QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

(CIA Briefer)

(This briefing not included here because of its level of security classification.)
WARSAW PACT LAND FORCES
(DIA Briefer)

Gentlemen, during the next few minutes I will discuss:

1. The location and status of the 86 Warsaw Pact divisions included in the study Mr. Woods will discuss later.

2. I will mention a more severe threat which is also analyzed in the study.

3. And I will get into the prospects of strategic warning and our view of Pact mobilization and reinforcement.

We carry a total of 86 divisions in the Warsaw Pact land forces located in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three western military districts of the Soviet Union.

These are the divisions we consider to be opposite the NATO Central Region and are therefore the divisions logical to include in the Land Forces Study. After mobilization we estimate the strength of this force to be about 1.3 to 1.4 million. The divisions are provided by the Pact nations as indicated here.

This chart shows the geographical location of these 86 divisions.

Now that I have described the numbers and locations, I would like to turn to the status of these divisions. Here I refer to their status in terms of strength in personnel and equipment, and the length of time we expect it would take the divisions to get to nominally full strength.
A Briefing on

NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

as Presented to

Allied Ministers of Defense by the U.S. Secretary of Defense
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* Not included here because of level of security classification of briefing.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

(U.S. SECDEF)

SLIDE 0

(Not included)
QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

(CIA Briefer)

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Now that I have described the numbers and locations, I would like to turn to the status of these divisions. Here I refer to their status in terms of strength in personnel and equipment, and the length of time we expect it would take the divisions to get to nominally full strength.
In assessing the status, we use intelligence from the sources listed here. The military writings are both classified and open source materials, usually in the form of manuals or articles in military journals.
This, then, is the process we use to establish the mobilization category (I, II, or III) for a Warsaw Pact division.

Category I divisions are divisions which have from 75-100 per cent of their equipment and personnel and are ready for movement within one day. The majority of these divisions are located within the forward area opposite the NATO Central Region. Subordinate units of these divisions train extensively and are maintained at a high state of combat readiness. These divisions have a full set of combat equipment. They may lack many of the required general purpose vehicles, but such vehicles could be quickly mobilized from the civilian economy. They are essentially combat ready as they stand.

Category II divisions are those which have between 50 and 75 per cent of their equipment and personnel. These units must be brought up to authorized strength through the mobilization of reservists and civilian vehicles, but could be mobilized and deployed to assembly areas within 5 days.

Category III divisions have approximately 20 to 35 per cent of their personnel - and 25 to 50 per cent of their equipment, including essentially all tanks and artillery pieces. We believe these divisions are intended for longer term mobilization. Most elements of these divisions must undergo extensive expansion through mobilization of reservists and the addition of civilian transport vehicles. The Soviets probably would be able to assemble the personnel and equipment for these units within about a week, but it would probably require up to several weeks to process reservists and equipment into sub-units.
This chart summarizes the status of the 86 Pact divisions opposite the NATO Central Region.

On this chart I have shown a map plot of the 86 divisions coded by category. Category I, those in the highest state of readiness, are shown as stars.

Category II are indicated by circles and Category III are shown by triangles.

For purposes of the study, we also posed a more severe threat to be used in the analysis in addition to the 86 division threat. This threat, referred to as the high threat, consists of 128 divisions.

The figure of 128 includes the 86 which I have already discussed. To these we added divisions from the Southern Flank, from the strategic reserve, and from the Sino-Soviet border. In each case we left sufficient divisions to secure the areas concerned.

Now I would like to turn to the prospects of strategic warning of an attack against NATO.

Shown on this slide is the definition of strategic warning as used in U.S. defense planning. The warning process is complete only when intelligence has presented sufficient evidence to convince the leadership that an attack is probable.

In contrast, tactical warning is a warning that an attack is underway.
It is conceivable for the Warsaw Pact to attack without reinforcement from their peacetime posture during a period of little or no tension. But we consider such an eventuality highly unlikely. Should they do so, evidence of military preparations would be minimal, and strategic warning if given at all would be a few hours or at the most a day or so prior to the attack.

We believe Warsaw Pact preparations would be dictated by these features of their doctrine and strategy.

The Soviets emphasize the value of surprise, but they also emphasize, equally or perhaps more, the importance of the initial period of a war - the initial attack - and the need for a preponderance of forces with strong reserves.

