CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO
THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN LEBANON (U)

FIRST INSTALLMENT
8 November 1957 - 15 July 1958

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HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, in a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested the urgent preparation of an operational plan "for possible combined U.S.-U.K. military intervention in the event of an imminent or actual coup d'etat in Lebanon and/or Jordan." Mr. Murphy proposed that the plan be prepared by JCS officers in collaboration with British military authorities in the US. He emphasized that the project would be on a contingency basis only, as no decision had been taken to intervene in Jordan or Lebanon under the contemplated circumstances.

(At) Ltr, DepUSSecState to CJCS, 8 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 2.

According to the New York Times, a violent Egyptian radio and press campaign against Jordan's King Hussein, openly calling for his assassination, had been going on for several days. The Egyptian propaganda barrage was causing Western and neutral diplomats to fear that a new crisis was in the making in the Middle East.

NYT, 9 Nov 57, 1:4.

The JCS designated Maj Gen Verdi B. Barnes, USA, Chairman of the Joint Middle East Planning Committee, to represent them in planning with representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff for possible US-UK military intervention in the event of a coup d'etat in Jordan or Lebanon. Gen Barnes was instructed to use as basic guidance the plan recently prepared by JMEPC for unilateral US military action in the same circumstances and to take the forces allocated in that plan as the maximum possible US force contribution. JCS believed the forthcoming plan should be written in terms of a coordinated operation by US and British forces, without a combined command structure. It should not envisage any US logistical support of British units but should if possible provide for use of British facilities on Cyprus for US air operations and staging purposes. To maintain close liaison and gain planning assistance, Gen Barnes was authorized direct contact with CINCHEM and USCINCEUR. Plans produced by the US-UK representatives would be submitted to the JCS for final US approval.

(At) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, CINCHEM, and CINCSAC, JCS 932741, 152359Z Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 2.

Following JCS-State agreement on the text, JCS sent a message to USCINCEUR, CINCHEM, and CINCSAC defining the plans urgently required for rapid US military action to re-establish order and the authority of a government friendly to the US in Jordan or Lebanon should the government of either country be overthrown by coup d'etat. The plans were to be based on CINCSAC OPLAN 215-56 and terms of reference in the current message, derived from an outline plan produced by JMEPC. The JCS
instructed CINCEUR to prepare plans in coordination with CINCNEIL for the movement of forces. CINCNEIL, in his role as CINOSPECOMME, would have operational control of the forces upon their arrival in the Middle East. He was instructed to prepare plans in coordination with CINCEUR for employment of the forces to accomplish the mission. Coordination of planning with the UK might be directed later, but no discussion with British personnel would take place until ordered.

(PS) Mag, JCS to US CINCEUR, CINCNEIL, and CINCSAC, JCS 932740, 1523532 Nov 57, reproduced in (FS) JCS 1857/410, "Plan for U.S. Military Action in Jordan or Lebanon (PS)," 18 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) see 2.

15 Nov 57

The US Ambassador in Amman submitted his estimate of what the Jordanian public reaction would be to US-UK support of Iraqi and Saudi Arabian intervention to help put down a coup against King Hussein. He foresaw no serious repercussions so long as US-UK support was chiefly logistical and involved no appearance of Western forces in or over Jordan. Active air support, however, would cause a strong adverse reaction, and a full military effort that placed Western ground forces in Jordan would generate violent revulsion, a wave of friendship for the USSR, and charges of "imperialist" interference. Direct US-UK support of King Hussein in the absence of Iraqi or Saudi Arabian intervention would have the most serious repercussions of all, and would result in the eventual removal of Hussein once the Western powers withdrew. In sum, unless Iraq and Saudi Arabia would be willing, in the event of a coup beyond Hussein's power to control, to make a substantial effort to continue the pro-Western monarchy in Jordan, no government with a Western orientation could exist in that country unless the US and UK were willing to turn Jordan into a permanent military base amidst a hostile population. On the other hand, if a successful coup were allowed to occur in Jordan, the successor government would be dedicated to immediate union with Syria, and Jordan would shortly cease to exist as an independent country.

(PS) Mag, Amman to SecState, 988, 15 Nov 57, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) see 66.

16 Nov 57

Acknowledging the JCS instructions of the previous day concerning plans for US intervention in case of a coup d'état in Jordan or Lebanon, CINOSPECOMME pointed out the importance of avoiding a situation requiring the Sixth Fleet and USAFE to carry out an emergency evacuation while engaged in combat operations. He recommended that plans be coordinated at once with the State Department for evacuation of US nationals from at least Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, beginning not later than the alert for Phase 1 of the intervention plan. Two days later JCS informed him that the question of timely evacuation would be discussed with the State Department.
The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that King Hussein planned to take immediate steps to form a close relationship with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His project aimed at political, economic, and military understandings among the three Western-oriented countries. Hussein also expressed concern over the possibility of internal uprising or an attack from outside by Syrian and/or Israeli forces. In either event he planned to request Iraqi military assistance.

Planning discussions began between the JCS representatives and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff regarding possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon. The staff conversations ended, with completion of the plan, on 25 November.

CINCSPECOM informed the JCS that he had completed a draft Tab A to Course of Action 8 in the revision of his OPLAN 215-56 submitted on 27 September, designed to serve as the plan for possible US intervention in Jordan or Lebanon outlined in the JCS instructions of 15 November. Meanwhile, CINCSPECOM requested the earliest possible JCS action on his proposal that the above-mentioned revision to OPLAN 215-56 (which would become OPLAN 215-58) be approved as the basic plan covering the case under consideration and similar situations in the Middle East.

At a joint meeting in Damascus of Syrian members of the Chamber of Deputies and visiting members of Egypt's National Assembly, the legislators unanimously called on the governments of Egypt and Syria to establish a federal union of the two countries. In Cairo, the Egyptian Parliament seconded the move.

In answer to an urgent plea from Nasser, the Soviet Union agreed to give Egypt economic assistance. A Soviet announcement also stated that the two countries had reached agreement on "military matters."

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- 3 -
20 Nov 57 The US Ambassador in Jordan was informed of the US position that a closer association among Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia would be considered a constructive development, provided it were a spontaneous indigenous move. Hence the US would not actively sponsor King Hussein's project in this regard, but the US would continue to encourage Iraq and Saudi Arabia to give political and economic assistance to Jordan and, in the event of need, military support.

(25) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1227, 20 Nov 57.

21 Nov 57 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that the Lebanese Government had taken steps on 18 and 20 November to improve internal security. Besides establishing controls over the Palestinian refugees and visa requirements for Egyptian nationals, the penal code had been modified to permit the death penalty for terrorism.

(27) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1660, 21 Nov 57.

24 Nov 57 Lebanon and Pakistan issued a joint communique announcing their agreement to strengthen the security of the two countries against "any form of subversion now threatening them." The communique also stated that the two governments planned future talks aimed at strengthening their economic and cultural ties.

NYT, 25 Nov 57, 2:3.

24 Nov 57 The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that at a formal audience King Hussein had reviewed at length current US-Jordan relations and had requested a reappraisal and definition of the basic US position on the Israeli problem. Hussein felt that the US should adopt firmer restraints on Israel and a clearer policy in support of Jordan. Expressing grave concern over the economic situation of Jordan, the King desired assurance of continuing US financial support for the future.


25 Nov 57 The US Ambassador in Amman was authorized to inform Jordan that the US was prepared to make available up to $10 million in FY 1958 to help finance Jordanian development projects. The program should concentrate on a limited number of major projects to stimulate local economy, particularly land and water development and phosphate and potash production.

(25) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1276, 25 Nov 57.

27 Nov 57 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan for US military action in Jordan or Lebanon prepared by JFMP. A summary of the plan had already been transmitted on 15 November 57 to US CINCCEUR, CINCNELL, and CINCUS for use as a basis for the preparation of detailed plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Tab A of Appendix VIII (Course of Action 8) to Annex A to CINCSPECOM's OPLAN 215-58 for emergency use and pending final approval, subject to certain specified modifications. The approved Tab A covered deployment of US forces to Lebanon or Jordan in the event of a coup d'état.

27 Nov 57

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they had prepared a tentative plan for US military action in Jordan or Lebanon in case of a coup d'état in either country, and that the planned operations were dependent on (1) staging bases for US forces at Adana, Turkey, and in Libya and Cyprus, (2) overflight rights in Israel, and (3) staging and overflight rights in France, Italy, Greece, England, and Canada. The Secretary was asked to communicate this information to SecState and request him to take action to insure the availability of these rights.

On 6 December, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had personally presented the above memorandum to Mr. William M. Rountree, the Assistant Secretary of State concerned with Middle Eastern affairs.

27 Nov 57

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCSPECOM that his draft OPLAN 215-58 (revision of OPLAN 215-56) had been approved, subject to certain modifications. Pending development by CINCSPECOM of supporting sections and annexes, the JCS approved references to OPLAN 215-58 for interim guidance, and the use of suitable portions of Appendix VIII to Annex A to OPLAN 215-58 in completing the Jordan-Lebanon contingency plan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they believed the unsatisfactory politico-military situation in the Middle East posed a serious threat to the security of the US and the Free World. Exploitation of that situation by the USSR resulted in a spread of Communist domination that could not be prevented by military measures alone. Hence, immediate and decisive US political and diplomatic action was imperative to stabilize the Middle East under conditions favorable to the Free World. The Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the US political effort must directly attack the basic Arab-Israeli problem, from which all other difficulties in the area stemmed. They considered that its resolution depended on: (1) the fixing of agreed boundaries for Israel, (2) a Western guarantee that Israel would stay within the boundaries thus fixed, and (3) settlement of the Arab refugee problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff affirmed that the threat to US security if the US failed to take the initiative in solving the problem was so great as to transcend the interests of any minority group within the US. If SecDef concurred, JCS recommended that he forward the above views to SecState with the recommendation that the matter be brought before the National Security Council as a matter of urgency.

"(45) Memo, CSA to SecDef, "Resolution of the Middle East Question (U)," 4 Dec 57, derived from (23) JCS 1887/409, same subj, 19 Nov 57, GCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 4."

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed JCS of the State Department's opinion that accelerated delivery of a squadron of F-66F aircraft to Iraq, as had been recommended by the JCS, would be politically unwise at present, but that the early establishment of an air-defense capability in Iraq was politically important. Hence the State Department favored an immediate survey to determine the minimum requirements of the Iraqi Air Force in this regard. The Assistant SecDef indicated that the Department of the Air Force would be requested to undertake the survey, as a step toward refining a military assistance program for Iraq.

"(46) Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, "Military Assistance to the Middle East (U)," 10 Dec 57, circulated as (46) JCS 1887/420, 10 Dec 57, GCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 4."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the conclusions in a report by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee that (1) US military support should be provided to Iraq and Saudi Arabia if those nations were to take military action to counter a coup d'etat in Jordan, and (2) details regarding this US military support would require discussion with military representatives of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The support would include airlifting advance Iraqi and token Saudi Arabian ground forces into Jordan,
and providing supplies for these forces, fighter-bomber aircraft for Iraq with maintenance and training support, and information and assistance through US liaison teams posing as observers.

Meanwhile US forces would maintain air surveillance of Jordan's frontiers and stand ready to intervene in the operation if necessary.


31 Dec 57

Foreign Minister Rifai of Jordan stated that his country would need an average of $50 million in US aid a year for five to ten years to help finance her economy and armed forces.

NYT, 1 Jan 58, 1:4.

8 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the Secretary of Defense on the advisability of furnishing military equipment requested by the Lebanese Army. Unwilling to endorse the entire Lebanese request because of its excessive concern with major end items, the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that US military objectives in the Middle East would be served by supplying selected items of military equipment that would give Lebanon increased capability to maintain internal security and some capability to defend against aggression.

(57) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Request for the Lebanese Army for U.S. Military Equipment (TS)," 8 Jan 58, derived from (57) JCS 1887/426, CCS 381 EMMA (11-19-47) sec 67.

10 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that the plan requested by the Deputy Secretary of State on 8 November 1957 for possible combined US-UK military intervention in case of an imminent or actual coup d'etat in Jordan and/or Lebanon had been prepared. On reviewing the plan, the JCS had found it to be a suitable basis for detailed operational planning. They considered, however, that such planning should not be conducted for the time being because of the possibility of compromising the plan and thereby jeopardizing the US position both in the United Nations and with the remainder of the Arab world. The Secretary was requested to obtain the concurrence of SecState in these views.

(57) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Contingency Plan for U.S.-U.K. Military Action in Jordan and/or Lebanon (TS)," 10 Jan 58, derived from (57) JCS 1887/427, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 5.

15 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that to insure adequate communications support of the plan for possible US military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon they recommended the clandestine establishment, if politically feasible, of a military medium-high-power radio transmitter
in Amman, Jordan. The JCS requested that SecDef obtain the approval of the State Department for this undertaking.

(25) Memo, CJCS to SeoDef, "Plan for U.S. Military Action in Jordan or Lebanon (U)," 15 Jan 58, derived from (TS) JCS 2034/46, CCS 361 (3-14-49) sec 6.

15 Jan 58

The US Embassy in Damascus reported a strong revival of the Syrian movement for union with Egypt, backed by most Syrian political leaders. The Embassy suggested that the US was in no position to check this movement and would be wasting its prestige in openly opposing so popular a cause. While domination of Syria by Nasser was obviously far from attractive, it seemed the lesser of two evils when compared with the only apparent alternative: Communist entrenchment in Syria so substantial that it could only be dealt with by force from outside.

(67) Msg, Damascus to SecState, 134, 15 Jan 58.

20 Jan 58

The JCS approved the final version of Tab A to Appendix VIII to Annex A of CINCSPECOM'S OPLAN 215-58, subject to certain modifications made after the tentative approval of Tab A on 27 November 1957 and to the following: the plans should be sufficiently flexible to permit implementation with fewer than the total allocated forces, if the JCS determined that the total forces were not needed. The JCS also informed CINCSPECOM that they approved the prestocking of certain supplies at Adana, Turkey.


22 Jan 58

The National Security Council adopted NSC 5801/1, "Long-Range US Policy Toward the Near East," which superseded NSC 5428, approved 23 July 54. NSC 5801/1 was approved by the President on 24 January 1958.

NSC 5801/1 described four major US objectives in the Middle East: (1) to maintain for the US and its allies the resources, strategic positions, and passage rights of the area, and to deny to the Soviet bloc strategic positions and control of Middle East resources; (2) to maintain stable, friendly, and progressive governments in the Middle East; (3) to achieve an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; and (4) to prevent further extension of Soviet influence and reduce existing Soviet influence.

To achieve these objectives, the US would, in general: (1) provide Free World leadership and assume major responsibility for the Free World in the Middle East; (2) seek to guide Middle East revolutionary and nationalistic pressures into orderly channels, not antagonistic to the West;
(3) encourage the economic development of the area and be prepared, if necessary, to increase US economic aid; and (4) provide military aid to friendly countries.

In support of this general guidance, the US would, among other things:

1. Implement the policy established by the American Doctrine; support but not join the Baghdad Pact; and, if necessary, accept a neutralist orientation of Middle East states and provide assistance to neutralist states in order to develop local anti-Communist strength.

2. Proclaim US support for the ideal of Arab unity. Discreetly encourage the ultimate federation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq, or of two of these states, and to this end strengthen Iraqi and Saudi influence in Jordan, while at the same time providing economic and military aid to Jordan. Seek continuing Israeli acquiescence in these moves concerning Jordan.

3. Seek to counterbalance Egypt's preponderant position of leadership in the Arab world by strengthening more moderate Arab states. Seek to determine if the West could profit from Nasser's neutralist policies, and, if so, assist Egypt where a clear-cut quid pro quo could be arranged.

