Dear Mr. Merchant:

I refer to Secretary McElroy's memorandum to the Secretary of State on the Berlin situation, dated 15 January 1959.

Attached thereto, as Appendix B to a memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a statement of the concept for test by application of limited force which has been under consideration.

The JCS now desire to amend this concept slightly to make it clear that the Allied convoy will not fire unless fired upon. Accordingly, a revised first page to Appendix B is forwarded herewith for your consideration. It is requested that the superseded page be destroyed in accordance with applicable instructions.

Sincerely yours,

John S. Guthrie
Major General, USA
Director, European Region

Enclosure

Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs
APPENDIX "B"

CONCEPT FOR TEST BY APPLICATION OF LIMITED FORCE

1. In order to demonstrate Allied determination to maintain their right of access to Berlin and to avoid accepting loss of access through bluff or obstruction short of the use of major military force, the Allies will use limited military force to test the Soviet and GDR intention.

2. Shortly after taking the K-Day actions enumerated in Appendix "a", the Allies will dispatch a small motor convoy along the access route, preferably from West Germany toward West Berlin. The convoy will include an armed, platoon-size combat escort of appropriate Allied composition equipped with long-range radio. The convoy and its combat escort will push through any opposition encountered, using force until stopped by force. The Allied force will not fire unless fired upon. The established surface route to Berlin will not be violated except if necessary to defend the convoy from GDR or Soviet military action.

3. In the event the convoy and its combat escort are cut off or stopped by force, the Allies will dispatch an Allied formation not to exceed a reinforced division from West Germany toward West Berlin via the access route. The mission of this formation will be to reopen the route to Berlin and assume control thereof, opening fire only if fired upon. The decision to dispatch this force must be taken in full recognition that it may lead to further major military operations. Prior to this decision, the following conditions should exist:

   a. The noncombatant evacuation order will have been implemented in Berlin. In West Germany its implementation will depend upon existing circumstances.

SECURITY - 8 - Appendix "B"

RECLASSIFIED 
DATE: 25 Feb 90-90-01-1894 901040 -40
AUTHORITY: JS/ISP.SMN088-52-
DECLAS ON: 2/23/71
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD OF LUNCHEON MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY McELROY, MINISTER STRAUSS AND MR. IRWIN - 17 December 1958

Secretary McElroy and Minister Strauss opened the conversation with a discussion of Berlin. Minister Strauss expressing his appreciation for the firmness of the American position and stating he agreed that the West must take a firm stand. Minister Strauss said he thought all means must be used to secure Berlin and he thought statements to that effect were good, but he also wanted to have equal emphasis laid on the shield concept in order to avoid possible complacency on the part of the European nations that they need not defend themselves, that they can rely on the U.S. to do their work for them. He said there was a tendency among some in Europe to use the existence of U.S. deterrent power as a reason to slow the European build-up.

In connection with the Berlin problem, Minister Strauss said that they were reorganizing some of their infantry battalions but would be glad to stop the reorganization if it were thought advisable to do so in order that the battalions would be more combat ready in case the Berlin situation became more critical. Mr. McElroy suggested that this was a military problem and one Minister Strauss should discuss with General Norstad.

Minister Strauss said Germany was writing the United States advising them that they had decided definitely to select the F-104 for their Air Force, that they intended to buy some and produce the rest in Germany, and that they had a technical team in the United States at the present time who were receiving excellent cooperation from U.S. industry. He said, of course, Germany would continue to need technical assistance both from U.S. industry and from the U.S. Government. He understood that certain machinery used in producing the F-104 belonged to the U.S. Government, and industry could make it available only with the consent of the Government.

Minister Strauss said that he had spoken to General Norstad about the possibility of Germany taking two squadrons of IRBMs. Originally Germany had a political problem and was not able to consider IRBMs, but now the Government feels they have overcome this political problem and would like to take two squadrons. General Norstad had advised him that the United States had decided to cease production and, therefore, that this was not possible. Secretary McElroy said he thought there must be some misunderstanding on the part of General Norstad as to the production situation. It was true that we were planning to cease production after eight squadrons because there seemed to be no demand for more and that we did not need them for our own
Forces. However, if a NATO military decision were made that more IRBMs were required, and this decision was made prior to April 1, 1959, it would be possible to arrange for additional production. It would not be possible unless the decision were made before April 1st. Mr. McElroy stressed that the question was a military and political one for NATO to decide, and only thereafter did it become a matter for negotiation between Germany and the United States Government. Secretary McElroy asked Mr. Irwin to discuss this with General Norstad.

Minister Strauss next spoke of wanting to build up nuclear storage sites in Germany for German forces. He said he would like to have one completed and filled quickly, that he had mentioned this to General Norstad. Minister Strauss' belief was that if nuclear warheads were once deployed in Germany it would be easier in the future to deploy others. He said two questions were being raised by some people. One concerned a rumor that the U.S. was planning to make a package deal with the USSR at Geneva which might affect the deployment of nuclear weapons to Germany. The other was a question as to when the United States would begin to fulfill the program of storing nuclear weapons in Germany. He, Strauss, wanted to be able to say when questioned that there were already nuclear weapons stored in Germany for use by German forces. If this were a fact, he thought it would be accepted and that political debate of the problem would cease. Mr. McElroy asked Mr. Irwin to discuss this matter with General Norstad.

Mr. Strauss then asked if the United States would be interested in Germany increasing its number of surface-to-surface missile units from 28, which Germany had agreed to take, to perhaps 36 or 40. However, he said this could be done only at the expense of conventional infantry or artillery battalions. He said that if there were to be any such change, he would need to know before the end of March. Mr. McElroy said that this was primarily a military decision and should be discussed with General Norstad. He asked Mr. Irwin to bring it to General Twining's and General Norstad's attention.

Mr. Strauss said that the German Government had ordered twelve conventional submarines of 300 tons and also hoped to have some fast 150 ton submarines, both types for deployment in the Baltic.

Mr. McElroy inquired as to Germany's relations with Denmark. Mr. Strauss said that on the surface they were very good, but that underneath there might be problems. He said that, however, on the military level they were good. Mr. Strauss referred to a recent Soviet statement that Germany and Denmark must not cooperate on naval matters in the Baltic. He said that Germany was interested in having a Baltic Command established as the line between Germany and Jutland was a weak one and should be under a single command. He said that he was not asking Mr. McElroy for anything now, but he wanted to point out that it was not feasible to command ground forces in Germany from Oslo, the location of the Northern European Command. He would like to see a Baltic Command set up under the Northern European Command, although another possible solution would be to prepare for a transfer of command from European North to European
Central in case of war. He said Germany was interested in this from a substantive point of view and was perfectly willing to have a Dane command the Baltic Command.

In discussing ways whereby our two countries could assist each other, Secretary McElroy voiced the hope that when the United States became involved in actions in other parts of the world, for example, Lebanon and Quemoy, that Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss would speak out actively in favor of U.S. action. Such support from Germany would be very helpful in the world scene. Mr. Strauss agreed, spoke of his support of past U.S. actions, and of the indivisibility of freedom. He criticized the attitude of some of the German press saying they took one view on U.S. action in Lebanon and Quemoy but an opposite one on the Berlin crisis. They thought the United States should do in Germany and Berlin what they had been criticizing the United States for doing in Lebanon and Taiwan.

Mr. McElroy asked how Minister Strauss thought the Berlin problem would develop. Minister Strauss said he thought that the USSR would turn the screw very, very slowly and methodically. He said that if the U.S. ever left Berlin, it would be very difficult to hold; that he was certain that Soviet-trained provocators would enter in great numbers as they had in the Baltic States and Czechoslovakia with the ultimate effect being loss of Berlin.

John N. Irwin II

John N. Irwin II
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE CHAIRMAN, MOBILIZATION INFORMATION GROUP

SUBJECT: Estimates of Additional Cost and Resultant Balance of Payment Implications in Phase II (1st Increment) of a Berlin Contingency

The enclosure hereto was prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and is forwarded for your information in connection with the contemplated buildup and deployment in Phase II of a Berlin contingency.

Enclosure

a/s, dtd 21 Nov 62
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

SUBJECT: Estimates of Additional Cost and Resultant Balance of Payment Implications -- Berlin Contingency, Phase II of 1st Increment

In accordance with previous arrangements, subject estimates are attached. Such estimates do not include any amounts for facilities construction incident to the deployment. In the absence of guidelines as to a deployment duration and the locations of deployed units, there is no basis for estimating possible additional construction costs. Accordingly, the assumptions underlying the attached estimates include an assumption that the deployment could be sustained for a period up to six months without construction of additional facilities.

/s/ CHARLES J. HITCH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Attachment

Upon removal of attachments this document becomes

Copy 3 of 16 Copies
Page 1 of 2 Pages
Buildup and Deployment in Phase II (1st Increment) of a Berlin Contingency - Estimates of Additional Costs and Gold Flow Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thousands of military personnel deployed</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Balance of Payments Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in millions of dollars)

One-time Costs:

- PCS movement of military personnel: 18.0
- Movement of equipment and provision of personal clothing and bedding items: 62.7

Total one-time costs of force deployment: 81.7

Relocation of dependents within 2 I: 18.0

Total one-time costs incident to deployment: 99.7

Monthly recurring costs:

- Personnel pay and subsistence: 1.3
- Operation and Maintenance activities: 4.1

Total recurring monthly costs: 5.4

NOTE: These estimates reflect the following assumptions:

1. No dependents will accompany deployed members.
2. Normal rotation of dependents from overseas will continue - No mass return.
3. No reserve units will be recalled to replace deployed units.
4. Period of deployment would not be so long as to warrant the construction of facilities which would otherwise be required if the forces were expected to remain deployed for a period of over six months. Accordingly, existing facilities will be utilized to the maximum, including four Air Force dispersed operating bases.
5. Supply inventory, based on 70 days for 30,000 Army troops is available in Europe.
6. The prepositioned two division Army package in Europe will be purchased from the Stock Fund.
MEMORANDUM FOR The Service Secretaries
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. McNamara

SUBJECT: New Authority for Partial Mobilization (TS)

Enclosed is a draft memorandum for the President on the above subject which Mr. McNamara and I plan to discuss with you Tuesday morning prior to the White House meeting in the afternoon. We therefore would like to have your comments on the paper Tuesday morning.

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc: Colonel Hollingsworth

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
OSD/J5
30 Dec 93 90-F01-1509-1511
DATE CASE # SecNav75-158

[Stamp with red ink]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Authority for Partial Mobilization

As you know, the authority granted you by the Joint Resolution of August 1, 1961, to order to active duty up to 250,000 members of the Ready Reserve without declaration of a national emergency expired on July 1, 1962. Accordingly, were you again to face the necessity of using members of the Reserve and National Guard to reinforce active units during the latter part of this year, you would, short of declaring a national emergency, be faced with a choice of two alternative courses of action; namely, (1) calling a special session of Congress to enact the necessary authorizing legislation; or (2) requesting standby authority from the Congress prior to the close of its present session.

