In a brief reply to Khrushchev's letter of 23 July, President Eisenhower wrote the Soviet leader that any discussion of the Middle East in the UN Security Council should be carried out under the established rules of the Council. He reiterated that any member nation might be represented by any member of its government, including the head of state, and pointed out that the Council was empowered to invite representatives of non-member nations to participate in the discussion under certain conditions. He also insisted that the Council concern itself with the Middle East in general, rather than limit discussion to a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan.

NXT, 26 Jul 58, 1:8; text, 2:4-8.

25 Jul 58

Secretary of State Dulles informed the US Embassy in Beirut that if General Chehab had reasonably wide backing among the Lebanese, he would be acceptable to the US as President of Lebanon. Indeed, the US would be willing to help persuade him to undertake the candidacy if necessary.


25 Jul 58

Secretary of State Dulles cautioned the US Embassy in Beirut that US forces in Lebanon should not be deployed near the Syrian frontier in the present circumstances.

(6) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 487, 25 July 58, DA IN 138311 (26 Jul 58).
25 Jul 58 In view of indications that the crisis in the Lebanese situation had passed, Air Force commands were authorized to decrease their alert status.

26 Jul 58 Change No. 6 to BLUE BAT formally designated Maj Gen Paul D. Adams, USA, as COMAMLANFOR, effective at 1200Z.

26 Jul 58 In a note to the West German Government, released by Tass, the Soviet Union called on West Germany to stop allowing the US to use German bases as staging points for its military activities in the Middle East.

26 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME directed COMAMLANFOR, COMAMAIRFOR, and COMAMNAVFOR to prepare corresponding supporting plans, for the following:
1. clearing the Basta of rebel forces;
2. defending Beirut against reinforced rebel forces;
3. defending Lebanon against UAR intervention; and
4. securing the Tripoli and Sidon areas. The plans were to embrace action taken by both US and Lebanese forces together or by US forces alone.

26 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that members of Admiral Holloway's staff had assured him US aircraft were under strict orders not to violate UAR airspace. There was no record of any violation of the Syrian border, as charged by the UAR (see item of 25 July 58), but a further investigation was underway. It was quite possible that US aircraft had intercepted some UAR planes for identification purposes, but any such action fell under the terms of the notice to air traffic issued at the beginning of the Lebanese operation.

26 Jul 58 In a letter submitted to the UN Security Council and circulated as a UN document the UAR charged that US aircraft on 18 and 21 July had committed three violations of UAR airspace and had intercepted four UAR civil and commercial planes.

26 Jul 58 As instructed by the State Department, the US Embassy in London informed the Foreign Office of the following US position regarding action in the Persian Gulf:
1. the US would continue to support the special British position in the Persian Gulf;
2. the US agreed with the British inclination not to intervene in Kuwait under the present circumstances and would counsel against military occupation except in the event of a coup d'etat or by prior agreement with the Ruler of Kuwait; and
3. the US endorsed the British plan to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf that could intervene in Kuwait or Qatar within 36 hours time, if necessary.
26 Jul 58

Force C virtually completed its movement by air to Beirut. Its strength of 1632, added to C CINCSPECOMMB, to the Force A strength of 1755, brought the total Army personnel in Lebanon to 3387. Force B remained in Germany, with one company on 12-hour alert and the remainder on 24-hour alert status. Forces D and E were en route to the objective area by sea, with estimated time of arrival 2-5 August.

(38) JWR Situation Report No. 14 (Middle East), 27 Jul 58, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 1.

27 Jul 58

The US Army Attache in Amman reported arrival at 1800Z of the first USAF C-119's airlifting supplies from Cyprus to the British forces in Jordan.

(6) Msg, USARMA Amman to DEPTAR, C 64, 281430Z Jul 58, DA IN 139785.

27 Jul 58

Since US forces in Beirut were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain suitable land and sufficient room for supply dumps and tactical troop deployment, CINCSPECOMME reported that further augmentation, in addition to Forces D and E already en route, would not be desirable.

(38) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 6936, 272111Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

28 Jul 58

CINCSPECOMME informed the JCS that the British Commanders in Chief in the Middle East had requested him to arrange to continue the airlift from Cyprus to Amman beyond 1 August. CINCSPECOMME advised the JCS that he was reluctant to be committed to this airlift on a continuing basis.

(38) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 6976, 280555Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7.

28 Jul 58

With regard to the Syrian border violations charged by the UAR (see item of 25 Jul 58), CINCSPECOMME received a report from his air commander that there had been no US air activity whatever on 18 July and that no US military aircraft had operated on 21 July in the area of the alleged violations.

(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 763, 28 Jul 58, DA IN 13904 (29 Jul 58).

28 Jul 58

At the first session of the Baghdad Pact meeting in London, Secretary Dulles cited the intervention in Lebanon as proof that the US was loyal to its friends and capable of quick decisive action. He assured the Pact members that in time of trouble the US would "act promptly, vigorously and even at great risk to itself to insure their independence and integrity." The US would not be dissuaded by Soviet attempts to play upon the world's fear of war.

NOTE REGARDING THE LAST ENTRY FOR 28 Jul 58:

Despite the reference in message JCS 945598, 28 Jul 58, to HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles currently en route to Lebanon, these weapons were still in Germany and never left there. Only the HONEST JOHN battery's personnel were en route, by sea. The following additional information is pertinent:

23 Jul 58. In a message to CINCUSAREUR. CINCSPEDOMME requested

(490-RR) Msg, CINCSPEDOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 2319562 Jul 58, DA IN 136976, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 3.

26 Jul 58. The Chief of Staff, Army, advised CINCUSAREUR of the State Department request that HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles not be landed in Lebanon. Apparently by decision of CINCUSAREUR, the HONEST JOHN unit's entire equipment was unloaded at Bremerhaven. The battery's personnel had already departed, however, on board another ship.


31 Jul 58. CINCSPEDOMME concurred in a recommendation by CINCUSAREUR that the men of the HONEST JOHN battery, upon arrival at Beirut, be returned to Germany to rejoin their equipment, there to be held in a 48-hour alert status.

(6) Msg, CINCSPEDOMME to JCS, 3121262 Jul 58; (6) Mag, CINCUSAREUR to CINCSPEDOMME, 36760, 30 Jul 58, DA IN 139736; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 4.

3-4 Aug 58. Their ship having reached Beirut on 3 Aug, the men were flown back to their home station in Germany the following day.

TOP SECRET
28 Jul 58 In London, Secretary Dulles signed a declaration of collective security with the Prime Ministers of the UK, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—the members of the Baghdad Pact, less Iraq. The US was pledged to cooperate with these states for their security and defense, and to "promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation." A US official told reporters that this action by the US was equivalent to joining the Baghdad Pact.

NYT, 29 Jul 58, 1:5-6; text, 6:4-5.

28 Jul 58 In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 25 July, Premier Khrushchev said the Soviet Government considered it essential and urgent to convene a conference of heads of government, including Premier Nehru of India, as previously proposed. By insisting on the procedures of a regular session of the Security Council, the US, he charged, was trying to stall off such a meeting of heads of government as could promptly take the decisions necessary to end the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and preserve and strengthen universal peace. Noting that Premier de Gaulle of France preferred a meeting in Europe, he said the Soviet Government, without objecting to New York, now favored de Gaulle's view, but any city desired by the US was acceptable.


28 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State and Defense concurrence, directed CINCSPECOM to not land the battery of HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles currently en route to Lebanon. The weapons, however, might be maintained afloat, immediately available for use if directed by JCS. A State Department request for this action had been forwarded to JCS by the Deputy Secretary of Defense two days earlier.


29 Jul 58 Lebanese Premier Solh escaped unhurt when a bomb was detonated near his car while en route to his office. The explosion killed one member of the Premier's motorcyde escort and injured others.

(EO) Mag, USAFRMA, USAIRMA, and ALUSNA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 274, 291609Z Jul 58, DA In 139207.

29 Jul 58 Undersecretary Murphy reported that as a result of the attempted assassination of Premier Solh a political crisis had developed in the Lebanese Government involving Gen Chehab. Solh, who had previously espoused an early presidential election and had been expected to support Chehab's candidacy, was now opposed to the election and vehemently condemned Chehab. He blamed Chehab for Lebanon's predicament, which he charged US inactivity condoned, and proposed to have him and other General Staff officers summarily dismissed. Upon being informed, in response to his direct question, that US forces would not be used to support his government against the Lebanese
Army should there be violent reaction to the removal of Chehab and other officers, Solh stated that he himself would resign and leave the country. Mr Murphy commented that this latest development pointed up the present government's lack of effective power and the attendant possibility of a military coup d'etat to establish real authority. Therefore, the indicated safest course for the US was with Chehab and the military.