5. Maintain support of the present Iraqi regime, but encourage trends toward the peaceful establishment of a more broadly-based moderate progressive government. Encourage Iraq to exercise constructive leadership within the Arab world.

6. Provide Lebanon with political support and with military assistance for internal security problems.

7. Keep the UK currently informed, and work with it on Middle East problems to the extent compatible with US area objectives. Inform the French generally, but with caution, and consult and exchange views with other Free World countries.

NSC Action No. 1345, 22 Jan 58.


The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to advise President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik that the US had decided to provide a limited number of modern jet fighters to Lebanon, the exact number and type to be determined later, and to facilitate the purchase of additional aircraft by Lebanon. He was also to advise them that the US was considering other forms of aid for Lebanon. (The US planned to supply six Hawker Hunter Mark VI jets, with the expectation that Lebanon would purchase six more, and was contemplating additional grant military assistance to include a small number of light tanks.)
30 Jan 58
The US Ambassador was instructed to inform Jordan that $20 million from US FY 1958 funds were earmarked for budgetary support during Jordan's FY 1959.

30 Jan 58
At the final public meeting of the Baghdad Pact conference in Ankara, Secretary of State Dulles told the delegates that the US was fully committed to back up the defenses of the Pact powers. He stated that Congressional approval of the American Doctrine had the same effect as actual US membership in the Baghdad Pact.

--- NYT, 31 Jan 58, 1:1.

1 Feb 58
Egypt and Syria issued a proclamation announcing their intention of uniting as one state, to be named the United Arab Republic, with "one flag, one army, one people." Presidents Kuwatly of Syria and Nasser of Egypt were to address their parliaments on February 5, and the peoples of Syria and Egypt were to vote in a plebiscite within 30 days on the question of union and the choice of a head of state for the new nation. The proclamation hailed the prospective merger as a step toward a general union of Arab states.

--- NYT, 2 Feb 58, 1:3, 4:1, 5:1.

3 Feb 58
The US Ambassador in Jordan was officially informed by Jordan that Saudi adherence to the proposed Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was contingent upon Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. Saudi Arabia had also indicated that it would be impossible to provide the $15 million promised Jordan for the next FY. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had made overtures to Jordan regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations and had offered unlimited economic and technical aid. Therefore, Jordan requested public support by the US for the proposed organization of pro-Western Arab states, no US opposition to Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, and $60 million in US assistance for all purposes, including replacement of the Saudi default.

--- Mag, Amman to SeoState, 1433, 3 Feb 58.

5 Feb 58
The US Ambassador in Iraq reported on a meeting called by Crown Prince Abdulillah, which the British Ambassador also attended. According to Abdulillah, the very existence of Iraq was being threatened by the imminent union of Egypt and Syria. Iraq therefore contemplated taking various actions, including military intervention, to overthrow the Syrian regime prior to the plebiscite scheduled for 21 February, and thus frustrate Nasser's project. The Crown Prince desired an indication of the attitude of the US and UK toward the Iraqi proposal, as well as the extent of support that might be expected.

--- Mag, Baghdad to SeoState, 1285, 5 Feb 58.
5 Feb 58  The Secretary of State instructed the US Ambassador in Jordan to inform King Hussein that, although the US favored Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon establishing closer political relations among themselves, any public expression of US approval in the absence of substantial progress toward realizing such a goal would serve no useful purpose. The Ambassador was also instructed to convey reassurances that Jordan's essential needs would continue to receive sympathetic consideration by the US.

(8) Mag, SecState to Amman, 1873, 5 Feb 58.

5 Feb 58  President Kwatly of Syria formally announced Syria's union with Egypt. In the same speech he nominated President Nasser of Egypt to be President of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and said that he would be the first to vote for Nasser in the plebiscite to be held on 21 February.

NYT, 6 Feb 58, 5:1.

7 Feb 58  The US Ambassador in Iraq reported that he had been advised by Crown Prince Abdullah that Iraq was preparing to move troops into Jordan as soon as possible, should they be requested by King Hussein when he and King Faisal met on 9 February.

(25) Mag, Baghdad to SecState, 1294, 7 Feb 58.

8 Feb 58  An analysis by the US Embassy in Damascus discounted doubts expressed in other quarters about the durability of the Egyptian-Syrian UAR, stressing: (1) the unifying influence of the existence of Israel; (2) the lack of Syrian nationalism except as part of the "Arab nation"; (3) the awareness of Nasser of the possible threats within Syria to the union; and (4) the strong internal political reasons for Syrian adherence to the union.

(6) Mag, Damascus to SecState, 2207, 8 Feb 58.

12 Feb 58  Nuri informed the US Ambassador in Baghdad that he had been asked to form a new Iraqi government, but his acceptance depended on US willingness to provide Iraq with adequate air strength. He specifically wanted two squadrons of jet interceptors, with necessary training personnel, before he would agree to assume office.

(48) Mag, Baghdad to SecState, 1327, 12 Feb 58.

14 Feb 58  Iraq and Jordan signed an agreement for the union of the two kingdoms. Under the Arab Union agreement, both King Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan were to retain their thrones, but there was to be a large measure of unification in defense and administration. During its five months' existence, the new state was sometimes called, in the press and elsewhere, the Arab Federation, but in the official usage of the US State Department it was the Arab Union.

NYT, 14 Feb 58, 1:2.
A Lebanese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Lebanon would join neither the UAR nor the Arab Union.

NYT, 19 Feb 58: 2:3.

The establishment of the Arab Union would not solve the most important domestic problems of either Iraq or Jordan, and might, indeed, make some of them more serious. The radical nationalists in Iraq, however, would probably not create a serious security problem, and the principal internal threat would come from Jordan's Palestinian population. Nevertheless, if the Arab Union survived its initial difficulties and was able to capitalize on Iraqi economic resources, its long-term prospects would be favorable.

21 Feb 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCNEIM to prepare a basic operational plan, based on CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58, for US military action in limited war situations in the Middle East. The plan should provide the basic intelligence, logistics, communications, and command arrangements required. Tabs to the plan should then be prepared to cover certain specific operations (for which operational plans were already in existence); protection of US nationals and interests, action to deter or intervene in Arab-Israeli hostilities, and intervention in Jordan and/or Lebanon. Data for preparation of additional tabs would be furnished by the JCS when they felt the situation called for further specific operational plans.

(58) SM-126-58 to CINCNEIM, "Military Planning for the Middle East (e)", 21 Feb 58, derived from (58) JCS 1887/433, CCS 381 EMREA (11-19-47) sec 68.

21 Feb 58

In plebiscites in Egypt and Syria, voters gave almost unanimous approval to the joining of the two countries in the United Arab Republic and elected Nasser the first President of the UAR.

NYT, 23 Feb 58, 1:2.

25 Feb 58

The US Government officially recognized the Government of the United Arab Republic (UAR). In a statement announcing recognition, the State Department said that it had noted the assurances of the UAR that it intended to respect and observe its international obligations, including all existing obligations of Egypt and Syria.

26 Feb 58 A visit of UAR President Nasser to Damascus was reported to be arousing enthusiasm among the Moslem population of nearby Lebanon. Many of the Lebanese Moslems were travelling to Damascus to join in the pro-Nasser demonstrations in that city. Christian leaders in Lebanon were reportedly fearful that the formation of the UAR might endanger the independent future of their country.

NCT, 27 Feb 58, 5:5.

28 Feb 58 According to a CIA report, Ali Abu Nuwar, exiled former Jordanian Chief of Staff living in Syria, was plotting to overthrow King Hussein and to bring Jordan into the United Arab Republic. Also associated with Nuwar was an Iraqi clique planning to overthrow King Faisal and bring Iraq into the UAR.

 Msg, CIA to JCS, TOCS - 3/348, 169,
 11 Mar 58, DA IN 99925 (12 Mar 58).

3 Mar 58 Nuri became Premier of Iraq. He had resigned from this position in June 1957 because of ill health, but his great prestige made him the only possible leader to head the Iraqi Cabinet during implementation of the Arab Union, recently formed by Iraq and Jordan.

NCT, 4 Mar 58, 3:5.

5 Mar 58 Lt. Col. Abdul Hamid SerraJ, the Syrian Army's "strong man," charged at a news conference in Damascus that King Saud of Saudi Arabia had attempted to procure the assassination of President Nasser and a Syrian Army coup d'etat, led by SerraJ, who was then to form a new Syrian Government not allied with Egypt. SerraJ showed reporters photostats of three checks from Saud totaling 1,900,000 pounds. He asserted that Saud's go-between had stated that the US Government was aware of these plans and would lead the way in recognizing the new Syrian Government that SerraJ was supposed to establish.

NCT, 6 Mar 58, 1:2.

7 Mar 58
President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and
the Crown Prince of Yemen signed an agreement
federating their two countries. Under the agreement
Yemen was to retain its existing regime and inter-
national status, but the federation was to have
"unified armed forces" and a united foreign policy.


In Manila for the SEATO Conference, British Foreign
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd told Secretary Dulles that
during his stopover at Baghdad he had found Iraqi
leaders in a very jittery state, visibly worried
about the continued existence of the regime. Un-
settling factors appeared to be the impact of
Nasser's appeal in Iraq and the unpopularity of the
projected Iraqi tie with Jordan in the Arab Union.
The Iraqi leaders had pressed Lloyd for British
assistance, which the UK was willing to give, and
Lloyd now turned to Secretary Dulles for US support.
Specifically, Lloyd desired a US extension of credit
to Iraq and the provision of fighter aircraft to
that country.

(28) Msg, Manila to SecState, SECTO 12,
11 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

In response to Secretary of State Dulles' report of
his conversation with Selwyn Lloyd (see above item),
the State Department provided the Secretary with a
suggested reply to the British request. The US
Government agreed to the urgent necessity of support-
ing the Arab Union and was willing to match the pro-
posed British contribution of the 50,000 pounds for
an Iraqi propaganda project. The US would find
greater difficulty in extending credit, but it was
prepared to consider assisting individual develop-
ment projects in Jordan and Iraq. While willing to
give assurance of the intention of providing Iraq
with fighter aircraft, the US Government could not
act until the report of the US survey team, scheduled
to leave shortly for Iraq, had been received. The
US wished to impress the Iraqi leaders with the
importance of making the Arab Union a real federation,
within which Iraq would assist Jordan. The US also
wished to emphasize its belief that Iraq and Jordan
should not attempt any military move against the UAR.

(43) Msg, SecState to Manila, TOSEC 22, 11 Mar
58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

12 Mar 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad, in reporting his
estimate of the position of the Iraqi regime, stated
that the Iraqi Army and policy showed no signs of
disaffection, and no effective leadership or
organization existed among the political opposition.
Further, he felt that Prime Minister Nuri and the
Crown Prince could weather Nasser's expected prop-
aganda offensive.

(73) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 1513, 12 Mar 58.
12 Mar 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon predicted that the new United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria would generate increasing tensions in the Middle East. He anticipated that Lebanon would be subjected to severe internal and external pressures, which might lead the government to ask for fulfillment of existing British, French, and US promises of support. The Ambassador felt that the American Doctrine would not be applicable in this case, unless the UAR moved closer to Communism than seemed probable at the moment. He suggested that the State Department "might wish to have in mind what answer to give when I am summoned to Palace at midnight and asked for instant help."

[97] Mag, Beirut to SecState, 3033, 12 Mar 58, DA IN 100429 (13 Mar 58).

12 Mar 58 The US Ambassador in Jidda reported that the Egyptian military advisers to Saudi Arabia had left, and that the USMM had been requested by the Saudi Minister of Defense to assume expanded training responsibilities.

(9) Mag, Jidda to SecState, 881, 12 Mar 58.

13 Mar 58 The National Security Council noted the President's request that the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, urgently explore what types of US support might be given to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia if required or requested in the immediate future. This was NSC Action 1875, approved by the President on 15 March.

(98) Memo, Dep SecDef to SecArmy, et al., "Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the Near East (9)," 19 Mar 58, encl to (96) JCS-1987/442, Note by Secys, same subj, 24 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

14 Mar 58 The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Jidda to inform King Saud that the US was willing to undertake to the fullest extent possible the functions formerly performed by the departing Egyptian military advisers.

(9) Mag, SecState to Jidda, 1284, 14 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

18 Mar 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was requested to apprise Chamoun of the US position on Lebanon's presidential election and efforts to amend the constitution to permit Chamoun to succeed himself. The US viewed the issue as a domestic political problem which, though having a bearing on the internal security situation, could only be decided by the Lebanese. Therefore the US would remain impartial and aloof. For the Ambassador's information, the US would not attempt further to dissuade Chamoun from seeking re-election and at the same time would avoid any indication of supporting him. However, if circumstances so required, covert assistance might be considered.

(98) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 3626, 18 Mar 58.
18 Mar 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to renew to Foreign Minister Malik the assurances of the US determination to support the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon in the face of external aggression and internal subversion. The US would be prepared to consider giving Nasser a direct warning if convincing evidence appeared that he was planning an aggressive move against Lebanon.

(s) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 3629, 18 Mar 58.

22 Mar 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested CINCSPECOM to prepare, as a matter of priority, plans for dealing with a possible coup d'etat in Saudi Arabia. The plans were to cover action to protect US nationals and interests, to maintain order, to re-establish the authority of a friendly government, and, possibly, to deter a coup if one seems imminent.

(s) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOM et al., JCS 93896, 22 Mar 58, derived from (t) JCS 1887/438, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 5.

23 Mar 58

King Saud issued a decree vesting the main responsibility for the formulation and execution of Saudi Arabian domestic and foreign policy in Crown Prince Faisal.

(s) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 943, 23 Mar 58.


27 Mar 58

CINCSPECOM submitted an outline operation plan for dealing with a possible coup d'etat in Saudi Arabia, in accordance with his instructions of 22 March. On 7 April 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to this plan, pending submission of the completed version for review.

(s) Msg, CINCSPECOM to JCS, 27 Mar 58, DA IN 104561 (29 Mar 58). (t) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOM, JCS 939730, 0722382 Apr 58, derived from (t) JCS 1887/446. All in CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.
27 Mar 58
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that a meeting to crystallize opposition to the re-election of President Chamoun took place at the home of former Foreign Minister Henri Pharaon. The 60 participants, including prominent Christians and Moslems, signed a resolution that called for a combined Christian and Moslem effort to oppose Chamoun's re-election and warned that the people were justified in using all available means to prevent a renewal of the presidential term. Ambassador McIlvick believed Chamoun would seek another term, in which case internal disturbances might lead to a civil war. (5) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 3242, 28 Mar 58, DA IN 104691 (29 Mar 58).

28 Mar 58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Secretary of State to reconsider the decision not to undertake negotiations for staging and prestocking rights at Adana Airfield in Turkey.

(4-29) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Staging and Prestocking Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus (a)," 28 Mar 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6, derived from (29) JCS 1887/439, same file, sec 5.

28 Mar 58
The Chief of Staff, Army, pointing out that NATO shield forces in Western Europe might be weakened at a critical time by the withdrawal of US Army combat troops for contingency operations in the Middle East, recommended that the CONUS-based Strategic Army Corps be used as an alternate source of troops for such operations. On 15 May 1958, at the request of its originator, this recommendation was withdrawn from consideration by the JCS.

(29) JCS 1887/444, Memo by CSA, "Utilization of Strategic Army Corps (STRAO) for Contingency Operations in the Middle East (a)," 1 Apr 58, and (a) N/H of JCS 1887/444, 15 May 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

28 Mar 58
The Department of Defense recommended to the Department of State that an appropriate agreement be negotiated with Lebanon, or a Presidential determination instrument (under the Mutual Security Act) be instituted, in order to make Lebanon eligible for grant military aid, specifically the items of military equipment recommended by the JCS on 8 January 1958.