Apart from the political and psychological effects of your requesting new call-up authority from the Congress, whether prior to recess or in special session, there are military considerations which suggest the advisability of such action.

The military requirements to meet immediate contingencies over Berlin are for the most part those spelled out in our current LIVE CAK plans. We now have in Europe the military means to undertake the initial operations, both ground and air, called for by these plans. Additional deployments to Europe can now be effected by our active forces. For example, to meet the threat posed by the introduction into East Germany of MiG21 aircraft we are prepared to deploy on short notice from the U.S. Strike Command five squadrons of F-100 aircraft, and after October 1, 1962 we could deploy an additional two squadrons of F-105B aircraft, making a total of thirty-three fighter aircraft squadrons in Europe.
Although the strength of our active forces is now greater than it was a year ago, in terms of numbers, combat-readiness and reaction time, it would still be necessary in certain contingencies to augment our regular forces with reservists and also to extend enlistments and periods of active duty and training for personnel in the active forces. These reinforcements (which are detailed in Inclosure 1) can be summarized as follows:

**Army:**

It is unlikely that, with its present active strength, the Army would need to call up Reserve or Guard units to meet the threat of military action over Berlin alone. However, if at the same time we were to face the possibility of having to deploy additional U.S. forces in other parts of the world, our recently completed General Purpose Forces Study indicates the advisability of putting on active duty two additional Army divisions plus some support units and individual reinforcements. The total number of Army personnel to be included in such a call-up is estimated at not to exceed 113,500.

**Navy:**

Since last year's call-up the Navy has been able, as a result of higher manning, to add to the strength of its forces at sea, particularly in the Atlantic. Should it become necessary, however, to institute maritime control or blockade measures, it would be advisable for the Navy again to put on full operational status the 40 destroyers and 18 patrol aircraft squadrons that were activated last summer to augment the Navy's regular ASW capabilities. The total number of Naval Reservists to be called to active duty for this purpose would not exceed 10,500.

**Air Force:**

Although a build-up of its tactical air units is in progress, the Air Force will be unable, prior to March 31, 1963, to replace the seven squadrons to be deployed to Europe without either drawing on the 9 squadrons now assigned to the Pacific or calling upon Air Reserve or National Guard fighter and troop transport
units. We recommend the latter alternative of ordering to active duty seven Air National Guard squadrons, with a total personnel strength of 2,500.

To authorize you to order to active duty the Reserve and National Guard personnel enumerated above, aggregating 126,500, would require the adoption of a Joint Resolution that could be limited to 150,000 members of the Ready Reserve as contrasted with the 250,000 authorized by the 1961 Joint Resolution. It is my recommendation that your request for the new call-up authority also be limited in time so as to expire at a date, say March 1, 1963, shortly after the resumption of the next session of Congress. In other words, the new stand-by authority would run for a period of 5 months as contrasted with the 11-month life of the call-up authority granted you last year. Thus, you would now be asking of Congress something less in terms of numbers and time than was requested of it in your proposal of July 26, 1961. A form of proposed Joint Resolution is attached as Enclosure 2.

Before you indicate to the Congressional leadership your intent to ask for new authority to order Reservists to active duty, it would be well, I believe, for me to sound out, as I did last year, the attitudes of the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. You will recall that when this subject was broached last July to Senator Russell and Congressman Vinson, we had no difficulty in coming into agreement with them on the terms of the proposed Joint Resolution with the result that the Resolution was passed within five days of its introduction and with only one day hearings before the two Armed Services Committees.

Although it seems wise to keep in low key the preparatory measures which we believe are necessary in order to make possible a speedy augmentation of our active forces should the occasion for such action arise during the period the Congress will not be in session, you can, if the temper of the times dictates, so modulate the manner of using the new call-up authority as to achieve the same kind of impact upon the Soviets and our allies that flowed from the Berlin build-up actions of last summer. By playing down the urgent character of the
need for another military mobilization and by stressing instead the precautionary nature of the action, i.e., standby legislation in lieu of calling a special Congressional session, you leave yourself the choice of later seeking to maximize any political or psychological advantages, and minimize any disadvantages, from utilizing such stand-by authority in the light of the then desired objectives of influencing the Soviets, the impact on our allies and the domestic political effects.
FORCES

Additional forces needed to augment the regular military establishment to meet a Soviet threat in Western Europe.

Based on the assumption that the United States might be required to take steps to deter war or to resist initial Soviet military moves with respect to Berlin, the following forces would be required to augment our present military capability under the conditions of a partial mobilization.

A. Army

(1) 30th Armored Division (Tennessee National Guard)
(2) 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania National Guard)
(3) Combat and administrative support type units (Army Reserve and National Guard) for the support of the 30th Armored and 28th Infantry Divisions.
(4) Limited combat, logistical and administrative support type units to overcome existing division force shortages in six of the eight CONUS based divisions.
(5) Normally, units or filler personnel previously called to active duty during the 1961 call-up would not be involuntarily recalled to active duty, until a period of approximately three years had passed.

Total strength of the above units -- 113,500.
B. Navy

(1) Personnel to augment active fleet, fleet support and shore establishment units to their full wartime strengths. 30,000 people

(2) Forty (40) ASW type ships with assigned reserve crews. If these ASW service units should be required for operational use at any time within 90 days of an early decision to use them, there would be no alternative but to recall the same crews which served in them during the recent mobilization.

Beyond 90 days, the original crews could be replaced by personnel recalled from the Ready Reserve active status pool.

(3) Eighteen (18) VP/VS ASW aircraft squadrons will be required to return to full operational status from the Naval Reserve program. The desired mix of these squadrons would be 11 VP squadrons and 7 VS squadrons plus 5 Naval air reserve maintenance units in support.

Total strength required to support the above position is 15,000, of which 10,500 are Naval reservists.
C. Air Force

(1) Effective 1 October 1962, the following augmentation requirements could be met. None of the units listed below was mobilized in 1961. All are Air National Guard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type Acft</th>
<th>No. of Acft</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>127th Tac Recce Wg Hq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Wayne County, Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th TRS</td>
<td>RF-84F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Wayne County, Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171st TRS</td>
<td>RF-84F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Wayne County, Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th TFS</td>
<td>F-86H</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Martin Airport, Baltimore, Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140th Tac Ftr Wg Hq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buckley ANG Base, Denver, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118th FIS*</td>
<td>F-100A</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bradley Field, Conn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152nd FIS*</td>
<td>F-100A</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Tuscon Municipal Airport, Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127th TFS</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th TFS</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sioux City Municipal Airport, Iowa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To be activated as TFS and utilized in air superiority role.

Total strength of the above units -- 2,500.

D. Total strength of augmentation forces -- 130,500.
A BILL

To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than twelve months, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until March 1, 1963, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member (whether or not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit), in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than one hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until March 1, 1963, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before March 1, 1963, for not more than twelve months. However, if the enlistment of a member of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under
the first section of this Act would expire after February 23, 1963, but before he has served the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlistment may be extended until the last day of that period.

SEC. 3. To achieve fair treatment among members in the Ready Reserve who are being considered for recall to duty under this Act without their consent, consideration shall be given to--

(1) the length and nature of previous service, to assure such sharing of exposure to hazards and national security and military requirements will reasonably allow;

(2) family responsibilities; and

(3) employment necessary to maintain the national health, safety, or interest.

SEC. 4. This Act becomes effective on the day after the eighty-seventh Congress adjourns sine die.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

The President has approved the following statement of U.S. policy on military actions in a Berlin conflict (National Security Action Memorandum No. 109):

In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be:

I If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartity agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access.

(COMMENT: Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.)

II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed
that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertake without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.)

(COMMENT: Since the Alliance proposes to exploit other means before initiating major military operations, non-combatant efforts to restore ground access will precede the military efforts shown below in any case. A separate issue is the choice between delay while reinforcing in Europe, and prompt action. Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be outweighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.)

III If, despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action:

A. European Theatre

1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary.

(Comment: Opposing strengths probably will be roughly comparable. Military success locally is not impossible. As a political operation, this shows the Soviets visibly higher risks of nuclear war. The pace and volatility of extended air operations raise risks of rapid escalation.)

2. Expanding non-nuclear ground operations into GDR territory in division and greater strength, with strong air support.
(Comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.)

B. World Wide

Maritime control, naval blockade, or other worldwide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets.

(Comment: This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and may entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe.)

IV If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective.

C. General Nuclear War.

(Comment: The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.)

In view of the President's approval of the above statement, Supplement I, "U.S. Policy on Berlin", to NSC 5803, "U.S. Policy Toward Germany", has been declared to be no longer applicable.
By way of amplification on the foregoing, I am attaching a copy of the body of the letter which the President has sent to General Norstad in forwarding to him the new directive.

Immediate action should be taken to revise all pertinent plans and policies on Berlin so that they take fully into account the new policy directive. In those cases where compliance will entail any significant impact on current plans and operations, I would expect to be so informed and to receive any appropriate recommendations.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in handling this memorandum, and that access to it be strictly limited on a need-to-know basis.

Incl-1

Cy of body of President's ltr to Gen. Norstad.

Signed

ROBERT S. McNAMARA
Secretary of Defense

Perry A. Long

CHQ-2 USA
Since your visit here I have given further thought to the two principal subjects of our discussion in relation to the Berlin situation, namely, contingency planning and the preparatory build up in NATO military strengths.

As you have been informed, all the measures you recommend for immediate action have been authorized and put in motion, except for the replacement of the 3rd battle group now in Berlin which will take place when additional such units move to Europe as part of the Long Thrust exercise.

My present thinking on the preferred sequence of types of actions that we should take in the event of any abrogation of Western rights in Berlin is reflected in the sequence of four courses of action designated by roman numerals in the enclosed outline. The import of this sequence should be clear to you, and I desire that it serve as the guidance for your discussions with our allies and for your planning of detailed military operations.

In the course of that planning I ask that you spell out for me with particularity your operational concepts for the command and control procedures within your command to be used in the "selective nuclear attacks" and "limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons" referred to in Contingencies IV A and B of the enclosure.

Two aspects of my present thinking about Berlin planning and preparation deserve especial emphasis.