29 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to inform the British that the US could not assume responsibility for the air supply of British forces in Jordan on a continuing basis, because of insufficient available aircraft. If facilities were available, CINCSPECOMME was to continue the airlift temporarily, until 6 August. Meanwhile, he was to ascertain a firm date by which the British line of communications from Aqaba to Amman would be completed, and advise the JCS.

30 Jul 58

While in consultation with Adm Holloway and the US Ambassador in Beirut, Gen Chehab explicitly stated that he would not request withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon until rebel military activity had been reduced and contained.

31 Jul 58

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in its second report, stated that no more than limited smuggling of arms into Lebanon—and that largely confined to small arms and ammunition—had occurred up to 15 July, and that no persons had been found who had "indubitably" infiltrated for the purpose of fighting. These conclusions were based on the results of air patrolling, both day and night, checked against the results of day ground patrolling, all-night watches, and occasional night patrols. Arrangements had been made with Opposition leaders on 15 July for unimpeded access to all the frontier under their control; but the arrival of US troops on that date had complicated the Group's task, and constituted one reason for the 15 July cut-off date for the report. However, the Group stated, no information had reached it since 15 July that would warrant a change in the general conclusions set forth in the report.

NYT, 1 Aug 58, 1:7-8; 2:3-6, 7.
31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut learned from discussion with Chamoun and Chehab that neither of them desired expansion of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Chamoun wanted US forces to remain in Lebanon until stability was restored; he would consider increasing UN forces only if US troops were withdrawn prematurely. Chehab, on the other hand, openly opposed increasing the Observer Group and, indeed, expected to ask for its departure about the same time US troops were withdrawn.

[67] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 867, 31 Jul 58, DA IN 140275, (1 Aug 58).

31 Jul 58 Gen Fuad Chehab was elected President of Lebanon by a vote of 48 to 7 (with 1 abstention) on the second ballot in the Lebanese Parliament. The only other candidate pledged his support to General Chehab after the election. Ten of the 66 members of the Parliament did not participate, including Premier Sami Solh, who had opposed holding of the election so long as violence continued.

[NYT, 1 Aug 58, p.18.

31 Jul 58 At a press conference Secretary Dulles informed newsmen that the US hoped there would be a greater measure of political stability in Lebanon at the time of US troop withdrawal than there was when they arrived. However, he said, "whatever our views may be, we would not stay in Lebanon after we had been asked to withdraw by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon."


31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that President-elect Chehab, under political pressure for an immediate public declaration calling on US forces to withdraw, asked if it might not be possible for the US to announce that the improved security situation in Lebanon would presently make it possible for US troops to leave. Chehab expected the civil war rapidly to die out now that the election was over, and he felt that Syrian-Egyptian interference would not be resumed again for some while, since Nasser reportedly had been severely shaken by the swift and effective US intervention in Lebanon. At the same time Chehab expressed the hope that US would help Lebanon with financial and military assistance, referring specifically to a need for US funds for the purchase of certain French-manufactured arms that were essential to Lebanese T/O & E's.

[65] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 869, 31 Jul 58.

31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon advised CNO that President-elect Chehab had stated how very pleased he was in his personal and official relationships with Admiral Holloway. Gen Chehab had said, "The Admiral showed an instant comprehension of our situation from the very moment we met on the airport road." The Ambassador had indicated to Chehab that he fully concurred.

[66] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 875, 1 Aug 58.
1 Aug 58

Replying to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 28 July about a meeting of heads of government in regard to the Middle East situation, President Eisenhower stated that he was instructing the US Permanent Representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting of that body on or about 12 August, at which heads of governments and foreign ministers might have direct discussions. The US would not insist on New York as the place, but ruled out Moscow. The US position, the President said, was that (1) the UN Security Council had the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and (2) through the Council, which represented them, the smaller nations participated in decisions inevitably affecting them.

Khrushchev's proposal, on the other hand, was that five great powers should impose their decision on the rest of the world in a manner reminiscent of the system of political domination in Eastern Europe.


1 Aug 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having noted the British desire for combined planning with US commanders in the Middle East, cabled the following tentative guidance to CINCNEAL REAR, CINCSPECOMME, and COMIDEASTFOR, to be applicable to all US-UK planning discussions: discussions relating to the Middle East, without commitment of US forces or facilities, could be carried on at all levels, exchange of information was authorized, and close liaison with the British was to be maintained by all commands, but the use of the term "combined planning" was to be avoided; no US forces or US actions in support of any US-UK plan could be committed by any commander without specific approval of the JCS.

(2) Msg, JCS to CINCNEAL REAR ECHELON, CINCSPECOMME, and COMIDEASTFOR, JCS 945925, 1 Aug 58, derived from (2) JCS 1887/485, 31 Jul 58. Both in GCS 361 (8-23-57) sec 7.

1 Aug 58

On the basis of investigation reports submitted to CINCSPECOMME, the US Ambassador in Beirut recommended that the US issue a denial of the UAR charge that US aircraft had violated the Syrian border. The US should concede, however, that its planes had intercepted UAR civil aircraft for identification purposes and should acknowledge that this sort of interception would continue as long as US forces remained in the area.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 889, 1 Aug 58, DA IN 140617 (2 Aug 58).

1 Aug 58

Task Group 74.1, proceeding from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf bearing the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, reported to CINCSPECOMME for operational control at 2330Z.

(2) Msg, CG 74.1 to CINCSPECOMME, 012323Z Aug 58, JMEPO Lebanon Mag File.
Army Sgt James R. Nettles was killed by rebel snipers on the outskirts of Beirut, the first ground force fatality resulting from hostile action since US forces entered Lebanon on 15 July.

Replying to Prime Minister Macmillan’s letter of 27 July, Secretary Dulles agreed with the suggestion that combined US-UK military planning should be speeded and expanded, in anticipation of further trouble in the Middle East if the Soviet Union declined to attend the proposed special UN Security Council meeting. Secretary Dulles wrote that “possible areas of trouble which our military planners should examine urgently include the Persian Gulf, Libya, Sudan and also Jordan in view of the possibility that there may be an attempted coup in that unhappy country while your forces are still there.” He proposed that the planning be undertaken by increased liaison between the British Chiefs of Staff and CINCNEEL REAR Headquarters in London.

The Israeli Ambassador informed the State Department that Israel had received a Soviet note on 1 August strongly protesting the US-UK overflights permitted by Israel. The Soviet note accused Israel of associating with the Western powers in acts of aggression and charged Israel with responsibility for a resulting increase in Middle East tension, which might develop into armed conflict. The Ambassador said Israel did not regret granting the overflight permission, but Prime Minister Ben Gurion believed that by making the request the US and UK had incurred an inescapable moral obligation. The Prime Minister thought it urgently necessary for US policy regarding the independence and integrity of Israel to be made clearly known to the Soviets.
[8] Mag, SecState to Tel Aviv, 110, 2 Aug 58.

The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv transmitted an urgent message from Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion that demanded immediate cessation of US overflights of Israel. The British Ambassador in Tel Aviv had received a similar demand. The Israeli Foreign Office intimated that Ben Gurion’s insistent action followed from his receipt of the stern Soviet note of 1 August and from concern that he had already exceeded the authority allowed him by the Cabinet in granting overflight permission. After consultation with his British colleague, the US Ambassador concluded that Ben Gurion had decided that the urgency of the supply needs of Jordan and the British forces there was not sufficient to justify the risk Israel was running in permitting overflights and that he did not feel able to resist strong Cabinet and potential public opposition on the matter.
[8] Mag, Tel Aviv to SecState, 137, 2 Aug 58,
DA IN 140962 (3 Aug 58).

2 Aug 58 King Hussein of Jordan announced, in Amman, the formal dissolution of the Arab Union. NYT, 3 Aug 58, 1:6.

3 Aug 58 Ships bearing Force E (tank battalion) and a major part of Force D (service support) arrived at Beirut and began unloading. When completely debarked, the two forces would add 72 tanks, 756 vehicles, and 5162 Army personnel to the US forces present in Lebanon. (25) JWR Situation Report No. 22 (Middle East), 4 Aug 58, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 2.

3 Aug 58 Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and Mao Tse-tung, the leader of Communist China, issued a joint communiqué in Peking, after four days of consultations there, (1) denouncing the "flagrant aggression" carried out by the US and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan, (2) maintaining that a conference of the heads of government of the big powers should be called at once to discuss the situation in the Middle East, and (3) demanding that the US and Britain immediately withdraw their forces from Lebanon and Jordan. NYT, 4 Aug 58, 1:8, 3:2-5.