(5) Ltr, Spec Asst to Dep Asst SecDef (ISA) to Spec Asst for Mutual Security Coordination, Dept State, 28 Mar 58, encl to (5) N/H of JCS 1887/426, 7 Apr 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 67.

1 Apr 58
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State Department considered the clandestine establishment of a radio transmitter in Amman, Jordan, to be politically infeasible at the present time. (See item of 15 January 1958.)
7 Apr 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that they considered the plan prepared by US and British staff officers for possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon to be a suitable basis for detailed coordination operational planning. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that such detailed planning was required at the present time.

(28) SM-252-58 to Repe of Br Chfs of Staff, "Contingency Plans for U.S.-U.K. Military Action in Jordan and/or Lebanon (28)," 7 Apr 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6, derived from (28) JCS 1887/427, same file, sec 5.

9 Apr 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut transmitted a formal Lebanese request for $15 million in US aid. The aid was to be applied to urgently needed economic and technical development projects, the specific nature of which would be determined in subsequent negotiations. The Lebanese Government hoped the requested funds could be allocated immediately from US appropriations for foreign aid in the current fiscal year ending 30 June 58.

(27) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 3395, 11 Apr 58.

10 Apr 58

CINCSPECOMME submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review his completed plan for possible military intervention in Saudi Arabia, in accordance with his instructions dated 7 April. The completed plan was in the form of a Tab B to Appendix VIII of Annex A to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58.

(29) Ltr, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, "CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58," 10 Apr 58, Encl to (28) JCS 2034/58, Note by Secys, "Supplement to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 (U)," 6 May 58, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec 8.

10 Apr 58

The British military member of the US-UK Working Group told the Group that the British disagreed with the JCS view, expressed in the memorandum of 7 April, that detailed coordinated operational planning for possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon was not required for the time being. He said the British would like to have a team of planners work with the JCS in rewriting and extending the plan, in view of changed circumstances in the area, and that they believed the major area commanders, at least, should be included in the planning.

14 Apr 58 The New York Times correspondent in Cairo reported that the Egyptian propaganda campaign against Jordan's King Hussein had increased greatly in severity and was apparently aimed at stirring up a pro-Nasser revolt among Jordan's Palestinian population. 
NVT, 15 Apr 58, 5:2.

14 Apr 58 The New York Times correspondent in Beirut reported that skirmishing between government and opposition forces in Lebanon had reached the point where the country was on the verge of civil war. The Lebanese Army was being deployed to prevent a Syrian-supported revolt by northern tribes. 
NVT, 15 Apr 58, 2:3.

19 Apr 58 Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced that his Government would not join the United Arab Republic or the rival Arab Union, but would cooperate with both. 
NVT, 20 Apr 58, 1:7.

23 Apr 58 The JSSC submitted a report on the responsibilities to be assigned the US Military Representative for the Middle East and the optimum location for his headquarters. On 13 June, this report was withdrawn from further consideration by the JCS. 
(43) JCS 1887/450, Rpt by JSSC, "U.S. Military Representation in the Middle East (U)," 23 Apr 58, and (45) N/H of JCS 1887/450, 13 Jun 58, CCS 381 EMMA (11-19-47), sec 69.

23 Apr 58 The State Department informed the British Embassy in Washington of the US decision to supply jet aircraft to Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Twelve Hawker Hunter Mark VI aircraft were going to Jordan, and six to Lebanon, within the next three months, all to be supplied through offshore procurement in the UK. The US requested the UK to assume responsibility for training. A squadron (15 aircraft) of F86's would go to Iraq, with a small number of these being provided, and training started, as soon as possible. 
(6) Msg, SecState to London, 7564, 23 Apr 58, CCS 381 EMMA (11-19-47) sec 69.

29 Apr 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to inform Malik, in response to a Lebanese request for US grant aid from funds appropriated for FY 1958, that all such funds had already been committed. Further, because of constitutional limitations governing appropriation procedure, the US was unable to make a long-term commitment to support a Lebanese development program but could only consider assistance on a year-to-year basis. 
(6) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4106, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to deliver a letter from the Secretary of State to Malik, which was intended to forestall any possible repudiation of the American Doctrine by Lebanon because of misinterpretation of its implications. The letter
emphasized that adherence to the Doctrine placed no obligation on Lebanon and involved no commitment to assist the US in the event of hostilities between the US and any country. The relationship between the US and Lebanon continued to be based on the principles of the UN Charter and the US desire to see Lebanon maintain its independence and sovereignty.

(47) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4107, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58

In a message to Secretary Dulles, Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali declared that US support of Lebanese President Chamoun was essential to keep Lebanon aligned with the West and thus prevent Nasser and the USSR from dominating the Middle East.

(48) Msg, Khartoum to SecState, 913, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that King Hussein, at the specific request of Chamoun, had agreed to provide 500 small arms with a supply of ammunition as soon as possible. These weapons were to be used to equip Chamoun's personal supporters, rather than the regular Lebanese armed forces.

(49) Msg, Amman to SecState, 1856, 29 Apr 58.

30 Apr 58

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Baghdad to inform Nuri and King Faisal that the US, following the survey team report and consultation with the UK, had decided to provide Iraq with a squadron of 15 F-86F jet aircraft (see item of 23 April 58).

(50) Msg, SecState to Baghdad, 2827, 30 Apr 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 70.

30 Apr 58

UAR President Nasser conferred for three hours with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow.

NYT, 1 May 58, 7:1.

30 Apr 58

The State Department announced the release of certain blocked funds of Egypt (now UAR), in recognition of the satisfactory agreement recently concluded between the UAR and the Suez Canal Company.


4 May 58

The US, British, and French Ambassadors in Beirut, believing that the Lebanese situation was likely to become critical within another week, agreed on a joint appreciation of the situation, for urgent consideration by their governments. President Chamoun was almost certain to seek amendment of the constitution and stand for re-election, but disorders would have to be expected if he was successful. The three Ambassadors concluded that the West, faced with a choice of supporting Chamoun or standing aloof, would have to support Chamoun, despite the risks, since Western failure to back him would have an adverse effect on the friends and allies of the West in the entire Middle East.

(51) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3647, 4 May 58, OCJCS files.
8 May 58
Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali told correspondents that the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo had been directed to protest strongly to the UAR Foreign Minister over inflammatory Cairo radio broadcasts aimed at Iraq.

NYT, 9 May 58, 2:3.

8 May 58
Nassib Metni, a "crusading" Lebanese editor, was shot down outside his Beirut home by two gunmen in what was generally regarded as a political killing. Metni, whose paper was considered pro-Communist, had been an outspoken critic of the Chamoun government.

NYT, 10 May 58, 6:1.

10 May 58
The Lebanese Army moved into Tripoli to restore order after the United States Information Service library in that city was sacked and burned late the previous evening by armed men demonstrating against the Lebanese Government. The rioting had been set off by the assassination of opposition editor Nassib Metni, on 8 May.

NYT, 11 May 58, 1:4, 20:5.

11 May 58
The US Embassy in Beirut urgently recommended an airlift of police equipment to Beirut to support the Lebanese security forces. The recommended equipment included tear gas projectiles, grenades, guns, and masks, and submachine guns, rifles, and ammunition.

(a) Msg, Beirut to SeoState, 3770, 11 May 58, OCJCS files.

11 May 58
The US Ambassador reported that the crisis in Lebanon was "rapidly reaching a very serious state." President Chamoun had that morning rejected an opposition demand that he resign. Later in the day, Lebanese Army commander Gen Chehab had declined a proposal by moderates that he become Prime Minister as a compromise measure that would allow Chamoun to complete his term yet forestall his re-election. An outbreak of violence appeared likely as the next step.

(b) Msg, Beirut to SeoState, 3772, 11 May 58.

11 May 58
The US Ambassador in Beirut forwarded President Chamoun's request that the US airlift twenty tanks with ammunition to strengthen Lebanon's security forces. While advised by the Military Attache of the current impracticability of such an airlift, Ambassador McClintock recommended on political grounds that the US Government make an immediate favorable response to the Lebanese request. He believed that nothing short of arrival of the tanks within two weeks, by whatever means, would sustain the confidence of Lebanese leaders in the pledges of support the US had given.

After presenting the request for tanks to the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Malik said that he and Chamoun, "thinking out loud," were wondering if the time had not come to plan for the deployment of a US Marine division in the event Syrian-Egyptian aggression, now indirect, became more overt. On receiving McClintock's strongly unfavorable reaction, Malik stressed that "this was the most tentative sort of thinking."
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported his firm belief, based on conversations with Chamoun, that the Lebanese President intended to request President Eisenhower to send US Marines if Syrian forces, irregular or otherwise, appeared in any numbers on Lebanese soil.

(25) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3782, 12 May 58.

The US Ambassador in Lebanon transmitted Malik's reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 29 April 58. Malik concurred generally in the views expressed by the Secretary and suggested that whatever misunderstandings existed about the relationship between Lebanon and the US under the American Doctrine were the result of enemy propaganda exploiting the past inadequacy of US aid to Lebanon. In order to eliminate that propaganda vulnerability he requested a US commitment of substantial financial assistance for the first year of Lebanon's six-year economic development plan. Malik also expressed concern over reaction to any appearance of US rapprochement with Nasser; he recommended the US position be made clear to reassure those who might misinterpret it.

(25) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3797, 12 May 58.

The British and US Ambassadors in Beirut stated in a joint appreciation that Gen Chehab had the means to control the situation without outside help, unless there were massive intervention from Syria. He will, however, "was vacillating at best, and lacking at worst." His resolution would be strengthened if Chamoun were to declare publicly that he did not intend to seek re-election.

(25) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3806, 12 May 58.

The Secretary of State requested the Ambassadors in Jordan and Lebanon to advise those two governments that the US would supply on a grant basis 12 British Hawker Hunter Mark VI jets to Jordan and 6 similar aircraft to Lebanon. Additional numbers would be provided in the future as the capacity to absorb and maintain them was established.

(25) Msg, SecState to Amman, 2514, and to Beirut, 4252, 12 May 58.

An armed insurrection in Beirut, aimed at overthrowing the Lebanese Government, was put down by army troops and the police after a day of intermittent street fighting. One of the three US libraries in the capital was sacked and burned, and a major pipeline of the IFO was cut. A state of alert, one step from martial law, was decreed and a curfew imposed in Beirut. Tripoli was reported still in a state of siege, with fighting going on between insurrectionists and the army. The Cairo and Damascus radios
were on the air all day, urging the Lebanese to overthrow their government.

NYT, 13 May 58, 1:1.

12 May 58

The Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was formally established.

NYT, 13 May 58, 4:5.

13 May 58

At a meeting in Beirut during the morning with the US, British, and French Ambassadors, President Chamoun described the situation in Lebanon as "very grave," although not yet desperate, and requested each Ambassador to forward an oral message to his Chief of State recalling the guarantees given to Lebanon regarding the maintenance of its integrity and independence. The Ambassadors should stress the possibility of a need for armed intervention within 24 hours of an appeal by the President or Government of Lebanon. Chamoun had not yet decided to ask for foreign troops, but would probably make his decision within the next 24 hours. All three Ambassadors suggested to Chamoun that an appeal to the UN Security Council be made simultaneously with any request for tripartite intervention.

(TG) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3826, 13 May 58, OCJCS files.

13 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut warned the State Department that, if the US intervened to maintain the integrity and independence of Lebanon, it would be a "capital political mistake" to support a second term of office for President Chamoun. Such support would provide grounds for charges that Western "imperialist" powers were intervening in local politics against what would be presented as the "will of the people."

(TG) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3832, 13 May 58, OCJCS files.

13 May 58

Secretary of State Dulles authorized the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform President Chamoun that a request for Western military assistance should be made only under the most compelling necessity, where the integrity of Lebanon was genuinely threatened and where its own forces were insufficient for protection. Nevertheless, upon request from the President and Government of Lebanon, the US would send combat forces to that country with the dual mission of protecting US nationals and property and of assisting Lebanon "in its military program." To meet US constitutional requirements the Lebanese request should be made in terms of this mission and not as an appeal under the American Doctrine, since President Eisenhower was not authorized to send troops with an avowed purpose of fighting for Lebanon's independence unless there was armed aggression from a country controlled by International Communism. In practice, however, the presence of US troops would free Lebanese forces from guard duties, and the exercise of the right of self-defense might further engage US forces in operations against the rebels.
The US Government stated three further conditions regarding the circumstances under which Lebanon might ask for intervention: (1) at least concurrently with any public request to the US, Lebanon would complain to the UN Security Council about outside interference in its internal affairs; (2) some Arab states would publicly support the Lebanese appeals to both the US and the Security Council; and (3) Chamoun would not push his candidacy for re-election should this appear to divide seriously the support necessary to preserve the integrity and Western orientation of Lebanon.

The US Ambassador was informed that the US and UK, working in concert, believed that French participation in the military operations would be "unproductive," but that the French Ambassador in Beirut might be informed of the above.

(28) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4271, 13 May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

13 May 58
Wishing to be certain that the Lebanese situation was truly understood, the US Ambassador in Beirut emphasized the following points: (1) Chamoun had been legally elected President of Lebanon, and his term did not expire until 23 September 58; (2) Chamoun had not been charged, even by his most bitter political opponents, with any crimes or misdemeanors in office; (3) the extreme opposition demand that he resign "instantly" had no legal basis. Chamoun had made no public statement regarding his intention to seek to amend the constitution to permit his re-election; (4) therefore, the call of the opposition for a general strike and resistance to Lebanese law enforcement agencies was outright "sedition and rebellion."

(c) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3840, 13 May 58, DA IN 115907-C (14 May 58).

13 May 58
Ambassador McClintock reported indications that pro-Chamoun supporters had begun to falter because of their belief that the Lebanese Army would not decisively control the security situation. It was felt the only solution was to form a new cabinet with Gen Chehab as Prime Minister. Chamoun was said to have agreed tentatively to this plan, but Chehab was willing to accept the position only if the general strike and armed disobedience ceased and providing he had complete support from Parliament. An opposition spokesman, however, had told the Ambassador it was "too late" for any scheme that retained Chamoun in office. Opposition forces would accept nothing less than Chamoun's "immediate resignation," with Chehab to be Prime Minister-President of a "national government."

(9) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3847, 13 May 58, DA IN 116028 (14 May 58).

13 May 58
The State Department authorized Ambassador McClintock to evacuate himself, US government employees, and their dependents from Lebanon whenever he determined it was necessary. He was informed
that the US Navy had ordered two destroyers to proceed to a position six hours from Beirut, with an estimated arrival 132100Z. These ships were to be used for evacuation only if commercial means were not available.

13 May 58

The US Embassy in Beirut was instructed to inform the Government of Lebanon that internal security equipment would arrive by air within the next few days and 18 tanks in approximately two weeks.

13 May 58

CNO directed CINCNELM to sail amphibious forces with both Marine battalions toward the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as practicable, without publicity.

13 May 58

In a conversation with US Ambassador McClintock during the evening, Gen Chehab said the situation in Lebanon was under control, although the Army was stretched to its utmost. He stated that he had told President Chamoun he could not guarantee the loyalty of the Moslem elements of the Army in the event of Western intervention. Later, McClintock saw Chamoun, who seemed more relaxed and confident than earlier in the day and who now said he did not think it would be necessary to send for foreign troops.

13 May 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, at a news conference, accused the UAR of being directly responsible for "massive interference" in his country. He cited a number of incidents as evidence of UAR responsibility for the Lebanese revolt. Lebanon, he said, had sent a note of protest to the UAR. Fighting continued throughout the country, and parts of northern Lebanon were reported to be in rebel hands.