First, what I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access. The purpose is to maintain our rights and preserve our alliance. The responses after Phase I should begin with the non-military and move to the military. We cannot plan in advance the exact time each response should be initiated; for one reason, because we cannot now predict the date of Soviet/GDR action, for another because we cannot foresee the duration or the consequences of each response. But there are some principles applicable to this matter of timing. The earlier responses should be thoroughly prepared in advance and the purpose should be to initiate them and keep them going long enough so that the next response may, if necessary, come in when needed. This requires vigor in preparation, readiness for action, and caution against going off half-cocked. The military sequence indicated begins with the air action outlined in III A-1. Since it seems likely that any form of Soviet blockade would include interference with air access, every effort in preparation should be made to increase the chance of success in air operations. The rewards of success would be great indeed. The other indicated steps are those outlined in III A-2 and III B. These courses will require the timely addition of considerable forces to your command and appropriate
dispositions on your central front. Should it appear that forces sufficient to defeat these actions are being brought in the response on which you would receive specific directives will one or more of those contained in paragraph IV.

Secondly, at this juncture I place as much importance on developing our capacity and readiness to fight with significant non-nuclear forces as on measures designed primarily to make our nuclear deterrent more credible. In saying this I am not in any sense depreciating the need for realization by the U.S.S.R. of the tremendous power of our nuclear forces and our will to use them, if necessary, in support of our objectives. Indeed, I think the two aspects are interrelated. It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the Soviets unless they are convinced of NATO's readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war. I will be interested to hear of any suggestion from you as to how we might intensify that realization.

When contingency plans have been completed and received through established channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review them with me and my other advisors.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The President has approved the following actions incident to Berlin contingencies:

   a. The deployment to Europe of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment with attached intelligence detachment at an approximate strength of 2300 officers and men.

   b. The prepositioning in Europe of the equipment of one armored division and one infantry division.

   c. The deployment to Europe, starting as early as possible but not later than 1 November 1961, of eleven tactical squadrons, their supporting units and one control group of the Air National Guard.

   d. Return from Europe to the continental United States of seven squadrons of the Tactical Air Command.

   e. The revision of planning for Exercise LONG THRUST to include elements of the Fourth Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division, and to provide for the rotation of battle groups from the Fourth Infantry Division through a series of such exercises so as to retain indefinitely in Europe two battle groups plus supporting elements.

2. It is the Secretary's desire that:

   a. The Secretaries of the Military Departments proceed with implementation of the above actions as they affect their particular Department.
b. This office be informed by memorandum of the details of actions to include key scheduling dates, together with proposals to finance these actions through re-programming where the requirement was not specifically provided for by the '62 appropriations, and required manpower adjustments.

c. The Army manpower requirements for port and caretaker detachments to support the approved actions be as austere as possible with a total of 3000 as the goal.

d. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, advise USCINCEUR and other appropriate commanders of these actions and take necessary action incident to paragraph 1 e. above.

3. This memorandum is classified "secret" because of the content of paragraph 1 b. and e.

George S. Brown
Brigadier General, USAF
Military Assistant

cc:
DepSecDef
ASD (Comp)
ASD (I&L)
ASD (ISA)
ASD (M)
ASD (PA)
SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs

REFER TO: I-15,909/61

17 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (I&L)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&I)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PA)
THE U. S. REPRESENTATIVE, NATO STANDING GROUP

SUBJECT: Presentation to North Atlantic Council, 8 August 1961

The attached copies of the Military Section of a statement made to the North Atlantic Council by Secretary Rusk on 8 August 1961, subsequent to the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., France and the Federal Republic of Germany, are forwarded as a matter of policy guidance.

Hayden Williams
Acting

Inclosure
a/s

cc: Mil. Asst. to Sec. Def.
    Mil. Asst. to Dep. Sec. Def.
    DEFREPRENA

OASD(PA) DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
OSD/JS
30 DEC 93 (90-F01-1509-151)

DATE CASE #
SECRET

8 August 1961

Military Build-Up

The military measures discussed by the four Foreign Ministers have a dual purpose. First, they form an integral and essential part of our effort toward peaceful solution of the Berlin problem. They are integral in that we are taking these steps in close association with our political, economic and psychological steps; all will march in cadence toward our policy goals of peace and freedom in Berlin. They are essential because our present military posture clearly has not deterred Khrushchev from embarking on a highly dangerous course. To let him see our unity and to understand his own hazards in pressing along that course, we must act together with cool and realistic vigor to strengthen all Alliance armed forces. The second purpose is to improve our military readiness in case the Russians - who, despite our efforts, can block our access when they choose - do nonetheless continue, and conflict results.

Since forestalling a conflict is our first object, we seek to bring the Soviets into negotiations with a position more reasonable than their present blunt demands. Under Soviet threats we see no measures in all our package more likely to bring reasonableness than these measures of calm, sober, deliberate military build-up. We do not propose to rattle the saber; we propose to show how quickly it can be drawn from its scabbard in defense of our obligations and rights. Within this framework we suggest prompt military strengthening be considered and carried out by this Alliance as a whole.

Timing is highly important. To influence the Soviets toward reasonableness, the Alliance must promptly begin, we believe, an orderly military build-up. If there is any way, short of the actual use of force, by which the Soviets can be made to realize Western determination, it is by making our strength visibly larger. If we wish, as we certainly do, to have their realization come before rather than after a separate peace treaty, we must start our build-up now. Yet we must also avoid prematurely creating forces we could not politically or economically sustain over the long haul. Called-up reserves are a costly and perishable product. On the other hand, if a conflict should eventually come, we shall badly need those reserves, and it takes months not weeks to get them into battle-worthy condition.
In the delicate task of steering among these scattered signposts, we think the best course lies in having a build-up in two phases. In the first, now beginning, NATO's M-Day forces should be brought to MC-70 levels, fully meeting the Commanders' readiness requirements of MC-55/l. This would be particularly important for those countries whose forces are deployed in the central region, but also of importance for all countries. During this first phase must also be laid the groundwork for the second phase, when reserve units should be called up to complete the First Echelon forces. Much can be done ahead of time to smooth and speed the later call-up. If the Soviets persist along their announced lines and fail to negotiate reasonably, so that the Alliance is obliged to carry out the second phase, these prior preparations would be immensely valuable. In fact, these should be among the earlier measures we take, for it is entirely possible that the second phase might have to begin well before the first has been completed.

Our military build-up will be in the first instance an effort to influence Soviet political decisions. In becoming stronger, we seek to change their political judgments about the relative strength of East and West, about the way those relative strengths are changing, about the usefulness of our force in a Berlin situation, and about the determination of the West. To alter these political judgments would in turn alter the limits which Soviet leadership has set upon Soviet actions. Should the crisis mount toward conflict, our military and other measures alike will aim at letting the Soviets see increasing risk to Soviet interests unless they change course. Even if Berlin access is blocked, our initial military actions would still aim to cause Soviet leaders to change their minds. In all this, NATO unity is an essential element of our program. A major Russian purpose now as always is to divide this Alliance, so it is vital that by the visible participation of us all they can see from the beginning the unity which you and I know exists.

What we do must be clearly realistic; it must suit present actualities and the possible evolution from them, so that the Soviets can tell we are serious. Certainly we should not try to deceive them - nor could we - into thinking our usable strength was rising when it was not. We should let the facts speak for themselves. Among these is the fact that we start with the Alliance already possessing substantial military strength, more than is commonly recognized. Our nuclear strength in particular is already great. After searching analyses of how to deal with a developing Berlin situation, we are more than ever convinced that a proper balance in our forces is indispensable.
During the review leading to adoption of our program, it seemed to the U.S. Government that a greater number of military alternatives were needed than the present force structure of the Alliance permitted. As we reviewed possible developments over Berlin, it was clear how many more difficulties these could make for Khrushchev and how much more effective they could be for the West if the variety of these possible courses of action and the strengths involved could be expanded. Always we sought ways to let the Soviet leaders see what lay at the end of the road, to show them what is really meant by the Alliance's strength, unity, and determination to keep Berlin free. At the same time, we have kept in mind the existing capabilities of the Alliance as a whole and the defense plans of the military authorities of NATO. Our planning should seek to reinforce, supplement, and extend these capabilities and plans, so that if the Soviets should choose to pursue their acquisitive designs by the use of force, the Alliance will be ready to deal with the problem at all necessary levels.

Because the situation can now be visualized somewhat more concretely than formerly in terms of dates and events, and because of our growing strength, military contingency plans are being reviewed. In this review, which will be comprehensive and intense, we count on the growing involvement and support of NATO political and military authorities. The military contingency planning group known as Live Oak is being brought into the SHAPE area, and we can expect close coordination of that planning with NATO as a whole. The problem of Berlin and access to it may in the first instance rest on the occupying powers but beyond the first instance we believe it to be a NATO problem.

The West must be prepared across the whole spectrum of military operations. This by no means signifies that we seek military solutions, for the reverse is true. We seek a military build-up at the beginning of our political efforts to solve the crisis, since we believe visible strength and determination must underlie those efforts. But at the same time we expect to exhaust all possibly productive efforts of other sorts before allowing an opportunity for force to be used. We control the nature and timing, however, only of our own actions. But we intend, if at all possible, not to be in the position of firing the first shot.

We in the West must have a wide choice of courses of action after the first Soviet use of force. No useful ones must be denied us through a rectifiable lack of military strength. As our build-up promptly proceeds, more military operations will be open to us. Although some may never be executed, and recognizing that planning implies no commitment to execute, we should have plans for a large variety of these. One non-violent form of military pressure aimed
at persuasion of the Soviets would be deployment exercises of our mobile forces; a more serious one would be the actual deployment of NATO forces to battle-ready positions. Another form of non-violent military action, assuming air access to Berlin is not forcibly interrupted, would include airlifts to supply the garrison and the Berlin population. Should Soviet action make it necessary, such airlifts could be supported by fighter escorts and possibly fighter sweeps. Naval measures of a non-violent nature are possible, such as the harassment of Bloc shipping. More forcible measures would range from mining selected waters to active blockade. Various forms of ground activity possible would extend from MP escort through various sizes of probes of Soviet intentions to major unit operations. Finally, the Soviets would have to consider that, if they expand the military action, the West can at any appropriate time take nuclear action ranging from limited demonstrative use of nuclear weapons through direct nuclear support of ground action to large-scale attack against airbases and missile installations in the USSR.

The forces of the Alliance already possess these military capabilities to at least some degree. Our ability to use them is subject to several severe limitations, the most limiting being that it is obvious to the Soviets that our shortage of conventional strength handicaps any execution of non-nuclear operations. Before certain latent capabilities can become actual alternatives, forces must be added. Our studies of the Berlin problem, just as earlier studies by this Council, have shown convincingly that the Alliance chiefly needs army divisions, tactical air forces, and combat and logistical support units. Lacking them, we might not convince Khrushchev of the dangers he risks until he has passed the point-of-no-return. But if we create those new forces, we get two things. First, we get a better chance of forestalling conflict. Second, we get more instruments to use, should conflict occur, to persuade him toward negotiation before the nuclear decision arises. Such a decision would be a political one shifting the conflict from the level of a Berlin operation to that of a much larger general confrontation.