3 Aug 58 Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy completed talks begun the previous evening with the leaders of the new Government of Iraq. During these talks he had assured them that the US had no intention of invading Iraq, or otherwise interfering with Iraq's revolution. The Iraqi leaders had (1) assured Mr. Murphy that their revolt had had no inspiration or help from without; (2) spoken of cooperation, rather than an alliance, with the United Arab Republic; and (3) stated, without evidencing hostility toward the Baghdad Pact, that Iraq's adherence to that Pact was under active study. NYT, 4 Aug 58, 1:7, 5:5-7.

3 Aug 58 Speaking in blunt terms to Israeli Ambassador Eban, Secretary Dulles said that he and the President were shocked by the appearance that, upon receiving the Soviet protest against US-UK overflights, Israel had immediately requested that the flights be stopped. The US and UK had acted in the Middle East "to show Nasser and the Soviets there was a point beyond which they could not go," and the two Western nations understood they had Israel's support. The US could not successfully defend the independence of Israel and other countries in the area if "Israel felt so menaced by the USSR that it would instantly do whatever the Soviets want." Secretary Dulles recalled the assurance given under the American Doctrine that the US would instantly come to Israel's aid if attacked by a Communist state. (26) Mag, SecState to Tel Aviv, 111, 3 Aug 58.
3 Aug 58 At the request of the State Department, CNO directed that the task group bearing the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, return to Singapore and revert to CINCPACFLT control, but he cautioned that it must be prepared to reverse course again if the situation in the Persian Gulf worsened. (S) Mag, CNO to CINCSPECOMME and CINCPACFLT, 20840, 031815Z Aug 58, JMEPO Lebanon Mag File.

4 Aug 58 General Fuad Chehab, in his first statement to the nation after becoming President-elect of Lebanon, invoked unity as the basis for achieving the national aims, "of which the foremost is the withdrawal of foreign troops." NYT. 5 Aug 58, 1:1.

4 Aug 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Survey Council to assess the situation that was likely to exist in the Middle East after the immediate crisis there had passed and to submit recommendations on actions that could be taken to improve the position of the US in the area. (U) SM-522-58 to JSSC. "Long-Range Actions in the Middle East (U)," 4 Aug 58, CSS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7, derived from (S) JCS 1887/482, 25 Jul 58, same file, sec 6.

5 Aug 58 In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 1 August, Premier Krushchev expressed regret that the President (and Prime Minister Macmillan) had made impossible a meeting of the five heads of government proposed by the Soviet Union. However, since the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan was still urgently necessary in the interests of peace and the independence of those countries, the Soviet Government was instructing its UN representative to request a special session of the General Assembly. The Security Council, he said, with its membership consisting principally of countries belonging to NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO, plus Chiang Kai-shek's China, had already shown itself to be incapable of dealing with the problem. He hoped the US would support the Soviet request for a special session of the General Assembly as a step toward relaxing tensions and preparing the way for a meeting at the summit. Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIX, No. 1001 (1 Sep 58), pp. 342-346.

5 Aug 58 Secretary Dulles received a letter from Prime Minister Ben Gurion that authorized resumption of the US airlift over Israel to Jordan (see item of 3 August 58). Ben Gurion avowed that the stoppage begun on 3 August had been requested for reasons other than acquiescence in the Soviet protest of 1 August. The Soviet note would not be answered for several days, and Israel's reply would be a firm but polite rejection of the charge that by permitting overflights, Israel was aiding US-UK "aggression." (S) Mag, SecState to Tel Aviv, 119, 5 Aug 58.
5 Aug 58 The Israeli Ambassador in Washington conveyed his
Government's permission for US aircraft to overfly
Israel on consecutive nights beginning 5 August and
ending at dawn on 10 August. US military aircraft
would not be authorized to overfly Israel thereafter.
(25) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 946117,
5 Aug 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

5 Aug 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff formally directed CINCSPECOMME
to begin planning for orderly but prompt withdrawal
of US forces and materiel from Lebanon, in view of the
probability that Chehab would ask for US troop with-
drawal upon assuming the presidency. CINCSPECOMME had,
in fact, already informed CNO that he had ordered the
preparation of phased withdrawal plans immediately after
Chehab's election. CINCSPECOMME had noted that Chehab
could hardly do otherwise than set the withdrawal of
US forces as an early objective of his administration,
and he believed the early departure of some Marine
forces would greatly assist Chehab in resisting internal
political pressures.

In a related message sent later the same day, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCSPECOMME that the
Department of State considered it would be politically
desirable to reduce the number of US forces in Lebanon.
Accordingly they directed him to submit recom-
endations concerning the reductions that could be
made, consistent with his mission.
(26) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 946103,
051914Z Aug 58. (28) Msg, CINCMEC REAR to CNO, 9678,
05110Z Aug 58. (45) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS
946107, 051948Z Aug 58. All in CCS 381 Lebanon
(5-13-58) sec 4.

5 Aug 58 Because of the unstable situation in Jordan the US
Ambassador in Amman was authorized to proceed with
Phase I evacuation of dependents. In view of the
imminent outbreak of disturbances, the departure was
to be arranged quietly so as not to precipitate a
crisis.
(25) Msg, SecState to Amman, 420, 5 Aug 58.
(48) Msg, Amman to SecState, 415, 8 Aug 58. (45) Msg,
SecState to Amman, 471, 8 Aug 58.

5 Aug 58 The US Department of State agreed to a British pro-
posal to train Jordanian and Lebanese pilots in the
UK, instead of in their home country, to fly the
Hawker Hunter aircraft allocated to Jordan and Lebanon.
Delivery of the Hawker Hunters to Jordan and Lebanon
would thus be postponed until the training period of
about four months duration was completed.

5 Aug 58 CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to sail TRANSPEHROIN 8 from
the United States, with one Marine BLT plus a RLT
Headquarters and Hq Company embarked, to relieve one
TRANSPEHROIN and BLT in the Mediterranean.
(47) Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT, 20981, 052327Z
Aug 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.
The Government of Lebanon formally endorsed the status of forces agreement that had been negotiated by the US Embassy in Beirut. The agreement's terms were brief and extremely liberal, reserving all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction to the US military authorities, barring civil suits, and exempting the forces from all taxation, import duties, and mail and customs inspections.

Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1569, 101341Z Aug 58.

The US Ambassador in Amman conveyed the response to Jordan's request of 25 July for various forms of US assistance. The US decision on providing funds for two additional brigades for Jordan, as well as on a US-Jordanian mutual defense treaty and establishment of a MAAG in Jordan, would be deferred until after the UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East. With respect to the request for a new regional defense organization, the US disagreed with Jordan regarding the current effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact arrangement and considered Jordan's proposal both undesirable and unfeasible. Premier Rifai, stressing the need for an overt show of US support, indicated that preliminary coordination with the US Military Attache would be started in anticipation of a favorable decision on the postponed issues. The US Ambassador commented that he concurred in Rifai's assessment that the situation required tangible evidence of US interest if the pro-Western government of Jordan were to survive.

Msg, SecState to Amman, 397, 2 Aug 58.
Msg, Amman to SecState, 372, 4 Aug 58.
Msg, SecState to Amman, 423, 4 Aug 58.
Msg, Amman to SecState, 404, 6 Aug 58.

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that one battalion of approximately 900 British troops had disembarked from a UK carrier and cruiser at Aqaba on the night of 6 August. The battalion was being transported overland to Amman.

Msg, Amman to SecState, 409, 7 Aug 58.
DA IN 142579 (8 Aug 58).

The US Ambassador in Beirut requested discretionary authority for CINCSPECOMME to initiate withdrawal of one and possibly two Marine battalions. The Ambassador and Adm Holloway had discussed with Gen Chehab the advisability of a symbolic withdrawal of US forces, and Chehab had concurred that there would be political advantage in a token re-embarkation, providing the bulk of US forces remained intact in Lebanon until peace and security were assured. However, the Secretary of State, although conceding some psychological value in a reduction of US forces in the near future, declined to grant the discretionary authority at that time.

Msg, Beirut to SecState, 993, 7 Aug 58.
Msg, SecState to Beirut, 779, 9 Aug 58.
7 Aug 58 The Soviet press announced the completion of Soviet military and naval exercises in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan that had begun 18 July.

(1) Msg, ALUSNA USARMA USAIRA Moscow to CNO, 0446, 071010Z Aug 58.

7 Aug 58 The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a US resolution calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly, beginning 8 August, to consider the Middle East situation.

NYT, 8 Aug 58, 1:7.