14 May 58

US Ambassador McClintock presented in detail to President Chamoun the US Government's answer to the Lebanese President's appeal of the previous day (see relevant items of 13 May). Chamoun expressed the hope he would not need foreign aid, but thanked McClintock for this immediate and impressive manifestation of US support. He agreed with the US reservation concerning French participation, doubted that France would be in a position to send troops anyway, and explained he had felt it necessary to include France in his appeal since France had given guarantees to Lebanon. Chamoun also left no doubt that he fully understood the US stipulation that he would not push his candidacy for re-election if this course appeared dangerous to Lebanese stability.

- 25 -
14 May 58

Confirming a telephone call to CINCELM by Vice Adm R. E. Libby, Deputy CNO (Plans and Policy), JCS directed Adm Holloway to note the recent State Department message to the US Embassy, Beirut (see item of 13 May 1958), and to act in general consonance with the contingency plan for US-UK military action in Jordan and/or Lebanon. Adm Libby's call, the JCS message, and a subsequent CNO message constituted authority for CINCELM to engage in combined planning with the British.


14 May 58

The JCS informed US CINCNEUR, CINCJANT, and CINCELM that in view of the internal situation in Lebanon, President Chamoun might soon request US assistance. These commands, accordingly, were directed to take appropriate precautionary steps in order to be able to implement on short notice the plan for US military action in Jordan and/or Lebanon.


14 May 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCELM of the British view that combined forces used in a Lebanon operation should be under US command, and that US forces should precede British forces into Lebanon. These two points were agreeable to the State Department and the JCS.

(55) Msg, JCS to CINCELM, JCS 941872, 142228Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

14 May 58

The US Ambassador to Lebanon cabled that in view of the worsening situation in Tripoli, he was advising Americans there to evacuate to Beirut. The British were taking similar action, and both Embassies were attempting to arrange the evacuation in a manner to avoid creation of panic among Lebanese Christians in North Lebanon.

(55) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3875, 14 May 58, DA IN 116667.

14 May 58

The French Charge in Washington expressed to Assistant Secretary of State Rountree his Government's determination to participate in any intervention in Lebanon, whatever the risks. Rountree emphasized the dangers of putting French troops into Lebanon and indicated strong US opposition to French participation.

(55) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4298, 14 May 58, OCJCS files.

14 May 58

The US Government announced that it was doubling the strength of the Marine force with the Sixth Fleet and that a shipment of police equipment was
being airlifted to Lebanon. The State Department issued a statement of encouragement to the Lebanese Government, but President Eisenhower, at his press conference, refused to comment on the situation. In Lebanon itself, the situation was reported as improving, despite continuing agitation by Cairo and Damascus radio and repeated demands for the Lebanese opposition that Chamoun resign immediately.

**NNT, 15 May 58, 1:2-3, 14:1-3.**

14 May 58

The Government of the UAR in Cairo refused to accept the Lebanese note of protest that charged the UAR with "massive interference" in Lebanon.

**NNT, 15 May 58, 5:4.**

14 May 58

The US Embassy in Baghdad reported that Prime Minister Jamali had sent a message to Lebanon pledging Iraq's willingness to assist the Lebanese Government in any way considered feasible in the present crisis, and encouraging that government to resist to the utmost the "aggression being undertaken by forces of Nasserism and Communism."


15 May 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik gave the US Ambassador an urgent message from Chamoun. Excited by reports of alleged Syrian troop movements across the border, Chamoun wanted the US to know that he might need armed help "not in 72 hours or 48 hours or 24 hours but in 6 hours." Ambassador McClintock attempted to calm Malik and stressed the need to verify what appeared to be rather vague and unreliable intelligence reports. Reporting to the State Department, McClintock noted that he had informed Chamoun on 14 May of the presence of US destroyers six hours from Beirut (see item of 13 May), which, the Ambassador suggested, might have accounted for Chamoun's six-hour time limit.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3906, 15 May 58, OCJCS files.

15 May 58

As authorized by the State Department, Ambassador McClintock told Gen Chehab that the highest authorities in the US Government were impressed with the manner in which the General was handling a difficult situation, and that they had sent him their best wishes for success. This greatly pleased Chehab.

(9) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4232, 14 May 58;
(9) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3941, 16 May 58. Both in OCJCS files.

15 May 58

CINCHEIM informed JCS that two amphibious groups, each carrying a Marine BLT, had sailed for the Eastern Mediterranean, with the first echelon expected to arrive in an area about 60 miles west of Beirut at 190900Z May, and the last echelon at 211900Z May. Task Force 60 would leave at high speed at 160700Z May to conduct exercises in the Ionian Sea. Preliminary staff level planning talks
were held with the British on 15 May. They were progressing smoothly and would be continued on 16 May in hopes of completing a draft outline plan as quickly as possible.


15 May 58

King Hussein advised the US Ambassador in Jordan that he intended to consult with Iraq on joint intervention should the UAR take open military action in Lebanon. He requested that the US urge Chamoun to appeal to the UN Security Council immediately, before the situation deteriorated to a point where outside intervention was the only course left to preserve Lebanon.


16 May 58

In a conversation during the morning with US Ambassador McClintock, Gen Chehab expressed his contempt for Lebanese politicians on both sides, but stated his fear that, unless the fighting ended, there was great danger of open Moslem-Christian strife. He, himself, refused to head the government, and would stand by Chamoun until the end of his legal term of office, but not beyond that time. Chehab still believed a facesaving solution was possible (presumably without intervention), if Chamoun would give guarantees to all elements in Lebanon of his intention not to succeed himself. He felt that the three Western Ambassadors should immediately impress upon Chamoun the need for these guarantees.

(27) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3937, 16 May 58, OCJCS files.

16 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut, on his own initiative, emphasized to President Chamoun the importance of Chamoun's issuing a statement that he did not seek re-election. The President made no comment except to thank him.

(28) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3949, 16 May 58, OCJCS files.

16 May 58

In response to a query from CINCSPECOMME, JCS informed Adm Holloway that the State Department had been requested to secure overflight and staging rights from Turkey, Libya, France, Italy, and Greece. The Department, however, was reluctant to approach these Governments until the decision was made to intervene in Lebanon. In the absence of such rights, CINCSPECOMME was nevertheless to proceed, ignoring the legal question to the extent required to execute his plan.

Air Marshal Sir William Dickson, Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff, informed General Twining of the great satisfaction in London with Admiral Holloway's cooperation and the progress of US-UK planning. With regard to the immediate situation, he expressed the anxiety of the British Government over the fact that, until the US amphibious force then moving east in the Mediterranean actually reached the Levant, effective assistance could not reach Lebanon in less than 48 hours if called for. Dickson suggested advancing the readiness of US and British forces to be flown into Lebanon, urging particularly that consideration be given to bringing US forces in Germany to an immediate state of alert.

16 May 58

The JCS directed US CINCEUR and CINCELM to bring one battle group and the necessary airlift for it to a state of readiness to permit arrival on Lebanese airfields within 24 hours of an execution order, assuming such airfields were safely held by the Lebanese Army. JCS assumed that US CINCEUR and CINCELM would arrange for fighter cover. British troops on Cyprus were being brought to the same state of readiness.

16 May 58

CINCSPECOMME submitted outline plan BLUE BAT, the US-UK plan for combined military intervention in Lebanon, to the JCS. The plan had been given general approval by the British Chiefs of Staff. In substance, BLUE BAT provided for Adm Holloway to command the combined US-UK forces as CINCAMBRITFOR, with other US officers commanding US-UK land, air, and naval forces, in an intervention to support a friendly Lebanese Government or, if necessary, to re-establish its authority; the forces would assist in the maintenance of order and protect US-UK nationals and interests. The operation would include two US airborne battle groups, two US Marine BLT's, and a British infantry brigade group, supported by US-UK naval and air forces, with US forces being committed first. The initial objective of the operation was the Beirut area, after which operations would be expanded to include other essential areas.

16 May 58

The JCS held a meeting with State Department representatives to discuss the latest political and military information regarding possible intervention in Lebanon. It was believed that Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey were all willing to give open assistance if the US-UK intervention in Lebanon occurred.
Session 16
Middle Eastern
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Jordan, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia. They emphasized, however, that if the long-range US
objectives in the Middle East were to be achieved without resort to force, bold political action and
carefully planned economic measures were necessary. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff renewed their
earlier recommendation (see item of 4 December 57) that three steps be taken to resolve the basic
Arab-Israeli problem: agreement on fixed boundaries for Israel, establishment of a reasonable guarantee
that Israel would not thereafter expand territorially, and solution of the refugee problem.

In the politico-military realm, the JCS recommended that the US Government consider seeking an
invitation to provide additional support to the UN Emergency Force in order to broaden its mission in maintaining the Arab-Israeli armistice. The US
might also take measures to make affiliation with, or support of, the Arab Union more attractive to
Saudi Arabia. Purely military actions that JCS recommended the Department of Defense propose to the
State Department included the following: (1) provide Iraq with one or two squadrons of fighter/bomber
aircraft, as previously recommended; (2) improve existing limited early warning and air control
capabilities of the countries under consideration; (3) expand the MAAQ in Iraq to deal with Arab
Union matters; (4) assist the Arab Union and Saudi Arabia in developing a greater capability for
coordinated internal security by giving military aid and training support; and (5) establish a small
training mission in Lebanon.

On 1 July 1958 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed JCS that all the above
recommended military actions had been approved; some had been implemented in part while others
found to be politically infeasible at present would remain under active consideration.

Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the
Near East (c7)," 16 May 58, CCS 381 EMME (11-19-47) sec 70, derived from (c7) JCS 1887/452, same file, sec 69. (c7) N/H of JCS 1887/452, 8 Jul 58.

In a public address upon his return to Cairo from the USSR, Nasser charged that Lebanon was attempting
to turn its "purely domestic dispute" into an international incident with the UAR, in order to invoke
foreign assistance. He asserted that the UAR had
no part in the dispute and had no intention of interfering in Lebanese internal affairs, but would not accept other foreign interference.

(c) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 3008, 17 May 58, DA IN 117303 (18 May 58).

17 May 58

At a Saturday morning meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plan BLUE BAT as submitted by CINCSECOMME on 16 May. Notification of this action was sent to CINCSECOMME at 1616Z.


17 May 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved a proposal by Adm Holloway to furnish plan BLUE BAT to the US and British Ambassadors in Beirut, to be held by them until an actual operation was directed and then passed to the senior friendly Lebanese military commander. The JCS directed that information given to the Ambassadors be restricted to the broad outlines necessary to facilitate execution of the plan.


17 May 58

CINCUSAFE informed CSAF that to satisfy the airlift requirements for BLUE BAT, he would need an additional 26 C-124's to deploy the entire airborne battle force in 24 hours, or 12 C-124's to deploy it in 72 hours. With no augmentation, a total of five or six days would be required. Less than two hours later, USAF directed COMMATS to deploy immediately 26 C-124 aircraft to bases in Europe.

(US) Msg, CINCUSAFE to CSAF, ODC 8 RM 975, 171616Z May 58, DA IN 1117124; (US) Msg, USAF to COMMATS, TS 9720, 171752Z May 58. Both in GCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) se 1.

17 May 58

In identical communications to the US and UK, the Government of Pakistan voiced its concern over the situation in Lebanon and expressed the hope that the lawful Government of Lebanon would receive necessary assistance.

(c) Msg, Karachi to SecState, 2882, 17 May 58.

17 May 58

The Department of State issued a statement confirming reports that consideration was being given to the sending of US troops to Lebanon to protect American lives and property if the Lebanese security forces were unable to do so and if the President of Lebanon requested the US troops. In another statement, the Department said that planned arms shipments to Lebanon, augmented in some cases, were being speeded up, so that the Lebanese Government could defend the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon.

NYT, 18 May 58, 1:4.
18 May 58  The Soviet Government, through its official news agency, accused the US of hatching a new plot in the Middle East by interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Soviet statement said that the US Sixth Fleet had received urgent orders to support the political maneuvers of certain Western Embassies in Lebanon, and warned that these Western activities would lead to "serious" consequences for Lebanon and the Middle East.

NYT, 19 May 58, 8:3.

19 May 58  Secretary Dulles and his advisers met with JCS, OSD, and CIA representatives to discuss the necessity of finding a solution to Lebanon's internal political problems without intervention and of lessening the British "enthusiasm" for immediate military action. Intervention would put the US in the position of supporting Chamoun's continuance in office against the terms of the Lebanese constitution and possibly without Lebanese Army support. It was agreed that the State Department should endeavor to discourage the presentation of a Lebanese complaint to the UN Security Council, since disadvantages of a UN presentation seemed to outweigh the advantages. The group also concluded that, since the Lebanese Army apparently had the situation in that country under control, the US should de-emphasize the prospect of military action and play down military preparations, but in view of the "great explosive potentialities" in Lebanon, the readiness of US forces must be maintained. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to induce Chamoun to find a solution to Lebanese internal political problems on his own. It was mentioned that messages instructing the appropriate US Ambassadors to request overflight and staging rights had been prepared, for dispatch when an actual decision to intervene occurred.


19 May 58  CINCNEALM reported that the Sixth Fleet was now well into the Eastern Mediterranean. The Carrier Striking Force would be held approximately 12 hours steaming time from a position to support a landing in Lebanon, and amphibious forces would be approximately 12 hours from Beirut.

(26) Mag, CINCNEALM to CNO, 5513, 191641Z May 58.

19 May 58  The JCS informed CINCSECOMME that, in view of the possible international repercussions, it was preferable that he remain in London rather than board his flagship, unless, in his opinion, the situation required his presence.

(2S) Mag, JCS to CINCSECOMME, JCS 941961, 191732Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.
19 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that his British and French colleagues said their Governments were separately sending small amounts of automatic weapons for use by Lebanese security forces. The Ambassador also noted that the recent US shipment of five plane-loads of police equipment had very much gratified the commandant of the Lebanese gendarmes, Gen Chehab, with more trained pilots than aircraft, had asked the UK for three Vampires. The Ambassador learned the following day that the British had decided to provide four Vampire jets, probably to arrive on 22 May.

(Msg) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4028, 19 May 58; (Mes) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4043, 20 May 58. Both in OCJCS files.

19 May 58

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Lebanon to make clear to Chamoun that if he reached the point of requesting US-UK military intervention, the US would strongly object to French participation in the operation. The Ambassador was to ask Chamoun to restrict any approach to the French to a request for other forms of assistance, specifically excluding French armed forces.

(Msg) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4390, 18 May 58, OCJCS files.

19 May 58

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Beirut to raise the question with Chamoun of broadening his government as one means of averting civil war in Lebanon. If Chamoun replied that this was impossible without his renouncing a second term, the Ambassador was to emphasize the importance of insuring the continuous existence of a genuinely independent Lebanon and the continuation of pro-Western policies. This approach had been agreed to by the British and French.

(Msg) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4400, 19 May 58, OCJCS files.

19 May 58

The French Ambassador in Beirut told his US and British colleagues that the right-wing Christian, pro-Chamoun Phalangist Party had requested France to provide it with arms and demolition experts and to ask the Government of Israel to undertake diversionary measures, presumably against Syria. Paris was willing only to supply arms and had given Ambassador Roche discretionary power in the matter. The US and British Ambassadors both argued strongly against the provision of arms to any but duly constituted Lebanese Government security forces.

(Msg) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4046, 20 May 58, OCJCS files.

20 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that the Government of Lebanon had decided to submit Lebanon’s case to the UN Security Council, and on the following morning had agreed to lodge a complaint with the Council of the Arab League as well.