The coordination required by these other concepts would also militate against maintaining the element of tactical surprise and would afford opportunities to acquire indications of Soviet preparations.

The idea of assuring the stability of the rear - a concept stimulated by World War II experience - also calls for preparations likely to be detected.

Therefore, considering all these factors, we conclude that the USSR would reinforce in Eastern Europe prior to an attack.

It is from these preparations that we would derive indications of Soviet intentions for an attack against NATO.
The strategic warning problem would be affected by the difficulties inherent in handling the sheer volume of information available. A more difficult problem would be correct interpretation of incomplete evidence and conflicting information.

We would expect to get evidence and indications of the possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack through their activities during the weeks or even months before hostilities began. But the evidence might well not be sufficient to provide strategic warning, that is, sufficient evidence to convince our leadership that an attack is probable. However, some of the indications of Pact increased military preparations would probably be sufficient for NATO to make certain precautionary preparations of its own.

Mobilization might occur as a precautionary move by the Warsaw Pact in a period of tension well in advance of a decision to reinforce the forward areas or to attack.

As a worst case, the Soviets might decide to mobilize and to reinforce as soon thereafter as possible. However, should they do so, divisions brought to full strength by mobilization would have to begin movement before they reached the combat readiness level of the Category I already in Eastern Europe.
I would like to shift now to the subject of a Warsaw Pact build-up. That is, their capability to mobilize and reinforce in Central Europe against NATO's Central Region, the area in which the main effort is most likely to occur. This is the Western theater in Soviet terminology.

We presently estimate that the Pact has 58 divisions located in Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, of which 27 are Soviet. All of these are considered to be at a high state of readiness except for two Polish and three Czech divisions.

There is evidence that the Pact will employ three fronts in the area opposite the NATO Central Region.

Although there are many possible Pact plans on how the divisions would be assigned to these fronts, for purposes of the analysis to be discussed later, we have made the following assignments.

To the Northern front, we have assigned 22 divisions with the mission of attacking toward the North Sea coast and the Danish Straits.

In the Central front, where we expect the main attack, we have assigned 21 divisions. This front will attack on axes toward Frankfurt and Cologne.

On the Southern front we have placed the remaining 15 divisions, which will attack into Southern Germany.
Reinforcing and reserve units will be drawn from the 3 western military districts of the Soviet Union. This provides 28 divisions with appropriate Army and front headquarters and support units.

They would take up positions in Poland and Czechoslovakia prior to the initiation of hostilities where they would be in position to reinforce, particularly the central front, where we expect the main attack. This then places a total of 86 divisions opposite the NATO Central Region.

Now with regard to the movement of these 86 divisions, we have calculated the time to get them into position. In making these calculations, we have made certain assumptions.

Movement will be completed prior to the initiation of hostilities. Priority on the utilization of road and rail capacity will be given to military movements. And finally, there will be little delay in initiating movement after regimental size units complete their mobilization.

Transportation requirements were computed for the entire reinforcing structure.

Movement of these forces in our scenario is by rail and road.

Our computer analysis confirmed our manual analysis which indicated the rail capacity and rolling stock would permit the movement without serious delay or bottlenecks.
In our analysis the road network was used primarily for short moves. The railroads were used extensively for long hauls.

To review -- the force to be deployed, that is, the 66 divisions, is initially located as shown here.

Upon completion of forward movement, they are located as shown here.

In summary, I have covered these major points:

1. The location and status of the 66 Warsaw Pact divisions which Mr. Woods will refer to as the designated threat to the NATO Central Region.
2. I have mentioned the more severe threat of 128 divisions also used in the analysis. Mr. Woods will refer to this as the high threat.

3. That completes my portion of the presentation. Are there any questions?

I will be followed by Mr. Woods.

Two Backup-charts:

B-25: Location of Warsaw Pact Divisions by Type.

B-26: Indicators of Warsaw Pact Attack on NATO.
The purpose of this presentation is to describe the NATO ground forces used in our analyses of the NATO Warsaw Pact conventional balance.

For convenience, the forces have been classified into three major categories -- DPQ assigned or earmarked; National Command forces for the common defense located within the Center Region Area; and other forces which are from nations with defensive responsibilities in the Center Region area but which are not DPQ committed nor located in the ACE area.