7 Aug 58 Forwarding four alternative evacuation plans, CINC-SPECOMME recommended adoption of Plan A, which called for embarkation of one Marine battalion in amphibious shipping within three days after date of receipt of the JCS execution order. The Marine battalion would then serve as a floating reserve. CINC-SPECOMME requested authorization to initiate the plan at a time he would recommend after his meeting with Chehab on 11 August. He proposed, moreover, that the JCS authorize stoppage of all further unloading of equipment and supplies at Beirut, except items essential to operations ashore.


8 Aug 58 At the first meeting of the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, Secretary General Hammarskjold set forth a program for stabilizing the Middle East, with the following principal provisions: (1) a declaration by the Arab states reaffirming their adherence to the principles of mutual respect for each other's territory, nonaggression, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs; (2) the continuation and extension of existing UN activities in Lebanon and Jordan; (3) joint action by the Arab states, assisted by the UN, to further their economic development.

NYT, 9 Aug 58, 1:1.

8 Aug 58 The US State Department concurred in the British proposal to stagger training periods of Jordanian and Lebanese pilots sent to the UK for instruction in flying Hawker Hunter aircraft, a certain number of which were earmarked for delivery to Jordan and Lebanon as soon as the pilots qualified. The first group of Jordanian pilots would begin training 10 August; training of the last group of Jordanian and all the Lebanese pilots would be deferred until 1959.


(47) Msg, SecState to London, 1602, 8 Aug 58.

8 Aug 58 CNO advised CINC-SPECOMME of the State Department's concern that a sudden deterioration of the internal security situation in Jordan might not permit evacuation of all US nationals by commercial means. Military airlift might be called for on short notice and ground forces might be required to convoy Americans from their area of residence to the Amman airport. CINC-SPECOMME accordingly requested CINC-USAFE to establish contact...
with COMSIXTHFLT and prepare for a possible air evacuation of US nationals from Amman.

(25) Msg, CINCSPCOMME to CINCUSAFE and COMSIXTHFLT, 1348, 091752 Aug 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

9 Aug 58

Jordanian Premier Rifai, speaking for himself and King Hussein, informed the US Ambassador that they would reject outright any suggestion that Jordan be made a "ward of the UN" and they would not accept the stationing of any type of UN force or observer group in their country. Jordan's leaders had no confidence in the UN's ability to give protection against either aggression or subversion. All Jordan wanted was to be given sufficient arms to defend itself, whereupon the British forces could depart.

(6) Msg, Amman to SecState, 434, 9 Aug 58,
DA IN 143156 (10 Aug 58).

9 Aug 58

Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai revealed to the US Ambassador his plan for action in the event of a serious rebellion among the West Bank refugees. He intended to abandon the West Bank to Israel, set up defenses behind the Jordan River, and guard the capital city of Amman as the symbol of Hussein's rule. Thus the country would revert to the territorial boundaries of the earlier Trans-Jordan. In commenting to the State Department the Ambassador was skeptical that Rifai would actually abandon the West Bank, which included Jerusalem, but he believed Rifai's "last stand" concept faithfully reflected Jordan's desperate situation.

(6) Msg, Amman to SecState, 434, 9 Aug 58,
DA IN 143156 (10 Aug 58).

10 Aug 58

To Undersecretary Murphy, stopping over in the UK, Foreign Minister Lloyd emphasized that the US and UK must keep together on their action regarding Lebanon and Jordan. In particular Lloyd said it would be an "absolute disaster" if US forces left Lebanon before arrangements for Jordan's future had been settled, allowing a parallel British withdrawal. He believed the US and UK should give the appearance of willingness to stay in Jordan and Lebanon for a decade if need be, in order to induce Nasser and the Soviets to begin working toward a realistic current settlement. Hence he doubted the wisdom of public announcements that US forces would withdraw when requested by a legitimate Lebanese Government. Discussion revolved around the possibility of arranging some sort of neutral status or UN guardianship for Lebanon and Jordan, since the whole Western intervention would appear a fiasco if, a few weeks after withdrawal, Jordan and/or Lebanon joined the UAR.

If this could come about without precipitating a war or substantially benefiting Nasser's UAR.

At a morning meeting with Ambassador McCloy and Adm Holloway, President-elect Chehab gave his opinion that withdrawal of one Marine battalion from Lebanon would be helpful to the internal political situation and would be consistent with the improved security conditions in the country. He believed such a token withdrawal would make it easier for moderate opposition leaders to keep their followers under control and would highlight unfavorably any extreme action undertaken by Syrian and Egyptian agents. With regard to timing, he thought it important that the operation begin before the UN General Assembly resumed its sessions on 13 August. A voluntary withdrawal, made with the approval of the Lebanese Government and before Soviet delegates had had an opportunity to speak in New York, would avoid any appearance that the US had acted under a Soviet threat. President Chamoun concurred generally with these opinions. Chehab made certain suggestions regarding the proposed US communiqué announcing the withdrawal, and the Ambassador forwarded a draft text to Washington later in the day.

CINCSPECOMME proposed, subject to Washington approval, to begin withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, from Beirut into amphibious shipping at 0500Z 13 August. He recommended that the communique announcing the withdrawal be released in Beirut and Washington 24 hours earlier. Full press and other publicity coverage of the operation was planned.

The US Army Attaché in London reported that Gallo Plaza of the UN Observer Group had completely reversed his original attitude toward the landing of US forces in Lebanon. He now felt the US should not withdraw until the security situation had improved materially. The Ambassador also commented on the cordial cooperation that existed between Gen Bull, Adm Holloway, and other members of UN and US staffs.

The US Army Attaché in London reported that the British had 2,914 troops and 388 RAF personnel stationed in Amman. The British War Office, for purposes of logistic and administrative planning, assumed the 16th Parachute Brigade (or a comparable unit) would remain in Jordan at least six months rather than the two months initially forecasted.
12 Aug 58  The US Ambassador in Amman reported that a pattern to the British course of action in Jordan was becoming apparent. Indications were that Britain hoped to regain the position of influence it held prior to the ouster of Glubb Pasha by convincing Hussein that British troops were indispensable to keep him in power and avoid civil war. To this end pressure was being applied to have Rifai replaced by a more tractable Prime Minister. The Ambassador warned that if Rifai were removed both Hussein and Jordan would be lost.

(8) Msg, Amman to SecState, 461, 12 Aug 58.

12 Aug 58  In private consultations with Soviet delegate Gromyko at the UN, Secretary Dulles pointed out that US forces could be quickly withdrawn from Lebanon if the work of the UN Observer Group was continued and neighboring Middle East states pledged themselves to let Lebanon alone. In Jordan, on the other hand, no clear-cut solution was foreseeable; a collapse of Hussein's regime might lead to an Israeli seizure of the West Bank, which could provoke Arab retaliation and create grave consequences for the US and USSR. Gromyko showed a constructive interest and suggested that the US and USSR might agree on a statement providing assurances of the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and Jordan. He declared, however, that Jordan's internal affairs should be left to the Jordanians.


13 Aug 58  Re-embarkation of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, at Beirut began at 0500Z. The operation was completed, in a total loading time of 49 hours, at 150600Z August.


13 Aug 58  The UK requested the US to seek Israeli permission for overflight by US aircraft bearing 24 anti-tank guns to the British forces in Jordan, where the weapons were urgently needed for protection in case the Jordanian armored corps rebelled and attacked the British. Although reluctant to approach Israel in view of earlier US assurances that overflights would be completed on 10 August, the State Department recognized the danger of having the British wait for transportation of the weapons by sea.

(8) Msg, SecState to New York, TOSEC 3, 13 Aug 58.

13 Aug 58  In an address before the third emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower presented a program for peace in the Middle East consisting of the following six elements: (1) UN efforts to assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon; (2) UN measures to preserve peace in Jordan; (3) UN steps to control the fomenting from without of civil strife; (4) creation of a standby UN Peace Force; (5) steps, under UN auspices, to establish an Arab development institution on a regional basis, to be governed by the Arab states themselves but capable of
attracting international capital, both public and private; (6) steps, on the initiative of the countries involved, to avoid a new arms-race spiral in the Middle East.


13 Aug 58 Following President Eisenhower to the rostrum at the emergency session of the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko again denounced American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, asserted that oil was the real reason for it, and urged the Assembly to support a Soviet resolution calling for the withdrawal of the US and British forces without delay.

NYT, 14 Aug 58, 1:8.

14 Aug 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut jointly with the Director USOM-ICA reported that a study of Lebanon's financial capabilities indicated insufficient cash resources to meet Lebanon's ordinary budget obligations through the second six months of 1958. Lebanon would not even be able to meet the September payrolls. The USOC Team therefore recommended that the US, in order to prevent a financial crisis, make a cash grant of $5 million to support the ordinary budget, and in addition release the $8 million Lebanese pounds of counterpart funds provided under Richards' aid, which would be used for extraordinary budget expenditures in support of development projects.