(Msg) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4084, 21 May 58.
In a press conference discussion of the application of the American Doctrine to the situation in Lebanon, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the authority of the Doctrine was not limited to cases in which international Communism was involved. He noted that the Mansfield amendment, added by Congress to the Administration's original version of the Doctrine, declared the independence and integrity of the Middle East nations to be vital to peace and the national interest of the US, and that this was "certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter."

Questioned further, he declined to say categorically that this provision gave the Administration clear authority to go to the defense of an independent country without further recourse to Congress.


The Lebanese Government lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, charging the United Arab Republic with endangering peace in the Middle East by interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs. According to the complaint, the United Arab Republic was responsible for the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon and for supplying arms to individuals in rebellion against the legal government of Lebanon.

NVT, 23 May 58, 1:2.

CINCSPECOMME, pointing out that the Sixth Fleet, with Marines, was scheduled to remain within 12 hours of Lebanon, recommended that the BLUE BAT alert status of the Army battle group and its airlift--permitting deployment from Europe to the objective area within 24 hours--be changed to one permitting deployment within 48 hours. He added, however, that the additional C-124's flown to Europe for BLUE BAT should be retained there until the Lebanese situation eased.

(28) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 5537, 221651Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

In response to CINCSPECOMME's recommendation of the previous day, the JCS approved reduction of the alert status for BLUE BAT of the Army battle group and its airlift to permit arrival in the target area within 48 hours instead of the previously directed 24 hours. The JCS also indicated the airlift augmentation stationed in Europe might be reduced.


The State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that it shared his concern over the likelihood that the political initiative in Lebanon might pass to the opposition, and that, when this occurred, Chamoun might seek foreign intervention as his
"trump card." The Department directed the Ambassodor to reiterate to Chamoun the conditions necessary for US intervention, emphasizing that Western forces should be requested only under the most compelling necessity. Under no circumstances would US forces intervene where Lebanese forces were unwilling to fight. Chamoun, directed the Department, should be disabused of any idea that he could refrain from decisive action to solve the Lebanese political problem because he felt he could count on foreign forces to back him against domestic opposition.

(25) State to Beirut, 4482, 23 May 58, O/JCS files.

23 May 58

Less than 72 hours after a Lebanese request to US officials for mortar ammunition, 1,000 rounds each for 60-mm and 81-mm mortars reached Beirut. The speedy delivery was greatly appreciated by Lebanese security officials.

(29) USARMA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 97, 23 May 58, DA IN 119205 (24 May 57), MEP Lebanon File.

27 May 58

USCINCEUR reported to JCS that, in response to the JCS directive reducing the BLUE BAT alert status of the Army battle group and its airlift (see item of 23 May 58), USAF had indicated its desire to withdraw the MATS augmentation aircraft from Europe. USCINCEUR believed that these aircraft were still necessary for the execution of his mission, and he recommended that they be retained in his theater until the alert status was further reduced to 72 hours or more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved this recommendation the following day.

(48) Mag, USCINCEUR to JCS, EC 9-2778, 271658Z May 58, DA IN 119998 (28 May 58); Mag, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 942490, 282011Z May 58. Both in GCS 361 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

27 May 58

The UN Security Council met to take up the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic. Discussion of this question was postponed, however, until conclusion of the Arab League Council's consideration of it. See items for 6 June. NYT, 28 May 58, 10:2.

27 May 58

Premier Sami Solh of Lebanon, in a national broadcast from Beirut, stated that his Government did not intend to amend the Constitution to permit re-election of the President and that President Chamoun had never approached the Premier on this question. However, he did not say categorically that Chamoun would not seek a second term.

NYT, 28 May 58, 8:4.

27 May 58

CINCMEJ reported that a squadron of the Iraqi Air Force and approximately 1,500 Iraqi Army troops had arrived in the Amman area in mid-May to participate in the Jordan Army Day Parade on 25 May.
The withdrawal of some 3,000 Saudi Arabian Army troops from Jordan was completed on 20 May.

28 May 58

A US Navy vessel bearing 18 American tanks, with ammunition, arrived at the port of Beirut and began unloading. The Lebanese Army took direct delivery from shipside.

(4) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4310, 28 May 58, DA IN 120476 (29 May 58).

28 May 58

The US Government recognized the establishment of the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan.


29 May 58

Ambassador Mc Clintock reported that the Lebanese political impasse continued, but efforts were being made to find a compromise solution, mostly centered around Chehab becoming Prime Minister. Since Prime Minister Solh's declaration two days earlier that his government would not sponsor Chamoun's re-election, demands that Chamoun resign immediately were less strong except among extreme oppositionists.

(4) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4333, 29 May 58, DA IN 121044 (31 May 58).

30 May 58

The Patriarch of the Maronite Catholic Church in Lebanon stated at an unusual press conference that he feared the situation in Lebanon had become too grave for compromise, and suggested that the time would soon come for President Chamoun to "take a trip." He had previously proposed that Chamoun be permitted to serve out his term as President after turning over actual control of the Government to Gen Chehab, the Commander of the Lebanese armed forces.

NVT, 31 May 58, 1:6, 5:1.

30 May 58

The US Air Attache in Ankara reported that the Turks continued to be deeply concerned over the crisis in Lebanon and were seeking every opportunity to lend support to Chamoun. On 23 May, according to Foreign Minister Zorlu, the Turks had begun an airlift to Lebanon of 1,000 submachine guns and ammunition.

(4) Msg, USAIRI Ankara to CSAF, 3008452 May 58, CAF IN 89322 (31 May 58).

2 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut described the current situation in Lebanon as a precarious lull brought on by a military and political stalemate. There were indications of a steady build up of anti-government irregulars but no evidence that any centralized rebel command organization existed.

The main political issue was quieted for the moment by the fact that the regular Parliamentary session had concluded without considering a constitutional amendment to permit Chamoun's re-election. A special session would be called later to elect a new President.
The US Ambassador in Iraq transmitted a formal Arab Union representation regarding the Lebanese situation. The Arab Union Government believed the time had come for the American Doctrine to be invoked and the insurrection to be quelled by US and British forces as the only way to save Lebanon.

US intervention could keep any pro-Western government in office, but it would be difficult to create a stable situation not clearly dependent on US forces. A US-supported regime would be widely opposed and probably would not long survive the withdrawal of Western forces.

UAR reaction against US intervention would be sharp, and would include increased propaganda, continued covert assistance to the Lebanese rebels, and probable sabotage against Western oil interests. The governments of Jordan and Iraq would welcome the intervention, but there would be strong adverse popular reaction. Saudi Arabia would probably seek to avoid involvement, as would Israel. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan would almost certainly support the US move. Adverse reaction would be intensified if the UK participated in the operation.

Soviet reaction to US intervention in Lebanon would probably be confined to vigorous diplomatic and propaganda action. If the intervention were extended to include US military action on UAR.
territory, the Soviets would react more strongly, possibly in increasing military assistance and providing "volunteers." It was unlikely, however, that the USSR would take any action that it estimated would involve serious risk of general war.

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5 Jun 58

An "area conflagration" was likely within the next year or so as the result of a collapse of Jordan, an Israeli preventative military action, or a resort to force by Nasser or his opponents. Further, the situation in Lebanon might develop in a way that would bring the hostile forces in the Middle East into open conflict.

In Lebanon the UAR was arming and encouraging the predominantly Moslem opposition to President Chamoun. Should Moslem elements gain the upper hand, they would probably not be able to take all of Lebanon into the UAR, but Moslem parts of the country might attempt to secede, which would almost certainly precipitate a civil war. Whatever the immediate outcome of the Lebanese crisis, however, the trend in that country would probably be in the direction of neutralism.

In Iraq the conservative anti-Nasser regime was considered to be in firm control. Although there was opposition and little popular support, the government controlled the army and was likely to be able to maintain itself in power for the next several years.

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5 Jun 58

Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Osseiran summoned all deputies to convene on 24 July to elect a new President.

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6 Jun 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation of Adm Burke that, since the situation in the Mediterranean had become relatively stable, all amphibious forces (and attached units) assigned to CINCEM in augmentation of the normal strength of the Sixth Fleet should be withdrawn at the earliest possible date. CNO was authorized to allow CINCEM to return these augmenting forces at his discretion. Adm Burke indicated that he would coordinate with the State and Defense Departments before dispatching the authorizing message to CINCEM.
The Arab League Council concluded its meetings in Bengazi, Libya, on Lebanon's complaint of interference in Lebanese internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, without adopting any resolution.

NHT, 7 Jun 58, 3:2.

Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon, opened Lebanon's case against the United Arab Republic in an address before the UN Security Council. Much of the address dealt with specific instances of gun-running, bombings, and assassinations inside Lebanon, and press and radio propaganda from abroad, all of which he charged to the United Arab Republic. These activities, he said, constituted "massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention" in Lebanese internal affairs and had an "unmistakable aim—to overthrow the present regime in Lebanon and to replace it with one that would be more subservient to the will of the United Arab Republic." He requested the Security Council to stop the UAR's interference in Lebanon.

His charges were immediately denied by Omar Loutfi of the United Arab Republic, who said that Lebanon's troubles stemmed from domestic opposition to President Chamoun and were all internal, and that the UAR had not intervened in, and had no desire to impair the independence of, its sister Arab state.

The Soviet representative characterized Malik's presentation as "unconvincing." The representatives of the US, Britain, and France, however, appeared to regard Loutfi's disclaimer as insufficient to offset the evidence presented by Malik.

NHT, 7 Jun 58, 1:7.

In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Cairo, Nasser denied that he sought to incorporate Lebanon in the UAR or dominate its government. All he wanted was a Lebanese government that would
not be hostile. He renewed proposals he had made earlier for a joint US-UAR approach to the Lebanese problem. This would have called for Chamoun to finish his term, Chehab to become Prime Minister, and amnesty to be offered to Lebanese rebels, with Nasser doing his best to induce the Lebanese opposition to accept this plan. A US offer to forward these ideas to Chamoun, without endorsing them, was viewed by Nasser as being of dubious value, since Chamoun would not accept them unless they had US backing. He suggested, however, that the US might offer these ideas as its own, after which, if Chamoun reacted favorably, Nasser would do all he could to get the Lebanese opposition to go along with them.

Ambassador Hare concluded that, for reasons not clear and probably rather complex, Nasser desired to liquidate his commitments in Lebanon and bring the crisis there to an end.

(25) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 3241, 7 Jun 58.
(25) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 3244, 8 Jun 58.

9 Jun 58

During a White House consultation between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, with their advisers, Secretary Dulles stressed the objectives of maintaining a pro-Western government in Lebanon and supporting the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq. He believed that recent Lebanese developments were in a direction that made a need for US-UK intervention less likely, but he warned that "we are not in the clear yet by any means." Armed intervention he described as the lesser of two evils, but still an evil.

Prime Minister Macmillan thought it would be very difficult to keep President Chamoun in power for a second term. President Eisenhower agreed, saying that to attempt it "would be asking for even more rebellion." Regarding the possibility of finding a vigorous pro-Western successor to support, a State Department official said Gen Chehab was "probably the best available prospect."

27 Jun 58, Joint Secretariat Control Division Hot Box File.
President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, and their advisers discussed the provision of aircraft to Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (see items of 23 and 30 April 1958). The US representatives restated the US intention of purchasing by offshore procurement in the UK six Hawker Hunter VI aircraft for Lebanon and twelve for Jordan. The UK representatives indicated that three of these aircraft could be provided to each of the two countries within six weeks after receipt of a letter of intent from the US, with the balance being provided within six months. Gen Twining stated that every effort would be made to provide the letter of intent within a week. It was agreed that the RAF would conduct the training of Lebanese and Jordanian forces receiving the aircraft. Gen Twining agreed to have four F65F aircraft flown into Iraq, within two weeks, with the balance of 11 aircraft (making a full squadron) to be delivered within three months. Training in Iraq would be provided by the US.

[357] Asst SecDef (ISA), Memo for Record, "MAP Planes For Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq," 10 Jun 58, enc1 to (357) JCS 1887/463, Note by Secya, same subj, 18 Jun 58, CCS 381 EMEEA (11-19-47) sec 71.

Lebanese Government forces won a crucial test of strength against a larger rebel force under Kamel Jumblatt, who had made a surprise attempt to cut the Beirut-Damascus road. At the same time, the Government defeated an effort by other rebel forces to take Tripoli.

N Y T, 11 Jun 58, 3:4; 12 Jun 58, 4:5.

The US Ambassador in Iraq reported a political crisis was developing because of the Arab Union's financial predicament. Prime Minister Nuri had offered his resignation to King Faisal, declaring that the Arab Union could not stand unless its immediate budgetary problem was quickly solved and long-term financial strength was gained by adding Kuwait to the Union. The King had told the British Ambassador he feared Nuri's resignation would mean the end of the Arab Union and in very short order the royal family "would find it impossible to carry on as they would have nothing to offer." Faisal desired that his views be conveyed to Prime Minister Macmillan in Washington for urgent consideration by him and the President. The US Ambassador concurred in the recommendations made by his British colleague that the US and UK give immediate assurance of financial assistance to cover the AU budget deficit, agree to seek ways of solving the long-term financial difficulties confronting the Arab Union, and prevail upon Kuwait to join the Union.

[36] Mag, Baghdad to SecState, 2039, 10 Jun 58.

Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai told the US Ambassador that King Hussein was deeply concerned that Lebanon would slip into the UAR orbit if Jordan and Iraq did not take positive action to intervene. The King proposed that Iraq and Jordan arm selected tribes
living along the Syrian border and encourage raids in
an effort to pin down UAR security forces. Also he
favored shutting off road and rail communications
into Syria in order to squeeze the UAR economically
and generate discontent among Syrians already
irritated by UAR controls. So far, however, Hussein's
attempts to arrange discussion of his proposal with
Iraqi officials had been rebuffed.

[1] Mag, Amman to SecState, 2130, 11 Jun 58,
DA IN 123920 (12 Jun 58).

10 Jun 58

10 Jun 58

11 Jun 58

The Lebanese Government's
request for this assistance had originally been
directed to King Hussein of Jordan, who had relayed
it to Iraq.

[16] 16 Jun 58,
DA IN 125078.

11 Jun 58

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in
Beirut to inform Chamoun that Nasser had indicated
he might be willing to use his influence to end
dissidence in Lebanon provided it was understood that
Chamoun would finish his term, Chehab would become
Prime Minister, and the opposition would be granted
amnesty. The US was forwarding this to Chamoun as
a matter of loyalty to Lebanon, and not because it
endorsed or trusted Nasser's proposal. When informed
of this proposal, Chamoun replied that he distrusted
Nasser and was unwilling to deal with him.

[28] Mag, SecState to Beirut, 4710, 11 Jun 58;
[28] Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4629, 11 Jun 58. Both
in OJCS files.

11 Jun 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCELM to prepare
a contingency plan that would expand CINCSPEC
OPPLAN 215-58 to provide for implementation of the
American Doctrine in Iraq.

[28] Mag, JCS to CINCELM, JCS 943139, 1120112
Jun 58, derived from [28] JCS 1887/458, CCS 381 BMJEA
(11-19-47) sec 70.

11 Jun 58

The UN Security Council, by a vote of 10 to 0 (the
USSR abstaining), adopted a resolution authorizing
the Secretary General to send a UN observer group
to Lebanon "to ensure that there is no illegal
infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other
material across the Lebanese borders."

Dept of State Bulletin, Vol XXXVIII, No. 994
(14 Jul 58), p. 90.
12 Jun 58  UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld set up a three-man commission to implement the Security Council resolution requiring the sending of an observer group to Lebanon. Hammarskjöld made clear that the observers were "not a police force," like the UN Emergency Force on the border between Egypt and Israel. The observers would not intervene with direct action; rather, he considered that their presence was "essential and useful as a contribution to the preventing of possible illegal traffic." They would stay within the boundaries of Lebanon, would be assisted by field agents detached for the purpose from the UN Truce Supervision Organization, and would report any smuggling of arms or personnel through the UN Security Council.