Today we face an opportunity and a threat, both calling for the same response. The opportunity is the chance to improve the prospects for reasonable negotiations, and the threat is that of war. Before I describe the U.S. response, let me draw some of these points together. We believe that Khrushchev started this crisis because he was not deterred by our present posture. We believe he does not want general war. If he can be brought to see the trail of powder leading toward general war, he may not strike the match. It will be his act that starts hostilities if they come. On our part, we seek ways to show him that trail of powder. We seek more ways than we now have, ways that can be
effective at once, as well as ones more suitable to early stages of hostilities. To have these, we must take now certain steps to increase our conventional strength; these are consistent with, and without prejudice to, the program of improving NATO's balanced deterrent and defensive strength. Our measures support the general long-term NATO defense effort. In this connection, we agree with the recently expressed consensus of the Permanent Council that the longer term NATO defense planning should continue to be pursued by the NAC. We seek to persuade him, now if we can, and later if that must be, that he must change the Soviet course of action and negotiate on reasonable terms. Both in its own right and as a background for other political and economic actions, a military build-up is the best means of persuasion we can find.

Regardless of Khrushchev's tactics, we believe the first phase of this build-up must be pressed to completion.

The U.S. has begun a program to strengthen its military forces. While keeping in mind the global problem, we are improving our contribution to common defense of the NATO area. We are increasing, and preparing to increase even more if that becomes necessary, the forces which can be applied if military actions are required concerning Berlin. The legislative process to support this build-up is already nearly completed, and the virtual unanimity of Congress clearly shows the united determination of the U.S.

The kinds of action contained in this program, some of which have already actually begun, include:

a. Raising manpower and readiness level of active units, to prepare them for early deployment.

b. Increasing airlift and sea-lift capability.

c. Accelerating production of non-nuclear ammunition, equipment, and stocks.

d. Preparing for rapid deployment of added ground and air units to the NATO area.

e. Making stand-by preparations to call up further reserve units of all Services.

f. Increasing nuclear delivery and other general war readiness levels.

Through this program the U.S. will become capable this year of deploying six additional division forces and up to 30 additional
tactical air squadrons to the NATO area. This represents a deployment greater than our planned contributions to NATO through M/30 of a general war. These forces would not actually be deployed unless and until further events and the state of execution of overall Allied plans for dealing with Berlin indicated that such deployment was timely. Nonetheless, their very readiness and availability should bear significantly in the political equation long before their actual deployment was considered.

In addition, our program will provide for such vital collateral military capabilities as:

a. Increased readiness of our long-range nuclear strike capability, including an accelerated alert status in our Strategic Air Command.

b. Greatly improved capabilities to conduct anti-submarine warfare and other necessary naval operations.

c. Retention of the capability to cope with possible acts of limited aggression outside the European area, and a strengthened general war posture.

The main specific actions we have begun are of two kinds, each costing about half of the three and a half billion dollars now being appropriated for the build-up. The first category is of actions in the areas of personnel, units and operations. The chief features are:

a. Increases in selective service call-ups, and extensions in terms of service of personnel now on active duty.

b. Bringing combat units in Europe to full wartime manning levels as soon as possible, and adding, when necessary, support units.

c. Bringing four active division forces in the U.S. to combat readiness, so that they can be deployed within 30 days. (2 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 Marine division are involved, in addition to the 2 airborne divisions, 1 infantry division and 2 Marine divisions now ready for early deployment.)

d. Expanding training and logistical base capacities.

e. Preparing transport and facilities for deployments to Europe.

f. Stand-by preparations to mobilize five additional divisions (2 infantry, 2 armored and 1 Marine) when needed.
g. Increasing amphibious and administrative sea-lift by retention and reactivation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet.

h. Activation of additional naval units for anti-submarine and other missions.

i. Stand-by preparations to increase active fleet personnel strength levels.

j. Retention of twelve tactical air squadrons and six strategic bomber wings and associated tanker units not previously planned for the active force. (Tactical squadrons include 8 fighter-bomber-reconnaissance, and 4 transport.)

k. Preparing to call up twenty-nine reserve fighter-reconnaissance squadrons and eleven reserve transport squadrons.

l. Diversion of Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to military use.

m. Preparations to arrange for bases and facilities to support deployment of air units to Europe.

n. Acceleration of ground alert in strategic bomber units.

The second category of actions are those relating to material and supplies, and here the principal features are:

a. Accelerated procurement of material and supplies which will be required to support the foregoing units in possible operations, and which can be delivered in time to have most direct bearing on a Berlin crisis.

b. Tank rebuild, aircraft reworks, and the like.

c. Accelerated production of ammunition and appropriate expansion of the munitions productions base.

Now what are the steps which all of us in NATO could take? It seems to us that we could all do everything possible to get our M-Day forces up to MC-70 levels during the first phase, particularly those forces in the Central Region. Visible moves should be made virtually at once by each member, if we are to communicate the sort of unity which may give Khrushchev second thoughts.

Much progress can be made in the manpower area, by building up the Manning levels of existing units with well-trained, effective
men. Many measures could be taken promptly without awaiting parliamentary action, such as fleshing out air units with pilots now assigned to staffs. Some recall of reservists may be involved. Speedy activation of key units now in default is important. A very necessary step seems to us to be to extend the terms of service for conscripts to enough to accomplish the purposes of the Alliance.

Legislative, administrative, and logistical preparations can be made for the swift processing of reserve units and individuals into a state of combat readiness. For existing units, states of readiness and combat readiness training can be improved.

The military equipment situation can be bettered, too, for both existing units and reserve forces. Besides filling units up to combat standards, we can proceed in establishing balanced and appropriate war reserve stocks. Procurement actions can be accelerated, with round-the-clock production established for critically short items. Parliamentary provision of funds and the physical acquisition of needed supplies and equipment are among the best sorts of evidence we can give the Russians of our united determination.

All these actions, and many others which you and your governments will surely discover, can be done with important effect during the first phase, while we are soberly but swiftly building on an accelerating rate toward MC-70 M-Day totals. Meanwhile, the planning and concrete preparations can be underway, and perhaps some mobilization exercises held, with a view to speeding the second phase call-ups. Of course we all hope the second phase, to complete first echelon forces, which as you know would bring us to about 40 divisions in the Central Region, will not have to be carried out. But if we are faced with imminent conflict, we will need those forces badly, and it takes a great deal of time and effort to have them become combat-worthy. We can shorten that time and be stronger at the critical moment, if we act now.

I am glad that I can report to you a general accord on the part of the Four Foreign Ministers with this program, as well as an earnest hope that it will also have your governments' wholehearted support. As we inform you of our own specific measures toward a prompt, orderly military build-up, we also urge that all of us in the Alliance consider together how best this may be done by us all. We realize that every country has special problems that somewhat limit and channel the measures that can be taken. But, in our view, now is indeed the time for extra added effort to surmount our difficulties, if we are to keep the peace.
We submit to you this idea: that each government urgently review the situation and decide what it can do. I am sure the Permanent Council, under the Secretary General, can develop procedures that will expedite the taking of common or parallel measures. I am equally sure we all stand ready to help each other if joint action is the answer to any problem. But I must add that this is a time when each of us must move ahead without waiting to see what others may do. This is a time when leadership in effort needs to be shown by every NATO member.
TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

Refer to: I-16, 796/61

26 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (NAPOLIER)
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Berlin

1. Following the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, July 19, the President approved the following for further guidance and instruction of the heads of the responsible departments and agencies:

a. Political

The President and the Secretary of State have carefully reviewed together the political situation relating to Berlin, and their position is being stated in presidential messages to Macmillian, de Gaulle, and Adenauer. The President's views will be further developed in his address to the nation July 25th.

b. Military

The President has authorized a prompt strengthening of the United States' military position, in the light of the general international situation. While the steps immediately authorized are related to improvement of U.S. capabilities in...
the next twelve months, the President considers these decisions to be steps in a continuing program for strengthening the armed forces. He expects at a later date to review further proposals from the Secretary of Defense relating to the long-time military position of the U.S.

The President intends that all possible steps be taken, without a present call for major ground units of the reserves or the National Guard, to give the U.S. the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962, that the international situation may warrant it. In connection with an operating decision to effect such a deployment, further measures will be taken to maintain adequate ground forces in the United States.

In pursuit of this decision, the President has directed the submission to the Congress of proposals for appropriative and other legislative authority necessary for this program, without the present declaration of a National Emergency.

In particular, the President has authorized a request for increases amounting to $3.2 billion in new obligational authority. The measures approved are those listed in Attachment 1 of Annex C of the documents prepared under date of July 10, 1961, by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group in response to NSC Action Memorandum No. 59 of July 14, 1961, with the exception of Items 8, 18, and 22 of Attachment 1, and one-half of the sum allotted for Items 10A and 10C.

*See attachment. The measures approved by the President are those listed under column Action. Figures listed in the remaining columns should be disregarded, as they are in the process of revision.
The President directed that negotiations be undertaken immediately with our allies looking toward their parallel participation in such a higher level of military readiness. In these discussions there will be no initial indication of any U.S. willingness to increase military assistance to our allies for these purposes.

c. Economic

The President approved the policy set forth in Annex B of the report of July 18 with regard to economic sanctions in the event of interference with access to West Berlin, and authorized immediate negotiations with our major allies on such a policy.

d. Information

The President assigned to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency the responsibility for coordinating the information activities of the U.S. Government capable of advancing international understanding of the U.S. position on Berlin.

2. Addressees will initiate all appropriate preparations in order to be in a position to implement the actions referenced in paragraph 1-b above as expeditiously as possible upon receipt of further specific instructions.