LET Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1108, 14 Aug 58.

14 Aug 58 During the UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation Jordan's representative said that UN measures designed to prevent aggression against Jordan or interference in her internal affairs "must not envisage by any means the dispatch of United Nations forces or United Nations observers to be stationed on Jordan territory or guard the Jordanian frontier." However, it was "imperative" that inciting propaganda, both in radio broadcasts and in the press, be stopped, and his Government would not object to a special UN agency to monitor such propaganda.

NYT, 15 Aug 58, 1:1, 4:8.

15 Aug 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that Gen Chehab had commented on the beneficial political effect of the 13 August retraction of one Marine Battalion and was considering whether to suggest a further withdrawal before his inauguration as President on 24 September. He repeatedly expressed gratification over the original landing of US forces, remarking that their presence had saved the country from complete anarchy.

The General said he had been approached by the UN Observer Group concerning the establishment of a UN armed police force in Lebanon but had said he was opposed to the idea. Chehab stressed that the Lebanese people would have to find a solution themselves and could not depend on the perpetual stationing
of foreign forces in Lebanon; whether UN or US.

15 Aug 58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff released Force B (503rd Airborne Battle Group) from its alert status in Europe after having consulted CINCSPECOMME.

15 Aug 58
COMAMLANPOR requested Department of the Army authorization to contribute $3,500 worth of medical supplies and 800 blankets to a project for the relief of distress among the civilian population of Northern Lebanon. The Department of the Army granted this authorization the following day, with State Department concurrence.

15 Aug 58
The third report of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon followed the previous reports of the Group in failing to substantiate the Lebanese Government's charges of massive infiltration of personnel and materiel into Lebanon. The third report said that a few arms might have been brought into the country illegally, but that this practice had declined since the presidential election of 31 July. As of 10 August, the group had 166 ground observers and 24 air-operations personnel; since 15 July it had been able, through "tact, patience and perseverance," to recover ground lost as a result of the US troop landings and bring the main possible infiltration routes under "direct observation." Though 24-hour air observation of the border had not yet been established, it would be upon receipt of a UN shipment of 8 planes and 6 helicopters.

18 Aug 58
In a very plain-spoken consultation with UAR delegate Fawzi at the UN, Secretary Dulles repeatedly stressed that US and British forces could quickly withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan if the UAR gave firm assurances it intended to "lay off" those two countries, exerting its influence to calm rather than excite the unsettled conditions in the area.

18 Aug 58
The representatives of Iraq, India, and Indonesia, speaking for the first time in the UN General Assembly's Middle East debate, called for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and British troops from Jordan. Meanwhile Nasser and Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia issued a joint communique condemning the presence of foreign troops on Arab soil.
Premier Rifai appealed urgently to the US Ambassador in Amman for an early indication of US intentions regarding King Hussein's proposals for a US-Jordanian mutual defense treaty, establishment of a MAAG in Jordan, and US financing of a 2-brigade expansion of the Jordanian Army. Rifai had determined that the British troops must depart not later than October. If by that time substantial US support had not been pledged, he intended to resign, having concluded that the pro-Western policy of his administration had been a failure. The next Premier would, with little doubt, seek to reach an accommodation with the UAR and Jordan's other pro-Nasser neighbors.


The first shipment of US military materiel received by Iraq since the 14 July coup d'état arrived at Basra. A State Department spokesman said it did not constitute a resumption of military aid but the fulfillment of previous obligations.

(26) NMT, 21 Aug 58, 1:4, 10:4.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCSPECOMME to airlift 24 105-mm. rifles and 1200 rounds of ammunition for these anti-tank weapons from Cyprus to Amman, in support of British forces in Jordan, upon receipt of confirmation that Israel had granted overflight rights.

(27) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME and USAIRA Tel Aviv, JCS 946908, 21 Aug 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 8.

The UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by the Arab states (1) recording renewed assurances by the members of the Arab League that they would observe their pact to respect each other's system of government and refrain from any action designed to change the system of a member state; (2) calling upon members of the UN to follow a policy of strict non-interference in each other's affairs and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each
other; (3) requesting the Secretary General to make such practical arrangements, in the light of the foregoing, as would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan; (4) inviting the Secretary General to consult with the Arab countries of the Near East regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries; and (5) requesting the Secretary General to report on the above as appropriate, the first report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.


23 Aug 58

The Secretary of State informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that the US was making available $5 million for the support of Lebanon's ordinary budget over the next two months.

(a) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 974, 23 Aug 58.
(b) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1287, 26 Aug 58. (c) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 1017, 27 Aug 58.

23 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that the British were developing a plan to activate two additional Jordanian rifle brigades, so designed as to increase the internal security capability but not the offensive capability of Hussein's army. The British hoped the US would agree to assist financially in the project, whose annual cost was estimated at $5 million.

(d) Msg, Amman to SecState, 611, 23 Aug 58.

23 Aug 58

Gen Adams, COMAMLANFOR, reported that while on aerial reconnaissance an engine failure had forced his helicopter to crash land in shallow water, 50 feet from the beach near Beirut. He had escaped with only minor injuries and was back on duty.

(U) Msg, COMAMLANFOR to DEPTAR and CINCSAREUR, 231615Z Aug 58, DA IN 740594, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

24 Aug 58

CINCSPECOMME reported his interview with Gen Chehab following the wounding of an American soldier. He had told Chehab that the road block where the incident had occurred must be liquidated and the houses in the vicinity cleaned out. This could be done by (1) the Lebanese Army, or (2) the Lebanese Army and US tanks, or (3) US forces alone. Chehab agreed that the Lebanese Army would carry out the operation that afternoon. Further, he readily acceded to the stationing of US tanks along the American lines of communication wherever they had been subjected to sniper fire, and he agreed to disseminate widely an order of the day to the Lebanese Army explaining that the US forces were present for a friendly purpose but would react vigorously if their military security was jeopardized or their movements restricted in agreed areas of operation.

(e) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 241401Z Aug 58, CCS 361 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.
25 Aug 58  UN Secretary General Hammarskjold left New York by air for the Middle East, to carry out consultations designed to lead to a withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and British troops from Jordan, in accordance with the Arab resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 August.

NYT. 26 Aug 58, 5:3.

25 Aug 58  The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that Gen Chehab had called a meeting of all rebel leaders with the limited objective of eliciting a declaration fore-swearining acts of violence in order that Beirut and other towns might be opened up. Instead, the rebel leaders presented a manifesto containing political demands which the General felt would only provoke Christian Loyalists to further reprisals against the Moslem opposition. With respect to their insistence on immediate withdrawal of US forces, Chehab stated flatly that US forces would remain until violence had ceased and the security situation had returned to normal. He pointed out that the opposition itself, rather than create a vicious circle, must cooperate to restore order if they wished to see the Americans leave.

(7S) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 1269, 24 Aug 58.

(38) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 1311, 27 Aug 58.

28 Aug 58  As instructed by the Secretary of State, the US Ambassador in Amman informed King Hussein and Premier Rifai that, in addition to other forms of assistance, the US would provide up to $10 million in budgetary support for each of the remaining two quarters of the fiscal year, making the total supplied during Jordanian FY 1959 approximately $42 million. While specific commitments for subsequent fiscal years could not be made because of US appropriation procedures, the past record of US assistance should give assurance of continuing help. In response the King and Rifai vowed to continue their fight to maintain the independence and integrity of Jordan and agreed to drop any further consideration of abdication and resignation. They also pledged to consult with US officials prior to taking any action on withdrawal of British troops.

(6) Mag, SecState to Amman, 666, 27 Aug 58.


29 Aug 58  UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and Premier Rifai of Jordan issued a joint communique stating that their three days of talks had "indicated a large area of agreement" regarding practical arrangements leading to withdrawal of British troops from Jordan. Informed sources were reported as saying that Hammarskjold had been given a Jordanian plan for the establishment of a UN "presence" in Jordan, the United Arab Republic, and Iraq before Jordan would request the British troops to leave.

NYT. 30 Aug 58, 1:7.
29 Aug 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following actions to be taken by CINCSPECOMME: (1) Reduce the number of aircraft in Composite Air Strike Force B, at Adana, Turkey, during the period 1-15 September 1958; (2) carry out personnel rotation in the CASF B and USAFE forces at Adana during the same period.