NYT, 13 Jun 58, 4:1.

12 Jun 58  President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan sent a message to AU Premier Nuri in regard to financial support for the Arab Union. On the assumption that the Union would become operative on 1 July 58, the US was prepared to make available up to $25 million for the period 1 July - 31 March 59, which would cover the entire Jordanian share of the Union budget and leave an estimated excess of $6.25 million to be applied to the Iraqi share. The UK would contribute up to $4 million to the Union budget.

(2) Mag, SecState to Amman, 2730, and to Baghdad, 3233, 12 Jun 58.

12 Jun 58  In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they had found acceptable from the military point of view a draft political directive, prepared by the US-UK Working Group on the Middle East, to be addressed to appropriate military commanders should the US and UK decide to intervene militarily in Lebanon.

The directive stated that the US and UK were entering Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government to provide military assistance in the face of massive interference from the outside that had disrupted Lebanese security and gravely threatened the country's independence. Western forces were being provided to help protect US-UK lives and property and "to assist the Government of Lebanon in its military program for the preservation of the independence and integrity of Lebanon." Operations would be limited to Lebanese territory and would employ the minimum force necessary to attain the objectives, with military tasks being turned over to Lebanese authorities as soon as possible. Withdrawal would be carried out as soon as the Lebanese Government was able to act with sufficient force by itself. A US-UK warning had been issued that any interference with the operations in Lebanon would be met with force. The directive instructed the military commanders to seek advice on political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon from the US and British Ambassadors in Beirut, whose views would be controlling. (The final clause...

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above reflects the addition of a clarifying sentence approved by JCS on 17 June 58.)

13 Jun 58

Prime Minister Nuri of the Arab Union, upon receiving the message of 12 June from President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, expressed bitter disappointment over what he considered an inadequate amount of US-UK financial support for the Union's budget. Working himself up to a dramatic pitch, he delivered an ultimatum to the effect that either the US and UK would provide an additional $5 million to cover the estimated nine-month AU budget deficit, and Kuwait would be made to join the Arab Union, or he would resign and allow the Arab Union, along with Western influence in the Middle East, to collapse. The US Ambassador commented on Nuri's emotional reaction as evidence of the low value placed on the Arab Union by its two partners, and as confirmation that the US would have to underwrite its budget if the Arab Union were to become a reality.

13 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut cabled that the Lebanese Government had urgently requested 8,000 rounds of 75-mm ammunition. Ambassador McClintock estimated that the cost of airlifting this ammunition was beyond Lebanon's financial resources, and he strongly recommended that the USAF fly one C-124 with an initial shipment to Beirut without charge. The balance could be sent by sea at commercial rates.

14 Jun 58

Fiercely serious fighting took place in Beirut, originating in an attempt by opposition forces to liberate political prisoners who might have furnished incriminating evidence to the UN observers. Lebanese Army action frustrated the attack. At 1700Z, Prime Minister Solh informed the US Embassy that either the UN Secretary General should immediately furnish police forces or the US might wish to send units of the Sixth Fleet to protect US lives and property. He said the situation in Beirut was out of control and asked the US Ambassador to bring his message to the attention of President Eisenhower. Reporting on this, Ambassador McClintock said that while the situation in Beirut was grave, he did not believe it was necessary to do more than place the Sixth Fleet on immediate alert. He did, however, urgently recommend that the two US destroyers within six hours steaming time of Lebanon be moved closer in at dawn of 15 June and that he be authorized voice radio communication with the ships.

14 Jun 58

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14 Jun 58

At about 1600Z, Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik telephoned Assistant Secretary of State Rountree and said that he had heard from Chamoun that the situation in Lebanon was critical. Malik did not request US intervention but indicated that such a request might be imminent. Later reports from US sources in Beirut showed the immediate situation to be somewhat improved, but indicated that the long-term prospects remained gloomy.

OGCS files.

14 Jun 58

Secretary of State Dulles was sufficiently disturbed by the flareup in Beirut to leave a class reunion at Princeton and return to Washington for an emergency conference at the State Department and a telephone conversation with US Ambassador McClintock in Beirut. He then told reporters the situation in Beirut was "serious but not alarming."

NYT, 15 Jun 58, 1:8, 15:1, 19:1.

14 Jun 58

In response to a request from the US Ambassador in Beirut, COMSIXTHFLT ordered two US destroyers to take station 30 miles off Beirut, out of sight of the shore. The destroyers might be used for a show of force or to fire a covering bombardment for the evacuation of US nationals. They were to contact the US Embassy in Beirut every half hour on a clandestine circuit. COMSIXTHFLT also directed the two destroyers to be prepared to escort a US attack.
cargo ship carrying three LCM's for the Lebanese Government into Beirut or to some other designated point, at the call of the US Naval Attaché in Beirut. "Intelligence Summary," encl to (26) Memo, CNO to CJCS, "Lebanon," 15 Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

15 Jun 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, having requested an urgent Sunday morning meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Rountree, explained that Chamoun had informed him that the situation in Lebanon had again deteriorated, with Syrian parachutists and Egyptian-trained Palestinians joining the fighting. Chamoun wanted an immediate answer, to give to the Cabinet, to the question: would the US intervene militarily at once if asked? Rountree replied that he could give no answer suitable for transmission to Chamoun by telephone, but that an answer would be sent through the US Ambassador in Beirut. Later in the day, Malik asked Rountree if he could tell Chamoun, with US approval, to "hold firm--do not yield." The Assistant Secretary replied that he could not, since this could readily be misinterpreted. While the US agreed that Chamoun should not yield on any matter fundamental to Lebanon's independence, he should not refuse any reasonable internal political compromise. (30) State Dept, Memo of Conversation, "Lebanon," 15 Jun 58, encl to (26) CM-140-58, CJCS to Taylor, et al., same subj, 27 Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

15 Jun 58

The State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut of Assistant Secretary Rountree's conversation with Malik that morning (see above item) and directed him to inform Chamoun that the US position on military intervention in Lebanon had not changed. He was to recall for Chamoun the US terms that the declared purpose of intervention would be to protect US lives and property and to assist Lebanon "in its military program" for the preservation of the country's integrity and independence, and that Lebanese security forces would have to exert a maximum effort to defend their country. The Ambassador was also to stress the changed situation resulting from the fact that Lebanon had recently sought and obtained a UN Security Council resolution placing observers in the country. The US would find it very awkward to take action that would appear to disregard the existence of this UN effort.

Accordingly, if Chamoun, accepting the US terms reiterated above, came to believe that intervention was necessary, the US suggested that an emergency UN Security Council session be called. There Lebanon would report that a stepped-up campaign to extinguish Lebanese independence before the UN observation effort could be organized was obviously in progress, that Lebanon was no longer able unaided to protect both foreign life and property and its own independence, and that therefore certain countries were being invited to send troops to protect their nationals,
freeing the Lebanese forces to concentrate on defense of the country's integrity.

(25) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4790, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58

At 1830Z, Malik telephoned Secretary of State Dulles. He said that any Middle Eastern country inviting armed intervention by the West would be the subject of "shame and reproach" for generations, and, therefore, there were three prerequisites to such a request: (1) it should be made only in extremis; (2) there should be some Arab participation in, or support of, the intervention, even if token, perhaps by Iraq and Jordan; and (3) the action must have the moral support of either the UN Security Council or General Assembly. Secretary Dulles told Malik that this was a statesmanlike approach, and coincided with the US view.


15 Jun 58

At a late Sunday afternoon White House meeting, the President and representatives of the State and Defense Departments, CIA; and USIA discussed the situation in Lebanon. Secretary Dulles said that Malik's latest telephone call (see above item) had been helpful, although the views expressed were not necessarily those of Chamoun or the rest of the Lebanese Government. The Secretary warned that intervention under present conditions would lay the US open to charges of undermining the UN observation effort, which Lebanon itself had requested. He agreed with the view expressed in a message just received from the British Foreign Secretary, that military action in Lebanon should be withheld until a further attempt to settle the matter in the UN had been made.

The President discussed the weakness of Lebanese leadership, the dangers of intervening before the UN had reported its own action was ineffective, and the difficulties that would be imposed by unfavorable popular reaction in Lebanon. If the US intervened, it might well have to remain indefinitely, and he recalled as pertinent the arguments the US had advanced against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt in 1956, particularly "where would it lead; where would it end?" Secretary Dulles stated, however, and the President agreed, that if Chamoun requested US intervention, and the US did not respond, every pro-Western government in the area would disappear. The US, therefore, had little or no choice.

The President commented that if the US was forced to act, everything possible should be done to make the intervention under the most favorable auspices and circumstances, and the Lebanese Army should be bolstered so that US forces could be quickly withdrawn. He directed Gen Twining to have the JCS study the "military possibilities and problems involved."
(Assigned to JMEPG, this study was cancelled on 22 July 58.) He also asked for examination of the possibility of giving Lebanon "massive military support," possibly accompanied by technicians, as an alternative to intervention.


On the recommendation of Ambassador McClintock that deterioration of the Lebanese situation made it necessary, the State Department declared a Phase I emergency for Lebanon, directing that dependents desiring evacuation be moved to Italy.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4750, 15 Jun 58. DA IN 125026. (C) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 4793, 15 Jun 58, DA IN 125180 (16 Jun 58).

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported to the State Department his conclusions after a long talk with Gen Chehab. Chehab saw no prospect of quelling the insurrection by his own means, although he was willing to continue to fight defensively. US military officers in Beirut, however, felt that the Lebanese armed forces, led with initiative and conviction, could put down the civil war, although at a high cost in casualties. Nevertheless, so long as Chehab was in command, the Lebanese Army probably would not act to end the fighting. Chehab did not welcome the prospect of Western intervention but felt it was inevitable. His troops would not oppose this intervention and would probably cooperate in a lukewarm manner. It was necessary, concluded McClintock, to "get a new general" before the West intervened.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4746, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun declared that it was clearly impossible for the Lebanese armed forces to restore order until Gen Chehab was removed from command. Chamoun feared, however, that Army demoralization after Chehab's dismissal might permit the rebels to gain control of Beirut. Hence it seemed to him safer to wait until after a Western landing to remove the General.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4756, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

The US Ambassador in Beirut concurred in the recommendations of the US UN Ambassador that the US should encourage the Secretary General to enlarge the UN Observer Group in Lebanon quickly to a total of about 500 men. Ambassador McClintock pointed out that the UN observers could not succeed in their mission unless they were present in sufficient numbers to patrol the means of access to Lebanon.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4760, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.
15 Jun 58 The French Ambassador in Beirut expressed to the US Ambassador his feeling that any US-UK intervention in Lebanon should include a token French participation. Ambassador Roche said that with DeGaulle in power it was practically certain that France would insist on participating.

(45) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4767, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58 The French Embassy informed the State Department that a French warship was moving to the Lebanon area with instructions to remain outside territorial waters for the present. The action was designed solely to protect French nationals and had not resulted from a Lebanese request for assistance. The French naval commander had been ordered to establish contact with US and British commanders in the area upon his arrival there.

(45) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4811, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58 UN Secretary General Hammarskjold announced that he would go to Lebanon to investigate the situation there. Meanwhile, Norwegian Maj Gen Odd Bull, the first member of the three-man UN Observer Group, arrived in Beirut.

(NYT) 16 Jun 58, 1:8, 3:2.

16 Jun 58 During the morning the US Ambassador in Beirut gave President Chamoun a letter conveying the US terms for intervention, in accordance with the State Department's instructions of the previous day (see Item of 15 June 58). Chamoun read the letter carefully and said he agreed with all points. Ambassador McCloy, speaking for the three Western Ambassadors in Beirut, urged Chamoun to take resolute steps against the opposition and to announce definitely that he would not be a candidate for re-election. The Ambassador also stressed the US objections to French participation in any intervention, and Chamoun agreed to limit his request to the French to one seeking material only.

(46) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4773, 4774, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

16 Jun 58 The US delivered five F6F aircraft to Iraq. The ten remaining planes of the squadron being provided Iraq were scheduled for delivery by 17 September 1958.

(26) N/H of JCS 1887/452, 8 Jul 58, CCS 381 EMME 11-19-47 sec 69.

16 Jun 58 At 1825Z, a US attack cargo ship completed transfer of three LCM's to Lebanese crews at a rendezvous 20 miles west of Tripoli, as arranged by the US Naval Attache in Beirut.

16 Jun 58 At 1915Z, Chamoun summoned a US Embassy official and gave him a handwritten Arabic text of a resolution signed that day by each member of the Cabinet authorizing Chamoun to call for friendly military intervention "when he thinks fit." Chamoun appeared desperate, as evidenced by the fact that he entrusted not only this document but also his wife's jewels to the American official. He definitely feared an attack on the palace that night.

(FO) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4795, 4818, 17 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

16 Jun 58 Fighting in Beirut dwindled to a few sporadic outbreaks of rifle fire and explosions, but rebel leader Salama said there would be a full civil war if President Chamoun did not resign.

NYT, 17 Jun 58, 1:6.

16 Jun 58 The US Atlantic Fleet announced that a five-ship amphibious force and a Marine battalion of 1,800 men would depart for the Mediterranean on 25 June to relieve a similar force retained there beyond its scheduled date of return.

NYT, 17 Jun 58, 2:6.

17 Jun 58 In a morning conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun was calm and apologetic over his excitement of the previous evening (see item of 16 June 58), indicating that matters were well in hand. On instructions from the State Department, Ambassador McCloy reiterated that Chamoun should make every attempt to solve Lebanon's problems through the UN before asking for Western intervention. With regard to the Cabinet's authorization to call for friendly intervention that Chamoun had received the previous day, the President emphasized that this was "for stand-by use" and that he had no intention of calling for outside assistance except as a last resort.

(FO) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4812, 17 Jun 58; (FO) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4814, 16 Jun 58. Both in OCJCS files.

17 Jun 58 The French Ambassador in Beirut informed his US and British colleagues that Chamoun had said he would include France in any request for Western assistance. The French, however, would apparently send only a warship to protect French lives. In another conversation that day, Chamoun told a US representative that he would only ask for French participation in military staff work, a possibility that the US Ambassador regarded as dangerous. On 18 June, Chamoun made a similar statement to the British Ambassador, who immediately argued against the idea.

(FO) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4833, 17 Jun 58.

(FO) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4846, 4855, 18 Jun 58. All in OCJCS files.

17 Jun 58 At his news conference, Secretary of State Dulles described the Lebanese crisis as one causing "considerable anxiety" to those who believed in the
independence and integrity of the countries of the Middle East. He declared that the US was ready to support any move to increase the size of UN border patrols in Lebanon. Moreover, he stated, if the US were called on to provide physical as well as diplomatic support for the Government of Lebanon, it "would be inclined to go along with that also."

**NYT**, 18 Jun 58, 1:1, text, 14:2-6.

17 Jun 58

The Iraqi Government asked the UAR press attache in Baghdad to leave the country, accusing him of activities against the interests of the Arab Union. **NYT**, 18 Jun 58, 3:5.

18 Jun 58

CINCSPCOMME informed CNO, among other things, that the readiness of British ground forces to participate in BLUE BAT was not affected by the situation in Cyprus. CINCSPCOMME believed French participation should be excluded if possible, since French association with the US-UK venture would be politically damaging and operationally confusing.

**[32]** Mag, CINCSPCOMME to CNO, 3714, 18014125 Jun 58, JMEPO Lebanon Mag File.

18 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that British intelligence had definitely identified a Lebanese working with the UN Observer Group as an Egyptian spy whose mission was to keep the UAR informed of contemplated movements of UN observers. The British Ambassador had informed Gen Burns of the UN Observer Group.