Incl-1
A/s

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Copy 3 of 3 Copies
Page 3 of 3 Pages
**Action**

**General**

1. Obtain authority to call up selected reserve forces; declare a National Emergency  
   Date Required: 9/1  
   Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
   Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --

2. Extend terms of service of active duty personnel; extend tours of duty abroad (except for hardship areas)  
   Date Required: 9/1  
   Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
   Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --

3. Increase the draft call beginning in September  
   Date Required: 8/1  
   Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
   Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --

4. Modify policy on dependents abroad  
   a. Stop movement abroad  
      Date Required: 11/1  
      Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --
   b. Return Army dependents in Europe  
      Date Required: 11/1  
      Increase in Personnel Strength: 20

**Army**

5. Make 3 STRAF divisions combat ready  
   Date Required: 9/1  
   Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
   Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --
   a. Add to army training base to relieve STRAF of training function  
      Increase: 18,200  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 84
   b. Fill out STRAF units to full TO&E strength  
      Increase: 13,000  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 53
   c. Add support units to STRAF  
      Increase: 35,000  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 143

6. Strengthen Army forces in Europe  
   Date Required: 9/1  
   Increase in Personnel Strength: --  
   Increase FY 62 NOAA (in milli): --
   a. Bring 7th Army to full TO&E  
      Increase: 7,000  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 32
   b. Bring other Army units in Europe to full TO&E  
      Increase: 7,000  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 32
   c. Add support units  
      Increase: 50,000  
      Increase FY 62 NOAA: 191

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a. This program assumes that units in Europe will be at full combat readiness and that 2 additional U.S. divisions will be deployed by 1-1-62; 2 more by 2-1-62; and 2 more by 3-1-62. 2 airborne, 2 National Guard, and 3 Marine Divisions remain in U.S. on 3-1-62.

b. Includes personnel and O&M costs.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>Decision Required</th>
<th>Increase in Personnel Strength</th>
<th>Increase FY 62 N (in mill)</th>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Expand the training base capacity</td>
<td>9/1 (start)</td>
<td>3,300</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Mobilize 4 National Guard divisions</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>592</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Preparation of Army logistical base</td>
<td>8/1</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Deploy forces to Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Transport divisions to Europe</td>
<td>10/1</td>
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<td>174</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Reactivate 15 transports</td>
<td>10/10</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Provide facilities in Europe</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>Total Army personnel and O&amp;M increase</td>
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<td>285,500</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Rebuild tanks and other equipment</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Army Procurement</td>
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<td>Total Army</td>
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### Navy

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Decision Required</th>
<th>Increase in Personnel Strength</th>
<th>Increase FY 62 NOA (in million)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>13. Increase amphibious lift to 2 division capability (reactivate 22 ships)</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>7,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Increase administrative lift</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Schedule 17 MSTS active transports to arrive Europe by 15 December (54,000 men)</td>
<td>10/20</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Schedule 15 preallocated MSTS transports to arrive Europe 15 December (79,000 men)</td>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>--600</td>
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<td>c. Transport cargo for a and b</td>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>15. Retain ships planned for deactivation; provide ASW aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Retain 1 CVA</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Retain 1 CVS</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>2,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. 18 VP/VS squadrons</td>
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<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Retain 10 DD, DER and APA</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Active 40 DD/DEs for anti-submarine patrols</td>
<td>11/1</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Activate 11 fleet support ships</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Raise active fleet from 82% to 91% strength</td>
<td>start 9/1</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Naval aircraft reworks (1188 aircraft)</td>
<td>8/1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Navy Personnel and O&amp;M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Kits for missile control</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Navy Procurement Total Navy</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Navy and Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This document must not be reproduced without permission of the originating office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Date Decision Required</th>
<th>Increase in Personnel Strength (in millions) Increase in FY 62 NOA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. Retain 5 B/RB 66 squadrons</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Retain 3 F-100 squadrons</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Call up 29 Air Nat'l Guard squadrons (21 Ftr &amp; 8 Recon) and 2 Control Gps</td>
<td>start 9/1</td>
<td>25,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Retain 4 C-118 squadrons</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>2,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Call up 6 ANG C-97 squadrons</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>4,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Call up 5 C-124 squadrons and assign to MATS</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>4,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Divert the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (250 aircraft)</td>
<td>54 days notice</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Start negotiation for European bases</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Emphasize nuclear power option a. Request nuclear rights at French bases</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Accelerate B-52 and B-47 ground alert</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Delay deactivation of 6 B-47/tanker wings</td>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>22,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Misc. USAFE Pers. (MSQ)</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Provide Pers. for Manual Control of Interceptors at US Radar Sites</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>3,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Air Force Personnel and O &amp; M</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Air Force Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Attachment II**

**Financial Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Increase in FY 62 NOD</th>
<th>Increase in (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and O&amp;M</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy and Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and O&amp;M</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and O&amp;M</td>
<td>63,327</td>
<td>329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
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<td>425</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and O&amp;M</td>
<td>479,327</td>
<td>2566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This document must not be reproduced without permission of the originating office.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM:  THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT:  The Defense Department Recommended Program Force Increases and Related Actions

It is recommended that a budget supplement for additional FY 1962 obligatory authority in the sum of $4.343 billion be provided the Department of Defense for the purposes summarized in the attached schedules. In the event it is decided to exclude support for the cost of mobilizing 4 Army and 1 Marine reserve divisions and 60,000 naval reservists, totaling 254,000 personnel (Items 8, 18 and 22 in Attachment 1), the budget supplement would be reduced to $3.384 billion.

*   *   *   *

The principal objective of this program is to make possible a significant increase in our military strength by 1 January 1962 and to further increase it in the months immediately following. With the exception of selected measures for our nuclear forces, this program focuses on building up our non-nuclear military power. The following types of actions are included:

1. Accelerating production of non-nuclear equipment, ammunition and stocks.
2. Bringing active units to a higher manpower level.
3. Increasing our sea and air lift capability.
4. Calling up ground, tactical air, and anti-submarine reserve units to active duty and intensively training them.
5. Provision for deploying additional ground and air units to Europe.

The program would permit the addition of approximately 480,000 military personnel to our Armed Forces. The additional
new obligation authority required for FY 1962 would be approximately $4.3 billion.

At present we have a total of 17 Army and Marine divisions, of which approximately 14 can be considered combat-ready. By the addition of 4 Army and 1 Marine reserve divisions, and the re-organization of the 3 Army STRAF divisions, the new program would provide a total of 22 combat-ready divisions by approximately January 1.

The major air strength increases are provided by the calling to active duty of 21 fighter, 3 reconnaissance, and 6 transport Air National Guard Squadrons. These squadrons would be available for deployment before January 1.

Such a partial mobilization would require either a Presidential declaration of a limited National Emergency or Congressional action. Such action should be taken by September 1 if the recommended build-up and deployment of forces is to be completed by January 1, 1962 or shortly thereafter.

The recommended procurement actions are limited to those items that can be delivered in FY 1962 and therefore bear most directly on the prospective crisis. These procurement actions do not depend on the declaration of a national emergency; it is most important that immediate budgetary action be taken on them. There is a lead time of many months in obtaining a significant increase in production; stocks of some important categories of non-nuclear materiel are in extremely short supply.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the posture resulting from this partial mobilization, the deployments considered, and the anticipated contributions of NATO allies will:

"a. Provide to USCINCEUR/SACEUR the capability to initiate measures to reopen access to Berlin.

\a/ Preliminary plans of the Joint Staff provided for the addition of 559,000 military personnel and an increase of $6.9 billion in FY 1962 NOA. These have been scaled down in this proposal to actions more directly related to the Berlin crisis.
"b. Provide sufficient forces to wage non-nuclear warfare on a scale which will indicate our determination and provide for some additional time to begin negotiation before resorting to nuclear warfare.

"c. Provide increased readiness for the use of nuclear weapons should escalation to this level become necessary."

The scale and character of many of the recommended actions yield long term as well as short term benefits. $1.8 billion, about 40% of the total, is for procurement of items that should be bought in any case. About $2 billion additional will be devoted largely to rehabilitating ships and aircraft whose utility will extend well beyond an immediate crisis. As for the remaining $2.3 billion, if used, it will have been a contribution to an important political objective and it will provide our military forces with useful large-scale training in mobilization and deployment.

Attachment I is a summary of the actions called for in the full program. Attachment II is a Financial Summary. There are, in addition, two enclosures: The first is Recommended Allied Force Contributions, the second, an assessment of the Improved Position Anticipated from U.S. and Allied Military Build-up.
SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

International Security Affairs

In reply refer to I-15541/61

26 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Military Measures Related to Berlin (U)

Attached for your information are copies of the Military Program portion of a Memorandum on Measures for Dealing with the Berlin Situation which was distributed by the Secretary of State to the Ambassadors of the three Western Powers on 21 July 1961.

FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA):

[Signature]
John W. Dean, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

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Joint Chiefs of Staff - 9
Secretary of the Army - 3
Secretary of the Navy - 3
Secretary of the Air Force - 3

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30 DEC 93 (90-FOII-1509-161)
CASE #

TOP SECRET CONTROL

13

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
THE MILITARY PROGRAM

The U.S. intends to increase promptly the military strength which could be applied in event of blocked access to Berlin. The purpose is twofold: to deter Khrushchev from pressing a Berlin crisis to the point of conflict, and to become better able to deal with a conflict if it nevertheless occurs. We expect that the Allies will wish to make corresponding increases in their own strength, so that our united efforts can have fullest effect. The benefits we expect from developing this added power are described below, followed by statements of the U.S. program and suggested comparable Allied programs.
A. Improved Position Anticipated from U.S. and Allied Military Build-Up

What deterrent and related political effects and what opportunities for action not available from present strengths can be anticipated as a consequence of a prompt though orderly build-up of the Alliance's military power?

The only military action which present deployed strengths make possible is a gradual series of probes culminating in a reinforced battalion-sized effort which, if thrown back, would require us either to accept humiliation or to initiate nuclear action. In the meantime the NATO front remains vulnerable to sudden penetration by Soviet forces such as might present us with a fait accompli.

The proposed U.S. and Allied build-up would have important deterrent effects upon the Soviet Union and would contribute substantially to the security of the North Atlantic area.

Although our common efforts have actually produced a substantial degree of all forms of military strength, there are many among us who do not recognize the degree of strength these efforts have already brought. Through an uncritical acceptance of reported Soviet division and aircraft numbers and a keen awareness of NATO's own military deficiencies, it is easy to mislead oneself into attributing to the Soviet Union a capability rapidly to overwhelm NATO in non-nuclear action regardless of what we may do. This leads to the false conclusion that the only effective military action available to NATO is immediate nuclear action and that there is little or nothing that can be done to improve our position.

The proposed program of U.S. and allied build-up would open wider options for NATO military action, and would thereby create a basis for a reversal of the misconceptions about NATO weakness and for a substantial increase in the credibility of Western capacity to take actions which would render the situation uncontrollable by the Soviet Union and, therefore, dangerous to its basic interests.

Carried to completion, the U.S. and allied program would make possible the deployment along the crucial central front of 40 allied divisions -- about one and a half million men -- including a substantial force in strategic reserve, prior to the sending of a probe along the autobahn. These divisions would be supported by substantial allied air power and by nuclear power generally superior to that of the Soviet Union. Even if the Soviet Union were to mobilize and deploy the maximum number of divisions which it is believed the terrain and Soviet logistics could support on the central front, 50 to 55 Soviet divisions (1,500,000 men), the Soviet Union would not have the margins necessary for assurance of rapid offensive success with non-nuclear weapons.