30 Aug 58 The US Ambassador in Amman reported that King Hussein was pressing for an early decision on US assistance to the Jordanian Army and had stressed that provision for two additional modern-equipped brigades was a minimum requirement. King Hussein was also concerned over the "antiquated administration" of the Army and had asked for a US military survey and evaluation team to make recommendations for reorganization of his country's armed forces.

(8) Msg, Amman to SecState, 700, 30 Aug 58.

5 Sep 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that President-elect Chehab believed it would strengthen his position in the internal political situation if the withdrawal of a second US Marine battalion occurred by 15 September. The Ambassador and Adm Holloway agreed with Chehab that announcement of a further US withdrawal would be particularly useful if it preceded UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's scheduled visit to Beirut. Accordingly, the Ambassador requested authorization to inform Chehab and Chamoun officially of the US intent to retract one Marine battalion by 15 September, before they began discussions with Hammarskjold on 10 September.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1434, 5 Sep 58.

5 Sep 58 Lebanese rebels closed down their four clandestine radio stations which had been broadcasting anti-Government propaganda. In a final broadcast, the "Voice of Arabism" announced the shut-down was being made in the national interest.

NYT, 6 Sep 58, 1:6.

9 Sep 58 Secretary Dulles, at a press conference, said that while the situation in Lebanon appeared to be improving, it would be premature to announce any definitive plans for total withdrawal of US troops.

NYT, 10 Sep 58, 8:8.

9 Sep 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State Department concurrence, approved CINCSPECOMME's recommendation that the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, be embarked in TRANSPHIBRON 4 beginning 15 September and sail for the United States about 19 September. They also approved for planning purposes the retraction of the last Marine unit, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, on 30 September, to serve as afloat reserve, and the departure of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, for the United States about 1 October. It was assumed that the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, would return to the United States in
company with either the 19 September or the 1 October sailing, depending on the availability of shipping.

(26) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 947739, 091754Z Sep 58. (26) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 0634, 0607452 Sep 58; (27) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 0633, 0607572 Sep 58. All in JMEPO Lebanon Msg file.

10 Sep 58 CINCSPECOMME ordered the embarkation in TRANSPHIBRON 4 of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, beginning 15 September, and the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, beginning about 17 September, with the whole force to sail for the United States when ready. Also, having received the approved text from JCS, CINCSPECOMME released a statement announcing the intended withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines.

(27) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to COMNAVFOR and COMMILFOR, 1833, 100646Z Sep 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg file. NYT, 11 Sep 58, 1:8. (27) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 947739, 10 Sep 58, reproduced in (27) JCS 1887/500, "Withdrawal of Marine Battalion From Lebanon (U)," 10 Sep 58, CINCSPECOMME, JCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.

10 Sep 58 The US Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to inform the Iraqi Prime Minister that, in the absence of any F-86 training activity or apparent Iraqi interest to date in resuming such activity, the US was withdrawing all training personnel. The Ambassador was to say, if asked, that the training mission could be reconstituted if the Iraqi Government was prepared to affirm and implement its responsibilities under outstanding US-Iraqi agreements. He was also to say that clarification of the Iraqi Government's attitude concerning existing bilateral agreements and future US-Iraqi military relations was desired before the US took a decision on resuming the shipment of major items (including F-86 aircraft) of programmed military aid to Iraq.

(27) Msg, SecState to Baghdad, 969, 10 Sep 58, DA IN 152479, reproduced in (27) JCS 1887/501, "F-86 Training Activity in Iraq (U)," 10 Sep 58, DC 381 (6-23-57) sec 9.

12 Sep 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff received informally a State Department opinion that, if conditions remained generally stabilized in Lebanon, it might be possible to withdraw the remaining US forces by the end of October. Until the British left Jordan, however, it might be necessary to maintain a "political presence" in Lebanon, through a token force. The State Department understood that UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld (who was en route to New York following completion of his Middle East tour) did not intend to make any recommendation concerning withdrawal of US and British forces when reporting to the General Assembly. By stern talk Hammarskjöld had extracted a number of pledges from Nasser, but since the Secretary General had reservations about Nasser fulfilling his promises, he reportedly did not regret the arrangements he had made as providing a firm basis for withdrawal of Western forces.

16 Sep 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malki was elected President of the UN General Assembly by a 45-31-4 vote, despite the fact that his opponent, Sudan's Foreign Minister Mahgoub, had the support of the other Arab states and the Soviet bloc.

NYT, 17 Sep 58, 1:8.

16 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCSPECOMME to begin outloading and departure of Army service units from Lebanon as shipping became available. CINCSPECOMME accordingly directed that the operation begin on 22 September.


17 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to submit an outline plan for withdrawal of all US forces, equipment, and basic supplies from Lebanon by 15 October 1958, assuming no requirement for support of British forces in Jordan during the period.

(25) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 948177, 17 Sep 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.

18 Sep 58

Answering a query from the Secretary of State regarding the minimum time required to accomplish the complete withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon, the Director, Joint Staff, stated that this operation could be completed between 15 and 20 October. He pointed out that this estimate was predicated on the immediate issuance of directives to ready the sea transportation, and that any delay in issuing these directives would correspondingly delay the withdrawal.


19 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Amman conveyed to King Hussein the US decision to respond to his request for a survey team, which would both investigate the current military requirements of Jordan and develop recommendations looking toward improvement of the organization and administration of the Jordanian Army.

(5) Msg, SecState to Amman, 846, 18 Sep 58.
(5) Msg, Amman to SecState, 925, 19 Sep 58.

19 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the concept and outline plan for withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon submitted by CINCSPECOMME. All troops, equipment, and basic supplies were to be returned by sea or air to their home station by 15 October. The plan called for the operation to commence on 22 September, and, following a phased retraction of Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force elements, to be completed by the deactivation of COMAMNAVFOR, COMAMLANPOR, and COMAMAIRFOR on 15 October.
Execution of the plan would be directed by JCS. The plan assumed there would be no requirement for support of British forces in Jordan during the period.


The State Department concluded that the target date of 15 October for completion of the US withdrawal from Lebanon was too early and that the end of October was a more realistic planning goal. The principal complication was the need to coordinate the US move with the British departure from Jordan, a matter which was under continuing discussion with the British Government. The Department of Defense had been informed of the change. Routine outloading of heavy equipment from Lebanon would continue, as would the assembly of shipping, in anticipation of a firm decision on the date of full withdrawal.


In an unannounced early-morning move arranged by Ambassador McCintock, a US Army helicopter lifted Lebanese Premier Solh from his residence to the Beirut airport, from which a USAF plane transported him to Adana. The Turkish Government then assumed responsibility for his movements.

21 Sep 58. (24) Msg, CINCSPECOMM to JCS, 222123Z Sep 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

In the wake of a series of kidnappings and threats of violence by opposing Lebanese political forces, an around-the-clock curfew was placed in effect in Beirut at 1800Z.

21 Sep 58. NTT, 22 Sep 58, 10:1.

23 Sep 58. Gen Chehab took office as President of Lebanon. Retiring President Chamoun left for a short vacation in the mountains but said he would return soon "to serve Lebanon as a simple citizen." Chehab, in an inaugural speech, said he would work for the withdrawal of US forces.

23 Sep 58. NTT, 24 Sep 58, 1:4.

24 Sep 58. An outbreak of Christian-Moslem strife appeared imminent in Lebanon. The Christian Phalangist Party had taken the initiative by calling a general strike and launching terrorist activity against the Moslems. US military forces, while continuing withdrawal of equipment and personnel according to schedule, had taken appropriate defense measures and made a show of force. CINCSPECOMM reported sending a warning to the Christian insurgents that US artillery would destroy the Phalange headquarters if any sabotage or interference with American movements emanated from their quarter. To preclude any appearance that the US command was taking sides in the civil dispute, a similar warning had been issued to Moslem elements in
the Basta district. CINCSPECOMME also reported that the Lebanese Army was acting vigorously and had issued an order that any unauthorized person carrying weapons in public would be shot on sight.

(67) Msg, USARMA Beirut to DA, CX 329, 241146Z
Sep 58, DA IN 156178. (68) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 231251Z Sep 58, DA IN 156184. (69) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 6488, 242101Z Sep 58.

24 Sep 58

In Beirut the Cabinet to serve under President Chehab was announced. Rashid Karami, former Tripoli rebel leader, was Prime Minister as well as Minister of Interior and Defense. The Cabinet consisted of four Christians, three Moslems, and one Druse, and did not include any military members.

(67) Msg, USARMA Beirut to AGSI, CX 331, 251206Z
Sep 58, DA IN 156527.

24 Sep 58

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, at British request, obtained Nasser's permission for British troops to use Syria as part of their route of their planned withdrawal from Jordan.

(68) Msg, New York to SecState, 38, 24 Sep 58.