If we count the total national forces in each of these categories for the NATO nations with responsibilities in the Central Region and that portion of AFNORTH which is contiguous to AFCENT, the sum of the forces is 72 and one-third divisions, when brigades and regiments count as one-third of a division.

We recognize of course that not all of these forces should be counted, just as not all 220 Warsaw Pact divisions should be counted for the war in the Central Region.

NATO on the other hand considers only those forces reported in the DPQ as assigned or earmarked and subtracts U.S. Marines, plus some British and Canadian forces planned for use in AFNORTH. As a result, there are generally about 32 and two-thirds divisions considered available for employment within the Center Region. NATO would have more than just these
DPQ committed forces at its disposal in the event of war, and we count others that could reasonably be expected to participate, a total of 51 and one-third NATO divisions. Major additions are made by including U.S. forces from the continental U.S. and French forces. But all countries can add forces beyond the DPQ commitment. The total does not come to 72 and one-third divisions because we exclude European country forces deployed elsewhere and U.S. reserve divisions, the U.S. Marines, and the U.S. division in Korea.

SLIDE C-2

SLIDE C-3
We have prepared and used similar country-by-country rules for force counts in the other NATO countries; we believe all non-US NATO forces could be available. General Seith will now address US reinforcement capabilities.
In a war, US reinforcements to Europe will of course depend upon our ability to deploy units rapidly and reliably from CONUS.

This slide shows the principal land combat units of the US that are likely to be available. These are not all listed in the DPQ, but we have plans to deploy them where required.

- In-place forces, of course, are already in theater.
- Over two and two-thirds division sets of equipment plus accompanying support forces have been prepositioned. Personnel for these units can quickly fly to their equipment and prepare for combat.
- Other active units are available to deploy on M-day. In addition, required support forces must also be deployed. They take about one and one-half times the lift of the combat units.
- Concerning reserve units, these figures show the days after mobilization when they are available to start deploying if committed. We are concerned about this time and are seeking ways to shorten it.

This slide shows the number of aircraft -- military and civilian -- and ships that are available for the deployment. Ships and military airlift transport cargo only. All personnel are airlifted in civilian passenger aircraft, and join their equipment in Europe. There are more than enough
passenger aircraft for this task. The ships shown are US Flag vessels, plus approximately 200 ships which we hope - this fall - will be committed by the Allies.

SLIDE D-3 ON

Travel time to Europe of course varies. In our planning, this facet is worked out in detail. Beyond simple travel time, here are some of the additional time constraints on unit deployments.

- Preparation for overseas movement is the time for a unit to prepare its people and equipment for shipping, and for travel to the port. Units going by air take less time than by sea because airports are closer to units' CONUS locations - and equipment packaging is not required for air shipment whereas it is for shipment by sea.

- Loading time is significant mainly for sea shipment.

- Marry-up time is that time required for the unit's personnel to locate their equipment, get it operating and assemble as a unit. Units deploying by air (except for prepositioned units) have no marry up, because they go to the same airport as their equipment which can be shipped in an operational status.

- Finally, the reassembled units must travel to their battle positions. To these times must be added actual movement times by air or by sea. As you can see, these additional constraints are considerably larger for units traveling by sea.

SLIDE D-4 ON

Here are the results of a deployment simulation - for the Central Region only - using data that I have just shown. This simulation was made
Independently of the land battle analysis, but its results were used in that analysis. And the last seven divisions shown here, however, were not considered as being available for purposes of the land battle analysis.

The days shown on the slide are what it takes to get into position, ready to be committed. In addition to these combat units, support units, resupply, and ammunition are being transported.

SLIDE D-4 OFF

These results are obtained without considering attrition on either side. This impacts in two ways. First, equipment is lost. Second, strategic lift assets are lost. However, shipping losses may not be as serious as suggested; first because of the large amount of combat unit material and manpower already in position or airlifted; and second, because these attrition results are quite sensitive to the assumption that substantial Soviet submarine forces are pre-deployed.

I will be followed by Mr. Woods, reporting on a currently-underway land force capability study.
Before beginning my briefing on a major study we are conducting on land force capabilities, I would like to summarize the points we already made about the timing of mobilization and the availability of forces. These times and forces are the ones used in our land force study.