**[33]** Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4859, 18 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

18 Jun 58

Speaker Osseiran of the Lebanese Parliament warned the US Ambassador in Beirut that if there were foreign intervention in Lebanon, he would regard it as an infringement of Lebanon's sovereignty and would personally lead the battle against the foreign forces. French participation in a foreign intervention, he said, would be even worse, because of the deep-seated anti-French feeling in Lebanon. Reporting on this conversation, Ambassador McClintock commented that Osseiran undoubtedly represented a majority of Moslem Lebanese, who were violently opposed to any Western intervention.

**[34]** Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4861, 18 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

18 Jun 58

In response to a question at his press conference, President Eisenhower said he would not forecast the circumstances under which the US might take military action in Lebanon. Such action, he said, would be dependent upon the judgment of the UN observer team in Lebanon and of Secretary General Hammarskjold, who was due to arrive there on 19 June.


19 Jun 58

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Beirut and began talks with UN observers and Lebanese leaders on the question of bringing peace to Lebanon.

**NYT**, 20 Jun 58, 1:2-3.
19 Jun 58  
Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai told the US Ambassador that Turkey had informed both Iraq and Jordan that if they wished to send troops to aid Lebanon, safe passage across Turkish territory was guaranteed and the Turkish Government would provide both sea and air transport for the final move from Turkey to Lebanon. Jordan was not responding favorably to this proposal, since it was learned that the Lebanese appeal for Iraqi-Jordanian assistance, via Turkey, had been originated personally by Foreign Minister Malik in Washington and not officially by President Chamoun.


20 Jun 58  
The US Ambassador in Beirut gave Chamoun a lengthy message from Secretary of State Dulles explaining the President's remark at his press conference of 18 June. In sum, Dulles restated the US view that Lebanon should call for an emergency session of the UN before requesting US help, that the US had confidence in Chamoun and would do all it could to assist him, and that Lebanon had the capacity to solve its problems without recourse to foreign military aid. Chamoun replied that he would not request intervention "unless the knife is at my throat." Reporting his conversation, Ambassador McClintock concluded that Chamoun was in one of his optimistic moods, but that he was doing little or nothing to find a solution to the situation.

[257] Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4890, 19 Jun 58;  
[257] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4936, 20 Jun 58.
Both in OCS/CJS files.

20 Jun 58  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed USCINCUS that, for political reasons, the State Department was unwilling to negotiate for additional staging rights at Adana, Turkey, on a long-term basis. The Department was prepared to request these rights on an urgent basis in the event of the implementation of BLUE BAT, and no difficulty was anticipated. The previous JCS instructions directing necessary action even in the absence of these rights still applied. On the question of prestocking rights, however, the State Department was willing to approach Turkey.


20 Jun 58  
CINCUS and the British Chiefs of Staff discussed proposals made by C-in-C British Middle East Land Forces to enlarge the forces and extend the planning for BLUE BAT in view of the apparently increasing morale and determination of rebel forces in Lebanon. CINCUS opposed these changes as unnecessary, holding that BLUE BAT was adequate to meet initial objectives and that the plans were sufficiently flexible to be expanded as the situation dictated. CINCUS's position was concurred in by CNO.

20 Jun 58 During a conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun confirmed once more that he did not desire Iraqi or Jordanian military intervention at that time. [55] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4941, 20 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

22 Jun 58 UN Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Cairo for talks with UAR President Nasser. "Diplomatic sources" in Beirut said he would ask Nasser to halt his anti-Lebanese propaganda campaign and to close the Syrian-Lebanese frontier in order to stop the movement of supplies to the Lebanese rebels.

26 Jun 58 CINCSPECOMME submitted to the JCS his estimate of the military and political situation in Lebanon. Despite reports of a formidable build-up of rebel forces, he did not view the fighting strength of the insurgents as commensurate with their numbers. Hence the BLUE BAT operation remained feasible, although there would probably be a longer period of fighting and higher casualties, especially among the Lebanese. [625] Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 5044, 261762 Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

26 Jun 58 Former Lebanese Premier Rashid Karami, rebel leader in Tripoli, told reporters he would fight any UN police force sent to Lebanon. He denied receiving aid from Syria, but warned that he expected outside help in case of an "attack" on Lebanon. Karami said he supported Gen Chehab for the presidency.

26 Jun 58 The Soviet press denounced the idea of a UN police force for Lebanon as "foreign intervention" and a threat to peace. It warned that the USSR would not stand idly by in such an event.

27 Jun 58 Adm Sir Michael Denny of the BJSN, Washington, presented an aide-memoire to JCS in which the UK called for a revision of BLUE BAT to include simultaneous landings at both Beirut and Tripoli. Noting that opposition strength had increased and the effectiveness of the Lebanese Army had lessened since the plan was first drafted, the British saw a danger of rebel violence against US and British lives and property in Tripoli in the event of a Western landing at Beirut alone.


27 Jun 58 Lebanon charged in the UN that the movement of weapons and personnel across the border from Syria into Lebanon was continuing and, indeed, had actually increased, despite the presence of UN observers. The Lebanese delegation issued this charge after it became known at the UN that Secretary Hammarskjold

- 53 -
would not recommend a UN police force to guard the Lebanese border.

NYT, 28 Jun 58, 4:8.

29 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported Prime Minister Rifai's statement that both he and King Hussein were gravely disturbed that Dag Hammarskjold's recent visit to the Middle East had not generated forthright UN action on the Lebanese problem, since they believed that unless a UN or US-UK police force were provided to seal the Syrian-Lebanese border, the Chamoun government was doomed. Chamoun's fall would further elevate Nasser's prestige in the Arab world and would encourage insurrection in Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In discussions with Hammarskjold during his visit, Rifai had made clear that if Jordan became convinced the UN was either unable or unwilling to resolve the Lebanese situation, the Jordanian leaders would not wait for an emboldened Nasser to step up his subversive campaign against their country but would launch a counterattack against the UAR.

LET Mag, Amman to SecState, 2271, 30 Jun 58, DA IN 129992.

30 Jun 58

At a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, the latter made pointed queries regarding the value and validity of the US pledge to assist Lebanon. Secretary Dulles replied that the US intended to take every practical measure to prevent a victory for Nasser and Communism and to demonstrate to Middle Eastern governments that friendship with the West was an asset, not a liability. He stressed, however, that US intervention in present circumstances would generate great opposition both in the area and within the UN, since it could not honestly be said as yet that the UN effort in Lebanon had failed. Dulles urged that Chamoun busy himself with selecting a successor to the presidency who truly reflected the Lebanese spirit of independence and would not compromise with Nasser. The US would help such a successor with economic and other assistance.

LET Mag, SecState to Beirut, 5097, 30 Jun 58.

1 Jul 58

The three Western Ambassadors in Beirut urged President Chamoun to attempt to reach a political solution by announcing his intention not to seek re-election and by forming a widely based government of national union in order to facilitate an eventual compromise. Chamoun's reply was an angry one, in which he blamed his difficulties on his identification with the West. He declared that had he broken his Western ties and turned to a policy of "positive neutrality" he could easily have been re-elected for a second term. Charging that the US, UK, and France were weakening in their guarantees of Lebanese integrity and independence, he demanded to know where he stood with respect to these guarantees. US
Ambassador McCloy immediately replied that, as far as the US was concerned, there had been no lessening of readiness to intervene if necessary.

1 Jul 58

At a news conference in Detroit Gen Nathan F. Twining declared that the US was ready to send troops into Lebanon if the situation required it. "We are prepared for any eventuality—all out war or limited war—right now," he said.

2 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to the British proposal that BLUE BAT be revised to include simultaneous landings at both Beirut and Tripoli (see item of 27 June 58). The JCS shared the British concern for Western lives and property in Tripoli, but, after consultation with Adm Holloway, they had concluded that the operational concept of BLUE BAT was sound and that all of the forces allocated were required to execute it. Should the UK nevertheless consider it essential to secure Tripoli as part of the initial operations, this might be accomplished by landing additional British forces at Beirut and deploying them northward overland, or by a simultaneous operation by additional British forces against Tripoli. If this was agreeable, the JCS would direct Adm Holloway, as CINCAMBRITFOR, to modify BLUE BAT to include planning for this additional phase of the operation.

2 Jul 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik gave Secretary Dulles an informal note outlining a suggested program for solving the Lebanese problem short of Western intervention. It called for increased political and material support for Lebanon by the West, including provision of military and technical advisers. Malik also suggested a larger UN observer group and renewed action in the UN, "prudent" Iraqi and Turkish troop movements, and measures to exploit the internal difficulties in Syria.

3 Jul 58

President Chamoun confirmed to Western representatives that the Lebanese Government had made tentative approaches to Iraq about the possibility of joining the Arab Union or otherwise forming a defensive military alliance with Iraq and Jordan.

3 Jul 58

The Lebanese Ambassador in Washington submitted a request to the State Department for $40 million in economic aid, $20 million of which he said was...
needed urgently. The State Department representative
with whom he talked pointed out certain practical
difficulties but said the request would be studied. 

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold stated at a news
conference that, to his knowledge, there was no
foundation for a charge that "massive infiltration"
of men and arms into Lebanon was currently taking
place.

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in its first report
to the Security Council, failed to confirm Lebanon's
charges that men and arms were being smuggled across
the border from Syria. Some success had been
achieved by observer teams in penetrating rebel-
held territory, but they had often been handicapped,
or entirely frustrated, by firing in their vicinity,
mixed roads, destroyed bridges, or a simple refusal
of opposition leaders to admit them to areas under
those leaders' control. In all the foregoing
instances, the report said, the observer teams
"appear to have touched upon sensitive spots which
are in areas claimed by Government sources to be
supply and infiltration routes." Those rebel bands
that the observers had been able to inspect were
found to be equipped with mortars, bazookas, machine
guns, hand grenades, and land mines of many make.
It had been impossible to determine how these arms
had been acquired, or whether any of the men had
infiltrated from outside Lebanon, though there was
little doubt that the "vast majority" of the men were
Lebanese.

A French Foreign Ministry spokesman said it seemed
"incontestable" to his Government that there had
been "considerable infiltration" into Lebanon.

A British Foreign Office spokesman stated, in effect,
that his Government was holding to its position that
Lebanon had justified her charges against the United
Arab Republic in the UN Security Council. The UK
saw no reason to modify the stand previously taken
by its representative in the United Nations.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told a reporter at
the United Nations that his Government took "strong
exception" to the report by the UN Observer Group
in Lebanon. He noted the distinction between the
term "massive infiltration," used by Hammarskjold,
and the "massive intervention" charged by Lebanon
against the UAR in the Security Council. The latter
term, Malik said, included Cairo radio broadcasts
and also money sent by the United Arab Republic to
the rebels.
The Lebanese Government's comments on the Observer Group's report were set forth in detail in a formal statement made public the next day and circulated among members of the Security Council. This statement challenged the validity of the UN report, since its conclusions all related only to rebels and weapons that the rebel leaders had allowed the Observer Group to see. Lebanon asserted that the rebel-held weapons included heavy types that only governments could supply, that rebel training and assembly camps were being operated in Syria, and that the UAR radio and press attacks on the Lebanese Government were as virulent as ever. Therefore, the statement concluded, Lebanon's charges against the United Arab Republic remained "undiminished and intact."

NYT, 8 Jul 58, 5:1; 9 Jul 58, 8:3-8.

The US Ambassador in Beirut, at the direction of the State Department, informed Chamoun that the US considered any formal relationship between Lebanon and the Arab Union a matter to be decided between those two governments (see item of 3 July 58). The US suggested, however, that any overt step such as a defensive military pact might be inopportune and might further disturb matters in Lebanon. Chamoun made no comment on this presentation.

(AS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 205, 8 Jul 58; (GF) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 96, 7 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files.

9 Jul 58

The Pakistani Finance Minister suggested to the US Ambassador in Karachi that if UN intervention in Lebanon did not materialize, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan might encourage Iraq to give Lebanon military assistance.

(AS) Mag, Karachi to SecState, 85, 10 Jul 58.

9 Jul 58

President Chamoun of Lebanon made a firm statement for the first time that he would leave office on 23 September 1958 and not seek re-election. He made the statement to the Associated Press in Beirut.

NYT, 11 Jul 58, 6:1.

10 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported various indications, including a statement to him by the Commandant of the Lebanese security forces, that military intervention by Iraq, or by Iraq and Turkey, was being considered by President Chamoun.

(TS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 243, 10 Jul 58; (AS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 256, 10 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files.

11 Jul 58

In a conversation with the British Charge in Beirut, Chamoun stated that Chehab was the only man who could receive sufficient votes on 24 July to be elected President. Asked if it would help if the three Western Ambassadors told Chehab separately that he should accept the presidency, Chamoun agreed.
The US Ambassador recommended to Washington that this step be taken.
(TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 325, 12 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

12 Jul 58

According to the Lebanese Minister of Finance, the Lebanese Cabinet decided to postpone indefinitely consideration of a defensive military alliance with the Arab Union.
(4) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 342, 13 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

12 Jul 58

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon announced an agreement with rebel leaders by which it achieved at least limited access, for the first time, to all Lebanon's 172-mile frontier with the Syrian province of the United Arab Republic.
NVT, 13 Jul 58, 23:1.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that a group of Iraqi Army officers had executed a swift coup d'etat at 0230Z. Fighting had been limited, and by dawn the capital city appeared relatively normal, except for local patrol activity and jubilant crowds. The formation of a "Republican Government of Iraq," with a cabinet of Colonels and leftist civilians, had been announced over Baghdad Radio.
(U) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 52, 14 Jul 58.

14 Jul 58

During the morning, President Chamoun summoned the US Ambassador in Beirut and demanded US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours. Chamoun, angered and highly excited, charged that the Western governments had consistently underestimated his warnings of danger in the Middle East, and now developments in Iraq had proved him to be right. Not only had the US ignored his warnings, but the UN had been "blind," and Secretary General Hammarskjold had given carte blanche to Nasser. Chamoun wanted US intervention without any more inquiries or specifications or conditions. If the Sixth Fleet was not there within 48 hours, he would at last know where the US stood with respect to its assurances of support. The Lebanese President said he had already made a similar request of the British and would shortly ask for French intervention, although he understood that the French lacked the means to undertake anything beyond a token operation.

Reporting on his interview with Chamoun, the US Ambassador noted that the Lebanese President's request had been made orally and without any other intelligence than what he had heard from the Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad radios, plus a single message from the British Embassy in Baghdad.
(4) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 358, 14 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Iraq sent an assessment of the situation in Baghdad following the coup d'etat, admittedly based on limited information. The revolt
appeared to have wide backing from the Iraqi public, Army, and Air Force, with no indications of a countermove by any loyalist forces. Numerous conflicting reports had been received of the fate of King Faisal, Nuri, and the Crown Prince. Although he had reports that one American had been injured and perhaps two killed in mob violence, and the sentiment of street crowds was clearly anti-Western and pro-Nasser, the Ambassador saw no sign of strong anti-American feeling. He predicted, however, that any US intervention in Lebanon would produce strong hostility toward the US.

14 Jul 58
The State Department informed the US Embassy in Beirut that the President was meeting with Congresional leaders at 1830Z. Barring strong opposition at this meeting, it was likely that the response to Chamoun's request for intervention would be in the affirmative.

14 Jul 58
Ambassador McClintock reported certain discrepancies in the statements made by President Chamoun to the US, British, and French Ambassadors. The most important was Chamoun's request for US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours, whereas the British and French had received a 24-hour demand. All three diplomats were struck by the fact that Chamoun had made this important request solely on the basis of reports from radio Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, whose broadcasts he would normally have distrusted. Noting that as yet there was no hard evidence of an increased military threat to Lebanon, Ambassador McClintock felt that the decision to intervene must be taken in Washington in the light of broader considerations affecting the entire Middle East. "So far as Lebanon alone is concerned, we cannot as of mid-day discern need for so portentous a step."