From such
From such a posture a large number of options are opened to the West. A probe launched from such a position carries conviction of serious intent. If the Soviets were to throw it back, they could not be certain of our response. We might initiate expanded ground action with the assurance that allied forces could not quickly be driven back. They must consider the possibility that we would take the initiative in striking with surprise all East German airfields, or even air and missile installations in a deeper area. Another option open to us would be to exploit our naval superiority in sea action in appropriate areas. They must further reckon with the various alternatives of nuclear attack which would be open to us, including an attack against Soviet air bases and missile installations in the USSR.

The significant point, however, is that the West would have the option of initiating large scale ground action which the Soviets could not throw back rapidly with conventional means. They could hardly believe that they could overwhelm NATO forces in large scale and continued ground action without certain escalation to nuclear war.

The most important results of a U.S. and allied build-up are, however, to be sought in the phase prior to a ground probe. In view of the fact that military actions after an initial ground probe could tend, as the forces engaged became more numerous and varied, to pass beyond the positive control of either side short of ultimate escalation into general nuclear war, a ground probe should be delayed until all other reasonable alternative courses have failed. These other courses will not in themselves necessarily be conclusive and a number of them cannot be indefinitely sustained. It therefore makes a great deal of difference to their probable effectiveness whether they are undertaken against a background of continued non-nuclear military weakness or against a background of growing military strength.

Economic counter-measures gain added weight when they presage military action should they, in themselves, not accomplish the desired results.

An airlift becomes more meaningful and enemy counter-measures less likely against a background of increasing military strength. Furthermore, the contemplated build-up would give us substantially increased fighter cover for such an airlift and an increased bomber attack threat against counter-measures.

Naval harassment and even naval blockading actions are more likely to be suffered without major retaliation in a situation of growing power than against a background of unchanged strength.

In view of
In view of the stockpiled supplies in Berlin, there may be time to consider what military response should be made to harassment, or blockade of the access routes, and to complete any needed build-up. This element of time will allow us to relate any decision about the actual deployment of U.S. divisions to Europe to the development of the crisis. In the meantime there would be a continuous improvement in the training, filling up, and equipping of the NATO forces in being, an improvement in their deployment and in their air support. All such U.S. and allied actions would contribute to a long-run improvement of allied forces as well as to increased readiness for the current crisis.
B. The U.S. Military Program

The United States Government plans, subject to approval by the Congress of necessary increases in the Defense budget, to undertake immediately a program designed to improve and augment the forces we can contribute to common defense of the NATO area, and specifically to any military actions which the Alliance may find necessary in connection with a possible Berlin crisis.

The purpose of this military program will be twofold: First, to give clear evidence of our determination, and of the fact that we will conduct any negotiations, political, or economic actions against a background of strength, in order to persuade the Soviet Union that its present course is not only dangerous but also fruitless. Second, to increase the range of military alternatives available to the Alliance should the Soviet leaders nevertheless precipitate a crisis, in order to allow time for them to correct the miscalculation which led to the crisis and divert the course of events away from nuclear war in a manner which preserves our interests.

The kinds of actions contemplated in this program include:

-- Bringing the active units of our military establishment to higher manpower and readiness levels, prepared for early deployment.

-- Increasing air and sea lift capabilities.

-- Accelerating production of non-nuclear equipment, ammunition and stocks.

-- Providing for rapid deployment of additional ground and air units to Europe.

-- Making stand-by provision for calling up selected ground, tactical air, and naval reserve units whenever the developing situation indicates that such action is advisable.

-- Increasing nuclear delivery and other general war readiness levels.

Details concerning major actions contemplated in the program are indicated in Section C.

To finance the program, the Congress will be asked to authorize about $3.2 billion now, with additional expenditures to be authorized if and when additional mobilization is indicated.
Of the funds involved, in excess of $1.75 billion will be devoted to procurement, and the remainder to additional personnel and operating costs.

This program will give us the capability, by the end of this calendar year, to deploy six additional division forces and up to thirty additional tactical air squadrons to Europe. This represents a deployment in excess of our planned contributions to NATO through M July 30 of a general war. These forces would not actually be deployed unless and until the situation, agreed plans, and corresponding programs on the part of our European allies warranted such action. Nevertheless, their very readiness and availability should exert considerable influence on the situation long before actual deployment became a consideration.

In addition, our program will provide for such vital collateral military capabilities as:

-- Increased readiness of our long-range nuclear strike capability, including an accelerated alert status in our Strategic Air Command.

-- Greatly improved capabilities to conduct anti-submarine warfare and other necessary naval operations.

-- Retention of the capability to cope with possible acts of limited aggression outside the European area, and a strengthened general war posture.

The United States Government considers that this program, particularly if associated with corresponding programs on the part of our allies, will substantially enhance the credibility of our policy, which is to deter the Soviet Union from carrying out its threats with respect to Berlin, and to provide us with the necessary military posture to achieve our common political objectives in a Berlin crisis should one develop.
C. **Major Actions in the U.S. Program**

1. **Personnel, Units, and Operations**

   a. Increases in selective service call-ups, and extensions in terms of service of personnel now on active duty.

   b. Bringing combat units in Europe to full wartime manning levels and adding support units.

   c. Bringing four active division forces in the U.S. to combat readiness, so that they can be deployed within 30 days. (2 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 Marine division are involved, in addition to the 2 airborne divisions, 1 infantry division and 2 Marine divisions now ready for early deployment.)

   d. Expanding training and logistical base capacities.

   e. Preparing transport and facilities for deployments to Europe.

   f. Stand-by preparations to mobilize five additional divisions (2 infantry, 2 armored and 1 Marine).

   g. Increasing amphibious and administrative sea lift by retention and reactivation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet.

   h. Activation of additional naval units for anti-submarine and other missions.

   i. Stand-by preparations to increase active fleet personnel strength levels.

   j. Retention of twelve tactical air squadrons and six strategic tanker wings not previously planned for the active force. (Tactical squadrons include 8 fighter-bomber-reconnaissance, and 4 transport.)

   k. Preparing to call up twenty-nine reserve fighter-reconnaissance squadrons and eleven reserve transport squadrons.

   l. Diversion of Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to military use.

   m. Preparations
m. Preparations to arrange for bases and facilities to support deployment of air units to Europe.

n. Acceleration of ground alert in strategic bomber units.

2. Material and Supplies

a. Accelerated procurement of material and supplies which will be required to support the foregoing units in possible operations, and which can be delivered in time to have most direct bearing on the prospective Berlin crisis.

b. Tank rebuild, aircraft reworks, and the like will also be involved.

c. Accelerated production of ammunition and appropriate expansion of the munitions production base.
D. Other NATO Strengthening. It lies within the capability of the NATO powers to bring about a large increase in our collective non-nuclear military strength. Some increase in strength could be managed within several weeks; within six months a major improvement in the basic military situation in Europe could take place. The key to the potential change lies in our ground forces.

While the number of men in active NATO units in the Central Region is quite comparable to the Soviets', many NATO divisions are below proper levels in trained manpower, are poorly equipped, and have inadequate stocks. Most importantly, the Soviet ability to mobilize additional forces and move reinforcements into Central Europe well exceeds that of NATO forces. In thirty days, the Soviets can more than double their well-equipped forces, while NATO can add only a little over half to its M-Day strength, and the added units will mostly be poorly equipped. In any case, the NATO stock levels of equipment and supplies would probably not be adequate for much more than 3 or 4 weeks of intensive combat. This posture may not deter Soviet action endangering our common interests.

Being convinced that our objectives are best attained through improving rapidly our real and visible capacity for non-nuclear air-ground action in Central Europe, while further strengthening our already substantial nuclear strength, the U.S. has decided upon the program described in the preceding section. It involves U.S. readiness to make force contributions on a scale in excess of our MC-70 commitments.

The U.S. expects its allies will wish to strengthen their contributions to NATO concurrently.

A suitable program might be in two phases. In the first, from now until the end of 1961, M-Day forces agreed in MC-70 would be brought up to the levels and standards agreed in MC-70. At the same time, advance preparations of reserve forces would be intensified in anticipation of the second phase, to be undertaken when and if it becomes clear that despite our first phase actions the crisis continues. The second phase would entail bringing generally the remainder of the First Echelon forces of the Central Region to an active state and deploying them as ready forces.

To carry out this program, the NATO allies would act during the first phase so that as rapidly as possible they can have deployed in the Central Area the numbers of combat ready divisions shown in Column A below. Suitable preparations having been made in the first phase for further strengthening, the NATO allies would be ready to deploy additional combat ready divisions into the Central Area to create the totals shown in Column B below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column A</th>
<th>Column B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the first phase, Italy would also prepare two divisions for deployment in the second phase. Countries on Northern and Southern flanks would increase their ready strength also.

Besides these ground force reinforcements, some additional air and naval strengthening would be needed and feasible during the time available.

The following measures would apply to all members generally:

a. Increase to MC-70 standards the manning and equipment levels of existing active units.

b. Maintain a minimum of an 18 month term of service.

c. Establish war reserve stocks at 90-day operational level.

d. Assume heightened state of readiness and accelerate the combat readiness training of active units.

e. Prepare during the first phase to bring second phase units rapidly to full combat readiness.

f. Accelerate the preparation of additional reserve forces through speeded production, intensified training, and mobilization exercises.

g. At an appropriate time transfer operational command of selected forces to NATO commanders.

The U.S. has set forth in the preceding section those specific measures which it intends to take in addition to the more generally
applicable ones. Other NATO governments will no doubt likewise wish to set out the comparable specific measures which would contribute toward our common aims. A number of impressions which the U.S. has concerning some of these will be communicated to each government.

The program as a whole would make evident our united determination to carry out our commitments to defend the freedom of the people of West Berlin and to act together in the common defense. Soviet leadership would be faced with new, compelling evidence that the allies were indeed prepared to deal with whatever situation grew out of a Soviet aggression over Berlin. In addition, the real NATO military capability and range of alternatives would be improved.
SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

Refer to: I-15,423/61

STRAUSS-McNAMARA CONVERSATION

Participants: Secretary McNamara
Assistant Secretary Nitze, ISA
FRG Minister of Defense Strauss
German Ambassador Greve

Place: Secretary McNamara's Office

Date: July 14, 1961, 9:30 - 11:50 a.m.

Minister Strauss opened the conversation by indicating he wished to talk about Berlin and NATO long range requirements planning. Secretary McNamara said that the general problem of NATO goes further than Berlin and suggested that they begin by discussing the current Berlin crisis.