Thus far we have talked about available forces in terms of divisions. Comparing numbers of divisions is nearly meaningless because the size and composition of divisions differs markedly. When we compare men, we get a different picture of relative strength; comparing weapons, some would favor Pact, some would favor NATO. Large assets exists on both sides and there is no reason to conclude that the Pact has overwhelming superiority. More forces would be added on NATO’s side and the Soviets might add more after M+30/M+23.

Our presentations thus far have concentrated on what forces would be available and when, ignoring interactions and effectiveness of forces. These factors were addressed in great detail in the land forces study.
LAND FORCES STUDY
(DPA&E Briefer)

SLIDE F-1

This briefing is a progress report covering the scope, approach and preliminary conclusions of a NATO Center Region land forces requirements review. The study has been going on over the last two years and its purposes were to examine intelligence inputs, the assumptions made about opposing capabilities, and the models used to estimate force requirements.

SLIDE F-2

This chart covers the scope of our work to date. We have other studies on-going in tactical air forces, naval forces, and nuclear forces, and we hope in the future that we will be able to combine all the results from these studies.

SLIDE F-3

Many inputs are needed to make estimates of capabilities and to operate the models that compare opposing forces. These are the most important inputs we have examined so far. For threat size we used a range. For NATO forces we counted the 51 and 1/3 divisions that I referred to earlier.
NATO we assumed individual losses would be replaced as they occurred. The effect of this combination of replacement assumptions is significant. It reduces the combat life of Pact divisions, and thereby reduces the average number of Pact divisions on line. For reduced strength Reserve and Cadre units, we made assumptions which reduced their initial effectiveness. There are many scoring systems available to compare forces and in the study we examined several.

We made some improvements in the inputs to estimates of force requirements, and we used a range of estimates to reflect the uncertainties.

The next few slides show how we treated the major inputs.

SLIDE F-4

I said that we used a range of threats, and this is probably the single most important input in a comparison of the Pact and NATO. We used as a designated threat those forces probably designated in Pact plans for use against NATO's Center Region. They include all divisions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, as well as Soviet forces in the three Soviet Western Military Districts. The designated threat total is 86 divisions, leaving 136 Pact divisions in other areas.

In this study a high threat was also constructed. It included the designated forces and added forces from opposite Turkey and Greece, from opposite China, and the entire Soviet Strategic Reserve for a total of 128 divisions. The high threat is an estimate of the maximum Pact capability versus the Center Region. It leaves holding forces on other Soviet and Pact borders roughly equal to the forces of other potential enemies.
This slide shows the theater wide build-up comparison of Pact and NATO tanks, where the Pact has a seven day headstart in mobilizing. The build-ups are plotted in terms of tanks in thousands as a function of days after Pact
mobilization. Note that the high Pact curve is a combination of high readiness estimates, high estimates of availability and high estimates of equipment holdings combined with the high threat divisions. The low Pact combines the designated threat divisions with the lower readiness, availability, and slightly lower equipment holdings estimates. These high Pact and low Pact build-ups are compared to NATO's build-up. The well known Pact numerical superiority in tanks is shown. (Flip) The figure at the right shows that NATO is numerically superior in anti-tank weapons. We believe that the average quality of NATO and Pact anti-tank weapons is about equal in current forces.

SLIDE F-7

The next slide shows a similar build-up comparison, but in terms of artillery in thousands. The Pact has a large numerical superiority in artillery, but this would be offset to some extent by NATO advantages in lethality, accuracy, and responsiveness. (Flip) In terms of total manpower, NATO has more men than any threat. However, NATO would use more of these men in non-combat supporting roles. Similar buildup comparisons for small arms and mortars would favor NATO. A comparison in terms of APCs would show the high Pact to be superior to NATO and the low Pact to be inferior.

SLIDE F-8

These comparisons of the numbers of weapons and men do not give us a clear picture of the overall balance. They do not reflect the relative contributions of different weapons types, nor do they reflect the quality differences which exist among weapons of the same type. In order to make
a direct comparison of opposing forces some scoring system is needed to evaluate and aggregate the forces. In this study we used two weapons scoring systems and they give much different results.

SLIDE F-9

The first, firepower potentials, are widely used by our Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff and by SHAPE. Firepower potentials are proportional to the lethality of a weapon's munitions and to the expected expenditure of ammunition by each weapon. Firepower potentials give most credit to tanks and artillery.