25 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that despite the renewed civil disturbances in Lebanon, President Chehab had stated explicitly that the US should adhere to its phased plan of withdrawal, which would see the departure of the last US forces before the end of October.

(67) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1703, 25 Sep 58.

25 Sep 58

Referring to the JCS memorandum of 24 July 1958 to the Secretary of Defense concerning a political advisor for CINCSPECOMME, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the JCS that the Department of State considered the assignment of a political advisor to CINCSPECOMME's staff to be unnecessary "in view of the fortuitous developments in Lebanon and the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly."

(68) N/H of JCS 1887/480, 30 Sep 58, CCS 361 (8-23-57) sec 6.

26 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCHEIM that they approved the draft US-UK Planning Group paper titled "Coordination of U.S./U.K. Plans for the Persian Gulf," subject to certain modifications contained in their message.

(69) Mag, JCS to CINCHEIM, JCS 948629, 26 Sep 58, derived from (68) JCS 1887/499, 8 Sep 58. Both in CCS 361 (8-23-57) sec 9.

26 Sep 58

CINCSPECOMME recommended that he be authorized to complete the re-embarkation of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, by 30 September. When this was accomplished, he believed it would be feasible for the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, already afloat, to depart for the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State Department concurrence, approved these dispositions the following day.
TOP SECRET

(26) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to ONO, 7053, 260946Z
Sep 58. (28) Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 948733,
271607Z Sep 58. Both in JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

26 Sep 58
In a summary statement of the results of the US
operation, CINCSPECOMME noted that the situation in
Lebanon had been changed in the direction the US
intended. "Lebanese have had an orderly and practically
unanimous election of a President, the new President
has been inaugurated and a government of high calibre,
which seems determined to govern and to unify and
pacify the country, has taken charge, and importantly,
Lebanon is subject to no outside pressure or jeopardy.
We have demonstrated our ability to quickly deploy in
great strength in the Middle East in case of danger
to American lives and property and for other political
objectives dictated by our country. I believe all of
these are worthy accomplishments and will justify us
in the eyes of the world and history."

(26) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to ONO, 7053, 260946Z
Sep 58, JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

30 Sep 58
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that the head of
the Phalange Party had requested him to use his good
offices in negotiating a political solution that would
end the Phalange-called Christian general strike. The
Ambassador thereupon asked various Lebanese political
leaders to a meeting at his house, where he proposed
a formula to resolve the deadlock. The formula
provided for a vote of confidence for Premier Karami's
Cabinet, an expansion of the Cabinet to allow three or
four positions for pro-Chamoun loyalists or other
Christian elements who felt they were without represen-
tation in the Government, and agreement to a
subsequent increase in the membership of Parliament
from 66 to 88.

(26) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 1724, 28 Sep 58.
(38) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 1757, 30 Sep 58. (3) Mag,
Beirut to SecState, 1773, 1 Oct 58.

30 Sep 58
USARMA in Baghdad reported the announcement of major
changes in the Iraqi Cabinet, marked by the departure
of several pro-Nasser officials. In addition, Col
Abdul Salam Arif, recently deposed Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Interior, had been appointed
Ambassador to West Germany. The Cabinet replacements
appeared to be generally conservative, nationalist,
and neutralist in outlook.

(58) Mag, USARMA Baghdad to ACSI DA, 011000Z
Oct 58, DA IN 158153.

30 Sep 58
TRANSPHIBERON 8, with Headquarters, 6th Marines, and
the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, embarked, arrived in
the Beirut area from the United States.

(68) JWR Situation Report No. 78, 1 Oct 58, CCS
1 Oct 58 The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, departed Beirut for the United States in TRANSPIBON 8, while TRANSPIBON 2, bearing the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, sailed for Naples. No Marine units remained ashore in Lebanon, but approximately 7500 Army personnel held positions in the Beirut area. 

(2) Msg, CINCSPECOM to CNO, 8593, 011321Z Oct 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg File. NYT, 30 Sep 58, 6:3.

1 Oct 58 The UN Observer Group in Lebanon reported that it had detected no cases of infiltration across the Lebanese border in the last five weeks. Though some areas of Lebanon were still held by armed forces in opposition to the Government at Beirut, the report said, and though there was some tribal feuding, conditions within the country and along its borders were generally peaceful. 

NYT, 2 Oct 58, 1:7, 11:3.

1 Oct 58 Sir Pierson Dixon, head of the British UN delegation, circulated a memorandum at UN headquarters stating that the British Government, in consultation with Jordan, had agreed to begin the withdrawal of its troops from Jordan on 20 October. In a speech opening the Jordanian Parliament, King Hussein made a parallel statement. 

NYT, 2 Oct 58, 11:4-5, 7-8.

2 Oct 58 Former President Chamoun of Lebanon in effect rejected the three points suggested by US Ambassador McClintock as a basis for resolving the Lebanese deadlock, after a visit by the Ambassador. Former Premier Saeb Salam, the leader of the rebels in Beirut while Chamoun was President, also rejected the three points, declaring that the US Ambassador should have no part in Lebanon's internal affairs (see item of 30 September). 

NYT, 3 Oct 58, 8:3.

2 Oct 58 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, addressing the UN General Assembly, attacked Secretary General Hammarskjold's report of 30 September as containing "artificial optimism" and being incorrect, unobjective, and one-sided. He charged that the US and Britain were flouting the will of the Assembly, as expressed in the resolution of 21 August, in not withdrawing their troops from Lebanon and Jordan immediately. He was answered the following day by the Jordanian delegate, who maintained that Hammarskjold had correctly interpreted the resolution, which Jordan had helped draw up. 

NYT, 3 Oct 58, 1:4, 8:4; 4 Oct 58, 4:5.

5 Oct 58 According to the New York Times, Premier Kassem of Iraq broke up a plot against him by officers in the regiment of Col Abdel Salam Arif, whom Premier Kassem had recently deposed as Deputy Premier. Kassem had reportedly placed Col Arif under house arrest, transferred the officers of the regiment to distant points or placed them under surveillance, and moved the regiment, after disarming it, about 80 miles north of Baghdad. The attempted coup d'etat was presumably an expression of pro-Nasser sentiment. 

6 Oct 58  A Jordanian Finance Ministry spokesman said that Jordan had received $1,610,000 from Britain as the first installment of a recently approved loan of $2,800,000. The second installment was expected in January. NYT, 7 Oct 58, 3:6.

7 Oct 58  CINCSPECOMME submitted his withdrawal plan, which scheduled the departure of all US forces from Lebanon by 25 October, "while retaining tactical integrity and adequate support throughout retraction." He proposed to begin shortly the outloading of the Army tank battalion and various Army support units, completing this phase of the operation before 19 October, when the outward airlift of the 187th Airborne Battle Group would commence. All remaining troops, to be moved by sea, would outload on 24 October, completing their departure the next day.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched their approval of the plan later in the day.


8 Oct 58  The State Department announced that, barring unforeseen developments, US troops would be totally withdrawn from Lebanon by the end of October, as a result of improvement in Lebanon's security situation and progress toward greater international stability in the area.


9 Oct 58  The US Ambassador in Beirut reported on the Lebanese reaction to the wording of the communiqué on withdrawal of US forces. The phrase, "barring unforeseen developments," had been seized upon by the Moslem population and construed as a provocative indication that US troops intended to stay in Lebanon indefinitely. Prime Minister Karami was particularly upset and wanted to send a formal note demanding withdrawal of US forces at once in order to counteract the effect of the phrase on the Moslems. The Ambassador, however, by arranging for Adm Holloway to meet with Karami and discuss the details of US withdrawal, was able to reassure the Prime Minister and prevail upon him to temper his action. Following the meeting the Ambassador received a letter, handed him by the Prime Minister but signed by Foreign Minister Takla, which referred to the terms of the US communiqué and requested that US troops "be withdrawn entirely from Lebanon in any case and no matter what circumstances by the end of this month of October." The Ambassador commented that the text of the letter would probably be made public, but the fact that it was signed by a
Christian rather than a Moslem would help mitigate any propaganda repercussions.


13 Oct 58

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the draft version of NSC 5820, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," was acceptable from a military point of view, provided their comments and recommendations for modifications were accepted. Subject to this provision, they recommended that the Secretary concur in the adoption of NSC 5820 to supersede NSC 5801/1 as US policy toward the Near East. One objection to NSC 5820 raised by the JCS was with regard to US policy toward Iraq. While agreeing that the US should seek to maintain friendly relations with the new Iraqi regime, the JCS recommended deletion of "continue to offer United States technical assistance . . . ." Rather than asking Iraq to accept US technical assistance as a continuation of programs repudiated by the new regime, or offering assistance before Iraq asked for it, the US should consider any Iraqi requests for new programs or the reinstatement of old ones on the same basis as requests from other Near Eastern countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also disagreed with the policy proposed in NSC 5820 regarding the leaders of pan-Arab nationalism, especially Nasser (that the US should seek to work with these leaders as much as possible while seeking to exert constructive influence on them). The JCS view was that the US should disassociate "legitimate Arab nationalism" from Nasser's leadership and deal with Nasser only in his role as political head of the UAR.