Minister Strauss said he would begin by discussing the background of the situation; what could one say about the purposes of the Soviet Union? He thought they wished to accomplish these purposes in two stages. The first stage would not, in his opinion, directly affect Western access to Berlin.

If they do not change their view and we do not give in through negotiations, they will make their unilateral peace treaty. They will not, however, wish to incorporate Berlin into the GDR at this time. Even now there is unrest in East Germany. If they were to attempt to incorporate two million West Berliners, they will greatly increase the danger of an actual uprising. What Khrushchev now wants is diplomatic or de facto recognition of the GDR. This would constitute a legalization of the loot the Communists have achieved through their Hitlerian measures. For Ulbricht, it would be a tremendous factor. Eighty-five percent of the population in East Germany is against him, but these people are not resistance fighters. They saw what happened in Hungary. If the West were formally to recognize the GDR, this would be interpreted as a moral breakdown on the part of the West. It would assist a consolidation of the GDR. It would mean that we had once more agreed to the formal giving up of the right of self-determination. It would have effects in Poland and other Eastern European countries. It would mean a betrayal of two obligations the West has assumed. One of these obligations was that we recognized only one Germany. The second was the obligation we assumed to strive for reunification of Germany as a fundamental basis of our policy. We would be abandoning these obligations in the face of the fact that the Communists have broken all the various commitments that they have made with respect to Germany and Berlin.

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DATE CASE #

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

SecNav Cont. No. 5-16/75
Ulbricht wants to stop the outflow of refugees through Berlin and he wants a formal interruption of the ties between Berlin and Western Germany. Even though Berlin were not incorporated into the GDR and access were maintained, Ulbricht would stay in a good position gradually to strangle the physical position of the Berliners. Such actions would constitute a transition to the second phase.

Minister Strauss thought the Communists would be careful not to furnish the West with a plausible reason to go to war. They would adopt a graduated step by step procedure. To give an example, they could stop the importation of aluminum to Berlin under some trumped-up pretext. Berlin industrial production would then go down. They would then say, "We will sell to you the aluminum you need." If the Berliners were to say, "If we use your aluminum, we will not be able to sell our finished products to the West," the Communists would then reply: "We will buy everything you can make. All you will have to do is to make a slight change in your currency arrangements, and we will guarantee to take all you can produce for ten years."

Minister Strauss said no statesman in the West can tell his people that we will take all measures, including war, to prevent such action. Secretary McNamara agreed.

Minister Strauss said that here is the gap. We must take a number of measures, including psychological, to close this gap. We must create a fear of war behind the Iron Curtain, a fear of a war caused by Soviet actions. We can create this in the same way that Khrushchev is now doing with his threats that 6 hydrogen bombs could destroy the United Kingdom and 8 could destroy France. We could do this in the same way that the British tried to do it before World War II. They conducted continuous propaganda over BBC saying that the result of Hitler's policy would be war; that the war would not be a blitzkrieg; that it would be a long and bloody war. Many Germans, including he himself, had listened often to such broadcasts. They did not believe them because the U.K. was not believable before World War II. We must now make our position believable.

Minister Strauss said there shouldn't be so much talk about a re-appraisal of NATO strategy. Nobody has more reasons to eliminate the use of nuclear weapons in Europe than have the Germans. We would be strange and pathological creatures if we, with our 210 people per square mile and with our vulnerability to nuclear attack, wanted to use nuclear unless they were absolutely needed to prevent war, not to make war.

Secretary McNamara said there had been a misunderstanding as to this Administration's policy with respect to nuclear weapons. We have done everything possible to increase the capability of our nuclear deterrent.
We have increased our Polaris Program from 19 to 29, and substantially moved up the date of the completion of these Polaris sites. We have raised the real effectiveness of our bomber force by 50 percent by increasing the ground alert from 30 percent to 50 percent. We have ordered the construction of Minute Men production facilities. But in addition to increasing the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, we believe we must also increase our conventional war capabilities.

Minister Strauss said that he had been very much against the Radford theory of absolute reliance upon nuclear weapons when this theory had been advanced in 1956. He said he sent Hoesinger to Washington to protest. As he had understood that theory, it provided that whenever a single aggressor crossed the border and was not thrown out by nightfall, we would use our full nuclear power. Strauss said they agree much more with what the Kennedy Administration proposes to do than they do with that theory. The Radford theory lacks credibility.

Minister Strauss said that immediately after the election, he will submit a bill to Parliament to extend the term of military service. Those who are now drafted for 12 months will be drafted for 18 months; those specialists who are now drafted for 18 months will be drafted for 24 months. If this is not passed, Strauss said he would give up his job. Strauss said there was a tremendous gap between the empty phrases of the Socialists indicating their support for a firm position on Berlin and the actual measures which they will support.

Minister Strauss said he intended to increase the defense budget which is now at 11.2 billion DM to 13.5 billion DM in 1962, 15.2 billion DM in 1963, and 16.5 billion DM in 1964. He said these were not theoretical computations. They were actions they proposed to take to confirm that Germany will do what is necessary.

Minister Strauss said one could analyze the differences between Peking and Moscow. There were differences, but not serious ones. It is clear that the Communists do not want a major war or one that is apt to escalate up to a major war. Everything else, subversion, guerrilla actions, civil wars, minor wars, they support. Therefore, we must maintain the threat of serious war. The Russians would not worry about losing three divisions far from home. We can't really threaten them by merely military demonstrations. Certainly, we must be prepared for a probe or larger test action, but that should be a last chance. It will not solve the problem.

Public opinion does not play the same role in the Communist world as it does in the West, but it is, nevertheless, important psychologically. We can play upon it by saying, "You are the victims of ambitious rulers whose policies are bringing the threat of war. War will mean unbelievable destruction and the end of life."
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If war actually comes, Strauss said we must call up the population in the Soviet world to act against their leaders. We must aim at the whole in a showdown, but the important thing is what we do in peacetime. We must risk the poker play; if we do not risk the poker play, we have lost the gamble in advance. We also must make our own populations aware of the seriousness of the situation.

Minister Strauss again indicated his contempt for the empty phrases of the German Socialists about firmness toward Berlin. When he put the first proposal for emergency legislation before Parliament, the Socialists said, "Oh no, we don't want to do that."

Secretary McNamara said we can't continue going along as we are. President Kennedy at the very outset of his Administration announced his determination to keep our present forces in Europe. In fact, we want to increase our forces in Europe, but the present ratios of U.S. contribution in the form of men, cost, and gold outflow is far too great in comparison to what the European countries are doing. Either the Europeans must do more or we will do less.

Minister Strauss returned to his problem with the Socialists. He said that the Union of Transportation Workers had just had a meeting at which they passed two resolutions. The first said Germany should stand firm for the freedom of Berlin. The second resolution was a protest against the emergency measure which Strauss had introduced in the Parliament. There is a built-in structure for failure in democracies; we can become the slaves of public opinion. People ask why a common foreign policy in Germany is not possible. The SPD has changed its public professions and now says it is for NATO, but if the Administration takes emergency measures, they call up the entire population in protest. It is not enough if the phrases are common, since the actions are diametrically opposed. The Socialists are still in favor of a weak German contribution to NATO. We want to come up with a new program which will meet the MO-70 goals. We have not done so yet. We can't say that every nation should fulfill its obligations to Germany except Germany itself.

Minister Strauss thought we should consider the Berlin problem in three phases. The first phase might be the phase of negotiations. He said he didn't think much, however, of the proposal of a super peace conference. He didn't think 52 nations could accomplish what 4 nations had obviously found impossible.

Before getting to the second phase, Strauss discussed the third phase. The third phase would be that of military measures. When this phase begins, it will mean we have lost control of affairs. He said the Germans will take part in all measures which flow from prior decisions arrived at in common. The Germans have in the past been excluded from contingency planning. This cannot continue.

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Secretary McNamara said he agreed the Germans must participate in contingency planning.

Minister Strauss said the French had just removed their veto on German participation in military contingency planning. He then went back to his discussion of the third phase. He said if shooting begins, then the risks become uncalculable. Therefore, we should pay particular attention to the second phase during which we still have calculable control of events.

We should put in the second phase all measures short of immediate war. This could include a blockade of the various Straits, or Cuba, or possibly of Albania, which could include economic warfare, and could include a total strategic embargo.

Strange flotillas carrying Communists weapons to Africa and other places have been seen at sea. It is less dangerous to seize such shipping than it is to shoot at Soviet divisions. If our allies are not now prepared for actions of that type, they will not be prepared to stick with us in the more serious dangers of a third phase. Mountbatten says the U.K. will be loyal to its treaties but before they go to war, many things must happen.

Minister Strauss said we should be prepared to establish an air lift. Germany would be ready to make all sacrifices to support such an effort.

Secretary McNamara said he would like to return to the third phase. He asked how Strauss visualized such a military action would proceed.

Minister Strauss said we should make a probe, perhaps in stages. At present we can't afford to send in more than a brigade. We are short of what we need by 8 or 10 divisions. We are careless when we talk of all divisions as really being divisions. Germany now has 11½ divisions. Of these 8 are assigned to NATO and 3 are training divisions, but he has only 300,000 thousand men. He would need 480,000 to support their 12 divisions and 20 air wings.

Minister Strauss said there was a schizophrenic attitude among some of our allies. They want us to fulfill our NATO commitments but, at the same time, accuse us of military megalomania. We desire that the NATO Ministers or Heads of State say to us: 1, We have asked Germany to do its share in contributing to NATO defense; 2, We have set certain firm planning goals and target dates; 3, The Goddammed Germans aren't fulfilling their commitments; 4, We expect the Germans to do their duty. Strauss said that if the Germans do what they should do, there is always a big noise of complaint in the British, Danish, Norwegian, and minor U.S. press. Germany is expected to be weaker than Belgium and stronger than the Soviet Union.

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Secretary McNamara returned to the question of what it is we should do if a probe is thrown back.

Minister Strauss replied that this depends on the forces that are available. Secretary McNamara then asked Strauss what he thought should be done in advance to make necessary forces available.

Minister Strauss replied by saying that if you send 12 additional divisions, if the U.K. mobilizes, if the French bring back additional divisions, we can undertake a major military action, but we must immediately start interdiction.

Secretary McNamara suggested that counter air could be effective even if restricted to iron bombs.

Minister Strauss said one must hit vital targets in the USSR, and you must say that publicly now. He said, "You may not like that, but I can't help myself. I believe it to be true." Strauss went on to say that if we have 10 or 12 additional divisions, we can start major military action with interdiction. If this leads to a political solution, that is O.K. If not, the action must go to total war. There is a question as to what happens to your air force during such an initial phase.