We also used Weapons Effectiveness Indicators, or WEIs, to compare the forces. The WEIs count mobility and survivability as well as firepower. They are largely based on the judgment of Army officers about the relative values of differing technical performance characteristics of the weapons systems. The WEIs existed in seven different categories of weapons, and weighting factors reflecting the relative contributions of different weapons types were needed in order to produce an aggregate value for the opposing forces. In this study two sets of weighting factors were considered. One was based on the judgments of a group of military officers. The second set of weighting factors placed the relative contributions of the different weapons types as equal to the cost of owning and operating the various weapons systems. The value of the weapons systems should be proportional to the cost, and if these cost based factors are incorrect the overall effectiveness of our force can be increased by reallocating resources to different weapons types. The WEIs give more credit than the firepower potentials to the lighter weapons systems.
The effect of the different scoring systems is significant when aggregated over the total opposing forces. On this slide we compare the high Pact and low Pact to NATO in terms of force potential measured in Armored Division Equivalents, ADEs. An ADE is simply the score for a force divided by the similar score calculated for a U.S. armored division. We have compared the buildup in ADEs for both firepower potentials and weapons effectiveness indicators. The answer to the question "low Pact minus NATO" differs by nine ADEs depending on whether firepower potentials or weapons effectiveness indicators are used. Changing from the FPPs to the WEIs improves the picture for NATO because the WEIs give more credit to the lighter weapons and NATO relies more on these weapons than does the Pact. With either FPPs or WEIs the difference between the low Pact and NATO can be explained in the difference in tank and anti-tank capabilities possessed by the two forces.

In the course of this study we investigated a number of methods and models for estimating requirements in comparing opposing capabilities. Models deploy forces on the ground and calculate attrition and movement of attacker based on force ratio. In the models, the attacker is stalemated -- cannot advance -- when the ratio of his forces to the defenders drops below 1.4 to one in a corps sized sector. Each model was used with the inputs I described earlier to estimate NATO capabilities. The models produced generally consistent results.
This study has served to point out the large uncertainties that exist in estimates of NATO requirements. Many of these uncertainties will persist. Most of the uncertainties are associated with different estimates of key inputs, such as the size of the threat force, the Pact system and capability for replacing losses, the ratio that the attacker needs to penetrate the defensive positions, the relative values assigned to the weapons of the two sides, and the timing of D-day. We recognize that much more work is required to narrow the range of uncertainty of requirements.

Now I have a comparison of SHAPE's analysis in their 57/70 study and the inputs used in this study. NATO and Pact forces are shown in armored

* Combination of designated threat divisions with lower readiness, availability, and slightly lower equipment holdings estimates.
** High threat divisions, with high readiness estimates, high estimates of availability, and high estimates of equipment holdings.
division equivalents, ADEs. The bars at the far left and far right of the slide are the ADEs used in SHAPE's study.
That concludes the progress report of the Land Forces Requirements Study.

SLIDE G-0

As I mentioned, that study left as an uncertainty possible logistics constraints on either side. We are beginning to focus more of our work in this area.

SLIDE G-1 (Map with Northern, Central and Southern Fronts labeled)

A Warsaw Pact logistics study has been completed. It examined the Soviet stocks of POL and ammunition identified in East Germany and had as a primary goal to determine the adequacy of these stocks to support a Pact aggression in Europe organized along the lines described earlier.

SLIDE G-2

SLIDE G-3
To determine the significance of the Pact logistical requirements, the model was rerun with additional logistic assumptions. Logistical support plans were developed which shipped stocks in accordance with Pact
planning factors. We have placed the ground support elements of air regiments into the movement requirement with destinations provided from the NATO MBFR Working Group SGTA work. After M+30, selective air interdictions were imposed on the transportation network to cause delays within the network. All ground force units including those left in Poland in earlier studies, were assigned supplemental destinations in the forward area.

We have thus far focused on land forces. General Seith will now discuss tactical air forces.
Thus far we have briefed mainly on Land Forces. We and the NATO MBFR Subgroup on TacAir have been making good progress in analysis of the Air Battle, although we have not yet solved the problem of integrating tacair into land analyses.