14 Jul 58
The US Ambassador to Lebanon learned through the French Ambassador that upon first hearing the news from Iraq, Gen Chehab had passed word to opposition leaders that they must not take any action. Chehab appeared confident that the Lebanese rebels would remain quiescent under this threat.

14 Jul 58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense the text of warnings to aircraft and shipping in the area of BLUE BAT operations, which had been approved by both the British and US Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense was requested to obtain State Department approval for the dissemination
of these warnings upon the initiation of military operations.


14 Jul 58

King Hussein urgently requested through the US Ambassador in Jordan that the US provide tankers and emergency pipelines for the importation of petroleum products into Jordan via Aqaba in order to meet the needs of his security forces. He also informed the Ambassador that he had assumed authority as acting President of the Arab Union in the absence of King Faisal, and intended to put down the Iraqi rebellion by using the Jordanian Army and loyal Iraqi units. Hussein, greatly concerned over the Lebanese situation, urged the US to intervene militarily, if necessary, to keep Chamoun's pro-Western government in power.

(FO) Msg, Amman to SecState, 79, 14 Jul 58.

14 Jul 58

Following completion of the regular NSC meeting, the President held a special meeting in his office to consider the current developments in the Near East in the light of a briefing by the Director, CIA. Present at this meeting were the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director, CIA, the Special Assistant to the President (NSA), and other staff officials.

(FO) Record of Actions by the NSC at its 372d Meeting, 14 Jul 58.

14 Jul 58

President Eisenhower requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council as early as practicable on the morning of Tuesday, 15 July, to consider the situation in the Middle East. He decided on this course after a series of conferences with Congressional leaders and other officials.

NYT, 15 Jul 58, 1:8.

14 Jul 58

Prime Minister Macmillan, near the end of the day, ordered 6,000 British troops to prepare for quick movement to the Middle East. This order followed a Cabinet meeting of six and a half hours at which Government leaders discussed emergency plans for joint action with the United States in regard to the coup d'etat in Iraq. The possibility of armed intervention in Iraq with British paratroop forces from Cyprus was discussed at the Cabinet meeting, according to "informed sources" in London, in case it should be necessary to protect the lives of more than 2,700 British and Commonwealth citizens in Iraq. The Prime Minister also discussed the Middle East situation with President Eisenhower by telephone during the day.

NYT, 15 Jul 58, 1:5, 4:3.
14 Jul 58

The United States cut off all military aid to Iraq until the situation there could be clarified. Officials stated that the move was without prejudice to any policy decision in the future. 

NYT, 15 Jul 58, 5:5.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia cabled that news of the Iraqi monarchy's downfall was jubilantly received by all levels of opinion in Saudi Arabia except the King's entourage and that the event was being hailed as a victory for Arab unity. Most Saudis appeared to believe that establishment of a pro-UAR regime in Iraq would make likely a closer association of the Saudi Arabian Government with the UAR.

(c) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 50, 14 Jul 58, DA IN 132777 (15 Jul 58).

14 Jul 58

At 2223Z, CNO directed CINCHEM and CONSIXTHFLT to land Marines in Lebanon at 1300Z, 15 July, and to sail the entire Sixth Fleet easterly as soon as possible. The Lebanese were not to be notified of the forthcoming landing prior to 1000Z, but the US Naval Attache in Beirut might be informed earlier. In a further message at 2249Z, CNO said execution of BLUE BAT Situation One in its entirety had not been ordered because discussion was in progress concerning whether the British would follow the Marines into Beirut or go into Iraq. CNO directed, however, that the BLUE BAT concept be followed as far as possible.


15 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed US CINCUR and other commanders of the scheduled Marine landing in Lebanon and directed them to take no action that would disclose the imminence of US military operations. After the landing, CINCUR was to bring one battle group and its airlift to a state of readiness that would permit arrival at Beirut airfield within 24 hours of an execution order, or, if airdrop was required, within 36 hours. CINCUR was to be prepared to follow with a second battle group. Twenty-six C-124's were being flown to Europe, with their movement to be completed within an estimated 36 hours. CONTAC was directed to provide day-fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft for BLUE BAT, scheduling their arrival at Adana to begin
20 hours after issuance of an execution order.

(34) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, et al., JCS 944751, 150031Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 3. [For a study of the timing and the selection of action and information addresses of this and other important messages, see (37) JCS 2293/1, "Review of Actions Related to U.S. Military Intervention in Lebanon (U)," 23 Oct 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 5,7

15 Jul 58

At 0336Z, the State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut of the forthcoming Marine landing in Lebanon and directed him to inform Chamoun no later than 1000Z—that is, at least three hours prior to the landing—that this action was being taken in response to Chamoun's request and that the US expected full cooperation from the Lebanese armed forces. Shortly before the landing, the Ambassador was to request that the Lebanese Government close the Beirut airport.

(37) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 204, 14 Jul 58, OJCS files.

15 Jul 58

Sixth Fleet units were underway at 0500Z and were proceeding toward the objective area at their best speed.

(37) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 1168, 150555Z Jul 58.

15 Jul 58

At 0830Z, the US Ambassador in Beirut informed Chamoun of the forthcoming US landing and restated the political terms under which it would occur. He cautioned the President against disclosure to members of the Government who might transmit the news outside Lebanon prior to the beginning of the operation. Pointing out that the British were not landing in the initial phase and might not land at all, the Ambassador also suggested that it was unnecessary to request French participation. A few minutes later, he repeated this observation to the French Ambassador, who agreed that since the landing was to be solely a US operation, there was no need for French participation.

(37) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 390, 15 Jul 58, OJCS files.

15 Jul 58

Ambassador McCintook, agreeing with President Chamoun that there would be psychological advantage in making the initial US landings with as impressive a show of force as possible, sent a message to the Task Force Commander suggesting the fullest use of tanks and air cover.

(37) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 393, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 132987.

15 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that Chamoun had kept Gen Chehab uninformed of the imminent landing of US Marines in order not to allow time for staging an Army coup. Upon receiving definite word of the operation from the Ambassador, Chehab had urgently requested that the actual disembarkation of troops be avoided lest reaction to that
event cause the disintegration of the Lebanese Army, inactivating the force that theretofore had loyally sustained the Chamoun regime. The Ambassador promised to convey Chehab's professional opinion to the Task Force Commander and to recommend that, if possible, the ships be docked in Beirut with the Marines remaining on board. The Ambassador subsequently learned his message had not reached the commander in time.

(4) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 401, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 133066.

15 Jul 58 Minutes before the scheduled Marine landing in Lebanon the US Ambassador telephoned Gen Chehab about a report that the General was sending troops to arrest President Chamoun. Chehab expressed astonishment but said that he did fear an Army coup against the President. Chehab repeated that his hand would be strengthened by a delay in the US landing. The Ambassador warned Chehab that US forces were landing in support of the legitimate government of Lebanon and that there would be most disagreeable consequences if the Lebanese Army moved against the chief of state. Chehab, accordingly, said that he would "recommend" that the coup against Chamoun be stayed.

(5) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 402, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jul 58 The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, landed at Beirut at 1300Z. By 1410Z the airfield had been secured. CONSEXTHFLTL reported that the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, would land at about 160300Z July.


15 Jul 58 President Eisenhower announced that, in response to an urgent request from President Chamoun, he was sending "a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and . . . encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." The initial announcement came in the form of a statement to the press at 1320Z. Later in the day, the President sent a message to Congress and made a radio and television speech to the nation. All of these statements were substantially the same. Mr. Eisenhower emphasized that US troops would be withdrawn as soon as the UN took "further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence."

NYT, 16 Jul 58, 1:8; texts, 2:3-8.

15 Jul 58 The US Military Attache in Amman reported that lack of petroleum and other supplies would prevent any offensive action by the Jordanian Army. The Army was currently taking precautions against internal disturbances—not preparing for a move into Iraq.

(8) Msg, USARMA Amman to AGSI DIVPTAR, 0 28, 151317Z Jul 58, DA IN 133952.
At the UN, US Ambassador Lodge pledged that the Marines would be withdrawn from Lebanon as soon as the UN was able to ensure Lebanon's continued independence. He declared that events in Iraq and Lebanon had "demonstrated a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without support from friendly nations." Lodge introduced a resolution calling for: (1) immediate cessation of illegal support of the Lebanese rebels; (2) continuation of the activities of the UN Observer Group; (3) consultation by the Secretary General with Lebanon and other UN members to make additional arrangements, including the use of an international military force, to protect Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence; and (4) full cooperation from all governments concerned. The US position was supported by the British, French, and Canadian delegates. Earlier, the Soviet Union, backed by the UAR, attacked the US intervention, charging that the US had committed an "act of aggression against the Arab world" and introducing a resolution that called on the US to withdraw its troops forthwith. One Soviet delegate told a reporter that Soviet and other "volunteers" might go to the Middle East.


CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to outload and prepare to sail to the Middle East the 2d Marine Division (minus) and such Marine aviation units as could be lifted.

(45) Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT, 29340, 151419Z 15 Jul 58.

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Beirut to arrange a meeting at the earliest opportunity between the US military commander in Lebanon and the head of the UN Observer Group. The Ambassador was to see that no actions were taken in the field that might allow the US to be blamed for a premature withdrawal of the Observer Group.

(45) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 213, 15 Jul 58, OCGCS files.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME, USCINCEUR, and other responsible commanders to execute the US portion of BLUE BAT, as modified by the substitution of COMTAC aircraft specified earlier on 15 July.

(45) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, et al., JCS 944755, 151508Z Jul 58, OCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 3.

King Hussein urgently requested the US Government to relieve Jordan's desperate petroleum situation by airlifting sufficient fuel oil and gasoline to meet minimum civil requirements.

15 Jul 58 The US Ambassador to Jordan reported that both King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai enthusiastically endorsed the US intervention as the only means to preserve Lebanon's integrity and independence. With regard to Iraq and the King's intention of maintaining an Arab Union Government, Hussein had decided not to form a new AU cabinet at present, but instead had asked Rifai to assume the added positions of AU Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense. The Ambassador was advised that the Iraqi regiment stationed near Amman had been permitted to return to Baghdad with full equipment because of Hussein's desire to avoid bloodshed; the Iraqi commander had threatened to use force if he were detained.


15 Jul 58 The Soviet news agency Tass denounced the US landing in Lebanon as an "open act of aggression" and ridiculed President Eisenhower's explanation. Pravda characterized the move as "a direct act of war and open piracy." The government of the United Arab Republic reacted similarly, charging that the US landing in Lebanon constituted "another Suez." NYT, 16 Jul 58, 15:5, 1:5.

15 Jul 58 Lebanese rebel leaders issued a statement accusing the US of aggression against their country. The US, said the statement, had "destroyed its claim of faithfulness" to the UN Charter and had "failed to respect the principles of freedom of peoples to decide their own fate." One rebel leader, Saab Salaam, called on all Lebanese "to stand and defend your fatherland with your blood." NYT, 16 Jul 58, 12:5.

15 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut complained to the State Department that, contrary to the instructions contained in the BLUE BAT political directive (see item of 12 June 58), US military commanders were not heeding his instructions concerning what he felt were political matters. This was interfering with his "extremely delicate endeavor" to keep the Lebanese Army from "disintegrating." Moreover, the Lebanese Army looked to him to interpret US military actions, but almost four hours after the start of the operation, he had not been able to establish contact with the US commanding officer. He requested that the US military commander be instructed to get in touch with him and to take his judgment of matters of "vital political importance."


15 Jul 58 The French Government informed the State Department that it approved of US intervention in Lebanon but did not consider it desirable to join in the operation at present, particularly since the British
were not involved. The French were, however, maintaining a small naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(2) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 228, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 133522 (16 Jul 58).

15 Jul 58

A flood of unconfirmed and often contradictory reports about the situation in Iraq gave a murky picture of events in that country. The fate of King Faisal, Premier Nuri, and Crown Prince Abdullah was unclear. Martial law had been extended to all of Iraq, and assemblies of more than five persons were banned. The situation appeared to have become calm, although there were rumors—denied in Baghdad—that some Iraqi Army units and tribes had refused to accept the new regime. Iraqi troops in Jordan were reported to be withdrawing toward the Iraqi border, and the Amman radio claimed that these forces were marching on Baghdad to counterattack the rebels. The Baghdad radio declared that Iraq had broken its Arab Union tie with Jordan.

NYT, 16 Jul 58, 1:2, 14:2.

15 Jul 58

The new Prime Minister of Iraq, Brig Gen Abdul Karim Kassem, assured the US Ambassador that his regime desired friendship with the US. He declared that American lives and property were safe, but if the Embassy should conclude that it was necessary to evacuate its citizens, safe convoy overland or freedom of air flight would be guaranteed. The Ambassador also reported a radio announcement that Nuri had been hanged.

(5) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 139, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 133190 (16 Jul 58).

15 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Jordan reported that King Hussein had asked the UK what action it and other Baghdad Pact members proposed to take to crush the revolt in Iraq and restore the pro-Western government. Feeling that nothing short of substantial military intervention in Iraq could preserve the Free World's position in the Middle East, Hussein was disturbed that a day had passed without a British reply. Should the Baghdad powers intervene, he was willing to send Jordan's army into Iraq to participate in the action, if meanwhile US troops entered Jordan to maintain internal security. As another move against the new Iraqi regime, Hussein requested the US Government to freeze all Arab Union funds in the US and release them only when he, as the AU's legal head, authorized the withdrawal.


15 Jul 58

In a radio statement at 1800Z, President Chamoun said that his government, beset by plotters against Lebanese freedom and sovereignty and disappointed by the failure of the Arab League and the UN to help matters, had sought guarantees under the UN Charter, particularly Article 51, to regain peace and freedom.
His short statement made no specific mention of the West or the US landing, but his remarks were followed by a resume of President Eisenhower's announcement that US forces were being dispatched to Lebanon.

(U) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 412, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jul 58

In a statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkey expressed its complete approval of the US action in Lebanon. The Prime Minister of Sudan also supported the US landing and called the event the "turning point towards stability." The official Yugoslavian news agency, however, criticized the unilateral US action in Lebanon as threatening to precipitate a new world war.


15 Jul 58

At 2100Z, CINCNORAD directed subordinate commands to assume a state of increased readiness in-conformance with CONADR 55-3, 1 Nov 55, as amended.

(U) Msg, CINCNORAD to COMMER STARR /617 AFB, et al., 152100Z Jul 58, CAP IN 63346 (15 Jul 58), JFED Lebanon Msg File.

15 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to CINCSPECOM a revised political directive for BLUE BAT (see item of 12 June 58). The State Department also sent a copy to the US Ambassador in Beirut. As compared with the draft approved by JCS in June, the revised version:

1. omitted all references to the UK;

2. did not refer to "massive interference from outside" as the reason for the Lebanese request for assistance;

3. used more direct phraseology when describing the US purpose as "to assist the Government of Lebanon in maintaining the independence and integrity of the country and to ensure the protection of US life and property";

4. stated that US forces would be withdrawn when the Lebanese Government was able to act with sufficient force by itself, or after the UN had assumed the responsibilities undertaken by the US;

5. directed CINCSPECOM to establish liaison and cooperate with the UN Observer Group;

6. omitted the statement that a warning had been issued that any interference with the US operations would be met with force; and

7. strengthened slightly the instruction to regard the US Ambassador's views as controlling on political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon.

(U) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOM, JCS 944787, 152122Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

(U) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 217, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.