14 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in London was informed that the British expected to withdraw the main body of their forces from Jordan by air in a period of about five days time, beginning 25 October, by flying them non-stop from Amman to Cyprus, over Syria and Lebanon. With the assistance of the UN Secretary General the
UK had gained UAR permission to overfly Syria and UAR agreement to the stationing of UN officials in Amman, Damascus, and Beirut to control ground-to-air communications with the British aircraft.


14 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported the arrival of the US military survey team, headed by Brig Gen Richard A. Risden, USA. He also reported that evacuation of British forces was proceeding according to schedule and that King Hussein planned to leave on a European vacation the first week of November.

(5) Msg, Amman to SecState, 1116, 14 Oct 58.

15 Oct 58

The formation of a new, four-man Lebanese Cabinet was announced. The Cabinet, formed after it became clear that Premier Karami could not obtain the required vote of confidence for the one he had originally organized, seemed acceptable to all factions, and its formation appeared to have saved the country from the renewed threat of civil war. The new Cabinet consisted of: Rashid Karami, a Sunni Moslem, as Premier, and also holding the four ministerial posts of Finance, National Economy, Defense, and Information; Hussein Oueini, a Sunni Moslem, as Foreign Minister, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Planning (economic development); Raymond Edde, a Maronite Roman Catholic, as Minister of the Interior, Social Affairs, and Communications; and Pierre Gemayel, a Maronite Roman Catholic and Phalangist leader, as Minister of Public Works, Education, Agriculture, and Health.

Two days later the Lebanese Parliament gave Premier Karami's new Cabinet a unanimous vote of confidence.


17 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that Lebanon still desired aircraft as well as other military assistance. He recommended that if possible the US go ahead with all or part of the program to provide Hawker Hunter planes and find other funds for military assistance for the ground forces.


18 Oct 58

CINCSPECOMME requested the Navy Department to consider bestowing suitable awards on two component commanders in recognition of outstanding performance of duty in connection with BLUE BAT. He recommended Maj Gen Adams, COMAMIANFOR, for the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal and Major Gen Viccellio, COMAMAIRFOR, for the Legion of Merit.

(5) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3595, 181826Z Oct 58, JNEFG Lebanon Msg File.
18 Oct 58 The UK Ministry of Defense announced that all British troops in Jordan would be withdrawn from that country by about 11 November. At the UN, it was announced that the UN Observer Group in Lebanon would assist in the British evacuation.


19 Oct 58 The last major US military unit in Lebanon, the 187th Airborne Battle Group, began leaving by air from Beirut Airport. At the same time, US Embassy wives and children, who had left Lebanon months earlier, began returning.

NYT, 20 Oct 58, 5:3.

20 Oct 58 After extensive observation of Lebanon's defense establishment, the US Ambassador in Beirut, with the concurrence of Adm Holloway and Gen Adams, had concluded that a complete reorganization of the Lebanese armed forces was indicated. Military capability could be greatly improved if men and materiel already on hand were utilized efficiently. He therefore proposed that the US, by suggesting that future investment in the Lebanese armed forces as currently organized would not be worthwhile, try to elicit a request from President Chehab for a US training mission to undertake a reorganization study. The Ambassador recommended that the US approve such a request, should one be made.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 2019, 20 Oct 58, OCJCS Files.

23 Oct 58 CINCSECOMME moved his headquarters to London, effective 1200Z. The final withdrawal movement from Lebanon continued, the status of Army personnel being as follows:

- Departed by airlift 2263
- Departed by sealift 2506
- Total ashore Beirut 2012


23 Oct 58 After reviewing pertinent actions of the JCS and higher authority related to the implementation of Operation BLUE BAT, J-3 recommended that the JCS direct an appropriate agency of the Joint Staff to investigate the feasibility of, and if appropriate develop, a uniform system of progressive alert procedures for all commands established by the Secretary of Defense and such other commands as might be involved in the implementation of war plans. This uniform alert system was to be designed to (1) assist the JCS in expeditiously determining and directing the degree of alert to be attained, and (2) prevent misinterpretation of alert and security directives.

24 Oct 58 The airlift of British paratroops from Jordan to Cyprus, over Syria, began.

25 Oct 58 CINCSPECOMME dispatched his final BLUE BAT SITREP, reporting the operation completed, with all forces having departed Beirut and reverted to normal operational control.
       (c) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 5358, 251221Z Oct 58.

28 Oct 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was informed that both the State and Defense Departments did not favor US involvement in the program he had suggested for reorganization and re-equipment of the Lebanese armed forces (see item of 20 October 58). Instead, only routine continuation of the Military Assistance Program and possibly visits and training programs for Lebanese officers were contemplated.
       (c) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 1696, 28 Oct 58.

The presence of these forces, it was noted, had slowed the trend in both countries toward seizure of control by local forces sympathetic to the UAR. It had not, however, changed basic trends in the area, which would continue in the direction of neutralism and accommodation with Pan-Arab nationalism. The most significant immediate consequence of the US-UK withdrawal would be the increased danger to the shaky regime of King Hussein, who, if he continued his present government and policies, might well be overthrown within a few months. This also raised the possibility of Israeli and UAR intervention in Jordan. The withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon was not likely to produce any marked or sudden change in that country.

29 Oct 58, J-2 files.

30 Oct 58 The Secretary of State, noting the timing of King Hussein's vacation and the fact that no member of the royal family would be left in Jordan during the critical period following the departure of British forces, queried the US Ambassador in Amman on the possibility that Hussein might be planning not to return. The Ambassador's opinion was that the King definitely intended to return after approximately one month, and that he was obliged to go to Europe both for reasons of health and in connection with his contemplated betrothal.
       (c) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1104, 30 Oct 58.
       (c) Msg, Amman to SecState, 1234, 31 Oct 58.

30 Oct 58 The National Security Council amended and adopted the draft statement of policy in NSC 5820, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," as revised by the NSC Planning Board. The final version, NSC 5820/1, was
approved by the President on 4 November. Some of the changes proposed by the JCS (see item of 13 October 58) had been incorporated in NSC 5820/1, although their recommendation concerning policy toward Iraq was not fully adopted.

The primary objectives of NSC 5820/1 were
(1) denial of the Near East area to Soviet domination, and
(2) continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet vital Western European requirements on reasonable terms. Secondary objectives included (1) political evolution and economic and social development in the area to promote stable governments, popularly supported and resistant to Communist influence and subversion, and (2) the expansion of US and, where appropriate, Free World influence in the area, and the countering and reduction of Communist influence.

To achieve these ends, the US should, among other things: (1) endeavor to establish an effective working relationship with Arab nationalism, seeking at the same time to influence, stabilize, and contain the movement, and recognizing that a policy of US accommodation to radical pan-Arab nationalism as symbolized by Nasser would include many elements contrary to US interests; (2) accept neutralist policies of Near Eastern states when necessary; (3) support the idea of Arab unity; (4) promote national and regional economic development; and (5) support leadership groups that offered the best prospect of progress toward US objectives in this area.

With regard to Lebanon, the US should support the continued independence and integrity of that country, without becoming too closely identified with individual factions in Lebanese politics, and should seek discreetly to disengage from relationships that might be disadvantageous to US interests.

With regard to Jordan, the US should, among other things, seek to bring about the "peaceful evolution of Jordan's political status," to reduce the US commitment to Jordan, and to transfer to Jordan's Arab neighbors responsibility for economic support of Jordan if possible.

With regard to Iraq, the US should: (1) seek to maintain friendly relations with the new government on a reciprocal basis, including a willingness to continue US technical assistance; (2) acquiesce in but not actively encourage Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; (3) on request, indicate US willingness to give sympathetic consideration to the continuance of limited military assistance if the Iraqis were prepared to cooperate in making its continuation fruitful; and (4) encourage pro-Western elements within Iraq, but avoid becoming identified with specific individuals and political issues.

30 Oct 58 The head of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon, Calo Plaza, announced that he considered the work of the Group to have been completed, and that he hoped to arrange for the Group's withdrawal as soon as possible. His statement followed a declaration on 29 October by Premier Karami that the need for the Observer Group had ended and that he expected to ask the Group to leave soon.