In the next few minutes I will present for your consideration an alternative to the usual perception of the air situation in NATO. Then I will show the results of some analyses done in the US and by the NATO subgroup on TacAir, using data involved in the alternate perception. This was developed from analysis of three fundamental questions shown here:

Concerning the first question -- What do NATO and the Warsaw Pact have to work with - the analysis summarized here relied upon counting of tactical aircraft.
Opposing that Warsaw Pact force, it has been customary to ascribe to NATO only those aircraft listed in Defense Planning Questionnaire, and only those located in the Federal Republic, the Benelux countries, and the United Kingdom.

Thus, the "Balance" of tactical air is seen as about a two to one Pact superiority.

Now, concerning reinforcements: these tactical aircraft in the three Soviet western military districts could be deployed into Eastern Europe for a Central European war.
Having counted the tactical aircraft in the Center Region as one indication of the air assets which NATO and Warsaw Pact have to work with -- and having concluded that NATO in general has as many tactical air assets as does the Pact, the next question the analysis addressed had to do with capability; what could those aircraft do?

Here is a breakdown of NATO and Pact aircraft by designated mission, for NATO as indicated in the DPQ. This chart compares in place NATO and Pact aircraft and, (FLIP 1), here is the comparison of reinforced strengths. This indicates NATO superiority in designated attack aircraft and Pact superiority in air defense. The analysis which I will shortly brief placed these aircraft only in their designated mission. We recognize, of course, that many of them have a dual capability and expect that in actual combat they would be used as most needed.

To get a preliminary indication of NATO's air capability, one analysis examined what these aircraft that are in place in peacetime could do with respect to two aspects -- ordnance delivery and air defense.

Concerning ordnance, the analysis measured the aggregate amount of ordnance that could be delivered to the forward edge of the battle area (or FEBA) - and to discrete distances beyond the FEBA. Each tactical attack unit was considered -- from its peacetime base, by expected weapon load, and considering the individual range/payload characteristics of each aircraft.
Concerning air defense, using time on station on combat air patrol (CAP) as a measure, the analysis showed this:

Again this is only a measure of how many hours the whole inventory can stay on patrol -- with no combat -- from its peacetime deployment.

The deciding factor will be how the opposing commanders mix the employment of their air assets in actual combat; how they take advantage of their respective strengths and weaknesses.

Merely counting forces does not tell the whole story. We think that today our equipment and men have qualitative advantages in many areas, particularly in attack aircraft, and munitions, and crews. We also have some disadvantages. For example, our ability to rapidly deploy tactical air assets creates a major problem of air base overloading, wherein the
US must bed down on the average of 4 times as many aircraft per base as our Allies. We believe that the risk is too great not to pursue a more equitable sharing of available space.

**SLIDE H-5**

The outcome of any analysis depends upon the key assumptions which are inserted into the model. These graphs show some results of analyses conducted by the NATO Subgroup on TacAir, using the same data base as I showed to you earlier, and relative to total close air support sorties delivered:

- Case A resulted from using generally more Warsaw Pact favorable assumptions.
- Case B depicts close air support sorties delivered over time if one uses generally more NATO favorable assumptions.

**SLIDE H-6**

The previous graphs illustrate how varying study inputs can alter analytic outcomes.

These are the inputs which these analyses show will have the most significant impact on changing the outcome:

- Timely decision and degree of mobilization
- Shelters
- Defense of bases (dispersal is a factor here)
- Employment policies

Implicit is a recognition that the side possessing an advantage in surprise and initiative; of ability to mass its air assets; of tactics, and of quality will have an important advantage. These things require close integration of command and control structure, doctrine, and resources.

This has been a very "broad brush" treatment of a very complex subject.
To summarize: the preliminary analysis I have just described -- one of a number -- indicates that the general tactical air balance in Europe is better than has been commonly thought. I have also shown you some key factors in the assessment, and the more essential force improvements which we believe are indicated as a result of our analyses.

SLIDE H-6 OFF
Mr. Minister, at this point we have completed briefings that showed how we have counted Pact and NATO land and air forces -- and some of our preliminary analysis of this data. Many uncertainties remain. We make no claim that any purely analytical study can be used to determine the outcome of an actual military engagement. The utility of these studies lies in increasing our basic understanding of our own -- and the enemy's -- resources, of the potential impacts of various modernization projects, of readiness, MBFR schemes, force planning, and the like.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense has stated the case for a strong conventional option that can be achieved within the potential resources of NATO. We recognize that the NATO allies, for the most part, are making progress toward the goals of AD-70 study. However, we believe that there are major shortfalls in the quality and employment of NATO forces that must be corrected if we are to achieve our full potential. These shortfalls tend to fall into the following groups:

A. High pay-off equipment improvements that have not yet been fully programmed -- or that we do not know have been programmed -- particularly aircraft survivability and anti-tank weapon capabilities.