Secretary McNamara said we were proposing to retain 6 B-47 wings which would otherwise be deactivated which constitutes 200-odd planes. If one lost them, one would be no worse off than we plan to be now.

Assistant Secretary Nitze asked whether Strauss was contemplating interdiction in this phase with nuclear weapons or with iron bombs. Strauss said that in Phase 3, you must use nuclears both on the ground and in the air from the beginning; otherwise you will be in a hopeless position.

Secretary McNamara returned to the question of what Minister Strauss saw as being the necessary actions in the preparatory phase. Strauss said he would declare a state of emergency and then would add 10 divisions to NATO strength. He believes the Soviets then won't take the risk of pressing forward with their current program. Before we get to a point where we lose control of developments as we would in the third phase, we must do everything we can in Phase 1 and Phase 2 to avoid the necessity for Phase 3.

Assistant Secretary Nitze said he thought there was a misunderstanding between Secretary McNamara and Minister Strauss as to the initial actions under Phase 3. In his introductory remarks, Minister Strauss had said that the Russians would wish to avoid both a nuclear war and a major non-nuclear war which could lead to a nuclear war. The implication was that they would wish to avoid a situation where we would be apt to initiate Phase 3 without the use of non-nuclears. If we started the action with non-nuclears, the Russians would be faced with a decision either to back
down or to throw in such additional forces as would cause us to escalate to nuclear war. Wouldn't the Russians believe it more credible that we could politically initiate a non-nuclear war than that we could make the total jump to all-out war at once? If we use nuclear on the ground and have nuclear interdiction of the Soviet lines of supply from Russia to the West in the initial actions under Phase 3, wouldn't it be wiser to go all out from the beginning?

Minister Strauss said he recognized the force of the argument. Perhaps we should break Phase 3 into two parts in our thought. The initial phase and the all-out phase.

Secretary McNamara asked for Strauss' guess as to what the Soviets have in nuclear weapons. The latter described the Moscow Air Show as similar to the one Hitler put on in 1938 when he did not have the strength necessary to go to war, and indicated that he was not impressed. Khrushchev would not show his new weapons, if he intended to use them. Strauss also thought that the U.S. had more and a better spectrum of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Secretary McNamara commented that if this was the case, the Russians would think long and hard before using nuclear. Strauss commented that if we get to Phase 3 and actually had to fight, then the whole problem of Communists' penetration into the West should be solved; a neutral belt should be installed between NATO and the Soviet Union. Mr. Nitzse replied that while this might be so, it could not be a base for NATO planning since such an expanded objective would split the alliance apart.

Secretary McNamara then inquired about the state of German ammunition stocks. Strauss said that they have 30 days' stocks for 8 divisions, and stocks for one brigade in divisions 9, 10 and 11. He said his problem is not that of money, but of depots. They are in the wrong position; they are too far forward. The Turks are behind in their delivery of ammunition under contracts which they have with the Germans, but the Germans do not know where to put the ammunition if it were to arrive and are not pressing the Turks for delivery.

Secretary McNamara asked Minister Strauss for his views on a common logistic system. Strauss said that present plans call for 9 NATO countries to fight on German soil. There would be 9 supply channels. It is obvious that in time of war this must be reduced to a single supply channel. Why not do it in time of peace? Everyone says no to this proposition except the U.S. Mr. Nitzse asked whether the U.S. hadn't also seen objections to a common logistic system. Strauss said that this was incorrect. We had, however, advised them to create their own logistics system in the absence of a common NATO system.

Secretary McNamara returned to the problem of logistics. If we added 10 divisions to NATO strength, there would be the problem of your additional 4 divisions. How are the ammunition requirements to be supplied?
Strauss replied that Germany was careful not to establish an individual armament industry. This would have brought about serious political problems. Instead they have placed orders for ammunition in Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Norway, Holland, and the U.K. The Germans have given verbal promises that they will keep these facilities occupied for additions to their stockpiles and for expenditures during maneuvers and training, etc. Turkey, Greece, and Portugal have reserved the production capacity for Germany both in peace and in war. The Germans are producing infantry and artillery ammunition up to 40 mm in Germany, but not tank ammunition or anti-tank ammunition. They are still working on an arrangement with Spain for the production of ammunition there. The entire Israeli ammunition capacity is worked for the Bundeswehr there. They are contracting for two additional factories, one for 80 mm. mortars and the other for wire-guided anti-tank weapons. One of these is to be in Spain, the other in Portugal. They are building an air base in Portugal four times larger than NATO standards require. They are also building sanitary facilities in the south of Portugal. The problem is the size of stockpiles. They can't acquire enough real estate in Germany to accommodate them.

Minister Strauss said the basic law, the design of which was influenced by the occupation authorities, prevents Germany from doing just what Germany is now committed to do. Under their decentralized form of Government, the Isender are sabotaging the land acquisition for the German defense establishment. In one case they have been negotiating for a piece of land for five years with no results. As soon as a real crisis with military aspects becomes evident, then all the production capacities which they have contracted for would go on a three shift basis. To build their ammunition stocks up to a 60-day supply for all 12 divisions would take them six months. But even this would require legal authority to compel German industry to do what was necessary.

Strauss said he had not bought this type of ammunition in the U.S. because he was worried about transport deliveries in time of war.

Secretary McNamara suggested that purchases in the U.K. would help the U.K., particularly in view of their gold outflow problem. Strauss said there were only two answers for the British gold problem. These were devaluation, and U.K. membership in the common market. Mr. Nitzes questioned whether membership in the common market could be achieved in time to have effect promptly. Mr. Strauss indicated he thought it could.

Minister Strauss then referred to some of the longer range problems. He said the Defense Ministers must achieve a far better degree of cost effectiveness. There was now a waste both of human capabilities and of money. Even though we won't find the answer today, we should promptly get at this problem. In the field of missiles, the Russians have 19 types while the West has 77.
Minister Strauss said that they would have placed orders in the U.K. to buy tanks long ago except for the fact that the British spent five years trying to complete their tank development so that the Germans would be faced with a take it or leave it decision. They had urged the Germans to buy the Bluewater, the Thunderbird, the Bloodhound, none of which was in as advanced a state of development as similar U.S. weapons. The Minister said we should have a division of tasks. There should be joint planning. There was a tremendous waste under current procedures.

He said they should be purchasing the American helicopters but Messmer had told him that the German decision to buy the 104G instead of the Mirage had been a blow to them. The French could understand that decision on military grounds but that argument could not be used with respect to the helicopters. Messmer had said that the decision on the helicopters will be a test of your attitude on Franco-German reconciliation.

Strauss said he realized it would be theoretical to say experts could go from one country to another deciding where given weapons should be purchased; e.g., heavy helicopters in one country - medium helicopters in another - light helicopters in a third. Work was proceeding on a Franco-German tank prototype but if war were to come shortly, five different varieties of tanks would show up at the same time. In spite of the difficulties, Minister Strauss said he could not accept the proposition that these problems are insoluble.

Secretary McNamara said that he understood the Germans would like to have us extend our procurement services to the Germans for all items, even those not used by our services. Strauss said that was correct. Secretary McNamara said we will agree to act as your purchasing agent. It will, however, be necessary to work out the particulars.

Minister Strauss asked whether we could not get together on the development and production of the next generation of tanks beyond the M60. He said the U.S. technicians were considering a missile-carrying tank. This seemed to him to be a possibility for the period of 67 - 70, but seemed premature for the period 62 - 67. He said the M60 seemed to be excellent from the technical point of view but not from the tactical point of view. The Soviet T-10 can see an American tank 300 yards before the American tank can see the Soviet tank. Strauss said that as long as we think in terms of operating under the overwhelming air superiority we had in World War II, we will be wrong. Tanks and anti-tank weapons and artillery are the main Soviet weapons. He said General Trudeau was enthusiastic about two German prototype tanks. He thought we should have a standard common tank. If Germany and the U.S. agree on one, the chance of getting the French to join us would be far greater. This would be one step forward to common maintenance, logistics, etc.
Secretary McNamara asked how long it would take to develop and produce such a tank. Minister Strauss said they will start production of 50 tanks for a test battalion in September. This tank weighs 35 tons, has an 800 horsepower Mercedes diesel engine, a 200 mile radius, is 2.4 meters in height, and is fast - 75 kilometers per hour - and highly maneuverable. It is, in his opinion, half a generation ahead of the M60. He asked Secretary McNamara what it is we have in mind to follow on after the M60. Secretary McNamara said we have nothing in mind. Strauss said they contemplated six months for a users test. Then they would place an order for 250. They contemplate full-scale production in 63. The German requirement would be 2,000 to replace the M47. They contemplate using the M47 gun for an anti-tank weapon.

Secretary McNamara asked how this tank compared with the Soviet tanks. Strauss said their experts had designed the tank after careful study of the Soviet tanks. All their experts concluded that speed, range, maneuverability, and low profile are the essential criteria. In view of improved anti-tank weapons one can't build invulnerability into tanks today. This is why speed, range, maneuverability, and low profile are essential. He said that to build the M60 in Germany would be more expensive by 10% or 15% than building the new German tank in Germany.

Secretary McNamara asked whether they would buy 2,000 of these tanks from us if we joined them in a development and production program. Strauss replied that they would have to break down their requirement into parts. One part would have to be built in Germany so that they would have a facility for repair work and capacity to produce spares. If we could achieve partnership in the development and production of this tank, we could get other partners. The French tank is more mature in its development than is the German tank. Strauss believes, however, that they have a newer and better idea even if it is less thoroughly developed.

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SUBJECT: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrant (S)

It may soon become desirable to show more clearly to the USSR, with our partners, the U.S. determination and ability to apply military power in the Berlin situation. I consider that temporary reinforcement of U.S. forces in Europe and some expansion of U.S. capability to reinforce further are among the most meaningful acts toward this purpose. The primary objective of such actions would be to deter the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

It is requested that the JCS, in coordination with other addresses, study and provide me by 6 June their views and recommendations regarding the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of:

a. An air mobility exercise of about two battle groups to Germany in June, and return within 2-3 weeks, on the order of Long Harvest.

b. Movement (air, sea, or both) of one SEABAC division to Germany or Italy in July for a one- or two-month period.

c. Calling one reserve component division to active service in July for a 30- or 60-day period.

d. Other similar scale activity of ground, naval, and air units which you consider would contribute significantly to the above objective at this stage.

For the purpose of this study, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, International Security Affairs, Comptroller, Manpower and Installations and Logistics are requested to provide all necessary guidance, assistance and support in their respective areas to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For planning purposes, it should be assumed that these operations would be funded above present budgetary levels.

It is emphasized that this study is for planning purposes only and should not prompt any preparatory activity. Implementation would be a matter for decision at the highest level.

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPIN
Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

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