B. Ability to sustain combat operations for as long or longer than would the Warsaw Pact -- and this is necessary whether in a conventional or a nuclear context. War reserve stocks are a key shortfall here.

C. Gaps in the necessary integration and cooperation in NATO.
I have not mentioned the vitally important roles of Flank and Maritime forces, but assure you that the United States recognizes the global implications of a NATO conflict, and that its forces are programmed and structured to cope with such an eventuality.

I will now briefly cover the four specific improvement areas which we believe should receive special emphasis for study and future programming within NATO, and by individual countries.

SLIDE I-1

First, Aircraft Shelters

We appreciate the efforts of the Eurogroup in starting the aircraft sheltering program. But, in fact, most in-place forces remain unsheltered. The US goal is for shelters for all European-based tactical aircraft, and for NATO funded sheltering of 100% of the US air forces assigned and earmarked for NATO, and for the US Rapid Reaction Force. Additionally, to achieve better dispersal, consultations are underway to obtain wartime use rights for US aircraft at more allied bases, which would be a very inexpensive means to improve our employment posture.

FLIP

Antitank Weapons

A great number of improved antitank weapons have been programmed to enter NATO forces; but there has not been general NATO agreement as to their value in defeating the Warsaw Pact tank threat. As a result, there has been a proliferation of weapon developments, some delays in decision and introduction of weapons and a variety of organizations to use them. A future land battle is expected to be fought by dispersed fast moving armored and mechanized units. Armor targets will only mass at the time and place of the attacker's choice. Thus, NATO elements
will be operating in a fluid setting, where units are intermingled and mutually supporting each other. In such a situation there should be interchangeability of future costly anti-armor munitions, there should be compatible tactics and logistics, and frequent combined training and exercises. All of this implies closer integration of organization and doctrine, of research, of logistics programming and procurement, and of cross training among NATO commanders.

**FLIP**

**War Reserve Stocks**

To reiterate, we believe that in a war with the Pact, it is possible that NATO might have to fight with conventional weapons longer than we want or think — whether or not augmented by nuclear weapons. Certainly victory by attrition should not be granted by the allies as a logical Pact alternative strategy. We believe that there are critical deficiencies in the stock holdings of most nations. Some stocks are malpositioned, or do not permit operation of combat units from other national bases. While several countries have indicated the initiation of programs for modern air munitions buys, we do not know the extent of these. We believe that a common NATO program of goals, and hard supporting programs, is essential.

**FLIP**

**Reorganization of Air in the Central Region**

A number of major anomalies exist in the NATO command structure, and, of these, the posture and control of air forces in the central region is the most urgent; we have not harmonized our operating concepts, methods, or training, nor do we possess the command and control arrangements, which would allow US, Canadian and German forces of the South to be employed
effectively in support of allied operations in the North, and vice versa.

**FLIP I-1 OFF**

Last week, as you know, military committee guidelines were dispatched to SACEUR. The thrust of those guidelines is shown here.

**SLIDE I-2**

Thus, we now have broad agreement concerning the direction which the reorganization will take.

We believe that dramatic interim improvement at very little cost, in the near term, is possible -- by using existing NATO and National facilities, equipment, and combat capabilities -- without waiting for procurement of substantial amounts of new equipment or facilities or of changing its fundamental strategy.

**SLIDE I-2 OFF**

Mr. Minister, to sum up -- we believe that MC 14/3 remains a viable strategy for NATO. We have illustrated how we analyze Warsaw Pact/NATO capabilities; our studies are continuing -- the finite answers required will come with continued progress in our analytical process. But we are encouraged that NATO rests on the high side of the spectrum of possessing a credible deterrent and a viable conventional defense force. Important improvements are needed - some with high priority -- and these can be identified and implemented without overwhelming costs. A major prerequisite to improvement is greater integration of our study effort, of our forces, and of our mutual programs to support those forces.

Sir, this concludes the briefing.

**SLIDE I-3 ON**